# Table of Contents

Welcome from the Editor ................................................................. 1

## I. Articles

Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: 
Introducing the RTV Dataset .......................................................... 2  
*by Jacob Aasland Ravndal*

Targeted Killings and Compellence:  
Lessons from the Campaign against Hamas in the Second Intifada .......... 16  
*by Charles Kirchofer*

## II. Research Notes

Research on Radicalisation: Topics and Themes ................................... 26  
*by Alex P. Schmid*

Constructions of Terrorism .................................................................. 33  
*by Scott Englund and Michael Stohl*

Terrorist Migration to the Dark Web .................................................. 40  
*by Gabriel Weimann*

A Framework for Assessing the Mobilization of Westerners by Jihadists in Syria and Intervention Points for Counter-Measures .............................................. 45  
*by Joshua Sinai*

## III. Special Correspondence

Winning Hearts and Minds in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: 
A Personal Recollection of a Peace-Building Effort with the Taliban .......... 53  
*by Muhammad Feyyaz*

## IV. Resources

Bibliography: Islamic State (Part 2) .................................................. 59  
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

## V. Book Reviews

Counterterrorism Bookshelf:  
7 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects ................. 99  
Reviewed by Joshua Sinai
Phil Gurski. The Threat from Within. Recognizing Al-Qaeda-Inspired Radicalization and Terrorism in the West. ............................................................... 105

Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid

VI. Notes from the Editor

Crowdfunding Initiative on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of Perspectives on Terrorism .................................................................................................................. 107

About Perspectives on Terrorism ................................................................................................................................. 108
Welcome from the Editor

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume X, Issue 3 (June 2016) of Perspectives on Terrorism at www.terrorismanalysts.com. Our free online journal is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna (Austria), and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts (United States). Now in its tenth year, Perspectives on Terrorism has more than 6,200 regular subscribers and many thousand more occasional readers and website visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer reviewed by external referees while its Research Notes, Policy Notes and other content are subject to internal editorial review.

This issue begins with a description of a new database on right-wing terrorism in Europe by Jacob A. Ravndal, a Norwegian researcher working at the newly established “Center for Research on Extremism: Right-Wing Extremism, Hate Crime and Political Violence” (C-REX), in Oslo, Norway. The second article, authored by Charles Kirchofer, looks at the impact of Israeli targeted killings on the course of the second Palestinian Intifada.

This issue continues with four Research Notes. The first originates from a presentation of Alex P. Schmid given to a panel of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) on the European Union on 13 April 2016 in Vienna. It outlines some topics and themes for future research. This is followed by a summary of the proceedings of two conferences, written by Scott Englund and Michael Stohl. These conferences addressed Constructions of Terrorism and were held in December 2015 and April 2016 respectively. The third Research Note by Gabriel Weimann highlights recent developments in terrorist uses of the Internet, namely the migration of terrorist communications to the Dark Net. Finally, the fourth Research Note by Joshua Sinai presents a framework for addressing radicalisation in Muslim diasporas in the West.

This is followed by a Special Correspondence from the country coordinator of the Pakistan Network of the Terrorism Research Initiative, former Brigadier Muhammad Feyyaz. He describes his own efforts to win the hearts and minds of tribal people in Pakistan’s FATA, competing with the Taliban. The Resource Section of the present issue of Perspectives on Terrorism features an extensive bibliography on the Islamic State, the second on this subject, from the hands of the Information Resources Editor of our journal, Judith Tinnes. This is followed by the usual Capstone reviews of recent publications in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies by our Book Reviews Editor, Joshua Sinai. Finally, the editor reviews a recent publication from Phil Gurski, a Canadian Al-Qaeda expert, on homegrown jihadist terrorism.

Last but not least I would like to draw your attention to our crowdfunding effort which seeks to assure the continued publication of our independent journal for the second decade of its existence (see p. 107).

This issue of the journal was prepared at the Terrorism Research Initiative headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The next issue (August 2016) will be prepared by Prof. James Forest at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts.

Sincerely,

Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid

Editor-in-Chief Perspectives on Terrorism
Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV Dataset

by Jacob Aasland Ravndal

Abstract

What is the record of right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) in Western Europe post-1990? To date, RTV incident data suitable for temporal and cross-national comparisons have been lacking. Consequently, few comparative studies of RTV exist, and we generally have limited knowledge about the most recent evolution of RTV in Western Europe. To help fill these gaps, this article introduces a new dataset covering RTV incidents in Western Europe between 1990 and 2015. Including the most severe types of incidents only, the dataset comprises 578 incidents, including 190 deadly incidents causing 303 deaths. Each incident has been manually researched by the same person and coded on a range of variables, including time and location, perpetrator and victim characteristics, organizational affiliations, weapon types, and number of casualties. The article also proposes six hypotheses aiming to explain the perhaps most puzzling finding emerging from the RTV dataset: that the number of deadly incidents has declined considerably under conditions commonly assumed to stimulate RTV. These conditions include increased immigration, enhanced support to radical right parties, Islamist terrorism, and booming youth unemployment rates.

Keywords: right-wing extremism; terrorism; violence; Western Europe; database

Introduction

In Western Europe, right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) is commonly portrayed either as a marginal problem or as an imminent threat. Political motives aside, the coexistence of these two opposing views originate in a lack of systematic incident data showing variation in attack frequencies over time or between countries. This lack of good incident data limits our knowledge about the extent of RTV in contemporary Western Europe, including whether it is a rising or declining phenomenon, whether some countries are experiencing more RTV per capita than others are, and who the main perpetrators and victims are. Especially important, it constrains the potential for making causal inferences based on temporal and cross-national variation.

To help fill these gaps, this article introduces a new dataset covering RTV incidents in Western Europe between 1990 and 2015. Focusing on the most severe types of incidents, that is, attacks with a lethal or near-lethal outcome, attacks involving the active use of deadly weapons, and extensive plots and preparations for armed struggle, the new dataset offers a modest yet relatively consistent account of RTV in post-1990 Western Europe. In particular, an effort has been made to include all relevant deadly incidents (the dataset comprises 578 incidents, including 190 deadly incidents causing 303 deaths). The dataset can therefore be used to compare frequencies of such incidents across time and space, and also serve to make causal inferences from these patterns with reasonable confidence. The entire dataset is exclusively based on open sources; all data and corresponding sources will become freely accessible online upon the publication of this article via the C-REX website.[1]

To illustrate the need for fresh RTV incident data, the article first reviews existing terrorism databases and relevant incident chronologies. Part II introduces the RTV dataset, explains how it has been built, discusses its strengths and weaknesses, and presents some key findings. Finally, part III proposes six hypotheses aiming...
to explain the perhaps most puzzling finding emerging from the RTV dataset: that the number of deadly incidents has declined considerably under conditions commonly assumed to stimulate RTV. These conditions include increased immigration,[2] enhanced support to radical right parties,[3] Islamist terrorism,[4] and booming youth unemployment rates.[5]

**Reviewing Existing Incident Data**

Why do we need fresh RTV incident data? One reason is that public opinion about the extent of RTV in Western Europe tends to polarize towards two opposing ends: at one end, various domestic intelligence agencies and other governmental bodies tend to downplay the RTV threat. These actors’ position is epitomized by Europol’s Terrorism Trend and Situation Report (TE-SAT), based on annual reports of terrorist incidents from EU member states.[6] Since Europol started reporting terrorist incidents systematically in 2006, only nine right-wing incidents (four attacks, five plots) have been reported, two of them happened in Western Europe. By contrast, Europol registered 2,111 “ethno-nationalist and separatist” terrorist incidents during the same period. The discrepancy between right-wing and ethno-separatist incidents may reflect a true yet probably smaller difference in attack frequencies. However, it likely also reflects EU member states’ interest in reporting certain types of terrorism and not others. Furthermore, many right-wing attacks remain below these governments’ radars, either because they are registered as hate crimes rather than terrorism, or because they are never registered at all.

At the other end of the spectrum we find various anti-racist organizations, policy-oriented think tanks, journalists, and other interest groups. These actors tend to exaggerate the RTV threat, typically by use of anecdotal evidence rather than through a systematic incident analysis.[7] They portray Europe as facing rising levels of right-wing militancy and violence – a situation that if one could believe some accounts, even resembles the interwar period in and around Germany.

These two opposing accounts can only be tested with more systematic incident data. However, existing terrorism databases do not satisfy this demand. Larger and well-known terrorism databases, such as the Global Terrorism Database (GDT) and the RAND Worldwide Database of Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), both US-based, do not code for the political profile of an attack’s perpetrator. Using these American databases, it is virtually impossible to effectively distinguish right-wing attacks from others. A handful of relevant incidents can be found using relevant search queries. However, these incidents appear to have been registered haphazardly, they often lack source references, and substantial information about perpetrators and context is often missing – or even misleading.[8]

Among the top 20 terrorism databases reviewed by Alex Schmid’s Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, only four databases allow isolating right-wing attacks in Western Europe from other attacks.[9] Two of these – the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) and the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) – recently became unavailable, thereby leaving us with Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED), and Europol’s annual EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT).

As already explained, TE-SAT offers scarce information about right-wing terrorism, which, if we are to interpret the reported attack frequencies literally, is close to being non-existent in Western Europe. By contrast, the 648 right-wing terrorist attacks registered by TWEED[10] have proven helpful for identifying and categorizing key right-wing terrorist actors and events in post-WWII Western Europe.[11] However, TWEED only covers the period 1950-2004, and is not helpful for capturing more recent developments. TWEED also relies entirely on a single news source: *Keesing’s Record of World Events*. A single source ensures data consistency, but many incidents most likely never made it to the news headlines *Keesing’s* daily news digest relies upon. TWEED is therefore helpful for painting the larger picture but less helpful for detailing
lower-scale incidents – a type of violence that may be more characteristic of contemporary right-wing militants.

Another relevant database (not included in Schmid's *Handbook of Terrorism Research*) is the Domestic Terrorism Victims Dataset (DTV) covering terrorist killings in Western Europe 1965-2005.[12] DTV includes two (of five) relevant perpetrator categories: “Extreme-right” and “Neonazi” [sic]. The DTV codebook fails to explain why these two categories were kept apart. It does, however, state that “it was much more difficult to find reliable information about the perpetrators of these killings” (extreme-right and neo-Nazi) and that “the information we have obtained about these killings is, in general, of worse quality than the one on nationalistic and leftwing [sic] terrorism.”[13] In other words, the main problem with the 250 extreme-right and neo-Nazi murders registered by DTV post-1990 is that they rely on poor sources. Many sources are no longer available online, and those that are available generally include few details about each incident.

While compiling the RTV dataset, the author of this article thoroughly researched every single extreme-right and neo-Nazi murder listed by DTV. This investigation revealed that many incidents should not have been included, either because the target selection was not primarily based on right-wing beliefs or by anti-minority biases, or because their circumstances remain extremely vague. In the creation of a new dataset, the author also came across murders that should have been included in the DTV dataset but were not. Furthermore, by excluding non-lethal incidents and terrorist plots, DTV misses out on important elements of the larger RTV universe. Thus, while DTV can be useful for comparing the modus operandi linked to different perpetrator's ideologies, it is less relevant for analysing contemporary right-wing terrorism in more depth.

In addition to existing terrorism databases, a handful of relevant incident chronologies have been compiled for some countries. Most notably, right-wing murder chronologies have been compiled for Germany,[14] the UK,[15] Spain,[16] and Sweden[17] – some of which were used as key sources for the DTV dataset. Relevant incident chronologies have also been compiled for countries such as Spain,[18] Italy,[19] and Greece[20] by anti-racist activists. However, some of these chronologies have rather broad and vague inclusion criteria. Having checked all registered incidents thoroughly, this author noticed a tendency to include incidents that either cannot be corroborated by credible sources, or whose target selection turned out not to have been primarily based on right-wing beliefs or anti-minority biases.

Potentially more credible sources are the various hate crime statistics published annually in a number of West European countries. Some of these statistics are of great value, such as the annual reports from the German[21] and Austrian[22] domestic intelligence services. These reports distinguish between different types of violence – murders, bomb attacks, arson attacks, and physical assaults – committed by right-wing activists. They do not, however, provide contextual information about each incident.

The majority of official hate crime reports are, however, less helpful for analysing right-wing violence. Some of them, such as the UK statistics, do not distinguish violent from non-violent hate crimes.[23] Instances of racist graffiti or verbal racial abuse are included in the same category as violent attacks. Another problem is that some official hate crime statistics, for example those from Finland, do not distinguish racist crimes (some of which are committed between minority groups) from crimes committed by right-wing activists. [24] In the Danish statistics, left- and right-wing attacks have recently been compiled together.[25] The latest German report no longer distinguishes between different types of right-wing violence, and mixes politically motivated attacks with apolitical crimes such as robberies. Another limitation of many national hate crime statistics is that they only include incidents reported to the police. A considerable number of attacks therefore remain unreported.

Yet the most important reason why most of these statistics are of limited value is that they are ultimately incomparable. Each country uses different definitions, different registration methods, and different inclusion criteria. Some countries also tend to change their methods and criteria from time to time, making time-series
analysis difficult. Some countries do not provide official hate crime statistics at all, including Spain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal.

Finally, a handful of academics have compiled relevant datasets, all of which have been used as background sources for building the RTV dataset. Daniel Köhler has created a database of German right-wing terrorist groups and incidents for the period 1965-2015.[26] Jan Oskar Engene has compiled an extensive dataset of political violence in Norway from 1945 to 2012 (unpublished). René Karpantschof has registered violent and non-violent protest events from the Danish right-wing scene for the years 1990-1997.[27] Aron Kundnani has compiled right-wing murder incidents for post-1990 Europe, largely based on the murder chronologies discussed above.[28] In addition, Kundnani has collected some incident data. However, the number of incidents included in Kundnani’s study is limited, and the data have not been systematically organized and categorized, thereby making temporal and cross-national comparisons difficult.

Summing up, existing databases and incident chronologies are outdated (TWEED, DTV), understate right-wing incidents (TE-SAT, GDT, RDWTI), lack contextual information (TWEED, DTV), rely on poor or no longer available information (DTV, GTD), omit terrorist plots or non-lethal incidents (DTV), apply overly lax inclusion criteria (anti-racist incident chronologies), or contain incomparable data (national hate crime statistics). As a result of all this, a new dataset was created by the present author.

Introducing the RTV Dataset

Counting 578 incidents only, the RTV dataset is smaller than most other terrorist databases. However, compared to most other terrorist databases, RTV includes more information about each incident, including all corresponding sources. This information has been used to code a range of variables such as date, location, incident type, perpetrator’s organizational structure, perpetrator’s organizational affiliation, target group, type(s) of weapon used, and number of casualties.

Inclusion Criteria

Each RTV incident has been carefully selected, using the following criteria: The dataset includes only incidents whose target selection – minority groups, political adversaries, or the government – is based on right-wing beliefs.[29] Incidents resulting from physical confrontations initiated by the victim, or violence caused by disputes within or between right-wing groups, are not included.

Furthermore, the dataset includes only violent incidents of a certain severity or those with a terroristic quality. More specifically, the dataset includes (1) attacks with a lethal or near fatal outcome, (2) attacks involving active use of deadly weapons such as knives, firearms, and bombs, (3) major attack plots involving use of deadly weapons, (4) discoveries of bomb-making materials or major arms depositaries belonging to right-wing activists, and (5) other violent incidents that unmistakably qualify as acts of terrorism.[30] Vandalism and other attacks causing material damage only, such as fire bombs targeting empty buildings at night, are not included.

Sources, Strengths and Weaknesses

The RTV dataset is based on many different sources. A majority of incidents are based on online newspaper articles. Other key sources include activist autobiographies, official and unofficial RTV chronologies and datasets, anti-fascist blogs and bulletins, personal communication with RTV experts, court documents, online videos, and in some cases secondary literature. Multiple sources have been gathered for nearly all incidents, most of which are available online from links embedded in the publicly available dataset. As a general rule, poorly documented incidents whose motivation remains unclear are not included. The number
of incidents that has been considered but not included in the dataset is much larger than the number of incidents that has been included.

The use of multiple sources entails both advantages as well as disadvantages. One advantage is that the number of incidents included is higher than it would have been using only one or a handful of sources, thereby strengthening the potential for making precise descriptive inferences. A disadvantage is that the potential for making causal inferences based on comparisons across time and space is somewhat weak, because the data are skewed towards countries and time periods that are better documented by available sources. For example, regular reports on right-wing violence in Italy have been found only from 2003 onwards, leaving the period 1990-2002 underreported in this particular case.

Because of this inherent limitation, it might be more fruitful to use deadly RTV incidents rather than all RTV incidents as a basis for explanatory analysis (all incidents should, however, be included when descriptive inference about RTV more generally is the main goal, such as exploring hypotheses about operational patterns, targeting, and organizational dynamics). Considering the severity of political and racist murders, such incidents rarely go unnoticed. We may therefore assume that the dataset covers (nearly) all relevant deadly RTV incidents between 1990 and 2015. While compiling the RTV dataset, this author also made an effort to include all incidents with a fatal outcome by asking RTV experts across Western Europe to provide information about relevant cases.[31]

Furthermore, RTV killings arguably constitute a reasonably good indicator of right-wing violence more generally. Political and racist murders rarely occur in complete isolation from less severe forms of violence. In many cases, violent perpetrators have been groomed through other violent episodes before committing a murder. We may therefore expect to find higher levels of right-wing violence in places and during periods with higher murder frequencies.

In addition to attacks and killings, the RTV dataset also includes major plots and preparations for armed struggle, unlike many other terrorist incident databases. Such incidents arguably constitute important elements of the RTV universe because they might have caused considerable harm had they not been discovered in time by the police.

A final strength of the RTV dataset is that all incidents have been researched and coded by the same person, using explicit and standardized inclusion criteria. This method ensures a degree of data familiarity and consistency that is hard to achieve in larger databases counting thousands of incidents.

**Incident and Perpetrator Types**

The RTV dataset distinguishes between four incident types: (1) premeditated attacks, (2) spontaneous attacks, (3) attack plots, and (4) preparation for armed struggle. Attacks in which perpetrators have actively pursued a pre-defined person or target group have been coded as premeditated. Attacks triggered by random confrontations between perpetrator(s) and victim(s) associated to some pre-defined target group have been coded as spontaneous. Planned but not completed attacks by an identifiable group or individual involving the use of deadly weapons have been coded as plots. Finally, discovery of bomb-making materials or major arms depositories belonging to right-wing activists have been coded as preparation for armed struggle.

In many cases, the level of strategy and organization behind an attack or plot is hard to determine based on the available sources. Distinguishing terrorist incidents from other types of incidents has therefore been intentionally avoided because of the inherently blurred nature of such incidents. Yet a considerable number of the incidents included in the dataset would indeed satisfy most standard definitions of terrorism.
Building on Ravndal’s typology of right-wing terrorism and violence,[32] RTV perpetrators are categorized into seven types: (1) perpetrators acting on behalf of organized groups (known entities with five or more members whose association primarily relies on a strong commitment to right-wing politics), (2) affiliated members of organised groups acting on their own, (3) autonomous cells (clandestine entity of two to four members whose association primarily relies on a strong commitment to right-wing politics), (4) gangs (informal constellations of three or more acquaintances with a general right-wing commitment, but whose loose association primarily relies on social bonds, e.g. skinhead gangs and racist youth gangs), (5) unorganized perpetrators (two or more perpetrators with no known association to any specific right-wing group, cell, or gang), (6) lone actors (single perpetrators who prepare and sometimes also carry out attacks without anyone else knowing about it beforehand), and (7) shadow groups (unresolved attacks claimed by formerly unknown groups).

Having introduced some key features of the RTV dataset, we can now turn to some key findings.

**Key Findings**

Table 1 shows the distribution of incident types across the seven RTV perpetrator types:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator type</th>
<th>Type of Violence</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Premeditated attacks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spontaneous attacks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preparing for armed struggle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized groups</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated members</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous cells</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangs</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unorganised</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lone actors</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shadow groups</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1. RTV Violence and Perpetrator Types*

The perhaps most striking pattern from Table 1 is that premeditated attacks have been predominantly carried out by gangs (117 incidents) or lone actors (96 incidents), and less frequently by organized groups (30 incidents) or their affiliated members (37 incidents). Spontaneous attacks are mainly carried out by gangs (40 incidents), unorganized groups (34 incidents), and lone actors (25 incidents).

Next, consider the number of fatalities. Table 2 shows that the majority of killings have been committed by gangs, unorganized groups, and lone actors – and not by organized militants. However, autonomous cells have a much higher kill rate per attack than all other types – almost 1:1. Note that in Table 2 two cells in the lone actor row contain two numbers. The second number represents an outlier incident: the 22/7/2011 attacks committed by a lone actor in Norway in 2011, leaving 77 persons dead and 151 persons severely wounded.
## Table 2. RTV Perpetrator Types, Attack Frequencies and Casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator Types</th>
<th>Attacks</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized groups</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated members</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous cells</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangs</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unorganised</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lone actors</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>56 (+77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shadow groups</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sum</strong></td>
<td><strong>523</strong></td>
<td><strong>226 (303)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turning to victims, two groups stand out as these are by far most frequently targeted: immigrants (249 incidents) and leftists (138 incidents). Other significant target groups include Muslims (28 incidents), government representatives (25 incidents), homeless people (25 incidents), and homosexuals (23 incidents). Jews have been less frequently targeted (7 incidents), while Muslims appear to be increasingly targeted. This observation resonates well with a general ideological reorientation by many extreme-right groups, who no longer consider their main enemies to be Communists or Zionists, but rather Islam and Muslims.[33]

Finally, RTV perpetrators most often resort to knives (119 incidents), unarmed beating and kicking (108 incidents), explosives (86 incidents), firearms (85 incidents), and blunt instruments such as iron bars, bats, or wooden sticks (68 incidents). In addition, firebombs (38 attacks) and arson (20 attacks) have also been frequently used. Truly complex terrorist attacks that combine explosives and firearms have so far happened only once (the 22/7/2011 attacks in Norway).

