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Welcome from the Editor

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the publication of the October 2015 issue (PT IX 5) of Perspectives on Terrorism at: <www.terrorismanalysts.com>. Now approaching its 10th year of publication, our journal has 5,600 e-mail subscribers and many more website visitors (287,483 in 2014), making it probably the most widely read journal in the field of terrorism- and counter-terrorism studies. Our open access journal is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative ( TRI), headquartered in Vienna (Austria), and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts (United States). Six issues of the journal are published annually.

The Articles in each issue are fully peer-reviewed by external referees, while its Policy Briefs and other content are subject to internal editorial quality control. The current issue opens with a contribution summarising some of the findings of the award-winning dissertation of Dr. Anneli Botha (South Africa). The reader will find a report of the jury listing also all other theses submitted for the annual TRI Award for the ‘Best Doctoral Thesis on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism’ (2014) as well as a brief description of the short-listed three finalists theses at the end of this issue.

Our second article, written by Paul J. Carnegie, explores how Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, has been dealing with terrorism, using a mixed carrot-and-stick approach. The third article, from the hands of Brenda Lutz and James Lutz, is more quantitative in nature; it analyses how globalization and terrorism are linked in the Middle East, both in the years before and after 9/11. As so often, the picture is more complex than expected.

This issue features two Research Notes. The first, by Marion van San, is based on ethnographic research, looking very closely at a small sample of young men and women from Belgium and the Netherlands who decided to become foreign fighters or jihadist brides in Syria. It turns out that the push factors are in most cases stronger than the pull factors. The second contribution, from Donald Holbrook, proposes a new methodology to measure extremism in media content, something very useful when deciding where to draw a line between licit freedom of expression and illicit incitement to terrorism.

PT IX 5 also provides the reader with a timely Policy Brief about the future of Afghanistan and the peace process; the author is Kambaiz Rafi, a citizen of Afghanistan. His text is followed by the Book Reviews section, with contributions from our regular Book Review Editor, Joshua Sinai, and from Anita Peresin. In the bibliography section, Judith Tinnes – like Joshua Sinai a member of our Editorial Team – provides us with another extensive literature review, this time on Muslims and the West.

While the present issue of Perspectives on Terrorism was assembled in Vienna by the Editor-in-Chief, the December issue will be prepared in the U.S. by Prof. James Forest, co-editor of PT and interim director of the CTSS.

Sincerely,

Alex Schmid
I. Articles

Radicalisation to Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda: a Political Socialisation Perspective

by Anneli Botha

Abstract

Africa is increasingly being classified as the new battleground against terrorism. Yet, despite this renewed interest, countries on the continent have been experiencing manifestations of this threat already for several decades. Similar to most countries in the Middle East, Asia, Latin America and Europe, countries on the African continent focus on addressing the symptoms and not the cause of terrorism. In addressing the manifestations of terrorism, countries directly affected by acts of terrorism predominantly adopted a security-centric approach in an attempt to bring an end to the violence. Although this might be effective in the short term, in the majority of cases, a security-centric approach has proven to be ineffective and often even counterproductive. Realising this, several scholars—and, since 2006, also the United Nations in its Global Counterterrorism Strategy—have called for addressing the underlying reasons, or conditions conducive to terrorism. Despite this positive shift in focus, governments on the African continent continue to refer to outdated lessons learned from other countries, mostly on other continents, when formulating their own counter-terrorism (CT) strategy. Learning from the experiences of others is necessary, yet foreign CT lessons often tend to be broad and general and, as a result, ineffective. Policy makers and practitioners tend to fall into the trap of framing counter strategies on what are assumed to be the underlying driving factors instead of actually conducting empirical research into the ‘real reasons’. It is from this premise that interviews were conducted with 285 individuals and family members associated with al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) in Kenya and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda in an attempt to find empirical evidence to support or discard what are perceived to be the root causes of recruitment into these four militant organisations. The resulting doctoral dissertation has as its most important lesson: countering and preventing terrorism should start with looking at the ‘who’ in addition to asking ‘why’.

This article is a summary of the main research findings capturing the personal backgrounds of respondents representing the four organisations. Specific reference will be made to early childhood, the school and friends as socialisation agents in establishing ethnic and religious identity. The analysis concludes by describing the influence of these factors on radicalisation associated with external—most notably, economic, educational and political—circumstances in identifying the most critical factor driving radicalisation.

Keywords: Terrorism, Root Causes, Africa, Radicalization, Kenya, Uganda, Lord’s Resistance Army, Allied Democratic Forces, Al-Shabaab, Mombasa Republican Council

Introduction

When exploring why young people turn to political violence, researchers have for many years emphasised the importance of external circumstances that provide the conditions conducive to terrorism. Although these are important, my own personal experience led me to the realisation that much more should be taken into consideration. During field research in 2003 that included discussions with victims of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Combat and Preaching (GSPC) – the forerunners of al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – an Algerian mother approached me and asked why one of her sons...
had joined the GIA while the other became a police officer. That was the moment it dawned on me that most scholars tend to oversimplify processes of radicalisation and recruitment by focussing exclusively on the external environment, without acknowledging the role the individual plays in this process. Why do young people, when confronted with the same circumstances, growing up in the same household, decide on two very different career paths in their lives?

Understanding radicalisation and recruitment from a political science perspective without including political psychology is clearly insufficient. I was definitely not the first researcher to be confronted with the reasons why and how individuals decide on a particular political position and participate in either legitimate or illegitimate political activities. While a number of factors play a role in the radicalisation process, political socialisation provides important insights into an individual's increasing involvement in radical causes. John Horgan and Max Taylor best described the nexus between socialisation and radicalisation: “What we know of actual terrorists suggests that there is rarely a conscious decision made to become a terrorist. Most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialisation towards extreme behaviour.”[1] Peter Neumann probably provided the least complex description when he explained that the term ‘radicalisation’ referred loosely to “what goes on before the bomb goes off.”[2]

Radicalisation, however, involves both external circumstances – referring to domestic and international circumstances, as presented in the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy – and internal, or personal, factors. The latter also relate to the interpretation of the external environment and can be influenced by psychological considerations that refer directly to political socialisation. In addition to a number of studies that concentrate on broad contributing factors or external circumstances, there is a need to go one step further to understand the internal dynamics leading to individuals taking that final decision to commit an act of terror, or to become involved in an organisation and/or operation that will resort to such a tactic.

Before getting into the role political socialisation plays in understanding radicalisation and recruitment, the majority of research has (until recently) almost exclusively focused on the radicalisation process on both internal (personal) and external (environmental) circumstances as these can be found among young people in the Middle East and Europe. In addition to this limited geographical focus, the majority of publications have dealt particularly with Islamist extremist organisations that resorted to terrorism as a tactic. Consequently, authorities on the African continent generally refer to initiatives implemented in the Middle East and Europe to counter radicalisation in order to inform their own counter strategies. More recently, a specific need has been identified to understand radicalisation from a political socialisation perspective in such a manner that it can also assist policy makers and practitioners in their counterterrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives.

**Defining Socialisation and Radicalisation**

Historically, political socialisation as a theory served as a bridge between psychology (the individual) and the person's political behaviour after borrowing from anthropology, psychology and sociology. More important, political socialisation differentiates between the different agents, or role-players, involved in moulding a person to become a ‘political animal’–a term first introduced by Aristotle.

According to Dawson and Prewitt, socialisation referred to: “… the process by which children, born with an enormous potential for different types of behaviour, come to adopt the specific standards of their own society... [Therefore] political socialization is the developmental process through which the citizen matures politically. The citizen acquires a complex set of beliefs, feelings and information which help him comprehend, evaluate and relate to the political world around him. His political views are a part of his more
general social views … related to his religious, economic and cultural views”.[3] Providing a more practical description, Dowse and Hughes explained that this process came down to: “… what the individual learns, when it is learned, how it is learned, and the personal consequences of this process.”[4]

Socialisation and, per implication, political socialisation, is interpreted as a lifelong process through which a person develops a unique frame of reference that guides individual choices. An individual's frame of reference can be defined as the 'glasses' through which he/she sees or perceives the world around him or her. This frame of reference also includes a person's views on politics and religion, developed through a similar process as his/her views on a specific political party or ideology. Ultimately, the political self is made, not born, to include “feelings of nationalism, patriotism, or tribal loyalty; identification with particular partisan factions or groups; attitudes and evaluations of specific political issues and personalities; knowledge regarding political structures and procedures; and a self-image of rights, responsibilities, and position in the political world.”[5]

Lewis Froman (1961) proposed three variables that influenced the process of political socialisation: the environment (agents of socialisation), personality and politically relevant behaviour.[6]

**Conditions Conducive to Terrorism and Radicalisation**

Before creating the impression that external circumstances do not play an equally important role in the radicalisation process, it is important to recognise that for radicalisation to occur the individual still needs to make sense of external circumstances he/she is confronted with. The forming of perceptions is an interwoven process, influenced by the individual's background (personality) and identity; it cannot be separated from external circumstances. In other words, every person forms mental images of the world, which are needed to provide an understanding of the world around him or her. From these 'images', stereotypes emerge that will impact on how individuals interact or react to the 'other'.

The difficulty with this process is that perceptions are being formed of the 'other' that is based on insufficient information, dis-information and often also a lack of education. Not only will both sides – us and them – drift apart, but the potential for conflict increases. Martha Crenshaw noted that: “The actions of terrorists are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality. Perceptions of the political and social environment are filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences and memories.”[7]

Religion and ethnicity are powerful influences on the formation of a person's identity. In addition to the role these play as facilitators of social cohesion, an organisation – such as a religious organisation – in itself can become central to a person's identity.

Returning to external circumstances (which are being interpreted by the individual), the United Nations, in its Global Counterterrorism Strategy (2006), identified what it termed 'conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism'. These circumstances included, but were not limited to, prolonged unresolved conflicts; the dehumanisation of victims of terrorism; the absence of rule of law and violations of human rights; ethnic, national and religious discrimination; political exclusion; socioeconomic marginalisation; and lack of good governance.[8]

**Methodology and Theoretical Framework**

The following discussion summarises some of the findings of the author's recent dissertation, *Radicalisation to Commit Terrorism from a Political Socialisation Perspective in Kenya and Uganda*. This research found support for the notion that political socialisation is a continuous process, where early lessons influence
a person’s predispositions. Insights framed by several well-known theories, starting with the symbolic interaction school of thought on political socialisation, explain that the individual is a product of a socialisation process. Additionally, the thesis profited from the cognitive, or developmental, school of thought, in particular Jean Piaget’s and Lawrence Kohlberg’s explanation that political socialisation occurs in stages. For this reason, the study did not take as its starting point the moment when a person joined a militant organization. Rather, it also focused on early childhood, school, friends, and the formation of ethnic and religious identity of the militants. One of the central questions that this study addressed was the role economic circumstances play in conflict, reflecting the class struggle theory of Karl Marx.

However, pluralist theory contributed the most to this study through the focus it places on asking a series of questions: (a) who (b) learns what (c) from whom (d) under what circumstances and (e) with what effects? Through these questions, the effect of external (macro) factors on the individual throw a new light on the debate regarding the relative weight of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors in the radicalisation process.

Three of the four organisations referred to in this study base their ideology on religion, both Christianity with reference to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Islam with reference to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, commonly referred to as al-Shabaab or ‘The Youth’. However, ethnicity is an equally important factor in the radicalisation process, leading to the inclusion of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) as a multi-religious organisation driven by regional secession (not based on one single religious or ethnic cause) from the rest of Kenya. In order to understand the ‘who’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ individuals were radicalised, 285 interviews were conducted with members of these four organisations and the families of al-Shabaab members who had been killed or incarcerated, or who had disappeared in Kenya.

Contrary to most other studies on the root causes or conditions conducive to terrorism, this study instead focused exclusively on the immediate period before and after radicalisation. In interviews with current and former members of the ADF, LRA, al-Shabaab and MRC, respondents were asked a series of questions going back as far as their early family life in assessing whether a link exists between a person’s early childhood development—when identity—and perception-formation occurs—and later susceptibility to radicalisation.

While a political socialisation perspective might not be a new theoretical framework for analysing the making of militants and terrorists, such an explanation of participation in terrorist organisations in East Africa is new. The dissertation was the first study that used biographic profiles of individuals associated with terrorism in Kenya and Uganda in an attempt to understand susceptibility to extremism and radicalisation.

Although a basic understanding of relevant conditions provides insight into radicalisation processes, it is important to realise that a combination of factors is often present and that this combination will differ from person to person. Furthermore, not all people confronted with the same set of circumstances will be radicalised, and not all of those radicalised will eventually commit acts of terrorism. Central to this process is the role individual characteristics play in linking the world to that individual’s interpretation of the external environment and the outcome of the political socialisation process in the form of identity formation and subsequent radicalisation.

**Political Socialisation Agents and Radicalisation**

Although personality itself plays a critical role in how an individual interprets the world – which was one theme of the larger dissertation study – the present article will not focus on findings related to personality types. Instead, here the focus will be on the role primary (family, friends, school) and secondary socialisation agents (e.g. media) play in the radicalisation process.
The family plays an essential role (whether positive or negative) throughout any person’s life, but especially in the period between infancy and the moment a child reaches school-going age. The family is deemed to be the first step in the transmission of fundamental values. Considering the extensive influence of family in political socialisation, a number of questions were asked to test family impact on the respondents interviewed, in order to determine whether the family indeed played a major role in the radicalisation process. Starting with the socialisation process, the bond (or lack thereof) between parent and child plays an extremely important role in developing a person’s self-esteem and identity. In other words, if there is not a strong bond between parent and child in early life, the chances that a person will carry over certain positive values and lessons to later life will be limited. Simple questions, such as whether the respondent’s parents were aware of their decision to join the organisation, or whether their parents supported this decision, served to explore this level of trust. For example, only 6% of ADF and 11% of al-Shabaab respondents informed their parents of their decision to join the organisation. These figures was higher among MRC (24%) and LRA (26%) respondents, who said that they had informed their parents about their joining the organisation. When asked if their parents supported this decision, 3% of ADF, 21% of al-Shabaab, 24% of LRA and 59% of MRC respondents answered in the affirmative. One possible explanation for these differences relates to the history of these organisations and what they represent. Joining a banned group, such as al-Shabaab and the ADF, brought its own risks and might explain why parents were not informed. In contrast, following a parent’s footsteps to take over the mantle in fighting for the rights of especially an ethnic or geography-based group, might explain a person’s willingness to inform parents of his/her decision with members of the LRA and MRC.

Families tend to establish the foundation in transferring political antagonisms, loyalties and viewpoints from one generation to another. In order to assess the extent of parents’ active political involvement, respondents were asked whether their parents discussed politics with them when they were growing up. The parents of respondents in Uganda were considerably less politically active than those in Kenya: less than half (41% of ADF and 44% of LRA parents) discussed politics with their children. In contrast, 68% of al-Shabaab and 78% of MRC parents discussed politics with their children. Based on such findings, one can assume that primary political socialisation through parents – as an agent – was greater in Kenya than Uganda.

In assessing the relationship between an absent parent and joining a terrorist organisation, the results of this study regarding an absent father figure were very similar to those that J. Post had found in his study of 250 West German terrorists (from the Red Army Faction and the 2 June Movement). In that particular study, 25% had lost one or both parents by age 14, while 79% did not have a positive family relationship – in fact, 33% had a particularly hostile relationship with their fathers. [9] Many respondents among the ADF (44%), LRA (38%), al-Shabaab (18%) and MRC (31%) had grown up without a father figure. However, the majority of respondents who joined these organisations did grow up with a father figure present. This is not to say that experiencing abandonment or a lack of belonging will not contribute to make a young person susceptible to seek another father figure, or enhance the need to belong to a group to experience acceptance and a feeling of belonging. What is important to realise is that these feelings can be experienced even in situations where both parents are present.

At a certain age, the school and peers take over from parents as the primary political socialisation agent. Although parents still play a role, depending on the young person’s relationship with his or her parents, going to school introduces a completely new environment. Through interaction with other groups – most notably religious and ethnic or tribal groups – the person will develop new or reinforce existing perceptions of the ‘other’. For this particular reason respondents were asked whether they had contact with ‘others’ (particular attention was paid to whether ethnicity or religion was the core of the group the person joined), and whether they had friends from the ‘other’ side while growing up. When asked whether they had contact with people from other religious backgrounds, 100% of MRC, 97% of ADF, 88% of al-Shabaab and 88% of
LRAs respondents answered in the affirmative. Some 100% of MRC, 97% of ADF, 96 of al-Shabaab and 85% of LRA respondents said that they had had contact with other ethnic groups. Considering that the majority of respondents attended public school, having contact is, however, very different from having friends from other ethnic or religious groups, especially when the ‘other’ is later categorised as the enemy. For example, although 88% of al-Shabaab and 97% of ADF respondents had contact with other religions, al-Shabaab respondents in particular indicated that only a small minority formed close friendships with Christians. The latter example speaks to the development of subgroups based on racial, religious, ethnic and social class, as presented by Dawson and Prewitt.[10] Through such subgroups, students establish their own school segregation system that prevents members of their respective group from having meaningful contacts with others. Through these subgroups and subsequent limited interaction, the positive influences of attending a mixed school are lost.

Segregation at school occurred naturally, presenting a very unique trend, as 27% of ADF respondents attended Christian schools while being Muslim, while 30% of ADF and 25% of al-Shabaab respondents attended Islamic schools. Similarly, attending school with other ethnic groups in the coastal region of Kenya or northern Uganda did not imply that respondents were in close contact with ethnic groups they classified as the enemy. Rather, the presence of minority ethnic groups tended to confirm the ‘us’ against ‘them’ paradigm. In other words, the political socialisation process continued and although respondents might have had contact with ‘others,’ these group images had most probably been built on perceptions of the ‘other’ that were already established by their parents.

Friends, another primary socialisation agent, played a central role throughout the study in introducing respondents to the organisation, being informed of their (i.e. the respondents’) decision to join, or even joining the organisation with the respondents. Friends introduced 66% of MRC, 38% of al-Shabaab, 35% of ADF and 31% of LRA respondents to the organisation. Although the last three organisations reflected a percentage below 50%, it is important to note that friends still represented the biggest single role-player in terms of being informed of the respondent’s decision to join. No fewer than 34% of al-Shabaab, 33% of MRC, 21% of LRA and 15% of ADF respondents informed a friend of his/her decision to join the organisation. Again, friends made up a very important group: 82% of MRC, 71% of al-Shabaab, 58% of ADF and 40% of LRA respondents joined their respective organisations with friends. In contrast, only 25% of LRA, 15% of ADF, 7% of MRC and 6% of al-Shabaab respondents joined their respective organisations with family members.

Respondents also indicated that they recruited other friends to the organisation: 60% of MRC, 54% of al-Shabaab, 23% of ADF and 12% of LRA did so while 36% of MRC, 13% of al-Shabaab, 11% of ADF and 0% of LRA respondents recruited other family members. As a result, friends made up one of the most important political socialisation agents of this study, followed by religious leaders, in the case of al-Shabaab.

Secondary socialisation agents are equally important in the political socialisation process. Specific reference was made to the media, which can serve as a ‘front’ to indoctrinate and radicalise susceptible individuals. Evidence of this was seen particularly in the dedicated communication strategy employed by both al-Shabaab and the MRC. They were using Internet-based channels such as blogs, Twitter and video and/or audio recordings to reach and indoctrinate potential and existing members. Considering the time spent and the relevancy of messages, susceptible individuals changed their opinions to mirror those of the orator. The study found an inability and oversight of governments to use the media to build national unity and identity following independence. Instead, it was found that the media was often used as a platform to transmit divides, especially during elections, and to harness political support based on religious and/or ethnic division.
Becoming a radical often involves a role model whom a new member can look up to in teaching him or her how to act. This person plays an important role in instilling the values that the group represents and to think and act for the collective, thereby serving as another political socialisation agent. Religious scholars and other leaders played an important role in the ‘collective conditioning’ or indoctrination process of new members. For example, 34% of al-Shabaab and 29% of ADF respondents were introduced to the respective organisations through a religious figure. In addition, 26% of al-Shabaab respondents informed a religious leader of their decision to join the organisation. This was the second biggest group, after a friend, to be informed of respondents’ decision to join the organisation among al-Shabaab respondents. This brings us to other active role players who introduced respondents to the mentioned organisations. As detailed earlier, 66% of MRC, 38% of al-Shabaab, 35% of ADF and 31% of LRA respondents were introduced by a friend, while a relative introduced 27% of LRA, 19% of ADF, 7% of MRC and 3% of al-Shabaab respondents. Additionally, the group itself approached 11% of the recruits of the LRA, 7% of both the ADF and MRC and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents. It is important to note that 31% of LRA, 21% of al-Shabaab, 20% of MRC and 5% of ADF respondents joined these organisations on their own and without the introduction of an intermediary.

Identity and Radicalisation

The study further shed light on the role an absent national identity feeling plays in increasing the prominence of sub-national identities – based on religion and/or ethnic principles – which can be transferred from one generation to the next. This is in line with the theory presented by Robert LeVine, who found in 1963 that during the independence processes in many African countries, people were more loyal to local tribes and local government units than to the newly established nation states.[11] Since 1963, neither Kenya nor Uganda has been able to establish an inclusive national identity – beyond the brief moments of patriotism when the national team wins a football match. Although the majority of African scholars place the blame on colonialism, the inability of such countries to establish a national identity after half a century of independence reflects rather poorly on the post-colonial leadership.

Instead of building a new political culture, leaders sporadically drew on their own ethnic or religious identity, encouraging a new cycle of identity-based politics, either by ethnic or religious association. It should, therefore, not come as a surprise that the core of the ADF, LRA, MRC and al-Shabaab are still relying on ethnic and religious identity. Consequently, al-Shabaab and ADF respondents identified with their religious identity, whereas MRC and LRA respondents identified with their ethnic and geographic identity. However, joining these respective organisations was not only a means for the respondents to express their social identity, but also served as a vehicle to fight for their respective in-groups. To assess this particular aspect two inter-related factors need to be present: firstly, religious or ethnic identity needs to be important, and secondly, there needs to be a perceived threat to this identity.

