Volume VIII, Issue 6
December 2014
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Welcome from the Editor

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume VIII, Issue 6 (December 2014) of Perspectives on Terrorism at www.terrorismanalysts.com. Our free online journal is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna (Austria), and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts (United States).

Now in its eighth year, Perspectives on Terrorism has almost 4,700 regular subscribers and many more occasional readers and visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer-reviewed by external referees while its Research Notes and other content are subject to internal editorial review.

This issue begins with a presentation of research data and analysis by Petter Nesser and Anne Stenersen who have catalogued planned, foiled, failed and completed jihadist attacks in Europe. Then Vincent Bernatis examines the use of Twitter by the Taliban in Afghanistan. This is followed by Paul Kamolnick’s detailed critique of ideological contradictions and disagreements between al-Qaeda’s spokesman Adam Gadahn and a group of militant but respected Islamic scholars. The Resources section features an extensive chronology by Ioannis Mantzikos, listing attacks by Boko Haram, a terrorist group that has managed to conquer and hold territory in the north of Nigeria. Recent and older publications on Single Issue Terrorism and Terrorism and (Social) Media are provided by Eric Price and Judith Tinnes in their bibliographies. The book reviews section by Joshua Sinai highlights new publications as well as some older ones worth mentioning.

This issue of the journal was prepared by the co-editor of Perspectives on Terrorism, Prof. James Forest, at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, while the next issue (February 2015) will be prepared in the European offices of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) in collaboration with guest editor Paul Gill (University College London).
I. Articles

The Modus Operandi of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe

by Petter Nesser and Anne Stenersen

Abstract

This article provides the most thorough overview yet of how jihadis have plotted terrorist attacks in Europe. Drawing on a database of 122 incidents, we review trends in weapon types, attack types and target types in the period 1994–2013. The overall finding is that jihadi terrorism in Europe is becoming more discriminate in its targeting while attack types and weapons are becoming progressively more diverse. The most likely scenarios in the coming three to five years are bomb attacks and armed assaults against sub-national entities, communities and individuals. A majority of the terrorist attacks will be limited in scope, but mass-casualty terrorism cannot be excluded. Foreign fighters from Syria are likely to influence the threat level in Europe, but we do not expect them to alter patterns in modus operandi dramatically.

Keywords: Tactics, targeting, foreign fighters, Europe, jihadist terrorism networks

Introduction

While we are starting to learn more about the “who” and “why” of jihadi terrorism in Europe, very few studies have dealt with the “how.”[1] The modus operandi of jihadis in Europe ranges from simultaneous mass casualty bombings such as those in Madrid on 11 March 2004, to crude attacks such as the killing of a British soldier in Woolwich on 22 May 2013. Considering the continuous threat of jihadi terrorism in Europe and the sizeable contingent of European fighters in Syria, there is an urgent need for research-based knowledge about the modus operandi of European jihadis. This article makes three contributions. First, we offer the most thorough overview yet of how jihadis plotted terrorist attacks in Western Europe. Secondly, we propose tentative explanations as to why the terrorists have altered their weapon types, attack types and target types over time. Thirdly, we discuss what modus operandi to expect three to five years from now. The study is explorative. We do not aim to formulate or test theory in a strict sense. Our main objective is to create an empirical basis for further theorizing on why terrorists alter their modus operandi.

Two overall trends have been identified. First, targeting is becoming more selective. In the 1990s and early 2000s, jihadi terrorism in Europe was dominated by random mass casualty attacks on transportation, exemplified by the Madrid bombings. In recent years it has become more common to target Jews, artists involved in the Prophet Mohammed cartoons affair, or soldiers in uniform. Secondly, weapons and tactics are becoming more diverse. In the 1990s and early 2000s, jihadis in Europe operated in groups and planned bomb attacks with certain types of explosives. In recent years, more terrorists have worked alone and they used a broader repertoire of weapons, including knives, axes and handguns. Our data suggest that a majority of jihadis in Europe still prefer to work in groups and carry out bomb attacks, but that an increasing number resort to single actor terrorism and crude weapons to avoid detection.

When discussing the data, we compare the period before and after 2008. The year 2008 was chosen for methodological reasons, as explained in the method and data section. However, when interpreting the results it is worth noting that the time around 2008 was characterized by certain developments in the jihadi field that were bound to influence international terrorism. From 2008 onward, al-Qaida's central organization
was weakened by a drastic increase in drone attacks in northwestern Pakistan. At the same time, regional al-Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa were on the rise, and some of them began to dabble in international terrorism on al-Qaeda’s behalf. In addition, since 2008 more independent sympathizers were drawn toward jihadism via new social media such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.

We propose two overall explanations for the changes in modus operandi. We contend that the trend towards more discriminate targeting reflects al-Qaeda’s need for legitimacy and support in a situation when the organization is weakened by counter-terrorism and faces competition from other jihadi groups. By focusing on discriminate targets, the organization may have hoped to win broader sympathy and make up for some of the criticism it faced following mass-casualty attacks that killed Muslims. Such an approach resembles, to some extent, what Neumann and Smith refer to as ‘strategic terrorism,’ which implies that terrorist groups will eventually shift away from indiscriminate violence and move towards activities designed to boost the group’s legitimacy. However, al-Qaeda’s trajectory deviates from the framework because it has not abandoned mass-casualty terrorism altogether. Instead–probably to fulfill a dual need of upholding its reputation as the world’s most dangerous terrorist organization on one hand, and to win sympathy on the other hand–the organization has widened its repertoire of tactics to include both discriminate and indiscriminate attacks. As for the trend towards diversity in weapons and tactics, we contend that it first and foremost reflects how jihadi networks have had to adapt their modus operandi in response to Western counter-terrorism measures. However, we also surmise that this diversity reflects a more heterogeneous landscape of actors.

Based on the trends we identify here, we expect bomb attacks and armed assaults to be the most likely terrorism scenarios three to five years from now. The most likely mass-casualty scenario is a bomb attack in a crowded area. The most likely tactical innovation is a combination of several crude methods such as arson, armed assaults and small bomb attacks. We expect that jihadis in Europe will prefer attacking sub-national entities, communities and individuals with symbolic value, rather than societies at large. However, certain elements within al-Qaeda and like-minded groups will continue to plot indiscriminate mass killings.

Al-Qaeda has so far been instrumental in shaping the threat from jihadi terrorism in Europe, but as of 2014, new and powerful actors are on the rise. The Islamic State (IS) and other jihadi outfits in Syria and Iraq may also affect the modus operandi of jihadi terrorism in Europe. We have been tracking terrorist incidents with alleged links to IS in 2013-2014, but at the time of writing, they do not constitute a solid basis for generalization. Looking ahead, blowback from the war in Syria and Iraq may influence jihadi terrorism in Europe in several ways. Returning foreign fighters may bring with them new technologies and tactics, or they may introduce a sectarian dimension to attacks, targeting Shias or Kurds. The most dangerous scenario is that IS or like-minded groups launch a top-down organized campaign of international terrorism as a response to Western military involvement in the conflict. But the most likely effect in the short to medium-term is contagion of attack methods broadcast widely in media, such as public beheadings and other revenge-driven executions.

Definitions and Scope

The article surveys jihadi terrorist plots in Western Europe. By “terrorist plot” we mean planned, prepared, and executed terrorist attacks. The criterion for including a terrorist plot in the dataset is that there are strong indications in open sources that an identifiable jihadi group or individual planned to attack one or several targets. We did not set as a criterion that the evidence should hold up in court and lead to convictions, as many terrorist plots were disrupted at an early stage. Although terrorism is a highly contested concept, we
see no reason to problematize it here. The essence of terrorism is violent attacks to spread fear, ultimately with a view to sending a political message.[5] With this in mind we see little ambiguity concerning the cases addressed in this study, which mostly involve plans to conduct bombings or shootings against non-combatants inside peaceful European societies.

As for the adjective “jihadi”, it refers here to militant individuals, groups, networks and ideologies emanating from the Arab-based foreign fighter movement of the Afghan jihad in the 1980s.[6] The “Afghan-Arab” movement represented an internationalization of post-colonial Islamist insurgencies against Arab dictators. It gave rise to the idea of global jihad, which meant that in order to defeat Arab dictators, jihadis had to target the U.S. and Israel first. Ideologically, Al-Qaida and like-minded movements are referred to as “salafi-jihadis.” Put simply, this means that they combine revolutionary Islam originating from Egypt with fundamentalist Islam as practiced in Saudi Arabia (Salafism or Wahhabism).[7]

The salafi dimension has implications for the modus operandi, in the sense that any act of violence by jihadis must find justification and precedent in the traditions of the Prophet (hadith). For example, a verdict by a recognized salafi scholar on the individual duty of Muslims to kill people who insult the Prophet Mohammed has had direct effects on the threat situation in Europe. It should also be underscored that jihadis’ dependence on religious justification by no means contradicts strategic thinking. On the contrary, the movement has a strong tradition of producing strategic texts and evaluating the fruitfulness of its methods of struggle.[8] In jihadi thought, religious tenets and strategy go hand-in-hand as the militants consider it a religious duty to mimic the warfare strategies and tactics pursued by the first Muslims.

Geographically we limit our survey to Western Europe. We do not include Eastern Europe or Russia, and we refer to jihadi activity in other Western countries only for context. The main reason for these limitations is capacity. Gathering data for this kind of study is work intensive and we have not been able to monitor other regions closely enough to produce data suitable for systematic comparison at this point.

**Existing Literature**

The literature on terrorists’ modus operandi is relatively small and scattered. Most studies of jihadi terrorism in Europe focus on radicalization and pay limited attention to operational aspects. The few studies that address the modus operandi of jihadis in Europe concentrate on certain dimensions, such as the scope and distribution of terrorist plots, the kind of explosives used, and the complexity of attacks, rather than broader trends in the use of weapons and choice of tactics.[9] Most standard works on terrorism address terrorists’ modus operandi, but rarely as a separate topic or in real depth. They provide examples of attack methods, targets and weapons preferred by different terrorist organizations, but usually as part of a broader discussion of the origins and rationale for those particular organizations.[10] Other studies concentrate on macro-trends such as the impact of globalization and technological progress, the transition from “old” to “new” forms of terrorism (which includes the emergence and spread of suicide terrorism), and, last but not least, terrorists’ interest in, and possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[11] While these studies are taken into account when we discuss possible determinants of European jihadis’ modus operandi, they have a different objective than that of this article, either operating at a higher level of generalization (historical macro-trends), or focusing narrowly on certain attack modes or weapons (e.g., suicide terrorism or WMD).

There are only a handful of studies that specifically focus on the modus operandi. Some of them provide a general overview of trends based on open source databases.[12] However, most available databases in the terrorism research field (including those maintained by RAND, MIPT, or the START Center’s Global Terrorism Database) do not systematically include failed or foiled terrorist plots. In studies of the modus
operandi, this constitutes a problem, because we are not only interested in what types of attacks terrorists have pulled off, but also what they might want to do and try to do. Others have combined databases and case studies to examine “lone wolf” terrorism, terrorist innovation, weapons choice and target selection. These studies produce relevant insights that will be taken into account in this study. For example, Adam Dolnik highlights how countermeasures influence terrorist innovation, and C.J.M. Drake theorizes how terrorists pragmatically narrow the scope of targets when they realize what is doable with the resources at hand.

Method and Data

Our trend analysis is based on a dataset containing 122 jihadi terrorist plots in Europe between 1994 and 2013. The dataset starts in 1994 because this is when the first incident of jihadi terrorism in Europe took place. The complete dataset and definitions of the variables are published online at the website provided in the end note. Due to space limitations, we do not provide details about individual plots in this discussion. Instead we refer to plot names (for example, “Crevice Fertilizer Plot”), which correspond to the entries in the dataset. Each entry in the dataset provides a reference to a newspaper article or other source containing an outline of the terrorist plot in question.

Due to the low number of plots each year (from zero to ten) it was meaningless to undertake a year-to-year analysis. Therefore, we divided the dataset into three time intervals of approximately equal length: 1994–2000, 2001–2007, and 2008–2013. This allowed us to identify and visualize changes in the quantitative output.

There are methodological challenges associated with data reliability. When attacks have been foiled, there is often incomplete information regarding key variables such as weapons choice, target selection and attack method. In an attempt to reduce the problem of missing information we distinguish “well-documented plots” (n=93) from “vague plots” (n=29). The distinction is based on how well each plot fulfills the following criteria of documentation: 1) known jihadi perpetrator(s), 2) identified target(s) and 3) concrete evidence (such as bomb materials and suicide notes). The quantitative output we present is based on the 93 well-documented plots, unless otherwise specified.

Vague plots have been used in the qualitative analysis to cross-check the absence of certain attack modes. For example, there is only one example of a plot to hijack and crash an airplane into a target after 2001. The absence of such plots, even when including vague cases, strengthens the observation that this particular modus operandi was rarely considered by jihadis in Europe.

Even when we focus on well-documented plots, there is considerable variation in their scope and nature. We do not distinguish plots that were disrupted at an early stage from launched attacks. We do not distinguish small and amateurish attacks that led to no casualties as different from the Madrid bombings, which killed 191 people. This creates certain challenges when coding variables.

First, how do we code cases in which the attack planners have discussed several modus operandi, but not yet reached a final decision regarding the weapon, attack type or target? For example, in the “London Xmas Plot” of December 2010, the terrorists discussed a number of targets including the London Stock Exchange, the U.S. Embassy, unspecified Rabbis, and Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London. In such cases, we decided to code all options discussed because there is not enough information for us to decide which target was most likely. The same logic has been applied in cases where the terrorists discussed several weapons or attack types. Consequently, some weapon types, attack types and target types may be over-represented in the quantitative output. As highlighted by Drake, terrorists tend to discuss ambitious targets in the early stages of their...
planning, before ending up with something less ambitious, but more realistic.[17] Nevertheless, we consider it useful to register all scenarios assessed by the terrorists so as to be able to detect changes in their interest in different weapons, attack types and targets over time.

Secondly, how do we code cases in which the planned modus operandi changed after the attack was set in motion? Incidents where attackers barricade themselves to fight the police are typical examples. This occurred with plots such as the “Madrid Bombings” (2004), “Hofstad 1, Bouyeri” (2004) and “Mohammed Merah” (2012). We decided to code such incidents based on the original attack plan, for two reasons. First, we want to achieve as much consistency in the coding as possible between disrupted and launched attacks. Secondly, it is unclear whether violent acts against first responders qualify as terrorism in a strict sense. This point is well illustrated in the case of the “Bourgass Ricin Plot” (2003), when the terrorist suspect attacked and killed a police officer with a knife during his arrest. The original terrorist plan, which had prompted the arrest, was to carry out random killings in the U.K. using poison left in public places. It would be misleading to code the police murder as part of the terrorist plot.

There are borderline cases, such as that of Mohammed Merah, who ended his 2012 shooting spree in Southern France with a 32-hour barricade of his apartment. The incident bore the hallmarks of a planned barricade incident – a modus operandi associated with so-called “Mumbai-style” attacks.[18] The goal is to prolong the attack as much as possible, in order to increase media coverage and exhaust local emergency response resources. Merah was well armed and motivated to fight until death. In addition, he was in contact with the mass media an hour before the barricade started.[19] Nevertheless, it would be misleading to categorize the attack as a ‘barricade incident’. Merah was trapped in a corner after an eleven-day-long manhunt. It is likely that the barricade was an action of last resort, rather than indicative of a trend towards more barricade-style terrorist plots in Europe.

Having addressed some key methodological issues, we now turn to the results from our quantitative analysis of 93 well-documented jihadi terrorist plots in Europe.

Results

Weapon Type

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are the preferred weapon type among jihadis in Europe. 78% of all plots in 2001–2007 involved the use of IEDs, as did 65% of all plots in 2008–2013. Although the percentage has dropped in the last period, it is noteworthy that 65% of jihadi plots in Europe after 2008 involved IEDs in some form. But a majority of these plots were disrupted at an early stage. Only six IED attacks have been launched after 2008. None of them resulted in any casualties.[20]

Home-Made Explosives (HMEs) have become more common after 2008, while military and commercial explosives have become less common. Jihadi terrorists have widened their arsenal of HMEs over the years. Prior to 2001, jihadi bomb plots in Europe were dominated by the Armed Islamic Group’s (GIA) use of chlorate mixtures (a low-grade explosive) in closed containers such as gas canisters and pressure cookers. Peroxide-based mixtures (a high-grade explosive) came into use in 2001 and have occurred in plots regularly since then. Gas cylinders started appearing in plots in 2004, and were used in Germany in 2006 and in the U.K. in 2007. Fertilizer-based explosives started occurring in plots in 2004, and were used in Italy in 2009 and Sweden in 2010.

Two other weapons trends are worth mentioning. First, there has been an increase in plots involving knives
and firearms. Knives and firearms were used in 7.3% of plots during 2001–2007, and in 33% of plots after 2008. Only one attack was launched using knives/firearms before 2008, compared to seven after 2008.

Secondly, there is a decrease in plots involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials. Use or attempted use of CBRN materials occurred in six plots in 2001–2007, but are absent from all plots after 2008, even when considering vague cases. Four of the six CBRN plots we registered in 2001–2007 involved poisonous chemicals or toxins. One plot involved a plan to create a “dirty bomb” from a radiological substance known as Americium-241. The last plot included a plan to bomb the Borssele nuclear power plant in Holland. While we use the abbreviation “CBRN” throughout this paper, it should be stressed that we have uncovered no plans to spread contagious diseases or to obtain crude nuclear weapons throughout the period studied.

On the one hand jihadis in Europe have diversified their arsenal of weapons over time. On the other hand, they have also stopped using certain types of weapons. Plots to use CBRN materials and rockets are virtually non-existent after 2008. Plots to hack computers to cause real-world damage are completely absent from the dataset, both before and after 2008. The general development is towards weapons that are technologically simpler. The exception is IEDs, where there is no clear trend. IEDs are becoming simpler in some cases and more advanced in other cases. We will come back to possible explanations for these developments.

**Attack Type**

Bombing is the dominant attack type, occurring in 65% of all plots after 2008. However, individual assassinations and armed assaults have become more common over the years. Plans to assassinate have increased from 4.9% of all plots in 2001–2007, to 25% of all plots after 2008.

The overwhelming majority of bomb plots are land-based. Out of 122 cases in the dataset there are only eight examples of air-based bomb plots and one example of a sea-based bomb plot. Seven out of the eight air-based bombings aim to explode planes in mid-air, while the last case is a plot to crash an airplane into Heathrow airport. The sea-based bomb plot is a vaguely documented plan to explode explosive-laden trucks onboard a passenger ferry.[21]

The scope of the bombing plots varies greatly, from involving bombs the size of hand grenades to plots to use large truck-size devices. Truck bombs have so far not been used successfully by jihadis in Europe, even though they have been employed by other terrorist groups and individuals in the region.[22] There have been several foiled plots to employ truck bombs by jihadis. The best documented is probably the “Fertilizer Plot” (Operation Crevice) in 2004, in which 600 kgs of Ammonium Nitrate and an unknown quantity of aluminum powder was seized. There are at least five other plots in the dataset in which perpetrators have considered using truck-size bombs, but only one of them appears to have moved from mere planning to actual weapons acquisition: Nizar Trabelsi’s plot to attack the Kleine Brogel Airbase in Belgium in 2001, where 100 kgs of “sulphur” and unknown quantities of other precursors were seized by police.

Another observation is that few hostage situations have been created by jihadis in Europe. During the period 1994–2013, there were a total of three hostage incidents. All of them occurred after 2008 and involved “Mumbai-style” plots where hostages were supposed to be held by teams of mobile gunmen inside buildings. It is somewhat surprising that this modus operandi has not become more widespread, especially with the media attention received by the Mumbai attacks in India, and the subsequent fear among European security services that such attacks would materialize in Europe. However, Mumbai-style attacks should not be discounted as a possible threat. Of the three plots mentioned, all were considered serious and potentially
lethal cases. One of the cases, referred to as the “Europe Mumbai Plot” in the dataset, may have involved up to three separate attacks in different countries, according to intelligence leaks.[23]

Another dimension we looked at is the occurrence of single-actor vs. group plots. There is a significant increase in single-actor plots (from 12% to 38%) and a corresponding decrease in group plots in the period after 2008 (see Figure 1). However, groups of two or more terrorists remain the most common jihadi cell configuration, occurring in more than 60% of all plots after 2008.

A relatively high proportion of the single-actor plots are launched attacks. In the whole period, 14 out of 20 single-actor plots were launched. It is striking that single-actor terrorists go undetected in 70% of the registered cases while group plots go undetected in only 19% of the cases.

We caution that our break-down of single-actor vs. group plots may not accurately represent the typical size of a jihadi attack team. An attack may be planned and prepared by a network, or group, yet carried out by a single member. In some cases, there is concrete information that a group designated one of its members to carry out an attack. However, in many cases it is not entirely clear how many members of the group would participate in the attack.

![Single actor vs. group plots](image)

*Figure 1: Single-actor vs. group plots*

**Target Type**

Next, we looked at the types of targets that jihadis in Europe prefer. Three trends are worth highlighting.

First, there is a slight increase in attacks on military targets after 2008. Before 2008 there were six plots to attack military targets, but none were launched. After 2008 there were seven plots of which five were launched. Four of the launched attacks targeted soldiers in public places, and a fifth was aimed at a military base in Italy.[24] The last two plots targeted military bases, but were disrupted at an early stage. According to Drake’s theory of terrorist target selection, it is possible that the cells would have settled for a less ambitious target.[25] In any case, there has been an increased tendency to target military personnel after 2008. This is especially apparent when we also consider interview data indicating that there has been a considerable spike in threats and hoaxes against military personnel over the last few years.[26] Attacks in other parts of the West, such as the Fort Hood incident in Texas, U.S. in 2009 and the recent attacks on soldiers in Canada in
October 2014 point in the same direction.\[27\]

Attacking military personnel in public places is a new modus operandi among jihadis in Europe: starting with the Kosovar Arid Uka’s attack against a shuttle bus carrying U.S. soldiers at Frankfurt international airport in March 2011, and followed by Mohammed Merah’s killing spree in France in March 2012, and the soldier stabbings in the U.K. and France in 2013. There was only one similar plot before 2008. In January 2007, a U.K.-based cell planned to abduct and behead a British Muslim soldier who had served in Iraq, and to videotape the ordeal. It should be stressed that this particular cell drew inspiration from the beheading videos issued by Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi’s group in Iraq which were disseminated from 2004 onwards. There are concerns that the beheadings by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (IS) today could inspire out-of-theater terrorist attacks in a similar fashion.

A second targeting trend is that plots against aviation and public transportation have become less frequent. After 2008, there were only three plots targeting aviation and three plots targeting buses, trains or metro systems. However, there has been no similar decrease in the targeting of public places. Jihadis are still interested in targeting crowded areas, even if they do not seem to target public transportation and airplanes as often as before.

A third trend is that plots targeting public figures have increased. When we single out the victims of these plots we find that they are distributed as depicted in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>No. of plots</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artists/publishers who insulted Islam</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kurt Westergaard, Lars Vilks, Martin Rynja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians with anti-Islam views</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Markus Beisicht, Lars Hedegaard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians, general</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Stephen Timms (British MP), Boris Johnson (Mayor of London)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/unspecified</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dalil Boubaker (Muslim cleric), “Public figures”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Assassination targets mentioned in plots after 2008

The majority of the plots against public figures appear to have been motivated by revenge, especially against people who insulted the Prophet Mohammed or Islam in general. This attack mode was first employed among jihadis in Europe in November 2004, when Mohammed Bouyeri assassinated the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. It saw an upsurge after the first publication of the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed by *Jyllands-Posten* in 2005 and amid re-publication of the cartoons by European media in following years.

Two other aspects of targeting we have looked at are target nationality and plot country. Target nationality is one of the most precise indicators of what enemy the terrorists want to harm, whereas plot country may not necessarily reflect the terrorists’ enemy perception fully. For example, although quite a few terrorist plots emerged in Germany, most were aimed at Jewish, U.S. or French targets rather than German ones. This could serve as one out of several indicators that Germany is considerably lower on the jihadis’ enemy ranking than the U.K., where almost every plot was aimed at British targets. However, at the same time the fact that plot after plot occurred in Germany tells us something about the presence of jihadis with the will and capacity to resort to terrorism in that country. In addition to being a country in which jihadis planned to launch attacks, Germany has also been a staging ground for attacks in other countries, most famously the Hamburg Cell’s preparation of the 9/11 attacks, but also other cases such as a cell in Frankfurt plotting to bomb the Christmas market in Strasbourg, France. As the variables tell us slightly different things we find it interesting
to explore the relationship between target nationality and plot country.

Table 2 shows the top five regions in Europe to be exposed to jihadi terrorism. We decided to group some of the countries together in order to gain a more readable picture. Thus, we talk about Scandinavia as one region, even if most plots have occurred in Denmark. The U.K. and France have experienced the most plots over time, followed by Germany, Scandinavia and Italy. Plots in the U.K. have mainly targeted the U.K.; plots in France have been aimed at French, U.S., Jewish and Russian targets, whereas many plots in Italy and Germany have targeted U.S. or Jewish people and interests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plot country</th>
<th>No. of plots</th>
<th>Plot country was target</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>67 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>83 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany and Switzerland</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>82 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Countries most exposed to jihadi terrorism 1994–2013

The most striking development in recent times is the threat in Scandinavia. This trend starts to show up in the statistics since 2005, and as many as 82% of the plots in Scandinavia were directed against Scandinavian targets. Nearly all of these plots were against people and institutions involved in the Prophet Mohammed cartoons affair. Still, there were a couple of incidents that were not immediately related to this incident, such as the 2010 Stockholm suicide bombings, or assassination plots against Swedish artist Lars Vilks and the Danish Islam-critic Lars Hedegaard.

We see an overall tendency towards fewer plots against U.S. targets compared to European targets. After 2008, most plots targeted the U.K. (30%) followed by Scandinavia (20%) and France (13%). Scandinavian targets appears to have surpassed French and Italian targets, which have historically been more prominent.

In addition to looking at target types and nationalities, we have examined how selective jihadi terrorists are when they choose their targets. Do they aim to target European society at large, or do they prefer to target specific sub-national groups and individuals? The results are shown in Figure 2. We see a clear tendency towards more discriminate plots.[28] In 2001–2007, 22% of all plots were targeting a specific sub-national group, profession or individual. After 2008, the proportion has increased to 55%. This is coupled with a similar decrease in random attacks.
Having briefly reviewed several important patterns in the data, we now turn to possible reasons why jihadis in Europe have changed the ways in which they operate.

**Main Changes and Possible Explanations**

**More Variety in IED Manufacturing Techniques**

After 2008 there is increased variation in the bomb-making techniques employed by European jihadis. There is no clear trend regarding the technical sophistication of the devices. IEDs are becoming simpler in some cases, and more advanced in other cases. It appears that the most advanced IEDs are connected to training and assistance from abroad, while simpler devices are often based on recipes from the Internet.

The clearest example of IED innovation coming from abroad is probably the 7/7 and the 21/7 attacks in London in 2005. Both attacks relied on a bomb-making technique which had never been employed by jihadis in Europe before. It involved a main charge made out of hydrogen peroxide and an organic substance.[29] Initially, the 21/7 bombers were portrayed as mere “copycats” who had been radicalized at home. It was later revealed that the ringleader of the cell had received training in Pakistan at the same time as the 7/7 bombers, which would explain why both plots employed a device which was novel at that time.[30]

There have been at least three other cases in Europe during the period 2006–2009 which involved a similar peroxide and organic substance mixture.[31] All of these plots were linked to training in Pakistan, and all but one (the “Sauerland Cell”) have been linked to one of al-Qaida’s operational planners, Rashid Raouf.[32] The Sauerland Cell received support from an Uzbek group named the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) based in North Waziristan. This group is believed to be part of al-Qaida’s network in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region, but direct links between the Sauerland Cell and al-Qaida’s central organization were never established.[33]

There are other examples of cases where technical assistance from al-Qaida is linked to IED use in Europe. For example, bombs made of TATP in combination with the military high explosive PETN (Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate) have only been used in three jihadi plots – the “Richard Reid Shoe Bomb” in 2001, the “Sajid Badat Shoe Bomb” in 2003, and the case of the “Underwear Bomber” in 2009. Reid and Badat were originally part of the same plot and they both received the bomb devices from al-Qaida handlers in Afghanistan or...
Pakistan in late 2001. The Underwear Bomber received the PETN and TATP device from al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), based in Yemen.[34] Yet another example is the “Transatlantic Airliners Plot” in 2006. The novel idea of smuggling liquid explosives onboard planes was masterminded by al-Qaida’s operational planners in Pakistan.[35] This leads us to surmise that novel bomb-making techniques are usually introduced in Europe as a result of training and assistance from abroad.[36]

Another explanation for the increased variation in bomb-making techniques is that the Internet has made crude bomb recipes more accessible. This has so far produced a slight increase in crude and amateurish attacks, such as the “Nicky Reilly” plot in the U.K. in 2008, and the “London Xmas Plot” in 2010 which relied on making pipe bombs out of match heads. However, Internet resources can hardly explain why certain bomb-making techniques have been introduced in Europe at certain times. Peroxide and organic substance bombs were first used by jihadis in Europe in 2005, but instructions on how to manufacture such a device did not appear online until 2010.[37]

As jihadis continue to access conflict zones such as Syria, Iraq and Somalia, it is likely that the repertoire of bomb-making techniques will widen further. It is also likely that increasingly sophisticated and interactive Internet platforms will improve possibilities for online learning.[38] However, in the short to medium-term, the greatest and most dangerous innovations in bomb-making techniques in Europe will probably come as a result of training abroad, rather than online self-study.