### From Description to Explanation

Existing RTV research typically covers one of three regions: the USA, Russia (sometimes including Eastern Europe), and Europe (sometimes excluding Eastern Europe). Although RTV perpetrators may share some universal ideological traits, scholars generally tend to agree that context matters. These three regions represent different political, institutional, and cultural contexts from which RTV perpetrators emerge.[34]

Scholars studying the American context have produced some of the most advanced studies to date, partly because they have had access to systematic incident data.[35] While some findings from this body of research come across as highly context-specific, other findings may be more universally valid, such as the strong relationship identified between the number of active militants and groups on one hand, and levels of terrorism and violence on the other.[36]

In Russia, systematic incident data have also been available from the SOVA Center from 2004 onwards.[37] These data suggest that Russian RTV levels exceed those of any other country or region in the world, even when controlling for the population. Despite such high RTV levels, however, the Russian case remains largely understudied, with a few notable exceptions.[38] More research is thus needed to explain this outlier case.

Unlike the United States and Russia, systematic incident data has to date not been available for Europe as a whole, as discussed above. Consequently, much European RTV research consists of case studies covering specific groups, countries, or regions.[39] One notable exception is Koopmans’ study of right-wing violence in Western Europe.[40] However, to establish cross-national and temporal variation of his dependent
variable (right-wing violence), Koopmans compares incident data from different datasets that are ultimately incomparable.\[41\] The causal inferences presented in Koopmans’ study must therefore be read with caution.

For some West European countries – Germany in particular – systematic incident data have been available, thus enabling a number of more rigorous studies. \[42\] However, one could argue that Germany represents in several ways (e.g. history, size, federal system) an outlier case, and that one should be careful about generalizing findings from Germany to the rest of Europe.

Either way, it is beyond the scope of this introductory article to truly engage with the existing RTV literature and the myriad of different hypotheses and theories proposed therein.\[43\] For the purpose of this article, it suffices to say that although the number of RTV publications covering (Western) Europe is considerable and growing, the inferences that can be drawn from this body of research remains somewhat limited, due to the heavy inclination towards case studies and a general lack of comparative perspectives. By introducing the RTV dataset, the present author hopes to prepare the ground for more such comparative studies in future research.

As already explained, killing incidents represent the most definitive and reliable measure of RTV. Analysing RTV killing incidents across time and space reveals several interesting patterns for further explanatory analysis. One of them will be briefly elaborated upon here, namely a considerable decline in deadly RTV incidents across Western Europe since the 1990s (Figure 1). In the following, a suggestion is made how this pattern might be further explored in future studies. The idea is just to illustrate how RTV data can be used in explanatory studies. Actually carrying out such an analysis would require considerably more space and rigorous analysis and is beyond the scope of this article.

![Figure 1. RTV killing incidents, 1990-2015 (N=190)](image)

A decline of deadly right-wing incidents may come as a surprise at a moment in time when experts are warning about rising levels of right-wing militancy and violence across Europe.\[44\] Yet several annual reports on right-wing violence over the past 10-15 years show low, stable, or decreasing levels of violence. Such reports can be found from around 2000 onwards for Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Austria, and Switzerland (see Appendix 1).\[45\]
It should be noted, however, that these patterns may change in some countries following the ongoing irregular migrant flow crisis in Europe. It is still too early to say anything certain about the effects of this crisis on RTV, partly because many suspicious attacks remain unsolved. Many reported attacks have targeted empty buildings and other symbolic targets and would therefore not be included in the RTV dataset. Furthermore, few if any deadly incidents directly related to the migrant crisis have been reported thus far, although such incidents may of course have happened without attracting any media attention. With this minor limitation in mind, the reader should be aware that the RTV dataset and the following brief discussion is limited to the period 1990–2015, and that only a handful of incidents related to the ongoing irregular immigration crisis have been included in the dataset, most of which occurred in Germany in 2015.

The stable or declining patterns of right-wing violence that may be inferred from the RTV dataset and other relevant sources (see Appendix 1) challenge widespread assumptions regarding the conditions under which RTV is expected to occur—such as increased immigration,[46] enhanced support to radical right parties,[47] Islamist terrorism,[48] and substantial youth unemployment rates.[49] The fact that these macro variables have generally increased while right-wing killings and violence have decreased or remained stable gives us reason to believe that they may be less important than is often assumed. Clearly, more sophisticated causal analysis is needed before drawing any conclusions with confidence. However, we might benefit from looking at other explanatory variables, in addition to these four “usual suspects.”

What other variables might help explain a general decline in West European RTV since the 1990s? Based on a broad reading of existing research, I propose the following six hypotheses as points of departure for future research:

\( H 1: \text{Less Activism} \)

The first hypothesis states that contemporary West European youths may be less politically active than their predecessors were. As mentioned previously, existing research suggests a strong relationship between the number of political activists on the one hand, and political violence and terrorism on the other.[50] Thus, when the total number of political activists drops, we should also expect a drop in the number of political activists who radicalize and eventually turn to violence and terrorism. This trend can be observed through indicators such as youth electoral participation or youth memberships in political parties. While scholars seem to disagree about whether contemporary youths are actually less interested in politics, or whether they only express their political interest differently, there appears to be a broad consensus that they participate less in traditional political activities.[51]

\( H 2: \text{More Internet Activism} \)

The second hypothesis is that contemporary youths who do participate politically use different arenas and channels of influence from which direct violence is less likely to emerge. Most notably, street activism has been largely replaced by internet activism. Existing research suggests that “keyboard warriors” operating at the transnational level are less likely to carry out violent attacks than radicalized street gangs operating on the national or local levels.[52] At the same time, the Internet clearly represents a platform for radicalization. However, it remains unclear whether the Internet mainly pacifies and keeps most radicalized youths off the streets, or rather pushes them into the streets (and to conflict zones) to commit violent acts.[53] More systematic research is therefore needed to better understand the effects of internet activism on violent radicalization.
H 3: Less Crime

A third hypothesis is that RTV may be caused by similar factors as apolitical violent crimes. Such factors as the quality of policing, social cohesion, the existence of illicit markets, and the existence of a legitimate state authority, have been found to significantly influence homicide rates in Europe.[54] Paramedic capabilities have also improved, which may influence death rates. When general homicide rates drop, one would expect a similar drop in RTV killings. Matching homicide rates (Figure 2) with RTV killing rates, one finds that the patterns largely overlap, suggesting that RTV may in part be explained by societal factors beyond mere politics and ideology.

![Figure 2. Intentional homicides in Western Europe, 1994-2012](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/crime/database)


H 4: New Subcultural Trends and Action Repertoires

The fourth hypothesis is that the subcultural trends and preferred action repertoires of contemporary right-wing militants have changed. During the 1980s and 1990s, an inherently violent skinhead subculture emerged throughout Western Europe and beyond. Violence was at the core of the skinhead movement and sometimes became an end in and of itself.[55] Today, the skinhead subculture has been largely replaced by less violent and confrontational subcultural styles in many West European countries. Some scholars refer to the “new right” (la nouvelle droite) as a more intellectualized movement that prefers long-term, deliberative, democratic and (social) media-oriented activism over violent street activism and terrorism.[56] We may thus be witnessing the emergence of a new form of right-wing activism that is less focused on violence per se, and more focused on a broader repertoire of mostly non-violent forms of action. [57]

H 5: Political Opportunity Structures

The fifth hypothesis, derived from social movement research, suggests that the use of violence becomes less likely when radical right-wing actors gain access to political decision-making.[58] The underlying mechanism, sometimes referred to as the “pressure cooker theory,” is that when radical right parties obtain substantial electoral support, followed by political influence, this may function as a “safety valve”, releasing pressure from dissatisfied activists who may otherwise have turned to violence. By contrast, when access to
political decision-making is blocked, engaging in violent protest and revolutionary struggle becomes more attractive. Thus, the fact that radical right parties have gained access to political power in a number of West European countries over the past 25 years might have contributed to less violence.

H 6: Multicultural Acceptance

The final hypothesis is that contemporary Western youths are more accepting to non-Western immigrants than previous generations were. While the youth generations of the 1980s and 1990s experienced large-scale non-Western immigration for the first time and witnessed how this immigration changed the outlook of many cities, towns and neighbourhoods, a larger share of today’s youths grow up in multicultural societies. They do not experience the same “cultural shock” that apparently produced so many violent and xenophobic reactions during the 1980s and 1990s.[59] Perhaps it is the case that initial experiences with immigrants in formerly ethnically homogenous societies produce violent responses? This could help explain, for example, why Eastern Germany, which has received far less immigrants than Western Germany, currently experiences much higher levels of anti-foreigner violence.[60]

Conclusion

The dataset introduced in this article offers new and detailed information on RTV perpetrators, their victims, and, more in general, about the evolution of RTV in Western Europe after the end of the Cold War. Drawing on these new data, the article adds two important nuances to existing warnings about rising levels of right-wing militancy and violence in Western Europe:

First, the majority of attacks and killings have not been committed by organized militant groups but rather by unorganized gangs and lone actors. While organized right-wing terrorism in Western Europe has been rare, lone-actor terrorism is more widespread and may be on the rise. This trend is still not very strong, but the number of lone actor incidents per year has increased slightly since the 1990s. More research is therefore needed to better understand why and how some individuals enter such a violent path.

Second, the number of deadly incidents motivated by right-wing beliefs or by anti-minority biases has declined considerably since the 1990s, with zero incidents in 2014 and one incident in 2015. The article proposed six hypotheses aiming to explain this decline: less activism, a shift toward more Internet activism, less crime in general, different subcultural practices and action repertoires, more favourable political opportunities, and acceptance to multicultural societies. To further explore the fruitfulness of these six hypotheses, they might be tested in future comparative research, for example to investigate why some countries have experienced considerably more RTV than others have.

In this article, only bits and pieces from the RTV dataset have been presented. Several aspects have yet to be addressed, most notably cross-national variations in the frequency of (deadly) attacks. Other aspects that may be explored, using the RTV dataset, include the relationships between different perpetrator types and target groups, or between different organizational structures, weapon types, and casualty numbers. The dataset may also be used as a point of departure for more detailed investigations of specific regions, countries, militant groups, and perpetrators types. For example, the dataset includes 140 incidents involving 76 different lone actors whose background and motives could be explored in future research. This author hopes that the RTV dataset will prove useful and stimulate more comparative research, aiming to uncover the conditions under which RTV is most – and least – likely to occur.
Terrorism is here understood as premeditated threats or use of violence intended to intimidate and thereby influence an audience beyond the immediate target.

Right-wing beliefs are here understood as ideas promoting social inequality. For a more detailed discussion, see Norberto Bobbio and Allan Cameron, Terrorism, 2012.


Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and the Center for Extremism Research (C-REX) at the University of Oslo (2016–).

Please note the RTV Codebook and RTV Dataset are available as supplementary files from the C-Rex website.

Notes


[8] For example, in GDT the three terrorist attacks committed by lone actor David Copeland are registered as attacks committed by Combat 18/White Wolves. Copeland was, however, never a member of Combat 18, whereas White Wolves appears to have been his own one-man project.


[24] The Finnish reports can be found online by googling "polisistien tietoon tullut viharikollisuus suomessa".

[25] The Finnish reports can be found online by googling "polisistien tietoon tullut viharikollisuus suomessa".


[29] Right-wing beliefs are here understood as ideas promoting social inequality. For a more detailed discussion, see Norberto Bobbio and Allan Cameron, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).


[31] I thank Rob Witte from Lokaal Centraal, Willem Wagenaar from the Anne Frank Stichting, Ingrid Aedenoom from the Centre interfédéral pour l’égalité des chances, Daniel Köhler from the German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies, and the Italian Editors of InfoAntifa for sharing useful information.

Appendix 1. Right-Wing and Racist Violence in Seven West European Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sweden 1</th>
<th>Sweden 2</th>
<th>Denmark 1</th>
<th>Denmark 2</th>
<th>Netherlands 1</th>
<th>Netherlands 2</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>776</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1047</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>801</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>990</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Unit of analysis: Severe abuse motivated by white power ideology. Source: Annual reports by the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO); URL: http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/publikationer.html.

2 Unit of analysis: Violent crimes motivated by white power ideology. Source: Annual reports by The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Bra); URL: http://www.bra.se/bra-in-english/home/crime-and-statistics/hate-crime.html. * From 2014 onwards, Bra no longer provides information about violent crimes committed by the extreme right specifically.

3 Unit of analysis: Racially motivated violent incidents – may also include racial violence between minority groups (2003-2006 manually counted by this author). Source: Annual reports by the Danish Secret Service (PET); URL: https://www.pet.dk/Publikationer/RACI-indberetning.aspx.

4 Unit of analysis: Politically (right and left) motivated violent incidents. Source: Annual reports by the Danish Secret Service (PET); URL: https://www.pet.dk/Publikationer/RACI-indberetning.aspx.

5 Unit of analysis: Violent assaults motivated racism and/or the extreme right. Source: Annual report (Racism and Extremism Monitor) by the Anne Frank House; URL: http://www.annefrank.org/en/Education/Monitor/Homepage/Racism-monitor/.

6 Unit of analysis: Violent assaults motivated racism and/or the extreme right. Source: Report by the Anne Frank House, "Second report on racism, anti-Semitism, and right-wing extremist violence in the Netherlands"; URL: http://www.annefrank.org/en/Education/Monitors/Vercour/root%20percent20daten%20verkoophoofd%20aan%20hand%20van%20publieke%20instellingen%20en%20publicaties
documentatie%20over%20rechtsextremisme%20en%20antisemitisme%20in%20het%20Nederland/.


8 Unit of analysis: Violent attacks (actions violentes) committed by right-wing activists. Source: Annual reports by La Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme (CNCDH); URL: http://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/?f01=im_field_theme%3A139&f11=im_field_type_de_document%3A147. * From 2014 onwards, CNCDH no longer specifies violent acts.

9 Unit of analysis: Bodily injury (Körperverletzung) perpetrated by right-wing activists. Source: Austrian Security Service; URL: http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/bmi_verfassungsschutz/.

Targeted Killings and Compellence: Lessons from the Campaign against Hamas in the Second Intifada

by Charles Kirchofer

Abstract

There is little consensus among scholars on whether targeted killings of members of terrorist and militant groups work, though some have argued that they do, at least under certain circumstances. Most of the work so far has focused on the ability of targeted killings to disrupt targeted groups’ ability to function. In many cases, work has centered on whether they work and not addressed how they work if they do. There has been insufficient study of the coercive effects of targeted killings and these studies have often produced mixed results, with violence sometimes increasing and sometimes decreasing after targeted strikes. This article argues that the focus on disruption and a failure to differentiate between deterrence and compellence and properly to account for the timing of attacks may be at least partly to blame for the mixed record observed from the use of targeted killings. It asserts that targeted killings are inherently compellent and can therefore only be used to change a status quo and potentially establish new “rules of the game.” They cannot be used to deter (i.e. to maintain current rules). Taking this into account could shed new light on discussions of the appropriateness of targeted killings in given situations and their effectiveness overall.

Keywords: counter-terrorism; Hamas; Israel; deterrence; compellence; Intifada

Introduction

Targeted killings are one of the most controversial tactics in states’ counterterrorism toolkits. This controversy even extends to the definition of “targeted killing.” This article adapts Carvin’s definition of targeted killing and defines them as “the planned direct killing of an individual because of their perceived membership (and often perceived leadership)” of a militant organization. [1] There have also been plenty of arguments on the legality and morality of targeted killings as well as, on a more fundamental level, their effectiveness. Most studies posit (or assume) that targeted killings work by disrupting a given terrorist group and reducing its operational effectiveness. The use of targeted killing for deterrence or compellence has often either not been evaluated or has been rejected in the belief that they lead to worsening violence. Israel provides a wealth of data and scholarship on targeted killing and this article therefore focuses its attention there. It will argue first that disruption alone cannot account for the effect of targeted killings of militant political leaders and that the missing element is compellence. Second, the apparent mixed bag when it comes to assessing the effectiveness of targeted killings may be the result of a failure to differentiate between deterrence and compellence. Finally, it will illustrate that these two factors mean that, while the observation that targeted killings do not deter over the short-term is basically correct, their usefulness in establishing medium-term deterrence via compellence has largely been overlooked.

Rationality

This article argues that disruption is generally not enough to explain the successes claimed for targeted killings; compellence plays a decisive role. As a coercive tactic, compellence accepts that opponents have choices and assumes they are rational. Some might argue that suicide terrorists, by their willingness to blow themselves up, show that they are irrational. This may be true according to the conceptions of rationality held by most people, but as Bryan Caplan has argued, there is more than one type of rationality, while terror...
networks are made up of more than just bombers.[2] Robert Pape illustrates one such type of rationality, arguing convincingly that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic and is therefore rationally justified. [3] For Thomas Schelling, rationality implies only that a person’s behaviour is “motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system.”[4] The idea of acting according to a “value system” adds flexibility to the conception of rationality: A person or group may value political goals over survival and may consider fighting more important than winning, for example. Such rationality implies that even a highly motivated group or individual would still hesitate to undertake actions that would threaten their political cause. Extended targeted killing campaigns can threaten to weaken a group considerably by creating a leadership vacuum, which would in turn endanger the very cause the group is fighting for. This is the standard of rationality used here and is the rational choice mechanism by which this article proposes that targeted killings effect compellence.

The Literature

Scholars disagree over whether targeted killings work, with several asserting they have no effect or even cause increased violence. Mohammed Hafez and Joseph Hatfield conducted a multivariate analysis of targeted killings during the Al-Aqsa (or “second”) Intifada in Israel and Palestine. They conclude that targeted killings have no effect, positive or negative, on violence.[5] Kaplan et al come to much the same conclusion. They use a “terror stock model” for their analysis, which “models suicide bombing attempts as a function of the number of terrorists available for the planning and execution of such attacks.”[6] Steven David asserts that “No compelling evidence exists that targeted killing has reduced the terrorist threat against Israel. By May 2002, after eighteen months of targeted killings carried out at an unprecedented scale, the number of Israeli victims of Palestinian terror had reached an all-time high of nearly 500. […] A much stronger case can be made that targeted killing actually increases the number of Israelis killed, by provoking retaliation.”[7]

Other authors argue targeted killings may work. Asaf and Noam Zussman use the “forward-looking, information-aggregating nature of asset markets to claim that the stock market should react positively to news about effective counterterrorism measures but negatively to news about counterproductive ones.” They show that the stock market views targeted killings of political leaders as counterproductive while viewing those of militant wing leaders positively (falling after the former and rising after the latter). They proffer disruption as the mechanism: “[T]he assassination of a military leader, relative to a political one, has more potential to disrupt terrorist operations severely. In addition, they argue that “attempts to assassinate a senior political leader would tend to increase greatly the motivation for retaliation.”[8] While their reasoning on the mechanism for disruption is sound, their assumption that the stock market is a reliable proxy is questionable and their analysis, like most, does not consider how compellence could be used to Israel's advantage.

Other authors focus more on the targeted killing of political leaders. Daniel Byman argues that targeted killings can be effective at disrupting groups that engage in terrorism. He also emphasizes, though, that groups can adapt to the threat of targeted killing by adopting a decentralized structure: “Today’s PIJ [Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a group close to Hamas] and its counterparts are so loose in their organization that true decapitation is no longer possible.” Nevertheless, he notes that Hamas became less effective over the course of the Second Intifada.[9] Statistics support this (see Figure 1 below). Hamas' remaining leadership also made sudden decisions to change course following the targeting of their political leaders. This suggests coercion, not just disruption. “Before his death, [Hamas leader Abdel Aziz] Rantisi conceded that the killings had made things harder for his organization. And Hamas never retaliated for his death. In 2005, the group even declared that it would unilaterally accept a ‘period of calm’ because of the losses it was suffering among its senior cadre.”[10] Steven David also supports Byman's observation. He states that “there is strong evidence that the policy of targeted killing hurts Palestinian organizations to the extent to which they are willing to
alter their behavior,” for example in encouraging them to accept ceasefires in exchange for a halt to killings. [11]

This effect from targeting the senior leadership of Hamas is also confirmed by Ophir Falk: “It is evident that the targeting of high value ideological leaders, primarily in Gaza, was usually effective in decreasing subsequent suicide bombing fatalities.”[13] Falk’s study is limited to determining that a decline occurred; he does not attempt to explain why. Avi Kober argues that “the decapitation of Hamas’ political and spiritual leaders seemed to have accounted for the organization’s decision to suspend hostilities against Israel, which essentially meant the end of the second intifada.”[14] He suggests that this occurred due to a leadership vacuum and that killing political leaders was more effective in disrupting Hamas than killing military leaders. Matt Frankel’s study of 20 historical cases of “high value targeting” (HVT) also claims some campaigns have been successful—but highlights failures as well, though his study includes capturing militants as well as killing them.

Discussion

The above studies have limitations. For starters, and as Stephanie Carvin has argued, the multiple studies of targeted killings have used definitions and cases too varied to produce a reliable judgment on whether targeted killings work (or do not) in general, rather than just in the specific circumstances the authors cover. [15] This author agrees with that assessment, while adding that, even within cases, a failure to distinguish between political and militant leaders as well as the lack of consideration of coercion, the difference between deterrence and compellence, and the timing within the cycle of escalation, all make attempts to understand targeted killings difficult and determination of their effectiveness all but impossible. A different approach is needed.