Starting with the importance of religion to al-Shabaab and ADF respondents, 59% of al-Shabaab and 56% of ADF categorised their religion (Islam) as most important, followed by 37% of al-Shabaab and 30% of ADF respondents who classified it as very important, while the remaining 14% of ADF and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents still indicated that their religion was important. Although all four organisations included respondents who had converted from one religion to another, the impact of conversion was analysed more closely in organisations such as the ADF and al-Shabaab, where religious identity was paramount. Although evidence exists – especially amongst al-Shabaab respondents – that individuals who were converted and radicalised by radical religious leaders were more vulnerable, only 9% of al-Shabaab respondents interviewed had converted before joining.
It is, however, important to note that the period between converting and joining differs considerably, as only 42% of this group converted to Islam up to a year before joining al-Shabaab. In other words, the majority (58%) had converted up to six years before joining the organisation. Those who had converted within a year before joining were most likely converted by a radical religious scholar. This indicates that reaching the same conclusion for the majority of respondents who converted is problematic. The conversion rate amongst ADF respondents was higher, with 22% of respondents interviewed having converted before joining the organisation. Among these respondents, 50% had converted within the year before joining, with some even indicating that they had converted and joined at the same time. Political socialisation – even among those who had converted over a longer period – changed through the individual’s interaction with others whom he or she did not have close associations with. Whether this change in political socialisation agent had an impact on the radicalisation process, can be seen more accurately in those cases where conversion and radicalisation happened simultaneously or one soon followed the other, as with many ADF respondents.

Beyond determining that religion is important to al-Shabaab and ADF respondents, their threat perception also needed to be analysed: 97% of al-Shabaab and 77% of ADF respondents considered their religion to be under threat. Regarding the type of threat, 60% of al-Shabaab and 35% of ADF respondents classified it as a physical threat, whereas 46% of ADF and 34% of al-Shabaab respondents categorised it as an ideological threat. The remaining 19% of ADF and 6% of al-Shabaab respondents considered the threat to be both physical and ideological.

However, if there is a threat, there must be an enemy to complete the ‘us’ and ‘them’ equation, or, to put it differently, to establish in- and out-groups. Respondents were asked to indicate who was behind this threat. In response to this question, 58% of ADF and 49% of al-Shabaab respondents identified their respective governments, while 20% of ADF and 18% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that the enemy was external. Some 24% of al-Shabaab and 11% of ADF respondents identified another religion (Christianity) as being behind the threat, while 11% of ADF and 9% of al-Shabaab considered this threat to be a combination of their government and other countries or religions.

In terms of the importance of ethnicity, 23% of LRA and 18% of MRC respondents classified their ethnicity as most important, 69% of LRA and 68% of al-Shabaab respondents categorised it as very important, while the remaining 13% of al-Shabaab and 8% LRA respondents considered ethnicity as important. It is, however, worth noting that – in contrast to religious classifications – neither MRC nor LRA respondents represented a single ethnic group. Instead, they represented and referred to a number of ethnic groups within a specific geographic area. Similar to the ADF and al-Shabaab, the Kenyan government (with respect to the MRC) and Ugandan government (the LRA) were identified as the primary enemy, followed by specific ethnic groups. In contrast to the findings on religion, the MRC and LRA did not refer to an external enemy.

From this, it would appear that social identity based on religion and ethnicity had been transformed into an organisational identity. In other words, the respective organisations purported to represent the interest of the religious and ethnic identity groups. Members of all four groups consist of individuals who were drawn to other members of an in-group (based on religious or ethnic affiliation) that stood together against an out-group. Although the in-group was based on religious or ethnic affiliation, the majority of respondents referred to the organisation when asked to identify ‘us’: 84% of both MRC and LRA respondents, 68% of al-Shabaab and 59% of ADF respondents. Additionally, a further 36% of ADF and 32% of al-Shabaab respondents also referred to their religion. With reference to their ethnic group, 14% of MRC combined organisational members with ethnicity, while a further 4% of LRA and 2% of MRC respondents categorised ‘us’ as members of their ethnic group, and/or people from their geographic area.
When asked to identify ‘them,’ answers varied from references to government to other religious to ethnic groups and other countries. For 92% of LRA, 79% of ADF, 52% of MRC and 30% of al-Shabaab respondents, their respective governments were classified as ‘them.’ For 67% of al-Shabaab and 16% of ADF respondents, ‘they’ were identified as other religious groups, while only 5% of ADF and 3% of al-Shabaab respondents referred to other countries. With reference to ethnicity, 43% of MRC and 4% of LRA respondents referred to other ethnic groups as ‘them.’ Despite these different answers, ‘they’ was used to refer to the strongest manifestation of ‘the enemy’ in the mind of each respondent.

For all respondents, social identity was paramount in influencing the person’s drive to join a particular organisation. In both the ADF and al-Shabaab, religion – in this case Islam – was central to the identity of each respondent. In contrast, MRC and LRA respondents referred to minority ethnic groups marginalised by those in power.

For in- and out-groups to be in conflict with each other, a real or at least perceived threat needs to exist, as explained earlier. Due to political marginalisation or economically caused, relative deprivation, political power and access to resources served as the capital that in- and out-groups competed for. The individual must also attach meaning to the particular situation for him or her to respond (through the group). The study further confirmed that smaller groups, whether religious or ethnic, established stronger in-group identification, experiencing the need to protect themselves against larger out-groups. For example, Islam is the minority religion in both Kenya and Uganda, while it serves as the social identity marker for both al-Shabaab and the ADF. Although the MRC and LRA are multi-ethnic in their composition, both groups attract members from smaller ethnic groups in very specific geographic locations where others present a threat. In all four groups, the government, through its security forces, represented the ‘other’ who was behind the threat. This study also confirms the observation made by Hector Avalos that religious conflicts are seldom only about religion. Instead, it is often about national territory, political leadership and other matters, framed within a religious context. [12]

Emotions – anger, contempt, guilt, fear, hatred and revenge or vengeance – emerged through the interviews as another component needed in the radicalisation process. Respondents were asked whether anything had happened that influenced their decision to get involved or join the organisation. Based on the answers given, a large number of respondents referred to instances of injustice against members of their in-group, based on religious and ethnic identity. This supports the finding of Martha Crenshaw, who identified vengeance as the most central emotion common to both individuals and groups in driving them to acts of terrorism. [13] This refers in particular to the desire to avenge not oneself but others, directed at those held responsible for injustices.

The six emotions named above are all driven by subjective perceptions and interpretations of instances of injustice or discrimination. These injustices were predominantly based on political circumstances, associated with the way in which security agents dealt with a particular situation that involved members of the in-group. This supports a finding of Horgan, who noted that individual experiences of victimisation from security forces were of key importance. [14]

When assessing the role of frustration in joining and being a member of the organisations, discussed throughout the study, respondents were asked to rate their frustration levels at the time of joining. Some 88% of LRA, 49% of ADF, 48% of al-Shabaab and 33% of MRC respondents rated their frustration between 8 and 10 (the highest tier); 54% of MRC, 48% of al-Shabaab, 19% of ADF and 12% of LRA respondents rated their frustration levels between 5 and 7 (second tier); while only 32% of ADF, 13% of MRC and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents placed their frustration between 1 and 4 (the lowest tier). Frustration cannot exist in isolation;
a reason is required. Two of the most prominent reasons – threats to religion and ethnicity – were already referred to above. Respondents were also asked to specifically identify the reason for joining the organisation. Firstly, referring to religion, 87% of al-Shabaab and 54% of ADF respondents referred only to threats to their religion as the main reason for joining. An additional 6% of al-Shabaab and 2% of ADF respondents referred to a combination of religious and economic reasons, and a further 6% of ADF respondents referred to a combination of religious and political motives. Secondly, with reference to ethnicity, 25% of MRC and 19% of LRA respondents referred only to perceived threats against their ethnic group. It is important to remember that although a further 58% of LRA respondents gave personal reasons, the majority of these personal reasons could be categorised as ethnic in nature. Additionally, 14% of MRC respondents referred to a combination of ethnic and economic reasons, and a further 2% of MRC respondents referred to a combination of religious and political reasons. The remaining two reasons were political and economic.

Religious scholars and other leaders played an important role in the ‘collective conditioning’ or indoctrination process of its members. For example, 34% of al-Shabaab and 29% of ADF respondents were introduced to the respective organisations through a religious figure. Additionally, 26% of al-Shabaab respondents had informed a religious leader of their decision to join the organisation. This was the second biggest group, after the friend category, when it came to letting others know about their decision to join the organisation among al-Shabaab respondents. It is, however, important to note that 31% of LRA, 21% of al-Shabaab, 20% of MRC and 5% of ADF respondents joined these organisations on their own and without the introduction of another role player.

External Circumstances and Radicalisation

Considering the interplay between friendship and personality type, McIntyre and Platania found that young people with insecure identities, driven by idealism, were particularly vulnerable to adherence to an ideology and/or participation in an ideological group. The age of most respondents confirmed the vulnerability of adolescents and young adults and the risk of groupthink among friends: 40% of LRA, 19% of ADF, 17% of al-Shabaab and 7% of MRC respondents joined between the ages of 15 and 19; 45% of MRC, 35% of al-Shabaab, 24% of ADF and 20% of LRA respondents joined between the ages of 20 and 24; 28% of ADF, 25% of MRC, 21% of al-Shabaab and 12% of LRA respondents joined between the ages of 25 and 29; 20% of al-Shabaab, 15% of ADF, 14% of MRC and 12% of LRA respondents joined between 30 and 34 years of age; 8% of LRA, and 2% of MRC and 1% of ADF and al-Shabaab respectively joined between 35 and 39 years of age. The most vulnerable period identified in this study was between 20 and 34. Despite similarities, it is also clear that each organisation had a unique age profile. The most dramatic of these is the LRA, which presented a younger profile, with 40% joining between the ages 15–19 while the MRC manifested a somewhat older profile: none of its respondents represented the 10–14 age group, and only 7% fell in the 15–19 age group.

Radicalisation is a gradual process – which makes it very difficult to define exactly when it occurs. When respondents were asked to provide the duration of time between first introduction and actually joining the organisation, members of all groups interviewed – with the exception of al-Shabaab – referred to an overall period of more than six months between first introduction and actually joining the organisation.

One of the more widespread allegations – that poverty is a cause of terrorism – was disproven by this study. Without denying that poor economic circumstances can make a person more susceptible to recruitment, it must be noted that only a small minority – 13% of ADF, 12% of MRC and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents – specifically referred to dire economic circumstances as a reason why they joined the organisation. As mentioned above, a further 6% of al-Shabaab and 2% of ADF respondents referred to a combination of
religious and economic reasons, while an additional 14% of MRC respondents referred to a combination of ethnic and economic reasons.

Respondents who mentioned economic circumstances specifically referred to situations where increased economic disparities occur within identifiable ethnic, religious and geographic groups. Members of the MRC in Kenya were most prominent in referring to disparities between the economic circumstances of coastal people and those in other parts of the country, but they also referred to discrimination experienced in comparison to outsiders living in ‘their’ region. This is an example of how relative deprivation can become a political issue and the resulting frustration a driving factor for radicalisation. Therefore, monitoring socio-economic trends in preventing radicalisation will be especially useful where there are economic disparities within identifiable ethnic, religious and geographic groups. Indicators that will be particularly useful are rates of population growth, degree of access to public service, uneven development, urbanisation and uneven unemployment and education opportunities – especially if these are linked to religious, ethnic or other relevant categories. These factors are likely to contribute not only to social conflict but also to a community’s vulnerability to radicalisation.

**Education** is one of the most important factors to be taken into consideration in preventing future radicalisation. Although the role of schools was already mentioned as a socialisation agent, education is the only way through which better career opportunities and upward social mobility can be achieved – countering perceptions of relative deprivation. The higher someone’s level of education, the more likely that person will participate in conventional politics. When a person is better informed and has a better understanding of his/her role within the political process, he or she has the ability to express political opinions and has a greater stake in the political process. It was found that the inability of respondents to stay in school and enhance their level of education was one of the most central factors that made them susceptible or vulnerable to later radicalisation. The majority of respondents – 79% of LRA, 67% of MRC, 66% of ADF and 47% of al-Shabaab – only had a primary school education, whereas 45% of al-Shabaab, 26% of ADF, 24% of MRC and 21% of LRA respondents had reached secondary school.

At the other end of the spectrum, a very small minority of respondents – only 9% of MRC and 8% of al-Shabaab – indicated that they had received tertiary education. Not having sufficient education severely limited employment opportunities beyond low-paying, unskilled jobs. Those who studied further were predominantly drawn to religious studies, especially Islamic studies. What is particularly interesting is that students were not required to finish school before becoming an imam or a religious teacher – some respondents only had a primary school education. In other words, madrasas and the more secular schooling system run on two very different criteria. The consequences are far reaching, as it correlates directly to the quality of education received by individuals who only attend religious schools, especially madrasas. Without questioning a person’s ability to be a good follower of his or her particular religion, it must be debated how someone – placed in a position of authority – can guide others without the ability to understand disciplines other than theology. This is particularly significant when it happens at a time in a young person’s life when he or she should develop an ability to think critically. This is not to question the place for religious education; however, instructors should also have the necessary credentials to teach students about other disciplines.

The findings above support those of Berrebi, who explained that when education was religious it might encourage radical thought while only marginally increasing productive opportunities in the labour market. Consequently, although such individuals might consider themselves as educated, they might not be able to do much with the education they received. This again contributes to perceptions of relative deprivation and supports the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Educated individuals are less likely to refer to violence to correct real or perceived injustices (which cause frustration) since education enhances self-confidence and
assertiveness. In other words, better education and encouraging young people to stay in school is the best strategy against relative deprivation, but then everyone ought to have the same opportunities, and career advancement and social mobility should be based on merit – not on any other criteria.

Conclusion

Preventing and combating terrorism should start with understanding what drives an individual to resort to terrorism, taking into consideration the reality that not all people experience the same external circumstances – not even people growing up in the same household. In order to understand radicalisation, this study asked the question to what extent political socialisation explains the participation of individuals in terrorist organisations in Kenya and Uganda. Is there a difference in the applicable factors between the divergent ideological frameworks of the Allied Democratic Forces and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, and al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council in Kenya?

This study found that political socialisation—starting with the family, and expanded through peers, school, media, and earlier political experiences, and ending with the terrorist group—played a distinctive role in each of the four organisations. In addition to the differences, which create a distinctive profile for each organisation, the study also noted remarkable similarities, starting with personality types, position in the family and education (or the lack thereof). With this in mind, how can law enforcement and social organisations be guided to identify and reach individuals at risk? The process of answering this question starts with calling on governments and their security forces to understand the uniqueness of each militant organisation. In other words, to copy and paste counterterrorism strategies from one country to another is likely to be ineffective if not downright counterproductive. The only inclusive finding across organisations and between countries has to do with the way in which countries and their security forces respond to these organisations. Indiscriminate repression provokes feelings of revenge and contributes to terrorist recruitment. Strategies based on ethnic and religious profiling, mass arrests and torture proved extremely counterproductive. In line with this, the study found that both Kenya and Uganda have been unable to establish an inclusive national identity. Instead, religious and ethnic identity drives perceptions of political exclusion and feelings of relative deprivation.

One of the key findings of this study is that only a very small minority is driven purely by poor economic circumstances. A core influence among individuals being radicalised relates to the fact that people lose their trust in politicians and the political system, while anger and frustration are directed at security agencies that are viewed as agents protecting the current regime at any cost. As a result, instead of preventing and combating terrorism, their repressive approaches ensure that young people affected by them – and even other family members – are radicalised. The prevention of unconventional political participation should therefore start with creating a political landscape in which people, especially those being marginalised, can express themselves freely. In addition, it must be stressed that the legitimacy of the political process can only be ensured when the political playing field is perceived as being free and fair. Therefore, the legitimacy of the government, the measures security agencies implement to respond to threats of terrorism, and the enhanced individual potential for unconventional political participation are interlinked. Finally, the study also found that education is a key factor in ensuring legitimate participation in the political process and the most effective strategy to prevent perceptions of relative deprivation.
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Notes


Countering the (Re-) Production of Militancy in Indonesia: between Coercion and Persuasion

by Paul J. Carnegie

Abstract

In the early 2000s, Indonesia witnessed a proliferation of Islamist paramilitary groups and terror activity in the wake of Suharto's downfall. Having said this, over the years since Suharto's downfall, the dire threat predictions have largely failed to materialize at least strategically. This outcome raises some interesting questions about the ways in which Indonesian policy responded to the security threat posed by Islamist militancy. Drawing on Temby's thesis about Darul Islam and Negara Islam Indonesia and combining this with Colombijn and Lindblad's concept of 'reservoirs of violence', the following article argues that countering the conditioning factors underlying militancy and the legacy of different 'imagined de-colonizations' is critical for degrading militant threats (especially Islamist ones) in Indonesia. Persistent and excessive punitive action by the state is counter-productive in the long run. It runs too high a risk of antagonizing and further polarizing oppositional segments of the population. That in turn perpetuates a 'ghettoized' sense of enmity and alienation amongst them towards the state and wider society. By situating localized responses to the problem in historical context, the following underscores the importance of preventative persuasion measures for limiting the reproduction of militancy in Indonesia.

Keywords: counter terrorism policy; Indonesia; imagined communities; Islamism; militancy; postcolonial state.

Introduction

Militancy in Indonesia is not new if we take that to mean combative and aggressive action in support of a cause.[1] This is of no great surprise given the archipelago's size, diversity and history. From the Tuanku Imam Bonjol's Padri rebellion in the 19th century through to the rise of Darul Islam (DI–Abode of Islam) and Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII–Indonesian Islamic Army) during the long struggle against Dutch colonial rule, Indonesia has a complex history of radicalism, separatism and rebellion. It has often spilled over into ethnic and religious conflicts in places such Sambas in West Kalimantan, Sampit in Central Kalimantan, Ambon in the Moluccas and Poso in Central Sulawesi to name but a few instances.[2]

Moreover, given its recent authoritarian past, any state-led policy response to militant threats (especially Islamist ones) in Indonesia is going to be a sensitive political issue. The Indonesian Government may not officially differentiate between any particular militant groups in Indonesia but over the last decade and more, its Counter Terrorism Policy (CTP) has focused predominantly on the threat posed by militant Islamist groups operating within the jihadist orbit. In fact, Indonesia's contemporary anti-terrorism laws are largely a by-product of the 2002 Bali Bombings.[3] Although there is public support for dealing with the problem, there is also public concern over the possible return to the sort of repressive practices of the Suharto era. [4] The following article maps the contingent contours of contemporary Islamist militancy in Indonesia and the ways in which localized understandings of the problem have shaped responses. Drawing on Temby’s thesis about Darul Islam and Negara Islam Indonesia and combining this with Colombijn and Lindblad’s concept of ‘reservoirs of violence’, it argues that preventative persuasion measures are critical in countering the conditioning factors underlying Islamist militancy in Indonesia and the legacy of different ‘imagined de-colonizations’.
State, Militancy and Context

Before going further, some historical context and specific analytic perspectives are useful for giving us a better sense of the reproductive capacity and ‘imaginings’ shaping militant group dynamics in Indonesia. This framing makes the seemingly sporadic, periodic and episodic qualities of contemporary Islamist militancy in Indonesia slightly more intelligible. In fact, the contemporary terrain of Indonesian militancy displays a number of significant conditioning developments. Historically speaking, overlapping strands of national, religious, and cultural identity have created some uneasy tensions in Indonesia. While there can be little doubt of the significance of Islam as a religion in Indonesia, during both the colonial and postcolonial periods some contentious and ambiguous relationships and interactions formed between the state, international contexts and the polity’s cultural-religious identification, especially in terms of Islam as a mobilizing force.[5] In fact, there have been numerous attempts simultaneously to harness and curtail Islam’s state-level ambitions.[6]

In a broad schematic sense, we can trace a three-way split in Indonesia as a variety of ‘identity politics’ evolved in response to tensions created by the emergence of the modern nation-state, namely traditionalist, modernist and radical.[7] In terms of political Islam, the traditionalist response gave rise to the massive Sunni Islamic socio-religious organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU–Awakening of Ulama) with members numbering in the tens of million. In the immediate post-independence era, the modernist Islamic party Masyumi (the Council of Muslim Organizations) was the major Islamic political party in the fledgling republic. Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s other main socio-religious organization, still views itself as the custodian of Masyumi’s modernist Islamic legacy. In counterpoint to the political representative ambitions and social mission of traditionalist and modernist responses, a much more radical and militant divergence manifested itself. A divergence that gained traction in the large networks of revolutionary Islamic militias that formed around Darul Islam (DI–Abode of Islam) and Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII - Indonesian Islamic Army) in the context of the Indonesian National Revolution and the fight against Dutch colonial rule. As Quinton Temby notes, this latter split is in many ways a seedbed of contemporary militant offshoots in Indonesia, especially for groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI–Islamic Community).[8]

This contingent historical experience is important for explanatory purposes because often a recourse to violent militancy rests on questions of identity—a point emphasized by Colombijn and Lindblad through their use of the historical concept of ‘reservoirs of violence’ for explaining conflict in Indonesia.[9] During the struggle against the Dutch, various groups had built up ‘reservoirs of violence’ (arms, training, repertoires, loyalties, supply routes and networks) at the same time as developing different ‘imagined decolonizations’. If we think about the roots of violence after World War Two across Indonesia, it was often conflict over how to define postcolonial identities and in response to the exclusionary injustices of nation-state building. That is to say, certain group identities often forged and crystallized in opposition to the emergence of the modern nation-state and its coercive/exclusionary practices. This fuelled certain demands for autonomy and sometimes precipitated violent action. Significantly, ‘reservoirs of violence’ can persist across time and, whilst not a direct causal catalyst of violence, they can pattern action when it arises. In fact, many of the contemporary militant groups in Indonesia in some ways trace an insurgency connection back to the formation, structures, ‘repertoires of violence’ and visions of these anti-colonial militias.

To elaborate, the rise of Sukarno’s secular nationalism signaled major restrictions on radical Islamic movements in Indonesia and precipitated a host of unintended consequences. Sukarno banned DI and TII in the aftermath of independence but under the leadership of S.M. Kartosuwiryo (pak Imam), the Darul Islam secessionist rebellion and violent insurgency for the establishment of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII–Indonesian Islamic State) continued in places such as West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh and South Kalimantan.
from 1949 to 1962.[10] For NII, “Islam was the foundation and legal basis of the Islamic State of Indonesia, the Koran and tradition constituting the highest authorities.”[11] After a bloody campaign by the Indonesian military, Kartosuwiryo was eventually captured and executed in September 1962.[12] Nonetheless, Kartosuwiryo proclaiming himself imam of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII–Indonesian Islamic State) on 7th August 1949 created a powerful alternative ‘imagined decolonization’; an alternate ‘myth of nationhood’. To use Benedict Anderson’s[13] terminology, it constituted a different ‘imagined community’ to the unitary Pancasila state envisioned by the secular nationalists. It should also be noted that many ulama, especially those from Nahdlatul Ulama, opposed Kartosuwiryo’s vision and insurgency efforts.

