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Publication

Cautious communicators: Strategic communication of European Union commissioners in regulatory decision-making

Müller, Braun & Fraussen examine the conditions under which commissioners appear in the news and which communication strategies they pursue.

Author
Moritz Müller, Caelesta Braun, Bert Fraussen
Date
24 April 2022
Links
Cautious communicators: Strategic communication of European Union commissioners in regulatory decision-making

The bureaucratic reputation literature stipulates that bureaucracies strategically aim to maximize reputational benefits and minimize reputational damages through targeted communication strategies. Departing from this assumption and using an extensive dataset on the media coverage of 54 legislative acts, Müller, Braun & Fraussen examine the conditions under which commissioners appear in the news and which communication strategies they pursue. Their analyses show that commissioners are more likely to appear in news coverage in the context of technically complex issues. They find that if a regulation is less politically conflictual, they are more likely to promote the commission's policy preferences, whereas they adopt a more passive style of communication in the face of political conflict. The findings further the scientists' understanding of regulatory policymaking by explaining bureaucratic behaviour through a communicational lens.

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