DEALING WITH JIHADISM

A policy comparison between the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK and the US (2010 to 2017)

Stef Wittendorp, Roel de Bont, Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker
Dealing with jihadism: A policy comparison between the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK, and the US (2010 to 2017)

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December 2017 (the research was completed in October 2016)

ISSN 2452-0551
e-ISSN 2452-056X

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Cover design: Oscar Langley
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGG</td>
<td>Mixed Anti-Terrorist Group (Antiterroristische Gemengde Groep; Groupe Interforces Anti-Terroriste, GIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADIV</td>
<td>General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Dienst Inlichting en Veiligheid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>Cell for Financial Information Processing (Cel voor Financiële Informatieverwerking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO</td>
<td>Directorate of Administrative Police Operations (Directie van de operaties inzake bestuurlijke politie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGJ</td>
<td>Directorate-General of Judicial Police (Algemene Directie Gerechtelijke Politie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJP</td>
<td>Directorate of Countering Crime against Persons, operates under the DGJ (Directie van de bestrijding van de criminaliteit tegen personen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCU</td>
<td>Federal Computer Crime Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGP</td>
<td>Federal Judicial Police (Federale Gerechtelijke Politie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOD</td>
<td>Federal Public Service (Federale Overheidsdienst)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>Joint Information Box</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIV</td>
<td>Framework Document Integrated Security (Kadernota Integrale Veiligheid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIVC</td>
<td>Local Integrated Security Cell (Lokale Integrale Veiligheidscel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTF</td>
<td>Local Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTF</td>
<td>National Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCAD</td>
<td>Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (Orgaan voor de Coördinatie en de Analyse van de Dreiging; Organe de Coordination et d’Analyse de la Menace, OCAM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>Network AntiRadicalism (Réseau AntiRadicalisme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSSE</td>
<td>State Security Service (Veiligheid van de Staat)</td>
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### Denmark

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Service (Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PET</td>
<td>Security and Intelligence Service (Politiets Efterretningstjeneste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIRI</td>
<td>Agency for International Recruitment and Integration (Styrelsen for International Rekruttering og Integration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>Partnership of schools, social services and the police (Skole, Socialforvaltning, Politi)</td>
</tr>
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### Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAMF</td>
<td>Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BfV</td>
<td>Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz; federal domestic security service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKA</td>
<td>Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMI</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BND</td>
<td>Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAR</td>
<td>Joint Defence Centre against Right-wing Extremism (Gemeinsame Abwehrzentrum gegen Rechtsextremismus; now GETZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GETZ</td>
<td>Joint Centre for Countering Extremism and Terrorism (Gemeinsames Extremism- und Terrorismusabwehrzentrum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTAZ</td>
<td>Joint Counter-terrorism Centre (Gemeinsame Terrorismusabwehrzentrum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LiV</td>
<td>State Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Landesbehörde für Verfassungsschutz; state security service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LKA</td>
<td>State Criminal Police Office (Landeskriminalamt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Military Counter-intelligence Service (Militärischer Abschirmdienst)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSU</td>
<td>National Socialist Underground (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Faktion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBEG</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism Supplemental Act (Terrorismusbekämpfungsergänzungsgesetz)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBG</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism Act (Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz)</td>
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**France**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CILAT</td>
<td>Inter-Ministerial Counter-terrorism Committee (Comité Interministériel de Lutte Anti-Terroriste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRI</td>
<td>Council for Domestic Intelligence (Conseil du Renseignement Intérieur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDN</td>
<td>Council for Defence and National Security (Conseil de Défense et de Sécurité Nationale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Council for Domestic Security (Conseil de Sécurité Intérieur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCRG</td>
<td>Central Directorate of General Intelligence (Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux; incorporated in the DCRI in 2008 and in the DGSI as from 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCRI</td>
<td>Central Directorate of Domestic Intelligence (Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur; transformed into the DGSI as from 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGSI</td>
<td>General Directorate of Domestic Security (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DST</td>
<td>Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire; incorporated as part of the DCRI per 2008 and in the DGSI per 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Armed Islamic Group (Groupe islamique armé)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>Judicial Police (Police Judiciaire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLAT</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism Coordination Unit (Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCLAT</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism Coordination Service (Service pour Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste)</td>
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**The Netherlands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIVD</td>
<td>General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst; formerly BVD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASTA</td>
<td>Official Steering Group Terrorist Actions (Ambtelijke Stuurgroep Terroristische Acties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>Ministry of General Affairs (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVD</td>
<td>Domestic Security Service (now AIVD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZK</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Alliance (Christen Democratisch Appel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COTb</td>
<td>Coordinating Body on Counter-terrorism Coordination (Coördinerend Overleg Terrorismebestrijding)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CT Infoxbox  Counter-terrorism Infobox
CU  Christian Union (ChristenUnie)
DTN  Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands (Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland)
GCT  Joint Counter-terrorism Committee (Gezamenlijk Comité Terrorismebestrijding)
IND  Immigration and Naturalisation Services (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst)
KMar  Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (Dutch gendarmerie corps; Koninklijke Marechaussee)
MIVD  Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst)
NCTb  National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding; now NCTV)
NCTV  National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid; formerly NCTb)
OCW  Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap)
OM  Public Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie)
PvdA  Labour Party (Partij voor de Arbeid)
PVV  Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid)
SMN  Alliance of Dutch Moroccans (Samenwerkingsverband Marokkaanse Nederlanders)
SZW  Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid)
V&J  Ministry of Security and Justice (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie)
VVD  People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie)

United Kingdom

BIT  Behavioral Insights Team
CNI  Critical National Infrastructure
CONTEST  Counter-Terrorism Strategy
CPS  Crown Prosecution Service
CSP  Crime Safety Partnerships
CTC  Counter-Terrorism Command
CTIRU  Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit
CTSA  Counter-Terrorism Security Advisor
DCLG  Department for Communities and Local Government
DI  Defence Intelligence
GCHQ  Government Communications Headquarters (intelligence service focused on intercepting electronic signals)
ISC  Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament
JTAC  Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
LAA  Local Area Agreement
MI5  Military Intelligence, Section 5 (also known as the Security Service, internal intelligence and security service)
MI6  Military Intelligence, Section 6 (also known as the Secret Intelligence Service, foreign intelligence service)
MPS  Metropolitan Police Service
NaCTSO  National Counter-Terrorism Security Office
NHS  National Health Service
NI  National Indicator
NIS  National Indicator Set
NOMS  National Offender Management Service
NPCC  National Police Chiefs’ Council
OSCT  Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism
PCTN  Police Counter-Terrorism Network
PEO  Prevent Engagement Officers
PET  Preventing Extremism Together
PSA  Public Service Agreement
PVE  Preventing Violent Extremism
RICU  Research Information and Communications Unit
SIDC  Security Innovation and Demonstration Centre
SRGP  Security and Resilience Growth Partnership
YJB  Youth Justice Board

United States
AEDPA  Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
ATA  Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
CAB  Community Awareness Briefing
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
City HRC  City of [city name] Human Relations Commission
CREX  Community Resilience Exercise
CTS  Counterterrorism Section
CVE  Countering Violent Extremism
DHS  Department of Homeland Security
DNI  Director of National Intelligence
DoJ  Department of Justice (Ministry of Justice)
DoS  Department of State (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
DSOP  Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency
HSAS  Homeland Security Advisory System
IC  Intelligence Community
ICG  Interagency Coordination Group
IPC  Interagency Policy Committee
ISBCC  Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center
JTTF  Joint Terrorism Task Force
LAPD  Los Angeles Police Department
LASD  Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
NCTC  National Counterterrorism Center
NSCT  National Strategy for Combating Terrorism/National Strategy for Counterterrorism
NSS  National Security Strategy
NTAS  National Terrorism Advisory System
NTB  National Terrorism Bulletin
OCF  Office for Community Partnerships
OCRL  Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
ODNI  Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OHS  Office of Homeland Security
PDB  President’s Daily Brief
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIP</td>
<td>Strategic Implementation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTIC</td>
<td>Terrorist Threat Integration Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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**Other**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTF</td>
<td>Foreign Terrorist Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
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</table>
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Summary

This report offers an understanding of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies in the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Its emphasis is on developments following the 11 September 2001 attacks, and addresses the phenomenon referred to as jihadism. This report, the first in a series, hopes to contribute to a greater understanding of Dutch policy in an international perspective. Subsequent reports will explore particular subareas in more detail, including person-specific measures regarding so-called Syria/Iraq travellers, and court cases against these individuals. This report offers background information by analysing how approaches dealing with jihadism, which involve counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation measures, are organised in the above-mentioned countries. This report examines policy plans and strategies, both at the declaratory level and, to a lesser extent, during implementation. In addition, this report looks into which actors are involved in dealing with jihadism. The primary focal point are policies at the national level with other levels of administration such as policies by local authorities featuring only indirectly.

The report identifies three developments. Firstly, because plans and strategies have been developed in all countries, it is possible to refer to counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation as policy domains. However, there are differences in each country. Germany has a counter-terrorism strategy, but it is not public; this also applied to the British counter-terrorism strategy until 2006 and to the Belgian counter-radicalisation strategy until June 2016. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom explicitly use their policy documents to communicate with the public about policies and potential threats. Both countries have been developing plans for dealing with radicalisation since 2005. Denmark followed in 2007 and the United States in 2009. France is a relative newcomer in this area, with its first serious initiatives in 2014. In all countries, the public visibility of the counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation domain has increased enormously. At the same time, the many revisions of plans show that the structure and content of policies dealing with jihadism is has no fixed form.

The second development refers to the increased coordination of policy and initiatives for sharing information. This is related in particular to the idea
that counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation require a comprehensive approach. Although the traditional actors such as intelligence and security services, the police, and judicial authorities remain important, there are also new ones. These actors include socially-oriented institutions in the fields of education, welfare, and care, both governmental and non-governmental, as well as the commercial sector. This comprehensive approach is also evident in the different levels of administration involved in counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation: it is not exclusively a national issue; instead in each country local authorities are regarded as crucial for the success of national objectives. The policy domain links several administrative levels and types of activities (from early identification to criminal prosecution). This means that coordination and information-sharing (will) play an important role in conducting policy. The third development regards the demarcation of the policy domain. It does not have clear boundaries, in particular due to the inclusion of non-traditional security partners and non-governmental partners with regard to preventing radicalisation.
1 Introduction

Concerns about the growth of and support for jihadism at home and abroad have increased since 2012. Initially these concerns focused on so-called foreign fighters who travelled to conflict zones in Syria. These concerns came to include persons returning from the battlefields in Syria/Iraq and persons who were stopped on their way as well as a growing number of (attempted) larger and smaller attacks. As a result, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation have been high on the political agenda in the Netherlands. Since then existing policies have been intensified, new measures have been taken, and assessments have been made whether additional initiatives are necessary.

For instance, in the Netherlands an Integrated Approach to Jihadism was presented in August 2014. In addition, a new Dutch counter-terrorism strategy was introduced in 2016, which focused on a flexible and sustainable approach to dealing with terrorism and extremism. The Dutch situation is not unique: other Western countries have also been confronted with jihadism, and have taken or announced similar measures in recent years.

The aim of this series of reports is to show how the Dutch response to jihadism compares internationally for the period of 2010-2016. This report offers an overview of policies in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). This report focuses on the period following the attacks on 11 September 2001, as this event led many countries to take extra measures against terrorism. It therefore covers a broader period than that stated above.

The response to jihadism is embedded within other practices and includes counter-terrorism, which involves obtaining information about, the advance identification of, as well as the possible criminal prosecution of individuals considered to be a risk to the democratic legal order. This involves the intelligence and security services, police, and judicial authorities. The response to jihadism also includes the prevention of radicalisation through

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1 Special thanks to Amy Kasper in assisting with the translation and to Aimee Feeney for the final editing.
3 Rijksoverheid 2016, p. 7.
socially-oriented, restrictive as well as criminal measures. This report inventories what kind of measures are taken in terms of dealing with jihadism.

This report shows the similarities and differences between the above-mentioned countries and the Netherlands in how they deal with jihadism. The general context is largely the same, meaning that all these countries are confronted with jihadism. However, the degree to which this is the case differs, and the way in which these countries respond also varies. This is partly due to the political and legal culture of the countries and differences in their state structures. In order to analyse the similarities and differences in their policies dealing with jihadism, it is important to assess the context in which they have developed.

The subject of this first report is how policies regarding jihadism are organised in the investigated countries. To this end, policy plans and strategies were examined. Do these exist? Are they accessible to the general public? Is there an overarching vision for dealing with jihadism? Secondly, which actors are involved in policies dealing with jihadism? Are mainly national bodies involved, or are local authorities also included in crafting policy? Do non-governmental actors play a role?

The report is structured as follows. First of all, the set-up of the study is delineated in greater detail. This is followed by two parts, whereby Part One examines the policy plans and strategies of each country. Part Two examines the actors involved in the policies, explained again for each country. Finally, the conclusion summarises the most salient similarities and differences between Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK, the US, and the Netherlands.
2 Study design and methods

This chapter explains the choices informing the design and methods informing this series of reports.

2.1 Background information on this series of reports

This study was made possible by funds from the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). Since 2012 there have been many developments with regard to dealing with jihadism. As mentioned in the introduction, the aim of this report is to contribute to a greater understanding of Dutch policy in an international perspective. This report is the first in a series, and which provides an overview of counter-terrorism policy and the prevention of radicalisation in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK, the US, and the Netherlands.

Subsequent reports will be thematic. One report inventories measures taken against (potential) Syria/Iraq travellers and returnees, and another report maps court cases against these individuals. These reports seek to increase knowledge about dealing with jihadism by inventorying and comparing the laws and policies of the Netherlands with that of six other Western countries.

2.2 Framework of analysis

An overall framework is used to make a comparison possible between countries. Although this framework particularly applies to the subsequent reports, we will briefly explain it here. This framework consists of the fivefold distinction between different types of government intervention that are mentioned in the Dutch counter-terrorism strategy: acquire, prevent, defend, prepare, and prosecute.

The decision to use this framework is twofold. Firstly, the aim of this series of reports, as mentioned above, is to explain to Dutch policymakers how Dutch policy relates to that of several other European countries and the US. The fivefold distinction is an obvious choice, as they represent the overall vision for the Dutch approach to counter-terrorism and the prevention of radicalisation. Secondly, classifying the other countries according to the five above-mentioned aspects is useful in terms of shedding light on other countries’ priorities.
2.3 Terminology

A number of terms in this report must be explained in greater detail. To begin with the term *policy domain*. The introduction referred to counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation as a policy domain. This term suggests a field with a clearly demarcated set of problems and actors, but this is not the case. Reality is much more complex. In this report, the term policy domain refers to efforts dealing with jihadism which includes both counter-terrorism as well as counter-radicalisation. The boundaries of this domain vary over time and differ from country to country, as do the number and type of actors that are active in this policy domain.

Another term that needs explanation is *jihadism*. This is the most common term in Dutch discourse to refer to what is considered in the National Counter-terrorism Strategy 2016-2020 as ‘the most important threat (…) for our national security’.\(^4\) With the term jihadism the NCTV refers to “an extreme political ideology which aims to meet the divine obligation to spread Islam all over the world. This is to be achieved by a ‘holy war’ against all unbelievers: In the eyes of Jihadists, anything that deviates from the ‘pure doctrine’ has to be fought with violence”\(^5\). This ‘holy war’ is also called the lesser jihad, the armed struggle to defend Islam. In this report the term ‘jihadism’ does *not* refer to the basic meaning in the Quran, the greater jihad, which indicates the inner effort of a believer to live as a good Muslim.\(^6\)

Since 2004 the term ‘jihadism’ has been commonly used in Dutch policy documents; before 2004 the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ was used, and until 2001 the term ‘radical Islamic groups’ appeared regularly.\(^7\) For the term *foreign fighter* and *returnee* variations have been used, which are still common, such as ‘jihad-goers’, ‘jihad fighters’, ‘Syria travellers’, and ‘foreign fighters’.\(^8\) This search for the most suitable terminology reflects attempts to define the problem. The terminology also varies internationally, as is shown

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\(^4\) Rijksoverheid 2016, p. 6.
\(^5\) Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid 2016.
\(^6\) Berger 2006, p. 203.
\(^7\) Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst 2005; Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst 2002.
\(^8\) See Bakker and De Roy van Zuidewijn 2015, p. 21.
in Table 1. For reasons of clarity, in this report the terms Syria/Iraq travellers and returnees are used.

**Table 1: Recent names for Syria/Iraq travellers in the selected countries (2014-2016)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>‘Foreign Terrorist Fighters’, ‘Syriëstrijders’(^9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>‘truslen fra personer udrejst til Syrien og Irak’, ‘udrejsende’(^{10})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>‘Ausgereisten’, ‘Rückkehrer’(^{11})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>‘les filières syro-irakiennes’(^{12})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>‘Foreign fighters’(^{13})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>‘Foreign (terrorist) fighters’(^{14})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4 The national context

Jihadism is an international phenomenon. In several international fora countries collaborate in dealing with jihadism. These include the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe, the European Union (EU), the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the Counter Terrorism Group, the latter being part of the so-called *Club de Berne*, an informal annual meeting of mainly European security services. Without downplaying the role of these international fora, the focus of this report is with the national level as policy is mainly implemented in this context. Within the national context, regional and/or local initiatives are also examined, although the main focus remains the national level.

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\(^9\) FOD Binnenlandse Zaken 2016; Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en minister van Justitie; Vlaamse regering 2015.

\(^{10}\) Politiets Efterretningstjeneste 2014.

