

IRP Conference 2012

Trends in
the Muslim World:
Perspectives from
Research and Policy

THE
HAGUE
NL

17→19
APRIL
2012



CONTENTS

Foreword	3
Islam Research Programme in General	5
Session 1:	
CITIZENSHIP IN TRANSITION	7
→ CAIRO (Egypt)	11
→ RIYADH (Saudi Arabia)	14
Session 2:	
TRANSNATIONALISM	17
→ RABAT (Morocco)	21
→ ANKARA (Turkey)	24
Session 3:	
(RELIGIOUS) MINORITIES & CONFLICT	27
→ KHARTOUM (Sudan)	30
→ ABUJA (Nigeria)	34
Session 4:	
ISLAMIC ACTORS & DISCOURSES IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN	39
→ DAKAR (Senegal)	43
→ JAKARTA (Indonesia)	47

Non-referenced cover photo:

Below right: Vote counting during
parliamentary elections, Cairo.

AHMED JADALLAH/REUTERS, 2011.

Trends in the Muslim World: *Perspectives from Research and Policy*

By *Katrien Bardoel*



The Project Office Islam Research Programme (Project Office IRP) organises in collaboration with the Social Development Department (DSO) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs a number of conferences as part of the research programme ‘Strengthening Knowledge of and Dialogue with the Islamic/Arab World’, in short Islam Research Programme. The last conference of the series takes place on 17-19 April 2012 in The Hague, the Netherlands and brings together policy officers and researchers currently participating in one of the several IRP research projects.

This working conference aims to present the (final) research results of the different IRP projects and to provide a platform for knowledge exchange between researchers and policy officers. As a way to enhance the debate, and, where possible, to allow for comparison between the individual IRP projects that are presented, we have opted for a thematic approach under the umbrella of ‘Trends in the Muslim World: Perspectives from Research and Policy’.

We are pleased to welcome Dr René Otayek who will open the conference with a lecture on Tuesday evening 17 April. Dr Otayek is a political scientist and director of the institute ‘Les Afriques dans le Monde’ (LAM) [Centre for Comparative and Multi-Disciplinary Research] of the University of Bordeaux (France). In his lecture, he will put African and Arab transitions in a comparative perspective.

After the opening session, the participants will take part in four sessions spread over two days, which are divided up into four themes and capture some of the main findings of the IRP projects: Citizenship in Transition, Transnationalism, (Religious) Minorities and Conflict, and Islamic Actors and Discourses in the Public Domain. Each session will deal with two case studies by looking at specific countries, and will be concluded with a reflection presented by an external speaker. We are thrilled to be able to welcome a great number of excellent speakers from all over the world. This programme includes their abstracts and biographies and aims to present the conference guest with a comprehensive overview of what promises to be two days of interesting discussions and debates.

We look forward to welcoming you in The Hague.



Katrien Bardoel is Project Coordinator, Islam Research Programme

Chatham House Rule

To encourage openness and the sharing of information this conference is held under the Chatham House Rule. When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.

Strengthening Knowledge of and Dialogue with the Islamic/Arab World

Islam Research Programme in General

Since May 2008, the Project Office Islam Research Programme (Project Office IRP) has conducted the coordination and management of the research programme ‘Strengthening knowledge of and dialogue with the Islamic/Arab world’ (in short: Islam Research Programme) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DSO/OO*). The Project Office IRP is administered by a consortium between Leiden University and PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory.

THE ISLAM RESEARCH PROGRAMME

The contemporary Muslim world is changing, and the revival of ‘Islam’ as a political, socio-economic, and religious factor in this part of the world has received a great deal of attention. Within the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and at a number of Netherlands’ embassies in the Muslim world a need has arisen for more knowledge of societal trends and movements. Considering developments in the relations between Muslim and non-Muslim countries as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims in various countries, investment in knowledge of the Muslim world is clearly of great importance. The increased attention to religion and development in foreign policy also helps to illustrate the need for this knowledge.

The programme concentrates on research on contemporary developments in the Muslim world that are relevant for Netherlands’ policy development in the field of international cooperation. Research topics fall within the areas of Islamic law, political and socio-economic developments, and culture and religion. The research projects are planned and carried out in close

* DSO: Social Development Department; OO: Research & Education.

consultation with Dutch policy officers at embassies in various Muslim countries (Burkina Faso, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan and Turkey), and they are aimed at gaining, sharing and using knowledge of recent developments in the Muslim world. Participation of researchers (m/f) from countries that are part of the programme contributes to research capacity building in these countries.

Within this research programme, collaborations are commenced between the Netherlands' embassies in the Muslim world, on the one hand, and scholars and research institutions, on the other. Within the programme, scholars carry out research that answers questions relevant to policy formation at the diplomatic mission involved. The research projects are implemented by researchers or research institutions in cooperation with local researchers and in consultation with the Netherlands' diplomatic missions that have commissioned the research. Interaction between the diplomatic mission and the researcher is an integral part of the project. In addition to research activities, so-called 'knowledge activities', such as discussion meetings and workshops, are also organised.

STAFF

- **Katrien Bardoel** (*Project Coordinator/LU*)
- **Titia van der Maas** (*Project Officer/LU*)
- **Anton Koonstra** (*Controller/PwC*)
- **Michael Blokdijk** (*Financial Officer/PwC*)

ACADEMIC ADVISORY BOARD

- **Dr Sylvia Bergh** (*Lecturer, International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam*)
- **Dr Jan Breman** (*Professor Emeritus, University of Amsterdam*)
- **Dr Martin van Bruinessen** (*Professor Emeritus, Utrecht University*)
- **Dr Amrita Chhachhi** (*Senior Lecturer, International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam*)
- **Anke van der Kwaak** (*Senior Advisor and Researcher, Royal Tropical Institute Amsterdam*)
- **Dr Annelies Moors** (*Professor, University of Amsterdam*)
- **Dr Marina de Regt** (*Coordinator Sephis, International Institute for Social History*)
- **Dr Benjamin Soares** (*Senior Researcher, African Studies Centre*)
- **Dr Karin Willemse** (*Associate Professor, Erasmus University Rotterdam*)

Wednesday
18 April 2012

1

Citizenship in Transition

In the Muslim world the notion of citizenship has become particularly pertinent since the 'Arab spring'. This session tries to explore how Islamic actors shape political discourses and debates on citizenship rights in Egypt and Saudi Arabia respectively.

Redefining Citizenship in the Arab World

Mazen Hassan

One of the main problems facing many Arab countries – whether in transition or not – is the issue of citizenship. Throughout many of these countries, whenever there are religious minorities, there is also a problem of unbalanced representation and discrimination. It is a problem that affects countries' social capital and hence also the potential for human and economic development. Partly, this has been due to undemocratic forms of government; indeed, resolving issues of identity is an inescapable phase in any process of state formation and in many Arab countries that phase has been suppressed by authoritarian styles of governance. Nevertheless, in cases where democracy is/will be restored, discrimination of minorities could be done in the name of 'democratic majority' rather than by an authoritarian ruler.

