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Welcome from the Editor

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume IX, Issue 2 (April 2015) of Perspectives on Terrorism at www.terrorismanalysts.com. Our free online journal is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna (Austria), and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts (United States).

Now in its ninth year, Perspectives on Terrorism has over 5,000 regular subscribers and many more occasional readers and visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer-reviewed by external referees while its Research Notes, Policy Notes and other content are subject to internal editorial review.

This issue begins with analysis by Lorenzo Vidino on the history, ideology and tactics of various radical Islamist organizations through which several individuals have found their way into terrorist networks, and how European authorities have responded to these organizations. Then Anton Weenink explores whether behavioral problems and disorders can be found in a sample of radical Islamists that are known to police in the Netherlands as actual or potential ‘Jihadis’. Next, Mark Sedgwick cautions us on the risks of using terms like “jihadism” too loosely in our analysis of ideological motivations for terrorism. And in the final research article, Samuel Bettwy examines how terrorism has been depicted in cinema since the 1970s, and how this affects public perceptions and cultural discourse about terrorism.

A Policy Note provided by Juliette Bird describes the evolving role of NATO in confronting terrorism and violent extremism. This is followed by a Research Note by Ely Karmon that illustrates how al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are competing for territorial control and the hearts and minds of jihadists worldwide. The Resources section features an extensive bibliography by Judith Tinnes on genocide and mass atrocities against civilians. The book reviews section by Joshua Sinai highlights several new publications, including two popular books on ISIS. Philip Holtmann provides a brief Op-Ed about how Jihadi subculture tries to present itself as true, original and traditional, by using the Islamic method of authorization and legitimation to attract followers and convert them to their point of view. And the issue concludes with information about the ongoing efforts within the TRI Networks of Ph.D. Theses Writers.

This issue of the journal was prepared by the co-editor of Perspectives on Terrorism, Prof. James Forest, at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, while the next issue (June 2015) will be prepared in the European offices of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) by Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid.
I. Articles

Sharia4: From Confrontational Activism to Militancy
by Lorenzo Vidino

Abstract

This article seeks to explore the history, ideology and tactics of various radical Islamist organizations inspired by the al Muhajiroun-style of activism that have operated in various Western European countries over the last twenty years. It devotes a particular focus to their complex relationship with violence. Finally, it also looks at how European authorities have dealt with these groups over time.

Keywords: al Muhajiroun, Sharia4, Hizb ut Tahrir, radicalization, non-violent extremism, Islamism, foreign fighters, Omar Bakri Mohammed, Anjem Choudary

Introduction

Since the early 2000s, countless theories have sought to analyze radicalization processes among Western Muslims. Studies have dissected the many internal and external factors that, operating concurrently, lead some young European, North American and Australian Muslims to join violent groups like al Qaeda or, more recently, the Islamic State. One relatively understudied aspect is the role of extremist but not directly violent Islamist organizations in this process. Particularly over the last few years, in fact, it has become apparent that in most (but not all) Western countries a large and growing percentage of individuals who engaged in violent jihadist activities have been involved in groups like al Muhajiroun or the Sharia4 global movement before making the leap into violence.

These groups are complex and difficult to categorize entities, epitomizing the heterogeneity of Islamism in the West. They adopt unquestionably radical positions, often engaging in highly controversial rhetoric and actions to attract attention and create tension while straddling the line between legally allowed stunts and illegal behaviors. Yet, despite endorsing the worldview and actions of militant jihadist groups, most of their activities tend to be non-violent or, at worst, entail scuffles with police or intimidation of adversaries. At the same time, the cases of individuals that, with varying degrees of intensity, gravitated around these organizations and subsequently engaged in terrorist activities are plentiful. And, in some recent cases, there are indications that the leadership of some of these organizations have transformed from headline-grabbing agitators (dismissed by most as buffoons) into full-fledged jihadists actively involved in combat in Syria and Iraq.

Given these dynamics, it is not surprising that these organizations have often been at the center of heated debates. One argument—an academic one, but with important practical implications—is related to the role they play in the radicalization process. While some scholars and policymakers consider them as “conveyor belts” facilitating and expediting radicalization towards violence, others have challenged this analysis.[1] A related and equally controversial topic of discussion revolves around the necessity, legal feasibility and practical effectiveness of banning these organizations.

This article seeks to explore these and other aspects.[2] It aims to look at the history, ideology and tactics of various organizations (each of which, to be clear, has its own peculiarities) that have operated in various Western European countries over the last twenty years. It then devotes a particular focus to their complex
relationship with violence. Finally, it also looks at how European authorities have dealt with these groups over time.

From Hizb ut Tahrir to Sharia4: A Diverse Scene

The ideology and forms of political activism of the groups examined in this article trace their roots to a large extent to those of the pan-Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT, Liberation Party). Founded in the early 1950s in East Jerusalem by Taqiuddin al Nabhani, an al Azhar-educated judge, the group espouses a pan-Islamic doctrine that sees in the reestablishment of the Caliphate the only answer to the military, economic and moral subjugation it alleges Muslims suffer at the hands of Western powers and corrupt Muslim rulers. [3] The group claims to resort only to non-violent means, such as education and public demonstrations, to further its goals. It nonetheless possesses a clandestine structure and sometimes, allegedly, engages in violent activities (albeit not under its own name).

Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, HT never developed into a large social movement. Rather, within each country where it established a presence it remained always a small, somewhat cultish and secretive group. Yet, like the Brotherhood, it managed to spread to dozens of countries worldwide, including in the West. It was in Great Britain, in fact, that in the 1990s the group—while stifled by harsh repression in Middle Eastern countries—had somewhat of a re-birth. The main engineer behind this was a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood from Aleppo, Omar Bakri Mohammed. After studying at al Azhar and other prestigious Islamic law faculties, Bakri joined HT in Beirut in 1983 and later moved to Saudi Arabia, where he was repeatedly arrested. In 1986 he moved to London, where he quickly developed a small following.[4]

The charismatic Bakri introduced a new form of Islamic activism in Europe. Unlike other groups, which operated without drawing attention, Bakri’s HT branch began leafleting, manning booths, and organizing all sorts of events in public venues to disseminate its message. Its rhetoric was also deliberately confrontational and provocative. It was through stunts such as calling for the conversion of the Queen in a poorly attended but loud event in Trafalgar Square that Bakri’s group managed to attract the attention of both British Muslims and the media.

Yet HT’s leadership did not see these developments favorably, as it had envisioned the role of its newly established British branch mostly as a hub for media activities aimed at the organization’s main goal: establishing a caliphate in the Middle East. Bakri’s provocative and insubordinate style brought him in conflict with HT’s leadership, and the two parted ways in January 1996. Just three days later he launched a new organization, al Muhajiroun, which initially comprised only three members.[5] The group’s trademark in-your-face rhetoric and tactics made it extremely popular, even though its membership remained fairly small. It soon established branches throughout the UK. In the post-9/11 environment the group ramped up its rhetoric, attracting increasing scrutiny from British authorities. Arrests and other forms of pressure led the group to disband in 2004. In August 2005 Bakri left for Lebanon and then Home Secretary Charles Clarke banned him from returning, declaring his presence in the country “not conducive to the public good.”[6]

Yet al Muhajiroun activists, led by Bakri’s right hand man, Anjem Choudary, began forming an alphabet soup of organizations that carried on—often with even more incendiary tones—the group’s legacy.[7] Despite various bans imposed by the British government, groups like the Saved Sect, al-Ghurabaa, Muslims against Crusades, Need4Khilafah, Muslim Prisoners, the Islamic Emergency Defence (often shortened to IED as a play on Improvised Explosive Device) and many others carried on the message and style first introduced by Bakri (who kept in close contact with his followers from his exile in Tripoli).
The Spread to Continental Europe

The continuous metamorphosis of the al Muhajiroun network was not limited to the UK. Small spinoffs of the movement had been present throughout Europe and in the United States since the late 1990s. But around 2010 Choudary began to systematically export a new brand: Sharia4. In an interview with Joe Mulhall, the former lawyer turned firebrand cleric recounted the birth of the movement as follows:

I was being approached by Abu Imran, he came to see me in February or March 2010 and he said he was very impressed with our activities and he wanted to know how they could do something similar. [...] He stated that his own movement was called Sharia4Belgium after our Islam4UK and then I think he initiated Sharia4Holland and then people in France wanted to be part of it and people in other countries and basically it spread like that without us. Many people started to attribute themselves to us, they started wanting to know more about us. I started to be invited to different places. I went to Indonesia, I went to Belgium. It was a natural thing.[8]

One of the largest and well known of the Sharia4 franchises is, as Choudary recounted, Belgium’s. In early 2010, in fact, a small group of mostly Antwerp-based activists led by the charismatic Fouad Belkacem (the above-mentioned Abu Imran) started Sharia4Belgium. The group adopted the same tactics as their British counterparts: confrontational protests aimed at attracting media attention, publicity stunts, disruption of events and aggressive online presence. Its message was also identical, from a direct condemnation of democracy as un-Islamic to a stated goal of introducing sharia in the country. Belkacem was arrested in June 2012 and later sentenced for inciting hatred and violence against non-Muslims.[9] The group announced its disbandment in October of that year. As will be seen later in this discussion, many members of the group later traveled to Syria to join various jihadist groups and recruited many of their contacts in Belgium to follow them.

Sharia4Belgium attracted the attention of like-minded individuals across the border in the Netherlands, where soon some activists from The Hague, Delft, and Amsterdam established Sharia4Holland. Around the same time two similar groups appeared on the Dutch scene.[10] The first, Straatdawah, came together after the success of an October 2011 demonstration held by various Salafist-leaning activists in The Hague to protest the law to ban the integral veil in the country. The informal cluster that coalesced from the event began conducting public preaching events (also known as “street dawa”—hence the name Straatdawah in Dutch) in city centers of various Dutch towns. Their literature and rhetoric targeted equally Dutch society at large and Muslim leaders, including prominent Salafist leaders of the first generation, who, in their view, failed to pursue the cause of sharia in the Netherlands.

Similar views motivated another Dutch group that was formed at the time, Behind Bars. The founders of the group were former worshipper at The Hague’s As Soennah mosque.[11] As Soennah had long been one of the key centers of Salafism in the Netherlands and authorities had often linked it, at least on an ideological level, to terrorism.[12] But around the mid-2000s, while retaining many controversial views, the mosque and its charismatic leader, Fawaz Jneid, began changing their positions. Partially under pressure from the government and the media after the Theo van Gogh assassination, Jneid began reneging his previous rejection of democracy and some of his most extreme positions, creating dissatisfaction among some of his followers. Relations between the mosque and the hardline group further deteriorated when the former decided to alert the Dutch security services that some former As Soennah worshippers had attempted to travel to Somalia to join al Shabaab. Rejected from mosque, the small group of hardliners began a campaign to free some of their former fellow As Soennah attendees who had been imprisoned in Morocco, Pakistan and the Netherlands itself—hence the name Behind Bars.
Since the late 2000s, groups inspired by Sharia4’s ideology and tactics have popped up throughout Europe. In Denmark, where a HT branch had been established by British activists already in the early 2000s[13], a group calling itself Kaldet til Islam (Call to Islam) appeared around 2010. The group has links to Choudary and its activities and style closely resemble those of the al Muhajiroun network. In Norway the “branch” of this informal network is represented by the Profetens Ummah (Prophets of the ummah).

Over the last few years authorities in several other European countries have also witnessed the birth of small groups that, while largely adopting the ideology and tactics of the Sharia4 movement, do not seem to possess any operational link to it. Rather, they tend to form autonomously through the initiative of one or more charismatic leaders with an ability to mobilize small groups of sympathizers through cleverly framed social media and real-life activities. A quintessential example of this dynamic is Forsane Alizza (Knights of Pride), a network of some 15 activists that formed around self-proclaimed Nantes-based imam Mohamed Achamlane in early 2010. The group organized several events in various French cities that attracted small numbers of protesters but, given their rhetoric and occasional confrontation with law enforcement, received large attention from the media. The group was eventually dismantled by the French Ministry of Interior in March 2012.[14]

While still attracting little more than a few hundred activists, the organizations operating in northern and central European countries seem to be able to mobilize significantly larger numbers than those seeking to emulate them in southern Europe. In Italy, for example, Anas el Abboubi, a young Brescia-based activist, managed to make contact with the leadership of the al Muhajiroun network and Sharia4Belgium through the Internet. El Abboubi attempted to form an Italian branch of the network, establishing a handful of related websites and organizing events in the Brescia—events that failed to attract more than a half dozen sympathizers.[15]

An explanation for the limited success of these organizations in Mediterranean countries is likely to be found in their immigration history. Groups like Sharia4 appear to attract almost exclusively second/third-generation European born Muslims (plus a sizeable number of converts to Islam). Unlike central and northern European countries, large-scale Muslim immigration to countries like Italy or Spain began only in the 1990s and therefore only now a second generation of locally-born Muslims is coming of age. It will be interesting to see whether the phenomenon will spread to southern European countries in the future.

**Similarities and Differences**

The general worldview of HT, the Sharia4 movement and groups like Forsane Alizza is largely similar. They all embrace a highly politicized version of Salafism that shuns democracy and sees the formation of a purely Islamic state, often framed as an a-historically interpreted Caliphate, as the solution to all the cultural, military, economic and political ills plaguing the global ummah. They all see the West as a morally corrupt entity intent on attacking Islam and dividing Muslims. And they combine various forms of political activism, ranging from public dawa to more secretive activities, as the best tactics to advance their goals.

Yet there are some profound differences between HT and the “second generation” of organizations (which, to be clear, also have differences among themselves):

**Structure and membership structure profile:** Both HT and “second generation” organizations attract only small numbers of activists. Their internal dynamics are quite different. HT is organized through a strict and secret system of units following a hierarchy that leads all the way to the group’s leadership in the Middle East. Groups of the new generation, on the other hand, are spontaneous and fluid formations of like-minded
individuals without a clear leadership and structure. In many cases, they also tend to ignore HT’s proverbial secrecy, openly revealing their identity and views on- and offline (although they do tend to operate with more discretion if discussing terrorism-related activities).

Their membership profiles also tend to differ. HT’s members tend to be university students and highly educated individuals—a fact that is reflected in the group’s intellectual approaches and rhetoric. While exceptions are not uncommon, groups of the second generation on the other hand tend to attract less educated individuals. Many of them even have a recent past in criminal activities and gangs. Even their looks tend to differ. HT members dress somberly: shirts and trousers for men, jilbab for women. The “new” activists adopt a different style. Men tend to wear more visible “Salafist clothes” (such as ankle-length pants) but also flashy track suits and sneakers (a reflection of their street background). Women tend to wear the niqab.[16]

Tactics: Many of the tactics adopted by the new groups are similar to HT’s, but they tend to be more confrontational. Both, for example, perform street dawa, leafleting and manning booths distributing literature. But the new groups often accompany these activities with public prayers; these tend to be held deliberately in symbolic places and with the display of flags of (or with references to) various jihadist groups.

HT itself has always made provocation one of its trademarks, but the new groups have taken this approach to a higher level. Arguably the watershed moment for the new groups was represented by the protest held in February 2006 in front of the Danish embassy in London. There activists of the al Muhajiroun network held highly provocative banners with slogans such as "Butcher those who mock Islam" and “Europe you will pay, your 9/11 is on the way." And while the protest did not degenerate into a full confrontation with the police, the atmosphere around it was extremely tense.

The protests in front of the Danish embassy set a precedent that a few years later various organizations throughout continental Europe sought to emulate. In June 2011, for example, some twenty Forsane Alizza sympathizers protested in front of the Limoges courthouse in which Mohamed Achamlane was tried for having conducted a disruptive protest the previous year inside a local McDonalds, which he accused of having links to Jewish financial circles. The men, who wore scarves over their faces, held placards which read “Secularism to the devil” and “Sarkozy go to Hell” and eventually stormed the building.[17]

Similarly, Sharia4Belgium became notorious because of its deliberately aggressive protests. The violent disruption of the speeches by Dutch writer Benno Barnard at the University of Antwerp and Dutch Green Party MP Tofik Dibi and feminist advocate Irshad Manji in Amsterdam—all individuals the group identified as anti-Islam—gave Sharia4Belgium significant media attention. In June 2011 the group was also behind protests in Molenbeek, an immigrant-heavy area of Brussels, that degenerated into violent street clashes with police. The protests were triggered by an incident in which a woman wearing the niqab had been reportedly brutalized by the police who had sought to detain her under the country’s law banning the use of integral veils in public.

In many cases groups of the second generation engage in deliberately provocative actions whose main goal is not to disrupt or seek a violent confrontation but, rather, attract media attention. These publicity stunts tend to be successful because mainstream media find these events very camera-friendly, therefore triggering a relationship of mutual exploitation with extremist groups. A quintessential example of this perverse mechanism is represented by the announcement made in early 2010 by Islam4UK, an al Muhajiroun spinoff, to conduct a protest in Royal Wootton Bassett, the English town where British military casualties are repatriated. The group planned to march through the town with black coffins and signs disparaging soldiers.
The march never took place but the group nonetheless achieved its goal, as Anjem Choudary explained:

_On the Friday I [...] said I was considering doing a procession through Wootton Bassett [...] that obviously got the whole world talking. By Monday Gordon Brown was talking about it in parliament [...] by about Tuesday or Wednesday the whole of our methodology was printed verbatim on the BBC website. I had written a letter to British soldiers and the whole letter was printed in the Guardian. The amount of coverage we received globally for the ideas that we had was phenomenal._[18]"

A similar dynamic took place in the summer of 2011, when various areas of East London were flooded with bright yellow posters and leaflets with the puzzling and ominous header “You are entering a Sharia-controlled zone – Islamic rules enforced.”[19] Posted on walls, bus stops and poles in Waltham Forest, Tower Hamlets and Newham, East London boroughs with large Muslim populations, the slickly designed signs also identified the allegedly prohibited activities: “No Alcohol,” “No Gambling,” “No Music or Concerts,” “No Porn or Prostitution,” and “No Drugs or Smoking.”

The leaflets were the work of Muslims Against Crusades and Islam4UK.[20] In typical al Muhajiroun fashion, its leaders were unapologetic about their initiative and happy to receive media attention over it. Claiming that up to fifty thousand leaflets had been printed, Choudary stated that the area of Waltham Forest was about to become Britain’s first _sharia_-controlled zone. “We have hundreds, if not thousands, of people who are willing to go out and make sure our laws are obeyed,” stated the London-born former lawyer. “This is the best way of dealing with drunkenness, loutrishness, prostitution and the sort of thug life you get in Britain.”[21] He also added that his group aimed at “run[ning] the area as a Sharia-controlled zone and really to put the seeds down for an Islamic Emirate in the long term.”[22]

Muslims Against Crusades leader Abu Izzadeen hinted that the initiative was just the first step of a larger campaign called the Islamic Emirates Project. “Twenty-five areas around Britain have large Muslim populations, including Bradford, Dewsbury, Leicester and Luton,” stated the London-born convert Abu Izzadden, who in 2008 had been sentenced to four-and-a-half years in jail for terrorism-related offences. “We want to turn them all into Islamic Emirates, where the excesses of Western civilization are not tolerated.”[23]

British media alarmingly reported the introduction of “Britain’s first Sharia law zone,” triggering strong condemnations from politicians and intellectuals of all political persuasion and faith. In reality, the campaign by Islam4UK and Muslims Against Crusades was similar to what most of the groups’ actions are: publicity stunts aimed at attracting media attention, provoking and creating tensions. Despite their leaders’ claims, there are no reports of any of the groups’ members—or even the thousands of people invoked by Choudary—enforcing the dicta of the leaflets.[24] Yet the massive coverage it garnered made this publicity stunt extremely successful. Unsurprisingly, it has been repeated in other countries.[25]

**Geographic aims:** Both HT and the new groups see the formation of a strict sharia-ruled Islamic state as their end goal. But while both milieus eventually envision a global caliphate ruling the entire planet, there is a significant difference in the geographical boundaries of their more immediate ambitions. While HT advocates the introduction of Islamic law only in countries where Muslims form the majority of the population, the new groups are equally interested in Western countries. A Dutch HT activist interviewed by Ineke Roex clearly explained the difference: “Sharia4Holland wants to implement sharia law in the Netherlands, but that is not our job. We focus on the Islamic countries, where Islam is in people’s hearts. In the Netherlands, the majority is non-Muslim, so it has no sense.”[26]
Relationship with Violence

The relationship between violence and groups such as HT or those of the new generation is a particularly controversial and policy-relevant topic. At the center of this debate, scholars and policymakers have often placed the so-called “conveyor belt” theory of radicalization. In substance, many have argued that these organizations, while not openly and directly advocating violence, propagate positions that fall immediately short of it and that, they argue, provide the ideological foundations for violent groups.

This theory has many supporters and an equal amount of critics, and has been at the forefront of the terrorism debate since the 9/11 attacks. It inserts itself in a much more dated (though arguably timeless) debate over the relationship between extremist ideas and violent actions. While often utilizing different names to indicate the two phenomena, scholars have in fact long distinguished between cognitive and violent radicalization. Cognitive radicalization is the process through which an individual adopts ideas that are severely at odds with those of the mainstream, refutes the legitimacy of the existing social order, and seeks to replace it with a new structure based on a belief system that is completely different. Violent radicalization occurs when an individual takes the additional step of employing violence to further the views derived from cognitive radicalism.[27]

The relationship between radical ideology and violent actions is extremely contested among scholars and policymakers—not just when it concerns Islamists but also all kinds of radicals.[28] Some of those involved in the debate tend to focus almost exclusively on ideology, ignoring all other personal, political and circumstantial factors that, in the vast majority of cases, do play a substantial role in the trajectory that leads individuals to embrace the use of violence for political goals. Others tend to underplay if not completely dismiss the role of ideology in the radicalization process, arguing that people become violent radicals because of personal connections or psychological traits.

Striking a balance between the extremes in this polarized debate is not easy. It is nonetheless fair to state that ideology is just one of the factors, together with personal circumstances, that drive individuals to radicalize and eventually commit acts of violence. It is indeed apparent to most scholars and experts that extremist belief is not always a precursor to terrorism. As Peter Neumann argues, “being a cognitive extremist, in other words, is neither sufficient nor necessary as a condition for becoming a terrorist.”[29] Similarly, it is evident that not all individuals who embrace radical ideas eventually commit acts of violence in their furtherance. To the contrary, most cognitive radicals will never make the leap into violence.

At the same time, most scholars and practitioners agree that the role of ideology in the radicalization process cannot be dismissed. In 2008, the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization argued that radicalization takes place “at the intersection of an enabling environment and a personal trajectory.”[30] An individual's personal profile and history is crucial in understanding why he reacted in the way he did to outside stimuli, influences, push and pull factors on the radicalization path. Understanding his (or her) psychological processes is extremely difficult but of fundamental importance. At the same time, argues the Expert Group, the absorption of a certain ideology is an equally fundamental component of any radicalization trajectory.

The “enabling environment” to which the Expert Group refers indicates the places, whether in the physical or virtual world, where individuals are first introduced to a radical ideology and where they can subsequently develop and nurture their devotion to it. Violent political behaviors are not born in a vacuum. Rather, those who carry them out have had to be exposed to various influences that led to them embracing a radical political ideology. That does not mean that other factors, from psychological traits to the influence of charismatic mentors, do not play a role. But it appears clear that the individual must have interacted, even
superficially, with factors that introduced him to a certain worldview.

While in many cases operating together with other elements, organizations like HT or al Muhajiroun contribute to an "enabling environment" and constitute a powerful gateway into militancy in violent groups. That is not to say that all militants of these groups make the leap into violence. Exactly as in drugs, from which the term "gateway" is borrowed, most marijuana users will not make the leap into harder drugs, similarly most activists in this "lighter" former of Islamism will not graduate into violent militancy. But for those who do, militancy in these groups was the necessary introduction to a worldview that is virtually identical to that of groups like al Qaeda or the Islamic State.

These dynamics are extremely difficult to assess in general terms and each case should be analyzed individually. But there are many cases of individuals who at some point were involved, albeit with varying degrees of engagement, with HT and second-generation organizations like al Muhajiroun in various Western countries who then made the leap into violence. HT members who engaged in violent actions include, for example Moez Garsallaoui, the Tunisian-born Switzerland-based militant who established some of the first jihadist online forums for French speakers before becoming a key trainer in al Qaeda-linked training camps in Pakistan,[31] and the perpetrators of the failed 2007 Glasgow airport bombing. In the UK, data released in 2009 by the Centre for Social Cohesion showed that one in seven individuals convicted for terrorism-related offences had links to al Muhajiroun.[32] More recent data by Raffaello Pantucci indicate that about half of terrorist attacks carried out by Britons at home or abroad had links to the group.[33] They include “shoe-bomber” Richard Reid, Tel Aviv's Mike's Place suicide bombers, some of the July 7, 2005 bombers and, most recently, the killers of British army fusilier Lee Rigby, among many others.

On one hand it would be simplistic and misleading to see the path that brought these individuals from activism in HT or al Muhajiroun to violent militancy as a straight, predictable line, uninfluenced by other factors. As a 2010 classified paper presented by the British government to the Cabinet's home affairs committee, stated: “It is sometimes argued that violent extremists have progressed to terrorism by way of a passing commitment to non-violent Islamist extremism, for example of a kind associated with al-Muhajiroun or Hizb ut Tahrir ... We do not believe that it is accurate to regard radicalisation in this country as a linear ‘conveyor belt’ moving from grievance, through radicalisation, to violence … This thesis seems to both misread the radicalisation process and to give undue weight to ideological factors.”[34] Indeed, there is ample evidence that some individuals have engaged in terrorist activity without being fully radicalized by an extremist ideology.

On the other hand, as well-known former HT member Ed Husain argues, “[t]here will always be a segment of this movement that will take jihad to its logical conclusion and act immediately, without leadership.”[35] Furthermore, evidence gathered throughout Western countries over the last 15 years clearly shows that many members of these organizations do make the leap into violence. Many—arguably the majority—do not. And yet the number of individuals engaging in violent activities who had in the past been more or less actively involved in these groups is extremely high.

