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**Note from the Editors**

About Perspectives on Terrorism
Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume XI, Issue 2 (April 2017) of Perspectives on Terrorism at http://www.terrorismanalysts.com. Our free and independent online journal is a publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University’s Campus The Hague. Now in its eleventh year, Perspectives on Terrorism has close to 7,200 regular subscribers and many more occasional readers and website visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer reviewed by external referees while its Research and Policy Notes, Special Correspondence and other content are subject to internal editorial quality control.

Here is a brief look at the contents of the current issue:

The first article by Peter Wignell, Sabine Tan, Kay L. O’Halloran & Rebecca Lange provides a richly illustrated overview of the two main online propaganda magazines of the ‘Islamic State’, using discourse analysis to explore shifts in emphasis from Dabiq to Rumiyah. The second article by Charles Kirchofer raises the question whether terrorist organisations can be deterred and arrives at a rather positive conclusion in the case of Israel and Hamas.

This issue of Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) features three Research Notes. The first by Veronika Fajmonová, Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley looks at U.S. public opinion polls and opinion shifts among Muslims in the United States related to Islamist terrorism and concludes that sympathy for violent extremism continues to be low. A second Research Note by James Lutz and Brenda Lutz focuses on obvious and not so obvious linkages between terrorist attacks and the population size of countries. The third Research Note, authored by Abdullah bin Khaled al–Saud, looks into a low-key Saudi counter-narratives campaign based on primary sources.

Furthermore, in the Resources Section, there is another bibliography on the civil war in Syria – already the third from our journal’s Information Resources Editor, Judith Tinnes. While this overview lists mainly academic and think tank titles, more ephemeral recent materials on issues related to terrorism recently noted on the Internet are again presented by web analyst Berto Jongman.

In the Book Reviews, the reader will find next to the numerous short book reviews by Joshua Sinai – two more detailed ones. The first by Parmida Esmaeilpour is reviewing a new book on the popular uprisings in the Middle East of 2011. The second, reviewed by the editor-in-chief of Perspectives on Terrorism, introduces the Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism.

The current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism was jointly prepared by Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid and Prof. James J. Forest, the main editors of the journal, in collaboration with our new Associate Editors from ISGA, Dr. Bart Schuurman and Jennifer Dowling.
A Mixed Methods Empirical Examination of Changes in Emphasis and Style in the Extremist Magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah

by Peter Wignell, Sabine Tan, Kay L. O’Halloran & Rebecca Lange

Abstract
The change in name of ISIS's flagship English language magazine from Dabiq to Rumiyah prompted media speculation about its significance. This article uses a mixed methods approach that integrates a qualitative social semiotic discourse analysis approach with quantitative methods of information visualisation to examine empirically changes in emphasis and approach in both magazines over time to determine whether the changes are ones of style or substance. The paper argues that, while ISIS has changed its strategic focus over time in response to its changing fortunes, the organisation's underlying world view, values and ultimate aims remain consistent and unchanged.

Keywords: mixed methods approach, multimodal discourse analysis, violent extremist discourse, information visualisation, Dabiq, Rumiyah

Introduction
The extremist organisation which refers to itself as Islamic State (referred to here as ISIS) is a prolific producer of media output. The “vast majority of official media releases are in Arabic” [1], however a proportion of ISIS's media output is also in other languages, with English the most common other language used.[2] Among these publications are the professionally produced online magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah. From July 5, 2014 to July 31, 2016, Al Hayat Media Centre, the branch of ISIS’s Ministry of Media which produces material in English, produced fifteen issues of Dabiq.[3] On September 6, 2016, the first issue of Rumiyah was released. Since then further issues of Rumiyah have been released on a more or less monthly schedule. Since no further issue of Dabiq has appeared since the first issue of Rumiyah appeared, it seems most likely that Rumiyah has replaced Dabiq as the organisation's flagship non-Arabic propaganda magazine.

The change in name has prompted media speculation. Is the change from Dabiq to Rumiyah a sign that ISIS is under extreme pressure from “unrelenting airstrikes” [4], or is it “just a savvy PR decision”[5]? It has also been reported that Rumiyah lacks the “fire and brimstone” apocalyptic narrative of Dabiq” [6], is shorter than Dabiq, and lacks “the unifying theme of other ISIS propaganda tools” .[7] Comerford also notes that ISIS is under increasing pressure on several fronts but cautions against underestimating the resilience of ISIS's ideology as the group has shown “its ability to respond to changes in situation or fortune”[8], suggesting that the change in name of the magazine might signal a shift in emphasis from a physical caliphate to a more virtual one.

Both the ISIS in crisis hypothesis and the resilience and adaptability of ISIS are supported by Siyech, who states that “IS’ state-building enterprise appears to be crumbling with the continuing loss of territory, towns and cities in Iraq and Syria”. [9] Recruitment has also declined with the number of foreign fighters joining IS falling from 2,000 recruits every month to fewer than 50.[10] However, Siyech cautions against writing ISIS's obituary prematurely, arguing that, “while the group will lose its territory in Iraq and Syria, its capacity to conduct attacks in Iraq and elsewhere will not be diminished.”[11]
Ingram is ambivalent, speculating whether *Rumiyah* represents part of an expansion or a contraction in ISIS’s propaganda.[12] Shanahan suggests that, following losses of territory, naming their front-line publication aimed at a Western audience after a town that is soon to be lost to them “would not be a good look ‘going forward’” for ISIS. However, re-naming the publication after the historical centre of Christianity could be “a way to show what you aspire to”.[13]

Spada points to similarities between *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* in layout, photographic style and appeal to a Western audience.[14] Alternatively, Pragalath reports that *Rumiyah* is said to be made up of articles which have been recycled from ISIS’s daily news bulletins while *Dabiq* features new content; and *Rumiyah* focuses more on current operations while *Dabiq* emphasises longer-term goals and on propagating ISIS’s ideology. [15] Similarly, Friedland points to differences, stating that “ISIS has switched away from *Dabiq* in favor of an easier to read, less theological magazine”.[16]

This media speculation raises questions which are worth exploring empirically. An analysis of these magazines provides an opportunity to examine how ISIS has adapted and adjusted its propaganda strategy to changing circumstances as they provide a chronicle of how ISIS has presented its agenda to the English-speaking world for a period of over two years. The questions addressed in this article include:

- What, if anything, can be read into the name change from *Dabiq* to *Rumiyah*?
- Is the switch in title another strategic adaptation to changing circumstances for ISIS?
- Are apparent differences between *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* something new or do they continue a trend already evident in Dabiq?
- Are the changes matters of style or substance; what are the similarities/differences between *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* and what, if anything, do they imply?

Through addressing these questions the article argues that similarities and differences between *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* show that ISIS has changed its strategic focus over time in response to its changing fortunes and capabilities. In conceding that a quick victory is not possible, ISIS has adjusted its rhetoric and plans of attack. However, the organisation’s underlying world view, values and ultimate aims remain consistent and unchanged.

**Theoretical Approach**

This article integrates the qualitative social semiotic approach of Systemic Functional Multimodal Discourse Analysis [17] with quantitative methods of information visualisation [18], to examine changes in emphasis and approach over time in the English language versions of the online propaganda magazines *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*.

Systemic Functional Multimodal Discourse Analysis (SF-MDA) is an approach that studies human signifying processes as social practices and is concerned with different sign systems and their integration in texts and social activities, interpreted within the contexts of the situation and culture.[19] The approach builds on Halliday’s systemic functional theory (SFT).[20] Three of the key tenets of this approach are that a) language and other semiotic systems are viewed as resources for making meaning; b) it is a theory where meaning in language and other semiotic systems is realised through choices from sets of possible alternatives; and c) language and other semiotic resources are structured according to the functions which meaning-making resources have evolved to serve in society.

Although it was initially applied to language, SFT has been adapted and extended to include the study of other semiotic resources and multimodal texts and artefacts to account for the ways in which linguistic and
non-linguistic resources combine and interact in communicating meaning.[21] In this article, an SF-MDA approach is integrated with information visualisation [22] so that patterns of change in choices in Dabiq and Rumiyah over time can be investigated and displayed.[23]

In a qualitative study of the content of the text of Dabiq, Kiefer, Messing, Musial and Weiβ propose that the magazine is one of the leading media instruments used for radicalisation, especially of Western audiences. [24] However, they analysed only text, arguing that images just serve to support the text and do not contain any new information.[25] On the other hand, Kovacs argues for the importance of “the interconnection of texts and images” where “the text is often an integral part of the image and the same applies vice versa”. [26] It is assumed here that, since both Dabiq and Rumiyah are multisemiotic productions, the combinations of text and image will be more revealing than either text or images on their own. For this reason, the focus of this study is text, images and their relations, as described below.

**Methodology**

**Data Set**

The data set for this study consists of the fifteen issues of Dabiq and six issues of Rumiyah. All issues were downloaded, all images were extracted and image files were catalogued and assigned a unique identifying label. In total 1095 images from Dabiq and 201 images from Rumiyah were classified according to their subject matter and context, based on the framework developed by O’Halloran, Tan, Wignell, and Lange for classifying images and article types in the first 14 issues of Dabiq.[27] Images were first classified into superordinate categories and then sub-categorised according to distinguishing features. This resulted in 12 superordinate image categories and 75 sub-categories (see Table 1).

Similarly, all articles in all issues of both magazines were classified into types according to article titles and the article's content focus. Where articles in Rumiyah did not have the same category title but were very similar in content to articles in Dabiq they were classified as belonging to the same category. For example, articles titled ‘Hikmah (Wisdom)’, which preach the ISIS version of Islam, do not appear in Rumiyah but are similar in content to a series of articles in Rumiyah called ‘The Religion of Islam and the Jama’ah of the Muslims’. The labels assigned to article types, although different in wording, more or less match the content of those used by Colas.[33] Twenty article types were identified (see Table 2). The distribution of article types was then matched with all issues of Dabiq and Rumiyah (see Table 3).

**Table 1. Image Classifications and Explanations of Key Terms (adapted from O’Halloran, Tan, Wignell, and Lange).**[28]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image Category</th>
<th>Description (Experiential Meaning)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. FAR ENEMY</td>
<td>The term Far Enemy is used by Jihadist Salafists to refer to Western sponsors of Arab regimes: the United States, its Western allies and Israel.[29]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. NEAR ENEMY</td>
<td>The term Near Enemy was initially applied to secular Arab regimes considered apostate by jihadis.[30] It is also used to refer to other secular Muslim regimes.[31]</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. ISIS HEROES</td>
<td>Heroes are people, living and dead, regarded by ISIS as worthy of emulation. Hero images are sub-classified according to whether the hero is alive – mostly mujahideen, or dead – martyrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ISIS ICONS</td>
<td>Three prominent ISIS icons are identified: the ISIS flag, the AK47 assault rifle, and what we refer to as the Tawheed gesture. These icons are often used in combination with other image categories.[32]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Article Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cover/Table of contents</td>
<td>Introduce the main theme and table of contents in <em>Rumiyah</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cover</td>
<td>Introduce the main theme of the issue in <em>Dabiq</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Table of contents</td>
<td>Present the table of contents in <em>Dabiq</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Last page message</td>
<td>Short articles imparting words of wisdom, often quoted from scripture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Foreword</td>
<td>Articles akin to editorials, reflecting ISIS values and obligations of Muslims. Topics include migration to ISIS territory, encouraging lone-wolf attacks, gloating reports on attacks on Western countries, denunciations of Far Enemy ‘crusaders’, promises of ISIS victory, gloating about attacks on Near Enemy (especially Shi’a Muslims), all justified and legitimised by references to selected scripture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Hikmah (Wisdom)</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Amongst the Believers are Men</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>To/From Our Sisters/For Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>From the Pages of History</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>In the words of the Enemy</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Feature Articles</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>Far Enemy Captives</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>John Cantlie (Captive British journalist)</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>ISIS Reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Advertisements</td>
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<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Eulogy/Obituary</td>
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<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Infographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Procedural</td>
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Table 3. Distribution of article types across issues of Dabiq and Rumiyah.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Type</th>
<th>Dabiq</th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Rumiyah</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analysis and Discussion</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Wignell et al. show that ISIS presents a clear and unequivocal agenda founded on a clear set of values which are condensed into readily recognizable icons and that together these represent and reinforce the organisation's consistent antagonistic world view. [35] The principal question that is addressed here is: do aspects of that agenda which are highlighted change from time to time as ISIS adapts to and accommodates changing circumstances?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Choice of Magazine Name: Dabiq and Rumiyah</td>
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<td>Dabiq takes its name from a small nondescript town in Syria near the Turkish border. The town itself is of no strategic importance, however it figures in an apocalyptic prophecy by the Prophet Muhammad. [36] The prophecy foretells of a cataclysmic battle at Dabiq between the Muslims and the Romans. This apocalyptic theme, which continues through all issues of Dabiq, is introduced at the top of the table of contents of Issue 1 with the quote from the leader of one of the previous incarnations of ISIS, Abu Mus'ab az-Zarqawi: “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah's permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq”.</td>
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Figure 1. Timeline of Issues of Dabiq and Rumiyah and Key Events in the Changing Fortunes of ISIS

- **29 Jun 14**: Caliphate declared
- **4-10 Jun 14**: ISIS capture Mosul
- **13 Aug 14**: US/coalition airstrikes on Iraq and Syria begin
- **Jan 15**: ISIS controls 90,800 sq km of territory in Iraq and Syria
- **17 May 15**: ISIS capture Ramadi
- **Sep 15**: Russian airstrikes on Syria begin
- **13 Nov 15**: Paris attacks
- **26 Jun 16**: Fallujah recaptured
- **16 Oct 16**: Dabiq captured by Turkish backed Syrian rebel forces
- **31 Dec 16**: Istanbul nightclub attack
- **21 Dec 16**: Berlin Christmas market attack
While *Rumiyah* does not foreground the apocalyptic message it has not disappeared. In *Rumiyah* ISIS appears to be resigned to a longer time frame to achieve victory. For instance, the quote featured in *Dabiq* has been replaced by a quote from another deceased leader of another previous incarnation of ISIS, Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir (Abu Ayyub al-Masri): “O muwahhidin (believers in *tawhid*: the absolute oneness of Allah), rejoice, for by Allah, we will not rest from our jihad except beneath the olive trees of Rumiyah (Rome)”.

Issue One of *Rumiyah* was released on September 6, 2016. On October 16, 2016, ISIS lost control of Dabiq to Turkish backed Syrian rebel forces.[37] The timing of the change of name and the release of the new magazine a few weeks before the fall of Dabiq indicates both foreknowledge of a change of circumstances and careful preparation to accommodate that change. In Issue 3 of *Rumiyah*, the fall of Dabiq is rationalised in a feature article titled ‘Towards the Major Malhamah (battle) of Dabiq’ (*Rumiyah*, Issue 3, pp. 24–26). This article warns that ISIS's enemies are deluded in thinking that the fall of Dabiq was a psychological victory as this was only the “minor battle of Dabiq” and not the “Major Malhamah of Dabiq” (*Rumiyah*, Issue 3, p. 25), which has yet to take place.

**ISIS's Fortunes 2014-2016 as Reflected in Text and Image Combinations in Dabiq and Rumiyah**

While it is difficult to determine exactly the size of territory and population that has been and is under ISIS control, clearly ISIS went through an initial phase of rapid expansion, followed by a phase of slower expansion and consolidation, followed by a phase of contraction, which continues. Johnson reports that at the end of 2014, ISIS controlled a third of Iraq, a third of Syria and had control over more than 9 million people and further states that as at March, 2016, ISIS had lost 22 per cent of that territory.[38] Gilsinan cites estimates of maximum territory under ISIS control from 12,000 square miles to 35,000 square miles.[39] Figure 1 shows the covers of *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* with their release dates and a corresponding timeline of some key events in the expansion and contraction of ISIS-controlled territory. The timing of the release of...
each issue of Dabiq and Rumiyah can be mapped against this timeline. The main themes as reflected in the style and content of each issue are summarised below.

**Dabiq**

For Dabiq, the title of the issue and the image on the cover reflect the central theme of each issue, which is then most often taken up in a feature article. The cover includes the title of the issue, which introduces the main theme of that issue, and, in most cases, a pointer to a feature article(s) which connects directly to the title of the issue (e.g. see outlined features in Figure 2). The covers include an image which visually relates to the main theme of the issue. The selection of main themes in Dabiq changes over time.

The first three issues of Dabiq were released during the time of greatest ISIS expansion. In Issue 1 the principal theme is the declaration of the caliphate and the tone is one of rejoicing. Secondary themes, which persist through all issue of Dabiq, are the coming apocalypse and the exposition of ISIS's intolerant and antagonistic world view. Issues 2 and 3 put out a call for migration. They present migration as an obligation and warn of the consequences of not becoming part of the so-called Islamic State. The cover image of Issue 2 is of Noah's Ark. The feature article that stems from the cover uses the story of Noah and the Flood to develop the argument that allegiance to ISIS is the only way to avoid annihilation. In Issue 3 one lengthy feature article extols the virtues of *muwahhidin* who migrate to what ISIS refer to as the land of *malahim* (battle) to join the *jihad*, while another feature article, 'Hijrah from Hypocrisy to Sincerity', adopts a more threatening tone. The theme of Issue 4 predicts both victory for ISIS and the forthcoming apocalypse. The articles which link to the cover are the ‘Foreword’ and a feature article called ‘Reflection on the Final Crusade’. This article finishes with a quote from Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, now deceased but at the time a key member of ISIS leadership, who forecasts a final defeat for the “Crusaders”.

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*Figure 3. Cover pages of Dabiq, Issues 1–15.*
Issues 5 to 8 focus on unity and disunity among jihadist groups and the deviance of those not allied to ISIS. For example, Issue 5 boasts of a growing number of jihadist groups pledging allegiance to ISIS while Issue 6 focuses on discrediting jihadist groups which have not aligned themselves with ISIS. Issue 9 shifts attention to ‘conspiracy’ between the near and far enemy. Issues 9 and 10 both have a strong apocalyptic and theological focus. From Issue 11 onwards the focus is firmly on ISIS’s enemies, near and far. The title of the issue refers to the Battle of al Ahzab in 627CE.[41] The historical battle is used an analogy for the current conflict between ISIS and a coalition of ‘enemies’. Issue 12 features the Paris attacks of November 13, 2015. Issue 13 focuses on ‘enemies’ closer to home and is an attack on Shi’a Muslims, again using historical accounts and scripture. Issue 14, attacks the ‘near enemy’, again using historical and scriptural arguments to assert the apostasy of Arab leaders who are not aligned with ISIS. Issue 15, ‘Break the Cross’, shifts the attack back to the far enemy with an attack on Christianity. Figure 3 gives an Overview of the Cover Pages of Dabiq, Issues 1–15.

**Rumiyah**

The covers of *Rumiyah* contrast with the covers of *Dabiq*. In the six issues of *Rumiyah* the cover page includes the name of the magazine, the number of the issue and the table of contents superimposed over an image. The issues have no title. Each cover has a dominant image which links to one or more articles in the magazine (outlined in Figure 4). For example, in Issue 1, the image is of a “martyred” ISIS leader, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, which connects to the Foreword ‘Stand and Die Upon That for Which Your Brothers Died.’ The covers of the six issues of *Rumiyah* are consistent in format.

**Similarities and Difference between Dabiq and Rumiyah**

The covers and main motifs in *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* show a pattern which changes over time. The shift in the aspects of ISIS’s agenda which are foregrounded is also reflected in the choice of certain image-types, which can be visualised using the frequency analysis tool in the MMA Visualisation app. Figure 5 show the distribution of three major image types (ISIS Heroes, Near Enemy and Far Enemy) across all issues of *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*. Figure 5 demonstrates, for example, that greater emphasis was placed on depicting ISIS Heroes in the early issues of *Dabiq*. In contrast, the number of images depicting the Far Enemy and the Near Enemy increased over time. The emphasis on ISIS Heroes corresponds with the phase of greatest ISIS expansion, when ISIS was most actively trying to recruit foreign fighters, while the increase in attention to enemies builds from the time when ISIS came under increasing attack. In *Rumiyah*, ISIS Heroes feature strongly in Issue 1, are less emphasised in Issue 2 and show a trend of increasing emphasis over the remaining issues. Images of the Far Enemy reach a peak in Issue 3, then drop and level off for the remaining issues, whereas
Near Enemy images show an inconsistent but steady increase across issues. Trends, however, are more difficult to interpret due to the smaller number of images in each category.

Comparison of the aggregated distribution of images and article types is more revealing. Figures 6a and 6b show the distribution of images and article types in Dabiq and Rumiyah, based on the percentage of images and articles found in each magazine. The main difference in image distribution between the two magazines is in the categories of ‘Near Enemy’ (29% in Dabiq, 22% in Rumiyah), ‘Far Enemy’ (20% in Dabiq, 11% in Rumiyah) and in the image category ‘Infographics’ (19% in Rumiyah, not present in Dabiq).

Figure 5. Image Type Frequency Analysis for ‘ISIS Heroes’ (top), ‘Far Enemy’ (middle), and ‘Near Enemy’ (bottom), Dabiq, Issues 1–15 (left), and Rumiyah, Issues 1–6 (right).

The distribution of image and article types is quite consistent across Dabiq and Rumiyah. However, there is one major difference. Infographics appears as both a new image category (Figure 6a) which may be embedded within other article types, and a new article type (Figure 6b) which may consist of text and images or assemblages of text only (e.g. see Figure 7). Infographics condense into a more accessible form themes which are addressed in Dabiq through dense passages of text, and account for many of the differences in the other categories. Of the 38 infographics in the six issues of Rumiyah, 20 are about battles/military operations against the near enemy, 16 are about religion or religious advice, while the remaining two are about encouraging lone wolf attacks, and other near enemy issues.
Apart from this difference the distribution of image and article types is similar in both magazines. Of the twenty article types 10 are common across issues of both magazines: ‘Advertisements’, ‘Amongst the Believers are Men’, ‘Feature Articles’, ‘Foreword’, ‘From the Pages of History’, ‘Hikmah (Wisdom)’, ‘Interviews’, ‘ISIS Reports’, ‘Last page message’, and ‘To/From Our Sisters/For Women’. Each magazine also has a cover and a table of contents, which are on separate pages in Dabiq and on the same page in Rumiyah. The covers of Dabiq also contain the title of the issue while the issues of Rumiyah are numbered but not titled. Despite these differences a cover and a table of contents are common to both magazines. Two further article types in addition to Infographics, ‘Eulogy’ and ‘Procedural’, which are not present in Dabiq, were found in Rumiyah.
Four article types found in *Dabiq* are not found in *Rumiyah*: ‘In the Words of the Enemy’, ‘Near Enemy Issues’, ‘Far Enemy Captives’ and articles by captive British journalist John Cantlie.

*Figure 6b. Distribution of Article Types in Dabiq (Issues 1–15) and Rumiyah (Issues 1–6).*

Of the article types new to *Rumiyah*, ‘Eulogy/Obituary’ is similar to the *Dabiq* articles titled ‘Amongst the Believers are Men’ in that it deals with the lives of exemplary “martyrs”, although it does appear to be reserved for deceased ISIS leaders. These articles also carry an additional message that, as Islam continued and expanded after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the deaths of ISIS leaders will not defeat the grand plan.
The principal difference in the distribution of article types across the two magazines is in how ISIS addresses their near and far enemies. Article types such as ‘In the Words of the Enemy’ appeared in each issue of Dabiq. These articles tended to focus on denunciations of political enemies and ‘conspiracies’ between near and far enemies. Enemy leaders and public figures were foregrounded in the images. These articles appear to have been replaced in Rumiyah by procedurals which encourage more direct attacks by spelling out instructions and procedures for how to select the correct knife and create carnage (Rumiyah, Issue 2, pp. 12–13), how to
select and use the most appropriate vehicle for attacking crowds (Rumiyah, Issue 3, pp. 10–12) and how to make a Molotov cocktail and napalm to commit arson attacks (Rumiyah, Issue 5, pp. 8-10). Issue 6 contains an article describing sarin gas but stops short of providing a recipe (Rumiyah, Issue 6, p. 20).

Apart from being considerably shorter than Dabiq, Rumiyah is also different in several other respects. For instance, the apocalyptic theme which is foregrounded in Dabiq, is downplayed in Rumiyah. While both magazines emphasise attacking enemies near and far, the prediction of an imminent apocalypse is no longer prominent in Rumiyah, although it has not disappeared. The quote which appears at the top of the Table of Contents of each issue of Dabiq, predicting the destruction of the Crusaders has been changed in Rumiyah, where it has been replaced by the previously cited quote from the leader of AQI who succeeded al-Zarqawi, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. The nature of the quote suggests postponement of an imminent apocalypse with a promise of a much longer-term victory. What Berger refers to as accelerated “apocalyptic time” has slowed as claims that the ‘Hour’ is fast approaching are more difficult to support in the changed circumstances. [42]

The final page of each issue of Rumiyah contains the same citation from scripture superimposed over the same image. In each issue the image has an olive tree in the foreground with a town in the background. At the bottom centre of the image is the word ‘Rumiyah’ in large type. The image echoes the quote at the beginning of the issue with its visual reference to olive trees. This is a variation on the pattern found in the last page of each issue of Dabiq, where each last page contains a different citation from scripture and a different image (see Figure 8 for illustration). Also, other apocalyptic messages and articles found in several issues of Dabiq do not appear in Rumiyah. For instance, there is reference to “the Hour” (the Day of Judgment) in only one article in Rumiyah.

Dabiq itself is not constant in style and format. There were several changes over the course of the fifteen issues. For example, the article type classified as ‘Last Page Message’ shows an interesting pattern. From Issues 1 to 9 a different faded image appeared behind the text of the table of contents. This image was repeated but with full clarity on the final page of the issue with passages of scripture superimposed over the image. In Issues 10 and 11 the image behind the table of contents is blurred so that its subject cannot be discerned. The image behind the scriptue on the final page is fully visible. In both issues it is an image depicting enemies of ISIS. In Issue 12 the earlier pattern returns only to be replaced in Issue 13 by the second pattern.

Issues 14 and 15 have a different pattern altogether. The tables of contents now have the contents in a column on the left side of the page and several images underneath each other on the right. The image on the final page now relates directly to the text of the scripture on the page and to the theme of the issue. For example, in Issue 14, the title of the issue is ‘The Murtadd (apostate) Brotherhood’ and the theme of the feature article which relates to the title is deviance and apostasy. The text on the final page is from a Hadith (Muslim from Abu Sa’id al-Khudri) about the emergence of the Dajjal (the Muslim equivalent of the Anti-Christ) and his attempt to get a true believer to stray. Failing in his attempt he throws the believer into hellfire. The image behind the text is a vivid edited photograph of a burning lava flow (see Figure 8).
These changes show progressive stylistic development with the tables of contents of Issues 14 and 15 and the last page message of Issue 15 of *Dabiq* being similar in visual style to the same pages in *Rumiyah*. The style appears to have stabilised in *Rumiyah* (see Figure 8).