DIFFERENT MANIFESTATIONS OF THE CITIZENSHIP CRISIS

In the Arab world, such a crisis manifests itself in different shapes and forms. One such form is a crisis over what constitutes a citizen and whether different religious beliefs entail different citizenship rights. Central to the process of constitution building that is going on in Egypt now, for example, is a debate over whether Copts (and women) should be given rights to hold high-ranking political posts – with of course the presidency as the ultimate position. In many Gulf countries, Shiite minorities are practically excluded from the ruling class. Secondly, there is also the problem of unbalanced distribution of resources/gains which is a logical co-phenomenon of political discrimination. It might not be a huge problem in a country like Egypt – where the state does not have much to redistribute anyway – but potentially significant in countries, where oil revenues provide a large

share of GDP and that revenue is mainly controlled by the state. Lastly – and of course most dangerously – sectarian violence could erupt – and does erupt. Such incidents usually upgrade the crisis to a different, much more significant, level.

AUTHORITARIANISM, RELIGIOUS PREACHERS AND REGIONAL INFLUENCES

Numerous factors (have) contribute(d) to the citizenship crisis in the Arab world. In addition to authoritarianism, there is an intrinsic problem in Islamic political thought over the place of non-Muslims (or Muslims of other sects) in a predominantly Muslim (Sunni) society. In some aspects, it is a problem of different interpretations of religious text and hence also rests on an even greater problem of where to place religion in a Muslim country. Secondly, religious preachers shoulder some of the blame; their discourse can be quite helpful in some cases, but in others it can also be quite provocative. Thirdly, a regional factor does seem to play a significant role. When it comes to Egypt, for example, the Palestinian issue is still largely seen as a conflict between Muslims and Jews and hence to be able to better deal with it – so goes some discourses – the country needs to design the perfect Islamic society and then the problem of Copts comes to the fore. In Gulf countries on the other hand, Shiite minorities are viewed as more loyal to the Shiite leaders of Iran than to those of their own countries.

ARAB-SPECIFIC OR MUSLIM COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ANSWER

What are the possible scenarios to overcome this challenge? No easy answer of course. The most likely scenario – the best case scenario – is for that answer to be *Arab-specific* or *Muslim country-specific*. It is not likely to be an answer similar to Western paths. In predominantly Muslim societies, a Western style secular formula will not serve as a magic bullet. Probably, it is time for Arab societies to create their own model of citizenship. Central to reaching that model are three critical catalysts. Adoption of democratic rules (which is necessary but by no means

enough); supportive elite behaviour and a shift of focus on individual countries' developmental problems – the solution to which is likely to draw/mobilize experts from different religious backgrounds and hence enhance the country's social fabric.


MAZEN HASSAN is a Lecturer of Comparative Politics at Cairo University, Egypt. He has a PhD degree in politics from Oxford University (UK), two MA degrees from both Cairo University and Warwick University (UK). After focusing on the new democracies of post-communist Europe and Latin America in his earlier studies, he is now shifting the focus to the transitional contexts of the Arab spring and conducting several studies on the electoral scene and the emerging party system in post-revolution Egypt. He has published in *Democratization* and *Foreign Policy*.

Egyptian demonstrators, Tahrir Square, Cairo on April 1, 2011.

MOHAMED ABD EL GHANY
/REUTERS, 2011



The New Positioning of Islamic Actors in Egypt after the Revolution



Rabha Allam

This presentation will briefly explore the new priorities of Islamic actors in post-revolutionary Egypt and how they have changed their discourses and structures to meet new priorities in light of the political context. Many of the Islamic actors who were not listed as political actors are building new political parties and getting more involved in politics.

ISLAMIC POLITICAL ACTORS



The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), though having been involved in politics for decades, has only now launched its own political party. At the same time, many of the MB activists who represent a different stance than the mainstream line have defected and have formed their own parties. Moreover, the Salafis who opposed political activity in general for a long time, have changed their position and have become intensively politicised. The same goes for their traditional adversaries, the Sufis, who have aligned themselves with the former ruling party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), and have forbidden their followers to defy the repressive regime. They have formed political parties and have aligned themselves with the seculars, in fear of a Salafi invasion into the political scene that could restrict their Sufi activities. Concerning the official Islam represented by Al-Azhar, its discourse has also become highly politicised. Rather than calling people to obey the existing regime, Al-Azhar

has played a coordinating role amongst different political parties to move the public debate about the state's identity towards a rational consensus. Alongside losing their exclusive role of speaking for official Islam, Al-Azhar faces several challenges set by some Azhari scholars, who are deeply involved in the revolution and who have gained credibility amongst the revolutionary youth coalitions. This orientation has affected the political discourse in the public space and simultaneously affected the internal discourse within these Islamist movements.

THE POSITION OF YOUTH

Apart from highlighting the political role of Islamic actors, the presentation will also give an idea about the positioning of the youth in those Islamic political trends. Are they aligning themselves with their traditional leaders or are they seeking rapprochement with their young fellows in the revolutionary movement? For instance, the MB youth who have traditionally obeyed their leaders, were involved in many activities that the MB announced they would boycott. The same goes for the Salafi youth who have been getting more independent in their political views, and have allied themselves with other revolutionary youth, despite their leaders' opposition.

THE MECHANISM OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE PRODUCTION

Finally, the presentation explores the mechanism of political discourse production, the agenda setting, and the alliances built upon that basis in order to clarify when Islamic actors tend to cooperate or compete. This analysis can help to tackle the different positions of those actors regarding the presidential candidates, and the possible repercussions of these positions.

IRP CAIRO PROJECT IN BRIEF

The IRP Cairo Project started in April 2010 and is to be completed in May 2012. The project is a cooperation between the Netherlands-Flemish Institute in Cairo (NVIC) and Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) in Cairo. The project studies religious actors and discourses in order to analyse domestic political and social developments in Egypt. Additionally, this project aims to identify relevant interlocutors for dialogue for the Embassy. The first phase of the project consisted of an extensive 'mapping' of Islamic actors and organisations, their discourses and the activities they organise in Egypt. The second research phase focuses on Islamic actors and the new media with a focus on their communication strategies and how Islamic preachers address issues of citizenship in the public sphere. The working plan for the Cairo project was ready designed, when the Egyptian revolution started. The plan was adjusted where possible in order to incorporate relevant developments with a larger emphasis on the reshaping of the position of Islamic actors after the ouster of Mubarak.

RESEARCH COORDINATOR AND MAIN RESEARCH TEAM IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER:

- **Rabha Allam** (*junior researcher, ACPSS*)
- **Paulien Baujard** (*junior researcher, NVIC*)
- **Dr Sabine Dorpmueller** (*senior researcher, NVIC*)
- **Dr Kim Duistermaat** (*project manager, NVIC*)
- **Hadeer Elmehdaway** (*junior researcher, ACPSS*)
- **Allaa El Roubi** (*junior researcher, ACPSS*)
- **Eman Ragab** (*junior researcher, ACPSS*)
- **Dr Dina Shehata** (*senior researcher, ACPSS*)

Riyadh

Intellectual Debates on Citizenship in Saudi Arabia



Joas Wagemakers

The Riyadh project has focused on three different themes: gender mixing (*ikhtilat*), civil society and intellectual trends and debates. This presentation is derived from the third theme and concentrates on the debates about citizenship among Saudi thinkers and scholars.