A subset of the debate related to the relationship between al Muhajiroun and its spinoffs throughout Europe (and, similarly, North America and Australia) and violence is focused on whether such groups provided simply an ideological antechambre (or cognitive precursor) to terrorism or were directly involved in the mobilization of those in their milieus who wanted to make the leap to violence. Many in the Western counter-terrorism community, in fact, had long perceived these groups as dogs that bark but don't bite. Most observers acknowledged that the activities of these organizations provided an ideologically conducive environment for some individuals to move on to violent actions. But it was often argued that that shift
happened autonomously through a personal decision made by the individual who—dissatisfied with the groups’ loud talk but absence of concrete follow-through—distanced himself from them and joined violent groups.

In reality, there is considerable evidence that al Muhajiroun has long been directly involved in the mobilization of its members and hangers-on. Choudary has openly boasted about recruiting for various conflicts as early as the 1990s:

Now before 2000 if you look at our demonstrations we would openly say yes, jihad in Chechnya, you should go, not that we were sending people but we would say yea. [...] You know we were actually collecting for Chechnya, you know in Trafalgar Square. There was no problem about supporting the Jihad in those days either verbally, even financially or to go abroad it was not illegal. The fact is that all those things were done openly. We were even recruiting people standing in Trafalgar Square to send them abroad.[36]

It is never easy to determine whether assertions by Choudary like these are boastful propaganda or truth. But in this specific case, his claims are supported by substantial evidence documenting several cases of top al Muhajiroun members establishing training camps in Pakistan and openly recruiting individuals for various terrorist activities as early as the late 1990s. Bakri and Choudary have always managed to remain one step removed from these activities, at least when it comes to the evidence that prosecutors have been able to produce, but the role of individuals who were immediately close to them is well documented.

These dynamics have taken a new turn, particularly in continental Europe, since the beginning of the civil war in Syria. While in the past the direct involvement of these enabling environments (which, to be sure, are characterized by a high degree of informality and fluidity) in the mobilization for violent activities was unclear, it is now much clearer when it comes to the facilitation of the passage of hundreds of aspiring European jihadists to the battlefields in Syria first and, subsequently, Iraq. In many cases it was evident that the increased brutality and sectarian nature of the Syrian rebellion, combined with the ease with which its members could reach the Syrian battlefields, led to a shift in these extremist network activities, which transformed from simply jihadist-leaning to fully involved in mobilizing for combat.

This phenomenon has been particularly evident in Belgium. During the first half of 2012, Sharia4Belgium engaged in extremely provocative actions in Belgium, although—other than scuffles with the police during some protests—there were no indications that the group was involved in any violent activity. But in August 2012 a handful of Sharia4Belgium members who had spent some time in Lebanon with Bakri returned to Belgium and, in just over a few weeks, the massive mobilization of Belgian volunteers towards the war-torn Arab country began.[37]

The first to leave for Syria were many of the core Sharia4Belgium members who had not been detained by Belgian authorities. Over the following months larger numbers of Belgian aspiring jihadists followed them—many of them second-tier Sharia4Belgium members, sympathizers or personal contacts of first-tier members already in Syria. The active involvement of Sharia4Belgium in mobilizing its networks arguably explains the disproportionally large number of Belgians fighting in Syria. Authorities estimate, in fact, that some 400 Belgian citizens and residents have fought in Syria, the highest per capita number among all Western countries.[38]

A very similar dynamic took place in neighboring Holland. The AIVD, the Netherlands’ domestic intelligence agency, argued that by the end of 2012 Shariah4Holland, Behind Bars and Street Dawah had ceased their public activities. “This,” states the AIVD, “coincided with the first wave of jihadist departures from the
Netherlands to Syria, the success of which was probably attributable to the close contacts between Behind Bars/Street Dawah and Sharia4Belgium. Individuals associated with the two movements were at the heart of that sudden exodus.”[39] The agency continues its analysis:

Several members of radical Islamist organisations such as Sharia4Holland and Behind Bars are among those that left to Syria to join the jihad. This is indicative of how blurred the line between radicalism and jihadism has become. These movements have created an environment in which people with similar ideas meet and develop radical ideas into jihadist ideologies. This group dynamic has led to a rapid radicalization of many individuals as well as concrete attempts to join the jihad in Syria. [40]

The conflict in Syria seems to have brought to the fore a difference between HT and the new groups that was only somewhat detectable before. HT, in fact, seeks to achieve its goal of establishing Islamic states mostly through two tactics: propaganda and infiltration of military forces. Through the former it seeks to win hearts and minds and mobilize popular support. But HT has always stressed the importance of placing small cadres of trusted followers in strategic sections of countries’ armies in order to eventually organize a coup d’ etat, the fastest way to seize power.[41]

Yet, as a group, HT does not tend to involve itself directly with violence. Its rhetoric does not shun it—to the contrary, in many cases it glorifies it. Significantly, in its internal rhetoric the endorsement of violence is more explicit than in its public statements.[42] Overall, HT’s position towards violence is ambiguous to say the least. As Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley cleverly put it, there are two ways of seeing it: “The first is to say that they have been committed to non-violence for fifty years. The second is to say that they have been waiting fifty years for the right moment to begin violent struggle.”[43]

Yet HT, for both ideological and tactical reasons, does not directly engage in violence in the West. Some of its members (or, more frequently, hangers-on) do make the leap into violence, but there are no indications of the group being directly involved in any kind of terrorist-related mobilization in the West.[44] Groups of the second generation, on the other hand, have made it abundantly clear in both words and deeds that they do engage in violent activities. In most countries this shift from the HT activism-based approach to violent militancy has taken place over time. In the UK it matured shortly after 9/11 and, even more decidedly, after 7/7.

In the wake of the London attacks, in fact, Saved Sect leader Abu Uzair declared: “We don’t live in peace with you any more […] The banner has been risen for jihad inside the UK, which means it’s allowed for the bombers to attack.”[45] Choudary described the difference of thinking between his group and HT with these words:

It’s a very fundamental difference. It’s the difference between saying someone is an apostate and fighting against them. […] Are the leaders of Muslim countries Muslims or non Muslims, are the regimes apostate regimes, are the armies apostate armies? […] HT still believe armies are still ok to seek a relationship with because of their belief in the separation of their inner belief and their outer action. Which we don’t believe.[46]

In most continental European countries the shift from HT’s largely non-violent confrontation to the new groups’ open use of violence has taken place a few years later, often triggered or at least accelerated by the Syrian conflict. This is how the AIVD summarizes the evolution of the movement in the Netherlands:

At first it was not clear what direction this new activist movement would take. Depending on the groups, by and large their public message kept within the boundaries allowed by Dutch law. As did
the methods used to disseminate it. Nonetheless, jihadist rhetoric and symbolism were used openly. The movement was led by jihadists, and it attracted supporters of the jihad. But there were no signs of any intention to commit acts of violence, and for a long time departures to join the struggle elsewhere were rare. Only with the emergence of Syria as a theatre of jihad did attention finally shift from dawah to actual participation in the holy war.[47]

To Ban or Not to Ban?

Over the last fifteen years Western authorities have been debating what to do with organizations like HT, al Muhajiroun and the like. The recurring philosophical and legal dilemma is whether to ban them or not. As for the former, opponents of a ban argue that a democratic state should not police ideas, no matter how despicable they are. Essentially, they advocate the application of the Voltairian principle “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” Other opponents argue that a ban would feed into the group’s narrative and create resentment in the broader Muslim community.[48] On the other hand, proponents of a ban argue that some ideas are so repugnant and dangerous that the state has a right—and even a duty—to ban groups that spread them. This debate focusing on the extent of freedom of speech is shaped by each country’s cultural, political, legal and historical circumstances.

But, even assuming philosophical objections are bypassed, states encounter various legal difficulties—which, again, vary from country to country—in banning these groups. Because of the country’s recent history, Germany’s constitution is particularly strict against groups that promote racist and anti-democratic views. Unsurprisingly, Germany is the only Western country to have formally banned HT from public activities (even though the ban does not make membership in the group illegal). The ban, which was issued in January 2003, was based on the fact that the group had been distributing anti-Semitic propaganda.[49]

Despite its rejection of Western legal systems, HT appealed the ban both within the German court system and in front of the European Court of Human Rights. And despite the group’s constant rejection of the principle in its propaganda, the leader of the German HT branch appealed to freedom of speech in criticizing the ban. “The German government,” has stated Shaker Assem, “has decided it would rather subvert its own principles by banning a political group, and prohibiting its thoughts, rather than engaging in debate or intellectually challenging it.”[50]

But in countries that do not have provisions as stringent as Germany’s, a ban is often not a feasible option. In Denmark, for example, article 78, 2 of the Constitution states that only “organizations that seek to obtain their goals through violent means, instigate violence or similar punishable impact on individuals of other convictions, can be dissolved by law.” Both the 2004 and 2008 inquiries on HT by the Danish Director of Public Prosecutions came to the conclusion that the group did not possess these characteristics and therefore—despite calls from politicians throughout the spectrum of Danish politics—could not be banned.[51] Unsurprisingly, new calls to ban HT were made by prominent Danish politicians after the January 2015 terrorist attacks in Copenhagen.[52]

But even when a ban is possible, its substantial effectiveness is hardly guaranteed. British authorities have repeatedly proscribed al Muhajiroun spinoffs: al-Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect in July 2006, Islam4UK, Call to Submission, Islamic Path, and the London School of Shari’ah in January 2010, Muslims Against Crusades in November 2011, Need4Khilafah, the Shariah Project and Islamic Dawah Association in June 2014. After each ban the activists of the proscribed organizations simply continued their activities under a new name. Choudary, a trained lawyer who is deeply aware of the limitations of British law, candidly described this dynamic to Joe Mulhall:
I’ll put it like this, names are irrelevant. The important thing is your activities. [...] The point is, platforms, bodies and organizations are there for the same reason which is to pass on the message. [...] I wouldn’t read too much into the names. You know the government proscribe organizations but you know I could give you another 20 or 30 bodies and platforms which are associated with us, which continue. [...] The way it all functions is that unless you operate openly as al-Muhajiroun with the same people and stuff like that, organized in the same way, the government will have difficulties, they have difficulties prosecuting anyone.[53]

One case where the ban seems to have worked is that of Forsane Alizza, which French authorities proscribed in February 2012 under a 1936 law prohibiting “combat groups and private militias.” Yet the case presents two peculiarities. First, Forsane Alizza was significantly smaller than HT, al-Muhajrioun or Sharia4Belgium, as it had only a dozen members. Moreover, many of its members, including its charismatic leader, were arrested right before the ban. The group, in essence, resembled a cell rather than a relatively large informal network as its counterparts throughout Europe.

Conclusion

The Syrian conflict has further highlighted the security implications of the activities of groups belonging to the al Muhajiroun family. The assessment that they are “dogs that bark but don’t bite” has been revised by counterterrorism authorities throughout the continent, even though mobilization dynamics change from group to group and from country to country.

But concerns about these organizations are not limited to violent radicalization. If views are somewhat split on the relationship between their activities and terrorism, few challenge the accusations that their rhetoric is extremely dangerous from a social cohesion point of view. Their positions on integration, women’s rights, freedom of religion, homosexuality and several other aspects often clash with the views and values embraced by the vast majority of Western citizens and enshrined in all Western countries’ constitutions.

Moreover, the fact that their polarizing views receive high media visibility has created a dangerous dynamic in many European countries. Various right wing groups—whether established ones such as Belgium’s political party Vlaams Belang, or more improvised formations such as the English Defense League and, more recently, Germany’s Hooligans Against Salafism—have largely utilized the stunts of al Muhajiroun-like groups as mobilizing tools for their own campaigns. In what is becoming a perverse but constant mechanism, European right wing groups and al Muhajiroun spinoffs are mutually reinforcing enemies, the propaganda of each providing ammunition to the other.

Yet, despite all the clear challenges posed by these groups, it is extremely difficult for any democratic society to take effective measures to clamp down on them. Repressive measures are not always available and, even when they are, they could prove ineffective if not counterproductive.

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Notes


[2] Substantial information and analysis for this article is derived from the findings of a recently published book edited by the author of this piece (*Sharia4:*
Straddling political activism and jihad in the West, Dubai, al Mesbar Studies and Research Centre, 2015, in Arabic). The author wishes to thank the contributors: Rashad Ali, Joe Mulhall, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, Ineke Roex, Jarret Brachman, Kirstine Sinclair, Saad Ali Khan, and Philippe Migaux.


[5] Ibid.


[15] Lorenzo Vidino, Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy: Birth, Development and Radicalization Dynamics, ISPI (Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale) and European Foundation for Democracy, April 2014. El Abboubi was arrested in June 2013 for distributing online material for terrorism training purposes. Released after a few weeks he left Italy and traveled to Syria, where he reportedly joined the Islamic State group.


[21] Sue Reid, “As Islamic extremists declare Britain’s first Sharia law zone, the worrying social and moral implications,” Daily Mail, July 29, 2011.


[23] Sue Reid, “As Islamic extremists declare Britain’s first Sharia law zone, the worrying social and moral implications,” Daily Mail, July 29, 2011.


[25] For Denmark, for example, see Line Prasz, "Borgmester: Sharia-zoner er uacceptable," Politiken, October 18, 2011.


[31] Lorenzo Vidino, Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, November 2013, pp. 15–6.

[32] One in Seven UK Terror-related Convictions Linked to Islamist group Now Threatening to Relaunch, Centre for Social Cohesion, 1st June 2009.


[34] Andrew Gilligan, "Hizb ut-Tahrir is not a gateway to terrorism, claims Whitehall report," The Telegraph, July 25, 2010.

[35] Ed Husain, "I know how these terrorists are inspired," The Telegraph, May 2, 2007.


[37] Personal interview with Belgian official, Brussels, February 2014.

[38] Ibid.


[44] Authorities in many countries throughout the Middle East and Central Asia, on the other hand, accuse the group of being directly involved in militant activities and have banned it.


[48] See, for example, Adrian Cherney, "Why Australia shouldn't ban Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir," SBS, October 10, 2014.


[50] Ian Cobain, "Islamist group challenges Berlin's five-year ban in European court," The Guardian, June 24, 2008


Behavioral Problems and Disorders among Radicals in Police Files

by Anton W. Weenink

Abstract
In this article we explore to what extent behavioral problems and disorders can be found in a sample of radical Islamists that are known to the police in the Netherlands as actual or potential ‘jihadists’. Our aims are, first, to assess whether the consensus in terrorism studies that terrorists are ‘surprisingly normal’ is justified when it comes to these subjects; second, we try to establish whether behavioral histories offer clues to the police on how to approach them. Personal details of 140 subjects, who are considered to have traveled from the Netherlands to Syria, or on whom police had information that they might be preparing to do so, were entered in police databases. Preliminary results indicate that individuals with histories of behavioral problems and disorders are overrepresented. The results are at odds with the consensus view on terrorists alleged ‘normality’. A focus on individual psychology could complement existing social-psychological approaches to radicalization. It may also assist in broadening awareness among policy makers and law enforcement officials that disengagement efforts need to be tailored to the individual, and that mental health specialists might have to play a role here.

Keywords: Jihadists, the Netherlands, terrorist psychology, mental health, criminology

Introduction
The starting point behind this article was unease with the accepted wisdom that “the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality”;[2] and that terrorists do not “suffer from some sort of mental disorder.”[3] Data in terrorism and extremism files of the National Police of the Netherlands appear to provide evidence that several subjects did have a history of problem behavior, if not personality disorders or mental illness. Whether or not subjects with ‘troubled’ personalities were overrepresented was not immediately clear. Therefore, and because police – for whom prevalence rates are less important–need to know how to approach radicalized individuals, we decided to take a closer look at an issue many researchers consider settled.[4]

The Consensus
Since the early nineteen eighties, the view that terrorists tend to have ‘normal’ social backgrounds and are not mentally disordered has become widely accepted among terrorism researchers. Studies on Italian, German and Irish terrorists failed to provide evidence for any major psychopathology or terrorist personality; notably, many terrorists had unremarkable middle class backgrounds.[5] After 9/11, studies of jihadi terrorism seemed to confirm this image of terrorist normality. Dismissing Neo-Freudian theories that postulate terrorists to suffer from pathological narcissism, paranoia or authoritarian personality disorder, Sageman concluded, “terrorists are surprisingly normal in terms of mental health”.[6] Silke, in a review of studies into the psychology of jihadists–those by Sageman [7] and Bakker in particular [8]–arrived at the same conclusion.[9]

In an attempt to explain ‘radicalization’–defined as the process that puts people on the path to political violence,[10] or of becoming involved in terrorism[11] – some researchers use an alternative approach,
social psychology. Sageman, for example, rejects micro and macro level theories that explain radicalization, and proposes a mid-range theory in which four elements are key: “a perceived war on one’s in-group; moral outrage at some salient major injustice; resonance with personal experiences; and mobilization by an already politically active network”.

The Internet fosters a bottom-up process of radicalization and self-recruitment. The fact that terrorists are heterogeneous in several respects is utilized to confirm the impossibility of finding a terrorist personality, or unique properties of terrorists that would allow for making a terrorist ‘profile’. Horgan and Bjørgo draw attention to the distinct motives and psychological processes that are at work at different stages, by which individuals engage in terrorism, remain terrorist, disengage from terrorism, or become recidivists; they also stress that different types of individuals get involved in different types of activities.

Different mechanisms explain how groups radicalize. There is no need to assume terrorist irrationality, as there seems to be some logic in terrorist normality: The mentally ill would be a liability to clandestine organizations. This explains also why Lone Actor Terrorists (‘Lone Wolves’), who seem to be the exception to the rule of terrorist normality, indeed operate alone.

Undoubtedly, social psychological approaches have enriched our understanding of the process of radicalization. Acknowledging identity problems and grievances in immigrant youth, and differentiating between roles, phases and motivations can assist policymakers in responding more adequately to radicalization. Showing there is no ‘terrorist personality’, or that profiling of terrorists is impossible helps to prevent the introduction of policies that would be ineffective, or even counter-effective as they could lead to stigmatization.

This being said, we think the evidence for ‘normality’ in radical Islamist terrorists is less unambiguous than currently accepted. Bakker, for example, found that mental illness was overrepresented in a sample of European jihadists. Venhaus, in a large sample of foreign fighters, did not find “signs of any clinical psychosis”, but did note that “antisocial behavior was clearly present in all”. Merari likewise found that “although none of the would-be suicides was diagnosed as psychotic, most of them had personality traits which made them more amenable to recruiting for suicide missions”. In the Netherlands, on the basis of files from criminal investigations into Dutch jihadist networks, De Poot and Sonnenschein found that many subjects had a criminal record, had been substance abusers, and had attained lower educational achievements.

In Germany, on account of interviews with 39 convicted extremists and terrorists of different ideological backgrounds (twenty-four right-wing, nine left wing, and six Islamist oriented extremists) Lützinger found that they “did not display any pathological features”; however, she did note that “all individuals in our group had experienced the same irregular developments and shown the same deviant behaviour during the first and second socialisation instances (family and school) as other offenders who did not necessarily become extremists or terrorists”. Bouzar found that 40% of jihadists in a French sample had suffered from depression. These studies diverge in design and results, but overall, suggest that the social and psychological background of terrorists tends to deviate from the average. Radical Islamists came from less privileged social strata, and although most of them were not mentally ill, many had a history of problem behavior and troubled backgrounds. In this article we assess whether these findings also hold for the new wave of radical Islamists from the Netherlands: those who travel to the Middle East to join jihadist organizations.
Research Focus

Research question, definitions, and goals

This article is the result of explorative research that was conducted between February and November 2014. Where possible, we add recent findings. Our research question is: to what extent do jihadists have a history of problem behavior or mental disorder? We conducted a number of database searches in the Dutch National Police database by entering the personal details of known and suspected jihadists. We searched for information indicating that these jihadists have been diagnosed with a disorder or disability (conduct disorder, personality disorder, mental illness, cognitive disability), as well as for signs of problem behavior. The concept ‘problem behavior’ usually refers to ‘difficult’ behavior in children, as well as in adults; we use it as an umbrella term for conduct that deviates from the social norm and causes harm or distress to oneself or others; such as a history of quarrels, crime, and violence.[26] The focus is on maladaptive behavior that suggests a lack of self-control (see under Method as well).[27] When an individual persists in such behavior, it may flag an underlying ‘psychopathology’, such as antisocial personality disorder or a mental illness.

‘Jihadists’ is the term we use for radical Islamists who participate in what they perceive to be the ‘jihad’: a holy war against perceived ‘enemies of Islam’. (We will not treat ‘radical behavior’, which could be considered a form of deviancy in its own right, as such as indicative of some mental health problem). In addition to the search for mental health problems, we also take a brief look at some background variables that may help us assess whether Dutch jihadists tend to have normal and ‘unproblematic’ social backgrounds or not: age, gender, nationality and, as far as our sources allow, socio-economic characteristics. We consider backgrounds to be more ‘problematic’ if a subject’s relations with family and friends are unstable, if he or she did not finish school, is unable to find employment, is homeless, etc.

Our research serves two purposes: to establish whether or not jihadists are relatively troubled, and to highlight individual cases, which might be of help in developing ways of approaching them. In a next phase the research could be extended to other forms of potentially violent radicalization, such as right- and left-wing and single-issue extremism.

The sample

The sample is a list containing personal details of radical Islamists from the Netherlands whom the Dutch police suspect of having joined the fight in Syria, or are considered potential travelers (for example, because they have expressed their intent to do so). The list is a national ‘List of Travelers’ (LOT), as compiled by the Counterterrorism and Extremism (CTE) team in the Central Unit of the Dutch National Police. The original data come from local police units. When local police believe that a person in their district has left for Syria (or is considered a potential traveler or returnee, etc.), they share the personal details of this person with the CTE Team. Although many of the subjects can be considered ‘foreign fighters’, the more neutral term ‘travelers’ will be used here. This allows for differentiating between those who leave to participate as a fighter and those who take on other roles (for example, as a housewife or a provider of humanitarian aid). Importantly, it also includes those who have not yet departed. A LOT from February 2014 was chosen as the research sample; this was the most recent List at the time the research started. This LOT will be referred to here as ‘List S’. List S contains the personal details of 140 individuals.

The number of subjects on the LOT, as well as their statuses, changes nearly on a daily basis. Joining the fight in Syria became popular amongst radical Islamists by the end of 2012; in 2014 Iraq became a country of destination as well.[28] By November 2014 the LOT contained the details of almost 300 ‘travelers’. Evidently,
during the research, the sample size as a share of the total population of travelers declined from 100% to less than 50%. Additionally, travelers’ statuses changed as people moved in and out of the conflict zone, were killed or arrested, etc. In February 2014, eight travelers had already died in Syria; by January 2015, the number of casualties in the sample had risen to 16, and 21 in the LOT.

**Databases**

We use several police databases. To retrieve information we entered full name and date of birth of each subject from List S in an online facility that gives access to four underlying databases, with the following acronyms (which we do not translate here):

- **BVH**: files from local police units; if there is a hit, it leads to police reports from community police officers, describing home visits, street quarrels, citizen’s reports to police, etc. BVH also contains many interviews with and interrogations of subjects and their acquaintances. BVH was our most important source.
- **HKS**: all crimes adult subjects have been suspected of and for which police drew up a report for the public prosecutor; HKS does not show if the public prosecutor decided to drop a case. A single report may contain records of more than one crime.
- **GBA**: citizen registration: address and migration.
- **VIP**: residential history, including data that indicate periods of homelessness, institutionalization, detention.

We also consulted a database with the criminal record of subjects; ‘JD-Online’, which shows a subject’s life record of convictions for both crimes and misdemeanors.

**Method**

It should be clear that we do not diagnose.[29] We do not have access to the subjects or their medical files, and police data are not detailed enough in order to consistently apply criteria from, for example, the DSM V classification of mental disorders. We merely assign subjects to the following categories on the basis of information found:

- **Category A No hit**

For individuals without any traceable problem behavior or mental health problem, we created two subcategories:

- **A.1 No problem behavior found**
- **A.2 No problem behavior found, but problematic social setting**

Category A.2 allows for tracing back those cases where we found no information on problem behavior in an individual, but where there is evidence of serious social problems.

- **Category B: Problem behavior**

- **B.1 Mild problem behavior**: a limited number of petty crimes and misdemeanors, vandalism, high debts, etc.
B.2  Problem behavior: Persistent offending; child neglect (by the subject).

B.3  Serious problem behavior: e.g. persistent serious criminality; references that a subject is mentally impaired, or seems to suffer from a conduct or personality disorder, or mental illness, but where no indications of a diagnosis were found.

A subject with a criminal record containing less than 10 suspicions or convictions [30] for crimes that are not too serious, ends up in Category B.1 when there are no additional signs of problem behavior. An individual is categorized in B.1 as well when local police consider an individual to be a member of a criminal youth group. Category B.2 contains subjects that have been suspected of, or convicted of, 10 or more crimes, or of more serious crimes as well as cases of child neglect. Category B.3 covers individuals with apparently serious and persistent problematic behavior. Serious problem behavior can pertain to persistent offending, but with an extra factor – such as, repeated violent crimes, repeated escalating conflicts with family or neighbors, self-mutilation, child abuse or molestation etc. Category B.3 also comprises those with cognitive disabilities, as well as those who were institutionalized, but for whom no psychiatric diagnosis was found.

- Category C: Diagnosed mental health problem

Category C contains individuals of whom we found information that they have been clinically diagnosed with a disorder. The main source here are police reports; indications of a diagnosed mental health problem in a police report we try to control in other police reports and in sources like VIP (residential history) or verdicts. Having a mental disorder does not necessarily imply more serious problem behavior, or that someone is to be considered more dangerous than individuals in Category B.

In a next phase, we hope to replace the use of categories with a formal coding system and procedure, in collaboration with forensic psychiatrists. Below, we compare our results with prevalence rates in DSM V, and with findings from a mental health service in the Netherlands. We do not yet have a control group.