Finally, there are several features which are constant across *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*. For instance, scripture is consistently behind all the arguments used by ISIS to justify what they do. Scripture is used in almost all
articles as evidence to support arguments for action. There are also feature articles in *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* devoted specifically to ISIS’s interpretation of Islamic faith and practice. Other things which feature prominently in both magazines are *jihad* and the glorification of “martyrdom”; field reports on current ISIS military activity; and articles on ISIS's views on the role and duties of women. While there have been stylistic changes across issues of *Dabiq* and between *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*, the core content and the values espoused are consistent across both magazines. The arc-graphs in Figures 9a and 9b illustrate, for example, that despite the obvious difference in the total number of images and articles (1,095 images and 290 articles for the 15 issues of *Dabiq* versus 201 images and 117 articles for the six issues of *Rumiyah*), the overall pattern of image-article type combinations remained quite consistent across *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*.

**Summary and Conclusions**

The above analysis has addressed the questions posed in the introduction to this paper, that is: What are the similarities/differences between *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* and what, if anything, do they imply? What, if anything, can be read into the change from *Dabiq* to *Rumiyah*? Is the switch in title another adaptation to changing circumstances for ISIS? Are apparent differences between *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* something new or do they continue a trend already evident in *Dabiq*?

In summary, *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* are more similar than they are different. The analysis and discussion have shown that ISIS’s core values, intolerance and an antagonistic world view are constant across all issues of *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*. Likewise, their reliance on selected Islamic scripture to justify their position remains constant. What changes is the strategies they use to enact their antagonism. When ISIS was expanding rapidly their antagonism was realised on the battlefield. When they came under attack from coalition airstrikes they began to focus on ISIS-orchestrated and lone-wolf attacks, especially in countries allied to the United States. When they were under increasing attack from the air and on the ground and forced into a defensive war their ability to launch and orchestrate attacks was reduced so they focused on instructional articles for potential lone-wolf terrorists.[43]

Looking across all issues of *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*, ISIS shows itself to be an organisation that readily adapts to changing circumstances. Changes in focus across issues of *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* appear to closely align with changes in ISIS’s circumstances. For instance, the focus was on migration, recruitment and state-building when ISIS was rapidly expanding the territory under its control. ISIS presented itself as an expanding, victorious and administratively competent organisation, successfully carving out an ever-growing ‘promised land’ for their believers. As their territory reached its maximum and no further gains were looking likely, they switched focus to highlight affiliated organisations, particularly in Africa, to present a case that their caliphate was expanding globally. When their home territory started to shrink again they switched focus to attacks their enemies, far and near.

When seen against this backdrop, the change in their showpiece magazine’s name from *Dabiq* to *Rumiyah* can be interpreted as strategic. With the fall of *Dabiq* imminent the forecast apocalyptic battle was not going to happen any time soon so the apocalypse was put on hold and the emphasis switched to the eventual conquest of Rome, which does not have a date attached to it and can therefore happen at any indefinite time in the future.

Overall it can be surmised that ISIS will pursue its agenda by using whatever resources it has at its disposal at the time. While ISIS foregrounds different strategies to pursue its agenda at different times depending on their circumstances, the overall goals and the rationale used to justify them remain constant. As Ingram points out, the central message of *Rumiyah* is no matter what losses ISIS suffers on the ground their *jihad* is “fundamentally a battle of opposing values and is never-ending”. [44]
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Notes
[2] Ibid., p. 89.  
[10] Ibid., p. 25.  


[25] Ibid., p. 143.


[28] Ibid.


[34] Wignell et al. (2016), note 32.


Managing Non-State Threats with Cumulative Deterrence-by-Denial

by Charles P. Kirchofer

Abstract:
Israel has long used cumulative deterrence-by-denial to deter aggression from state and non-state actors alike. To achieve this, it has combined other measures, including deterrence-by-punishment and compellence, both at the tactical level. It has also compelled actors it can attack directly to clamp down on non-state actors more difficult to target in what is commonly known as “indirect deterrence.” Israel’s relative success in this suggests that cumulative deterrence may be used as a conflict management tool that can encourage conditions for finding more permanent political solutions to long-term confrontations. Israel’s case also demonstrates the usefulness of a consistent, long-term strategy for managing non-state threats. Finally, it suggests that conflicts may be managed for extended periods with mostly military means, though such means can only assist in laying the groundwork for conflict resolution. The US and its allies could benefit from the judicious application of Israel’s deterrence lessons as they seek ways to manage conflicts that appear intractable or too costly to attempt to resolve today.

Keywords: deterrence, compellence, terrorism, non-state actors, Israel, conflict management

Introduction

This article explores the possibility of managing conflicts using so-called “cumulative deterrence” instead of attempting to resolve such conflicts in the short term when this would be impossible, too risky or too costly. It does so by examining Israel’s long experience with the cumulative deterrence-by-denial of terror organizations in neighboring countries and territories and asking what lessons from this experience may be applicable to countering violent groups of non-state actors in general—even if defeating or finding political accommodation with such groups is currently implausible. This may provide an alternative to the options of costly and risky war-fighting vs. ignoring problems in the hope that they will eventually resolve themselves without outside assistance.

Audrey Kurth Cronin has argued that terror groups are sustained by what their sympathizers view as successes—and that these vary and go far beyond achieving an overall strategic aim. In addition to achieving a strategic aim, terrorist groups also have tactical or process goals, such as exacting revenge, lionizing a leader, or carrying out attacks to gain sympathizers’ attention.[1] Even when groups fail to achieve their strategic aims, as is usually the case,[2] they can thus survive if they can accomplish process goals that maintain their momentum. It is therefore not enough to deny groups overall success; they must also be prevented from achieving a significant proportion of their tactical and process goals—a difficult task that is nevertheless possible with properly calibrated punishments and inducements applied at the right time.

To counter the momentum al-Qaeda’s achievement of tactical and process goals provided, Cronin recommends clarifying what al-Qaeda is, exploiting the cleavages in the movement, hiving off disparate parts of the organization that are not really committed to al-Qaeda’s overall mission (including treating such entities differently from al-Qaeda’s “core”), highlighting al-Qaeda’s mistakes (such as killing Muslims) and making fewer of our own, and encouraging a popular backlash against it.[3] All these tactics are designed to deny al-Qaeda success in achieving process goals like maintaining unity and focus, expanding its influence, recruiting, and gaining sympathy from its audience. Denial of success in these areas would severely hinder the group’s ability to function and damage its momentum, leading to falling support for the group.
Some of Cronin’s recommendations require a slight adjustment to fit groups that are dissimilar to al-Qaeda. For example, it may make more sense to exploit cleavages between terror groups and host or patron states than to attempt to do so with cleavages within a group more cohesive, centralized, or localized than al-Qaeda. In addition, some of Cronin’s elements do not even apply to other cases or would be difficult to accomplish. Not all groups have cells and franchises that may be susceptible to attempts to hive them off from the core group in the way al-Qaeda affiliates can be. Another example is that it may not always be feasible for governments to highlight mistakes and encourage counter-mobilization if the audience in question has too little faith in the government attempting to message them—or if the group in question is mindful of public opinion and careful not to enflame it.

All of these potential differences apply to Israel’s struggles against Yassir Arafat’s Fatah group and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas. Israel has a long history of using a form of cumulative deterrence-by-denial to deter aggression from its adversaries, but it has not succeeded in convincing Palestinians to revolt against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an umbrella group in which Fatah is the largest faction, and Hamas; exploiting internal cleavages within the groups;[4] or hiving off franchises.

Despite this, Israel has achieved considerable, though certainly not complete, successes in deterring terror from both groups. Its experience of deterring first Fatah and then Hamas by denial can shed further light on the sorts of approaches the US and its allies can take to assist in reducing attacks from some modern religious terror groups. Its case also contains a warning: Despite its successes, one cannot say that Israel has accomplished its strategic aims and no longer faces a terrorist threat. If the “push factors” that encourage terrorism remain, the threat of terror is likely to re-emerge. The obverse is also true, however: If cumulative deterrence-by-denial is done well and push factors are removed or ameliorated, it has the potential to lay the groundwork to resolve conflicts by easing violence and helping create incentives to maintain the peace.

**Deterring Non-State Actors**

Denying a terror group success in strategic or process goals can lead to deterrence—even when animosity is extraordinarily high, as in the case between Israel and Hamas. Hamas continues to be well-armed with rockets and has not moderated its stance on desiring the destruction of the State of Israel and yet, Israel’s border with Gaza is mostly quiet.[5] Israel has been managing violence with Hamas, with considerable success, for nearly three decades now. Deterrence-by-denial is a significant part of this.

Deterrence-by-denial is one of two broad forms of deterrence recognized in both strategic theory and criminology. The criminological idea is that would-be criminals will often decide against taking on a given target if they deem their chances of success with that target to be lower, and the costs and risks higher, than other options they have. Similarly, deterrence theorists have long recognized that retaliation (punishment) was not the only way to deter an adversary from taking an undesirable action.[6]

The basic workings of deterrence-by-denial in strategic contexts are similar to those in criminology: An adversary comes to perceive a target to be so well protected that attacking it would be futile. That adversary then decides to do something else. What that something else is, is one of the central problems inherent in practicing deterrence-by-denial: There are often plentiful other “softer” targets for attack, so that deterrence-by-denial ends up simply shifting attacks from one place to another. This can still be useful in protecting particularly high-value targets, but the impossibility of guarding every target from attack should be immediately apparent.

This problem is only relevant at the tactical level, however, and other approaches can be used instead at that level. At the strategic level, there is only one overall target: the deterring state or a group of states (such as the West as a whole). Moreover, deterrence-by-denial does not mean preventing all attacks, but rather preventing them from having the effect the attacker wishes to achieve. Over time, this denial can lead attackers and,
perhaps more importantly their supporters, to seek alternative means of achieving their goals. If non-violent means are available, they may switch to these for achieving at least some of their aims.

The Zionist leader Ze’ev Jabotinsky recognized this back in 1923 and argued that Jews in Palestine needed to protect themselves with an “iron wall, which the native population cannot breach.”[7] He argued that, once the Arabs had lost all hope of breaching the “iron wall,” “the leadership will pass to the moderate groups [and] both peoples can live together in peace, like good neighbors. But the only way to obtain such an agreement, is the iron wall, which is to say a strong power in Palestine that is not amenable to any Arab pressure.”[8]

The historian of Israel, Avi Shlaim, argues that this has been Israel's strategy, conscious or not, ever since.[9] Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, indeed echoed Jabotinsky's assessment: “A comprehensive agreement is undoubtedly out of the question now. For only after total despair on the part of the Arabs, despair that will come not only from the failure of the disturbances and the attempt at rebellion, but also as a consequence of our growth in the country, may the Arabs possibly acquiesce in a Jewish Eretz Israel.”[10] Likewise, Israel's current prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, wrote in 2000, “the only kind of peace that can endure in the Middle East is a peace that can be defended (the peace of deterrence).”[11] As Netanyahu and his former defense minister Moshe Ya'alon see it, the reason Israel has not achieved peace with the Palestinians is because they have not yet accepted Israel's permanent existence. Until they do, Israel must defend itself and deter aggression.[12]

Cumulative Deterrence-by-Denial through Deterrence-by-Punishment

The image of an “iron wall” is about defensive, i.e. passive, measures. In reality, however, it is impossible to physically defend all of Israel (or any state) and prevent all or even most attacks. This would appear to make strategic deterrence-by-denial impossible. Luckily, it is possible for tactical deterrence-by-punishment and even pre-emption to achieve a cumulative deterrent effect over time (hence the term “cumulative deterrence”). Israeli policymakers have long accepted that they “cannot prevent every murder of a worker in an orchard, or a family in their beds. But it is in our power to set a high price on our blood, a price too high for the Arab community, the Arab army or the Arab government to think it worth paying.”[13] In other words: Israel seeks to deter attacks via retaliation because relying on defense and denial alone is impossible.

Doron Almog and Uri Bar-Joseph explain that deterrence-by-punishment can create “cumulative deterrence,” which is nothing more than deterrence-by-denial on a grander scale and achieved through means including, but not limited to, both deterrence-by-punishment and -by-denial at the tactical level. Over time, Israel's foes come to expect retaliation and, losing hope in the idea of eliminating Israel anytime soon, significantly moderate their attacks. This phenomenon is also described by Lawrence Freedman (in the concept of “internalized deterrence”), Patrick Morgan, Thomas Rid, and Amir Lupovici, who have all noted the potential for deterrence to establish norms of behavior that become internalized.[14] As Shmuel Bar, an Israeli academic with a background in national security, explained: After each round of violence with Hamas, Israel sets the bar for acceptable violence lower. Over time, then, cycles of confrontations with Hamas will lead to lower levels of violence.[15]

The idea that actors can learn to be deterred after being punished for attacks, i.e. that periodic escalations can produce greater deterrence later, is absent from traditional deterrence conceptions in international relations and strategic studies. This is odd, since it has long been a central part of the conception of deterrence in criminology. Criminologists call the idea that criminals learn from experiencing punishment (either themselves or vicariously through someone close to them) specific deterrence and, though debate certainly continues, there is empirical support for its operation—especially when accounting for factors like attribution bias.[16]
Indirect Deterrence and the “Return Address” Problem

Non-state actors often do not have a “return address,” i.e. territory that can be targeted in retaliation for attacks. Israel has tried a few means of getting around this problem. In the early years of the modern state, it faced infiltration across its borders from Jordan and Egypt, mostly by unorganized individuals and small groups. Most of the time, Israel simply did not have the resources to police its long, winding, and irregular borders effectively. Moreover, as Israeli Chief of the General Staff Moshe Dayan and Director General of the Ministry of Defense Shimon Peres argued at the time, attempting to do so would have been a strategic error by focusing too many of the resources Israel had on border policing, leaving it open to the greater strategic threats represented by the armies of Israel’s Arab neighbors.[17]

Instead, Israel began retaliating against Jordanian and Egyptian-controlled villages.[18] The results of this policy were mixed, with some, like the policy’s progenitor Moshe Dayan, claiming it “proved effective and deterred many,” while others, like then-Prime Minister Moshe Sharrett, admitting after two Israelis were killed in Ajjur: “The [Israeli public's and army's] rage must be defused…. I do not believe that the reprisal will help in any way in terms of security. On the contrary…”[19] Eventually, Moshe Dayan stated, Israel decided that “even when Arabs harm peaceful civilians, we must direct our retaliation against military objectives.”[20] There was a danger that the reprisals against Jordan and Egypt could lead to another war with Israel’s Arab neighbors.[21] This was not necessarily a bad thing as far as the country’s then-Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion saw it because such a war was coming, anyway: “Our neighbours are preparing for a second round and we may assume that they will be more prepared and united.”[22] He believed they would be ready by 1956.[23] His prophecy came true (he also did little to prevent its realization) in the form of the 1956 Suez Crisis and Israel’s successful Sinai campaign. After that war, infiltration declined as a main concern for Israel. The experience also led Israel to a recipe for success that it uses to this day: if it does not control the territory from which attacks emanate, it applies pressure or retaliates against the authority that does control that territory.

The authority that controls such pieces of territory can be a state, like Jordan, Egypt, or Lebanon, or a non-state actor with sufficient “state-like manifestations” that make it susceptible to deterrence targeting, like the Palestinian Authority (PA), Hezbollah, or Hamas since it gained control of the Gaza Strip.[24] When a party puts pressure (e.g. through reprisals) on an authority even though that authority is not itself responsible for the attacks that party wishes to deter, this is known as “indirect deterrence.” This term is somewhat of a misnomer because it actually entails the use of compellence. The overall effect for the initiator looks like deterrence, however, hence the use of the term.

Indirectly Deterring Fatah

Deterrent threats are used to maintain the status quo and prevent an opponent from taking an undesirable course of action. They are not meant to encourage an action. In the example of Fatah operating from Jordan, the attacks were already happening and the status quo was therefore one that included violence. Israel wished to change this and establish a new status quo wherein Jordan would clamp down on Fatah and the PLO. Attempting to change the status quo by coercing an opponent to do something is known as compellence. Israel was thus attempting to coerce Jordan into action, not prevent it from doing something; it was trying to compel Jordan, not deter it. Furthermore, Jordan was free to rein in the PLO in any way it wished (whether by deterrence or other means). So-called “indirect deterrence” therefore need not entail any actual deterrence.

The reason this matters is because compellence is much harder to achieve than deterrence, mainly because complying with a compellent demand is more blatant than complying with a deterrent demand since the latter only requires maintaining the status quo, something the opponent can claim was always the intention. Complying with a compellent demand also carries with it the humiliation of bowing to pressure from another
party. Deterrence, moreover, has clear limits, whereas complying with a compellent demand may attract further demands for concessions that would undermine the party’s credibility and therefore its own ability to deter.[25] Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal himself has noted this phenomenon: He states that negotiations conducted during a period of weakness “lead only to surrender in the face of a dominant enemy... lowering the ceiling of demands and political discussions.”[26] Finally, as Schelling noted, compellence requires the compelling party to risk the deterioration of the status quo to implement its threat. In practice, this often requires administering punishment until the intended party complies (a form of negative reinforcement).[27]

It therefore carries greater risks and requires more immediate, potentially destabilizing, action.

In the case of Israel and Fatah, indirect deterrence via compellence was fairly effective nonetheless. After the 1967 war showed the extent of Israel’s military muscle, lending additional credibility to its threats against its neighbors, Syria's president, Nureddin al-Atassi, warned Fatah against raids across the border into Israel: “You will lose and drag us all along with you in the catastrophe.”[28] Israel’s pressure on Jordan, which had also lost territory to Israel in 1967, coupled with PLO’s own missteps, which led Jordan’s King Hussein to view the it as a threat to stability and his rule of the Kingdom, eventually led Jordan to oust the PLO altogether. The King approved draconian actions against the group to drive its members from Jordan in a September 1970 operation so devastating the PLO has since referred to it as “Black September.”[29]

Indirectly Deterring Hamas

Israel has also used indirect deterrence against Hamas via the PA and against other militant groups in the Gaza Strip via Hamas itself. “By establishing deterrence, Israel [had] led [the PLO] towards peace” by the 1990s.[30] The result was the Oslo Accords, which led to an alignment of interests between Israel and the PLO: “If Arafat wanted to be president of a new Palestinian state, Israel would need better security. If Israel wanted his cooperation in improving its security, the Palestinians would need to see progress toward the establishment of a state.”[31] This gave Israel leverage: It had surrendered control of parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the newly founded PA, but that territory was now a “return address” for Israeli reprisals if it was attacked, including by Hamas, which began its suicide bombing campaign against Israel in the 1990s. The leverage ran in both directions, of course, and the PA was also able to initiate violence against Israel if it was not satisfied with progress on the Oslo negotiations. Both sides using this leverage eventually undermined trust and led to the collapse of the indirect deterrence relationship.

Before that collapse, however, violence had fallen by 1999 to its lowest level at any time since the signing of the Oslo Accords. Shlomi Eldar, an Israeli journalist who was frequently in Hamas's home base of Gaza at the time, explained, “Hamas was nowhere to be seen. They had gone underground.”[32] Mosab Hassan Yousef, who worked with Israeli intelligence and was the son of a Hamas founder, said of the period: “[The PA] had destroyed the military wing of Hamas and thrown its leadership and fighters into prison. Even after they were released, the Hamas members went home and did nothing more against the PA or the occupation.”[33] It was not until the PA released Hamas members from prison at the start of the Second Intifada that the group once again became deadly. “Indirect deterrence” had worked, but the momentum required in this case to sustain it had vanished.

Israel recognizes the difficulty of relying on compellence of a third party to control its opponents and has therefore often opted to take a more direct approach, at times abandoning deterrence altogether in favor of an offensive push to eradicate the threat. After leaving Jordan, PLO leader Yassir Arafat moved his operation to Lebanon. Rather than try to deter the PLO indirectly through Lebanon’s weak and war-riven government, Israel went on the offensive with an operation to push the PLO out of Lebanon for good.[34] This succeeded, and the PLO moved its headquarters to faraway Tunisia, where it was “less cohesive and more vulnerable to pressures from the Arab states.”[35] This, combined with diplomatic pressure from the United States, a fear that his movement could be superseded, and the potential held out by international conferences for a political
opening, led Arafat to renounce terrorism for the first time in a statement (though to a much lesser extent in practice) in 1988.[36] Deterrence and compellence had not permanently ended PLO violence, but they had moderated its position and brought it to the negotiating table on terms Israel could consider acceptable for the first time.

**Directly Deterring the PA and Hamas**

A lack of trust and the slow accumulation of tit-for-tat attempts at leverage on both sides eventually killed the Oslo process. As PA leaders told former Shin Bet (internal security) head Ami Ayalon: “We don't put Hamas members in prison for your sake. We only do it because our people believe that at the end of the day we'll have a state beside Israel. When we no longer believe that, forget about us.”[37] When an opposition member of Israel's parliament, Ariel Sharon, visited the Temple Mount, known to Muslims as the Haram al-Sharif or Noble Sanctuary, Arafat sought once again to use his leverage to coerce Israel into progress on the implementation of Oslo. The PA encouraged protests and eventually released members of Hamas from prison, igniting the deadliest wave of Israeli-Palestinian violence since at least the 1940s.[38] Arafat also founded a militant group of his own to carry out suicide attacks, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.[39]

Major General Giora Eiland, head of the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) Planning Directorate, explains that Israel now saw that the problem was “the Palestinian Authority which was allowing this reality to exist.” Israel could no longer “rely in any way on the Palestinian Authority with regard to security.” He notes that this “was a very deep strategic change. ...[S]trategically speaking we had crossed a certain line in which we... were entering a direct and frontal fight with the Palestinian Authority” instead of just against Hamas.[40] In short, the “indirect deterrence” of Hamas had collapsed because the Oslo Accords had. Israel was now seeking to disrupt the PA and Hamas and to compel them to halt the violence.

Israel moved to deter violence from suicide attackers by accelerating construction of the security barrier in the West Bank. Though the barrier comes nowhere close to stopping all border crossings, empirical evidence analyzed by Hillel Frisch shows that it works and statements by militants also evince the barrier’s success.[41] This is in part because the barrier means “different terrorist cells... have to work together, exposing themselves to Israeli counterterrorism in the process....‘One plus one is eleven’ when it comes to counterterrorism,”[42] former Shin Bet head Avi Dichter contends, arguing that this expansion of the operation's circle from one cell to another offers exponentially more opportunities for disruption.”[42] By 2004, combined with increased checkpoints in the West Bank and improved intelligence, the barrier helped Shin Bet “to stop 95 percent of the attempted attacks on Israel, capturing almost every suicide bomber who dared attempt crossing into Israel”.[43]

Israel also sought to compel Hamas to halt violence through a campaign of targeted killings aimed at Hamas’s senior political leadership. As the Palestinian negotiator and politician Ziad Abu Amr recalls, “the attempt on [Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-]Rantissi’s life [on 10 June 2003] was a catalyst of some sort. Especially when certain intelligence came to the Palestinian side to the effect that Israel was determined to liquidate all the Hamas leaders. And I think the Hamas leaders and we, too, took that very seriously. And I remember I asked... is Hamas better off with its founders and top leaders around, or do you think this is irrelevant? If you think it is important... I think we have to do something political about it right now.”[44] Giora Eiland reports “The unsuccessful attempt to hit Rantissi caused Rantissi, who was one of the worst extremists among the Hamas leaders, ...to change his mind overnight and to suddenly accept requests by the Palestinian Authority and the Egyptians to give a chance to the hudna [ceasefire]. ...the effect of the attempt on his life was immediate.”[45] Hamas agreed to a ceasefire shortly thereafter and more than a month passed without Hamas violence. Targeted killing had succeeded in compelling Hamas to reduce its violence in exchange for the tacit prospect of allowing its senior leaders to survive.
Despite the truce, tit-for-tat violence soon resumed and a pattern of escalations, temporary lulls, and tit-for-tat attacks sparking renewed escalation continued until April 2004, when Israel successfully killed Hamas founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Yassin and, a few days later, Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi. In 2004, Hamas carried out only one further suicide attack in August. Hamas external leader Khaled Meshaal essentially admitted that Israel was limiting Hamas’s ability to hit back, claiming the fall in suicide attacks was due to “difficulties on the ground’ dictated by ‘a temporary extraordinary situation,’ such as the Israeli army’s stringent measures.” The number of suicide attacks plunged from 2003 to 2005, ceasing altogether by 2007 (see Figure 1). Israel wished for the attacks on its citizens to stop, the PA wished to regain control of its cities, and Hamas wished to avoid the death or imprisonment of all its senior leadership. The collapse of indirect deterrence had been bloody, but Israel now deterred Hamas and the PA directly. As so often, however, the situation was soon to change and Hamas would shift tactics to get around Israeli deterrence, requiring a new series of counteractions.

Israel had raised the cost to Hamas of carrying out suicide bombings so much that Hamas announced it was abandoning the practice in 2006. As attacks became harder through 2004, however, Hamas made increased use of a new tactic: rocket and mortar launches (see Figure 2). Israel’s focus was on the much deadlier suicide attacks, so projectile launches were not clearly covered by the “red lines” (figurative lines Hamas may not cross without sparking retaliation) Israel had established against violence towards the end of the Second Intifada.

*Figure 1: Deaths and Casualties in Hamas Suicide Attacks.*

Directly Deterring Hamas, indirectly Deterring other Gazan Groups

When Hamas took over control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, some in Israel believed this would be helpful because it would make targeting, and therefore deterring, Hamas easier. Israel’s military intelligence director Amos Yadlin told US Ambassador Richard Jones that a Hamas takeover
“would please Israel since it would enable the IDF to treat Gaza as a hostile country rather than having to deal with Hamas as a non-state actor.”[51] Though this was probably not the consensus view, as evidenced by Israel’s later actions attempting to compel Hamas’s ouster, the group’s takeover did give it a clear return address and ensured that the people of Gaza would now hold it accountable not just for resisting Israel, but for their overall safety and quality of life. As another official put it: “Hamas is a clear and defined enemy…. All their buildings are now targets, as is anyone walking around with a weapon.”[52]

Despite the fact that Hamas now had a clearer “return address,” Israel did not simply try to deter it. Instead, it sought to weaken its government and compel Gazans into ousting it from power by sealing off the Strip. UN Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Territories, Richard Falk, described the situation in Gaza in 2008 as a "humanitarian catastrophe that is unfolding day by day."[53] A Gazan municipal employee recalls: “There was a slow suffering in August, September, October and you thought ‘let it come!’”[54] Israel had pushed Hamas into a corner: It wanted to bring Hamas down, not just stop rocket launches. Simply stopping the attacks would thus not have ended the blockade or Gazans’ suffering. Israel’s compellence therefore overrode deterrence. Since Gazans might eventually try to eject Hamas if they continued to suffer and Hamas did nothing, Hamas saw escalation as its only option. Schelling explained this thus: If the enemy “is not to react like a trapped lion, [he] must be left some tolerable recourse.”[55] Making an opponent feel like a “trapped lion” is an example of a “push factor” encouraging violence even when an actor expects retaliation for such actions.