There are also issues unique to each study. In their own words, Hafez and Hatfield’s investigation of the use of targeted killings for deterrence “assumes that repression against violent strategies is applied consistently,” but Hamas’ political leadership was targeted only rarely and much later than its military leadership. If the targeted killing of political leaders has a greater impact than that of military leaders, this is a significant oversight. The authors also do not consider compellence and its potential uses when examining the hypothesis that targeted killings lead to a backlash. To compel a group to end violence, a strike must be alarming enough to overcome the provocative nature of the strike itself and a period of calm must be on offer if the group complies. If a strike comes during a period of relative quiet, this violates the implicit offer of calm that comes with deterrence and can thus be expected to cause escalation. On the other hand, if a strike during a period of violence is not provocative enough, it may fail to lead to compellence even as it fails to spark further escalation, potentially because the militant group is already operating at its maximum. Failure
to take these factors into account makes the observed outcome dubious. The authors’ also fail to find effects for disruption from targeted killings. The time horizon needed for disruption to begin to take hold is not clear and depends on the relative rates of killings and recruitment and training. It is dubious to judge targeted killing campaigns with horizons of weeks or months, as several months or even years may instead be needed.

The study by Kaplan et al assumes targeted killings achieve their effects via disruption and also focuses mostly on the targeted killing of militant members rather than political leaders, even as other authors have suggested that targeting political leaders has been the most effective. The terror stock model also does not account for functional differences between various members of a militant network. Not all members of the organization are equally capable. Beyond that, it is clearly not the case that a larger “stock” necessarily equals more attempts. Hamas carries out far fewer attacks now than it did during the Second Intifada, but the reason for this is not because it has fewer militant members. Hamas makes strategic and tactical decisions. It is not simply a machine for converting recruits into attackers. Quantitative, statistical analyses will always struggle to take such factors into account.

Frankel asserts that “the end goal with an insurgency is generally to bring the movement into the political process, while the end goal with a terrorist organization is its elimination.”[16] Putting aside the difficulty of deciding what sort of group one is dealing with and how realistic a political process may be, this statement highlights another crucial difference: Targeted killing to restore even a temporary calm is a very different animal from targeted killing meant to disrupt and ultimately eliminate an opponent. If the goal is elimination, the group in question cannot be deterred or compelled, only disrupted. Coercion is an attempt to change an opponent's cost calculus. That opponent must survive in order to do this. If the would-be coercer is not willing to accept a group's continued existence, that group has no incentive to stop fighting and every incentive to fight on for the sake of its very survival. Studies of targeted killings in such situations should not expect to find coercive effects. Many other studies should, however, and have overlooked such effects.

Hamas has choices and considers them carefully.[17] Its political leaders make the big decisions on the overall direction in which the organization is heading and on whether or not to participate in ceasefires. They do not decide on individual operations on the ground.[18] This makes Hamas more difficult to disrupt, but leaves it open to compellence. Targeted killings are by their nature provocative and therefore always compellent rather than deterrent; that is, they seek to change the status quo rather than maintain it. As scholars of deterrence like Lawrence Freedman have argued, compellence is much more difficult to achieve than deterrence.[19] Thomas Rid has shown the result in practice: When Israel has attempted to change the status quo, higher levels of violence have been required than when it has attempted merely to maintain it.[20] If targeted killings are a tool for compellence rather than deterrence, the question of whether militants or the senior leadership are targeted becomes central, as compellence must be dramatic if it is to work. Finally, as Charles Brockett and others have argued, timing is also important. His study found that repressive measures were more likely to succeed when mobilization had not yet begun or was already at its peak, but likely to intensify mobilization between these two extremes.[21] This is precisely what a study of compellence would lead one to expect.

Israel’s Targeted Killings on Hamas in the Second Intifada
As the above graph (Figure 1) shows, Hamas began a deadly campaign of suicide attacks from 2001, shortly after the outbreak of the Second Intifada. As Figure 2 below illustrates, Israel began targeting Hamas members that year as well. Figures 2 and 3 show that these targeted killings did not initially reduce Hamas’ effectiveness, as the number killed and injured per attack actually rose in 2002. This trend then reversed in 2003, though the difference was too small yet to draw clear conclusions. Partly as a result of the initial failure, Israel upped the ante towards the end of 2002. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was keen to capitalize on
the momentum provided by revelations arising from the Karine A. affair that Yasser Arafat was involved in supplying terrorist groups. He wished to start killing Hamas’ top military commanders one by one.[22] The first was to be Raed Karmi, who had long evaded capture. Karmi’s death sparked a massive wave of violence from Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups similar to that caused by killing Yahya Ayyash (“the Engineer”) in 1996, the last time Israel had targeted such a prominent member of the military wing.

Figure 2[23]

Figure 3: Targeted killings of Hamas military members. By month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Targeted killings and attempts on Hamas political leaders. By month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Israel had thus far refrained from targeting the leaders of Hamas’ political wing since 1997, when Israel attempted to poison Hamas political leader Khaled Meshal in Jordan. That effort backfired miserably. It resulted in international condemnation (President Clinton eventually pressured then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu into releasing the antidote), damaged relations with Jordan, and landed Hamas a public relations coup and a flood of donations from around the region. Nevertheless, Israel’s leadership decided it was time to try this particular tactic again in 2003 by targeting Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantissi.

The response from Hamas and the world was very different this time around. Ziad Abu Amr, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council who was involved in ceasefire negotiations with Hamas in 2003, recalls:

*I think the attempt on Rantissi’s life [on 10 June 2003] was a catalyst of some sort. Especially when certain intelligence came to the Palestinian side to the effect that Israel was determined to liquidate all the Hamas leaders. And I think the Hamas leaders and we, too, took that very seriously. And I remember I asked... are you better off with your leaders around, is Hamas better off with its founders and top leaders around, or do...*
you think this is irrelevant? If you think it is important... I think we have to do something political about it right now.[25]

Major General Giora Eiland, then head of the IDF’s Planning Directorate, agrees. “The unsuccessful attempt to hit Rantisi caused Rantisi, who was one of the worst extremists among the Hamas leaders, [...] to change his mind overnight and to suddenly accept requests by the Palestinian Authority and the Egyptians to give a chance to the hudna. [...] the effect of the attempt on his life was immediate.”[26] Hamas and other Palestinian groups thereafter agreed to a ceasefire. Hamas did not commit a single attack throughout the month of July 2003.

As so often, that ceasefire began to fray after a series of tit-for-tat actions that began with the death of four Palestinians in an Israeli raid in Nablus, followed by suicide attacks by Hamas and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades that killed two and wounded a dozen more, and ended with Israel’s killing of Mohammed Seder, a member of Islamic Jihad, a group close to Hamas, in August 2003. Hamas retaliated, perhaps more aggressively than intended: “[T]he Hamas leaders later acknowledged [that their retaliation] in Jerusalem [was an] overdose.”[27] Israel hit back again, this time killing Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shenab, also in August 2003. Shenab had a mixed military and political background but had most recently been involved in ceasefire negotiations with the PA and espoused moderate views in favor of a halt to suicide bombings.[28] The tit-for-tat violence ended as violence rose rapidly instead, as it had after the killing of Karmi the year before. The PA’s Dahlan asserts that Israel’s choice of Shenab, who was a moderate, showed there could be no ceasefire.[29] Hamas viewed the killing of Shenab as breaking the rules when it had been minded to keep things quiet and had seen its actions as merely proportionate retaliations.

To counter the rising violence, Israel attempted its most audacious killing yet: Hamas founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.[30] Hamas did not initially change course, but Israel struck again immediately after Hamas’ next attack, targeting the house of Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar, killing his son.[31] Although Hamas once again vowed revenge, the rest of 2003 was quiet, with it carrying out just one attack on an Israeli settlement in Gaza in October, none at all in November, and a single rocket attack in December, which harmed no one.[32]

The lull at the end of 2003 was not the consequence of disruption. It was the result of a decision by the Hamas leadership to enact a cessation of attacks within Israel’s pre-1967 borders in exchange for a halt to the targeted killing of its members.[33] Israel reciprocated, without explicitly agreeing to any ceasefire, and did not carry out any targeted killings in October or November.[34] It carried out just one, of a bomb-maker, in December, to which Hamas responded with the aforementioned non-deadly rocket launch.

Hamas engaged in a few attacks in January 2004, perhaps in response to Ariel Sharon’s announced plan to withdraw Israeli troops and settlers from the Gaza Strip. It carried out no attacks in February. Nevertheless, the January attacks illustrate that the targeted killings had not yet produced extensive deterrence. Israel therefore began to hit Hamas again in March, when it killed three senior Hamas militants in a missile strike. Hamas responded with a rocket attack that caused “minor damage” to nearby shops.[35] Israel took out five al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades militants shortly thereafter, for which the two groups responded with a suicide attack. Finally, Israel responded by attempting again to kill Sheikh Yassin, this time with success. Hamas’ response was limited: It launched rockets from Gaza, engaged in a shooting attack on a West Bank settlement, and committed a suicide attack on 17 April 2004 that killed only the bomber (though it wounded four Israelis).[36] Israel responded immediately by successfully killing Abdel Aziz Rantissi that same day.

Hamas’ attacks declined sharply after the death of two of its most important leaders. It carried out just two suicide attacks the following year and then, in 2006, announced that it was halting suicide bombing altogether.[37] What explains this dramatic turn of events? Kober is of course correct when he asserts that no direct causal link can be proven between targeted killings and the reduction of violence chronicled here. [38] The rapid shifts in Hamas’ behavior observed in the immediate aftermath of the targeted killing of each
of its political leaders, including agreeing to a ceasefire, meeting to propose ceasefires, and generally reducing attacks, along with reports from negotiators like Abu Amr, who indicate Hamas was concerned about the decimation of its upper echelons, however, all strongly suggest that targeted killings were affecting Hamas’ decisions. There is no doubt that Hamas’ activities were simultaneously being curbed by Israeli security operations and the West Bank barrier and it is also true that such developments themselves will have led Hamas to reconsider its options. However, the evidence that targeted killings had effects, too, is strong.

Israel’s targeted killings led Hamas to reconsider its actions and change behavior, shifting away from the actions that most angered Israel—suicide bombings. In other words, Israel coerced Hamas into halting its suicide operations. This still leaves us with the question of why targeted killings sometimes provoked greater violence and sometimes induced calm. To understand this, it is necessary to look at the different dynamics of two aspects of coercion: deterrence and compellence.

**Deterrence vs. Compellence: Coercion with a Difference**

The above section showed that targeting militant leaders can lead Hamas to retaliate as much and sometimes more than it does after the targeting of one of its political leaders. This is not always the case, though, as Israel continued to target militants throughout the Second Intifada and beyond. Targeting high-up military-wing leaders can be as audacious as targeting political leaders, however, and this hints at the key to the puzzle: the “rules of the game.”

Israelis have for some time talked about “mowing the grass” in Gaza. This refers to periodically curtailing Hamas’ capabilities while “hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along Israel’s borders.” This is meant not only to deter Hamas, but also to send deterrent signals to others in the region who might think of attacking Israel.[39] Gabi Siboni, of Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, advocates using “force that is disproportionate to the enemy’s actions and the threat it poses. […] Such a response will… [increase] Israeli deterrence and [reduce] the likelihood of hostilities against Israel for an extended period.” Although he was speaking specifically about the threat from Hezbollah in this instance, he makes clear that this applies to Hamas in Gaza as well.[40] As Thomas Rid argues, the question is not whether deterrence demands “proportionate” or “disproportionate” force. Instead, the “disproportionate use of force may be demanded if the goal is to redefine the rules of the game.” When the goal is maintaining the rules and keeping them from eroding,” however, “proportionate” force is more appropriate.[41]

This is correct, but it betrays a misconception of deterrence. Deterrence is the threat of retaliation unacceptable to an opponent to convince that opponent to refrain from actions the deterring side dislikes. As such, it is by definition a tool for maintaining the status quo. Any attempt to “redefine the rules of the game” is therefore an attempt at compellence, not deterrence. Compellence is the threat or use of force to convince an opponent to change behavior or a status quo the compeller dislikes. Although often used as though it were nearly interchangeable with deterrence, compellence is different. Because deterrence seeks to maintain the status quo, the limits of a deterring party’s demands are clearly defined (refrain from something the opponent is not currently doing, anyway). This also means that compliance with a deterrent threat is invisible and can always be rationalized, saving face. Compellence, in stark contrast, has no intrinsic limits. The opponent cannot be certain that compliance with one demand will not simply invite further demands. Furthermore, because compellence demands a change in behavior or the status quo, compliance is blatant and therefore humiliating. Finally, because it seeks to alter the status quo, compellence appears more aggressive than deterrence. Complying with a compellent demand therefore brings with it the fear that giving into aggression will signal weakness, thus reducing the opponent’s own ability to deter. For all these reasons, compellence is far harder to achieve than deterrence.[42]
It is true that deterrence situations often shift into compellence situations. Lawrence Freedman gives the example of the Cuban Missile Crisis, during which he asserts that the US attempted both to discourage the USSR from constructing further missile sites in Cuba (compellence) and to discourage it from attempting to pass through an American blockade (deterrence).[43] In fact, both these actions were attempts at compellence, since the Soviet ships were already underway and turning them around involved a public change of course, not the maintenance of the status quo. The US naturally saw itself as the defender in this situation and therefore as maintaining the status quo, but the USSR saw the opposite. For Khrushchev, his own actions were intended to bolster deterrence in Cuba against a possible US invasion—the Soviets were therefore the defenders in his eyes and the American blockade was an attempt to compel them to give in to American aggression.

The tendency for both sides to see themselves as defenders and the fact that deterrence situations can morph into ones of compellence means the two cannot be discussed in isolation and may explain why few authors even mention compellence—and then only in conjunction with deterrence. This is an unfortunate oversight. This distinction is often overlooked even among eminent scholars on Israeli deterrence. In one article, Shmuel Bar mentions compellence only together with deterrence, as if the two were essentially one tactic; in another, he makes no mention of compellence at all.[44] Thomas Rid, Jacob Amidror, and Doron Almog also make no mention of the concept of ‘compellence’ in some of their important articles on Israeli deterrence, despite the important role it has played.[45] Daniel Byman’s book on Israeli counterterrorism is not about deterrence, but he does occasionally mention it—without reference to compellence.[46]

Although deterrence situations can and do blend into ones of compellence, it is possible to differentiate between the two and the rule of thumb is this: If a given defender is issuing threats to forestall actions that have not yet occurred and the target of those threats could still back down without this appearing to be a capitulation, this is deterrence. If a given defender is issuing threats to halt attacks that have already begun or otherwise attempt to change a status quo—however new that status quo may be—this is compellence. Seen this way, the US’s prevention of the Soviet shipments to Cuba was clearly compellence: The Soviet Union could no longer back down without this being obvious. The action the US deemed unacceptable was already underway. The status quo the US felt had been violated, namely that of no nuclear weapons being located in Cuba, had already ceased to exist. Restoring it now required compellence, which is why the crisis was so nerve-wracking.

Determining whether deterrence or compellence is the goal with targeted killing is easy, especially when it involves prominent members of an organization. Targeted killing is by its very nature provocative. It threatens the very survival of the targeted group via its decision makers. It therefore cannot be used to signal resolve in an attempt to maintain the status quo. It is instead always an escalation and therefore signals a change in the status quo. In other words, the actual use, as opposed to the threat, of targeted killing is compellent, not deterrent. This explains the different results achieved in the cases mentioned above. The killings and attempted killings of Karmi, Shenab, al-Makadme, and the failed attempt on Yassin all resulted in increased violence. Both the attempt and the successful killing of Rantissi and the attempt on Zahar led to falls in violence. The effect of the successful killing of Yassin is unclear: Hamas initially continued attacks, but Israel killed Rantissi very soon thereafter, which led to a fall in violence. It is not possible to say whether one killing would have been enough or if both were required. It is clear that Hamas violence dropped thereafter.

The difference between the killings that increased violence and those that decreased it had less to do with the type of person they were targeting (they were all high-up members of the organization and were mostly political) and much more to do with timing. When Israel carried out killings at a time when Hamas viewed itself as exercising restraint or still adhering to a ceasefire, this provocative move encouraged Hamas to abandon the ceasefire and retaliate. There was no incentive for Hamas to maintain a ceasefire when its most important leaders were being killed regardless. When violence was already high, Hamas would reduce
attacks in the hope of receiving a reprieve from targeted killings. Israeli decision makers are aware of this effect, though it seems none have referred to it having to do with the concept of compellence. For example, both Giora Eiland, Head of the IDF’s Planning Directorate, and Defense Minister Ben-Eliezer opposed the targeting of Karmi because they knew it would end the ceasefire in place at that time.[47]

**Conclusion**

Targeted killings may successfully disrupt the operations of terrorist and militant groups, but their effects go beyond this when a group’s high-level leadership is targeted. There is potential to use targeted killings to coerce an opponent into accepting a ceasefire. Crucially, however, the group would need an incentive to accept being deterred thereafter. To provide that incentive, targeted killings of the group’s political leadership must be avoided during ceasefires and other periods of calm if maintaining calm is the goal. Considering the coercive effects of targeted killings, as well as the type of targets and timing of strikes, may shine a new light on the effectiveness of targeted killings in other cases as well. The insight on compellence and targeted killings elaborated in this article has implications far beyond Israel, as it is not the only country to engage in the practice of targeted killings and the difficulties inherent in compellence and deterrence-through-compellence are universal. When governments plan strikes, they must consider whether they wish only to disrupt or also to coerce. If the latter, they would do well to keep the difference between deterrence and compellence firmly in mind. It can be the difference between escalation and calm.

**About the Author:** Charles P. Kirchofer is an Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts at Lowell and a PhD candidate in War Studies at King’s College London. He recently published an article for the Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs entitled “Israel and Hamas: Stabilizing Deterrence” (5 January 2016). Other publications include a book review of John Harrison’s “International Aviation and Terrorism: Evolving Threats, Evolving Security” for the British journal Defence Studies as well as articles on Israel, terrorism, and the Syrian refugee crisis for the British newspaper The Telegraph.

**Notes**


[10] Ibid.


[26] Interview with Giora Eiland, interview by Brooke Lapping, 2005, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London.

[27] Interview with Ziad Abu Amir, 2005.


[29] Interview with Mohammed Dahlan, October 27, 2004.


[34] “Israeli Targeted Killings of Terrorists | Jewish Virtual Library;”


[37] Ibid.; Conal Urquhart, “Hamas in Call to End Suicide Bombings,” The Observer, April 9, 2006; URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/apr/09/israel.

[38] Kober, “Targeted Killing during the Second Intifada.”


[41] Rid, “Deterrence Beyond the State.”


[43] Ibid., 111.


[47] Interview with Giora Eiland, 2005.
II. Research Notes

Research on Radicalisation: Topics and Themes

by Alex P. Schmid

The following text is a slightly expanded version of the author’s introduction to a panel titled ‘Next Wave of Research Topics and Themes’ held at the end of a Research Seminar on ‘Radicalisation: From Theory to Practice’. It was held on 12-13 April 2016 in Vienna, Austria, and organised by the European Radicalisation Awareness Network. RAN was set up in 2010 by the European Commission as an EU-wide umbrella network of practitioners engaged to prevent and counter radicalisation to violent extremism. Its Centre of Excellence (RAN CoE) acts as a hub in connecting, developing and disseminating expertise and seeks to develop state-of-the-art knowledge.

Keywords: Radicalisation; research; extremism; terrorism; European Union; Radicalisation Awareness Network

Introduction

The idea that terrorism comes in waves was first introduced by David C. Rapoport, the grand old man of terrorism research who started teaching about the subject half a century ago. He distinguished between four waves:

- the Anarchist Wave (1870-1920s)
- the Nationalist Wave (1920s-1960s);
- the New Left/Marxist Wave (from the 1960s to the 1980s), and the
- Religious Wave (from the late 1970s to today and beyond)

Rapoport’s theory is one of the better theories in terrorism research, although it has not gone unchallenged[1].

This raises the question whether there are also waves in terrorism research and, if so, what are the drivers. Clearly, one of the biggest drivers of terrorism research is government funding which became substantial only after 11 September 2001. Research on what was termed by the European Commission “Violent Radicalisation” began, with few exceptions [2], only after the attacks in Madrid (11/3/2004) and London (7/7/2005). It was a largely political construct; there had been hardly any social science research driven by this particular concept before the early 21st century.[3] The phenomenon of homegrown terrorism emerged from immigrant diaspora communities worried national and European policy makers. The US-UK intervention in Iraq, launched under false pretexts, was widely viewed as an attack on a Muslim country in immigrant circles. It angered many young Muslims in Western Europe, making some of them susceptible to recruitment efforts of Islamist terrorist organisations. Both the United States and European governments had been reluctant to explore the root causes of terrorism after 9/11 and the US-led attack on Iraq. By shifting the public discussion away from Western meddling in the Muslim world to Islamist meddling with Muslim youth in the West in the form of radicalisation and recruitment, politically safe ground was reached for exploring some drivers behind homegrown terrorism—such as the role of certain mosques and other recruitment hot spots such as prisons. A European Expert Group on “Violent Radicalisation” was set up by the European Commission. It was chaired by Fernando Reinares and produced in mid-May 2008 a concise report that was, however, shelved and never officially released.[4] The Expert Group's report interpreted radicalisation as
socialization to extremism, manifesting itself in acts of terrorism and observed that radicalisation happens at the “intersection of an enabling environment and a personal trajectory.”[5]

Yet to this day the main focus of radicalisation research has been on the “vulnerable individual” who is somehow manipulated into becoming a terrorist, with radicalisation being the Black Box which contains the riddle of “what goes on before the bomb goes off”, to use a snappy formulation of Peter Neumann, director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) in London. To this day, the ‘enabling environment’, has not received the same amount of attention as the ‘vulnerable individual’. [6] Even less attention than to the meso-level has been given to macro-level drivers of radicalisation.