*Increase in the Use of Knives and Firearms*

There has been a relative increase in plots involving knives and firearms in recent years. The first such attack was the assassination of an Imam by the GIA in France in 1995. The next example is the slaying of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004. The assailant shot van Gogh numerous times with a semi-automatic pistol, and subsequently tried to decapitate him. After van Gogh’s murder, there were no knife or firearm attacks until 2010, when a Danish-Somali jihadi attempted to kill the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard with an axe (coded as knife in the dataset). In 2008–2013 there was a marked increase in plots to use knives and firearms among jihadis. 33% of the plots in this period involved a knife, firearms or both – sometimes in combination with explosives.

We first believed the increase in knives and firearms to be a direct consequence of the increase in individual assassination plots, because knives and firearms are more typical assassination weapons than bombs. However, when looking at the plots there is only a partial correlation. Only four out of the 13 knife and firearm plots in 2008–2013 could be defined as assassinations. While all knife plots involved attacking and killing a single person (either well-known individuals such as Kurt Westergaard, or representatives of religious or occupational groups, such as soldiers or Jews), the firearm plots covered the whole spectrum from assassinations to shooting sprees and complex, “Mumbai-style” attacks.

An alternative explanation is that the terrorists resort to knives and handguns simply because it has become more difficult to acquire precursors for explosives without alerting security services. There is some anecdotal evidence to support this. Consider the following statement by Mohammed Merah during a conversation with police negotiators while barricaded inside his apartment in Montauban, 2012. Regarding his weapons training in Waziristan he said:

“I was asked to make bombs. I did not want to, you see … I told them that the ingredients, the ingredients needed to make bombs are, they are under surveillance in France. I might get arrested even before having [inaudible] something. Are you listening? After this, I told them, train me [in the use
of guns.”[39]

It is possible that there are other cases where jihadi have decided on knives or handguns as the weapons of choice, based on similar reasoning. However, if this was the only reason we would expect a marked decrease in the use of explosives after 2008, making up for the increase in the use of knives and handguns. This is not the case. The number of plots involving knives and handguns increased by 26% after 2008, while the number of bomb plots decreased by only 13% in the same period.

A more general explanation is the effect of contagion. Terrorism research has shown how terrorists tend to emulate each other, a phenomenon accelerating in the age of social media.[40] It is highly likely that inspiration from successful attacks outside Europe has contributed to the increase in plots involving knives and handguns in Europe. The Mumbai attacks in India in 2008 are thought to have inspired at least three plots in Europe in recent years. Another high profile incident which may have served as inspiration is the Fort Hood shooting massacre in the U.S. in 2009. This was the first time that a jihadi carried out a successful mass killing with firearms in a western country.

Adding to the contagion effect, al-Qaida's strategic leadership has celebrated such attacks in their propaganda. In the al-Sahab video “You are only responsible for yourself,” issued in June 2011, Adam Gadahn specifically encouraged Muslims in the West to use handguns to carry out attacks:

“America is absolutely awash with easily obtainable firearms. You can go down to a gun show at the local convention center and come away with a fully automatic assault rifle, without a background check and most likely, without having to show an identification card. So what are you waiting for?”[41]

The ideas expressed in the al-Sahab video are far from new in al-Qaida circles. They are largely based on Abu Mus'ab al-Suri's strategic writings, which were conveyed to al-Qaida recruits in Afghanistan in lectures and pamphlets throughout the 1990s.[42] Al-Suri and the al-Sahab video both point to several historical examples of jihadi who carried out individual attacks with simple weapons, starting with the gun attack on the Jewish politician, Meir Kahane, in New York in 1990 by an Egyptian Islamist.[43] Likewise, in 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri received massive media attention for shooting and killing Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam. This illustrates the historical precedents for this attack mode long before the upsurge in 2008–2013, which lends credence to the contagion effect explanation.

In addition, we contend that the rise in knife and firearm plots is part of a more general trend towards diversification of attack types and choice of weapons among jihadi in Europe, a trend we partly ascribe to jihadi's adaptation to counter-terrorism measures, and partly to a more heterogeneous actor landscape.

Increase in Single-Actor Plots

While group-based terrorist plots are still most common, there has been a steep increase in single-actor terrorism among jihadi in Europe since 2008. The increase is somewhat connected to the rise in assassinations, but not fully. There are several examples of group plots to assassinate, such as “Davud” (2010) and “Public Figures France” (2013). Likewise, there are examples of single–actor plots to launch mass casualty bomb attacks in public, such as “Nicky Reilly” (2008) and “Andrew Ibrahim” (2008). The scope of individual plots by jihadi in recent times is surprising, as terrorists generally tend to operate in groups, and attacks by single actors have historically been quite rare.[44]

Single-actor terrorism is usually traced to 19th century anarchists and their strategy of leaderless resistance,
but right-wing extremists have been behind most single-actor incidents since the 1980s. Jihadi strategic thinkers began to promote leaderless resistance during the early 1990s, but it was only in the mid-2000s that al-Qaida leaders began to call upon followers to stage attacks on their own.[45] Today, the call for individual terrorism is a main feature of jihadi propaganda aimed at followers in the West. The rise in single-actor plots in Europe is linked to this propaganda, but we need to consider the underlying causes.

The literature on single-actor terrorism distinguishes between “solo-terrorists” and “lone wolves.”[46] The former operate alone, but are linked to and may receive support from an organized terrorist group. The latter act completely on their own and only draw inspiration from political movements.[47] A good example of solo-terrorism is Richard Reid who was trained and deployed by al-Qaida to bomb a transatlantic jet, whereas the Norwegian right-wing mass killer Anders Behring Breivik was a lone wolf without any organization behind him. Among solo-terrorists it is possible to distinguish between those who are tasked “from above” by a group and those who initiate something “from below”, reaching out to organized groups for guidance and assistance. While the distinction between solo-terrorists and lone wolves can be blurred, it must be kept in mind when searching for explanations of why more jihadis work alone in Europe.

Research has yet to identify a common profile among individually operating terrorists. However, characteristics such as social problems, loneliness, and mental illness are more common among lone wolves than among other terrorists. The latter do not systematically differ, socially or psychologically, from non-terrorists.[48] Also, whereas solo-terrorism is supposed to fulfill some strategic aim for organized groups (for example upholding a certain level of a terrorist threat when a group is under pressure from counter-terrorism), lone wolves tend to be driven by more elusive motives, mixing political grievances with personal ones.

Most single-actor terrorists in our data may be defined as “bottom-up” solo-terrorists, but some (such as Richard Reid) received orders and directions from al-Qaida or affiliated groups. At least three of them (Roshonara Choudry, Andrew Ibrahim and Arid Uka) resembled lone wolves. The majority of single actor terrorists in our data interacted with organized extremist environments in Europe, and many spent time with jihadi groups abroad. All of them drew inspiration from al-Qaida and acted in accordance with the group’s ideology although they rarely received direct operational support. Most of the terrorists seem to be relatively normal, but troubled young men. Several were known to have experienced psychological problems, but only one of them, Nicky Reilly (2008), had been diagnosed with a mental illness (Asperger syndrome), as far as we know.

Because extremist connections and ties to militant groups abroad have been commonplace among the perpetrators, we attribute the increase in single-actor plots in Europe mainly to strategic-tactical considerations by jihadis facing a difficult operating environment, and to ideological incentives.

Strategic texts by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri prescribing the use of independent cells and individual attackers in situations where jihadis are unable to establish territorial control have likely contributed to the rise in solo-terrorism. His ideas have been redistributed in AQAP’s Inspire magazine, which has been downloaded and read by multiple terrorists operating in Europe since the late 2000s. Moreover, multiple leaders and spokespersons within al-Qaida’s networks have called for individual attacks, including Osama bin Laden, Abu Yahya al-Libi and Anwar al-Awlaki. The latter has also guided two single actors in Europe aiming to down transatlantic airliners (“Underwear Bomber” and “Rajib Karim Heathrow Plot”), and was cited as a main inspiration by the Pakistani female student Roshonara Choudry who stabbed British MP Stephen Timms in 2010.
We further contend ideological-religious justifications for individual attacks have contributed to the rise in single-actor plots. Bin Laden’s reference to a religious text by Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah on how one of the Prophet’s men infiltrated a Jewish clan and assassinated a poet who once insulted the Prophet seems significant. Bin Laden’s reference to the text appeared in a speech that was published in 2006, but it was also cited as a source of inspiration for Mohammed Bouyeri who murdered Theo Van Gogh in 2004. By using this reference, al-Qaida leaders ground a particular modus operandi in a verdict by an Islamic authority who is highly regarded among jihadis and non-jihadis alike. The effect of this should not be underestimated, especially when assessing triggers for solo-terrorists and lone wolves.[49]

In addition to strategy and ideology, the contagion effect of terrorism should be considered a factor.[50] The booming jihadi presence in social media may have contributed to the rise in single-actor plots. From around 2008, jihadis increasingly started to employ YouTube, Facebook and Twitter as propaganda platforms. In this way they managed to instantly reach out to new and far broader audiences than was the case with more exclusive and oftentimes password protected forums.

Operationally, single actors have certain advantages in that they are much harder to detect than groups. On the other hand, it is more challenging, both from a psychological and a logistical perspective, to operate alone. This may be a main reason why group plots are still more common than single-actor plots.

**Decrease in the Targeting of Public Transportation**

There has been a decrease in the targeting of both land-based and air-based public transportation after 2008. Initially, we thought that this was related to the increase in discriminate attacks, since attacks on public transportation must be considered random by definition. However, this line of reasoning is not supported fully by other patterns in the data. Notably, the occurrence of plots targeting public areas is constant—both before and after 2008. The majority of the plots were aimed at targets such as shopping centers, nightclubs, restaurants, crowded streets and even schools, and were bound to cause random mass deaths. Only a handful of plots against public areas were discriminate in nature (for example, “Tawhid Jewish Restaurant” in 2002 and “EDL plot” in 2012).

With regard to air-based targets, the terrorists may have been deterred by countermeasures, such as increased security at airports, and onboard the planes themselves. However, for land-based transportation this could hardly be the case. Buses and trains are not associated with the same strict security measures as airplanes. So why have there been so few plots to target land-based transportation after 2008, while plots to launch bombings in public remain quite common?

Failing to see any other reasonable explanations we suggest that contagion may have played a part. Plans to attack transportation may have been overrepresented in 2001–2007, due to inspiration from 9/11 and the bombings in Madrid and London.[51]

**Decrease in the Targeting of U.S. Interests in Europe**

In 2001–2003, there was a clear tendency among jihadis to target American interests across Europe.[52] This was in accordance with al-Qaida’s notion of a global jihad against the “far enemy” (U.S.A.), rather than European countries. The pattern started changing in 2003–2005, when jihadi terrorists increasingly targeted European interests. This was mainly a result of the involvement of European countries in the Iraq intervention.[53].
Over time, other motivations to attack European countries became apparent as well, such as the publication of the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in Denmark in 2005, and their re-publication in several European newspapers in subsequent years. 15% of all plots after 2008 were directly targeting *Jyllands-Posten* or the cartoonists, while only 10% of the plots in the same period targeted the U.S..

The increase in the targeting of European interests illustrates how al-Qaida’s global jihad came to involve America’s allies to a greater extent in the mid-2000s. This development was mainly a reaction to Europe’s contribution to the “War on Terror”, but it was accentuated by justifications in jihadi ideology. Before the Iraq war, many jihadi in Europe claimed to stay in the region under a “Covenant of Security,” a religiously defined security pact between Muslims living in non-Muslim countries and their “host states.” According to this pact, Muslims are forbidden to put a non-Muslim host state and its citizens in harm’s way, as long as they are free to practice their religion.[54]

However, in the mid-2000s jihadi ideologues annulled the pact on the grounds that European countries participated in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, insulted the Prophet Mohammed (Danish cartoons), and persecuted Muslims (arrests of radical Islamists). It is symptomatic that many jihadis in Europe have since stressed wars, persecution and insults when threatening Western countries, and that captured terrorists have justified their actions similarly. The Stockholm suicide bomber’s reference to the Swedish contribution in Afghanistan and anti-Islam artwork by Lars Vilks is one out of numerous examples.

**More Discriminate Targeting**

Our most intriguing finding is a relative increase in discriminate attacks among jihadis in Europe since 2008. The majority of such plots are directed towards institutions, artists and politicians perceived to be anti-Islam. Another category of plots focus on military targets, in particular military personnel in public areas. A third category involves plots against Jewish interests.

In the first category we find plots related to the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, targeting either *Jyllands-Posten* in general, or individual cartoonists. A related type of attack is assassination plans against artists or other media figures perceived as being anti-Islam. Here we find personalities such as Swedish artist Lars Vilks and Danish author and Islam-critic Lars Hedegaard.

Assassination plots in Europe generally target individuals with little or no strategic value. The most high-ranking politician to be targeted by jihadis in Europe is Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London. If we consider vague plots we also find Prince Harry, the third heir to the British throne, but more likely targeted for symbolic reasons as he served in the British Army in Afghanistan. Overall, the assassination plots seem to be motivated by ideologically justified revenge, rather than strategic considerations.

Al-Qaida leaders and spokespersons have, on multiple occasions, encouraged attacks against specific types of targets. Anwar al-Awlaki has talked about the permissibility of attacking Western soldiers in their home countries, and a number of leaders (including Osama bin Laden himself) talked about the permissibility and duty of attacking individuals who have insulted the Prophet Mohammed.[55] As for the targeting of Jews and Jewish interests, the struggle against Israel and its policies in Palestine has always been a core issue for al-Qaida and like-minded movements and among mainstream Muslims alike.

A trend towards discriminate attacks is somehow counter-intuitive. Randomness is a hallmark of terrorism which seeks to instill fear in larger populations. Discriminate attacks do not instill fear in larger populations the same way, but are easier to justify–politically and religiously–than random ones. Discriminate attacks
speak to a larger segment of Muslims than the narrow and ultra-extreme folks that have traditionally been
drawn to al-Qaida’s networks. Facing pressure in multiple conflict zones (as a result of U.S. drone attacks
in Northwestern Pakistan and jihadi infighting in Syria and Iraq), leaders and thinkers of al-Qaida and its
affiliates may want to reinvent themselves to resonate with new generations of recruits. In order to attract
sympathy and support from a far-flung recruitment base which can be addressed via social media, an
increased focus on undisputed targets and attacks that may attract at least some sympathy makes sense.

We do not see the tendency towards more discriminate attacks as a major change though. Al-Qaida has
continued to plan mass-casualty attacks in Europe, in addition to calling for discriminate attacks. An article
in a 2012 issue of Inspire magazine illustrates the dual recruitment strategy of al-Qaida and likeminded
groups. An assassin should not just target “military personnel and political leaders,” but

“... anyone that the shari’ah allows him to eliminate. Thus, he is not afraid to study the movements
of personalities that openly insult the religion, apostates that play a helping role for the enemy ag-
gressors, and non-combatants in either selective hits – such as to obtain ghanimah [war booty] for
further operations – or mass hits – to destroy an infrastructure of political and/or economic rep-
resentation.”[56]

In this quote, AQAP speaks to several audiences, both the most extreme (who justify random mass killings,
and attacks for the sake of financing future operations), and those closer to the “mainstream” (who justify
the use of violence against certain enemies of Islam, for which there are clearer justifications to be found in
Islamic Law).

Overall, we see the trend towards more discriminate attacks as yet another sign that the threat to the region
is becoming more heterogeneous. This is important to keep in mind as we turn now to offer some informed
projections regarding future trends.

**Future Trends**

What will jihadi terrorism in Europe look like in three to five years from now? The question is challenging
because the jihadi actor landscape in Europe is becoming increasingly diverse. Up until now, jihadi terrorism
in Europe has been dominated by al-Qaida and like-minded movements. While only a few terrorist attacks
have been planned and directed by al-Qaida’s central organization, a majority of the plots have nevertheless
responded to a large extent with al-Qaida’s guidelines. The rise of new and powerful actors in Iraq and
Syria such as the Islamic State (IS) may change this pattern.

The IS does not take orders from al-Qaida, but presents itself as a rival organization. The Syrian conflict has
so far attracted around 3,000 European foreign fighters, a number which is unprecedented in the history of
jihadism. Many Europeans fight for IS and several of them have obtained high positions in the group. It is
therefore likely that the rise of IS will affect jihadi terrorism in Europe, but the question remains how.

There are at least two possible scenarios. IS could launch a top-down organized terrorist campaign in
Europe as a reaction to Western military involvement in Iraq and Syria. This is the most dangerous scenario.
Alternatively, European veterans of the conflict in Syria will continue to plot scattered attacks on their own
initiative following radicalization in the war theatre. This is the most likely scenario. In both cases, the modus
operandi may, or may not, differ from the al-Qaida-inspired terrorism seen in the region so far.

Only a handful of plots in Europe have been traced back to Syria and Iraq since the beginning of the uprising
in 2011. In March 2014, a Syria veteran was arrested in France with TATP explosives. In May, another Syria
veteran shot and killed four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium. In July, Norway was put on a high terror alert due to information that a group of four individuals were on their way from Syria to Norway to carry out a terrorist attack. In October 2014, several men were arrested in the U.K., suspected of being in the early stages of preparing a terrorist attack in London.[57]

Plots are too few and vague to say much about the “IS-effect” on jihadi terrorism in Europe at this point. However, we note that none of them represent a new modus operandi. The best documented incident, the Jewish Museum shooting, is consistent with a trend toward discriminate targeting and hand-held weapons.

IS differs from al-Qaida in at least two ways, which could affect its modus operandi. First, the group has an extreme sectarian agenda, and secondly, it glorifies and celebrates brutal acts of violence, including beheadings on camera. These were also characteristics of its forerunner al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), especially under Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi in 2004–2006. Al-Zarqawi’s beheading campaign probably inspired at least one beheading incident in Europe, the Theo van Gogh murder in Amsterdam in 2004. As far as we know, AQI’s campaign did not translate into any sectarian attacks in Europe. The difference between then and now is that IS attracts a much larger contingent of Europeans than AQI ever did. Moreover, IS’s clever use of new social media platforms ensures that violent acts are broadcast to a larger and more diverse audience than before.

In the short to medium-term, the most likely blowback effect from Syria and Iraq is scattered attacks by returning foreign fighters. We expect their modus operandi to roughly follow the trends outlined in this study. In addition we may see contagion of attack methods broadcast widely in media, such as public beheadings and other revenge-driven executions.

The blowback effect is taken into account when we suggest some concrete scenarios for future attacks below. We extrapolate the most likely scenarios from trends we have identified throughout the study.

**Most Likely Modus Operandi**

We believe bomb attacks and armed assaults to remain the most likely modus operandi for jihadi terrorists in Europe in the coming 3–5 years. Both suicide attacks, and attacks with remote-controlled or timed devices must be expected. As for plots involving knives and firearms, they are still less frequent than bomb plots. However, due to the relative increase in such plots in recent times we surmise that this modus operandi may soon match the frequency of bomb plots.

It could be argued that the trend towards more discriminate targeting would lead to a decreasing use of bombs, which imply random deaths. However, this is not necessarily so. More discriminate targeting may also imply a move towards “harder” targets which would actually increase the need to use bombs (the heavily protected offices of *Jyllands-Posten* being one such example). And there are still a considerable proportion of plots (28%) targeting randomly. Bombs in crowded places should therefore still be a concern for Western security services.

**Most Likely Mass-Casualty Scenario**

We suggest that the most likely mass-casualty (>10 deaths) scenario in the in the coming 3–5 years is a bomb attack against a crowded area. We regard this as more likely than “Mumbai-style” attacks, because it requires less coordination and may be carried out by individuals as well as groups.

The second most likely mass-casualty scenario is Mumbai-style attacks. Such attacks will probably involve teams of mobile gunmen who either take hostages and barricade themselves, or simply shoot and kill as
many people as they can. They may combine shooting attacks with cruder forms of violence, such as arson or knife attacks, in order to disperse emergency response resources (the original Mumbai attackers used remote-controlled IEDs for this purpose).

Attacks using advanced weapons such as rockets or chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials are within the realm of possibility for jihadis in Europe. However, we consider them the least likely of the mass-casualty scenarios. CBRN terrorism in crude forms cannot be ruled out, but jihadis in Europe have probably never possessed a capability to cause mass destruction with CBRN, and are unlikely to do so for the next five years.

The Syrian civil war and rise of jihadi groups such as IS can, in theory, represent a CBRN threat. However, there is so far scant evidence that IS have obtained chemical agents from Syria, or that the organization has planned to employ such agents in international terrorism. Due to the logistical difficulties and high risk of detection associated with moving a chemical weapon or an advanced rocket system to Europe, jihadis will probably consider conventional terrorist weapons and attack methods sufficient.

**Most Likely Tactical Innovations**

There are anecdotal examples in the dataset of innovative terrorist plans. In some cases information about such plans may reflect the concerns of Western counterterrorism agencies, rather than what jihadis actually aim to do. Nevertheless, discussions among terrorists about novel attack methods may be indicative of scenarios we might expect in the future. Even if information on innovative plans does not represent actual attack plans, the very fact that they were discussed in the media could give ideas to future terrorists.

Attacks using miniature model cars and airplanes have been discussed on jihadi forums since at least 2006. [58] The first example of a jihadi plot to use model airplanes occurred in the U.S. in 2011. A U.S. citizen of Bangladeshi origin was arrested and later convicted of plotting attacks on the Pentagon and the Capitol with model airplanes filled with explosives.[59]

The most serious case in Europe was probably the “New Chechen Cell” case in Spain in 2012. Three individuals of Russian and Turkish origin were arrested and charged with planning a terrorist attack. They had a video in their possession, showing them practicing with a model airplane, and 100 grams of an unknown explosive.[60] A second, but more vague, plot occurred in Germany in June 2013. German police arrested two Tunisian suspects and confiscated model airplanes “powerful and big enough to carry explosives,” according to the media.[61] Finally, the perpetrators in the “Pak-Bengali Plot Luton” in 2012 discussed attacking a Territorial Army (TA) base by driving a model car carrying explosives under the gate. [62]

Another scenario contemplated by jihadis is the use of vehicles as weapons. The method was first described in an infamous *Inspire* magazine article from 2010 entitled “The ultimate mowing machine.”[63] It suggested welding steel blades on a pickup truck and then ramming it into a crowd of people, and following up with a handgun attack if possible. Reportedly, the perpetrators of the “Pak-Bengali Plot Luton” in 2012 discussed ramming cars into crowds of people, while making references to the idea presented in *Inspire* magazine.

There is one example in our material of a vehicle used as a weapon. The Woolwich assailants in 2013 first hit Drummer Lee Rigby with a car, before slaying him with a meat cleaver.[64] This attack method is generally not suitable for killing more than one or very few victims. The *Inspire* magazine article attempted to present a creative way of conducting “mass killing” by adding steel blades to the car, but it is surely hard to imagine
such a vehicle driving in traffic without raising suspicion.

Based on our survey, we endorse Dolnik’s observation that “multiplication and synchronization of traditional tactics” is a more likely scenario than a move towards new tactics and weaponry.[65] We see arson in combination with other weapons as a possible future scenario which has potential to cause mass casualties. Our data encompasses only one well-documented case in which arson has been used as a weapon. Two individuals attacked the home of publisher Martin Rynja in London in 2008, attempting to set the house on fire.[66] Arson attacks have been promoted in several online texts offering strategic and operational advice to the jihadi movement. Abu Musab al-Suri suggested using forest fires as a way to terrorize the enemy and causing economic damage, while Inspire magazine ran an article that suggested setting fire to cars in parking lots.[67] Neither al-Suri nor Inspire magazine have suggested using fire as a way of killing masses of people though.

However, fire in combination with other weapons represents an innovative and potentially dangerous scenario in Europe. Arson was used as a tactic in the Mumbai attacks in India in 2008. The purpose was apparently to kill hotel guests hiding in the upper floors of the Taj Hotel, after the attackers had barricaded themselves on the lower floors.[68] Needless to say, the fire created spectacular television images and the burning Taj became a signature image of the Mumbai attacks.

The last innovation we would like to draw attention to is the praxis of video filming crude attacks with action cameras so as to post them online. Both Mohammed Merah’s 2012 attacks in France and the 2014 Jewish Museum shooting by Mehdi Nemmouche exemplify this modus. The grizzly movies of beheadings by IS in Syria might inspire followers to carry out similar atrocities in front of the camera in Europe.[69] If scattered, crude attacks are filmed they could imply massive psychological impact even if the number of casualties is small.

Conclusion

Our main finding is that jihadi terrorism in Europe is becoming more discriminate in its targeting while attack methods are becoming more diverse. Overall, we surmise this reflects broader changes within the jihadi movement. Some of these changes have been initiated from above and some are pushed from below.

Jihadi terrorist plots in Europe involve cells controlled by al-Qaida, cells controlled by other jihadi groups, as well as independent cells, or individuals. Overall, it seems that even self-radicalized individuals who plot attacks on their own are sensitive to broad ideological and strategic guidelines emanating from al-Qaida’s central leadership.

We contend that the trend towards more discriminate attacks is partly a result of changed tactical guidelines from al-Qaida and its branches. Messages encouraging revenge attacks on individuals who insulted the Prophet Mohammed started appearing in 2006, after the crisis sparked by the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in Denmark. The new strategy was most clearly expressed in the 2011 al-Sahab video described earlier, which encouraged Muslims in the West to carry out individual acts of terrorism, rather than going to a conflict area and fighting, and eulogized the Fort Hood shooter as a role model. The video reflects deeper changes in al-Qaida’s approach to jihad in the West. By 2011, the U.S. drone campaign in northwestern Pakistan had killed a number of al-Qaida members including several leaders of al-Qaida’s External Operations branch. This reduced al-Qaida’s ability to stage top-down terrorist attacks in the West, and pressed the organization to rely more on individual sympathizers to carry out attacks on its behalf.
Individuals are more easily mobilized by emotional causes (such as insults against the Prophet Mohammed), than the lofty political strategies of global jihad. The shift towards more discriminate attacks therefore resonates with individual sympathizers while at the same time serving a strategic purpose. The crisis sparked by the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed came at a convenient time for al-Qaida because it was exactly the kind of mobilizing cause that could speak to a larger segment of Muslims than the ultra-extreme group traditionally attracted to al-Qaida.

As for the diversification of attack types and weapons, we contend that it reflects a tactical adaptation to more effective counter-terrorism efforts by European security services. However, we also argue that this diversification has to do with new jihadi actors plotting attacks in the region. This diversification is likely to increase in the years ahead. While in the time period surveyed (1994–2013), terrorists linked to—or inspired by—al-Qaida have been most important in shaping the threat to Europe, new groups and individual terrorists are becoming a more important part of the threat picture.

The ongoing conflict in Iraq and Syria is going to affect the jihadi threat to Europe in coming years. Returning foreign fighters from Syria have already staged plots in Europe and more will come. We expect that a majority of plots will follow the trend toward more discriminate targeting and more diverse attack methods. However, we will also see plots targeting European society at large, especially when European nations contribute more to the U.S.-led coalition in Syria or Iraq.

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**Notes**


[18] A “Mumbai-style attack” can be defined in several ways – the most essential element being teams of mobile gunmen who attack civilians in crowded places or inside buildings. The gunmen may or may not be equipped with suicide vests or IEDs, and hostage-taking and barricading inside buildings may or may not be part of the operation. In this article, “Mumbai-style attack” refers to the modus operandi used in the original Mumbai attack in 2008 – it was carried out by several teams of gunmen against multiple targets simultaneously, it involved several weapon systems (handguns and IEDs) and hostage taking/barricading was part of the attack.


[22] The largest bombings in Europe (truck bombs of 1,000-1,500 kgs.) were carried out by the Provisional IRA in England and Northern Ireland the 1990s. More recently, in 2011, right-wing terrorist Anders Behring Breivik set off a 950 kg truck-bomb outside the government quarter in Oslo.


[24] The five launched attacks are: Mohammed Game's attempt to bomb an Italian military base (12 October 2009), Arid Uka's shooting of U.S. soldiers on a shuttle bus in Frankfurt airport (2 March 2011), Mohammed Merah's shooting campaign in Southern France (March 2012), the Woolwich attack on a U.K. soldier (22 May.
2013), and the Paris soldier stabbing (27 May 2013).


[26] Interview with European security officials, April 2014.


[28] For definition of the “random vs discriminate attack” variable, consult Codebook in Appendix B.


[33] For more on the possible links between the Sauerland Plot and al-Qaida, see Guido Steinberg, German Jihad: On the internationalization of Islamist terrorism (Columbia University Press, 2013): 94-95.