There were also “pull factors”: perceived vulnerabilities Hamas sought to exploit. Israel had only left the Gaza Strip three years prior and was not keen to reconquer it. Moreover, even an invasion into the Gaza Strip seemed unlikely. Israel had retreated only in 2006 from southern Lebanon without achieving its objectives against Hezbollah, which continued to rain rockets on northern Israel until Israeli troops withdrew—an apparent victory for a non-state actor controlling a strip of land adjacent to Israel. As Abu Obeida, the spokesman for Hamas’s military wing, summarized: The “Zionists military commander or political [sic] cannot afford results [sic] of a decision as big as the invasion of the Gaza Strip, especially the feel of defeat.
This combination of push and pull factors essentially ensured escalation.

The result was “Operation Cast Lead,” the 2008-2009 Gaza war. As Figure 2 shows, rocket fire from Gaza fell dramatically after the war (in fact, the fall was sharper than pictured, because most of the rockets launched in 2009 fell before the end of Cast Lead). Deterrence had taken hold, but it was not stable: Tit-for-tat violence returned in 2011 and intensified in 2012, making the status quo less palatable. As in 2008 and as in the run-up to the Second Intifada, both sides began to surmise that they have more to gain from escalation than from the worsening status quo. This is where the goal of cumulative deterrence tomorrow can clash with the goal of tactical deterrence today: If a future status is preferable to today’s status quo, there is less incentive to avoid escalation. The same held true for Hamas: Gazan opinion polls showed that Hamas’s approval ratings fell in 2012 when PA President Mahmoud Abbas was involved in talks with Israel, just as they had two years earlier when armed groups in Gaza fired rockets at Israel but Hamas abstained. Hamas also knew that its approval had risen after the last confrontation with Israel. Both sides thus had “push factors” encouraging conflict.

The result this time was “Operation Pillar of Defense/Cloud” in 2012. That war ended with an internationally-backed truce in which Israel agreed to ease its blockade of Gaza—in some ways a victory for Hamas. The calm was even shorter-lived this time around. Changes in the Middle Eastern political arena, especially the rise to power of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, saw Hamas increasingly isolated in 2014. It even accepted a unity deal with Abbas’s Fatah that year. Even as Hamas appeared to be conciliating with Fatah, its leaders were encouraging Hamas’s militant cells in the West Bank to abduct Israelis to hold in exchange for Hamas members in Israeli prisons. In June 2014, a cell from Hamas’s military wing in Hebron obliged, kidnapping and murdering three Israeli teenagers. Israel initially focused its attention on the West Bank, as the Gaza border remained quiet. Over time, as it emerged that Hamas had indeed orchestrated the abduction and as projectile fire from Gaza intensified, tensions continued to mount. This eventually erupted into “Operation Protective Edge,” the third war in Gaza in seven years.

Since 2014, the Gaza border has been quieter than at any time since before Hamas’s takeover. Occasional rockets have been fired from the Strip, but none of these have been from Hamas. This calm is most easily explained by deterrence: Hamas’s political situation, vis-à-vis both Fatah and Egypt, for example, has not changed significantly, nor has Hamas’s capacity for violence been severely reduced. In fact, it apparently replenished its rocket arsenal quite quickly. On top of this, Hamas actively curbs attacks on Israel by arresting rocket launchers, most of whom belong to groups competing with Hamas that are aligned with the Islamic State group. Deterrence is essentially invisible as it is a non-event, so its action can only ever be posited in probabilistic rather than certain terms, but the probabilities point toward deterrence, at least for the time being.

Hamas’s maintenance of calm on the border with Israel is due to a clear choice on its part to maintain that calm. In August of 2016, Israel even attempted to move to the next level in cumulative deterrence by redrawing its red lines once again at an even lower threshold: it no longer accepts even a single rocket being launched from Gaza—even if it causes no damage or injuries, as is often the case. Every other time Israel has attempted this has come only after a major escalation. This time, Hamas appears to have accepted that the Gaza border should remain quiet.

**Cumulative Deterrence and Countering Terrorism More Broadly**

The repeated rounds of calm, followed by increasing tit-for-tat attacks ending up in escalation may not sound like a promising general recipe for countering terrorist violence. The fact that Israelis can mostly continue to live their lives as normal when an entity on their border wishes to see their state destroyed is,
However, an astonishing accomplishment. As former Deputy Director and Head of the Palestinian desk at Israel's Ministry for Strategic Affairs, Kobi Michael, observed in 2014: “The Palestinian mainstream actually abandoned terrorism in the sense of at least the most serious type of terrorism… the suicide bombers. …This is a huge achievement for the IDF and for the State of Israel. [It is due in part] to the understanding with the Palestinians that terrorism is not good for them, that terrorism actually enhances the capabilities of Israel to use its advantages towards the Palestinians because it creates... legitimacy for using military force.”[64]

Essentially, Israel has ensured that its iron wall remains in place, eliminating “pull factors” (e.g. relative defender weakness) that would encourage an attack. Israel is also careful not to exacerbate “push factors” that would encourage Hamas attacks. For example, Israeli officials were careful to note explicitly during the last two big operations that they had no intention of toppling the Hamas government in Gaza. As Schelling observed, “the threat of massive destruction may deter an enemy only if there is a corresponding implicit promise of non-destruction in the event he complies.”[65] If the intention is to reestablish deterrence, the deterrer must be careful to provide inducements, such as a promise to be left alone, as well as threats.

Even some of the earliest scholars of deterrence theory in criminology, like Beccaria and Voltaire, have recognized that excessively harsh punishments can actually increase unwanted actions rather than decrease them. “If the same punishment is prescribed for two crimes that injure society in different degrees, then men will face no stronger deterrent from committing the greater crime if they find it in their advantage to do so.”[66] For example, if “the death penalty is applied equally to petty theft and grand larceny, it is clear that they will try to steal a lot. They could even become murderers if they think that this is a way not to be caught.”[67]

The status quo Israel promises in exchange for quiet must be a better option than the punishment it promises in exchange for violence. Properly calibrated threats are thus not the only important factor in effecting deterrence; properly calibrated promises and rewards are equally vital. Furthermore, if current conditions for Hamas are improved during a time of relative quiet, it has a greater incentive to maintain that quiet and more to lose in another round of escalation.[68] Israel has also striven to avoid civilian casualties during its operations, helping to reduce, though not eliminate, local grievances and international condemnation that would threaten to reduce its freedom of maneuver. Israel is thus careful to retain the moral high ground that underpins its legitimacy.

Israel has declined to topple Hamas because it does not want to fill the vacuum that would create indefinitely or end up with an even worse adversary on its hands, as was the case when Israel ousted the PLO from southern Lebanon only to have Hezbollah take its place. At the same time, Israel is fully aware that it cannot simply disengage from the wider region. This is in stark contrast to the post-9/11 counterterrorism policy of America, which has the luxury of swinging between activism and disengagement. Such swings are unwise, however, as much of Israel's success in countering terrorism is rooted in the sheer consistency of both its approach and its will to carry it out.

To return to Cronin’s points, Israel has certainly demystified Hamas, at least for audiences within Israel. Israeli policymakers understand Hamas very well and carefully differentiate between its actions and those of other groups, avoiding giving the sense that Hamas is omnipotent and omnipresent. While remaining alert to the threat Hamas does, and could later, pose, it has also avoided exaggeration, making clear that other threats, namely Iran, are more severe. Israel has also exploited cleavages wherever possible, for example between Hamas and its foreign supporters as well as between Hamas and Arafat's/Abbas's Fatah. Other than that, however, Israel has largely diverged from Cronin's recommendations: It has not hived off groups claiming allegiance to Hamas because there are none.[69] As noted above, it did attempt to highlight Hamas's mistakes and encourage a popular backlash against Hamas among Gazans by implementing the blockade—but this has so far failed. Despite this, Israel has been able to manage its conflict with Hamas in lieu of resolving it.
The US, in fact, has more options and tools at its disposal than Israel, which has allowed it to survive mostly unscathed despite an inconsistent foreign and security policy and a lack of consensus within the US about the best path forward. From its inception, most of Israel’s Arab and Muslim neighbors have rejected it. This is not the case with the United States, which the Arab and Muslim world once saw as a positive example in comparison with the colonialist powers of Europe. Furthermore, unlike Israel, the US has no territorial disputes with Middle Eastern countries and terrorists and Middle Eastern states do not currently threaten the US very existence. In fact, the US remains a key ally to many countries in the wider Middle East (though this does not necessarily translate into a positive view of America) and beyond: When Pew polled citizens of majority-Muslim Indonesia, they responded that America was their greatest ally.[70] Finally, while many Palestinians would prefer Hamas to Israel, most Muslims throughout the world view America more positively than the Islamic State group America is fighting. It is well within America’s power to ensure this remains the case as long as it avoids making mistakes that would cast it in a worse light, such as killing large numbers of innocent civilians.

It may seem that the case of Israel, which faces existential threats and cannot physically disengage from the region, and the case of the US, which faces no existential threat and engages by choice, are too different, but there are lessons that can be learned beyond Israel’s borders. The first is perhaps that, with all its advantages, the United States ought to have the capability to hold violence and chaos in check without having to topple every regime carrying out that violence and spread democracy by force. The record for the security of both countries is mixed at best when it comes to ousting opposing governments and authorities from territories they control. Many regimes supporting violence and terrorism can be left in power and brought closer to compliance with international norms at least as regards their external behavior. This requires that America and its allies do not shy away from fierce retaliation when necessary, but also that they do what they can to improve the status quo for the people living under such regimes and or unrecognized authorities whenever those regimes and authorities keep the peace. In the end, America’s greatest asset may, however, be the most significant force holding it back from taking such an approach: the real and severe threats Israel faces have led to a greater consensus about the responses required than have emerged in the post-Cold War United States. Absent that sense of threat and a consensus on how to counter it, the US may lack the will to apply consistent policies, including occasional harsh reprisals as well as ostensible rewards to “enemy” regimes and authorities, that could lead to cumulative deterrence-by-denial.

The most core interest of any governing authority is usually its survival and control of its territory, but Israel did not need to topple Hamas in Gaza or even threaten to do so to achieve deterrence. This is all the more remarkable considering Hamas’s level of animosity towards Israel. With the proper intelligence, the US and its allies could find assets to target against enemy regimes and authorities significant enough to effect coercion. Threats of regime change could still be used, but only if there is a credible opposition. As Israel’s fight against Hamas (and indeed the West’s perceived existential struggle against the former Soviet Union) shows, however, this is often unnecessary and could make things worse.

This could even have worked for Islamic State, though this would not have been the best course of action. Failing to counter such a group forcefully and allowing it to appear to overturn the regional order did not bolster deterrence—it undermined it. The Islamic State has also served as a symbol of what can be accomplished with sufficient brutality and an alleged adherence to the harshest interpretations of Islam. Even its relatively brief success may already have reinvigorated the so-called “fourth wave” and extended its life beyond the initial generation predicted by David Rappoport’s “wave” model of modern rebel terrorism. If religious terrorism is ever to end, the West cannot afford more such mistakes.

Nevertheless, there is good reason for caution when contemplating the toppling of an already-established regime or authority. Israel fears that, if Hamas ever lost control in Gaza, whatever replaced it would have to be deterred afresh.[71] Zones of contested sovereignty can often become hotbeds of terrorism and many
such hotbeds come into being without US (re-)action. The corollary is that US action is no guarantee of conflict resolution in such zones, either. Many are highly resistant to the imposition of control by one group or government, even with the investment of considerable US resources. Extensive occupations also have costs beyond those to the treasury and that in American lives: They make the occupier responsible, directly or indirectly, for the population under occupation. Any human rights abuses, as well as the often necessary curtailment of civil liberties in times of conflict, have a corrosive effect not only on the occupier's image, but also on its own society, as Israelis themselves have learned.[72]

Instead, it may be possible to work with a recognized government or governments and/or friendly authorities to reduce violence in such situations so as to give space for resolving the conflict over governance later, rather than trying to force a solution in the short term with extensive US involvement and funding. Groups that control pieces of territory within a failed state may be convinced to halt attacks against the recognized government and other competing groups and renounce international terrorism in exchange for allowing them, for a set, mutually-agreed period, to retain control of the territory they currently hold. The fact that there is a precedent for this from the Prophet Muhammad's lifetime, known as a hudna [truce], can also help in securing and legitimizing such an arrangement when it involves Islamist groups.[73] Some conflicts may not be resolvable at an acceptable cost at the present, but this does not mean the US and its allies should simply disengage altogether. Conflicts can escalate and draw the US back in if it fails to manage them just as easily as they can escalate when one attempts to resolve them quickly at all costs.

Cumulative deterrence can be a sort of “second-choice” tool for conflict management when conflict resolution is infeasible, but it could also aid in finding long-term solutions. The “peace dividend” provided by the establishment of a long-term ceasefire would boost support for that ceasefire, even as international aid disproportionately improved prospects for people in government-controlled areas, undermining support for the authorities controlling other areas. Coupled with the increased trust that extended periods of ceasefire can bring, this could ease the way for negotiations between the various factions on how to share power as local support for a return to violence dwindles. It is not that militant groups in such a situation would simply give up, but that they would come to see a greater risk (through loss of public support) from returning to violence than from pursuing a political path. Such an outcome is by no means guaranteed and can only result from conflict resolution, not mere conflict management that deterrence provides. Nevertheless, reducing violence can save lives and managing conflicts can make it easier for conflict resolution to proceed over the longer term.

Conflict management can support conflict resolution, but it provides no permanent solutions itself. It is not enough to attempt to close off avenues to violence if others for achieving political change are not opened up. The most recent Pew poll on Muslims’ attitudes towards democracy showed continuing broad support for it.[74] Without the ability to effect change in their lives through some sort of broad political participation, large-enough numbers of Muslims remain likely to continue to support violent attempts at doing so. This is why, though the West is now rightly skeptical of democracy promotion at gun-point, it is wrong to swing too far in the opposite direction. The only long-term solution to political violence remains ensuring that a countries’ citizens have non-violent means of effecting change. The US and its allies are, in many parts of the world, the only actors on the world stage capable of cautiously supporting the sorts of changes needed for people to improve their lives without resorting to violence. Shying away from this responsibility could be the greatest peril of all.
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Notes
[4] Though it did "successfully" exploit cleavages within Palestinian society that helped diminish the PLO - and give rise to Hamas.
[8] Ibid.
[15] At that time, Jordanian control of the West Bank and Egyptian administration of the Gaza Strip were largely unrecognized by the international community.


[34] This created a vacuum that was filled by Hezbollah - a reminder of the sorts of unintended consequences any action may trigger.


[40] Interview with Giora Eiland, interview by Brooke Lapping, 2005, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London.


[44] Ziad Abu Amir, interviewed by Brooke Lapping, 2005; Original Records for BBC Documentary ‘Elusive Peace: Israel and the Arabs’ Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London.

[45] Author interview with Giora Eiland.


[50] Kirchofer, author’s "Database of Hamas Terror Attacks."


[69] Israel has exploited cleavages between groups close to Hamas, such as Islamic Jihad (in part through indirect deterrence), but Hamas does not have "franchises" in other locations in the mold of al-Qaeda and Islamic State because its aims are local.


[71] Unless Abbas's Fatah seemed willing and able to re-establish control in Gaza, a prospect that remains unlikely for now.

[72] To note just one prominent example, see: Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), p. 351. - The author notes that, in 1995, "72 percent of troops interviewed felt that serving in the Occupied Territories was 'very demoralizing.'


Research Notes

Tracking Radical Opinions in Polls of U.S. Muslims
by Veronika Fajmonová, Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley

Abstract
This Research Note examines two telephone polls (2007, 2011) and three Internet polls (2016) to track opinions of U.S. Muslims relating to the war on terrorism. Results indicate that a small but consistent minority (five to ten percent) justify suicide bombing of civilians in defense of Islam, while those seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam have declined from more than half to about a third. This decline coincided with a decline in perception of discrimination against Muslims in the U.S., and correlational results confirm that perceived discrimination is one source of seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam. Other results from both the Pew and Internet polls show that disapproval of U.S. foreign policies affecting Muslims also contributes to seeing a war on Islam. Discussion emphasizes the value of Internet polling for tracking shifts in the opinions of U.S. Muslims, but acknowledges that polling has not yet discovered what is different about the small minority who justify suicide bombing.

Keywords: Opinion Polls, U.S. Muslims, war on terror, Internet polling

Introduction
It has long been recognized that effective counter-terrorism programs require more than finding, fixing, and finishing those who have turned to political violence. Beyond radical action, there are radical beliefs that can inspire and justify political violence. These beliefs define the battleground of the ‘war of ideas.’ Some indication of the importance attached to this war is the fact that googling “Terrorism ‘war of ideas’” in March 2017 produced over seven million hits.

In this Research Note we first consider the jihadist narrative, then track the elements of this narrative in beliefs of U.S. Muslims as represented in two Pew telephone polls and three smaller Internet polls. We are interested in two questions. First, what changes over time can be discerned in opinions of U.S. Muslims relating to the war on terrorism? Are radical opinions becoming more common, less common, or staying the same? Second, are there any useful predictors of radical opinions related to the jihadist narrative? What do we know about how and why some U.S. Muslims maintain radical opinions?

What is the Jihadist Narrative?
Thomas Johnson identified jihadist narrative themes from analysis of primary Taliban sources: “An appeal to past Afghan struggles against ‘foreign invaders.’” “The battle between the Taliban and the Karzai ‘puppet’ regime and its foreign coalition represents a ‘cosmic conflict’ between the ‘righteous’ and the infidel.” “Afghans have a collective religious responsibility to fight the apostates and invaders.”[1]

David Betz offers a similar summary of the elements of the narrative of Global Jihad: “(1) Islam is under general unjust attack by Western crusaders led by the United States; (2) Jihadis, whom the West refers to as ‘terrorists,’ are defending against this attack; (3) the actions they take in defence of Islam are proportionally just and religiously sanctified; and, therefore (4) it is the duty of good Muslims to support these actions.”[2]

The narrative of Global Jihad is conveniently represented as a pyramid of radicalization (Figure 1) in which the base includes Muslims who currently do not accept any of the narrative. The layer above the base includes
those who sympathize with the first element of the jihadist frame: that the West is waging a war on Islam (narrative level 1, pyramid level 2). Next higher in the pyramid are Muslims who believe that jihadis are acting in defense of Islam and that their actions are morally and religiously justified (narrative elements 2 and 3, pyramid level 3). Highest in the pyramid of opinion radicalization are Muslims who believe there is an individual duty to support and participate in the defense of Islam (narrative element 4, pyramid level 4.

Figure 1. Opinion Radicalization Pyramid

Tracking Radical Opinions in the 2007 and 2011 Pew Polls of U.S. Muslims

There is reason to believe that different Muslim communities in the US may have different views of political issues. Such differences might arise initially from the political contexts that moved different groups to emigrate from their homelands. Many Iranians came to the US, for instance, when the Shah was toppled. Somalis came to the US when famine and violence made their homeland a dangerous place. But experience in their new homes must also play a role in determining immigrants’ political and social attitudes. For example, some believe that the European experience of jihadist terrorism has been worse than the US experience because Europe is less accepting of immigrants.[3]

Recognizing that immigrant groups can differ markedly in their cultures and their political viewpoints, McCauley and Scheckter used the 2007 Pew poll of U.S. Muslims to compare seven origin groups defined by country of birth: Pakistanis, Iranians, South Asians, Arabs, sub-Saharan Africans, Europeans, and African-Americans. Results indicated substantial group differences, with Iranian-born and African-Americans standing out from other groups in their political opinions.[4]

In this section we conduct the same kind of origin group comparisons for the 2011 Pew poll of U.S. Muslims, with special attention to possible opinion changes between 2007 and 2011.

Challenges of Polling U.S. Muslims

Muslims in the US constitute less than one percent of the population and different ethnic and origin subgroups of U.S. Muslims are correspondingly smaller percentages. Standard polling methods, such as random-digit dialing or address sampling, are impractical when the target group will comprise less than one percent of those sampled.
Nevertheless, there have been polls of US Muslims using one or both of two approaches to getting the sample. The first approach is to accumulate Muslim respondents who turn up in national polls, using standard probability sampling techniques. Over many U.S. national polls, a polling company identifies a number of Muslim respondents; these individuals can then be contacted all at once in a poll targeting only Muslims. The second approach is to sample randomly from neighborhoods known to have a relatively high proportion of Muslim residents. The odds of calling a Muslim can thereby be raised, although Muslims living outside ‘Muslim neighborhoods’ will likely be under-represented in this approach.

Polls of U.S. Muslims have typically used a combination of the two approaches, but the samples thus obtained have usually been too small to permit fractionating the sample to compare subgroups defined by birthplace. The 2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S. Muslims are exceptional in the size of the sample obtained: each Pew poll had over a thousand respondents. Our study takes advantage of these larger samples to compare groups of U.S. Muslims based on country of birth, and to look for change in the pattern of group results between 2007 and 2011.

There is a special challenge in identifying African-American Muslims in the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls. Pew has estimated that 2.35 million Americans are Muslim, and that 20% of these are African-American (indicating approximately 470,000 African-American Muslims). African-American Muslims are typically members of one of several (typically Sunni) groups, including the American Society of Muslims (the descendent of the original Nation of Islam), the new Nation of Islam (now led by Louis Farrakhan), the Five Percenters, the Dar al-Islam, the Islamic Mission of America, and other smaller organizations. Though some use the term “Black Muslims,” historically this term has had specific connotations in relation to the Nation of Islam; in this Research Note we refer to African-American Muslims.

Unfortunately the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls did not explicitly ask whether respondents were African-American. Thus, rather than looking at all Pew respondents born in the US, our analysis focused on African-American Muslims as defined by three criteria: born in the US, both parents born in the U.S., and self-identified as “Black.”

In sum, we compare origin groups in both the 2007 and 2011 Pew Polls of U.S. Muslims, focusing on three questions tapping radical ideas: opinion of the war on terrorism, opinion of Al-Qaeda, and opinion of suicide bombing in defense of Islam.


In this section we describe the number of respondents in each origin group for the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S. Muslims, the treatment of missing data, and the use of unweighted data in our analyses.

Overview of respondents in the 2007 and 2011 Pew Polls of U.S. Muslims. The 2007 Pew Poll had 1050 respondents, including 28 coded missing for place of birth and 15 born in countries coded as ‘other’. There were 273 respondents reporting they were born in the US; 135 were identified as African-American Muslims and the remaining 138 respondents do not appear in this report. The total of 2007 Pew Poll respondents represented in this report is thus 869 (1050-28-15-138).

The 2011 Pew Poll had 1033 respondents, including 19 missing place of birth and 95 born in countries coded by Pew as ‘other’. There were 289 respondents reporting they were born in the US; 110 were identified as African-American Muslims and the remaining 179 do not appear in this report. The total of 2011 Pew Poll respondents represented in this report is thus 740 (1033-19-95-179).

Groups defined by birthplace. This report follows the procedures used by McCauley and Scheckter with the 2007 Pew poll to identify six origin groups among respondents of the 2011 Pew poll. In 2011 as in 2007, two countries had large enough numbers of emigrants to form separate groups: Pakistan (158) and Iran (58).
South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka) had 125 emigrants, Arab countries had 219 emigrants, and Sub-Saharan Africa had 70 emigrants. In addition, we identified African-American Muslims as those who self-identified as Black and who reported being born in the US with both father and mother also born in the U.S.

In their analysis of the 2007 poll, McCauley and Scheckter identified a seventh origin group: emigrants from European countries (59 respondents). In 2011, however, there were only about 4% of foreign-born U.S. Muslims coming from a European country, and Pew coded such respondents in 2011 as other. European emigrants were thus not included in our comparison of 2007 and 2011 results.

Missing data. In this report tabled percentages are calculated without missing responses (‘don’t know’ or ‘refused’) in the denominator.

Weighted vs. unweighted data. In their analysis of the 2007 Pew poll of U.S. Muslims, McCauley and Scheckter used unweighted data. In the present study, we compared results using both weighted and unweighted data for both 2007 and 2011. Results were generally similar but there were some anomalous results using weighting.

Pew recommends using weighted data to correct for sampling biases so that results can be more representative of the population sampled. In the achieved samples of U.S. Muslims in both 2007 and 2011, younger individuals with more education were over-represented and older individuals with less education were under-represented. Higher weights are thus given to older respondents with less education.

One such individual from South Asia reported himself as over fifty years of age, with a high school education, and as a convert to Islam. His responses were weighted x6 and he was alone responsible for a change in the percent of South Asian converts from two percent with unweighted data to eight percent with weighted data. He also had a big influence on the South Asian correlation of convert status with approval of Al-Qaeda: the correlation was negligible with unweighted data but .89 with weighted data.

Although weighting may be useful when results are aggregated across a thousand respondents, weighted data can produce misleading results for analysis of a hundred respondents in a particular origin group. In this Research Note we report results using unweighted data.

2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S. Muslims—Results

Here we focus on perceptions of the war on terrorism. A full report of 2007 and 2011 results for items relating to demographics, religiosity, perceived discrimination, and opinions of government policies can be found on the START website. For these items not reported here, 2007 and 2011 results were generally similar except that presidential approval was substantially higher for President Obama (2011) than for President George W. Bush (2007) and satisfaction with how things are going in the country was likewise higher in 2011 than in 2007.

Opinions relating to the war on terrorism. Table 1 shows that in both 2007 and 2011 about half of U.S. Muslims (2007 49-81%; 2011 39-50%) did not believe that the war on terrorism (WOT) is a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism. Two groups showed a substantial decline in doubts about the war on terrorism (African-Americans 81% in 2007 vs. 50% in 2011, Iranians 66% in 2007 vs. 40% in 2011); indeed every origin group showed a numeric decline in doubts about war on terrorism. This decline is likely associated with the massive increases in presidential approval from 2007 to 2011.
Favorable opinion of Al-Qaeda (AQ) was low in both polls (1-12% in 2007 and 0-6% in 2011). Similarly, justifying suicide bombing (SB) was low in both polls: 2-10% in 2007 and 2-9% in 2011.