SESSION I

SHIITE REFORMERS ON CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship has become a central concept among Saudi reformers over the past few years and this is especially the case among Shiites. Because Shiites are seen as deviant Muslims or even as apostates by many scholars of the Kingdom's guiding Wahhabi ideology and because they mostly live in the country's oil-rich Eastern Province but see very few of its benefits, Saudi Shiites have long felt discriminated by the regime.

Shiite intellectuals and religious scholars have come up with an alternative citizenship (*muwatana*). They argue that the state should ban official sectarianism and religious incitement against Shiites and adopt a policy of tolerance and pluralism instead, providing all Saudi citizens with truly equal rights and duties *vis-à-vis* their rulers. Only then will all Saudis have full and equal citizenship.

Interestingly, not all intellectuals reach this conclusion in the same way. While some adopt a religious terminology, stressing that the king is the 'shepherd' and the people his

‘flock’, meaning that they each have their own rights and duties towards one another and can be treated as equals before the law, others disagree. The latter believe that the ‘shepherd’/‘flock’ dichotomy is precisely what is wrong with the system now, with the king acting as a benevolent father looking after his children. These intellectuals emphasise instead that the proper relationship between the ruler and the ruled is one derived from Western political philosophy, namely a social contract in which the people pledge loyalty to their ruler because of a contractual agreement, not a personal relationship.

SUNNI REFORMERS AND CONSERVATIVES ON CITIZENSHIP

The country’s Sunnis also debate citizenship, albeit in a slightly different way. Whereas Shiite intellectuals stress the need to curb sectarianism and promote religious tolerance to achieve equality, Sunni reformers generally put greater emphasis on political rights. They also argue for citizenship as meaning equal rights and duties *vis-à-vis* the ruler (including women’s rights), but focus on achieving this through a constitutional monarchy, fighting corruption, greater freedom, strengthening civil society and democratisation.

The conservative religious establishment knows that its own role as unelected guardians of the Wahhabi character of the state will suffer, if the Kingdom were to give its inhabitants full and equal citizenship. This is because many Saudis want to reform the religious establishment or even do away with it altogether. Partly for this reason – but also because of ideological loyalty to the king’s position as *wali l-amr* (ruler in charge) – conservative scholars are staunch supporters of the king. Ironically, they sometimes adopt the same discourse that Shiite reformers arguing for equal citizenship use: the king, the conservatives say, is the ‘shepherd’, and his ‘flock’ should be loyal to him. People may advise him in private, but overt demands (let alone demonstrations) are absolutely forbidden.

Considering the revolutions and revolts taking place in the Arab world, the ‘shepherd’ welcomes such help from his trusted religious allies. Given the lively debates on citizenship across the country, however, it remains to be seen how long the ‘flock’

is willing to accept being denied its rights. For now, the status quo seems bearable. Yet it seems only a matter of time before the state simply has to give all inhabitants full citizenship, or risk becoming the very type of police state that is now being challenged across the Middle East.

IRP RIYADH PROJECT IN BRIEF

The IRP Riyadh Project is a collaboration between Clingendael Institute (the Netherlands) and Radar Groep BV. The project started in April 2010 and will be completed in April 2012. The aim of this project is on the one hand to analyse recent developments in relation to civil society, women and intellectual trends and debates in Saudi Arabia, and on the other to promote and foster practical cooperation between researchers and organisations in Saudi Arabia and the Netherlands. The first theme focuses on how Saudi women perceive and experience the creation of parallel female spaces in education, the workforce and civil society. The second theme studies whether Saudi Arabia's civil society has a socio-political transformative potential. The third part focuses on intellectual trends and debates about citizenship in Saudi Arabia.

RESEARCH COORDINATOR AND MAIN RESEARCH TEAM IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER:

- **Paul Aarts** (*coordinator, supervisor, University of Amsterdam*)
- **Hussain Abdulla Alalak** (*researcher*)
- **Mohammed Cheppih** (*facilitator, Radar Groep BV*)
- **Annemarie van Geel** (*researcher, Radboud University Nijmegen*)
- **Mariwan Kanie** (*researcher, University of Amsterdam*)
- **Dr Roel Meijer** (*coordinator, supervisor, Clingendael Institute, The Hague*)
- **Dr Karin van Nieuwkerk** (*supervisor, Radboud University Nijmegen*)
- **Dr Joas Wagemakers** (*researcher, Clingendael Institute, The Hague*)

Wednesday
18 April 2012

2

Transnationalism

This session explores how governments in the Muslim world, specifically Turkey, Morocco and Pakistan, try to shape religious life and how state policy impacts transnational relations and identity formation of citizens living abroad.

The Loosening Grip of Foreign States on their Subjects in Western Europe

Some Reflections on the Limits of Transnational Governance

Marta Bolognani

In my intervention I will bring to the fore the complex dynamics characterising transnational interactions in Western Europe with particular reference to Muslims. In the first part of the presentation I will look at what is at stake in this political process from the point of view of the countries of origin, the countries of settlement and the migrants or their second generation. In the second part I will provide examples from my research among Pakistanis in Britain and will refer to a small sample of interviews with Pakistani associations in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France and Switzerland in order to clarify what I believe are the current trends in Western Europe as far as the areas of influence of states of origin on their émigré citizens.

IMPORTANCE OF TRANSNATIONAL POPULATION

Countries of origin often consider their émigrés as a great resource. They are first of all an economic resource as they send remittances or even plan to return and thus invest; they are also potential brokers for diplomatic relations and may carry with them seeds of social change (social remittances). More and more countries then have recently become more assertive in maintaining connections with the expatriates and even interfere in their processes of settlement abroad (see Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and his appeals to both the German State and

the German Turks). All these factors may be helpful towards the policies of a given government or may be seen as dangerous, as in the case of Morocco described in this panel, where there is a fear that Islamist elements may be imported into the country of origin through ‘contamination’ of Moroccan subjects abroad. All over the world an increasing number of governments affected by mass emigration are thus putting in place policies to maximise the potential of their transnational population.

RESPONSE FROM COUNTRIES OF SETTLEMENT

Countries of settlement in Western Europe have had a tradition of looking more towards the perceived threat to the existing social fabric by immigrants than at their benefits. Issues of insularity and of maintenance of divisive customs are often mentioned in the public discourse, while the economic discussion of the benefits of the immigrant workforce is played down, if not challenged. An underlying message in this discourse is the choice given to migrants: either fully integrate (whatever this means), or go back. To safeguard a broad spirit of liberalism, however, countries of settlement feel obliged to recognise particularistic civil society phenomena, such as the formation of ethnic or religious associations.

THE CASE OF PAKISTANIS IN EUROPE

Stuck in between, migrants both as individuals and as groups will have to make choices through processes of personal and collective (political) negotiation. These choices will respond to political and discursive opportunities and adversities in ways that are affected by religious belief, trajectories of self-realisation, changes occurred during migration, demographic variables and ideology. In my case-study I will illustrate how Pakistanis in Europe have kept a very strong emotional connection with Pakistan, but have overall abandoned political relations or hopes in favour of a more Muslim universal formula that often affords them the opportunity of becoming transnational in a way that resonates both with citizenship debates in the country of settle-

ment and religious trends such as the revival of the *Ummah* discourse. In this way Pakistanis in Europe show how transnationalism itself carries the potential, in the long term, to erode the more institutionalised relationships with the country of origin.

