Leiden Theoretical Philosophy Colloquium with Jeanne Peijnenburg 'On Hume's Regress Argument'
- 13 December 2018
- P.J. Veth
2311 VJ Leiden
The Leiden Theoretical Philosophy Colloquium Series is pleased to announce a lecture by
On Hume’s Regress Argument
In A Treatise of Human Nature David Hume presents an intriguing argument that led to much debate among Hume scholars. It occurs in the section ‘Of scepticism with regard to reason’ (Treatise 1.4.1), which has been described as “the least understood” passage in Hume’s writings. The argument aims to show that, if we were to rely purely on reason, ignoring the role of custom, habit and the senses, we would be unable to have any beliefs at all. In this talk I explain that the argument is invalid as it stands, but for different reasons than have been hitherto put forward.
Jeanne Peijnenburg is professor em. in Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Groningen. She was vice-dean, head of research and chair of the department. Most of her publications are in formal epistemology.
Leiden Theoretical Philosophy Series
The aim of the series is to present lectures expressing non-standard views on philosophical questions relating to knowledge, truth, science, logic, metaphysics, and the mind, including their history.