**Experts**

A minimum of inter-subjectivity was realized by sharing the method and findings with experts. The plan and results were discussed with two social scientists, a forensic psychiatrist and researchers at the National Police. A behavioral expert advised on the categories we use to sort cases. Crime analysts, criminal investigators, and an expert in Arabic studies at the CTE Team, all with many years of experience in the field, provided information on subjects and their histories, and discussed our findings with us. Initial results were discussed with the CTE Team, other police researchers and forensic psychiatrists at the National Police. An expert from a psychiatric health service commented on our results and shared quantitative and qualitative findings.

**Limitations**

Readers should be aware of several limitations. As mentioned, there was no access to psychiatric reports, and medical experts are not allowed to share mental health data on individuals with law enforcement, except under severe legal restrictions.[31] Neither are we permitted to discuss specific cases. Further limitations pertain to the completeness and quality of databases. Files from local police in BVH that are older than five years, cannot be consulted, and the police registration system of suspicions (HKS) in most cases does not contain data from the period before a subject reaches 18 years of age. HKS appeared to be incomplete as well, because several records appeared to be missing. Furthermore, police do not record socio-economic and educational statuses of subjects in a systematic way.
Results

We present our results in two steps. First, we discuss demographic characteristics of travelers, followed by the discussion of behavioral and mental health issues.

Demographic variables

The subjects in our sample are not a cross-section of the ‘normal’ population when it comes to their nationality, age, gender, and other social and economic characteristics.

- Nationality

In the Netherlands it is possible to have two nationalities. Having a second nationality can be considered an indication of immigrant status of travelers or their parents. In the sample, the first nationality is Dutch in 133 (95%) cases; 108 subjects (77%) have a second nationality; 25 (18%) are only Dutch and 7 (5%) are not Dutch. Evidently, most travelers come from immigrant families. First and second nationality was distributed as follows:

![Figure 1 Nationality by number of travelers (n1=140)](image)

The largest groups by second nationality are Moroccans (78 subjects, 56%) and Turks (13 subjects, 9%). These percentages are considerably higher than the share of their immigrant communities, that each account for roughly 2% in a population of 16.8 million, as of January 1st, 2014.\[32\] We can safely conclude that jihadists of Moroccan descent are overrepresented in the sample. Nevertheless, a total of 78 travelers also testifies to how rare Jihad travel is in the Moroccan community, as it is in others.

- Age and gender

The age distribution of travelers is similar to findings in earlier terrorism research: The mean age in the sample is 24. On average men are older (25) than women (21). With 117 men (84%) and 23 women (16%), males dominate the sample. Travelers tend to be young, but Jihad travel is not at all ‘adolescence limited’, as criminality is.\[33\] On January 1st 2014 only ten subjects had not reached the age of 18. At 17%, women are
more often underage than men (5%). Only one underage traveler, a sixteen-year-old boy, effectively joined a jihadist organization, and was killed.

- Social and economic characteristics

Some findings cannot be quantified, such as that many subjects in our sample seem to come from broken families; six subjects had lost a parent, in two cases due to suicide. Additionally, educational achievements tend to be rather low. We could not find a subject with a completed higher education in the sample thus far. Subjects either did not finish high school or vocational training, or became unemployed afterwards. We did not find subjects who had had a steady career; when they were employed, it was mainly in irregular jobs. As mentioned, several individuals had been homeless – six were at the moment of registration on the LOP–for longer or shorter periods of time. Homelessness seems to be related to conflicts with parents and partners, or with finding no place to live after detention.

Demographic characteristics indicate that travelers do not form a cross-section of Dutch society. Males in their mid-twenties, with immigrant and socially vulnerable backgrounds dominate the sample.

**Behavioral Problems and Disorders**

- Crime

Our crime data suffer from inadequacies that do not allow for discussing involvement in crime extensively. Of 66 travelers (47% of the sample) we found one or more reports in HKS; these 66 received 380 police reports. The overall registration level in HKS is 23% for young men younger than 22 [34] suggesting that male travelers are twice as often involved in crime as other young men. The percentage comes close to that of the group in the Netherlands that is criminally most active, that of young men of Moroccan descent, that stood at 54% in the study of Blokland et al. Subjects of Moroccan descent are overrepresented as we saw above, but this cannot completely explain the high crime level in the sample.[35]

Twenty six percent of the women had a record in HKS, compared to 5% of women under the age of 22 in the Netherlands as a whole, suggesting that female travelers are five times as often involved in crime as other women.[36] In fact, women travelers tend to be ‘more criminal’ than men in the wider population.

Curiously, the 47% with a HKS registration, is lower than that of travelers in JD-Online that have been convicted for a criminal offence (53%).[37] This indicates that HKS is incomplete because not all police reports lead to a verdict. Since HKS data is incomplete, we refrain for now from discussing the type of crime travelers have been involved in.

- Behavioral problems and disorders

The figure below shows the score in the sample for each of our categories.
Figure 2 Behavioral problems and disorders, by category (n = 140)

Our results indicate that a psychosocial problem can be identified in 60% of travelers. Just under half of the subjects exhibit problem behavior (46% in Category B). In one in five there appears to be either serious problem behavior (14% in Category B.3) or a diagnosed personality disorder or mental illness (6% in Category C). Below, we present details for subjects in categories B.3 and C.

- Category B.3

In twenty individuals, five women and fifteen men, we found indications of serious problem behavior, or indications of a mental health problem of which we did not find a diagnosis:

1. Mentally impaired (most likely).
6. Criminal. Mental capabilities under examination.
7. ‘Borderline personality’.
8. Psychiatric help to manage anger.
11. Unmanageable as a child. Youth welfare work. Tantrums.
In eight individuals, two women and six men, we found a diagnosed disorder:

1. Psychotic.
4. ADD (Attention Deficit Disorder), schizophrenia, refuses medication
5. Psychotic; medication and psychiatric aid.
6. Schizophrenia.[38]
8. PTSD. Persistent offender. Homeless. Unmanageable as a child.

The descriptions reveal comorbidity of difficulties in individuals, and many individuals come from ‘multi-problem’ families.

Behavioral problems and disorders in a second group of travelers
In the period March 2014–January 2015, 158 additional travelers were listed. So far, we have analyzed the details of 43 travelers (27%) from this ‘second group’ (32 men, 11 women).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subjects in group 2</th>
<th>Preliminary % (n2 = 158)</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Behavioral problems and disorders in a selection of 43 travelers from a second group (n2 = 158)

With 16.4% the total of Categories B.3 and C is somewhat lower, but we only used 27% of this second ‘group’. Therefore, the score of these categories can be expected to rise. Nearly all Category B.3 subjects in the second group received some form of psychiatric help. The cases in the ‘second group’ are relatively heavy because of selectivity bias: we typically studied them after members of the CTE Team brought them to our attention when they presumed these were potentially relevant cases. Hence, subjects without behavioral problems will be underrepresented. We did decide to show the preliminary results from the second group, as they reinforce the impression of widespread behavioral problems and disorder in jihadists.

Do the Troubled Persons make it to the Jihad Zone?

One reason why terrorists were supposed to be ‘normal’ was that mentally unstable persons are thought to be a liability to a terrorist organization. If this were true, we would not expect many troubled subjects to reach the conflict zone, let alone to join groups like the Islamic State (IS) or Jabhat al-Nusra. Some subjects on List S that we categorized as B.3 and C attempted to join, but indeed did not make it. However, in both categories 75% reached Syria or Iraq (15 in Category B.3 and 6 in Category C), which is slightly higher than the ‘rate of success’ in the sample as a whole (73%, 102 subjects).[39]

Involvement in Terrorist Activity

Police data and open sources suggest that jihadists from the Netherlands may have been involved in atrocities: beheading, stoning, and flogging, as well as the execution of prisoners of war. Two travelers from List S died in suicide attacks. From the ‘second group’ two subjects became suicide bombers as well. Thus, some jihadists from the Netherlands may have been involved in terrorist activities and in war crimes. Among the perpetrators we find Category C subjects (both from List S and from the group that joined later). They are terrorists who were diagnosed with a mental illness.

Validation

Prevalence

Our finding of eight persons or almost 6% of the sample with a diagnosed personality disorder or mental illness indicates that mental health problems are more common in jihadists than in the general public. In our sample, three people (2%), suffer from schizophrenia. The prevalence for schizophrenia in DSM V is 0.3 to...
0.7%.[40] Two persons in the sample (1.4%) suffer from psychosis, which has a lifetime prevalence of 0.21 to 0.54%.[41] In the second group we so far found five people with psychosis. This indicates that with 7 subjects in the population of 298 travelers (and potential travelers), as of January 2015, prevalence of psychosis is 2.3%. Both afflictions seem to be overrepresented, but the numbers are too small to be definite. We have not yet checked our findings against a proper control group, which might diminish the gap. On the other hand, we do expect that closer scrutiny will reveal that some of the people in categories B.1 to B.3 and A.2 belong in Category C. This impression, that our results represent a lower limit, was confirmed by a mental health service.

**Findings from a mental health service**

In January 2015 we discussed our findings with an employee of a mental health service. The service employs psychiatrists who treat and guide psychiatric patients; it has a forensic psychiatric department that treats disturbed criminals. It participates in a multiparty policy platform on radicalization, through which it receives personal details of radicals provided by local authorities from one of the ‘larger’ municipalities in terms of the number of jihadists. The service is only allowed to reveal whether these radicals – travelers and other Islamist radicals – have been under psychiatric treatment on a ‘yes or no-basis’. In this municipality, the answer was ‘yes’ in 31 cases so far, which accounted for 60% of all cases submitted. Every week, two or three new cases can be added concerning radicals who have been under psychiatric treatment. In another municipality 76% (19 out of 25) of radicals had been under supervision of the Child Protection Service. The data from the service indicates that mental illness and disorders in radicals are more common than we found.

With regard to travelers, our respondent observed that nearly all have experienced domestic violence – as a victim, a perpetrator, or both. Among radicals that have not or not yet joined the Jihad, many suffer from mental illness or personality disorder, but one should differentiate between types. There are ‘ideologues’ and ‘thrill seekers’. Ideologues, among whom many converts can be found, tend to suffer from a weak ego. Thrill seekers are merely attracted to radical Islam for the kick; they tend to have behavioral problems or are mentally impaired, and typically have a criminal record. Returnees from Syria have been damaged by their warzone experience and need to be ‘de-escalated’ (rather than de-radicalized) in some way.[43] Our respondent made two final observations. Firstly, there are cases of people suffering from psychosis who use the rhetoric of radical Islam because it is a sure way of attracting attention. They should be distinguished from genuine radicals. Secondly, many of the problems found in radical Islamists can be found in right-wing extremists as well, which confirms some of our first impressions of this group.[44]

**Conclusion**

The preliminary answer to the research question is that at 6% in our sample people with a diagnosed mental health problem are overrepresented. Another 46% displayed problem behavior. In 48%, we found no signs of problem behavior or mental health problems, but 8-percentage point of this group seems to have a problematic social background. We tend to think that our findings represent a lower limit of the prevalence of behavioral and mental health problems because 1) we had no access to medical files; 2) police sources are incomplete, and 3) a mental health institution found that 60 percent of radical Islamists in their files received psychiatric treatment.
Discussion

Our results and the categories we use are purely descriptive and do not reveal causes. Behavioral and mental health problems may spring from any of the ‘biopsychosocial’ factors that affect individual development. Nevertheless, because the normality thesis does not appear to hold for the jihadists studied, we discuss some tentative answers as to why this could be the case.

1. The thesis of terrorist normality may have been premature, considering the lack of data many terrorism researchers complain about.[45] Victoroff observed: “the total number of published theories exceeds the number of empirical studies - an imbalance that may be of more than academic import … the much-cited claim that no individual factors identify those at risk for becoming terrorists is based on completely inadequate research.”[46]

2. Theories of terrorist psychology have been refuted on the ground that there is no single psychological characteristic that allows for defining a ‘Terrorist Personality’ or a ‘Terrorist Profile’. Our results confirm that mental issues diverge, but we see no reason why a psychology of terrorism should be about finding similar peculiarities in every single case. An example of this is Silke, who was not impressed by a finding that 33% of West-German terrorists had lost a parent: “It would be one thing if 92% had lost a parent before 14, but 33% is of uncertain significance. It still leaves 67% with both parents, but who nevertheless went on to become terrorists”. But what if the other 67% had different troubles that contributed to their radicalization?[47]

3. Individual and social psychology are often regarded as rival explanations, whereas we consider them to be complementary levels of analysis.[48] Regardless, social psychological approaches are ill equipped to explain why the overwhelming majority of youngsters from perceived social risk groups abstain from radicalization, and do not go to Jihad.[49] Apparently, only few individuals are vulnerable to radicalization. Here we would like to hypothesize that a causal nexus between psychosocial problems and radicalization might be that ‘problem behavior’ tends to isolate individuals, not only from society, but from relatives and peers as well. As social psychological approaches suggest, social isolation is often a starting-point for radicalization. Isolated individuals are in need of companionship, and in a radical group they find identity, structure or even an alternative family.[50]

4. The focus in the literature on mental illness may have lead to an undervaluation of the role of minor mental issues. Although mental illness is overrepresented in our sample, minor problems seem to be more common, as was suggested in Merari’s work and several studies on European radicals we referred to. Silke, however, considers the whole idea of minor mental problems ‘insidious’ and ‘dangerously misleading’. In 1998, he saw a ‘second wave’, a “second major attempt to set terrorists psychologically apart from the rest of the population”; the effect of this ‘attempt’, according to Silke, could only be to immunize the theory that terrorists are abnormal.[51] We disagree. Immunization is a risk only when a focus on minor issues would preclude generating new, testable hypotheses, but the opposite seems to be the case here. Perhaps the discussion should be broadened even further, to include the question whether variation in individual characteristics or temperament affects vulnerability to different radical ideologies and behaviors – which brings us to our next point.[52]

5. In 2005, Victoroff proposed to incorporate insights from neuroscience in the psychology of terrorism, but to our knowledge his proposal found no resonance.[53] Here, terrorism research lags behind developments in, for example, criminology, where biosocial criminologists try to identify neurobiological risk factors for antisocial behavior and violent crime in particular.[54] These risk
factors could play some role in terrorist violence as well. Points of mutual interest between terrorism studies and neuroscience are not difficult to find, especially when it comes to explaining specific cases of murder and a propensity for cruelty in some individuals.[55] Another subject of mutual interest could be the role of child abuse and neglect, of which many Islamist radicals seem to have been a victim, and which are known to affect neurological development.[56] This is not to say that we expect neuroscience to identify biological risk factors that contribute directly to radicalization or terrorist behavior,[57] but we do think such factors should be considered important pieces of the puzzle.[58]

6. The world has changed to the extent that we would hesitate to retroactively generalize our finding of relative ‘abnormality’ in radicals to terrorists in older studies, like the members of the RAF, the Red Brigades, or even the Mujahedin of the 1990s. The difference the Internet makes can hardly be overestimated. The Internet, as Sageman stressed, facilitates a bottom-up ‘recruitment’ process.[59] Nowadays isolated youngsters have a means of finding companions that troubled loners could only dream of twenty years ago. After meeting offline with their online radical friends, group dynamics take over. Furthermore, for radicalized individuals, finding a ‘bridge to the Jihad’ has become much easier as social media allows for real time communication with those already on the battlefield.

The vastly extended opportunities for communication might also explain why we find many cases where radicalization was not a gradual process at all, as it was supposed to be in earlier studies. In a matter of weeks, people radicalize and attempt to travel to Syria or Iraq. On the receiving end of the recruitment process things have changed as well. An organization like IS does not resemble so much a ‘traditional’ clandestine terrorist organization that has to survive in a hostile society, as an insurgent movement fighting for control over territory. To an insurgent organization, troubled foreigners need not be a liability. They can be used as cannon fodder, for sex, and as ‘willing executioners’ – either in the conflict zone, or as Lone Actors in their own country. For people suffering from behavioral and mental problems, barriers-to-entry to organized terrorist activity have become much lower.

Our study offers little room for the tabula rasa approach of social psychologists who maintain that radicals are people just like you and me, and that environment is all that explains radicalization. For policy makers and law enforcement officers, one implication seems to be that there is no one-size-fits-all approach of preventing radicalization, or of stimulating de-radicalization and disengagement. For police, our findings underline the importance of collaboration with providers of mental health services in dealing with radicalization, and in approaching radicals. Therefore, we think it would be valuable if police forces in other countries would allow researchers to study the behavioral and mental histories of radicals as well. Perhaps a greater sensitivity in terrorism researchers to psychopathology in radicalization could speed things up somewhat. There is some urgency here.

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Note

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily express those of the National Police of the Netherlands.

Notes


[3] Our research proposal was accepted without much ado. In the Netherlands, several researchers have had access to closed terrorism investigation files:


[21]”Two main personality patterns were discerned: dependent-avoidant personality (60% of the would-be suicides) and impulsive-unstable personality (26.7%).


[22] De Poot and Sonnenschein et.al. (2011).

[23] Sascha Lützinger (2012), *The Other Side of the Story. A qualitative study of the biographies of extremists and terrorists*, Wiesbaden: Bundeskriminalamt, p.60. [http://www.bka.de/nn_205960/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/Publikationsreihen/01PolizeiUndForschung/1__40__TheOtherSideOfTheStory.html](http://www.bka.de/nn_205960/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/Publikationsreihen/01PolizeiUndForschung/1__40__TheOtherSideOfTheStory.html)


[25] Bouzar's cases are an exception, they mainly came from middle class families. However, perhaps this is due to a selection issue because her sample is based on cases that were brought to the attention of Bouzar's institute by subject's relatives themselves.

[26] Obviously, not all unpleasant conduct can be considered 'problematic behavior‘: “Occasionally, a child will have a temper tantrum, or an outburst of aggressive or destructive behaviour, but this is often nothing to worry about. Behavioural problems can happen in children of all ages. Some children have serious behavioural problems. The signs to look out for are if the child continues to behave badly for several months or longer, is repeatedly being disobedient, cheeky and aggressive; if their behaviour is out of the ordinary, and seriously breaks the rules accepted in their home and school. This is much more than ordinary childish mischief or adolescent rebelliousness. This sort of behaviour can affect a child’s development, and can interfere with their ability to lead a normal life. When behaviour is this much of a problem, it is called a ‘conduct disorder’” (“Behavioural problems and conduct disorder: information for parents, carers and anyone who works with young people”, [http://www.bouzar-expertises.fr/metamorphose](http://www.bouzar-expertises.fr/metamorphose)).


[30] When HKS turned out to be incomplete (no suspicions in HKS, but convictions in JD-Online), we used the number of convictions.

[31] When a psychiatrist considers a patient to be a serious danger to the self or others, the psychiatrist can decide, after consulting colleagues, to share details with law enforcement.
There are 375,000 citizens from Moroccan and 396,000 from Turkish descent (Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS statline), accessed 10 December 2014).


23 percent of men and 5 percent of women born in 1984 and the twenty-second year were at least once recorded in HKS. Young people of non-Dutch origin are overrepresented in police records. Of all non-Dutch origin groups men of Moroccan origin are over-represented the most: 54 percent of them between twelve and 22 years come at least once in contact with the police, a third five times or more.” (Arjan Blokland, Kim Grimbergen, Wim Bernasco & Paul Nieuwbeerta (2010), “Criminaliteit en etniciteit. Criminele carrières van autochtone en allochtone jongeren uit het geboortecohort 1984” [Crime and ethnicity. Criminal careers of native and immigrant youngsters from birth cohort 1984], Tijdschrift voor Criminologie 52/2, pp.122-152.

66 Subjects or 47% are men of Moroccan descent; 34 of this group–or 52%–has at least one registration in HKS.

Blokland et.al. (2010).

Another 8% was convicted of minor offenses or misdemeanors only.

We use the labels as we found them, and abstain from discussing the controversies that seem to haunt psychiatric classification; one of the issues is whether schizophrenia should be considered a ‘normal’ psychotic disorder or not.

This includes travelers who have ‘left’ and ‘returned’, or are ‘deceased’.

APA (2013, pp.102).

APA (2013, pp.116-117). Psychotic disorder may be ‘medication/substance induced’. The prevalence rate is for “Psychotic Disorder Due to Another Medical Condition”. The prevalence rates here “are difficult to estimate given the wide variety of underlying medical etiologies.”

Percentages close to 50% are not what one would expect in ‘normal’ populations, but in prison populations: “There is no doubt that the prevalence of personality disorder, which is around 4 per cent of the general UK population (Coid et al., 2006) is markedly raised in criminal populations. In a systematic review of 62 surveys of prisoners in 12 countries, Fazel and Danesh (2002) reported that of 18,530 men, 60 per cent had a personality disorder and 47 per cent had an antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). The equivalent figures for women were 42 and 21 per cent.” (Richard Howard and Conor Duggan, “Mentally Disordered Offenders. Personality Disorders”, in Graham J. Towl and David A. Crighton (2010), *Forensic Psychology*, Chichester: BPS Blackwell / John Wiley and Sons, pp.320-321.)


So far, there are six right wing extremists on the ‘open’ list – one in Category B.1, four in Category B.2, zero in Category B.3, and one in Category C. Domestic violence seems to be one commonality.

Sageman (2014), pp.569-570) is a recent example.


Silke (1998), p.65-66); cf. Sageman’s (2004) discussion of several factors in Freudian explanations, neither of which is a sufficient explanation of radicalization, seems prone to the same logic. We would be interested to learn how many did not score on any of these variables.

Cf. Victoroff, who recommends seeking “a middle ground between the reductionist position that proposes a single psychology of terrorism and the nihilist position that denies any explicit psychology of terrorism” (2005, p.31).


For example, we suspect that the prevalence and nature of psychosocial problems may differ between radicals with different ideological agendas, or between single-issue and other terrorists. The difference in personality traits of ideologues and thrill seekers deserves attention too. Specific ‘minor’ issues like weak self-control in thrill seekers may be a risk factor for radicalization. We agree with Freilich et.al who think the characteristics and motivations of terrorists have


[54] Cf. Moffitt (1993, p.680): “the link between neuropsychological impairment and antisocial outcomes is one of the most robust effects in the study of antisocial behavior”. Cf:

- Kevin M. Beaver, and Anthony Walsh (eds.), 2011, *The Ashgate Research Companion to Biosocial Theories of Crime*, Franham (UK) and Burlington (USA): Ashgate;


- Dick Swaab, (2010), *Wij zijn ons brein. Van baarmoeder tot Alzheimer* [We are our brains. From the womb to Alzheimer’s], Amsterdam & Antwerpen: Uitgeverij Contact.


[56] “Studies show that abuse and neglect have consequences for the development and regulation of the hormonal stress system (an overactive stress system can lead to depression, while an underactive stress system can lead to antisocial behaviour), for social information processing (for example, being too quick to interpret situations or other people's behaviour as threatening or hostile)” (De Kogel, 2008, p.147).

[57] Van der Gronde et.al show in an extensive research study that, although biological risk factors for human aggression can be identified, understanding individual cases always demands accounting for environmental factors and life events as well. “In the future, new information from neuroscience, when integrated into the information already available from sociological and psychological assessments, could contribute to the development of better risk assessment tools, treatment and cures for offenders, reducing recidivism as well” (Toon Van der Gronde, Maaike Kempes, Carla van El, Thomas Rinne & Toine Pieters, 2014, “Neurobiological Correlates in Forensic Assessment: A Systematic Review”, *PLOS One* 9(10): e110672. Doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0110672).

[58] “Different biological, psychological, and social risk factors can interact in shaping either violence or self-sacrificing heroism. Violence and terrorism are not just low physiological arousal, yet this is certainly one of the active ingredients that, when combined with other influences, can move us toward a more complete understanding of killers like Kaczynski” (Raine, 2013, p.133).

Jihadism, Narrow and Wide: The Dangers of Loose Use of an Important Term

by Mark Sedgwick

Abstract

The term “jihadism” is popular, but difficult. It has narrow senses, which are generally valuable, and wide senses, which may be misleading. This article looks at the derivation and use of “jihadism” and of related terms, at definitions provided by a number of leading scholars, and at media usage. It distinguishes two main groups of scholarly definitions, some careful and narrow, and some appearing to match loose media usage. However, it shows that even these scholarly definitions actually make important distinctions between jihadism and associated political and theological ideology. The article closes with a warning against the risks of loose and wide understandings of such important, but difficult, terms.

Keywords: jihadism, definition, terminology, ideology, counter-terrorism policy.

Introduction

The term “jihadism” has become increasingly popular since 2000, and especially since 2008. It is used in two main ways. Sometimes it is used very narrowly, as by Omar Ashour, who defined jihadism in 2011 as the belief that “armed confrontation with political rivals is a theologically legitimate and instrumentally efficient method for socio-political change” (emphasis MS) [1]. Sometimes it is used very widely, however, interchangeably with terms such as “Islamism” and “violent extremism.” “Jihadism” may even seem to be replacing “Islamism,” a possibility foreseen by Martin Kramer more than ten years ago in an article in which he noted how “Islamism” was then replacing “fundamentalism,” and wondered what new term might one day replace “Islamism” [2]. On the whole it is “extremism” that has replaced “Islamism” in Western political discourse, as Jeffrey Bale has recently observed, [3] but “jihadism” is a strong contender in the media (contrary to Bale’s view).

This article looks at the implications of the two different senses in which the term “jihadism” is used, narrow and wide. It argues that the crucial difference between them is that the narrow sense proposed by Ashour and others implies that jihadism is part of the problem, while the wider senses of the term imply that jihadism is the problem. This is a difference that has important implications for how we understand the problem of jihadism, and thus also for how it is handled. As this article will further argue, it is better to understand jihadism as part of the problem. All jihadis, from Iraqi fighters in the armies of the so-called Islamic State (IS) to individual murderers in European cities, have something in common. Equally, however, there are things that distinguish one type of jihadi from another.