MARTA BOLOGNANI is the General Secretary of the Muslims in Britain Research Network and Research Associate at the Centre for Migration Research at Sussex University. She holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of Leeds (UK), and is an expert on Pakistani transnationalism with particular reference to the UK. Marta is currently part of a Norwegian research programme on return migration (PREMIG). After teaching at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) between 2006 and 2008 Marta has worked at the University of Bristol around issues pertaining Muslims and the public sphere in Europe for the European Union funded Project 'EurIslam'. Her latest publication is the edited collection *Pakistan and its Diaspora: Multidisciplinary Approaches* (New York: Palgrave, 2011).

Rabat

Moroccan State-Islam for Moroccans Living in the Netherlands?



Merel Kahmann

The Moroccan state was founded on a convenient combination of Islamic traditions, notably the Maliki school, Ash'ari doctrine and Sufism. The legitimacy of the Moroccan head of state, today King Mohammed VI, is also propped up by religion in that he claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad and presents himself as 'Commander of the Faithful'. Such interweaving of political and religious authority means that the Moroccan state should not only be interested in the financial and physical well-being of its citizens, but also their religious lives.

It is therefore not surprising to observe that Moroccan policy towards Moroccans living abroad, in part, concentrates on their religious life, and attempts to ensure adherence to the religious doctrine designed by the Moroccan state. This apparent religious piety of supporting the state religion in fact serves national political interests in two ways: first, by providing its citizens with a relatively mild form of Islam, the state seeks to hinder the rise of radical Islamic traditions that in their turn may destabilise Moroccan politics; second, the religion fosters a bond between the King and Moroccans abroad, thereby hoping to increase their sense of 'Moroccanhood' and, more importantly, to ensure that their money continues to flow back into the state over successive migrant generations.

*Moroccan families
returning from vacation,
Algeciras (Spain).*

ANTON MERES/REUTERS, 2004.



MOROCCAN RESPONSE TO STATE-ISLAM ABROAD

Yet, Moroccans abroad are not simply the passive receptors of this policy. Their engagement with the state religion has real consequences for the (in)effectiveness of the state's policy. For example, Moroccans living in the Netherlands perceive the fusion of Islam and political interests as problematic. From the Moroccan-Dutch perspective it is important to distinguish Moroccan traditional Islam from Moroccan state-Islam. They may follow the Maliki tradition, but keep their distance from Moroccan state-Islam due to its political flavour. Similarly, a mosque committee might employ an imam from Morocco, while avoiding Moroccan state institutions. These examples illustrate the critical attitude and resistance of Dutch Moroccans to the political goals for which Moroccan state-Islam is a vehicle.

INTERACTION MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT AND MOROCCAN RELIGIOUS LIVES IN THE NETHERLANDS

In this presentation we will discuss the interactions of the Moroccan government with the religious lives of Moroccans living in the Netherlands. Yassine Dguidegue will elaborate on

the religious policy installed by the Moroccan government for Moroccans living abroad including the various instruments installed by the Moroccan government. He will also draw attention to official Dutch policy and political climate surrounding religious policy and how they affect the success of the Moroccan government's religious initiatives in the Netherlands. Merel Kahmann will present research results based on interviews with Moroccan-Dutch citizens. She has asked what their views are regarding the Moroccan religious policy for Moroccans living abroad and to what extent they rely on Morocco and the Moroccan government for their religious lives.

IRP RABAT PROJECT IN BRIEF

The IRP Rabat Project is conducted by Leiden University. The project started in September 2008 and will be completed in June 2012. The aim of this research is to present an analysis of Moroccan policy, both its objectives and instruments, directed at Moroccans who live abroad, in particular the Netherlands. The project both serves a PhD programme as well as a knowledge source for Dutch policymakers to improve their understanding of Moroccan policies in this respect. Questions that the research team addresses include whether and how Dutch Moroccans experience the effects of Moroccan policy initiatives. It thereby aims to answer the question what impact, if any, these policy initiatives have on the integration process and identity formation of Moroccans in the Netherlands.

RESEARCH COORDINATOR AND MAIN RESEARCH TEAM IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER:

- **Dr Maurits Berger** (*supervisor, Leiden University*)
- **Dr Léon Buskens** (*supervisor, Leiden University*)
- **Yassine Dguidegue** (*junior researcher*)
- **Merel Kahmann** (*researcher, Leiden University*)
- **Heleen van der Linden** (*coordinator, Leiden University*)

Ankara

Diyanet, the Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs in a Changing Environment

Thijl Sunier



Our initial research question was what policy changes can be observed in recent years within and towards Diyanet.

SESSION 2

The IRP project findings lead us to conclude that there are no remarkable breaks with the period prior to the coming to power of the AKP. To that extent AKP has not used its political power to enforce major changes in the position of Diyanet more than other governments in the past. Yet we contend that a thorough assessment of the policies of Diyanet should neither be confined to the last decade, nor to the policies of the present government alone, but take into account the transformations of Turkish society over a much longer period. Only then we are able to interpret both changes and continuities as we observed them in our research. That is why we included older documents, secondary literature and other relevant sources in our analysis. The conclusions described above should be interpreted against the background of these societal transformations.

ROLE OF DIYANET IN LIGHT OF SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATIONS

Since the 1980s, Turkish society underwent fundamental social and political changes. New political parties emerged that addressed their constituencies through new media, the country opened up economically and a new urban middle class



Eyup Sultan Mosque, Istanbul.
MURAD SEZER/REUTERS, 2010.

emerged. Even more fundamental and related to these developments are the growth of a civil society in Turkey and a gradually taking root of democracy, not just legally but also in social life. The political effects of these changes gradually unfold. For one thing it is clear that Islam has become a crucial factor in the making of modern politics in Turkey. Admittedly, Islam has long played a marginalised political role and is more visible today. This has often mistakenly been referred to as the 'return of Islam'. This is not a very adequate understanding of the recent developments. Islam in Turkey has long been associated with rural backwardness, provincialism and conservatism and not least a strong inward looking attitude. Turkey's main Islamic political movement until the end of the 1990s was strongly against the relations with the European Union. However, the societal basis of the AKP is a strong urban Islamic middle class with an international outlook. The present saliency of Islam as a social and political force can, however, only be understood against the background of societal changes and not vice versa. Another important development is the intensified negotiations between Turkey and the European Union about the country's membership. The fact that the vast majority of the Turkish population has an Islamic background gives the membership issue a deeply cultural and religious connotation.

IRP ANKARA PROJECT IN BRIEF

The IRP Ankara Project, with the title ‘Managing Religious Diversity in a Changing World’, was conducted by the VU University Amsterdam and the University of Utrecht. The project started in October 2009 and was completed in December 2010. The project aimed to analyse the role of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyamet) today, both in the Netherlands and in Turkey. The research started from the assumption that the relation between religion and state in both Turkey and Western Europe is complex and dynamic. Taking a closer look at Diyanet therefore provides a good starting point, because it is an institution of a secular state that – paradoxically – is a major actor in Turkish religious life, illustrating this very complexity in the relation between religion and state. The central question in this project was how the recent changes in the religious and political balances of power (the coming into power of AKP, the Justice and Development Party) influence the position and political-religious decisions of Diyanet, and the relationships with the other players in the ‘religious field’.