The three terrorism-related items have non-negligible missing rates, raising the possibility that responses may be biased by fear of the consequences of endorsing pro-terrorist opinions. But the pattern of missing does not support this possibility. Table 1 shows that percentages of missing responses for the three terrorism-related items are similar in 2007 and 2011, with 9-22% missing for the WOT item, 9-27% missing for the AQ item, and 0-11% missing for the suicide bombing item. We believe that the most threatening of the three items asks about justifying suicide bombing in defense of Islam, yet this item has lower missing rates than the WOT item and AQ item. Overall, the pattern of missing data suggests that missing rates reflect more honest ignorance than defensiveness.

Consistent with this interpretation is the fact that six of six origin groups showed a decline in percent missing on the AQ item from 2007 to 2011. There is no reason defensiveness would decline, but ignorance might decline as Al-Qaeda continued to be salient in the news during these years. Indeed bin Laden was killed in May 2011 during the Pew poll conducted from 14 April to 22 July 2011.

Predicting radical opinions. As possible predictors of radical opinions we examined eight demographic items and fourteen opinion items (six religiosity items, five discrimination items, three items evaluating the U.S. government and its actions).

Based on substantial correlations between AQ and SB items (.24 in 2007 and .32 in 2011, with missing recoded as described below) we created a RadOpinion scale as the mean of responses to these two items. (The war on terrorism item was not correlated with AQ or SB items in 2007 or 2011). Thus four regression models were calculated: for both 2007 and 2011, a model predicting opinion of the war on terrorism and a model predicting RadOpinion.

To keep the number of respondents constant across the terrorism-related items, missing values for these three items were recoded as mid-scale values. For instance, missing values for the SB items were recoded as 2.5 on the four-point scale for this item (often, sometimes, rarely, never justified). Also, to control for mean opinion differences across origin groups, these groups were coded as dummy variables (African-Americans the uncoded comparison group), and these dummy variables were included in each of the four regression models. With so many predictors, we used a conservative level of significance and present here only predictors with a beta significant at p<.01. Complete results of the regression models are available from the authors.
Table 2 shows that in 2007 there are four significant predictors of seeing the war on terrorism as insincere: disapproval of President George W. Bush (beta .19), seeing military force in Afghanistan as a wrong decision (beta .16), seeing discrimination in government surveillance (beta .15), and seeing media unfair to Muslims (beta .13). In 2011 opinions are more crystalized. There is one outstanding predictor: seeing military force in Afghanistan as a wrong decision (beta .34). The adjusted R squares (.20 in 2007; .22 in 2011) indicate that, despite numerous and varied predictors, the level of prediction is only moderate.

Table 2: Regression predicting seeing the war on terrorism as insincere in 2007 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Beta 2007</th>
<th>Beta 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media unfair to Muslims</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination in USG surveillance - yes</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove president</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan was wrong decision</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R square</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R square</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Only predictors with beta significant at p<.01** are tabled, except predictors significant only in 2007 or 2011 show also the non-significant beta for comparison. Missing values were excluded within predictors, but recoded as mid-value for the war on terrorism item predicted.

Table 3 shows that, in 2007 there is one significant predictor of RadOpinion: low education (beta .23). In 2011 there are two significant predictors: low education (beta .20) and feeling physically threatened as a Muslim in the U.S. (beta .23). Again the adjusted R squares (.16 in 2007; .18 in 2011) indicate that the level of prediction is only moderate.

Table 3: Regression predicting RadOpinion Scale in 2007 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Beta 2007</th>
<th>Beta 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education - low</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being physically threatened</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R square</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R square</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Only predictors with beta significant at p<.01** are tabled. Missing values were excluded within predictors, but recoded as mid-value for items averaged in the RadOpinion Scale predicted.
2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S. Muslims—Discussion

We used the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S. Muslims to examine three opinions related to the war on terrorism: seeing the war on terrorism as insincere, favorable opinion of Al-Qaeda, and justifying suicide bombing in defense of Islam. We compared results for these items across time (2007 vs. 2011) and across six origin groups (Pakistan, Iran, South Asian countries except Pakistan, Arab countries, sub-Saharan African countries, and African-Americans).

Stability and change over time. U.S. Muslims maintained their overwhelming disapproval of Al-Qaeda and suicide bombing; across origin groups and years, approval rates ranged from zero to twelve percent. Less reassuring are the results for opinions of the war on terrorism: although every origin group showed at least a small 2007-2011 decline in the percentage seeing the war on terrorism as insincere, in 2011 respondents seeing the war on terrorism as insincere still ranged from 39-50 percent. That is, in 2011 close to half of every origin group continued to see the war on terrorism as insincere.

Predicting opinion that the war on terrorism is insincere. In 2007 there were four significant predictors of seeing the war on terrorism as insincere: disapproval of President Bush, seeing military force in Afghanistan as a wrong decision, seeing discrimination in government surveillance of Muslims, and seeing media unfair to Muslims. In 2011 there was only one significant predictor: seeing military force in Afghanistan as a wrong decision predicts opinion of the war on terrorism as well as all four predictors taken together in 2007.

Our interpretation of this pattern is that disapproval of the war on terrorism in 2007 was part of a broad mix of disapproval of the government and its actions, whereas in 2011, under President Obama, the war on terrorism had crystalized to mean military intervention in Muslim countries.

Predicting RadOpinion. In 2007 only low education was a significant predictor of RadOpinion, that is, the mean of opinion of Al-Qaeda and opinion of suicide bombing. In 2011 there were two significant predictors: low education and reporting being physically threatened or attacked because of being Muslim. The one consistent predictor, low education, is not statistically strong; we do not yet understand why a small minority of U.S. Muslims have this radical opinion.

Group Differences. Broken down by origin group, results for two groups invite special attention: African-Americans and Iran-born.

Table 1 shows a small but consistent tendency for African-American Muslims to have more radical opinions than other origin groups. In 2007 and again in 2011, African-American respondents were most negative toward the war on terrorism, most positive toward Al-Qaeda, and most positive toward suicide bombing. This consistency suggests that U.S. Muslims may not be a homogenous population and that generalizations about "U.S. Muslims" may be misleading.[14]

Demographically, Iran-born Muslims stand out in both 2007 and 2011. They are older than other origin groups, less religious than other groups on five of our six measures of religiosity, and they are Shi’a rather than Sunni. Despite these differences, their opinions of U.S. government policies look like the opinions of other origin groups. Notably, they are no less likely than other groups to see the war on terrorism as insincere, and no different in their opinions of Al-Qaeda and suicide bombing.

These results are important in showing just how broadly U.S. Muslims disapprove of the war on terrorism. Even Shi’a Muslims in the U.S.—who have sectarian reasons for disliking Sunni-based Al-Qaeda—even Shi’a Muslims show substantial disapproval of the war on terrorism (insincere 66 percent in 2007, 40 percent in 2011).

In brief, results from the Pew 2007 and 2011 polls of U.S. Muslims have provided one strong predictor of opinion of the war on terrorism—disapproval of U.S. troops in Afghanistan—but only weak and inconsistent
predictors of opinions of Al Qaeda and suicide bombing. Seeking better predictors and more recent assessment of the opinions of U.S. Muslims, we turn now to three Internet polls of U.S. Muslims.

**Tracking Radical Opinions in Internet Polls of U.S. Muslims**

The research presented in this section is part of a multi-year research project exploring the use of Internet polling as a tool to access opinions and attitudes of U.S. Muslims.

**Internet polls of U.S. Muslims--Methods**

*Panel recruitment.* Samples reported here were recruited and data collected by Knowledge Networks (KN), a division of international market research corporation GfK. Sampling begins from the KnowledgePanel, whose members are recruited through national random samples of the U.S., originally by telephone and now almost entirely by postal mail. Households are provided with access to the Internet and a netbook computer, if needed. KnowledgePanel is thus representative of the U.S. adult population, with panel members from listed and unlisted telephone numbers, from telephone, non-telephone and cell-phone-only households, as well as households with and without Internet access.

The target population for our research consists of non-institutionalized adults age 18 and over residing in the United States who identify as Muslim. To sample this population, KN identified Muslim households from the KnowledgePanel and solicited their participation in our study, which has so far included six waves of polling. The results reported here from Waves 4, 5, and 6 had respectively 90, 88, and 87 respondents from KnowledgePanel (about a 50 percent return rate from the panel samples).

In addition, KN recruited ‘opt-in’ (volunteer) Muslim respondents from other polling vendors that included respectively 121, 124, and 127 respondents (about a one percent return rate from the opt-in solicitation). The opt-in sample was included to raise the number of respondents to 200, to give more stability to percentages and correlations in our analyses. The cost of this sample enlargement is the threat of unrepresentative results from the opt-in sample. Comparison of results for KnowledgePanel participants with results from the combined panel and opt-in participants suggests that this threat is minimal. This comparison and additional details about KnowledgePanel procedures are available in an overview of Waves 1-3 available on the START website.[15]

For a multi-wave tracking poll, stability of sample characteristics is perhaps as important as representativeness. Even a sample that is not fully representative can capture change in opinion if the characteristics of the sample do not change over time. Our goal was a sampling procedure that could be repeated to produce stable sample characteristics such that at least large changes in opinion over time could be detected. Our design goal was a stability that would permit confidence in measuring changes of opinion of more than 15 percentage points. This kind of stability is evident in the Results reported here for three waves of polling of U.S. Muslims.

The three polls were fielded as follows: Wave 4 28 January–17 February 2016, Wave 5 26 May–15 June 2016, Wave 6 28 October–8 November 2016. These dates are abbreviated to the closest month in Table 4.

*Poll items.* As with the Pew polls, we focus on two items assessing opinion radicalization of U.S. Muslims: a question about the war on terrorism and a question about suicide bombing and other attacks on civilians in defense of Islam.
Internet Polls of U.S. Muslims—Results

We first look for change over time in opinions about the war on terrorism and suicide bombing, then look for predictors of opinion on these two items. In comparisons across waves we focus on substantial differences, differences of fifteen percentage points or more (statistically, for two groups each with n=210, differences of 15 percentage points are significant at p<.01 two tailed).

Tracking opinions over time. Rather than asking about whether the war on terrorism is insincere, as the Pew polls did, we asked more directly Do you feel the war on terrorism is a war against Islam? (Yes; No; Not sure/Don’t know) Table 4 shows that there was a substantial decrease in the percent of U.S. Muslims saying ‘yes’ to this question: from 47 percent in January 2016 to 30 percent in June 2016 and 32 percent in October 2016.

Table 4: Radical opinions in three waves of internet polling of U.S. Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 4</th>
<th>Wave 5</th>
<th>Wave 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N 211</td>
<td>N 212</td>
<td>N 216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

War on Islam
Percent yes 47 30 32

Suicide Bombing
Percent often or sometimes justified 10 8 9

More difficult to be Muslim
Percent yes 39 49 --

People acted suspicious of you
Percent yes 54 27 --

Been called offensive names
Percent yes 73 19 --

U.S. policies dictated by Jewish Interests. Percent agree 21 43 47

Note. Items not included in the Wave 5 poll are indicated as --.

Our internet polls used the same question about justifying suicide bombing and other attacks on civilians used in the Pew polls (See Table 1). Table 4 shows no change over time in response to this question: the percent seeing suicide bombing as often or sometimes justified was 10 percent, 8 percent, and 9 percent across Waves 4-6. It is worth noting that this kind of consistency over time indicates that our sample characteristics are stable over time, and adds confidence to the demonstration of substantial change for opinions about the war on terrorism noted in the preceding paragraph.
The 2015 jihadist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino prompted us to include in Waves 4 and 5 three questions about experience of discrimination. The first question is general. *Since the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, has it become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S., or hasn't it changed very much?* (Has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S.; Hasn't changed very much; Not sure/Don't know).

The second and third questions are about personal experience. *Since the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, have people acted as if they are suspicious of you?* (Yes, has happened; No, has not happened; Not sure/Don't know). *Since the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, have you been called offensive names?* (Yes, has happened; No, has not happened; Not sure/Don't know).

Table 4 shows substantial change in opinion for two of the three discrimination items. From Wave 4 to Wave 5, reports of suspicion and offensive names declined respectively from 54 percent to 27 percent and from 73 percent to 19 percent. These declines occurred despite the same time reference: “Since the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino.” Of course respondents may be reporting feelings of being discriminated against, rather than recalling specific incidents of discrimination. But the question remains, what explains the substantial changes of report on these two items?

It seems possible that the perception of suspicion and hostility toward U.S. Muslims peaked shortly after the San Bernardino attack on the first of December 2015. Our January 2016 poll could catch this peak, but by the time of our June 2016 poll U.S. Muslims had recovered much of their confidence that life in the U.S. was not so threatening after all.

Finally, we included in Waves 4-6 an item about U.S. foreign policies. *Some people say that U.S. foreign policies are dictated by Jewish interests. How do you feel about this?* (Agree; Disagree; Not sure). Table 4 shows substantial change in opinion on this question. From 21 percent in January 2016, agreement increased to 43 percent and 47 percent in June and October 2016.

This opinion change may be related to the rise of Donald Trump, who was not seen as a serious candidate in January 2016 but by June was reaching for the Republican nomination he won in July and by October was reaching for the presidency he won in November. In March 2016 both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton appeared before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee; both promised security for Israel but Trump went further in promising to move the capital of Israel to Jerusalem. He ended with the thought that his daughter Ivanka was about to have a beautiful Jewish baby. It is possible then that the political ascendance of Donald Trump led U.S. Muslims to see increasing Jewish influence in U.S. foreign policy.

To summarize what we have learned about radical opinions of U.S. Muslims: perception of war on Islam decreased between January and June 2016 (47 percent to 30 percent), justification of suicide bombing was unchanged (about ten percent justifying).

In the next two sections we look for correlates of opinions on these two items. Our Internet polls had much smaller samples (around 200 respondents) than the Pew polls (around 1000 respondents). Regression analyses using dozens of predictors were therefore not attempted with the Internet polls, but simple correlations were calculated.

**Predicting perception of a war on Islam.** In order to test whether perceived discrimination might be related to seeing a war on Islam, we combined the three discrimination items into a scale. For the general item, *Has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S.* was coded 3, *Hasn't changed very much was coded 1, and Not sure/Don't know was coded 2. For the two personal experience items, *Yes* was coded 3, *No* was coded 1, and *Not sure/Don't know was coded 2. For Wave 4 the discrimination scale had $M(211)=2.47$ with $SD=.47$ and alpha=.63. For Wave 5 the discrimination scale had $M(212)=1.76$ with $SD=.67$ and alpha=.66.
Numerical values were similarly assigned to responses to the questions about a war on Islam, suicide bombing, and seeing U.S. foreign policies dictated by Jewish interests.

The discrimination scale was significantly related to seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam, $r(209)=.26 p<.01$ in Wave 4 and $r(210)=.41 p<.01$ in Wave 5.

Seeing U.S. policies dictated by Jewish interests was also significantly related to seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam: $r(209)=.32 p<.01$ in Wave 4 and $r(210)=.23 p<.01$ in Wave 5.

The two predictors were not consistently correlated: discrimination with policies dictated by Jewish interests was $r(209)=.07$ ns in Wave 4 and $r(210)=.22, p<.01$ in Wave 5.

Taken together these results indicate that there are two different sources of the opinion that the war on terrorism is a war on Islam: perceived discrimination and opposition to U.S. foreign policies.

**Predicting justification of suicide bombing.** Results were disappointing. For the Pew polls, low education was a consistent if weak predictor of the RadOpinion scale that averaged opinion of suicide bombing and opinion of Al-Qaeda. But for the January, June, and October 2016 Internet polls, correlations of education with opinion of suicide bombing were inconsistent and small, never reaching the .01 level of significance. Younger age was significantly correlated with justifying suicide bombing in the June and October 2016 polls: $r(210)=-.25 p<.01$ and $r(214)=-.18 p<.01$. But the correlation of age and opinion of suicide bombing in the January 2016 poll was not significant at $r(209)=-.09$.

Thus, across both the Pew polls and the Internet polls, there is no strong and consistent correlate of justifying suicide bombing. Although perceived discrimination and seeing U.S. foreign policy as dictated by Jewish interests predicted seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam, they did not predict justifying suicide bombing.

**General Discussion**

This report examined two kinds of polling data—telephone polls and internet polls—in order to track and understand radical opinions held by some U.S. Muslims.

We began by examining opinions about the war on terrorism, suicide bombing, and al Qaeda as assessed in the 2007 and 2011 Pew telephone polls of U.S. Muslims. We found some small differences by origin groups, especially for African-American Muslims, but in general results indicated change over time only for opinions of the war on terrorism: a majority of U.S. Muslims saw this war as ‘insincere’ in 2007 but only about half saw it as insincere in 2011. Opinions of al Qaeda and suicide bombing showed no change: in both 2007 and 2011, a small but persistent minority of less than ten percent of respondents had favorable views of al Qaeda or justified suicide bombing.

We used correlational analyses to try to understand what was different about respondents with radical opinions. For opinions of the war on terrorism, results indicated that a consistent and strong predictor was negative opinion of U.S. foreign policy as represented by disapproval of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. For opinions of al Qaeda and suicide bombing, correlational analyses were less successful: low education was the only consistent predictor of radical opinions on these items, and was only a weak predictor.

We turned then to examining opinions of the war on terrorism and of suicide bombing in three internet polls of U.S. Muslims conducted in 2016. Results showed substantial change in opinion of the war on terrorism: in January 2016 about half of U.S. Muslims saw a war on Islam but in June and October 2016 only about a third saw a war on Islam. This change in opinion coincided with a decrease in perceived discrimination, and correlational analyses within both the January and June 2016 polls showed that indeed individuals feeling less
discrimination were less likely to see the war on terrorism as a war on Islam. We conclude that at least part of
seeing a war on Islam comes from feeling discrimination in the U.S.

But another part seems to come from disapproval of U.S. foreign policies. Seeing U.S. foreign policies as
dictated by Jewish interests was correlated with seeing a war on Islam in both the January and June 2016
internet polls. Confirming the relation between foreign policy and seeing a war on Islam is the observation
from the Pew polls that disapproval of U.S. troops in Afghanistan was the best predictor of seeing a war on
Islam.

It appears then that, for U.S. Muslims, there are two sources of seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam:
perception of discrimination against Muslims in the U.S. and disapproval of U.S. policies relating to Muslims
abroad. If this conclusion is correct, then the war of ideas might try to attack perception of a war on Islam
in one or both of two directions. One direction would be to reduce the reality or at least the perception of
discrimination against Muslims in the U.S. The other direction would be to reduce U.S. interventions in
predominantly Muslim countries, or at least to explain better the need for such interventions.

Numerous polls of U.S. Muslims have assessed opinions representing the sympathizer and justifier levels
of the opinion radicalization pyramid, and these opinions—about the war on terrorism and about suicide
bombing and other attacks on civilians in defense of Islam—were the focus of the current study. We examine
first the 2007 and 2011 Pew telephone polls of Opinions about suicide bombing against civilians in defense of
Islam remain opaque. There has not been any change in opinions justifying suicide bombing: Internet polls
in January, June, and October 2016 are like the Pew polls in 2007 and 2011 in showing a persistent minority,
ten percent or less of U.S. Muslims, justifying suicide bombing. And we have not yet identified a strong or
consistent predictor of opinions about suicide bombing. Better understanding of how a small minority of U.S.
Muslims persist in justifying suicide bombing should be a priority for future research.

Finally, our results indicate that small-sample internet polling can track at least large shifts in the opinions
of U.S. Muslims, that is, shifts of fifteen percentage points or more. The pattern of stability in opinions
about suicide bombing gives confidence to observed changes in opinions about the war on terrorism, about
discrimination, and about U.S. foreign policy. As an alternative to the traditional telephone polling, Internet
polling offers the advantages of lower cost and faster turn-around. These advantages can be especially
useful for assessing reactions to unfolding political events, or when longer-term changes require repeated
assessment to observe trends.

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Notes

The Ambiguous Effect of Population Size on the Prevalence of Terrorism

by James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz

Abstract

Absolute population size has been proposed as one factor that encourages terrorism since large states have more difficulty maintaining security. More populous states suffer from more terrorism because they have more people, but the relationship disappears when per capita measures of terrorism are used. There are some indications that smaller states are more secure, but the evidence is not consistently present.

Keywords: Causes, Terrorism, Population, Incidents, Statistics

Introduction

A large number of factors have been suggested as ones that influence the occurrence of terrorist activities. The idea that countries with larger populations are more susceptible to outbreaks of terrorism has been proposed as one such effect. This idea is based on variations of the view that countries with larger populations are less secure as a consequence of the fact that police and security forces have more difficulty in detecting or arresting terrorists in more populous countries. There have been a number of studies, in fact, that have indeed found a statistical connection between levels of terrorism and population size. Larger countries are more likely to suffer from terrorist incidents than smaller countries. What is also interesting, or even perplexing in many ways, is the failure to consider the more basic proposition that larger states suffer from an increased number of terrorist incidents simply because they are larger. If .0001% of the population of a state will engage in terrorist violence, then – other things being equal - a country of 10 million will experience more acts of terrorism than a country of 2 million because larger countries are likely to have a higher number of disgruntled individuals in an absolute sense. Controlling for population in an analysis simply controls for the effects of absolute size, and it is quite possible that the connection is weaker or would even disappear if measures of the level of terrorism that are used are relative to the population base rather than being related to absolute population totals.

Previous Studies

Numerous studies have suggested that nations with larger populations have been associated with more terrorism. The discussion below only deals with a sampling of the previous work rather than a comprehensive survey of all the previous analyses that have taken population into account as one linkage with higher levels of terrorism. In these studies, consequently, population is usually included as a control variable in studies that look at connections between other variables and terrorism. A number of studies have simply included population size as a variable that would have explanatory power for terrorism levels with little comment. [1] There have been additional studies, moreover, that have specifically suggested that population size will have a significant and positive effect on the amount of terrorism that will occur. [2] A number of additional potential reasons have been put forward to explain the linkage. It has been argued that larger populations could negatively affect state capabilities and affect the degree to which a country could effectively govern its own territory [3]. A related argument is that it will be more difficult for governments to control larger populations. [4] Another possible explanation that has been advanced is that larger populations will lead to increased costs of policing that could place a strain on national resources. [5] Related arguments in other
studies have included the idea that it is more difficult to provide security for the entire population in larger countries. [6]

There have been some exceptions to the use of population as a control for underlying causes of terrorism. It has actually been suggested that contrary to other analyses that larger countries might have less terrorism since greater size would increase the capabilities of the state. [7] One analysis did find that larger countries had less terrorism, contrary to expectations. [8] Two other studies have used population in a different fashion. Meierricks and Gries [9] included population in their analysis to control for the effects of size on the links between terrorism and economic growth rather than as a possible cause of terrorism. Lutz and Lutz [10] used per capita measures of terrorism rather than absolute levels of events to test for linkages between globalization, terrorism, and economic consequences. These approaches suggest that population may not have consistently had the effects that others have suggested. It is also possible that previous results might be responsive to the time period used, the data set, or whether the analyses included international incidents, domestic incidents, or both.

A slightly different argument regarding size has been put forward. For very small states, it would be difficult for terrorists to remain unknown and therefore more difficult for them to operate. It has been suggested, for example, that terrorism was not likely to be present in the internal conflicts in the Greek city-states because the citizen body was relatively small and clandestine violence would be difficult to utilize since terrorists would be unable to maintain the necessary anonymity. [11] Similarly, it has been suggested that crime was largely absent in colonial America because towns were small and any perpetrators would be known; furthermore, community pressure acted as a deterrent. [12] Political crimes such as terrorism would be less likely in smaller communities under similar circumstances.

**Analyses**

As a first step, information for the number of incidents, injuries, and fatalities were collected for 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2005 for as many countries and territories as possible from information available in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the University of Maryland. [13] The GTD information is quite detailed. It contains information for the country in which terrorist attacks occurred. It was thus possible to aggregate data on an annual basis at the country level on the number of incidents, the number of fatalities, and the number injured. The number of incidents was a fairly straightforward figure. Many terrorist incidents do not involve any fatalities or injuries, and others such as assaults and assassinations (or assassination attempts) only involve one victim. [14] It is actually only a minority of incidents where there are multiple casualties. The number of injuries reported is less reliable since there are differing definitions of what constitutes an injury and in a minority of cases the number injured is simply listed as unknown. [15] Of course, the attacks with the largest number of fatalities are normally the ones that have the greatest psychological effects. There are a few cases where the number of fatalities noted is listed as unknown but that situation is rare. These entries had to be coded as zero fatalities or injuries respectively even though it was likely in many of these cases that unknown figures reflected a lack of precise numbers rather than the fact that there had been no deaths or injuries.

It was also necessary to collect data on population. The population totals were drawn from the World Bank [16], which differs in many cases from the official figures based on national census figures that are collected and reported in the UN Statistical Yearbook. The use of the World Bank population figures had the advantage of a common estimation methodology for all countries and territories rather than different national calculations. The use of the World Bank figures also normalized the calculations of population totals for periods that fell between actual census years. The population totals also permitted the calculation of per capita incidents, casualties, and fatalities for the different countries and territories. Since the lack of terrorist activities in a more populous country would have greater relevance than the absence of incidents or casualties...
in a less populous country, each zero entry for incidents fatalities, or injuries was actually coded as 0.01 instead of 0.00 for purposes of additional standardization before the division by the base population figures. This method, which gave slightly greater weight to the absence of activity in the more populous countries, has been used in previous studies of terrorism. [17]

With the information on terrorism and population it was possible to derive correlation coefficients between the terrorism measures and the absolute population figures and then a comparison of population levels and per capita terrorism measures. Absolute population, however, would not be expected to be a perfect predictor of higher terrorism levels. There were differences between countries independent of size. For example, China with a billion plus inhabitants has had much lower levels of terrorism than India with a similarly large population. On average, however, larger countries were expected to have higher levels. The correlation coefficients calculated between absolute population size and terrorism indicated that larger countries frequently did have higher levels of terrorism at a significant level (see Table 1). Although absolute population was often linked to more terrorism, the relationship was not present for 1985, indicating that such linkages were not consistently present. It is possible that there were years or even possibly periods of time when anomalous results will be possible. It is worth noting that the correlations were more consistently present for 1995 and 2005, suggesting that in the later periods when terrorist activities had increased it was possible that either patterns of terrorist activity changed or perhaps that there was better reporting of the violence that did occur.

