Matthew di Giuseppe
Matthew DiGiuseppe is an assistant professor of International Relations at the Institute of Political Science.
Matthew DiGiuseppe is an assistant professor of International Relations at the Institute of Political Science. His research interests lie at the intersection of international political economy and security studies.
Much of his research focuses on how variance in a state’s access to global sovereign credit markets influences the internal and external security decisions of politicians. More recently, he has begun to examine the individual level micro-foundation of sovereign debt crises that shape political incentives to constrain or ignore mounting sovereign debt burdens. Beyond debt politics, he has also published research on alliance politics, individual-level preferences towards trade agreements, the effect of non-governmental organizations on state capacity, respect for physical integrity rights, and foreign direct investment location.
Before joining the Institute of Political Science at Leiden, Matthew was an assistant professor the University of Mississippi for six years. He received his Ph.D. from Binghamton University in 2012 and holds a M.A. and BA from Saint John’s University in New York. His work has been published in the British Journal of Political Science, International Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Peace Research, Political Research Quarterly, Foreign Policy Analysis, Economics & Politics, Business & Politics, and International Interactions.
Matthew DiGiuseppe is available to supervise PhD students and invites PhD research proposals in the areas of:
- International Political Economy
- War and Security Finance
- The Politics of Sovereign Debt
See for more information on PhD positions:
- DiGiuseppe M.R., Murdi A. & Campbell S. (2019), International Development NGOs and Bureaucratic Capacity: Facilitator or Destroyer?, Political Research Quarterly 72(1): 3-18.
- Di Giuseppe M.R. & Barry C.M. (2019), Transparency, Risk, and FDI, Political Research Quarterly 72(1): 132-146.
- DiGiuseppe M.R. & Kleinberg K. (2019), Economics, security, and individual-level preferences for trade agreements, International Interactions 45(2): 289-315.
- Di Giuseppe M.R. & Shea P.E. (2019), The Devil’s Haircut: Investor–State Disputes over Debt Restructuring, Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(8): 1889-1922.
- DiGiuseppe M.R. & Shea P.E. (2018), Sovereign credit and political survival in democracies, Business and Politics 20(3): 360-389.
- DiGiuseppe M.R. & Poast P. (2018), Arms versus Democratic Allies, British Journal of Political Science 48(4): 981-1003.
- Di Giuseppe M.R. & Clay K.C. (2017), The Physical Consequences of Fiscal Flexibility: Sovereign Credit and Physical Integrity Rights, British Journal of Political Science 47(4): 738-807.
- DiGiuseppe M.R. & Shea P.E. (2016), Borrowed time: sovereign finance, regime type, and leader survival, Economics and Politics 28(3): 342-367.
- DiGiuseppe M.R. (2015), Guns, butter, and debt: Sovereign creditworthiness and military expenditure, Journal of Peace Research 52(5): 680-693.
- DiGiuseppe M.R. & Shea P.E. (2015), Sovereign credit and the fate of leaders: reassessing the “democratic advantage, International Studies Quarterly 59(3): 557-570.
- DiGiuseppe M.R. (2015), The fiscal autonomy of deciders: Creditworthiness and conflict initiation, Foreign Policy Analysis 11(3): 317-338.
- Di Giuseppe M.R. & Allen M.A. (2014), Tightening the belt: Sovereign debt and alliance formation, International Studies Quarterly 57(4): 647-659.
- Di Giuseppe M.R., Barry C.M. & Frank R.W. (2012), Good for the money: International finance, state capacity, and internal armed conflict, Journal of Peace Research 49(3): 391-405.
No relevant ancillary activities