RESEARCH COORDINATOR AND MAIN RESEARCH TEAM IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER:

- **Alper Bilgili** (*researcher, Istanbul University*)
- **Nazlı Bilgili** (*researcher, Sabancı University Istanbul*)
- **Dr Nico Landman** (*senior researcher, Utrecht University*)
- **Heleen van der Linden** (*researcher, VU University Amsterdam*)
- **Dr Thijl Sunier** (*project coordinator, VU University Amsterdam*)

Thursday
19 April 2012

3

(Religious) Minorities & Conflict

The session looks into the diverse ways in which religious identity is shaped in relation to other social cleavages such as ethnicity or regionalism in Nigeria and Sudan. Furthermore, this session examines the role of the legal context in the formation of religious identity (by regulating diversity).

Freedom of Religion in Nigeria and its Implications for Religious Identity

Jamila Nasir

This presentation will focus on the concept of freedom of religion as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its implications for the religious identity of its citizens. Religion plays a major role in the process of identity shaping both at the global and at the local levels. The world religions (Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism etc) all offer their adherents peculiarities that help identify the borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’. However, the adaptation of the religious codes to a specific situation can often lead to the shaping of a particular outlook of how we live and relate to others in society.

SESSION 3

RELATIONSHIP STATE AND RELIGION

Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states: “the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State religion.” This is supposed to define the relationship between state and religion. However, in Nigeria the government constantly intervenes in religious matters, of which the historical antecedents resulted in the reduction of the scope of the Sharia – the Islamic Law operating then – by removing aspects of it that looked “repugnant to natural justice and humanity”. At the same time, the intention of the formulators of this section of the Nigerian Constitution was to make the state ‘impartial’ in Nigeria’s multi-religious and multi-ethnic sphere, and thus give equal treatment to all religions.

This discussion will therefore examine the constitutional provision in the light of the declaration of the extension of the scope of the Sharia, which the governments of some states in

Northern Nigeria (Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina, Borno etc.) have undertaken since 1999 and its effect in the process on shaping religious identities in the context of the Sharia debate in Nigeria, especially when there are conflicts between Christians and Muslims.

JAMILA NASIR is Professor of Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Jos. She was a Senior Researcher in the 2002-2004 project on 'The Shariah Debate and the Shaping of Muslim and Christian Identities in Northern Nigeria' and co-edited the Jos Conference volume, P. Ostien, J.M. Nasir and F. Kogelmann, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Shariah in Nigeria* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd., 2005). She is also actively involved in Human Rights Monitor in Kaduna and BAOBAB for Women's Rights in Lagos. Her most recent book is *Sharia Implementation and Female Muslims in Nigeria's States in Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria (1996-2006): A Source Book*, written by J. M. Nasir and Compiled and Edited by Phillip Ostien, Vol. III. (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd., 2007).

Khartoum

Managing Religious Diversity in the Two Sudans



Mohamed A. Salam Babiker, Noah Salomon

This presentation will discuss how the governments of Sudan and South Sudan are regulating religious diversity in a manner that attempts to reconcile state ideology with international human rights norms as well as the practical need for social peace and political stability.

LEGAL STATUS OF MINORITIES AFTER THE SECESSION OF SOUTH SUDAN

The first presentation, by Mohamed A. Salam Babiker, concerns the legal status of religious minorities after secession of South Sudan placed in the context of the ongoing debate, whereby the National Congress Party (NCP) assures that Sharia will be the source of legislation in the upcoming constitution and the strong pressure from conservative groups on the NCP to abide by its promises. The presentation will first examine the existing legal and institutional framework applicable to minorities. The category of ‘minority’ in Sudan comprises both non-Muslims and Muslims such as traditional believers (those participating in a variety of extra-canonical folk practices) as well as Muslim groups who do not concur with dominant mainstream Islam and adopt a different version of Islamic interpretation (i.e. Shia and Republican Brothers). Second, the presentation highlights how the protection of religious minorities after secession will

raise critical issues, if indeed Sudan will be governed by the new constitutional design based on Islamic law. If a classical interpretation of Sharia is applied, there is an urgent need for stronger and more effective institutional protection in terms of substantive laws, mandate and institutional mechanisms to guarantee rights of both Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. Third, the presentation highlights the potential contradictions between the mainstream philosophy of traditional Sharia (that classifies the subjects of an Islamic State into different religious categories) and international human rights norms related to religious rights (to which Sudan adheres). Such classification will impact negatively on religious minorities, who would be rendered as second-class citizens in their own country. Finally, the presentation compares the existing legal guarantees for religious minorities in both Sudan and South Sudan, put in place after the end of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). If such arrangements cease to exist and no constitutional guarantees are agreed upon to recognise the religious diversity in both societies, inter-religious relations could be a potential threat to peaceful co-existence and security in the very near future.

INDEPENDENT ISLAM: ESTABLISHING RELIGION AT THE BIRTH OF SOUTH SUDAN

The second presentation, by Noah Salomon, explores how the nascent state of South Sudan is managing religious diversity as well as how Muslim minorities living in that state constitute themselves under the new political arrangements they have entered. While the central government officially promotes a clear separation between religion and state, those who understand South Sudan as a distinctly Christian nation have become increasingly vocal. It is within this context that religious minorities fear an increasing marginalisation within southern state and society. Muslim communities, in particular, fear persecution in the new state after decades of civil war in which Islamisation, if not Islam, was portrayed as a prime adversary to southern flourishing. Southern Muslims, however, are keen to distinguish themselves from their northern co-religionists and stress their desire for full integration as South Sudanese.

This portion of our presentation will address three clusters of research questions. What will the religious identity of the South Sudanese state be? How will the state balance a commitment to secularism, on the one hand, with demands for some variety of religious establishment on the other? Secondly, what will South Sudanese multiculturalism look like? In a nation where neither tribes, nor regions, nor even individual families are traditionally divided on the basis of religion, how will South Sudan's adoption of internationalist languages of religious freedom, and the concomitant constituting of Muslims as a distinct demographic, affect the existing social fabric in which it is easy to find households containing Muslims, Christians and adherents of local traditions under the same roof? Finally, how will South Sudanese Muslims position themselves within the new political context, which they have entered? How will South Sudanese Muslims define 'South Sudanese Islam' independent of the cultural stamp of the north?



Members of the Islamic Council of South Sudan during the independence ceremony, Juba.

NOAH SALOMON, 2011.

IRP KHARTOUM PROJECT IN BRIEF

The IRP Khartoum Project, started in February 2011 and to be completed by September 2012, is executed by the Centre d'Études et de Documentation Économiques, Juridiques et Sociales (CEDEJ) (Khartoum) in cooperation with the University of Khartoum. The project aims to create a better understanding of the legal, political, and social aspects of religion in Sudan. In this regard, the project aims to contribute to an alternative and insightful reading of the political sphere and of the official use of religion in politics. The two central themes, 'New Religious Trends' and the 'Status of Religious Minorities after the Referendum', are interlinked and include these different aspects of religion, revealing its multifaceted practices, usages and expressions. The first theme covers modern Sufi actors, Salafism, Islamic centrism and Islamic think tanks. The second theme studies the position of Christian and Muslim minorities in Sudan and South Sudan from a socio-legal perspective.