\(^{11}\) Bundesministerium des Innern 2016a.

\(^{12}\) Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2015; Premier Ministre 2016.

\(^{13}\) HM Government 2016.

\(^{14}\) U.S. Department of State 2016a.
2.5 Selection of countries

This study focuses on seven countries. Besides the Netherlands it includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK, and the US. The choice of these countries is informed by the following considerations: they are neighbouring countries to the Netherlands (Belgium and Germany); the country has a pioneering role in dealing with jihadism (UK); they have a different approach (Denmark and France); or there is little knowledge about their policies regarding jihadism (US).

2.6 Time period

Although the overall series of reports focuses on policy developments between 2010 and 2016, the current report covers a broader period since it is a background study. The country studies in this report briefly detail events before 2001 but the emphasis is on developments after 2001.

2.7 Sources and methods

This report primarily examines declarative policy: policy that is included in action plans and strategies. To a lesser extent it examines actual policy implementation. The initial step of the research involved the mapping of documents that set out the approach to counter-terrorism or how to deal with radicalisation, extremism or jihadism. This initial broad scope was necessary, because dealing with jihadism is not a distinct activity but part of counter-terrorism and the prevention of radicalisation. This report has limited itself to outlining the main features of the policy rather than a detailed inquiry. Relevant academic literature was used to interpret developments. Several academic experts and policymakers were consulted to clarify certain matters.
Part I

Policies
3 The Netherlands

3.1 The emergence of counter-terrorism as a policy domain

The Netherlands has been developing a response to terrorism since the 1970s. The immediate occasion were several hostage-takings and two train hijackings by Moluccan groups, resulting in several deaths. After this the Domestic Security Service (BVD), which was mainly occupied with countering communist influences, expanded its focus to include terrorism. An Official Steering Group Terrorist Actions (ASTA) was set up to coordinate the actions of the police, judicial authorities, and the BVD. The Dutch strategy towards terrorism was also known as the Dutch Approach: attempts to enter into a dialogue with the offenders was tried for as long as possible, but the use of force was never excluded. Aside from interventions by the police and army, this approach to dealing with terrorism had little public character, and it is hard to speak of a distinct policy domain at this time.

This changed somewhat starting in 1991, with the publication of an annual report about the activities of the BVD. Terrorism was one of the areas of attention in the report. But it was not until after the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 that major changes occurred. In October 2001, the government presented the Counter-terrorism and Security Action Plan, in which 43 measures were announced to strengthen the detection of (potential) terrorists.\(^1\) An actual policy vision followed in June 2003. By way of the document Terrorism and the Protection of Society, the so-called comprehensive approach (‘brede benadering’), already developed by the BVD in 1999, was declared official government policy.\(^2\)

The comprehensive approach combines a criminal (repressive) and preventive approach, whereby the latter is aimed at the identification of individuals before they are prepared to use violence, i.e. processes of radicalisation. The 2003 document referred to ‘addressing the roots of terrorism’, besides a listing of measures relating to detection, intervention, legal prosecution, surveillance and the protection of persons and objects.\(^3\)

\(^1\) In Dutch: ‘Actieplan terrorismebestrijding en veiligheid’.
\(^3\) Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2003, p. 6.
After the attacks in Madrid in March 2004, two additional policy documents were published with an emphasis on improving and intensifying existing measures. A new addition was the establishment of an alert system informing important business sectors or districts about the risk of a terrorist attack on the basis of a number of threat levels.\(^4\) In practice this system was, and still is not, widely used. Another priority was improving the coordination of counter-terrorism policy through the creation of a new actor: the National Counter-terrorism Coordinator (NCTb).\(^5\)

### 3.2 The prevention of radicalisation

The prime concern with detection and criminal prosecution meant that a concern with addressing the root causes of terrorism, which was outlined in the 2003 document, remained behind.\(^6\) This changed in August 2005 with the publication of a new policy document entitled Radicalism and Radicalisation, along with the policy framework Approach to Hotbeds of Radicalisation, published in December 2005. It meant that the ‘preliminary phase’ which could lead to terrorism became a domain of policymaking. The prevention of radicalisation included three elements: actively confronting radicals and their facilitators, promoting societal resilience, and reinforcing the bond of individuals and communities with society and the legal system.\(^7\)

Characteristic of the prevention of radicalisation was, and still is, the taking of administrative measures due to the impossibility or undesirability of starting criminal procedures.

The Balkenende IV government (2007-2010; CDA, PvdA and CU) promised to take more action against radicalisation, leading to the publication of the government-wide Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007-2011 in August 2007. This plan mainly focused on ‘Islamic radicalisation and right-wing extremist radicalisation’ as the most important societal concerns. Animal rights activism and ‘extreme left/anti-globalists’ were also mentioned, but regarded as less urgent matters.\(^8\)

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\(^4\) Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2004a, p. 7.
\(^5\) Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2004b, p. 6.
\(^6\) Abels 2012.
\(^8\) Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2007, p. 5-7. This distribution of attention is also evident from the way in which subsidies are spent, see KplusV organisatieadvies 2012, appendix 3.
3.3 Strategy and evaluation

In November 2007, Democrats 66 (D66) MP Alexander Pechtold requested an exploration of how to conduct an evaluation of counter-terrorism policy.\(^9\) In May 2009, the Suyver Committee, which was created for this purpose, concluded that the policy’s coherence could be improved.\(^10\) The Rutte I minority government (2010-2012; VVD and CDA with parliamentary support by the PVV) decided to draw up a National Counter-terrorism Strategy 2011-2015. The strategy is organised according to five themes.

In this counter-terrorism strategy, policy is organised on the basis of five themes. ‘Acquiring’ refers to gathering intelligence and information about (possible) threats. ‘Preventing’ refers to countering attacks as well as the phenomenon of terrorism itself. ‘Defending’ refers to taking protective measures with regard to individual persons, services or sectors as well as important sectors as a whole. ‘Preparing’ refers to dealing with the potential consequences of an attack, varying from crisis decision-making to increasing societal resilience. ‘Prosecuting’ refers to criminal prosecution whereby the emphasis lies on intervening in the preparatory stages of terrorist offences. Furthermore, the counter-terrorism strategy emphasises the importance to ‘evaluate [it] periodically and test for legitimacy, effectiveness and proportionality’.\(^11\) The end of the strategy’s duration would constitute the first moment of evaluation.

In the spring of 2016, the first evaluation of the strategy appeared and this was carried out by scholars in public administration experts affiliated with Utrecht University. The evaluation ascertained that the attention to and the capacity for counter-terrorism in the period 2011-2015 was subject to change due to shifting political priorities and budget cuts. One of the recommendations was to make a distinction between a permanent and a flexible use of capacities.\(^12\) The new strategy, which was published in July 2016 and organised on the basis of the same five themes as the previous strategy, adopts this recommendation.\(^13\)

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\(^10\) Commissie evaluatie antiterrorismebeleid 2009, p. 85.
\(^11\) Rijksoverheid 2011, p. 110.
\(^12\) Universiteit Utrecht 2016, p. 9.
\(^13\) Rijksoverheid 2016, p. 4.
3.4 Dealing with jihadism

In the spring of 2013, concerns about ‘jihad travellers’ became very prominent.\textsuperscript{14} In the Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands (DTN) 32, a periodical communication informing the House of Representatives and the general public about the current terrorist threat, the NCTV mentioned a strong increase in the number of Dutch individuals travelling to conflict zones. In June 2014, the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) identified a transformation of jihadism in the Netherlands: from small, independent, isolated networks to more connected, and visible networks.\textsuperscript{15}

Further policy development concerning the response to jihadist travellers occurred with the Integrated Approach to Jihadism Action Programme in August 2014.\textsuperscript{16} This programme consists of six elements: risk reduction of would-be jihadists, interventions for those travelling to conflict zones, radicalisation, social media, and exchange of information and cooperation. Although the Action Programme introduced several new measures, it continued the comprehensive approach with its combination of repressive and preventive measures. This corresponded with the counter-terrorism strategy which emphasised the importance of engaging in criminal prosecution when terrorist offences are still in a preparatory phase.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2013, p. 2.
\item Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst 2014, p. 5-6.
\item Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid and Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2014.
\item Rijksoverheid 2011, p. 99.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Figure 1: Timeline the Netherlands; policies and events

- **October 2001**: CT and Security Action Plan
- **September 2001**: Attacks US
- **March 2004**: Attacks Madrid
- **November 2004**: Attacks Amsterdam
- **July 2005**: Attacks London
- **July 2003**: Terrorism and the Protection of Society
- **December 2005**: Approach to Hotbeds of Radicalisation
- **August 2005**: Radicalism and radicalisation
- **April 2011**: National CT strategy 2011-2015
- **August 2014**: Integrated Approach to Jihadism Action Programme
- **July 2016**: National CT strategy 2016-2020

**Years and Events:**

- 2001
- 2002
- 2003
- 2004
- 2005
- 2006
- 2007
- 2008
- 2009
- 2010
- 2011
- 2012
- 2013
- 2014
- 2015
- 2016

- **March 2012**: Attacks Midi-Pyrénées
- **March 2013**: DTN 2: Increase Dutch Jihad travellers
- **May 2013**: Attack Woolwich
- **May 2014**: Attack Brussels
- **January 2015**: Attacks Paris
- **February 2015**: Attacks Copenhagen
- **November 2015**: Attacks Paris
- **March 2016**: Attacks Brussels
- **July 2016**: Attack Nice; Attacks Germany
4 Belgium

4.1 An overview
Since the 1980s Belgian counter-terrorism policy has focused on understanding and dealing with the roots of terrorism. In line with this focus on prevention, the Belgian government prepared the confidential Mosque Plan in 2002. This plan focused exclusively on radicalisation related to jihadist terrorism. In 2005 the name was changed to Action Plan Radicalism, also referred to as Plan R. This federal plan broadened the scope by also including ‘other expressions of inflammatory language, fundamentalist ideas, racist, anarchistic, and extremist opinions’. The document contained administrative and legal measures of a proactive, preventive, and reactive character. Currently, it remains the cornerstone of the Belgian federal approach to dealing with jihadists travelling to and returning from Syria and Iraq. Periodic evaluations of the plan are carried out, but the results are not publicly available.

Although radicalisation had been on the agenda for quite some time in Belgium, the issue was not addressed in a resolute way. After the introduction of Plan R, it took about ten years before preventive policy was actually realised on a decentralised level. This was partly due to the fact that radicalisation was not regarded as an urgent problem. Another factor was the complex state structure in Belgium (see the heading Complexity). Only after the departure of Belgian citizens to Syria in 2012 that additional plans were crafted on the federal, regional, local, and community-based level.

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1 Coolsaet and Struye de Swielande 2007, p. 19.
2 Personal communication R. Coolsaet, emeritus professor International Politics Ghent University 20 August 2016.
3 In Dutch: ‘Actieplan Radicalisme’.
4 Saerens 2006-2007, p. 28.
5 Belgische Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers 2007.
7 Coolsaet 2015.
8 Personal communication M. Dewaele, radicalisation project team employee VVSG, 10 June 2016.
9 The regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital Region) are area-based governments and constitute the first decentralised layer in the administrative organisation of Belgium together with the communities. The regions address local issues (including economics, employment, housing, and the living environment). The communities (Flemish, French, and German) are local governments and address local issues (including culture, education, health care, youth care, social assistance, family help, and migrant reception).
Due to the complex administrative structure, where each level develops its own plans, Belgium has relatively many policy documents for dealing with jihadism. Often the plans have been drawn up without considering the resources required to actually implement them. Most of the plans focus on tackling radicalisation. These plans therefore have a broader application that goes beyond an exclusive focus on dealing with jihadism. Nonetheless, they do mainly focus on (the threat posed by) jihadism. For instance, the 2014 Flemish policy document Internal Administration and Urban Policy promises local level support in the preventive approach to radicalisation, with a specific focus on jihadists travelling to and returning from Syria and Iraq. In consultations – e.g. between the municipality and the police – the topic of dealing with jihadism is a regular theme.

4.2 New federal policy documents

The first plan that was published in response to Syria travellers was the federal Prevention Programme Violent Radicalisation of 2013, which supplemented the broader federal Plan R. The programme advocates for a preventive approach to radicalisation. The further elaboration and implementation of the programme falls to cooperation between civil society and federal, regional, and local administrations. The programme is based on scientific insights, experiences as well as consultations with foreign partners.

In addition, ten additional proposals were presented by the Minister of the Interior and Equal Opportunities. A number of these proposals were rejected by the other ministers – such as a proposal to amend the Mercenary Act by means of a Royal Decree, which would make participation in armed conflicts abroad an offence. According to the inner cabinet, the law against terrorism was sufficient. Other proposals, including strengthening border

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10 W. Bruggeman, conference regarding the approach to radicalisation, Vilvoorde, 31 May 2016.
11 Personal communication P. van Ostaeyen, historian and Arabist, 18 May 2015.
13 Personal communication M. Dewaele, radicalisation project team member VVSG, 10 June 2016.
14 In Dutch: ‘Preventieprogramma van gewelddadige radicalisering’.
15 Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Gelijke Kansen 2013, p. 2, 24. The regional level refers to both regions and communities.
16 Delafortrie and Springael 2013. The article does not specify exactly who these ‘partners’ are.
controls and rules necessitating parental approval for children to travel abroad, were passed on to a working group for further ‘examination’.  

After the attacks in Paris in January 2015 and the antiterrorism operation in Verviers that same month, a federal 12-Point Plan was published and almost completely implemented over the course of 2015. Although the emphasis of this plan was on counter-terrorism, several aspects deal with the prevention of radicalisation. For instance, the plan aimed to improve the detection and tackling of radicalisation by training prison staff and deploying ‘Islam consultants’. Shortly after, the Action Plan against Radicalisation in Prisons appeared. The 12-Point Plan also promised a revision of Plan R. This revised version, which was approved in December 2015 and made publicly accessible in June 2016, represents the basic structure for the response to radicalisation and emphasises the need for an integrated approach. The plan increased the number of actors involved in the prevention of radicalisation. After the attacks in Paris in November 2015, a federal 18-Point Plan appeared. Besides promising to free up extra funds for counter-terrorism and security, the plan also promised criminal and administrative measures for the purposes of detention, a widening of investigative powers, and more intensive checks and surveillance by the police and military.

Alongside these plans, the course of Belgian policy was also set by several Circulars from 2014 and 2015. The Circular of 31 January 2014 concerns the improvement of coordination between various police, intelligence, and security services regarding the exchange of information in order to ensure an integrated approach to counter-terrorism and the prevention of radicalisation. The confidential Circulars of 21 August 2015 and 9 July 2015 also deal with the exchange of information between public agencies concerning jihadists returning from conflict zones as well as criminal proceedings against returnees.

4.3 Complexity

The above mentioned federal Prevention Programme Violent Radicalisation urges regional and local authorities to further develop preventive policies concerning radicalisation. This proved to be a relatively slow process, in large part due to Belgium’s complex state structure where decision-making is divided between the federal state, the three communities, and the three regions.\(^{23}\) State reforms transferred a large number of powers to the communities and regions in January 2014. These transferred powers mostly concerned home care, metropolitan policy, social economy, and Houses of Justice. A cooperative agreement from the same month between the federal state, communities, and regions aimed to improve the cohesion of criminal law policies and security policy by more closely involving the communities and regions.\(^{24}\) As a result, the authority for reducing conditions contributing to radicalisation is at the decentralised level.

To deal with this complexity the Framework Policy Document on Integrated Security (KIV) was introduced in June 2016.\(^{25}\) This policy document, applicable until 2019, states that ‘it is not easy to draw up and realise effective security policies in [the Belgian] state structure, in which many fundamental powers were assigned to the federal states (…)’.\(^{26}\) This is why the KIV assesses the cohesion between the various plans. The policy document provides a reference framework for other Belgian plans concerning security policy.

4.4 Decentralised policy implementation

Various plans were developed at a decentralised level following the publication of the federal Prevention Programme Violent Radicalisation in 2013. In terms of policies by Belgian communities, the Brussels-Capital Region presented an Overall Plan for Preventing and Countering Radicalism in January 2015.\(^{27}\) This plan will serve as a foundation for the Brussels-Capital Region’s Overall Security and Prevention Plan (not yet published at the time of writing).\(^{28}\) The French-speaking community (the ‘Fédération Wallonie-
Bruxelles’) also published Initiatives to Prevent Radicalism and Promote a Good Society in January 2015. This plan provides for, among others, the formation of a counter-radicalism coordination network, participation in the federal prevention strategy, and the implementation of anti-discrimination policy. Prevention policy specifically for the field of education is set out in Prevention Plan against Radicalism at School. The German-speaking community (the ‘Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft Belgiens’) published Strategy for the Prevention of Violent Radicalism of the German-language Community in mid-2016. This strategy is based on Plan R and the KIV, and is in force until the end of 2020.

The Flemish community prepared the draft policy document Prevention of Radicalisation Processes which may result in Extremism and Terrorism. This was further refined in an action plan which was approved by the Flemish government in April 2015. Moreover, the Flemish government also published Points of Reference for a Local Approach to Radicalisation at the end of 2015, which explains in broad terms how local authorities can make policy with regard to the prevention of radicalisation. The policies of the communities and regions are quite similar notwithstanding a few differences in emphasis.