[34] As a side note, the same PETN and TATP combination was used by AQAP in the “Cargo Planes Plot” in 2010, where the explosives were hidden in printers on board of two cargo planes bound for the U.S. It is not included in the plot list because the plot itself did not affect Europe in any significant way. The Underwear Bomber plot is included, because the perpetrator boarded the plane in Amsterdam.


[36] The hypothesis is supported by other cases such as the “Fertilizer Plot.” Recipes for fertilizer bombs are easily accessible in open sources and online. However, European jihadists only started plotting attacks with fertilizer bombs in 2004, after receiving training in Pakistan. The cell behind the “Fertilizer Plot” reportedly met with al-Qaida representatives in Pakistan to discuss the plot. It is unclear who exactly provided the training to them, and why they chose to use a fertilizer bomb rather than peroxide-based explosive. Nevertheless, the case illustrates how training abroad seems to be an important factor in explaining how innovative IED manufacture techniques get transferred to Europe.

[37] Author’s observations based on searches in a comprehensive archive of online jihadi training manuals maintained by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).

[38] Note, however, that the current state of jihadi online learning is not particularly advanced. See Anne Stenersen, “Bomb-making for beginners: Inside an al-Qaida e-learning course,” Perspectives on Terrorism 7, No. 1 (2013).


[41] “You are only responsible for yourself,” al-Sahab, 2 June 2011.


[43] Al-Suri calls the phenomenon al-jihad al-fardi, or “individual jihad”, referring to what we would call “single actor”, “solo” or “lone wolf” terrorism in Western parlance.

[44] See, for example, Ramon Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention, 2012 edition (Springer, 2011)


The reference to the hadith was made in Osama bin Laden’s "Oh People of Islam", *al-Sahab*, April 2006.


There are anecdotal examples in Europe of convicted jihadis who praised, and in some cases sought to emulate, past jihadi terrorist attacks. For example, one of the members of the Crevise cell in the U.K. was overheard praising the Madrid bombings shortly after they happened in 2004. Another example is the Jewish Museum shooter in 2014, who had previously bragged about carrying out a “five times Merah” attack (referring to the shooting spree of Muhammed Merah in Southern France in 2012). “Profile: Waheed Mahmood,” *BBC*, 30 April 2007; “Mehdi Nemmouche,” “Je vais faire cinq fois Merah au 14 Juillet” *Libération*, 7 September 2014.

Nine out of 16 plots in this period targeted U.S. interests.


"Important for all the Mujahidin from all the Brigades" (in Arabic), Muntadayat muhajirun al-islamiyya, 20 October 2006. On file with Author.

"Two admit publisher attack plot," *BBC*, 29 September 2011.

The alleged ringleader was a former Russian special forces soldier who allegedly spent time with jihadi groups, including the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and al-Qaida, in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. “Spain: Model plane video evidence of terror plot," *Associated Press*, 11 August 2012; “3 suspected Islamist terrorists arrested in France,” CNN, 1 March 2013,

"German police foil Islamist terror plot to use remote controlled aircraft filled with explosives as guided missiles," *Daily Mail*, 25 June 2013.


"The ultimate mowing machine," *Inspire* No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 53-57.

There are several examples of attempts to use vehicles as weapons in countries outside Western Europe. In March 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar attempted to drive a Jeep through a crowd at North Carolina University in the U.S. More recently, in October 2014, Martin Rouleau rammed his vehicle into two Canadian military personnel in Quebec, Canada. "Defendant offers details of Jeep attack at University," *New York Times*, 8 March 2006; "Canadian soldiers run down in possible Quebec terror attack," *The Star*, 20 October 2014.


In September 2014, an IS-linked plot to behead a person in public was allegedly thwarted by police in Australia. "Australian PM says police raids follow IS linked beheading plot," *Reuters*, 18 September 2014.
The Taliban and Twitter: Tactical Reporting and Strategic Messaging

by Vincent Bernatis

Abstract

The US military’s surge in Afghanistan from 2009 through 2012 was designed to blunt Taliban momentum and ultimately allow international forces to significantly reduce their presence and transition full responsibility for security to the Afghan government by 2015. In May of 2011, near the height of the surge, the Taliban leadership countered the international coalition by opening a distinct new front in their asymmetric battle; one waged not with bullets and bombs, but with regular English language posts on Twitter. This article utilizes public relations and communications theory to analyze a sample of these Tweets alongside Mullah Omar’s yearly Eid messages. In doing so, the argument is made that Taliban information operations on both the tactical and strategic levels promoted a narrative of the conflict designed to weaken the international public’s resolve to actively oppose the Taliban through a long-term deployment of primarily Western military forces to the country. For policymakers, the Taliban’s own chronicling of the war on social media indicates that insurgent forces are not nearly as capable of waging a jihad across all regions of the country as they might wish to be, nor are they in command of a large network of infiltrators willing and able to attack their international trainers and Afghan military partners on command. Academically, the Taliban’s use of Twitter reinforces other research showing that even in the more diffuse, less restrictive atmosphere of social media, the leadership of armed Islamist groups often attempt to exert control over internet-based information operations through the establishment of official social media accounts.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Taliban, social media

Introduction

The exigencies of war have a profound influence on organizations. The protracted insurgency in Afghanistan forced each belligerent party to develop innovative strategies in an effort to achieve victory. For forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), this largely comprised the adoption of full-scale counterinsurgency. The Taliban, a radical Islamist movement, also evolved in unexpected ways. For some, it may come as a bit of surprise that a group that once banned most forms of modern entertainment in a self-styled effort to “return to the early days of Islam” would nevertheless come to utilize the internet and social media as part of their campaign to return to power.[1] With a recent survey of the Afghan population reporting that only 3% of respondents utilized the internet to gather news, it seems highly unlikely that the Taliban’s regular Twitter posts and online distribution of strategic messages are designed for consumption by a domestic constituency.[2]

This analysis addresses a key question about the Taliban’s internet presence. How can we classify the Taliban’s digital information operations in terms of public relations and communications theory? It can be argued that the Taliban social media presence and the online publication of Mullah Omar’s yearly Eid messages represent a “press agentry” communications model (explained below) designed to draw attention to a Taliban narrative positioned to weaken the international public’s resolve to actively oppose the Taliban through military means.[3] From a communications theory perspective, the Taliban believe they can accomplish their objectives by casting key stakeholders in the following roles: the members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are brutal “invaders”, the Afghan government and security forces are feckless stooges of the international forces, while the Taliban are a moderate force seeking to deliver a sovereign and Islamic Afghanistan to its people. Finally, the Taliban—by their own accounting on Twitter—contradict their claims
of an expansive countrywide insurgency and are less responsible for infiltration type attacks then they might wish to be.

**Sample Selection and Methodology**

A comprehensive longitudinal examination of messages produced by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) is beyond the scope of this work.[4] While such an examination would undoubtedly add statistical validity to the model used herein, the communications selected for this study were chosen based on their qualitative significance: that is to say that the sum total of the social media posts and annual Eid messages offer the Taliban's narrative during a period encompassing the height of Obama's surge strategy through the ultimate withdrawal of those roughly 30,000 extra U.S. soldiers in 2012.[5] This research design juxtaposes the Taliban accounting of attack data against US Department of Defense reports to Congress. The latter reports detail, among other variables, “Enemy Initiated Attacks” per month as reported by each regional command, regardless of whether or not they caused fatalities.[6] While organizations such as the RAND Corporation have noted a number of problems with certain metrics utilized by ISAF and the Department of Defense in the Afghan war effort, the attack statistics used herein comprise the only available comprehensive data set that reports attacks against ISAF units throughout the country.[7] For an official measure of ISAF fatalities which detail the type, date, and location of an attack, this report also utilizes the data set compiled by iCasualties.org.[8] Finally, a precise and detailed account of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) fatalities occurring since 2009 does not exist. However the Brookings Institution's Afghanistan Index provides a monthly estimate of ANSF fatalities based on quotes from Afghan officials and secondary source reporting.[9]

In sum, the data gathered from the Taliban Twitter feed can be compared to official reporting of anti-ISAF attacks and estimates of ANSF fatalities as a means to determine how the organization desires to portray its insurgency effort to a largely Western audience. This same analysis will also provide a comparative means by which to assess the Taliban's military performance. While it would be valuable to utilize a sample of Tweets that encompasses the period from the start of the English language postings in May of 2011 through at least the publication date of this article, doing so would require a major change in the design of this study. In particular, the limited availability of historical Twitter postings, coupled with the fact that ISAF and the US Department of Defense quit recording the number of “Enemy Initiated Attacks” in March of 2013, means the analysis herein represents more of a natural experiment. In essence, this research takes advantage of a limited window of time during a critical period—the denouement of the U.S. surge—of Afghanistan's recent history in which data from two competing sources of information could reliably be compared to one another. Thus, the remaining sections of this essay detail how the insights extracted from the dueling figures provided by the Taliban and international community relate to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's larger strategic messaging initiatives. First, this study analyzes non-administrative, English language Tweets of the Taliban Twitter handle “@alemarahweb” during the fighting season of 2012. This particular time period and the Taliban feed selected for study comprise a data set that meets the following conditions: international media recognizes the account producing the Tweets as Taliban affiliated, the relevant time period allows comparison with data gathered by alternative sources (ISAF and iCasualties.org), and Taliban messages on alternative online platforms help place the Tweets in a more holistic context.[10] The subsequent paragraphs offer both a detailed explanation of the data selection process and the methodology of analysis.

The Twitter feed “@alemarahweb” began to post in English in May of 2011.[11] However, the only Tweets freely accessible are those posted after November of 2011.[12] Existing freeware programs focused on metrics such as a Twitter account's relative influence in the “Twitterverse” or tracking the most commonly used
hashtags are largely useless in analyzing the content of a Taliban Twitter feed that is not wholly integrated into a likeminded network of insurgent members and rarely, if ever, uses English hashtags. Other studies of the social media engagement of Middle Eastern groups focused on waging a global jihad utilize these types of Twitter analytics with some success. In such cases, researchers measured the relative influence of jihadis operating among a digital community of believers in which the senders, receivers, and sharers of ideas all have access to computers.[13] If a significant number of Taliban fighters across Afghanistan were utilizing laptops to communicate with each other and their leaders in the social media environment, then standard Twitter analytic metrics would be useful. In this case, a study of the Taliban's social media efforts requires either tailor-made software or manual coding by a human; this article utilizes the latter method.

To whittle the volume of the data set down to a manageable yet topically relevant size, the decision was made to examine Tweets from the summer fighting season of 2012, a period encompassing May through September.[14] This study purposely excludes Tweets from “@alemarahweb” that reference administrative details, such as the posting of a new video to the Islamic Emirate’s webpage, since these Tweets do not intrinsically contain information of relevance. Essentially, this research design only involved coding Tweets that reported on direct actions by insurgents or those which highlighted current events perceived by the Taliban to be beneficial to their cause (a protest against “American desecration of a Qur’an”, for example). Each of the 349 Tweets from the resulting sample was then coded based on the manner in which they utilize terms like “invader”, “puppet”, or “minion” to categorize individuals opposed to the Taliban. From each Tweet, the study also tabulated the alleged number of fatalities inflicted on civilians or counterinsurgent forces, along with the manner of attack, and any aerial assets that may have been destroyed. The final element of coding for each Tweet included a location categorization by correlating the listed area of an event to a specific ISAF regional command (RC).[15]
Figure 1. Map of ISAF Regional Commands (Dated September 2011) [16]

Take the following Tweet as an example:

3 invaders killed as their tank blown up in IED blast: LOGAR, Sept. 24 – A roadside bomb blast planted by Muja... http://bit.ly/VwBe7p.[17]

In this case, the attack would be coded as an event in which ISAF is referenced using some derivation of the word “invader”. The mode of attack is an improvised explosive device (IED) resulting in three ISAF fatalities, one tank destroyed, and the event occurred in the RC-East area of responsibility. Most of the Tweets from this Taliban account utilize some derivative of this particular format and usually detail the method of attack, number of fatalities inflicted, any equipment destroyed, the province in which the event occurred, and the date of the event. The end product thus includes a number of quantifiable metrics from the Taliban perspective, such as ISAF or ANSF fatalities by month by region, which can then be compared against similar data gathered by other organizations. In order to more thoroughly analyze such data, this essay will combine aspects of marketing and public relations theory previously applied to cases similar to the one presented in this work.

**Applying Theory**

According to Zelin, the major growth in jihadi social media can generally be attributed to the 2010 efforts of the now deceased Anwar al-Awlaki.[18] One of the main findings of Zelin’s work, though it focuses almost exclusively on Arabic speaking jihadi groups, is that affiliated individuals tend to shun Twitter in favor of the exclusivity of online forums and do not regularly use English in their postings.[19] However, one recent work analyzing the social media usage of Western nationals fighting in Syria showed that “most groups’ media outlets still...
post their content to jihadi forums but will simultaneously create sponsored Twitter accounts where they release new statements or videos” and that much of the content, often in English, posted by these individual fighters remains more heavily influenced by a group’s central leadership than a casual observer might otherwise expect.[20] The Taliban case, therefore, is more reflective of the latter trend where message content is controlled through the use of official or semi-official social media accounts. The notable exception however, is that there is no evidence to show that the Islamic Emirate's English language posts result from the presence of Western citizens who have joined the Taliban’s cause. Nevertheless, to more effectively examine why and how an organization—corporate, militant, or otherwise—utilizes Twitter, it is useful to look at research from the field of public relations.

Waters and Williams provide an excellent summary of organizational practices on Twitter in stating that “research has shown that advocacy organizations rarely use social networking sites or blogs to create dialogue; instead, their primary focus is information sharing.”[21] Though the Taliban are not an advocacy organization of the same type included in the Waters and Williams study, they view themselves as a legitimate governing entity (albeit in a militarily imposed exile) that is nevertheless communicating to an audience about a desire to return to power. The aforementioned study goes on to highlight four particular models of public relations. The first is known as “press agentry” and is classified as a “one way asymmetrical model” in which communications are designed to “catch attention and interest and to convince the audience of an idea, using any means necessary.”[22] Additional characteristics of the press agentry manner of communication include “sensationalism” and “embellishment” that “stretch or abandon the truth” and contain few, if any, “backup or references” in support of the particular claim.

A detailed look at the Taliban Twitter feed shows that it is clearly engaged in this method of public relations. Taliban reporting of attacks through the summer of 2012 is rife with embellishment in terms of damage inflicted on ISAF forces, but appears to understate the effectiveness of their attacks against ANSF elements. Specifically, based on Twitter reporting, the Taliban claim to kill an average of 196 ANSF personnel per month during this period; resulting in a total of 980 fatalities. Estimates based on data compiled in the Brookings Institutions’ Afghanistan Index, suggests an average monthly death toll of closer to 309 ANSF personnel, though a lack of regular, detailed reporting from the Afghan government negatively impacts the precision of such an aggregated estimate.[23] Nevertheless, the overall trends illustrate a messaging campaign primarily targeted to demoralize a Western audience. Table 1 shows a brief sample of the comparative difference in attack metrics between ISAF and the Taliban.
Table 1. ISAF Fatalities and Helicopter Crashes by Reporting Source for Summer 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Attack</th>
<th>Taliban Reported</th>
<th>ISAF Reported *</th>
<th>Taliban Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IED/Suicide IED</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>+62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Action (not «insider attack»)</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>+384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Action («insider attack»)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ISAF Fatalities by Hostile Action</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>+436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Destroyed</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters Downed Due to Hostile Fire (resulting in fatalities)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters Downed Due to Non-Hostile Causes (resulting in fatalities)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data based on iCasualties.org independent analysis of official ISAF news releases and other media reporting [24]

What is also interesting is the extent to which the Taliban Twitter feed tends to understate casualties caused by attacks in which an ANSF member turns his weapon on an ISAF soldier. This will be discussed in more detail in the strategic messaging portion, but this is indicative of the Taliban’s general lack of direct responsibility for insider attacks even though they recognize their tactical effectiveness and propaganda value.[25] As a final specific example of the Taliban’s attempt to utilize Twitter to sensationalize the impact of an attack on Western personnel, one needs to look little further than the reporting surrounding a suicide attack in Kabul (RC-Capital) on May 2, 2012. Although the Taliban Twitter account claimed this resulted in the death of 43 “invaders”—the largest single day death toll for an attack in which the Taliban “confirm” killing foreigners—in fact the only non-Afghan citizen killed was a private security guard.[26] In any event, they also failed to mention the associated deaths of six civilians, which is not surprising given that the Taliban Twitter account does not contain a single post in which insurgents acknowledge that their actions may have caused civilian casualties. Overall, the general character of the Taliban’s sensational and unsubstantiated claims exemplifies the press agentry model. Importantly though, these mostly tactical reports are less concerned about accurately conveying the numbers of ISAF personnel killed in Afghanistan so long as they serve to draw attention to the Taliban’s larger strategic messaging themes. As we will see in the next section, the Islamic Emirate delivers its respective narrative via a bi-level communications scheme in which regular Twitter messaging attempts to reinforce the material in Mullah Omar’s annual Eid ul-Adha and Eid ul-Fitr manifestos.

One particularly prescient study that provides an appropriate manner of assessing the content, delivery, and interpretation of jihadi media is that of Baines and O’Shaughnessy who describe terrorism as a “deviant sub-branch of political marketing”.[27] These authors rely on concepts from marketing theory known as “intended positioning” and “cultural interpretation” to indirectly determine what particular message(s) the producer of a video glorifying jihad is attempting to convey. Most specifically, they utilize a deconstruction technique attributed to Jacques Derrida which attempts to identify “privileged themes” and “binary pairs or opposites” in an effort to reveal what message a work is designed to portray and the manner in which it
is conveyed.[28] Utilizing this same technique, it is argued here that the adoption of the internet in general and Twitter, in particular, is designed to deliver the Taliban's privileged themes (its intended position) in a manner that is readily used and understood by citizens of Western societies (cultural interpretation).

Regardless of whether or not Mullah Omar actually writes the Taliban's annual messages for Eid ul-Adha and Eid ul-Fitr, the Taliban leadership is increasingly aware of the importance of influencing Western public opinion.[29] The Taliban no longer appear hesitant to engage in the media war, which may be a direct influence of the senior leadership's interactions with Bin Laden in which the latter is reported to have advised his Afghan hosts that “it is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles.”[30] In other words, media engagement is perhaps even more important to winning a campaign than the actual tactical or operational task itself. In embracing the media as an additional tool of asymmetric warfare, the Taliban's 2011 Eid ul-Adha message mentions the Islamic Emirate's “official Spokesmen, Websites and Press Releases” while encouraging “the men of letters” to “put to work their pens in the cause of defense of their religion.”[31] The Taliban leadership seems to most poignantly address both the audience and purpose of their information operations in stating that “the American and Western people have no further taste for extending the Afghan war and seeing their soldiers return in coffins.”[32] The Taliban thus have identified the Western citizenry as the center of gravity of the international war effort and target this audience through a number of privileged themes portrayed in different mediums.

As the aforementioned excerpts from Mullah Omar demonstrate, the Taliban look to the internet in general and social media in particular as an operational front complementary to actual violent action against ISAF and ANSF targets. Ultimately, both components are part of a strategy to force a complete and permanent withdrawal of an international security force presence in Afghanistan. Communications theory states that the presence of “opposites or binary pairs” in the text will ultimately reflect the intended message of the author. For the Taliban, Twitter is a means of pumping out a consistent stream of alternative identities: ISAF soldiers are “invaders” and “terrorists”, not liberators; and Afghans serving in the security services or government are neither patriots nor true Muslims, but “puppets”. [33] Chart 1 demonstrates a Taliban preference for portraying ANSF and ISAF personnel not as worthy military “enemies”, but as a less legitimate type of opponent.

![Chart 1: Taliban Twitter and the Creation of “Alternative Identities” for ANSF/ISAF](image)

With the “binary pairs” of the Twitter feed identified, it is important to examine the extent to which these Tweets support the deliverance of the Taliban's privileged strategic messaging themes.
One major theme that the Taliban attempted to reinforce following the 2012 fighting season is that of a more effective jihad expanding to all parts of the country. In Mullah Omar’s 2012 Eid ul-Adha message he states:

"The ranks of Jihad do strengthen, experiencing expansion in every part of the country because of the close support of [our] brave people with the Mujahideen and their sacrifices. Massive aggressive and Jihadic [sic] tactical attacks are carried out against the grand bases of the invaders.[34]"

Given the limitations of available data, it is not possible to accurately assess the claim of an expansion of jihad to all regions of the country. However, Table 2 shows that much of the fighting occurs in the Pashtu dominated South and East of the country, as a relative proportion of overall attacks.

Table 2. Attacks by Region as Reported by the Taliban and ISAF for Summer 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Taliban Reported Anti-ISAF Attacks</th>
<th>ISAF Reported Anti-ISAF Attacks*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RC-South</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-Southwest</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-East</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-West</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-North</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-Capital</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*ISAF reported percentages equal 101% due to rounding (and raw figures are unavailable)

** ISAF reports this as statistically negligible in respect to the total number of attacks

Though the Department of Defense acknowledges that regional commands outside of these areas are clearly not immune to Taliban penetration, the Taliban’s reach into places like Mazar-e-Sharif (RC-North) and Kabul (RC-Capital) is likely blunted by the enmity they created during their years in power.[35]

A second privileged theme the Taliban attempt to convey to the West in their effort to erode public morale is the insurgents’ ability to deliberately plan and execute “insider attacks”. In the Eid ul-Fitr address following the 2012 fighting season, the Taliban appeared ready to portray themselves as key facilitators, if not direct planners, of past attacks while also demonstrating a capability to conduct them in the future. In addition to allegedly creating a “Guidance, Luring and Integration” operational wing, the Taliban take responsibility for the season’s attacks in stating that “Mujahideen have cleverly infiltrated the ranks of the enemy according to the plan given to them last year”. However, as mentioned earlier in this analysis, Taliban Tweets fail to account for the full range of fatalities resulting from the incidents and they do not provide Tweets claiming responsibility for a number of insider attacks reported by ISAF. Ultimately, because the Taliban are likely not the proximate cause of a number of insider attacks they are forced to retroactively claim responsibility in order to strengthen the narrative that they are able to penetrate ISAF’s most secure locations.[37]

Conclusion

From the outset, this study sought to analyze the Taliban’s social media and general internet presence in an effort to better classify the organization’s information operations while also gaining a new perspective on insurgent operations. Assessments and statements from both sides of the military divide acknowledge that the Taliban’s ability to use the media became an increasingly important front in the war for Afghanistan.[38] The analysis of Tweets from a Taliban social media account illustrates how the Taliban are primarily engaged in a model of public relations dominated by an effort to draw attention to a number of themes designed to
drain Western support for a prolonged military effort. While the Taliban have largely been successful in adopting and experimenting with a platform capable of delivering their competing narrative to Western audiences, their own tactical reporting on Twitter does not fully complement key strategic themes. The Taliban, as much as they might wish themselves to be, are not waging a jihad that is consistently effective in attacking their enemies across all regions of Afghanistan nor are they in command of a network of sleeper cells willing and able to conduct insider attacks on demand. Yet, unquestionable military effectiveness is not necessary to force the permanent withdrawal of international forces. For the Taliban, their goals cannot be achieved through social media outreach and internet proclamations alone, but their narratives can garner increased attention if they are built on a steady stream of newsworthy tactical victories.

Accordingly, Taliban social media activity presents a rich opportunity for continued study. Future research utilizing computer programming to analyze a greater sampling of Tweets from multiple Taliban accounts could improve on the sample utilized in this research, leading to more accurate predictions about how the insurgents will counter the body of international forces remaining in the country after 2014. With the government of Afghanistan, the US, and NATO recently signing new security mandates, other studies could continue to track the Taliban social media presence to see if it changes to address new audiences, convey different themes, or disappears altogether. Ultimately, this study provides a basic foundation from which to start.

**About the Author:** Vincent Bernatis will receive his MA in Middle East and Islamic Studies in December of 2014, formally concluding his year studying as a Fulbright Postgraduate Scholar to the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom. Prior to his selection as a Fulbright Scholar, Vincent served as a combat arms officer in the U.S. Army, deploying to Afghanistan’s Kandahar and Kunduz provinces in 2011. He earned his Bachelor of Science in International Relations from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 2008.

**Notes**


[3] Eid ul-Fitr celebrates the end of Ramadan and the breaking of the fast, while Eid ul-Adha is the second of these holidays to occur during the calendar year and commemorates Ibrahim’s willingness to sacrifice his son as a mark of obedience to Allah.


[6] The US Congress mandates that the US Department of Defense submits these progress reports on Afghanistan every 180 days. Therefore, each report covers


[8] iCasualties.org. "Operation Enduring Freedom", 2014 [Datasheet online]; available from http://icasualties.org/oef/. iCasualties.org compiles casualty lists based on reporting by ISAF and respective countries’ defense ministries and relevant news releases. The data also includes helpful additional details as to whether service members were killed in an “insider attack” or died in a helicopter crash attributed to hostile fire.

[9] Livingston, Ian and Michael O’Hanlon. Afghanistan Index. Selected Data on Afghanistan and Pakistan (Brookings Institution, 2014). For 2012 they estimate the total number of ANSF deaths to be 3,400 individuals for the period from January through November. This entails a monthly average of 309 deaths per month. Unfortunately, the lack of more detailed reporting means that this number fails to take into account the seasonal spike in attacks (and deaths) that occur during the summer months.

[10] Boone, Jon. “Taliban Join the Twitter Revolution.” The Guardian. 12 May 2011. It is important to note that two other “official” Taliban Twitter feeds are now in existence, “@ABalkhi” and “@Zabihmujahid”. The latter is the namesake of the Taliban spokesman often frequently contacted by media outlets for comments about particular attacks.


[12] Software is available that is capable of archiving or storing Tweets for a set period of time, but such programs store all future posts based on user specifications. These programs are not capable of recovering or retroactively archiving Tweets which have already “expired”.


[14] Many of the Tweets on the feed are exact duplicates of each other. The data set only utilizes one Tweet of the “duplicate pair” to avoid double counting. Additionally, any additional information in the Tweet beyond 140 characters is excluded because the information was either inaccessible or contained a non-functioning link to an external website.

[15] The ISAF regional commands during this period are RC-North, RC-East, RC-South, RC-Southwest, RC-West, and RC-Capital. For further information on the regional command structure, see: http://www.isaf.nato.int/.


[22] Ibid, 356.

[23] Livingston and O’Hanlon, 13. The authors of this report cite a number of issues with obtaining an accurate breakdown of ANSF casualties, but provide a yearly estimate of ANSF fatalities by compiling reporting from the Afghan government and independent news organizations. For 2012, the report's 11 month estimate of ANSF fatalities of 3,400 personnel was taken and this number was divided by 11 to obtain a monthly average of 309. However, due to the lack of detailed reporting and data only covering a shortened year (11 months) the monthly average does not capture the fluctuations in fatalities that occur due to seasonal variations in the intensity of fighting. The lack of publically available reports also means that it is impossible to provide an official estimate of which regions of the country are deadliest for ANSF personnel. Nevertheless, it is the best metric available that allows for a comparison of Taliban reported anti-ANSF attacks.
iCasualties.org reporting is considered a reputable source for a monthly breakdown of all ISAF casualty data. News organizations as varied as the BBC, NY Times, and Agence France-Presse have all utilized this database for their own reporting. For an examination of how iCasualties became a widely cited resource see: Cohen, Noam. "Close Watch on Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq." New York Times. 21 November 2010. Think tanks also recognize this dataset as reputable source. For example see: Livingston, and O’Hanlon. Afghanistan Index. Selected Data on Afghanistan and Pakistan (Brookings Institution, 2014), 10.

My analysis of the Taliban’s statements on Twitter largely corroborate the ISAF assessment in December of 2012 which states that insider attacks are both an "enemy tactic" and "have a cultural component", yet "remain useful to the insurgency whether or not they are deliberately planned. See: US Department of Defense. Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (December 2012), 1, 6.


Obtaining these messages directly from the Taliban’s website is difficult as the page is frequently removed from internet servers or blocked. Therefore, all versions of the Eid addresses are obtained from third party websites. Unfortunately, the author could not locate any vetted, officially translated catalogue of all of the Taliban’s Eid addresses in open source material.

Zehlin's study quotes this correspondence between Bin Laden and Mullah Omar on page 3.

Omar, Muhammad. "Mullah Omar's Eid ul-Fitr Message (August 28, 2011)." Information Clearing House, 28 August 2011 [translated text of address on-line]; available from http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article28997.htm; and "Mullah Omar's Eid-ul-Adha Message 2011." Uruknet. 04 November 2011 [translated text of address on-line]; available from http://www.uruknet.de/. The latter message actually directs the Taliban’s “countrymen” to seek out information from the Islamic Emirate’s “Spokesmen, Websites, and Press Releases”, though Taliban leadership may have later realized that the digital medium was more effective for reaching Americans than Afghans.


Term usage is not mutually exclusive and the chart accounts for all relevant derivatives of a particular alternative identity. For example “invader,” “invading”, and “invaders” are all counted under the identity of “invader”. Multiple uses of the same derivative in a single Tweet are not double counted. Also, identities are not mutually exclusive as the Tweets occasionally use two distinct qualifiers. For example a dead ANSF soldier may be referred to as both a "hireling" and a "minion" in the same post. In this case, the count for each identity is increased by 1.