RESEARCH COORDINATOR AND MAIN RESEARCH TEAM IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER:

- **Akram Abbas** (*junior researcher, University of Khartoum*)
- **Dr Einas Ahmed** (*senior researcher, academic coordinator, CEDEJ*)
- **Mai Azzam** (*junior researcher, CEDEJ*)
- **Dr Mohamed Abdel Salam Babiker** (*senior researcher and co-coordinator, University of Khartoum*)
- **Dr Agnès de Geoffrey** (*senior researcher, administrative coordinator, CEDEJ*)
- **Omer Humeida** (*junior researcher, University of Khartoum*)
- **Dr Samia el Nagar** (*senior researcher, Ahfad University for Women, Sudan*)
- **Dr Abdel Basit Saeed** (*senior researcher, Ahfad University for Women, Sudan*)
- **Dr Noah Salomon** (*senior researcher, Carleton College, Northfield, USA*)

Abuja

Muslim & Christian Minorities in Northern Nigeria



Raufu Mustapha

SESSION 3

Religious minorities in Nigeria function at different levels of political agency and overlap with other cleavages such as ethnicity and regionalism. The non-Hausa Muslims, the Muslim Others of Kano, are caught between their co-religionists (the Hausa) on the one hand, and their co-ethnics (the southern Christians) on the other. Their perspectives and opportunities as a religious minority are therefore radically different from those of the Christian minority. This presentation highlights the diversity and internal dynamics in Nigeria by presenting three case studies: Yahaya Hashim and David Ehrhardt reflect on different dynamics of minority status in the city of Kano, while Jibrin Ibrahim's work on the Christian minority at the northern regional level introduces issues of history, political construction and competition, and insertion into national politics which are not so pronounced in the minority dynamics of Kano.

MUSLIM MINORITIES AND ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN KANO (YAHAYA HASHIM)

This part of the presentation focuses on the numerically significant but hidden population of non-Hausa Muslims in Kano. It documents and explores the changing configuration of ethno-religious conflicts in Kano by examining how the non-Hausa Muslim minority experience conflict. It explores how they organise the protection of their interests both in times of peace and conflict. How and why they are called or not called to the peace table, their identities as Muslims or as Muslim Others and their

institutional cleavages around ethnic or religious associations. The study shows how the reluctance to accept diversity among the dominant Hausa Muslims in Kano has created a feeling of two classes of Muslims in the city; with one class considered 'indigenous and authentic' and the other consisting of Muslims of minority ethnicities (within Kano) who are rendered second class even as they remain and feel part of the majority (Muslim) population in the city. Conversely, the link between intolerance, violence against Muslim minorities and their status as victims is also explored. The study found that non-Hausa Muslim minorities are attacked by both non-Hausa Christians and by Hausa Muslims during conflicts. The study also finds that their associations lack formal influence and are seldom called to the peace table after conflicts.

CHRISTIAN MINORITIES IN KANO (DAVID EHRHARDT)

Although the Nigerian constitution prohibits state religions and protects individual freedoms of conscience and of religious worship, many Christians in Kano feel they are an embattled minority in a Muslim city. This presentation critically examines the position of Christians in this ancient trading city, looking at their socio-economic status, their political participation, and the extent to which their freedoms of conscience and worship are constrained. The presentation shows a mixed picture: while Christian minorities in Kano are often better off than Muslims in socio-economic terms, their political participation is negligible, and many of them feel their religious freedom is, in some ways, significantly limited. CAN (Christian Association of Nigeria) provides one channel through which Christian communities attempt to tackle these inequalities; however, it has proven difficult for this highly politicised organisation to balance its adversarial national rhetoric with the practical local needs of Christians in Kano.



Friday prayer of the Qadiriyya Sufi order, Kano.

PHOTO BY DAVID EHRHARDT, 2012.

THE CHRISTIAN CONSTITUENCY AND MINORITY POLITICS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA (JIBRIN IBRAHIM)

Since 2009, there has been a rapid growth of terrorist activity in Northern Nigeria linked mainly to the activities of a radical Islamic group popularly known as Boko Haram. Christian communities, their churches and drinking bars have been targets in addition to security forces. The Christian community in Northern Nigeria feels seriously threatened. The Nigerian state itself is under threat from this growing insurgency and democracy is facing a major challenge. One of the most worrying dimensions to the Boko Haram ideology is their rejection of the modern, secular and federal state as they favour a theocratic Sharia state. It is important to note that the politics of the North has for long been configured as a power struggle between the majority Hausa-Fulani Muslim community on the one hand, and the non-Muslim, mainly Christian populations in the

Middle Belt on the other. The opposition between the two first took an organisational form with the formation of the Northern Nigeria Non-Muslim League in 1950, which metamorphosed into the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) in 1955. The UMBC was established as a front to mobilise Christian northerners to enable them to contest the perceived Muslim Hausa-Fulani hegemony. This was one of the major constituencies President Goodluck Jonathan mobilised to secure his elections in 2011. The political melange that has emerged has created one of the most explosive situations in the history of Nigeria, which we will be exploring in this presentation.

IRP ABUJA PROJECT IN BRIEF

The IRP Abuja Project is a collaboration between the University of Oxford (UK) and the Development Research and Project Centre (dRPC, Nigeria). The project started in October 2010 and will last until September 2012. Religious faith and its institutions are of unparalleled significance in Nigerian society today. Exploring their functions and dynamics will therefore help to identify entry points for policy interventions not only in the area of conflict resolution, but also in the area of socio-economic and human development. The project encompasses two overarching thematic goals: the mapping of Islamic actors in the north of Nigeria; and analysing the dynamics of inter-faith relations between Muslim groups, and between Muslims and Christians.

RESEARCH COORDINATOR AND MAIN RESEARCH TEAM
IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER:

- **Dr Abdulganiy Abimbola Abdussalam** (*research assistant*)
- **Dr Nur Alkali** (*researcher*)
- **Mohammed Bello** (*researcher*)
- **Habib Bukar** (*researcher*)
- **Dr Bunza** (*researcher*)
- **Tanko Danburan** (*researcher*)
- **Dr Rachel Diprose** (*researcher*)
- **Dr David Ehrhardt** (*research officer*)
- **Dr Yahaya Hashim** (*researcher*)
- **Dr Jibrin Ibrahim** (*senior advisor*)
- **Ustaz Khalid Muhammad Ibrahim** (*research assistant*)
- **Musa Ibrahim** (*researcher*)
- **Dr Abubakar Lawal** (*researcher*)
- **Dr Mahmoud El-Lawal** (*researcher*)
- **Dr Nasiru Idris Medugu** (*research assistant*)
- **Muhammad Sani Adam Modibbo** (*research assistant*)
- **Dr Abubakar Kawu Monguno** (*researcher*)
- **Ballama Shittima Mustapha** (*researcher*)
- **Dr Muhammad Umar Ndagi** (*research assistant*)
- **Dr Sa'adatu Hassan Liman** (*research assistant*)
- **Aminu Hayatu** (*researcher*)
- **Dr Mashood M. M. Jimba** (*research assistant*)
- **Dr Abdul Raufu Mustapha** (*coordinator*)
- **Dr Philip Ostien** (*main consultant on North Central Zone*)
- **Haruna Suleman** (*researcher*)
- **Surajo Muhammad Rimi** (*researcher*)
- **Bappare Umar** (*researcher*)
- **Dr Abubakar S.I. Wakawa** (*research assistant*)
- **Dr Judith Ann Walker** (*coordinator*)
- **Hamza Yau** (*researcher*)

Thursday
19 April 2012

4

Islamic Actors & Discourses in the Public Domain

This session will offer an interpretation of the relationship between Islam and democracy, via a discussion of the politics of negotiation in Muslim public spheres. Two case studies will be presented: one on the role of Islamic actors and ideas in the public debate on good governance in Senegal. The second case study describes forms of intellectual and cultural resistance to Shariatism in Aceh Indonesia.