Prior to the above mentioned plans, the four Flemish municipalities of Mechelen, Antwerpen, Vilvoorde, and Maaseik had already published a document called Controlling Muslim Radicalisation. This document, published in July 2013, was intended as a guide for local authorities to develop policy with regard to preventing and dealing with radicalisation. In the meantime, various local authorities have developed their own policy plans. This applies in particular to municipalities which are confronted with jihadists travelling to and returning from Syria and Iraq. For example, the

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29 In French: ‘Initiatives de prevention du radicalisme et du bien-vivre ensemble’.
31 In French: ‘Un Plan de prévention contre le radicalisme à l’école’.
32 In German: ‘Strategie zur Vorbeugung von gewaltsamen Radikalismus in der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft’.
33 Paasch 2016.
34 In Dutch: ‘Preventie van radicaliseringsprocessen die kunnen leiden tot extremisme en terrorisme’.
35 In Dutch: ‘Handvaten voor een lokale aanpak van radicalisering’.
36 Personal communication M. Dewaele, radicalisation project team employee VVSG, 10 June 2016.
37 In Dutch: ‘Beheersen van moslim-radicalisering’.
Vilvoorde Municipal Council approved An Integrated Plan for Warmth and Security in May 2014.\textsuperscript{38}

Several smaller municipalities jointly formulated and implemented policies to distribute the financial costs. In certain cases the federal government provides funding.\textsuperscript{39} The federal government reserved 17 million euros for the Action Plan Against Radicalisation, Violent Extremism, and Terrorism in the Kanaalzone in February 2016.\textsuperscript{40} This extensive plan replaced an earlier proposal by the Molenbeek mayor Françoise Schepmans which she intended to implement in the wake of the November 2015 attacks.\textsuperscript{41} However, not every municipality has a policy in this field, but it is expected that local policy will develop further in the coming years.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{38} In Dutch: ‘Een integraal plan voor warmte en veiligheid’.
\textsuperscript{39} See for example: FOD Binnenlandse Zaken 2015, p. 10; Lemmens 2014.
\textsuperscript{40} In Dutch: ‘Actieplan tegen radicalisering, gewelddadig extremisme en terrorisme in de Kanaalzone’.
\textsuperscript{41} N.N. 2016a; N.N. 2016b.
\textsuperscript{42} P. Ponsaers, conference on the approach to radicalisation, Vilvoorde, 31 May 2016.
Figure 2: Timeline Belgium: policies and events

2015

January
12-Point Plan; Initiatives to Prevent Radicalism and Promote a Good Society; Overall Plan for Preventing and Countering Radicalism

March
Action Plan against Radicalisation in Prisons

April
Prevention of Radicalisation Processes which may result in Extremism and Terrorism

November
18-Points Plan

December
Points of Reference for a Local Approach to Radicalisation; Plan R (revision, public since June 2016)

January
Attacks Paris

February
Attacks Copenhagen

January
Counter-terrorism action Verviers

November
Attacks Paris

2002
Mosque Plan (not public)

September 2005
Plan R (not public)

2001

September 2001
Attacks US

September 2001
Attempted attack Kleine Brogel airbase

2004

March 2004
Attacks Madrid

April 2016
Strategy for the Prevention of Violent Radicalism of the German-language Community

July 2013
Controlling Muslim Radicalisation

July 2013
Prevention Programme Violent Radicalisation

July 2014
Sixth state reforms

June 2016
KV; Plan R

2005

July 2005
Attacks London

November 2004
Attacks Amsterdam

March 2012
Attacks Midi-Pyrénées

May 2014
Attacks Brussels

March 2016
Attacks Brussels

July 2016
Attacks Nice
Attacks Germany

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016
5 Denmark

5.1 Counter-terrorism

In June 2002, the Danish Parliament approved a series of legislative amendments, better known as ‘regeringens anti-terroRpakke’.\(^1\) With these changes Denmark complied with international agreements that created a legal framework for countering terrorism. Specific modifications involved the inclusion into the Danish criminal code of terrorism as a criminal offence as well as the direct or indirect provision of financial support for terrorist activities. The changes also allowed for the extradition of suspects to other EU member states. Moreover, the telecom sector was obliged to store data for at least one year for the purposes of detection and prosecution. Furthermore, these amendments allowed the government permission to access non-public data from information systems.\(^2\) The decision of Denmark to comply with these international obligations is notable given the Danish opt-out regarding EU cooperation on matter of police and justice.\(^3\)

In June 2004, the Danish government published A Changing World – New Threats, New Responses: Statement by the Government on the Fight Against Terrorism.\(^4\) In the report the threat of terrorism is described as complex and unpredictable and requiring a comprehensive effort.\(^5\) Three objectives are central to the approach: (1) tackling existing terrorist networks and groups; (2) developing a long-term approach aimed at removing the underlying causes of terrorism, this refers to the provision of developmental aid and conflict prevention abroad; and (3) preparing for attacks by protecting citizens and vital interests. Since 2004 a progress report detailing the progress on implemented measures has appeared annually. Since 2004 the report has been published annually, to demonstrate progress on implemented measures.

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\(^1\) The legislative proposal was adopted with 97 votes in favour and 10 votes against.
\(^2\) Folketinget 2002.
\(^3\) In case of measures resulting in the transfer of sovereignty, the opt-out means that EU measures can only be adopted when the Danish Parliament gives permission by a five-sixth majority or when there is a majority of MPs and a majority of voters in a referendum in favour. European Union 1997, p. 143. See also Lindekiłde and Sedgwick 2012, p. 19.
\(^4\) In Danish: ‘En verden i forandring – nye trusler, nye svar. Redegørelse fra regeringen om indsatsen mod terrorisme’.
\(^5\) Udenrigsministeriet 2004, p. 3.
5.2 A new impulse
The attacks in London in July 2005 prompted the Danish government to assess whether additional counter-terrorism measures were required. As a result, that November they published the Government Action Plan for Counter-terrorism.\(^6\) Again the necessity of a comprehensive approach regarding national and international policy was emphasised.\(^7\) The plan focused on the intelligence and security services: the domestic security and intelligence service (PET) and the military intelligence service (FE).\(^8\) It listed improvements in terms of the functioning of the organisations, their mutual cooperation, and deployment of resources. Also mentioned are the tightening of regulations regarding the entry and stay of foreign nationals in Denmark hostile to democratic values. Another series of measures concerned improving civil preparedness in the event of an attack.

In addition, the plan contained measures for improving civil preparedness in the event of attack. It also considered important entering into dialogue with the Muslim community as well as research into terrorism and radicalisation. Nevertheless, most of the plan is made up of measures for improving the detection of (potential) terrorists whereby in particular broader access to information is the key element. To implement the measures, the Danish Parliament adopted the ‘anti-terrorpakke II’, a series of legislative amendments, in June 2006.\(^9\)

5.3 The prevention of radicalisation
In Denmark the prevention of radicalisation started locally with pilot projects set up in Aarhus and Copenhagen. In 2007 the city of Aarhus trained fifty crime prevention workers in recognising signals of radicalisation.\(^10\) This was not in response to any particular event, but rather was an anticipatory measure inspired by the Amsterdam Action Plan We Citizens of Amsterdam,

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\(^6\) In Danish: ‘Regeringens handlingsplan for terrorbekæmpelse’.
\(^7\) Statsministeriet 2005, p. 4.
\(^8\) The PET or ‘Politiets Efterretningstjeneste’ and the FE or ‘Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste’.
\(^9\) The legislative proposal was adopted with 91 votes in favour and 26 votes against.
\(^10\) Aarhus, which has 300,000 inhabitants, is the second largest city in Denmark. For the trial project, see Integrationsministeriet 2008, p. 11-12; Kühle and Lindekilde 2010, p. 13.
which was published shortly after the murder of Theo van Gogh (November 2004).  

In January 2009 the Danish government presented a national plan – A Common and Safe Future: An Action Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and Radicalisation Among Young People. The plan had a broad focus and included initiatives to make contact with young people influenced by extremist ideas, promote the participation of young people in society on the basis of their rights and obligations, start a dialogue with young people and provide information about Danish society and its opportunities, promote democratic values, and counter isolation in vulnerable neighbourhoods.

The 2009 plan was met with great opposition. Criticism primarily came from academics and communities which were the targets of interventions; the majority of the population was much less critical. The main points of criticism were that the plan would contribute to stigmatisation of entire communities as a collective risks for society, and that radicalisation was interpreted as a security matter instead of a social issue. In the end, substantial parts of the plan were not implemented, in particular those concerning integration, countering discrimination, and promoting social cohesion. Consequently, in a new plan published in September 2014 and drawn up by the centre-left government that took office in 2011, this focus on integration and social cohesion did not return. The new plan emphasised individual interventions, both to prevent radicalisation and extremism and to assist individuals re-integrating in society after leaving jihadist circles or after return from conflict areas in Syria and Iraq.

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11 For the motivation for the project, see Integrationsministeriet 2008, p. 11; For the Dutch inspiration, see Hemmingsen 2015, p. 31.
12 In Danish: ‘En fælles og tryg fremtid. Handlingsplan om forebyggelse af ekstremistiske holdninger og radikalisering blandt unge’. The plan was also published in English.
13 Regeringen 2009. The other areas of attention are: preventing extremism and radicalisation in prisons and improving knowledge, international cooperation and partnerships with various institutions and organisations.
14 Personal communication with Danish radicalisation expert, 4 May 2016.
15 Hemmingsen 2015, p. 12; personal communication with Danish radicalisation expert, 4 May 2016.
16 Personal communication with Danish radicalisation expert, 4 May 2016.
18 Personal communication with Danish radicalisation expert, 4 May 2016.
5.4 The Aarhus model

The departure of several dozen young people from Aarhus to Syria in 2013 led the city to initiate the Aarhus model, a targeted strategy carried out in cooperation with the police of East Jutland.\(^{19}\) This strategy provides a range of services (such as psychological help, health care, education, and a personal mentor) for suspected travellers and returnees to facilitate their re-integration in society.\(^{20}\) This approach has become the national standard in Denmark and has attracted a lot of international media attention.\(^{21}\) It is usually described as an exception to the more repressive approaches of other European countries. What is often overlooked is that (suspected) travellers and returnees will only receive help with their re-integration when they do not qualify for legal prosecution and the PET does not regard them as a risk to national security.\(^{22}\)

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\(^{19}\) Personal communication with Danish counter-terrorism expert, 12 April 2016; Bundsgaard 2015. For a discussion about the (theoretical) assumptions of the model, see Bertelsen 2015.

\(^{20}\) Personal communication with Danish radicalisation expert, 4 May 2016.

\(^{21}\) Hemmingsen 2015, p. 18. For the international media attention, see Crouch and Henley 2015; Hooper 2014.

\(^{22}\) Personal communication with Danish radicalisation expert, 4 May 2016; Bertelsen 2015, p. 245.
Figure 3: Timeline Denmark; policies and events


September 2001
Attacks US

November 2004
Attack Amsterdam

March 2004
Attacks Madrid

July 2005
Attacks London

November 2005
Government Action Plan for Counter-terrorism

June 2006
Counter-terrorism package II

June 2002
Package of counter-terrorism measures

January 2009
A Common and Safe Future: An Action Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and Radicalisation Among Young People

September 2014
Preventing Radicalisation and Extremism: The Government’s Action Plan

2013
Several dozen young people travel from Aarhus to Syria

May 2013
Attack Woolwich

May 2014
Attack Brussels

March 2012
Attacks Midi-Pyrénées

January 2015
Attacks Paris

February 2015
Attacks Copenhagen

January 2016
Attacks Brussels

July 2016
Attack Nice
Attack Germany
6 Germany

6.1 Historic context

The response of the West German government to the extreme-left political violence of the ‘Rote Armee Faktion’ (RAF) during the 1970s is often regarded as the starting point of counter-terrorism in Germany.\(^1\) During that period the authorities were given broader powers of investigation, certain civil liberties were restricted (prisoners were refused access to lawyers under specific conditions), and membership of terrorist organisations became a criminal offence.\(^2\)

In the early 1990s, politically motivated violence was increasingly committed by groups with a xenophobic, racist, and/or right-extreme worldview.\(^3\) Concerns about right-wing extremist groups dominated the domestic security agenda, but this changed after the attacks on 11 September 2001.\(^4\) To the horror of many Germans, it appeared that one group of the aircraft hijackers had lived in Hamburg for years, where they had made preparations for the attacks. After the attacks, ‘Islamist Terrorism’ became a much discussed topic, both among the public and the authorities.\(^5\)

6.2 ‘Islamist Terrorism’ as a new priority

Hardly a week after the attacks in the US, the first counter-terrorism measures were put in place by the Bundestag, the German federal Parliament. These concerned restricting immigration in order to refuse entry or deport individuals who are considered a threat to national security, and the authority to ban religious extremist organisations. The latter measure had already been under consideration for some time.

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\(^1\) See for instance Malthaner and Waldmann 2003. See chapter three of De Graaf 2010 for a detailed study on how the firm response by the West German federal government against the RAF actually contributed to social unrest.


\(^3\) Bundesministerium des Innern and Bundesministerium der Justiz 2001, p. 276.

\(^4\) Concerns about right-wing extremism became a major concern again in 2011 when it appeared that the violence of a right-wing extremist splinter group (‘Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund’, NSU) had gone unnoticed for years.

\(^5\) Compare for instance: Bundesministerium des Innern and Bundesministerium der Justiz 2001, and Bundesministerium des Innern and Bundesministerium der Justiz 2006. In the former document, ‘Islamist Terrorism’ was not mentioned. The quote is in the 2006 document on p. 134.
A second package of measures followed in January 2002: the Counter-terrorism Act (TBG). This act aimed at improving the exchange of information between the various intelligence and security services and the police, and broadened the authority of the intelligence and security services. However, the act was criticised for not adequately protecting personal data. Several measures introduced by the TBG contained sunset clauses, which required an evaluation by the Ministry of the Interior (BMI). The act was extended in January 2007 by way of the Counter-terrorism Supplemental Act (TBEG) and included a further expansion of intelligence and security services’ access to personal data.

Four years later, in October 2011, the Bundestag approved an extension of the TBEG, although not without protest. Both the Social Democrats and the Greens requested an evaluation of the legislation by an external party, but their proposals did not receive enough votes. Instead a government committee conducted an evaluation in 2013, reviewing the functioning of all involved government agencies, their objectives and competences concerning counter-terrorism and its relation to the law. This evaluation was generally positive. The committee did observe that in case of preventive intervention the use of criminal law has raised concerns from a constitutional law perspective. The TBEG was assessed again in December 2015, after which particular provisions of the act were extended again, this time until January 2021. It concerns the access by the intelligence and security services to information from telecommunications providers in order to better detect terrorist organisations and intervene in a more targeted manner.

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6 Officially the act is referred to as ‘Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus’ or alternatively ‘Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz’, see Deutscher Bundestag 2002, p. 361.
7 Deutscher Bundestag 2016a.
8 In German: ‘Bundesministerium des Innern’.
11 Deutscher Bundestag 2011b; Deutscher Bundestag 2010. The Social Democrats or the ‘Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands’ (SPD) and the Greens or ‘Bündnis 90/Die Grünen’.
12 Deutscher Bundestag 2015a, p. 13.
13 Bundesministerium des Innern and Bundesministerium der Justiz 2013, p. 262.
14 Deutscher Bundestag 2016b, p. 2.
At the federal level Germany has a comprehensive, but non-public Strategy of the Federal Government for the Combating of International Terrorism.\textsuperscript{15} The objectives of this strategy were based on those of the 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The German strategy is focused on disrupting terrorist structures, addressing the causes of terrorism through prevention and de-radicalisation, protecting the population, reducing the vulnerability of the country, and improving international cooperation.\textsuperscript{16}

After three successive violent incidents, of which two incidents were alleged to be related to IS (Islamic State), the German Minister of the Interior Thomas de Maizière presented a new package of measures to promote security in August 2016.\textsuperscript{17} The package contained three ‘cornerstones’: (1) measures relating to the personnel, material, and organisational resourcing of the security services; (2) measures relating to prevention and integration as key ingredients for a ‘sustainable’ security policy; (3) a rigorous and tough approach for dealing with dangerous individuals (‘Gefährder’), persons considered a risk to national security, as well as individuals feeding radicalisation.\textsuperscript{18} In the media this was portrayed as an new security concept, but the measures were essentially an intensification of existing policies aimed at prevention, detection, and prosecution.\textsuperscript{19}

### 6.3 The prevention of radicalisation

The prevention of ‘Islamistischer Radikalisierung’ is included in the Strategy of the Federal Government for the Prevention of Extremism and Democracy Promotion, which also addresses racism, xenophobia and left-wing and right-wing extremism.\textsuperscript{20} This strategy aligns with earlier policies of the fede-
eral government to counter extremism that date back to 1992, although for a long time they were mainly concerned with right-wing extremism. There are two key elements of this strategy: promoting democratic thought and conduct, and developing measures for preventing extremism.21

Germany does not have a national strategy specifically dealing with jihadism and the phenomenon travellers to and returnees from conflict zones in Syria/Iraq. The Interior Ministers of the federal states indicated in December 2015 that they needed such a strategy in order to improve the cohesion of measures against jihadism and those travelling to conflict zones.22

21 Deutscher Bundestag 2016c, p. 7.
22 Deutscher Bundestag 2015b, p. 3.
Figure 4: Timeline Germany; policies and events
7 France

7.1 Historic context

French counter-terrorism has a reputation for being repressive and tough.¹ The current French strategy can be traced to the 1980s and 1990s. Two bodies were created to improve the operational coordination between the police and the intelligence services. In 1984, the Counter-terrorism Coordination Unit (UCLAT) was set up as part of the Ministry of the Interior, and in 1986, the Counter-terrorism Coordination Service (SCLAT) was established within the Ministry of Justice.² There was no inter-ministerial coordination, and hence no centralisation of counter-terrorism activities, but as a means of improving coordination the establishment of UCLAT and SCLAT was considered to be a success.³

A series of bombings in 1986 led to the belief that French authorities were not capable of suppressing this violence.⁴ A new law adopted that same year defined terrorist offences and centralised counter-terrorism efforts by creating the position of the investigative judge with the authority to establish whether an act should be prosecuted as a terrorist offence.⁵ This meant that dealing with acts of terrorism became part of regular criminal proceedings. This was a considerable departure from the prosecution of attacks occurring in France that related to the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962). In order to try these acts, a special national security court was convened in 1963 which operated outside the legal system; it was discontinued by the then newly elected President François Mitterrand in 1982.⁶

The 1994 White Paper on Defence referred to terrorism as ‘undoubtedly the most important non-military threat’ to French security.⁷ The aforementioned

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² Shapiro 2007, p. 139-140.
³ Shapiro 2007, p. 140, 151.
⁴ Shapiro and Suzan 2003, p. 71-73. The acts were claimed by the (until then unknown) Committee for Solidarity with Political Prisoners from the Near East (CSPPA).
⁵ Shapiro and Suzan 2003, p. 77-78. For the definition, see L’Assemblée nationale en le Sénat 1986, p. 10956.
⁷ In French: ‘Livre Blanc sur la Défense’. The original text is: ‘L’action terroriste est sans doute la principale menace non militaire qui soit en mesure d’affecter notre sécurité’ (translation by the author),
1986 law was amended in 1996. A series of bombings in 1995 followed earlier government attempts to disrupt the activities of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) on French soil. The GIA was one of the participants in the Algerian civil war (1992-2002) and regarded France, due to its role as former coloniser, as an enemy. The 1996 legal amendment criminalised preparatory acts, in this case a conspiracy to commit terrorist offences. This amendment made preventive intervention possible in case of serious indications that law breaking was imminent. France thus continued to develop its approach to counter-terrorism whereby the potential breach of the law is decisive of the moment of intervention; policymaking is structured around this idea.