The coefficients for per capita levels of terrorism with the absolute population were much more consistent. There was no evidence that larger countries suffered from more terrorist activity proportional to their size in any of the years or for any of the measures. This first analysis suggests that previous findings connecting population size to terrorist violence was an artifact of the reliance on size and not an indication that larger countries are actually more prone to such violence.
Table 1: Correlations between Population Size and Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Absolute Measures</th>
<th>Per Capita Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incidents, 1975</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>.141*</td>
<td>-.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>-.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incidents, 1985</strong></td>
<td>-.018</td>
<td>-.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>-.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=176</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incidents, 1995</strong></td>
<td>.200**</td>
<td>-.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>.140*</td>
<td>-.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>.159*</td>
<td>-.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=178</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incidents 2005</strong></td>
<td>.174**</td>
<td>-.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>.152*</td>
<td>-.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>.099+</td>
<td>-.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=179</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**α = .01 * α = .05 + α = .10**

Notwithstanding the above results, it was possible, as noted, that there was the possibility that terrorism might be more difficult in the smallest countries and territories since their small size might make it easier to detect militants or to capture terrorists once they had launched any attacks. International attacks where terrorists from one country chose to attack their own government or its supporters on foreign soil might be less likely in the smaller states. Not only would such terrorists be easier to detect, but a small country is less likely to be an important foreign supporter or to have targets, such as multinational corporations or government agencies, from the home country that the dissidents would choose to attack. Kurds opposed to being part of Turkey (or Iraq or Iran), for example, would find more potential Turkish targets to attack as a protest against the policies of their government in France or Germany than in Denmark or Ireland. All other things being equal, diaspora communities which might provide important support for violent activities are also more likely to be present in larger states. The one factor that might make smaller countries more inviting as targets for international attacks would be weaker security and counterintelligence agencies.

To consider the possibility those smaller states would be less likely to suffer attacks, the countries and territories were divided into two groups. One group consisted of countries and areas with a population of less than one million and the second group of all the larger countries. T-tests that compared the means of the two groups were derived for each of the four years. The comparison was made for both absolute levels of incidents, injuries, and fatalities and for the per capita measures of these terrorism variables. If population size were indeed a factor in terrorism, then the per capita levels would be significantly higher for the more populous countries.

Not surprisingly, the absolute averages for the small countries and the larger ones were routinely different by large amounts, and the differences in means were significant. The larger countries had much higher average figures for incidents, injuries, and fatalities than did the countries with less than a million people.
(see Table 2). Absolute values for the three measures have obviously increased over time, especially for the larger countries, compared to 1975 and 1985. The comparisons for the per capita levels were more interesting. In 1975, there were more per capita incidents and injuries in the smaller countries than in the larger ones, but the differences were not significant ones in this year. In 1985, the per capita numbers were in the expected direction but the differences were not significant except for injuries. In 1995, the results for per capita measures were again mixed. In the case of incidents, there were more per capita activities in the smaller countries and territories but they were not significantly more frequent. Per capita fatalities were high in the larger states, and in this case the differences in the means were significant. In 2005 the results were as expected with incidents and injuries being significantly higher in the larger states. Thus, overall there were some indications that larger countries were somewhat likely to experience more terrorist attacks. This evidence was not consistent, however, and in seven of the twelve cases the null hypothesis of no difference between large and small countries could not be rejected.

Table 2: Difference in Means: Large States and Small States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Small State</th>
<th>Large State</th>
<th>T-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents 1975</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>5.624</td>
<td>2.613**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>5.811</td>
<td>2.331*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents 1985</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>.578</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>.613</td>
<td>42.506</td>
<td>3.157**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>54.701</td>
<td>2.790**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents 1995</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>.575</td>
<td>110.492</td>
<td>2.129*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>43.693</td>
<td>3.585***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents 2005</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>84.648</td>
<td>2.024*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>41.210</td>
<td>1.709*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>Fatalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>.253</td>
<td>.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>112</td>
<td>.363</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2.004</td>
<td>2.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>118</td>
<td>6.579</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1.824</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1.565</td>
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</table>

Per Capita Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td>.208</td>
<td>.399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.776*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2.670</td>
<td>8.519</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1.220</td>
<td>.551</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.657**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>.563</td>
<td>1.979*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.413</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*α = .10 *α = .05 **α = .01 ***α = .001 Italicized entries are contrary to expected values.

Since small countries adjacent to larger countries could become the sites for terrorist activities spilling over from these neighbors or be chosen by a militant organization as a convenient place to attack people or facilities identified with another country, the above analysis was redone with one group consisting of small island countries of less than a million in population and all other countries. If a small population would make terrorist activity more difficult, insular status should enhance the effect. There would be no chance of a border crossing by land with evil intent and opportunities for escape abroad would be more limited. As it turned out many of the countries with less than a million inhabitants were also island nations, but not all of them were.

The means for absolute levels in 1975 were not in the predicted direction for all three measures in all years and were significant (see Table 3). In 1975, 1985, and 1995 the absolute number of incidents, injuries, and fatalities were quite a bit higher in the larger or non-insular states, and the differences were significant. In 2005, the differences in means remained large, but in the case of incidents the t-value was significant. In general, absolute population size was linked with higher levels of terrorism.
Table 3: Difference in Means: States and Small Island States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Small Island State</th>
<th>Large State</th>
<th>T-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Absolute Values</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents 1975</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents 1985</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>.544</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>.684</td>
<td></td>
<td>38.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents 1995</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>.427</td>
<td>134</td>
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<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>.613</td>
<td></td>
<td>103.064</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.759</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incidents 2005</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>135</td>
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<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td></td>
<td>80.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Per Capita Values</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents 1975</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>.229</td>
<td></td>
<td>.381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>.193</td>
<td></td>
<td>.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents 1985</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2.042</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>2.999</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>.467</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents 1995</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2.091</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Injuries 6.609 3.052 .700
Fatalities -.467 7.625 2.546

Incidents 2005 43 .169 135 .538 1.936
Injuries -.145 2.967 1.967
Fatalities -.145 1.552 1.689

* $\alpha = .10$ ** $\alpha = .05$ *** $\alpha = .01$ ** $\alpha = 001$ Italicized entries are contrary to expected values.

The per capita measures displayed a different pattern just as they had for the comparison of the larger and smaller states. In the year 1975 incidents were actually higher in the island territories than in the other larger and non-insular countries but not at a significant level. It is perhaps noteworthy that the higher level was for incidents but not present for casualties which usually are a reflection of more serious attacks. In 1985, however, fatalities were higher in the non-insular states at a marginally significant level, but there were no meaningful differences in either incidents or injuries. The results for 1995 indicated that the number of per capita incidents and injuries were higher for the non-insular countries but not significantly so. Fatalities were much higher in the non-insular countries and territories in this year. In 2005, the averages were higher for the non-insular countries, and all three measures did achieve a minimum level of statistical significance. For these four years, although there were some indications that the larger states had higher per capita levels of terrorism, there was no consistent evidence that the smaller island countries had less terrorism than the larger countries. In fact, the results for differences in means between the small and larger states reflected in Table 2 appeared to distinguish slightly better between the two groups than insular or non-insular status combined with size.

Conclusions
The results of the above analyses generally confirmed the obvious conclusion that larger countries suffer from more incidents of terrorism as well as the accompanying casualties because there are more people who might resort to violence. Interestingly enough, there were some cases for the four years chosen where the smaller countries had higher absolute levels for the measures, but they were not significantly larger except for one marginal case. The absolute measures were usually higher for the larger countries and territories and the differences were significant ones. When the per capita levels of incidents, injuries, and fatalities were used, however, there was very little evidence that the differences in means were significant. In the few cases where there were significant differences in means (five cases out of twelve), it was the larger countries that did suffer from higher levels. The limited number of significant results provides only a minimal amount of evidence to suggest that larger states suffer from proportionally more terrorism. The division between the small island states and the other countries and territories yielded similar results. The non-island states had higher absolute values in some cases and significantly so. In terms of the per capita values, the differences between the two groups were normally in the expected direction but in most cases they were not significant.

Overall, it is difficult to find any meaningful evidence or support for the proposition that more populous states are more prone to terrorist violence because their size makes security and police operations more difficult. The conclusion was particularly obvious with the correlations in Table 1. There were, however, at least a few instances that suggest that it might be somewhat more difficult for terrorist organization to operate in smaller countries, and perhaps insular territories (which overlapped to a large extent with small countries). Beyond this possibility, there are no great differences that can be ascribed to size as such. The major effect of
the inclusion of population in analyses would appear to be to increase the explanatory value of the equations that are generated. [18] It also introduces one additional value that makes the evaluation of the impact of control variables versus the explanatory variables included in the particular analysis more difficult. The use of per capita measures, which can be easily generated when there is information on the number of events and casualties and population levels, resolves this issue. The use of per capita measures instead of the inclusion of population as a control variable, moreover, provides for more parsimonious explanations of various aspects of terrorism, which is often methodological desirable since it makes evaluations of the results easier.

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Lutz & Lutz have collaborated in researching various aspects of terrorism, including the economic consequences of terrorism and links between globalization and terrorism.

Notes


The Tranquillity Campaign:  
A Beacon of Light in the Dark World Wide Web

by Abdullah bin Khaled al–Saud

Abstract
This Research Paper sheds light on the experience of the pioneering Saudi–based independent online counter–radicalization campaign called ‘Sakinah’ (Tranquillity), launched in 2003. Relying on multiple interviews and discussions with the founder and head of the campaign the writer of this Research Note was granted exclusive access to early archived campaign materials and records of dialogues with terrorists and radicals. This Research Note is able to highlight the history and methodology of the campaign’s work, the shifted motivations of radicals over time, and the importance of such initiatives and efforts. It also shows how, as a result of the changing nature and environment in which radicals operate, the campaign innovated its strategies and moved from a defensive counter-narrative engagement towards more offensive, proactive messaging aimed at eliciting specific reactions and taking control of the narrative and debate.

Keywords: Tranquillity Campaign, Counter-radicalization, Saudi Arabia, Al-Qaeda, ISIS.

Introduction
On a sweltering day in September 2015, coinciding with the Muslim festivity of Eid al–Adha, Sa’ad and Abdulaziz al–Unizi (22 and 16 years old) lured their cousin Medwis (21) to accompany them on a small journey to a remote area near their village of al–Shamli not far from Ha’il in the north of Saudi Arabia. There, they tied him up, got their camera rolling, pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al–Baghdadi, and killed him in cold blood on account of alleged apostasy, namely for having registered recently as a soldier in the Saudi security forces.[1]

While the incident shocked the Saudi public, most revealing and alarming were the details that the father of the two perpetrators gave in a TV interview following the incident.[2] According to him, the elder son had only left the village twice, once to nearby Ha’il for a dental visit and once to Tabouk further north for a short visit; the younger had never left his tiny village in his whole life. They were apparently normal young men who were not known for causing trouble and, due to the intimate and close nature of their village’s community, did not have any friends who were suspicious or unknown to their father. Moreover, according to their father, they were not very strict observers of religious duties, sometimes missing prayers in their nearby mosque. The only thing the father was very keen to emphasize and blame for the radicalization of his sons was the internet and how much time they used to spend facing their laptops or smart phone screens.

This incident highlighted the well–documented fact that radical and terrorist groups have long been using social media as tools to further their agenda. As many academic papers and policy reports have pointed out, radical groups have used the internet to disseminate their narratives, [3] indoctrinate new recruits,[4] and even to gather intelligence.[5] However, less attention has been given to the virtual initiatives and campaigns–designed to offset such harmful effects and broach a counter–narrative to the radical ideology–aimed at winning back the hearts and minds of our most valued treasure, the youth. One of the first and most successful initiatives is the Saudi–based Sakinah (Tranquillity) Campaign to Promote Moderation.
History and Methodology of the Campaign

*Sakinah* is an independent, non–governmental “edification and interactive communication” initiative, under the supervision of the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs. It was launched in 2003, during a critical juncture in the history of the Saudi Kingdom, which saw the onset of the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s terror campaign that lasted for almost three years before being crushed and driven out of the country.[6] With a team of approximately 40 individuals from various religious, psychological, and social disciplines, the campaign targets social media and online forums and groups in an effort to confront those who broadcast deviant radical thoughts and ideas, disseminate correct and moderate religious concepts and understandings in matters relating to new and contemporary events, and identify and engage with prospective radicals.

During its infancy, the *Sakinah* struggled in managing some online conversations and discussions due to, first, lack of experience and, second, absence of an easily accessible database of theological reasoning and arguments on the topics and issues that radicals and terrorists express their extremism through. With time, experience was gained and work has been institutionalized in the sense that the massive database collected and constructed by the *Sakinah* throughout the years allows its non-experts to now debate complex and deep theological issues with confidence.

In recent years, the *Sakinah* has also employed a new and offensive methodology, aimed at provoking defensive reactions that can then be exploited to dictate the terms of the debate and control its content and direction. The importance and effectiveness of such a proactive strategy is that “[U]nlke defensive messaging that focusses on the opposition’s message, going on the offensive gives the opportunity to get your key messages across.”[7] The way and reasons behind this methodological shift or addition will be explored in more details later.

Apart from the excellent 2008 *CTC Sentinel* piece on the *Sakinah* campaign by the late Christopher Boucek,[8] little has been written about it. Over the course of more than thirteen years to date, the campaign workers and collaborators, directed by the founder of the campaign, shaikh Abdul Mun‘im al-Mushawwah, have had the opportunity to engage thousands of individuals who espouse extremist views in open candid bilateral discussions over the internet, exploring their inner thoughts and beliefs and endeavouring to discover entry points through which they can sway them and, possibly, influence their convictions. As a result, they have gained cumulative experiences, through trial and error, in how and when to use theological, political, logical, ethical, or emotional languages during their virtual interactive dialogues. Such efforts and expertise must be digested, especially when we know that terrorist organizations’ use of social media as tools to facilitate recruitment and attract new followers is likely to increase over the coming years.[9]

According to the latest *Sakinah* report,[10] the campaign has succeeded in moderating the opinions and correcting the views of 1,500 of the total 3,250 radicals it entered into either private or public one-to-one online dialogues and discussions with. Out of those 1,500, two-fifths have retreated completely from all or most of the radical thoughts they used to adopt, while the rest have abandoned the most dangerous of these ideas and thoughts. Targeted individuals were not confined to a specific country or region, as half were from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region, 30 percent from other neighbouring Arab countries, and the remainder from Europe and America. Most importantly, all of these dialogues and revisions were documented and archived by the campaign, which will soon launch the “Sakinah Documentary,” a goldmine for the benefit of specialists and researchers upon request.

Three Generations and Multiple Motives

In a phone interview, al-Mushawwah explained to the present writer that the campaign dealt with three generations of radicals and terrorists over its history: first, the al-Qaeda generation from 2003 to 2006; second, those who saw the recession of al-Qaeda and the expansion of branches and other organizations
from 2007 to 2010; and third, the generation of contemporary Arab revolutions and their aftermaths from 2011 and continuing. The question that begs asking here is, after all of this wealth of experience exploring the minds of terrorists and radicals belonging to different organizations during different periods, what lessons have been learned as to the main factors and drivers along the paths towards radicalization?

Despite the diversity and multiplicity of motivations and factors behind such a process that can differ from one case to another, al-Mushawwah argues, one consistent theme featured clearly and strongly in almost all of the campaign's discussions spanning the three generations, an emotional one, relating to actual or perceived grievances such as defending Muslim lands against external aggression, setting the captives free, or supporting helpless and vulnerable Muslims. However, this emotional and psychological underpinning, which is usually coated in religious language and terms, is strongest in the current generation, al-Mushawwah contends.

Moreover, an important and central motive behind the radicalization process of many was the search for an identity and belonging, which can come in different templates: bay'ah (oath of allegiance), Caliphate, state, wilayat (provinces), and so forth. This motive is also more visible in the current generation, especially among those who come from Western countries. A third theme that was present in the language of a sizeable number of radicals throughout the three generations is the urge for retaliation, especially in those who had previous relationships with dead or imprisoned terrorists or who had lived and fought in previous conflict zones.

The religious catalyst, such as the dogmatic understanding of al–wala’ wa al–bara’ (loyalty and disavowal), takfir (excommunication), and mudhaharat al–mushrikin (befriending/allying with the polytheists), has always been present. However, according to al-Mushawwah, the use of religious language and fatwas was stronger and more visible in the first generation, ebbed markedly in the second, and resurfaced again with the third, although not as strong as it was a decade earlier. Unlike the early al-Qaeda radicals, the subsequent ISIS militants have no patience and show no interest in deep theological and jurisprudential debates. The best way to engage them and capture their attention, according to al-Mushawwah, is by challenging the utopian mental picture of the so-called Caliphate, and exposing the horrendously barbaric and un-Islamic acts committed by their beloved group, thus provoking them to take defensive postures and enter into dialogue.

Lastly, and more inexplicably according to al-Mushawwah, was what he called “the fashion” of joining virtual or practical radical environments, especially among those belonging to the third generation. Members of the Sakinah campaign were surprised to find some who were not motivated by any of the above-mentioned motivations. Their only drives were to try to “follow the wave” and emulate it. This can be explained, however, by the appeal of adventurism, leadership, and glory that terrorist organizations promise new recruits. Over the years al-Qaeda and, more professionally, ISIS have succeeded in manufacturing an image or brand for themselves, one that celebrates, in romantic expressions, comradeship, poetry and anasheed (religious hymns), glorious battles, and even death. Such temptations and lures can, and have, appealed to some new followers and recruits.

Dialogues during the Early Years

During the early days of the campaign, its workers and collaborators endeavoured to construct a database of moderate understanding and cognitive theological rooting of the main contentious issues that terrorists use to assert their radical interpretations. Nowadays, they have around 500 substantive materials, available on the campaign's website. These form a solid intellectual and knowledge base that can benefit researchers and knowledge seekers.

However, it is the campaign's experience in dialogues and discussions, under pseudonyms obviously, with both hard-line and border-line radicals that is most pioneering and intriguing at the same time. I was able to
obtain exclusive access to some of the early dialogues. Among the campaign’s early public debate opponents was the head of AQAP’s media team in Saudi Arabia, Abdalaziz al–Tuwail’i, who used to be very active in internet forums and who wrote under several pseudonyms such as akhu min ta’ Allah (‘brother of he who obeys Allah’) until his arrest in mid–2005.[14]

One of Sakinah’s most important debates with him, in 2003, was organized by a supervisor of the then prominent al–Saha al–Arabiyya electronic forum on the critical issue of “the apostasy of he who helps the infidel against the Muslim.” The debate lasted for about a month with claim and rejoinder posts between al–Tuwail’i and the Sakinah operatives writing under the name al–Mu’jam al–Kabeer (Macro Thesaurus). During the debate, which was very theological, the Sakinah endeavoured to expose al–Tuwail’i’s selectivity and his attempt to “twist the neck” of Qur’anic verses and texts of past scholars in order to fit his preconceived point of view on the issue.

Al–Tuwail’i’s radical position was that any kind of help to non–Muslims against Muslims, regardless of the nature of that help or the motives and reasons behind it, results in absolute kufr (disbelief). However, the Sakinah operatives strived to explain to al–Tuwail’i, as well as all those who were following and reading this public debate, that this is not the case, as contexts, motives, amounts, and nature of “help” are all determinants and factors that must be taken into account before passing a judgement or a final ruling.

Another important and in–depth early debate involved al–Katibah (the Battalion), whose real name remains unknown but he was probably, according to al–Mushawwah, one of AQAP’s religious officials at the time. After a long debate with him on the public forum, he was convinced by the Sakinah operative, who was writing under the pseudonym al–Rasid (the Observer), to move the debate to the private chat room in order to escape the interventions of others and have a “quiet deep discussion on such important matters in our religion.”

The debate with al–Katibah, just like the one with al–Tuwail’i, was very theological, the norm for most debates during that early period of the campaign. It touched upon very critical issues such as the excommunication of Muslim rulers, the status of non-Muslims in Muslim countries, the meaning and interpretation of the hadith (Prophetic saying) “expel the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula,” and the definition and application of the doctrine of tatarrus (the permissibility or impermissibility of killing human shields). The very frank and intimate discussion started with al–Katibah professing the excommunication of the Saudi rulers due to the usual reasons radicals raise regarding this matter, such as the helping of the Americans in their fight against Islam, the application of man–made laws, and the “persecution” of the so–called mujahideen. According to him:

[N]o obedience and deference is due to those who changed the religion of Allah, and allied with its enemies…. They [Saudi rulers] have apostatized many times over, as the mujahid Imam Osama bin Laden, may Allah protect and support him, has said, when they enabled the enemies of Allah [to use and occupy] the land of the two Holy Mosques…. Do you have any doubt in their disbelief? By Allah, it is more obvious than the disbelief of Abu Jahl [one of Meccan polytheists at the time of the Prophet, peace be upon him].

The Sakinah operative then attempted to organize the dialogue and establish an agreed–upon baseline. After asking al–Katibah to confirm his agreement on “the obligation of obedience to the Muslim ruler” in general, he embarks on breaking down and refuting the claims al–Katibah raised as the basis for excommunication and infidelity of the Saudi state, masterfully citing early stories of the Prophet, peace be upon him, and other statements from early scholars of Islam.

By the end of the discussion, which lasted intermittently for two and a half months, al–Rasid was able to convince al–Katibah, through the use of extensive religious evidence and citations, that takfir is not a matter to be taken lightly and that the Saudi rulers are not in fact murtaddin (apostates). Even though al–Katibah did not backtrack on all of his previous positions, if one follows the trajectory and development of the
discussion and reads between the lines, the creeping of doubt into his previously firm and hard convictions is discernible.

After sensing *al–Katibah*’s slight change of tone, the *Sakinah* operative tried to connect with him personally and emotionally before continuing the theological discussion, as here excerpted:

> Before I [continue] commenting on your messages, allow me this word: I know the difficulty of accepting reality and the difficulty of changing convictions. Like you, I used to believe in some issues for a long time, was certain of the soundness and correctness of my path and opinion, and experienced the difficulty of changing conviction. However, everything becomes easy for he who has the religion of Allah as the light of his heart and sight. My dear brother, you used to excommunicate Muslims, and I know that was because of your enthusiasm for religion and not the corruption of your intent. You have realized now that the issue of excommunication is a dangerous one and that accusations of apostasy or excommunication of a person or the Saudi state can be answered and refuted. I want you to ask the Exalted Lord to save you from this fitnah (testing or trial), and by Allah I am praying for you.

Multiple other discussions were conducted via e-mail exchanges after establishing initial contact through social media and online forums. Such efforts yielded varying degrees of success, but in general, as al-Mushawwah contends, *Sakinah* was “able to influence the vast majority of those who entered into the dialogue with an open mind.” Once, an ex-radical abandoned his extremist beliefs after twelve days of continuous e-mail exchanges. In his first private message, he warned the *Sakinah* operative not to be “a defender of the ignorant apostates” and explained that it was his desire to save him from *kufr* (disbelief) that prompted him to accept engaging in private communication.

However, a month later he e-mailed, stating that he now sees the truth and is thanking God for guiding him to the right path before he gets involved in the spilling of protected blood. He went on to write, “[I]t is incumbent upon you oh shaikh [*Sakinah* operative] to help the remaining poor youth [radicals] who believe they are following the truth… May Allah forgive you where have you been a long time ago!”

**Recent Innovative Strategies**

In recent years, many things have changed. The nature of the main social media sites, such as Twitter with its 140 characters, does not allow for in-depth theological debates. Moreover, the nature of today’s terrorist organizations’ propaganda has changed, with ISIS mastering the art of graphic cinematic clips[15] encapsulating complex issues in a few simple words. The nature of today’s radicals has changed as well, in the sense that many are influenced more by romantic, utopian, and glorious ideals[16] rather than by religious principles, scholarship, or knowledge.[17] Therefore, the nature of the *Sakinah* messages and dialogues had to change accordingly.

Nowadays, while still employing theological and religious language in bilateral dialogues whenever the need arises, the *Sakinah* campaign attracts radicals to debates through the creation of challenging hashtags, especially on Twitter, and the dissemination, through them, of aggressive offensive challenges to their conventional wisdom and ingrained beliefs, often in the form of caricatures and infographics. Aside from the obvious aim of challenging the radical narrative, they aim to force the radicals onto the back foot and push them into adopting defensive postures in order to take control of the direction and topic of the narrative and debate.

The campaign often succeeds in provoking reactions from extremists and radicals who, as al-Mushawwah contends, respond more to such hard-hitting provocative doses of reality about the barbaric, un-Islamic, and unrestrained nature of their organizations than to long and deep religious *fatwas*: on the ruling of jihad or *al–*
wa'la' wa al–bara', for example. When that happens, they try to move the conversation to the private domain in order to establish a “personal” link that stands a better chance of getting through to the target.

One example of such hashtags is #كودخيال (‘do not let them fool you’), which was an old dormant one until the campaign revived it in May 2015 to serve its ends. The topics and nature of the disseminated messages vary from short religious notes on specific contentious topics, emotionally-charged pictures, such as that of a funeral prayer of the mother killed by her two sons,[18] aimed to incite remorse and revisionism, lists of aggressive, shock-inspiring facts in an infographic, and ridicule of provocative caricatures.

The campaign is also active on other social media sites such as Facebook and Telegram, where they manage several accounts and platforms. One of their strategies on Facebook is to give these accounts an evidently independent and general Islamic character in order to attract a large number of followers. Through them, they start subtly disseminating their moderate counter–radicalization messages and instructions. One of their Facebook platforms has around 410,000 subscribers or followers.

Conclusion

In short, virulent radical thoughts and ideologies calling young people to violence are in many ways like a malignant cancer that corrupts isolated cells and converts them into mortal enemies of the host body/country. Similar to the way that modern medical science can make great inroads in the fight against cancer, counter–radicalization efforts should also focus on, first, studying in detail the process and mechanisms by which the cancer/radical–ideology invades a healthy cell/mind and converts it into a destroyer of life and, second, discovering specific vulnerable steps in the process at which it can be stopped, derailed, or otherwise rendered harmless.

It is safe to argue that the Sakinah campaign has been one of the pioneering effort in that direction. Even if its successes over the past thirteen years have not been many nor much publicized due to the sensitive and anonymous nature of its work, the impact of its efforts is most certainly valuable as these may have resulted in the saving of many human lives all over the world.

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Notes


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[13] “Al-Taseel al-Shari’i” [The Theological Rooting], Assakina,
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Resources

Bibliography: Conflict in Syria (Part 3)
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism–BSPT-JT-2017-2]

Abstract
This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the Syrian conflict. To keep up with the rapid changing political events, more recent publications have been prioritized during the selection process. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, Syria, conflict, uprising, civil war, Assad regime, rebels, opposition, Jabhat al-Nusra, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, YPG, Russia

NB: All websites were last visited on 22.03.2017. This subject bibliography is conceptualized as a multi-part series (for earlier bibliographies, see: Part 1 and Part 2). To avoid duplication, this compilation only includes literature not contained in the previous parts. However, meta-resources, such as bibliographies, were also included in the sequels. Literature focusing specifically on the “Islamic State” (a.k.a. ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) has been excluded as it is covered in a separate multi-part bibliography. – See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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**Note**

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

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Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects
Compiled and Selected by Berto Jongman

Introductory Note by the Editor

The amount of new publications, reports, policy papers, lectures, presentations, videos and briefings in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism can be overwhelming for the untrained researcher as well as for young counter-terrorist professionals. In the following, a selection of recent open-source online publications, grouped into a dozen categories, has been made by a seasoned former intelligence analyst. An attempt has been made to select items from a variety of sources and positions, presenting different perspectives. Selection not necessarily means endorsement for certain positions or specific lines of argumentation. In addition, an attempt has been made to include also a number of non-terrorist items from the broader spectrum of political violence and armed conflicts.