As Temby contends Darul Islam is not so much a ‘movement’ as a community that perpetuates and reconstitutes itself by looking-back to Kartosuwiryo and who ‘imagine’ themselves as members of Negara Islam Indonesia. That is, they view themselves as a ‘nation’ contiguous with the state proclaimed by Kartosuwiryo in 1949. By drawing on the work of Anderson, this is the idea that people who perceive themselves as part of a ‘community’ ultimately imagine it. As such, in the Indonesian context, the ‘nation’ of Darul Islam is largely mobilized around a socio-political construct that rests upon a process of invention and re-invention of Kartosuwiryo’s legacy. Adopting this perspective sheds some interesting light on the reproductive dynamics of contemporary militancy in Indonesia. If we view contemporary militancy in Indonesia in significant respects as part of a wider reiterative process and pattern of violence associated with attempts to (re)constitute Negara Islam Indonesia across space and time, it makes seemingly sporadic, periodic and episodic fluctuations in militancy more intelligible. Moreover, social movement theory brings some clarity to the enduring symbolic power and mobilizing potential of Kartosuwiryo’s legacy and the force of his alternative ‘imagined decolonization’. According to della Porta and Diani, “the more intense one's socialization into a particular vision of the world, the stronger the impetus to act.”[14]

In the Indonesian context, although the militias and communities supporting the establishment of Negara Islam Indonesia fell into disarray after Sukarno’s concerted military campaign, Kartosuwiryo’s idea, his legacy, the memories, ‘reservoirs of violence’ and loyalties of those times did not fade completely. In fact, they continue to provide powerful contextual narratives and ideational resources. This constitutes the substance of perception for a temporally and spatially dislocated ‘imagined community’ of sporadic groupings to re-coalesce in militancy and action around a resiliently ‘powerful myth’ and ‘imagined’ objective.

In other words, the formation and structures of militia’s that emerged in the context of the anti-colonial struggle and mobilized to action by the idea of Negara Islam Indonesia provide a touchstone, no matter how tenuous, for several contemporary militant Islamist offshoot in Indonesia. The roots of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI–Islamic Community), Ring Banten, Abu Bakar Battalion, Abu Umar Network, and Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN–Nusantara Islamic Jihad Forces) all trace a link and in some sense a nebulous feeling of loyalty, kinship, connection and belonging to the ‘imagined community’ of Darul Islam and the vision of Negara Islam Indonesia. A bit like gravity, you can’t see it but it exerts a decisive pull nonetheless.

Moving our analysis of conditioning factors forward, we can also see by the early 1970s a wider international context interacting with localized developments. The rising influence of Saudi Arabian and Gulf petro-dollars start to play a more significant role and strengthens ties through substantial aid and support for Muslim groups in Indonesia.[15] Alongside scholarships for dakwah activities promoting Wahhabist teachings, this largesse helps nurture and underpin the growth of a neo-fundamentalist Salafi movement both directly or indirectly. Moreover, the dissemination of radical teachings was facilitated in many instances by hadhrami (Indonesians of Middle Eastern descent) of which Abdullah Sungkar is a notable example.[16]
In fact, even under the repressive grip of Suharto, subterranean allegiances to the idea of Negara Islam Indonesia continued and the latent threat of militancy would occasionally flare. For instance, the activities of the relatively short-lived Komando Jihad (another offshoot of DI) in the 1970s and early 1980s posed a threat to Suharto’s New Order. The same was true for the Imron Group which took inspiration from the 1979 Iranian revolution and was involved in the Bandung police post incident and the hijacking of a Garuda DC-9 plane in 1981. Other flare ups included the Tanjung Priok massacre in 1984, the bombing of Borobudur in 1985 and the Lampung incident in 1987.[17]

The interaction with a wider international context also plays a significant role when a coterie of combat hardened new arrivals and returnees who had fought with the mujahidin in Afghanistan in the late 1980s go on to provide influential tutelage to aspiring local militants and jihadists.[18] For instance, Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi and Nasir Abbas trained alongside Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) members from the Philippines at Afghanistan Mujahidin Military Academy at Camp Saddah. This camp on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was operated by Tanzim Ittihad-e-Islamy Afghanistan under the command of one Abu Sayyaf. On their return, the ties the likes of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi and Nasir Abbas had made with MILF leaders and the Abu Sayyaf network in Mindanao, Philippines would be an important precursor to militant activities in Indonesia. Many aspiring local militants and jihadists also drew succor from their links back to Pesantren Al-Mukmin (aka Pondok Ngruki) founded by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar in 1972. It is well-documented that Hambali, al-Ghozi, Ali Imron, Amrozi, Huda bin Abdul Haq (Ali Gufron/Mukhlas) Joni Hedrawan (Idris) and Dulmatin all had connections to Pondok Ngruki.

Given these manifold conditioning factors and the destabilizing events of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, it is of little surprise that conducive conditions existed for Islamist extremism and paramilitary groups to prosper in the economic instability and political uncertainty of the immediate post-Suharto period.[19] The practice of turning of a blind eye or not following up investigations by sympathetic hardline ‘green’ factions in the National Police Force (POLRI) and Armed Forces (TNI) alongside endemic corruption also facilitated the situation.[20]

**Militant Groups, Jemaah Islamiyah, Fragmentation and Progeny**

Many militant Islamist groups in Indonesia are typically factional in character and retain some sort of direct or indirect link to larger hardline organizations.[21] It is estimated that 15 to 20 percent of all Saudi charity dollars sent to Indonesia end up one way other in the hands of ‘suspect’ groups.[22] Allegations also abound about links between komite aksi penanggulangan akibat krisis (KOMPAK – Action Committee for Crisis Response) set up in Central Sulawesi in 1988 to help victims of flood, disaster and conflict and the indirect channelling of funds to militant groups.[23]

The following is in no way an exhaustive list but gives us some indication of the most visible groupings. For example, although nominally disbanded since 2002 after its involvement in inter-communal violence in the Maluku and Papua, Laskar Jihad (LJ–Militia of the Holy War) was largely viewed as a militant offshoot emerging from links to Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama'ah (FKAWJ–Forum for Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet). Despite denials, suspicion persists that the erstwhile LJ also enjoyed indirect links with orthodox Islamic organizations, namely, Dewan dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII – Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia) and Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas dengan dunia Islam (KISDI – Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World).[24] In the case of its militant activities in the Maluku region, support and training also came from sympathetic “green” factions in the armed forces, in particular from Kopassus.[25] LJ always publicly denied any links with al-Qaeda and...
focused firmly on domestic concerns, making a reemergence of its ‘repertoires violence’ not beyond the realms of possibility if the right set of domestic circumstances arose. Similar to a certain extent, *Laskar Pembela Islam* (LPI–Defenders of Islam Army) operates as the paramilitary wing of the hard-line vigilante organization *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI–Islamic Defenders Front) with very much a domestic issues focus and tacit support from certain sections of the military and the police forces.[26] Somewhat differently, *Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia* (Indonesian Mujahidin Militia) acts as an umbrella term for largely anti-statist mujahidin groups not associated with Laskar Jihad. These include *Mujahidin KOMPAK*, *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI–Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly) and the now disbanded Sulawesi based vigilantes *Laskar Jundullah* (Army of God or God’s Soldiers). Interestingly, when MMI, FPI and AMIN led renewed recruitment attempts in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami under the guise of providing humanitarian aid and *dakwah*, they met with little community support.[27] Other organizations with links to militant vigilante groups include *Forum Umat Islam* (FUI–the Islamic People’s Forum), *Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia* (Forkami–the Indonesian Muslim Communication Forum), *Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI–Party of Liberation–Indonesia) and *Gerakan Islam Reformis* (Garis–the Islamic Reformist Movement).

As we can see, militant Islamist groups across Indonesia are numerous and a pretty mixed bag. Given the myriad different groupings operating in Indonesia an overall assessment of them remains difficult. Nonetheless, examining the workings of Indonesia’s CTP in response to one of its key militant threats, namely Jemaah Islamiyah, is still instructive.

As mentioned, networks like *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) are not new in Indonesia. JI, *Ring Banten, Abu Bakar Battalion; Abu Umar Network, and Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara* all trace links and draw succour from *Darul Islam*. Yet, the threat posed by networks like JI only really entered public consciousness in the early 2000s, due to a rising tide of concern about new globally networked terrorism.[28] Established militant extremist networks like JI could feed into narrative discourses that allowed them to (re-)present themselves as a regional franchise of al-Qaeda with links across Southeast Asia. JI was always much more than a mere propaganda vehicle for al-Qaeda. On a discursive level, by allying with a new set of pan-regional partners who envisioned *darul Islam nusantara* (an archipelagic Islamic state), JI was able to adopt a convenient piece of fear-inducing propaganda in the pursuit of its long held objective of *Negara Islam Indonesia*. JI’s deeper roots and objectives in Indonesia facilitated its ability to conduct *jihadist* operations and meant it posed a very real security threat to the Indonesian authorities. For instance, the Christmas Eve bombings in 2000 in Medan, Northern Sumatra and Batam Island; the 2002 bombings in Bali and Sulawesi; the 2003 Jakarta JW Marriott Hotel bombing; the 2004 suicide bombings at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and the 2005 Bali restaurant bombings all bore a substantial JI stamp. The Marriott and Ritz Carlton bombings in Jakarta in 2009 were also linked to the work of a JI splinter group, probably *Tanzim Qaedaat al-Jihad* formerly led by the now deceased Noordin M. Top.[29]

A major goal of Indonesia’s CTP has been diminishing and fragmenting this threat strategically. Its success is closely aligned to the inroads made by Indonesia’s US/Australian backed elite counter-terrorism squad, *Detasemen Khusus 88* (Special Detachment 88 — more commonly known as *Densus 88*). *Densus 88* formed in 2003 in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombings with economic aid incentives and logistical assistance from the US Department of State’s Anti-Terrorist Assistance program and from the Australian government. Along with the TNI and POLRI, they received large amounts of equipment, technical support and training to enhance the country’s threat reduction capacity. This even included the construction of multimillion-dollar training facility partly funded by Australia. In fact, the last decade has brought Indonesia and Australia (an important regional partner of the US) closer together in making inroads against the perceived extremist threat. The Australian government also committed AUD$36.8million over 5 years in cooperation with the
Indonesian government to establish the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in 2004. Based at Indonesian National Police Academy (AKPOL) in Semarang, this bilateral initiative provides a joint police training program for combatting terrorism.

As a result, Densus 88 has managed to cut a swathe through JI's operational capacity over the last decade. It is responsible for the incarceration or death of many of JI's leading figures as well as other Islamist militants. An estimated 700 militant suspects have been arrested and around another 60 killed by the squad. In fact, over the last decade, all the major suspects in the 2002 Bali bombing have either been imprisoned, executed or killed. For example, former terror mastermind Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali), a key link between JI and al-Qaeda is now languishing in Guantanamo Bay. In 2005, Densus 88 killed the Malaysian Dr. Azahari bin Husin, one of the alleged technical masterminds behind the 2002 Bali bombings. In 2008, the two brothers Huda bin Abdul Haq (Ali Gufron/Mukhlas), Ali Amrozi bin Haji Nurhsyim (Amrozi) along with Imam Samudra were executed by firing squad on the prison island of Nusa Kambangan for their role in the 2002 Bali Bombings. The same year saw the South Jakarta District Court rule that JI was an illegal organization. This public judicial unmasking of its activities brought JI out of the shadows. It severely dented JI's ability to infiltrate communities and thrive as a tanzim siri (secret organization). In 2009 Densus 88 also killed Azahari's close partner and 'money man' Noordin M. Top. Dulmatin (a leading member of JI) was shot in 2010. Furthermore the radical cleric and JI emir (spiritual head) Abu Bakar Ba'asyir received a 15 year sentence in 2011 for his attempts to set up and support jihadi training camps in Aceh. In the same year, Abu Umar and six alleged members of his group were arrested on suspicion of planning to bomb the Singapore embassy in Jakarta. In 2012, Umar 'the demolition man' Patek was also sentenced to 20 years in jail after his capture and extradition from Pakistan.

Clearly, the shape, scope and character of Indonesia's militant Islamist 'terror-scape' has been altered since the 2002 Bali Bombings. Shifts in leadership, the removal of key figures, ideological divisions, fragmentation and changing pathways to militancy have all played a part in re-orientating the scheme of things. Nonetheless, despite the 'hard tactic' effectiveness of Densus 88 in degrading JI's organizational and operational capacity, investigation reveals that JI members have always been bound as much by kinship, marriage, schooling, training camps and mutual business relationships as by structured organizational bonds.

Operational diminution, fragmentation and loss of leadership does not mean JI has simply disappeared. It may have lost much of its coordinating leadership and strategic threat but its strength never wholly resided in a coherent organizational structure. Indeed, flux, mutation and realignment are as much a part of JI's DNA matrix as fixed organisational structure and hierarchy. Differences in attitude and ideology also contribute to more centrifugal than centripetal tendencies–something exacerbated by weak overall leadership.

Since the death of the charismatic Abdullah Sungkar in 1999, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir made for a relatively unconvincing figurehead, having never really possessed the necessary strategic or coordination skills to be a major unifying force of Indonesia's militant Islamists. This lack of collective solidarity is also related to the fact that while there may be broad agreement on the idea of an Islamist state in Indonesia, thinking on the method and approach of achieving that goal varies widely, especially in relation to the extent of using violent and non-violent means. For instance, when Dulmatin (now deceased) returned from training in Mindanao he questioned the effectiveness of suicide bombing as an operational tactic and became a strong advocate of a more coordinated coalition between the activities of organizations (lintas tanzim) and advocated focusing on longer-term strategic goals. He held that fostering community support for their aims would help to establish secure bases across different regions. Part of this involved enforcing sharia through jihad and promoting the 'correct' form of Islam by means of dakwah. These bases would then in turn act as focal points to further
consolidate the radical Salafi jihadist insurgent message and project. This has brought about a shift from indiscriminate terror to more persistent insurgent activities.

A renewed emphasis on study circles and pengajian (teaching in certain areas) led by clerics, some of whom promote non-violent dakwah (Islam propagation) while others advocate violent jihad has allowed JI and some of its more recent splinters like the Abu Bakar Ba’asyir inspired Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT–Partisans of the oneness of God) to gain purchase in areas with long histories of insurgency and localized intra-communal conflict. Parts of Indonesia and certain ‘imagined communities’ provide deeply embedded narrative structures of meaning upon which militant Salafi jihadist discourses can provisionally engraft. The situation is complicated further by the adjacent long running separatist conflict led by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. For instance, in 1996 Abdullah Sungkar, through his close links with then MILF leader Salamat Hasyim, moved JI’s main training to Mindanao and built Camp Hudaibiyah on land within MILF’s larger Camp Abu Bakar complex.[34] Although a tentative peace deal has been brokered in Mindanao recently, it is still a staging post for training camps and trafficking routes; a surrogate ‘reservoir of violence’ so to speak. This means that ideas, arms and personnel can still channel up and down from Mindanao, often facilitated by the MILF and the likes of the Abu Sayyaf network, reaching out through a chain of islands across the Celebes Sea and into places like Sulawesi and the Muluku.

Evidence suggests that the militant dynamics and reproductive fluctuations of the current period strongly reflect a combination of the Darul Islam thesis put forward by Temby and the work on the roots of violence in Indonesia by Colombijn and Linblad. In fact, it is probably more accurate to describe JI as a loose divergent network of groups. A composite ‘imagined community’ who draw on specific imaginings, structures of meaning and reservoirs of violence. These temporally and spatially dislocated sporadic militant groupings, each one made up of like-minded extremists, (re-) coalesce around a resiliently ‘powerful myth’ and ‘imagined’ objective in opposition to the Indonesian Republic.

**Between Punitive Action and Preventive Persuasion?**

As noted, Indonesia’s CTP may have made inroads in reducing the country’s strategic terror threat but at the same time, the state agencies involved in implementing it have also been subject to some harsh criticism.[35] This places increased pressure on an already friable rule of law. Accusations abound both domestically and internationally of human rights abuses. They usually concern the activities and operating procedures of Densus 88 and range from extra-judicial killings, arbitrary detentions and torture allegations to a worrying lack of transparency and accountability. In fact, given the militant group dynamics and their fluctuating reproductive qualities highlighted in this article, methods used to degrade Indonesia’s terror threat may ‘blowback’, especially as groups fragment and switch tactics to more localized retaliatory responses.

Indonesian authorities do recognize that exclusive reliance on excessive tactical assaults and incarceration (a punitive ‘hard approach’) in dealing with militant Islamist groups will be counterproductive in the long run. [36] Research shows that prisons also act as incubators for extremism by way of radicalization, training and recruitment.[37] Although critics complain of ex-President’s Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s overly tentative handling of terror issues, there has been some success, albeit limited, to balance ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ approaches in dealing with the threat of radicalization and militancy.[38] The thinking is that getting militants to turn away from violence and terrorism and reclaiming them for society is crucial for lasting containment.[39] If you can convince imprisoned militants to renounce violence and sever previous ties rather than incarcerating them indefinitely, this is viewed as a more effective long-term strategy. The goal is to get militants to turn
away from violence and terrorism and reclaim them for society not just for the sake of security containment but also for restoring societal harmony.

This awareness stems largely from a localized understanding of the problem. Culturally speaking, resorting to excessive callousness or coercion are not signs of power; in fact, it is more likely to undermine one's legitimacy as it is seen as disharmonious. Rather, community support and harmony is better served through displays of benevolence and magnanimity. This also fuses with a particularly important part of Islamic teaching in Indonesia: the acknowledgement of repentance (tobat). In short, tobat places an emphasis on allowing a person the right to change themselves while at the same time also putting an obligation on society to accept those changes. When terrorists repent, society then reciprocates by accepting the changed behaviour.

Significantly, it is this notion of repentance that helps inform and shape many of the specifically localized approaches to dealing with the spectre of militancy in Indonesia. In fact, the utility of military force diminishes disproportionately if its runs too high a risk of stoking community unrest. As mentioned, given the networked ties that bind members of the extremist community, persistent punitive dealings have major limitations. Harsh treatment and indefinite incarceration alone can simply fuel frustration, resentment and the anger of inmates and, by extension, their immediate and extended families towards the Indonesian state and wider society.

If we accept that group identities often forge and crystallize in opposition to the state and its coercive/exclusionary practices and secondly, that the periodic and episodic fluctuations of militancy in Indonesia are part of a wider reiterative process and pattern of violence associated with attempts to reconstitute Negara Islam Indonesia across space and time. Then the more violent the state's response, the more it risks merely perpetuating a ‘ghettoized’ sub-culture of hate and alienation towards itself. The danger being that the more intense this oppositional socialization of a ghettoized vision of the world becomes, the stronger the impetus to act out its realization through violent means.

Putting issues of under-resourcing and ad-hoc institutionalisation aside for a moment, Indonesia's localized understanding of its own militant problem has brought about a ‘smart’ approach of disengagement and de-radicalisation rather than just an exclusive reliance on a traditional 'hard' approach of tactical assaults, punishment and detention. Although limited and not as successful as the approach of the authorities in Singapore, the Indonesian ‘soft’ approach angle involves breaking the nexus of radicalisation through persuasion and alternatives. Operationalizing this approach in practice has included the organisation of prayer sessions by members of Densus 88 in conjunction with militant detainees as a sign of respect and opportunity to atone for past deeds. Former Densus 88 chief, Brigadier General Surya Dharma was a prime mover in promoting the idea of treating someone fairly and give them a second chance if they genuinely seek to repent (bertobat). Rather than marginalizing imprisoned militants further, the rationale goes that if you can get them to recognize the destructive consequences of their actions, then there is the possibility of opening a path to a credible alternative or second chance. This allows them an opportunity to rediscover a different Islamic meaning in their lives, a discursive one that disconnects them from the destructive cycle of extreme thinking, mobilisation and violence.

There have also been efforts to encourage inmates to speak out about their experiences as a warning to others and using their influence over other inmates to cooperate with authorities. For instance, by publishing and talking about his experiences ex-JI commander Mohammed Nasir Bin Abbas provided counsel on how to ‘de-program’ extremist mind-sets especially amongst Indonesian youth. Ex-JI member Ali Imron (brother of Amrozi) also renounced his past mistakes by publishing a book and tapes and publicly advocating
against terrorism. He and others have worked closely with the authorities and different non-state actors (i.e. socio-religious organisations) in their de-radicalisation efforts with militant detainees. These initiatives have also run in conjunction with advertising campaigns on the streets and through the media promoting an anti-jihadist message. The real goal in all of this is to provide these people with a ‘way-back’.

*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* (BNPT–The National Counterterrorism Agency set up 5 years ago to coordinate Indonesia’s CTP) has also taken steps to establish a multi-institutional de-radicalization program in co-operation with religious groups, clerics, NGOs, universities and schools. This co-operative initiative includes the two largest national Islamic organizations *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah* along with the likes of Al-Hikam College, the Islamic State University of Surakarta and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences. BNPT also runs the newly constructed $144.2 million Indonesian Peace and Security Centre (IPSC) in Sentul, West Java which now serves as a de-radicalization and rehabilitation facility for some of Indonesia’s most hardened convicted terrorists. The goal is to get militants to turn away from violence and terrorism and reclaim them for society not just for the sake of security containment but also to strengthen societal harmony.

[43]

Transforming the attitudes and conditions that incubate intolerance and lead it to spill over into home-grown forms of violence and terror may form a part of Indonesia’s approach, but there remains a fine line between too little interference and actively dealing with militant threats. Moreover, tackling the ‘grey area’ between radicalism and outright terrorist activity is an issue fraught with difficulties in Indonesia. An unwillingness of authorities to tackle effectively this ‘grey area’ or intervene for whatever political reasons could have unintended consequence. For example, radical organizations like *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI–Islamic Defenders Front) may be slowly realizing that politics and bombs do not mix. Yet violent intimidation of so-called ‘heretics’ and ‘deviants’ by its associated ‘thugs’ or the local mobs they help incite still continues largely unabated.[44] Recently, the SETARA Institute reported 264 attacks on religious minorities in 2012, up from 244 in 2011 and 216 and 2010 with local Ahmadiyya, Baha’i, Christian or Shi’a minorities the main targets.[45] Prosecutions do occur but they are all too infrequent and the outcome is usually lenient.[46]

Ongoing operational disagreement and tension between POLRI and the TNI over the way to deal with the problem does little to alleviate the situation. The TNI’s Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS) favours monitoring radical groups rather than banning them outright. They fear that wholesale bans can force groups underground and make tracking their activities even more difficult. In contrast, POLRI’s Home Security Intelligence Agency (BIK) has sought to have organizations such as *Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI) outlawed for its activities.

**Conclusion**

On balance, indicators point in the direction of a diminished macro-threat environment and a more manageable strategic security situation in Indonesia. The strategic threat may have been reduced and contained but concerns about a growing atmosphere of intolerance going unchecked cannot simply be ignored, especially given the complex and deeply rooted types of insecurity that exist in Indonesia.