7.2 Counter-terrorism

The next legal amendment followed shortly after the attacks on 11 September 2001. This amendment, which was already under consideration well before the attacks, broadened the legal requirements for gathering telecommunications data as well as sanctioning preventive body searches and the checking of luggage, freight, airmail, planes, and vehicles in public spaces. Since a legal definition of terrorist offences already existed in French law – not all countries had criminalised this activity before 11 September – the 2001 legislative amendment is not regarded as a drastic innovation, but rather as the intensification of an already existing approach. As such, the attacks on 11 September 2001 are also referred to as a ‘non-event’ in the context of French counter-terrorism policy.

French counter-terrorism policies were further modified and intensified through a number of legislative amendments adopted between 2001 and 2012. Two themes predominated: broadening access to databases for law enforcement and intelligence services in order to facilitate preventive inter-
vention, and extending investigative powers. A number of these measures included sunset clauses, meaning that the continuation of the measure would be subject to periodical approval by Parliament. However, several of these temporary measures were given a permanent status before their effectiveness had been evaluated. Additionally, attempts were made to improve operational and policy coordination by creating new bodies at the presidential and ministerial levels as well as among the intelligence and security services; Part Two will discuss this in greater detail.

7.3 The prevention of radicalisation

The prevention of radicalisation is a relatively new policy domain in France. White Papers from 2006 and 2008 contained minimal references to the term. Interest in the prevention of radicalisation increased after the shootings by Mohammed Merah (2012), the attack in the Jewish museum in Brussels (2014), and the departure of youngsters to Syria and Iraq. The 2013 White Paper on Defence and National Security mentioned the need to develop the prevention of radicalisation, but without specifying this in any detail. The 2014 plan Prevention of Radicalisation and Support for Families presented a more specific strategy.

While this plan from 2014 primarily strengthened investigative powers, such as the ability to withhold travel documents of individuals suspected of travelling to conflict zones, the plan also included soft policy. For instance, a telephone hotline was proposed to assist those near to persons thought to be radicalising as well as intervention programmes for those believed to be radicalising, including with a focus on leaving behind this condition. Lower administrative levels – ‘régions’ and ‘départements’ – were called upon to develop this strategy. The introduction of soft policy constituted a departure from the strong emphasis on law breaking as the moment of intervention.

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16 The White Paper is available in English. Ragazzi 2014, p. 3, 10. Also see République Française 2013, p. 99.  
18 Le ministre de l'intérieur 2014a. The withdrawal of travel documents of suspected travellers to conflict areas in Syria/Iraq became possible later that year, see L’Assemblée nationale en le Sénat 2014.  
19 Le ministre de l’intérieur 2014a. France has an administrative organisation whereby the country is divided into 18 ‘régions’, which are then divided into in 102 ‘départements’; these are then split into the most basic administrative units, 36,658 ‘communes’.
New measures followed after the attacks on the offices of the weekly magazine *Charlie Hebdo* (2015). In April 2015, a three-year plan was launched to confront racism, anti-Semitism, and spreading hate, both online and offline.\(^{20}\) The plan did not specifically refer to counter-terrorism or the prevention of radicalisation, instead highlighting the recent increases in racist and anti-Semitic statements, but the attack on *Charlie Hebdo* provided an additional motivation to adopt the plan.\(^{21}\) The government also announced that it would address radicalisation in prisons. Prisoners at risk of radicalisation would be systematically separated from the rest of the prison population, which at the time of the announcement only happened on an incidental basis. In addition, the number of prison imams would be increased and their training improved.\(^{22}\)

Fifty new measures were introduced several months after the attacks in Paris in November 2015. This Action Plan against Radicalisation and Terrorism (May 2016) replaced the previously mentioned 2014 plan.\(^{23}\) It was one of the first documents, besides the 2006 White Paper, to specifically deal with counter-terrorism and the prevention of radicalisation. Previous White Papers from 2008 and 2013 discussed counter-terrorism within a broader context of national security. The 2016 plan provided for the expansion of powers of detection and prosecution by improving the gathering and sharing information, amongst others by imposing stricter regulations on the sale of prepaid cards for mobile phones and the use of passenger name records data from airlines for detection. Additionally, the plan from May 2016 focused on strengthening citizenship through education, supporting persons in contact with individuals suspected of radicalising, preventing radicalisation in schools, creating space for criticism of ideologies informing radicalisation, and an open exchange of knowledge about Islam. Besides, the plan required that each city have a plan of action.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{20}\) Premier Ministre 2015.  
\(^{21}\) Rubin and Breeden 2015.  
\(^{22}\) Hellmuth 2015, p. 989. Also see Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2015, p. 14.  
\(^{23}\) In French: ‘Plan d’action contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme’.  
\(^{24}\) Premier Ministre 2016, p. 7-9.
Figure 5: Timeline France; policies and events
8 United Kingdom

8.1 The counter-terrorism strategy

Strategies for dealing with jihadism in the UK mainly fall under the umbrella of CONTEST: the British national counter-terrorism strategy. CONTEST originated in 2003, but it was only made public in 2006.\(^1\) Revised versions followed in 2009 (CONTEST 2) and 2011 (CONTEST 3). Despite the duration of CONTEST 3 ended in 2015, no new version has been published yet. The strategy has had four so-called workstreams since 2003: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare.\(^2\) Substantial changes were in particular made with regard to Prevent. Before the attacks on 7 July 2005 in London – during the term of the then-classified first CONTEST strategy – British counter-terrorism policy mainly focused on external threats. A ‘community-based’ preventive approach was not a new concept in the UK, but it was considered to be redundant after the attacks on 11 September 2001.\(^3\) Following the attacks in 2005, however, prevention became an integral part of British counter-terrorism policy.

A key part of Prevent is the Channel programme, which was piloted in 2007 and administered across England and Wales in 2012. Channel is focused on providing early support for individuals identified as vulnerable to radicalisation.\(^4\) After a person has been referred to the Channel programme, a network of several partners offers tailor-made support services. The Prevent strategy became the cornerstone of CONTEST. It is the only workstream to be delineated in a separate public policy document in 2011.\(^5\) Prevent has been placed on a statutory footing by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. As a result, particular institutions such as the educational sector, have been given a Prevent Duty. This means that they are obliged to report suspicious behaviour.

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\(^1\) Mastroe 2016, p. 52.
\(^2\) Pursue focuses on preventing attacks (mainly through criminal proceedings), Prevent focuses on preventing developing terrorist activities or supporting terrorism, Protect focuses on protecting against attacks (including measures regarding infrastructure and border control), while Prepare focuses on minimising the impact when an attack occurs.
\(^3\) Briggs 2010, p. 971.
\(^4\) HM Government 2011b, p. 57.
\(^5\) Referred to as Prevent Strategy, see HM Government 2011b.
The British prevention strategies have been controversial. Initially there was criticism that the government was subsidising Muslim organisations with a radical ideology.\(^6\) This concern diminished after the revision of Prevent in 2011. Prevent was also criticised for being discriminatory toward Muslims and for engaging with Muslim communities only for the purposes of intelligence gathering.\(^7\) A recurring point of critique has been that while the government recognises Muslim communities as important partners in Prevent, it also regards these communities as ‘suspect’. Muslim organisations, journalists, academics, and teachers have often mentioned the counter-productive effect of Prevent – creating grievance and distrust among Muslims and against the government itself.\(^8\) The above-mentioned obligation to report suspicious behaviour, which has applied since 2015 for teachers and staff at institutions in the fields of health, youth care, and social work, has been met with resistance.

Prevent has not been regularly evaluated by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, in contrast with other counter-terrorism legislation. The previous Reviewer, David Anderson, emphasised the importance of an independent evaluation, noting that ‘Prevent has become a more significant source of grievance in affected communities than the police and ministerial powers’.\(^9\) The most recent controversy concerns the risk assessment (ERG-22+), on the basis of which persons may be referred to the Channel programme. The Royal College of Psychiatrists has expressed serious doubts about the quality of this risk assessment.\(^10\)

### 8.2 Evaluation and a shift in focus

Prevent has been evaluated by the national government since 2007. This entails supervising the allocation of financial resources to local authorities. This is done through the Local Area Agreement (LAA) and the National Indicator Set (NIS), in which the objectives for local authorities have been established. Achievement of these objectives results in extra funds for local

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6 See for example: Durodié 2015.
7 See for example: Briggs 2010; Lister et. al. 2015; Gayle 2016; Durodié 2015; Price 2016; Jeory and Cockburn 2016; Anderson 2016.
8 See for example: Lister et. al. 2015; Gayle 2016; Anderson 2016; Shabi 2016.
9 Anderson 2016, p. 3.
10 Royal College of Psychiatrists 2016, p. 5-6. Also see the letter from Armstrong et. al. 2016 in the *Guardian*. 
These instruments were introduced to improve the consistency between national and local government priorities, and to offer more opportunities for local administrators and service providers to respond to the requirements of their local communities. In that vein, LAAs determine the local government’s objectives, yet how these are accomplished is decided in the local level.

In CONTEST 2 (2009), it was announced that for the first time counter-terrorism policy would be monitored on the basis of a Public Service Agreement (PSA). Each PSA would include the objectives and responsibilities for the actors involved. This proved to be short-lived, as the new coalition government already abolished the PSA system by June 2010. Later that year, also the LAA and the NIS were discontinued. According to the new government, they focused too much on what the national government required instead of what was needed on a local level.

The LAA and the NIS were succeeded by the Structural Reform Plan. Whereas the LAA was result-based, the Structural Reform Plan reflects the position that the ‘government cannot commit to outcomes, but can commit to inputs’. Besides evaluation on the basis of resources and objectives, the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) has been evaluating Prevent on the basis of insights from behavioural-scientific literature since 2010. The BIT started as part of the British government, but is presently owned by both the government and Nesta, a foundation aimed at innovation.

The first formal evaluation of CONTEST by the government took place in 2010. That same year, the British government also published its first public annual report on CONTEST. Shortly after, CONTEST 3 made such annual reports on the progress of CONTEST mandatory. These annual reports illustrate the shifting focus of the CONTEST strategy. On paper the four work-streams, as described in CONTEST 3, focus on Al Qaida as well as related groups and individuals. These were regarded as the most serious threat to the UK when the strategy was formulated. However, subsequent annual reports

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11 See Department for Communities and Local Government 2008. See also Mastroe 2016, p. 53.
12 Department for Communities and Local Government 2006, p. 15.
13 Department for Communities and Local Government 2006, p. 102.
14 HM Government 2010.
16 Mastroe 2016, p. 55.
17 HM Government 2011.
demonstrate that the strategy’s focus has recently shifted toward IS and the conflict in Syria and Iraq.  

8.3 Key developments within CONTEST

Besides the shift in focus, another notable difference between the strategy from 2006 and the revisions from 2009 and 2011 is the size of the documents. In terms of the number of pages, CONTEST 2 and 3 are much more extensive than the first published version in 2006. This change is probably based on the introduction of counter-terrorism strategy as a communicative instrument. Reporting about threats and policy was not only regarded as important for fostering openness and trust, but also relevant for raising public awareness. As former Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated in the foreword of CONTEST 2: ‘if people are better informed about the threat they will be more vigilant but also more assured’. However, not everything is shared. For instance, each workstream has a detailed implementation plan which is not made public for security reasons.

A second development is a change in terminology in 2009, replacing ‘violent extremism’ with ‘extremism’. The justification for the change was that extremism may contribute to a climate in which individuals might slip into violent behaviour. This implies a certain degree of causality between extremism and violent extremism. The change was controversial: triggering debate among academics about the assumed causal relationship, and creating uncertainty among local authorities and communities about what to do. For instance, contradictory statements by the national government led to confusion on whether Prevent should focus on other forms of extremism aside from extremism related to Islam. In response, the 2011 revision made clear that Prevent, like CONTEST, refers to all forms of extremism, radicalisation, and terrorism.

19 The first public version of CONTEST consists of 36 pages. With CONTEST 2 and 3 this is 176 and 132 pages respectively.
20 HM Government 2009, p. 6; See also Gregory 2009, p. 2.
23 Briggs 2010, p. 975-976.
24 HM Government 2011.
A third development concerns the relationship between Prevent and so-called community cohesion. The evaluation by the new conservative-liberal coalition government from 2010 stated that the focus on integration in the original strategy drawn up by Labour came at the expense of efforts aimed at preventing (home-grown) terrorism.\(^{25}\) Therefore, former Minister of the Interior Theresa May referred to the strategy as ‘flawed’.\(^{26}\) In response, the 2011 Prevent strategy focused on confronting extremist ideas. With this the British government hoped to make a clearer distinction between the agenda of Prevent, which is the responsibility of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), and that on community cohesion, which is the responsibility of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).

Before the 2011 Prevent revision, initiatives on community cohesion were part of Prevent, and were the responsibility of the DCLG. As a result, community cohesion-related policy was partly linked to counter-terrorism, with the consequence that Prevent was criticised as a government instrument for collecting intelligence, rather than a means of confronting radicalisation and extremism. In addition, the overlap caused friction between the OSCT and the DCLG. This was due to, amongst other things, a different interpretation of what ‘community engagement’ through Prevent implied. In CONTEST 3 from 2011 the Prevent and community cohesion domains were separated.

### 8.4 The new counter-extremism strategy

In October 2015, the Counter-Extremism Strategy was published. It stated that British values are under pressure as a result of ‘extremists operating at a pace and scale not before seen’, and that the UK ‘[w]ill meet this challenge with a new and more assertive approach’.\(^{27}\) The strategy focuses on four points: countering extremist ideology; building a partnership between all actors committed to countering extremism; disrupting extremists; and promoting cohesion through the Cohesive Communities Programme.\(^{28}\)

According to Karen Bradley, Minister for Culture, Media, and Sports, the counter-extremism strategy is not part of counter-terrorism, because extremism is a broader category than terrorism. However, the Parliamentary Joint

\(^{25}\) HM Government 2011b, p. 6, 30.  
\(^{26}\) HM Government 2011b, p. 1.  
\(^{27}\) HM Government 2015b, p. 9.  
\(^{28}\) HM Government 2015b.
Committee on Human Rights indicated that the distinction between these two terms is not clear, as Prevent also deals with countering extremism (see also the notes on terminology in the previous paragraph). Moreover, the committee doubted the need for new measures to counter extremism, believing the current instruments would suffice. 29 A legal framework for counter-extremism measures has been announced, the Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill, but as of the writing of this report it has not yet been published.

Figure 6: Timeline United Kingdom: policies and events
9 United States

9.1 Counter-terrorism policy

The Office for Combatting Terrorism was established in the US after the hostage-taking of Israeli athletes by a Palestinian splinter group during the Munich Olympic Games in 1972. Housed as part of the Department of State (DoS), this unit was responsible for developing and coordinating international counter-terrorism policies. An official counter-terrorism strategy followed in 1983, after bombings in Lebanon killed numerous American soldiers. This included the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA), wherein the US helped other countries to increase their knowledge of terrorism and strategies for its suppression. These efforts were foremost characterised by diplomacy and law enforcement, and counter-terrorism was considered an international affair rather than a domestic one. During the Cold War the US mainly focused on threats from other states and the ways in which these states could be deterred. The threat of non-state actors did not fit in this picture, and therefore did not become part of the national security strategy.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Justice (DoJ) grew more concerned about terrorism after the bombings in New York in 1993 and Oklahoma in 1995.¹ This led to the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The act’s provisions included new federal powers for the prosecution of suspects, more severe forms of punishment, and a ban on fundraising for terrorist purposes. Two years later the FBI listed counter-terrorism as its top priority in the ‘FBI Strategic Plan 1998-2003’.² However, counter-terrorism was not part of the national security strategy.