For research to become cumulative, one needs to agree on a definition. Despite more than ten years of research we still do not have a generally agreed upon definition of “radicalisation”. The definition articulated by the European Union – which presumably is the one RAN is following – is short but not very precise:

“Radicalisation: Individuals or groups becoming intolerant with regard to basic democratic values like equality and diversity, as well as a rising propensity towards using means of force to reach political goals that negate and/or undermine democracy.”[7]

If we indeed would take–following this official European definition–democracy, equality and diversity as benchmarks for measuring degrees of radicalization, we would have a great deal more radicalisation in the world, and not just among “vulnerable youth”.

My own definition of radicalisation is one that owes an intellectual debt to the work of Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko[8] but goes beyond them:

“an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either

(i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion,
(ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or
(iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes.

The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialisation away from mainstream- or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilisation outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognised as appropriate or legitimate.”

There are many other definitions[9] as there are many ways of looking at the problem. Radicalisation can be viewed as a process of political socialisation towards extremism. Alternatively, radicalisation can be viewed as a process of conflict escalation in terms of increased use of illegal methods of political action when confronting an opponent. It can also be seen as a mobilisation and recruitment process, masterminded by manipulative political or religious entrepreneurs. It can finally be viewed primarily as a conversion process, a life-changing transformation from a more individual-centered personal identity to a new, collective-centered identity which makes the vulnerable individual subservient to the demands of an extremist religious cult while making him or her think of belonging to a superior group of true believers.[10]
Problems with the Concept of Radicalisation

If we look at the history of radicalisation research we find that there was an initial focus on prison radicalisation, followed by one on mosque and madrassa radicalization. More recently the main focus is on internet and social media radicalisation. Should we call this sequence of research ‘waves’?

It might perhaps be better to call the very strong focus on radicalisation itself as one wave of (counter-) terrorism research if we want to stick to this aquatic metaphor. Several leading researchers have expressed unhappiness with this heavy focus on radicalisation in terrorism research. To quote one of them, John Horgan: “We should not have allowed to have radicalisation center stage. (...) We are stuck with radicalisation”.[11] My own unhappiness with the concept of radicalisation and its use has been expressed in a literature review.[12] It is threefold:

i) the association of radicalisation with radicalism (rather than extremism; the former is an outflow of the 18th century enlightenment while the latter is regressive and authoritarian rather than progressive and egalitarian);

ii) the one-sided use of the term for non-state actors only (as if those holding state power never become more extreme in the course of a conflict); and

iii) the almost exclusive focus on the micro-level of the vulnerable individual (rather than a broader focus on the meso-level of the radical milieu or the macro-level of society, state and international system).

There are more problems with the concept of radicalisation. In some cases individual radicalisation follows joining a terrorist group rather than the other way round. In other cases (e.g. defensive vigilantism) those using terrorist tactics were never radicalised. In most cases, those holding radical (as opposed to extremist) views never engage in terrorism. The question “Why some radicalise while most do not radicalise?” is still in need of satisfactory answers.

A Dozen Topics and Themes for Research

If we look not at radicalisation and its opposite concept de-radicalisation but at Counter-Terrorism as a whole, one can note a shift from a (i) law enforcement approach that treated terrorism as crime to a (ii) military approach in the ‘Global War on Terror’ which treats counter-terrorism as a special type of counter-insurgency. More recently, we have seen advocacy for a (iii) whole-of-government approach, followed by pleas for a (iv) whole-of-society approach and even a (v) whole-of-UN-approach. Perhaps one could also apply the wave metaphor to these five phases.

Leaving the wave metaphor behind, what topics and themes should be next in terrorism and counter-terrorism research in general and radicalisation research in particular? Here are a dozen suggestions:

1. **Use of primary sources**: Clearly the gap between academic research and counter-terrorism intelligence needs to be narrowed. Intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies often have too many data but lack time and also lack some of the analytical skills available in academia to fully exploit this heap of unprocessed raw data.[13] The problem to get security clearances makes it, however, difficult for researchers to work with primary sources. Most governments keep their in-house information close to their chest. [14]

2. **Re-contextualise research**: Research on terrorism and radicalisation needs to be re-contextualised and linked to the history of a conflict on the one hand and government politics on the other hand.[15] There is a great difference between someone radicalising in Syria or Gaza from someone radicalizing
in Brussels or Paris. There is a great difference between radicalisation in a democratic country and under an authoritarian dictatorship. There is a great difference between radicalisation in an occupied country and a free one, between a country at war and one at peace. Looking at radicalisation only from the perspective of those at the top social hierarchies both at home and abroad is bound to lead to biased results and bad policies.

3. **Address rather than avoid the role of religion:** Religion and conversion to a fundamentalist religious worldview needs to be problematised rather than avoided. There has been a tendency in the United Nations but also with many governments to say that terrorism has nothing to do with religion and, more in particular, that Islam is peaceful and terrorism is un-Islamic. Political correctness has stood in the way of unbiased research. It has become customary to use the term “violent extremism” to avoid the term “Islamist terrorism”. It is repeated again and again that there is no profile of a terrorist. However, most contemporary terrorist attacks are perpetrated by self-declared Muslims, or recent converts to Islam. Here in Europe many of these radicalised young males in European urban diasporas have an immigrant background from Arab and other Muslim countries, have a history of involvement in drugs and crime, and a not insignificant part of them have been plagued by family (incl. domestic violence) and mental health problems. This does not amount to a single terrorist profile but is more than mere coincidence.

There are two basic approaches to de-radicalisation: one focuses on bringing people back into the community, the other focuses on bringing them back to the true faith. We in the West have stressed almost exclusively the first approach while in Muslim-majority countries efforts are made to bring them back to the “true religion”. While there are hundreds of religions, cults and sects, all claiming to be in possession of some special if not the only truth, we should not focus our attention on community only in order to avoid the perplexing world of beliefs. We should take the faith-based ideology of extremists seriously - without ideology radicalisation to a fanatic religious extremism, most terrorism is unlikely.

4. **The role of media-induced contagion** needs to be addressed; what we call radicalisation might, in part, be contagion – imitation of behavioural models seen in social and mass media. The news value system of our commercial media favours conflict over peace, violence over non-violence, action over reflection, perpetrators over victims, and therefore unwittingly promotes violence for effect. As long as our mass media do not distinguish between events which happen anyway and pseudo-events that happen only- or mainly - because there are journalists around and the media are most likely to report about them, we will continue to provide terrorists with free publicity in exchange for the blood of victims.

5. **The silence of the moderates:** We need to examine why the mainstream moderates in Islam are so hard to mobilise against the extremists who get most of the media and public attention. Are the moderates afraid of being killed by more extremist muslims? Are they secretly subscribing to the goals if not the means of the jihadists? Are they too divided, too disorganized or lacking resources? Or are they raising their voices but we do not hear them? These are issues that need to be addressed.

6. **The paradox of much sympathy but little support for jihadists:** We still have no satisfactory answers why so few radicalise given the fact that so many non-extremists are growing up in the same social circumstances as those who become terrorists. 99 percent of all Muslims have not radicalised but sympathy and sometimes support for jihadists is much more widespread. We also have to ask: what makes some more resilient to radicalisation than others? We need to look not only at pull- and push factors behind radicalisation to violent extremism and terrorism but also at resilience factors that
inhibit such radicalisation. Here is my own, admittedly untested, list of individual level resilience factors[16]:

A) Negative

- No family breakdown, with positive father figure;
- No previous involvement and exposure to violence;
- No violent friends or criminal gang or drug scene involvement;
- No signs of mental disorders;
- No fascination with weapons and martial arts.

B) Positive

- Ability to think and act for themselves rather than accept ideological slogans;
- Decent employment, with prospect of upward social mobility;
- Successful integration in immigrants’ host society;
- Acceptance of democracy, freedom and gender equality;
- Acceptance of information from non-Salafist sources.

7. The role of the family in radicalisation and de-radicalisation: Family members of young Muslims who have gone missing often express surprise that their son or daughter suddenly resurfaces in Syria. Through acts of omission or commission families play a role in such developments. Yet their role in both radicalisation and de-radicalisation is under-explored. It is, for instance, remarkable how often terrorist cells contain brothers from the same family or cousins and other kin.

8. Indicators of Radicalisation: A comparison of regional and national checklists on outward signs of radicalisation in real life and signs in online behaviour is urgently needed.[17] French authorities, for instance have published a list of such signs of radicalization:[18]

- They stop listening to music;
- Stop watching TV and going to the cinema;
- Dramatically change eating habits;
- Stop all sport activities;
- Change the way they dress;
- Sever relations with old friends;
- Reject members of their own family.

9. Evaluation of de-radicalisation programs: This should have one of the highest priorities. Such programs have mushroomed in recent years. Yet without systematic, rigorous and comparative evaluations of de-radicalisation programs, no real progress towards more promising practices can be made.
10. *Willingness of communities to reintegrate former extremists:* Like the concept of *civil society* the concept of *community* is used as a mantra. Yet to which community can de-radicalised former militants go back to? Who is willing to offer him or her employment? Which neighbourhood would accept a former terrorist criminal? Which community in particular should the ex-convict re-integrate to? Probably not the same one he came from. Community building, creating social cohesion, should be high on our national agendas. Yet in most countries it is not.

11. *Professional training of qualified mentors* to guide vulnerable people away from the pathways to radicalisation. There are many social workers and others engaged in this type of work, but proper training has often been lacking. Such mentors might be selected former extremists who have genuinely persuaded themselves and others that they were misled in the past.

12. *Greater focus on collective de-radicalisation:* Since individual de-radicalisation is labour-intensive, greater focus should be on the exploration of the possibilities for the de-radicalisation of a whole group of extremists (e.g. in a prison context).

**Conclusion**

These then are a dozen suggestions for new topics and themes of research on and around the issue of (de-) radicalisation. Some of them are not new but all are, in my view, under-researched.

What is most needed is that we try to better understand fanatical extremism and how to break or defuse it. To do so we have to have the courage to enter the radical and extremist milieus and talk to the angry, the disillusioned and the forlorn who search for significance and recognition in their lives and hope to find it in fundamentalist religion. How else can we hope to bring them back into the midst of our societies?

**About the Author:** Alex P. Schmid is a member of the RAN network. He is Associate Professor at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University, Campus The Hague. Dr. Schmid is also a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) in The Hague and Editor-in-Chief of *Perspectives on Terrorism*.

**Notes**


[2] Ted R. Gurr. Political Rebellion. Causes, Outcomes and Alternatives. New York: Routledge, 2015. Gurr defined radicalisation in these terms: "Radicalisation refers to a process in which the group has been mobilized in pursuit of a social or political objective but has failed to make enough progress toward the objective to satisfy all activists. Some become discouraged, while others intensify their efforts, lose patience with conventional means of political action, and look for tactics that will have greater impact. This is the kind of situation in which modeling or ‘imitative’ behavior occurs. Impatience and frustration provide an expressive motivation (anger) and rationalistic grounds (dramatic episodes of violence elsewhere) that make it likely that some activists will decide to experiment with terror tactics. The choice is made, and justified, as a means to the original ends of radical reform, group autonomy, or whatever. And the dynamics of the process are such that the terrorists believe that they enjoy the support of some larger community in revolt." – Idem, p. 171. Chapter 9. Terrorism in Democracies. When it occurs, why it fails (originally published in 2003).


"radicalisation can be understood as a process of individual depluralisation of political concepts and values (e.g. justice, freedom, honour, violence, democracy) according with those concepts employed by a specific ideology). With a higher degree of individual internalisation of the notion that no other alternative interpretations of their (prioritised) political concepts and values exist (or are relevant), one can show (e.g. in syntax, language and behaviour) the progression of the radicalisation process. (…) However, this means that a high level of radicalisation does not necessarily equal a high level of violent behaviour or extraordinary brutality. (…) The important link here is the fusion (and combination) with a certain type of ideology that inherently denies individual freedom (or equal rights) to persons not part of the radical persons in-group and thusly the degree of ideological incompatibility with the mainstream political culture." – Daniel Koehler. Understanding Deradicalisation: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism. Forthcoming, 2016, quoted from MS.- According to TerRa, a EU funded Dutch project: “Most definitions have in common that they refer to an individual process, often strongly influenced by group processes. During this process, the dominant political order is rejected, as well as dialogue, compromise and tolerance as means to bring change. Instead, violence is more and more adopted as an appropriate method to attain certain goals. Thus, at some point, radicalisation can (but does not necessarily) lead to terrorism.” – IMPACT. TerRa Toolkit. Amsterdam: IMPACT, 2014, p. 3.


Constructions of Terrorism
by Scott Englund and Michael Stohl

Abstract
Occupying considerable space in the daily awareness of people across the globe, terrorism is nevertheless an elusive concept, falling prey to politicization, loose definition, and lack of context. In some ways terrorism has been described as whatever a person wants it to be, which often gives it an out-sized role in public opinion and policy demands. The Constructions of Terrorism Project, jointly undertaken by Abu Dhabi research center TRENDS Research and Advisory and the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, seeks to approach this slippery concept from multiple directions, employing a variety of research methodologies, from many academic disciplines and policy-making perspectives. The goal is to thoroughly explore the many ways in which terrorism is constructed by academics, political leaders, the public, and those who employ terror to get what they want. It seeks to provide a forum in which the diversity of conceptual understandings of terrorism can be collectively interrogated, believing that from the high-ground of a more thorough, rigorously investigated understanding of terrorism, better, more effective means of confronting it can be developed and implemented.

Keywords: Terrorism; Counterterrorism; International Security; Political Violence

The Constructions of Terrorism Project
Defining terrorism is a difficult but vitally necessary task if we wish to effectively confront it. Terrorism is violence that evokes a visceral, psychological response in order to coerce compliance. It is the indirect application of force such that the pain and suffering of its victims is intended as a means to some other end; the victims have done nothing to be targeted and can do nothing on their own to avoid violence. States and non-state groups can engage in terrorism. It is purposive, organized behavior with a rational objective, though its methods shock and appall. Studying terrorism requires the analysis to burrow into some of the darkest recesses of human behavior. This begins with understanding the multiple constructions of terrorism. By studying how the concept has been constructed in all its various incarnations, we may then better understand not only the problem of terrorism (and all its ramifications) but also form more effective means to limit the destruction attended by terrorist violence and better protect our societies.

TRENDS Research and Advisory, an Abu Dhabi based independent research center, and the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, announced a partnership in the summer of 2015 in order to focus on the “Constructions of Terrorism.” Occupying considerable space in the daily awareness of people across the globe, terrorism is nevertheless an elusive concept, falling prey to politicization, loose definition, and lack of context. In some ways terrorism has been described as whatever a person wants it to be, which often gives it an out-sized role in public opinion and policy demands. The Constructions of Terrorism Project (COTP) seeks to approach this slippery concept from multiple directions, employing a variety of research methodologies from many academic disciplines and policy-making perspectives. The goal is to thoroughly explore the many ways in which terrorism is constructed by academics, political leaders, the public, and those who employ terror to get what they want. The COTP does not intend to solve the problem of defining terrorism, somehow exceeding the scholastic efforts of other research projects [1] or to fully reconcile divergent approaches to the theoretical concept. It does, however, seek to provide a forum in which the diversity of conceptual understandings of terrorism can be collectively interrogated, believing that from the high-ground of a more thorough, rigorously investigated understanding of terrorism, better, more effective means of confronting it can be developed and implemented.
Part of the Constructions of Terrorism Project is a two-year, four-conference series, of which there have now been two. The first was held at the University of California, Santa Barbara on December 3-4, 2015. That first conference opened the question of defining terrorism in all its various constructions, and thus laid the foundation of the project. The second conference was co-sponsored and hosted by the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. on April 27-28, 2016; it specifically confronted the challenges presented by the so-called Islamic State, also known as ISIS/ISIL or by its Arabic acronym Daesh. Both conferences featured presentations by terrorism experts drawn from many academic disciplines and professional experiences. Each presentation prompted fruitful discussion among the conference attendees and members of the public who were able to attend at no cost.

Constructing a Definition: December 2015 Conference, Santa Barbara, California

At the first TRENDS-Orfalea conference on the “Constructions of Terrorism,” three important and impactful ongoing discussions and conclusions about those discussions emerged during the two days:

1. It was clear that defining and describing terrorism requires putting terrorist violence into the political context in which it occurs - this will sometimes require introspective and reflective analyses of work and ideas that have been attempted previously;

2. Defining terrorism is important, but perhaps primarily when in support of decisions about how to approach counterterrorism;

3. Constructing terrorism must necessarily involve constructing terrorists and their organizations; acts of violence are carried out by individuals, therefore individual pathways to violence need to be considered and these actions are often conducted on behalf of organizations whose structure, goals and ideologies also need to be considered.

The conference also benefitted from significant discussions on research methodology and new avenues for quantitative analyses. Although there were differences of opinion about the relative importance of variables and approaches, considerable overlap emerged. The degree to which this complex question was shared and discussed from multiple disciplines and perspectives was encouraging and intellectually stimulating. The research presented at this conference will be published by the University of California Press in 2017.

The first continuing discussion centered on the insights that constructing terrorism is, in part, an introspective process, requiring an examination not just of terrorists and what they do, but also what is done to them before and after they decide to act. Acts of terror and terrorists themselves are embedded in both a local and a global political system. The best understanding of terrorism, therefore, situates an act of violence within its unique political environment in which there are multiple actors; to focus on the actions of terrorists alone is to perceive only part of the phenomenon. This was vividly described by conference speaker Mark Juergensmeyer, when he explained that focusing on the perpetrators of violence alone is like trying to understand the moves of a boxer in a ring fighting an invisible opponent. One boxer’s moves are comprehensible only with reference to the other boxer’s actions. The suicidal act of flying airplanes into buildings, for example, can make sense only when one understands that the perpetrators and planners of that act believed themselves to be engaged in an apocalyptic cosmic battle of good vs. evil. In fact, terrorist violence may be conducted with the objective of eliciting a specific reaction. Clark McCauley explained that “jujitsu politics” is designed to use the overwhelming power of targeted states against themselves. According to his research, acts of terror elicit anger, an emotional response that is stronger than fear and intimidation. As McCauley argued in his paper,
“Anger is associated with aggression and out-one group derogation; fear is associated with defensive strategies of surveillance and curtailed civil rights. Anger is the emotion sought by terrorists seeking to elicit overreaction to their attacks - using the enemy’s strength against him in a strategy of jujitsu politics. The power of this strategy, and the importance of anger reactions in making the strategy successful, are hidden in definitions of terrorism that focus only on fear and coercion.”

The reaction itself is part of the larger strategy employed by terrorists. It is therefore impossible to disentangle the act of terrorist violence from the type of response it elicits; there are always at least two participants in an act of terrorism. Taking this argument perhaps furthest, Lisa Stampnitzky suggested that there would be no definition of terrorism without counter-terrorism. Rather than suffering from a dearth of definitions for terrorism, there is actually a plethora, making selection of a definition the real problem. Stampnitzky suggests that the best definition of terrorism is how it is defined in practice, thus counter-terrorism “defines” terrorism. Finally, Richard Falk reminded conference participants of the logically dangerous approach of using the term terrorism to signify a particular actor (usually one with whom one disagrees) rather than the nature of the violence itself. Focusing on actors invites selective use of the term; thinking about the act itself means to situate it in its political context.

A second discussion and set of insights centered on the recognition developed during the conference that defining terrorism is perhaps most important in determining what to do about it. Constructing terrorism means also constructing the institutional responses to terrorist violence. David Schanzer approached the topic from a legal perspective. Terrorism is a tactic, which can be used by anybody. Political expression can take many forms; even the use of violence to advance a political objective entails choices. What sets terrorism apart from other forms of violence is its intentional violation of the laws of war. He concluded, “Understanding terrorism as a tactic—akin to tactics like conventional warfare or murder for hire - and ridding us of particularly useless concepts like a “war on terror” or even “counter-terrorism” will help bring clarity to the current sprawl of post-9/11 security policy.”

Sometimes definitions of terrorism can be too inclusive, or constructed in such a way as to exaggerate its potential for damage. John Mueller has long held that the threat of terrorism has been exaggerated, and shared with conference participants his observation that phenomena like civil war and insurgency are being re-defined as “terrorism.” As a result, people over-estimate their own risk of falling victim to terrorist violence, which in part fuels over-reaction by government agencies. Mueller concluded, “Although even knuckle-heads can occasionally do damage, there is something quite spooky about expanding the definition of terrorism so that it threatens to embrace all violent behavior that is directed at an ideological or policy goal, about imagining terrorists to be everywhere, about extrapolating wildly to conclude that many are omni-competent masterminds, and about acting like their press agent by flaunting and exaggerating their often-pathetic schemes to do damage. The result has been a mis-overestimation of terrorism’s importance and impact.”

Central to Mueller’s argument is the widespread tendency to “over-hype” the threat of terrorism. This is in part an artifact of how the media construct terrorism. Benjamin Smith, Scott Englund, Andrea Figueroa Caballero, Elena Salcido and Michael Stohl, provided the results of a quantitative examination of over 110,000 print newspaper articles which found that “al-Qaeda” was the most symbolically meaningful name used to describe terrorism over the past eighteen years. In fact, in sixty percent of the articles, there was no reason for al-Qaeda to be mentioned, except as a way to help define some other terror group. The implication is that applying an “al-Qaeda” frame so broadly could erroneously paint a veneer of solidarity over terrorist groups and actions that in fact belong to their own unique political milieus.

Properly constructing a terror threat is essential to creating effective counter-measures. In their paper, Englund and Stohl argued that when distinct constructions, or facets, of the contemporary threat presented by Daesh are conflated, then the response to that threat is bound to be muddled and ineffective. Properly
demarcating the various distinguishable facets of a terrorist threat is a necessary, but not sufficient, step towards effectively countering that threat. If “terrorism” is tricky to define, and different definitions lead to different responses, then the concept of “radicalization” has become perhaps even thornier. Anthony Richards argued that in the United Kingdom, the concepts of “terrorism, radicalization, and extremism” are being merged in unhelpful, and perhaps counter-productive, ways. He explained that in the UK,

“there is an increased wider concern with the way citizens think ideologically - that if they believe in certain non-violent dogmas that are said to be ‘conducive’ to terrorism then they are viewed as part of the ‘terrorist problem’, even if they deplore the violent methods of Al Qaeda and Isis.”

