The existing good governance studies have identified an empirical link between macro-level bureaucratic factors such as the type of recruitment system of public servants (i.e. meritocratic) or salary levels and favorable outcomes. Our proposed research aims to advance the previous studies by, first, shifting the unit of analysis from macro structure to individual bureaucrats: we will ask top and middle-range local civil servants. And, second, conducting survey experiments in which we will confront public managers with hypothetical real-life decision-making situations, where they must weigh the demand of their political superiors (e.g. interested in having a positive report on a particular policy they have promoted) against civil servants’ professional norms (e.g. offering a balanced policy report). We will conduct a survey experiment to public managers in Swedish, Spanish, and Japanese municipalities. Survey experiments-vignette and conjoint experiments will allow us to conduct analyses with a more careful attention to the causal mechanism than observational data in order to understand what motivates civil servants’ behavior.

• bureaucracy
• bureaucrats
• comparative public policy
• government
• survey