Counter-terrorism became the foremost security priority after the attacks on 11 September 2001. For the topic of homeland security a new ministry – the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – was created in 2002. The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) was introduced: a threat scale with five colours/levels, ranging from green to red.³ Counter-terrorism had a pro-

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004.
² National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004.
³ The colour illustrates the risk of attacks: green (‘low’), blue (‘general’), yellow (‘significant’) and orange (‘high’) and red (‘severe’).
minent place in the new 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS), also referred to as the Bush doctrine. Military action became more dominant in US external counter-terrorism policy, with law enforcement and diplomacy receding to the background. This was reflected in the new language introduced during the presidency of George W. Bush: a ‘global war on terror’. The contours of this strategy would largely remain unchanged under Bush’s leadership. The NSS proved to be a blueprint for the National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism (NSCT), introduced in 2003, and the two revised versions in 2006. The objective of the National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) was to complement the NSS and strengthen the NSCT.

Counter-terrorism policy shifted under the presidency of Barack Obama. The NSCT from 2011 no longer referred to a ‘global war on terror’, but to being in a state of war with Al Qaida. At the same time drone strikes were increasingly utilised. Moreover, there was a greater focus on the (potential) threats domestically, spurred by incidents including the departure of at least 20 Somali Americans from Minneapolis-St. Paul to Somalia between 2009 and 2011.

Additionally, the HSAS was replaced by the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS), designed to improve communication with the public on (potential) threats. The NTAS accomplished this through disseminating Alerts and Bulletins. The first Bulletin was published in December 2015 – two weeks after the attack in San Bernardino, California. In this Bulletin the DHS expressed its concerns about domestic violent extremism and terrorists who may be considering various targets. The second Bulletin once again emphasised these concerns, referencing the attacks in San Bernardino, Paris, Brussels, and the shootings in Orlando.

9.2 The emergence of CVE policy

The American federal government launched a plan on countering violent extremism (CVE) for the first time in 2011, in response to the increased

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4 White House 2002.
6 White House 2011c.
7 Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2016; Serle 2014.
8 White House 2011c; Vidino and Hughes 2015.
threat of extremism since 2009. This strategy, called Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism, has three objectives: increasing involvement of the federal government in communities, developing CVE expertise, and countering extremist propaganda.

Responsibility for the plan’s implementation was given to local administrations, with support from the federal government where necessary. A few months after its introduction, the plan was expanded to include a more detailed Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP), in which the objectives, tasks, and responsibilities for various departments and services were delineated. The DHS and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) also carried out various CVE activities. These chiefly included Community Awareness Briefings (CABs) and Community Resilience Exercises (CREXs). However, implementation of the CVE plan proved to be complicated: the number of actors overseeing it was limited and there were insufficient resources.

9.3 A new focus on CVE

CVE policy was once again given priority after the attacks in Boston in April 2013 and the emergence of IS. Initially its focus was on three cities: Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis-St. Paul. These cities were chosen because of their relation to problems of jihadism, extremism and/or terrorism, and previous experience with community engagement. Minneapolis-St. Paul, in addition to New York and Chicago, were the cities most confronted with jihadism. According to the American government, Americans who had departed to join al-Shabaab in Somalia since 2007 were radicalised in Minneapolis-St. Paul.

After some of these fighters had been killed by al-Shabaab itself, the authorities in Minneapolis-St. Paul approached the Somali community as a partner to jointly prevent more young people from joining al-Shabaab. This created room for dialogue and changed the relationship between the police and the

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10 Vidino and Hughes 2015, p. 6. CVE is a soft approach, focusing on addressing the causes of extremism.
11 White House 2011a, p. 5-7.
12 White House 2011b.
13 Vidino and Hughes 2015, p. 6.
14 Vidino and Hughes 2015, p. 1, 4.
15 Vidino and Hughes 2015, p. 7.
16 U.S. Department of Justice 2015.
17 Mullins 2016, p. 282.
18 Anti-Defamation League 2015.
community.\textsuperscript{19} The existence of such relationships also played a role in the choice of Boston, which had already carried out activities in the realm of community engagement and community policing.\textsuperscript{20}

Similarly, in 2008 Los Angeles took the first initiatives to build trust between organisations and social actors to realise a whole of government and whole of community approach toward CVE.\textsuperscript{21} Under the banner of the Three City Pilot, these three cities worked on local CVE frameworks.\textsuperscript{22} As part of the new CVE agenda the FBI launched a website for students in 2016 called the Don’t be a Puppet-campaign. Through this online portal the FBI uses interactive programmes to inform students about (the risks of) extremism.\textsuperscript{23}

The three cities announced their plans in February 2015. Boston developed A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies, which identified seven problems and provided potential solutions.\textsuperscript{24} The Los Angeles Framework for Countering Violent Extremism consisted of three cornerstones: prevention, intervention, and interdiction. Prevention received the most attention of which community engagement and setting up public-private networks are key elements.\textsuperscript{25}

Minneapolis-St. Paul introduced the Building Community Resilience plan, which mainly focused on the local Somali-American community, the largest in the US. Together with this community they identified causes of radicalisation, and these were dealt with through three pillars: engagement, prevention, and intervention.\textsuperscript{26} Policy in Minneapolis-St. Paul had a strong emphasis on countering jihadist recruitment, and its pilot programme on the subject shared similarities with its anti-gang recruitment policies.\textsuperscript{27}

This new CVE approach and the national CVE strategy from 2011 were criticised for similar reasons as Prevent in the UK.\textsuperscript{28} Critics referred to the

\textsuperscript{19} Personal communication D. Gartenstein-Ross, counter-terrorism expert Foundation for Defense of Democracies and university lecturer at Georgetown University, 22 April 2016.

\textsuperscript{20} Murphy 2014.

\textsuperscript{21} Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group 2015.

\textsuperscript{22} Vidino and Hughes 2015, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{23} Federal Bureau of Investigation 2016.

\textsuperscript{24} Greater Boston Regional Collaborative 2015.

\textsuperscript{25} Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group 2015.

\textsuperscript{26} N.N. 2015.

\textsuperscript{27} Personal communication D. Gartenstein-Ross, counter-terrorism expert Foundation for Defense of Democracies and university lecturer at Georgetown University, 22 April 2016.

counter-productivity of the American approach because of its emphasis on law enforcement as well as its focus on Muslims. The interest group for Americans of Arab descent – the Arab American Institute – pointed out the stigmatising effect of CVE activities for Muslims, protesting that programmes for community outreach appeared to be used for security objectives.\(^\text{29}\) In July 2015, 42 human rights and community organisations asserted in an open letter to the House of Representatives that the obligation to report extremist behaviour and statements to the government restricts civil liberties.\(^\text{30}\) The letter also criticised the lack of scientific evidence for the assumptions that form the basis of the American CVE policy.

### 9.4 Evaluation of CVE

The CVE policy was evaluated in 2015 by eleven federal departments and institutions. Their evaluation identified four key needs: (1) better coordination and prioritisation of CVE activities, (2) clear responsibilities and clear communication between government bodies and with the population, (3) participation of ministries and services from outside the domain of national security and (4) a better assessment, distribution, and prioritisation of resources. A CVE Task Force was set up in January 2016 to implement the recommendations.\(^\text{31}\) CVE projects subsidised through the CVE Grant Program were monitored by the Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Science and Technology Directorate of the DHS evaluated such projects.

Finally, the DoS published various reports on counter-terrorism policy, in which the number of victims before the implementation of a certain policy was plotted against the number of victims after the implementation of that same policy.\(^\text{32}\)

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\(^{29}\) See for example: Arab American Institute 2015.
\(^{30}\) Brennan Center 2015.
\(^{31}\) U.S. Department of Justice 2016.
\(^{32}\) Adams, Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2011.
Figure 7: Timeline United States; policies and events


September 2002
Creation DHS (formal)

February 2003
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

March 2004
Attacks Madrid

July 2005
Attacks London

September 2009
New York Metro Plot (Arrest Zazi)

November 2009
Shooting Fort Hood

November 2004
Attack Amsterdam

May 2010
New York Times Square Plot

April 2013
Attack Boston

May 2014
Attack Brussels

January 2015
Attacks Paris

May 2015
Shooting Garland, Texas

November 2015
Attacks Paris

December 2015
Attack San Bernardino

March 2016
Attacks Brussels

June 2016
Shooting Orlando

July 2016
Attack Nice; Attacks Germany

August 2011
Empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the US

February 2015
National Security Strategy

January 2015
CVE frameworks Three City Pilot
Part II

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Actors
10 The Netherlands

10.1 The national government and the issue of coordination

Various government bodies at both the national and local level as well as non-governmental organisations are involved in dealing with jihadism. The ministries of Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) and Security and Justice (V&J) play a leading role in the field of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation. The Minister of V&J is responsible for the coordination of counter-terrorism policy, while implementation is managed by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). Meanwhile the AIVD, under the authority of BZK, is the primary agency for collecting intelligence regarding (possible) risks to the democratic legal order. The National Police, which also resides under BZK, is responsible for arrests after the issue of an official notice by the AIVD.\(^1\)

Coordination between the above-mentioned bodies and other actors as part of countering terrorism has emerged as an important issue since the attacks on 11 September 2001. For instance, the theme of coordination was prominent in a letter to the Parliament that accompanied the first package of counter-terrorism measures in October 2001 which mentioned that the measures spanned ‘various policy fields’.\(^2\) This package of measures also described the roles of other ministries with regard to countering terrorism, such as those of Finance, Defence, and Transport, Public Works and Water Management.\(^3\)

After the attacks in Madrid in 2004, further initiatives were taken to improve mutual coordination on political, policy, and operational levels. For this purpose the Joint Counter-terrorism Committee (GCT) was established. It includes representatives from various ministries and government bodies, such as: V&J, BZK, General Affairs (AZ), Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Social Affairs and Employment (SZW), Education, Culture and Science (OCW), the NCTV, the Public Prosecution Service (OM), the National Police, the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), the Royal Military Constabulary (KMar), the Military Intelligence and Security Service

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\(^1\) In Dutch: ‘ambtsbericht’.
\(^3\) The Ministry was re-organised and renamed in 2010 as the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment.
(MIVD), and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND). The ministries of SZW and OCW became involved in dealing with jihadism through the Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007-2011. Another instance of institutional coordination is the Counter-terrorism Info-box (CT Info-box), initiated in 2004. This partnership between ten government agencies aims to intensify the exchange of information about persons who, in the context of counter-terrorism, are considered a threat to Dutch society.

As stated previously, the NCTV has an important coordinating role. It was established as the National Counter-terrorism Coordinator (NCTb) in 2005, at the time under the shared responsibility of BZK and what was at the time the Ministry of Justice, with the latter responsible for coordination. One of the core tasks of the NCTV is to coordinate the implementation of the activities concerning counter-terrorism and the prevention of radicalisation. The NCTV provides a link between politics and executive agencies, on both the national and local level.

The work of the NCTV at present includes a variety of tasks. This concerns drawing up threat analyses as well as the DTN, which are important for developing policy. Besides, the NCTV develops, adapts, and strengthens policy in the fields of counter-terrorism and the prevention of radicalisation. Another responsibility is strengthening the resilience of infrastructure and vital sectors, which it accomplishes by linking various organisations within and outside the government (including business and science sectors) in order to increase knowledge about security. Protecting ‘vital interests and sectors and protecting persons, objects, and civil aviation’ is also a NCTV priority. Finally, the NCTV links the (hard) criminal and socially-oriented (soft) approaches to terrorism and radicalisation through its coordinating role.

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4 Universiteit Utrecht 2016, p. 112.
5 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2007b, p. 3.
7 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2004b, p. 5, 7, 9-10. See also Bakker and De Roy van Zuijdewijn 2015, p. 37.
9 See for more background information about the establishment and function of the DTN: Abels 2008; Bakker and De Roy van Zuijdewijn 2015.
10 Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid 2016.
11 Abels 2012, p. 3.
10.2 The role of non-governmental organisations

The Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007-2011 made subsidies available to non-profit organisations for national projects ‘in the field of democratic development and conflict management for young people’.12 Apart from government-funded projects, civil society organisations also started self-funded initiatives. For instance, in January 2015 the Alliance of Dutch Moroccans (SMN) started a telephone helpline which parents could call for advice concerning radicalisation; organisations can also make use of this service for questions about radicalisation. The details of these conversations are not shared with third parties. Besides telephone support, the SMN deploys confidential advisers to support parents in dealing with radicalisation.13 Another such example is the project Oumnia works which was started by the non-profit organisation Steunpunt Sabr in The Hague to assist mothers in dealing with their radicalisation.14

10.3 The role of municipalities

At the municipal level, multiple actors work together to address radicalisation. The ‘person-oriented approach’ through case-by-case consultations is widely used by Dutch municipalities with regard to the prevention of radicalisation and those potentially travelling to as well as those returning from Syria/Iraq. Municipalities such as Amsterdam, Arnhem, Delft, The Hague, Eindhoven, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and Zoetermeer have public policy plans concerning the prevention of radicalisation.15 The case consultations link several local government actors, in particular criminal law (police, the Public Prosecution Service, probation services) and the care sector.

In several municipalities the link between criminal law and the care sector is institutionalised through the so-called Safety House. This is a networked entity through which actors from different work fields come together to deliberate and decide on interventions in complex cases. The Safety House, which dates back to the end of the 1990s, is also where the issue of radic-
sation is taken up. Not all municipalities make use of the Safety House. The municipality carries the final responsibility for public order and security at the local level and therefore remains the most important (coordinating) actor.

Several municipalities have reporting and advice centres for first-line workers, so that social workers, teachers, and care providers have the opportunity to receive advice about radicalisation. In recent years, the police have been given a special task in confronting radicalisation. The community police officer is regarded as an important actor who detects signals of (possible) radicalisation at an early stage and passes them on to other relevant social institutions or government services.

Non-governmental actors are also involved at the local level for the prevention of radicalisation, including those active in the field of (youth) care. The degree and the way in which non-governmental actors are deployed vary for each municipality. In Rotterdam for instance, ‘social and voluntary organisations (…), such as Islamic and Jewish interest groups, mosques, centres of expertise regarding diversity, [and] self-organisations’ are involved in the prevention of radicalisation.

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17 See amongst others: Gemeente Amsterdam 2016; Gemeente Rotterdam 2016; Gemeente Maastricht 2016.
18 Gemeente Rotterdam 2015, p. 16.
11 Belgium

11.1 Federal policy coordination and implementation

Counter-terrorism in Belgium is primarily the responsibility of intelligence services, although other governmental actors are increasingly involved as well. After the attacks on 11 September 2001, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office and several specialised federal police forces were given a more central role. As a result of the earlier mentioned 12-Point Plan, the special protection assignment (with regard to visiting foreign heads of state) of the State Security Service (VSSE) was transferred to the federal police to allow for more capacity for intelligence collection.

The Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office is authorised to carry out (national and international) criminal investigations into terrorism. It ensures the division of tasks, cooperation, and coordination regarding terrorism cases. The public prosecutor brings together all parties involved in investigations and oversees their coordination. The parties involved are the decentralised directorates of the Federal Judicial Police (FGP), the Central Unit Terrorism of the Federal Police and the intelligence agencies.

While these investigations are mainly carried out by decentralised directorates, a unit within the Directorate of Countering Crime against Persons (DJP) has developed a programme for an integrated approach. The DJP coordinates various decentralised directorates. Besides acting as coordinator, the DJP also exchanges information with the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAD, see below) and monitors suspected websites together with the Federal Computer Crime Unit (FCCU). In addition, several magistrates

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1 Belgium has two intelligence services: the civil State Security Service (VSSE, under the authority of the Minister of Justice, sometimes also under the authority of the Minister of the Interior) and the military General Intelligence and Security Service (ADIV, under the authority of the Minister of National Defence). Both services are supervised by the National Security Council.
3 The Dutch translation of Central Unit Terrorism is ‘Centrale dienst terrorisme’.
4 Federale Gerechtelijke Politie 2009, p. 17.
and investigating judges have been appointed since 2006 to assist with the increase in the number of terrorism-related investigations.\textsuperscript{5}

Belgium established the OCAD in 2006 as the successor to the Mixed Anti-Terrorist Group (AGG), which was itself established in secret in 1984 following attacks in France and Belgium. The OCAD is an expansion of the AGG with the aim of more effective coordination of information. Whereas sharing information through the AGG was done on a voluntary basis, it became mandatory with the OCAD. This new structure of cooperation and information sharing includes besides the intelligence services and police also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the Customs Department.\textsuperscript{6}

The OCAD produces threat analyses on the basis of information supplied by partner services.\textsuperscript{7} Beside long-term strategic analyses, the OCAD issues ‘punctual’ threat analyses as well.\textsuperscript{8} These include general threat assessments applying to the whole of Belgium, but also analyses regarding specific persons, groups, events, organisations, or infrastructure. With regard to specific persons, the OCAD determines the threat posed by all individuals it has listed as Foreign Terrorists Fighter (FTF).\textsuperscript{9} On the basis of these threat analyses, the OCAD determines the threat level for Belgium. The level of threat can differ locally, unlike in the Netherlands. As is the case with the intelligence services, the OCAD is controlled by Committee I.