Religious Multivocality, Non-Liberal Argument, and Democratic Negotiation in Muslim Public Spheres

Leonardo Villalón

The dominant approach in both academic scholarship and media coverage of the Muslim world frames the relationship between Islam and democracy in terms of the ‘compatibility’ of Islam and democracy. This approach is understandable, given that both religious and political actors actually tend to publicly debate issues and policies in such terms. This presentation will argue, however, that the very existence and prevalence of such debates actually underlines the fluid possibilities of negotiation in the Muslim public sphere. This presentation thus suggests the theoretical limitations of the compatibility approach – or, more strongly, that it is a conceptual dead-end – and proposes instead that we should begin with an understanding of the essentially contested nature of both core concepts: ‘Islam’ and ‘democracy’.

EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

Rather than approaching the question of democracy in terms of the approximation of a normative liberal model, we should begin with an empirical consideration of what democracy as thrust onto the agenda in much of the world in the past two decades has in fact entailed: a set of not always cohesive political ideas, an existing repertoire of institutions developed by experimentation and shaped by historical accidents in various specific parts of the world, and a broad ideological agenda for organising social and political order which was both borrowed and pushed from one context to another by the forces of glo-

balisation. In any given context, then, there is much room for debate and discussion on which elements are essential to a democratic order, which can be jettisoned, and which can be adapted or modified to fit local cultural and social contexts.

RELIGIOUS MULTIVOCALITY

Crucially, however, to the extent that the democratic order allows for the participation of religious actors, or for that matter of ordinary citizens wanting to frame their preferences in religious terms, the door is open to religious multivocality, and thus to the potential for democratising the religious order itself. Given open debate in the public sphere, as soon as an argument is made that any given policy proposal should be ‘compatible’ with religion, the possibility is open for multiple actors to argue both for and against the policy, supporting competing positions with the contention that this can be possible if religious texts or traditions are ‘correctly’ interpreted. Such arguments may not be ‘liberal’ (they do not derive from philosophical arguments about the requirements for human freedom), but they nevertheless open the door to democratic debates about whether given policies should be adopted, and in what form.

DEMOCRACY AS NEGOTIATED AND ONGOING POLITICAL PROCESS

This contribution builds on the political scientist Alfred Stepan’s work on religion and democracy to propose a conceptual understanding of democratisation as a negotiated and ongoing political process, inherently involving negotiation and compromises among actors with competing visions of society, and thus sometimes (perhaps often) invoking non-liberal public arguments in the name of religious values. Importantly, it will also argue that this dynamic is evident everywhere where religion is present in the public sphere, and not only in Muslim world, drawing a comparison to the current American context in which religious arguments profoundly inform policy debates in the public sphere.

LEONARDO A. VILLALÓN is Associate Professor of African Politics at the University of Florida, where he served as director of the Center for African Studies from 2002-2011. He has published numerous works on religion and politics and on democratisation in the Muslim countries of the African Sahel, where he has lived and traveled broadly over more than twenty years. He is currently completing a book on religion and democracy in Senegal, Mali and Niger.

Dakar

The Role of Islamic Actors & Ideas in the Public Debate on Good Governance in Senegal

Mamadou Bodian

In Senegal, since the 1990s, religious actors have increased their visibility in the public space. They have produced original discourses and practices that draw heavily on Islam and have sought to overcome the moral, political and economic predicaments of Senegalese state and society.

These discourses and practices can be observed in four different spaces. The first is the 'space of mediation' that has been historically occupied by the leaders of Sufi brotherhoods or *marabouts*. They often mediate between the government and the rest of society and help appease tensions. The second space is the 'space of preaching'. It is a composite universe in which Islamic scholars, imams, and Quranic teachers or *Serigne daara* operate. They use a variety of communication channels (mosques, religious programmes on radio and on TV, etc) to publicly express their views on how the country is ruled. The third sphere is the 'space of free criticism', in which mostly grandsons of the *marabouts* – in search of religious, social and political leadership – operate. The fourth and last space is the 'space of civic activism'. Religious actors with secularised speeches predominantly occupy this emerging space. They are politically committed and undertake civic actions for political and social change.

CAN RELIGIOUS ACTORS INFLUENCE IDEAS ON GOOD GOVERNANCE?

It is hard to measure how influential religious actors are in changing people's behaviours in the direction of good governance. Generally speaking, their discourses and practices have helped to promote a new understanding of what might be a 'good Muslim society'; that is, a society built upon principles of justice, equity, peace, and respect of human dignity. More specifically, the influence of religious actors depends on issues they address and the audience they target. For instance, since 2008

The main mosque in Touba, centre of the Mouride brotherhood.

NICK TATTERSALL/REUTERS, 2007.



the Association of Guediawaye Imams has been at the fore front of the fight against electricity cuts and the high cost of electricity bills. Its leaders have emerged as models of trust and loyalty, especially in Dakar's neighbourhood, where their opinions are followed. Additionally, the preachers have expanded the base of their audience, particularly since the liberalisation of the media in 1994. They are continually adjusting their discourse to better articulate an interpretation of Islamic dogma and religious readings of social, political, and economic matters. The preachers' argument on corruption and bad governance is gaining wide acceptance among citizens. Unlike imams and preachers who often side with the masses, authorities of Sufi brotherhoods usually manage to stay above the political and social fray. However, the fact that they are often engaged in clientelist relations with state officials and shy away from issues of corruption raises questions about their ability to be 'producers of good governance'. Nevertheless, their role as mediators is crucial in maintaining a peaceful social and political atmosphere, as it facilitates the dialogue between different actors.

DIVERSITY OF VOICES AND ACTIONS

In sum, within the current context of high demand for ethics and transparency in the management of public affairs, a key marker of religious actors' implications in the debate on good governance is the diversity of their voices and actions: religious civic activists undertake anti-corruption initiatives; preachers denounce corruption practices via the media and help strengthen accountability; leaders of Sufi brotherhoods provide a terrain for a peaceful dialogue between political and social actors. When these roles and endeavours are well articulated, they are able to provide a fertile ground for good governance in Senegal, as long as the country remains a functioning democracy, in which the freedom of the media and associations are guaranteed.