All the items included here surfaced online in the period mid-January to beginning of April 2017. ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’ plans to offer its readers regular updates in future issues of our journal, categorised in the same format:

1. Non-Religious Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns
2. Religious (mainly Jihadi) Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns
3. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics
4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism
5. Counter-Terrorism – General
6. Counter-Terrorist Strategies, Tactics and Operations
7. State Repression and Civil War at Home and Clandestine & Open Warfare Abroad
8. Prevention and Preparedness Studies (including Countering Violent Extremism, De-Radicalization, Counter-Narratives)
9. Intelligence
10. Cyber Operations
11. Risk & Threat Assessments, Forecasts, Analytical Studies
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1. Non-Religious Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns


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**About the Compiler:** Berto Jongman is a former senior Military Intelligence Analyst and current International Consultant on CBRN issues. A sociologist by training, he also worked for civilian Swedish and Dutch research institutes. His publications include the edited volume Contemporary Genocides: Causes, Cases and Consequences (1996). Jongman was the recipient of the Golden Candle Award for his World Conflict & Human Rights Maps, published by PIOOM. He also contributed to various editions (1984, 1988, 2005, 2011) of the award-winning Handbook on Terrorism Research, edited by Alex P. Schmid. Currently he is a regular contributor to the Public Intelligence Blog (URL: http://phibetaiota.net/), IB Consultancy (URL: http://www.ib-consultancy.com/home/about/) and BlueWaterIntelligence (URL: https://blue-water-intelligence.com/?language=en.).
Book Reviews


Reviewed by Parmida Esmaeilpour

Shabnam J. Holliday and Philip Leech’s timely volume on the protests and uprisings in the Middle East, known as the ‘Arab Spring’, advances a cogent and critical argument for reorienting the body of literature on this subject. This is because they take particular issue with the terms used to describe the uprisings — the ‘Arab Spring’ or the ‘Arab Awakening’— claiming that such terms are “misleading.” (p. 2). As they argue, “it was not Arabs alone who have been protesting for political or social change and/or against their governments…. non-Arab populations of the Middle East have also witnessed, endured and participated in protests and uprisings of their own.” (p. 2). Accordingly, they claim there is a “need for analyses that look beyond an approach that pockets Arabs together and in isolation from their Iranian, Israeli, Kurdish and Turkish neighbours and/or fellow citizens.” (p. 7). To examine these issues, the volume’s contributors discuss eight detailed case studies — Iran, Palestine, Israel, Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan — in which they demonstrate the commonalities between the popular uprisings in the Arab and non-Arab Middle East in order to “encourage broader engagement with the region beyond the Arab World.” (p. 180).

Following the editors’ introductory overview, the second chapter by Shabnam J. Holliday and Paola Rivetti employs two approaches to deconstruct the heterogenous identities and political discourses in Iran’s ‘Green Movement’. In the third chapter, Nicole F. Watts examines the Sulaimani protests in Iraqi Kurdistan and presents two competing versions of Kurdish national identity. In the fourth chapter, Philip Leech discusses two major waves of protests in the West Bank against the Palestinian Authority from 2011-2012, and in chapter five, Giulia Daniele examines grassroots activism in Israel during the same protests. In chapter six, Lorenzo Trombetta explores civil society networks in the Syrian conflict and discusses Syrian national identity. In chapter seven, Fernando Carvajal takes stock of the diversity of political identities in Yemen during its revolution. In chapter eight, Brecht De Smet pursues a philosophical line of inquiry regarding Egypt’s Tahrir Square and the concept of ‘the people’. The last chapter (prior to the conclusion) turns to Tunisia; Rory McCarthy examines the evolution of the post-Islamist Ennahdha party ideology in the context of the uprisings which started in 2010.

In addition to challenging the “artificial restriction of analysis to the so-called ‘Arab World’”, which Holliday and Leech label “methodological regionalism” (p. 180), through these diverse case studies, and in spite of the commonalities that bridge the Arab and non-Arab divide, Holliday and Leech suggest that the term ‘Arab Spring’ itself reinforces the narrative of “a singular, transformative ‘spring’, which problematically reduces a broad collection of uprisings to a single phenomenon (p. 2, 12).

At its core, this volume is interested in the “construction and reconstruction of political identities during protests or uprisings, as well as in the aftermath,” which they broadly define as “the ways in which agents (individuals or groups of people) identify themselves and their interests in relation to established power substructures at the state and/or national level.” (p. 178; 3). The essays in their volume elucidate the conditions under which identities become meaningful and highlight the various ways identities interact and intersect with one another. This emphasis on identity politics, as well as a concurrent emphasis on individualism and political agency, gives rise to a rich discussion of the plurality and fluidity of identity. (pp. 7, 177-8). Their case studies illustrate that “Arab identity continues to exist alongside other identities,” and that “Arab and non-Arab alike… state identity (Iran, Yemen, Tunisia, Syria) and, indeed, pseudo-state
identity (Palestine, Iraqi Kurdistan) continue to be important despite and in spite of other political identities.” (p. 7). For this reason, it is “the question of how to appropriately interpret the relationship of agency and structure” that is central to their volume, and not “the arbitrary distinction between the ‘Arab’ and the ‘non-Arab’ Middle East” (p. 5). The ahistorical nature of much of existing scholarship on political identity in the Middle East is also a point of contention for Holliday and Leech, who emphasize that identity is not fixed in space nor time, especially “in the context of a deeply interconnected region and a rapidly changing globalising world.” (p. 181).

Another central discussion in the volume is the seemingly paradoxical prevalence of both secular and Islamist or post-Islamist politics. Holliday and Leech denounce the “false dichotomy of Islamism versus secular authoritarianism, or… Islamism versus secular ‘democracy.’” (p. 181). Their volume depicts how secularist and Islamist/ post-Islamist politics are mutually reinforcing as “secular politics “[open spaces] for long repressed Islamist movements to seek elected office and legitimate political power” (p. 8).

The volume, thus is unique in many respects. The chapters are grounded in critical approaches to politics and the contributors draw liberally from the work of Antoni Gramsci, Edward Said, and Marxist thought (p. 5, 9). Much weight is given to subaltern groups and agents of “counter-hegemonic strategies,” and the contributors are careful to unpack and undermine the prevailing “essentialist, often orientalist, accounts that claim sectarianism as the sole explanation for protest” (pp. 10-11). The volume itself can be seen as an act of protest against Eurocentric accounts of the protests and uprisings across the Arab and non-Arab Middle East. Concurrently, the volume addresses a prominent gap in the literature by calling into question “the notion that ‘the Arab World’ can be reasonably separated from the broader region” (p. 3). Finally, Holliday and Leech capitalize on the unique (though unfortunate) topicality of their volume which coincides with the “ongoing civil war in Syria and Yemen,” “the presence of the Salafi Da’ish,” and the renewed salience of “the ‘Kurdish issue’” (p. 4). As a result, their volume makes a sophisticated contribution to our understanding of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’.

About the Reviewer: Parmida Esmaeilpour is a Master’s Student and Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Canada.

Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid

Since 9/11 counter-terrorism basically developed along two major lines: one based on a military paradigm (as in the American ‘Global War on Terror’), the other based on a law enforcement paradigm, emphasizing criminal prosecution relying on the police and the courts. The focus of this volume is on this law enforcement paradigm when it comes to countering ‘terrorism’ - a term that has escaped an international law definition so far, although there is widespread agreement as to its core, namely ‘the instrumental political killing of civilians in peacetime’ (Ben Saul, p.37).

In a landscape where monographs on terrorism are published every couple of hours, many law enforcement professionals and researchers welcome handbooks that look at the field of terrorism studies from a broader perspective. Routledge has published handbooks of Terrorism Research (2011, edited by A.P. Schmid), the History of Terrorism (2015, edited by R.D. Law), of Critical Terrorism Studies (2016, edited by R. Jackson), with one more on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism (2017, edited by A. Silke, et al) forthcoming.

The wide-ranging volume reviewed here, the Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism, has been edited by Genevieve Lennon (University of Strathclyde) and Clive Walker (University of Leeds). It focuses mainly on UK counter terrorism laws but also covers, to varying extents, US, Australian, Canadian, Israeli as well as EU and UN legislation.

In partial analogy to the British government’s counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) of ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare’, the book is divided into four parts: (i) The boundaries and strategies of national counter-terrorism laws [seven chapters]; (ii) The pursuit of terrorists through national criminal justice process and executive measures; [twelve chapters]; (iii) protective security [four chapters], and (iv) preventive measures [five chapters].

The forty contributors include well-known authorities like Ben Saul (who authors the chapter ‘Terrorism as a Legal Concept’), Amos Guiora (who co-authors the ‘Homeland Security’ chapter) and, of course, the co-editor Clive Walker himself, Britain’s leading authority in the field. He co-authors no fewer than eight of the 30 chapters of the volume, including its introduction and conclusion.

The volume’s chapters address as diverse issues as ‘The interaction of terrorism laws with human rights’ (by Federico Fabbrini), ‘Detention and interrogation in law and war’ (by Stephen I. Vladeck and Clive Walker), ‘Precursor crimes of terrorism’ (by Manuel Cancio Melia and Anneke Petzsche) and ‘The victims of terrorism’ (by Illaria Bottigliero, Lyal S. Sunga, and Clive Walker).

The editors of this interdisciplinary handbook note since 9/11 a proliferation of anti-terrorism laws, a drift they term ‘Total Counter-terrorism’ (p.463). While this is worrisome, the alternative escalation of military counter-terrorism operations has proven to be even more problematical as witnessed by the American intervention disasters in Afghanistan and Iraq. As long as the escalation of non-military counter-terrorist measures occurs within the rule of law and the confines of constitutional democracy, there is some guarantee that human security will not be sacrificed to national security – an approach clearly favoured by the editors (Lennon & Walker, p.467). The Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism makes clear that the law is far from powerless when it comes to countering terrorism.

This is a solid reference work that should be on the bookshelf of every law school library.

About the Reviewer: Alex P. Schmid is Editor-in-Chief of Perspectives on Terrorism.
Counterterrorism Bookshelf:  
50 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects  
Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

This column consists of capsule reviews of books from various publishers. The reviews are listed in these sections: “Terrorism – General Accounts”, “Terrorism – Groups”, “Terrorism – Africa”, “Terrorism – Northern Ireland”, “Terrorism – Asia”, “Counterterrorism – International Law”, “Counterterrorism General”, “Counterterrorism – Conflict Resolution” and “Textbooks and Social Science”.

Terrorism – General Accounts


This is a well-constructed account, as the author explains, “of a group of radical Malay men and women in colonial Malaya who once formed part of the inmate population of Pudu Prison” in Kuala Lumpur. (p. 4) The significance of this group, which operated in the Malay Peninsula (including Singapore), is that they “played major roles in political, educational, social, and cultural institutions directed toward ending foreign rule” by the British, which led to their imprisonment in the 1940s and early 1950s. (p. 11) The author concludes that “the Malay radicals became agents of change in their society, who introduced new vocabularies of struggle, a new language of resistance, and new visions of politics, while imprinting the spirit of freedom in the minds of their compatriots.” (p. 194) The author is associate professor in the Department of Malay Studies at the National University of Singapore.


This interesting volume represents the proceedings of the Coloquios Internacionales sobre Cerebro y Agresion (CICA) and Society for Terrorism Research's (STR) inaugural conference, which was held in Spain in 2007. The volume's contributors draw on academic disciplines such as criminology, psychology, psychiatry, sociology, physics and international relations to examine the relationship between human aggression and violent behavior in the form of terrorism. The book's thirteen chapters discuss topics such as the psychological development of terrorists from childhood to adulthood; the role of aggression in terrorism; applying Terror Management Theory (TMT) to analyze the motivation to engage in terrorism; the psychological impact of terrorism on its targeted population as a driver for governmental antiterrorism policies; issues in profiling terrorists and effective alternatives, such as utilizing grounded theory methods (GTM) to analyze individuals who turn to terrorism; utilizing risk assessment methods to identify pathways into becoming Islamic terrorists; analyzing female suicidal terrorists in Chechnya; an assessment of the threat of biological, chemical, and nuclear terrorism; the risk of nuclear terrorism; and conceptualizing the cyberterrorist threat. The editors are academic psychologists who are affiliated with the Society for Terrorism Research (STR).


This well-informed book about how to think about the future of warfare has the added value of having its Foreword written by General H.R. McMaster, at the time Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center, and Deputy Commanding General, Futures, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and currently National Security Advisor to President Donald Trump. As General McMaster writes, “Thinking
clearly about future war is obviously important for military officers. Military leaders use their vision of future conflict as a basis for how to direct military operations or train soldiers. Senior officers draw on their understanding of war to provide best military advice.” (p. viii) This book fulfills General McMaster’s prescription as it looks at the evolution of the mechanics of war and the main features of future warfare, with increasingly robotic “warriors” on the ground (e.g. Unmanned Forward Observer units, Special Weapons Observation Reconnaissance Detection Systems and Tactical Autonomous Combatants), aerial (e.g., anti-satellite strikes using directed energy, electrical lasers, microwaves or plasma emitters) and cyber space (e.g., winning a war before it starts in physical space by dominating an adversary military’s information technology infrastructure). Regarding the future of terrorist warfare, the author writes that “tomorrow’s terrorists, insurgents and irregular fighters will be more imaginative than states in finding ways to wage war – a sobering thought indeed.” (p. 15) Future terrorist operatives, the author foresees, will become proficient in cyber-attacks because of its many advantages. He writes: “One is scale – it would involve few players; another proximity (everyone is within range everywhere at the same time); and a third is precision – you can be discriminating or not in your targeting.” (p. 93) The author is Professor of International Relations at The London School of Economics and Political Science.


This is an interesting account of 19th century Russian reform-era radical populism which emerged in response to the limited reforms introduced by Alexander II. As the author explains, the restricted nature of these reforms in limiting suffrage, speech, and assembly “helped to create a frustrated public sphere alongside a substantial measure of discontent and subversion.” (p. ix) To examine these issues, the author explores the underground activities of radical populism from the point of view of its participants in terms of “Why and how did an underground come into being in the first place? How did it evolve over time? How did those who occupied the underground manage to maintain its autonomy? In what ways did members of the populist underground make use of the pre-existing spaces of the cities in which they operated? And how and why did the populist underground carry out the violent acts for which it is best known – assassinations of state officials including the tsar – in the face of a powerful state with a police force dedicated to their eradication?” (p. x) Distinguishing his analytical approach from others that focus on the ideological nature of radical populism, the author adopts a different approach that focuses on the trajectory of its “organization and activism” over time. The author concludes with the prescient observation that “among the real radical populists of Russian history, the turn to terrorism did not rest on a foundation of ethics alone. The choices the populists made in the 1860s and 1870s reflected a much more familiar phenomenon: young people in changing times casting about recklessly in search of a way to usher in a better world.” (p. 274) The author is associate professor of history at the Harriet L. Wilkes Honors College of Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida.


This is a highly detailed account of 19th century anarchism and its relationship to Social Democracy in Germany, which the author argues was “crucial to Social Democratic refashioning and the reorientation of non-socialist attitudes toward the movement; opposition to anarchism provided German Social Democrats an important means by which to distance themselves from the stigma still attached to socialism in the 1870s.” (p. 12) The author observes that anarchism, particularly anarchist terrorism, served to shape European politics at the time, with anti-anarchist rhetoric serving to “demarcate the parameters of legitimate politics.” (p. 12) To examine these issues, the author discusses the history of conservative Germany’s anti-revolutionary rhetoric vis-à-vis anarchist activities such as assassination attempts against Kaiser Wilhelm I, which the government blamed on the Social Democrats, government efforts to pass laws to restrict socialism,
and changes over time, particularly in the decade before the outbreak of war in 1914 that contributed to decreased concern about the danger of anarchism. In the concluding chapter the author brings the discussion to the current period's concern about the terrorist threat by noting that the 19th century German case has “utility for evaluating how we talk about terrorist threats, radicalism, and the bounds of legitimate political expression in the twenty-first century, suggesting that we can learn something from how vilified political minorities [such as the Social Democratic party-JS] created a political culture of free and open debate in a time of fear and confusion.” (p. 21) The author is Associate Professor and Department Chair, History, and Coordinator of European Studies, at St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York.


Terrorism, particularly religiously-driven terrorism, draws its support from radical subcultures within the societies where it operates. In the West, which is primarily secular in the form of separation of state and religion, extremist religious movements of all denominations have been attempting over the past several decades to exert themselves in these societies, with the most extremist groupings within them using terrorist tactics to inflict their vengeful anger against their adversaries. This book explains the larger context in which these radical religious subcultures operate. Its six chapters discuss topics such as the role of religion in social and political theory (e.g., the classical theories on demarcating the state and religion by Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Peter Berger); the moves over the years by secular elements to “privatize” religion, whether Christianity or Islam; and the moves in recent times by religious forces to assert themselves in society, for instance, in what the author terms “negative religious liberty rights” by publicly wearing manifestations of their religions such as a cross or a veil by Muslim women as a way to highlight themselves “as a besieged minority.” (p. 186) Although such religiously separatist drives are not “terroristic,” they are part of a larger fabric in society in which extremist groups within such religious sub-cultures decide to advance their causes via terrorist attacks. The author is Professor of Sociology at the University of Bern, Switzerland.


This is a comprehensive, detailed and primary data-based account of right-wing extremism and terrorism in post-Second World War Germany. It covers topics such as the literature on right-wing terrorism; defining right-wing terrorism; the development of the militant far-right in Germany following the Second World War; a case study of the right-wing terrorist group National Socialist Underground (NSU); an examination of counter-measures by the German police and intelligence service against the NSU; an assessment of the effectiveness of German right-wing terrorism in terms of their group sizes, weapon types, tactics, targeting, and ‘life spans’, and an encyclopedic listing of military and terrorist right-wing groups in Germany in the post-Second World War period (with listings of their name, size, time of known activity, casualties, tactics, planned attacks, executed attacks, targets, and a summary overview). Also valuable is a chronological listing of right-wing terrorist groups and lone wolves and their periods of activity from 1963 to 2015. The concluding chapter provides a list of lessons learned, including the finding that “Right-wing terrorists are indeed overwhelmingly oriented towards a long-term and low-threshold strategy of violence.” (p. 255) The chapter’s section on directions for future research is also notable for its observation that “Right-wing terrorism is one of the most under-researched fields in the academic study of terrorism and political violence and consequently one of the least understood.” (p. 255) This is followed by the conclusion that “Because the majority of terrorism research has focused on jihadi terrorism, a potentially distorting bias about the nature of terrorism can only be corrected if other forms of political violence are studies and compared with each other.” (p. 257) This volume’s extensive bibliographies, which accompany each chapter, are another
valuable contribution to the research on right-wing terrorism. The author is Director of the German Institute on Radicalization and De-Radicalization Studies (GIRDS) and Fellow at George Washington University's Program on Extremism, in Washington, DC.


The contributors to this edited volume examine the root causes of terrorism in various religions, as the editors explain, from the perspective of “religious and philosophical issues, such as religious violence in scriptural monotheism, radical interpretations of religious texts, militancy and sacrifice, apocalypticism and terrorism, and religious terrorism in today's particular cases.” (p. xiii) This perspective is discussed in the book's twenty chapters, which cover topics such as the role of biblical stories in terrorism, whether religion is inherently violent, the role of religion in suicide bombings, using religion to legitimate violence, Hinduism and terrorism, Roman Catholic responses to Islamic fundamentalism, non-violent religions and violent cultural practices by Igbo Nigeria Africans, theological and strategic foundations of militant Salafi jihadism, religious terrorism in Turkey, and Islamic terrorism and Islamic radicalization in the Russian Federation. With such interesting and well-informed chapters, the volume would have benefited from a concluding chapter that synthesized the contributors' discussions. The volume also lacks an Index. Despite these shortfalls, this book is recommended as a textbook on the role of religion in driving religiously-based terrorism. Mahmoud Masaeli is Professor of Global Ethics and International Development at the University of Ottawa, Canada. Rico Sneller is Professor of Philosophical Anthropology at Leiden University, The Netherlands.


This is an innovative account of “dark ideas”, a term used in the book to refer to a specific type of ideological doctrinal innovation used by violent extremists that propel terrorism into new “strategic and tactical paths,” with Neo-Nazism and jihadism among the most significant exemplars of such innovations in contemporary terrorism. To examine the impact of the innovations introduced by such “dark ideas”, each of the book’s chapters addresses three questions: “(1) What is the origin of each innovation? (2) What is the context that surrounds each innovation? (3) How did they transition from idea to action?” (p. vii) This conceptual approach is applied to examining the personalities and impacts of leading and innovative ideologues and strategists in jihadism, such as Sayyid Qutb, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Abdullah Azzam, and their counterparts in Neo-Nazism, such as Ben Klassen, William Pierce, and Louis Beam. The discussion then shifts to an examination of the terrorist “implementers” of such ideological innovators, such as Usama bin Laden (jihadism) and George Lincoln Rockwell (neo-Nazism). In another interesting chapter, the author discusses Muhammad Maqdisi (jihadism) and David Duke (Neo-Nazism) as creators of “soft extremism.” The author perceptively concludes that “If information warfare against violent extremists will ever be successful, it has to be generated from an ‘inside out’ perspective. This means that culture, context, and ideas need to be understood from an adherent's perspective, not as irrational psychological babble. In regards to addressing ideas, *Dark Ideas* affords a way to isolate certain innovations, analyze them in context, and provide a conceptual path forward. It is the hope that this text will inform future discussions on the connection between ideas and incidents of violence, how these ideas are transmitted, and the relationship of the idea to the men or women who advance them.” (p. 119) The Appendix includes a useful case study in the form of a table that lists jihadi terrorists such as Nidal Hasan and Umar Forouk Abdulmutalab and their connection to Anwar al-Awlaki, their ideological patron. The author is assistant professor of criminology and criminal justice, and director of the Peace and War Center, at Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont.
This is an attempt to critically examine the “widespread belief that the more civilized we become, the more we are inclined to shy away from war in order to resolve differences and disputes. There is a related assumption that when forced to resort to war, civilized societies are more likely to abide by the rules of war…” (p. vi) The author finds that “civilization and war are, to all intents and purposes, two sides of the same coin.” (p. vi) This also applies to countering terrorism by so-called “civilized states”, with the author arguing that “the global war on terror is just that latest circumstance in which those prosecuting the war, in response to atrocities or acts of savagery by an uncivilized foe, seek to justify a turn to any means necessary, including ‘more brutal’ means of warfare.” (p. 92) Although the author’s discussion draws on the great books and essays on civilization by authors such as Thomas Hobbes, Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, Hans Morgenthau, William McNeill, and Samuel P. Huntington, in this reviewer’s judgment, he does not appear to fully understand their arguments about the components of civilization, including their modernizing dimensions. Moreover, like Edward Said’s book on Orientalism, which he cites in the book’s conclusion, he does not appear to understand the nature of the threats presented by religiously extremist terrorists and their adherents who are waging war against what constitutes a modern society. The author is Associate Professor of History and Political Thought at the University of Western Sydney, Australia.


This is a well-argued critique of the use of propaganda in the counter-terrorism campaigns by the United States and the United Kingdom. The author defines propaganda as including public diplomacy, public affairs, information operations and psychological operations (PSYOP) as they are “institutionally defined and politically motivated.” (p. 13) Following a discussion of the boundaries and the extended apparatus of propaganda, how ‘formal’ propaganda is coordinated, and Anglo-American relations in the counter-terrorism propaganda war, this framework is then applied to a case study of how propaganda was employed in the Iraq War in the aftermath of the U.S.-led intervention in March 2003. There is much to commend in this book, including the author’s distinction between strategic level PSYOP (as long-term goals); operational PSYOP (intermediate goals), and tactical PSYOP (near-term goals). (p. 13) The book, however, would have benefited from a more extensive discussion of the nature of the terrorist adversaries that these propaganda campaigns had attempted to counter, in order to present a more comprehensive context to discuss these issues. The author is Lecturer in Journalism Studies at the University of Sheffield, United Kingdom.


This conceptually innovative volume is the product of a workshop held in Berlin in April 2014, in which the participants discussed image operations across different academic fields. As explained in the volume’s introduction, image operations refers to the means by which images are used by various sides involved in an event to “depict news stories but are [also-JS] crucial to their legibility, illegibility, and perceived reality.” (p. 3) In this volume, the contributors discuss “the use and function of imagery in three areas: contemporary warfare, insurgency/counter-insurgency and non-violent political activism.” (p. 4) The book is divided into three parts: Part 1, “Using images, metaphors, process, affects” (different levels of image operations ranging from “metaphorical usage in world politics to everyday practices of arranging images on a desktop”); Part 2, “Images in warfare, insurgency and counterinsurgency” (such as images of acts of terror, including videotaped testimonies of suicide bombers); and Part 3, “Image activism and political movements” (how artists and activists from different countries utilize various digital visual technologies to investigate political conflicts). The volume includes 35 photos that illustrate the authors’ discussion. Jens Eder is Professor in
Media and Communication Studies at the University of Mannheim, and Charlotte Klonk is Professor in Art History and New Media at the Humboldt University in Berlin.


As explained by the authors, “This book explores the challenges faced by news organisations in attempting to protect journalists, in responding to kidnappings of their journalists, and in covering abductions of one of their own. It explores the familial, governmental, and economic influences on news organisations during kidnappings and lays out some good practices for avoiding, preparing for, and responding to the horror of a kidnapping.” (p. 1) The book addresses these challenges by discussing issues such as why journalists are kidnapped, which are either premeditated or opportunistic; the four types of capture or killing of journalists (detained or imprisoned by combatants in conflict zones, deliberate abduction and killing of journalists by groups or individuals to “stop their coverage”, having journalists killed in a crossfire, and kidnapping for ransom or holding as hostage by terrorist and criminal groups); relations between the kidnappers and the journalists’ governments; news organizations responses to such kidnappings; the experience of being kidnapped, based on case studies; how news organizations cover the kidnapping of journalists; the roles of private organizations that provide security to journalists in conflict zones; and best practices for journalists and their employers in preventative planning. Robert Picard is North American Representative for the Reuters Institute in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, and Hannah Storm is Director of the International News Safety Institute (INSI).