Besides tasks with regard to counter-terrorism, the OCAD coordinates the implementation of the previously mentioned Action Plan Radicalism or Plan R in its capacity as chair of the National Task Force (NTF), the action plan’s strategic steering committee.\textsuperscript{10} The NTF meets on a monthly basis and consists of the Directorate-General for Security and Prevention Policy under of

\textsuperscript{5} Coolsaet and Struye de Swielande 2007, p. 13. Magistrates work under the direction of the federal public prosecutor. The Belgian legal system has two types of magistrates: judges and public prosecutors (also referred to as federal prosecutors). The federal public prosecutor can call in an investigating judge when there is evidence for a crime. This judge carries out an investigation to determine whether further prosecution is required. The judge is authorised to hear witnesses and suspects, appoint experts, and recommend compulsory measures. The dossier will then be shared with the public prosecutor for further handling.

\textsuperscript{6} The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a terrorism unit since 2005 to coordinate information from Belgian embassies abroad and to supply this information to the OCAD.

\textsuperscript{7} Delefortrie and Springael 2004; Coolsaet and Struye de Swielande 2007, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{8} OCAD undated.

\textsuperscript{9} OCAD undated; Clerix 2014.

\textsuperscript{10} Vincke et. al. 2016, p. 11, 13.
the Federal Public Service (FOD) of the Interior, the Directorate-General of Penitentiary Institutions under the FOD of Justice, and the Public Prosecution Service.

After the revision of Plan R in 2015 membership of the NTF was further extended with the federal public prosecutor, the federal police, the State Security Service (VSSE), the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Armed Forces (ADIV), the FOD of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate-General Crisis Centre, the Permanent Commission of Local Police, the Cell for Financial Information Processing (CFI) and the Immigration Service.

Each participating service coordinates information-gathering in its own field regarding seven topics: ideology and propaganda, cultural centres and non-profit organisations, propaganda centres; websites and the Internet, radio and TV broadcasts, and networks and prisons. After analysis, data is stored in the Joint Information Box, a common databank, under the management of the OCAD.11

The OCAD briefly had a federal Syria Task Force, which offered support to local authorities and supervised local coordination in terms of dealing with jihadists.12 This has now been taken over by 23 Local Task Forces (LTF).13 These LTFs are kept informed by the OCAD about jihadists (possibly) travelling to or returning from Syria and Iraq. The LTFs assess which measures can be taken on a local level.14 The central counter-terrorism service of the Directorate-General for Judicial Police (DGJ) and Directorate of Administrative Police Operations (DAO) support these LTFs.15 Measures on a local level are implemented by Local Integrated Security Cells (LIVC).

The Directorate-General for Security and Prevention Policy, under the FOD of the Interior, coordinates federal prevention strategy. It established the Unit Radicalism (also referred to as the Unit R) in 2014, as proposed in the 2013 federal prevention strategy. Unit R is responsible for the preparation, elaboration, and evaluation of security and prevention policy. Moreover, Unit R coordinates initiatives to prevent radicalisation and advises authori-

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13 This is organised at the level of the judicial districts. The following parties are represented: the local and federal police, the intelligence services, and the OCAD, possibly complemented with a representative of the local public prosecutor’s office.
14 Clerix 2014.
15 Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken 2014.
ties about violent radicalisation and means to address it. Other responsibilities of the unit include increasing scientific knowledge and expertise, and the training of (local) professionals.\textsuperscript{16} Unit R is a contact point for mayors who have questions about radicalisation or require professional help with regard to the issue, though in practice fulfilling this offer of support has been a slow process.\textsuperscript{17}

\subsection*{11.2 Local and regional counter-radicalisation}

On the local level, mayors are requested to establish an LIVC in order to address the issue of radicalisation.\textsuperscript{18} The LIVC is the main component of the integrated approach at the local level to deal with jihadists travelling to or returning from Syria and Iraq. It is a multidisciplinary consultative platform in which the mayor, the local police, religious institutions, schools, (sports) associations, and social workers participate.\textsuperscript{19} These institutions not only focus on detecting radicalisation, but also on dealing with radicalisation, including the offering of follow-up care and rehabilitation to returnees. Local police shares relevant information from the LTF with the mayor, after which the LIVC takes measures.\textsuperscript{20}

Partnerships between local government and non-governmental actors in Mechelen and Maaseik show that not all civil society actors actually participate. This has to do with a lack of time or a desire to not be associated with confronting radicalisation. Besides, it has happened that an organisation with which young people are connected is not invited.\textsuperscript{21} Municipalities have different degrees of involvement as well, with lack of time being the most important factor. As a result, these less involved municipalities also have less impact on policymaking. Often the opportunity to obtain additional funding from the federal government impact the degree to which municipalities may focus on strategies for the prevention of radicalisation. Municipalities who, due to the extra funding, can specifically dedicate a civil servant to anti-radicalisation policy can participate in consultative platforms

\begin{footnotes}
\item[16] FOD Binnenlandse Zaken 2015, p. 10.
\item[17] Personal communication M. Dewaele, radicalisation project team employee VVSG, 10 June 2016.
\item[18] Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken and Minister van Justitie 2015.
\item[21] Souffriau 2015.
\end{footnotes}
more adequately compared to municipalities where the tasks of anti-radicalisation are added to a civil servant’s existing workload.\textsuperscript{22}

In addition, the 2013 Prevention Programme Violent Radicalisation includes responsibilities for local non-governmental actors. Civil society is requested to (continue) to invest in fostering the participation of individuals from all sections of society. The federal government also wants to stimulate projects from these partners – whether they are carried out in conjunction with the federal government or not – to strengthen the resilience of young people, to teach democratic values, to provide counter-arguments, and to disseminate information on the risks of radicalism.\textsuperscript{23} An example of this is the (educational) network of Islam experts. At the request of the Flemish Minister of Education, this network started to visit schools in Flanders to explain Islam and radicalisation, in order to start a counter-narrative.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22} Personal communication M. Dewaele, radicalisation project team employee VVSG, 10 June 2016.
\textsuperscript{23} Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken 2013, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{24} See for example: Vlaanderen undated.
12 Denmark

12.1 Operational and local coordination

Denmark has also pursued improving coordination between government services. The 2005 Action Plan recommended to establish a Centre for Terror Analysis.\(^1\) This centre, which opened in 2007, is comprised of fifteen employees from the PET, FE, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Agency for Crisis Management, who are rotated and serve on a temporary basis.\(^2\) The Centre aims to ensure an optimal exchange of information between the institutions involved. In addition, the Centre draws up strategic analyses and threat analyses, covering both the threat of terrorism in Denmark and the threat against Danish interests abroad.\(^3\)

Danish policy regarding radicalisation has since its inception – the 2007 initiatives in Aarhus – been embedded in existing structures dealing with crime prevention. Since the 1970s Denmark has built partnerships on a local level between schools, social services, and the police (the so-called SSP), which are aimed at preventing and dealing with youth crime. This cooperation and sharing of information has been legally institutionalised, including the guarantee that SSP information may not be used in criminal investigations.\(^4\) The parties involved come together when there is a reason for concern about an individual and assess the kind of help that is needed. At first the system was controversial, because it was regarded as a way to inform on someone, but it has become fully commonplace.\(^5\)

The strategy for dealing with radicalisation through so-called Info-houses proceeds according to the same principle. It is a regional partnership between the police, municipality, and social services. Signs of radicalisation are gathered and discussed via this platform, and together the actors determine what approach is required. For instance, they may determine whether a

\(^{1}\) Statsministeriet 2005, p. 5; Persson 2013, p. 23-24.
\(^{2}\) The agency for crisis management (‘Beredskabsstyrelsen’) resides under the authority of the Ministry of Defence and focuses on dealing with the consequences of major accidents and calamities. The agency is also responsible for the Danish Fire Service. See Beredskabsstyrelsen 2016.
\(^{3}\) Politiets Efterretningsstjeneste 2016.
\(^{4}\) Justitsministeriet 2015.
\(^{5}\) Personal communication with Danish counter-terrorism expert, 12 April 2016.
situation could be handled by a social worker or a mentor, or whether the PET must become involved.\textsuperscript{6}

12.2 Ministerial coordination

Within the PET, the Centre for Prevention has been responsible for dealing with radicalisation. They engage with individuals whom the PET thinks pose a threat to society and also with individuals who have been sentenced for violent extremism or terrorism. Besides, the Centre for Prevention trains, advises, and supervises first-line workers (police, social services, psychiatry, and probation services). Finally, the Centre maintains contact with individuals and social institutions that may play a role in reducing radicalisation.\textsuperscript{7} As such the Centre links local and national approaches and oversees their coordination.

The Centre shares this role of coordinating body with the Agency for International Recruitment and Integration (SIRI), a part of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, and Public Housing.\textsuperscript{8} SIRI largely has the same tasks as the Centre: aside from coordination, they also provide training, advice, and supervision, though with a slightly different emphasis. For example, SIRI offers support to municipalities and the police in cases of recruitment and when individuals leave extremist groups. SIRI also spreads knowledge and promotes awareness by publishing a (multilingual) pamphlet under the title ‘Are you afraid that your son or daughter is heading for Syria?’ SIRI also makes possible the training and deployment of mentors and coaches, so they may assist parents and family members dealing with processes of radicalisation.\textsuperscript{9} This system of coaches and mentors is regarded as a crucial part of Danish counter-radicalisation strategy. The idea is that those actors who know best about persons at risk of radicalisation and who are able to gain their confidence may play an important role in dealing with radicalisation.

\textsuperscript{6} Hemmingsen 2015, p. 27-28.
\textsuperscript{7} Politiets Efterretningstjeneste 2014, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{8} Denmark has had a ministry that deals with integration since 2001.
\textsuperscript{9} Udlændinge-, Integrations- og Boligministeriet 2016.
13 Germany

13.1 A crowded scene

In Germany the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) are responsible for counter-terrorism with regard to internal security. Both institutions reside under the Ministry of the Interior (BMI). The Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Military Counter-intelligence Service (MAD) amongst others, are responsible for the timely identification of foreign (terrorist) threats.¹ The BND reports to the Federal Chancellery – the executive office of the Chancellor – while the MAD reports to the Ministry of Defence. These services represent the federal level. However, the sixteen federal states are primarily responsible for public order and security. Only in specific circumstances – domestic implications of international terrorism – do the BKA and BfV play a role.² Each federal state therefore has its own criminal police (LKA) and security service (LfV).

The division of competences between the federal and state level is based on restraint towards a centralised police force, in view of past experiences with the Gestapo and Stasi.³ Until an amendment to the Constitution in 2008, the role of the BKA was limited, for example, to supporting federal states with police tasks; the amendment allowed the BKA to act in cases of international terrorism when, amongst others, the danger exceeded the individual state level. An independent investigation by the BKA on (preventing) international terrorism required permission from the federal states. The effectiveness of federal and state police and security services in countering terrorism is still negatively affected by competition about the division of responsibilities between the federal and state level.⁴ It must be noted, however, that there has been some improvement in recent years.

¹ Germany has a so-called ‘Trennungsgebot’, whereby the constitution regards police tasks and security tasks as separate activities. Hellmuth 2016, p. 97, mentions that there has been a discussion about whether this separation in the constitution only has an organisational nature or also a constitutional nature.
² Deutscher Bundestag 2011c, p. 3.
³ Hellmuth 2016, p. 96.
⁴ Hellmuth 2016, p. 91-92.
13.2 Coordination

The attacks in Madrid in 2004 provided the occasion for Germany to improve mutual cooperation between the various police and security services. The Joint Counter-terrorism Centre (GTAZ) was founded in December 2004. This is not an independent body, but a cooperation and communication platform of no less than 40 bodies that are involved in maintaining national security. GTAZ also has an analytical component, drawing up threat analyses and strategic analyses with regard to international terrorism.5

Besides the federal and state police and intelligence services, GTAZ also includes the MAD, the Federal Office for Refugees (BAMF), the federal prosecutor, the criminal investigation unit of the customs department, and the federal police.6 GTAZ is primarily dedicated to tackling ‘Islamist Terrorism’.7 After the violent acts of the National-Socialist Underground Party (NSU) a similar body for cooperation and the exchange of information was established for right-wing extremism.8

13.3 De-radicalisation and the role of non-governmental organisations

At the federal level various entities are involved in the prevention of radicalisation. The intelligence and security services established in 2009 a Working group Deradicalisation within GTAZ in order to play a greater role in preventing jihadism and supporting de-radicalisation.9 This Working group examines (the development of) jihadist ideologies, identifies radicalisation at an early stage, identifies possibilities to remain in contact with radicalising individuals, and offers support and assistance to the community (family and friends) of the radicalising person.10

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6 In view of the ‘Trennungsgebot’, the activities of police services and intelligence services are strictly separated in an institutional sense as part of GTAZ. The staff of both services meet in various working groups; see Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2016a. Federal prosecutor (‘Generalbundesanwalt’), criminal investigation unit of the customs department (‘Zollkriminalamt’) and the federal police (‘Bundespolizei’).
7 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2016a.
8 Initially this was the ‘Gemeinsame Abwehrzentrum gegen Rechtsextremismus/Terrorismus’ (GAR), which started in December 2011. In November 2012 it was given a new name, ‘Gemeinsames Extremismus- und Terrorismusabwehrzentrum’ (GETZ), and a broader area of attention: extremism and terrorism from the left, xenophobia, counterintelligence and counterproliferation, see Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2016b.
9 Endres 2014, p. 4.
10 Endres 2014, p. 4-5.
The BAMF, also a participant in GTAZ, plays a significant role with regard to the last theme of supporting and assisting the community of the radicalising person. The BAMF operates under the BMI and deals with asylum procedures, and also stimulates and coordinates the integration of migrants.\footnote{Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2016a.} The BAMF also includes since 2012 an advice centre about the prevention of radicalisation, in particular with regard to ‘Islamist groups’.\footnote{Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2016b.} This includes a hotline for persons seeking assistance in dealing with radicalising individuals. The hotline guarantees the anonymity of the caller under certain circumstances; however, this anonymity may be set aside if security is at stake and authorities have to be called in.\footnote{Endres 2014, p. 8.}

The BAMF also maintains contact with social institutions that offer assistance for de-radicalisation. One of these institutions is HAYAT-Deutschland, which was the first institution in Germany in 2011 to offer programmes for the community (parents, friends, teachers, and employers) and the individual in the process of radicalisation him/herself.\footnote{HAYAT-Deutschland 2016. See Endres 2014, p. 7 for a summary of other social institutions which offer comparable programmes.} HAYAT-Deutschland has been operating in the vicinity of Berlin and East Germany and is part of the ZDK Gesellschaft Demokratische Kultur. This latter institution started with EXIT-Deutschland in 2000, a programme for individuals wishing to break with right-wing extremism.\footnote{EXIT Deutschland 2016.}

The initiatives for preventing radicalisation and de-radicalisation in Germany are generally closely related to the approach to extremism as discussed in Part One. This includes its organisation in terms of specific cooperation and coordination between the authorities and social institutions as well as the applied methods.
14 France

14.1 The investigating magistrate as a new actor

French counter-terrorism policy has been primarily handled by the police and judicial authorities since the mid-1980s. The moment of intervention is determined by an (imminent) breach of the law, on the basis of information from intelligence services. This is a substantial change compared to previous decades, when foreign policy considerations had a strong influence, especially in terms of dealing with international terrorism. The idea was that the best way to safeguard the country from attacks was for France to adopt as neutral a position as possible on issues related to foreign terrorist groups.¹

The emphasis on diplomacy as a tool to counter terrorism petered out in the mid-1980s, when the French authorities were not able to immediately deal with a series of bomb attacks. This raised questions on how the country should deal with terrorism.² The 1986 legislative amendment tasked particular investigative magistrates with investigating terrorist acts. This further gave shape to a criminal approach to countering terrorism, with the investigating magistrate occupying a prominent position. Cases concerning counter-terrorism are passed on to the investigating magistrate by local prosecutors who tend decides whether the perpetrators should be prosecuted or not.³ As such, the work of the investigating magistrate is located in between a federal prosecutor and a lawyer.

The magistrates can initiate a judicial investigation and order the searching of premises, wiretapping, and serving of summons. In practice they work closely with the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST), which is one of the domestic intelligence services (see more about the reorganisation of these services under the heading Coordination). The actual prosecution of

¹ Shapiro and Suzan 2003, p. 69-70.
² This episode in the French history of counter-terrorism has been controversial for a long time (and perhaps still is), because of the suggestion that the bomb attacks ended as a result of the political agreement between France and Syria and Iran as instigators of the violence. See Shapiro and Suzan 2003, p. 74.
³ The French name of these judges is ‘juge d'instruction’ and the position is a general part of the French legal system. See E-Justice 2016.
perpetrators is done by a regular district court.\textsuperscript{4} It is argued that the system of investigative magistrates has a depolitising effect. The decision about the nature and approach to particular acts of violence is placed beyond politics since it is the investigative magistrate who decides whether or not the offenders should be prosecuted. However, the system has also been criticised for lack of supervision of the work of the magistrates.\textsuperscript{5}

\textbf{14.2 Coordination}

From the mid-1980s onwards efforts were made to promote cooperation and the sharing of information with regard to countering terrorism. UCLAT has been active since 1984 in stimulating the sharing of operational information. One level above UCLAT is the Inter-Ministerial Counter-terrorism Committee (CILAT), an body that coordinates policy measures.\textsuperscript{6} After the attacks on 11 September 2001, President Jacques Chirac appointed a ‘Monsieur sécurité’, a presidential adviser, to strengthen supervision and coordination in the field of security and counter-terrorism.\textsuperscript{7} In 2002, the President reconvened the inactive domestic security council (CSI). Chaired by the President, this council focused on improving interdepartmental coordination on an even higher level than CILAT. The CSI’s powers were expanded in 2007 by merging it with the French defence council, creating a new council for defence and national security, the Council for Defence and National Security (CDSN).\textsuperscript{8}

There is also a council for domestic intelligence (CRI), which since 2004 has aimed to improve the coherence of the activities of the domestic intelligence services, the DST and the Central Directorate of General Intelligence (DCRG), and of the police services (Judicial Police (PJ) and the National Gendarmerie). The CRI became superfluous in 2008 as a result of the merger that year of the DST and the DGRC into the Central Directorate of General Intelligence (DCRI). The DCRI changed into General Directorate of Domes-

\textsuperscript{4} In France the court of assizes (‘cour d’assises’) has jurisdiction over serious crimes, which also includes terrorism. Normally speaking this court consists of three judges and six jury members (citizens), however with terrorism cases there are no jury members. See E-Justice 2016.