Jihad, Jihadis, Jihadists, and Jihadism

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “jihad” has been in use in English since the 1860s. It is, of course, derived from jihad, an ancient Arabic term, and its meanings in English remain linked to its meanings in Arabic. These are disputed, as they have been for centuries. At one extreme it has been argued that the term denotes religiously obligatory campaigns of conquest directed against non-Muslims, who, qua non-Muslims, should in principle be conquered. At another extreme it has been argued that it denotes any commendable effort made in a good cause, such as stopping smoking or planting trees to prevent environmental degradation [4]. There are a variety of positions between these two extremes. These disputes
reflect prescriptive rather than analytic disagreements, disagreements about what Muslims should or should not do rather than disagreements about how analysts and policy makers should understand what is going on. This article concerns itself not with the prescriptive but with the analytic.

The term “jihad” was joined in 1920 by “jihadi,” an adjective that was initially used by scholars as an English translation of the Arabic word *mujahid*, a substantive denoting a person participating in a jihad. It was first used in connection with discussion of the Sokoto Caliphate established in West Africa by Usman dan Fodio (1754-1817) [5]. This is the sense and context in which the word “jihadist” was used for the first time in English, when the American historian John Ralph Willis coined the term in 1967 to describe Dan Fodio [6]. The terms “jihadi” and “jihadist” in the sense of *mujahid* do not raise any significant problems of definition, since their meaning depends very closely on the central term, “jihad.” Anyone who fights in what he thinks is a jihad is a *mujahid*, a jihadi or a jihadist. Whether or not the conflict in question is “really” a jihad is a prescriptive question, not an analytic one.

Other senses of the word “jihadist,” however, do raise analytic problems. One other sense of “jihadist” is as the adjectival form of the substantive “jihad,” as the English equivalent of the Arabic adjective *jihadi* rather than as the English translation of the substantive *mujahid*. In this sense, the alternative form “jihadic” was coined by the Jamaican ethnologist and poet Michael Garfield Smith in 1969 to describe the governmental forms of (once again) the Sokoto Caliphate, [7] but the term “jihadic” failed to catch on. “Jihadist” in the sense of “jihadic” is clearly more abstract and analytical than “jihadist” in the sense of *mujahid*. Whether or not a form of government reflects jihad is not a prescriptive question. Equally difficult is a related sense of “jihadist,” describing that which supports or encourages jihad. Andrew Hess applied the term in this sense in 1970 to fifteenth-century Ottoman *ghazavat* literature that glorified past jihadists (*mujahids* or *ghazis*) and thus encouraged current ones [8]. The *ghazavat* literature was the forerunner of today’s online jihadist *nashid* (plainsong) genre.

It was in this sense that the word “jihadism” was used in English for the first time, in 1986, when the Israeli historian Haggai Erlich wrote of the threat posed to late-nineteenth-century Ethiopia by what he called “Mahdist jihadism” [9]. Erlich used the term to denote an inclination towards jihad. It was not the existence of the Sudanese Mahdists that posed a threat to Ethiopia, but the possibility that they might decide to wage a jihad against the Ethiopians [10]. Erlich’s “Mahdist jihadism,” then, had something in common with familiar terms like “Soviet expansionism” or “Prussian militarism.”

Some uses in English of terms derived from the Arabic *jihad*, then, have been unproblematic analytically, as when the campaigns of the Sokoto Caliphate are described as jihad, or those who took part in them are described as jihadis or jihadists. Whether the campaigns of the Sokoto Caliphate were “really” jihad in a theological sense is perhaps an interesting question for a theologian, but it is not a question that needs detain the historian or analyst. Some uses of the group of terms derived from jihad, however, have been more problematic analytically. It is not self-evident that the governmental forms of the Sokoto Caliphate were jihadic, that certain fifteenth-century Ottoman poems encouraged jihad, or that the Mahdists were jihadist in the way that the Soviets were expansionist or the Prussians militaristic. These are all difficult analytical questions that might be argued one way or the other.

**Narrow Understandings of Jihadism**

“Jihadism” in Erlich’s sense, or in the sense in which Hess used “jihadist” in 1970, is analytically problematic, but still capable of precise definition. Such a definition was in fact given in 1994 by Nikki Keddie, who was the second scholar to use the term “jihadism.” Like Erlich, she used the term in reference to the Mahdists, in
a discussion of what she generally called “jihad movements” [11]. Her definition of jihadism was movements that “called for holy war against external non-Muslim enemies or practiced jihad against local rulers and enemies whom they considered not truly Muslim” [12]. This definition reflected the generally accepted scholarly understanding of the group of movements across the peripheries of the Muslim world that, from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century, used the discourse of jihad as well as armed force against enemies external or internal. The use of armed force was not new, as rebellions of one sort or another were frequent events in the Middle East, but the revival of the discourse of jihad was new. The most famous of these earlier jihadist movements was the original Wahhabi movement. The Mahdists and Dan Fodio are also generally understood as part of the same phenomenon, as are the Cyrenaican Sanusis. Some of these movements focused on external non-Muslim enemies, like the Sanusis, who fought the Italian colonizers. Some focused on local rulers and other enemies, like the Wahhabis, who focused first on rivals such as the Banu Khalid and then on the Ottomans, whom they considered not truly Muslim.

Keddie’s late pre-modern and early modern jihad movements have given rise to little controversy amongst scholars, largely because they have generally been studied individually rather than comparatively. There have been few comparative studies save Keddie’s own article and the 1979 PhD thesis of Ruud Peters [13]. Standard, non-comparative scholarly explanations of Wahhabism and Mahdism differ in ways that parallel contemporary discussions. Explanations of Wahhabism focus on the religious and ideological more than on the political and material, while explanations of Mahdism focus on the political and material more than on the religious and ideological. Keddie, in contrast, identified a number of common socioeconomic and religious causes for the movements she studied [14]. It would be interesting to compare these analyses with contemporary events, but this article will not attempt such a comparison.

The application of the term “jihadism” to modern jihad movements dates from 2002, when it was used in a report of the American think tank RAND. The report’s characterization of jihadism as “a radical cult of violence” and “a muscular religious offensive that elevates the concept of jihad from a struggle within one’s soul to an unlimited war against the West” [15] reflected the spirit of the times, but did little to advance analysis. The next scholarly definition was coined in 2006, when Thomas Hegghammer distinguished between three varieties of Islamist violence: that of local revolutionaries seeking the overthrow of their own governments, especially during the 1960s and 1970s; that of regional separatists in areas such as Palestine and Chechnya, especially in the 1980s and 1990s; and, since 1996, that of Osama bin Laden and his followers, who privileged the global struggle against America over both local revolutionary and regional separatist struggles [16]. This third and last variety of Islamist violence is what Hegghammer called “global jihadism.” The first two of these varieties of violence were jihadism in Keddie’s terms, as all “called for holy war against external non-Muslim enemies or against local rulers ... considered not truly Muslim.” The third, global jihadism, was new, unknown in Keddie’s period of analysis.

Ashour’s definition of jihadism, already quoted above (the belief that “armed confrontation with political rivals is a theologically legitimate and instrumentally efficient method for socio-political change”), follows Keddie and Hegghammer. The “socio-political change” that Ashour’s definition identifies as the objective of jihadism might be the defeat of Keddie’s “external non-Muslim enemies,” the replacement of “local rulers ... considered not truly Muslim,” or the triumph of Hegghammer’s strategy of “global jihadism.” Ashour is less interested than Keddie or Hegghammer in the objective of the jihad. His contribution is to draw attention to the fact that a jihadist must believe that violence is both “theologically legitimate” and “instrumentally efficient.” To consider violence theologically legitimate but instrumentally useless does not produce jihad, and nor does considering violence instrumentally efficient but theologically illegitimate. That Ashour draws attention to this point may reflect his earlier ground-breaking work on the end of the jihad fought
by the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG), which showed that a change of view on instrumental efficiency—the conclusion that the jihad was getting nowhere—mattered most in leading the EIG to end its jihad, and was then justified in theological terms [17].

Keddie, Hegghammer and Ashour were not especially concerned with political ideology. Ashour did describe the belief in the legitimacy and instrumental efficiency of jihad as “a modern Islamist ideology,” but here he is using “ideology” more in the sense of “conviction” than in the sense of “political ideology.” The relevant political ideology for him is Islamism. Here he appears to follow the scholarly consensus in understanding it as the ideology descended from that developed by the Muslim Brothers in mid-twentieth-century Egypt. Islamists may favor two roads to power: violent, like the EIG, or non-violent, like Islamist parliamentary parties from the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in Morocco to the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PAS) in Malaysia. Islamism, then, does not of itself produce jihad.

**Wide Understandings of Jihadism**

The widest understandings of jihadism are found in a journalistic context. In this context, the term “jihadist” has been used interchangeably with terms such as “militant,” “Islamists,” or “terrorist,” suggesting that these terms all mean much the same thing. A review in early 2015 of four British and American publications, two non-tabloid and two tabloid, [18] showed that all these terms were used to identify both IS and Europeans going to join it, and also to identify a variety of other groups and individuals from Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Mourabitoun in Mali, to al-Qaeda and various lone actors in the West. In all four publications, there were frequent references to “jihadist ideology” and “extremist ideology,” generally without any explanation of what it was, other than violent [19]. One unusual Op-Ed in the *New York Post*, however, provided a sort of definition, explaining that “Jihadists are driven by an ideology … that yearns to ‘restore’ a mythical caliphate, one governed by the most austere version of Sharia law” [20]. If “caliphate” is replaced by “state,” this could equally serve as a definition of “Islamism” or even “fundamentalism.” The implication is that jihadism is an ideology, that it is that particular ideology that produces jihad.

Although Western politicians are careful to avoid the term “jihadism,” they sometimes seem to understand “extremism” in terms that are not so different from these. British Prime Minister David Cameron, for example, recently referred to the “poisonous and extremist ideology” of IS, which he identified “not just in Iraq and Syria but right across the world, from Boko Haram and al-Shabaab to the Taliban and al-Qaeda” [21]. The implication, once again, is that jihadism is an ideology, that it is that ideology that produces jihad.

Some scholars appear to be advancing similar definitions, but on closer examination are generally not intending to do so. Salwa Ismail, for example, wrote of “‘Jihadist’ ideology” as combining the idea of replacing *jahiliyya* (society in a state of ignorance) with the *hakimiyya* (sovereignty) of God, with the use of the concept of jihad to justify the use of violence [22]. It would appear that what Ismail actually meant by “Jihadist ideology” was the ideology that the jihadists subscribed to, not the ideology that was responsible for the jihadism. Similarly, David Charters defined “jihadism” as “a revolutionary program whose ideology promises radical social change in the Muslim world [and] give[s] a central role to jihad as an armed political struggle to overthrow ‘apostate’ regimes, to expel their infidel allies, and thus to restore Muslim lands to governance by Islamic principles” [23]. Jihadism for Charters is a program, then, and the program has an ideology, but it is the program that gives a role to armed struggle, not the ideology. A further example is provided by Jarret Brachman, for whom “jihadism” is a “current of extremist Islamic thought whose adherents demand the use of violence in order to oust non-Islamic influence from traditionally Muslim lands en route to establishing true Islamic governance” [24]. It is clear that what distinguishes jihadism from other currents of Islamist
thought for Brachman is the emphasis on violence, not the political ideology.

Ismail, Charters and Brachman link jihadism with Islamist ideology, then, but do in fact distinguish jihadism from Islamism, even though at first sight they might appear not to. Some other scholars link jihadism with the more theological ideology of Salafism, which is of course generally on poor terms with the Islamism of the PJD, PAS and the like. These definitions follow on Gilles Kepel's 2002 identification of the current wave of jihadism as “jihadist-Salafism,” [25] which itself builds on the work of Quintan Wiktorowicz, who in 2000 had identified the split between jihadis and non-jihadis as the most important split in the Salafi movement [26]. Neither Kepel nor Wiktorowicz, however, argued that Salafism produces jihadism, or that a non-Salafi cannot be a jihadi. They merely observed that some Salafis are jihadists, and many jihadists are Salafis, much as Ismail, Charters and Brachman in effect observed that some Islamists are jihadists, and many jihadists are Islamists.

There is, then, in fact little scholarly support for the wide understandings of the New York Post Op-Ed writer and of David Cameron. Most scholars do generally distinguish between jihadism on the one hand and ideologies such as Islamism or Salafism on the other hand. This is an important distinction to make.

The Global and the Local

The distinction between local, regional and global is also an important distinction to make. It may be the most important distinction that is lost when wide understandings of jihadism replace the narrow. During the Cold War, many political movements that are now understood as nationalist and therefore local were seen as part of a single global Communist threat. Once all movements for political change involving Communists were defined as part of one global phenomenon, that global phenomenon was not hard to find. A classic case was the Mossadegh government in Iran during the early 1950s, which is now generally understood to have represented liberal nationalism against monarchical power and entrenched foreign (mostly British) economic exploitation, which is very much how the Truman administration initially saw it. Once the Mossadegh government was understood as part of a global Communist threat by the Eisenhower administration, however, the result was the American promotion of the 1953 military coup that put an end not only to the Mossadegh government but also to any possibility of evolutionary political change in Iran, and so accidentally helped to lay the groundwork for the 1978-79 Iranian revolution [27]. With hindsight it is clear that the view of the Truman administration was the right one, and that it would have been better to have made a clear distinction between the global threat presented by the Soviet Union and the local threat presented (or perhaps not presented) by the Mossadegh government.

British Prime Minister David Cameron, in conflating IS, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, the Taliban and al-Qaeda, may be repeating the error of President Eisenhower. Yes, all these movements are jihadist in the narrow sense that they consider jihad both legitimate and instrumentally efficient, but while al-Qaeda is clearly global in Hegghammer's sense—in terms of targeting the West in general and the U.S. in particular—other groups appear to be much less global if two questions are asked. The first question, following Hegghammer, is whether they target a global or a local enemy, whether they operate globally or locally. The second question, following current European security concerns, is whether they recruit globally or locally.

In terms of the first question, IS, the Taliban, al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram all originally operated only in one locality and targeted local enemies. All save Boko Haram have been involved in military engagements with US forces, but in all cases this involvement was involuntary. IS and al-Shabaab have been targeted by US air power, but have not yet attacked American targets themselves, save for the well publicized and gruesome executions of a few Americans in the region who fell into IS's clutches. The Taliban have attacked
American and allied targets, but only in Afghanistan and adjoining areas. Al-Shabaab has attacked targets that are loosely allied with the US, but again only in Somalia and adjoining areas. Boko Haram is suspected of having cooperated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the group that was formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) but declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2006. However, no actual operations are known to have resulted from this alleged cooperation. Al-Shabaab declared allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012, but once again no operations are known to have resulted from this. The Taliban attempted to protect al-Qaeda against the US in 2001, but failed to do so. In terms of the first question, then, none of the four groups is particularly global.

In terms of the second question, neither the Taliban nor Boko Haram is known to have recruited outside their own areas of operations. Al-Shabaab, however, does recruit globally, though primarily among the Somali diaspora. It is really a Somali ethnic organization, not a global one. IS, on the other hand, recruits globally, and without ethnic limitation. It attracts global jihadists. It is, however, not primarily composed of global jihadists, but of locals from Syria and Iraq.

A narrow understanding of jihadism, then, allows a distinction to be drawn between global and local jihadism. Since policy responses to local and global jihadism should be distinct and contextually relevant, this is an important distinction to draw.

**Conclusion**

The term “jihadism,” then, is by its nature more difficult than the more basic terms “jihad” and “jihadist”/”jihadi” in the sense of mujahid, all of which have clear descriptive meanings. These terms raise major prescriptive issues, as they have done for centuries, but they do not raise analytic issues. The term “jihadist” in the sense of “jihadic” raises more analytic issues, as it can be argued one way or another whether or not a particular practice is characteristic of, or encouraging of, jihad.

It is the term “jihadism” that is most slippery, however. It is useful to denote the wave of modern movements that legitimize their actions by reference to jihad, just as it was useful to identify the late pre-modern wave about which Keddie wrote, but it does not explain that wave. It may, however, appear to offer an explanation, especially when used loosely and widely in the media, where jihadism, Islamism, and Salafism may be conflated. Such an understanding obscures important differences. Islamism and Salafism are not the same thing, and are in fact often in opposition to each other. Most Islamists are not jihadists, just as most Salafis are not jihadists. Jihadists focusing on local revolution are not the same as jihadists focusing on regional separatist struggles, and both differ from jihadists focusing on global jihad. Some scholars may appear to agree with the wide sense of jihadism as found in the media, but on closer examination they prove to be observing that jihadists commonly subscribe to Islamist or Salafi ideology, not that jihadism, Islamism, and Salafism are all the same thing.

Jihadism closely resembles terrorism in being essentially a means to an end, not an end in itself, except perhaps for single individuals in an existential sense. Much of what has been said of terrorism in this respect is thus also true of jihadism, including the observation that certain ends—and thus certain ideologies—are more likely to be associated with jihadism than others. Jihadism, like terrorism, is generally used in an attempt to promote major political change. This may be the fall of a local regime, or the liberation of a territory from foreign, non-Muslim rule, or even to bring about the retreat of American global power. This political change will generally be considered a means to the further end of establishing a good life, logically understood in Islamic terms, and often, but not necessarily, in Salafi terms. Jihadism, then, is primarily about means, not ends, just as terrorism is primarily about means rather than ends. The ends intended to be served
by terrorism vary, but are often either political in the left-wing sense or nationalist in the separatist sense, or sometimes a combination of the two. The ends intended to be served by jihadism may also be either political or separatist, or a combination of the two.

We should be careful to avoid repeating analytical errors that have had negative consequences in the past in terms of response. We should distinguish local and regional jihadism from global jihadism, even when these sometimes overlap, and we should distinguish jihadism from Islamism and Salafism, even when they too sometimes overlap. The term “jihadism” is a valuable one, but we should make sure to use it carefully, and narrowly.

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Notes


Evolving Transnational Cinematic Perspectives of Terrorism

by Samuel W. Bettwy

Abstract

This article describes the attributes of transnational cinema in general and of transnational terrorism cinema in particular and then presents a survey of representative films since the 1970s about terrorism from the United States, Europe, and the Middle East, as well as films from South America and India. The survey shows that, due to the forces of globalization and international terrorism, a transnational, albeit U.S.-European-dominated, cinematic discourse of terrorism is evolving. The discourse is due to the willingness of filmmakers, especially European filmmakers, to challenge their own nations’ public perceptions and cultural discourses of terrorism and the willingness of audiences to consider those challenges.

Keywords: Terrorism, Media, Perception, Counterterrorism

Introduction

The North Korean government’s extreme reaction to the 2014 film The Interview[1] is a reminder of Hollywood’s parochial perspective of international terrorism since the 1970s which tends to alienate the rest of the world, especially audiences in countries and regions where terrorists are spawned. When Ezra and Rowden wrote in 2010 that commercial cinema’s “depiction of terrorism . . . comes closest to offering its most ideologically revelatory and analytically transparent imagery and narrative constructions,”[2] they were not referring to Hollywood’s superficial, cartoonish renditions of the triumph of American exceptionalism over subhuman, foreign terrorist foes. They were referring to serious attempts, especially through transnational cinematic collaborations, to depict the sources and causes of terrorism. As Baratieri wrote in 2009: “There is still a place for revolutionary cinema that proposes analysis and reveals causes.”[3]

On August 27, 2003, for example, the Directorate for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict at the Pentagon screened the 1966 film The Battle of Algiers[4] for a select group of military and civilian planners and analysts to consider mistakes made by the French in Algeria that should be avoided by the United States in Iraq.[5] The screening was intended to show how the brutal methods of the French military succeeded tactically and operationally against guerrillas of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) in the Battle of Algiers (1956-1957), but failed strategically during the Algerian War as a whole (1954-1962).

Films about terrorism offer insight into the perspectives of both terrorists and counterterrorists. As Quiney states: “fictional and popular cultural representations of the terrorist offer intriguing insights into certain evolving imaginary constructions of terror and its proponents which are influencing legal and political formations of a post-9/11 New World Order.”[6] Transnational cinema is especially worth analyzing, because it transcends national biases and tends to present more balanced and universal narratives. As discussed below, the evolution of international terrorism (or, transnational terrorism)[7] appears to have caused a corresponding evolution of transnational films about terrorism, especially collaborations between U.S. and European filmmakers and between European and Middle Eastern filmmakers.

Definition and Attributes of Transnational Cinema

In general, “transnational cinema is a relatively contemporary development within the unfolding process of globalization.”[8] Film scholars tend to use the term transnational cinema “as a largely self-evident qualifier
requiring only minimal conceptual clarification.”[9] Relevant to terrorism studies, transnational cinema and transnational terrorism are interrelated in that both transcend national boundaries and both are considered to be responses to globalization and the “unrelenting march of capitalism across the globe.”[10] Transnational cinema about terrorism can therefore be compared to Third Cinema (and its legacy) which was a reaction of Third World filmmakers to the perceived evils of capitalism and imperialism.[11] But, as discussed below, transnational cinema emanates from both East and West and not only from the Third World. It therefore tends to offer more balanced criticisms of both globalization and terrorism.

The development of digital technologies such as the VCR, the DVD, and now streaming, as well as the increasing use of multilingual subtitles and the globalization of English, have enabled expansive distribution of, and accessibility to, films worldwide. Terrorism has long been a subject of popular cinema, especially Hollywood and Hollywood-styled cinema (also known as First Cinema), and transnational terrorism has become a natural subject of transnational cinema.[12] Indeed, filmmakers from the United States and Western Europe, which are primary targets of transnational terrorism, have increasingly led the way in the production of transnational films about terrorism. By contrast, filmmakers from South America and India, where terrorism has been predominantly domestic, have produced several national films about terrorism, but rarely collaborate with foreign filmmakers to produce transnational films.

Filmmakers have their own inherent, national biases, and because economics compel them to cater to their domestic audiences, their national films tend to express the “national discourse” or “public memory” of their own nations.[13] As Ruberto and Wilson observe, “national cinema can be seen as an insidious and isolationist concept, one that collapses many forms of identity into a hegemonic vision of culture.”[14] Because of these biases, many Western and Eastern[15] national films about terrorism and counterterrorism show parallel and reciprocal processes of humanization and dehumanization.[16] As filmmakers from different countries collaborate to produce transnational films, they tend to challenge their own national discourses and public memories, and it becomes difficult to discern the origin of the film.

“A film might be said to count as an instance of marked transnationality if the agents intentionally direct the attention of the viewer towards various transnational properties.”[17] Overriding properties of transnational films about terrorism include balance, self-criticism, and universal themes. These attributes are generally not achieved purely through the filmmaker’s imagination or independent research. They are achieved through a “cinematic exchange” of ideas, namely through collaboration with filmmakers around the world. A cross-pollination of ideas results in a culturally and politically “hybrid” film.[18]

Transnational films tend to present balanced depictions of terrorism and its causes when they are “experimental,” as do Pontecorvo’s Battle of Algiers,[19] Spielberg’s Munich,[20] and Hany Abu-Assad’s Paradise Now,[21] meaning that they are designed to promote social, political, artistic, and/or aesthetic values.[22] “Opportunistic” films, on the other hand, are market-driven, as are most Hollywood films, and therefore more likely to reflect the biased or nationalistic attitudes of a particular domestic market. It is generally recognized that a transnational, experimental film about terrorism is more likely to be effective in telling a persuasive story to international audiences, because they are more likely to watch it and to perceive it as authentic.[23]

Films can be scaled from weakly to strongly transnational, depending on the content of the themes and the extent of international collaboration of directors, producers and/or distributors, of reception by audiences internationally, of intercultural dialogue and personalization of both sides (terrorists and counter-terrorists), of polylinguism, and of realism.[24] It is possible for a film that is “made within a purely national framework of production and oriented” towards a domestic audience to express transnational themes such
as globalization, Islamic terrorism, and the diasporic experiences of Muslims.[25] Examples of national films that possess transnational qualities include *The War Within* [26] and Ratnam’s *Dil Se* [27] which was the first Bollywood film to make the top ten British films list.[28]

The more “national” and/or “opportunistic” a film is, however, the more its discourse includes wholly fictional plots and characters, dehumanization of the terrorist, heroic and ego-centric representations of the counterterrorist, and/or sympathetic personalization of the victims. Hollywood, which dominates the international film market, has produced the largest amount of national films on terrorism, especially action-adventures and *policiers*. So-called Hollywood or Hollywood-styled films that are designed to appeal primarily to American and other Western audiences reflect an overconfident sense of American exceptionalism and a dehumanization of terrorists who are usually Arab or Middle Eastern. Representative films include *Warhead* (1977),[29] *The Delta Force* (1986),[30] and *Hot Shots! Part II* (1993).[31]

The more transnational and/or experimental a film on terrorism is, the more it uses stories based on real-life events, intercultural dialogue that expresses both criticism and personalization of the terrorist and/or counterterrorist, intercultural dialogue that expresses the desires and motivations the terrorist and/or counterterrorist, and/or international collaboration between or among filmmakers.

The diasporic narrative, for example, sets up a vehicle for comparing and integrating viewpoints in the host and home countries. Examples include *The War Within*,[34] *India*, Indian-American director Mira Nair’s short-subject contribution to September 11[35] (11 film shorts by various directors from around the world), and *My Name is Khan*,[36] which are discussed below. Examples of transnational films that are based on real-life events include *The Delta Force* (1986), *Munich* (2005), *Bullet in the Head* (2008),[37] and *The Assault* (2010),[38] also discussed below. *The Delta Force* is anomalous in that it has back-to-back transnational and national properties; the first half fairly describes an actual event (the 1985 hijacking of a TWA jet aircraft), and the second half regresses to pure fiction to satisfy the appetite of American audiences for retributive justice.[39]

Applying these factors that define transnational films, military and national security strategists and policymakers can benefit from an analytical framework for reading films about terrorism to recognize national biases and the properties of transnational filmmaking. *The Battle of Algiers*,[40] for example, has transnational and experimental properties, even though it is a one-sided, sympathetic portrayal of the Algerian revolutionaries. It was made by Italian director Gillo Pontecorvo, who was a self-described Marxist, but the film has been well-received by a broad audience internationally and remains a classic. Perhaps its transnational properties explain its enduring appeal.