Conference co-convener Richard Burchill continued this line of analysis, arguing that although a proliferation of law concerning terrorism may allow governments to intervene earlier to disrupt terrorist planning, these legal constructions conflict with one another. This risks ever broadening the scope of what is considered “terrorism” or “extremism” which can lead to an inconsistent application of law.

Finally, terrorism, like any social phenomenon, is expressed through the actions of individuals. Any construction of terrorism should also account for how individual terrorists are constructed or how individuals come to accept or even carry out terrorist violence and how organizations that employ terrorism construct their rationales. Mia Bloom described “cultures of martyrdom” in which children are prepared for suicide missions:

“By fetishizing the afterlife and emphasizing the benefits of martyrdom, it has become easier for terrorist organizations to convince young people to volunteer for suicide operations. The ‘culture of martyrdom’ requires religious sanction and the promise of religious justification/reward.”

She found that strategies for preparing young people for suicide missions were similar to approaches employed by pedophiles. For example, both tend to prey on children in similar situations, and both use trust and incrementalism to lead to an action that is otherwise socially taboo. Finally, in a culture of martyrdom, targeted assassination of terrorist leaders is made less effective by building the infrastructure of a multi-generational struggle. Lasse Lindekilde presented two alternative constructions of the “lone wolf” terrorist. Rather than being isolated and entirely independent, Lindekilde and his co-investigator Stefan Malthaner explained that these individuals were usually at least tangentially part of a wider movement. In one construction, which they label the “peripheral-drifter-pathway,” the individual is, “partially embedded in semi-radical friendship-groups and weakly connected to wider radical milieus.” While never becoming a part of a radical group, the peripheral-drifter, “drifted in the margins, weakly considering but then again dropping plans to join jihad abroad.” A second pathway, the “failed joiner,” tries to connect to radical groups, is successful at making contact, but is rejected or expelled; forced to function outside the group, this individual decides to act alone. Finally, Steven Corman argued that although terrorism may not be strategically rational, it is organizationally rational from a narrative perspective. Familiar and widely accepted socio-cultural master narratives connect present-day events with the personal narratives of group members, which allows individuals to perceive “victory” even when terrorist groups rarely achieve their practical political objectives. In this way, story-telling and recognizing one’s own place in a larger narrative can make otherwise irrational acts of self-sacrifice acceptable to both perpetrators and supporters of groups.

In addition to the foregoing discussion, valuable insights highlighted how terrorism research is conducted. Fitting neatly with the first discussion theme, that the best understanding of terrorism is to also consider responses to it, this line of inquiry is sure to benefit from the “Government Actions in Terror Environments” (GATE) dataset, which was introduced to the conference by Laura Dugan. Dugan argued that government actions beyond that which is explicitly described as counter-terrorism can affect the behavior of terrorist groups. She concluded by arguing that counterterrorism analysis should,
“reconsider conceptualizing counterterrorism to include more nuanced behavior by governments that could elicit a reaction from terrorist organizations or their constituencies. By expanding how we construct counterterrorism, we are better able to develop insight into what works and what does not work in different contexts.”

Victor Asal, suggested that although a great deal of intellectual effort has been given to defining terrorism by focusing on who is targeted in a particular act of violence, “this has not led to an investigation of whether or not different operationalizations of the target would have different causal explanations.” Asal suggests that the question may be addressed by testing the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to determine whether different operationalizations of the concept of terrorism (at least with respect to who is targeted by terrorist violence) would produce different correlations and causal relationships which would provide understanding of the dynamics of terrorism.

In the study of international relations, three common levels of analyses are the international systemic, the domestic institutional, and the individual. Applying these analytical lenses to the same political phenomenon can lead to different theoretical explanations; often each has significant strengths and weaknesses. As with most analytical tools, each level of analysis is likely to explain some things better than others. Likewise to the general study of international relations, which is best served by employing a variety of explanatory models, the Constructions of Terrorism Project (and the study of terrorism in general) will benefit most from a multi-disciplinary effort approaching the phenomenon from different levels of analysis. Whether approached as a social phenomenon, or a tactic of asymmetric warfare, or a violation of international humanitarian law, or as an individual cost-benefit decision or psychological roots analysis; terrorism is sufficiently complex to warrant an equally sophisticated and nuanced approach to its study.

**Confronting the Islamic State/Daesh: April 2016, Washington, D.C.**

For the second conference, again organized by TRENDS Research and Advisory, based in Abu Dhabi, UAE, and the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies at the University of California, partnership was sought with the Stimson Center. It brought together terrorism and counter-terrorism experts from diverse backgrounds to confront the challenges presented by Daesh. Underlying questions addressed by the participants included: What is the so-called Islamic State (also known as ISIS/ISIL, Daesh)? What threat does it pose to global security? Should we even consider it to be a threat? What will be left behind after it is defeated or destroyed?

The conference began with a discussion that traced the history of “terrorism” as a means of political expression and looked at how counter-terrorism actions can both inspire and deter terrorist violence. It challenged participants to reconsider the very definition of who the terrorists actually are. This opening panel of Mark Sageman, Laura Dugan, and Marie Breen-Smyth instituted what became an abiding theme of the conference: to effectively confront Daesh, we must be willing to challenge established conceptions of what it represents, what motivates it and what the appropriate response to it is.

From the theoretical and statistically driven examination of the issue from the scholarly heights, two academics with counter-insurgency experience in Iraq dove deep to compare Daesh to historical violent revolutionary political movements. Craig Whiteside, a former US Army officer with combat experience in Iraq, asserted that Daesh represents a return to revolutionary warfare, much in the same strain of the kind of war fought by the Vietnamese Communists in the 1960s and beyond. Scott Englund, a former intelligence analyst, also with Iraq war experience, compared Daesh to contemporary and historical guerrilla movements in order to understand how it might eventually end. He concluded that Daesh will likely remain a traditional terrorist threat even after its inevitable military defeat.
The next panel considered how Daesh still survives in a conflict where so many states and violent organizations are opposed to it, and even thrives in the form of affiliated organizations spreading across the globe. Hussein Ibish assessed that the conflict spread across Iraq and Syria represents one of the most complex conflicts in modern history; Daesh is able to survive in the spaces of the overlapping and conflicting interests of each of its opponents. Joel Day explained how Daesh has extended its influence to organizations as far away as South-East Asia, and how these far-flung organizations tend to benefit from their association with Daesh. Thus, the threat posed by Daesh appears global, requiring a global response.

How Daesh communicates and how Western media cover it was investigated in the next panel. Charlie Winter, using documents he has translated himself, reported on a pattern of ISIS off-line propaganda, which he compared to the insidious propaganda efforts undertaken by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Ben Smith and Andrea Figueroa-Caballero examined the failure of United States media outlets to differentiate between Daesh and al-Qaeda; and argued that this fundamental failure has led to the public misunderstanding the motives (and perhaps goals) of Daesh. Such confusion also leads to poor perception of appropriate counter-measures, and unrealistic expectations of an early victory.

Understanding how Daesh recruits supporters and inspires them to leave home and join the fight in Iraq and Syria or to conduct acts of terror wherever they might live is of particular interest to European political leaders. Danish scholar Lasse Lindekilde presented a model of de-radicalization and disengagement used by the Danish city of Aarhus, which experienced a disproportionately high number of its citizens leaving to join the fight in Syria and Iraq and evaluated its current status. Sara Zeiger described the role women play in terror organizations like Daesh, and the role they can play in discouraging people in their community from joining or supporting Daesh. Mia Bloom described how Daesh preys on children and uses them as child-soldiers. Taken together, the discussion centered on how some of the most vulnerable are drawn into fighting, what efforts are being undertaken to challenge the attraction of Daesh's ideology and how to redirect young people and women away from potentially self-destructive behavior whether they were voluntary or involuntary recruits.

Two apparently different approaches to the topic ended up converging on the important question of how people perceive the threat posed by violent organizations. Victor Asal, using new data and statistical analysis, demonstrated patterns of lethality among violent groups in the Middle East region while John Mueller challenged the basic understanding of Daesh by asserting that it does not represent a true threat to global security. Though these two presentations began from two different beginnings, and used entirely different methods, the discussion converged around how threats are perceived and thus how the public demands their governments to respond. Although being killed in a terrorist attack is a very remote threat, people remain concerned about terrorism. Indeed, though Daesh (or the threat terrorism in general) does not represent an “existential threat,” it is a tremendously significant threat to security in the Middle East and North Africa, a region that remains strategically important for much of the rest of the world.

Finally, the very nature of the threat Daesh presents, and what could come after it was considered at the conference. Risa Brooks began by posing an analytical puzzle, is Daesh qualitatively different from other terrorist groups, or is it just an extreme example of prior types? If it is different, is that the result of its own characteristics, or the environment in which it operates? She assessed that though it may take advantage of unique political conditions, Daesh does not represent a unique or exceptional threat. Psychologist Clark McCauley explained that he believed the core of the Daesh phenomenon is emotion, specifically humiliation, which he defined as the combination of anger and shame. He then proposed a radically different approach to confronting Daesh. This violent group is successful because it offers an exhilarating remedy for humiliation, thus to effectively end it as a violent movement, an even greater remedy must be made available. His solution was to reconsider the ethnically based nations that redrew the map of the Levant drawn at the conclusion of the First World War, claiming that essentially this was a process that is already underway.
The conference concluded with an insightful discussion between Stimson Center Chairman of the Board, Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield and International Law scholar Richard Falk, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967. Professor Falk drew two conclusions regarding Daesh: first, it is not exceptional or wholly unprecedented in its activity, and second, what is new is that the two primary actors are not strictly “states” as traditionally understood in international law. Daesh is an insurgency or guerrilla movement that desires statehood, but will not achieve that; the United States is a “global state” that has taken on a “self-appointed” global security role. Secondly, militarism has failed to resolve political conflicts that are contained within states. Militarism is defined as an over-reliance on military force to influence the outcome in a political conflict. Militarism is not necessarily equated with any use of military force, which is at times necessary. Drawing examples from Afghanistan, Libya and the Syria-Iraq crisis embodied by Daesh, military action has often only exacerbated political conflicts. The implication is that using additional military force (a large commitment of United States personnel, for example) to confront the problem presented by Daesh may not be effective.

**The Way Ahead: Terrorism and Human Rights**

Terrorism and efforts at confronting terrorist violence (lumped under the broad label counter-terrorism) both raise complex questions about human rights. Very obviously, terrorist organizations such as Daesh, or Boko Haram, or the Taliban violate the very basic human right to life; but to what extent do some counter-terrorism measures infringe on this same right—or other rights? It may be simple to condemn terrorists for their inhumane tactics, but it is much more complicated to judge the measures which societies that rely on the rule of law are willing to employ in order to be and feel more secure. As the Constructions of Terrorism Project continues, future efforts will be directed toward this thorny set of questions. Tentatively, the third conference is scheduled to be held in London in December of 2016.

**About the Authors:**

Scott Englund is a non-resident fellow with TRENDS Research and Advisory, Abu Dhabi, UAE and a post-doctoral scholar at the Orfalea Center for Global and International Relations, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Michael Stohl is Professor of Communication, Political Science and Global and International Studies and Director of the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

**Note**

Terrorist Migration to the Dark Web

by Gabriel Weimann

“Increasingly, we are unable to see what they [terrorists] say, which gives them a tremendous advantage against us.” — FBI Director James Comey, December 2015 [1]

Abstract
The terms Deep Web, Deep Net, Invisible Web, or Dark Web refer to the content on the World Wide Web that is not indexed by standard search engines. The deepest layers of the Deep Web, a segment known as the Dark Web, contain content that has been intentionally concealed including illegal and anti-social information. The conventional Surface Web was discovered to be too risky for anonymity-seeking terrorists: they could be monitored, traced, and found. In contrast, on the Dark Web, decentralized and anonymous networks aid in evading arrest and the closure of these terrorist platforms. This paper reports some of the recent trends in terrorist use of the Dark Web for communication, fundraising, storing information and online material.

Keywords: Internet; Dark Web; Deep Web; Terrorism; Al-Qaeda; Islamic State

Introduction
Beneath the familiar online world that most of us know and use, a world of YouTube, Google, Facebook, and Twitter, lies a hidden network of sites, communities, and platforms where people can be anyone, or do anything they want. This is the Dark Web. One can describe the Internet as composed of layers: the “upper” layer, or the Surface Web, can easily be accessed by regular searches or directing your web browser to a known website address. However, “deeper” layers, the content of the Deep Web, are not indexed by traditional search engines such as Google. The deepest layers of the Deep Web, a segment known as the “Dark Web,” contain content that has been intentionally concealed. The Dark Web can be defined as the portion of the Deep Web that can only be accessed through specialized browsers. A recent study found that 57% of the Dark Web is occupied by illegal content like pornography, illicit finances, drug hubs, weapons trafficking, counterfeit currency, terrorist communication, and much more.[2] Probably the most notorious example of these activities can be seen in The Silk Road website. In October 2013, the FBI shut down the first version of this drug market and arrested its owner Ross William Ulbricht. The Dark Web has been associated with the infamous WikiLeaks, as well as Bitcoin, said to be the currency of the Dark Web. Over its successful two-year run, The Silk Road made over US $1.2 billion in bitcoins. Of course, dissident political groups, civil rights activists and investigative journalists in oppressive countries have also been known to use the Dark Web to communicate and organize clandestinely.

To access material in the Dark Web, individuals use special software such as TOR (The Onion Router) or I2P (Invisible Internet Project). TOR was initially created by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory as a tool for anonymously communicating online. It relies upon a network of volunteer computers to route users’ web traffic through a series of other users’ computers so that the traffic cannot be traced to the original user. Not all Dark Web sites use TOR (i.e., “onion”) addresses, but a TOR-enabled web browser can access virtually any site without revealing the user’s identity. On the Dark Web, a visitor must know where to find the site in order to access it. A few search engines have been developed for the Dark Web, but they are limited in scope and usefulness.
Terrorist Interest in the Dark Web

Terrorists have been active on various online platforms since the late 1990s.[3] However, the Surface Web was discovered to be too risky for anonymity-seeking terrorists: they could be monitored, traced and found. Many of the terrorist websites and social media on the Surface Web are monitored by counter-terrorism agencies and are often shut down or hacked. In contrast, on the Dark Web, decentralized and anonymous networks enable evading arrest and the closure of these terrorist platforms. According to the London-based Quilliam Foundation, “The terrorist material reappears on the Internet as quickly as it is banished and this policy risks driving fanatics on to the ‘dark web’ where they are even harder to track.” Moreover, “Islamist forums and chat rooms in English and French are still widely available, but...a large portion of more extremist Islamic discourse now takes place within the dark web.”[4] “ISIL’s activities on the Surface Web are now being monitored closely, and the decision by a number of governments to take down or filter extremist content has forced the jihadists to look for new online safe havens,” Berton writes in her report on ISIS’s use of the Dark Web.[5]

Following the November 2015 attacks in Paris, ISIS has turned to the Dark Web to spread news and propaganda in an apparent attempt to protect the identities of the group's supporters and safeguard its content from hacktivists. The move comes after hundreds of websites associated with ISIS were taken down as part of the Operation Paris (OpParis) campaign launched by the amorphous hacker collective Anonymous. ISIS's media outlet, Al-Hayat Media Center, posted a link and explanations on how to get to their new Dark Web site on a forum associated with ISIS. The announcement was also distributed on Telegram, the encrypted communication application used by the group. Telegram is an application for sending text and multimedia messages on Android, iOS, and Windows devices. Telegram is so confident of its security that it twice offered a $300,000 reward to the first person who could crack its encryption. The messages shared links to a Tor service with a “.onion” address on the Dark Web. The site contains an archive of ISIS propaganda materials, including its documentary-style film, The Flames of War. The site also includes a link to the terrorist group's private messaging portal on Telegram. My earlier report on terrorists’ use of the Dark Web revealed some early indications of the growing terrorist interest in the dark online platforms.[6] However, within several months, monitoring of online terrorism added new indications, new findings and new trends of terrorist presence in the Dark Web.

What are Terrorists Doing on the Dark Web?

A simple description of what terrorists do on the Dark Web would be, “more of the same but more secretly.” However, that is only partially true. Terrorists are using the Dark Web as they have been using the Surface Web for several decades, but there are also new opportunities offered now to cyber-savvy operatives. Terrorists have used the Internet to provide information to fellow terrorists, to recruit and radicalize, to spread propaganda, to raise funds, and to coordinate actions and attacks. All of this activity, however, has now shifted to deeper layers of the Internet. Terrorist propaganda material, for example, is now stowed in the Dark Web. On 15 November 2015, two days after the Paris attacks, ISIS posted a message discussing their official Isdarat website, which archives propaganda and releases. The message contained links to a hidden Tor service with a “.onion” address, indicating the move of the Isdarat outlet to the Dark Web. The message declared: “Due to severe constraints imposed on the #Caliphate_Publications website, any new domain is deleted after being posted. We announce the launch of the website for “dark web.” The online libraries of terrorist material led several Jihadists to suggest a “Jihadwiki”.[7] In December 2015 an al-Qaeda group called the “al-Aqsa IT Team” distributed a manual entitled “Tor Browser Security Guidelines” for ensuring online anonymity while using Tor software. It offers step-by-step instructions for everything from downloading and installing the browser to steps for hindering geolocation and identification by counter-terrorism agencies.
Terrorists are now using the Dark Web also to communicate in a safer way than ever before. Although it has been long assumed that terrorist attacks are coordinated in a secret network, solid evidence has only been attained in 2013. In August 2013, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted encrypted communications between al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Nasir Al-Wuhaysi, the head of the Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The Institute for National Security Studies revealed that, for about a decade, the communication between leaders of the worldwide al-Qaeda network “apparently took place in a part of the Internet sometimes called deepnet, blacknet, or darknet.”

Recently, ISIS and other jihadist groups have used new online applications which allow users to broadcast their messages to an unlimited number of members via encrypted mobile phone apps such as Telegram. Since it went live on 14 August 2013, Telegram has seen major success, both among ordinary users as well as terrorists. But it was not until its launch of “channels” in September 2015 that the Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC) began to witness a massive migration from other social media sites, most notably Twitter, to Telegram. On 26 September 2015, just four days after Telegram rolled out channels, ISIS media operatives on Twitter started advertising the group’s own channel dubbed Nashir, which translates to “Distributor” in English. A recent ICT special report on Telegram revealed that “since September 2015, we have witnessed a significant increase in the use of the Telegram software (software for sending encrypted instant messages) by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. In March 2016 alone, 700 new channels identified with the Islamic State were opened.”

While many of the channels have Islamic State affiliations, there are an increasing number of channels from other major players in the global jihadi world: these include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and Jaysh al-Islam, both in Syria. Al-Qaeda’s Yemeni branch (AQAP) launched its own Telegram channel on 25 September 2015 and the Libyan Ansar al-Shari’ah group created its channel the following day. According to a TRAC report, membership growth for each discrete channel is staggering. Within a week's time, one single Islamic State channel went from 5,000 members to well over 10,000. When asked about it, Telegram’s CEO Pavel Durov conceded that ISIS indeed uses Telegram to ensure the security of its communications, but added: “I think that privacy, ultimately, and our right for privacy is more important than our fear of bad things happening, like terrorism.”

Another safe communication application adapted by terrorists is the TrueCrypt. One of the ISIS members who was captured by French police in August 2015 revealed details about this program. Reda Hame, a Parisian IT specialist who traveled to Syria to join ISIS and fight was instead put through a rapid training course and sent back to France to carry out an attack. Hame provided details of his training to use TrueCrypt, an encryption application, and how, before returning to France, he was given a USB drive containing the program. The ISIS technicians also instructed Hame to transfer TrueCrypt from the USB key to a second computer once he reached Europe. TrueCrypt was launched in 2004 by Paul Le Roux, a programmer and a crime lord, who operated a global drug, arms and money-laundering cartel out of a base in the Philippines. Le Roux was arrested in Liberia on drug-trafficking charges in September 2012. But TrueCrypt is still active and backdoor-free, which explains why ISIS terrorists still use it for encrypted communications and file sharing.

Terrorists can use the Dark Web for fundraising, money transfers, and illegal purchase of explosives and weapons, using virtual currencies like Bitcoin and other crypto-currencies. For instance, “Fund the Islamic Struggle without Leaving a Trace” is a Deep Web page which invites donations for Jihad through transactions to a particular Bitcoin address. A PDF document posted online under the pseudonym of Amreeki Witness titled “Bitcoin wa Sadaqat alJihad,” which translates to “Bitcoin and the Charity of Violent Physical Struggle,” is in fact a guide for using the Dark Web for secretive financial transactions. The weapons used for the deadly Paris attacks are now thought to have been purchased from a hidden Dark Web store, which,
according to official documents from the Stuttgart prosecutor’s office, was a German Dark Net vendor under the username DW Guns.[14] Some reports revealed that the Dark Web has also become a medium for some terrorist organizations to sell on online black markets human organs (probably of their captives), as well as stolen oil or smuggled antiquities looted from ancient cities.[15]

In January 2015, the Singapore-based cyber intelligence company S2T uncovered concrete evidence that a terror cell, purporting to be related to Islamic State and operating in the Americas, is soliciting Bitcoin as part of its fundraising efforts.[16] The online message from the group’s fundraiser, a man later identified only as Abu-Mustafa, declared: “One cannot send a bank transfer to a mujahid [someone engaged in Jihad] or suspected mujahid without the kafir [infidel] governments ruling today immediately being aware …A proposed solution to this is something known as Bitcoin …To set up a totally anonymous donation system that could send millions of dollars’ worth of Bitcoin instantly…right to the pockets of the mujahideen, very little would be done [against it].”[17] Another example comes from Indonesia where a Jihadist group collected donations, both from national and international donors, through Bitcoins on the Dark Web. Furthermore, getting a stolen identity from the Dark Web, they hacked a Forex trading website to whip the points of the member. From these series of cybercrimes, the terrorist group collected US $600,000.[18]

**The Challenge of Dark Web Terrorism**

Terrorists flying drones to spread highly radioactive material over a civilian area: this is part of the nightmare scenario that U.S. President Barack Obama urged world leaders to consider as they debated better ways of controlling nuclear material. Speaking to a group of 50 heads of state and foreign ministers in Washington, D.C., in April 2016, President Obama described how a terrorist group had bought isotopes through brokers on the Dark Web. In March 2016, the French Interior Minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, argued that the Dark Web is being used extensively by terrorists. In a meeting of the National Assembly, he said that those who have been responsible for the recent terrorist strikes in Europe have been making use of the deep web, communicating through encrypted messages.