\textsuperscript{5} Shapiro 2007, p. 138-139, 145-146, 148, 155.

\textsuperscript{6} The high officials (‘directeurs de cabinet’) of the President, the Prime Minister, and the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Overseas Territories, and Defence participate in this, as well as the police, gendarmerie, and the UCLAT. See Bigo 2006, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{7} Hellmuth 2016, p. 201-202.

\textsuperscript{8} Hellmuth 2016, p. 202-203. Besides the President, the CSI consists of the Prime Minister, as well as the ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Defence, Budget, and Economy and Finance.
tic Security (DGSI) in 2012. This created more clarity. Additionally the prison system’s intelligence service, established in 2003 to identify and monitor radicalisation among prisoners, started to share information with other intelligence services after the attack by Merah in 2012.

There are two notable aspects regarding these attempts to improve coordination between the various ministries and services. First of all, the greater role played by the President in the domain of national security (‘Monsieur sécurité’, the CRI, and the CDSN), which was traditionally the Prime Minister’s responsibility, demonstrated a centralisation towards the executive power. Secondly, the Feneche committee’s recommendation that a further streamlining of the work of the intelligence services was necessary after the two major attacks in Paris in 2015, which in light of the earlier mentioned developments that concerned the restructuring of security agencies, was perhaps not a surprising conclusion.

14.3 Lower administrative levels and the separation of church and state

Measures have also been taken on lower administrative levels to address ‘radical Islam’. This has been done on a regional level since 2005, carried out by units consisting of various government services (tax, police, ‘préfecture’, and animal health). These units visit institutions suspected of activities related to ‘radical Islam’ and carry out inspections monitoring compliance with rules and regulations. This is an expression of counter-terrorism policy that focuses on the violation of the law, as described in the previous chapter about France.

Additionally, the strict French view on separation of church and state (‘laïcité’) means that the presence of religion and as such the participation of religious institutes in the public domain as a partner in addressing radicalisation is unlikely. The practice of community policing, which is much more common in the Netherlands and the UK, shall be more difficult to apply in France. Nevertheless, there are contacts between intelligence services and representatives of particular religious communities, but these contacts are

9 Hellmuth 2015, p. 984.
10 Hellmuth 2015, p. 990.
11 Hellmuth 2015, p. 985.
12 Sanderson 2016.
13 Ragazzi 2014, p. 28. The ‘préfet’ is the representative of the Ministry of the Interior on a local level.
14 Ragazzi 2014, p. 10, 35.
not official. The French government does have an indirect influence on the desirability of certain religious movements. For instance, when French citizenship is granted or a permit to build a mosque is issued, it requires the approval of the intelligence services.

The practice of laïcité restricts the formal involvement of social actors, such as religious institutes, in participating in counter-terrorism at an early stage. At the same time, according to reports in the media the French strategy for de-radicalisation is still in its initial phase. In light of the novelty of anti-radicalisation in France and recognising the strict separation of church and state, it is still unclear how anti-radicalisation efforts will develop. The 2016 plan includes references to education, sports clubs, and interregional teams for offering support to persons who are radicalising, and training persons to make contact with populations who are vulnerable to radicalisation. It is still uncertain which institutions or government services will play a role in dealing with radicalisation. For example, most employees of the telephone helpline are former employees of the intelligence services.

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15 Ragazzi 2014, p. 10.
16 Ragazzi 2014, p. 10.
17 See for example Renout 2016.
19 Hellmuth 2015, p. 988.
15 United Kingdom

15.1 From threat to policy

Various government bodies play a role in determining CONTEST policy. Threats are assessed by means of confidential analyses prepared by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). This partnership was established in 2003 and is based at the headquarters of the Security Service (MI5) in London. JTAC analyses national and international intelligence, establishes threat levels, and informs ministries and government services about terrorist threats. The agency also produces reports on inter alia terrorism-related developments and terrorist networks.\(^1\) The confidential JTAC analyses are an important input for the annual National Risk Assessment. On the basis of this assessment the British government formulates objectives for each of the four CONTEST workstreams.

The National Security Council is periodically informed about the progress of policy implementation. This council consists of ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, and was set up in 2010 to oversee all matters relating to national security, intelligence and defence. The OSCT, which falls under the Home Office, is responsible for coordinating CONTEST. The Extremism Task Force of the Prime Minister is responsible for coordinating counter-extremism efforts.

Aside from the coordination of CONTEST, the OSCT played a leading role in the creation of the 2011 CONTEST strategy. In this regard, the OSCT was assisted by the ministries, the Devolved Administrations, the police, and the intelligence services – which are all engaged in the strategy’s implementation as well. Since 2010 the Home Office has consulted the broader public about specific themes within CONTEST. Thus far, this has occurred six times and included a three-month consultation process for the new Prevent strategy, which started in November 2010. The consultations in the form of meetings, focus groups, and an online survey included the views of local authorities, religious communities, and students. Despite these measures, the

\(^1\) Persson 2013, p. 27.
strategy has been criticised because of the minor role of the Muslim community in its implementation.²

15.2 Pursue, Protect and Prepare

The implementation of counter-terrorism policy involves many different government actors. The Intelligence services, police services, and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) play a central role. The UK’s three main intelligence services are the Security Service (or MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (or MI6), and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). MI6 and GCHQ operate under the responsibility of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

MI5, designated as the leading intelligence service after the Cold War in the field of counter-terrorism, focuses on domestic threats. The earlier discussed JTAC was set up in 2003 for the purposes of more efficient coordination between MI5, MI6, GCHQ, Defence Intelligence (DI), the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and the police. MI5 closely cooperates with the main police service in the region of London which gathers intelligence and has counter-terrorism responsibilities: the Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC, also referred to as SO15) of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).³ The operational activities of the MPS are linked to regional and national police networks through the Police Counter-Terrorism Network (PCTN).⁴

In the context of the Pursue workstream, the above-mentioned intelligence and security agencies focus on investigating terrorist activities and disrupting threats, while the CPS is responsible for prosecution. In addition, the police and intelligence services, together with the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) of the Ministry of Justice, examine the risks posed by persons sentenced for terrorists offences.⁵ The National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO), part of the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC), supports a network of about 190 counter-terrorism advisors (CT-

² Skoczylis 2015; Ganesh 2015.
³ The CTC/SO15 is a merger between the Special Branch (SO12) and Anti-Terrorism Branch (SO13).
⁴ HM Government 2011a, p. 115.
SA) who are part of local police units. Their task is providing assistance in all fields of Protect and Prepare.\(^6\)

Besides government bodies, non-governmental actors are also involved in the implementation of counter-terrorism policy. There have been several changes in this area in recent years, in particular with regard to the Protect workstream. In the first public version of CONTEST, published in 2006, the role of non-governmental actors was limited to public-private cooperation in protecting critical infrastructure (Critical National Infrastructure, CNI).\(^7\) However, the annual CONTEST report from 2015 mentions cooperation with actors in domains as diverse as the communications sector, the Internet, infrastructure and CNI, science and technology, and volunteer organisations.\(^8\) Examples of such collaboration are the Griffin Project and the ARGUS Project. In these projects, managers, reception and security staff are informed about terrorism-related issues and given training in preventing, responding and recovering from an attack. These projects also aim to build confidence and share information about terrorism and crime.

The government took additional steps to strengthen its relationship with the private sector in 2014 following the publication of the National Security Through Technology policy report.\(^9\) This included establishing the Security and Resilience Growth Partnership (SRGP), the Security Innovation and Demonstration Centre (SIDC), and a new position within the OSCT: the Director of Security Industry Engagement.\(^10\) With the creation of the latter position, the government signals the private sector as integral to CONTEST.\(^11\)

### 15.3 Prevent

Prevent policies are primarily implemented at the local level in prisons, schools, and neighbourhoods.\(^12\) The organisation of Prevent is comparable to the UK’s Crime Safety Partnerships (CSP).\(^13\) Prevent builds on a similar structure, in which policies are implemented by multiple actors, including

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\(^6\) HM Government undated.


\(^8\) HM Government 2015; Rosemont 2014, p. 148.

\(^9\) Ministry of Defence 2012.

\(^10\) For more information see: Home Office undated.

\(^11\) Rosemont 2014, p. 149.

\(^12\) HM Government 2011a, p. 112.

\(^13\) Skoczylis 2015.
the police, social workers, religious communities, educational institutions, probation services, and prisons. A network of coordinators supervises the work of these actors and supports the activities of Prevent. There are two types of Prevent coordinators. The first type is a Home Office official who assists the local government in creating and implementing action plans. The second type assists educational institutions and offers training courses.\textsuperscript{14}

The police are basically the public face of Prevent via the use of Prevent Engagement Officers (PEO).\textsuperscript{15} These PEOs support the network of coordinators, visit neighbourhoods, and disseminate information on various topics to other Prevent partners (e.g. on political tensions between neighbourhoods).\textsuperscript{16} The PEOs are an important means by which (local) actors are linked together. Police also plays a central role in the Channel programme, a cornerstone of Prevent. They coordinate the activities of an interdisciplinary network of actors which is designed to support individuals who are referred to Channel. In this network, the local government is always involved. Depending on the case, the National Health Service (NHS), social workers, educational institutions, youth crime services, the Home Office, Troubled Families Teams, the prison system, and probation services can become involved as well.\textsuperscript{17}

Communities play an important role within Prevent. The government states that communities can often refute extremist narratives more adequately than the government itself.\textsuperscript{18} However, studies from 2009 and 2010 showed mixed results in terms of the degree to which the authorities draw on the capacities of communities. Local authorities proved selective in initiating dialogue with individuals or organisations representing communities. Local authorities also took decisions regarding Prevent without consulting or otherwise involving communities or other local non-governmental actors.\textsuperscript{19} One reason given for sidestepping these actors was that they lacked sufficient resources and expertise.\textsuperscript{20} This is not the only sign of friction

\textsuperscript{14} Mastroe 2016, p. 53.  
\textsuperscript{15} Lakhani 2012, p. 192.  
\textsuperscript{16} HM Government 2011a, p. 70.  
\textsuperscript{17} HM Government 2015c, p. 7. The national Troubled Families programme was launched in 2011. A Troubled Families Team supports local authorities through interventions and support to families. These teams fall under the responsibility of the DCLG.  
\textsuperscript{18} HM Government 2011b, p. 7.  
\textsuperscript{19} Briggs 2010, p. 976-977; Kundnani 2009, p. 15-17.  
\textsuperscript{20} Briggs 2010, p. 977.
between the authorities and communities in the context of Prevent. Recent reports showed that less than ten percent of all references to Channel came from communities. Most of these references came from schools, welfare institutions, and the health care sector.\textsuperscript{21} The choice for particular Prevent partners also caused controversy. Then Home Secretary Theresa May stated in the introduction to the new Prevent strategy in 2011 that certain organisations should not have been subsidised but taken action against.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21} Hamilton 2015.
\textsuperscript{22} HM Government 2011b, p. 1.
16 United States

16.1 Policy development
The federal government developed both the national counter-terrorism strategy and the national CVE strategy without the involvement of non-governmental actors. For instance, the national CVE strategy was crafted by an Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), whereby White House officials responsible for national security played a leading role. The strategy was then discussed with and approved by the DoS, DoJ, DHS, the departments of Finance, Justice, Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Veterans’ Affairs as well as the FBI and NCTC, and finally signed by the President.\(^1\) Different procedures were followed on the local level. The strategies developed as part of the Three City Pilot were the outcome of rounds of consultation involving both state and non-governmental actors. This included the Muslim communities in each of the three cities.

16.2 Counter-terrorism: Coordination and implementation
President Bush announced the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) following the attacks on 11 September 2001. The OHS was replaced by the DHS with the 2002 Homeland Security Act. More than twenty federal institutions who dealt with homeland security became part of this new department. The department’s objectives were to improve coordination and cooperation between the various government services and to prevent new attacks.\(^2\) The key tasks of the department mainly concern counter-terrorism.\(^3\) Despite the concentration of government services on homeland security into one department, the DHS is not solely responsible for security and counter-terrorism.\(^4\) Other important actors which will be explained below are the DoS and the DoJ.

Part One already briefly discussed the Office for Combatting Terrorism, which had been created within the DoJ after the hostage-taking in Munich in 1972. This office, which is now known as the Bureau of Counterterrorism

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\(^1\) White House 2011b.
\(^2\) Nemeth 2010.
\(^3\) Clarke 2004, p. 119.
\(^4\) Clarke 2004, p. 125.
and Countering Violent Extremism, is responsible for developing and coordinating counter-terrorism initiatives against threats from abroad. The DoS houses the Global Engagement Center, which was known as the Center for Strategic Counter-Terrorism Communications before 2016. This centre is responsible for communicating CVE to a global audience, and coordinates, integrates, and synchronises information to refute propaganda from organisations such as IS and Al Qaida, whereby offering an alternative narrative.\(^5\)

DoJ’s Counterterrorism Section (CTS) is responsible for the development and implementation of legislation and policy regarding both domestic and international terrorism.\(^6\) The DoJ is also involved in counter-terrorism via the FBI, which coordinates the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). The JTTFs are networks of law enforcement agencies conducting counter-terrorism investigations and sharing this information with partners.\(^7\) A comparable function is undertaken by the fusion centers, which fall under the shared responsibility of the DoJ and the DHS. A fusion center shares information between various levels in intelligence and law enforcement circles as well as with other relevant actors such as the private sector which manages critical infrastructure.\(^8\)

The DHS, the DoS, and the FBI are part of the so-called Intelligence Community (IC) which totals seventeen services.\(^9\) This includes the NCTC, a part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which promotes coherence within the IC. The NCTC is the successor to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which was established in 2003 in response to the 9/11 Commission Report.\(^10\)

The NCTC, another member of the IC, is a collaboration between various actors, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI. In this capacity the NCTC is responsible for preparing terrorism-related analyses and advising the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) about intelligence

\(^5\) U.S. Department of State 2016b.
\(^6\) U.S. Department of Justice undated.
\(^7\) U.S. Department of Homeland Security undated b.
\(^9\) The 14 other members are: Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Navy Intelligence, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
\(^10\) For the report, see: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004.
operations and analyses concerning counter-terrorism. This makes the NCTC the primary agency to combine and analyse intelligence in the field of counter-terrorism (with the exception of domestic terrorism).\textsuperscript{11} The agency gathers and integrates information from the entire IC and prepares analyses on the basis of this information, which are offered to policymakers, police, intelligence, and defence agencies as well as agencies concerned with homeland security and foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{12} The general public is informed through the NTAS system of the DHS as referred to in Part One.

16.3 CVE: Coordination and implementation

A number of federal agencies involved in counter-terrorism policy also play an important role with regard to CVE. Responsibility for the coordination of the CVE strategy at the national level falls to the National Task Force. It was established in November 2010 and is managed by the DHS and the DoJ. All federal departments and federal agencies involved in community engagement are represented in this task force, and the federal government adopts the role of facilitator and contact point for local authorities and local networks.

Important on the government side are federal public prosecutors (US Attorneys), the FBI, the DoJ’s Civil Rights Division and the Community Relations Service, and the DHS’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (OCRL). The US government recognises that cooperation with communities, the private sector, and citizens is an essential part of CVE.\textsuperscript{13} However, it remains unclear what concrete roles these non-governmental actors should have with regard to the conduct of CVE.

The (federal) government also supports and coordinates with regard to the local strategies of Minneapolis-St. Paul, Boston, and Los Angeles. The DoJ supervises the entire CVE pilot programme. The federal public prosecutors from the states of Minnesota, Massachusetts, and California do this for Minneapolis-St. Paul, Boston, and Los Angeles respectively. These programmes are also undertaken in cooperation with the White House, the DHS

\textsuperscript{11} National Counter-terrorism Center undated a. The FBI is the primary organisation responsible for domestic terrorism. See: Rosenbach 2009.

\textsuperscript{12} Examples of such analyses are the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and the daily National Terrorism Bulletin (NTB).

\textsuperscript{13} White House 2011a, p. 3.
and the NCTC.\textsuperscript{14} These actors coordinate policy at the federal level and are in direct contact with local security services and communities through the above-mentioned CAB and CREX instruments.\textsuperscript{15} Similar to the national CVE approach, the federal government focuses in particular on supporting these communities so that they are able to respond more adequately to the needs of individuals and families.\textsuperscript{16}

In order to improve the coordination of the CVE approach by the DHS it was announced that the Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) would be launched in September 2015. The aim of the OCP is to assist both public and private actors regarding CVE through coordination, innovation, and support (for example, through finance and training). At the same time the OCP tries to build trust and working relationships between the government and communities. To accomplish this, the OCP works together with the OCRL. Additionally, the Countering Violent Extremism Task Force was set up in January 2016 to further develop coordination. Executive government bodies participate in this task force under the chairmanship of the DHS and the DoJ in order to offer more efficient support on a local level for CVE.\textsuperscript{17} The task force focuses on the four key needs, as identified in the 2015 evaluation and as described in Part One.