Although a splintered *jihadist* community appears limited in its ability to elicit broad-based popular support for its violent tactics, there are also multiple recruitment paths into radicalization and Islamist militancy whether it be spiritual, intellectual or kinship based. Continued commitment to a nuanced response is a priority in Indonesia if it is to yield meaningful containment. As this article has demonstrated militancy in Indonesia has the ability to reproduce, metastasize and re-coalesce anew in ‘old’ ways. These temporally and spatially dislocated militant groupings can (re-) coalesce around resiliently ‘powerful myths’ and ‘imagined’
objectives in opposition to the Indonesian Republic. For example, Densus 88 arrested 11 suspects accused of planning attacks on several high-profile targets in 2012. They were from a relatively new home-grown splinter group, Hasmi (the Sunni Movement for Indonesian Society). Even more recently, police arrested several terror suspects supposedly led by the Abu Hanifah cell.[47] The latter also has links to the Abu Omar network that operated in Surakarta and Cirebon, West Java. They were allegedly plotting attacks against the Myanmar Embassy in Jakarta and against several US targets in Java in response to the persecution of Rohingya in Myanmar.[48] If we factor in a lack of coordinated management of radical organizations, lax money transfer regulations[49] and porous, notoriously difficult to patrol borders, conditions for incubating militancy and reproducing home-grown forms of violence remain.

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Notes


[3] On 12th October 2002, in the aftermath of the Bali Bombings, then President Megawati Soekarnoputri issued two PERPU (Government Regulation In-Lieu of Law — Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang) No. 1/2002 on the eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism and No.2/2002 on Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism in relation to the bomb explosion incident in Bali. In April 2003, Indonesia introduced new anti-terrorism legislation (Law No 15/2003) with a set of wide-ranging measures designed to combat terrorist threats. These included incarceration provisions ranging from a minimum of three years to life sentences. It also allowed for the death penalty in extreme cases. It gave government agencies the authority to detain and investigate suspected terrorists for three days, based on initial intelligence information; a maximum of seven days based on sufficient evidence; freeze suspected bank accounts; open and examine mail and intercept telephone and other communications of suspects for a period of sixty days at a time. See The Indonesian Laws Information Centre, ‘Undang Undang No. 15/2003 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pendana Terorisme. (No. 15/2003 on the Elimination of Terrorism)’ http://www.wirantaprawira.net/law/.


Jakarta: Pustaka Simar Harapan.


[24] DDII and KISDI are both major promoters of 'Islamization from below' in Indonesia and active in propagating translated Muslim Brotherhood texts and Salafist ideas through pesantren, mosques and on university campuses. They receive substantial funding from the Middle East.


[26] International Crisis Group (ICG) (2010). "Indonesia: ‘Christianization’ and intolerance." International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 114, Jakarta/Brussels, November 24, p. 17. Top ranking officials have all appeared at FPI events in Jakarta that sends a less than mixed message about official attitudes to FPI methods for maintaining so-called 'law and order'.


[44] Having said this, FPI’s chairman and founder, Habib Muhammad Riziek Syihab, did receive a 1.5 year jail term in 2008 for inciting attacks against a gathering held by the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief in Jakarta that injured seventy demonstrators.


[49] Whether the implementation of Law No. 9/2013 on the Prevention and Eradication of Terrorism Financing will help stem matters is still an open question.
Globalisation and Terrorism in the Middle East

by Brenda J. Lutz and James M. Lutz

Abstract
The processes involved in globalisation can disrupt the social, economic, and political systems of countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Such disruptions could resort in increased levels of political unrest, including outbreaks of terrorism. An analysis of terrorism levels and indices of economic, social, and political globalization and levels of terrorism between 1970 and 2010 indicated that levels of globalization were in fact associated with later outbreaks of terrorism. Social globalisation levels appeared to have the greatest impact in the first half of the study period.

Keywords: Globalisation, terrorism, Middle East

Introduction
Terrorism is a phenomenon that has spread to nearly all parts of the world in the last part of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Many countries in the Middle East and North Africa have been at the center of this violence as the region has suffered from both domestic and international terrorist activities. While it is abundantly clear that there is no single cause that explains terrorism, it has been suggested that increasing globalisation has contributed to outbreaks of terrorist violence. If globalisation has, in fact, played such a role, then higher levels of terrorism would be associated with greater levels of globalisation. The following analyses will focus on various indices of globalisation and their relationship to incidents of terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa.

Globalisation
It appears to be quite likely that globalisation can be linked to political difficulties in a number of countries. Paul Wilkinson noted that modern terrorism has been a reaction to globalisation. Globalisation is a very complex process, one that has been defined in a bewildering variety of ways. There is, however, at least some general agreement on broad outlines in the economic sphere; globalisation involves “the widening, deepening, and speeding up of international connectedness.” Globalisation, however, goes beyond simple increases in economic interactions as it includes cultural, military, political and social dimensions. There are a number of factors likely to contribute to increased levels of globalisation. For example, recent increases in overall globalisation have been attributed to a favorable conjunction of technological, political, and economic circumstances. Frequently, one of the consequences of the movements of ideas and materials is that socially dissimilar groups will be brought into closer physical proximity to each other, possibly leading to increases in conflict. While in the long term it is possible that increased contacts among dissimilar groups and their homogenisation can reduce terrorism, that time has obviously not yet come.

Globalisation can bring benefits. It has been suggested that the countries that have been most involved in the processes of globalisation are the countries that have benefitted the most from it. Greater economic interactions with the outside world, however, can also lead to greater anxiety about the social and cultural changes that come with economic adaptations. The level of inequality present in societies can moreover increase, as local groups and individuals have to adapt to external actors, with new competition from...
elsewhere in the global economy, and other changes in their situations or position in the world. The spread of market capitalism that has been associated with globalisation in the 19th and 20th centuries has frequently undermined the structure of local economies.[10] Traditional economic systems, although frequently characterized by high levels of internal inequality, usually have some mechanisms of reciprocity that include obligations on the part of both the well-to-do and the less well-to-do. More modern economic practices, however, can undermine the reciprocity elements without any beneficial reduction in levels of inequality, thereby increasing societal tensions. Under these circumstances, even though globalisation frequently generates economic growth and increased wealth at a societal or national level, only some groups will benefit while other groups will suffer. One recent study found that increased trade, the traditional form that economic globalisation has taken, has been associated with reduced inequality; however, financial globalisation and especially direct foreign investment have been associated with greater inequality.[11] Of course, financial globalisation and direct foreign investment are a more modern form of globalisation. Financial globalisation doubled its impact from 1990 to 2004.[12]

Groups that are disadvantaged by the changes that accompany globalisation could naturally oppose the leaders, groups, or political systems that are associated with these changes. Such opposition may take acceptable forms through existing political channels, but it can also take more violent forms when disadvantaged groups cannot gain satisfaction by peaceful means. The importance of globalisation as a contributor of conflict can be observed in the fact that symbols of modernity that come with globalisation have often been among the targets for attacks.[13] Ironically, the violent opposition can in turn weaken governments and make it more difficult for them to manage the changes that are occurring or to meet the resulting challenges.[14] This type of situation can result in a vicious circle of unrest and challenges that continue to reduce the capacities of government, inducing political decay instead of political development. [15] Globalisation has also provided increased opportunities for dissident groups to strike across greater distances against any external actors that they see as enemies [16] The idea that a terrorist group can strike across these greater distances (as exemplified in the case of 9/11) intensifies the feelings of insecurity that terrorist activities are designed to generate.[17] This level of insecurity has been further increased by the globalisation of the media.[18]

The effects of globalisation are not always negative. Some forms of interaction with the world system have been linked with lower levels of transnational terrorism.[19] Analyses of outbreaks of civil wars, on the other hand, have shown mixed results in terms of their relation to globalisation but provide at least some indication of a connection.[20] If such is the case, globalisation can be both a blessing and a curse. Countries that have become more integrated into the global system may eventually be able to increase their stability, but countries undergoing the process of integration or facing the shocks that come with globalisation may be likely to suffer greater disruptions or problems.[21]

There has been significant evidence that globalisation has led to political violence in different eras and locations. In even earlier times, increasing globalisation was linked with violent outbreaks. In the ancient world, the incorporation of Judea-first into Greek empires and then into the Roman Empire-led to changes in the economic structure of the local society and marginalization of some groups in the province.[22] The incorporation of Judea and Israel into earlier empires had not challenged the basic economic and social systems of the Jewish community, unlike the challenges presented by the Greek and Roman states. One consequence of this disruption was a series of Judean revolts against the Greeks and the Romans. These revolts initially relied on terrorism and guerrilla warfare and then eventually on conventional battles.[23] The Boxer Rebellion in China in the late 19th century was in many ways an ethnic and cultural reaction to globalisation and the resulting intrusion of foreign ideas into traditional Chinese society. The attacks by the
Boxers against Chinese Christians and foreigners used classic terrorist techniques designed to expel foreign influences.[24] Eventually, the Boxers were able to escalate to open warfare against foreigners and even gained assistance from some regular military units and elements of the political elite.

In more recent times, left-wing extremists that were active in the latter part of the twentieth century were vehemently opposed to the global spread of capitalism.[25] World systems theory suggests that modernized states are responsible for underdevelopment and the failures of states on the periphery of the global system. [26] The increasing reach of multinational corporations that came with globalisation was seen as an unmitigated evil that had to be opposed by violence. Violent groups with right-wing ideologies have also been reacting to what they perceive to be the negative effects of globalisation. The current debates about immigration in Europe and the United States are another manifestation of such popular concerns. Populist groups have frequently opposed the immigration of people from culturally and religiously dissimilar areas. [27] The Red Scare in the United States after World War I was a similar reaction to the spread of what many in the United States saw as radical and dangerous leftist ideologies such as socialism, communism, and anarchism that threatened the American way of life. [28] Opposition to foreign influences is not restricted to majority populations. Smaller ethnic communities have also seen their cultures in danger of being overwhelmed or absorbed by larger groups as a consequence of the homogenizing trends that are often associated with globalisation and thus often resort to violence in “self-defense”. [29] It has been suggested that terrorist actions directed specifically against the United States have been a reaction against the cultural globalisation that comes with greater contact with the West. [30]

Religious terrorism increased greatly towards the end of the twentieth century. On several occasions various religious groups have reacted negatively to the challenges that come with globalisation. Globalisation by its very nature has the potential to undermine traditional religious values in societies. Western secularism has threatened indigenous cultures and local religions exposed to the broader world. [31] The spread of ideas linked to globalisation can actually promote rebellions rooted in religion, a reaction to the threat of global homogenization. [32] One consequence of increasing globalisation and the spread of secularization has been a resurgence in religious beliefs, including fundamentalist views, in all of the world's major religions. [33] There are Jewish extremist groups in Israel that have reacted to globalisation not only by targeting Palestinian Arabs but by attacking Jewish citizens that they see as too secular. [34] Islamic groups have clearly responded to threats that globalisation represents to them. [35] The global jihad has represented a continuing response to the threat that exposure to the broader world has represented to Islamic communities. The earlier violence involving Palestinians, especially the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), was more of a nationalist response to the presence of Israel rather than a religious one but reflected at least in part globalisation effects. Boko Haram (“Western Education is Forbidden”) in Nigeria is just one of the latest manifestations of this trend. The economic dislocations that came with globalisation have marginalized many individuals in northern Nigeria, including groups of Muslims who have lost both their economic and social status. Many of them have been attracted to Boko Haram. [36] Elsewhere, militant Hindus in India have attempted to drive out foreign religious influences. Muslims have been the major targets but Christianity is also considered a threat to extremist Hindus. [37] Some right-wing groups in the United States that are opposed to foreign influences and immigrants have a clear religious element in their ideologies. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan that launched the sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subways reflected a high level of concern about the cultural and religious changes that came with globalization. [38] The effects have been universal “as the globalization of culture tends to promote fundamentalism or puritanism in almost all religions.” [39]

Globalisation has had an additional effect on the prevalence of terrorism and the techniques used. The presence of modern communications and transportation has provided opportunities for violent organizations
to learn from each other, to communicate with members in distant locations and to reach out to possible recruits. It also provides greater opportunities for violent groups to attempt to influence external actors with their attacks.[40] Although anarchists practiced an early form of leaderless resistance attacks with their campaigns of assassinations, this type of terrorism has become more prevalent with the internet and social media. The Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIL) has demonstrated all too well the potential that modern forms of communications have for recruiting potential foreign fighters to its ranks and incite others to undertake lone wolf attacks on their home ground. Modern transportation linkages have facilitated travel, allowing the launching of terrorist attacks in foreign countries.

Clearly, globalisation can engender religious, ethnic, economic, and ideological opposition movements with splinter groups of them engaging in violent responses, including the use of terrorist tactics. Globalisation may cause such violence, contribute to it, or be largely irrelevant in some cases. Since there is no single cause for terrorism, globalisation will not explain all outbreaks of violence, but there could well be some connection. Therefore, the basic hypothesis to be tested in this article is whether or not higher levels of globalization can be associated with higher levels of terrorism. The analysis of terrorist incidents in the Middle East and North Africa provides an opportunity to determine whether various levels of globalisation have, in fact, led to more terrorism, at least for the countries in the MENA region.

Data

In order to determine if there were possible links between levels of globalisation and the occurrences of terrorism, two available databases containing the necessary information for both variables were used. The data on terrorism was drawn from the Global Terrorism Database maintained by the University of Maryland. [41] The database contains information on the number of incidents, fatalities, and injuries suffered in terrorist attacks. It was possible to compile annual totals for each year from 1970 to 2010. There were some occasions where the information on the number of injuries suffered in attacks was listed as unknown; therefore, those data were less precise than the data on incidents and deaths. These data on incidents and casualties were standardised to reflect the different population sizes of the countries in question by dividing the measures by population in the millions. Standardisation was essential since previous studies have noted that terrorism becomes more likely with an increase in population size.[42] Simple probability, of course suggests that terrorist incidents will be more frequent in larger countries. For the years from 1970 to 1979, the number of incidents and fatalities was divided by population (in the millions) in 1975. Population in 1985 was the divisor for the data for the 1980s, population in 1995, the divisor for the 1990s, and population in 2005 the divisor for the years in the 21st century.[43] The World Bank population estimates provided a standardized base for population figures for all the countries in the region, and the World Bank data had the advantage of estimates based on the same methodology. Further, since a lack of incidents, fatalities, or injuries would be more meaningful in Egypt than in Bahrain or Qatar, each zero entry for incidents or for zero fatalities was coded 0.01 instead of 0.00 for purposes of standardization, giving slightly greater weight to the absence of any activity in more populous countries. This approach duplicates one used in earlier studies that analyzed the economic effects of terrorism in Latin American countries and sub-Saharan Africa.[44]

Data on globalisation for each year from 1970 to 2010 were drawn from the KOF Index of Globalization developed by the Swiss Economic Institute. This comprehensive database has an economic index of globalisation, a social index of globalisation, and a political index of globalisation for each year. Data for individual countries for each index were not available for every year, but there were measures for at least some of the indices for each year. There is also a cumulative index that combined the economic, social, and political data. This overall index value represents a weighted average for the three indices. The
individual indices and the cumulative provided measures that reflected the complex nature of the process of globalisation. The economic index is based on financial flows and trade as well as indications of restrictions on international interactions. The social index is based on information flows, foreign citizens in residence, and measures of personal contacts with the outside world. The political index relies on the number of embassies present in a country, membership in international organizations, international treaties, and participation in United Nations peacekeeping efforts. None of the indices was based on a single measure; thus, there was a built-in smoothing function that leveled out any dramatic changes from any single economic, social, or political measure. The overall index, of course, reflects an even greater smoothing function since it is based on a weighted calculation drawn from the three indices. The economic index was weighted 36%, the social index 37%, and the political index 26% for the calculation of the overall index.

Data were available for almost all the Middle East and North African countries except for the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) for which there was no data for the period since it became independent. Restricting the analyses to these countries alleviated some of the difficulties of previous analyses of globalisation and increases in political violence by focusing on one region rather than the whole world (Inclusion of the developed countries in West Europe and elsewhere could be a potential problem. These countries are the most globalised but the least likely states to face civil wars). The availability of three individual indices and the overall index mean that it has been possible to measure the influence of different forms of globalisation as well as making a more comprehensive measurement. These databases combined to provide information for a forty year period which provides an excellent opportunity not only to determine whether globalisation and terrorism are linked but if any effects of globalisation are constant or whether there were changes that had occurred through time and with different types of interactions.

In the following analyses the basic measure of linkages between globalisation and terrorist activities was based on a series of correlations between these indices and the standardized measure of terrorist incidents, fatalities, and injuries. Correlations were run for the economic, social, political, and total globalisation indices. If globalisation had contributed to outbreaks of terrorism as hypothesized, then there would be positive associations between the indices and the measures of terrorism. While there could be an immediate link between globalisation and terrorism, it was also possible that the effects of globalisation might take some time to develop. As a consequence, the levels of economic, social, and political globalisation in a given year, as well as the level for the overall index were correlated with incidents and fatalities in not only in the same year \( t \), but also in years \( t+1, t+2, \) and \( t+3 \). The tests for lagged effects provided an opportunity to determine the possible long-term connections between globalisation and terrorism.

**Results**

If globalisation in its various forms was in fact placing stress on societies in the Middle East and North Africa, then the number of incidents or casualties would be greater in those countries with higher levels of interaction with the outside world. There could be possible differences between the effects of economic, social, and political interactions. Economic interactions have been seen as particularly disruptive to traditional societies, and it is possible that the analyses of countries in this region could provide support for this view that economic activities could have a greater impact than social or political ones. It is also possible that social or political interactions can bring in their wake new (and potentially threatening) ideas and viewpoints, which could result in increased violent opposition to outside influences.

Terrorism was a major issue in a number of countries in the 1970s. A variety of Palestinian groups were engaging in activities against Israel and Israeli interests. Turkey was experiencing violence between the left and right that led to brief military rule beginning in 1971 and levels of violence that became so great
that another military intervention occurred in 1980. During this decade the Lebanese political system disintegrated and a complex civil war began. Some distinctive patterns emerged for the region in this decade (see Table 1). Over half (69 of 120 possible) of the correlations for the social index were significant ones, including 45 at the a = .05 level. A slightly higher number (72) of the overall index was significant as well, but not as many were significant at the higher level, perhaps reflecting the lack of association between economic and political globalisation with the terrorism measures. The political index had virtually no explanatory power for any of the terrorism variables (only 5 of 120 correlations). The economic index only had limited explanatory value as well. The economic index of globalisation had the smallest number of actual observations since data was missing for this index more frequently than for either the social or political indices. In this period, the countries that had higher levels of social integration with the outside world were the ones more likely to experience higher levels of terrorism in the same year and in subsequent years. There was no apparent difference for the predictive values of any of the three measures of terrorism. Of the three measures, the number of injuries was somewhat less frequently as a good predictor. This result may reflect the fact that information on injuries in some attacks was not known, usually in cases where there were bound to have been some injuries. There was not any real difference in the number of significant associations in year \( t \), \( t + 1 \), \( t + 2 \), and \( t + 3 \). Interestingly enough, in 1978 and 1979 there were a few indications (high negative associations) that countries that were the least economically integrated into the world system suffered more from terrorism.

In the 1980s, the conflict in Lebanon still continued with the associated terrorist violence. The first years also witnessed the continuation of violence between the left and right in Turkey. In the later years of the decade, problems were beginning to appear in Algeria that would eventually lead to a civil war situation. Israel and the Occupied Territories continued to be sites for attacks. The index for social globalisation had by far the greatest link with terrorism (see Table 2). Virtually every association was significant (114 out of 120). Clearly, higher levels of social interactions with the outside world are linked with increased activities by organizations willing to use terrorist techniques. There were no cases in which greater political globalisation was associated with terrorism in the same or later years. There were only a few cases in which economic globalisation or the total globalisation index was linked with terrorism. There were actually twelve cases in which there were negative associations in the other tail of the distribution for economic globalisation. These associations occurred in the first part of the decade, indicating that there was the possibility that the countries less integrated into global economy were slightly more likely to be affected by terrorism.

In the late 1980s there were seven such negative associations for the index for political globalisation, indicating that countries with weaker ties to the outside world might have been more vulnerable to terrorism or perhaps were targeted because they lacked external support or allies. At least one study found that more treaty relationships were associated with lower levels of terrorism.[46] The results for this period might suggest that this would be a possibility. The positive associations on the social index were similar for years \( t \), \( t + 1 \), \( t + 2 \), and \( t + 3 \). The small number of other positive associations were scattered among the same year or later years. All three measures of terrorist violence (incidents, fatalities, and injuries) had similar results.
Table 1

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*α = .10, α = .05, α = .01
Correlations in brackets are in other tail of distribution

The number of observations varies for the various indices which influences the level of significance for correlations at the same level.
In the 1990s terrorist attacks were regularly occurring in Israel and the Occupied Territories. In this decade Algeria suffered through a civil war in which terrorist attacks by dissident Islamic groups were an important part of the challenge to the government. Turkey was then facing attacks from Kurdish nationalists and a limited number of attacks by Islamic groups. Many other countries in the region now had to deal with at least some terrorist attacks by Islamic groups that were challenging what they saw as governments which were too secular and which had ties with the West that were seen as being too close. The various measures of globalisation had different patterns in this decade. The social index still had the greater connection with terrorism but much less frequently than in the past—there were only 21 significant correlations. Most of these links were in the early part of the decade, indicating that the patterns from the 1980s continued into the first years of the new decade. Any association of higher social globalisation and terrorism had disappeared by the end of the decade. There were only a few correlations (four) indicating that economic globalisation could be linked with terrorism.

Unlike the previous decade there were no indications in the 1990s that weaker global economic ties were associated with terrorism. There were almost as many correlations for the political index as for the social index (18), suggesting that greater political globalisation was associated with terrorism—reversing the negative trend that was the case in the 1980s. During this period, there was no evidence that greater external political ties had supplied benefits for the countries in question. While the higher associations for the social index were concentrated in the early years of the decade, the significant associations for the political index were scattered throughout the period. Given the limited number of higher correlations, it is not surprising that the overall index that combined the other indices was limited to only seven significant examples. There was no pattern in terms of whether the significant associations were more prevalent in the same year as the values for the indices or in later years ($t + 1$, $t + 2$, or $t + 3$). All three measures of terrorism (incidents, fatalities, injuries) performed equally well or poorly in this time period.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century the situation in various parts of the Middle East changed. The attack on 9/11, of course, changed the views of governments, populations, and dissident groups. The attacks had some of their greatest repercussions in the Middle East region and Afghanistan. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq resulted in increased terrorist and non-terrorist attacks by many groups opposed to the US presence, new governments, or other contenders for political power and influence in the state. Islamic jihadists came to Iraq from many countries. There were other attacks by Islamic extremists in many other countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Yemen became a center for terrorism in the shape of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was active in North Africa and parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The results for this decade were quite different from the earlier years. The indices for political globalisation and social globalisation had no significant associations during the years in question (see Table 4). The index for economic globalisation had 25 cases of significant associations with terrorism concentrated in the first half of the decade, indicating that economic globalisation may have had a destabilizing influence in these years. The overall index had only five significant positive associations in 2001 and 2002.
### Table 2
Correlations between Globalization and Terrorism in the 1980s

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* α = .10  **α = .05  ***α = .01  Correlations in brackets are in other tail of distribution
The number of observations varies for the various indices which influences the level of significance for correlations at the same level.
What was much more noticeable was the large number of negative associations in the other tail of the distribution—indicating that countries that were less involved in the global scene were the ones more likely to suffer from terrorism—or perhaps that there was a feedback loop in which terrorism had weakened the global ties of some countries that was then reflected in the later associations. It is also possible that the linkages that came with economic globalisation might help to mitigate the effects of terrorism. Foreign aid, for example, has been determined to reduce the negative effects of terrorism on foreign direct investment.