The growing sophistication of terrorists’ use of the Dark Web presents a tough challenge for governments, counter-terrorism agencies, and security services. There is an urgent need to develop new methods and measures for tracking and analyzing terrorist use of the Dark Web. Thus, for example, the American Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) believes the answer can be found in MEMEX, a software that allows for better cataloguing of Deep Web sites. Providing clear evidence that shows the Dark Web has turned into a major platform for global terrorism and criminal activities is absolutely crucial in order to provide the impetus for the necessary tools to be developed to counter it. MEMEX was originally developed for monitoring human trafficking on the Deep Web; but the same principles can be applied to almost any illicit Deep Web activity. In February 2015, a special report entitled “The Impact of the Dark Web on Internet Governance and Cyber Security” presented several suggestions regarding the Dark Web.[19] The report states that “in order to formulate comprehensive strategies and policies for governing the Internet, it is important to consider insights on its farthest reaches—the Deep Web and, more importantly, the Dark Web.” It also notes that “While the Dark Web may lack the broad appeal that is available on the Surface Web, the hidden ecosystem is conducive for propaganda, recruitment, financing and planning, which relates to our original understanding of the Dark Web as an unregulated space.”

Finally, it is necessary to remember that the Dark Web also serves journalists, civil rights advocates, and democracy activists—all of whom may be under threat of censorship or imprisonment. Thus, the alarming infiltration of Internet-savvy terrorists to the “virtual caves” of the Dark Web should trigger an international search for a solution to combat illegal and nefarious activities, but one that should not impair legitimate, lawful freedom of expression.
About the Author: Gabriel Weimann is a Full Professor of Communication at the Department of Communication at Haifa University, Israel. His research interests include the study of media effects, political campaigns, persuasion and influence, modern terrorism and the media. He published nine books and more than 180 academic articles in scientific journals. He received numerous grants and awards from international foundations and was a Visiting Professor at various universities including University of Pennsylvania, Stanford University, Hofstra University, Lehigh University (USA), University of Mainz (Germany), Carleton University (Canada), the American University (Washington, D.C.), the NYU branch in Shanghai (China) and the National University of Singapore. His books include Terror on the Internet (2006) and Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation (2015).

Notes
[1] In the FBI’s director’s testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
A Framework for Assessing the Mobilization of Westerners by Jihadists in Syria and Intervention Points for Counter-Measures

by Joshua Sinai

Abstract

This Research Note presents a framework for mapping the radicalization and mobilization pathways of radicalized Western Muslims (who represent a small proportion of their countries’ overall Muslim populations) into (1) becoming foreign fighters in Syria to engage in insurgent and terrorist activities or to decide to return to carry out such attacks in their home countries, (2) becoming radicalized in the West by these jihadist organizations and their local surrogates to carry out terrorist attacks in their own home countries without leaving them, and, to validate the framework’s preemptive counter-measures, (3) becoming radicalized into deciding to become jihadi fighters in Syria but being prevented from traveling there either at border crossing points, such as Turkey, or through other preventative measures at various stages of their mobilization in their home countries. To accomplish these objectives, the framework presents five categories that characterize such trajectories, which are broken down into thirteen factors, with each factor marked by critical points for preemptive intervention by government security services.

Keywords: Radicalization; Mobilization; Foreign Fighters; Terrorism; Counterterrorism; Countering Violent Extremism; Disengagement from Terrorism.

Introduction

Since the breakdown of Middle Eastern states such as Syria in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, which began in late 2010, Western security services have been highly concerned about three distinct developments resulting from the radicalization and mobilization of thousands of Western Muslims (whether Muslim-born or converts) by the so-called “Islamic State” (IS, also known as Daesh) and al Qaeda-affiliated jihadists in Syria – which had become a failed state as a result of this insurgency, as well as other factors. The first development of concern is the proliferation of thousands of Western Muslims (as well as Muslims from other global regions) into becoming foreign fighters on behalf of these jihadist organizations, particularly in the Syrian civil war, with an estimated 5,000 Western European individuals reportedly joining the jihadists in Syria, with an additional 280 coming from North America, by the end of 2015.[1] In the second development, some of these radicalized Western foreign fighters have returned to their Western countries to conduct attacks on behalf of these jihadist groups, such as the terrorist attacks by such returnees (and their local cells) in Brussels, Belgium (May 24, 2014 and March 22, 2016) and Paris, France (January 2015 and November 14, 2015). In the final development, the jihadi ideology of IS has radicalized other homegrown Islamist extremists to remain and conduct terrorist attacks in their Western home countries, such as the shooting rampage by the husband-and-wife team of Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik (although she had grown up in Pakistan) in San Bernardino, California (December 2, 2015).

Objective

In light of these three inter-related jihadist threat trends, Western security officials are concerned that, to demonstrate its continued relevancy as a ‘world class’ Islamist insurgency, IS, in particular, may be intensifying its efforts to set up terrorist cells in Western Europe to conduct further attacks, including potentially, a nuclear attack, while continuing its operations to expand the areas it controls in Syria and Iraq (where fewer Western foreign fighters are reported to be present).[2] To upgrade the capability of
governmental counter-terrorism services to better understand how these three threat trends have converged and to effectively counter them through appropriate preventative measures, this Research Note presents a framework for mapping the radicalization and mobilization pathways of such individuals into violent extremism along five categories that characterize these trajectories, which are broken down into thirteen factors, with each factor marked by critical points for preemptive intervention by government security services.

This framework is also intended to upgrade the counter-terrorism capability of other entities such as non-governmental organizations in local communities that play an important role in countering violent extremism and facilitating the disengagement of such violence-prone individuals into peaceful activities because they are the first line of defense against the outbreak of violent extremism in their midst since they are familiar with the neighborhoods where such individuals live and the tailored measures required to de-radicalize them. For academic analysts, it is hoped that this framework will serve as a building block for further research and analysis to shed additional light on how to track and counter these distinct radicalization and mobilization trajectories of Westerners into jihadist violence, since many of those who traverse these paths share common characteristics that can be generalized into theories and hypotheses for testing and validation purposes.

Finally, this framework is intended to supplement other academic studies on these issues. These include Peter Nesser’s *Islamist Terrorism in Europe: A History*, which attempts analytically “to demonstrate how jihadi terrorism in Europe emerged through an intricate interplay between foreign and European factors, between top-down and bottom-up processes of radicalization, and between social and ideological motivations.”[3] Another valuable analytic study is Phil Gursky’s *The Threat From Within: Recognizing Al Qaeda-Inspired Radicalization and Terrorism In the West,*[4] which analyzes key conceptual drivers that influence such radicalization and mobilization pathways, such as socio-economic backgrounds, psychological characteristics, as well as physical venues, as well as key concepts from Islam and Muslim history and attitudes towards Western ways and policies, that help shape what the author terms an “extremist mindset.” This framework is also intended to augment the work of academic research institutes on these issues, such as the International Center for the Study of Radicalization’s (ICSR) study of the motivations, trajectories and personal histories of Western (and Australasia) foreign fighters engaged in the Syrian civil war.[5]

To operationalize this framework, three basic endpoint scenarios that characterize Western jihadist violent extremism are posited: (1) becoming foreign fighters in Syria to engage in insurgent and terrorist activities or to decide to return to carry out such attacks in their home countries, (2) becoming radicalized in the West by these jihadist organizations and their local surrogates to carry out terrorist attacks in their own home countries without leaving them, and, to validate the model’s preemptive counter-measures, (3) becoming radicalized into deciding to become jihadi fighters in Syria but being prevented from traveling there either at border crossing points, such as Turkey, or through other preventative measures at various stages of their mobilization in their home countries.

In this Research Note’s primary section, the radicalization and mobilization of susceptible individuals into these potential endpoint scenarios are mapped in Table 1. “A Framework for Modeling the Radicalization and Mobilization Pathways into Jihadist Terrorism and Intervention Points for Effective Preventative Countermeasures.” The framework’s five categories and their thirteen factors are then applied to three case studies of prototypical Western individuals to test whether they have exhibited any of the characteristics of these three types of radicalization and mobilization trajectories. If the framework is found to be testable against these cases, then it is hoped it will be capable of providing counterterrorism services, as well as academic analysts, with a framework to map where their persons of concern may be located along the trajectory of early radicalization to further mobilization in order to enable them to implement appropriate counter-measures for successful preemption during the formative early pre-incident attack or pre-foreign
travel phases. It is recognized that this preliminary framework does not cover all the pathways to jihadist violence that can be found among Muslims and recent converts to Islam in Western diasporas and that further research and analysis is required to develop a more comprehensive, detailed and exhaustive mapping of these processes into terrorist violence, which will constitute a larger effort into understanding how to influence such individuals towards the trajectory of de-radicalization and disengagement pathways from terrorism.

Elements of the Framework

The framework proposed here consists of five categories broken down into thirteen factors, marked by critical points for preventative intervention, that characterize the pathways driving radicalization and mobilization into jihadist violent extremism, whether as homegrown terrorists or as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.

Table 1. “A Framework for Modeling the Radicalization and Mobilization Pathways into Jihadist Terrorism and Intervention Points for Effective Preventative Countermeasures.” [6]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathways into Jihadist Violent Extremism In-Country &amp; Becoming Fighters in Foreign Conflict Zones</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Preventative Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category 1: Radicalization Factors</td>
<td>A process by which individuals or groups are indoctrinated and mobilized to adopt increasingly intolerant and extremist political and/or religious beliefs and behaviors, ranging from aggressive proselytizing to violent extremist.</td>
<td>Preventative Measures: “Soft” multidisciplinary programs to counter extremist ideologies, promotion of social cohesion and socio-economic integration in society, law enforcement programs to identify and apprehend extremist radicalizers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-1 - Push Factors: Personal Crisis</td>
<td>Cognitive opening (“born again”-type) to embrace extremist ideologies due to feeling socially marginal and downgraded by others, often accompanied by family, relational and/or employment problems, and a sense of uprootedness and alienation from own or host society.</td>
<td>Preventative Measures: Focusing on integration into society and economy by addressing discrimination and other issues that give rise to personal grievances. Target at-risk individuals to make them more resilient to extremist ideologies; implement individual self-empowerment programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-2 - Push Factors: Domestic Issues</td>
<td>Personal and/or group-specific grievances such as beliefs that host or own society is discriminating against them and co-religionists rather than accepting them as equals.</td>
<td>Preventative Measures: Promoting a sense of belonging and shared identity through inter-personal dialogue at grassroots level, anti-discrimination projects, improving educational opportunities, and encouraging non-violent and legal ways to address grievances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-3 - Pull Factors: Foreign Issues</td>
<td>Feeling outrage at the unjust suffering of co-religionists in a foreign conflict to which one’s Western government, in their view, is indifferent or hostile.</td>
<td>Preventative Measures: Counter-narratives that Western government involvement in Syria (and Iraq) is not motivated by religious Christian antipathy towards Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4 - Extremist Sub-cultures/Local Radicalizers</td>
<td>Pervasiveness of extremist ideologies that are spread by local radicalizers and recruiters, whether preachers, community leaders, jihadist veterans, and other operators and facilitators, working often by means of family and friendship networks.</td>
<td>Preventative Measures: Outreach programs that cooperate with responsible local community leaders to counter extremist ideologies with counter-narratives and self-empowering programs that promote constructive engagement in society rather than a turn to violent extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5 - Social Media &amp; Influential jihadist or religious Leaders</td>
<td>Extremist groups employ social media venues, incl. websites, online magazines, or Twitter and YouTube videos, featuring influential spiritual and jihadist leaders to promote extremist activities on behalf of their cause, including becoming fighters on behalf of their co-religionists in a foreign conflict. Vulnerable individuals “buy” their polarizing narratives and reject Western values while embracing jihadist interpretation of Islam. Anti-Christian, anti-Semitic and anti-Shia hate rhetoric</td>
<td>Preventative Measures: Vetting and monitoring extremist social media websites, countering their extremist leaders with counter-narratives to encourage disengagement from extremism and discouraging travel to foreign conflict region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Category II: Triggers**

Triggers might include, a personal crisis or media-transmitted narratives of suffering of co-religionists; a belief that there is a need to join insurgent groups to avenge for the death of their associates (even if these are neither family members nor friends) and that it is their religious duty to embark on warfare to defeat the enemies of their religion.

**Preventative Measures:** To counter such triggers, utilizing disillusioned returnees or local community leaders to dissuade potential recruits from traveling through messages such as explaining that they will be exploited as ‘cannon fodder’, that the insurgents themselves are committing brutal atrocities against innocent fellow Muslims, and that their potential travel or resort to terrorism will serve to destroy any chances for advancement in their own societies.

**Category III: Preparation for Travel to Foreign Conflict Zone**

Prepare to travel to the foreign conflict zone by taking measures such as intensifying contacts with returnees/recruiters/facilitators that will enable them to enter the conflict zone; start to make travel plans; adopt a ‘cover story’ for their travel; and start selling/giving away personal possessions because they realize they may never return.

**Preventative Measures:** Identifying the warning signs that an individual may be preparing to embark on suspicious travel to a foreign conflict zone and dissuading or preventing such travel by taking away passports.

**III-1 - Funding Sources**

Fund travel by depleting one’s personal bank account, seeking donations from associates or others for the foreign travel, receive funds from unexplained sources (e.g., radicalizers/recruiters/jihadi charities who manage such travel), or engage in illicit activities such as credit card fraud to raise funds.

**Preventative Measures:** Monitoring and tracking suspicious funding activities to facilitate travel to a foreign conflict zone.

**III-2 - Logistical Facilitators**

Seeking logistical facilitators in a local community or on the Internet to enable foreign travel.

**Preventative Measures:** Monitoring and tracking those who contact logistical facilitators.

**III-3 - Transit Routes**

Transit routes stretch from countries of origin to bordering countries, such as Turkey, which may or may not require entry visas. Once in-country, local smuggling facilitators collect Western recruits at airports and transport them to safe houses at designated border towns for eventual smuggling them into Syria or Iraq.

**Preventative Measures:** Multilateral and bilateral level monitoring programs that collect data on suspicious foreign travel and the logistical networks that smuggle them to their destinations.
| Category IV: Activities in Syria or Iraq (Fighting, Training or, less often, Humanitarian Aid) | Once at their conflict zone destinations, Westerners are likely to become fighters, or martyrs or receive training and indoctrination for deployment upon their return to their Western countries of origin. | Preventative Measures: Monitoring and tracking these individuals' movements and activities, such as in social media, including contact with their families and associates in their home countries. |
| Category V: Returning to Western Countries of Origin | A minority might return to their Western home countries, for reasons ranging from disillusionment with fighting in harsh battle environments, to even further radicalization upon completion of their training and indoctrination to become radicalizers, recruiters, sleepers or terrorist operatives in their home countries. | Preventative Measures: Canceling passports, revoking residence permits and denying re-entrance to home country's border crossings, arresting returnees at border crossings, or permitting them to return but tracking their activities in their local communities, or engaging them in programs to de-radicalize and disengage them from terrorism. |

**Illustrating the Use of the Framework**

In this section, the framework's categories and factors are operationalized by applying them to the following three case studies:

(i.) *Mehdi Nemmouche*

In an illustrative case of a Western homegrown violent extremist being radicalized by ultimately joining the jihadi insurgents in Syria and returning to the West to carry out a terrorist attack (Categories I-V), on May 24, 2014, Mehdi Nemmouche, aged 29, a dual French-Algerian national, walked into the Jewish museum in Brussels and killed four people with his Kalashnikov rifle. He was eventually arrested on May 30, at the Saint-Charles railway station in Marseilles, and in late July 2014 he was extradited to Belgium to face trial.

Like others fitting his trajectory, Nemmouche's personal background matched the factors associated with Categories I-II. He had a history of juvenile delinquency while growing up in La Bourgogne, one of the poorest neighborhoods in Roubaix-Tourcoing, where he was raised by his grandmother.[7] Beginning in his early 20s, his criminal activities landed him in jail several times, with his last release from prison in early December 2012.[8]

Moreover, Nemouche's trajectory of indoctrination into Islamism and jihadism also matched Category I's 2-5, as he was reportedly radicalized while in prison (the exact circumstances of his radicalization process was unclear at the time of this writing, but are likely to be revealed in his trial's proceedings).

Finally, Nemouche's trajectory into joining ISIS followed Categories III-IV, as he made his way to Syria as part of a French contingent that had joined ISIS via Turkey in early January 2013. Once in ISIS, he remained with the group for some 11 months, eventually becoming one of their guards at a prison that held Western hostages.[9] It was there in 2013 that he reportedly bragged to several of his hostages (who were later released as part of a ransom deal) about his “ambitious plans to attack the July 14 Bastille Day parade in Paris.”[10] While his specific motivation or circumstances for his decision to return to Europe are not known, according to one report he may have either “fallen out with ISIS, or perhaps he just got bored or ISIS commanders decided he was too unreliable.”[11]

In an example of how French security services failed to adequately employ the preventative measures of Category V, starting with monitoring his trips to Malaysia and Singapore, Nemmouche managed to return to Europe via Frankfurt, Germany, in December 2013.[12] Interestingly, even though his name was included on
a French watch list[13] and the German authorities had alerted the French authorities that he had landed in Frankfurt, no further action was taken to apprehend him either by the German or French security services. [14] In a further example of how the preventative measures of Category V were not utilized by Western security services, Nemmouche may either have travelled to France from Frankfurt, in which case the French security services missed him, or had travelled straight to Brussels.[15]

(ii.) Michael Zehaf-Bibeau

In a case of a homegrown violent extremist being radicalized by the jihadi insurgents in Syria/Iraq and their radical subcultures in Western countries into carrying out attacks in one’s own country, on October 23, 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, aged 32, shot Corporal Nathan Cirillo while on ceremonial guard at a memorial in the center of Ottawa, Canada, and then forced his way into the nearby Parliament building where he continued firing his weapon, shooting an officer in the leg to enter the facility. He was immediately killed by one of the local security officers.

Zehaf-Bibeau, like other homegrown Western Muslims, exhibited the characteristics of Category I’s factors of 1-5. In terms of “Personal Crisis” he had a history of “criminality of violence and of drugs and of mental instability,”[16] he regarded himself to be socially marginal, experienced employment problems, and had a sense of uprootedness and alienation from Canadian society. He also believed that his society was discriminating against his co-religionists, and, in terms of “Foreign Issues”, he felt outrage at his country’s military activities against his co-religionists in Syria/Iraq.

It was especially in regard to Category 1-3, as well as Category II’s “Triggers,” that it was reported that the day prior to his attack, he was overheard by bystanders at an Ottawa shopping mall engaging in an angry and loud discussion with a stranger about the justification of killing of civilians by soldiers, in which he stated that “If soldiers bombed your family, wouldn’t you want to kill them?”[17] Interestingly, this incident also revealed a gap in Canada’s preventative measures – especially those matched to Category I’s factors of 1-5, as well as Category II’s “Triggers,” since such angry statements, especially when directed against a stranger, should raise warning signals that such an individual may be predisposed to act on this angry sentiment – especially during a period of heightened levels of terrorism threats. Thus, if one of the bystanders had reported this exchange to the appropriate law enforcement authorities, it could have triggered a preemptive disruption of his planned attack the next day.

(iii.) Denver-Area Teenage Muslim Girls

With an estimated 200 Western women radicalized into becoming foreign volunteers on behalf of the jihadi insurgents in Syria and Iraq by mid-2014,[18] this phenomenon continued to grow as more and more Western Muslim women appeared susceptible to these jihadi messages. In an example of how parental intervention plays a crucial role in preventative counter-measures (see Category III-3 – “Transit Routes” preventative measures), following the departure on October 17, 2014 of three teenage girls (as minor girls, their identities were not disclosed) from Denver, Colorado, to Frankfurt, Germany, en route to Turkey and Syria (reportedly to join ISIS), their parents immediately contacted the American FBI, to alert them about their arrival at the Frankfurt Airport. The three teenage girls consisted of a 15-year old of Sudanese descent, and two sisters, aged 15 and 17, of Somali descent. Upon finding out that his daughter was missing, the father of the 15-year old, Assad Ibrahim, called the father of the two sisters, Ali Farah (whom the sisters had told they were going to be studying at the library that day), the two fathers then contacted the FBI. The three teenagers were intercepted by German authorities at the Frankfurt Airport, who placed them on a return flight to the United States, where they were apprehended by FBI agents. As minors, they were questioned by the FBI and released to their parents’ care.