This is a noteworthy account, from the point of view of a working journalist, of the tension between “the two trades of espionage and journalism.” The account begins with a discussion of how fiction writers, such as John Le Carre, and journalists, covered the world of espionage during the Cold War and how journalists, such as Jason Burke and Mark Urban, write about terrorism today. The author explains that it is during the current era of terrorism threats in the democratic societies covered in this book – the United States, Britain, and France – that “the intelligence agencies’ central task is to secure the state against external or internal threats” such as terrorism, and, particularly its intent to use weapons of mass destruction. (p. vi) Journalism, also, views “its free activity [as] a necessary pillar of a democratic order.” (p. vi) Thus the dilemma for journalism is in “deciding what is and what is not fit to be published,” including sensitive information that is generated through leaks, such as Edward Snowden’s massive leaks in 2013 of highly classified data about the U.S. government’s counterterrorism surveillance programs and techniques. While the author calls for a “purposeful response” by journalists to “politicians’ hype,” he nevertheless accepts the premise that the need for at least some level of secrecy by the security services in these three democratic societies must be respected “because of the presumed seriousness of the terrorists’ ambitions: their possible acquisition of WMD; [and] the attraction they have for some, especially the young, largely within [their] Muslim communities…” (pp. 225-226) The author is Senior Research Fellow at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford.

**Terrorism – Groups**

The contributors to this edited volume examine the evolution and decline of Euzkadi Ta Askatatasuna (ETA, Basque Homeland and Freedom). This Basque terrorist group was founded in 1959 when it engaged in political and cultural activities until around 1968. Then it transformed into a group that engaged in armed conflict and criminal operations until 2011, when it declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities. As explained in the volume's introduction, the book's contributors, who are Spanish academics who come from the disciplines of history, political science, and sociology, examine three areas: the interplay between ETA's tactics and strategy and the Spanish government's counterterrorism response policy; the impact of the polarization and fear created by ETA's violence, including feelings of victimization; and “the historical narratives and rituals that contributed to the production and reproduction of identity oppositions and war memories.” (p. 1) In the book's conclusion, the editors observe that “terrorism does not end once the organization that practices it drops its weapons, but continues through its consequences into the realm of narrative identity. Terrorism continues to exist through its transformation into collective memory, which is established according to the usual hegemonic social framework (defined by Basque nationalism), making it a political tool that is just as effective in remembrance as when it was a political practice.” (pp. 226-227)


This book was published in 1988 and reissued in 2015, as part of the publisher's “Routledge Library Editions: Terrorism and Insurgency.” It covers important periods in ETA's history, beginning with the origins of Basque nationalism in the 1890s, the establishment of ETA in the late 1950s, the beginning of armed struggle (which the author demarcates as 1967), ETA's activities during Franco's dictatorship and the beginnings of post-Franco parliamentary democracy. In the book's conclusion, the author rightfully observes that “Inevitably, studies of ‘terrorist’ groups which ignore the social context of their existence and concentrate solely on their internal organization and training, or the supposed psychological motivation of their members, end up examining either trivial, or at best secondary, features of the phenomenon. I have attempted to show the deep roots of ETA in Basque history and social structure.” (p. 277) This book is recommended for its detailed examination of ETA's socio-cultural and political nature during a significant formative period in Spain's history.


This book is an important contribution to the literature on resolving terrorist conflicts through political and military measures as it focuses primarily on ETA's last decade of existence, when various initiatives were introduced in an attempt to resolve the conflict between ETA and the Spanish government. As the author explains, this book “chronicles the history upon which the achievement of the end of ETA's violence was built within a framework determined by interlocking preoccupations regarding the risks and benefits of engagement with armed groups proscribed as terrorist and the costs and benefits of counter-terrorism for democratic states.” (p. 299) Interestingly, ETA's declaration of cessation of armed operations occurred unilaterally, as the author writes: “No negotiations took place and no peace agreement was reached in a process that saw unilateral change within a political-military organization and the broader structures of its political and social support, directly informed by actions of the state, pressure from Basque society and the involvement of international actors.” (p. 303) The author is a senior advisor to the president of the International Crisis Group and a Senior Advisor and Non-Resident Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University.
Terrorism – Africa


This is an important and empirically-based account of the role of political socialization in the process of radicalization into violent extremism and terrorism from an African perspective, which the author argues is essential in contributing “to more effective measures and strategies to prevent and combat terrorism.” (p. 5) Following the author’s overview of terrorism in Kenya and Uganda, the subsequent chapters examine the radicalization processes that characterize those who join the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, and al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) in Kenya, based on empirical research in the field in which the author conducted 283 interviews with radicalized member and relatives of other members who were killed. Also discussed are the prominent political socialization agents involved in their radicalization, such as parents, school and other peers, media of communications, and, “in the absence of a national identity, subnational identities – based on religion and ethnic principals,” which transfer “from one generation to the next.” (p. 212) It is through such early political socialization agents that the stage is set “for the way individuals interpret the world around themselves.” (p. 212) External circumstances also play a role in radicalization, such as economic circumstances, particularly a sense of “relative deprivation along the lines of ethnic and religious marginalization and frustration, [which] go over into political marginalization and frustration.” (p. 212) Based on primary research in Kenya and Somalia, the author proposes a number of recommendations for effective counter-measures by the affected governments and their security forces. These include developing and implementing intelligent counterstrategies, implementing policies to prevent ethnic and religious marginalization, enhancing the legitimacy of government, building an inclusive nation while celebrating diversity, building partnerships with local communities, and a commitment to addressing “the underlying causes of terrorism and therefore not only prevent[ing] individuals to resort to terrorism as a tactic but also to isolate terrorists from a potential support base.” (p. 218) The volume is based on the author’s doctoral dissertation, which was the winner of the TRI Award for the best Ph.D. thesis in the field of terrorism studies in 2014. The author is Research Associate of political studies and governance at the University of the Free State, South Africa.


This is an extensively researched and detailed account of the multi-dimensional nature of the terrorist threats facing the countries of East and West Africa. The author uses a chronological approach to discuss how Usama bin Laden and his al Qaida grouping had established their presence in Sudan in the 1980s and 1990s and how their terrorist activities, including the twin attacks in August 1998 in Kenya and in Tanzania, led to the post 9/11 response by the international community against such terrorism, with a focus on how this expressed itself in Africa. The discussion then moves to an overviews of the terrorist threats within individual countries–Cameron, Chad, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia–and then, in the second decade after 9/11, focuses on the series of “cataclysmic events” by al Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali. The involvement of local terrorist groups in maritime piracy off the coasts of East and West Africa is also discussed. In the conclusion, the author makes the important point that within the two prongs of the crises of nationhood and statehood facing these African countries, terrorist groups have either “been formed as territorial liberationist groups, or outside Islamic extremist groups taking sanctuary in the ongoing confusion and exploiting the ethnic and religious divide.” (p. 214) Exacerbating these problems, the author concludes, is the international community’s “under-focused” anti-terrorist response to such threats. (p. 220) The author is Senior Lecturer in Policing and Security at London Metropolitan University, United Kingdom.

This book, which also serves as a university textbook and primer, examines the factors responsible for the African continent's numerous armed conflicts, including those that are terrorism-related, after the Cold War, as well as the attempts by the international community to resolve them through various means. To examine these issues, the book is divided into three parts: Part I, “Contexts”, provides an overview of the statistical and political background of the continent's armed conflicts, based on several data sources, such as the Political Instability Task Force, Monty Marshall's database, and the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme. Part II, titled “Ingredients”, examines the period since 1990 to understand the interplay between five issues affecting Africa's armed conflicts (governance, resources, sovereignty, ethnicity, and religion). Part III, “Responses,” discusses the major international efforts to resolve Africa's wars, such as peace operations, humanitarian relief and development assistance. The concluding chapter presents the findings from the second and third parts, including how they might be used to design more effective responses to such armed conflicts within the African context. Such responses, the author cautions, must cope with the continent's neopatrimonial regimes (i.e., patronage politics). But as he concludes, “Taken together, the preceding insights add up to a hugely daunting agenda that will require considerable time, money and, most of all, political effort. Nevertheless, as one Africa proverb has it: peace may be costly but it is worth the expense.” (p. 278) The author is Associate Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University, in Washington, DC.

**Terrorism – Northern Ireland**


This conceptually innovative book draws on social movement theories to explain how terrorist movements decline by using the case of Irish Republicanism to demonstrate the validity of this approach. As the author explains, “The central contention of this book is that a refined conceptualization of the de-radicalisation process can explain declines in terrorism by movements. The focus of the book is primarily on how a behavior – namely, terrorism and political violence – changes, which is referred to as disengagement. Disengagement can be motivated by a change in priorities in response to changing circumstances, but this change in behaviour can be accompanied by the maintenance of attitudes that drove involvement.” (p. 5) The author adds: “De-radicalisation, on the other hand, refers to the motivations, ideology and attitudes to armed violence changing genuinely, meaning the individual or group no longer wish to engage in armed violence. The central assumption behind the concept of de-radicalisation is that it can provide a more durable and stable form of disengagement if the drivers of violence are changed or removed.” (p. 5) The account then shifts to explaining how these processes of disengagement and de-radicalization played out in Irish Republicanism, with an added factor of a process of morphogenesis – structural change – facilitating a substantial decrease in Republican terrorist violence. The author is Lecturer in International Security at the University of Leeds, UK.


This is a conceptually interesting account of ideological and organizational splits within the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) over the years that actually enabled the PIRA's leadership, as the author notes, to bring “the majority of their movement away from sustained paramilitary activity.” (p. 3) To assess this transformative development, the author examines four main splits within the PIRA, which occurred in 1969/70, 1974, 1986, and 1997, by examining why and how each of the splits took place, and what were the effects of the splits. (p. 6) He finds that—with the latest manifestation of violent dissident Republicanism still
posing a relatively minor and largely manageable threat, primarily characterized by criminal activities—it remains the responsibility of the mainstream Sinn Fein leadership to carry on with its political work. As the author writes, “It is this kind of brave move that must be sustained to maintain peace across Northern Ireland.” (p. 201) The author is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of East London, UK.


Although written some ten years ago, this account of how the rationale for violence on the Irish Republican and Ulster/British Loyalist sides shaped Northern Ireland's party politics at the time is still relevant for understanding the Province's current events, particularly, as the author presciently noted, “whether the causes of conflict and the paramilitary actors have finally been removed.” (p. 9) To examine these issues, the chapters' concepts that explain the causes of conflict, such as ethno-national explanations and solutions, colonial explanations, structural explanations, and solutions to such sources of conflict such as consociational power-sharing; the Irish Republican Army's (IRA) objectives and methods; the different measures used by the British government to counter the IRA; Sinn Fein, IRA's political front; the loyalist's sectarian violence; and an assessment of the attempts to resolve the conflict, such as the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). In the concluding chapter, the author writes that "many problems remain regarding the government and economy of Northern Ireland, a legacy of the rejection of the state by the minority community, misrule by its majority, emergency-oriented direct rule and unsatisfactory executive power sharing." (p. 212) He concludes that “Until a settlement embeds, Northern Ireland, although largely peaceful, remains a failed political entity.” (p. 214) The author is Professor of Politics at the University of Liverpool, UK.

**Terrorism - Asia**


With pre- and post-independence Indian society plagued by inter-communal and terrorist violence, the contributors to this volume attempt to examine the vexing issues that make societal solidarity so difficult to achieve in order “to offer a cogent alternative for creating a strong solidarity among different communities in India.” (p. 8) As the volume's editor explains, these underlying issues involve “Why should Muslims, or say any other community, be looked upon as a threat to the Indian society? How can this be possible that any particular community be viewed as dangerous, threatening, diabolical or uncivilized, or, why is it that the claims that the Other makes always needs to be looked upon as illegal or immoral?” (p. 8) What makes this volume especially interesting is the editor's highlighting of the notion advanced by Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister (who was largely responsible for ushering independent statehood), of the need to create a secular and modern Indian nation that would be devoid of any communitarian differences, and how “this idea of a secular nation collapsed like a heap of cards because what Indians achieved was only a reel of that real Nehruvian dream.” (p. 4) It is against this historical background that the volume's contributors discuss topics such as narratives by survivors of the anti-Sikh pogrom in 1984; Mahatma Gandhi's concept of violence; an Indian feminist's critique of “patriarchal discourses of honour and cultural purity within a broader framework of nationalism and communal violence”; the “rise of the spectre of terrorism in Bollywood movies”; “literary representatives of gendered violence”; communal and sectarian violence in Kashmir; and how the issue of ethnic solidarity is discussed in Salman Rushdie's novel *Midnight's Children.* (pp. 8-12) The volume's editor is Assistant Professor of English at the University of Taiz, Yemen.

This is a comprehensive and detailed assessment of the role of intelligence agencies in supporting the Indian government's counterterrorism campaigns from the 1980s until the current period. Specifically, as the author explains, “This book investigates whether Indian counterterrorist failures are failures of intelligence, or failures to act on intelligence. It concludes that they are the latter. Specifically, they are failures to act on long-term warnings or strategic intelligence. Such inaction stems from four factors, two of which are political and two operational. The factors are: a lack of political consistency and consensus, and a lack of operational capacity and coordination. Between them, these constraints ensure that decision-makers in the Indian political and security establishments fail to act on initial warnings provided by intelligence agencies.” (p. 2) Following a useful literature review on the role of intelligence in counterterrorism, as well as an historical overview of the establishment of intelligence agencies in India, this conceptual framework then is applied to case studies such as the separatist movements in Punjab and Jammu Kashmir, the pan-Islamist threats to India, and the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai by the Pakistani-sponsored Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). In the concluding chapter, the author recommends the “adoption of an offensive counterterrorist policy [that] would require massively upgrading Indian intelligence capabilities and orienting them for offensive use.” (p. 205) He adds: “For this to happen however, it has to cease relying on defensive counterterrorist policies and shift to a posture of active defence.” (p. 205) The Appendices include useful tables listing yearly fatalities in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, and a table on major attacks by Pan-Islamist jihadists in India from 2002 to 2008. The author is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland.


This is a well-organized, comprehensive and detailed handbook on the terrorist threats facing the Asian-Pacific countries and their governments’ counterterrorism response measures. Following Rohan Gunaratna's introductory overview, the 28 countries of what are considered part of the Asia-Pacific are covered, including the five countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan). With the country overviews written by leading regional experts, each chapter begins with a background to the conflict(s), a description of the terrorist groups active, the terrorist leaders, governmental counter-terrorism response measures (including counter radicalization and rehabilitation programs, where present), and ends with a conclusion. The concluding chapter, by Stefanie Kam, presents the volume's findings, such as the insight that “In Southeast Asia, Malaysia and Indonesia appear to be the most significantly affected by the threat from the Islamic State,” (p. 637) that a number of countries in South Asia covered in the book such as “Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Bhutan, are recovering from the scars of past insurgencies to various degrees or are still dealing with remnants of these insurgent groups,” (p. 640) and that regional cooperation in countering terrorism by these countries is hampered by “the lack of coordination and synchronization among sovereign states due to mistrust between them.” (p. 641) Gunaratna is Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), at Nanyang Technology University, Singapore. Stefanie Kam is an Associate Research Fellow with the ICPVTR.

**Counterterrorism – International Law**


This is an encyclopedia-like comprehensive account of international law and the use of force against terrorism as it is expressed through international laws, United Nations resolutions, and academic writings on
these topics. Following an introductory overview, the book’s six chapters discuss topics such as the historical background of terrorism, how terrorism is defined, terrorist tactics, international and state terrorism, the roles of international and regional organizations in countering terrorism, legal justifications for the use of force against terrorism, and a comparative analysis of the causes of terrorism and recommendations for resolving terrorism. The author concludes that “In writing and thinking about terrorism, inexorably, I want to convey that the road to fighting against terrorism is long and treacherous, but the end is known in advance. In the end, terrorists are defending a lost cause. The defeat of terrorists is inevitable, and there will eventually be the triumph for democracy that we anticipate.” (p. 326) The author is Assistant Professor in the College of Law at the University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates.

Federico Fabbrini and Vicki C. Jackson (Eds.), **Constitutionalism Across Borders in the Struggle Against Terrorism** (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2016), 368 pp., US $ 135.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-78471-538-0.

The contributors to this volume examine how constitutional rules and principles in the field of counter-terrorism move across country borders in the campaign against terrorism. Specifically, as explained by the volume’s editors, “the book underlines how constitutional-like norms consolidate at the level of international and supranational organizations as a limit to the exercise of public power in the field of counter-terrorism policy, especially in the effort to block terrorism financing; in this regard, the book emphasizes what many in the EU would call the vertical emergence of constitutionalism beyond the state.” (p. 1) Also examined is “how the application of constitutional rights, including due process and free speech, extends extra-territorially, to state anti-terrorism action overseas,” (p. 1) and “how transnational cooperation between states in areas such as intelligence gathering and data sharing calls for updating domestic constitutional law rules or for adopting new international law compacts that would entrench rights across borders.” (p. 2) Finally, as the editors write, “these threads are interwoven in an interplay between constitutional law, international law, criminal law and the law of war, creating complex webs of norms and regulations that apply in the struggle against terrorism conducted across borders that appear increasingly more porous.” (p. 2) This framework is examined in the volume’s 14 chapters, which are divided into four parts: “International Constitutionalism and Anti-Terrorism Finance Measures,” “Counter-Terrorism and Constitutional Migrations,” “Extraterritoriality, Detention, and Free Speech,” and “International Criminal Law, International Law, and Terrorism.” This volume is the product of papers that were presented at a Conference of the Research Group on ‘Constitutional Responses to Terrorism’ of the International Association of Constitutional Law, held at Harvard Law School in March 2014. Federico Fabbrini is an Associate Professor of European & International Law at iCourts (Center of Excellence for International Courts), Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, and Vicki C. Jackson is the Thurgood Marshall Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA.


The contributors to this handbook comprehensively examine how international law has responded to the phenomenon of terrorism in terms of regulating terrorism as a criminal activity and managing how counter-terrorism is to be conducted in a legal regime. As explained by the handbook’s editor, “the problem of terrorism engages a very broad spectrum of specialized branches of law: transnational and international criminal law; the law on the use of force; state responsibility; international humanitarian law; human rights law; refugee law; international financial law; the law on development and humanitarian assistance; and the law of the United Nations and international organisations.” (p. x) To examine these issues, the handbook’s 43 chapters are divided into five parts: normative frameworks (e.g., defining terrorism in international law, how international law defines aviation, maritime, and nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism, including the financing of terrorism); terrorism and conflict (e.g., international law on terrorists’ use of force); terrorism and human rights (e.g., extraordinary rendition, counter-terrorism and international law, torture
and counter-terrorism, terrorism prosecutions, and victims' redress amid terrorism's changing tactics and strategies); terrorism and the United Nations system (e.g., the role of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre), and terrorism and regional organizations (e.g., the legal responses to terrorism by the European Union and Council of Europe, the Organizations of American States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, counter-terrorism and Pan-Africanism, and regional responses to terrorism in Asia and the Pacific). The handbook's editor is Professor of International Law at the University of Sydney, Australia.

Counterterrorism - General


This volume is the product of the proceedings from the January 26-27, 2017, conference hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews, Scotland. As explained by Bruce Hoffman, in his introductory overview, at the conference sixteen panelists and two keynote speakers discussed the variegated dimensions of the issues of terrorism and counterterrorism that the new Trump Administration has to address in formulating its national security policies. Fourteen of these presentations were included in this volume. As an organizing principle, each article focuses on the problem at hand and the author's policy recommendations. Readers will find all the articles interesting. These include Bruce Hoffman's article on “The Evolving Terrorist Threat and Counterterrorism Options for the Trump Administration” in which he discusses five key potentialities arising from current threats, such as the resilience of ISIS's external operations arm, the enduring threat posed by the tens of thousands of foreign fighters who have joined ISIS and al Qaida's fighting forces, the prospect of al Qaida “absorbing – whether amenably or forcibly – ISIS's surviving cadre” (p. 6), the possibility of terrorist deployment of WMD, and what the new administration should do about these developments. Also noteworthy is David Veness's article on “Global Trends in Terrorism”, in which he highlights seven layers of threats: core groups, external structures, affiliates, local groups, inspired/provoked incidents, foreign terrorist fighters (FTF), and insiders. (p. 23) Paul Pillar's article, “Terrorism and Current Challenges for Intelligence,” makes the important point that “bulk collection and analysis of data, especially telecommunications data … is exactly the kind of intelligence material that is most useful when the main task is not to monitor a known threat such as a named organized group or quasi-state but instead to identify one emergent threat out of a vast amount of innocence. This is the task of finding those who are not part of any larger organization but who establish themselves as terrorists only when they conduct their first, and perhaps only, attack. The intelligence task is a job akin not only to finding a needle in a haystack, but of trying to determine which pieces of hay in the stack will turn into needles.” (p. 109) It is such insights by veteran counterterrorism experts that will also benefit the larger terrorism and counterterrorism studies community.


This volume utilizes oral history-type interviews with Australian Special Forces officers who had served in Afghanistan to analyze the principles of effective counterinsurgency operations. Specifically, it uses the experience of 18 members of the Australian Reconstruction Task Force 4 (RTF4) which deployed to Afghanistan from April to October 2008 as the basis for its examination of these principles. With counterinsurgency defined in general as political, social, civic, economic, psychological, paramilitary and military operations employed in an integrated manner to defeat an insurgency, the Australian approach, as
discussed in this volume, encompasses the ten principles of political primacy and legitimacy, host nation primacy (and strengthening its security forces), reinforcing the rule of law (and host nation legitimacy), support and good governance (including a safe and secure environment), a comprehensive approach, a dominant narrative (that also serves to discredit the insurgent's narrative), effective intelligence (especially in understanding the insurgent adversary), adaptation (including flexibility in seizing new initiatives), physical and moral isolation of the insurgents, and presence in the local environment—each of which “reinforces the rule of law and supports the dominant narrative.” (pp. 6-7) This volume includes numerous photos of the Australian Special Forces and equipment in Afghanistan, maps, and order of battle diagrams that illustrate the text. The authors are senior oral historians with the Australian Army History Unit.


This is an important academic and public policy analysis of the role of the “conceptual and empirical requirements of defining, classifying, explaining, and responding to terrorist attacks” in “crafting effective counterterrorism policy.” (p. 1) This is done by examining the magnitude of current terrorism threats and the state of academic research in analyzing them; the issue of responding to terrorist incidents, which in the United States are rare events, and, therefore, difficult to predict their frequency rate; placing failed and foiled terrorist plots within the overall context of the wider terrorist threat; explaining the nature of terrorist organizations; the dilemmas involved in attributing responsibility for attacks to specific terrorist perpetrators; and formulating metrics to measure the effectiveness of counterterrorism campaigns.

There is much to commend in this excellent study. Chapter 3, “The tip of the Iceberg: Accounting for Failed and Foiled Terrorist Plots,” for example, provides a valuable breakdown of terrorists’ plot development as communication of intent, attempt to acquire capability, practice or training, elaboration of actual plan, and final physical implementation— all of which are useful, as the authors explain, for determining “at what stage the plot was foiled or failed, if it was.” (p. 79) In another example, Chapter 6, “Counterterrorism Results: Can Effectiveness Be Evaluated,” provides a comprehensive discussion of the goals and objectives of counterterrorism, which is buttressed by an overview of leading academic formulations of the metrics of effectiveness. This chapter, however, could have been improved by a table or diagram that synthesized these leading conceptual approaches, which would have benefited the public policy community who require tool kits to use in their own work to assess the effectiveness of their counterterrorism programs. In the final chapter, “Moving Forward,” the authors present findings from their earlier chapters, including an insight from the discipline of criminology that also applies to the environment of terrorism: namely, “all crime requires just three elements: motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardians.” (p. 218) This book is recommended as a primary or secondary textbook for university courses on terrorism and counterterrorism. Crenshaw, a leading academic expert on terrorism, is a Fellow at several institutes at Stanford University, and LaFree is professor criminology and criminal justice and director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland.


This is an interesting account of the components required to implement an effective domestic counterterrorism (CT) campaign. While primarily focusing on the United States, the author also discusses the approaches of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands to provide lessons learned in effective response measures, with the common adversary in all three cases Salafi-jihadist terrorism. As the author explains, the lessons learned from countering Salafi-jihadist terrorism are intended to serve more broadly to inform strategies for combating other forms of unconventional threats; for instance, right- or left-wing terrorists, ethno-nationalist groups, separatists and single-issue terrorists.” (p. xv) The first requirement for effective
counterterrorism is to understand the terrorist adversary. To accomplish this objective, the author utilizes a Social Identity Theory (SIT) approach to counterterrorism, which “demands purposeful contact between in-groups and out-groups, as well as an effort to develop new interactions that might attract members of the terrorist recruiting pool to membership into expanded, more inclusive groups.” (p. 25) The SIT approach, the author notes, “has the potential to attract those undergoing the radicalization process away from terrorism.” (p. 25) Following a valuable discussion that assesses the effectiveness of the counterterrorism approaches of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands, the discussion shifts to an analysis of counterterrorism in the United States, with all three cases accompanied by useful diagrams that illustrate their approaches. The next chapter, “Practical Applications: the Marriage of Lessons Learned and Social Identity Theory,” presents the author’s synthesized findings on how to recognize the magnitude of the domestic threat and appropriately align government agencies in a holistic way at the national and local levels in order to counter and prevent violent extremism in a coordinated manner, including the capability to identify and reach out via so-called Regional Outreach Coordination Centers (ROC) to suitable leaders in the communities that feel aggrieved. This integrated approach is accompanied by a valuable diagram that outlines the components of counter-radicalization as four-fold: eliminate root causes, increase trust in government, create safe space for debate, and reduce grievances, etc. (p. 212) This book is recommended as a supplemental text for courses on terrorism and counterterrorism. The author is a veteran officer in U.S. federal law enforcement and a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security.


An effective counterterrorism campaign utilizes elements of strategy, operations, and tactics to achieve its objectives. As explained by the author, a prominent academic expert on strategy, “The core challenge of strategy is the attempt to control action so that it has the political effect desired. Indeed, strategy is all about the consequences of action that is tactical behaviour.” (p. 1) With military strategy of particular relevance to counterterrorism, the author defines it as “the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.” (p. 21) The author also formulates a valuable general theory of strategy that is based on 23 elements, which are divided into four parts: “nature and character of strategy,” “making strategy”, “executive strategy,” and “consequences of strategy.” (pp. 47–48) Throughout these, the three elements of strategy, operations, and tactics are interlinked, the author points out, so that in the case of a military – and counterterrorism – campaign “when strategy and operational artistry are absent or confused, the tactical consequences for troops can be appalling.” (pp. 39–40) With regard to the future of strategic conceptualization, the author observes that “A major challenge to statecraft and strategy is the difficulty of proposing for an ever-changing today, with no idea of its shelf-life.” (p. 116) The book also includes a valuable listing of books on strategy for further reading. The author is Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, UK.