The local plans of the Three City Pilot show that local non-governmental actors should play an essential role in implementing CVE policy. Networks of governmental and non-governmental actors are seen as a way to increase resilience against extremism. Such forms of engagement between the various actors appear to be initiated by the government. But activities are also carried out by the local communities themselves, such as projects aimed at promoting the participation of people in society. While these projects are not by definition referred to as CVE, they are in line with the CVE agenda.

Other activities by these local actors are specifically aimed at CVE, such as projects to increase awareness regarding extremism and recruitment.\textsuperscript{18} In particular institutions for (higher) education, experts and (representatives of) Muslim communities are given roles as part of CVE. In the plans of Los

\textsuperscript{14} Murphy 2014.
\textsuperscript{15} National Counter-terrorism Center undated b.
\textsuperscript{16} U.S. Department of Homeland Security undated c.
\textsuperscript{17} U.S. Department of Justice 2016.
\textsuperscript{18} Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group 2015.
Angeles and Boston the private sector is also mentioned as a partner. This partner concerns in particular the media, which is seen as being able to increase the reach of narratives, and educational institutions for improving the skills of young people.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{19} Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group 2015; U.S. Greater Boston Regional Collaborative 2015.
17 Conclusion

Counter-terrorism, in particular the focus on dealing with jihadism, has become an important domain of policymaking in the years since the 11 September 2001 attacks in all of the seven countries investigated for this report. Besides this similarity, there are also many differences among the countries, and counter-terrorism – as an area of policymaking – is very much in motion. The dynamics of the policy field are greatly influenced by (the threat of) attacks and the respective political, institutional, and social contexts. The boundaries of this field are also not fixed. For one country, dealing with jihadism is more encompassing than for another country.

The three most important developments signalled in this research are:

- The increasing visibility of the policy domain;
- The increase in coordination of policy and information sharing;
- An increased focus on radicalisation and a further broadening of policy.

The latter development is that in which counter-terrorism has most distinguished itself in the last ten years or so, compared with previous decades. Before exploring these developments in more detail, we present several general observations about how the different countries deal with jihadism.

17.1 General observations

In order to explain the developments with regard to counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation focused on jihadism in this concluding chapter, we have provided summaries in tables 2 and 3 on pages 98-101. In these figures, the countries have been placed below each other in the left column. In table 2, the columns show in what year plans were announced for each country, whether in the field of counter-terrorism (T) or regarding strategies for addressing radicalisation (R), extremism (E), or jihadism (J). Table 3 provides a summary of evaluations for each country with regard to these four areas. The next two columns of table 3 indicate which ministry is currently responsible for this domain, and whether there is involvement of non-governmental actors. The last column shows whether there is any coordination in the policy domain regarding approaches to dealing with jihadism, and if this is the case, by which actor. Together tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of developments over time and the similarities and
differences between each country. These developments are briefly explained below.

- In all investigated countries additional plans have been drawn up regarding counter-terrorism after the attacks on 11 September 2001. In many cases they have been made public, but not always. Belgium and Germany have plans, but they have not been made public. The same initially applied to the UK; however, the country made its strategy public in 2006. Denmark, the Netherlands, and the US have had public plans for a longer time. France presented a plan later, in 2016, specifically in the field of counter-terrorism;

- With the exception of the US, usually the justice or interior ministries are primarily responsible for counter-terrorism. The American DHS, although comparable with an interior ministry, has a narrower horizon by focusing on domestic or ‘homeland’ security. But attaching more prominence to security is seen elsewhere as well: in the Netherlands the Ministry of Justice has increased its profile as a security actor by changing its name to Ministry of Security and Justice;

- Nowadays all countries regard the strategies for addressing radicalisation or extremism as a policy field with its own distinct character which requires different knowledge and expertise than counter-terrorism;

- The terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ are not clearly delineated. Only the UK and the Netherlands make a distinction between both terms. The UK is the only country which not only has an approach for dealing with radicalisation through the Prevent strategy, but also recently introduced its own strategy for tackling extremism;

- In all countries non-governmental actors are involved in the policy field, but to very different extents. In the UK, the US, Germany, and the Netherlands, these actors are actively involved, both in drawing up and implementing the plans. Denmark is cautious and France is hesitant in involving religious institutions because of the strict separation of church and state;

- In all countries there is a coordination of policies with regard to dealing with jihadism. The most common form is coordination between the police and intelligence and security services. The
Netherlands is the only country which coordinates counter-terrorism and radicalisation across the full scope of the field.

Below these general observations will be explained in greater depth.

17.2 Reflection

17.2.1 Increasing visibility of the policy domain

The fact that counter-terrorism – particularly focusing on jihadism – and counter-radicalisation have become prominent policy fields seems hardly a surprising conclusion. More notable are the differences in openness regarding the various policies. Part One showed that there are large differences between the countries. Germany has a counter-terrorism strategy, but it has not been made public, similarly to Belgium’s Plan R, although the revised version was eventually made public in June 2016. Other countries, such as the Netherlands, have produced various policy documents which are the subject of political and public debate.

There are several reasons why it is worthwhile to mention the visibility aspect of policies dealing with jihadism. First, public action plans and strategies provide the public with insight into the vision adopted and measures taken. This connects to issues of transparency, legitimation and evaluation of public actions. Second, action plans and strategies serve as a means of communication intended to inform other government bodies or citizens about both threats to society and the possible solutions crafted by the government. Third, public action plans and strategies create political and social expectations about security, what Beatrice de Graaf refers to as the performative power of counter-terrorism policy.¹

The Dutch counter-terrorism strategies from 2011 and 2016 recognise the relationship between policy and the intensity and nature of social perceptions of terrorism.² It can be stated that informing citizens to reassure them is inextricably related to a certain degree of alarm about the threat. In relation to the visibility and public nature of the policy domain, this means that more information does not always result in better informed or reassured citizens.

When we compare the countries, we see that most countries in recent years have taken their policies more into the public domain and their citizens have

¹ De Graaf 2010.
² Rijksoverheid 2011, p. 74; Rijksoverheid 2016, p. 8.
become more informed about policies conducted, but this does not necessarily mean that they are less afraid.

17.2.2 An increase in policy coordination and information sharing

In all countries examined, new initiatives have been taken in recent years to improve national coordination and exchange of information, in particular between the intelligence and security services. The need for this can be traced to the blurring of the boundaries between national and international security, an insight which can also be found in policy documents.\(^3\) An absolute separation of responsibilities, whereby security services and police are responsible for dealing with domestic threats, while intelligence services and defence are responsible for foreign threats, has been regarded as insufficient since the 1990s.

Especially in view of the emergence of counter-radicalisation policies, and thus the broadening scope of policies dealing with jihadism, the coordination of policy will likely become more important. What makes this even more complex is the fact that partners outside the ‘classic’ security domain are increasingly involved in dealing with jihadism. As a result, policy has become more comprehensive, which can be seen both on a declaratory level and in practice. Two developments play a role here.

First of all, we may observe changing roles: the social domain is moving closer to the work of security professionals due to counter-radicalisation policies, while intelligence and security services have become more connected to actors in the social domain. The UK and Denmark are illustrative in this respect. Particularly in the UK, but also in Denmark, schools and social organisations are asked to contribute ideas and to counter radicalisation. At the same time, the Danish PET tries to counter radicalisation at an early stage through the Centre for Prevention. The multidisciplinary consultative structures on a local level in the Netherlands and Denmark are manifestations of the increasing role of the police in the social domain.

A second development is the increase in public-private cooperation. This cooperation is not equally developed in all countries. However, it has greatly expanded in the UK, the US, and Germany.\(^4\) Denmark is cautious in this

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\(^3\) Anderson et. al. 1995; Bigo 2000.

\(^4\) This is mainly related to the idea that the government should play a cautious role in regulating society, and therefore intentionally leaves many tasks to the private sector.

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respect. Danish authorities are more sceptical about working with a sector characterised by profit incentives – at least when it comes to counter-radicalisation. A similar consideration relates to cooperation between government bodies and non-profit organisations and (religious) communities. To what extent can or do these non-governmental actors want to play a role with regard to dealing with jihadism, and what effects does this have on their functioning and place in society? These developments and accompanying questions and considerations make policy coordination and information sharing one of the most difficult aspects related to dealing with jihadism.

17.2.3 The increasing focus on radicalisation

The most distinctive element of dealing with jihadism in the past decade is the growth of policy aimed at identifying (potential) violent perpetrators at the earliest possible stages, through so-called soft policy (dialogue, coaching, and mentorship). When we compare the seven countries, in general two approaches can be identified. The UK and US, in particular, emphasise counter-radicalisation primarily as an ideological effort, whereby the narratives of jihadist ideology must be refuted. In contrast, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, and Belgium focus more on social and environmental factors. Until recently, French policy tended toward the first approach, but recent policy initiatives seem to indicate a movement towards the second approach.\(^5\)

There are also new and diverse developments regarding the scope of the intervention domain. Policy plans for counter-radicalisation in the UK, Denmark, and the Netherlands initially focused heavily on promoting the integration of minorities. An oft-heard criticism was that this would stigmatise entire population groups and create suspect communities. Later versions of these plans broke with such a focus, and moved more towards specific interventions. As concerns future developments, the question remains where the boundaries are for policies on jihadism. Because developments concerning how to deal with jihadism are closely related to the observed level of threat, political and social discussions concerning (national) security, and availability of resources, it is not possible to give a conclusive prediction in this respect.

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\(^5\) These two approaches are not mutually exclusive.
17.3 Continuation

This report shows the main features of how seven countries deal with jihadism by focusing on their counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation plans and policies. For this purpose we examined plans and strategies and the actors involved, and distinguished three major developments. In the next reports we will specify and expound upon a number of subareas. We will discuss in particular issues that hold a prominent place on the security agenda: person-specific measures with regard to those travelling to and returning from the battlefields in Syria/Iraq, as well as court cases against these individuals.
18 Dilemmas

On the basis of this report a number of dilemmas can be identified.

**Formulation**

- There is a difference in terminology between the countries in terms of identifying the issues relevant for counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation. Table 1 on page 17 shows this with regard to Syria/Iraq travellers. What is referred to as ‘jihadism’ in the Netherlands is called ‘Islamistischer Terrorismus’ in Germany and ‘militant Islamisme’ in Denmark. While the term Countering Violent Extremism is used in the US, it is called ‘confronting radicalisation’ in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and France, while the notions of extremism and radicalisation are combined in Denmark. The struggle about terminology is a manifestation of how to get to grips and thus make sense of the threats and risks counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation deal with.

- Programmes for countering radicalisation have received much criticism, in particular in the UK and US, for contributing to the stigmatisation of Muslim communities as allegedly important places of radicalisation and risk of terrorism. For instance, the name of the Mosque Plan, which was announced in Belgium in 2002, was perhaps not the most sensible choice. The 2015 British Counter-Extremism Strategy also refers regularly to examples of Islamist extremism, amongst others, to legitimise the need for a strategy. In light of this, and building on the preceding bullet point, the question is when certain terms or ways of framing turn into stereotyping or even stigmatising.

**Comparability**

- In the US and Germany there are programmes for those leaving jihadist groups and undergoing de-radicalisation based on previous experiences with gangs or right-wing extremism. Such initiatives may explain how persons can be removed from certain (politically) violent environments. However, it can be questioned to what extent the dynamics and needs in the case of jihadism are the same as with gangs and right-wing extremism. Are these two phenomena actually the most relevant examples for obtaining knowledge about dealing with jihadism? In other words, with which other problems may policies for dealing with jihadism be compared and on what basis?
Accountability

- The way in which counter-terrorism policy is evaluated varies per country, a summary of which may be found in Table 3 on pages 100-101. Are the evaluations carried out by the ministries who are also responsible for the policy, or are they undertaken by external actors? What is examined as part of these studies? Does it concern individual measures, the effects of the policies, the consistency of all measures, the statutory framework, or the implementation of the measures? The question also arises whether these evaluations must be made public for the purposes of democratic accountability.

- A large number of different actors are involved in counter-radicalisation. From the viewpoint of democratic accountability, the question is how the commercial and non-profit sectors and communities should relate to this. Can and should these non-governmental actors be assessed regarding their efforts and results? If so, how?

Scope of the policy domain

- All countries apply a variant of what is referred to as the broad approach in the Netherlands. Beside investigation and prosecution, there is also a focus on the early identification of processes that may lead to political violence. Traditional actors such as the police, judicial authorities, and the intelligence and security services have responsibilities here, but increasingly so do socially-oriented government actors, non-governmental organisations both with and without a profit incentive, as well as communities. This may be called an integrated approach, but the question is whether such an approach is at odds with providing the policy domain with a clear focus. Is an integrated approach a conscious choice, the result of a lack of choice or perhaps indecisiveness? Who actually supervises this broad field?

Role of non-governmental organisations and communities

- On what basis should non-profit organisations be involved in dealing with radicalisation? Do these organisations only qualify for government subsidies when they focus on developing activities as part of counter-radicalisation efforts?

- Communities are regarded as an important player in preventing radicalisation, because it is thought that they are relatively close to individuals at risk of radicalisation, and can therefore identify early signals more adequately. The question is how these communities
should be contacted. It is also important to consider to what extent
organisations are involved that have many ideological similarities
with those persons who (may) want to take the step to use violence.
Where should the line be drawn? How should minorities within less
visible communities be dealt with?
Table 2: Overview policy domains; policy and actors, continues on next page (legenda on page 101)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Executive ministry/ministries</th>
<th>Social actors involved in drafting plan</th>
<th>Coordinator/responsible</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>Government-wide</td>
<td>Yes (focus group)</td>
<td>NCTV (under direction of V&amp;J)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R</td>
<td>V&amp;J, SZW</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NCTV (under direction of V&amp;J)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>N/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J</td>
<td>V&amp;J, SZW</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NCTV (under direction of V&amp;J)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>MoI, Jus (implementation esp. by decent. gov't)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NTF (chair OCAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R</td>
<td>MoI, Jus (implementation esp. by decent. gov't)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NTF (chair OCAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E</td>
<td>MoI, Jus (implementation esp. by decent. gov't)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NTF (chair OCAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>N/a</td>
</tr>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Yes (focus groups)</td>
<td>PET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R</td>
<td>MoI, Integration</td>
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<td>PET, SIRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E</td>
<td>MoI, Integration</td>
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<td>PET, SIRI</td>
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<td>J</td>
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<td>N/a</td>
<td>N/a</td>
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<td>T</td>
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<td>J</td>
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<td>N/a</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>MoI</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>MoI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>J</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Government-wide</td>
<td>6 consultations since 2010</td>
<td>OSCT (under direction HO; before 2006 Cabinet’s Office)</td>
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<tr>
<td>R</td>
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<td>Consultations for drawing up Prevent 2011</td>
<td>OSCT (under direction HO; before 2006 Cabinet’s Office)</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
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<tr>
<td>J</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>US</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>T</td>
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<td>Ministries</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>DHS, DoJ</td>
<td>No (with local pilots: yes)</td>
<td>NTF (chair DHS, DoJ)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

*Table 2: Overview policy domains, continuation (legend on page 101)*
Table 3: Overview policy domains: evaluations, continues on next page (legend on page 101)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>E</td>
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<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interim evaluations of Plan R, both with regard to content and structurally (results not publicly accessible). Projected annual evaluations of the Prevention Programme from 2013 by a platform (federal government, authorised sub-entities and VVSG). The Radicalism Unit is also responsible for evaluating the policy regarding radicalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interim evaluations of Plan R, both with regard to content and structurally (results not publicly accessible)</td>
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<td>J</td>
<td></td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interim evaluation of implementation Action Plan from 2009 by COWI consultancy (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td></td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/a</td>
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<table>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation Strategy to prevent extremism, form and date unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
### Table 3: Overview policy domains; continuation (legend at the bottom)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>J</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>Report to Parliament about legislation with sunset clauses. Evaluation CT legislation (2012)</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>N/a</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>US</strong></td>
<td>Comparing number of victims before and after the implementation of the policy by Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>CVE evaluation (review) by eleven ministries and services in 2015. In case of subsidies for CVE projects: each project has its own target which measures the success of the project. The OCP and FEMA monitor the project. The Science and Technology Directorate of the DHS carries out independent evaluations</td>
<td>CVE evaluation (review) by eleven ministries and services in 2015. In case of subsidies for CVE projects: Each project has its own target which measures the success of the project. The OCP and FEMA monitor the project. The Science and Technology Directorate of the DHS carries out independent evaluations</td>
<td>N/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Legend for tables 2 and 3

- **CT**: Counter-terrorism
- **CVE**: Countering violent extremism
- **DHS**: Department of Homeland Security (US)
- **E**: Extremism
- **Esp.**: Especially
- **Gov’t**: Government
- **J**: Jihadism
- **Jus**: Ministry of Justice
- **M&E**: Monitoring and Evaluation
- **Mol**: Ministry of the Interior
- **N/A**: Not applicable
- **OCP**: Office for Community Partnerships
- **R**: Radicalisation
- **T**: Terrorism
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ISGA is a part of the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs and is located in The Hague. It is a multidisciplinary research environment with five areas of focus: Terrorism and Political Violence; Security and Cyberspace; Diplomacy and Global Affairs; Governance of Crises; and Intelligence and Security.