Pontecorvo’s film contains many of the attributes found in current transnational films such as intercultural dialogue, depictions of heroic female terrorists, personalization of both terrorists and counterterrorists, and realism to garner sympathy for the revolutionary terrorists (the film was banned in France for five years). Pontecorvo achieves realism by using post-World War II neorealist (*cinéma vérité*) techniques such as handheld camerawork, shots on location in the Casbah of Algiers, and non-actors, including actual revolutionaries from the French-Algerian War.[41] In fact, it is arguable that realism is among the most persuasive attributes of a transnational film insofar as it reflects social reality to both domestic and foreign audiences.[42]

Below is a discussion of representative films about terrorism from the United States, South America, Europe,
India, and the Middle East since the 1970s, showing that, due to the forces of globalization and transnational terrorism, a U.S.-European-dominated global discourse of terrorism is evolving. The discourse is due to the willingness of filmmakers, especially U.S. and European filmmakers, to challenge their own nations' public memories and national, cultural discourses of terrorism and the willingness of audiences to consider those challenges. U.S. filmmakers appear to be on the verge of venturing down the trail blazed by European filmmakers, namely collaboration with Middle Eastern filmmakers to produce transnational films about Islamic extremism and terrorism.

**Evolution of Transnational Terrorism Films since the 1970s**

A survey of national films about terrorism across time and around the world reveals that, in general, filmmakers make films about terrorism that has occurred in their own countries. Such a survey also reveals that Hollywood and Hollywood-styled films about domestic terrorism distinctively possess few transnational properties. By contrast, national films made in Europe, South America, India, and the Middle East are comparatively more balanced in their narratives about domestic terrorism. They tend, for example, to personalize terrorists, while condemning their violence. Hollywood films of the 1980s that depict overseas terrorists, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Afghani mujahedin, also tend to personalize terrorists, demonstrating the ability of U.S. filmmakers to tell balanced narratives about terrorism.

As terrorism transcends national borders, witness Islamic terrorism, filmmakers from different countries are doing the same, collaborating to produce transnational films. U.S. and European filmmakers have collaborated to produce remarkable transnational films, but the collaboration of European and Middle Eastern filmmakers is even more remarkable because it has resulted in a transnational, hybrid product of Western and Eastern points of view. There has been little international collaboration by South American and Indian filmmakers, perhaps because their countries are the targets more of domestic terrorism than of transnational terrorism. A notable exception is Brazilian filmmaker Walter Salles’ romantic portrait of revolutionary Che Guevara as a medical student in his early twenties in *The Motorcycle Diaries*, a strongly transnational, collaborative film. The survey below therefore focuses on the evolution of films about terrorism in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East.

**United States**

After World War II, the tension between Israel and neighboring Arab countries began to raise awareness among Americans about Arab terrorism, especially after the 1972 massacre at the Munich Olympics, the expansion of the Palestine Liberation Organization's terrorist campaign against Israel, the 1973 oil embargo, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Americans began to perceive Arabs in general as a possible threat to American national security. This new awareness was reflected in the narratives of several Hollywood films made between 1972 and 1977. As Eisele stated, in Western films, “the Arab other moved from being a (sometime) protagonist and sympathetic other to being an antagonist and savage terrorist.” A representative film is *Warhead* in which a U.S. weapons expert (played by David Janssen) battles against both Israeli soldiers and Palestinian terrorists to find and disable a nuclear warhead that accidentally fell out of a U.S. Air Force aircraft during a flight over Jordan. In *Warhead,* the Palestinian terrorists are dehumanized as the laughable Other, “raving, maniacal,…devoid of human decency and morality.”

In the 1980s, the threat of Islamic terrorism is realized; Americans experience the humiliation of the Iranian hostage crisis from 1980 to 1981 and the overseas bombings and hijackings of the mid-1980s. For the
most part, Hollywood discontinues its portrayals of easy American triumphs over Arab terrorists. In Back to the Future,[49] for example, Libyan terrorists murder Doc (played by Christopher Lloyd) in retaliation for his theft of their plutonium. One exception is the second half of The Delta Force[50] in which two Special Forces officers (played by Chuck Norris and Lee Marvin) lead a team of counterterrorists who kill dozens, perhaps hundreds of Islamic terrorists in the process of successfully freeing all of their hostages, unharmed.

Hollywood otherwise diverts the attention of its audiences to overseas, revolutionary terrorism in the 1980s. U.S. audiences traditionally worship revolutionaries, so they freely accepted favorable portrayals of the mujahedin who were struggling in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union which was a primary perceived threat to American interests during the Cold War.[51] A representative Hollywood film that supported the national discourse of a justified proxy war against the Soviet Union[52] is Rambo III[53] in which the indestructible hero Rambo (played by Sylvester Stallone) is assigned to help resupply the mujahedin.

The tendency to favorably portray a foreign “freedom fighter” also naturally resulted in strongly transnational films such as the James Bond film The Living Daylights,[54] in which Agent 007 (played by Timothy Dalton) is assisted by the mujahedin. The film is a U.S.-U.K. collaboration, featuring international stars and filmed on location in several countries, including Morocco, Austria, and the United Kingdom. The dialogue is only superficially intercultural, however. The Beast of War[55] contains some transnational properties as well. It presents the story of a series of skirmishes between the mujahedin and a Soviet tank crew that becomes lost in the mountains of Afghanistan. It is filmed in Israel, features foreign actors, contains authentic intercultural dialogue, including Pashto-speaking Afghans, and it gives a personalized portrayal of both the tankers and the mujahedin. It might be argued, then, that Hollywood films of the 1980s about terrorism in other countries tended to be more strongly transnational.

The first half of Israeli-born American filmmaker Menahem Golan’s The Delta Force also stands out as a film ahead of its time. The film begins by closely tracking details of the real-life hijacking of a 1985 TWA jet aircraft and the deliberate killing of an American passenger by members of Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad.[56] Names have been changed, including the name of the airline (WTA in the film), but the film’s allusion to the 1985 hijacking it unmistakable.[57] In the real hijacking, the remaining hostages are freed after the hijackers’ demands are met, and the hijackers evade capture. As mentioned above, however, the second half of the film is a fantasy in which American counterterrorists triumph over Islamic terrorists. Director Menahem Golan compromises a potentially authentic film to sate the appetite of U.S. (and perhaps Israeli) audiences for retributive justice.

Just as Hollywood glorified the mujahedin in films of the 1980s, it romanticized IRA terrorists during the 1990s,[58] even after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Such favorable portrayals of the IRA can be explained by Americans’ traditional sympathy for revolutionaries, especially those that do not directly threaten them,[59] and by a lack of appreciation for the terror and violence that Europeans had experienced in World War II.[60] And like the 1980s films about the mujahedin, many of the 1990s films about the IRA have strong transnational properties. Patriot Games,[61] in which the “good” IRA and its leaders are outraged by the brutal tactics of a “bad” splinter faction, is shot in London and Washington, DC, and features international American and Irish stars Harrison Ford, Richard Harris, and Patrick Bergin. The Devil’s Own[62] is a U.S.-Irish production filmed in New York and Ireland, featuring international stars Brad Pitt and Harrison Ford. The film condemns violence, but it portrays the IRA in a good light and the British Special Air Service (SAS) in a bad light.[63] And The Jackal,[64] which is filmed in Russia, Finland, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, and features international stars Richard Gere, Bruce Willis and Sidney Poitier, is about a former IRA sniper and a former ETA terrorist (Basque separatist) who assist the FBI to prevent an assassination of the U.S. First Lady.
Apart from a brief detour to pay tribute to the mujahedin and the IRA, Hollywood films of the 1990s continue to echo the national discourse of American dominance and exceptionalism over Arab terrorists who are portrayed as primitive, irrational and easily thwarted. In a defining scene from *Patriot Games*, Jack Ryan watches ghost-like images through a live satellite feed as the SAS kills everyone in a Libyan training camp while they sleep (because it mistakenly believes the renegade IRA faction is training there). As Eisele noted in 2002, the Arab terrorist, which first began to appear as a character in Hollywood films in the 1970s, continues to be depicted as “pure evil . . . counterpoised with the pure good of a European hero, or more often an American.”

Representative films of the first half of the 1990s include *Delta Force 3: The Killing Game* in which the heroes prevent terrorist Kahlil Kadal from detonating a nuclear weapon in Miami, Florida, *Hot Shots! Part II* in which the hero (played by Charlie Sheen) rescues American troops from a Middle Eastern despot, *True Lies* in which the hero (played by Arnold Schwarzenegger) prevents Arab terrorists from employing a nuclear warhead, and *Executive Decision* in which the hero (played by Kurt Russell) thwarts Arab terrorists from deploying biological weapons.

Hollywood’s narrative about Middle Eastern terrorists began to evolve rapidly after the fall of the Soviet Union, the advent of globalization, the Persian Gulf War, and al-Qaeda’s partially successful 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, its simultaneous 1998 truck bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and its 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. American fear of Marxism was replaced with fear of Islamic extremism, and U.S. audiences could no longer be convinced, even in suspended belief, that the Middle Eastern terrorist was inept and incapable of striking on U.S. soil. This new national discourse that terrorists are clever enough to carry out their plans is expressed in films like *The Siege*, *Rules of Engagement*, and *The Sum of All Fears*. *The Siege* depicts the U.S. President’s declaration of martial law, targeting American Muslims and Arab-Americans, after a series of terrorist bombings in New York City. Director William Friedkin intended an antiterrorism theme in *Rules of Engagement*, and there are transnational elements such as collaboration with a German production company and intercultural dialogue. But Friedkin’s transnational intent was overshadowed by his depiction of a massacre of a mob of Yemeni civilians by U.S. Marines which prompted the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee to call the film “probably the most racist film ever made against Arabs by Hollywood.” *The Sum of All Fears*, also a collaboration with a German production company, was completed shortly before the 9/11 attacks, and its release was delayed until May 2002 due to the alarming nature of the film’s subject matter (European neo-Nazis detonate a nuclear bomb on American soil).

After the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which had a tremendous impact on Americans’ concern for personal safety, Hollywood films about domestic terrorists emerged, such as *The Rock* (1996), about renegade U.S. soldiers with chemical weapons, *The Jackal*, about an attempted assassination of the U.S. First Lady by an American (played by Bruce Willis), and *Fight Club* about a terrorist plot by young male Americans to blow up the headquarters of all U.S. credit-reporting agencies. Unlike Islamic terrorists, the American villains in these films are highly personalized. *Fight Club*, a collaboration with Danish film production company Taurus Film, is the most transnational of these films because of its theme and its reception. As Quiney notes, filmmaker David Finchner draws attention “to a new type of terrorist, who translates his personal dissatisfaction and powerlessness into political violence . . . in protest against the new global citizenship.”
In the wake of 9/11, which traumatized Americans even more than the Oklahoma City bombing, Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Association of America, appealed to Hollywood filmmakers to refrain from portraying Islamic terrorists in order to prevent a backlash against “the decent, hard-working, law-abiding Muslim community in this country.”[81] For the most part, filmmakers started making more strongly transnational films.[82] As Shaheen stated in 2008, “I believe thoughtful imagemakers are beginning to rollback slanderous portraits and create fuller, more complicated Arab characters and stories.”[83]

Out of respect for the victims, many U.S. filmmakers initially focused on the victims of the 9/11 attacks rather than grant the perpetrators any further publicity. In September 11,[84] Director Sean Penn portrays a personal view of one victim’s surviving widower (played by Ernest Borgnine), and in The Guys,[85] a journalist agrees to help a New York Fire Department captain write eulogies for eight of the firemen he lost in the World Trade Center. And the release of Collateral Damage[86] was postponed for four months to delete scenes of a terrorist bombing in Los Angeles and an airplane hijacking.[87]

In her contribution to September 11, noted Indian-American filmmaker Mira Nair, a vocal supporter of the Palestinians, tells a diasporic narrative based on the real-life story of Muslim American Mohammed Salman Hamdani, a first-responding paramedic who died when assisting victims of the 9/11 attacks. When his Muslim family reports him missing, investigators immediately suspect that Salman was a terrorist and start treating the surviving family members with suspicion as well.[88] This type of diasporic narrative about American paranoid hyper-vigilance-turned-racism is also told in the U.S. films The War Within[89] and The Space Between,[90] in which an American flight attendant and a Pakistani-American boy connect during 9/11, and in the internationally collaborative Indian film My Name is Khan.[91] The War Within and The Space Between are remarkable because, although they were made without foreign collaboration by American filmmakers about Islamic terrorism, they exhibit strong transnational properties.

In The War Within, American director Joseph Castelo employs extensive intercultural dialogue about the Islamic faith in a story about Pakistani Hassan (played by Ayad Akhtar) and his unwavering, successful plan to detonate a suicide bomb in New York City’s Grand Central Station. Castelo’s narrative is consistent with Egyptian Director Chahine’s theme in his segment of September 11[92] that “Americans decide who the terrorist is.” The main character Hassan turns to terrorism after American agents kidnap him from the streets of London and hand him over to Pakistani agents who torture him for two years. He is radicalized by a cellmate during his incarceration, and after his release, he is enlisted to go to the United States to carry out a suicide bomb attack. FBI agents end up arresting an innocent Pakistani-American who tries to alert them to Hassan’s plan. The film therefore ends where it began with the arrest and interrogation of an innocent who will be taught to resent America and become vulnerable to radicalization.

Steven Spielberg’s 2005 film Munich[93] represents a significant transnational challenge to the American discourse about terrorism. In this collaboration with French and Canadian production companies, he describes a “relationship between cultures from which we [Americans] are absent.”[94] Shot on location in Malta, Budapest, Paris, and New York, it presents a balanced narrative of both the Palestinian Black September members who kidnapped and murdered eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich and the Israeli Mossad assassins who tracked them down. Apart from whether Spielberg’s depiction of real-life events is thorough and accurate,[95] it was both credited[96] and criticized[97], in effect humanizing the Palestinian terrorists in his narrative and equating Israelis and Palestinians. In a defining scene, one of the Israeli assassins decries the mission as antithetical to Judeo ethics and morality.

Hollywood has also started taking an interest in South American terrorists, almost as if it (and its audiences) long for the days of a more rational, revolutionary terrorist whose limited demands can be understood
and perhaps even met. Just as Hollywood had romanticized the IRA, ETA and mujahedin in the 1980s and 1990s, Steven Soderbergh’s biopic *Che* [98] glorifies Che Guevara as a true revolutionary who “loves truth, humanity and justice.” To depict Che in a sympathetic light, Soderbergh sought authentic cultural portrayals and had difficulty convincing financial backers of his decision to shoot the film in Spanish, declaring “I hope we’re reaching a time where you go make a movie in another culture that you shoot in the language of that culture.” [99]

Also noteworthy is John Malkovich’s strongly transnational film *The Dancer Upstairs* [100] which features international star Javier Bardem playing a police captain who battles against the excessive violence of both the Maoist terrorists and the military in an unnamed Latin American country that is strongly hinted to be Peru. The film was partly filmed in Ecuador, and the polylingual dialogue includes the Andean Quechua language. Also noteworthy is director Mike Nichols’ strongly transnational 2007 film *Charlie Wilson’s War* [101] which is filmed in Morocco and the United States, features international stars Tom Hanks, Julia Roberts and Phillip Seymour Hoffman, and is polylingual (English, Dari, Russian, Urdu, Hebrew and Arabic). It sympathizes with the Afghan mujahedin, and criticizes the United States for its failure to engage in reconstruction activities after the Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan.

Karan Johar’s Hindi film *My Name is Khan* [102] is a rare collaboration between Indian and U.S. filmmakers (and a United Arab Emirates production company). [103] The result is a strongly transnational film. Its narrative is naive in the Indian tradition, but it contains extensive intercultural English-Hindi-Urdu-Arabic dialogue, it is diasporic, it features internationally-known Indian actor Shah Rukh Khan in the title role, and it is filmed on location in the United States and India. Khan, a Muslim with Asperger’s syndrome living in the United States, is mistaken for a terrorist when he is in reality a hero. The film is critical of the United States’ paranoid, racist hysteria in the aftermath of 9/11, just as Indian-American director Mira Nair was critical in her segment of *September 11*. [104]

This survey of U.S. films about terrorism suggests a few patterns. Hollywood filmmakers tend to set aside their national bias and employ transnational properties to present balanced portrayals of terrorism when they make films about terrorism that occurs in other countries. Relatively recent examples include *Munich, Che, The Dancer Upstairs, and Charlie Wilson’s War*. And, when Hollywood filmmakers make films about terrorism that has occurred in the United States, including Islamic terrorism, they tend to buck the Hollywood formula and present a more balanced narrative when they collaborate with filmmakers from other countries. Examples of such balanced narratives through international collaboration are *Fight Club* and *My Name is Khan*, and examples of balanced narratives without international collaboration are *The Space Between* and *The War Within*. Hollywood filmmakers have not, thus far, followed the lead of European filmmakers to collaborate with Middle Eastern filmmakers. As discussed below, such collaboration might produce even more authentic narratives about Islamic extremism and terrorism.

**Europe**

Western European cinema about terrorism during the Cold War reflects the sensibilities of a shell-shocked people who share the public memory of the atrocities and devastation of World War II and its aftermath, which includes coming to grips with the Holocaust and enduring the looming threat of Soviet expansion. [105] Therefore, unlike U.S. films, Western European films contain anti-violence themes. [106] Cold War European filmmakers offered a more artistic, “Second Cinema” alternative to Hollywood such as New Germany Cinema and French New Wave cinema. European national films also possess transnational properties in that they are often polylingual and deliver balanced portrayals of terrorists. And as discussed
below, post-Cold War European national films have become increasingly more realistic. Even though the United States dominates the international film industry, U.S. filmmakers seek to penetrate foreign markets through collaboration with foreign filmmakers, and the collaboration of U.S. and European filmmakers naturally results in an even more strongly transnational, hybrid film.

In the 1970s, German cinema “highlight[ed] a political climate of fear and mistrust rather than specific terrorist acts and their consequences.”[107] Examples include films of New Germany Cinema such as The Lost Honor of Katharina Blum[108] and Germany in Autumn.[109] In the 1980s, German filmmakers began to challenge the national discourse of terrorism in films such as Marianne and Juliane.[110] And by the 2000s, German films had begun to offer greater insight into terrorists’ motivations.[111] In The Legend of Rita,[112] which is loosely based on the Baader-Meinhof gang of 1970s West Germany, filmmaker Schlöndorff provides an “unusual humanization of the often demonized terror campaigns on both sides of the [Berlin] Wall” and “attempts to show the ‘other side’ of each,” implying that “East and West are perhaps not as far removed from one another as they are generally made out to be.”[113] German filmmaker Uli Edel was criticized for glamorizing members of the Baader-Meinhof gang in The Baader Meinhof Complex,[114] portraying the “very sexiness . . . of the Baader-Meinhof show–miniskirts, girls with Kalashnikovs, open sexuality, drug-taking.”[115] The film was criticized, especially by relatives of the group’s victims, for glamorizing their actions.[116]

In Italy as well, the terrorist has been shown in an increasingly personal light since the 1970s. Keep in mind that it was an Italian director, Gillo Pontecorvo, who used neorealist techniques to portray violent Algerian revolutionaries in a sympathetic light in the Battle of Algiers (1966).[117] Marco Bellocchio’s 2002 film Good Morning, Night,[118] which is based on the Red Brigade’s 1978 kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, departs from earlier depictions by challenging the national discourse of that event and those responsible for it. As Testa observes, the film juxtaposes “the inner workings of an incarcerated human being with those of the much younger one who supervises his imprisonment.”[119] Bellocchio’s approach of equating both sides of the struggle is comparable to the approaches of Enrique Urbizu in No Rest for the Wicked,[120] Spielberg in Munich,[121] and Neil Jordan in The Crying Game.[122]

French cinema has consistently provided a personal profile of the terrorist throughout its experiences with terrorism since the 1950s. Despite a rich history of terrorism to draw upon, however, the narratives of French films during the Cold War are entirely fictional and stylized. French New Wave films include Le combat dans l’île[123] (right-wing terrorist) and Jean Luc Godard’s films Masculin feminine[124] (would-be revolutionary), La chinoise[125] (Maoist student movement), and First Name: Carmen[126] (bank-robbing revolutionary).

In Le combat dans l’île, director Alain Cavalier was inspired by the right-wing extremists who attempted to assassinate President de Gaulle for his appeasement policy in Algeria (1960-1962), but there is no reference to any of those real events in the film.[127] Cavalier portrays the antagonist Clément (played by Jean-Louis Trintignant) as a violent madman. Driven by his irrational hatred toward French liberals, Clément alienates his family, his bride, and his best friend with whom he had made a blood pact when they were pre-teens. After he attempts to assassinate a Communist leader, Clément is double-crossed by the leader of his extremist group whom he then pursues to Argentina to exact murderous revenge. In the end, Clément dies in a gun battle with his best friend who is a staunch democrat and a pacifist. Through this narrative, Cavalier condemns the violence of terrorism, presents France’s public memory, and reveals very little about the sources and causes of right-wing terrorism.

Post-Cold War French films continue to personalize the terrorist, but begin to depict real-life events. In The
Assault,[128] French filmmaker Julien LeClercq faithfully re-creates the December 24, 1994 hijacking of Air France Flight 8969, giving a balanced, personalized portrayal of both the mujahedin of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and members of the French SWAT team (GIGN) that defeat them. LeClercq personalizes the hijackers, for example, by showing them as they individually dress and then huddle emotionally in group prayer during the morning of the attack.[129]

In Rebellion,[130] French filmmaker Mathieu Kassovitz recreates the bloody 1988 rescue, by a GIGN force, of hostages taken by Kanak separatists in the French protectorate of New Caledonia. Kassovitz presents the event as a politically-driven, unnecessary use of force in which two gendarmes and nineteen Kanaks died. Kassovitz portrays the Kanak leader as rational and intelligent, and the GIGN Captain Legorjus (played by Kassovitz) as “a man involved in a morally and politically complicated event that is ultimately beyond his control.”[131]

The French-German mini-series Carlos[132] is the story of real-life Venezuelan revolutionary Ilich Ramírez Sánchez who founded a worldwide terrorist organization and raided the 1975 OPEC meeting. Like Andreas Baader, he is portrayed in this film as a suave, hip, intelligent, good-looking, James Bond-like character.

Spanish filmmaker Jaime Rosales was criticized for failing to condemn home-grown ETA terrorism in the 2008 film Bullet in the Head[133] which is based on the real-life killing of two Spanish Guardia Civil by ETA gunmen in the French town of Capbreton on December 1, 2007. The film depicts two ETA members carrying out their normal daily lives over the four or five days leading up to their planned attack. As one film reviewer noted, “We see them chatting, working, even having sex. For about an hour and a quarter, they just look boringly, bafflingly normal… Look, says [filmmaker Rosales]: here the terrorist revolutionaries are; they look like you and me.”[134] In No Rest for the Wicked,[135] Spanish filmmaker Enrique Urbizu condemns the Islamic terrorists by equating them with the counterterrorist Santos Trinidad (played by José Coronado) who is a homicidal alcoholic.[136]

British filmmakers’ portrayal of the IRA has been surprisingly favorable since the early 1990s.[137] In The Crying Game,[138] an IRA member sympathizes with his captive; in In the Name of the Father,[139] an IRA member confesses to a crime to help free the wrongly accused; and in Some Mother’s Son,[140] IRA leader Bobby Sands is portrayed as a martyr and his mother as a hero. Hunger[141] is yet another sympathetic depiction of IRA prisoner Bobby Sands’ 1981 hunger strike. The Boxer[142] denounces IRA violence, but it presents a very personal story about a former IRA member and local IRA members.

European films about terrorism during the Cold War were inspired by real events and by a real Soviet threat, and though filmmakers used experimental techniques to achieve realism, the products were fictional abstractions, consistent with a collective abhorrence of the horrific brutality of World War II. Post–Cold War European cinematic depictions of terrorists and terrorist acts have challenged national discourses and public memories through realistic accounts of actual events and persons. As discussed above, European filmmakers have been collaborating with U.S. filmmakers to produce transnational films such as The Siege (U.S.-Germany), Fight Club (U.S.-Denmark), and Munich (U.S.-Canada-France). As discussed below, European filmmakers have also begun to collaborate with Middle Eastern filmmakers to make transnational films about Islamic extremism, something that U.S. filmmakers have not yet done.

Middle East

As Khatib notes, Arab films portray space more intimately. “[C]onflicts are more localized and closer to home.”[143] Egyptian, Algerian, and Palestinian film industries are robust, and their filmmakers have
produced several films that express their national discourses about Islamic fundamentalism, extremism, and terrorism. Egyptian and Algerian filmmakers express the national discourse that Islamic fundamentalism leads to extremism and is therefore a threat to national security. They also tend, however, to blame the West and globalization for the phenomenon of terrorism.[144] Palestinian filmmakers are focused on Israel, and they present the Palestinians as victims, the Israelis as aggressors and persecutors, and the West as either a supporter of Israel or ineffectual in negotiating a peace. U.S. and European filmmakers tend to sympathize with their viewpoint. When European and Middle Eastern filmmakers collaborate, the result is a strongly transnational film that challenges Western discourses about terrorism.

In 1994, Egyptian filmmaker Nader Galal made what is considered to be the first Egyptian film to denounce Islamic terrorism. In The Terrorist (Al-irhabi),[145] an Islamic terrorist converts to secularism and is murdered by his former comrades.[146] In his 1997 film Destiny (al-Massir),[147] Egyptian filmmaker Youssef Chahine depicts Islamic fundamentalists as “dark forces preying on the weak and using terror against every kind of enlightenment and pleasure.”[148] In the evolving era of transnational cinema, a few Eastern filmmakers, most notably Youssef Chahine and Atef Hetata, have collaborated with Western European filmmakers to produce narratives that express a distrust of Islamic fundamentalism, the West, and globalization.

In the French-Egyptian collaboration The Other,[149] Chahine depicts poor and middle-class Egyptians as victims of both globalization and Islamic terrorism through star-crossed lovers Adam and Hanane (played by Hanane Turk) who are modern-day Egyptian Romeo and Juliet. And in his contribution to the collaborative film September 11,[150] Chahine criticizes both Islamic fundamentalists and the United States. In his September 11 short film, he argues that the United States is responsible for 9/11 because it created the monster that attacked it. “Americans decide who the terrorist is,” says Chahine (played by Nour El-Sharif ) in his film.