For an assessment of the insurgency during the relevant period, see: US Department of Defense. Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (December 2012), 3-5. For an account of how the Taliban's pre-2001 military campaigns created regional enemies see: Barfield, 262.


US Department of Defense. Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (December 2012), 1, 6, 35. Interestingly, this report states that the Taliban overstate both the number of casualties and the number of attacks. This is not borne out by Tweets on the examined account, but may refer to quotes given to media outlets after an insider attack occurs.

Ibid, 21, 33, 35. Portions of these sections also use direct quotes from various Taliban messages—such as the yearly Eid messages quoted in this essay—to demonstrate that the Islamic Emirate’s various media outreach and information operations are important elements of the conflict.
Has Adam Gadahn Forsaken the Lawful Jihad for Anti-Americanism? A Case Study of Ideological Contradictions

by Paul Kamolnick

And if you say that this barbaric style is known in your tribal traditions, or your people's traditions, or tolerated by your Shaykh or Emir, we would say: It is not allowed in our Islam . . . A fight that is not guided by the Shari'ah rules is not honored.[1]

We denounce any operation carried out by a Jihadi group that does not consider the sanctity of Muslims and their blood and money. We refuse to attribute these crimes to Qa'ida al-Jihad Organization. . . . This position and the judgment is not to be changed if the act is carried out in the name of Jihad or under the banner of establishing Shari'ah and the legal measures, or under the name of promoting virtue and preventing vice. As long as it is forbidden in God's religion, we are disassociated from it.[2]

I have no doubt that what is happening to the Jihadi movement in these countries is not misfortune, but punishment by God on us because of our sins and injustices, or because of the sins of some of us and the silence of the rest of us.[3]

Abstract

Despite his importance as a senior Al-Qaeda spokesman, no detailed examination exists of Adam Yahiye Gadahn's employment of fiqh al-jihad—that branch of Islamic jurisprudence regulating the lawful waging of jihad—to condemn or condone violence committed in the name of Al-Qaeda. This article first provides a detailed exposition of Gadahn's sharia-based critique of affiliates' conduct deemed by him in violation of Islamic law and involving the commission of major sins. Second, Gadahn's conception of fiqh al-jihad is contextualized and contrasted with the comprehensive fiqh al-jihad-based critiques produced by respected militant Islamist scholars. A key finding here is that Gadahn (unlike these scholars) illicitly truncates the application of fiqh al-jihad with the result that he demands sharia-compliance when criticizing intra-Islamist violence yet ignores sharia-compliance when targeting America and Americans. Third, reasons are considered for this incoherent application of fiqh al-jihad and attempted Islamic legalization of anti-American mass casualty terrorist attacks. Finally, the discussion concludes with implications for counter-Al-Qaeda strategy.

Keywords: Adam Gadahn, Al-Qaeda, Fiqh al-Jihad, Anti-American mass casualty terrorism, counterterrorism

Introduction

The declassification of 17 documents captured during the United States government (USG) May 2, 2011 raid on then Al-Qaeda emir Usama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, offers scholars a rare opportunity to study candid internal discussions among Al-Qaeda's Senior Leadership (AQSL).[4] One of these documents is a 21-page single-spaced letter[5] authored by al-Qaeda senior communications operative Adam Yahiye Gadahn (aka: Azzam al-Amriki).[6] Composed about four months before the Abbottabad raid,[7] two themes are prevalent. In response to queries by AQSL's highest echelons, Gadahn supplies detailed suggestions for AQSL information warfare (i.e. 'media') strategy including a nuanced analysis of target audiences, messengers, messaging, and media.[8] He also produces a searing critique of certain affiliates and associates guilty of illicitly shedding Muslim blood. Though obviously frustrated by how this blood spilling subverts AQSL's messaging strategy, Gadahn's chief concern is moral and religious-legal. He boldly urges AQSL to formally disavow and disassociate from these groups' illegal, sinful conduct, and
actually pens a model declaration.

Analyses and commentary exist of Gadahn's media-related operations, [9] ascent to a surprisingly senior position in AQSL,[10] and his vehement denunciation of intra-Muslim bloodshed.[11] Beyond noting this latter concern, however, to date no systematic analysis exists of Gadahn's employment of fiqh al-jihad—that branch of Islamic jurisprudence regulating the lawful waging of jihad—to condemn or condone violence committed in the name of or in alleged sympathy with AQSL.

Why focus on Gadahn's employment of fiqh al-jihad? First, AQSL's legitimation as a salafist vanguard is based in its insistence that it fully emulates the path of the righteous ancestors (al salaf al salih) striving and struggling in the path of Allah to raise Allah's Word (jihad fi sabil Allah li Ila' kalimat Allah), and that it does so by righteously adhering to the Divine shari'a. Gadahn's letter provides decisive evidence, however, that he illicitly restricts the scope of fiqh al-jihad proscriptions and prescriptions to intra-Islamic bloodshed. By so doing he evades condemnation of, and often sanctions, other types of forbidden (haram) conduct including that associated with perpetrating mass casualty terrorist attacks against America and Americans. This finding is of particular relevance to United States Government (USG) personnel tasked with formulating strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat this terrorist adversary.[12]

Second, it is prudent to take Gadahn's sharia-based justifications or condemnations of 'jihadist' terrorist actions very seriously: they are functionally-related to his current status as a high-visibility official AQSL spokesperson charged with inspiring, inciting, and mobilizing English-speaking and Arabic-fluent audiences to attack the 'Zionist-Crusader' alliance. Gadahn has appeared this past decade in over 42 videos produced by AQSL's official media site al-Sahab (The Clouds). His sharia-based arguments and agitational propaganda have been prominently displayed in five of twelve issues of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) English-language online magazine Inspire. Gadahn's article, “Besiege Them: Practical Steps Toward the Liberation of Palestine and the Restoration of the Caliphate,” is the featured cover story in the Fall 2014 inaugural issue of Resurgence: AQSL's brand new English-language publication targeting the Indian Sub-continent.[13]

This analysis is organized as follows. First, a detailed exposition is provided of Gadahn's sharia-based critique of affiliates' conduct deemed by him to be in violation of Islamic law and involving the commission of major sins. Second, Gadahn's conception of fiqh al-jihad is contextualized and contrasted with the comprehensive fiqh al-jihad-based critiques produced by religious scholars associated with a group of militant Islamist scholars that can be collectively labeled a “Corrections Current” (a term explained later in this discussion). [14] A key finding here is that Gadahn, unlike these scholars, illicitly truncates the application of fiqh al-jihad with the result that he demands sharia-compliance when criticizing intra-Islamist violence yet ignores sharia-compliance when targeting America and Americans. Third, reasons are considered for this incoherent application of fiqh al-jihad and attempted Islamic legalization of anti-American mass casualty terrorist attacks. The article concludes with implications for counter-AQSL strategy.

**Gadahn's Shari'ā Case Against Intentional Homicide Committed by Muslims**

Gadahn presents a shari'a-based critique of affiliates' conduct deemed by him to be in violation of Islamic law and involving the commission of major sins. Qur'an, ahadith (traditions of the Prophet Muhammad), ijma (scholarly consensus), qiyas (analogical reasoning), and empirical history—major sources used by religious scholars to render religious opinions or verdicts (fatawa)—are introduced as evidence in support of his vehement request that AQSL openly disavow and disassociate from these murderous Muslims.[15] This request rests on the following three sub-arguments:
The Murderous Mujahidin

Gadahn alleges that the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), Somalian Harakat al-Shabab al Mujahidin (aka: al-Shabab, ‘The Youth’), and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)[16] are guilty of the commission of major sins. This conclusion rests on two premises: that these groups commit intentional homicide; and that this spilling of Muslim blood is a major sin in Islam.

Murderous Agents.

First, Gadahn cites various facts that have been reported and corroborated by reliable sources, and representing a mere “drop from a flood.”[17] Fourteen bombings are cited responsible for the murder of hundreds of innocent Muslims, and maiming of thousands more. These attacks, designed to kill regime targets or tribal foes, were conducted in playgrounds, marketplaces, mosques, public thoroughfares, the University of Islamabad, a graduation ceremony for new medical doctors in Somalia, checkpoints, restaurants, and many places “crowded with pedestrians, residents, and shoppers.” As a direct consequence, these murderous Muslims turned everyday life into nightmarish scenarios, shattering lives and families, and supplanting Muslim security and sanctity with horrific carnage.[18]

Second, Gadahn demonstrates the logical absurdity of two attempts by the culpable party to disassociate themselves from murderous conduct. In an attempt to deny responsibility for the murder of 70 Muslims and maiming of many others, the TTP’s Tariq ‘Azam and Wali al-Rahman Mehsud contacted the press and laid blame on the security contractor Blackwater. They also, Gadahn claims, “denied any relation between [the] Taliban Pakistan movement and Faisal Shahzad, who tried to blast Times Square in New York.” Their blatant dishonesty is proven, however, since following these very incidents “there was a film broadcast by (‘Umar Studio) the[ir] media branch” claiming responsibility for these attacks. A second incident involved using an Uzbek propaganda outlet Umma Studio’s own words to confirm their murderous assaults, since they openly “pledge [i.e. promise] in all rudeness to explode the mosques, as revenge for the attack on the Red Mosque, and to bombard other mosques at the tribal areas.”[19]

Gadahn concludes this evidentiary phase of his case with two stories.[20] In the first he recounts a conversation with a young Arab volunteer who had been told by his father that Egyptian militant Sayyid Qutb’s writings demand that every existing mosque should be viewed as a den of spies, informers, and agents of the ruling regime, and therefore destroyed. “I told him,” Gadahn recounts, “fine, if you see that they are mosques of evil, tear them down, but do not explode them when the praying people are inside them.” He concludes: “Imagine; a young man ready to detonate a mosque with what it includes, based on a generalization of what was stated by Sayyid Qutb, may God bless his soul.”[21] The second story was relayed to him by a militant whose task it was to reinforce a Taliban unit. This person asked the Taliban commander what the commander would do if for some reason his designated target, the Pakistani army, did not show up. The commander in charge stated that they should then target the Shi’a, and if the Shi’a were not present, the religious hypocrites, and if no hypocrites, someone from the general public or a passerby. “The head of the outside group was so angered and disputed him, [and] the local leader was embarrassed and stated that he was joking. The head of the outside group replied, ‘How could you joke like that in front of your soldiers and members?’”

Murderers are Major Sinners.

It is permissible in the context of warfare with non-believers to kill (or risk having killed) innocent Muslims.
Known as Muslim Tirs or Human Shields (*al-Tatarrus*), this is only permissible, however, under conditions of extreme duress and dire necessity, as a last resort even if one is under attack, and only within the context of a truly defensive jihad (*jihad al-daif*).[22] Gadahn cites Qur’an, Hadith, and reasons by analogy to prove that the TTP, al-Shabab, and the ISI violate these stringent rules governing *al-Tatarrus* and therefore are guilty of committing murder.[23]

Beyond Qur’an and a hadith, Gadahn employs analogical reasoning (*qiyas*) to demonstrate that the murderous carnage of the present has direct parallels to previous epochs whether committed by ultra-fanatical Muslim sects, medieval genocidal warriors and tyrants, or more contemporary despotic regimes. There are also profound dissimilarities between past epochs of lawfully regulated warfare and present-day murderous mayhem. “It is known that taking over of mosques and spilling the [blood of] innocents, was known throughout history to be associated with the worst groups and individuals,” he states. And this despite the fact “that their blood is never allowed to be spilled, nor money taken or dishonor, or hurt him or branding him an infidel, except upon a legal proof clearer than the noonday’s sun.”[24] “Have you not remembered that you are fighting in the Muslim towns and not in the infidel’s fortresses?” Gadahn asks. And instead of a military-on-military fight against a predatory Crusader power’s army you “detonate a mosque full of praying individuals, or any other place where Muslims gather, just for the sake of killing one of the individuals present in that location.”[25] The indiscriminateness, viciousness, and lack of any necessity for this barbarism of method serves as undeniable evidence of the most heinous of sins possible in Islam, or any faith. “If that targeted person really deserves to be killed,” he declares, “why not employ another method rather than random attacks, which is not tolerated by any mind or religion. [One] [w]hich does not differentiate between an enemy and a friend, the child and the old man, the man and the woman and the Muslim and the infidel?”[26]

Finally, Gadahn identifies two additional religious-legal violations beyond *al-Tatarrus*. Retributive justice (*qisas*) in Islam demands that limits be honored and that the repayment for a wrong not exceed the harm caused: indeed, Allah is more desirous of generosity and forgiveness—of compassion and mercy—than strictest justice let alone punitive vengeance. For example, in Quran 2:190 placed by Gadahn at the head of his model Declaration of disavowal, it states: “God almighty has stated: “Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors.”[27]

Violating retributive justice is joined by another egregious sin: the replacement of Allah’s shari’a by other sources of legislation that usurp Allah’s right to legislate. Calling the TTP’s murderous attacks on Muslims to task, he declares, “A fight that is not guided by the Shari’ah rules is not honored. If the fight adheres to the tribal traditions and human opinions that violate the Shari’ah whose ruling is no different from the constitutions and man-made laws, we should repudiate them and those rules should not be followed.”[28]

*Mute Satans?*

After establishing responsibility for the sinfulness of murdering Muslims as fact and law, Gadahn’s second sub-argument is also empirical and legal, and deals with the question of AQSL’s potential complicity in sin. Specifically, is AQSL religiously obligated to openly disavow and disassociate from those whom it accuses of having committed major sins? And by implication, Does failure to do so make AQSL complicit in those major sins? Gadahn’s answer is “Yes” to each.
The Religious Obligation to Publicly Condemn and Disavow Openly-Publicized Forbidden Wrongs.

Gadahn begins by invoking the requirement binding on all Muslims as a matter of righteous living to enjoin the good and prohibit wrongful conduct (al-amr bil-ma’ruf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar).[29] This murderous sinful conduct committed by persons claiming an association with AQSL’s jihad places greater responsibility on AQSL. The public professions made by these murderous Muslims can no longer be dealt with in secret as a matter of brotherly Muslim admonition and instruction of ignorant, wayward souls. The nature and publicity given this sinfulness, and AQSL’s aversion to publicly and unreservedly disavow these sins, have now become a vital religious matter. AQSL’s religious and legal responsibility substantially differs since:

The known repudiated act is judged differently from that of which no one is aware except the one committing it. The last type works in secrecy, and not to announce it—with some exceptions—while the first type is where denial is in the open. This benefits the others who would be willing or planning to do it or imitate the one doing it. And for other reasons, this disclosure of denial is what we ignored here. This made our denial incomplete and not qualifying to its basics, and God knows best.[30]

Gadahn’s reasoned dissent from any path other than public disavowal is unequivocal. For example, he dissents from those who successfully influenced Shaykh Atiyatallah, a key AQSL religious scholar, to remove from his fatwa a specific condemnation of the groups involved. “Those who advised him to delete that part,” Gadahn remarks, . . . “argued that we should not admit that such acts were committed from within our ranks: that means we have to impose a media silence!”[31] “This is a mistake from many aspects,” he continues:

The matter is religious and a fatwa and an order for virtue and a prevention of vice, and not a simple “organizational secret” of the type that we may impose a media silence on. Hiding the right, and delaying its details when in need, has strong religious implications, as is well known. Now that the matter is exposed to all, near and far, our silence will lead to be despised by people and despising ourselves, as we look in front of all as “Mute Satans.” We see the forbidden committed, and make no move, or look like compromisers, praising the killers while they are alive, and condole them when dead, and count them as good doers, irrespective of what we know about them of immorality. We look in the best of cases as inattentive who are not aware of what is happening around us.[32]

The necessity for a public disavowal is further buttressed by several related points. For example: Gadahn cites Prophet Muhammad’s own public disavowal of a fellow Muslim soldier; the insufficiency of individual-level condemnations of specific personalities about whom one may be ignorant, and the demand to publicly renounce—“loving the actor for what it has in virtues and hating him for what he has of vices and deviating from the path of the Shari’ah.”; current operational security concerns prohibit the type of private counsel that could be had if persons could be brought together to confront these sins with Shari’ah proofs; [33] and “the narrowness of the visions of those spoken to, their small minds, and the inclination of their hearts to brutality, ruthlessness, excess and intolerance to the statements of men and their banners.”[34]

The “level of the[se] repudiated acts and . . . type” demand severe, public accountability. But what of those who claim such a public disavowal will harm the ‘jihadi’ cause, for example by dividing the ranks of the mujahidin, or exposing the movement to enemy propaganda, or other reasons? To each of these Gadahn offers a rebuke. It is possible that a division of ranks will occur, but it is certain that these acts have “stained” the movement and it is therefore “better for them not to be in the ranks of the Mujahidin . . . [and that they] . . . should be removed and sanitized and cleared from the ranks.” And as for exposing one’s weaknesses to the enemy, there is no one but these bloody murderers and those complicit in their acts, who are to blame for the mosque preachers’ and public’s present revulsion.

[T]hese attacks are—I swear—a greater shame and more horrible weak points, and it has been
exploited by the enemies to a great extent. It has been exploited to distort the picture of the pious and loyal Mujahidin. Now many regular people are looking at the Mujahidin as a group that does not hesitate to take people's money by falsehood, detonating mosques, spilling the blood of scores of people in the way to kill one or two who were labeled as enemies. . . . The blame—or most of it—is laid on our shoulders. We contributed to that by not clarifying our stand on those forbidden acts in a sufficient way. We also contributed to the continuation of the perpetrators in their acts, by deferring the accusation from the contributors and blaming Blackwater Company instead.[35]

Those (Including AQSL) Knowledgeable of Widely-Publicized Major Sins Who Do Not Disavow and Disassociate from Those Who Commit Them are Accomplices in Sin.

An inescapable corollary follows from the above case proving murder, its sinfulness, and the publicized fanatical ruthlessness and openly-avowed vengeance driving these so-called mujahidin. To know, and not to disavow, is to partake and be complicit, in this sinful murder. “The acquittal of the organization,” he states, “[is] . . .not just an empty media-driven step.”[36]

In a model formal declaration, then, Gadahn provides all core elements which he believes should exonerate AQSL, himself included. “We refuse to attribute these crimes to Qa'idah al-Jihad Organization” and should it “be proven that those responsible for it are connected with the organization, the organization will take the appropriate measures towards them.” In his model “Acquittal and Warning,” he has AQSL openly denounce:

[A]ny armed operation that targets the Muslims in the places of their gathering, and any operation that does not account for the sanctity of their blood, souls, bodies, belongings or money. . . .[T]he explosive operations that takes place in the center of markets, streets, restaurants, and hotels that are packed with Muslims. It also includes, as a first principal, the detonation of mosques on the heads of the innocent praying public, shattering their bodies. Associated with that is exposing the Qur'an and the religious books to indignation and destruction.[37]

It is no longer possible to attempt to rectify these “horrible acts” using private channels; this sinning except for a few exceptions continues unabated since “there are some who insist on following a wrong method and a distorted jurisprudence for the sake of taking revenge. . . at the expense of innocent Muslims.” It is immaterial whether these acts are conducted “in the name of Jihad or under the banner of establishing Shari'ah and the legal measures, or under the name of promoting virtue and preventing vice” since as Gadahn declares “[a]s long as it is forbidden in God's religion, we are disassociated from it.”[38] Finally, Gadahn cites Qur'an, hadith, and analogies to prove that it is Allah's shari'a that must be followed and no obedience is owed to any man, including one's emir, if it requires that one violate this shari'a. The gravity attending the taking of life is so great, its consequences so profound, Gadahn urges every available means to ensure this prohibition is not transgressed. In short, a Muslim’s “blood is never allowed to be spilled, nor [his] money taken or dishonor, or hurt him or branding him an infidel, except upon a legal proof clearer than the noonday's sun.”[39]

“Not Every Martyr in This World is A Martyr on the Day of Judgment.”

Gadahn's condemnation of murder—whether as direct perpetrator or indirect accomplice—concludes with a dire warning. One may claim to be engaged in acts deemed holy to Allah, in this case killing or being killed during various 'jihadi' or 'martyrdom' operations. But whether that is actually the case is to be determined by Allah alone. Given the types of legal violation involved, i.e. intentional homicide, it is most unlikely that Allah has reserved Paradise for those guilty of such.
Intentional Homicide is Unforgiven.

Martyrdom is a privilege that may be granted by Allah to those who sacrifice by fighting and dying in the path of Allah to make Allah’s Word supreme. Gadahn identifies several categories of sinner whom despite their participation in the military jihad, Allah shall deny martyrdom—for example, persons who die without having discharged debts owed to creditors. From this fact he then reasons by analogy, “how about he who has killed scores or even hundreds of Muslim souls that he killed in absolute injustice. He is more eligible to be denied the heaven.” Or citing a tradition from Sahih-Muslim we learn that Prophet Muhammad denied an Islamic death to persons whose disobedience, narrow group biases, partaking of evils, and dishonoring of pledges led them beyond the faith community. Forgiveness is, as we earlier saw, one of the cardinal qualities of Allah's nature. Nevertheless, according to Gadahn, Allah does not forgive on the Day of Judgment those who intentionally spill the blood of innocent Muslims. Citing Qur'an 4:93-94:

If a man kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to abide therein (Forever): And the wrath and curse of God are upon him, and a dreadful penalty is prepared for him. O ye who believe! When ye go abroad in the cause of God, investigate carefully, and say not to anyone who offers you a salutation: "Thou art none of a believer!" Coveting the perishable goods of this life: with God are profits and spoils abundant. Even thus were ye yourselves before, till God conferred His favors: therefore carefully investigate. For God is well aware of all that you do.

And citing Sahih-Bukhari, “The Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him–PBUH) stated, 'The believer is within the realm of his religion as long as he did not target forbidden blood. . . ‘” Further, that Prophet Muhammad denied martyrdom and assured Hellfire to those, despite active participation in jihad, whose acts led them beyond the pale of belief.

The Fires of Gehenna Shall Consume the Flesh of Allah's Unforgiven Sinners.

Eternal hellfire (Gehenna), not Paradise at the right hand of Allah, waits those unforgiven and unredeemed sinners guilty of the willful, unnecessary, and brutally callous destruction of the life, honor, and property of innocent Muslims. Gadahn is emphatic in his demand: “We warn those responsible for those crimes, of disgrace in this lifetime and painful torture in the other. The consequences of injustice are grave, and injustice is the darkness of the Day of Judgment.”

Adam Gadahn’s Critique in Light of the Militant Islamist ‘Corrections Current’ Scholars

Gadahn has focused above on those elements of the TTP, al-Shabab, ISI, and others who mimic the methods of murderers whose sins Allah shall not forgive on the Day of Judgment. They are therefore destined to be privileged martyrs in Paradise but condemned sinners eternally consumed in Gehenna’s flames. Gadahn alleges that this destined fate is an inescapable consequence of these Muslims having violated the shari’a regulating Muslim use of human shields (al-Tatarrus). A tactic that should be used as an absolute last resort under circumstances of dire necessity has instead become a tactic of choice leading to the indiscriminate slaughter of hundreds of Muslims whose only crime is to have been praying in the mosque at the time a revenge-seeking member of an organization detonated a bomb to ensure his target was shrapnel-filled and crushed beneath the concrete of its exploded structure.

The sins involved are among the gravest known to Islam, second only to the denial of Allah’s indivisibility and absolute sovereignty. If one has unjustly taken a life given by Allah that by inviolable right is entitled to dignity, honor, and property, then one has denied Allah’s shari’a since, as Kamali states, “[t]o say that Islamic
law originates in divine revelation implies that adherence to its rules is at once a legal and religious duty.”[47]

While it is highly likely that Gadahn in other communications has addressed the universal reach of Allah’s shari’a, intra-Muslim murder is the exclusive focus of the above-examined letter. And, as stated earlier, Gadahn’s principled legal and religious concerns clearly outweigh his pragmatic media-related frustrations. The present author has no knowledge of Gadahn’s potentially more extensive sharia-based critiques that explicitly engage Muslim rights and responsibilities in relation to non-Muslims, or of Muslims deemed sharia non-compliant but not guilty of violating al-Tatarrus. Two results follow. From Gadahn we neither learn about other types of religious-legal violations of fiqh al-jihad, nor of a broader Islamic moral universe within which potential religious-legal violations are haram. To read this letter, and only this letter, is to emphasize a single albeit very significant legal principle—al-Tatarrus. But what happens when we examine a fuller range of potential criticisms that concern not just intra-Islamist murder but all forms of haram conduct during the jihad?

From this perspective a more comprehensive account of potential fiqh al-jihad violations is useful, one that through comparison and contrast will permit greater awareness of the nature and intended scope of Gadahn’s shari’a critique. Many critiques of haram conduct during jihad have been produced by Muslim scholars and ulema. However, many contemporary scholars deny the religious obligation to wage jihad, or lack credibility because of their proximity to a ruling regime or regime-apologetic writings.[48] A credible alternative is available, however.

The “Corrections Current” is a label given by the present author for an emergent body of scholarship authored by militant Islamists whose credibility derives from three bases: they regard the military jihad as a genuine religious prescription binding on observant Muslims until the Day of Judgment; they have participated as activists, militants, and occasionally actual fighters, in jihad; they are regarded by observant militant Islamists as learned religious scholars of fiqh al-jihad possessing unimpeachable integrity.[49] Table 1 (provided below at the end of this discussion) presents these comprehensive fiqh al-jihad prescriptions and proscriptions. We first focus on shared premises, and then points of profound disagreement.[50]

**Shared Premises: Jihad-Realist Militant Islamist Common Ground in Fiqh al-Jihad**

Beyond the presumption of sincerity of intention, and the obligatory religious prescription to wage jihad,[51] Gadahn/AQSL and the Corrections Current share four premises.

- **Sacredness of Muslim Life.** The life, honor, and property of every Muslim is sacred and intentional homicide is a cardinal sin whose moral gravity is second only to the denial of the singularity and sovereignty of Allah.[52]

- **Moderation; al-Wasattiya.** Fanaticism, extremism, and immoderation violate explicit and unambiguous Islamic tenets and traditions. Immoderation is the gateway to violations of the shari’a, and most often results in undermining the interests and values of the Umma.[53]

- **Muslim Tirs. al-Tatarrus.** The sanctity of life, and specific conditions that must be met for jihad to be waged, almost always render impermissible the killing of a Muslim, even if it is done unintentionally.

- **Against Takfir of Persons, Society (of Muslims, versus Regimes).** The impermissibility of takfir—declaring another Muslim an apostate, and therefore rendering their lives and property forfeit—stressing especially its historic consequence in undermining social solidarity, sowing chaos, creating disorder, facilitating dissension (‘fitnah’), and unleashing mayhem.[54]
These shared fundaments are logically related to the maximizing of Islamic dignity, and its maximal expansion; grounded in the Allah-derived rights to life, honor, and property; and related to the very function of the shari'a in its role of protecting and advancing the five essentials (al-daruyiyat al-khamsa) of life, religion, property, intellect, and family, that anchor dignified Muslim existence.[55]

Unshared Premises/Principled Disagreements: Militant Islamist Divergence in Fiqh al-Jihad

In his letter, Gadahn only tangentially addresses the United States. But his few comments, especially when corroborated with additional open source comments, provide sufficient evidence for the judgment that he accepts the shariatic justifications AQSL has used in its declaration of war and terrorist attacks against America and Americans. For example, his discussion of media strategy focuses on the the 9/11 terrorist attacks (September 11, 2011) making reference to “the tenth anniversary of the Manhattan raid.”[56] He also invokes AQSL’s Manichean dichotomy—US Crusader/AQSL Defender—in referring to “Bush’s Crusade wars”[57] and following his discussion of earlier epochs of brutality directed at Muslims, to “the Americans, the Arab and foreign tyrants, like the kings of Hejaz and Najd, Syria’s rulers, and the Pakistani ruler Pervez Musharraf.”[58] His letter contains not a single shariatic reference or argument condemning 9/11 or the use of mass casualty terrorist methods to attack Americans on American soil. Finally, in a recent video entitled “The Crime of Kidnapping Abu Anas al Libi and its Repercussions,” Gadahn in the context of exonerating al Libi states: “Teach the Crusaders a lesson they will not forget. Teach them that the lands of Islam are a red line and there is no place in them for soldiers, forces and bases. . . Rise and have vengeance against America, the enemy of Islam and the Muslims, and restore us the glory of Nairobi, Dar es Salam, Aden, New York, Washington, Fort Hood, Benghazi and Boston.”[59]

Assuming then Gadahn’s sympathy for 9/11 and AQ’s terrorist modus operandi directed against America and Americans, Gadahn/AQSL fundamentally differs from the Corrections Current scholars on several key principles and rulings in fiqh al-jihad (see Table 1 below). These differences can be summarized as follows: [60]

Jihad and Its Rightful Role in Islam.

