Blog Post | Space Diplomacy or Diplomacy in Space: Japan's voyage into the outer space(s) of foreign policy
Much of the literature on space diplomacy houses a Western precedent through the use of mainstream ideas of IR to emphasise space...
...as a site of geopolitics, competitions for power, and security cooperation. Space diplomacy as such is often reduced to a story of “diplomacy in space,” where terrestrial ideas of diplomacy are simply transplanted into orbit. This reinforces a lingering space race mentality which prioritises militaristic posturing, and silos thinking into a western experience of space as the only experience.
Even as space activities expand and debate moves towards understanding global diplomatic efforts that regulate space governance, ensure peaceful exploration, and foster international collaboration, there remains a focus on Western space powers and Western space initiatives. As a result, this “diplomacy in space” approach offers a way to examine Western space actors, but it has limitations in understanding Eastern space actors.
In contrast, Eastern space actors generally appear to favour independent space activities with engagement in space diplomacy more aligned with science diplomacy. This sees space as a domain where only scientific cooperation takes place. Negotiations between space actors have little to no diplomatic edge other than scientific collaboration. The potential for scientific collaboration is viewed as a part of the state's national interests. Whether that is in space or in the Antarctic, it is still purely science diplomacy first. This line of reasoning relegates space in a similar way to the “diplomacy in space approach”, in that, space is just a domain for interactions and has no significant influence beyond that.
The Singularity of Space
The domain of space itself has been overlooked within space diplomacy debates. This oversight relegates space to just another area of international relations, downplaying its dynamism and influence on the state's diplomatic interests. Space is distinguished by two unique factors that set it apart from other sites and policy domains: physical access is controlled by the few not the many, and there is no possibility of quick rescue in the event of an emergency. Unlike terrestrial initiatives at sites such as CERN or the Arctic, space presents profound challenges in both accessibility and safety. As a result, the rules and norms of behaviour in space have largely been shaped by the legacy actors of the space race — those who got there first effectively set the standards. Secondly, the absence of any quick rescue capability in space means that technical failures or emergencies often require independent resolutions. This stark reality heightens the importance of diplomatic relations in space, where collaboration, transparency, and trust between spacefaring nations are critical not just for stability, but for survival. Thus, there is a pressing need to reconceptualise space diplomacy in order to align the innately high-risk extreme environment of space with its strategic importance.
Japan as an unproblematic space actor
Japan charts a different voyage in space, one anchored in a more traditional foreign policy trajectory. Japan’s space diplomacy is not a tool of foreign policy but an addition, able to drive forward Japan’s cultivation of a spectrum of national interests in space without prioritising either scientific or militaristic posturing. There exists a unique balance to Japan’s space diplomacy, successfully engaging between Western and Eastern space actors through (1) collaborating with political initiatives such as the US led Artemis Accords, (2) fostering regional space partnerships through organisations such as ASEAN, and (3) ensuring safe space operations through collaborating with commercial companies such as Astroscale. Japan’s held a long-term commitment to the collaborative efforts on the global space stage maintaining and resupplying the International Space Station (ISS) as a partner since 1998, and on the regional stage through the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) that Japan established in 1993, highlighting ways Japan’s space diplomacy has built influence without relying on science diplomacy or militaristic posturing.
When Japan did move to include its military within its space activities, it was an incremental process aligned within the context of national defence, staying aligned with Japan’s pacifist commitments and global space trends. An approach that does not align with the “diplomacy in space” story but one that had to adapt to a changing use of its existing space technology.
Acknowledging that space technology houses transfer mechanisms that differ between military-to-civilian and civilian-to-military applications, Japan has leveraged dual-use technologies to support its national defence interests in space. Japan’s recognition of space as a foreign policy domain enables its existing non-military space technology adaptability. In doing so, Japan balances its diplomatic goals with a range of national interests while operating in a high-risk environment that demands coordination, caution, and cooperation.
This balance is a tried and tested practice of Japan’s space diplomacy even before the enactment of its 2008 Basic Space Law, which changed its interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty’s peaceful purpose’s principle from non-military to non-aggressive, enabling Japan to engage with space activities for military purposes. With its non-confrontational posturing in space, Japan has proceeded to discreetly and with minimal attention, attain notable milestones in space. Successfully navigating decades of space activities without becoming entangled in major geopolitical conflicts. In doing so, Japan has emerged as an unproblematic space actor.
Conclusion
Space is not merely a frontier for science diplomacy nor is it limited to a story of “diplomacy in space”; it is a foreign policy domain in its own right and Japan’s space diplomacy exemplifies this distinction. Whilst it may appear self-evident that states are engaging with space diplomacy to promote and/or serve their own national interests, discussions have yet to fully confirm this is because space is a foreign policy domain. In fact, there has been very little engagement between discussions on space diplomacy and foreign policy [1]. As space becomes a multi-stakeholder domain, the risks remain and so there is a need to establish a new understanding of how and why states operate in space, one that moves beyond purely scientific or militaristic posturing and fully engages with the economic, diplomatic, defence and strategic uniqueness of the space domain.
[1] Recent research published by The Hague Journal of Diplomacy has sought to address this lack of engagement through the Special Issue: Space Diplomacy: The Final Frontier of Theory and Practice.
Carol Buxton is a space policy researcher whose work lies at the intersection of International Relations, foreign policy, and public policy, with particular focus on Japan, East Asia, and the UK.
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