In the French-Egyptian collaboration Closed Doors,[151] Egyptian filmmaker Atef Hetata depicts how a young, sexually repressed male, Mohammad, growing up in a poor section of Cairo is recruited to study at a local madrassa that espouses the creation of an Islamic nation. As Armbrust writes about the film's reception, Closed Doors is “oriented to audiences and contexts of production outside the Middle East” so it is eyed with “suspicion among Egyptian expatriate or diaspora audiences.”[152] In the French-Algerian collaboration Rachida,[153] a female schoolteacher in Algiers defies terrorists who attempt to murder her for refusing to plant a bomb at the school where she teaches.

In Bab El-Oued City,[154] which is a French-German-Swiss-Algerian collaboration, Algerian filmmaker Merzak Allouache follows the conflict between a young Algerian man and local Islamic fundamentalists, hinting that the fundamentalists are supported by corrupt government officials.[155] Before he is driven out, the local imam tells the fundamentalists, “Violence begets violence. Islam is a religion of tolerance, against violence.” At the same time that this film criticizes Islamic fundamentalism, it associates Western influences with downfall and decadence.

The transnational 1996 film Haifa[156] is a Dutch-German-Palestinian collaboration. Palestinian director Rashid Masharawi depicts the daily, personal lives of refugees who hold out naïve expectations that their lives will change after the 1993 Oslo peace accords. Lemon Tree[157] is a Dutch-French-Israeli production in which Israeli filmmaker Eran Riklis presents the story of an Israeli defense minister who, for security reasons, threatens to tear down the lemon grove of his Palestinian neighbor.

The Academy-Award-nominated Dutch-Palestinian-Israeli-German-French collaboration Paradise Now
is a strongly transnational film. Dutch-Palestinian director Hany Abu-Assad presents a balanced narrative about two Palestinian friends who are recruited to conduct a suicide bombing mission in Tel Aviv. The Arabic language film is shot on location in Nablus and Tel Aviv. After much soul-searching, one of the would-be suicide bombers, Said, sums up his reasons for carrying out the mission: “[The Israelis] have convinced themselves that they are the victims. How can the occupier be the victim? If they take on the role of oppressor and victim, then I have no other choice but to also be a victim and a murderer as well.” Like Munich, Paradise Now was criticized by both sides of the Palestinian-Israeli debate. Palestinians in the West Bank criticized the film for portraying the suicide bombers as “less than heroic and godless, hesitant in their missions.” At the same time, Israelis criticized the film because it would “encourage more terrorist attacks all over the world.”

By collaborating with filmmakers from Western Europe and Israel, Egyptian, Algerian and Palestinian filmmakers are reaching Western audiences. And because of the courage of Western European and Israeli filmmakers to experiment with such collaboration, Western audiences are seeing narratives that challenge their national discourses about terrorism, capitalism, and globalization.

**Conclusion**

A survey of films about terrorism since the 1970s reveals that, outside the United States, both national and transnational cinema condemn violence, but provide balanced, personalized portrayals of both terrorists and counterterrorists. Due to globalized market forces, there has been increased international cinematic exchange to produce transnational films, including transnational films about transnational terrorism. Through transnational filmmaking, audiences worldwide are learning more about the causes and sources of terrorism in general and about Islamic extremism and terrorism in particular.

Mazzarr’s counterterrorism recommendation is to invest in “cultural entrepreneurs,” including “local writers, artists, and other cultural figures trying to reassert a form of identity in the face of global homogenization, especially those who serve up strong critiques of U.S. culture and policies, so long as the proposed remedies are nonviolent.” Transnational filmmaking jibes with Mazzarr’s recommendation, presenting balanced portrayals of terrorists and counterterrorists in internationally collaborative films such as Paradise Now and Munich, diasporic narratives in films such as The War Within and My Name is Khan, and criticism of globalization and Westerners in films such as Fight Club, The Other, Bab El-Oued City, and Closed Doors.

It is arguable that transnational films about Islamic extremism help to disabuse the extremists of their misperceptions that Islam justifies the use of violence. But Hollywood has been reluctant to address religion and “the relationship between violence” and fundamentalist Islam. Perhaps if U.S. filmmakers, like European filmmakers, were to collaborate with Middle Eastern filmmakers, they could produce transnational films that persuasively depict, for example, America’s own religious heritage and its assimilation of Muslims. As Peter Peterson of the Council on Foreign Relations writes, “The credibility of an American message will be enhanced significantly when it does not appear unilateral.” A transnational film can be so internationally collaborative that its national origins are difficult to determine. Such a cross-cultural product may be an effective medium to convey messages to counter the propaganda of Islamic extremists. More studies and performance data and measures are needed, however, to determine whether and to what extent transnational films affect the perceptions and opinions of audiences.
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Notes


[7] For a definition of international terrorism, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (it includes activities that “occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries…”). See also Robert Oakley, International Terrorism, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 611 (1986).


[16] Jayne Mooney & Jock Young, Imagining Terrorism: Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Terrorism, Two Ways of Doing Evil, 32 SOC. JUST. 119 (2005); Khatib, supra note 13 at 5.

[17] Ibid.


[22] Hjort, supra note 9 at 26.


[24] Hjort, supra note 8 at 13; Natalia Durovicová, Vector, Flow, Zone: Towards a History of Cinematic Translatoio, in Durovicová & Newman, supra note 9 at 100 ("polyglot films . . . seem like the very allegory of transnationality").


[27] Dil Se (India Talkies et al. 1998) (in).


[32] Higbee & Lim, supra note 9 at 9 ("the movement of films and film-makers across national borders and the reception of films by local audiences outside of their indigenous sites of production").

[33] Id. at 11 (concerning diasporic films).

[34] Supra note 26.


[38] The Assault (Labyrinthe Films et al. 2010) (fr).


[40] See supra note 4.

[41] Laura E. Ruberto, Neorealism and Contemporary European Immigration, in ITALIAN NEOREALISM AND GLOBAL CINEMA, supra note 14 at 244-45; Mark Parker, The Battle of Algiers (La battaglia di Algeri), 60 FILM Q. 62 (Summer 2007) (“There are no overlong set speeches . . . and exposition and incident never seem at odds").

[42] Ruberto & Wilson, supra note 14 at 1.

[43] The Motorcycles Diaries (FilmFour et al. 2004) (gb, us, fr, ar, pe, cl, de).


[47] Eisele, supra note 45 at 69; Khatib, supra note 13 at 5 (noting that Egyptian Arabs are depicted as "ignorant, cowardly and barbaric" in the film The Mummy (1999)).


[56] See Oakley, supra note 7 at 611, 613.


[58] "IRA" refers to the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

[59] See also Che (Wild Bunch et al. 2008) (fr, es, us).

[60] See Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism 244 (2012).


[63] See Shaheen 2001, supra note 44 at 32 (Brad Pitt would not accept the role of the IRA member unless the screenplay was re-written to humanize his character); Richard Kay & Michael Harvey, Diana So Sorry for Harry's IRA Movie Trip, Daily Mail (London), June 24, 1997, at 5 (after viewing the film with her two sons, Princess Diana issued a public apology for having watched it).

[64] The Jackal (Universal Pictures et al. 1997) (us, de, fr, gb, jp)

[65] See supra note 61.

[66] Eisele, supra note 45 at 71.


[68] Supra note 31.

[69] True Lies (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1994) (us).


[72] The Siege (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation et al. 1998) (us).


[74] The Sum of All Fears (Paramount Pictures et al. 2002) (us, de, ca).


[78] See supra note 64.


[80] Quiney, supra note 6 at 328-29 (citing Per Petersen, 9/11 and the "Problem of Imagination": Fight Club and Glamorama as Terrorist Pretexts, 60 ORBIS LITTERARUM 133-44 (2005)).


[82] But see Team America: World Police (2004) in which the heroes save the world from an international terrorist plot led by North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il.


[84] See supra note 35 (segment “USA”).


[91] See supra note 36.

[92] See supra note 35 (segment “Egypt”).


[95] The film, which is based on George Jonas’ thriller novel Vengeance: The True Story of an Israeli Counter-Terrorist Team, forewarns the viewer that it is “inspired” by real events.


[98] See supra note 59. See also The Motorcycle Diaries, supra note 43, directed by Brazilian filmmaker Walter Salles.


[101] Charlie Wilson’s War (Universal Pictures et al. 2007) (us, de).

[102] See supra note 36.


[104] See supra note 35 (segment “India”).


[106] See Bettwy, supra note 39.


[108] *The Lost Honor of Katharina Blum* (Bioskop Film et al. 1975) (de).


[116] Ibid.


[119] Carlo Testa, Film, Literature, and Terrorism: Mapping Italy’s Political Landscape by Cinematic Means, 84 *Italica* 787 (2007).


[121] See supra note 20.


[127] Director’s narrative, DVD (2010).

[128] See supra note 38.


[133] See supra note 37.
[135] See supra note 120.
[137] Ezra and Rowden call it an “ambivalence” that is due to “general reluctance of Western elites to complicate the racial indexicality of the term ‘terrorist’ as a marker for the potential contagion of ‘Third World’ and implicitly religious alterity.” Ezra & Rowden, supra note 2 at 13.
[141] Hunger (Film4 et al. 2008) (gb, ie).
[143] Khatib, supra note 13 at 12.
[144] Id. at 184.
[148] Armbrust, supra note 146 at 92.
[150] See supra note 35 (segment “Egypt”).
[152] Armbrust, supra note 146 at 922.
[155] Khatib, supra note 13 at 184.
[166] See supra note 36.
[167] See supra note 79.
[168] See supra note 149.
[170] See supra note 151.
[172] Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez & Christopher Boucek, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists 191 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand 2010).
II. Policy Notes

NATO's Role in Counter-Terrorism

by Juliette Bird

Abstract

NATO's contribution to the global approach to Counter Terrorism was expressed publicly in the NATO Policy Guidelines on Counter Terrorism endorsed at the 2012 NATO summit. The evolution of NATO's approach is described and NATO's current contribution is detailed, including recent examples of activities that reflect progress against the Counter Terrorism Policy Guidelines. Looking ahead, beyond agreed roles for NATO, the Alliance's relevance to work against Foreign Terrorist Fighters and to Countering Violent Extremism is examined. Finally, new ways are suggested to assist the UN and use NATO's existing assets more flexibly in the field of Counter Terrorism. Adoption of these would, however, require a change in Allies' ambition for the use of NATO in Counter Terrorism and hence a change in mandate.

Keywords: NATO, Counterterrorism, United Nations.

Introduction

In today’s febrile climate where terrorism has become a topic of importance, not only for terrorism ‘experts’ but for the average citizens of many countries, there has been a huge amount of soul searching and summit summoning in search of an adequate response. Terrorism, in addition to being subject to what has been referred to as the ‘politics of labelling’[1], is not monolithic; it has no single trigger or context and its manifestations are many and varied. Thus, as the United Nations’ Global Counter Terrorism Strategy[2] recognises, there are roles for a broad spectrum of actors in taking action against it. The perpetrators of terrorism and those that support terrorism as a legitimate strategy are the base level actors who must be countered. The responsibility to monitor, engage, deter or punish such individuals—as nationals of particular countries and members of specific communities, lies predominantly with nations—whether these actions are taken through governmental bodies or civil society. The range of counter terrorism relevant roles is wide and was well described in the 2011 U.S. National Strategy for Counter Terrorism[3] which speaks of the need to harness ‘every tool’ of national power.[3] The idea is refined in the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy which counsels use of the military, of diplomacy, development, science and technology and people-to-people relationships within a long term perspective.[4] The military are an asset to be used within a coherent, comprehensive approach whilst remaining conscious that, as President Obama underlined in 2013, “force alone cannot make us safe.”[5] In addition to tasks within all national fields, the UN strategy also sets out tasks for organisations at the regional, multinational and international level and here, as a political/military actor, NATO has a part to play within the global approach.

NATO's Historic Involvement in Counter Terrorism Activities

There is little residual public awareness that NATO, a brand memorable for its three Musketeer-like approach of ‘all for one and one for all’, has invoked its Collective Defence response under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty only once, in 2001, as a reaction to the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks perpetrated against the United States. Allies clearly believed in this key instance that NATO could act usefully in the field of Counter Terrorism.
Prior to 2001 NATO had generally considered terrorism as an issue of marginal relevance to the Alliance. In 1991 the Strategic Concept[6]—the in-depth review that Allies take every 10 years or so of the current security picture and the intended Allied response—mentioned terrorism as a valid threat but effectively placed it at the bottom of NATO’s ‘things-to-do’ list.[7] By 1999, the time of the next review, terrorism had become a topic of generally higher profile, due to the activities of a variety of groups in Allied nations and beyond.[8] In the 1999 Strategic Concept[9] terrorism was placed at the top of the list of non-military threats of relevance to NATO[10] and the potential for terrorist use of non-conventional weapons was noted.[11] However, no move was made to put in place any guidance as to what NATO’s own role might be in the face of such a challenge and neither civilian nor military staffs were organised to focus on the topic.

Thus, when the twin towers fell and an attack directed from abroad was officially deemed to have taken place, fulfilling the conditions necessary for an invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty[12], NATO had no official doctrine or expertise to call on. Article 5 calls for Allies to take ‘action deemed necessary’ in response to an attack upon one of their number. This does not equate to military action unless specifically called for. In this case the United States required back filling of its air surveillance capability having deployed its own assets to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. NATO’s response was Operation Eagle Assist whereby AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System – i.e. surveillance planes) assets of other nations were made available to fill the more routine roles for the United States. In parallel, there was a need to ensure that terrorist groups did not obtain new and more lethal capabilities so Operation Active Endeavour, involving maritime patrols of the Mediterranean to prevent shipments of arms and non-conventional materials, was launched in 2002.[13]

The first NATO summit after the declaration of Article 5, held in Prague in 2002, officially put in place the Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism[14], a document somewhat hurriedly drawn up after September 11, 2001. In Prague and at the next summit (held in Istanbul) Allies also took measures in other areas where NATO could contribute to the CT effort; these included enhanced intelligence sharing and CBRN efforts, new outreach to partners to cooperate on terrorism, establishment of a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit and identification of a budget to promote capability building against asymmetric threats (the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work).[15] New initiatives in Civil Emergency Planning, crisis management and Special Forces followed.

If a search is conducted for references to ‘terrorism’ in NATO’s internal documents from 2001-2005, it is difficult to tell which parts of the NATO structure led on the issue; it was the hot topic and most sections/divisions wrote on it, confident they had something relevant to offer. Thus it was that many of NATO’s core activities were often labelled ‘CT’. NATO undoubtedly contributed useful activities to the international approach over a 10-year period but, when a review of NATO’s CT posture was called for in 2011[16], it was clear that coherent action was needed to determine where NATO could add value.

The Refocusing Process

By 2011 the terrorism context had changed significantly from that of 2001. Even before Usama bin Laden was removed from the scene on May 2, 2011, Al Qaida was already viewed as a greatly reduced opponent. The Al Qaida ideology was rightly recognised as an ongoing threat but its manifestations had reduced in scale, particularly in Allied nations, and were increasingly seen to be tied to local situations and perhaps of somewhat less international concern. There was a feeling that terrorism might have been contained sufficiently to be lived with[17]; in Iraq, Zarqawi was dead and full-blown war was over so, despite continued
violence from a variety of terrorist groups[18] many of whom took some inspiration from the AQ ideology, and there was a tendency to look with hope upon the evolving changes in the Middle East and North Africa.

Similarly on the international CT scene, whilst little progress had been made on a universal legal definition of terrorism, the UN had added to the range of individual instruments under the General Assembly and the Security Council addressing specific aspects of terrorism[19] an overarching approach to be implemented by all. In 2006 the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS) was agreed and set a framework for nations and organisations to work within. An April 2011 NATO Defense College paper usefully summarised NATO’s need to move forward in the field of CT and discussed some options available.[20]

Under the UNGCTS tasks are divided across four pillars. Two of these, ‘measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism’ and ‘measures to ensure respect for Human Rights for all and the Rule of Law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism’ have little to do with NATO’s mandate or ability but the other two, ‘measures to prevent and combat terrorism’ and ‘measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism’, require actions that speak directly to NATO’s strengths (such as aspects of CBRN response and protection, denial of safe havens, sharing of information and best practices and protection of vulnerable targets). Here NATO, with its unique combination of political and military strengths, can add significant value.

So it was within this context that in December 2011 Allies considered the first draft of a policy accompanied by a staff document providing a comparative analysis of how the European Union, Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe contributed to the UNGCTS and where NATO could add particular strengths and expertise. By early 2012 agreement had been reached on NATO’s CT Policy Guidelines and these were endorsed by Heads of State and Government at the Chicago Summit in May 2012.[21] Extensive comment on the Guidelines was published later in the year by the U.S. National Defence University.[22]

Allies first put in place three principles for NATO action in the field of CT: whatever it does must be legal and within the UN framework; NATO should support Allies rather than lead CT efforts; and, particularly given the economic climate, NATO should seek to avoid duplication and promote complementarity with nations and with other international organisations. It is perhaps worth setting out the first two principles verbatim:

**Compliance with international law** – NATO continues to act in accordance with international law, the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN Global CT Strategy, international conventions and protocols against terrorism and relevant UN Resolutions provide the framework for all national and multilateral efforts to combat terrorism, including those conducted by the Alliance.

**NATO’s support to Allies** – Individual NATO members have primary responsibility for the protection of their populations and territories against terrorism. Cooperation through NATO can enhance Allies’ efforts to prevent, mitigate, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism. NATO, upon request may support these efforts.

The policy focuses Alliance efforts in three main areas:

**Awareness**: ensuring shared awareness of the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities (achieved through consultations (at NATO but also through outreach to experts), enhanced intelligence and information sharing, analysis and assessment).

**Capabilities**: striving for adequate Alliance capabilities to prevent, protect against and respond to
terrorist threats (in accordance with NATO’s level of ambition as defined in Political Guidance).

**Engagement:** continuing to engage with partner countries and other international actors to promote common understanding of the terrorist threat through enhanced consultations and practical cooperation through existing mechanisms. Emphasis is placed on raising awareness, capacity building, civil emergency planning and crisis management.

These pillars could be summarised as: ensuring that Allies (and where possible partners too) share a common view of the threat of terrorism and agree on how to address it – 69 nations (i.e. the 28 NATO Allies and their partners) constitute roughly one third of the world so a common approach can be immensely powerful; ensuring that NATO can continue to conduct its business despite the threat of terrorism (much work has been done in response to requirements derived from operations in theatre, particularly in Afghanistan where terrorist actions against ISAF forces were commonplace); and engaging with partners to push back the geographic boundary of the terrorist threat, beyond the Alliance territory of Europe and North America, by ensuring a common approach and, where possible, sharing NATO’s strengths to build the capacity of others.

Allies concluded the Guidelines with a paragraph on implications for potential future operations:

*NATO will maintain flexibility as to how to counter terrorism, playing a leading or supporting role as required. Allies’ capabilities represent an essential component of a potential response to terrorism. Collective defence remains subject to decision by the North Atlantic Council.*

**The Outcome: NATO’s CT Contribution Today**

Since May 2014, NATO has an agreed Action Plan that lists and assigns the tasks flowing from the policy guidance.[23] Examples of actions undertaken regarding each of the pillars over the past two years include:

**Awareness**

Intelligence reporting based on contributions from Allies’ internal, external and military services; sharing of experiences and views with political and intelligence experts from partner countries affected by terrorism: discussions with EU, OSCE and UN CT experts and also with the Global CT Forum whose work in the field of Foreign Terrorist Fighters for the Iraq/Syria theatre is at the cutting edge of international cooperation.

**Capabilities**

Projects supported by the Defence Against Terrorism programme of work respond to requirements identified in theatre against asymmetric threats, e.g. hardening of aircraft against MANPADs,[24], biometric identification systems, detection and destruction of Improvised Explosive Devices and associated route clearance procedures. Relevant work has also been done on better preparing military forces for new operational environments – one important aspect of CT for the military is to avoid, inadvertently, creating the next generation of terrorists by insensitive or culturally unaware behaviour. NATO’s Centres of Excellence have been important contributors to many projects, bringing their expertise to bear in areas as diverse as military engineering for route clearance, explosives disposal, cultural familiarisation, network analysis and education on terrorism and how to counter it. A new Centre dedicated to strategic communication should be able to contribute to future communication approaches during operations – this too can be an important aspect of CT for the military.[25]
**Engagement**

NATO's links to its partners have grown stronger and more mature since the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism was put in place in 2002 to promote an exchange on terrorism between NATO and its partners. It should be recalled that cooperation with partners is upon request only, it is not a unilateral outreach from NATO and most certainly is not imposed. With the advent of Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes that list areas of mutual interest for NATO and each partner, the adoption of the CT Policy Guidelines that identify NATO's areas of added value in CT and the transformation of partner cooperation mechanisms by the adoption of the Berlin partnership package in April 2011[26], counter-terrorism has been mainstreamed into relations with partners. Evidence of this can be seen in the cooperation projects underway or recently completed under both the Science for Peace and Security Programme (SPS) and the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). With Egypt, Phase I of a land mine clearance project has recently been completed. This involved a technical review of available solutions, equipment trials, training of personnel and assisted procurement. Phase II, which will enable Egypt to locate deeper mines, is now underway. Iraq has been provided with training on IEDs and explosive disposal and a larger scale approach is currently under consideration. With Mauritania, NATO has a multi-year SPS project to set up a civilian Crisis Management Centre (with associated equipment, communications and training) which will enable effective handling of both natural and man-made disasters anywhere in the country.

On a slightly more academic basis, SPS is supporting a project to review transitions from military operations to civilian-run CT strategies and to draw from these suggestions for the future. Other projects look at radicalisation in the context of military operations (particularly those involving Special Forces’ activity), review developments in CT strategies across North Africa in the wake of transitions from dictatorships, research detection systems for explosives and chemical/biological agents and work with experts on resilience and crowd behaviour to improve crisis response.

Education, training and exercises – as an aspect of standardisation and improved interoperability – are fundamental activities for NATO and are relevant to both Allies and partners. Building partner capacity in defence education is a relatively new approach for NATO but, in addition to the courses provided at NATO School Oberammergau and elsewhere, the DEEP now works to improve teaching skills and curricula. This can include efforts in the field of CT and COIN if and when this is requested by partners. Uzbekistan and Mauritania have both shown interest in being able to educate their personnel in these topics. The first 3-year arrangement with Mauritania has just been completed and was commended both by the defence college (Ecole Nationale de l’Etat Major) and the Office of the Mauritanian Chief of Defence Staff.

NATO’s relationship with the United Nations on CT has become much closer over recent years; CT is now an element of the annual staff talks and the UN is kept abreast of developments in NATO's Centres of Excellence and of courses available through NATO's education and training facilities. Working with Allies and partners it is now possible to establish targeted cooperation activities contributing directly to evolving UN requirements. NATO's expertise in explosive management, Civil Emergency planning, Small Arms and Light Weapons sequestration and destruction, etc., make relevant contributions to UN lines of effort. There is scope for more to be done with both the OSCE and the EU, particularly where NATO's strengths are complementary. North Africa, the Sahel and Central Asia seem prime opportunities for NATO to offer its expertise, to be delivered through or with existing assets such as the OSCE Border College in Dushanbe or EU projects in the Sahel.[27]
Looking Ahead

The terrorism environment is far from static and major developments over the past two years have had an impact on the Alliance, even though NATO has no new mandate for action in theatres where terrorism is rife. At the Wales Summit in 2014, awareness of the threat from terrorism (given the situation in Syria, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere) pervaded most meetings, although no one session was exclusively focused on the issue. This was reflected in the Summit Declaration[28] which, in addition to condemning the situation in Iraq/Syria and calling for a coordinated international approach, recognised terrorist acts and trafficking across the Sahel-Sahara region as a threat to wider security interests and underlined NATO's role in fighting terrorism including through military cooperation with partners to build their capacity to face terrorist threats. It noted that partners already work with NATO in combating terrorism and pointed to the inclusion of 'response to terrorism' in the Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme with Iraq. Counter terrorism related work (particularly information sharing, education and training, capacity building for crisis management and CBRN preparedness) is relevant to both the Defence Capability Building Initiative and the Readiness Action Plan which were elaborated at the summit.

One additional and important area reflected in the Wales Declaration was the Allies’ commitment to enhance their cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign fighters. This is a difficult area for the Alliance as most of both the threat and the workload related to returning foreign terrorist fighters is faced by nations themselves. Not only is it predominantly a national role, but it involves the activities of domestic intelligence and law enforcement agencies and civil society mechanisms, none of which are within NATO's purview. Thus, while nations remain extremely concerned about this terrorist phenomenon, NATO’s role at present falls firmly under the Awareness pillar of the NATO CT Policy Guidelines. Within the Alliance Turkey briefs often on the numbers of Allied (and other) nationals stopped and sent back from the Turkish border, many in response to bilateral intelligence inputs. However, subsequent action against those detained takes place on a national basis. Were NATO forces at any time to be mandated to act in Iraq, Syria or perhaps Libya they would be likely to find themselves facing fellow Alliance nationals who have joined the ranks of the jihadist groups. It seems reasonable to suppose that at that juncture NATO would take on a more precise and active role in the global effort against foreign terrorist fighters who would then be designated as enemy combatants. But this is not currently on NATO's agenda.

