Maria van der Schaar
Senior University Lecturer History and Philosophy of Logic
- Name
- Dr. M.S. van der Schaar
- Telephone
- +31 71 527 2005
- m.v.d.schaar@hum.leidenuniv.nl
Maria van der Schaar is a Senior University Lecturer at the Institute for Philosophy.
The teaching of Maria van der Schaar concerns the philosophy of logic, including philosophy of language, and its history. Topics include: speech acts, semantics, and truth; and Frege, Husserl, and Hume.
Research
The research of Maria van der Schaar concerns the philosophy of logic, including philosophy of language, and its history. Her historical research focuses on early phenomenology, the origins of analytic philosophy, and early modern philosophy. Her philosophical work stands in the tradition of intuitionism and Swedish proof-theory, especially the work of Per Martin-Löf, and she has proposed accounts of judgement, assertion, knowledge and meaning from this perspective. Unique in her research is the idea that the first person cannot be neglected in logic, and in philosophy in general. She aims is to bring problems in analytic philosophy to a deeper level of understanding by introducing ideas coming from phenomenology and the Kantian tradition.
Senior University Lecturer History and Philosophy of Logic
- Faculty of Humanities
- Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte
- Schaar M.S. van der (2024), The Tractatus and the first person. In: Zalabardo J.L. (Ed.), Wittgenstein's Tractatus logico-philosophicus: a critical guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 125-144.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2024), The Kantian background of Frege's notion of judgement, History and Philosophy of Logic 45(4): 460-475.
- Schaar M. van der (2024), Frege on Knowing the Fundamental Laws of Logic. In: Klev A. (Ed.), The Architecture and Archeology of Modern Logic: Studies Dedicated to Göran Sundholm . Cham: Springer. 339-359.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2023), Judgement and intentionality in early Brentano, Grazer Philosophische Studien 100(1-2): 151-172.
- Peijnenburg J. & Schaar M.S. van der (2023), E.E.C Jones and the law of significant assertion. In: Moland L. & Stone A. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of American and British women philosophers in the Nineteenth Century . Oxford Handbooks Series: Oxford University Press.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2022), Judgement and Inference: the Relevance of Twardowski's Distinction between Actions and Products for Philosophy. In: Brozek A. & Jadacki J. (Eds.), Twentieth Century Analytic Movement: Kazimierz Twardowski and his Position in European Philosophy. Leiden: Brill. 25-49.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2021), Modifying Terms and Modification in Husserl and the Brentano School’. In: Dewalque A., Gauvry C. & Richard S. (Eds.), Philosophy of Language in the Brentano School: Palgrave. 245-261.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2021), Force, Mood and the Unity of the Proposition. In: Mras G. & Schmitz M. (Eds.), Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition: Routledge. 4-56.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2019), Locke and Leibniz on Judgment: The First-Person Perspective and the Danger of Psychologism. In: Ball B. & Schuringa C. (Eds.), The Act and Object of Judgment; Historical and Philosophical Perspectives. New York, London: Routledge. 45-65.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2019), Assertions and Their Justification: Demonstration and Self-Evidence. In: Mras G.M., Weingartner P. & Ritter B. (Eds.), Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics: Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium: Walter de Gruyter. 183–196.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2018), Frege on Judgement and the Judging Agent, Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy 127(505): 225-250.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2018), Brentano on Truth and Evidence: Understanding Truth from a First-Person Point of View, Brentano Studien X 16: 187-205.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2017), Brentano, Moore, and Stout. In: Kriegel U. (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School: Routledge. 349-357.
- Schaar M.S. van der & Schliesser E. (2017), Women in Early Analytic Philosophy: Volume Introduction, Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5(2): .
- Schaar M.S. van der (2017), Metaphysics and the Logical Analysis of 'Nothing'. In: Brozek A., Stadler F. & Wolenski J. (Eds.), The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in European Culture. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook no. 21. 978-3-319-52869-4: Springer International Publishing. 65-78.
- Schaar M.S. van der & Schliesser E.S. (Eds.) (2017), Women in Early Analytic Philosophy. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2016), Review of: Betti A. (2015), Against Facts: MIT Press. Notre Dame Philosophical Review .
- Schaar M.S. van der (2016), Brentano, Twardowski and Stout: From Psychology to Ontology. In: Beaney M. (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2015), The Things We Call True, Grazer Philosophische Studien 91: 303-321.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2015), Kazimiers Twardowski: A Grammar for Philosophy no. 103. Leiden, Boston: Brill / Rodopi.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2014), Wooden Horses and False Friends: On the Logic of Adjectives. In: Mulligan K. & et al. (Eds.), The History and Philosophy of Polish Logic; Essays in Honour of Jan Wolenski. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 103-116.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2014), Mere Belief as a Modification. In: Reboul A. (Ed.), Mind, Values, and Metaphysics, Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan, vol. 2: Springer. 163-181.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2014) The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Review of: Dainton Barry & Robinson Howard, The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy: Bloomsbury. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28(4): 437-439.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2013), G.F. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2013), G.F. Stout and Russell’s earliest account of judgement’. In: Textor M. (Ed.), Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy: Palgrave Macmillan. 137-156.
- Schaar M. van der (2013), Introduction . In: Schaar M. van der (Ed.), Judgement and the Epistemic Foundation of Logic. Dordrecht: Springer. ix-xvii.