The goal of Islam is the raising of Allah’s Word by all permissible means, including the Call or preaching (Da’wa), enjoining the good and forbidding evil (hisbah), and—when legally permissible, advisable, and of definite benefit for Allah’s Word,—jihad. Jihad as a means is irreducible to its military dimension, however, and includes striving and struggling in the Way of Allah by combating one’s own immoral thoughts, soul, and deeds (jihad bil nafs); speech (jihad bil lisan) and the written word/knowledge (jihad bil qalam/ilm); behavioral and physical coercion to prevent evil and promote the good (jihad bil yad); and finally, the use of the sword (jihad bis saif). Restricting the universe of means available for raising Allah’s Word to one only—military jihad—is illogical and deviant. Imagine, for example, elevating prayer (Salat), alms (Zakkat), pilgrimage (Hajj), or the Ramadan fast (Sawm)” so that one could be a Salatist advocating “Salatism,” or one advocating “Zakkatism” or “Sawmism” or “Hajjism.” This is not Islam, but a deviant embrace of a singular means. ‘Jihadism’ and ‘jihadist’ are equally deviant when severed from their relation to other means, and the noble objective itself of Raising Allah’s Word.[61]

Legal Military Jihad versus ‘Jihadism’.

Jihad is an enduring religious obligation. However, because of the seriousness of such a declaration—the
equivalent of a declaration of just war in the West [62]—waging jihad is only permissible if one has taken explicit and careful account of abilities, circumstances, conditions, and the costs involved (relative to perceived benefits, and perceived alternative courses of action) that this ennobled religious prescription demands. ‘Jihadism’ is characterized by unlawful, inadvisable risk-taking in matters of military action—eschewing for example, legal and customary requirements regarding the relative strength of one's opponents; capacity to wage jihad; availability of less-costly options (i.e. da’wa, enforcing the good and forbidding evil, isolation, emigration, etc.); and costs to the Umma.

Prudent Military Jihad versus Reckless ‘Jihadism’.

A pragmatic, prudential substrate exists in Islam, as in every other great faith, that relates desired ends to available means, and evaluates courses of action in relation to the actual benefits that arise for its intended beneficiaries. It is on these grounds that bin Laden's unilateral decision to launch the 9/11 attack was calamitous for Islam. A deeply observant Muslim who is also wisely pragmatic may then ask: How has Usama bin Laden's so-called jihad benefitted Islam? What has been the cost to Islam and Muslims worldwide of Al-Qaeda's unilateral decision to declare, launch, and wage a terrorist campaign against America and Americans?

The Sacredness of Every Human Life in Islam: Is Only Muslim blood Sacred to Allah?

Despite the privileged sanctity Muslims hold within Allah's shari'a, that shari'a is universally applicable and relevant to every possible violation of any part of Allah's creation. Every creature, every feature of the universe, and, in the present context, every human being whether Muslim or non-Muslim, is of moral, legal, and religious concern within this shari'a. Due to the sacred nature of all life—its absolute sanctity—persons must be secure in their lives, persons, property, possessions, and honor. Allah is the Creator of all human souls. As Qur'an 4:1 states: “O mankind! Reverence your Guardian-Lord, who created you from a single person, created, of like nature, his mate, and from them twain scattered like seeds countless men and women.” While Allah privileges those who have sworn loyalty and disavowed the existence and worship of other deities, many categories of non-Muslim are deemed sacred in their blood, honor, and property and therefore inviolable.[63] This presumption is worth reciting in its holy context. For example: In Qur'an 5:32: “On that account: We ordained for the Children of Israel that if anyone slew a person—unless it be for murder or spreading mischief in the land—it would be as if he slew the whole people; and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people.”; Qur'an 6:151: “. . . Take not life, which Allah hath made sacred, except by way of justice and law”; The true servants of Allah, according to Qur'an 25:68 are “Those who invoke not, with Allah, any other god, nor slay such life as Allah has made sacred, except for just cause. . .”. The presumptive sanctity of all human life is based in the fact that Allah created all humans and invested them with the moral capacity to know and choose righteousness, and to know and avoid evil. Those guilty of unjustly slaying Allah's Creation thereby deny the Sovereignty and rights of Allah over all life and death.

Scholarly Authority in Islam: Practicing the ‘Jurisprudence of Justification’ (fiqh al-tabrir) and Fatwa Shopping.

It is impermissible to corrupt fiqh al-jihad by opportunistically producing post-hoc justifications for illegal acts; or failing to recognize the legitimate authority of religiously-learned experts and scholars on matters pertaining to shari'a and its legitimate methodology. As a corollary, one must maintain deep skepticism about persons whose scholarly credentials in shari’a are insufficient, particularly in such weighty matters as
inflicting harm and violence on others.

Declaring, Targeting and Attacking So-Called Apostate Governments: Takfir of Regime (Kufr al-Nizam).

It is only under the most dire circumstances that violently overthrowing a government would not increase threats to the lives, security, honor, and possessions of the umma. Apostasy that qualifies for such violent rebellion must involve more than negligence, sinfulness, or non-enforcement of shari’a provisions. It must involve active disavowal of the Islamic creed, assisting the enemies of the Umma, and overtly preferring the rule of men to that of Allah. Further, any consideration of violent rebellion requires a deep knowledge and realistic understanding of the nature of politics, political leadership, political authority, the nation-state, and the contemporary context within which the shari’a can realistically function.

Key Differences in Legal Rulings: Targeting and Attacking American and Americans in Islam.

The principles listed above clearly distinguish Gadahn/AQSL from the Corrections Current scholars. AQSL’s ‘Jihadism’ isolates and unduly privileges the military jihad as the exclusive means for raising Allah’s Word. Imprudent actions have replaced prudent ones, despite Islamic obligations demanding otherwise. Unrecognized, though with possible exception in Gadahn/AQSL, is the inviolable nature of all humans in their lives, honor, and property, including non-Muslims. Instead of any genuine scholar possessing the imprimatur of genuine shari’a training in fiqh al-jihad, it is only those whose fatawa sanction, even retrospectively, anti-American mass casualty terrorism, whose rulings are considered. Finally, though the takfir of persons and society is not practiced, the takfir of governments and declaration that they are in states of unbelief (kufr al-nizam) is readily announced.

These principles described above will re-enter the analysis later in this article. But first it is necessary to highlight the divisions between Gadahn/AQSL and the Corrections Current scholars over a vital sub-set of legal rulings specifically germane to AQSL’s anti-American terrorist modus operandi and 9/11 in particular. These constitute in essence the necessary and sufficient legal conditions required for declaring 9/11-facilitating conduct permissible within the context of the lawful military jihad. Gadahn’s failure to explicitly dissent from the modus operandi in effect on 9/11 and the absence of any mention of haram conduct in relation to attacking America and Americans logically warrant his inclusion in the discussion to follow. Like the above, these are presented as Corrections Current rulings, though more directly highlighting their religious-legal impermissibility.

It is Impermissible to Violate One’s Oath (Bay’ a) to, and Deny, an Emir’s Indivisible Sovereignty in Matters of Foreign Policy

Usama bin Laden despite having pledged loyalty (bay’a), knowingly and willfully disobeyed the Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Omar and deliberately attacked the United States from Afghan soil. Usama bin Laden was an invited guest enjoying complete security of person, property, and liberty of action, and was repeatedly told to refrain from provoking US hostilities. His impermissible actions are widely viewed as the proximate cause of the removal of the Taliban from power, and the calamitous consequences for Islamism arising from those events.
It is Impermissible to Target the ‘Far’ Enemy.

The targeting of the nearer enemy, not a far or the furthest enemy, is an essential Quranically-derived obligation. Without such quranic justification, then, the strategic decision by AQSL to target the US is devoid of religious warrant and deviates from standard scholarly judgment regarding the prioritizing of the umma’s enemies.

It is Impermissible for an Organization to Declare and Fight Offensive Jihad.

The medieval circumstances dividing the world into Islamic (Dar al-Islam) and non-Islamic (Dar al-Harb; literally ‘Abode’ or ‘House’ of War) spheres, and conditions elevating the role of Caliph and Caliphate, no longer exists. Collective Muslim majorities are now territorially organized into sovereign nation-states, and the state is a political organ possessing a legitimate monopoly on the means and use of violence. If today jihad is to be declared and waged to discharge the lawful collective duty (fard kifaya) to wage offensive jihad to expand the Umma, this can only be declared by a legitimate sovereign on the basis of the shari’a.[64]

It is Impermissible to Violate the Principle of Retributive Justice (Qisas).

Not only does Islam maintain that charity, mercy, and forgiveness are even greater virtues than mere retribution—though retribution is certainly ‘just’ and does restore a lawful reciprocity—permissible conduct (i.e. retribution) has been replaced with terroristic conduct that is forbidden (haram). Violation of this core element of restitutive justice in the shari’a of lawful jihad is especially evident in select fatwas solicited by AQSL claiming that it is permissible to kill millions of American non-combatants allegedly guilty of directly and indirectly murdering millions of innocent Muslims.[65]

It is Impermissible to Deny Muslim Responsibility for Muslim Actions in the World

It is an essential principle in Islam and Islamic jurisprudence that Muslims are accountable for actions in this world and conspiracism is not an acceptable means for accounting for rewards and punishments experienced by the contemporary Muslim world. Though the free-will/determinism question in Islamic theology is a matter of scholarly contention, Islamic ethics and the very concept of legal culpability largely presumes that humans are free moral beings capable of a range of morally permissible or impermissible choices. Among these is the choice to worship Allah and pursue Allah’s path and various methodologies for achieving Islamist objectives, not US treachery or design, that is ultimately responsible for the present Muslim world’s malaise.[66]

It is Impermissible to Deny the Need for Parental and Creditor Consent to Wage Offensive Jihad.

Individuals participating in an offensive jihad must have these permissions. Persons participating in a defensive jihad, however, generally do not. The costs of abandoning one’s parents, families, properties, and possessions, however, must be factored in, and the ulema have issued divided opinions. What is key here is the necessity of fully considering the practical implications for financial dependents of one’s decision to sacrifice life, limb, and property in the obligation and commitment to wage the military jihad.

The Impermissibility of Targeting on the Basis of Nationality.

There is no precedent in Islam for killing persons on the basis of national affiliation. Since in the modern
era Muslims may, and often likely will be, living in non-Muslim societies, this invites the potential killing of Muslims. However, its impermissibility rests on a broader religious tradition that while distinguishing persons on the basis of faith, does not do so on the basis of territorial residency or citizenship. Usama bin Laden’s and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s claim that they are targeting “Crusaders” in the “Crusader-Zionist” alliance is shown to be another instance of the ‘jurisprudence of justification’.

It is Impermissible to Target Non-Belligerent Civilians, including and especially non-Muslim Civilians, Especially Women, Children, the Elderly, Scholars and Students of Knowledge.

Islam singles out for special protection several privileged types of person among those who are kufr (non-believers). It is haram to violate their lives, honor, and property. What is essential is that persons least likely to represent a military threat are generally regarded as immune from combat-related violence.

It is Impermissible to Target Civilians at Home for Occupation Abroad.

Regardless of whether a country is presumed to be an occupying country, in this case AQSL’s presumption that the United States is ‘occupying Muslim lands,’ it is impermissible to harm civilians or non-combatants in that home country. Though AQSL’s terrorist modus operandi demands that symbolic violence be perpetrated on American non-combatant civilians, Islam does not practice ‘guilt by association’ nor deem collective punishment morally permissible.

The Impermissibility of Treachery, Violation of Oaths and Pacts of Security Granted (implicitly, or explicitly) to Muslims in Non-Muslim Majority societies.

The sanctity of oath-keeping in Islam is of paramount concern. Treachery is considered a cardinal sin in Islam, and Muslims are forbidden from dealing treacherously, even with their enemies. Further, a security pact (aman) governs the duty of Muslims who are provided the opportunity to enter, be secure in, and enjoy the liberties of life, property, possessions, and honor, in a non-Muslim society.[67]

The Impermissibility of Targeting Commercial Aviation.

Several blatant shari’a violations were committed through AQSL’s intentional hijacking of commercial airliners with civilians aboard to conduct the 9/11 attack. Again, one may see how AQSL’s terrorist modus operandi—requiring highly symbolic targets, fear-generating media exposure, and key target audiences—starkly contrasts with Islam’s religious-legal demand that the fundamentals of civilized interaction, including commercial exchange, contracts, and implicit presumptions of good faith, be honored.[68]
Table 1: Principled Agreement and Disagreement among Jihad-Realists in Fiqh al-Jihad: AQSL/Gadahn versus the Salafist Islamist Corrections Current Scholars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rulings in Fiqh al-Jihad/Shar'a of Jihad</th>
<th>Jihad-Realist Militant Sunni Orthodoxy</th>
<th>Salafist Islamist Corrections Current</th>
<th>AQSL/Gadahn 'Jihadism'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>职业道德</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leniency in Religion. Al-Wasat.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose Muslim Human Shields</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose Takfir of Persons, Society</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sincerity of Intention</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisprudence of Justification.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voiding Non-Muslim Security (aman)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihadism = Islam</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihadism = Military Jihad</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Interests Sacrificed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retributive Justice (Qisas) Violated</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive Jihad by Organization</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Advocate Violent Rebellion</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Muslim Life Sacred</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeting Non-Belligerent Civilians</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Treachery Permissible</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeting Nationality Permissible</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deny Need for Parental Consent</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Emir Sovereignty is Divisible</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeting the 'Far' Enemy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim Responsibility Void</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeting Commercial Aviation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

It is clear from the above that Adam Gadahn insists on sharia-compliance when criticizing intra-Islamist murderous violence, but either disregards or fundamentally dissents from the Corrections Current scholars’ use of this same body of Islamic jurisprudence to condemn as haram AQSL’s anti-American terrorist modus operandi. The question then, is why?

Let us first consider two possible explanations. First, one might argue that Gadahn’s letter has a narrower focus and the broader AQSL modus operandi is not its subject matter. Several sources of evidence were presented by the present author, however, internal to and beyond this particular letter confirming Gadahn’s public stance defending AQSL’s anti-American terrorist attacks: from the 1998 East African embassy bombings to the more recent targeting of military personnel and civilian non-combatants at Fort Hood and Boston.[69]

Second, one might argue that Gadahn rejects as insincere and coerced the fiqh al-jihad critiques of AQSL
authored by one of the most highly regarded Corrections Current scholars former Egyptian Islamic Jihad emir (ca. 1987-1993) and AQSL shari’a guide, Sayyid Imam Bin-Abd-al-Aziz Al Sharif. Current AQ emir Ayman al-Zawahiri claims, for example, that Sayyid Imam's writings are the coerced or insincere confessions of an imprisoned scholar forced to repent and in the process becoming a regime mouthpiece. However, a careful examination of al-Zawahiri's evidence reveals a contradiction that undermines this assertion. In Zawahiri’s 2008 critique of Sayyid Imam, Exoneration: A Treatise on the Exoneration of the Nation of the Pen and the Sword from the Denigrating Charge of Being Irresolute and Weak[70], Sayyid Imam is also accused of having written in 1993—eight years previous to his Egyptian imprisonment—a major tome running several hundred pages, ‘Al Jami Fi Talab al-Ilm al-Sharif’ (The Compendium of Divine Knowledge), adumbrating those major rectifications of which he is accused while imprisoned and likely under duress.[71] In Exoneration, Al-Zawahiri writes in reference to Sayyid Imam's 2007 book, “I say: it is a great pity that these are the same words of the author in his book Al Jami with minor additions or deductions,” and uses as evidence Sayyid Imam's 1993 book at length. Again, al-Zawahiri writes: “Regarding this [2007] document's author [Sayyid Imam], he [already] announced his revisionism in his book, The Compilation [Compendium] in 1994 [sic; 1993]. He then returned to private life under his real name in Yemen in a show of strange coexistence with the security services. After 11 September 2001, the Yemeni authorities arrested him on US orders and extradited him to Egypt . . . ”[72]

But if Zawahiri’s accusation that Sayyid Imam rejects AQSL's modus operandi beginning in 1993 is correct—a time during which Sayyid Imam was not under house arrest nor imprisoned but a free man who had returned to medicine and scholarship—how can his accusation [73] that this only occurred due to imprisonment and is first evidenced in Sayyid Imam's 2007 ‘revisionist’ book, Doctrine of Rationalization [i.e. Right Guidance] for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World (Wathiquat Tarshid Al-' Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w’ Al-Alam), also be correct?[74]

The present author advances what he considers a more compelling explanation of Gadahn's highly circumscribed application of fiqh al-jihad, selective moral outrage, and attempted Islamic legalization of anti-American mass casualty terrorist attacks. Suppose one argues that AQSL conceives itself as a pan-Islamist Sunni revolutionary ‘jihadist’ vanguard and that expulsion of the United States and its strategic allies from Muslim majority lands is for them a pre-requisite for reestablishing Sunni caliphal rule to oppose the current international order based in nation-states.[75] Further, suppose AQSL's terrorist modus operandi has as its strategic goals on one hand, the inciting, catalyzing, galvanizing, uniting, and leading as vanguard this broader anti-American pan-Islamist front; and on the other, undermining U.S. resolve, morale, and legitimacy through a strategy of exhaustion, attrition, calculated and sophisticated information warfare, and attacking and dividing U.S. alliances.[76] Figure 1 below displays the variety of religio-legal rulings listed in Table 1 above, but organizes them based on the strategic logic of this AQSL pan-Islamic ‘jihadist’ revolutionary vanguardism.
Patterns otherwise incoherent, and conduct religiously and legally *haram* and vulnerable to severe criticism by knowledgeable militant Islamic scholars of *fiqh al-jihad*, are made intelligible by this analytical approach. Supposing this is the case, then, AQSL/Gadahn neither adhere to the path of *al salaf al salih* (the path of the righteous ancestors) nor to struggle and strive in the path of Allah (*jihad fi sabil Allah*), adhering to Allah’s Shari’a. This is certainly the considered judgment of those Corrections Current scholars whose shariatic judgments may be regarded as learned and motivated by the desire to raise Allah’s Word using all means, but only within the religious-legal confines of the sharia. Could it be that AQSL is *not* a bona fide salafist organization but a pan-Islamist revolutionary political terrorist organization whose willingness to violate the sharia of lawful jihad to achieve its objectives has come at the expense of Islam and the Islamic Call? Sayyid Imam, salafist scholar and former senior AQSL sharia guide regards this as highly likely. He condemns AQSL’s ‘killing in masse doctrine’ and its murderous methods while drawing a parallel to violent secular
revolutionary vanguardism.

[F]or the Muslim to place an objective for himself that is beyond his capacity and not suitable to his conditions, even if it is legitimate in itself, and then follow any road to attain his objective, without being bound by the restrictions of Shari'a, then this would have given precedence to his quest from himself over his God's quest from him. This is not the way of the Muslims but the way of the revolutionary secularists. In Islam, there is no such thing as 'the end justifies the means', even if the end is noble and legitimate to begin with. On the contrary, a Muslim worships Allah through the means used just as he worships Him through the ends sought. If he dies before getting his end, he gets the reward for trying, and he is absolved from the sin of what he could not do.[77]

To Sayyid Imam jihad is not an immoral, murderous rampage but a noble obligation that must abide by a definite religious-legal framework, and that must factor in the overall consequences for Muslims and Islam of the weighty decision to engage in jihad bis saif (jihad of the sword). “[H]e [Ayman al-Zawahiri] and Bin Ladin brought... gross calamities on the Afghani people in order to hit a number of buildings in the United States through treachery and betrayal [9/11],” Sayyid Imam asserts. “Does what brings catastrophes to the Muslims constitute legitimate jihad? Are those to be considered sane people? They neither spared the Muslims nor defeated their enemies. Jihad is a duty, but if it shirks Shari’a guidelines it becomes unethical warfare.”[78] “Those who fear Allah do not scale walls like thieves to reach their objectives,” he continues, “betraying their Emir [Mullah Omar], taking their enemy in cold blood [the United States of America], and bringing calamities to the Muslims. Those who do so like them are not men of goodness and piety. For the believers, this is Allah’s verdict on them.”[79]

The Corrections Current scholars offer a unique internal shariatic critique based in a salafist Islamist conception of Allah’s sharia that universalizes Allah’s law and intended moral universe to all human souls. [80] A noble objective, Allah’s religion, cannot be fought for using ignoble means. In contrast, Gadahn offers a limited moral universe and a falsely truncated set of alternatives. “My Mujahid brother... who is satisfied with those acts, or who orders them, or conducts them,” Gadahn states, “is either ignorant needing education, or an agent planted amongst the ranks for the benefit of the enemies of the Mujahidin.[81]

However, is it not the case as proven above that Allah forbids the shedding of all human blood, without justice, and that Allah also forgives, and forgives again, with Divine mercy and clemency? Allah’s Qur’an states: “But, without doubt, I am (also) He that forgives again and again, to those who repent, believe, and do right—who in fine, are ready to receive True guidance” (20:8); “If Allah were to punish men according to what they deserve, he would not leave on the back of the (earth) a single living creature: but He gives respite for a stated term: when their term expires verily Allah has in His sight all His servants”(35:45); “Say: ‘O my servants who have transgressed against their souls! Despair not of the Mercy of Allah: for Allah forgives all sins for he is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful” (39:53).

Gadahn states that only two options exist to explain this intra-Muslim bloodshed: ignorance, or foreign agents planted amongst the mujahidin. But could he not also have said to them what can now be said of AQSL? It is neither ignorance nor others that are to blame, but willful and deliberate haram conduct by self-appointed ‘vanguards’ who elevate revenge and organizational survival above Allah’s shari’a. In the case of the TTP, al-Shabab, and ISI, the victims are Muslim innocents—men and women, children and elderly, shoppers in markets, students in schools, children in parks, worshippers in mosques. In the case of AQSL, the victims are American innocents—non-Muslim and Muslim—in men and women, children and elderly, shoppers in markets, students in schools, children in parks, and worshippers in churches and synagogues and mosques. Are these not also sacred souls in Allah’s universe? [82] Does not the sharia of lawful jihad declare
as haram the treachery, betrayal, murder, and all ignominious conduct required to carry out terroristic acts to accomplish AQSL's organizational objectives? Far from fighting tyranny, has not AQSL made itself a tyrant: a lawless despot, a murderer of sacred souls, a defiler of Muslim honor among uncounted millions who might otherwise be prepared to hear, listen to, and possibly respond to Allah's Call? Does not the judgment Gadahn makes regarding Allah's unforgiving of intentional murder and Gehenna's eternal flames now, necessarily, apply to him?

If it is indeed correct that Adam Gadahn illicitly restricts the scope of fiqh al-jihad proscriptions and prescriptions to intra-Islamic bloodshed; and if by so doing he evades condemnation of, and often sanctions, other types of forbidden (haram) conduct including that associated with perpetrating mass casualty terrorist attacks against America and Americans; then, it has been proven that Gadahn—and by implication AQSL—is in violation of the very shari'a of lawful jihad it claims to fastidiously uphold. This finding may be leveraged as part of a broader information warfare strategy designed to delegitimize AQSL most especially in the eyes of that sliver of high value recruits and potential militants for whom upholding the sharia of lawful jihad is of paramount value.[83]

The fact that an Islamic law of war may be leveraged against AQSL anti-American mass casualty terrorism ironically discloses a fault-line at the very heart of AQSL's uniqueness as a transnational terrorist organization. The legal violations above confirm, if corroborated, that Gadahn and AQSL have elevated anti-Americanism above the shari'a of lawful jihad. While this ‘Far Enemy’ strategy may have much in common with other forms of revolutionary anti-imperialism, transnationalism, or terroristic targeting of perceived global adversaries, it has little in common with the evolved shari'a of lawful jihad which even in its militant expression, forbids and condemns treachery, targeting non-combatants, and the destruction of life, property, honor, and reputation of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. It is highly advisable that strategists apprise themselves of the militant critique of AQSL's shari'a violations of lawful jihad. Prudence dictates, finally, that such an internal critique, where and when available, is an extremely efficient and uniquely potent means for delegitimizing terrorist adversaries.

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Notes
[3] Ibid., p. 15; See also p. 18: “Injustice is one of the reasons behind the defeat and disappointment, and the befallen miseries and sedition by the general public Muslims and Mujahidin . . . .[T]hose who insist on this criminal and pre-Islamic behavior should know that he is doomed to the same destiny that faced leaderships and groups and other trends in various arenas, after they shed the blood of Muslims, in bias to their group, doctrines and banners, by arguments that were weaker than the spider’s web” (a reference to a highly-popular metaphor in Qur’an 29:41).
influenced AQSL policy and strategy (see, for example: Dodwell, “The Abbottabad Documents: The Quiet Ascent of Adam Gadahn, ”

Gadahn’s influence extended beyond senior media advisor and sometime English-language propagandist to one whose considered opinions and judgments actually

Gadahn’s letter and one from Usama bin Laden to Shaykh Mahmud Aytiyyah (SOCOM-2012-0000015-HT, 20 October 2010), led to questions over whether

This point is more fully explored in the Discussion section below.

Gadahn’s letter to his “scathing critique of what he saw as the unjust and counterproductive activities of certain regional jihadist groups” (p. 20).

For Gadahn’s statements in Inspire, see: Winter 2010, Issue #4, Adam Gadahn, “Know that jihad is your duty,” p. 17; Fall 2011, Special Issue, #7, p. 4, Advertised as “coming soon”: “The Arab Intifada: Hopes, Concerns & Dangers: An Exclusive Interview with Adam Yahyiye Gadahn (Azzam al-Amriki).”; Fall 2011, Issue #8, p. 4; Spring 2013, #10: the front cover announces “Inspire Exclusive: From Adam Gadahn,” which is followed by featured placement in the table of contents —“Exclusive: An extract from the promised interview ‘The Arab intifada‘: Brother Adam sends three messages to the world”) — and finally page 36 exclusively dedicated to Gadahn’s photo and excerpts with bold subtitles: (“To the Mujahideen around the World”; “ . . .[T]o Those Calling to Islam and Jihad in General, and Those Working in Jihadi Media on the Internet in Particular”; Spring 2014, #12, p. 6: in the section “@heartthteworld: A Collection of quotes from friend and foe,” Gadahn is listed as “Al-Qaeda Mujahid (As-Sahab Media) and quoted, “Stand, revenge on America the enemy of Islam and Muslims. Remind us of the glories of Nairobi, Dar-es-Salam, Aden, New York, Washington, Fort Hood, Benghazi and Boston . . .[etc.]”.

See finally, Resurgence, Fall 2014, Vol #1, pp. 47-55, for Gadahn’s article (advertised as cover story) for AQSL’s latest English-language endeavor to incite galvanize, and mobilize on behalf of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).

[14] This Corrections Current will be fully discussed in a subsequent section.


[16] It is this affiliate, rebranded the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) from whom in early February 2014 AQSI formally disassociated. See, for example: VOA News, 3 February 2014, “Al-Qaida Disavows Syria Militant Group,” www.voanews.com/articleprintview/1843042.html, accessed 4 February 2014; Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda's general command disowns the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham,” 3 February 2014, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_general_co-print.php, accessed 4 February 2014. Gadahn’s urgent request in this letter for a formal declaration of disassociation from this Iraqi associate predates the latter by nearly three years. Gadahn proclaims here: “I do not see any obstacle or bad act if al-Qa’ida organization declares its discontent with this behavior and other behaviors being carried out by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq, without an order from al-Qa’ida and without consultation. I see that this is done immediately or lately, favorably sooner. I see that the organization should declare the cutoff of its organizational ties with that organization. The relations between al-Qa’ida organization and (the state) have been practically cut off for a number of years. The decision to declare the State was taken without consultation from al-Qa’ida leadership. Their improvised decision has caused a split in the Mujahidin ranks and their supporters inside and outside Iraq. What is left between al-Qa’ida organization and (the state), but the link of faith and Islam, which urges us to submit advice and apply the rule of propagating virtue and preventing vice, and the support of good deeds. This is the only solution facing al-Qa’ida organization, otherwise its reputation will be damaged more and more as a result of the acts and statements of this group, which is labeled under our organization (the blessed with God’s will)”.


[18] Ibid., pp. 12-14.


[20] Ibid.


[22] See Kamolnick, “Al Qaeda’s Sharia Crisis: Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence of Lawful Military Jihad,” pp. 398-399, and notes 28 and 29 (p. 413), for further examination of the definition and jurisprudence regulating Muslim Tirs.


[26] Ibid., p. 15.

[27] Ibid., p. 18. I have used the Ali translation in place of the Letter’s less felicitous English translation which reads: ‘And fight those who are fighting you and do not be aggressive as God does not like the aggressors.”

[28] Ibid., p. 19.


[30] Ibid., p. 17.

[31] Ibid., p. 16.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., p. 15.

[35] Ibid., p. 16. Indeed, that is exactly what Gadahn at that time (2009) did. The context was the TTP’s rise beginning in 2007 to become a murderous opponent of the Pakistani State and in the process “killed more than 2,670 people in attacks in Pakistan mostly blamed on the Taliban in the last two-and-a-half years” (AFP, 12 December 2009, “Al-Qaeda ‘not behind bloodshed’: US militant; also, boston.com, “Al Qaeda denies killing civilians in Pakistan: Claims Pakistani, US forces behind deaths of 300,” 13 December 2009, www.boston.com/news/world). Gadahn is quoted in the latter article as saying: “The perpetration of such deplorable acts and the pinning of responsibility for them on the mujahideen, only serves the enemies of Islam and Muslims, who are today staring defeat in the face. . . the mercenaries of the ISI, RAW [India’s intelligence agency], CIA, or Blackwater are the real culprits behind these senseless and un-Islamic bombings.” The former article quoting from the translated video, “The Mujahideen Don’t Target Muslims,” further quotes Gadahn referring to these “un-Islamic bombings which target Muslims in their markets, mosques, schools, shops and streets . . . the mujahideen declare themselves innocent of these attacks, and pronounce them part of a cynical, calculated and clandestine international campaign by the secular political forces.”