[47] The political index lacked any such linkages, but the economic index had nine such negative associations concentrated in the last four years. The index of social globalisation had 42 such negative associations (all after 2002), presenting a pattern that was completely different from the 1970s and 1980s when greater social integration had been consistently linked to terrorism. By the 21st century it became clear that the countries with lower values were suffering from more terrorism.

In the late 1980s there were seven such negative associations for the index for political globalisation, indicating that countries with weaker ties to the outside world might have been more vulnerable to terrorism or perhaps were targeted because they lacked external support or allies. At least one study found that more treaty relationships were associated with lower levels of terrorism [46]. The results for this period might suggest that this would be a possibility. The positive associations on the social index were similar for years $t$, $t + 1$, $t + 2$, and $t + 3$. The small number of other positive associations were scattered among the same year or later years. All three measures of terrorist violence (incidents, fatalities, and injuries) had similar results.

The overall index of globalisation had 55 such negative associations indicating that less integrated states had now become more vulnerable to this type of political violence. It was possible that the global jihadists were focusing many of their attacks on these states because they might be the ones with the weakest security and intelligence services. The few positive associations and the much larger number of negative correlations were present for both the same year and with lagged effects. All three of the terrorism variables had the occasional positive correlation or the more frequent negative correlations at similar levels.

The shift in the linkages between terrorism and globalisation appeared to occur between 2002 and 2003. There is always a danger of spurious associations with any analysis of this type but the globalisation indices are multifaceted in nature, thus limiting this possibility. It is more likely that globalisation may be an intervening variable rather than a spurious one. As an intervening variable it reflects other factors, but that is precisely the value of using an index that is created from multiple variables.[48]. One confounding factor, however, could be the effects of the 2003 intervention of Iraq by the United States and its allies. This change in 2003 raised the possibility that the violence in Iraq might explain the shifts in the results since it was the scene of many attacks against non-military targets that qualify as terrorism. As a consequence, the analyses were run for the years from 2003 to 2010 without Iraq being included in the data set to determine whether the events in that country were responsible for the reversal in the results.
### Table 3
Correlations between Globalization and Terrorism in Middle East in the 1990s

<table>
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\( \alpha = 0.10 \quad \alpha = 0.05 \quad \alpha = 0.01 \)

Correlations in brackets are in other tail of distribution.
The number of observations varies for the various indices which influences the level of significance for correlations at the same level.
Removing Iraq from the analyses did lead to some changes, but not exactly the ones that would explain the reversal. The correlations between terrorism and the index of economic globalisation remained the same since Iraq was one of the countries with missing data for this index for these years. There was no real change in the results for the political index of globalisation as it lacked any consistent associations when Iraq was removed from the data set. There were no positive associations between the index of social globalisation with Iraq included, but nine when Iraq was removed from the analyses. Further, the number of negative associations between the measures of terrorism and this index declined from 42 with Iraq to 12 without Iraq. This drop in the number was larger than would be expected with the removal of one observation from a relatively small data set. The nine positive associations, which were similar to patterns in earlier years, were present in 2003, 2004, and 2005. Although lower in absolute number, the negative linkages appear in later years.

These changes would suggest that the US invasion of Iraq did indeed have an impact on levels of terrorism beyond what would be accounted for by globalisation indices. The overall index had a pattern similar to the social index. There were 15 positive associations in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, but then the pattern changes to one where there were relatively high negative correlations. The number of overall negative associations (11) between 2003 and 2010 was much lower when Iraq was excluded from the analyses than when it was included (52).

Events in Iraq did not directly explain the differences that became apparent a few years into the decade since they eventually appeared when Iraq was removed from the data set. It is possible, however, that the American intervention of Iraq by itself or the intervention of Iraq combined with the 9/11 attacks and the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan resulted in major changes in the context in which terrorism was taking place in the Middle East and North Africa. Al Qaeda had become less of a hierarchical organization and more of a network and increasingly relied on a leaderless resistance style of assault in its foreign targeting after the US intervention in Afghanistan. Organizations linked to Al Qaeda and the ones inspired by it increased as did actions by individuals who saw themselves as part of the broader global jihad movement. The presence of US and other troops in Iraq and Afghanistan provided Al Qaeda and other groups with an excellent propaganda opportunity to mobilize individuals and groups by suggesting that the United States and the West were openly attacking Islam.[49] It would seem likely that Al Qaeda elements were able to move into some of the states less integrated into the global system to enhance its chances of survival and to create new bases after the defeat of the Taliban regime. It would be more difficult for the West to undertake major military campaigns in these states or provide major support to indigenous military forces than might be the case in countries with stronger governments and greater links to the global system.

The location for terrorist attacks changed, as a consequence of major changes in the regional political and military environment that may have placed states less integrated into the global system more at risk.
## Table 4
Correlations between Globalization and Terrorism in Middle East in the 2000s

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<th>time t + 2</th>
<th>time t + 3</th>
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*α = .10, α = .05, α = .01* Correlations in brackets are in other tail of distribution
The number of observations varies for the various indices which influences the level of significance for correlations at the same level.
Conclusions

The above analyses indicate that globalisation was connected with terrorism in at least some circumstances. However, that relationship was a nuanced one and it was also one that was subject to change. The absence of a consistent pattern through time suggests that there is clearly a need for continuing analyses of the potential effect that the penetration of foreign influences into different regions of the world can have on terrorist activities or political violence in general. One of the most obvious findings is that different measures of globalisation can have quite different effects. The economic, social, and political indices had clearly varied patterns of association. Not all forms of globalisation will have the same impacts and the impacts can differ in different time periods.

In the 1970s and 1980s, it was clearly the countries with higher scores on the social index that had the larger number of terrorist events and casualties in a very consistent fashion, indicating that social contacts had been particularly disruptive in the region (see Table 6). This pattern carried over into the first years of the 1990s. In the last part of the 1990s and the early 21st century, however, social globalisation no longer had this effect. In the 1990s there were some indications that increased political globalisation was now associated with greater outbreaks of terrorist activity. There was only slight evidence that economic integration in the earlier years was linked to terrorism. In fact, in later years there were indications that countries less integrated into the global economy were somewhat more prone to terrorism. For the first decade of the 21st century, there was some evidence that states with greater political ties had begun to experience more terrorism (however, this finding surfaced only when Iraq was excluded from the analysis). What was generally true for the economic and social indices and for the overall indices was that by the latter part of this first decade of the 21st century those countries with lower levels of globalisation were the ones that were more prone to terrorism. It is, however, important to keep in mind that the overall index was not always a good measure to use since it reflected the differences between the three components. The social, economic, and political indices at times did have dissimilar results; thus, the overall index understated the impacts of specific globalisation measures on terrorism. Clearly, analyses of terrorism and globalisation do need to look at the individual components and not just at the overall index.

In terms of the years and variables used, there was no consistent pattern. The associations for the same years and for levels of terrorism in one, two, or three years later were generally similar. Associations were sometimes higher and more significant in the same year, and sometimes were higher or more significant in one of the following years. Thus, it would be prudent to include some measure of lagged effects in additional analyses since such impacts may be relevant. At least some aspects of globalisation had long term links with outbreaks of terrorism. The number of incidents, fatalities, and injuries all seemed to work equally well although one variable might be clearly linked with globalisation in one year while the other two were not.
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*α = .10  α = .05  α = .01  Correlations in brackets are in other tail of distribution The number of observations varies for the various indices which influences the level of significance for correlations at the same level.*
There is greater variability, of course, in the number of casualties that can occur when there are only a limited number of attacks. The results from the above suggest that it is wise to include all three variables so as to not miss any associations that might be present. The number of injuries does remain probably the least useful since there is more missing data on this measure than on the number of fatalities.

The changes in relationships that occurred could result from a number of factors. It is possible that there were changes in the ways in which globalisation was taking place in the region but these types of variations are difficult if not impossible to test for. What is also possible is that there was a threshold level for globalisation effects. The countries in the first decades had been affected to varying degrees by globalisation, but as countries approached the threshold there were some states more affected, and these were the ones that now suffered more from terrorist violence. It is possible that eventually all or most of the countries in the region reached or passed the threshold of globalisation for which societies or economies can be sufficiently disrupted so as to drive individuals or groups that have been negatively affected to rely on tactics of terrorism. Under these circumstances, it was the countries that were now lagging behind in terms of globalisation that began to face the most difficulties. It is also possible that those Middle Eastern and North African countries that had become more integrated into the system had developed better adaptive mechanisms to the challenges that came with globalisation. This adaptation would then have been able to reduce the level of terrorist violence encountered.

A changing international environment and the types of issues that countries have faced could also have an impact on the different associations over the course of time. In the first decades, much of the violence involved Palestinians and Israelis. In the later years it involved Al Qaeda and other proponents of global jihad. Terrorism as a phenomenon was changing from the 1970s to the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. David Rapoport has suggested that there have been waves of terrorist violence.[50] While not all groups or incidents fit into particular waves,[51] he did identify broad patterns. Three of his waves came after World War II—first a nationalist wave, then a wave involving New Left groups in the later 1960s, and finally a religious wave beginning towards the end of the twentieth century. The ethnic and nationalist wave continued into the later years with groups like the Basque ETA, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the nationalist PLO (as opposed to the more religious Hamas). The New Left wave corresponds to the first decades of the present analysis. The critiques by the left of the failures and problems of global capitalism suggested that greater integration into the world economic system created significant problems for developing countries. Integration as noted at the beginning of this article can exacerbate issues of inequality among groups in all parts of the world. The results from the 1970s and 1980s would have been part of this wave, which may help to explain why social globalisation was so closely linked to outbreaks of terrorism (although it would have been anticipated by the left that economic effects would have been more important). The 1990s and 2000s, however, would have been part of the religious wave represented by al Qaeda and the global jihad movement, the Sikh uprising in the Punjab, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Hamas displacing the PLO in Gaza in the Palestinian struggle against Israel.

The earlier violence had elements of ethnicity and left wing aspirations and lacked religious elements. Given the different motivations of the groups using terrorism as a technique in different decades, it may not be so surprising that relationships changed, although it would have seemed likely that leftist ideological violence and perhaps nationalist violence would have had more links to economic globalisation rather than social globalisation and that religious terrorism would have been more affected by the penetration of outside ideas.
In future years, events flowing out of the Arab Spring (which was in many ways a manifestation of the intrusion of foreign ideas and globalisation) and the pushback by groups opposed to change could influence the pattern of activities. The Arab Spring has provided opportunities for groups willing to use violence to gain strength in some countries.[52]

In the final analysis the results from the present study were very ambiguous, suggesting that both terrorism and globalisation are indeed very complex and the relationship between them is doubly so. Additional analyses are clearly necessary to determine the types and extent of links between globalisation and all types of political violence, including the possibility of such associations in other regions of the world. It would also be useful to look at how rapid the changes in globalisation levels have been, but the fact that the indices rely on multiple variables creates as noted before a smoothing function which inevitably means that for most countries there is a steady increase in the values, especially for the economic and social indices which are in many ways the most interesting ones, rather than any dramatic changes from year to year. A different type of statistical analysis will be necessary as a consequence to test for this possibility which should be an appropriate topic for future research. A number of other possible intervening or conditioning variables could have played a role in reinforcing the effects of globalisation or limiting these. These types of exogenous influences could change over time in terms of their interactions and therefore their impacts. Even so, there were still strong indications that in the 1970s, 1980s, and early part of the 1990s higher levels of some types of globalisation were positively linked to terrorism. However, in later years the patterns changed. There is a very good possibility that the changes reflected shifts in patterns of globalisation, but also shifts in the major sources of terrorism from ethnicity to ideology and religion, significant changes in the global context, and/or the responses to changing levels of globalisation. Ultimately, additional research is necessary to better determine what the links between globalisation and terrorism are. There are obviously temporal differences, and there could very well be regional differences as well.

The complexity of the relationship between globalisation and terrorism provides limited information that can be of use to governments seeking to prevent violence. The complexities suggest that great care has to be used to determine which types of global interactions are potentially dangerous since these can vary over time. Even if the linkages were clearer, there is little that governments can do about globalisation even if they desire to do so. The process appears to be virtually inevitable. To date the anti-globalisation movements, both violent and non-violent, that have appeared to contest the effects of globalisation have been too weak to effectively challenge the political elites who favor globalisation.[53] While the opposition is likely to continue, it is unlikely to be able to prevent globalisation, although it might modify some of the negative consequences that can come with that process.

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About the Authors: Dr. Brenda J. Lutz is a Research Associate at the Decision Sciences and Research Institute at Indiana University. Dr. James M. Lutz is a Professor of Political Science at Indiana University-Purdue University at Fort Wayne. They have collaborated in researching various aspects of terrorism.

Notes


[18] Idem, p. 37.


[32] Jeffrey A. Shad, Jr., op. cit., p. 76.


[34] A. Pedahzur and A. Perliger, op. cit., p. 33.


[37] Ipsita Chatterjee, op. cit., pp. 89-93.


[40] Donald Black, op. cit., p. 19.


Ogen Goldman, op. cit., p. 43.


Andrew Targowski, op. cit., p. 88.
II. Research Notes

Lost Souls Searching for Answers?

Belgian and Dutch Converts Joining the Islamic State

by Marion van San

Abstract

Since the start of the Syrian conflict much has been written about Western foreign fighters who travel to the country to join Islamic State. In much of the literature it is asserted that a fair percentage of these foreign fighters are converts to Islam. Yet, we know very little about who these people are. In this Research Note, the image of converts who have joined the Islamic State as portrayed in the media is first examined. Subsequently, based on ethnographic research, an attempt is made to provide deeper insight into the family background of seventeen Belgian and Dutch converts. While this is a small sample, it can nevertheless contribute to a better understanding what makes young converts join the armed struggle in Syria in the name of Allah.

Keywords: Islamic State, converts, foreign fighters, radicalization process

Introduction

According to the latest estimates, the number of foreign fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq in order to fight alongside Islamic State has grown to nearly 30,000, of whom some 5,000 are from Western countries. Although exact numbers are hard to come by, terrorism experts have noted that a significant number of the foreign fighters coming from the West are converts to Islam and that the number of converts rushing to the aid of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) is far greater than in any other modern conflict in the Islamic World. [1] It is estimated that one in six Europeans joining the organization are converts from non-Muslim faiths, including Christianity, while some have a non-religious background. [2] In France, the ratio of converts among those leaving is even higher: about one in four. [3] From Belgium and the Netherlands dozens of converts have left for Syria, mostly women. The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) recently suggested that most Dutch jihadists are young Moroccans who grew up in the Netherlands. [4] Of a sample of the 329 young people with Belgian nationality, who joined the armed struggle in Syria, ten per cent are converts. [5]

Since the start of the war in Syria in 2011 there has been great concern about the number of converts joining Islamic State as this seems to indicate that violent extremism can attract people from all sorts of environments. [6] Although security services all over Europe perceive converts as a serious and growing terrorist threat, most researchers argue that only a small number of them are attracted to terrorism. [7] Other authors take a different view. Olivier Roy (2008), for example, mentioned the ‘very high level of converts’ (estimates range from nine to twenty per cent) in organizations such as Al Qaeda. [8] Simcox and Dyer considered the proportion of converts in the UK who committed Islamism-related offences in the last years ‘disproportionately high’. [9]

Empirical research on the involvement of converts in Islamism-related offences shows a fragmented picture. The report *Al-Qaeda in the United States. A Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offenses* profiled 171 individuals who were convicted of al-Qaeda related offences or committed suicide attacks between 1997 and 2011. Nearly a
quarter (24 per cent) of all al-Qaeda related offences were committed by converts to Islam. [10] The report *Islamist Terrorism. The British Connections* includes profiles of all Islamism-related terrorist convictions in the UK in 2010, and presents an overview of Islam-related terrorism with significant connections to the UK between 1999 and 2010. The analysis shows that fifteen per cent of the individuals who committed Islamism-related offences were converts. [11] In 2006, Edwin Bakker showed that out of 242 individual cases of jihadi terrorists in Europe, 14 were converts. [12] Some government-issued reports have also shed light on the increasing role of converts in terrorist plots and attacks. [13] However, a clear picture of the involvement of converts in terrorism is still missing. Furthermore, fairly little is known in the social sciences about the involvement of converts in terrorism. [14] There are numerous studies about converts, but they do not address their possible involvement in terrorism. [15] Despite this lack of knowledge, hundreds of media articles have appeared on converts to Islam joining terrorist groups. According to Kleinmann and Flower, most of these articles are speculative and only reinforce an inaccurate stereotype of the group. [16]

This research note will first focus on the image that has been presented in media reports over the last months referring to converts who have joined the Islamic State. Based on ethnographic research this Research Note aims to provide insight into the family background of a group of seventeen Belgian and Dutch converts. Eight concrete cases of Belgian and Dutch converts who joined Islamic State have been analysed in an effort to provide a more complete picture of who these youngsters are.

**Who are Islamic State’s Western Converts?**

Since the outbreak of the war in Syria there have been many media reports in which terrorism-experts and representatives of security services were asked to explain the large number of converts affiliated with the Islamic State, even though nobody seemed to know exactly how many of them had actually joined the organization. As already shown by Bartoszewicz, the image prevalent in the media presents converts as disaffected and often troubled young people. [17] Those who have joined the Islamic State are often described as ‘fragile people who are drawn to a sectarian version of Islam’ [18], or as ‘lost souls searching for answers’ [19] and ‘chasing a fictional dream’ [20]. They are, furthermore, often seen as people with little knowledge of Islam who have been influenced and radicalized by recruiters on social media. [21] The conventional wisdom regarding European converts to Islam and the branding of these people as a security threat is based, according to Bartoszewicz, on the premise that the majority lack the necessary religious knowledge and are therefore unable to discern between the various interpretations of Islam, which makes them easy prey for radicals. [22]

Experts often think that converts are more vulnerable than others because of a lack of social support. Some were abandoned by their families and they may not be accepted into mainstream mosques. This isolation can make them vulnerable to extremists hoping for white converts to add credibility to their cause. [23] An important reason for people to convert to Islam seems to lie in the desire to forge a new identity, one based on dignity, as claimed by Jessica Stern in *Newsweek*. For those who join Islamic State, there is an element of thrill-seeking as well, perhaps even an attraction to violence. [24] The reason why youngsters join the armed struggle, Peter Neumann, director of the ICSR in London, in an interview with *Der Spiegel*, pointed at their desire to provoke, which is common among teenagers. ‘Salafism is the most provocative form of rebellion in tolerant Western societies’ he said. ‘You can’t really do anything more extreme than that.’ [25]

In addition, converts are often described as the most dangerous, most fanatical followers of radical Islam. [26] This is illustrated by some cases of their involvement in suicide attacks, such as the twin brothers from North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany, who converted to Islam and committed a suicide attack on behalf of ISIS.
Another example is the 22-year-old Frenchmen from rural Normandy, who converted to Islam at the age of seventeen and appeared in an execution video from the Islamic State. There is also the example of the British convert Khadijah Dare who declared on Twitter after the beheading of James Foley her desire to replicate the execution: “I wna b da 1st UK woman 2 kill a UK or US terrorist!”. Ready to prove their dedication to Islam, it seems that converts are prepared to do anything, including perpetrating the most atrocious acts of violence. It is suggested, Bartoszewicz claims, that someone new to Islam does not have the cultural bearings or a sound religious grounding to resist radical interpretations of Islam. Such statements can lead to a false and misleading perception of the causality between European converts to Islam and terrorism.

The question is indeed if the image that is presented in media reports over the last few years about converts who joined the armed struggle in Syria accords with reality. To get more clarity on this issue, this Research Note examines the life stories of a group of Belgian and Dutch converts who went to Syria. Although the material is still too limited to draw far-reaching conclusions, it gives a unique glimpse into their lives. Further research is clearly necessary.

**Research on Belgian and Dutch Foreign Fighters**

The data for this research note were collected through ethnographic research on radicalizing youths and their families which started in 2012 and continues until the present day. Over the past years, the author had dozens of formal and informal conversations with youngsters who departed for Syria. Since May 2013 additional ethnographic research among twenty families whose children have joined ISIS has been conducted.

The youngsters and their families were initially found via Facebook, which turned out to be a suitable medium to reach a group that is notoriously difficult to access. But as the war in Syria progressed and tougher measures were proclaimed by the Belgian and Dutch governments to prevent the departure of so many youngsters, distrust increased. In addition, doing research through Facebook became more difficult, as the authorities were actively removing the profiles of radicalized youngsters. From that period onwards, informants were found through the author’s networks, the parents who already belonged to the researched group and from media reports about youngsters who had left for Syria.

Among the thirty-five youngsters who eventually left for Syria, there were seventeen converts. In six cases, interviews were conducted with the youngsters themselves and in eleven cases with their parents. These were seven young men from Belgium and three young men and seven young women from the Netherlands. They were all between 18 and 30 years old, with a low or medium level of education and originating from lower- or lower-middle-class socio-economic backgrounds. At the time they departed for Syria, only two of them were still in school. Six of them had obtained their diploma, whereas nine had left school without a certificate. To guarantee the anonymity of the youngsters and their families all personal information has been anonymized.

This Research Note examines eight concrete cases of Belgian and Dutch converts who have joined the Islamic State. Obviously, these eight cases cannot possibly provide a complete picture of the phenomenon of radicalized Belgian and Dutch converts. More empirical data are needed to gain a better understanding of what was really going through their minds when they decided to leave their families and join the armed struggle in Syria. Hence, conclusions are necessarily tentative.
Family Backgrounds of the Young Women

The families of most of the young women who joined ISIS have a history of problems, most of them related to the divorce of their parents, addiction, domestic violence and sexual abuse. For Joyce, an eighteen-year-old girl born and raised in the Netherlands, the problems started when she was a young girl. The family had two children (Joyce and her older sister Janice) and lived in a working class neighbourhood in a Dutch town near the Belgian border. Joyce's mother had been in an abusive marriage with Joyce's father for seventeen years before the couple finally divorced. Joyce was allegedly sexually abused by her father, but this could not be verified. She left for Syria in December 2013, ten months after converting to Islam.

Twenty-year-old Carla was friends with Joyce on Facebook. Her parents had two children: Carla and her older sister Viviane. Her mother left her father when she was pregnant with her youngest child. Carla's father always acknowledged parentage of her older sister but never recognized Carla as his daughter. According to her mother, this had a major impact on her life. Carla's mother has been in a lesbian relationship for the past seven years. The couple lives in a quiet area in the south of the Netherlands. Carla left for Syria in January 2014, seven months after converting to Islam.

