Universiteit Leiden

nl en

Publication

The game behind the vote – coalition building, sponsorship, and diplomatic strategy in the UN Security Council

In this article, the scholars highlight how the current composition of the UN Security Council creates constraints and limitations but also reveals the influence of non-permanent members on Council decisions.

Author
Madeleine O. Hosli, Gabriela M. G. Bueno, Sofia Pires Lopes & Katyayni Champawat
Date
09 October 2026
Links
View the article here

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the most prominent institutions in global governance. Yet, due to its institutional structure, it frequently is at an impasse. Many crises cannot be effectively addressed as the five permanent members (the P5) can veto resolutions, which very much determines coalition-formation and decision-making in this institution. However, diplomatic skill, coalition-building, and cross-regional cooperation can help overcome representation inequalities and stalemates caused by permanent-member veto power.

The findings show that institutional obstacles, power dynamics, diplomacy, and informal alliances shape Security Council outcomes, with both structures and strategies determining results. This may be even more important in an era characterised by geopolitical and geoeconomic volatility.

This website uses cookies.  More information.