[36] Ibid., p. 18.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid., p. 21.

[40] For Qur’an and Hadith, see Kamolnick, Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda: A Jihad-Realist Approach, pp. 31-33, note 20.

[41] Ibid., p. 18. Citing traditions in Nawawi.

[42] Ibid., p. 18.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid., p. 20.

[45] Ibid. For sake of argument, Gadahn’s assertion that Allah does not forgive intentional homicide is supposed. However, the Qur’an presents two additional versions: that only the sin of joining other gods with Allah is unforgiven, or, that all sins are potentially forgiven. For example: Qur’an 4:48: “Allah forgiveth not that partners should be set up with Him; but He forgiveth anything else, to whom he pleaseth; to set up partners with Allah is to devise a sin most heinous indeed.”; Qur’an 4:116: “Allah forgiveth not (the sin of) joining other gods with Him; but He forgiveth whom he pleaseth other sins than this: one who joins other gods with Allah, hath strayed far, far away (from the right).”; Qur’an 4:110: “If anyone does evil or wrongs his own soul but afterwards seeks Allah's forgiveness, he will find Allah Oft-Forgiving, Most merciful.” Qur’an 39:53: “Say: ‘O my servants who have transgressed against their souls! Despair not of the Mercy of Allah: for Allah forgives all sins for he is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.”

[46] Ibid., p. 18.


[48] See Kamolnick, Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda: A Jihad-Realist Approach, p. 53, note 57 for a select listing of these; and for a discussion of Saudi former dissident
[49] Key scholars and organizations associated with this current include: Dr. Sayyid Imam Bin-Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif, former Egyptian Islamic Jihad emir and AQSL shari'a guide; senior leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group shura council (Isam Dirbalah, Najih Ibrahim, Ali al-Sharif, Madi Abd-al-Rahman); senior leadership of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), including: emir Abdul Hakim al-Khwaildi Balhaj (aka Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq); deputy emir, Khalid Muhammad Al-Sharif; spiritual leader, Sami Mustafa Al-Saadi (aka: Abu al-Munir al-Saadi); its first emir, Miftah al-Mbruk al-Thawadi (aka: Abdul Ghaffar); military commander, Musafah Al-Said Qunayid (aka Abu al-Zubair); and, Abdul Wahhab Muhammad Qasidy (aka: Abu Idris, former AQSL sharia scholar and propagandist Abu Yahya al-Libi's eldest brother). The term "corrections" and not "revisionist" is accurate since these scholars wholly embrace Islamist orthodoxy and do not advocate revisions to fundamental Muslim principles, dogma, or theological imperatives. Rather, they advocate a return to legality and rejection of errant interpretations and false shari'atic justifications for conduct that in light of these corrections they now deem haram. Other terms that convey the spirit of this Current could be recantations, retractions, or rationalization. Valid Brown similarly refers to "the genre of 'revisions' or 'recantations tests (muraqijat), a growing body of literature by major jihadi figures offering mea culpas for former errors and diagnosing the ills besetting contemporary jihadi activism" (see, "Abu Gaith and al-Qa'ida's dissident faction in Iran," 11 March 2013, www.jihadica.com/abu-gaith-and-al-qa'idadissident-faction-in-iran/, accessed 6 March 2014). See also in Valid Brown's blog post a quote from Abu Ghaith's book Twenty Counsels on the Path of Jihad, released online November 2010 (Ghaith is a Kuwaiti cleric, bin Laden's son-in-law, and former al-Qaeda spokesman known for his vitriolic advocacy of mass casualty terror directed at the United States)—in which he states: "...[I]t has become necessary to issue the like of this series of educational essays to correct the path, direct the activity, treat the illnesses, apply balm to the wounds, refine the hearts, and provide the field and its members what they need in terms of guidance to remind and assist them and to raise them to a level that befits them." Gadahn's own letter may be viewed as a highly restricted contribution to this same genre. He states, for example, that he has prepared his formal disavowal "for the sake of correcting the path and repenting what has happened, and to call for victory and relieve the affliction that is encountering us...I hope that God would help the scholars to study and review and correct, or record similar statements—copying here is desired for documentation and influencing the receiving side. They should remember that words dispersed here and there, as those embedded in books and the speeches are not enough to explain the problem. What we need is direct speeches, defined and specialized on that subject" (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 17).

[50] The present is a mere summary of these legal prescriptions and proscriptions. The extensiveness of proofs prohibits the present author from re-presenting the detailed shari'a arguments pertinent to each legal principle discussed. For the original militant Islamist source material from which the following discussion derives, see:


[51] Gadahn also explicitly warns his readers against abandoning this perennial duty: “It is not acceptable to consider these personal crimes as a pretext to deny the compulsory Jihad duty, as a mistake does not justify a bigger mistake.” (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 18).

[52] See also the above discussion of Qur’an and ahadith in relation to the sinfulness of intentional homicide.

[53] This moderation will strike persons ignorant of AQSL’s religious Sunnite ecumenicalism as incorrect, but there is ample support documented by AQSL analysts. For one important recent study of this, see Nelly Lahoud Beware of Imitators: al-Qa’ida through the lens of its Confidential Secretary (Harmony Program, 4 June 2012, The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed 8 June 2012). Gadahn does not offer a frontal assault on immoderation beyond his critique of fanatical blood shedding, but one brief aside is telling. He states in reference to the potential downside of going public on these horrific attacks: “Now many regular people are looking at the Mujahidin as a group that does not hesitate to take people’s money by falsehood, detonating mosques, spilling the blood of scores of people to kill one or two who were labeled as enemies. While they shy away from listening to music or looking at a foreign woman—while those issues means very little to the common public, who see it as trivial issues. They are not, but [there is] no comparison to the sins that we are talking about.” Gadahn’s moderation vis-à-vis Sunnite orthodoxy is also evident in his harsh criticism of online ‘jihadi’ discussion groups: “As for the Jihadi forums, it is repulsive to most of the Muslims, or closed to them. It also distorts the face of al Qa’ida, due to what you know of bigotry, the sharp tone that characterizes most of the participants in these forums. It is also biased toward “Salafists” and not any Salafist, but the Jihadi Salafist, which is just one trend of the Muslim trends. The Jihad Salafist is a small trend within a small trend.” (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 4). In reference to a specific forum run by Muhammad al-Misra’ri he states that though ”he has excellent comments on Jihadi forums . . . his forum ‘al-Tajdid’ is not any better.” While agreeing with al-Misra’ri’s critique in relation to the ISI’s murderous rampage in Iraq, Gadahn nevertheless states: “As for other issues, like his definition of unification, some Fiqh theses, his exaggerated stiffness with the Shia, and those adhering to the buried, rejuvenators of myths and pagan appearances” Gadahn states “not at all.” (Ibid., p. 5).

See Mohammad Kamali, Sharia Law: An Introduction, pp 288-296, for a discussion of moderation and balance (al Wasatiyya) as a key Islamic religious precept.

[54] For key additional evidence confirming AQSL’s adherence to these shared premises, see Nelly Lahoud, Beware of Imitators: al-Qa’ida through the lens of its Confidential Secretary, 4 June 2012, Harmony Program, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, www.ctc.usma.edu.


[56] Ibid., p. 5; Also, when discussing whether media overexposure could undermine bin Laden’s persuasive influence, Gadahn expresses no moral revulsion and matter of factly reports: “It is all right if the Shaykh appeared now [early in 2011], then appeared in the 10th anniversary of the attacks of Manhattan and Washington.”

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid., p. 15.


[60] See note # 49 for original source material from which these disagreements are derived and compiled.

[61] Three additional arguments against reducing Islam to ‘jihadism’ may be made: (1) a rejection of the sectarian Kharijite claim that jihad bis safi is equivalent to faith as a pillar of Islam; (2) defense of the claim that while the five pillars of faith, prayer, alms, fasting, and pilgrimage are obligatory at a personal level (fard ‘ayn), the offensive jihad is a collective obligation that may be met by a section of the community on behalf of others; and (3) that being a ‘jihadist’ only means that one has met the eight qualifications for potential offensive jihad if required and declared, for example, that one is: a believer, mature and sound-minded, male, able-bodied,
economically independent, received parental permission, motivated by good intentions, capable of obedience and loyalty, will neither desert nor retreat, will be honest, straightforward, avoid treacherous acts including granting secure passage to enemies, and if he has killed, he must not mutilate. See Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955, esp. pp. 67-69, 83-93.


[63] It is possible that Gadahn is partially willing to admit this. He states, for example (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 15): "If that targeted person really deserves to be killed why not employ another method rather than random attacks, which is not tolerated by any mind or religion.[One] which does not differentiate between an enemy and a friend, the child and the old man, the man and the woman and the Muslim and the infidel?" He clearly states here that it is "not tolerated by any mind or religion," not just Islam, and that these indiscriminate methods violate Allah's forbidding of the shedding of blood of non-Muslim children, women, and old men.


[65] Gadahn (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 18) cites a classic verse bearing on retribution from the Qur’an (2:190) at the opening of his model disavowal—"God almighty has stated: “Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors." In its present context, however, it is exclusive to intra-Islamic blood shedding and therefore cannot be extended to Gadahn's understanding of retributive justice in relation to non-Muslims.

[66] It appears that Gadahn, while publicly declaring a "Crusader-Zionist" conspiracism, in his letter is far closer to recognizing Islamic responsibility for the present catastrophe facing the AQSL 'jihadists'. For example, he states: "I have no doubt that what is happening to the Jihadi movement in these countries is not misfortune, but punishment by God on us because of our sins and injustices, or because the sins of some of us and the silence of the rest of us. I do not see that my statement is an exaggeration and intimidation, as the Qur’anic verses, the Hadith and the scholar’s statements are plenty, and there is no need to state them" (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 15). And again: "Injustice is one of the reasons behind the defeat and disappointment, and the befallen miseries and sedition by the present catastrophe facing the AQSL 'jihadists'." And Gadahn also refers to the "Philippine Muslims" as "the infidels" in his reference to the Philippines being "a land where Muslims have friendly relations with the indigenous non-Muslim "heathens.""

[67] Bin Laden apparently found the TTP-sponsored attempted mass-casualty terrorist attack in New York City's Times Square by naturalized American citizen Faisal Shahzad just such a treacherous breach. Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad is now serving a mandatory life sentence for his guilty plea on ten felony counts for attempting to murder pedestrians in the failed 1 May 2010 vehicle-born improvised explosive device (VIED) deployed in Times Square. For Bin Laden, as a Muslim having taken an oath of citizenship, he was thereby dutifully bound from violating that oath. In one of the Abbottabad letters (SOCOM-2012-0000005-HT) Bin Laden writing to Sheikh Atiyatullah says: "Perhaps you monitored the trial of brother Faysal Shahzad. In it he was asked about the oath he took when he got American citizenship. And he responded by saying that he lied. You should know that it is not permissible in Islam to betray trust and break a covenant. Perhaps the brother was not aware of this. Please ask the brothers in [the] Taliban Pakistan [TTP] to explain this point to their members. In one of the pictures, brother Faysal Shahzad was with commander Mahsud; please find out if Mahsud knows that getting American citizenship requires taking an oath not to harm America. This is a very important matter because we do not want al-Mujahidin to be accused of breaking a covenant" (p. 7). We shall return to this matter in a subsequent section. In another letter presumably from bin Laden or possibly Sheikh Atiyatullah to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) emir Nashir al-Wuhayshi (aka: Abu Basir) written post-October 2010 (SOCOM-2012-0000016-HT) he states in relation to encouraging attacks on United States soil: "If the [Yemeni] government does not agree to a truce, concentrate on the Yemeni emigrants who come back to visit Yemen and have American visas or citizenship and would be able to conduct operations inside America as long as they have not given their promises not to harm America. We need to extend and develop our operations in America and not keep it limited to blowing up airplanes."

[68] This Egyptian Islamic Group sharia critique of the numerous sharia violations arising from the 9/11 terrorist operandi is well worth citing at length: "Hijacking planes and blowing them up involves frightening and killing those whom it is forbidden to terrorize and kill, either because there are Muslim passengers on the plane, or because there are non-Muslim children and women and elderly, whom it is not permitted to kill even in a state of war—in addition to the possibility of killing those whom it is not permitted to kill if the plane crashes into a civilian target when the hijacker does not know who is there. In addition, hijacking and blowing up planes involves a breach of faith towards the company that owns the plane and towards the passengers. The company gave the hijacker a ticket to use its plane on the condition that he not endanger its wellbeing and the wellbeing of the passengers, and when the hijacker hijacks and blows up the plane, he has violated this pledge. Likewise, the passengers all believe that the other passengers do not want to harm them and do not harbor any ill will, and this is based on custom and
the established usage among those who do business with airlines. This amounts to a guarantee of security [aman], or something approaching it, which forbids one to inflict harm. . . Hijacking planes and using its passengers as bargaining chips in order to achieve [the hijackers’] demands, and terrorizing them, and perhaps [even] killing them in order to put pressure on the governments of their countries or those countries’ occupiers, is forbidden in shari’a, because this is tantamount to punishing innocents (i.e. the passengers) in order to compel the occupier or transgressor to comply with the demands of the hijacker, and because most of these passengers do not have anything to do with the hijackers’ cause, and perhaps they are even sympathetic to them without the hijackers’ knowing this, and all of this is contrary to justice.” (See, Islam and the Laws of War [Al-Islam wa-tahdhib al-hurub]), in MEMRI #1301, “ Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya vs. Al-Qaeda,” 27 September 2006, p.3).

[69] Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, M.D., Army psychiatrist, was convicted and on 15 April 2013 sentenced to death for the 5 November 2009 shooting and murder at Fort Hood, Texas of 13 soldiers, and wounding of 31.

Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev detonated two pressure cooker bombs during the Boston marathon, killing four (two females, aged 29 and 23; an 8 year-old boy; and MIT police officer, Sean A. Collier, killed three days after the bombing), and injuring 264 others, many seriously and requiring amputation, including the serious wounding of a Transit Police officer.


[71] See al-Zawahiri, Exoneration, especially, pp. 4 (b), 12 (b), 76, 95, 113, 116, 120, 149, 151, 153, 197, 246, 247, 249, 258, 259, 263. Pagination is not furnished on this downloaded text so persons who seek to corroborate this must first paginate the text.

[72] Ibid., p. 4 b. See also Sayyid Imam’s rebuttal of al-Zawahiri’s claim (see , Exposure, Part 2, p. 4) that persons like Sayyid Imam who criticize al Qaeda must “serve the Crusading Zionist interests” even though al-Zawahiri admits that “what I denounced in The [Rationalization] Document I denounced previously in my 1993 book Al-Jami [fi talab al-Ilam al-Sharif], and actually before I wrote the book” (p. 4).


[74] Al-Zawahiri’s contradiction is key, but it is also the case that his ad hominem critique can be true, yet irrelevant to the validity or lack thereof of Sayyid Imam’s shari’atic case against AQSL. For this informal fallacy that seeks to refute the validity of a claim by attacking the validity of the claimant, see Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 13th ed., Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009, Pp. 127-131.

[75] See, for example: Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; Nelly Lahoud, Beware of Imitators: al-Qa’ida through the lens of its Confidential Secretary. Nasser al-Wuhaishi, present emir of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and AQSL second-in-command, in a March 2014 video posted to a militant Islamist website states: “The Crusader enemy, dear brothers, still possesses cards which he moves around. We have to remember that we are always fighting the biggest enemy. . . . We have to remove the cross, [and] the bearer of the cross, America.” (See: Reuters, “Yemen’s al-Qaida Leader Vows to Attack America in New Video,” 16 April 2014, www.voanews.com/1894546.html, accessed 17 April 2014.

[76] For a comprehensive analysis of AQSL’s terrorist modus operandi in relation to its core political and strategic objectives, see P. Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al-Qaeda: Fighting the War of Deeds, Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2014.

[77] Rationalization, Part 1, pp. 4-5; citing Qur’an 4:100, 5:27, 5:64, and 99:7-8; and two agreed upon ahadith, one in Sahih-Muslim, the other agreed upon by Ibn Abbas; Also, Sayyid Imam citing Qur’an 99:7-8: [T]he Almighty said: “Then shall anyone who has done an atom’s weight of good, see it [taken into account on the Day of Judgment]. And anyone who has done an atom’s weight of evil, shall see it.”

[78] Exposure of the Exoneration Book [Al-Ta’riya li Kitab Al-Tabri’ya], Part 10, p. 2; see also, Exposure, Part 3, p. 2.


[79] Ibid., Part 5, p. 4.

[80] For a most comprehensive conception that includes but extends beyond humankind to the entire Created world with emphasis on the earth’s environment, see: Professor Mustafa Abu-Sway, [n.d.] “Towards an Islamic Jurisprudence of the Environment: Fiqh al-Bi’ah fil-Islam, at www.iol.ie/~afifi/Articles/environment.htm, accessed 18 December 2013.[n.d]


[82] Thirty-two Muslims (26 men, and six women) were murdered in the 9/11 attacks. Twenty-eight Muslims died in the twin towers of the World Trade Center,
and three were among the passengers on the hijacked planes. These three were a husband and wife, who was at that time seven-months pregnant. Nationalities include: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Yemen, Iran, Ethiopia, Turkey, Trinidad and Tobago, Burma, Albania, Greece, and India. According to Al Araybia, “the most famous Muslim victim is the only Arab among all 9/11 victims, the Yemeni Abdul Salam Mallahi, who worked at the Marriott Hotel in World Trade Center. He was very brave and helped people escape the building. His body has never been found. The oldest victim was an Iranian woman who was 69 years old, and the youngest were two 25-year old men, Zohoto Ibisa, from Turkey, and a Pakistani, Khaled Shahid” (Kamal Kobeisi, “Remembering the Muslims who were killed in the 9/11 attacks,” http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/09/11/166286.html, accessed 5 March 2014). Murder left in its wake many family tragedies. “Baraheen Ashrafi’s husband, Mohammed Chowdhury, died atop the north tower, where he was a waiter at Windows on the World. Ashrafi, 38, lives in Edmond, Oklahoma, where she moved with her two children to be near her sister. “Ysuff Salie’s daughter Rahma, who was seven months pregnant, and Rahma’s husband, Michael, were passengers aboard the jet that crashed into the north tower. Ysuff, 64, and his wife, Haleema, 58, live in Newton, Mass, and run two bakery-cafés”; “Mehr Tariq’s husband Taiq Amanullah, an assistant vice president at Fiduciary Trust, died in the south tower. She is 49 and lives with her two young adult children in California’s Silicon Valley, where she moved in 2005 to be near her brothers.” (Cited in Rick Hampson, USA Today, “For families of 9/11 victims, a new pain,” 9 September 2010, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-09-03-1Amuslims911_CV_N.htm?csp, accessed 5 March 2014): In the East African embassy bombings (see, Indictment, United States v. Usama bin Laden et al., S(2) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1998)), 7 August 1998, excluding Americans, ten employees of the US embassy compound were murdered in Dar es Salaam (lit: ‘Abode of Peace’; Counts 224-234 in the Federal indictment, see pp. 81-82): Abdurahman Abdulla, Elias Elisha, Hassan Siyad Halane, Ramadhani Mahundi, Abdallah Mohammed, Abas William Mwila, Shaments Yusuf Nduange, Omari Yusufu Nyumbu, Mtendeja Rajabu, Said Rogathi, and Dotto Selemani; In the US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, Counts 11-223 apply to the 212 embassy compound employees murdered, see, pp. 71-79).

[83] See endnote 76 for the author’s advocacy of a broader War of Deeds’ within which AQSL’s failure to adhere to the shari’a of lawful jihad is but one key component.
II. Resources

Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries: A Chronology of Attacks

by Ioannis Mantzikos

Introduction [1]

Boko Haram's insurgency which pitted neighbour against neighbour, cost more than 4,000 lives, displaced close to half a million people, destroyed hundreds of schools and government buildings and devastated an already ravaged economy in the north-east of Nigeria, one of the country's poorest regions. Within less than five years (2010 – 2014) the Nigerian Islamist terrorists organization Boko Haram (BH) has evolved into the most lethal of all salafist jihadist organisations. Originally directing its attacks mainly at security forces and government officials, BH’s campaign has expanded to include attacks on Christians, critical Muslim clerics, traditional leaders, suspected collaborators, UN offices, bars and girl schools. Its campaign of terrorism, ranges from targeting students at state (secular) schools to health workers involved in polio vaccination campaigns.

In the first half of 2014 BH even surpassed the Islamic State in Iraq in terms of lethality, according to statistics compiled by the Intel Center.[2] On Tuesday, April 15, 2014, Boko Haram attacked a girls’ school in Chibok, Borno state, in northern Nigeria, abducting between 250-300 young girls. Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, released a video on May 5, threatening to sell the girls as “wives” while also expressing his ideological opposition to the idea of educating girls. The abduction of girls and subsequent developments have prompted several nations to send logistical support teams while the Nigerian government offered a $300,000 reward for information leading to the girls' rescue. On May 5 2014, Boko Haram took attacked the unprotected town of Gamboru Ngala, reportedly killing up to 300 civilians. These are just two incidents in a long row listed below.

The State Department's annual report on terrorism around the globe, issued in early 2014, estimated that the group’s membership ranges from “the hundreds to a few thousand.” The report warned that “the number and sophistication of BH’s attacks” are a source of concern. Increasingly attacking police and military targets, Boko Haram’s campaign of terrorism has turned into an insurgency that has also spilled over into neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger which serve as sanctuaries but have also become conflict zones.[3]

Table 1: Political Violence in the first half of 2014: the ten most lethal groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Terrorist/Rebel Group</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>2,924</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Islamic State (IS)</td>
<td>1,459</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>al-Shabaab</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>al-Huthi Rebels</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Jabhat al-Nusra</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR)</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Islamic Front</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Seleke</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This sudden growth of Boko Haram is even more astounding, given the fact that between 2003 and 2009...
only few incidents have been recorded. To chronicle this rapid rise, TRI has compiled a list of incidents, combining data from TRI's own records with those of a number of other databases and chronologies, such as incidents registered by the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database (START) and Emilie Ofetal's Timeline. While our listing seeks to be comprehensive, it is likely that due to censorship and other factors a number of attacks have escaped our attention. This chronology is primarily meant as a Resource for researchers focusing on Nigeria.

Chronology of Attacks 2003 – mid-2014

Pre-2010

Boko Haram attacks focused mainly on police stations, not directly targeting civilians. Some of their major attacks are listed here:

23–31 December 2003 – raid on government installations in the towns of Kanamma and Geidam (both in Yobe state) by about 200 gunmen by the Nigerian Taliban in which police weapons and vehicles were seized and policemen killed. Many “Taliban” were killed in the counter-attack.

January 2004 – attempted attack on Damboa police station.

June 2004 – attempted prison break of arrested members in Damaturu (capital of Yobe) in which four Boko Haram members were killed.

23 September 2004 – several dozen “Followers of the Prophet” (Al-Sunna Wal Jamma), also called “Nigerian Taliban”, including Aminu Tashen Ilimi, attacked police patrols and stations in Gwoza and Bama in which four policemen and two civilians were killed. 28 of the attackers were killed while others fled over the border into Cameroon. Remnant of this militant group are considered by some observers as forming the nucleus of what became Boko Haram.

10 October 2004 – attack on a convoy of cars transporting policemen near Lake Chad in the town of Kala-Balge in which three officers were killed and 12 policemen captured. They were shot later.

26 – 30 July 2009 – Heavy-handed police handling of a public order issue led to the hospitalization of 17 members of Boko Haram. Angered members of Boko Haram attacked police stations in Maiduguri & Bauchi. In these and other confrontations 22 militants, two police officers, one prison officer and at least 50 civilians died according to one account (others provide higher figures). The government ordered the military to assist the overwhelmed local police and at the end of the day more than 800 people were killed, many of them were innocent rather than members of Boko Haram. Other Boko Haram members were arrested, including the leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf. Together with some other members of Boko Haram he was publicly executed outside a police station on 30 July; 28 policemen and five prison warders as well as an undisclosed number of soldiers were also killed in the rioting that occurred in these five days.

2010

September 5, 2010 – Boko Haram members riding motorcycles, kill a retired ASP cop, Zannah Kyari. They also shoot another Bulama a village warden in Konduga Lga, in the leg, leaving the victim for dead.

September 7, 2010 – attack on the Bauchi jail, freeing some 700 inmates including about 100 members of
Boko Haram.[7]

September 21, 2010-Killings. Gunmen on motorcycles killed a local chief and a trader in Maiduguri.

October 6, 2010-Assassination. The national vice-chairman of the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP), Awana Ali Ngala, was killed in his house in Maiduguri. While gunmen riding motorcycles also fired upon the housed of Ali Modu, the speaker of the Borno State House of Assembly, killing one policeman.

October 7, 2010-Assassination. Mamman Zannah, a senior staff of Bama Local Council is killed by men supposed to belong to Boko Haram organisation.

October 9, 2010-Assassination. Sheik Bashir Mustapha, an Islamic scholar was assassinated in his home and Bashir Kashara, a Wahhabi figure was killed in a separate incident.

October 10, 2010-Assassination. A 10 year-old boy, alimajiri pupil of a traditional Islamic school is beheaded, some parts of his body removed.

October 13, 2010-Assassination. Boko Haram members kill a policeman attached to the private residence of Bauchi State Commissioner for Special

October 20, 2010-Assassination. Suspected Boko Haram militia kills a police inspector, Kashim Bukar by shooting him in the chest.

October 23, 2010-Assassination. Boko Haram members attempt to set a police station ablaze but are overpowered by the police. One member of the sect is killed.

November 13, 2010-Assassination. Two unknown gunmen riding on a motorcycle shoot and kill a soldier, Bashir Mohammed, attached to 231 Battalion of the Nigerian Army Biu.

November 19, 2010-Assassination. Suspected Boko Haram members open fire in a mosque during Juam’at prayer. Three persons are killed in the process.

November 24, 2010-Assassination. Suspected Boko Haram members kill a policeman (Ramat Mohammat) and a soldier (Salisu Jibrin) on their way home after duty.

December 4, 2010-Attacks. Nigerian army clashes with members of Boko Haram Islamist sect. Two of their members and three civilians die in the crossfire.

December 24, 2010-Bombing. The capital city of Abuja is rocked by a bomb on Yuletide. 11 persons confirmed dead and 30 injured.

December 24, 2010-Bombing. Nine explosions attacks rock the town of Jos on Christmas Eve, killing at least 80 persons and injuring many.

December 28, 2010-Attacks. Suspected Boko Haram Islamic fundamentalists fire shots at the Teaching Hospital, killing a policeman on duty and two civilians.

December 29, 2010-Attacks. Shootings against political party All Nigeria People's Party in Maiduguri in which eight people were killed.

December 29, 2010-Attacks. Members of radical Islamic group Boko Haram attack a police patrol team in Maiduguri, killing seven to eight persons; eight people are wounded.

December 29, 2010-Bombing. A bomb launhed by Islamic Sect Boko Haram at a relaxation spot in Abuja.
2011


January 9, 2011 - Assassination. Suspected Boko Haram members kill a policeman constable, Amos Tangurda, attached to COCIN Church, injuring the watchman, Mallam Akilahyel Solomon.

January 19, 2011 - Assassination. Deeper Life Christian Church pastor and three of his neighbours are killed by fundamentalists.

January 23, 2011-Assassination Boko Haram members operating on motorcycles attack and kill a soldier on his way to visit a relation in Borno.

January 26, 2011-Assassination Boko Haram members kill a policeman guarding a voter registration site in Bauchi.

January 27, 2011-Assassination Gunmen suspected to belong to Islamist sect Boko Haram kill a policeman guarding voter registration equipment in Gusau, Zamfara State.

January 28, 2011-Assassination of Modu Fannami Godio, secular opposition figure and gubernatorial candidate from the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP). Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.

January 30, 2011 - Two muslim extremists believed to belong to Boko Haram sect are killed as they attack policemen guarding a dam in Maiduguri.


February 13, 2011 During a criminal operation, Boko Haram organisation kills one of their members in error.

February 20, 2011 Five Boko Haram suspects die during a gunfight with the police. One of the financiers is killed too.

February 24, 2011 A police Inspector is gunshot by two suspected Boko Haram members operating on a motorcycle in Maiduguri.

February 28, 2011 Boko Haram members invade the private residence of a Divisional Police Officer, Mustapha Sandamu and killed two in Kaduna

March 7, 2011-Assacks. armed men killed more than 200 men, women and children whn Boko Haram attacked the villages of Dogo Nachawa, Zot and Tatsat.

March 12, 2011-Assassination of non-violent preacher Ahmad Abdullahi Bolori for criticizing violent groups.

