Blog Post | When Recommendations Collide: Strategic Behaviour and Credibility in UN Human Rights Reviews
Author: Valentina Carraro
The United Nations (UN) human rights system is complex and sometimes contradictory. For example, when the UN Committee against Torture reviewed Sweden in 2014, it stated that the country should always prosecute acts of torture, regardless of how much time had passed since the acts were committed [1]. However, a few years later the UN Human Rights Committee [2] recommended Sweden to provide for a maximum time window between the act and its prosecution that is appropriate to the gravity of the crime of torture – thus contradicting the other committee’s advice to not provide for any time limitations at all [3]. How was this possible?
The UN human rights system is made up of multiple, partly overlapping mechanisms for monitoring and protecting human rights. These mechanisms review similar obligations and produce recommendations for improvement, yet there is no formal hierarchy between them. In some cases, this leads to duplications or even contradictions in their output. When different UN bodies cover the same issues, do they amplify one another’s diplomatic influence, or do they generate duplication of work and possible confusion?
At a time in which multilateralism is under increasing political attack, governments that are uncomfortable with external scrutiny, and actors who are skeptical of international institutions more broadly, can readily point to duplications and contradictions as evidence that the UN is unable to speak with one voice, and therefore that its recommendations are optional, biased, or not worth resourcing. In that sense, coherence is not merely a matter of administrative efficiency: it is part of the system’s resilience and authority in a contested political environment.
Differences between the ten UN treaty bodies and Universal Periodic Review (UPR) provide a good example to explore these matters. They both review states’ human rights performance, but, typically, they work in parallel and with limited coordination. The treaty bodies are committees of independent experts monitoring implementation of the core UN human rights treaties. Their central activity is periodic reporting: states submit reports, engage in a dialogue with the committee, and receive recommendations for improvement.
The UPR, by contrast, is a peer-review mechanism operating in a political and diplomatic space, where states review each other and issue recommendations. Crucially, reviewed states must indicate whether they support each UPR recommendation or merely note it (= not support). Treaty body recommendations are not subject to a comparable acceptance procedure. In practice, UPR and treaty bodies often address the same rights issues, giving rise to frequent repetitions and occasional contradictions in the recommendations that they provide to states.
Based on findings from 22 interviews with professionals involved in these reviews in various roles - state diplomats, Treaty Body experts, UN staff and personnel from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) - this blog post explores the consequences of overlaps between these mechanisms.
Repetitions are not automatically helpful
Repetitions are widespread, both among the ten treaty bodies and between the treaty bodies and the UPR. Their consequences, however, differ depending on the circumstances.
Within the treaty body system, repetitions are often read as a coordination failure. Many officials are overwhelmed by repetitive recommendations: the same questions must be answered multiple times, in different formats, on different schedules. The result is not just inefficiency, it can also erode confidence in the system’s added value. There are, however, limited cases where repetitions are seen as helpful, for example when multiple committees underscore the urgency of an issue, or when they approach the same problem from distinct angles and thereby provide complementary guidance.
Between the UPR and the treaty bodies, repetitions are often described as intentional. States commonly consult treaty body reports when drafting UPR recommendations. Many interviewees viewed this as one of the UPR’s practical functions: to “translate” expert guidance into politically visible commitments.
Yet repetition can also lead states to engage in strategic behaviour. First, when a UPR recommendation duplicates a treaty body recommendation, a state can “note” it in the UPR – publicly signalling non-commitment – despite the expectation that treaty body recommendations should be implemented. Second, UPR recommendations may echo treaty body language but in softer, less specific terms. States may then implement the weaker, more diplomatic formulation and treat that as sufficient, effectively blunting the sharper expert guidance.
Contradictions are problematic
Contradictions are less frequent than repetitions, but they are generally very disruptive.
First, contradictions give states diplomatic room for tactical manoeuvre. When mechanisms point in different directions, sometimes most visibly on politically contested issues such as abortion or LGBT rights, states can choose which recommendation to follow, often pursuing domestic political priorities. At times, contradictions are exploited politically to cast doubt on the treaty bodies, a tactic used to contest scrutiny.
Second, contradictions damage the credibility of the reviews. Contradictions among treaty bodies are considered highly problematic because expert committees are expected to provide coherent, reliable guidance. Contradictions between the UPR and the treaty bodies are sometimes considered inevitable, given that the UPR is a political body and reflects divergent state preferences.
Mutually strengthening and undermining overlaps
The above discussion shows that overlaps produce different effects depending on the specific context and procedure at hand. Putting these patterns together yields a differentiated picture.
Overlaps between UPR and treaty bodies may lead the mechanisms to mutually strengthen each other when recommendations are repeated, although mainly when a) the reviewed state supports the UPR recommendation and b) the UPR formulation preserves the substance and specificity of the expert guidance. In contrast, when overlaps lead to contradictions, they create room for selective compliance and can reduce the credibility of the mechanisms.
Within the treaty body system, both repetitions and contradictions more readily damage credibility, largely because the benchmark for expert consistency and efficiency is higher.
Recommendations
Taking into consideration their complementary nature, how can the ability of UPR and treaty bodies to mutually strengthen each other be improved? [4]
First, the UN Secretariat could play a more substantial role as guardian of the process and to ensure coordination, thus providing an additional layer of objectivity which would help protect the UN human rights system against politically motivated attacks.
Second, if states did not have to report on the same issues to different Treaty Bodies, this would reduce the reporting burden on governments, while duplications and contradictions by different treaty bodies would be reduced.
Third, something as administratively straightforward as creating a shared database of recommendations delivered by the UPR and treaty bodies could promote efficiency and help reduce contradictions and unnecessary repetitions.
Valentina Carraro is Assistant Professor at Leiden University’s Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA). Her research interests include global human rights governance, state compliance with international law, and the use of expertise in public bodies. She holds a PhD in International Relations from Maastricht University (2017).
This post presents findings from Carraro, V. (2025) ‘Overlapping Institutions in the United Nations Human Rights System: Mutually Strengthening or Undermining?’, Journal of Human Rights, 24(2), pp. 199-216.
[1] Committee against Torture (2014) ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth and Seventh Periodic Reports of Sweden’, UN Doc CAT/C/SWE/CO/6-7.
[2] Human Rights Committee (2017) ‘Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Sweden’, UN Doc CCPR/C/SWE/CO/7, 6.
[3] Also see Carraro, V. (2022). ‘The more the better? The complementarity of United Nations institutions in the fight against torture.’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 40(4), 354–378.
[4] Also see Carraro, V. (2024) ‘Strengthening the Human Rights Council and the Treaty Body System’. In Markus Kornprobst and Slawomir Redo, eds., Reinvigorating the United Nations, Routledge.