Following the trajectory of Categories of I-III, the three girls had become radicalized into violent extremism via the Internet’s extremist websites,[19] and then, once radicalized and indoctrinated into ISIS-type
jihadism, proceeded to begin Category III’s 1-2 factors of researching the funding and logistical components of their travel to Syria, including, possibly, contacting potential logistical facilitators in Turkey.[20] It was reported that the 17-year old sister was the plan’s instigator.[21] Interestingly, their online activity in extremist websites reportedly went unnoticed by U.S. security services.[22]

Conclusions
As demonstrated by the application of this framework to the three case studies (especially the one involving the three teenage girls from Denver, Colorado), it is possible to preemptively prevent such individuals from reaching their final destinations in Syria if those closely associated with such individuals are able to notice their worrisome radicalization activities or early suspicious travel patterns, and to alert the appropriate authorities to disrupt their travel prior to their arrival at their transit or border entry points. The cases of the attacks in Brussels in May 2014 and the cases of the November 2015 attacks in Paris and the March 2016 attacks in Brussels (which are not covered in this Research Note) demonstrate that gaps still existed in Western governments’ counterterrorism measures to prevent such individuals from slipping through the preventative cracks. Finally, the case of the shooting rampage in early December 2015 by the husband-and-wife team in San Bernardino, California, demonstrates that gaps in domestic counterterrorism surveillance of foreign inspired jihadist adherents in the United States still needed to be fixed as well, especially in more effectively surveilling their extremist activities in physical and cyber realms.

In light of these conclusions, and the fact that the number of Western Islamist extremists and would be foreign fighters (which are reported to be on the decline as of mid-2016), it still needs to be acknowledged that the comprehensive surveillance program of such extremists based on the components presented by this framework may be beyond most Western counterterrorism and law enforcement agencies. For this reason it is crucial to obtain the active collaboration of the leadership of the relevant religious communities – especially on the local level – in identifying in their midst extremists and those in danger of becoming radicalized – and providing them the appropriate political opportunities to express themselves in a non-violent way, while also providing them the socio-economic means to advance themselves in their societies. It is also crucial to resolve the dilemma in Western societies to appropriately balance the requirement for security while still preserving citizens’ civil liberties.

At the end of the day, however, it must be recognized that the main causes for radicalization of Muslims in Western Diasporas include Islamist narratives that blame the unresolved conflicts in the Arab and Muslim world on their apostate adversaries, as well as their very real integration problems in their own societies, for which there are no easy solutions. Against this background, even the most comprehensive and best intentioned efforts of those seeking to counter the radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism emanating from Western Muslim Diasporas are bound to remain an uphill battle.

About the Author: Dr. Joshua Sinai is a Principal Analyst at Kiernan Group Holdings (KGH), in Alexandria, VA, USA, where he specializes in homeland security and counterterrorism studies.

Notes


Ibid.

Marc Weitzmann, “He Tortured for ISIS: So, Why Why He at Large Before the Brussels Museum Massacre?”


Dickey, “French Jihadi Mehdi Nemmouche Is the Shape of Terror to Come.”

Weitzmann, He Tortured for ISIS: So, Why Why He at Large Before the Brussels Museum Massacre?”

Ibid.


Rita Katz, “From Teenage Colorado Girls to Islamic State Recruits: A Case Study in Radicalization Via Social Media, SITE Intel Group, November 12, 2014.


Ibid.

Ibid.
III. Special Correspondence

Winning Hearts and Minds in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas:
A Personal Recollection of a Peace-Building Effort with the Taliban

by Muhammad Feyyaz

Abstract
This biographical contribution describes experiences of a military commander gained during field employment in North Waziristan Agency – the most militancy riven region in tribal areas of Pakistan. The recollection outlines the transformation of part of this turbulent area into a zone of peace through a well-structured peace-building vision. Primarily, the approach entailed the idea of applying the concept of inclusive human security in order to turn all stakeholders and antagonists into a cohesive community, tolerant of each other's existence. Importantly, the strategy was evolved in a backdrop when security conditions in the Agency were characterized by a heightened phase of Taliban-led violence and fluid counter insurgency operations. Risk taking was vital to restore order but it indeed proved worth the effort.

Keywords: FATA; Pakistan; peace-building; human security; Taliban; hearts and minds

Introduction
The tribal areas of Pakistan, situated on the Pakistan-Afghan border, commonly known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), have been in the global spotlight for more than a decade (Map 1). I had the opportunity to serve there during the turbulent period of June 2006 until January 2008, as a Brigade commander. It was a trying time in my professional life. Prior to taking up the post, I had articulated a strategy to restore order and create stability in the area. The territory that fell under my responsibility [called area of responsibility (AOR) in military jargon] comprised the lush green Shawal Valley as well as the Detta Khel area of the North Waziristan Agency (Map 2), an area also dubbed 'factory of suicidal bombers'. Together with my team we developed ideas based on our professional experience and learning, and decided to apply these with utmost rigor and perseverance. Our approach of peace-building was based on the idea of forging inclusive human security, the objective of it was to turn all stakeholders and antagonists into a cohesive community, tolerant of each other’s existence. The key features of our approach are briefly recounted in this contribution.
Ideas and Practices of Peace-building

Building Security Stakeholders

Given the chaotic environment of the area, I first envisioned to make local tribes indirect stakeholder in my security, i.e. of my entire military establishment in the area. Consequently, after seeking consent of my military seniors as well as peers and subordinate staff, I assembled some material resources to use for education. We selected children between the ages of 5 and 15 from different regions and tribal segment of the population for education at a school in Nowshera, a district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. My battalion commanders assisted me in the selection process by asking for applications and also pinpointing needy families regardless of their lineage, Taliban connections or religious inclinations. Following a series of selection procedures, we were able to gather a good number of young students, in keeping with the available resources. Some of the children had been taken to schools prior to my joining this brigade, but without an eye for the long-term dividends I envisioned. We conceptualized it as a goodwill civil action component of our presence in the region and adopted it as regular feature in our social interactions with locals. As time passed, and even in the midst of high-level Taliban violence, parents of children kept communication with me. This allowed me at times also to obtaining a reading of the pulse of the area, similar to feedback from community policing. When those children would come home, parents and peers saw their sophisticated and urbanized outlook; this motivated many more to come to us. In the process, we were able to develop a reliable constituency for whom our security became of prime interest as they wanted to see our engagement in the educational process of their children to continue. Almost ten years later, I am still in touch with some of the parents, while many of their children have now risen to higher education. This successful experiment was based on my experience as a UN Peace Keeper in Somalia. There I had learned to identify children as the most effective means and route to forge a lasting security paradigm in the most harsh environment, based on the idea of harmonizing stakes through mutual inclusion.
Following the same underlying theme, we embarked upon helping families in our AOR whose members were suffering from chronic diseases (e.g. vision impairment, hepatitis, pulmonary tuberculosis, skin disorders and heart problems, etc.) We connected them to hospitals and specialists in major cities; those requiring urgent attention were even flown by helicopters or transported through army ambulances to urban areas in case of emergency. This developed a second tier of security stakeholders which proved vital during an armed encounter with Taliban fighters belonging to Baitullah Mehsud’s faction. In this particular battle we lost several of our soldiers; those soldiers who succeeded in escaping an ambush found refuge with families sympathetic to us. The latter informed us, and we could retrieve our soldiers though bringing the wrath of Taliban upon them. Some of these friendly families were even displaced by the Taliban who destroyed their houses and forced their expulsion from their villages.

Higher military headquarters helped us a great deal in furthering our hearts & minds approach by sending mobile free medical camps along, with male as well as female doctors and paramedics; this became a huge success. This service came on top of the medical camps that my brigade already operated on a routine basis in the area. It was particularly satisfying to see how womenfolk thronged these medical facilities. They took our sincere endeavour to bring peace to the region to every household.

Reconciliation and Personal Healing

Bitterness, anguish and grievances stoked by previous Pakistani army operations ran deep into the psyche of local people in our part of FATA. While a plain apology for what had gone wrong in the past would have been seen as an empty gesture, a more practical reconciliation strategy addressing the material hardships and mental turmoil of affected people was deemed more effective to contain the psychological traumas. As part of a deliberate and carefully worked out plan, close liaison was established with all the families who had lost relatives and relations in operations with the army. In fact, our Brigade assumed responsibility to administer to their various needs. At times, I used to personally go to deliver rations to aggrieved families besides taking care of the education of their children. Furthermore, we would also attend all funerals in the area and visit homes of grieved families as a routine practice--despite the dangers associated with such interactions. Gradually, we were able to wean away the desperate families and their youth from undertaking retaliatory actions against us--or we against them.

Friends, not Master!

Pashtun people are fiercely independent as individuals, and have historically never submitted to authority by coercion. Therefore, I decided to use compassion and introduce the democratic notion of the military being subordinate to the people. This might appear astonishing to Western audiences but in a country like Pakistan where the military has frequently ruled the country, there was no such conception of the military being in a subservient position. Rather a mindset of superiority has existed among the country’s military leadership for a long time. On the first day of addressing a jirga (a council of elders, notables, representatives, et al) belonging to a warrior tribe, after an exchange of pleasantries, I sat on ground with them - something contrary to past military practices. I explained to them that I (metaphorically, the Pakistani army) was there because of them and for them, and not the other way round. That broke the class- and social barrier that had separated us and we discussed issues of common interest in a most congenial setting. This particular sub-tribe of wazirs known as jani khel from Shawal valley had been a principal challenger of the army due to past excesses from both sides; some of the known local Taliban commanders also belonged to this tribe. Not much later, some Taliban from their tribe could be employed as go-between in conciliatory talks with out-of-area Taliban. In fact, this meeting opened a flood gate: a series of interactions were initiated, built upon and could be sustained, resulting in an enduring friendly and peaceful situation in this hitherto highly volatile region of North Waziristan. This practice was followed with all the other tribes of the area, without distinction.
However, jani khels and khaddar khels from the Detta khel area (who had a reputation for violence) became close ally, and were influential in spreading our appeal for peace and harmony.

Map 2 – My AOR in North Waziristan Agency

**Accountability for Unrestrained Use of Force**

An idea that had long resided inside me was to exercise restraint in the use of force, again thanks to my past peace-keeping experience. It was an extremely hazardous endeavor, difficult to put into practice in a fluid environment such as FATA where it was widely believed that tribes only understood the language of bullets. I was determined to prove them wrong. Two measures were instituted to implement the new approach.

First, I began to ingrain with great persistence in the minds of my soldiers the theme of a restrained and accountable use of lethal force. I would emphasize (metaphorically) that this brigade was not operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that the conditions were different and warranted a spectrum of responses embodying peace-keeping virtues, with combat being the last option in a less escalatory and more cost effective process. The whole notion was to create space to get ourselves accepted as part of the local community, which would better serve the objectives of our deployment in the area.

Secondly, while addressing the locals on several occasions, I would pledge that even if I am killed by an IED (improvised explosive device) or a suicidal attack during routine movements, my protection squad (which comprised highly trained and well equipped soldiers), will not retaliate in kind. Besides, I also promised I shall not enter their houses unless so warranted by a special situation but that was to be done subject to consultation and approval of their elders. I further assured them of my intention not to use high caliber weaponry (or, for that matter, any weapon) for firing at their dwellings, under no circumstances. Orders were also issued to subordinate units for compliance with this. In one instance, near Detta Khel, a convoy of 150 vehicles was attacked by IEDs; the pilots providing aerial cover readied to open fire on some suspects. They were sternly dismissed by the ground convoy commander, reminding the pilots that such was not the practice in this brigade and that the brigade’s commander strictly objected to it. While ground forces and pilots were conversing on wireless, the entire area had tuned into what is locally called mokhwara, a radio, and clearly listened to my instructions not to use force. Somehow, a few individual soldiers did open fire on those suspected to have triggered the IED, and also apprehended them. I not only released them with a financial compensation, but also publically sought apology for imprisoning the innocent and causing hurt to their families. This turned out to be a big success in convincing the tribes of our sincere commitment to keeping the peace, bringing many more bystanders into our folds. An immediate impact of this action was that even the Taliban from Detta Khel became sympathetic and began to resist foreign intruders to prevent attacks against us.
In fact, several of them were only nominally Taliban—just to avoid reprisals against their families and property. Actually these men abstained from adhering to the propagated cause of the mainstream Taliban; these men were also not crossing into Afghanistan. I used this opportunity to bring back into use a number of vacant girls’ and boys’ schools, completing some quick impact development projects, organizing sports on national days, various children competitions, disposing of grievances involving compensations for past military operations and creating further inroads through frequent visits to remote border areas of the AOR in order to connect plaintiffs with local civil administration officials to settle outstanding issues.

The Challenge - Opportunity Nexus

I had heard former President General Musharraf frequently using the phrase ‘turning challenge into an opportunity’, but was unable to grasp its real meaning until two instances revealed its underlying spirit. First were the flash floods in the area, caused by torrential rains during July 2006. The moment was seized promptly and capitalized effectively by officers and men of the Brigade, to win over the local people’s hearts. The entire Brigade was mobilized, including aviation effort to reach out to the distressed people to demonstrate our capacity and readiness to share their loss by meaningful actions. This massive effort—which received considerable attention in the national media—brought me into immediate contact with the local populace soon after my arrival. It also neutralized the Taliban’s anti-government propaganda in the area. The second instance was more challenging.

One night in the early hours of May or June 2007, two NATO helicopters violated Pakistan’s air space, allegedly in pursuit of some fleeing miscreants. They began to bomb suspected civilians in a border village located on the southern fringes of my AOR, along a historical route leading into Afghanistan, called mangrota. The helicopters even opened fire on one of my border military post during this operation. The whole episode lasted for about 2-3 hours, despite protests from our side. In the process ten civilians had lost lives, and more than a dozen others were injured. The Pakistan Army was perceived by tribesmen and even by mainstream citizenry as America-friendly. It was also assumed that no such action would have been possible without the consent of Pakistan’s army headquarters or local commanders. In this way, suddenly a situation of strong attitudinal hostility was created, with multiple implications and consequences, including the possibility of exploitation by Taliban against our troops and those wishing us well. A meditation effort revealed that even though dangerous, this challenge could be turned into an opportunity to redeem goodwill and keep peace in the area. I therefore instructed the local battalion commander to help evacuate the victims to regimental first aid post. Some local elements stood up against it, but we managed through announcements from mosques to avail the medical help. There were some casualties in critical condition these were brought to Bannu CMH (combined military hospital) by air. In addition, political agent of North Waziristan Agency (the apex civil bureaucrat in the area) was approached and he announced handsome compensations both for the deceased as well as those injured. This critical situation turned out to be a catalyst in re-establishing ourselves even more strongly. Peace and calm was preserved, potential spoilers were disappointed and the situation returned to normalcy within no time.

Conclusion

Among others achievements, a significant spin-off of our peace-building efforts was that we were able to effectively check cross-border infiltration from, or into, our area by hostile and anti-state elements. Secondly, many of the Taliban renounced violence, while also keeping a watch on foreign fighters.

The Brigade remained an island of peace for one complete year—until other dynamics began to change its environment. Two reasons account for what I could achieve. A sense of purpose refined with a clear vision of objectives, and, secondly, the total support from superior commanders and the cooperation
from subordinates. It does not need a special mentioning that obviously all those engaged in this peace-building effort were constantly exposed to risks to their life. However, the concept of human security and its implementation was indeed worthy of taking such risks.

**About the Author:** Muhammad Feyyaz: A soldier turned academic, Brigadier (Retired) Muhammad Feyyaz joined the Pakistan Army in 1980 and was commissioned in an infantry battalion. Among several other assignments, including overseas as UN peacekeeper, he has remained instructor at the Army's Command and Staff College, Quetta, National Defence University (NDU) Islamabad and National School of Public Policy, Lahore. As an experienced peacekeeper, he also headed the Centre of Excellence for Peacekeeping Studies at NDU, Islamabad. He currently teaches in the School of Governance and Society at the University of Management and Technology, in Lahore, and also acts as country coordinator of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI)—Pakistan Chapter.
IV. Resources

Bibliography: Islamic State (Part 2)
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism - BSPT-JT-2016-3]

Abstract
This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the Islamic State (IS / ISIS / ISIL / Daesh) and its predecessor organizations. To keep up with the rapid changing political events, more recent publications have been prioritized during the selection process. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography; resources; literature; Islamic State; IS, ISIS; ISIL; Daesh; Al-Qaeda in Iraq; AQI

NB: All websites were last visited on 23.05.2016. This subject bibliography is a sequel to an earlier bibliography (Part I). To avoid duplication, this compilation only includes literature not contained in Part I. However, meta-resources, such as bibliographies, were included in both parts.—See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

Bibliographies and other Resources

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad (2012, November-): Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi’s Blog. URL: http://www.aymennjawad.org


Collins, Dylan et al. (2012, December-): Syria Deeply. URL: http://beta.syriadeeply.org

Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) (n.d.-): ISIL, Syria & Iraq Resources. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/isil-resources

Higgins, Eliot et al. (2014, July-): Bellingcat. URL: https://www.bellingcat.com

IntelCenter (n.d.-): Islamic State & other Jihadi Inspired & Directed Attacks outside of Insurgent Theaters 2014 to Present: Interactive Map. URL: http://intelcenter.com/maps/jihadi-inspired-directed-attacks.html#gs.i5VZ8a8


Pack, Jason et al. (2016-): *Eye on ISIS in Libya*. URL: [http://eyeonisinslibya.com](http://eyeonisinslibya.com)

Paraszczuk, Joanna (2013, August-): *From Chechnya to Syria: Tracking Russian-Speaking Foreign Fighters in Syria*. URL: [http://www.chechensinsyria.com](http://www.chechensinsyria.com)


Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) (2011, June-): URL: [http://sn4hr.org](http://sn4hr.org)


Van Ostaeyen, Pieter (2012, October-): *pietervanostaeyen: Musings on Arabism, Islamicism, History and Current Affairs*. URL: [https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com](https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com)

Wing, Joel (2008, June-): *Musings on Iraq*. URL: [http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk](http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk)


**Books and Edited Volumes**


**Theses**


Anfinson, Nadia Adnan (2015, July): “In the Words of the Enemy”: Mediatising the Islamic State in Dabiq. (Master's Thesis, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/221289


**Journal Articles and Book Chapters**


Akbarzadeh, Shahram (2015, Fall): *Iran and Daesh: The Case of a Reluctant Shia Power.* Middle East Policy, 22(3), 44-54. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12142


Chaziza, Mordechai (2016, Spring): China’s Middle East Policy: The ISIS Factor. Middle East Policy, 23(1), 25-33. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12171


**Support and War in the Middle East: Insurgency in the Holy Land.** (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 170-191.


Hazbun, Waleed (2015, Fall): A History of Insecurity: From the Arab Uprisings to ISIS. Middle East Policy, 22(3), 55-65. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12143


Hughes, Geraint (2016): Militias in Internal Warfare: From the Colonial Era to the Contemporary Middle East. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27(2), 196-225. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129171


Juneau, Thomas (2015, Fall): Containing the Islamic State. Middle East Policy, 22(3), 36-43. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12141


Paasche, Till F.; Gunter, Michael M. (2016, Winter): Revisiting Western Strategies against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The Middle East Journal, 70(1), 9-29. DOI: [http://dx.doi.org/10.3751/70.1.11](http://dx.doi.org/10.3751/70.1.11)


Rice, Ian C.; Whiteside, Craig (2016, February): The CTAP Interview: The Return of the Zarqawists: How to Deal with the Islamic State Movement. CTX, 6(1). URL: https://globalecco.org/the-ctap-interview61


Souleimanov, Emil Aslan; Pettrylovam, Katarina (2015, Fall): Russia’s Policy toward the Islamic State. Middle East Policy, 22(3), 66-78. DOI: [http://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12144](http://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12144)


Zelin, Aaron Y. (2015): From the Archduke to the Caliph: The Islamist Evolution that Led to “The Islamic State”. In: T. G. Fraser (Ed.): *The First World War and its Aftermath: The Shaping of the Modern Middle East*. London: Gingko Library, 159-174. URL: https://www.academia.edu/19349433/From_the_Archduke_to_the_Caliph_The_Islamist_evolution_that_led_to_The_Islamic_State


**Grey Literature**


Azani, Eitan; Fighel, Jonathan; Atiyas Lvovsky, Lorena (2016, February): The Islamic State’s Threat to Israel. (ICT Articles). URL: http://www.ict.org.il/Article/1612/The-Islamic-States-Threat-to-Israel


Crane, Keith (2016, January): The Role of Oil in ISIL Finances: Addendum. (RAND Testimonies, CT-448/1). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7249/CT448.1


Lawrence, John (2015, August): Tracking ISIS since (before) the Islamic State. (ISW ISIS Sanctuary Maps Collection). URL: http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/tracking-isis-islamic-state


Martin, Patrick; Kozak, Christopher (2016, February): The Pitfalls of Relying on Kurdish Forces to Counter ISIS. (ISW Backgrounder). URL: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Pitfalls%20of%20Relying%20on%20Kurdish%20Forces%20to%20Counter%20ISIS.pdf


Tayler, Letta et al. (2016, May): “We Feel we are Cursed”: Life under ISIS in Sirte, Libya. (HRW Report). URL: https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/18/we-feel-we-are-cursed/life-under-isis-sirte-libya


**Note**

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

**About the compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., is a Professional Information Specialist. Since 2011, she works for the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). Additionally, she serves as Information Resources Editor to ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. In her editorial role, she regularly compiles bibliographies and other resources for Terrorism Research. She wrote her doctoral thesis on Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents (focus: media-oriented hostage takings). E-mail: j.tinnes@gmx.de**
Counterterrorism Bookshelf:
7 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

This column is divided into two parts: the first part reviews three books on terrorism and counterterrorism, and the second part focuses on books on the legal aspects of counterterrorism.