March 26, 2011-Assassination. Boko Haram attack soldiers on routine patrol; One soldier is killed, 16 others
March 27, 2011-Assassination. Boko Haram sect member kill an ANPP chieftain, Alhaji Modu Gana Makanike, the Gwange II Ward Chairman of ANPP

March 29, 2011-Planned attack. Nigerian police uncovered a Boko Haram plot to bomb an ANPP election rally in Maiduguri.

April 4, 2011. Suspected members of the extremist Islamist sect, Boko Haram, kill two young men, Babaji (24) and Sadi. Seven children are also injured. This seems to be a revengeful mission: on 2 April, after the aborted parliamentary elections, Babaji has disarmed gunmen about to kill a local politician in Budum quarters.

April 8, 2011, Explosion. A bomb explosion claims the life of one of the bombers, Yahaya injuring the other, Mohamed, Al-Qaeda network (Boko Haram) is suspected. The suspects expected to explode four bombs.

April 9, 2011- Attack. Bombs exploded at two polling stations in Maiduguri. At least ten people were injured at the Unguwar Doki polling center, while there were six casualties at the Independent National Electoral Coalition polling center. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

April 15, 2011-Attack. Two suspected Boko Haram gunmen in Maiduguri attack a residential area, kill two soldiers before being chased by JTF. Two civilians also die, including a child. Five other persons, including two soldiers, are injured.

April 16, 2011-Attack. A police inspector, Elias Dawa, is killed in a gunduel by a Boko Haram member

April 16, 2011-Attack. Arrests. Two bombs exploded in Kaduna. Eight people were injured. The police arrested four foreigners (at least two of them from Niger) and a Nigerian accomplice. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

April 21, 2011-Attack. A bomb killed one person in Kaduna. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

April 22, 2011-Arrests. A bomb-making factory uncovered in Kaduna. Police said eight people were arrested, three of whom had been critically injured during the blast on April 21, 2011.

April 24, 2011-Attack. Four bombs were detonated in Maiduguri. Three people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.


May 5, 2011-Assassination Radical Islamic Sect Boko Haram members in Maiduguri kill two prison warders.

May 11, 2011-Assassination Boko Haram gunmen kill the Borno State Chairman NURTW, Ibrahim Dudu Gobe and wound his son.

May 11, 2011-Assassination Boko Haram gunmen kill a cleric, Sheikh Goni Tijjani, who was close to the state governor’s father, Galadima Modu Sheriff.

May 11, 2011-Assassination Boko Haram gunmen kill a cleric, Mallam Alhaji Abur, who was a critic of the Boko Haram Islamic sect.
May 12, 2011 - **Assassination** of political figures Abba Anas bin ‘Umar & Modu Fannami Godio.

May 17, 2011 - **Attack** Gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram members ambush a policeman in a local mosque.

May 18, 2011 - **Attack** on Maiduguri police station, about 10 people killed.


May 27, 2011 - **Attack**. Simultaneous gun and bomb attacks by a group of around 70 gunmen on a police station, a police barracks and a bank in Damboa, Borno State. Eight people were killed, including four policemen. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

May 30, 2011 - **Attack**. Mammy Market bombing in Bauchi, killing 13 and injuring 40 people inside the 33 Artillery Brigade barracks.

May 30, 2011 - **Attack**. 13 people were killed and 33 wounded in an attack on a beer garden in a military barracks complex in Bauchi.

June 6, 2011 - **Assassination**. Muslim cleric Ibrahim Birkuti, who was critical of Boko Haram. He was shot dead by two gunmen on motorcycles outside his house in Biu, 200 km from Maiduguri. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.

June 7, 2011 - **Attacks**. On a church and two police posts in Maiduguri. At least 14 people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

June 11, 2011 - **Failed attack**. A bomb was found by the police at Gonin Gora market in Kaduna. It is not known who planted the bomb

June 12, 2011 - **Attack**. Four people were killed in a Boko Haram attack on an unregistered drinking place in a suburb of Maiduguri. - Statement. Boko Haram released a list of conditions to be met before they would enter into a dialogue with the government.

June 13, 2011 - **Failed attack**. A bomb was found at the NNPC staff quarters at Narayi, Kaduna. It is not known who planted the bomb.

June 16, 2011 - **Suicide attack** on police General Headquarters in Abuja killed eight people (two, according to another account) and seventy vehicles were damaged or burnt.

June 19, 2011 Boko Haram militants attack a relaxation centre, killing two persons. Three of the injured persons later die. A security personnel driving his private car was also shot dead by suspected Boko Haram members.

26 June 2011 – **Attack** Suspected Boko Haram members riding on motorcycles fire several Kalashnikov gunshots at people playing card under a tree. A nurse is killed on the spot, four others are injured. Also Armed men suspected to be members of Boko Haram sect attack a police station and a commercial bank with arms and explosives. However, the force PRO, Olushola Amore, a deputy commissioner of police, reports that the bank attack was a purely robbery incident. Some of the money stolen is distributed to people outside. Six policemen including the Divisional Crime Officer and two civilian are killed.

26 June 2011 – **Attack** on beer garden in Maiduguri, killing 25 people and injuring 12 more.
June 27, 2011 – Attack 10 Boko Haram members attack and kill three Customs officers during a meeting.


July 3, 2011-Attack. An explosion at a bar close to police barracks in Maiduguri killed at least 10 people.


July 9, 2011–A combined police and military task force raid against Boko Haram group makes 30 dead including a little boy.

July 10, 2011 - Bombing of the All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State, killing 3 people and wounding 7 others.

July 12, 2011 The Boko Haram sect members launch two bombs into a moving military patrol vehicle, injuring two soldiers. JTF reprisals kill 3 persons who may be sect members.

July 22, 2011 JTF, Operation Restore Order shoots a Boko Haram member dead, injuring one civilian.

July 23, 2011. Explosion. An explosion which rocks a market and the crossfire between Boko Haram sect members and army leaves 13 civilians dead. 3 soldiers are injured. According another source, the military operation following the blast kills 44 persons. Amnesty International reportedly accuses army of the killing of 23 people.

July 23, 2011. Boko Haram members engage JTF, patrolling in the area, in a shoot out. The two sect members were in a Honda car and the driver was carrying a rifle. One suspect dies during the crossfire.

August 2, 2011- Attacks. A taxi driver is killed in an exchange of fire between JTF members of the Joint and those of the Boko Haram sect shortly after a bomb explodes. Many churches are destroyed. Two persons are reportedly injured.


August 12, 2011 - Assassination. Muslim cleric Liman Bana shot dead.

August 14, 2011 Islamic cleric, Liman Bana, 65, traile right from the Mosque to his residence is murdered by Boko Haram gunmen in presence of his family. The killers flee to Gambouru, a border community town with Chad.

August 15, 2011 A suicide bomber is shot dead before he could explode the bomb-laden vehicle at the police state command.

August 19, 2011 Boko Haram kills three policemen and a civilian watching television in a parlour.

August 23, 2011-Assassination. ANPP Chief, Alhaji Isa Marguba, 70, is shot dead by Boko Haram sect members, when he returns from the mosque.

August 24, 2011-Assasssination. Boko Haram members murder a State accountant, seven-months pregnant. She was staff of Ministry of Finance

August 26, 2011—Attack by explosives-laden vehicle (Honda Accord) on (UN) compound in Abuja, allegedly masterminded by Mamman Nur, killed 23 people and injured 80 others. In a martyrdom video, released on 1 September 2011, the perpetrator, Mohammed Abdul Barra, labelled the UN as the “forum of all the global evil” and praise was offered to the late Osama Bin Laden.

September 1, 2011-Assassination. Soldiers of Operation Tsaro” kill two motorcyclists suspected to be members of the Boko Haram sect.”

September 1, 2011 Soldiers stationed in Biu go on rampage after a military officer is killed by believed Boko Haram members. At least 3 people die and many shops are destroyed.

September 4, 2011-Assassination. Two suspected Boko Haram members shot and killed Muslim cleric Malam Dala outside his home in the Zinnari area of Maiduguri.

September 12, 2011-Attacks. Bomb and shooting on a police station and a bank in Misau, Bauchi State. Seven people were killed, including four policemen. The bank was robbed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attacks.

September 13, 2011-Attack. Boko Haram members in Maiduguri shot and wounded four soldiers in an ambush. The attacks followed the arrest of 15 Boko Haram members in various military raids on Boko Haram hideouts in the city.

September 17, 2011-Assassination. Babakura Fugu (brother-in-law of former Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf) was shot dead outside his house in Maiduguri by two suspected members of Boko Haram. Two days earlier, Fugu had attended a peace meeting with Nigeria’s ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo.

October 2, 2011-Assassination Boko Haram shoots three traders dead, including a patented medicine seller.

October 6, 2011 Mob kill two suspected Boko Haram members.

October 10, 2011 Bomb explosion kills at least one person. The bomb, which hit a JTF vehicle, is suspected to be thrown by members of Boko Haram.

October 10, 2011 A policeman is shot dead by bank robbers suspected to be Boko Haram members, who attacked the same bank and killed four policemen in March.

October 15s, 2011 Gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram members kill Ali Banga, the leader of the Borno State Vigilante Association.

October 16, 2011 Gunmen kill Modu Bintube, a member of the Borno State House Assembly, in front of his house. One source of information suspects the gunmen to be Boko Haram members. Following a bomb attack on a MOPOL base, a policeman and three attackers are killed. Fifteen vehicles are burnt and a building destroyed. The attack could have been carried out by Boko Haram members.

October 16, 2011 Gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram members kill a reporter (Zakariyya Isa) in front of his residence. In another source of information, a leader of Boko Haram explains that the murder was carefully planned because the journalist was spying on them and giving information to security agencies.

October 25, 2011-Assassination of a policeman. He was shot in his home in Damaturu, Yobe State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.

October 29, 2011-Assassination of Muslim cleric Sheikh Ali Jana’a, outside his house in Maiduguri, Borno
State. Jana'a was reported to have provided information on Boko Haram to the security forces.

**November 3, 2011 - Arrest.** Sanda Umar Konduga (alias: Usman al-Zawahiri) was arrested by the State Security Service (SSS). Konduga admitted to being a member of Boko Haram and claimed he was working for the People's Democratic Party (PDP) politicians in the State of Borno. Boko Haram rejected any links to Nigeria's political parties.

**November 4, 2011 - Attack.** Bomb and gun attacks in Damaturu, Yobe State. Targets included churches and mosques. At least 63 people were killed. Boko Haram claimed responsibility. - Attack. Suicide bombers attacked a military base in Maiduguri, Borno State. The number of casualties is not known. Authorities suspected that Boko Haram carried out the attack.

**November 13, 2011 - Statement.** Algeria's deputy foreign minister said that intelligence reports showed coordination between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram.

**November 15, 2011 - Attack.** Suspected Boko Haram members threw explosives at the convoy of Borno State governor Shettima in Maiduguri. No one was hurt.

**November 15, 2011** At least one child is killed during a cross-fire between Boko Haram members and men of the JTF. One source also mentions that two soldiers were killed.

**November 21, 2011** Three soldiers die in a clash between officers of the JTF and members of Boko Haram. Some civilians are also injured.

**November 24, 2011 - Statement.** A spokesman for Boko Haram, Abul Qaqa, claimed Boko Haram had links with al-Qaeda.

**November 26-27, 2011 - Attack.** Bomb attacks in Geidam, Yobe, following the arrest of Boko Haram members. Four policemen were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

**December 3, 2011 - Attack.** Suspected Boko Haram gunmen killed two people in Maiduguri, Borno State. Three bombs also exploded, but no one was killed.

**December 4, 2011 - Attack.** Bombing of two police buildings and two banks in Bauchi State. Three people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

**December 6, 2011 - Attack.** A bomb explosion in Kaduna metropolis, Kaduna State, brought down a block of shops and apartments, killing eight people. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

**December 13, 2011 - Attack.** Bomb attack targeting soldiers. The soldiers retaliated with shooting and ten people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.


**December 17, 2012 -** Three Boko Haram members are killed in Maiduguri by their bombs explosion. IED, AK 47 rifles, ammunition are recovered from the scene of the blast. While in Kano Policemen are killed in a bloody clash with suspected Boko Haram members. Four Muslim sect members and at least 3 police officers die while 14 persons are arrested.
December 19, 2012- Shootout between Boko Haram and police in Kano leave three Boko Haram members and three policemen dead. Police seized bomb-making equipment and made arrests.

December 21, 2012- After a bomb rams into a military convoy, a confrontation between Boko Haram members and JTF ensues, killing at least 53 people. Victims are soldiers (four deaths), policemen, members of the Islamic sect and civilians. A policeman, assistant commissioner of police was among the Boko Haram sect members killed.

December 23, 2011- Attacks. Explosions and gunfire in Maiduguri, Damaturu and Potiskum. According to military sources in Maiduguri, Boko Haram attacked JTF operatives in at least six places within a span of one hour. The clashes in Damaturu continued for four days, and resulted in at least 10,000 internally displaced people, and an unknown number of deaths.

December 24–25, 2011- Planned attack. A plot by Boko Haram to bomb the military barracks, the Bougainvillea Hotel and a Shell oil facility in Port Harcourt was thwarted when security agencies arrested several suspects on the night of 24–25 December, according to an army commander.

December 25, 2011- Attacks. Multiple bomb attacks against churches and Christian worshippers throughout Nigeria, including:

December 28, 2011- Attack. Bombing and shooting at a beer parlor in Mubi, Adamawa State. No one was killed, but 15 people were wounded. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

December 30, 2011- Attack at a military checkpoint in Maiduguri. Four passers-by were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

December 31, 2011- Statement. President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, Niger and Plateau States and ordered the closing of the borders to Chad and Niger near areas affected by recent attacks. He directed top security officials to set up a special counter-terrorism unit to fight the growing threat posed by Boko Haram

2012

January 4, 2012- Attack. Two gunmen, suspected to be Boko Haram members, entered a home and shot a teacher and his son in Dalla, Maiduguri. The JTF killed the two attackers during an arrest attempt.

January 5, 2012- Attack. Gunmen attacked a church in Gombe State. Reports of the number killed vary between three and six. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

January 6, 2012-Attack. Shooting at a church in Yola. Eight people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

January 10, 2012-Attack on a beer garden in Damaturu, Yobe State. Eight people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

January 13, 2012-Attack on a pub in Yola, Adamawa State and on a pub in Gombe, Gombe State. The attacks killed four and injured two. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attacks.

January 17, 2012-Attack on a military checkpoint in Maiduguri. Two soldiers and four attackers were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.—Arrest: Six members of Boko Haram were arrested in a military raid on a hideout in Maiduguri.- Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen attacked an army outpost
in Borno State, killing two people.

**January 20, 2012 - Attacks** on eight government security buildings in Kano, including the regional police headquarters, two local police stations, the local headquarters of the State Security Service, the home of a police official and the state police command headquarters. There were up to five suicide bombers, at least 20 explosions and sustained gunfire.

**January 22, 2012 - Failed attack.** Attempted bank robbery in Tafawa Balewa; repelled by security forces.

**January 24, 2012 - Arrests.** The JFT arrested 158 suspected Boko Haram members following the Kano attacks. Police reported seizing ten cars laden with explosives and about 300 improvised explosive devices hidden in soft drink cans and bottles at a number of locations in Kano.

**January 28, 2012 - JTF operation.** The JTF killed 11 members of Boko Haram in Maiduguri.

**February 1, 2012 - Attack.** Seven people were killed in Maiduguri, Borno State. Boko Haram took responsibility for the attack in a statement, saying they had killed 7 out of 30 persons earmarked to be executed because they revealed the identities of the 11 Boko Haram members who were killed by the JTF on January 28, 2012. - Arrest of (purported) spokesman for Boko Haram, Abu Qaqa. According to Boko Haram, the man who was arrested is not Abu Qaqa, but the SSS are certain that the captured man is Abu Qaqa.

**February 7, 2012 - Failed attack.** A bomb was diffused by the police anti-bomb squad in Kaduna. The bomb was found in the house of Hon. Auwalu Ali Tafoki, a former Chairman of the Kaduna South Local Area.

**February 15, 2012 - Attack.** Jailbreak in Koton-Karfe, Kogi State. About 20 gunmen attacked the prison with explosives and guns, freeing 119 inmates. Boko Haram claimed responsibility, saying they staged the operation to rescue seven Boko Haram members.

**February 20, 2012 - Attack.** Suspected Boko Haram bomb and gun attack at a market in Maiduguri. According to hospital staff, 30 civilians were killed. The army killed eight of the attackers and deactivated bombs.

**February 23, 2012 - Statement.** Nigeria’s minister of defense, Oluseyi Petinrin, stated that Boko Haram had ties to al-Qaeda.

**February 25, 2012 - Attack.** Gunmen suspected of being from Boko Haram launched simultaneous gun and bomb attacks on a prison and a police station in Gombe. 14 people were killed.


**March 2, 2012 - Attack** Boko Haram carries out two attacks, killing four people including a mother, her son and two others. In a second attack, a trader is killed at a market place and a tailor slaughtered with a knife.

**March 3, 2012**–One of the suspected masterminds of the October 1, 2010 bombing in Abuja, Tiemkenfa Francis Osvwo (alias General Gbokos), dies in Prison. His lawyer alleges that Osvwo was murdered by the authorities. The cell was fumigated with a strange substance on the January 8, 2012, which affected the health of all the other suspects.

**March 7, 2012 - Attack** on a police station in Ashaka, Gombe State. Seven people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.
March 8, 2012 - Kidnap, killings. An Italian and a British engineer, who were kidnapped in the northern town of Birnin Kebbi in May 2011, were killed when allied Nigerian-British forces tried to free them. Nigerian authorities blamed Boko Haram for the kidnapping and killings, but Boko Haram issued a statement denying any involvement.

March 9, 2012 - Assassination. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen killed a traditional ruler as he left a mosque after Friday prayers in the northeastern Gombe State.

March 10, 2012 - Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen attacked and burned down a police station in Bulabilin Ngaura village, Borno State, killing one policeman. - Failed attack. Boko Haram tried to attack a mobile police base in Maiduguri, but, according to local police, was repelled. One suspected Boko Haram member was killed and 11 were arrested.


March 12, 2012 - Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen attacked a military patrol, killing five people.

March 21, 2012 - Attack. Boko Haram suspects used explosives to destroy the Divisional Police Office's (DPO) house in the Tudun Wada local government area, 100 kilometers from Abuja. - Failed attack. The JTF killed nine suspected Boko Haram members and arrested two when they attempted to rob a bank.

March 30, 2012 - Attack. A government official reported that suspected members of Boko Haram killed four people when they robbed a bank and stormed a police station in Maiduguri, Borno State.

March 31, 2012 - JTF operation. A raid of a bomb factory in Kogi led to a shootout between the JTF and suspected Boko Haram members. Ten people killed.

April 4, 2012 - Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen killed seven people in a market in Maiduguri.

April 8, 2012 (Easter Day) - Attack. A suicide bomber in a vehicle detonated explosives near a church in Kaduna killing at least 38 people. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

April 12, 2012 - Statement. Boko Haram released a video threatening to overthrow President Jonathan within three months.

April 18, 2012 - Statement. The US government warned US citizens residing in Nigeria that Boko Haram is plotting attacks in the capital, Abuja, among others against hotels regularly visited by Westerners.

April 25, 2012 - Arrest. The JTF raided a suspected Boko Haram “bomb factory” in a home in Kano State and arrested an unknown number of suspects. Items recovered from the house included improvised explosive devices (IEDs), assorted containers, liquid substances, charcoal and a film about Osama bin Laden. No one was killed.

April 26, 2012 - Attack. A suicide attack on the offices of the Nigerian newspaper This Day in Abuja killed four people killed. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack. - Attack. A car bomb exploded outside a complex housing a number of newspaper offices, including This Day in Kaduna (Reported by AFP, April 26). Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack. - Statement. In a video statement, Boko Haram took responsibility for both April 26 attacks. The statement said that the media, and especially This Day, had offended the prophet Mohammed and told lies about Boko Haram, and threatened to attack other media houses.

April 30, 2012—Attack. A suicide bomber targeted a senior police official's convoy in Taraba State, killing 11 people. The official was not injured. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

May 4, 2012—Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen stormed a prison in Borno State, killing two guards and freeing an unknown number of prisoners.

May 6, 2012—Shootout between security forces and Boko Haram in Kano. Four Boko Haram members were killed.

May 11, 2012—Arrest. Suleiman Mohammed, described as Boko Haram's head of operations in Kano, was arrested with his wife and five children during a police raid in Kano.

May 12, 2012—Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen burned down a police station in Borno State. Two policemen were killed.

May 13, 2012—Shootout between security forces and Boko Haram in Kano. Six security force officers were killed.

May 19, 2012—JTF Operation. A suspected “Boko Haram enclave” was destroyed by the JTF in Jos.

May 22, 2012—Planned attack. Separate attempts to bomb police headquarters and a radio station in Abuja were stopped by security personnel in the buildings. The affiliation of the suicide bombers is unknown.


June 5, 2012—Assassination. Two gunmen on a motorcycle killed former Nigerian deputy police chief Abubakar Saleh Ningi, his driver and a bodyguard in Kano.


June 8, 2012—Attack. In a suicide bombing a man drove a car with explosives into the entrance of the police headquarters of Borno State. Four people were killed, including a policeman, and seven were wounded. No one claimed responsibility for the attack.

June 10, 2012—Attack. A suicide car bomb exploded outside a church in Jos. According to police, no one was killed in the explosion, but 41 people were wounded, and two bystanders were killed in subsequent retaliations. Attack. According to police, five gunmen attacked a church in the town of Biu, killing one and wounding three.


June 21, 2012—Statement. The United States Department of State designated Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kambar, and Khalid al-Barnawi as ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorists’. - Arrest attempt: Habib Bama (aka Shuaibu Bama and Habib Mamman) was shot in an attempted arrest by the JTF in Yobe State. Bama was critically wounded, and later died in hospital. In a statement Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa said the group was happy about Habib Bama’s “martyrdom.”
June 22, 2012—Arrest. The JTF arrested four people trying to place bombs in a mosque in Kano. The identity of the suspects was not released, but they were thought to be members of Boko Haram. Two days later, Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa denied the involvement of Boko Haram in the attempted bombing.

June 23, 2012—JTF operation. Four suspected Boko Haram members were killed in shootout when the JTF raided a Boko Haram hideout in Kano. The JTF recovered weapons, ammunition and a Honda vehicle primed for a suicide mission.

June 24, 2012—Attack. Gunmen attacked a prison in Yobe, freeing 40 inmates. Two attackers were killed, and several policemen wounded. The police claimed that Boko Haram was responsible.

June 25, 2012—Attack. An IED exploded near a cluster of bars in the city of Bauchi. Nine people were injured, but no one was killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

June 26, 2012—Attack. Three policemen were shot dead when gunmen attacked the regional police headquarters in the town of Wukari in Taraba State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

June 26–27, 2012—Attacks. 30 militants used explosives and guns to attack Kano’s Dala police division. According to the police, ten militants and one policeman were killed in the ensuing shootout. June 30, 2012—JTF operation. The JTF launched a pre-emptive offensive against Boko Haram in Damaturu (Yobe), following intelligence that Boko Haram planned to attack the city.

July 2, 2012—Attack. Nine construction workers building a mosque were killed in Maiduguri. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.


July 5, 2012—Press Release. A Nigerian court accuses two men of having links with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and of receiving funds from the militant group to be used in conscripting and sending recruits to Yemen.

July 30, 2012—Attacks. Suicide bombings at two police stations kill two people in the city of Sokoto.

August 3, 2012—Attack. A top Muslim traditional leader in Potiskum escapes a suicide attack when the bomber is thwarted by locals before blowing himself up outside a mosque.

August 19, 2012—Attack. Gunmen blow up a primary school, a church and police station in Damagun town in Yobe State.

September 16, 2012—Attack. Six are shot dead and nine injured when BH gunmen fire into a group of ludo game players in Bauchi.

September 23, 2012—Attack. A suicide bomber blows up his explosives-laden car near a church in the city of Bauchi, killing a female worshipper and her son and injuring dozens.

October 18, 2012—Attack. Twenty-three killed in coordinated bomb and gun attacks by BH in Potiskum.


2013


February 8, 2013 - Attacks. Gunmen kill 10 polio immunization workers and injure three others in separate attacks on two polio clinics in Kano.

February 10, 2013 - Assassinations. Three North Korean doctors are killed by unknown attackers in Potiskum in northeastern Yobe State.

February 16, 2013 - Kidnappings. Gunmen kidnap seven foreign construction workers—a Briton, an Italian, a Greek and four Lebanese—in Jamaare

February 19, 2013 - Kidnappings. A French family of seven is kidnapped in Cameroon and taken to Nigeria. BH claims responsibility.

February 25, 2013 - A video appears on YouTube of seven kidnapped members of a French family with their abductors, who claimed to be from BH, demanding the release of their imprisoned comrades. France condemns the video as a shocking “display of the kidnappers’ cruelty.

March 5, 2013 - Statement, Assassination. BH leader Abubakar Shekau denies any ceasefire deal with the government in a video in which a man accused of being an informant appears to be beheaded on camera.

March 15, 2013 - Assassination. Gunmen kill a senior judicial official in northern Nigeria’s largest city, Kano. Gunmen raid a prison in Gwoza, in northeastern Borno State, freeing 170 inmates and killing a civilian


March 22, 2013 - Attack. Twenty-five are killed in northeastern Adamawa State when attackers blast a jail, a police station and a bank with bombs, machine-guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Some 127 prison inmates escape during an attack on the jailhouse in Ganye town.

April 11, 2013 - Attacks. Four policemen and five BH gunmen are killed in a shootout during an attack on a police station in Babban Gida Village of Yobe State.

April 11, 2013 - Statement. BH leader Abubakar Shekau rejects the idea of any potential amnesty deal with the government.

19 to 26 April 2013 - JTF Operation. Fierce fighting between troops and suspected Islamists in the remote northeastern town of Baga kills 187 people.


May 7, 2013 - Attacks. BH launches coordinated attacks in the northeastern town of Bama against security formations, killing 55 people and freeing 105 inmates.

May 13, 2013 - Statement. BH claims responsibility for the Baga and Bama attacks in a video, which also depicts women and children apparently being held hostage.

May 17, 2013 - JTF Operation. Nigeria’s military announces a “massive” deployment of troops and military hardware to its restive northeast, after the president declares a state of emergency in areas where Islamist insurgents have seized territory. Phone signals are shut down in Borno and Yobe states.
June 17, 2013- BH gunmen storm a student dormitory in a secondary school in Damaturu, killing seven students and two teachers.

July 6, 2013- Attack. BH gunmen attack a government secondary school in Mamudo in Yobe State, killing 41 students and a teacher and setting dormitories on fire.

July 27, 2013- Attack. BH gunmen kill more than 20 civilians, mostly fishermen and traders. The attack is a reprisal for an attack on them by a vigilante group in Dawashe Village, near the town of Baga in Borno State.

August 31, 2013- Attacks. BH gunmen kill 12 nomads who storm Boko Haram's hideout to avenge the killing of two herdsmen killed by the insurgents following a previous attack on Yaguwa Village in Damboa District of Borno State.

September 11, 2013- Attacks. Gunmen with explosives and rocket-propelled grenades attack a police station in Ga'anda Village in northeast Adamawa State, killing two officers and injuring another. The police station is burned in the attack.

September 17, 2013- Attacks. BH gunmen kill 142 people and burn dozens of homes in coordinated attacks on the town of Benisheik in Borno State.

September 298, 2013- Attacks. BH gunmen open fire in a dormitory at the College of Agriculture, in the town of Gujba in Yobe State, while students were asleep. Forty students are killed.

October 24, 2013- Attacks. BH gunmen in military uniform launch coordinated attacks on a military barracks and four police facilities in Yobe State capital Damaturu. 21 persons including soldiers, police, civilians and insurgents were killed in multiple attacks carried out by Boko Haram sect members. However, another report says the Army killed 21 insurgents. An Army source put the casualty figure on the part of the insurgents at 70.

November 4, 2013- Attacks. Dozens of BH gunmen on motorcycles and in pickups kill 27 people and burn down 300 homes in a raid on Bama, a town in northeast Borno State.

November 13, 2013 - Kidnapping. Gunmen riding on motorcycles kidnap a French Catholic priest from his parish in the Cameroonian village of Nguetchewe, 10km from the Nigerian border. The 15 gunmen cross into Nigeria, and Cameroon authorities blame BH.

November 23, 2013- Attacks. BH gunmen kill 12 residents, burn several homes and steal vehicles in an attack on Sandiya Village, 85km outside Maiduguri. Over 40 Boko Haram members were killed in an offensive by the military. The sect members were killed during offensive air and land raids of their hideouts in Gwoza.

December 2, 2013- Attacks. Around 200 BH gunmen dressed as soldiers launch coordinated attacks on an air force base, a military barracks and a nearby checkpoint in Maiduguri.

2014

January 26, 2014- Attacks. At least 78 people are killed in two separate attacks in north-east Nigeria — one on a busy market in Borno state and the other in neighbouring Adamawa, with suspicions falling on Boko Haram.

February 11, 2014- Attacks. Suspected Boko Haram militants torch houses in the village of Konduga, killing at least 23 people, according to the governor of Borno state.
February 15, 2014-Attacks. Dozens of residents in northeastern Nigeria are killed in two separate attacks launched by Boko Haram, according to officials and residents.