After arriving in Syria, Carla struck up a friendship with Rose. The girls already knew each other from a group on Facebook. Rose had left for Syria in May 2014. She was nineteen years old at the time and had converted to Islam the year before. Rose's mother lives in an apartment in a quiet neighbourhood near Amsterdam. She has been married twice and has two children. Rose's parents divorced when she was two years old. Rose's mother was in an abusive marriage with Rose's father and ended up in a shelter for battered women. Her second marriage was similarly abusive and also ended in divorce.

Syona, 21 years old, was in the same Facebook group as Carla. Her mother and stepfather live in a nice middle class house in a quiet area near The Hague. Syona's father lives in a desolate neighbourhood in Rotterdam. His flat is shabby, with unpainted doors and walls, worn-out furniture and broken floor covers. The family has three children. Syona's parents divorced when she was nine months old. The parents blame each other for everything that went wrong with their children. According to Syona's mother, everything changed when she ended up in hospital for an extended period of time during which she was not able to take care of her children. But according to her father, there were already problems before his ex-wife got ill. She worked in a night club, was dating the ‘wrong’ kind of boyfriends and left her children on their own. When the mother became ill the three children moved in with their father, but the situation spiralled out of control very soon. It was obvious that Syona's father was not able to take care of his children. He was an alcoholic, had a criminal record and was heavily in debt. Because of this domestic situation problems soon arose. The oldest son joined a neo-Nazi group, the second became a drug addict, and, as a young girl, Syona spent her days and nights on the streets. She left for Syria in May 2015, six months after converting to Islam.

Troubled Teens

Joyce has always been a problematic child. As a young girl, she drank alcohol and used drugs, suffered from depression and mutilated herself. At the age of twelve, she spent four months in a mental institution. In the years that followed psychological problems continued to haunt her. In her hometown, she was known as a riotous girl, and was called ‘the slutty’ by the local boys. For many year her mother and sister feared that she would end up as a prostitute.

Carla had a troubled youth as well. She became pregnant at the age of fifteen, but the relationship with the father of her son lasted only for a short time. Between the age of fifteen and eighteen she lived, as she put
it, ‘everywhere and nowhere’. She moved from shelter to shelter and finally ended up on the street. ‘I was totally fed up with the situation’ she wrote later in a letter. ‘So I started to use cannabis, alcohol, and went to clubs almost every day’.

Looking back, her mother and her partner think that Carla could have ended up as a prostitute, as she was very naïve as a young girl. Fortunately, that did not happen.

Rose, too, had many problems as a child and was diagnosed with borderline personality disorder. At home as well as in school, she displayed serious behavioural problems. After her parents divorced, Rose barely had any contact with her father, who lived abroad. As a young girl she was always trying to get the attention of the young Moroccan boys in her neighbourhood. Her mother was worried that she would end up in a prostitution network and bought her daughter books to warn her about the danger. At the age of twelve, behavioural problems at home caused Rose to go to a juvenile facility. She quit school when she was sixteen. She has had various jobs, but often left after only a few weeks.

As a teenager, Syona lived on the streets, used drugs and was involved in petty crime. She must have been around 18 years old when she got into a relationship with Mohamed, a street criminal, who later left for Syria after being inspired to do so by his older brother. Although the two were in a relationship, Mohamed made Syona available to other men and acted as her pimp.

Conversion to Islam and Radicalization

Joyce started to read the Bible at the age of seventeen, but apparently did not find in it what she was looking for. Later, she discovered Islam and converted not long after. At first, her family was relieved, because the problems she had before seemed to disappear. She no longer came home drunk, had stopped using drugs and was not dating the ‘wrong’ guys anymore. However, shortly after her conversion, the problems started again. Joyce began to wear a niqab and, over the next ten months, became increasingly alienated from her mother. Eventually, Joyce got in touch with a Dutch jihadi fighter on Facebook, married him via Skype a few days later and, after a month, left for Syria to join her new husband.

Carla converted to Islam around the same time as Joyce. Her mother considers her conversion as a way of dealing with her problems. But her mother also observed that Carla's behaviour changed from the moment she started to attend Islamic lectures in The Hague. What she did not know was that Carla had met Mohamed, Syona's by then ex-boyfriend. A few weeks after her conversion, Carla began to wear a niqab. She married Mohamed in December 2013. Shortly after the marriage, Mohamed left for Syria. Carla followed her husband one month later, leaving her 5-year-old son behind.

Rose started to wear a niqab three months after her conversion. During this period she met a jihadi fighting in Syria on Facebook. A few months later she left for Syria herself and got married the day after her arrival. According to her mother, Rose went to Syria because she was looking for forgiveness. ‘They think that all their sins will be forgiven,’ Rose's mother explained. Many of the girls who left, as in Rose's case, appear to have lost their self-respect in one way or another and were told that they will get it back as soon as they start following the rules.

When Syona was twenty years old, she started reading the Bible but apparently the book did not make much of an impression on her. A short time later she converted to Islam, influenced by her best friend. Her father noticed that she became completely devoted to her faith. She started to learn Arabic, wore a niqab and went to the mosque every week. She also spent much time on the Internet, where she chatted with young people who had joined the armed struggle in Syria. For instance, she spoke regularly on Skype with Carla. But she also told her father that she was still in touch with Mohamed. Eventually, Syona also left. She hoped that, by doing
this, her sins would be forgiven. Travelling to Syria meant that she would get a ticket to paradise. ‘Mum,’ she wrote her mother a few days after her arrival in Syria, ‘Allah has given me a new opportunity; I have the opportunity to go to paradise, so this is really what I had to do.’

Family Backgrounds of the Young Men

While the girls often came from dysfunctional families and had many problems in their childhood and during adolescence, the situation of the young men was much more complicated. Simon, a 23-year-old born and raised in Belgium, is the oldest of seven children. In his family many problems were caused by the alcohol addiction of his mother, which eventually led to the divorce of his parents. As a young boy, Simon was diagnosed with ADD [explain abbreviation: Attention Deficit…?] and borderline personality disorder. In his early childhood he had lived in various juvenile facilities because of his behavioural problems.

The 24-year-old Chester was an acquaintance of Simon and also a convert to Islam. They met on Facebook, but also came across each other on a regular basis during meetings of Sharia4Belgium and Sharia4Holland. [33] Chester is the oldest son from a harmonious family of four that lives in a little village in the south of the Netherlands. Neither Chester nor his brothers and sister ever caused any problems.

Liam, 19 years old, lived with his mother and two sisters in Belgium. His parents were divorced. His mother had various relationships with the wrong kind of men and it was obvious she was not capable of raising her children. Liam spent most of the time at his grandmother’s house. When his grandmother became too old to take care of him, Liam went back to his mother.

Drew, 18 years old, grew up in a harmonious family with two children. His parents divorced when he was four. Drew was raised by his mother and stepfather since he was five years old. He never had any contact with his biological father. Drew’s mother has a warm relationship with both her children.

Conversion to Islam and Radicalization

Simon, who worked as an electrician, converted to Islam in 2006 because he was looking for a new purpose in his life. Worried about a negative reaction from his parents, he read books about Islam in secret. At some point, however, his father found out about his conversion, which caused a great deal of conflicts within the family for quite some time. Simon was very devoted to his religion, but he was also a womanizer. He married several times but his marriages all ended in divorce. He grew a beard and started to wear Islamic clothes, and sympathized with Sharia4Belgium. Like many youngsters at that time he regularly visited this organization where, in addition to lectures and classes, leisure activities were organized. Sharia4Belgium became the family he never had before.

Chester, who worked as a social worker, began to read the Koran ‘out of curiosity’ in the summer of 2011. The book made a tremendous impression on him and Chester converted to Islam. His parents were not pleased with their son’s conversion and worried that he would become isolated in the village where he grew up. Chester was very devoted to his religion from the beginning. He exchanged his CD collection for Islamic books, grew a beard and began to wear only Islamic robes.

Liam, who had converted to Islam in December 2010, had often played football on a little square opposite his mother’s house. He was still in high school when one of his neighbours introduced him to Fouad Belkacem, the spokesman of Sharia4Belgium. Belkacem discussed and interpreted certain parts of the Koran and was seen as a wise man by youngsters. Liam, in particular, was impressed by him. The atmosphere at the
headquarters of the organization was friendly and it became a second home for Liam. Every week he attended Islamic classes. He also joined the street-\textit{dawa} movement. From the moment Liam joined \textit{Sharia4Belgium}, his family noticed a change in him. He started to wear Islamic clothes and pressured his mother and sisters to convert to Islam as well. At school it was noticed that Liam's behaviour had changed. He began to criticize his Islamic classmates for practicing their faith incorrectly. He also criticized his teachers because of their religion (he attended a Catholic school). Because the problems were getting worse he was removed from school. From that moment on, Liam began to devote himself exclusively to his religion.

\textbf{Drew} converted to Islam in the summer of 2013. He had many Muslim friends and became interested in their religion. According to his parents his behaviour did not change after his conversion. He spent more time in his room but it was unclear whether this had to do with his conversion. He did not change his looks and kept listening to music. It is obvious that Drew was less devoted than Simon, Chester and Liam. Drew quit school shortly after his conversion and worked as a pizza boy at a local pizzeria. He was planning to return to school after the summer holidays. However, a few months later, he was suddenly gone.

\textbf{Leaving for Syria}

In the weeks leading up to his departure to Syria, \textbf{Simon} got married again but this marriage also ended in divorce. Without anyone to depend on, Simon quit his job. He began to suffer from depression. Almost all of his ‘brothers’ in \textit{Sharia4Belgium} had gone to Syria. Finally, in the winter of 2014, he decided to leave for Syria himself.

The first signs that \textbf{Chester} was interested in the armed struggle came a year after his conversion. At first, he was only communicating with like-minded people via Facebook but that changed when he started to go to lectures and conferences, where he met people he only had known from social media. In the summer of 2012, Chester regularly travelled to The Hague. Most of the young men he met there would join the armed conflict in Syria later that year. Mohamed and his older brother were also part of this group. Chester became more and more convinced that his place was in Syria, defending his brothers and sisters who were being slaughtered and raped by the Assad regime. On Facebook, he expressed sympathy for Osama Bin Laden and Anwar al Awlaki. At home, more and more conflicts arose and finally spun out of control in the winter of 2012. Chester left his parents’ house and went to The Hague. A few months later, in May 2013, he was suddenly gone.

From the time that \textbf{Liam} was expelled from school, he became increasingly involved in the activities of \textit{Sharia4Belgium}. Gradually, he started to join the protest actions organized by the organization and became more and more convinced that he had to go and help his brothers and sisters in Syria. In April 2013 he left, presumably with a group of ten other members of the organization.

\textbf{Drew}'s mother never noticed a change in her son's behaviour after his conversion, but as it turned out, Drew and the friend he later travelled to Syria with, had indeed been studying jihadism in the weeks leading up to their departure. The boys often sat together in their room, praying and reading the Koran. They also watched Youtube videos about the war in Syria. They read books about the armed struggle and listened to sermons of Al Qaeda ideologues. The boys became more and more convinced that they should leave for Syria to help their brothers and sisters. If they did, they would be rewarded with a place in paradise. They left in the winter of 2014. Chester’s departure came as a complete surprise to his family.
Conclusion

The public image of converts joining the Islamic State as currently portrayed by the media is mostly one of youngsters with a problematic youth who acquired their knowledge of Islam through social media and are therefore easily influenced. These young people are seen as more susceptible than others to radical versions of Islam because of their limited knowledge of the religions various traditions. The present research has led the author to conclude that there is a considerable degree of truth to these observations. Unlike Bartoszewicz, Kleinmann and Flower, the present author is not convinced that most media articles are speculative and only reinforce an inaccurate stereotype of the group of converted jihadists. Nevertheless, there is no denying that reality is usually much more complex than media reports would have us believe.

The converts introduced in this Research Note were all under the age of thirty, came from lower- or lower-middle-class socio-economic backgrounds and had a low or medium level of education. Many of them, especially the girls, had a problematic childhood and adolescence. A common theme throughout their lives is that almost all of them were, in one way or another, abandoned by their fathers at a young age. Most of them used alcohol and drugs as teenagers and frequented nightclubs, while some of them were involved in prostitution or petty crime. Their conversion was often a means to escape their former lifestyles. Some girls left for Syria because they thought their sins would be forgiven. Others left because they fell in love with a fighter.

An accumulation of problems eventually leading to a period of seeking religious guidance has often been described in the literature. Wiktorowicz, for example, explains how traumatic personal experiences often set in motion an introspective period of ‘religious seeking’. When a person’s ‘identity is tied in part to religion or he or she desired religious meaning, a cognitive opening may lead to religious seeking’, which can also make the person vulnerable to radicalization. It is, however, never one single incident that makes a person susceptible to radicalization, but rather a history of traumatic life experiences and mental or behavioural health issues. [34] As we have seen, the girls often entered a period of religious seeking and ended up converting to Islam. It was their way of leaving the past behind and seeking forgiveness. What appealed to them in Islam, and later also in the ideology of ISIS, was that there were clear rules according to which one is supposed to live. In the end, that was what most girls had been looking for all their lives.

The situation of the young men was somewhat more complicated. For some of them, a previous disappointment was the reason for their conversion while others became interested in Islam because they had friends who were Muslims or they simply started to read the Koran out of curiosity. Some of these youngsters grew up in harmonious families, but at some point in time entered a period of seeking religious guidance. They acquired their knowledge of Islam mostly through social media. The question remains as to what extent they are different from young men from Islamic families who travelled to Syria. (For instance, to what extent do males and females differ in their knowledge of Islam?) Another noteworthy difference between the young men and women who left for Syria was that, at the time of their departure, the men had been converts to Islam for much longer than the women. On average, the young men converted between two and ten years before they departed to the warzone, the women between six and twelve months. As far as the majority of the young men are concerned, their decision to leave for Syria was based on a more or less ‘informed choice’, whereas the young women’s conversion and subsequent departure for Syria were more often of an impulsive nature.

This Research Note sketched a more complex picture of converts joining IS than the one presented by the media. Much more empirical research is needed to help us find out how conversion can lead to radicalism and extremism. In any case, this Research Note shows that the converts who left for Syria were not all
lost souls searching for answers. Some made an informed choice, some left because they were looking for forgiveness, while others simply fell in love.

**About the Author:** Marion van San studied sociology and criminology at the Free University in Brussels. She completed her PhD in sociology at the University of Amsterdam (1998) and now works as a Senior Researcher at the Rotterdam Institute for Social Policy Research (RISBO), Erasmus University. Her current research focuses on the radicalization of youngsters from an educational perspective.

**Notes**


[3] Ibid.


[9] This figure is based on the fact that there are approximately 100,000 converts in the United Kingdom (Robin Simcox & Emily Dyer, *The Role of Converts in Al Qaeda Related Terrorism Offenses in the United States*, CTC Sentinel, 6 (3), pp. 20-23).


[27] The Local, German twins die fighting for Isis in Iraq, 26 May 2015.


[29] Lizzie Dearden, James Foley beheading: “I want to be the first UK woman to kill a Westerner’ says British jihadist in Syria”, The Independent, 22 August 2014.


[33] Sharia4Belgium is a Salafist youth organization founded in Belgium in 2010. Its sister organization Sharia4Holland was founded a year later. Dozens of youths who were part of these organizations have left for Syria, which led to the suspicion that the members were being targeted for recruitment.

Designing and Applying an ‘Extremist Media Index’

by Donald Holbrook

Abstract

Even though notions of extremism are subjective and relative, we can still be systematic in the way we approach them. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how such a systematic mechanism can be compiled and visualised. I propose a set of definitions, in an ‘Extremist Media Index’, to grade ideological media material conveying religious-political sentiments according to some very basic criteria concerning stages of activism and the nature of religio-political discourse. I test the reliability of these criteria and apply the Index to publications by Anwar Al-Awlaki and associated with far-right extremism in order to display the range of sentiments conveyed and how these can be understood through systematic grading.

Keywords: Extremism, Media, Ideology, Islamism, Right-wing, Methodology

Introduction

Counterterrorism is increasingly being framed as a battle of ideas. There are ideational components, it is argued, that underpin both terrorist organisations and processes of violent radicalisation. In early 2015, the British Prime Minister described efforts to tackle ‘extremist ideology’ as the ‘struggle of our generation’. The Home Secretary expressed the government’s determination to challenge ‘the impact that some people have in terms of the poisonous ideology that they are trying to implant in people’s minds’ [1]. In the United States, President Obama emphasised the need to ‘confront squarely and honestly the twisted ideologies that these terrorist groups use to incite people to violence’ [2].

These statements reflect a desire to weaken and undermine normative dimensions of violent political behaviour and target ideas that politicians and policymakers see as contributing to extremist behaviour. But what is ‘extremist ideology’? What does it look like and how do we define it, process it and code it? [3]

Setting aside complex—but important—questions about the role of ideology in radicalisation [4] or indeed the ‘essence’ of ideology itself [5], this Research Note explores ways in which the coding and grading of media content seen to convey extremist sentiment can be systematised and standardised. This, to reiterate, is not to assume that extremist ideology—or indeed non-extremist ideology—is a necessary or even central precursor to participation in terrorist activity [6]. The purpose here is merely to look at different ‘gradients’ of content.

The Research Note builds upon existing work with colleagues looking at tiers, expressions and variations of discourses associated with terrorism and political violence [7] and the aim here is to develop this thinking towards more systematic ways in which to approach such a body of content.

The focus is on ideology as beliefs and principles that guide political behaviour and define the goals and rationales of individual or collective political action [8]. The author is particularly interested in frames as interpretive schemata aimed at structuring political protest on the basis of fundamental ideas and beliefs [9] and how these are conveyed through different media [10].
Relativity and Subjectivity

Before setting out the proposed grading schema, we first need to revisit the central question, ‘what is extremist ideology?’ ‘Extreme’ ideas are by definition relative. They allude to a set of more moderate beliefs and principles that diverge from a particular abstract centre or ‘mainstream’. But these frames of reference are not stable.

Central themes of what today is seen as right-wing extremism, such as anti-Semitism, white supremacism, racism and xenophobia were once broadly accepted by authors, composers, scientists, industrialists, politicians, academics and other members of a European or North American elites and intelligentsia [11]. More recently, issues such as gay rights and full gender equality have come to the fore with both tolerance and intolerance constituting a broadly-accepted mainstream, depending on cultural and political realities on the ground.

As Alan Fiske and Tage Rai noted in their construction of ‘virtual violence theory’, notions of just violence ‘that in one culture or in one historical epoch are moral may be immoral in another culture or in another historical epoch’ [12]. Author Orhan Pamuk, for instance, reflects how people of the ‘East’ would celebrate the conquest of Istanbul in 1453 whilst those from the ‘West’ lamented the fall of Constantinople [13].

The answer to ‘what is extremist ideology?’ therefore, is geographically, temporally and culturally relative and subjective. To appropriate Miles’s edict on bureaucratic biases: where you stand on the issue depends on where you sit.

Systematic Analysis

Yet, even though notions of extremism are subjective and relative, we can still be systematic in the way we approach them. The purpose of this Research Note is to illustrate how such a systematic mechanism can be compiled. The author proposes a set of definitions to grade ideological media material conveying religious-political sentiments according to some very basic criteria concerning stages of activism and the nature of religio-political discourse. This is, in part, inspired by Max Taylor’s work on COPINE [14], which categorised the severity of child sex abuse images. Ideological content is obviously profoundly different and more ambiguous, but perhaps one can arrive at some form of tiered conceptualisation that draws out distinctions in terms of discourse and, in particular, highlights references to violence, especially lethal violence, in pursuit of religio-political causes and the divergent ways in which such sentiments are framed.

At this point, it is worth stressing another caveat. We are not concerned with prescriptions, about what should or should not be said or articulated or what is or ought to be legal or illegal [15]. The focus is only on conceptual yardsticks: social scientific ways of organising discourse and language into categories in a systematic way.

Why might grading be important? Firstly, ‘terrorist’ statements and communiques from individuals clearly associated with terrorist movements differ more than one intuitively expects. Usama bin Ladin, for example, said nothing about violent activism in his early Open Letters, before endorsing violence publically against, initially, members of the armed forces and then combatants and civilians, before issuing much milder messages about the environment and global aid just before his death. If we want to understand such nuances we need to develop systematic, testable and repeatable tools of measurement.

Secondly, standardised and systematic grading may offer ways in which to compare discourses from different extremist cohorts, such as the far-right and Islamist-inspired extremism. Thirdly, whilst the role of ideology
in ‘radicalisation’–a problematic and contested topic as noted above–is beyond the scope of this Research Note, systematised grading offers opportunities to explore relationships between mere consumption of ideological content on the one hand and active engagement in terrorism on the other. At least it provides parameters for comparative analyses and structured case studies.

The goal here is, therefore, to develop a relatively approachable and testable framework that is applicable irrespective of subject or particular political/ideological disposition.

**Framing and ‘Extremist’ Political Protest**

Delineating different tiers of content with respect to political protest relates directly to the ways in which events, issues and realities are framed in order to mobilise support and encourage particular action. Robert Benford and David Snow defined action-orientated sets of beliefs and meanings that were intended to inspire and legitimate activities and campaigns of social movement organisations as ‘collective action frames’. These were divided into three core communicative tasks: **diagnostic frames** describing problems that need to be addressed, **prognostic frames** as solutions to these problems, and **motivational frames** providing activist indicators that are designed to turn observers into participants [16].

A funnel offers a helpful analogy to picture how this fits within the context of political violence: many people might agree that particular grievances need to be addressed, a smaller proportion might agree with particular alternatives or solutions offered and a much smaller proportion still accepts that violence could be used to address those grievances. An even smaller group, motivated by a host of factors, would then actually seek to participate or support terrorist violence to redress that grievance.

We can use the same funnel analogy to look at ideological discourses and political activism in this context where some similar tiers emerge (Figure 1): we have, very broadly speaking, (1) moderate material conveying ideological/political/religious content without advocating violence; (2) radical political content that is hostile, confrontational or isolationist; (3) material glorifying violence and perhaps dehumanising ‘enemy’ people and then different scales in terms of scope of violence and targeting and level of facilitating detail that is offered.
Developing this categorisation further, systematising with numerical indicators, we arrive at a more structured assessment of content termed, for sake of identification, the ‘Extremist Media Index’ (EMI).