This is a well-informed critique by a former Turkish Special Forces officer, with operational experience in Afghanistan, of the Western-led coalition’s counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign in Afghanistan. The author contends that “in hybrid settings like Afghanistan, modern security actors of the world need new designs, preferably asymmetric ones, which zoom closer into the nature of an unfamiliar conflict in order to conceive of a framework for problem solving.” (p. xiii) As he explains, the “dilemma of strategic inputs and tactical outcomes” needs to be addressed in what he terms Afghanistan’s Tribalized Rural Muslim Environments (TRMEs), because traditional COIN strategies “excessively emphasize ‘what to do’ in strategic and operational level planning,” while he recommends that “‘how to do’ in tactical level planning is more
important to determine the end state of COIN in any TRME.” (p. xvii) Thus, as opposed to the conventional COIN’s doctrine that the “destruction of the enemy” would represent “a clear victory in TRMEs,” he argues that “the support of the populace should be the center of gravity.” (p. xix) This conceptual framework is then applied to explain the nature of TRMEs within Afghanistan’s tribalized, rural and Muslim environment and the conditions of the turmoil in the TRMEs that need to be addressed by COIN forces vis-à-vis their insurgent adversaries at the tactical level. The author is a security analyst and research fellow at the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC), Sabancı University, Turkey.


This is an account, as explained by the authors, of how “the speed of technological development” in the deployment of weaponized drones in American warfare, particularly in the war against terrorists overseas, “has far outpaced our understanding of how that technology interacts with politics, international law, and ethics.” (p. 3) While the authors accept “the tactical effectiveness of drones,” they contend “that there are practical as well as normative reasons to question extant drone policy.” (p. 3) These issues are discussed in the book’s chapters on how drones are used in warfare, and the relationships between drones and democracy, international law, and ethics. The concluding chapter, the authors write that “Our reliance on precision weaponry risks becoming a stand-in for hard moral or legal decisions. Combatant status [such as the status of the targeted terrorists-JS] cannot be determined by an algorithm, and we should not be lulled into believing that technical precision can extricate us from complicated questions. Instead, we should recognize the unshakably human character of war and identify new ethical and legal resources to regulate armed conflict.” (p. 157) John Kaag is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, and Sarah Kreps is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.


In this well-written book the author discusses the magnitude, reach and impact of the national security surveillance state, based on the estimated 58,000 secret NSA documents that Edward Snowden had illicitly disseminated to journalists in 2013. Of particular interest to counterterrorism studies is his account of the transformation of the U.S. government’s surveillance programs from their earlier period in which they “relied extensively on past records to build a picture of the suspicious person or the susceptible purchaser. Steadily, as real-time records of the present have proliferated, it has become increasingly possible to know what is going on at the time. And while, since at least the 1990s, risk management techniques had increasingly turned towards attempts to predict and pre-empt future developments, the anticipatory approach was ratcheted up some further notches as early forms of data analytics were brought into play.” (p. 84) In the latest development, such big data analytics now attempt to anticipate our actions. “Such systems attempt to create new knowledge using the statistical power of large numbers to help grasp the fragmented details of individual lives.” (p. 85) The problem, the author argues, is that while such big data analytics may be able to predict epidemiological trends such as the imminent outbreak of diseases, in the case of terrorism, “there is no regular presentation of accurate, identifiable and actionable intelligence… [because] it is nearly impossible to distinguish between a violent and non-violent activist, and with so few facts, correcting for false positives and negatives is both rickety and risky.” (pp. 85-86) Since the author provides no examples of such ‘false positives’ – or, for that matter, any examples of successful ‘connecting-the-dots’ through the use of big data analytics that apprehended terrorist operatives prior to the intended attacks (of which there are likely numerous cases), and, equally importantly, following their attacks, as was the case with Faisal Shahzad, the May 2010 Times Square bomber, his argument appears more polemical than one that is based on empirical evidence. Moreover, his description of what he refers to as ‘governmental surveillance overreach’, but without explaining the nature of the adversaries that such programs attempt to surveil prior to their attacks. As he
also fails to mention that within such governmental agencies civil liberties attorneys must authorize such activities prior to their initiation, he gives the impression of an Orwellian 1984 state, which is not the case. The author directs the Surveillance Studies Centre at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.


In this important volume in homeland security studies, the contributors, who are economists, discuss methodologies to assess the effectiveness of various policies designed to protect a country's infrastructure and population against terrorist threats (with other non-terrorism threats to the infrastructure, such as those impacting the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], also being discussed). As the editors explain, in such an assessment of effectiveness “an important dimension of the evaluation must begin with a clear definition of what these policies are intended to provide and how they will accomplish these objectives. This specification is important because the means used to enhance security may well diminish other ‘rights.’” (p. ix) These issues are discussed in the volume’s five parts. Part I, “Introduction and Objectives,” presents an overview of challenges in evaluating homeland security policies and the components of designing a benefit-cost architecture for homeland security policy analysis. Part II, “Security Policies and Reducing Risks,” discusses issues such as lessons from risk assessment, economics, and risk management at EPA; dealing with safety in UK public sector appraisal; and a comparison of key benefit estimation issues for natural hazards and terrorism. Part III, “Adaptation and Economy-Wide Effects,” discusses issues such as contrasting terrorism and natural disaster risk in an urban setting, and estimating the macroeconomic consequence of terrorist attacks. Part IV, “Practical Implementation of Policy Evaluation,” analyzes issues such as applying the methodology of benefit transfers for evaluating homeland security counterterrorism measures, which is explained as “Benefit estimates can be transferred through time or space; the key feature is that study-site values are used to estimate a value for a policy that is different from the original policy objective.” (p. 227) The concluding chapter, by the co-editors, “What We Know and What We Need to Learn,” recommends “small” and “large” steps for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve the analysis of homeland security policy. These include establishing an Economic Analysis Advisory Committee of outside experts to consult on benefit-cost analysis, as well as for DHS to build an ‘analysis platform’ to provide “an organized set of practices for DHS risk assessments and benefit-cost analyses.” (p. 263) This volume is the product of a workshop held in 2010 under the auspices of the DHS-funded CREATE (National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events) at the University of Southern California. Carol Mansfield is Senior Economist at RTI International and V. Kerry Smith is Emeritus Professor at Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona.


This volume is part of the publisher’s “Modern Warfare” series, which are designed to provide a visual account of defining military conflicts. Following an introductory overview about Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the chapters discuss how the war was declared, the air war, how Kabul was captured, the battle for Tora Bora, how NATO took charge of the campaign, the fight against the Taliban, countering the Taliban's IED bombing operations, the nature of the coalition force's soldiers' tours of duty, the types of military vehicles that were used in the operations, and the transition of the coalition's leadership from NATO to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) – although supported by largely United States-led coalition forces. In the Epilogue, the author concludes that “While Operation Enduring Freedom did not get Afghanistan completely back on its feet, it certainly made progress in many areas.” (p. 127) With more than 140 color photos illustrating the text, this volume is recommended as a concise visual documentary of OEF. The author is a prolific British writer on military affairs, armored warfare and terrorism.
The contributors to this volume apply multidisciplinary approaches to examine the processes involved in producing terrorism and the way it manifests itself. The book is divided into three parts. The first examines the causes of terrorism. In the chapter on the causes of the Arab Spring, the author, Saideh Lotfian, of the University of Tehran, places the blame on societal inequalities, repressive governments, and the policies of the “great powers” that promote “national security concerns, and not by the broad criterion of democracy promotion in the region.” (p. 22) Other chapters examine the causes of the politicization of European converts to Islam; the radicalization of Anders Breivik and the threat of right-wing terrorism; and the impact of the Internet's cyberspace in providing terrorist groups sanctuary to operate, just like the freedom to maneuver provided to them by failed states, also focusing on how jihadi groups use the Internet to disseminate their propaganda. The second part's chapters focus on how Spanish criminal law prosecutes terrorism and organized crime and the need to professionalize and internationalize its investigations, especially through the use of computer technology, to produce more effective investigations; the United Kingdom’s counterterrorism campaigns against terrorist threats emanating from Northern Ireland, the international (e.g., al Qaida) and domestic (e.g., right-wing) arenas; the components that constitute effective intelligence in counter-terrorism (such as effective communication from sources on the ground to national agencies and foreign partners) and how it is applied to the case study of Pakistan; and a software-based decision support system approach for analyzing and avoiding intelligence failure. The third part discusses the implications of the symbolic importance of group property in causing intergroup conflict and terrorism; the impact of cyber terrorism in causing fear and anxiety; and the role of revenge seeking and forgiveness in conflict resolution. Tali Walters is a forensic psychologist in Boston, Massachusetts, Rachel Monaghan is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Ulster, and J. Martin Ramirez is a Professor at Universidad Complutense Madrid.

Counterterrorism – Conflict Resolution


This important and comprehensive textbook on conflict resolution is also an ideal complement for terrorism and counterterrorism studies, as it focuses on the conflict resolution component in counterterrorism, which is essential for long-term resolution of terrorist conflicts when a terrorist adversary demonstrates a willingness to engage in the give-and-take of a negotiation process. The textbook, which is in its fourth edition (the first edition was published in 1999), is divided into two parts: Part I, “Contemporary Conflict Resolution”, by which the authors mean a traditional approaches to conflict resolution involving peacemaking, peacekeeping, postwar reconstruction, peacebuilding and reconciliation; and Part II, “Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution,” which draws on the new complex challenges in current inter-state and sub-state conflicts that require new tools such as “adequate hybrid local-global responses to tackle the new reality – the hybrid mix of local, regional and global conflicts that we call ‘transnational conflict’”. (p. 5) Such tools, the authors add, need to be “truly intercultural and transnational,” with a “new emphasis on linking conflict resolution to the ‘clusters’ of other pools of expertise and enterprise....” (p. 5) This framework is applied to the textbook's chapters, which include valuable conflict resolution models, such as a conflict tree, a model of conflict escalation and de-escalation, and the “hourglass model” that depicts a spectrum of conflict resolution and responses approaches. Of particular interest to counterterrorism is chapter eleven’s “Towards Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution,” which includes a section on “Testing Conflict Resolution: Responding
to Terrorism.” It presents a valuable framework that is based on four components: prevention (reducing proneness to terrorism), persuasion (reducing motivation and support), denial (reducing vulnerability and defeating hardliners), and coordination (promoting international cooperation and legitimacy) [pp. 338 – 347]. The concluding chapter discusses future trends that need to be considered in conflict resolution, such as emergent conflicts based on factors linked to identity/secession, revolutionary/ideology, and economic/resource. Future drivers of conflict include geopolitical transition, the North-South economic divide, the crisis of the postcolonial state, gender oppression, weapons development, and the environment. With regard to the ‘next generation’ of conflict resolution, the authors point to the earlier generations of precursors (1925-1945), founders (1945-1965), consolidators (1965-1985), reconstructors (1985-2005), and the new generation of what they term “cosmopolitans” (2005–) – who are in the process of developing “new tools and approaches that reflect upcoming technological and other challenges and opportunities that were not evident or available to previous generations.” (p. 502) Oliver Ramsbotham is Emeritus Professor of Conflict Resolution at the University of Bradford; Tom Woodhouse is Emeritus Professor of Conflict Resolution at the University of Bradford, and Hugh Miall is Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the University of Kent.


This reader is intended to complement the content of Contemporary Conflict Resolution [reviewed above] by providing additional articles that discuss the theoretical and practical aspects of conflict resolution. As the editors explain, it “provides examples of conflict analysis frameworks and their application to cases, case studies of mediation and negotiation, exercises in the use of skills for mediators, texts of peace agreements, codes of conduct of conflict resolution organizations and examples of cyber-conflict resolution.” (p. 1) The reader's 73 chapters are organized into six parts, with three types of chapters: reflective pieces (theory and conceptualization), guides to practice (the operational end of conflict resolution), and case studies. The six parts consist of Part I, “Foundations” (e.g., types of conflict, the management of protracted social conflict, and the mathematical psychology of war); Part II, “Conflict Theories and Analysis” (e.g., the dynamics of contention, ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war, and conflict analysis tools); Part III, “Praxis (1) Conflict Prevention and Nonviolence” (e.g., from escalation to conflict resolution, ethnic conflict and civic life in the case of Hindus and Muslims in India, and Mohandas Gandhi's article on nonviolence in peace and war); Part IV, “Praxis (2) Mediation, Negotiation and Reconciliation” (e.g., understanding conflict resolution, the mediation dilemma, and a training manual in community mediation skills); Part V, “Praxis (3) Peacebuilding” (e.g., the U.S. and U.N. roles in nation-building, the theory and practice of transitional justice and reconciliation, and code of conflict for conflict transformation); and Part VI, “Challenges and Future Directions” (e.g., why violence has declined, climate change and armed conflict, and a cultural perspective on peace studies). With three of the editors' affiliations listed in the preceding review, the fourth editor, Christopher Mitchell, is Professor Emeritus of Conflict Resolution at George Mason University.


This book, by a prominent academic practitioner in the discipline of conflict resolution, examines the utility of the role of prevention in mitigating state and sub-state conflicts. As he explains, “violent escalating conflict is a symptom of a causal problem of some sort, and de-escalating the conflict disarms the forces who demand attention to their problem; disarmament (conflict management) carried with it the promise of settlement (conflict resolution). Efforts at prevention must be complemented by efforts at solution, or the prevention will not hold.” (p. 3) To examine these issues, following the introductory overview, the book’s chapters discuss the nature of prevention (e.g., the roles of prediction and early warning mechanisms and the need to act on such information, including examples of successes and failures); the types of actors and factors involved
in conflict escalation (e.g., states and sub-states as actors and territorial and ethnic conflicts that require short-, medium, and long-term mechanisms for prevention); the norms required for long-term prevention (e.g., respecting an adversary’s territorial integrity, arranging for non-proliferation regimes for weapons of mass destruction, managing the issues of ethnic relations, human rights, territorial integrity, environmental protection, population displacement and democracy); the mechanisms of mid-term prevention (e.g., awareness, de-escalation, stalemate, ripening, and resolution); and methods of pre-crisis prevention (e.g., interrupting an escalation, separating the contending sides, and integration, by getting the adversarial parties to attempt to negotiate their differences); and measures to prevent a “post-crisis” outbreak (e.g., monitoring the implementation of an agreement and then managing the post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction activities). In the concluding chapter, the author calls for new imperatives, knowledge, mechanisms and agents to facilitate prevention for what he terms “this World in search of Order.” (p. 202) The author is Professor Emeritus at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC.

Textbooks and Social Science


This reviewer is not fluent in Italian, so this capsule review is based on the book’s English-language description on the publisher’s website (However, an English edition of the book is in the making). The proliferation of terrorist attacks by Islamist groups such as ISIS in the West has created a pervasive climate of insecurity and fear at being at the mercy of an “invisible and uncontrollable opponent.” To understand the nature of this threat, the author examines the origins, agendas, and activities of the spectrum of jihadist groups, led by ISIS, which has developed ‘business models to get rich.’ Moreover, like the modern political parties they seek to emulate, they seek to obtain consent by those they govern. Like ‘successful advertising agencies’, they devise marketing campaigns to take advantage of their audiences, and like government agencies they ensure that waste is collected, and schools and health systems are established. In such a complex environment in which they operate, to counter them military measures are not the most effective tool to defeat terrorism because it is essential to ‘dry up the sources that feed it’ and to solve the root causes of such forms of rebellion and insurrection, whether in the Middle East or elsewhere. Also required is the removal of “inefficient and corrupt states, where the gap of social inequality is excessively broad and dissent is stifled by imprisonment and torture.” It is only by understanding the individual pieces of this “explosive mosaic” and by “acting on them simultaneously”, the author concludes, that terrorism will end and the “world [will be-JS] free from fear. The Italian author is a Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv University, a Robert A. Fox Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), in Philadelphia, PA, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Modern War Institute at West Point, NY.


This textbook presents a comprehensive approach, beginning with explaining how to adopt a systematic approach in one’s literature review, choosing appropriate review methods, defining one’s scope (e.g., the problem to be examined, the context for the questions to be answered), assessing the evidence base (whether published or “grey” literature – i.e., information, which is widely used in terrorism studies, that is “produced on all levels of government, academic, business and industry in electronic and print formats not controlled by commercial publishing”) [p. 120], and synthesizing and analyzing quantitative and qualitative studies while minimizing the risk of bias and maximizing the reliability of the results, including deciding how to represent the data via graphical or other visualized approaches, identifying gaps in the literature. The concluding
chapter on writing, presenting and disseminating one’s literature review is especially useful, as it highlights the importance of considering one’s audience, such as policy makers who require reviews for decision support to provide answers or direction, or practitioners who might prefer summaries of information, or the research community, the media, or the public. (pp. 276-279) Also important is the creation of an audit trail that documents the steps taken in conducting the research so that the research is replicable for other researchers to utilize in advancing the state of knowledge on that topic. The textbook also includes an extensive glossary. Each chapter follows the same structure, with key features such as “In a Nutshell”, “Toolbox”, “Exercises and problem scenarios”, “Frequently Asked Questions”, “Key Learning Points”, and “Further Reading”. The authors are affiliated with the School of Health and Related Research (ScHARR), The University of Sheffield, UK.


Terrorism and counterterrorism studies are also a sub-discipline of comparative politics, so it’s useful to learn about latest developments in the study of comparative politics to advance the state of the analysis on these issues. As discussed by the contributors to this volume, some of the theoretical and methodological challenges in comparative politics that also need to be addressed in terrorism and counterterrorism studies include understanding the increased interdependence of countries in this era of enhanced globalization (and how, for example, this affects the requirement for closer cooperation in governments’ counterterrorism campaigns, since terrorist groups also take advantage of globalization); understanding how ‘de-nationalization’ and the emergence of other political units can also be used to analyze the way terrorist actors take advantage of the way that weak political authority and government structures function in the countries in which they operate (i.e., weak and fragile states); and how “the availability of an exponentially growing stock of empirical information that constantly needs new and more refined concepts and methods in order to deal with the data in adequate ways” (p. 2) also applies to the need to reformulate concepts and methods in terrorism and counterterrorism studies. The chapter by Olivier Giraud and Martino Maggetti, on “Methodological Pluralism,” discusses advances in social network analysis (SNA), which is widely used in terrorism and counterterrorism studies. They commend an approach “which combines an encompassing topographic study of the patterns of collaboration with a fine-grained analysis of the mechanisms through which ideas are transferred within these channels.” (p. 143) In the concluding chapter Martino Maggetti and Dietmar Braun note that for the state of knowledge to progress it is necessary “to relax the epistemological postulates underlying specific research traditions and endorse a reasonable degree of analytical eclecticism as a compromise between the ambition for a synthesis moving beyond existing approaches and the juxtaposition of competing paradigms.” (p. 194) Both editors are associated with the Institute of Political, Historical and International Studies (IEPHI) at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, where Dietmar Braun is Professor of Political Science and Martino Maggetti is Associate Professor of Political Science.


Terrorism is the ultimate violent manifestation of political activism gone wrong. Political citizenship and social movements are the most constructive expressions of political activism that seeks to bring about major social change, although there is always a possibility for political activism, when it feels itself frustrated and aggrieved by an unresponsive government, to turn violent. Interestingly, concepts such as ‘alienation’ and ‘relative deprivation’, which form important elements in understanding some of the underlying causes of terrorism, were initially formed in social movement studies. These issues are examined in this important academic handbook, whose 25 chapters (following an introductory overview) discuss how political citizenship’s activism turns into social movements that can range from mainstream to radical. The handbook

Among the book’s chapters, the chapter by Lyle Munro on animal rights social movements is of particular interest to the discipline of terrorism studies, as he writes that “groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) do use violence against alleged animal abusers and sometimes even terror.” (p. 530) He explains that these groups and others that are more peaceful pursue two broad political strategies: the politics of coercion (e.g., where property is destroyed) versus the politics of persuasion (e.g., where shocking imagery is used to persuade an audience to support one’s cause) [p. 531].

In terms of theory application, the author’s discussion of Piven’s and Cloward’s Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (1977) is especially pertinent to terrorism studies, as they “use the concept of ‘cognitive liberation’ to describe a best case scenario, where the climate for change is favorable, of how people lose faith in a system, begin to speak up about their grievances, and, once they learn their protests are effective, they experience ‘cognitive liberation’ and a sense of collective identity. (p. 535)

The handbook’s editor is Associate Professor in Political Science at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.


Although this handbook’s focus is on teaching international relations within the overall discipline of political science, teachers of courses on terrorism and counterterrorism studies will also find it useful. In particular, David Malet’s chapter on “Teaching Controversial Topics” makes the important point that in teaching topics such as how to label terrorists in a terrorism class, professors “need to take care to avoid personalizing debates or raising potential offensive topics without elucidating a clear and justifiable pedagogical reason for doing so.” (p. 253) In another insight, he adds that the application of theories such as Marxism cease to be abstract when students are informed that “people are willing to kill for and to die for [such-JS] theories,” and that Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations was used by Usama bin Laden “as one of his justifications for al-Qaeda’s major terrorist attacks.” (pp. 252-253) In another insight, he adds that “it is unfortunately a necessary element of classroom management to be on guard for students who seem to be getting too wrapped up in conflict or are behaving in any way that is threatening to the instructor or other students.” (p. 253) In addition to Malet’s chapter, readers will also benefit from the chapters on curriculum and course design, teaching subject areas, and in-class teaching techniques. John Ishiyama is at the University of North Texas, William J. Miller is at Flagler College, St. Augustine, Florida, and Eszter Simon is at the University of Birmingham, UK.


The contributors to this handbook examine the nature of the relationship between development and security, stabilization, demobilization of armed forces following conflict, and security sector reform (SSR) in conflict-affected societies. Their approach is exemplified by Mark Sedra’s chapter on “Transitioning from first to second generation security sector reform in conflict-affected societies,” in which he writes that the “September 11th terrorist attacks on the US engendered a shift in security thinking that has significant implications for the implementation of the SSR model. The elevation of terrorism to the head of the threat
matrices of most Western states has prompted them to view bilateral security sector assistance through a counter-terrorism lens. Broadly speaking, SSR came to be seen as an important security tool or weapon to secure the Western core against threats emanating from the global periphery.” (p. 170) This approach has led, the author argues, for the “exigencies of the ‘global war on terror’ rather than the goal of advancing the human security needs of local populations [to dictate-JS] the shape of many SSR programmes in the post-9/11 era.” (p. 171) One of the problems with this approach is that it ignores the full magnitude of the terrorist threats facing the societies in which terrorists operate, especially ones that are fragile (such as Somalia and Yemen), and blames their lack of development on external factors driven by “Western imperialism”, rather than their own internal problems for which they are largely responsible. Thus, the SSR model is viewed as an “idealized liberal” approach that seeks to impose security solutions on “difficult conditions in conflict-affected societies”(p. 178), when, in reality, without solving their security problems – for which they require external assistance – socio-economic development cannot take place – which is also a problem that is not adequately covered in the handbook’s other chapters. Despite these shortfalls that affect many of the handbook’s 27 chapters, several will be of interest to the terrorism/counterterrorism analytical community, such as the ones on stabilizing fragile states, corruption and post-conflict reconstruction, lessons from peace processes: the case of Nepal, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-Taliban combatants in Afghanistan. The handbook’s editor, a political economist, is Professor of African Politics at the University of Birmingham, UK, and Research Fellow in the Centre for African Studies at the University of the Free State, South Africa.


With the study of terrorism situated within the domain of criminology (i.e., terrorism is a form of crime that violates a nation’s laws), this comprehensive handbook brings together leading academic experts in the fields of criminological theories, methods, and research to apply their disciplines to examine the causes of terrorism and the components of effective counterterrorism. The handbook 36 chapters are divided into seven parts. Part I, “Introduction,” presents the editors’ overview on applying the discipline of criminology to the study of terrorism. Part II, “Etiology,” discusses topics such as the causes of radicalization; psychological factors involved in radicalization into terrorism; pre-incident indicators involved in the terrorists planning cycle; and group-level and country-level predictors of terrorism. Part III, “Theories,” covers prominent social and behavioral sciences’ theories to explain the causes of terrorism, such as general strain theory, social learning theory, situational approaches to terrorism, and victimization theories. Part IV, “Research Methods,” discusses the application of various methodologies to examine terrorism, such as social network analysis (SNA), spacial, temporal and multilevel modeling; and using latent class growth (LCG) and interrupted time series (ITS) analyses to estimate terrorism trends. Part V, “Types of Terrorism,” covers the spectrum of terrorism types, such as far-right terrorism in the United States; left-wing terrorism (anarchists and radical environmental groups); assessing aircraft hijackings as a terrorist tactic; the tactic of suicide terrorism; and a criminological perspective on the use of the tactic of assassination. Part VI, “Terrorism and Other Types of Crime,” covers criminological-related topics such as organized crime and terrorism; a comparison of terrorism and hate crime; financial crimes associated with far-right and al Qaida type groups; and utilizing the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to empirically analyze the spread of maritime terrorism. Part VII, “Countering Terrorism,” discusses subjects such as empowering local communities to counter violent extremism; defending against domestic terrorist plots in the United States; ten principles for effective counterterrorism; the impact of policy changes in the aftermath of 9/11 in prosecuting terrorism; legislative efforts to counter eco-terrorism; the role of prisons in radicalization into terrorism; and the utility of cyber criminological research in designing policies and security solutions to counter cyberterrorism. This is a valuable reference resource and a useful textbook with each chapter opening with an introduction, followed by an overview of the state of the literature on the subject, and concluding with a series of observations. The
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Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University, Campus The Hague. PoT is published six times per year as a free, independent, scholarly peer-reviewed online journal available at http://www.terrorismanalysts.com.

PoT seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism-, Political Violence- and Conflict Studies.

The editors invite researchers and readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

Perspectives on Terrorism has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s Research Notes, Special Correspondence, Op-Eds and other content are reviewed by members of the Editorial Board, while its Articles are peer-reviewed by outside academic experts and professionals. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and waging conflicts. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to. They are responsible for the content of their contributions and retain the copyright of their publication.

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The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) is a non-profit, educational and scientific corporation, registered on 2nd of June 2008 at the City of Raleigh, North Carolina. TRI’s mission is ‘Enhancing Security through Collaborative Research’. It has three Directors of which one is also President: Robert Wesley (President and Director), Alex P. Schmid (Director) and Edwin Bakker (Director). TRI has an International Advisory Board, currently consisting of eleven experts, a Consortium of Participating Institutions, currently consisting of 17 centers and institutes, and a group of 125 individual researchers supporting its efforts. They are listed below.

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