IRP DAKAR PROJECT IN BRIEF

The IRP Dakar project, which was conducted by the African Studies Centre in the Netherlands, started in September 2008 and was completed in December 2010. In addition to the execution of academic research, the project served to provide the embassy staff with background knowledge on the role of Islam in political and economic life in Senegalese society. The programme consisted of three sub-projects: the first served to analyse the relationship between Islam and politics, in particular the influence of the Senegalese Islamic brotherhoods on politics and vice versa. The second focused on the role of Islam (Islamic actors and networks, Islamic values) on the economy and the investment climate, and the third project analysed the role of Islamic actors and ideas in the public debate on good governance in Senegal. Particularly interesting was that throughout the research, the findings of the three sub-projects came to increasingly reinforce one another, contributing to the emergence of a dense picture of the changes and continuities of the role of Islam in Senegalese society over the last decades.

RESEARCH COORDINATOR AND MAIN RESEARCH TEAM IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER:

- **Dr Abdoul Azize Kebe** (*member steering committee*)
- **Selly Ba** (*intern*)
- **Mamadou Bodian** (*intern and senior researcher*)
- **Dorinda ten Brinke** (*intern, African Studies Centre*)
- **Jos van Dijk** (*intern, African Studies Centre*)
- **Dr Abdou Salam Fall** (*senior researcher*)
- **Dr Cheikh Gueye** (*senior researcher*)
- **Dr Mayke Kaag** (*coordinator, African Studies Centre*)
- **Marieke Kruis** (*intern, African Studies Centre*)
- **El Hadj Malick Sy Camara** (*intern*)
- **Dr Penda M'Bow** (*member steering committee*)
- **Dr Abdourahmane Seck** (*intern*)
- **Dr Ibrahima Thioub** (*member steering committee*)

Intellectual and Cultural Resistances to Shariatism in Aceh



Moch Nur Ichwan

Aceh is the only province in Indonesia allowed constitutionally to implement Sharia. The Law on Aceh Governance of 2006 regulates, among other things, Aceh's 'privileges' in the fields of religion, custom (*adat*), education, and the role of the *ulama* – privileges which have been interpreted generally as Sharia implementation. Apart from such state initiatives (both the law and privileges), there has also been a demand for a more totalised implementation of Sharia, voiced by Islamist parties, such as the United Development Party and Justice and Prosperity Party, and Islamist groups, such as the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). However, these Islamist groups did not come into being until some years after the tsunami of 2004, and have not yet gained much strength.

ALTERNATIVE VOICES

This research focuses on the 'alternative voices' to both officialised and totalised 'Shariatism' (or Sharia-ism), that is, a political agenda and ideology that places Sharia as both private and public law, and above all other kinds of laws, and necessitates the use of state to enforce it, in Aceh after the issuance of Law on Aceh Governance. This specific presentation focuses on intellectual and cultural resistances against this form of Sharia implementation.

MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS AND ACADEMICS

A number of Muslim intellectuals and academics in Indonesia – such as Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Fuad Mardhatillah, Affan Ramly, and Muhammad Alkaf – have been critical of official and totalised Shariatisation in their writings. There are also some institutions involved in this endeavour, of which some of the above intellectuals are members, such as The Aceh Institute, KSAF Institute, Komunitas Panteu, KSD (Kelompok Studi Darussalam) and FIRL (Forum Islam Rahmatan Lil-'Alamin) as well as the State Institute of Islamic Studies [IAIN] Ar-Raniry and Syiah Kuala University. There is also a small community of Shiite intellectuals, usually associated with KSAF Institute and Komunitas Panteu – although not all of their members or participants are Shiite – which is critical in this process too. Most of these actors promote their ideas through public discussions, seminars, and writings in mass media.

CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS OF RESISTANCE

There are also some cultural expressions of resistance which either directly or indirectly problematise officialised and totalised Shariatism. First, the empowerment of *adat* (customary) laws and practices. Second, literary and artistic works, in the form of poetry, short stories, novels, films, and caricatures. Third, cultural demonstrations, such as the 'skirt donation' and 'skirt rental' in West Aceh. Fourth, cultural events, such as the underground Gay Festival (Festival Pemilihan Duta Waria) and music concerts, including those organised by punk communities.

VARIETY OF INTERPRETATIONS

However, rhetorically, most of those critical of Shariatism do not reject Sharia as such, at least openly, and refuse to be labeled 'anti-Sharia'. In the context of Aceh, such a label could put them in a dangerous position and could negatively impact their struggle. What they oppose is the way Sharia has been interpreted and imposed by the government and Islamist groups. They offer alternative perspectives and interpretations of Sharia which are more democratic and tolerant to minorities.



A policeman stops girls during a street inspection, Banda Aceh.

BEAWIHARTA BEAWIHARTA/REUTERS, 2009.

IRP JAKARTA PROJECT IN BRIEF

The IRP Jakarta Project is executed by the Training Indonesia's Young Leaders Programme, which forms part of the Leiden Institute for Area Studies (LIAS). The project started in 2010 and will be completed in December 2012. The project aims to analyse religious trends in contemporary Indonesian society specifically looking at developments related to the role of Islam in political, cultural and socio-legal contexts. Additionally, this project aims to broaden the Embassy's network with researchers, policy officers and key figures in Indonesia. The first research theme is Sharia-based legislation in Indonesia focusing on a comparison between international treaties and local practices with regard to the position of women and children. The second theme is developments related to Islam in Aceh. The third theme studies developments within organisations and parties with Islam as their basis, focusing on the impact of Muslim organisations and the *ulama* group on political parties.

RESEARCH COORDINATOR AND MAIN RESEARCH TEAM IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER:

- **Marise van Amersfoort** (*programme officer, Leiden University*)
- **Dr Léon Buskens** (*senior consultant, Leiden University*)
- **Dr Kees van Dijk** (*senior consultant, Leiden University*)
- **Mohammed Latif Fauzi** (*junior researcher*)
- **Stijn van Huis** (*junior researcher, Leiden University*)
- **Reza Idria** (*junior researcher*)
- **Dr Nico Kaptein** (*research coordinator/senior consultant, Leiden University*)
- **Dr Ahmad Norma Permata** (*post-doc researcher, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University Yogyakarta*)
- **Dr Moch Nur Ichwan** (*post-doc researcher, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University Yogyakarta*)
- **Dr Euis Nurlaewati** (*post-doc researcher, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta*)
- **Bastiaan Scherpen** (*junior researcher*)

COLOPHON

- *Editors* **Katrien Bardoel, Hannah Mason**
- *Design* **De Kreeft, Amsterdam**
- *Print* **EPS, Amsterdam**

© 2012 Project Office IRP/Authors. All rights reserved.
 Nothing in this publication may be reproduced
 without the permission of the publisher/author.
 This publication is solely for the purpose of the 2012
 IRP conference and is not for further distribution or
 circulation. Responsibility for the facts and opinions
 expressed in this publication rests with the authors.
 The views do not necessarily reflect those of the
 Project Office or its supporters.


HET NUTSHUIS
RIVIERVISMARKT 5
2513 AM THE HAGUE

HOTEL IBIS
JAN HENDRIKSTRAAT 10
2512 GL THE HAGUE

TRAM 2 & 6
STOP: GROTE MARKT

TRAM 2 & 6
STOP: CENTRAL STATION

THE HAGUE
CENTRAL STATION



PROJECT OFFICE IRP

**P.O. Box 11089
2301 EB Leiden
The Netherlands
info@irp.leidenuniv.nl
+31-71-527 76 76**