**Extremist Media Index**

The system of grading devised for such an Index consists of two phases. First, titles or texts are coded according to a set of definitions that are intended to describe notionally ’moderate’, ’fringe’ and ’extreme’ content. Second, the ’extreme’ titles are coded in more detail to draw out ways in which violence is endorsed, the level of facilitating detail provided as well as the scope of proposed action. Does the author of the title (be that a video recording, audio speech, pamphlet or book, for example) clearly endorse violent tactics in pursuit of political aims in contemporary scenarios? If so, does s/he advocate targeted violence against soldiers only, or against non-combatants as well? If violence against non-combatants is celebrated or endorsed, does the author provide any details that would help a consumer of the particular title to carry out the prescribed act? [17]. The process of grading is described in Figure 2 and a more detailed set of definitions is provided in Appendix 1.
Figure 2: Extremist Media Index

1. Moderate material
   - No endorsement of violence or expressions of hatred/animosity towards people

2. Fringe material
   - Isolationism, hostility towards out-group without referencing violence

3. Extreme material
   - Endorsement/glorification of violence in contemporary context and/or stark dehumanization
     - References to violence are vague or limited to combatants
     - Violence against civilians clearly justified/glorified
     - Violence against civilians justified/glorified and specific facilitating details offered for indiscriminate attacks
     - Facilitating details of ‘Level 3’ titles can be directly followed to cause harm (e.g. bomb-making recipes)
Testing and Reliability

The first task before applying the Index to a relevant batch of content is to test reliability. Complex ideological discourses, as noted, are hard to subject to rigid content analyses with a substantial amount of agreement between coders [18]. This is a subjective realm, as discussed above, not an exercise in measuring any specific message or language characteristics and although the boundaries above may seem intuitive to many, they can be hard to identify. Anything approaching ‘strong’ agreement would therefore be impossible.

Nevertheless, to get a sense of inter-coder reliability, the author assembled a research team consisting of himself and two other researchers. Three coders thus graded the sample batch blindly and reliability scores were calculated using established reliability tests [19].

First, we tested 145 titles involving known activist and militant leaders, groups and publishers as well as a random selection of material conveying religio-political content and distributed online to test the range of the definitions. The focus was on the Islamist and far-right dispositions.

Second, we graded 32 titles that were rated as ‘extreme’ in the first phase according to the tiers defined for the second phase of grading as noted in Figure 2, above.

The coding results from the first phase were fed into Deen Freelon’s ReCal online reliability calculator [20]. The results for the first phase of grading revealed a Fleiss’ Kappa of 0.665, Cohen’s Kappa of 0.669 and a Krippendorff’s Alpha of 0.666. Whilst hovering around the limit of acceptable agreement for Krippendorff’s more stringent Alpha, the results suggest an intermediate to good result from Fleiss and Cohen [21]. Agreement for two coders was understandably higher with Krippendorff’s Alpha of 0.69.

The coding results for the smaller cohort of ‘extreme’ texts in the second phase of grading were weaker. For three coders, Fleiss was 0.586, Cohen was 0.593 and Krippendorff was 0.59. For the first two coders, however, agreement was significantly higher with Cohen’s Kappa of 0.766 and Krippendorff’s Alpha of 0.796.

These inter-coder tests emphasise the challenges of establishing agreement between coders on such a subjective dataset and with such broad categories but nonetheless illustrate how tests designed for more structured content analyses can be applied to such a body of content. The coding can provide at least an indicator of content whilst highlighting the subjective nature of the process.

Applying the Index

To apply the Index to a more relevant sample of media output, I selected a number of titles authored by Anwar al-Awlaki (a famous Islamist ideologue who became involved with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) as well as a cohort of prominent white supremacists.

We selected a collection of 118 Anwar al-Awlaki lectures and essays from Archive.org which had been downloaded over 80,000 times, according to the website, but also exist as bitTorrent files. We chose white supremacist publications from both the UK [Combat 18, Blood and Honour and White Nationalist Party/ British People’s Party] and the US [David Lane, William Pierce, Creativity Movement, American Nazi Party]. All have publicly been associated with extremism and serve as an illustrative example of how the Index can be applied.
Together with the research assistants, the author coded the 118 Awlaki titles and 34 white supremacist titles, first, according to the initial phase of grading (‘moderate’, ‘fringe’ and ‘extreme’). We then re-coded the ‘extreme’ titles according to second phase of grading.

The results for the white supremacist titles are presented in figure 3.

![Figure 3: Grading results for white supremacist titles](image)

Much of the white supremacist literature in the UK is cautious, partly because legal restrictions are known. Therefore, there is a tendency to focus on Aryan supremacy in an isolationist discourse, without endorsing violence or explicitly dehumanising others. Those texts that do endorse violence do so in a very ambiguous way. However, in the US scene we see authors going further. Ben Klassen of the World Church of the Creator, for example, endorsed all-out race wars against Jews and non-whites, without giving any details, which amounts to Extreme level 2 on the Index. Figure 3 has two peaks caused by the William Pierce novels *Hunter* and *Turner Diaries*, where the author, a physics professor, talks at length about devices, targets and attack scenarios, bringing it to Extreme level 3 on the Index [22].

Figure 4 shows grading results for 118 individual titles that Anwar al-Awlaki authored and disseminated over the years, both in audio lectures and essays.
The majority of Awlaki’s output is not extreme at all, but falls either in the moderate or fringe categories. These are titles that do not endorse violence in any way, being mostly religious tracts, but in many cases also isolationist or hostile towards non-Salafis, such as Sufis, and Shi’a and non-Muslims. There is also variation in his extremist output: plenty of titles legitimise mass-casualty violence but few offer details on how to bring this about. Most of this extremist output obviously came after Awlaki was released from prison in Yemen in 2007 and solidified his links with terrorism more openly, including with AQAP. But there are curious examples of earlier references to extremist ideas. In one part of an 18-CD audio lecture series on the Life of the Prophet Mohammed, published in 2000, for example, Awlaki drifted from the main topic of the otherwise moderate series to present justifications for suicide bombings against civilians in contemporary scenarios, which would be graded as Extreme level 3.

Variation, therefore, emerges in discourses associated with extremism, which is made explicit by the Index.

**Conclusions and Limitations**

It is necessary to end this Research Note by re-emphasising some caveats in relation to the Index. Again, this is a subjective process: it is inherently difficult to define objective parameters for something as value-laden as highly political ideological discourse. There are grey areas between categories and some boundaries are difficult to define, particularly between vague fringe material and vague level 1 extreme material therefore a degree of overlap between categories should be assumed. The red lines are not always that easy to spot. This is also a descriptive exercise: a method of organising discourse according to a pre-defined set of criteria, not an assessment concerning acceptability of particular language or disposition.

Nevertheless, the Index offers meaningful shortcuts to assessing content that are qualitative, theoretically grounded, empirically tested and repeatable. In designing such an Index, therefore, one ought to strike a balance between simplicity, practicality and accessibility for different coders on the one hand and
comprehensiveness and something that can offer meaningful descriptions of different sets of discourses on the other.

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Notes


[10] Paul Wilkinson’s (2006) definition is helpful: ”Media is a generic term meaning all the methods or channels of information and entertainment. The mass media are taken to encompass newspapers, radio and television and other important forms of communications, including books, films, music, theatre and the visual arts. The late twentieth century has seen the globalisation of the mass media culture, but we should not overlook the fact that throughout history informal methods of communication such as the gossip of the taverns, streets and marketplace have been the standard local media for transmitting information, and these informal channels coexist with all the latest multimedia technology in contemporary societies.”–Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, Second Edition. London; Frank Cass, p. 144.


[15] Even though plenty of examples exist, not just within the realm of terrorism legislation in the UK, but much more broadly in terms of laws against inciting racial or religious hatred or fomenting discrimination.


[22] The fact that these are novels, fantasies, of course illustrates the complexities of coding. The author, however, had clear intentions of bridging his fantasy and reality, at least in some way.
### Appendix

#### Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary grading category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - Moderate</td>
<td>General religious, political, philosophical or historical material and news commentary containing no endorsement of violence or hatred towards identified communities with generally moderate content along the lines found in mainstream religious/political texts and news media output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Fringe</td>
<td>Content is religiously or ideologically conservative and isolationist, politically radical and confrontational, but without any justifications conveyed for violence in present-day scenarios. Anger and hostility might be expressed towards a given group of people, such as the ‘kuffar’ (unbelievers) or immigrants, without the added assumption that these people are somehow ‘subhuman’ and legitimate targets of violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - Extreme</td>
<td>Material that legitimises and/or glorifies the use of violence, especially serious and potentially fatal violence, to achieve particular goals, as well as the fighters and martyrs who die for the cause, with some allusion to the view that such prescriptions continue to be relevant for contemporary activists. Also included within this category is material that focuses on dehumanising particular communities, citing issues of race, sexuality, origin or other aspects that render such people ‘sub-human,’ thus undermining their right to life. This category thus captures both publications advocating ‘jihadi’ violence against combatants or civilians, as well some works of the extreme right-wing, for instance, that can be more opaque in terms of references to violence but with a focus on presenting people such as Jews and non-whites as sub-human in the context of an imagined or envisaged confrontation with these groups of people.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Secondary grading category</th>
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<tr>
<td>Extreme Level 1</td>
<td>Serious violence (i.e. potentially fatal) is only justified/promoted/welcomed with reference to combatants or is vague, without any detail, e.g. talk about the virtues of collective violence, glorification of insurgency warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Level 2</td>
<td>Serious violence (i.e. potentially fatal) clearly justified/promoted/welcomed against non-combatants, but without any detail, e.g. “murder Muslims”, “kill the kuffar”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Level 3</td>
<td>Serious violence (i.e. potentially fatal) justified/promoted/welcomed against non-combatants and with some detail regarding facilitation, scope or direction: i.e. “do suicide attacks” (against non-combatants), “target the economy”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Level 3b</td>
<td>Same as ‘3’ but specific and directly applicable details offered, e.g. bomb-making recipes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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III. Policy Brief

The Afghan Insurgency and the Uncertainty of Peace Negotiations

by Kambaiz Rafi

Afghanistan's security situation remains precarious. The surprise takeover of the Kunduz city in North Afghanistan by the Taliban in late September 2015 [1] marks the culminating point in a series of insurgent push backs following the drawdown of the coalition forces. The Taliban combat capability which was largely diminished to IED [2] and suicide attacks following the 2009 US military surge [3], drove Afghan security forces out of the provincial center in a matter of hours. Kunduz city still remains gripped by firefight after the Afghan Army and police forces, aided by NATO air strikes, re-entered the city and are struggling to regain full control[4]. Coordinated insurgent attacks in Badakhshan, Takhar, Faryab and Baghlan provinces have also been reported, causing many to flee [5] their homes [6].

In recent months the Taliban were grappling with divisions following the confirmation of their elusive leader, Mullah Omar's death in early August [7]. Omar died two years ago in April 2013, an incident known only to his family and a close circle of associates. Mullah Akhtar Mansour, officially second in command, was chosen as leader of the Taliban following the news, an event that sparked fierce disagreements from influential Taliban members, including Omar's son Mullah Yaqoub whose allegiance to Mansour was announced by the Taliban spokesperson only in mid-September. The Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri and the Pakistani cleric Maulana Sami-ul Haq – dubbed the father of the Taliban – have also thrown their support behind Mansour.

However, a recent statement [8] by Mansour urging insubordinate Taliban members not to deny their cooperation, indicates that the rift between him and some of his important opponents remains unresolved. The so-called impartial council of religious elders that was tasked to settle differences between Mansour and his opponents declared in late September that its efforts have been unsuccessful.

Mansour swiftly appointed his deputies from members of the Haqqani network which strengthens his position. Nonetheless, it stirs another more deep-rooted confrontation with his leadership. His first deputy, Mawlawi Haibatullah, a cleric known for issuing fatwas in favor of terrorist activities, is an Ishaqzai like Mansour himself. This can enrage rival tribes, among them the Alizai whose members have been in slugfest with the Ishaqzais since the 1980s [9]. Former Taliban senior commander Abdul Qayoum Zakir – a prominent challenger of Mansour's authority – also belongs to the Alizai tribe.

Moreover, the founders of the Taliban movement, including Mullah Omar, have mostly belonged to the Ghilzai confederation of Pashtun tribes. Mansour is not a Ghilzai and even among the archrival Durani confederation of tribes, his Ishaqzai tribe is seen as a marginal one. The rivalry [10] between the Ghilzai and Durani confederations sometimes define the very Taliban insurgency, placing one against the other with the latter having usually dominated the central government. Placed at the top of a movement that Ghilzais have traditionally prided on leading, it remains to be seen to what extent Mansour can resort to religious piety rather than tribal affiliation to gain acceptance among the Taliban leadership.

So far Mansour has proven his knack for leadership in overseeing the takeover of Kunduz, the single most important achievement of the Taliban since their regime fell 14 years ago. The Kunduz onslaught can also be seen as a desperate attempt by Mansour to reinvigorate a movement that was on its way to disintegration.
What the ISIS did to regroup and revitalize Al-Qaida in Iraq by flooding into Northern Iraq under a new banner, Mansour is trying to do in Northern Afghanistan although with much less success.

Peace talks with the Afghan authorities have been pushed to the margins at the moment. ISIS involvement in Afghanistan[11]–officially announced in early January 2015 – and the leadership struggle in the Taliban movement with risks of further fragmentation, makes the Taliban wary of losing its support base among extremist elements if they talk peace.

ISIS in Afghanistan cannot be seen as a potential threat on par with the far extensive Taliban insurgency, despite the recent UN report indicating recruitment by the group in 25 out of 34 provinces of the country [12]. The group remains largely confined to the eastern province of Ningarhar where, for the first time, it conducted a series of largely unsuccessful attacks on several security checkpoints in the same week of the Kunduz takeover by the Taliban [13]. However, the mere presence of ISIS adds a new dimension to the overall Afghan insurgency. The vicious hostility shown by the ISIS in eastern Afghanistan has become a cause for worry to none other than the Taliban itself.

The Taliban leadership went far enough as to write a letter to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in June 2015, urging him to avoid meddling in Afghanistan. The plea was not heeded by Al-Baghdadi, as is seen by the escalation of violence between the Taliban and the ISIS affiliated militants in Ningarhar. In one show of defiance, ten Taliban members accused of apostasy by the ISIS were placed on explosives and blown up while the incident was being filmed in the typical ISIS style of brandishing its brutality.

Agreeing to a political settlement would also raise the dilemma of preserving Taliban's Jihadi cause. Though less pronounced as of late, the Taliban rank and file have always had the ambition of creating a Jihadi caliphate and revere their supreme leader accordingly. They called Mullah Omar Emir al-Mominin (Arabic for 'leader of the faithful') and now call Mansour the same. Opting for peace talks might drive away many seasoned zealots who justify their Jihad based on this notion and are vital for the group's survival at the moment.

Though Mansour initially endorsed the first round of Pakistan brokered peace talks with an Afghan government delegation for the first time in early July 2015, he quickly sidetracked once rumors of Mullah Omar's death started circulating. As a leader, his message was to first disown ever having sanctioned the talks and secondly, asking his militants to fight on [14].

He might return to talks in the future if changing dynamics on the battlefield compel him to look for political alternatives rather than managing an endless insurgency–something that he has already implied in his first message as leader when he points out that "the doors for indirect meetings with the enemy in regards to independence of Afghanistan … still are open". If that is what he is aiming for, the recent wave of attacks in the north can be understood as his strategy to both assert his leadership of the Taliban and, if he resumes talks with the government, walk to the table with a heftier bag of achievements.

Meanwhile, pressures on Mansour from influential opponents of peace talks among the Taliban cannot be ruled out. In a meeting [15] of Taliban members in Islamabad this year, Mansour has reportedly favored direct talks with the Afghan government but has seen opposition from Abdul Qayum Zakir who supports continued militancy. Zakir was initially believed to replace the Pakistan detained Taliban No. 2, Mullah Abdul Ghani Beradar, a position that eventually Mansour usurped in a power struggle. Zakir was also the main challenger to Mansour’s dictates during the long absence of Omar — who was revealed to be dead — more recently defying Mansour's statement of April 2014 that dismissed Zakir as the senior Taliban battlefield commander. Zakir started demanding evidence regarding whether Omar himself has ordered
his dismissal, giving rise to speculations regarding the misuse of his authority by Mansour. Zakir has many thousands of loyal militants in eastern Afghanistan and after the announcement of Mullah Omar’ death, reports of his disagreement with Mansour’s appointment as leader surfaced. A statement [16] on the Taliban website shortly after denied Zakir’s disagreement with Mansour’s leadership, but any certainty on this issue is yet to be brought to light. It is also possible that in return for Zakir’s much needed loyalty, Mansour has turned away from peace talks, at least till the time when Zakir can be pushed aside completely.

Another important Taliban commander in Helmand province, Mansour Dadullah [17] has officially parted ways with the group and has openly accused Mansour of orchestrating [18] Mullah Omar’s death, also condemning him for becoming a Pakistani stooge.

Two scenarios can emerge out of the recent events pertaining to the Taliban movement. Either Mullah Mansour asserts himself as the supreme leader of the Taliban after decisive victories on the battlefield, bringing provincial centers under his control and maintaining them through fierce resistance against the ANSF. The Taliban offensive in Kunduz is the defining moment whether this scenario will ever be realized. So far, the offensives in all the northern provinces, including Kunduz have been repelled by the ANSF while being backed by local population and NATO air support, although reports from the field do not offer clarity as to who will deal the final blow.

The second scenario also begins with Kunduz and stretches over northern Afghanistan where the Taliban have put their focus for their Summer offensive. Following the drawdown of the coalition forces and the political squabbles among the leaders of the Afghan Unity Government, this year was a good opportunity for the Taliban to make use of a weakened Afghan State. In case of failure, the Taliban’s Mullah Mansour will, with Pakistan’s [19] blessing, have to re-evaluate his belligerent approach. For Mansour, the currently (still limited) success in Kunduz provides him with a sudden rise in popularity which he can use to subdue his opponents within the Taliban. This may not be so if and when the ANSF deals the Taliban a few defeats and the Kabul government manages to ratchet up its security apparatus.

The first scenario is already stopping short in its tracks. What is more likely to follow from the second scenario is that Mansour’s leadership will be brought under further questioning, increasing doubts regarding him in the ranks of the Taliban. He is already accused of duping other Taliban members, allegedly in close cooperation with the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, by misusing Mullah Omar’s authority for two years. His likely move toward peace will further discredit him and lead to deeper fragmentations around the figures opposing talks, giving the ISIS and other Taliban splinters groups a chance to swell their ranks with new recruits.

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Notes
According to recent media reports, the Taliban have claimed recapture of large parts of the city from ANSF's control. Read more: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/taliban-claims-recapture-afgan-city-kunduz-151004132211450.html.

According to a report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), close to 20,000 families have been reportedly displaced in Kunduz, Badakhshan, Faryab, Baghlan and Badghis provinces by June 2, 2015.

Preliminary information from Kunduz published on UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) website on 30th September, 2015, indicate that 100 civilians have reportedly been killed during the current fighting in Kunduz while 6,000 have fled the city. Exact casualty numbers remain unknown due to ongoing combat operations.


The statement can be accessed through the following link: http://www.shahamat-farsi.com/?p=11921.


Read more: http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Pashtun%20Tribal%20Dynamics.pdf.

Hereby referred to as the ISIS.


Mansour Dadullah is a brother to the Taliban senior military commander Mullah Dadullah who was killed by the British and American Special forces in 2007 (read more: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dadullah).

For a detailed account of Pakistan's involvement with the Taliban, refer to the following report: http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/dp/dp18%20incl%20Dari.pdf.
IV. Resources

Bibliography: Muslims and the West

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the relationship between Muslims and the West in the context of terrorism. It covers topics such as Islamophobia, the stereotyping of Muslims, or Samuel P. Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” theory. Though focusing on recent literature, the bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to early September 2015. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, Muslims, West, Clash of Civilizations, Huntington, Islamophobia, stereotyping, integration, immigration

NB: All websites were last visited on 14.09.2015.—See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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Note

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., studied Information Science and New German Literature and Linguistics at the Saarland University (Germany). Her doctoral thesis dealt with Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents. Currently she works in the research & development department of the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). She also serves as Editorial Assistant for 'Perspectives on Terrorism'.
V. Book Reviews

Anne Speckhard. *Bride of ISIS: One Young Woman’s Path into Homegrown Terrorism.*


Reviewed by Anita Perešin

Anne Speckhard’s new book “Bride of ISIS” is a timely and precious resource for those who want to understand how ISIS attracts and motivates young Western women over the Internet and lures them into abandoning a comfortable life in a developed country to travel thousands of miles to become the wives of its fighters in the dangerous territories of the Islamic State’s proclaimed Caliphate, or to become homegrown terrorists in their own countries, ready to sacrifice their lives in the name of the “Great Jihad”.

Dr. Speckhard, who is an Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry and Security Studies at Georgetown University in the Schools of Medicine and Foreign Service, narrates through a fictionalized story based on an actual terrorist (Shannon Conley), and offers a fascinating insight into the personal transformation and psychological trajectory of an American teenager morphed into a would-be suicide bomber. Inspired by a composite of real cases, the author uses the character of Sophie Lindsay, a seemingly “normal” girl and once a successful student from a well-established Christian family, but in reality traumatized and left without support from family and friends after a violent experience in her past. The case study shows the power of the propaganda spread on the Internet by savvy ISIS recruiters, delivered to vulnerable persons, and shows how an idealized online love affair with an ISIS fighter via Skype, can be the trigger of dramatic changes in her life.

The author describes how ISIS manages to convince young Muslims from the West to fulfill what they believe is their religious duty, by “joining a cosmic battle” for the utopian state that ISIS claims to be building in Syria and Iraq. Anne Speckhard explains how the Islamic State, with its proclaimed Caliphate, is able to inspire “End Times mentality,” while creating at the same time fighters for the war theater of Syria and Iraq and grooming some of them to become self-organized homegrown attackers in the West. “The followers of ISIS believe this is all leading to the final cosmic battle and that Allah is calling them to the Great Jihad,” she writes, showing us how dangerous people who believe in apocalyptic visions can become when eager to sacrifice themselves for their ideas of an imaginary utopian future.

In parallel with Sophie’s life story with an ISIS fighter she had never met in person but who seduces her over the Internet into traveling all the way from home, the book presents the challenges that security experts from the Denver Fusion Center face, while working together to proactively identify and stop potential terrorists and other threats before they materialize. Adopting characters with expertise in jihadist extremism and working experience in the FBI and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Dr Speckhard explains through them, the fundamental features of ISIS structure, leadership, goals and propaganda.

The description of the events that lead to Sophie’s terrorist attack and her father’s commitment to justice and national security, are a contribution to the identification of one of the most effective paths to contain the threat: the collaboration with law enforcement of the families of the potential victims of indoctrination. In Sophie’s case, as in the actual case of Shannon Conley, her father makes the agonizing call to the FBI to stop his daughter from joining the terrorists—resulting in her arrest and ultimate conviction in the case of Conley.