- Schaar M.S. van der (Ed.) (2013), Judgement and the Epistemic Foundation of Logic. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2013) G.E. Moore, Early Philosophical Writings. Review of: Baldwin Thomas & Preti Consuelo (2011), G.E. Moore, Early Philosophical Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Journal of Value Inquiry 46: 511/514.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2012), Locke on Judgement and Religious Toleration, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20(1): 41-68.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2011), Mere belief and the etiolations of language. In: Reboul A. (Ed.), Philosophical Papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan. Geneve.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2011) Review. Review of: (2010), Robin D. Rollinger, Philosophy of Language and Other Matters in the Work of Anton Marty. Analysis and Translations.. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Grazer Philosophische Studien 83: 306-308.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2011), The Cognitive Act and the First-Person Perspective: an Epistemology for Constructive Type Theory, Synthese 180: 391-417.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2011), Assertion and Grounding; A Theory of Assertion for Constructive Type Theory, Synthese 183: 187-210.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2010) review. Review of: (2008), Omar Nasim 'Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers': Palgrave Macmillan. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18: 534-536.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2009), Twardowski on Knowledge, Judgement and Truth. In: Horecka A. (Ed.), Logic, Methodology & Philosophy of Science 5. Warschau: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper. 131-141.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2009), Judgement, Belief and Accepance. In: Primiero G. & Rahman S. (Eds.), Acts of Knowledge: History, Philosophy and Logic; Essays Dedicated to Göran Sundholm. London: College Publications. 267-286.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2009), Locke on knowledge and the cognitive act, Grazer Philosophische Studien 78: 1-15.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2008), Locke and Arnauld on Judgement and Proposition, History and Philosophy of Logic 29(4): 327-341.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2008) Review: Rosalind Carey, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Nature of Judgement. Review of: , Russell an Wittgenstein on the Nature of Judgement: Continuum. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews .
- Schaar M.S. van der (2007), Bolzano on Judgement and Error. Tomala O. & Honzik R. (Eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2006. Logica 2006. The Logica Yearbook. Prague: Filosofia. 211-221.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2007), The Assertion-Candidate and the Meaning of Mood, Synthese 159: 61-82.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2006), On the Ambiguities of the Term Judgement. An Evaluation of Twardowski’s Distinction betweeen Action and Product. In: Chrudzimski A. & Lukasiewicz D. (Eds.), Actions, Products and Things; Brentano and Polish Philosophy. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. 35-53.
- Schaar M.S. van der & Betti A. (2004), The Road from Vienna to Lvov: Twardowski’s Theory of Judgement between 1894 and 1897, Grazer Philosophische Studien 67(2004): 1-20.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2004), Evidence as a Criterion; a Criticism of Meinong and Höfler’s notion of Evidence, Papers of the 27th Int. Wittgenstein Symposium. Papers of the 27th Int. Wittgenstein Symposium 324-326.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2004), The Red of a Rose; on the Significance of Stout's Category of Abstract Particulars, Idealization XI: Historical Studies on Abstraction and Idealization, Poznan Studies 82(2004): 197-216.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2003), Judgement and Certainty, Knowledge and Belief, Papers of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. . Kirchberg 2003 311-313.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2003), Opinion, Assertion and Knowledge: Three Epistemic Modalities, Logica Yearbook 2002. . Prague 2003: Filosofia Publishers. 259-268.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2003), Review of: Woudenberg René van (2002), Filosofie van taal en tekst: Uitgeverij Damon. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 95: 153-154.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2003), Brentano on Logic, Truth and Evidence, Brentano Studien X 2002/03: 119-150.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2002), Hartmann's Rejection of the Notion of Evidence, Axiomathes 12: 285-297.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2001) Recensie van: Martin Stokhof, Taal en betekenis. Review of: . Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 93: 156-157.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2001), Waarborg en waarheid: een kritiek op Plantingas kennisbegrip vanuit een evidentietheorie van waarheid, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 93: 181-194.
- Schaar M.S. van der (2000), Judgement-Candidates. . Rationality and Irrationality 122-126.
- Schaar M.S. van der (1999), Evidence and the Law of Excluded Middle: Brentano on Truth, The Logica Yearbook 1998. . Prague 110-120.
- Schaar M.S. van der (1999), A Brentanian Logic; Twardowski's manuscript 'Logic 1895/6' as part of the school of Brentano, Volume of Abstracts. 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Cracow 453-453.
- Schaar M.S. van der (1999), L'analogie et la vérité chez Franz Brentano, Philosophiques 26: 203-217.
- Schaar M.S. van der (1997), 'Judgment and Negation', The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. In: Hahn L.E. (Ed.), The Library of Living Philosophers XXV 291-318.
- Schaar M.S. van der (1996), From Analytic Psychology to Analytic Philosophy: The Reception of Twardowski's Ideas in Cambridge, Axiomathes 7(3): 295-324.
- Schaar M.S. van der (1995), The Cognitive Value of Indexical Sentences: Kaplan versus Husserl. In: Hill J. & Kotatho P. (Eds.), Karlovy Vary Studies in Reference and Meaning.
- Schaar M.S. van der (1994), Is an Individual Nothing but a Packet of Properties?, From the Logical Point of View 1993: 59-62.
- Schaar M.S. van der & Meijers A.W.M. (1986), Realistische of anti-realistische milieufilosofie?, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 78: 251-261.