At present the cutting edge work undertaken by the United Nations (UNSCR 2170(2014), 2178(2014) and 2199(2015)) and the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (through the Hague-Marrakech Memorandum and the work of the Foreign Fighters working group) is of intense interest at NATO and consideration is continuously given to potential future roles for NATO. Matters are complicated by NATO's need to decide by consensus. Differing national positions and levels of involvement in the current threat picture mean that discussion of terrorism does not take place from a common baseline. For example, the Baltic states focus naturally on the neigbouring Ukraine/Russia situation, whereas Turkey, as a major transit country for those fighting in Iraq and Syria, has its attention firmly fixed on the need for a comprehensive solution to the threats from the South. Each Ally has its own optic, be it humanitarian issues, Libyan arms, the dynamics of the Sunni/Shia/Kurd relationship, developments in Sub-Saharan Africa or the need to remove Bashar al Assad. Without a unifying driver such as a UN mandate or a direct threat to the Alliance (rather than to individual members) and clear added-value for NATO involvement, overcoming such differing approaches to take large scale action at the Alliance level will remain difficult.

Although a recent paper from the NATO Defense College[29] spoke of a tentative role for NATO as a discussion forum for issues relating to the countering of violent extremism, Allies themselves have been reluctant to touch on this issue within the NATO context unless a substantive military relevance can be
demonstrated.[30] To date the countering violent extremism and Foreign Fighter issues appear better suited to action within the European Union, where Ministers of Interior and Justice, Social Welfare and Education can meet (only Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs meet within the NATO framework) and tools such as Europol, Eurojust and the Commission's Radicalisation Awareness Network are available. Much hope has been pinned on the sharing of lead information on suspected Foreign Fighters via Interpol whose computer system links all UN members' law enforcement structures. Here too, NATO is poorly positioned as such data is predominantly national and NATO's own data exchange with Interpol is, as yet, in its infancy within the context of Operation Ocean Shield and the potential transfer of biometric data.

NATO CT into the Future

Despite the high profile of terrorism at present and the commission of recent terrorist acts on the territory of NATO Allies (e.g., France, Denmark) with plots foiled in many others (e.g., Italy, UK, Spain) it is, to date, only Turkey that has turned to NATO for terrorism-related assistance. NATO has provided protection against missiles at the Turkish-Syrian border[31] given the threat from ISIL and other groups as well as the capabilities of the Assad regime. NATO's crisis response clearinghouse (the Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre) is available to Allies and partners should a major attack occur and Articles 4 (Consultation) and 5 (Collective Defence) remain options for the Allies.

Cooperative projects to improve partner capacity are clearly the way forward from the Wales summit. These include more work with Iraq; joint efforts with Jordan and through other 'Enhanced Operational Partnerships'; CT relevant support to Afghanistan under NATO's Enduring Partnership; and progress in UN-agreed projects in Libya when conditions permit. But what else might NATO consider should Allies seek to raise their level of ambition for the Alliance in the field of CT?

Could NATO offer more to the Global Effort on CT?

The UN could use NATO more effectively if the Alliance's cooperation activities were less geographically limited. The UN's efforts on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), and explosive remnants of war and mine clearance, are worldwide; their drive to counter the Boko Haram message in Africa requires international support; and their work with the African Union to implement good CT legislation and appropriate security structures is slow and difficult. Can NATO's resources be brought to bear on any of these issues in support of the UN? Or must the provision of such help remain a bilateral issue for Allies? Is there any appetite to use NATO as the vehicle to feed national assistance into the UN CT effort? Would any more resources be made available if so?

Could NATO use its existing assets better?

Is there any more flexibility (or capacity) to be found in NATO's Centres of Excellence, NATO School or Partnership Training and Education Centres (PTECs) all of which can wear both national and NATO colours? Likewise NATO's Special Forces Headquarters (another Memorandum of Understanding body rather than a part of NATO's core structure) can field CT trainers and advisors but are they as yet being used to maximum effect in cooperative security with partners?
…or should NATO remain content with its role as an information sharing platform?

In contrast to the EU, intelligence services can meet within the NATO framework (Article 4 of the Lisbon Treaty puts the intelligence agencies, together with National Security, beyond the mandate of the EU). Bringing together the North American and EU military and civilian intelligence picture on terrorism (and observations on the effect of recent CT measures) is a powerful asset but, in this particular field, perhaps serves more to inform Allies than to prepare the Alliance as a whole for action. Nevertheless, such a wide and strategic overview can offer some value in addition to the much more in-depth and focussed one-to-one intelligence exchanges that exist between Allies and between Allies and partners. Input from partners, especially from those nations where some Allies may not have an extensive diplomatic or intelligence presence, can add usefully to the general strategic picture as well as increasing the size of the community which views the threat through the same lens.

**Conclusions**

As an Alliance, NATO necessarily exists for the benefit of its members. However engagement with partners, both individual nations and international organisations, has become more important over time and is a key way to ensure mutual benefit. NATO’s 2012 CT Policy Guidelines focus on a shared threat awareness and possession of relevant capabilities for Allies, but also focuses equally on engagement with partners to push back the threat boundary and enlarge the like-minded community facing it jointly. Progress over the past two years on the tasks cascading from the Policy Guidelines has been satisfactory but more remains to be done in adjusting policy (crucially the Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism) so that the NATO CT approach is coherent. It is also important to work on improving CT education and training in line with the new Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation overarching policy.[32] Beyond this the focus should be on ever-improving cooperation projects and defence capacity-building with partners.

But the situation has evolved since NATO put its CT Policy Guidelines in place. Allies have yet to express any increased ambition for NATO in the CT field, but there are areas where NATO might be able to add to the global CT approach, particularly in support of the UN. The current hot topic in CT is Foreign Terrorist Fighters who are leaving many nations to fight (or to offer themselves as wives) in Iraq and Syria, predominantly in the service of ISIL/Daesh. Groups pledging support to ISIL/Daesh (e.g., in Sinai, Libya, Nigeria and Afghanistan) are also of concern but to date NATO has no formal role, military or otherwise, in countering ISIL/Daesh or any of its offshoots. NATO continues to reflect on how best to contribute to the evolving global CT effort in the absence of an official mandate. This Policy Note points to the seemingly unique strategic information-sharing role of NATO at 28 and wonders whether existing assets such as multinational Special Forces and Centres of Excellence might be able to contribute more. Answers to the questions must await Allied discussion but at present indications of willingness to go beyond the current mandate and level of ambition are slight. NATO has untapped potential which, given the scope of the terrorist threat, it would be wise of Allies to use better, and more often.

**About the Author:** Dr Juliette Bird has, for the past four years, held the post of head of NATO HQ’s Counter Terrorism section within the International Staff. This Policy Note reflects the author’s own views and opinions which do not necessarily correspond to the official position of NATO on the topic.

**Notes**


[5] Remarks by the President at the National Defence University (accessed 12 April 2015) [link]


[7] ‘Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage’

[8] The 1990s saw terrorist attacks by the LTTE, Irish Republican Army, Red Army Fraction, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Sikh Babbar Khalsa group and Chechens as well as in Algeria, Colombia, Serbia and Jammu/Kashmir etc.

[9] 1999 Strategic Concept [link]

[10] ‘Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems …’

[11] ‘The proliferation of NBC (nuclear, chemical and biological) weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. … Non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons.’


[13] Operation Active Endeavour [link]


[15] Prague declaration: [link] and Istanbul declaration: [link]


[19] Instruments relating to aircraft, hostages, nuclear material, explosives etc see [link] and specifically for General Assembly instruments: [link] and Security Council [link]

[20] NDC Research paper No 66 April 2011: ‘NATO’s Fight Against Terrorism. Where do we stand?’ Claudia Bernasconi. ISSN 2076-0957 Available for download from [link]

[21] NATO CT Policy Guidelines: [link]


[23] This document is classified and hence not available for public consultation

[24] Man portable air defence system

[25] Jihad Trending: a comprehensive analysis of online extremism and how to counter it. Ghaffar Hussain and Dr Erin Marie Saltman 13 May 2014, [link]

[26] Partnerships: a cooperative approach to security, item on Berlin partnership package 'towards a more efficient and flexible partnership' [link]

[27] Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (long and short term components) [link] including the College Sahelien de Sécurité [link]


[30] As in the SPS projects cited in paras 18 and 19


[32] MC 0458/3 whilst unclassified is not a public document
III. Research Notes

Islamic State and al-Qaeda Competing for Hearts & Minds

by Ely Karmon

Abstract

The Islamic State under the leadership of Abu Bakr al–Baghdadi and al-Qaeda under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri are competing for the hearts and minds of jihadists worldwide but also for territorial control in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia. Three examples, referring to France, Yemen and Nigeria respectively, illustrate this struggle among the main jihadist entities.

Keywords: Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, Yemen, AQAP, Boko Haram, Foreign Fighters

Introduction

In his attempt to successfully compete with the Islamic State (IS) under the leadership of Abu Bakr al–Baghdadi—who has claimed the title of Caliph Ibrahim—al-Qaeda (AQ) leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced, on September 4, 2014, the establishment of the new affiliate group “Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent” (AQIS). He also challenged the legitimacy of al-Baghdadi’s claim to the title of caliph by clarifying that the new jihadi organization will work under the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, whose Emir is the “commander of the faithful” Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Taliban leader.

AQIS has the same objectives as those articulated by Osama bin Laden and the other founders of al-Qaeda: prepare Muslims for jihad against their enemies; liberate Muslim lands now ruled by non-Muslims; and revive the Islamic caliphate. Al-Zawahiri mentioned Burma (Myanmar), Bangladesh, and India’s regions of Assam, Gujarat and Kashmir as battlegrounds for jihad by the new organization. This episode illustrates the evolving struggle of the two jihadist leaders, al-Zawahiri and al–Baghdadi, for the allegiance (bay’ah) of AQ and other jihadist and salafist franchises in the Middle East and beyond. This research noted provides an analysis of three recent examples of this competition for hearts, minds, territory and influence.

The January 2015 Attacks in France

One week after the January 7, 2015, terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo’s offices in Paris, the senior leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Nasser bin Ali al Ansi, claimed responsibility for the massacre on behalf of his organization. Newly released documents recovered in Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan in May 2011 reveal that al Ansi was previously appointed to the role of deputy general manager within al-Qaeda’s global hierarchy.[1]

According to U.S. officials, Said and Cherif Kouachi, the two brothers who carried out the massacre at the offices of the French satirical magazine, received training in Yemen in 2009 and 2011. Chérif Kouachi told a French TV station that he had been funded by a network loyal to Anwar al-Awlaki, a senior leader of AQAP involved in recruiting and training camps who was killed by a drone strike in 2011 in Yemen.[2]

Amedy Coulibaly, who between 7 and 9 January 2015 killed a policewoman and four people in a Parisian Jewish kosher grocery store, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in a video published online two days after his death. In the video, Coulibaly said he had coordinated his attacks with the Kouachi brothers and claimed
they “did some things together, some things separate” and arranged “to synchronize [their movements].” [3]

As Coulibaly’s video was filmed in his apartment between the shooting of the policewoman and the attack on the grocery story and was edited and posted by someone outside, it is not clear whether his allegiance pledge represents any previous link with IS or whether it was his ad-hoc decision, perhaps meant to attract more attention to his terrorist attacks and his personal role in the Charlie Hebdo event.

In the interview given by Coulibaly’s common law wife Hayat Boumeddiene to Dar al Islam, a French ISIS magazine, after she had fled France and reached ISIS-controlled Syria, her partner is described as “burning to join his brothers and fight with them against the enemies of Islam in the Caliphate.” However, he does not appear to have been a member of an ISIS cell.[4] In a way, Coulibaly’s behavior seems to epitomize the competition between the two groups, possibly reflecting the desire of a humble sympathizer to claim affiliation with the more famous entity.

While AQAP quickly took credit for the Charlie Hebdo attack, IS referred to Coulibaly’s terrorist operation only a month later, in its English magazine Dabiq, issue #7. Under the title “The good example of Abu Basir al-Ifriqi”, Amedy Coulibaly is presented as a “brave mujāhid” who had given his bay’ah to the Khilāfah [Caliphate] “beforehand – immediately upon its announcement – and sat in waiting for instructions from its leadership, while never traveling to Iraq nor Shām.” He met with Muslims in France, calling them to give bay’ah and defend the Khilāfah, while refuting the doubts spread against it. He provided “the two mujāhid” Kouachi brothers with money and weapons “so as to call to jihād under the banner of the Khilāfah.” The Dabiq article includes a long list of his good deeds in prison, his prayers, and the “order” to his wife to wear the hijāb.[5]

The same Dabiq edition also features an interview with Coulibaly’s wife, another “good example” for the wives of mujahids, happy to live “in a land where the law of Allah is implemented.” Hayat notes that prior to his death, Coulibaly asked her not to show him Islamic State videos because “it would make him want to perform hijrah [migration] immediately and that would have conflicted with his intent to carry out the operations in France.” [6]

Coulibaly, and his wife, are thus seen as self-radicalized Muslims influenced by IS deeds and propaganda. That is exactly what IS attempts to achieve through its sophisticated media campaign; to propagate the success of lone-wolf and homegrown terrorism narratives without investing much resources or effort. In this it imitates and in some measure improves the AQAP propaganda strategy, which was hitherto most prominently represented by AQAP’s older Inspire magazine. The ongoing investigation of the attacks and the arrest of some people considered to have supported the attacks should clarify the connections of AQAP, IS and other factions with these events, and hopefully explain the apparent cooperation between two rival organizations or their militants on the ground.

Yemen

In November 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced “the expansion of the Islamic State to new lands,” including Yemen. Announcements of allegiance to al-Baghdadi came from a prominent cleric named Mamoun bin Abd al-Hamid Hatem and other unidentified Yemeni jihadists who do not represent any well-known jihadist groups.[7] According to a Yemeni official, in January 2015 ISIS had a presence in at least three provinces in southern and central Yemen, and there is a “real competition” between ISIS and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), although AQAP remains the dominant force.[8]
The Islamic State’s “Sana’a Province” in Yemen claimed credit for its first major operation on March 20, 2015, following four suicide attacks at two Houthi mosques in the capital in which at least 142 people were killed and more than 351 were wounded—the deadliest terrorist attack in Yemen's history. This attack was not only a serious blow to IS's avowed Shia enemies in Yemen but also an attempt to compete on the ground with AQAP, al-Qaeda’s most important and successful faction, characterized by Washington as “the region's deadliest al-Qaeda franchise.”[9] The predominance of AQAP in al-Qaeda’s global network is attested by the appointment by Ayman al Zawahiri of Nasir al Wuhayshi as al-Qaeda’s “global general manager” in 2013, besides his position as AQAP’s emir.

AQAP distanced itself from the attack, asserting that it does not attack mosques. The very day of the suicide attacks at the Houthi mosques, AQAP seized control of the city of al-Houta. Al-Qaeda-linked Ansar al-Sharia militants took part in the fighting alongside other armed elements.[10] In 2012 AQAP briefly seized power in the city of Radaa but local tribesmen and government troops expelled them. Now that the Houthis are controlling Sanaa, however, the tribes in Radaa are siding with AQAP again.[11]

AQAP has been active in southern Yemen for a long time and after the eruption of the uprising against the former president Abdallah Saleh in 2011 it took control of most of the Abyan Governorate (which borders the Aden Governorate) and declared it an Islamic Caliphate in May 2011. The Yemeni military largely drove out AQAP elements and its allied faction Ansar al-Shari'a from much of Abyan in 2012. Despite the military campaign staged earlier that year, AQAP remained determined to establish an Islamic state in southern Yemen and showed few signs of weakness.[12]

IS is possibly trying to implant itself in Yemen on the background of the growing Sunni-Shia divide, sensing perhaps that it is losing ground in Iraq and Syria, after the defeat in Kobane and the loss of its Tikrit stronghold.

The Sunni tribes who provide the bulk of the fighters against the Houthis could turn now towards IS for help in their fight for the control of Yemen. Interestingly IS is still silent on the Saudi coalition air strikes in Yemen.

AQAP for its part is actively engaged in the fight against the Houthis and Saleh's troops. It captured, on April 2, 2015, the eastern port of Mukalla, Yemen's fourth biggest city, and freed 300 prisoners from its central prison.

U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter recently stated that the fall of the Yemeni government at the beginning of the year hurt joint counterterrorism operations there and that “AQAP has seized the opportunity of the disorder there and the collapse of the central government”, making gains on the ground. [13] The Houthis seized a Yemeni airbase that had been used by U.S. forces for counterterrorism operations as its remaining military personnel had withdrawn from the base. AQAP meanwhile boasted it would pay a bounty of 20 kilograms of gold for the killing or capture of the Houthi leader, Abdel-Malik Al-Houthi, or of Mr. Saleh, the former president.[14]

Bruce Riedel, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, holds that U.S. and its regional allies’ counter-terrorism efforts have been dealt a very significant setback as there is no American embassy or boots on the ground and, more importantly, the U.S can no longer count on crucial intelligence. He evaluates that “AQAP will be in a stronger position—at least in Sunni regions to the south and east—as it will no longer face constant pressure from the United States and the Yemeni government.” [15]
Nigeria’s Boko Haram pays Allegiance to al-Baghdadi

On March 7, 2015 Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram (BH), pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the emir of the Islamic State. In an audio message in Arabic released on Twitter he said: “[W]e announce our allegiance to the Caliph of the Muslims…and will hear and obey in times of difficulty and prosperity, in hardship and ease, and to endure being discriminated against, and not to dispute about rule with those in power.” Thomas Joscelyn claims that U.S. officials told The Long War Journal in February 2015 that the Islamic State had dispatched a team to Nigeria to negotiate a more formal alliance, and that BH’s propaganda has been promoted by Islamic State media operatives in recent months.[16]

On March 12, 2015, the Islamic State accepted the pledge of allegiance of BH, according to an audiotape from its spokesman Mohammed al-Adnani: “We give you glad tidings today about the expansion of the Caliphate to West Africa, for the Caliph, may Allah preserve him, accepted the pledge of allegiance of our brothers in Jama’a Ahl al-Sunnah Lil Dawa Wal Jihad [Boko Haram]. Adnani even said that Muslims who are “unable to immigrate to Iraq, Sham, Yemen, the Peninsula, and Khorasan,” may not be “unable [to immigrate to] Africa” and must support Boko Haram.[17]

In its propaganda, IS portrayed BH’s decision as a major boost for the group. Before Adnani’s speech was made public, IS had released several videos from followers and members praising Shekau’s announcement.[18]

Meanwhile, since late July 2014—almost parallel to the ISIS occupation of Mosul in Iraq and its thrust into Sunni territory—BH has captured large swaths of land in the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa across northeastern Nigeria and towns along the Cameroon border, such as Gamboru-Ngala and Banki. It has become a more conventional force with territorial expansion as its core objective, and a military strategy to go with it. According to some estimates, as of late September 2014, approximately 3 million people in northeastern Nigeria and in the border regions of Cameroon were under Boko Haram’s rule. Moreover, BH has also declared an “Islamic Caliphate” across the land under its control with the city of Gwoza designated as its headquarters.[19]

The formal proclamation of the establishment of the caliphate was made in a video released shortly after the seizure of Gwoza in which Shekau declared: “We are grateful to Allah for the big victory he granted our members in Gwoza and made the town part of our Islamic caliphate,” and he also categorically rejected the Nigerian state in his statement.

Jacob Zenn noted in December 2014 that “[d]espite its previous position as part of al-Qaeda’s global movement, Boko Haram appears to have shifted almost completely into the Islamic State’s orbit” since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the creation of a caliphate in July 2014. Analyzing two BH videos of November 1 and 10, Zenn concluded that they showed an ideological shift to IS. In the 10 November 2014 video, Shekau conveys greetings to “brethren” in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Shishan (Chechnya), Yemen, Somalia and “the caliphate in Iraq and Syria” but does not mention AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri or other al-Qaeda affiliates, as he did in prior videos and statements. No evidence exists, however, according to this analysis, that Shekau is trying to rival al-Baghdadi’s caliphate.[20]

In a recent article, Zenn argues that “the key factor that set the stage for the Boko Haram-Islamic State merger was the reintegration of Ansaru’s “GSPC network” and “AQIM network” into BH, as members of these two networks maintained contacts with former al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militants, who abandoned AQIM in favor of ISIS in Syria and Libya and may have mediated between BH and ISIS. Possibly the “AQIM faction” collaborated with IS on video production used to create a mass social media
platform in preparation for Shekau’s bay’ā to al-Baghdadi.[21]

According to Zenn, IS’s desire to expand into Africa and promote a new “wilaya West Africa” enabled BH to achieve the creation of an Islamic state legitimated by other “pure salafists.” IS could provide for BH what AQ could not, as Osama bin Laden rejected the idea of state formation in the near-term. Moreover, the Islamic State has elevated Shekau’s stature and legitimacy in the international jihadist arena as Boko Haram’s sole leader with respect to other factions in Nigeria and West Africa, something which Ayman al-Zawahiri never did.[22]

Zenn argues that BH’s “merger” with the Islamic State and Shekau’s pledge to al-Baghdadi is not a sudden tactical opportunistic decision but, based on the organization’s history and evolution, rather “a strategic, calculated, and long-term decision coming from the top of the Boko Haram leadership and communications structure.” [23]

However, Zenn notes that the announcement came at a time when Boko Haram was facing a large-scale military offensive by Nigeria’s army and the armed forces of neighboring countries launched in February 2015, which forced the organization to abandon territories it had controlled in northeastern Nigeria since mid-2014.[24] The Chadian army has made a particularly large contribution to the campaign, expelling BH fighters from several parts of Borno state in Nigeria and seized control of the town of Dikwa, about 50km southwest of the Nigerian border.[25]

Despite BH’s pledge of allegiance, it is clear that there was no merger between Boko Haram and the Islamic State. Assaf Moghadam, who recently proposed a typology of terrorist inter-group cooperation, defines mergers as “the most complete type of cooperation because they entail the unification of the collaborating groups’ command and control structure, the integration of their fighting forces, and the pooling of their resources.”[26] The BH-IS relationship does not enter in this category, at least for now.

It is not even a real strategic alliance, which would entail extensive share of know-how and resources and possibly exchange of fighters, while retaining “ownership of respective assets as well as distinct command and control over their organizations.” It is even doubtful that the BH-IS partnership involves “a high degree of ideological overlap and a general agreement on strategic issues.” It resembles more to a tactical alliance “based on shared interests” or a temporary “marriage of convenience” which is not sure to endure.[27]

No doubt Shekau’s alignment with al-Baghdadi is the most important move in the competition between AQ and IS since Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (ABM) has sworn allegiance to the Islamic State in November 2014 and rebranded itself Wilayat (province) Sinai. Shekau is the first well-known jihadist leader to openly join al-Baghdadi, and the alliance with Boko Haram is boosting IS’s global profile.

It should be noted, however, that “the alliance” between BH and IS comes on the background of the success of regional players like Chad and Niger to defeat Boko Haram forces on their turf and several setbacks of the Islamic State in Syria (Kobani) and in Iraq (Tikrit) and its attempts to return as a major military actor in western Syria and near the capital Damascus.

The reasons for Shekau’s volte face in favor of his allegiance to IS are not clear. His strong, boastful, fearless personality, his pretension to be a learned theologian, his decision to declare the establishment of a Caliphate across the land under BH control almost at the same time as the IS Caliphate, are a stark contrast to his decision to take the bay’ah to al-Baghdadi. It is of note that in the Dabiq #8, where the BH pledge of allegiance is presented in the chapter “The Bay’ah from West Africa,” Shaykh Abū Bakr Shekau is mentioned only once, his photo is not too flattering and his name is not mentioned on it, contrary to many other less important
persons posted in Dabiq.[28]

On the strategic military level, BH needs more the cooperation with AQIM, still loyal to AQ and al-Zawahiri, active on the Libyan, Algerian and Tunisian territory (much closer to Nigeria) and controlling part of the huge weapons arsenal the BH would need to defend its territory from the attacks by the regional coalition.

It could be that Shekau emulates Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who in 2004 obtained bin Laden’s nomination as emir of AQ in Iraq but immediately proclaimed himself as emir of al-Sham (Levant), responsible for the jihadi forces in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine and acting practically independently of AQ’s leadership until his death in 2006.

Shekau now needs the international jihadi legitimacy offered by IS, and perhaps also some financing, but it remains to be seen how long he will resist the temptation to be regarded as the real caliph of West Africa, or if he will be able to resist the military onslaught by regional forces and the new Nigerian government.

On February 9 2015, a video attributed to Ansaru was posted on YouTube. The video criticizes Boko Haram because it “launches physical and bomb attacks at Muslims and public places such as mosques, markets, and motor parks . . . contrary to the teachings of Islam.” Ansaru has long been critical of Shekau and his fighters but recently its verbal attacks on Boko Haram have become more frequent while the group is attempting to portray itself as the true defender of local Muslims, just as al-Qaeda groups have elsewhere around the globe. [29] This means AQ still has some foothold, even minimal, in northern Nigeria and neighboring French-speaking states.

**Conclusion**

It was al-Zawahiri who predicted in his December 2001 book *Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner* that “[victory for the Islamic movements against the world alliance cannot be attained unless these movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region.” [30]

In the conclusion of my 2005 book “Coalitions between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists and Islamists”, I pondered whether Islamists could challenge the U.S. and its allies, perhaps by taking control of a Muslim state. Only four countries seemed vulnerable, at that time, to such a scenario:

1. Pakistan, which has a nuclear arsenal and large radical Islamist movements that control part of its territory;
2. Indonesia, because of its large Muslim population, a territory of some 17,000 islands and jungles, political and economical instability (at the time), and a small but active Islamist terrorist organization;
3. Saudi Arabia, led by a corrupt and ineffective regime, with huge oil wealth, where Islamist movements are influenced by Wahhabi ideologues;
4. Iraq, whose internal stability and even integrity is in danger after the U.S. occupation, with the threat of Shi'a radicalism emerging in force after the destruction of the Sunni Ba'athist infrastructure.

I evaluated that as al-Qaeda has chosen to focus its campaign against the U.S. in Iraq and has enlisted all Islamist forces there, it is possible that the future balance of power between radical and moderate Islam, between the radical Islamist camp and its Western and Eastern enemies will be decided on the Iraqi battlefront.[31]

By establishing the Islamic State, ISIS has fulfilled al-Zawahiri’s condition while it is fighting his authority
over the jihadist camp.

Although AQIS’s first major terrorist venture—the September 6, 2014 attempt to hijack two Pakistan Navy frigates and use them to attack U.S. and Indian vessels—failed, the competition between AQ and IS continues on all fronts.