The author’s strategy to explain this complex psychological process of the transformations of “normal” Western women into ISIS members through the use of a fictionalized case, but with a rigorous consistency
with the reality of such situations in our societies (endnoted throughout the book to alert the reader to events that are based on actual cases), is a brilliant solution as it makes the issue comprehensible, revealing the prevalently emotional drivers of the situations described. At the same time the book offers—through the discussion of the Homeland Security and FBI characters—an in-depth analysis of ISIS strategies and modus operandi and contributes to a better understanding and to the identification of the most appropriate instruments and methods to counter radicalization.

“Bride of ISIS” is a book that reads like a thriller but is at the same time highly educational and informative, keeping the reader spell-bound about the fate of one young girl led astray and seduced into terrorism by ISIS.

**About the Reviewer:** Dr. Anita Perešin is a Senior Adviser in the Office of the National Security Council of the Republic of Croatia and an Adjunct Professor of counter-terrorism at the University of Zagreb.
Counterterrorism Bookshelf:

16 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

*This column consists of capsule reviews of recent books from various publishers.*


This is an annually published map on the risk of terrorism and political violence around the world, which is further analyzed in the accompanying booklet. The guide’s findings and assessments are based on what it terms empirical ‘Terrorism Tracker’ data assembled by The Risk Advisory Group and Aon. The Risk Advisory Group is a global risk consultancy, based in London, and Aon is a global risk management, insurance brokerage and reinsurance brokerage firm. In the map, what are termed ‘peril’ icons are assigned to the world’s countries, covering a spectrum of political violence risks from low to high that are aggregated on a cumulative basis in the form of terrorism, sabotage, strikes and/or riots, malicious damage, insurrection, revolution and rebellion, mutiny and/or coup d’etat, and war and/or civil war. The booklet presents an introductory commentary, macro analysis and findings, regional overviews, and the methodology underpinning the overall analysis.


This book presents practical and useful guidelines and practices for investigators and intelligence analysts to search the Internet as part of their investigations of individuals under suspicion but also for general or specific searches from open sources. The book’s first section, “Behavior and Technology,” discusses the Internet’s usefulness for investigations and how the Internet is used and ‘abused’ by criminals and other destructive actors; the second section, “Legal and Policy Context,” discusses laws and professional standards governing cyber investigations, including litigation cases; the third section, “Framework for Internet Searching,” discusses legal procedures and training tools; and the fourth section, “Internet Search Methodology,” discusses manual and automated search techniques, Internet intelligence reporting, types of illicit websites (ranging from child pornography to contraband digital assets), and Internet intelligence issues such as privacy and the adjudication of investigatory cases.


This edited volume is the product of a conference on multidisciplinary approaches to analyzing terrorism online and the measures to counter it, which was held in Birmingham, UK, in April 2013. Following an introductory overview, the chapters discuss issues such as how terrorism online has become a new strategic environment; the activities of lone actor terrorists on the Internet; the prevalence of hacktivism, with the extremist Turkish hacktivist group, RedHack, examined as a case study; an application of a malware cost model (MCM) to assess the cost-benefit utility of cyberterrorism; applying criminal law and “punishment-based” deterrence to counter cyberterrorism; an examination of the effectiveness of government intelligence and security services in monitoring the activities of cyberterrorists; the effectiveness of transatlantic...
collaboration by European and American governments in countering cyberterrorism; and an examination of international laws and regulations that govern the use of force by states in retaliating against cyberterrorist attacks.


This volume provides an extensively researched examination of the encrypted world of the 'deep web', which the author describes as “a catch-all term for the myriad shocking, disturbing and controversial corners of the net – the realm of imagined criminals and predators of all shapes and sizes.” (p. 3) A shortfall in this well written and informative book is the absence of an index to aid in identifying the cyber hacktivist individuals and groups discussed in the account. The author is a journalist and tech blogger for *The Telegraph* and Director of the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media, Demos, UK.


This book offers a comprehensive and gripping account of the appeal, activities and targeting of the global network of cyber hacktivists in the form of LulzSec and Anonymous, a loosely-affiliated network of political extremists who engage in cyber breaching of their perceived government and corporate adversaries. The author is a San Francisco-based writer with *Forbes* magazine.


Islamist terrorism represents a major domestic threat to the Russian Federation (which is likely to increase in response to Russia's intervention in the Syrian civil war against the Islamic State), yet little is generally known about Russia's domestic security services that are tasked to counter such threats. This slim and authoritative volume provides valuable details about these forces and their operations, ranging from the MVD, the Interior Troops (VV), the Federal Security Service (FSB), and other services, such as Military Police (VP), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MChS). Also discussed are these security services’ tactics and weaponry. The text is accompanied by numerous illustrations and photos. The author, a professor at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University, is a noted expert on the Russian military and national security.


This book presents an authoritative account of the origins and history of Russia's counterinsurgency campaigns in Chechnya against the region's Islamist militants. Beginning with a chronology of the insurgency in the modern era, the book then discusses the nature of the warring sides, how the earlier 'edition' of the war ended in 2009, and likely future trends. One of the author’s conclusions is especially pertinent to understanding the current period, as he writes: “the rest of the North Caucasus is experiencing rising local national and jihadist insurgency, which could yet blow back into Chechnya.” (p. 91) In this light, it will
be interesting to see if Russia’s current intervention in Syria against the Islamic State will blow-back into Chechnya and the North Caucasus. The text is accompanied by numerous illustrations and photos.


With Russia’s Spetsnaz Special Forces reportedly deployed in Syria and the Ukraine, this slim yet authoritative volume is of special interest as it discusses these forces’ Bolshevik legacy and their role during the Cold War, including in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. Also discussed is their role in the first and second Chechen Wars (1994–96 and 1999–2002). The examination of their role in the contemporary era is especially pertinent, with accounts of their activities in Georgia (2008) and in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014. The final chapter discusses their weapons, equipment, and tactics. The book is accompanied by numerous illustrations and photos.


This book provides a comprehensive and detailed account of the origins, root causes, religio-nationalist ideology, evolution and current state of Islamist terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus region and Russia’s counterterrorism response measures. The book’s chapters discuss issues such as the historical relationship between Russia and the North Caucasus; the terrorist outbreak against Russia, which began in November 1991; the religio-ideological underpinnings of Chechen terrorism, such as its incorporation of global jihadism and its use of suicide martyrdom operations, including by female ‘Black Widows’; Russia’s counterterrorism response measures by its military and security services; and the formation of the Caucasus Emirate in 2007 and the nature of its subsequent use of terrorism. The concluding chapter assesses the effectiveness of Russia’s counterterrorism campaign, which the author critiques for “overreliance on the hard-line approach to terrorism [which] risk further alienating the populations that might subsequently radicalize and join the ranks of terrorists.” (p. 182) The author is an assistant professor of international security studies at the College of International Security Affairs of the National Defense University, in Washington, DC. [This volume is part of Praeger Security International’s guides to terrorists, insurgents, and armed groups, of which James J.F. Forest, PT’s Co-Editor, is the Series Editor]


This book seeks to bridge the gap between what the author terms the sophistication of the ‘plague’ of Islamist-jihadist terrorism in exploiting the Western world’s liberal democratic values and the West’s difficulty in “attaining effective and balanced counter-terrorism policies” in response. (pp. ix-x) To accomplish this objective, the author begins with an overview of terrorism in general as multidimensional warfare, and then proceeds to discuss the challenges and dilemmas faced by liberal democracies in coping with Islamist terrorism, including whether liberal democracy is the “solution to terrorism – or part of the problem” (e.g., by overly appeasing such extremists in their midst); a cost-benefit-based conceptual model developed by the author on formulating proportionality in countering terrorism; the involvement by states, such as Iran, in sponsoring or engaging in terrorism; the nature of Islamist terrorist groups, such as the Palestinian Hamas (which is also discussed in a separate chapter) and the Lebanese Hizballah, as hybrid terrorist organizations.
that also engage in social welfare and political activities (including contesting elections). Boaz Ganor also analyses the rationales underlying these groups’ strategies, tactics, targeting choices, and overall warfare (e.g., conventional to WMD warfare).

There is much to commend in this book, especially the discussion in Chapter 8, “The Practical Aspects of an Islamist Terrorist Organization’s Rationale,” of the decision by such groups to engage in terrorism or guerrilla warfare, how they shape their warfare to appeal to internal, targeted, and international audiences, and the top-down and bottom-up triggers that are factored in their attack decisions. Also highly useful is the examination in Chapter 9, “Understanding the Rationale Behind Different Types of Terrorist Attacks,” of the distinction between personal initiative and organized terrorist attacks; the various steps involved in planning, training for, and conducting an attack; the distinction between ‘conventional’ and suicide attacks; and the rationale behind potential weapons of mass destruction attacks.

Some parts of the book, however, are problematic. The chapter on “The Proportionality Dilemma in Countering Terrorism” doesn’t really fit as a chapter 3, since it seems separate and out of place from the previous two chapters (as well as from the subsequent chapters) and could better have been placed in an appendix. It is written in a different style than the other chapters as it is a highly theoretical, is intended as a decision support tool, and the model it presents as a mathematical formula of proportionality = military necessity (advantage) over expected collateral damage would be too difficult for most readers to comprehend and, in any case, serves to distract the reader from the author’s primary thesis.

In Chapter 6, “Is Liberal Democracy the Solution to Terrorism – Or Is It Part of the Problem?,” Dr. Ganor’s discussion of recent American counter-terrorism policy is overly general as it relies on certain public doctrinal statements, but does not discuss the tremendous upgrades in American counterterrorism by the Bush and Obama administrations in transforming the FBI into an effective and proactive domestic counterterrorism agency, as well as its proactive use of the intelligence and military services overseas to target Islamist terrorists.

Finally, with Israel included by Dr. Ganor as an example of liberal democracy, his analysis would have benefited from a discussion of how the Israeli government has attempted to counter Jewish far-right religio-nationalist terrorism and whether such Jewish extremists and terrorists are also taking advantage of the state’s ‘liberal’ character – just like their Islamist counterparts in the West.

Dr. Ganor concludes, rightfully, that effective counterterrorism campaigns by liberal democracies must be comprehensive and integrated in their political, legal, military, and law enforcement measures, while adhering to the “legal legitimacy of liberal democracy.” (pp. 176-177)

Prof. Ganor is the Executive Director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) and a Dean at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya, Israel.


This handbook presents a comprehensive, detailed, and authoritative overview of the global Jihadi movement and its disparate affiliates, with a focus on their infrastructure, operational capabilities, and terrorist activities. The book is divided into six chapters, beginning with a short introduction that discusses the general structure and characteristics of Jihadi terrorist organizations, the nature of their leadership, command cadre and network structures, how their largely hierarchical organizational structures have been affected by the
killings of many of their commanders, and, as part of the discussion of al Qaida's history and evolution, its trajectory into external Jihad prior to 9/11. Following the introductory outline, the other chapters discuss the evolution of al Qaida's Salafi jihadi ideology since 9/11 (including the earlier ideological debate over the future of Jihadism between the late Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri (al Qaida's current leader), its organizational structure, its affiliated groups around the world (such as Jemmah Islamiyah and al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula) and their geographical areas of operation (in conflict zones such as Chechnya, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria), and new trends such as the emergence of lone wolves and homegrown violent extremists in Western countries and how they operate, especially via the Internet's extremist sites' radicalization, command and control, funding and logistical mechanisms. The book concludes with a discussion of the effectiveness of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) against the global Jihad with the authors finding that “jihadi terror is changing, yet never diminishing or even reducing,” and that “we now face new characteristics of a multi-organizational style as many elements – affiliated organizations and inspired individuals – are currently carrying the torch of jihad by conducting terrorist activities with international characteristics.” (p. 417) The authors also conclude that on the home front, “the campaign against Islamic radicalization and extremism seems to be a great failure….as it seems to have only limited impact as the numbers of Western jihadi volunteers that have been traveling to Syria illustrates.” (p. 417)

Rohan Gunaratna is professor of security studies and head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Aviv Oreg, an Israeli researcher, is the former head of the al Qaida and Global Jihad desk in the Analysis and Research Division of the IDF Intelligence Branch.


This book centers around the author’s thesis of whether the resort to terrorism works in achieving a group's political objectives (such as in overthrowing a colonial ruler) through a detailed examination of the use of terrorism by the right-wing Jewish underground against the British Mandatory authorities (although Palestinian Arabs were also attacked) during the formative period of Israeli pre-statehood in Palestine from 1917 to 1947. The Irgun (“Ha-Irgun Ha-Tzvai Ha-Leumi b-Eretz Yisrael,” also known by its acronym Etzel) and Lehi (the acronym of Lohamei Herut Israel, “Fighters for the Freedom of Israel,” also known as the Stern Gang) are the primary right-wing Jewish terrorist groups whose leaders, ideologies, and armed operations are examined to test the author's thesis. Here, a criticism of the author's overall approach is warranted since it was—in the view of this reviewer—actually the left-of-center Jewish paramilitary underground, led by the Haganah (“The Defense”) and the Palmach (acronym for “Plugot Mahatz”, “Strike Forces”), its elite special forces, under the political leadership of David Ben Gurion and the Mapai party, in collaboration with Chaim Weizmann (in his role as the top diplomat and statesman), that ultimately succeeded in bringing about Israeli statehood in May 1948, and not the Irgun or its leader Menachem Begin, as argued by the author. This is not intended to diminish the roles played by the Irgun and Lehi in militarily opposing British mandatory rule, but to point out that it was the more responsible and pragmatic left-of-center Zionist mainstream (including its role in the pre-state nation-building program — which was of little interest to the right-wing underground) that led the Yishuv (Palestine's Jewish Community) to proclaim Israeli statehood in May 1948. Thus, it was the pragmatism of the mainstream Zionist governing parties and not the Irgun or Lehi’s primary focus on terrorism that ultimately brought about Israeli independence and statehood. In fact, the Irgun continued to act so irresponsibly in the aftermath of statehood that the newly established Mapai-led government was forced to sink the Altalena, the Irgun’s ship that had attempted to illicitly smuggle arms into Israel in
June 1948. Despite these criticisms, Dr. Hoffman's book is tremendously well researched, using declassified primary sources from British archives, and is well written.


This book offers a detailed account of the history and evolution of U.S.-led Special Forces in counter-terrorism campaigns against Islamist terrorism since 9/11. Beginning with an introductory overview of the world of terrorism prior to 9/11, the book’s chapters cover topics such as the role of Special Forces in Afghanistan in overthrowing the Taliban regime in the aftermath of 9/11 (as well as their counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan through 2014 – including their mission to capture or kill Usama bin Laden in late May 2010), their operations in Iraq from 2003 to 2012, as well as their activities in new theaters of operations in Somalia, Libya, Yemen, Mali, and Syria. The author concludes that “Special Operations Forces will continue to be the tip of the spear in this global war against terrorism,” but that it is ultimately up to local government forces to lead such military campaigns with their own united governments supported by their own people. (p. 317) The book is illustrated with numerous photographs and maps that visualize the text. The author is an Australian military journalist and writer.


This volume provides an account of some of the major operations by Special Forces since 1990 in conflict zones in Iraq, Somalia, the Balkans, South America, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan. The introductory chapter presents a valuable overview of the history of Special Forces, beginning with a discussion of T.E. Lawrence’s role in bringing irregular operations into the sphere of military strategy and operations against the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, as well as the use of Special Forces in the Second World War, in Vietnam, and against terrorists and drug lords in cases such as Entebbe (July 1976), Mogadishu (October 1977), and Panama (1989). The use of Special Forces in counter-terrorism is also covered, with an interesting discussion of their desired operational capabilities described by the author as personnel survivability, counter WMD, mobility in denied areas and remote reconnaissance, sensory enhancements, and use of versatile weapons with “broader range of effects.” (p. 196) The text is illustrated by numerous photographs and also features sidebars that contain additional information and explanation. The author is a veteran British author on military subjects.


In this book the author provides an interesting theoretical and detailed examination of the nature and activities of environmental and animal rights extremist and terrorist groups in Europe and the United States. The book is divided into five parts. The first part presents a theoretical perspective on extremism, its origins and characteristics, and the conditions under which it turns to terrorism. The second part is an overview of animal rights extremism, with an analysis of its ideological foundations in justifying the use of violence, its history, and the movement’s leading groups, such as the Animal Liberation Front and Band of Mercy. The third part focuses on environmental extremism, its origins, root causes, and what the author terms “anarchist social ecology.” The groups discussed range from Greenpeace’s non-violent extremists to the violent Earth Liberation Front. Part four discusses these extremist groups’ strategy and organization
which are primarily leaderless resistance in nature and extensively active on the Internet, where they wage a “netwar” type of warfare. Also discussed are prominent lone wolves, such as the Dutchman Volkert van der Graaf (an animal rights extremist) and the American Theodore Kaczynski (known as the “Unabomber”). The final part discusses new trends in these types of violent extremists, such as the impacts of globalization, the Internet, cyberterrorism, and hacktivist-type swarming attacks in cyberspace against their adversary targets. The author concludes that “So far, only in the case of animal rights extremism can one talk about multiple, and hence, as it seems, not accidental, violation of the declared ‘no hurting humans’ principle.” (p. 224) The author is a professor on the Faculty of National Security and Logistics of the Polish Air Force Academy.


This volume provides a discussion of the likelihood of a terrorist group such as al Qaida to launch a nuclear weapon attack, the measures required to counter problematic nuclear states (such as North Korea or Iran) or fragile nuclear states (such as Pakistan) that might make it feasible for terrorist groups to acquire such weapons, and the unprecedented measures that the United States would need to implement in the aftermath of a potential nuclear attack. The author is a career U.S. government official in the Department of State and Department of Defense.

*About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai* is the Book Reviews Editor of *Perspectives on Terrorism*. He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.
V. Notes from the Editor

Announcement:

Dr. Anneli Botha: Winner of the Best Ph.D. Thesis 2014 Award

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) is awarding each year a prize of US $ 1,000.- for the Best PhD Thesis in the Field of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies. By the deadline of 31 March 2015, a total of 14 theses successfully defended at an academic institution of higher learning in 2014 were submitted to the jury.

The jury received dissertations from Australia (2), Canada (3), Japan (1), the Netherlands (1), Pakistan (1), South Africa (1), and the United States (5). Eight of the doctoral theses had male and six female authors. The topics covered a broad range of subjects and ranged from Criminalizing Terrorism: The Impact of Context and Cohort Effects on the Sentencing Outcomes of Terrorists to National Confidence and Development in Afghanistan: Insurgency vs. Counterinsurgency, from The Politics of the Attack: A Discourse [Analysis] of Insurrectionary Communiques to Leaderless Resistance, Radical Environmentalism, and Asymmetrical Warfare, from The Fatal Attraction of Suicide Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis of Suicide Terrorist Attacks in the Middle East and South Asia to Spatio-Temporal Analysis of Terrorism Vulnerability: A Case Study of Central Tokyo, Japan, from Contributions to Bayesian Statistical Modeling in Public Policy Research to Police and Counter-Terrorism in Pakistan after 9/11 (2001-2010), from Adult Public Education for Nuclear Terrorism: An Analysis of Cold War and War on Terror Preparedness Discourses to Extraordinary Measures – A Comparative Approach to Crafting a New Legal Framework for Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists, to The Science of Fighting Terrorism: The Relation Between Terrorist Actor Type and Counterterrorism.

The jury, consisting of the three directors of the Terrorism Research Initiative (Robert Wesley, James Forest and Alex Schmid) utilized a standard set of criteria to assess the quality of the submissions. These included whether or not the thesis under consideration was the product of in-depth research, whether it showed originality in terms of introducing new data, theory or methodology, and whether it showed novelty/uniqueness in its findings. After evaluation, three theses stood out and became the finalists:

- Radicalisation to Commit Terrorism from a Political Socialisation Perspective in Kenya and Uganda, written at the University of the Free State in South Africa by Dr. Anneli Botha;
- Countering Terrorism in the Maritime Domain: A Contemporary Evaluation of the International Legal Framework, written at the University of Wollongong, Australia, by Dr. Robin Bowley; and
- Pro-Integration: Disengagement and Life after Extremism, written at Monash University, Australia, by Dr. Kate Barrelle.

The thesis of Dr. Barrelle investigated individual disengagement from violent extremism in liberal democracies. It is based on the analysis of interviews with former extremists of different ideologies (left- and right-wing, jihadist and separatist) and asked the basic question “What is the experience of disengagement from the perspective of extremists themselves?” Based on social movement theory, the lucidly written thesis developed new empirical data on the basis of a strong conceptualisation. While the author’s own sample of interviewees was relatively small (n = 22) she tied her own data in with the results from more than 200 other interviews with ex-extremists and found common themes like disillusionment with the inside world of terrorist groups as cause for exiting. Dr. Barrelle, using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), developed a holistic model of disengagement and societal re-engagement called PIM (Pro-Integration Model) that is of direct practical utility for counter-radicalisation efforts.
The thesis of Dr. Robin Bowley examined “To what extent are international agreements ...likely to be successful in enabling the prevention of contemporary forms of maritime terrorism?” The author developed a Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix, distinguishing 21 forms of such terrorism. While written from a legal perspective, the thesis is rich in empirical data as the author identified and analysed 228 cases of maritime terrorism between 1968 and 2013, creating a comprehensive new data base (reproduced in the Appendix). The thesis is the product of an innovative and impressive breadth of original research and analysis, with useful policy recommendations. The jury was particularly impressed by the painstaking empirical work, drawing on a vast array of sources.

The thesis of Dr. Anneli Botha is based on extensive fieldwork in two East African countries, involving 238 interviews with members of four militant and terrorist groups (al-Shabaab, the Mombasa Republican Council, the Allied Democratic Forces and the Lord’s Resistance Army) as well as 47 close family members to generate thorough biographical profiles. Point of departure of the author was the question of one mother why one of her sons became a policeman and the other a terrorist. In order to answer such a question, the author used a political socialization framework, combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Anneli Botha looked at primary (family, friends, school) and secondary (e.g. media) socialization agents and their influence on the development of radicalisation in Uganda and Kenya. The author managed to identify the factors that radicalised young people – e.g. anger, hatred and frustration based on injustices experienced or witnessed. Those who joined militant organisations had lost trust in the fairness of the political system and had often experienced at close quarters instances of indiscriminate repression (mass arrests, torture) from the security forces.

The jury was particularly impressed by the extensive original field research of the author and by her ability to test standard assumptions (e.g. the role of poverty [negative] and the role of revenge [positive]) about what makes young people join terrorist groups.

While all three finalists produced remarkable theses, the jury finally decided to rank the dissertations of the finalists in this order: (1) Dr. Botha, (2) Dr. Bowley and (3) Dr. Barrele. The TRI Thesis Award 2014 therefore goes to Dr. Anneli Botha, with Dr. Robin Bowley and Dr. Kate Barelle as other finalists also receiving a document acknowledging their ranking as finalists. The winner has been invited to summarise some of the findings of her 439 pages long dissertation in an article which the reader can find in the current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism.

Congratulations, Dr. Botha!
About *Perspectives on Terrorism*

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at [www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com). It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.

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