February 26, 2014-Attacks. At least 29 students die in an attack on a federal college in Buni Yadi, near the the capital of Yobe state, Nigeria’s military says.

March 14, 2014-Attacks. Hundreds of militants were said to have taken part in the attack on the Giwa barracks in Maiduguri,

March 30, 2014-Failed Attack. Heavy gunfire that may have lasted some hours very close to Aso Rock, the presidential villa, starting at. Sunday morning. The gunfire appears to have been centered at Yellow House, the headquarters of the State Security Services (SSS).

April 14, 2014- At the suburban Abuja bus station a suicide bomber blasts himself in an explosion that killed at least seventy-five people and probably many more.

April 17, 2014-Kidnappings. More than 200 girls and young women went missing from their school dormitories

April 20, 2014-Attack. Suspected gunmen set ablaze some houses in the staff quarters of Government Girls Secondary School, Yana, killing a five-year old girl

April 23, 2014-Assassinations. Two Borno State politicians have been killed by suspected members of the outlawed Boko Haram sect in an highway ambush [9]

April 26, 2014-Attacks. Boko Haram insurgents have attacked a military unit at Blabili, 29 April 2014 Relatives say they have been told of mass weddings involving insurgents and some of the girls abducted two weeks ago

May 5, 2014- Statement. Leader of Boko Haram that kidnapped the girls announced plans to sell them

May 20 2014-Attacks. At least 118 are killed and 56 injured in two car bomb attacks on a market in Jos, central Nigeria, which go off within 20 minutes of each other. The regional governor blames Boko Haram.

June 1, 2014-Attacks. At least 40 are killed when a bomb explodes at a football stadium in Mubi in the north-east of the country shortly after a match. The attack is blamed on Boko Haram.

June 14, 2014- Attacks. Hundreds are feared dead in a suspected Boko Haram attack on four villages in Borno state, with local leaders putting the death toll as high as 500.

June 17, 2014- Attacks. 21 football fans are killed when a bomb rips through the viewing centre where they are watching the World Cup in Damaturu, northern Nigeria.

June 24 2014- Attacks. Local officials report 30 killed and more than 60 women kidnapped in a series of attacks over several days in Borno state, although the Nigerian government denies the abductions.

June 25 2014-Attacks. At least 21 people are killed and 17 injured in a bombing at a crowded shopping centre in the centre of Abuja. The attack — the third on the city in three months — is blamed on Boko Haram.

July 3 2014-Failed Attack. suspected Boko Haram fighters killed 5 people in Konduga (Borno) when a bomb believed to have been planted in a pickup van loaded with firewood exploded.
July 4, 2014-Attack. 15 people, including motorists, were killed when suspected Boko Haram gunmen laid ambush along Maiduguri -Mafa- Dikwa Road.

July 6, 2014-Attacks. Suspected Boko Haram fighters, dressed in military uniforms, killed seven people in an attack at Krenuwa village in the Marte district, near the northeastern border with Cameroon.

July 8, 2014-JTF Operation. Nigerian soldiers attempted to regain control over the Damboa military base that resulted in 15 soldiers killed when Boko Haram fighters counter attacked.


July 14, 2014-Attacks. Dille village in Askira Uba Local government of Borno State was attacked by suspected Boko Haram gunmen and killed 26 people as well as torching houses and three churches.


July 16, 2014-Attacks. Suspected Boko Haram fighters kidnapped a German in Gombi town of Adamawa State. The man, who is said to be the principal of a technical skill acquisition centre in the town, was abducted on his way to work.

July 17, 2014-Attacks. Suspected Boko Haram fighters destroyed a bridge in Gambou Ngala (Borno State), which linked Nigeria to Cameroon.


July 23, 2014-Attack. Two suicide bombings in Kaduna (north central city in Nigeria) during which approximately 82 people were killed.

July 24, 2014-Attacks. Suspected Boko Haram fighters launched a crossborder raid into Cameroon during which 2 Cameroonian soldiers were killed.

July 25, 2014-Attack. Boko Haram fighters attacked a community in the south of Borno State, killing its district leader, Alhaji Ibrahim Dawi, and about 12 people. Residents of Garubula village in Biu local government area of the state confirmed that Dawi was shot dead.

27 July 2014-Kidnapping. Boko Haram fighters kidnapped the wife of Cameroon's vice prime minister and killed at least three people during an attack on the northern town of Kolofata, Cameroon.

July 29, 2014-Failed Attack. Boko Haram is accused of two suicide bombing in Potiskum (Yobe State) during which 55 people were killed. According to witnesses, the first explosions occurred near the palace of the Emir of Potiskum at the Shi‘a Kalli Alkali Mosque. The second explosion was at a Majalisa, where Shi‘ate Muslims were resting at one of the primary schools in Potiskum.
July 30, 2014 - Boko Haram fighters set a light five churches in communities south of Borno, namely Kwajaffa, Tashan Alade and some communities in Hawul Local Government Area in the southern part of the state.

About the Compiler: Ioannis Mantzikos is a PhD candidate at the University of Free State in South Africa. He holds postgraduate titles from SOAS and King’s College London. He currently co-authors a book on the transformation of al-Qaeda in the Middle East and North Africa with Dr Denise Baken (forthcoming 2015).

Notes


Bibliography: Terrorism and the Media (including the Internet) (Part 2)

by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism–BSPT-JT-2014-6]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the multi-faceted relationship between terrorism and the media, including the Internet. To keep up with the rapidly changing media landscape (especially the social media) and the technological developments in cyberspace, more recent publications have been prioritized during the selection process. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, media, internet, social media, terrorism, Electronic Jihad, cyberterrorism

NB: All websites were last visited on 22.11.2014. This subject bibliography was preceded by an earlier part (Part I). To provide new content, the compiler only considered literature not contained in Part 1 (Only meta resources, such as bibliographies, were included in both parts).–See also Note for the Reader” at the end of this literature list.

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Note
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About the compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., studied Information Science and New German Literature and Linguistics at the Saarland University (Germany). Her doctoral thesis dealt with Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents. Currently she works in the research & development department of the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). She also serves as Editorial Assistant for ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. 
Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 22 Books on Terrorism & Counter-terrorism Related Subjects

by Joshua Sinai

This column consists of two parts: capsule reviews of books published by various publishers, and, continuing the series begun in previous columns, highlighting books by publishers with significant publishing programs in terrorism & counterterrorism-related studies (with the authors listed in alphabetical order). Please note that most of these books were recently published, with several published over the past several years but deserving renewed interest.

**General**


This comprehensive handbook applies more than 25 structured analytic techniques (SATs) that are employed in intelligence analysis to 17 case studies, in order to provide analysts with practice in using them against real world problems. This framework is outlined in a matrix of techniques in the book's opening pages, with the SATs broken down into eight categories of decomposition and visualization, idea generation, scenarios and indicators, hypothesis generation and testing, assessment of cause and effect, challenge analysis, and decision support. The 17 case studies include significant intelligence- and terrorism-related historical cases (some of a hypothetical nature) such as analyzing the identity of the fall 2001 anthrax killer, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the summer 1996 Atlantic Olympics bomber, the October 2002 DC sniper shootings, potential FARC attacks against the United States, the November 2008 terrorist attacks against Mumbai, India, and other cases of politically inspired violence. Each case study consists of a narrative, discussion questions, analytic exercises, and recommended readings. Originally published in 2011, this second edition features new cases and analytic techniques. Although primarily intended for intelligence analysts, this handbook's presentation of structured analytic techniques will also prove highly useful for students, educators and other practitioners in terrorism and counterterrorism studies. The authors, based in the Washington, DC region, are prominent private sector experts in training intelligence analysts in these techniques.


An original and innovative account of how terrorist groups employ visual elements in the form of distinct logos, flags and other imagery to market their ‘brand identities,’ and, as described by the authors, just like corporations and political organizations “to stand out in a highly competitive sector, or even to mark a claimed territory” (p. 11). Since visual identity is the book’s focus, only terrorist groups that have a distinct logo or flag are discussed, with such imagery located in open sources, such as a group’s website or video. For each of the 65 terrorist groups listed in the book (which are drawn from lists of designated terrorist groups established by major governments), the authors provide an overview of its ideology, geographical location, history, and an analysis of the imagery it employs. This handbook is a valuable contribution to the literature on terrorist groups, particularly in understanding how they go about using their distinct logos and flags to market themselves to their members, supporting constituencies, and even their targeted adversaries. Artur
Beifuss is a journalist and former United Nations counterterrorism analyst, and Francesco Trivini Beilini is a creative director who has developed branding identities of companies and cultural institutions.


A richly comprehensive and extensively footnoted account of the interaction between the global Jihadist/Islamist revolutionary movement’s propagation of what the author terms the “jihadist method” as well as its material support to the nationalist and Islamic extremists in Chechnya and the Caucasus since the mid-1990s. To examine this interaction, the chapters cover topics such as Jihadization and the Caucasus Emirate (CE), the nature of the CE’s leadership, organization and religious ideology, the CE’s terrorist operations, and the CE’s operational expansion into other regional conflicts—beyond its primary state adversary, Russia—such as Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Syria and Europe. The author’s discussion (pages 232-246) of the CE’s “direct inspiration” – and even operational cooperation – with Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the mastermind of the Boston Marathon bombing in April 2013, is especially interesting for its highly detailed information about their interaction. His conclusion is also pertinent, as he writes that ”the attack on Boston was the first such plot to be successful.” (p. 246). The concluding chapter places the CE in its comparative and theoretical context.


This book’s objective, as described by the editors, is to provide answers to one of the primary disagreements in counterterrorism circles, whether in academia or government, “over the nature of the [terrorist] threat, al-Qaeda itself, bin Laden’s authority over the movement after its expulsion from Afghanistan, and whether or not a leaderless process of terrorist radicalization and violence has superseded a leader-led one.” (p. ix) Moreover, as the editors add, their objective was to examine the thesis (as famously expounded by Marc Sageman’s “bunch of guys” theory of leaderless jihad) that “The main terrorist threat, [as] some claimed, no longer came from distinct jihadist groups and organizations but rather from independent, self-constituted local cells or from isolated, self-recruited individuals.” (p. x) To accomplish these objectives – which is the first time that such an undertaking has been achieved in a book of such comprehensiveness and length – the two editors and 26 other contributors attempted to answer these questions in 24 cases where al Qaeda and its affiliates were implicated in those attacks. These cases include the November 2002 Mombasa attacks in Kenya, the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, the aborted March 2004 Operation Crevice plot in London, the 2006 plot by the “Toronto 18”, the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the July 2010 attacks in Kampala, Uganda.

Based on these case studies, the editors conclude that while al-Qaeda “remained a clearly defined and active terrorist organization with an identifiable leadership and chain of command” and “embraced a goal-oriented strategy,” global Jihadism had become a “polymorphous phenomenon – not an amorphous one,” and had become “transformed into a dynamically heterogeneous collection of both radicalized individuals and functioning terrorist organizations” (p. 618). Most importantly in terms of challenging the leaderless jihad thesis, the editors find that although “Command and control of these entities was uneven…the al-Qaeda senior leadership nonetheless appeared to have had a direct hand in the most important and potentially high-payoff operations” (p. 618).

Finally, in terms of the evolving global terrorism threat by these “variegated jihadist actors,” the editors find
them “adhering to a shared ideology and a common mind-set serving and respecting the same preeminent leader – Osama bin Laden” (p. 619).

With current events in Syria and Iraq, particularly the emergence of the non-al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State (IS) as the primary jihadi insurgent organization in that region, adding fuel to the debate over the role and influence of al Qaeda “Central” and its affiliates in spearheading al-Qaeda-type insurgencies around the world, this edited volume is an indispensable reference resource for understanding the issues that need to be examined in evaluating al Qaeda’s current threat potential.


This is a highly detailed and comprehensive account of how the governments of Europe (including Russia) and the United States countered anarchist terrorist groupings operating in their societies, during the formative early period of modern terrorism when such groups represented the primary type of terrorist threats against them. The book’s chapters analyze the origins and activities of anarchist terrorism, as well as how the threatened governments cooperated in countering these threats. In the final chapter, “The Decline of Anarchist Terrorism, 1900-1930s,” the author concludes that in addition to the success of Western security services in reducing the capability of the anarchist groups to continue their violent campaigns, another factor causing the decline of anarchist terrorism (citing the historian David C. Rapoport, who also wrote the book’s Foreword) was that “after World War I a new, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist era in the history of terrorism developed and increasingly displaced anarchist terrorism” (p. 358). The author is Professor of History at the Louisiana Scholars’ College at Northwestern State University in Nachitoches, Louisiana.


A fascinating journalistic account (first published in 2013) of how, beginning in 2004, a small group of soldier-scholars, led by General David Petreaus, Colonel John Nagl, and other national security academics, were instrumental in introducing a more comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy into the U.S. military’s campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, which was formalized in the publication of the FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* field manual and published in December 2006. The book is also valuable for its overview of how the doctrine of counterinsurgency had evolved since the Second World War. With the current jihadi insurgencies in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere still requiring countermeasures that draw on military and ‘nation-building’ components, the insights contained in this book are still highly pertinent.


A well-written and comprehensive account of more than fifteen thousand years of warfare around the world and its impact on the evolution of civilization. Of particular interest is the author’s account of terrorist warfare, which he discusses in a brief section on the impact of the terrorist assassination of Austria’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand, in Sarajevo, on June 28, 1914, in ushering in the First World War, a longer section on an evaluation of the impact of al-Qaeda’s terrorist warfare in achieving its objectives, as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism campaign against it, and the emerging role of robotic drones in counterterrorism. The author’s conclusion, based on a famous Roman proverb, is worth reiterating: “If you want peace, prepare for war” (p. 393). The author is a Professor of Classics and History at
Stanford University.


A personal account by a retired head of the FBI's hostage Crisis Negotiation Unit, recalling famous hostage standoff crises his unit had attempted to defuse. These hostage crises, which are fully detailed, included the June 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 out of Athens, Greece, by Lebanese terrorists; the October 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise ship, the *Achille Lauro*, in the Mediterranean Sea; the February 1993 standoff by the religious cult led by David Koresh, near Waco, Texas; the June 1996 standoff with the Montana Freemen, a Christian Patriot movement, in Jordan, Montana, who opposed any government authority over them; the April 1997 standoff with far-right separatists in Texas; and the May 2001 hostage taking by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) of American missionaries (and others) in the Philippines. The author was also involved as head of the Crisis Negotiation Unit within the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group in tracking what became known as the “DC Sniper” incidents in October 2002. Mr. Noesner's conclusions are highly relevant for the current era, with terrorist groups extensively employing the tactic of hostage taking in their warfare, as he notes that while he generally favors the primacy of the negotiation approach in resolving hostage standoff incidents, it is important to track the progress of such efforts because there are times when “when the risks increase” and “negotiation isn't enough.” (pp. 215-216)


A sweeping, comprehensive account of the origins of the state of Israel from its pre-state beginnings in 1881, its establishment as an independent state in 1948, and more recent political developments in the state. Although the author's discussion ends in 2000 (it was initially published in English in 2012), thus making the account dated, it nevertheless provides a valuable understanding of political trends that are playing out today, particularly the increasing religious militancy by right-wing Jewish elements in the 1980s and 1990s who advocated obeying rabbinical orders “on worldly matters such as the evacuation of territories – thus blurring the separation that had existed in religious Zionism since the 1920s between the sacred, which was the rabbis' domain, and the profane, the domain of secular leaders, i.e., politicians” (p. 402). It is such insights that make this book indispensable for understanding the historical trends that have converged to produce the turbulent state of modern-day Israel. The author, one of Israel's leading historians, is a professor emerita at Tel Aviv University.


This atlas is a comprehensive visual representation of significant key indicators and statistics that characterize modern societies, such as urbanization, wealth and poverty, food and water, goals for development, energy resources and consumption, global warming and biodiversity, literacy, gender equality, pandemics, wars and peacekeeping, and cyber warfare. Although all of these topics affect terrorism-driven conflicts to some extent, of particular interest is the atlas's section on war and peace, which discusses the nature of wars in the 21st century, the roles of warlords, gang-lords and militias, the new front line in cyber-warfare, data on casualties of wars (including terrorist conflicts), and the spread of refugees due to such conflicts. In one of the author's numerous insights he notes that “The effects of war are long lasting. An average of 30 years of economic growth is lost through a civil war, and the country's international trade takes on average 20 years to recover.
People who might otherwise have grown up healthy are born into poverty, malnutrition, and ill health. And one effect of war is war itself; 90 percent of contemporary armed conflicts are old conflicts coming back.” (p. 66)


The contributors to this edited volume apply a multidisciplinary approach to comprehensively examine the motivations of those who become terrorists to resort to such warfare tactics, the nature of terrorist warfare vis-à-vis the prohibition against attacks on noncombatant civilians, the types of counterterrorism campaigns being waged by governments against their terrorist adversaries, the use of torture by governments to extract information from terrorist suspects, and techniques for effective counterterrorism measures, such as reducing the risk of terrorism by “integrating jurisdictional and opportunity approaches” (i.e., “simultaneously (1) taking a society-wide psychological/sociological approach to lowering general support for terrorism, and (2) implementing ongoing situational strategies to reduce terrorist opportunity” (p. 326) This book will undoubtedly be of renewed interest given the controversy surrounding the December 2014 U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee report on several of these topics.


A personal account by a former high-level U.S. government official in the Treasury Department and the White House of how he and his colleagues succeeded in implementing new measures and tools to apply financial pressure against the country’s terrorist adversaries (as well as state proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, such as North Korea and Iran). The insights provided by the author’s account make this book valuable for those seeking to understand how the financial component of counter-terrorism plays such a crucial part in undermining the capability of terrorist groups to function.


This volume’s primary objective is to analyze problems in political and economic systems around the world, and suggest opportunities to improve governance, locally and globally (with these volumes updated on an annual basis). What makes this handbook especially relevant for terrorism and counterterrorism studies – and particularly the analysis of root causes of terrorism – is its focus on how new grassroots movements are continuously emerging, which are part of “a broader phenomenon of spreading popular protests driven by a range of grievances and demands – irrespective of the political governance system in question” (p. 16). In fact, as the volume’s editors point out, “A recent study analyzing 843 protests between January 2006 and July 2013 in 87 countries found a steady increase in protests from 59 in 2006 to 112 during just the first half of 2013. Many of the protests – ranging from marches and rallies to acts of civil disobedience – involve issues that are of relevance to a more sustainable and equitable society. The lack of ‘real democracy’ is a major motivating factor and is seen as an underlying reason for the lack of economic and environmental justice” (p. 16).
Publications from Oxford University Press


With the discipline of terrorism and counterterrorism studies increasingly drawing on computational social science methodologies in constructing terrorism incident databases, employing link analysis and social network analysis mapping of terrorist networks and associations, as well as mining databases to generate insight on terrorists’ activities, this handbook’s comprehensive overview of the discipline of political methodology will be of special interest to those who employ such qualitative and quantitative methodologies in their work. The handbook is divided into nine parts: introduction, approaches to social science methodology, concepts and measurement, causality and explanation in social research, experiments, quasi-experiments and natural experiments, quantitative and qualitative tools, and organizations, institutions, and movements in the field of methodology. Of special interest are Chapter 4, “Agent-based Modeling,” Chapter 5, “Concepts, Theories, and Numbers: A Checklist for Constructing, Evaluating, and Using Concepts or Quantitative Measures,” Chapter 6, “Measurement,” Chapter 7, “Typologies, Forming Concepts and Creating Categorical Variables,” Chapter 10, “Causation and Explanation in Social Science,” Chapter 16, “Survey Methodology,” Chapter 19, “Time-series Analysis,” Chapter 21, “Bayesian Analysis,” Chapter 27, “Counterfactuals and Case Studies,” Chapter 29, “Interviewing and Qualitative Field Methods: Pragmatism and Practicalities,” “Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods,” and Chapter 36, “Forty years of Publishing in Quantitative Methodology.”


A comprehensive overview of the discipline of political science, covering the general categories of political theory, political institutions, law and politics, political behavior, contextual political analysis, comparative politics, international relations, political economy, public policy, and political methodology. Topics of special interest to terrorism and counterterrorism studies include Chapter 6, “Modernity and its Critics,” Chapter 14, “Judicial Behavior,” Chapter 15, “Law and Society,” Chapter 17, “Overview of Political Behavior:

Publications from Stanford University Press


An original account of how paramilitary organizations are co-opted by states that have difficulty controlling their territories, transforming them in the process into state-sponsored militias. The author applies his conceptual framework to analyze how such militias interacted with state authorities in three case studies: the GOLKAR (Partai Golongan Karya – Party of Functional Groups) in Indonesia, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran, and the Sunni-based tribal ‘awakening’ and numerous other Shi‘ite militias in Iraq. Although the author's conclusion is correct that “Learning to accommodate those nonstate actors who are actually providing security to local communities is a better alternative than waiting in vain for strong states to replace them” (p. 140), the IRGC is considered a highly repressive and economically corrupt arm of the state and the Shi‘ite militias in Iraq have greatly contributed to the country’s instability and anarchy. The author is an Assistant Professor in the School of International and Area Studies and the Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma.


In this paperback edition of a volume originally published in 2006, the author, at the time a U.S. Army Officer, discusses the Russian, British, and American approaches to counterinsurgency in order to generate findings about best practices in countering guerrilla and terrorist insurgencies. His conclusions are especially germane to the current era’s need for effective counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, as he writes that “there are no magic and inherently quantifiable ‘metrics’ that we can slap on a Power Point matrix, with green and amber gumballs, one that might precisely measure our path to victory in counterinsurgency. This type of warfare is much more complex and qualitative because much of it deals with the population’s perception of both the guerrillas’ and the government’s legitimacy and credible capacity to coerce” (p. 163). An effective counterinsurgency campaign, he writes, must “employ force minimally but credibly and persuasively; ensure there is a unified and joint civil-military interagency approach; take all measures to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the government; co-opt and include the political opposition, to include the former insurgent infrastructure, into the legitimate political process; and maximize the employment of indigenous forces early, in both regular and irregular roles” (p. 163).


An account, based on extensive archival research, of the evolution of the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine from the early 1960s to the current era as it was implemented in practice in the civil wars in
Vietnam until Iraq and Afghanistan. The author concludes that, as demonstrated by the difficulties encountered by the American counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a need to recognize the limits to military intervention and the strategic utility of the use of force, although, as he adds, “these lessons will be contested and reinterpreted anew as contemporary contingencies dictate” (p. 210).

Publications from the University of Chicago Press


The author draws on what he terms the English School of International Relations studies which “views states as members of an international society tied together by shared norms, general goals, and common rules that facilitate order and mitigate the negative effects of anarchy” (p. 2) to discuss how its most “hegemonic” power (i.e., the United States) and the international community cooperated against the jihadi threat posed by al Qaeda. The book is divided into two parts: an analysis of the jihadi threat, which, in the author’s phrasing “introduces the general logic guiding the systemic response,” (p. 34) [in which the ‘systemic response’ in ordinary English would mean ‘counterterrorism’] and the second part, “which examines specific spheres of international response, showing in the process that although the level of interstate cooperation has been high, it has also varied across issue areas” (p. 35). With statements such as “The approach presented in this book complicates assessments of the hegemon’s pursuit of multilateralism and its willingness to ‘go it alone’” (p. 34), and “The suppression of terrorism financing and reinforcement of states’ control over their borders represent efforts to bolster the international this society and its members in ways that are conducive to international cooperation” (p. 35), the volume is clearly intended for academic audiences who appreciate the use of jargon to explain international relations. It will be of limited utility to those interested in gaining a more insightful – and clearer – understanding of the jihadi terrorist threat and the components of effective counterterrorism. The author is assistant professor of political science at Haverford College and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.


This book’s aim is to examine the period in the aftermath of 9/11 “in which the American government used fear to control politics by manipulating the mass media and, through the media, public opinion. It describes how public relations strategies, the media’s presentation of news, pollsters’ decisions on what to ask about, and the public’s perceptions and opinions all interacted with each other on terrorism-related issues for four years after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001” (p. xii). The authors make the controversial claim that the U.S. government used fear and demagoguery to ‘control the politics’ of counterterrorism. Certainly, the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policies were not ‘flawless’, but the authors appear so determined to demonstrate that ‘selling fear’ was the administration’s paramount concern that the authors underestimate the magnitude of the terrorist threats against America and the West at the time in order to strengthen their ‘thesis’ that the U.S. vastly overreacted to these threats. While one may criticize the authors’ selling fear thesis, this book stands on solid ground in its operationalization of public opinion data to generate its findings.

This book's thesis can be summed up as follows: “The terrorism expert is arguably the most ironic authority figure since the inquisitor of the European witch-craze of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The role of the inquisitorial expert was to supply the mythology that fueled the witch-craze – a grotesque demonology based on the dualism of God and the Devil, and which rested on the confessions of witches obtained under torture.” (p. 24) Based on such assumptions that are sprinkled throughout the book, the author concludes that “The dialectical images of terrorism and counterterrorism unmask the traumatic core of current international politics – of a past that must be brought to an end once and for all.” (p. 223) With the same reality interpreted differently by those adhering to different ideologies and dogmas, it is left to the reader to decide whether to accept this author's version of the reality of the nature of terrorism and counterterrorism.

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Bibliography on Single Issue Terrorism

by Eric Price


NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterix [*] only have a clickable table of contents/or only have additional information.

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Rousseau, N.: The Farm, the River and the Picnic Spot: Topographies of Terror


See also these resources on the Internet:

Activists First / [list of organizations]: https://www.activistfacts.com/organizations

Earth First / TRAC: http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/earth-first


Single Issue Terrorism / START: http://www.start.umd.edu/topics/single-issue-terrorism


About the Compiler: Eric Price is a professional information specialist who worked for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) before he joined Perspectives on Terrorism.’
TRI Award for Best PhD Thesis 2014: Call for Submissions

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) seeks to enhance the quality of research in the field of Terrorism Studies. For this purpose it has established an Annual Award for the Best Doctoral Dissertation on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. Last year’s call for PhD theses submitted or defended in 2013 before an academic institution resulted in 29 entries. The jury, consisting of the directors of the Terrorism Research Initiative, identified three finalists and among them the winner—Dr. Tricia Bacon (American University, Washington, D.C.).

With this announcement, a new call is made for PhD theses submitted or defended at an academic institution in the year 2014. The winner will be announced in August 2015 and can expect an Award of US $ 1,000.- and a document signed by the jury, acknowledging the granting of the award. Altogether three finalists will be identified. They will all receive a document signed by the jury. The deadline for entries (in English, or with translation into English) is 31 March, 2015. Theses should be submitted in electronic form to the chairman of the jury, Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, at <apschmid@terrorismanalysts.com>, together with a cover letter (1-3 pp.) explaining its merits as the author sees them. Theses can also be submitted by academic supervisors.
Call for External Peer Reviewers

The quality of an academic journal depends on the quality of peer reviewers from the larger community of scholars and experts in an issue area. The Editors of Perspectives on Terrorism are looking to expand its pool of peer reviewers for articles submitted to our journal. Academics and professionals with a track record of well-received publications in recognized journals willing to participate in a rigorous but fair peer review process, should send their CV (or a brief biographic summary) and publication list, along with contact information and a short list of 1 - 3 topics of particular subject matter expertise to: james_forest@uml.edu.
About Perspectives on Terrorism

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at [www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com). It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.

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Leah Farrall (Massey University, New Zealand)

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Beatrice de Graaf (Utrecht University, The Netherlands)

Thomas Hegghammer (Stanford University, USA)

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John Morrison (University of East London)

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Sam Mullins (Wollongong, Australia)

Thomas Riegler (Vienna, Austria)

Simon Shen (Chinese University, Hong Kong)

Anne Speckhard (Georgetown University Medical School, USA)

Currently there are several vacancies on the Editorial Board. Readers of Perspectives on Terrorism are invited to submit names of possible candidates. Selection will take place on the basis of the publication record of those nominated, taking also into account their contribution to a better gender and geographical balance of the Editorial Board.

Members of the Editorial Board act as peer-reviewers for articles submitted to Perspectives on Terrorism. In addition, the Editorial Board relies on the special expertise of other experienced researchers. In particular we would like to acknowledge the contributions of

Dr. Dean Alexander

Dr. O. Shawn Cupp
People Behind the Terrorism Research Initiative

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) has three Directors: Robert Wesley (President), Alex P. Schmid and James J.F. Forest. TRI has an International Advisory Board (currently 11 members), a Consortium of Participating Institutions (currently 17 institutions and centers) as well as Group of Individual Researchers (currently 120) guiding and supporting its efforts. They are listed below.

International Advisory Board of the Terrorism Research Initiative

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Consortium of Participating Institutions

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Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC) at Campus The Hague of Leiden University, Netherlands.

(Handa) Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP), University of Wollongong, Australia.

Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, USA.

Defense & Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Department of International Relations, University of Minas (PUC), Brazil.

Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTrEC), Monash University, Australia.

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore.

Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University, USA.

The Institute of International and European Affairs, (IIEA), Dublin, Ireland, with a branch in Brussels.

Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), Athens, Greece.

Research Unit, Political Violence, Terrorism and Radicalization, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Denmark.

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