IS has achieved three main territorial successes: the alignment on its side by Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (Wilayah Sinai), Boko Haram (Wilayah West Africa) and the ISIS stronghold in Derna, Libya (Wilayah Barqa).

Al-Qaeda’s authority is still valued by AQAP in Yemen, al-Shabaab in Somalia and AQIM in North Africa. It is not yet clear what AQIS is representing in terms of territorial control, resources and fighters, and if it is not in fact the only group rallied around the AQ leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

AQAP, which already was the major actor among the AQ franchises, could become, on the backdrop of the Yemeni civil war and its potential territorial gains, the strongest contestant to the Islamic State and Caliph Ibrahim.

However, IS can boast that it recruited in its ranks the highest number, some 71%, of the 25,000 foreign fighters, mainly from Arab, Muslim and Western countries, who are fighting in Syria and Iraq, according to recent United Nations’ estimates. [32] According to EU Justice Commissioner Vera Jourova some 5,000-6,000 Europeans are fighting with jihadist groups in Syria.[33] A report by the French Parliament estimates that 1,430 French nationals have traveled to join jihadist groups in territory held by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, representing 47% of the European militants there, a somehow different estimate. [34] For the moment many of them serve as cannon fodder, fighters or suicide bombers in Iraq and Syria.

These represent a significant threat, as experienced lately in France, Belgium, Tunisia or Libya. The more IS or AQAP, al-Shabaab or Boko Haram will be squeezed militarily on the territory they currently hold, the more of their fighters will disperse to their countries of origin or other target states.

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Notes
[4] Flora Drury, “‘His heart burned to join his brothers’: France’s Most Wanted Woman praises Paris deli murderer husband in ISIS magazine as she boasts about how easy it was to flee to Syria,” London Mail Online, February 12, 2015.


[14] Ibid.


[18] Ibid.


[21] Ibid. Ansaru is a new militant group, close to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), formed in 2012 in northwestern Nigeria, which differs from Boko Haram ideologically, tactically, and geographically. Zenn distinguishes between three Ansaru groups: the “GSPC network,” the “AQIM network” and the “Middle Belt network.”

[22] Ibid.


[24] Ibid.


[27] Ibid. These definitions appear in Moghadam's typology.


[29] Thomas Joscelyn, "Jihadist divisions grow in Nigeria," Long War Journal, February 23, 2015, at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/02/jihadist-divisions-grow-in-nigeria.php. Joscelyn probably refers to the Ansaru "Middle Belt network" the only network using the Ansaru name. According to Jacob Zenn, the third Ansaru network was the “Middle Belt network,” which included mid-level recruits who supported the more experienced “GSPC network” and “AQIM network” masterminds and were often aggrieved Nigerian Muslims from states that experienced Muslim-Christian violence. See note 23.

[30] See citation in Ely Karmon, Coalitions between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists and Islamists, (Leiden, Netherlands, and Boston, MA:

[31] Ibid., p. 390.


[33] AFP, "About 6,000 Europeans are reportedly fighting with jihadist groups in Syria," April 13, 2015.

IV. Resources

Introductory Note by Alex P. Schmid

A bibliography on genocide in a terrorism journal might, at first sight, look out of place. However, both terrorism and genocide are extreme forms of political violence and both involve the one-sided killing of unarmed civilians. In fact, it is amazing that scholars who study terrorism have generally neglected to see this parallel with genocide. Recently, the terrorist group ISIS (Daesh) has attempted genocide against the Yazidis, an ethno-religious minority in Iraq. It is therefore useful at this time to provide a snapshot of the literature on genocide for the community of terrorism scholars.

Bibliography: Genocide (since 1980) Part 1

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism–BSPT-JT-2015-2]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on genocide that has taken place between 1980 and the present. Though focusing on recent literature, the bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to early February 2015. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Genocide and Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, genocide, one-sided violence, mass killing, state killing, ethnic cleansing, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Central African Republic, Bosnia, Iraq, Guatemala

NB: All websites were last visited on 08.03.2015.–See also the Note at the end of this literature list.

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**Note**

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Counterterrorism Bookshelf: Nine Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects

by Joshua Sinai

This column consists of capsule reviews of books published by various publishers, with the authors listed in alphabetical order.


This book offers an important account by a leading South African political activist of what had “gone wrong” in South Africa since the replacement of the Apartheid regime by a democratic political system under African National Congress (ANC) rule. As discussed by the author, the ANC—especially in the post-Nelson Mandela period, which was characterized by a high degree of enlightenment—has been taken over by growing intolerance of opposing views and government corruption. The author describes a significant worsening of conditions in education, public health, safety and security, and employment: the characteristics of a “failing state.” However, he concludes on an optimistic note that “In many ways we are a failing state, but we are not a failed state. Institutions such as the Constitutional Court and parliament are still in place. The media is largely free, civil society is still active. There have been other dark days (think back to the 1980s), and we survived and eventually triumphed.” (p. 145) Alex Boraine, who served in South Africa’s parliament, and helped to set up South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, now serves as Global Visiting Professor of Law at New York University’s Hauser Global Law School Program.


Since this reviewer wrote one of the volume's articles (on “Threat Convergence” – the creation of a new category of terrorist threat through the convergence of terrorism, WMD proliferation, criminality, cyber weapons proliferation, and enabling conditions in weak, failed, and even strong states), this should not be considered as a book review but a general overview of this book's chapters. Led by Robert J. Bunker, who assembled prominent contributors to write the volume's 65 articles, this book is encyclopedic in scope, with the articles' topics organized alphabetically. The articles [with the authors' names within parentheses] cover topics such as the Abu Nidal Organization (Jennifer Hardwick), al Qaida (Rohan Gunaratna), asymmetric warfare (Robert J. Bunker), aviation security (Kevin R. McCarthy), biological warfare (Peter Katona), chemical weapons (Raymond Picquet), conditions promoting terrorism (Byron Ramirez), counterinsurgency (Thomas X. Hammes), critical infrastructure protection (Stefan Brem), global insurgency (David J. Kilcullen), Hizballah (James. T. Kirkhope), homegrown violent extremism (Erroll G. Southers), netwar and networked threats (John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt), radicalization (Mitchell D. Silber), surface transportation security (Brian Michael Jenkins), terrorist mindset (Jeffrey A. Baxter and Daniel S. Gressang IV), and urban terrorism (Russell W. Glenn). Overall, these topics represent important issues in terrorism and counterterrorism studies.


Continuing the long-term work on these issues by Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, this edited volume
is a fourth compilation of articles published in Small Wars Journal, this time covering developments in the narco-trafficking-related crime wars and criminal insurgencies in Mexico and Latin America in 2014. The volume's chapters [with the authors’ names within parentheses] cover topics such as coverage of the activities of Mexican cartels (John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker), an assessment of the effectiveness of the first year of Mexico President Pena Nieto’s “war on drugs” (Chris Ince), an application of “grounded theory” in defining the cross-border violence by Mexican drug trafficking organizations (Clint Osowski), institutionalizing a risk-based approach for the U.S. Border Patrol (Robert D. Schroeder), the employment of advanced technologies such as ‘narco-submarines’ by drug smugglers (Byron Ramirez), the prevalence of ‘narco-cities’ in Mexico and beyond (John P. Sullivan), coordination failures among Mexican security forces (Irina Alexandra Chindea), how Plan Colombia can be applied to countering the drug cartels in Mexico (Michael Osborne), and the narco-trafficking problem in the Caribbean (Geoffrey Demarest).


This book is an important empirically-based examination by social scientists of the nature and magnitude of contemporary terrorism, drawing on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), an unclassified source for data on terrorist incidents which is maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), headquartered at the University of Maryland (where the three authors work, with Dr. LaFree serving as START’s Director). The book begins with an overview of the GTD, as well as other comparable terrorist incident databases, and the definition of terrorism utilized in populating the GTD’s terrorist incidents: “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” (p. 13). One of the advantages of such a general definition, the authors point out later in the discussion, is that it includes attacks by terrorist groups against civilian noncombatants as well as, in certain instances, military targets. (p. 112)

The book’s chapters then discuss trends in the frequency and geographic distribution of terrorist incidents around the world, the groups that are “attributed responsibility” for conducting such attacks (including their organizational “life spans”), an assessment of the types of weapons (e.g., firearms, bomb explosives, chemical or biological agents or radiological devices), tactics (e.g., armed assaults, bombings/explosions, assassinations or kidnappings), and targets (e.g., private citizens, businesses, government facilities, police, military, etc.) that terrorists consider and use in their attacks. They also examine the extent of fatalities and injuries produced by terrorist attacks (with airline bombings among the most lethal of such attacks), the factors that need to be considered in distinguishing domestic from international terrorist attacks, tactical innovations in terrorist attacks, the components of effective counterterrorism (e.g., coercive vs. conciliatory) in deterring terrorism, and what the authors term “taking stock” of lessons learned in their study of terrorism.

With much to commend in this comprehensive volume, especially interesting is the authors’ discussion of tactical innovations in terrorist warfare, such as in aerial hijackings, as well as the attractions of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons to attackers, the difficulty of obtaining and ‘weaponizing’ such weapons and the potential risks to their own safety in attempting to employ such dangerous weapons for those contemplating such catastrophic warfare. It is curious, however, that the most significant and, surely, the most effective tactical innovation in terrorist warfare in the contemporary period is not discussed: the use by terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas of sophisticated rockets and mortars in several wars against Israeli targets, which represents a ‘revolution in military warfare’ by such terrorist groups and making it possible for them to rely on less effective tactics such as suicide bombings, which do not inflict as much
widespread panic and anxiety, as well as physical damage on their targets – the primary objectives of terrorist warfare.

Also valuable is the authors’ discussion of the risks and ‘rewards’ to terrorist groups that employ the tactic of suicide terrorism in their warfare, especially their noting that “Probably the greatest disadvantage of suicide terrorism as a strategy is the difficulty of recruiting individuals who are willing to die for the cause.” (p. 194) When they write that “as organizations become more prestigious, they likely get more volunteers for their missions,” (p. 194) perhaps the term to describe such recruiting success is not “prestigious” but effectiveness in their “ideologically or religiously doctrinaire” appeal to persuade such susceptible adherents to become martyrs for their cause. The concluding chapter is especially interesting for its many insights about the state of terrorism and counterterrorism research, including a valuable discussion on future trends in automating terrorism incident databases.


This volume provides a compelling account (by a former prison warden in Arizona) of the origins, nature and magnitude of Islamic radicalization into violent extremism in the American prison system within the wider context of radicalization into extremism within prisons systems throughout modern history. As Mr. Hamm explains, his book is “about how prisoners use criminal cunning, collective resistance, and nihilism to incite terrorism against Western targets.” (p. 16) What is especially different about radicalization in prison as opposed to other venues, such as universities, mosques or the Internet, is that “Those radicalized in prison tend to play for keeps…. [and are] transformative experiences among inmates…. [because of] the social marginalization of inmates and their desire for bonding, group identity, and spiritual guidance. These changes make prisons a better place to foment terrorism than any other setting.” (p. 16) The book’s chapters cover topics such as Islam in prison, prisoner radicalization after 9/11, pathways to terrorism, “Al-Qaeda of California,” and a highly important discussion of “Terrorist Kingpins and the De-Radicalization Movement.” The appendix includes a valuable listing and description of terrorism-related activities of inmates in American prisons who were radicalized during their incarceration. Mr. Hamm is currently a professor of criminology at Indiana State University and a Senior Research Fellow at the Terrorism Center at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York.


A comprehensive examination, as explained by the author, of “the ideational elements that have been communicated publically by the Al-Qaeda leadership and the ways in which these have evolved over the past two decades,” in order to comprehend the organization’s ideological doctrine and objectives. (p. xvi) What makes this book innovative is its utilization of manual coding, based on a “bespoke checklist of themes,” of the statements of al Qaida’s leadership, particularly Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, to discern “long-term trends and changes over time” in the organization’s public rhetoric. (pp. 6-7) These themes are arranged according to three broad categories: first, problems, issues, and grievances; second, “envisaged responses and alternatives to these identified problems; and, finally, “communicative efforts to convey these sentiments toward various audiences.” (p. 7) The themes are also outlined in numerous figures and tables that accompany the text. This book was written prior to the emergence of the Islamic State as al Qaida’s primary jihadist challenger, where its forces have overtaken al Qaida’s allies in Syria and Iraq as well as apparently
superseding al Qaeda’s ideology in attracting Western recruits to wage jihad in those countries (as well as in their own societies). The author’s conclusions, as a result, are out-of-date, but he does make the insightful point that the mass mobilization that bin Laden and Zawahiri had “envisioned had failed to materialize.” (p. 165) This author’s analysis sheds important light on how al Qaeda’s multifaceted discourse has evolved and affected, as he writes, “a new generation of Al-Qaeda supporters, activists, and sympathizers.” (p. 166)


This edited volume was initially published as a special volume of the academic journal Terrorism and Political Violence (January–March 2014, Vol. 26, No. 1) by Routledge’s ‘parent’ company Taylor & Francis.[1] The contributors to that issue of the journal had initially presented their papers at the conference “Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism” that was held at Uppsala University, Sweden, under the auspices of the university’s Center for Police Research, on September 24-26, 2012. Following an introductory overview by the special issue’s editors, the contributors discuss issues such as counterinsurgency, law enforcement tactics, lone wolf terrorism, profiling lone wolf terrorists, governmental responses to lone wolf terrorists prior to the First World War, case studies of lone wolves such as Carlos Bledsoe, Anders Breivik, loners and autonomous cells in the Netherlands, school shootings as examples of lone wolf violence, lone wolf terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and detecting “linguistic markers” for signs of extremist violence in social media. Although one might argue that some of the lone wolves discussed in the volume may have actually been part of larger “packs of wolves” and were radicalised in social media by more “conventional” terrorist groups, this volume represents an important contribution to advancing our understanding of this important phenomenon.


Since their recent publication within a few weeks of each other, these two books have become best sellers on the subject of ISIS, the acronym of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, also called Islamic State, or, in its derogatory term, Daesh. With ISIS becoming the world’s most notorious and territorially successful terrorist group due to its savage, brutal and genocidal warfare tactics—even surpassing al Qaida and its affiliates as the top concern of counterterrorism community members in many countries—readers are eager to understand its origins, leadership, strategy, the nature of its religious appeal to susceptible Muslims around the world, and future trends in its warfare. Both books accomplish these objectives to some extent, although each is flawed in its own way.

Stern and Berger’s ISIS: The State of Terror is written in a more clear fashion and is better organized than Weiss and Hassan’s ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (which reads like a series of densely written episodes in ISIS’s history and current activities). However, the latter book, written by journalists who have spent extensive time in the region, is, nonetheless, better at capturing events and their dynamics on the ground, while the former is more academic, with a reliance on social science concepts to explain the ISIS phenomenon. At the very beginning of Stern and Berger’s book they spend too much time discussing ISIS as a ‘terrorist’ organization, defining terrorism as “an act or threat of violence against noncombatants.” And yet, ISIS has demonstrated a military prowess in its combat against the ineffectual Syrian and Iraqi military forces (also due to the presence of former Iraqi Baathist military officers in ISIS’s ranks), demonstrating that it is,
in fact, a paramilitary guerrilla army and not merely a grouping of ‘terrorists.’ The book’s successive chapters provide a valuable overview of the origins and evolution of ISIS (although one may disagree with the authors claim that “ISIS was born from the crucible of America’s ‘war on terrorism,’ (p. 177) when it should be seen instead as the product of the internal breakdown of Muslim societies in which it operates); the strong appeal of its religious ideology to recruits from around the world, including Western countries (as well as, unlike al Qaida, appealing to women, who have joined en masse); and its great success in exploiting the Internet to advance its ‘message.’

Stern and Berger explain that “Salafism, like all fundamentalism, is a response to the pain of modernity,” (p. 242) but they neglect to mention that as religious traditionalists, Salafists are driven by a fear of the opportunities for ‘liberation’ (especially among the sexes) and the scientific progress provided by modernity. The authors minimize the threat presented by Western returnees from Syria and Iraq, when they write that “Western returnees have been horrified by what they saw in the Islamic State and appear to have little interest in attacking their home countries, at least for now.”(p. 201) However, this analysis is called into question by recent cases in Europe and elsewhere that have involved returnees who have proceeded to plot or carry out terrorist attacks in their home countries. Finally, while the authors are correct that an effective campaign against ISIS must blunt its narrative, this reviewer feels that the ISIS narrative is so extremist and genocidal that the only means to counter this group is to substantially degrade its military capability and the territory under its control.

In comparison, the Weiss and Hassan book presents a more realistic portrayal of ISIS, and does not aim to provide sweeping policy recommendations to counter its wide appeal. They conclude that as “a deadly insurgency adept at multiple forms of warfare [it] has proved resilient, adaptable, and resolved to carry on fighting. A legacy of both Saddam and al-Zarqawi, ISIS has excelled at couching its struggle in world-historical terms. It has promised both death and a return to the ancient glories of Islam. Thousands have lined up to join it, and even more have already fallen victim to it.” (p. 242) On the same page, the authors also claim that “The army of terror will be with us indefinitely,” although anyone who has studied terrorism long enough will recognize the impossibility of such a claim.

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Notes:

[1] This special volume of the journal was also previously capsule reviewed by this reviewer in http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/340/html and is reiterated here.
Op-Ed: Challenging Jihadi Chains of Authorization (ijazat)

by Philipp Holtmann

Jihadis, especially those who belong to the Islamic State (IS) – extremists among extremists – often uphold outlandish Islamic legal opinions based on classical precedents that are basically absent in mainstream Sunni theology. Nevertheless, with these ideological-theological discourses jihadis are able to build protean networks. The discourses are disseminated through authorizations (ijazat) among the ideologues, who allow each other to distribute and teach their opinions. They cite these authorizations among their networks as a way to demonstrate erudite knowledge, and to honor each other, as well as to legitimize their leaders.

For a better understanding of this issue we first need to recall that jihadi theology is grossly under-researched, especially when it comes to such intricate but immensely important details as scholarly authorizations (ijazat). A rare exception is the scholar of Islamic studies Rüdiger Lohlker from Vienna University. Lohlker recently wrote an article in German in which he elaborates on an argument he has already highlighted in 2011. He approaches the study of Islamic authority and leadership from a sociological point of view, using the concept of “symbolic capital” introduced by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to show how Islamic learning and legal authority are organized by ijazat from elder sheikhs, who allow subordinate sheikhs to distribute certain texts and to disseminate certain legal views.

This method of authorization is also extremely important within jihadi subculture, since it creates social, cultural and economic capital. It produces pure power that bolsters the jihadi scene from within and without. Ideological leaders cite authorizations by other authorities to teach and to disseminate their bodies of works and the works they favor. In turn, subordinates distribute these shariatic ideas and visions in terms of ideological, tactical and strategic guidelines in a coordinated manner, so that donors and converts are attracted to support these networks. All forms of capital are interconnected and can reinforce each other.

By displaying such authorizations, for example on their websites, jihadi ideologues show how connected and knowledgeable they are, thereby parading how much social and cultural capital within their circles they possess. Beyond the structuring of Islamic networks in terms of knowledge, respect and influence, these ijazat create clear hierarchies as well. One example is the Austrian Muhammad Mahmud (aka Abu Usama al-Gharib), who left Germany for Syria in 2013 and recently married a high-ranking female propagandist in the Syrian ISIS-stronghold al-Raqqa. Al-Gharib has collected international ijazat from at least six jihadi and salafi authorities from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan and Morocco—respected figures in Islamic law and in the hadith sciences (oral transmissions of Islamic tradition). Such authorizations allow Mahmud in turn to issue authorizations to distribute his own knowledge—a patchwork of opinions he holds on the strengths of the other scholars—to the leaders of the German jihad network “al-Tauhid,” using his nom de guerre Abu Ibrahim.

Sharia—also known as “Islamic Law”—is not a monolithic body of law, comparable to European Civil Law or Anglo-Saxon Statutory Law. Rather, it is a matter of Islamic legal interpretation (fiqh). As Rüdiger Lohlker notes, most jihadis of IS perform a kind of Islamic legal archeology, which serves to create a halo of Islamic authenticity: IS scholars dig out old stories, opinions and precedents from the vast corpus of interpretations of original sources [the Quran and stories on the deeds of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions (sunnah)] which fit their worldviews. Yet those archeological findings have been largely forgotten, or are even discarded by more mainstream Sunni Islamic scholars. Examples are the throwing of homosexuals from the
top of high buildings, or the killing of prisoners of war. Precedents of both can be found in some older legal discussions, but not in modern Islamic theological discourses. Nevertheless IS appropriates such sidelined opinions from the past and tries to re-anchor them in post-modernity; a tool to achieve this is widespread Internet propaganda. Legitimacy derives, in their view, from chains of *ijazat* among leading Islamic scholars. These scholars present themselves and their interpretations of Islamic law as infallible, claiming to represent Allah’s divine guidance (*hidaya*).

Specifically Jihadi subculture tries to present itself as true, original and traditional, by using the Islamic method of authorization and legitimation to attract followers and convert them to their point of view, which places greater importance to life in paradise than on earth. Ultimately, *ijazat* among and between jihadi ideologues and authorities are directly linked to issues of leadership and organization, power and authority within jihadi groups, and last but not least, to corresponding actions in the form of acts of terrorism and war crimes.

Such chains of permission in the jihadi sharia, however, can only be challenged from within mainstream Islamic thinking. The standard “selling points” of Western civilization—human rights, freedom and equality, rule of law and democracy—have for many Muslims lost much of their persuasiveness due to unholy alliances of Western powers with Muslim autocrats and due to double standards in Western foreign and domestic policies. Yet, the West still has one major possible ally: the tens of millions of Muslims who live in the West and have, with very few exceptions, accepted democracy and the separation of state and religion. They have developed a more moderate interpretation of Islam, for which there are also historical precedents and theological authorities. These can be revived and mobilized and thrown into the struggle against jihadi and extremist-salafi sharia interpretations within which the (thus far unchallenged) *ijazat*-chains of permission and authorization play a crucial role. A reformation of Islam, based on alternative Islamic traditions, might in the end come from Muslims in the West, rather than from Muslims in the heartlands that are currently caught in internecine struggles between Shias and Sunnis.

**About the Author:** Dr. Philipp Holtmann is a specialist on Islam in the Middle East and in Europe and an expert on Israeli and Palestinian society, history and politics. He also researches contemporary populist movements in Europe. Philipp Holtmann received his PhD from the University of Vienna and has lived and worked for several years in the Middle East.
News from National/Regional TRI Networks of PhD Theses Writers

1. Establishment of the TRI PhD Network for Germany, Switzerland and Austria

Recently, the Terrorism Research Initiative PhD Network for Germany, Switzerland and Austria was established as a platform to promote intellectual exchanges between PhD students with a research focus on terrorism, counter-terrorism, radicalization, political violence, insurgency, counter-insurgency, violent non-state actors, asymmetric warfare, security studies and related fields. Despite an increasing threat from violent non-state actors, and unlike in countries like the United States, Great Britain or the Netherlands where terrorism research has reached a high degree of academic institutionalization, such consolidation has not been reached in the German language area.

Since radicalization, mobilization and support for terrorist acts constitute highly complex and heterogeneous social and political phenomena, research cooperation between researchers from various academic disciplines is crucial to improve the understanding of the processes underlying the occurrence of political violence and insurgencies. This necessity also becomes evident when it comes to participation in public debates which are often ill-informed and shaped by stereotypes and prejudices.

One of the principles of the TRI PhD Network Germany, Switzerland and Austria is its inter-disciplinarity, in line with the TRI overall mission statement "Enhancing Security through Collaborative Research". In addition, the network should help members to share their research and experiences to an interested and informed audience.

With this announcement, the new German-language based network seeks to establish first contacts with post-graduate students and professionals in the above-mentioned research fields. Once a critical number of participants has been assembled, workshops, lectures and conferences in cooperation with academic institutions, think tanks and policy-making institutions will be organized. Furthermore, an effort will be made to expand the dialogue between the various national and sub-regional TRI PhD writers’ networks. PhD students in the field of Terrorism Studies and related fields from German, Swiss and Austrian universities interested in participating in the new Terrorism Research Initiative PhD Network are invited to contact this network's Lucerne-based coordinator Johannes Saal (who is writing a PhD thesis on religious terrorism) at johannes.saal@terrorismanalysts.com.


A new chapter of TRI PhD theses writers has been established for Greek postgraduate students at home and abroad. The Greek chapter seeks to link up post-graduate students of Greek universities (public and private) having departments of political science, sociology, anthropology, criminology and military and other sciences. It also seeks to bring in touch with each other Greek researchers abroad who are working on their doctoral theses in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies (and related subjects like low-intensity conflicts, civil war, insurgency and various forms of political violence).

Ioannis Mantzikos, PhD Candidate at the University of Free State South Africa and RIEAS Senior Analyst, has been designated as country coordinator.

To join the TRI Greek Network, please contact: jmantzikos@gmail.com and provide him with the following details:
3. Report of Meeting of the TRI-network Netherlands–Flanders

On 20th February 2015, the Dutch-Flemish network met in Antwerp to discuss how to do research on clandestine groups (and lone actors), with a focus on exploring the mindset of (potential) foreign fighters who (want to) go to Syria and Iraq. It was noted that a better understanding about motives can only be obtained by allowing (potential) foreign fighters to share their story. To do so, a researcher has to be aware of the social milieu from which many of the foreign fighters have emerged. Interactions via Facebook and Twitter can be a good start of getting closer to the research population. Several other recommendations came out of the meeting, including these: (i) Work through intermediaries who can help to get you into contact with members of the researched population; (ii) Promise the interlocutors and informers anonymity as this tends to lead to more useful information; (iii) Use (semi-) public places to meet the persons you want to interview as this lowers the boundaries and increases security (Summary of report by Daan Weggemans (CTC/ICCT) and Lisa Heintzbergen (CTC)).
About Perspectives on Terrorism

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at [www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com). It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.

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