Starting with the premise that “To make their opponents feel threatened, extremists do not need to be well armed, or rational, or even very numerous,” the authors examine how such groups’ “extreme risk-taking behavior” is able to attract the sorts of individuals who are inclined to join such violent groups. (p. vii). Answering this question for social scientists is difficult, the authors point out, because “Extremists are few in number, operate underground, and are hard to reach not least because they tend to die young.” (p. viii). To examine these issues, particularly their hypothesis that “engineers are overrepresented among violent Islamist extremists,” the authors utilize available biographical data, especially levels and types of education, as their key variable, to determine why engineers are more prevalent in Islamist groups as opposed to other terrorist groups that are left-wing and secular in their ideological orientation.

What makes this volume highly innovative and an important contribution to the empirical study of radicalization and recruitment into terrorist groups is the way the authors frame these questions within the larger context of what they consider to be four questions that characterize extremism: first, the socioeconomic conditions that explain why individuals join extremist groups; second, do some individuals have a mind-set that is especially susceptible to becoming extremists; third, to what extent is the question of who becomes a terrorist “a matter of ‘supply’ – different types of people choosing particular types of extremism – or a matter of ‘demand’ – groups searching for and selecting suitable recruits?”; and fourth, “Does ideology matter in determining which types of people join certain groups?” (pp. xi-xiii).

To test their hypotheses, the authors focus on certain traits that characterize engineers that might cause them to be more attracted to the Islamist radical ideology vis-à-vis graduates from other disciplines, such as the social sciences and humanities, as well as whether relative deprivation might serve as another cause for their joining such extremist groups. (p. xiii). Finally, as part of their placement of these issues within the larger context of drivers into radicalization, they investigate “the character traits and dispositions that distinguish the various types of extremists” in general. (p. xiv).

Drawing on a dataset of 487 members of violent Islamist groups in the Muslim world active since the 1970s, the authors find that in this cohort “engineers are more likely to join violent opposition groups than non-violent ones, to prefer religious groups to secular groups, and to be less likely to defect once they join an Islamist group. None of these findings seems explicable in terms of relative deprivation.” (p. 161).

This book is also highly valuable for its discussion of the psychological drivers that characterize radicalization into violent extremism, such as “cognitive simplicity,” “intolerance of ambiguity,” and “need for closure” (NFC).

This conceptually innovative and empirically-based book utilizes open source materials to examine the evolution of Islamist terrorism in the United States and the United Kingdom prior to and since 9/11. Specifically, it attempts to explain in each of these two countries, and relating to the Global Salafi Jihad (GSJ), “who the terrorists are, how they operate and how they are being dealt with by the security services.” (p. xii). To capture such historical developments over time, the author's sample consists of individuals who were active in Islamist terrorist-related activity in the two countries from the 1980s through September 11, 2013. This includes 365 individuals in the U.S. and 427 individuals in the UK. (p. xiii)

To examine these issues, the book's chapters discuss the emergence of the homegrown Islamist terrorist threat in the West, their various motivations and operational manifestations in the U.S. and the UK, and the investigatory measures used by the counterterrorism services in the two countries and their legal outcomes.

There is much to commend in this important book. In addition to its comprehensive, yet concise analytical treatment of these issues, it utilizes quantitative techniques to assess the more than 750 cases which enable the author to systematize the findings into seven tables. These tables, which are used to illustrate the text, present findings on topics such as completed Islamist attacks in the West, the pre-disposing and direct factors that drive radicalization into terrorism, a statistical summary and background variable information, including operational activities of American and British jihadists before and after 9/11, and the types of investigative and legal processes used to arrest and prosecute such Islamist operatives.

Among the book's many interesting findings are that “the phenomenon has become increasingly home-grown since 9/11 in the sense that offenders are more likely to have been born and/or raised in the US/UK and to have radicalized there as opposed to being sent from abroad with the a priori intention of committing acts of terrorism. Rates of terrorist activity have also increased since 2001 and offenders have become more diverse in terms of ethnicity and socioeconomic background” (p. 259).

Although the book is based on a large empirical dataset of jihadi terrorist activity in the two countries, the author admits that its findings are limited by the sampling timeframe which ended in September 2013, with the involvement of jihadist terrorist groups in the civil wars in Syria and Iraq, which have introduced a “new era in jihadi terroris.” (p. 265). The author finds that this new era has greatly escalated the threat of Islamist violent activities in the West, including the travel of many of their adherents to these conflict zones. New trends introduced by these conflicts include their exploitation of the Internet to ‘virtualize’ the processes of radicalization, as well as the use of many Western fighters of their social media accounts to provide daily updates on their activities, including offering advice to others on how to join them in Syria.

The book concludes with a series of recommendations to strengthen U.S. and UK counterterrorism measures, such as greater selectivity in choosing partners in local Muslim communities to partner in countering violent extremism (CVE) programs, more clearly defining the criteria for success of such programs, and, in prosecuting returning foreign fighters, distinguishing between those who should be criminally prosecuted and those who can be de-radicalized and reintegrated into their Western communities.

The author is affiliated with the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Germany, and the University of Wollongong, Australia.

The contributors to this edited handbook examine the achievements of the discipline of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) in its first decade. CTS was established in 2004 as an alternative to what its academic authors term as the prevailing “orthodoxy” in terrorism and counterterrorism studies. As outlined by the volume’s editor, Richard Jackson (one of CTS’s main founders), the “orthodox” establishment is faulted for wrongly using the “terrorist” label on all opposition groups, for engaging in insufficient “primary research,” for “exaggerating” the magnitude of the terrorism threat, for the “gendered aspect of terrorism research,” and “other key issues.” (p. 2) Now that CTS has “succeeded in establishing itself as a unique and recognizable approach within the broader security and terrorism studies field,” Prof. Jackson adds, “it is now recognized for its particular critical theory-influenced ontology, its epistemological concerns, its methodological pluralism, its skepticism towards official counterterrorism culture and practice, and its sustained normative critique of the war on terror and Western counterterrorism practices.” (p. 2)

While there is much in contemporary terrorism and counterterrorism studies to criticize, this handbook’s contributors’ over-use of academic jargon and self-congratulatory tones do not contribute to the understanding that is needed to analyze and explain the nature and magnitude of the types of threats and challenges presented by contemporary terrorism and the components of counterterrorism required to address such threats. In one such example, in the chapter on “Critical Epistemologies of Terrorism,” James Fitzgerald observes that this reviewer, in a 2007 article, finds that “terrorism studies has yet to achieve the status of a hard science due to continuing difficulties in ‘problem areas’, such as reaching a consensus definition of terrorism and a lack of uniform coding and counting rules across a range of terrorism incident databases.” (p. 51) Prof. Fitzgerald, however, does not add to my 9-year old critique by explaining what a “consensus definition of terrorism” would constitute or how a new set of “uniform coding and counting rules” can be established to upgrade the utility of terrorism incident databases in explaining the magnitude of the terrorist threat (a point I had emphasized in my article).

In fact, the handbook’s only attempt to formulate a consensual definition of terrorism is found in the chapter on “The Definition of Terrorism,” by Timothy Shanahan, in which terrorism is defined as “the strategically indiscriminate harming or threat of harming members of a target group in order to influence the psychological states of an audience group in ways the perpetrators anticipate may be beneficial to the advancement of their agenda.” (p. 110) Without the inclusion of “the resort to violence,” which distinguishes terrorism as a particular type of armed warfare, it is doubtful if Prof. Shanahan’s provisional definition is ever likely to gain acceptance in the discipline or by government counterterrorism practitioners.

The resort to academic jargon is so pervasive throughout the handbook’s 27 chapters that, as George Orwell, had observed in his famous 1946 article on “Politics and the English Language,” one can say that it is being “used to dress up a simple statement and give an air of scientific impartiality to biased judgements.” Examples of such obscurantism include the chapter on “Methodology and the Critical Study of Terrorism,” by Jacob L. Stump, who writes that “Given the monist philosophical ontology on which a relational methodology operates, neither the neo-positivist conception of language (as a mirror) nor the CR [critical realism] conceptualization of discourse (as having multiple possible functions) is adequate.” (p. 95)

Some of the other chapters feature statements that make little sense. In the chapter on “Critical Evaluation of Counterterrorism,” Sondre Lindahl writes that “Importantly, a CTS framework of counterterrorism does not aim to provide solutions to terrorism in a problem-solving manner.” (p. 221) Unlike the author’s observation, however, isn’t one of the objectives of uncovering the root causes of terrorism to enable analysts and counterterrorism campaign planners to understand the underlying causes that need to be resolved? Moreover, how does this differ from his recommendation that an “emancipatory commitment” to counterterrorism should provide “an alternative to orthodox counterterrorism…” (p. 221).
Another statement that makes little sense is found in the chapter on “Media Coverage of Terrorism,” with Ben O’Loughlin writing, in a confusing manner, that “Terrorism is newsworthy, but terrorism only exists when covered by news.” (p. 284)

In other chapters the authors critique the “orthodox” treatment of terrorists, but without any evidence to substantiate their claims. An example is the chapter on “Terrorism and Peace Studies,” by Ioannis Tellidis, in which he claims that “the ‘terrorist’ label has been applied not only to extremist actors but also moderate nonviolent groups that sought to rectify grievances caused by states’ policies.” (p. 303). No examples are provided, however.

Finally, the chapter on “New Versus Old Terrorism,” by Alexander Spencer, relies in its discussion on “orthodox” terrorism analyses that are generally more than a decade old, with significant new trends not covered, such as terrorists’ exploitation of new means of communications, such as the Internet, and their impact on command and control, radicalization, and mobilization of new adherents, as well as its impact in “franchising” the decision to conduct terrorist attacks on its loosely affiliated, lone wolf Western adherents.

Those who subscribe to CTS’s jargon-laden and partisan approach will find much to admire in this handbook. George Orwell, on the other hand, would be flabbergasted.

The handbook’s editor, Richard Jackson, is Professor of Peace Studies and Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand.

**Counterterrorism – Legal Issues**


This comprehensive legal handbook is divided into five parts. The first part, “Introduction,” discusses the phenomenon of terrorism, how terrorism is defined, legal strategies for counter-terrorism, and the roles of parliament and the courts in reviewing terrorism legislation. The second part, “Investigation and Policing,” discusses the components of terrorist investigations (e.g., the use of surveillance, parameters for disclosing information about terrorism investigations, and domestic and international legal aspects in arresting and treating detainees following their arrest). The third part, “Criminal Law and Criminal Process,” discusses the components of terrorism-related criminal offenses within and outside anti-terrorism laws, international aspects of the criminal process, court sentencing, and the provisions of the post-punishment phase. The fourth part, “Other Legal Controls,” discusses terrorism-related executive powers over individuals, including comparisons with foreign country practices; the application of legal mechanisms to proscribe the activities of extremist organizations; countering terrorist funding; legal provisions in protective security, such as protecting critical facilities; and providing compensation to victims of terrorism. The final part, “Other Jurisdictions,” discusses the application of UK anti-terrorism laws in Northern Ireland and Scotland.

Clive Walker is Professor Emeritus of Criminal Justice Studies at the School of Law, University of Leeds.


This is a highly comprehensive and detailed survey and analysis of anti-terrorism legislation as it is applied in the United Kingdom, although it also includes references to such legislation in the European Union (EU), in international conventions, and in other Western countries. As a compendium, it includes key extracts from legislative texts, which are analyzed and critiqued. It covers terrorism and counterterrorism-
related topics such as the phenomenon of terrorism, how it is defined and categorized; the components of counterterrorism; the evolution of anti-terrorism legislation since 2000; the application of anti-terrorism legislation to proscribing extremist organizations, their funding and property; counter-terrorist powers, including their application to conducting terrorist investigations; consideration of criminal offenses within anti-terrorism legislation; the application of executive measures against individuals suspected of terrorist activity; criminal offenses related to the use of weapons of mass destruction, as well as attacking critical infrastructure sectors such as transportation; the application of anti-terrorism legislation to Northern Ireland; and legislative and other types of reviews of anti-terrorism laws. The appendices reproduce important anti-terrorism legal documents, such as the UK’s Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006, the “Counter-Terrorism Act 2008,” and the “Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.” An extensive bibliography is also included.


This edited handbook’s 30 chapters present a comprehensive and authoritative overview by leading legal experts of the application of legal measures in countering terrorism in all its manifestations. The handbook’s four parts are based on what are widely considered to be the principal components of counter-terrorism: prevent, prepare, protect, and pursue. Beginning with the editors’ introductory overview, the first part, “The Boundaries and Strategies of National Counter-Terrorism Laws,” discusses terrorism as a legal concept and the application of national laws to counter-terrorism and to states of emergency; the relationship between counter-terrorism and the laws of war; and the interactions between terrorism laws with human rights, constitutional accountability, and legal accountability. The second part, “The Pursuit of Terrorists Through National Criminal Justice Process and Executive Measures,” examines issues such as anti-terrorism laws vis-à-vis the employment of surveillance and intelligence measures; the application of the laws of war to the detention and interrogation of terrorism suspects; counter-terrorism policing; the arrest and trial of terrorists, including the use of evidence in trials; the handling and disclosure of sensitive intelligence-related information and materials; and legal issues in compensating the victims of terrorism. The third part, “Protective Security,” examines the application of legal measures in homeland security; legal issues involved in “stop and search” of terrorist suspects in the US and UK; securing the transport system; and legal instruments to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction. The fourth part, “Preventive Measures,” presents a comparative survey of counter-terrorism legal measures in the UK, Malaysia, and Pakistan; the social impact of counter-terrorism legislation and policies in Muslim communities in Western countries; legal issues involved in countering terrorists’ activities via the Internet; countering extremism while adhering to civil liberties; and guidelines in sentencing of terrorists following their trials. In the concluding chapter, the volume’s editors observe that effective counter-terrorism laws and judicial measures in a democratic society should aim “to deliver as much human security as national security.” (p. 467).

Genevieve Lennon is Chancellor’s Fellow at the School of Law, University of Strathclyde. Clive Walker is Professor Emeritus of Criminal Justice Studies at the School of Law, University of Leeds.


This is a comprehensive and authoritative examination of the use of preventative detention as a tool to preempt terrorist attacks. This is an important issue, the author argues, because “Preventative detention as a counter-terrorism tool is fraught with conceptual and procedural problems and risks of misuse, excess, and abuse. It is sometimes necessary to use it to save lives, but it has numerous drawbacks” (p. 2). It is also important to study this issue, the author adds, because “to date no one has examined together and
comprehensively detention under the law enforcement model, the law of armed conflict (LOAC) model, and the international human rights model, and compared each one against the others.” To fill this analytical gap, the author analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the laws relating to detention of terror suspects in seven countries (the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada, India, Israel, and France). Following the author’s introductory overview, which also presents a definition of terrorism, the book is divided into three parts. The first part, “Detention Provisions in Human Rights Treaties and Geneva Conventions,” discusses how preventative detention provisions are contained in various international conventions. The second part, “The Seven Countries,” examines how the preventative detention provisions are applied in practice in the countries under examination. The third part, “Recommendations,” presents a list of ten principles to form a “global core of detention principles.” These includes recommended measures such as clarifying the requirements for preventative detention to be based on grounds authorized by law, working towards eliminating indefinite detention, and providing a mechanism for independent oversight of detention.

The author is a British solicitor who received her doctorate at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, DC, which formed the basis for this book.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.
Phil Gurski. The Threat from Within. Recognizing Al-Qaeda-Inspired Radicalization and Terrorism in the West.


ISBN: 978-1-4422-5560-9 • Hardback; $ 75.00 (£49.95); 978-1-4422-5561-6; Paperback; $ 32.00 (£22.95); 978-1-4422-5562-3 • eBook; $ 31.99 (£22.95);

Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid

This book is the result of 15 years of study of Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism. Its author, Phil Gurski, recently retired from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). The volume is meant as a primer on understanding the terrorism threat in Canada and the West. The goal, however, is not purely academic; the main focus is on practice and detection of AQ-inspired terrorism in the West. Phil Gurski rightly observes that the religious nature of Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism is often downplayed; he therefore devotes a whole chapter to explain the key Islamic concepts used by Al-Qaeda in its radicalisation efforts. The author emphasizes that “Muslim communities and leaders cannot pretend that these terms are not being used or simply dismiss their ‘misuse’ as wrong, hoping that they will just go away” (p.71). This is an important observation, as politicians but also academic observers have often hesitate to make such a link between terrorism and religion for fear of being accused of Islamophobia.

There are about one million Muslims in Canada. One opinion poll conducted in 2007 among a sample of them concluded that 5 percent held that the performance of terrorists acts in Canada, as planned by the so-called “Toronto 18” was “fully justified”, 7 percent thought that it was “partly justified” while a further 15 percent were uncertain, answering “It depends”. That translates into, respectively, 50,000, 70,000 and 150,000 individuals or 270,000 in the aggregate – or 27 percent of the Muslim population of Canada (p.13). That is the pool of Muslims terrorist recruiters can try to (further) radicalise. Canada is, in this respect, not unique—sympathy and even support for anti-Western terrorism is astonishingly widespread among young Muslims in Western diasporas. While most Muslims are unlikely to put deeds by their words, it creates a problem for intelligence services to detect in time the few who become violently extremist and start preparing acts of terrorism. What are the predictive indicators to look out for? Phil Gurski presents a list of twelve “tangible, observable behaviors and attitudes of violent radicalisation” as a tool for analysts (pp.75-92,161):

1. Sudden increase in intolerant religiosity/change in behavior;
2. Rejection of different interpretations of Islam;
3. Rejection of/intolerance for, non-Muslims;
4. Rejection of Western ways;
5. Rejection of Western policies (domestic, military, foreign, social, etc.);
6. Association with like-minded people/ changes in social circles;
7. Obsession with Jihadi and violent-extremist websites and social media;
8. Obsession with/ Belief in, the common narrative;
9. Desire to travel to conflict zones/Obsession with foreign conflicts;
10. Obsession with violent jihad;
11. Obsession with martyrdom;
12. Obsession with End-Times.

In chapter 3, the author discusses these indicators in detail as these apply to 17 cases of foiled and completed attacks in Canada, participation in foreign terrorist plots, as well as foreign fighter experiences (at least 130 Canadians went abroad for jihad in Syria and other places). These 17 cases Gurski describes in the fourth chapter–where converts to Islam and immigrants and sons of Muslim immigrants figure prominently, with difficult youth, drug abuse, a crime record and occasionally mental health issues surfacing. While there are commonalities between the cases, Gurski notes “...that there is no single process of radicalisation. There is also no model predictive of who will move from advocating violent extremism to engaging in violent action” (p.122).

In the fifth chapter the author discusses soft (counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation) and hard (security- and law enforcement) responses to radicalisation toward terrorist violence. He admits that “In the war of ideas, we are being beaten badly” (p.138). While he concedes that Al-Qaeda’s single narrative “…should not be seen as unassailable” (p.139), he asks, “If an individual chooses to fight and die because they [sic] believe that God has asked them to do so, what human authority or agency can convince them otherwise?” (ibid.) Faith is blind and true believer terrorists generally have “closed minds” that make them “fact-resistant”. Yet some fanatical extremists have returned to reason and humanism. One of the approaches described in Gurski’s book refers to a Canadian government funded project which seeks to produce original counter-narrative films to tell stories of former violent extremists.

The volume contains several appendices, including one featuring a Radicalisation-to-Violence Matrix (pp.163-165) that further details the twelve indicators cited above. While the focus of the book is on Canada, many of its observations and insights also apply to other Western countries with Muslim diasporas. The volume is lucidly written, clearly structured, and carries the authority of someone who has been benefiting from decades of all-source access to classified intelligence information. Phil Gurski is not, as so many others, blowing up the threat of jihadist terrorism to the West. However, he is right on spot in identifying Islam-based religious extremism as being at the heart of the problem.

About the reviewer: Alex P. Schmid is editor-in-chief of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’ and former co-editor of ‘Terrorism and Political Violence’.
VI. Notes from the Editor

Crowdfunding Initiative on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of Perspectives on Terrorism

Dear Reader,

Perspectives on Terrorism, by some accounts the most widely-read peer-reviewed journal in the field of terrorism research, is celebrating its 10-year anniversary!

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), the non-profit organization behind Perspectives on Terrorism, has continually sought to provide the research community with free and non-partisan information on developments in terrorism and counter-terrorism from around the world.

For the past ten years, the journal’s editorial team, led by Alex P. Schmid, James J. Forest and Robert Wesley—the three directors of TRI – have not only volunteered their time, but have also fully financed the publishing of Perspectives on Terrorism out of their own pockets.

Now, as we prepare to ensure the next 10 years of service to the terrorism research community, we are, with this letter, appealing to those who value open access scholarship to help alleviate at least some of the financial burden associated with the publication of Perspectives on Terrorism.

To this end, we are inviting our readers and supporters to contribute to our new crowdfunding campaign in order to help keep Perspectives on Terrorism free of charge, openly accessible for its tens of thousands of regular and occasional readers.

Any and all contributions are welcome, and can be made online via the website link provided below. We run Perspectives on Terrorism on a shoestring budget – so a little money goes a long way!

TRI is a US non-profit (501c3) organization, so donations may be tax deductible.

We hope you will recognize our efforts to produce an independent journal on behalf of the international research community, and we thank you in advance for your contribution!

Sincerely,

Alex P. Schmid                              James J. Forest                             Robert Wesley

To make a donation in support of the open-access scholarly journal, Perspectives on Terrorism click on the following link:

https://www.gofundme.com/perspectivestri
About Perspectives on Terrorism

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at [www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com). It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.

*Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism*

- **Alex P. Schmid**, Editor-in-Chief
- **James J.F. Forest**, Co-Editor
- **Joseph J. Easson**, Associate Editor
- **Joshua Sinai**, Books Reviews Editor
- **Judith Tinnes**, Information Resources Editor
- **Jared Dmello**, Editorial Assistant
- **Jodi Pomeroy**, Editorial Assistant
- **Eric Price**, Editorial Assistant