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Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume VIII, Issue 3 (June 2014) of Perspectives on Terrorism at www.terrorismanalysts.com. Our free online journal is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the University of Massachusetts’ Lowell campus.

There has been a change in our Editorial Team. Tim Pippard, Assistant Editor for many years, has left Perspectives on Terrorism. We thank him for his work. Given the rapidly increasing number of submissions to our journal, the Editors are welcoming suggestions for his replacement. We are looking for a qualified candidate with broad editorial experience and professional expertise.

The three Directors of the TRI, acting as jury, have completed their evaluation of the submissions for the “Best Dissertation on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism published in 2013”, reading more than 10,000 pages of text. Three finalists have been identified. Their names will be made public in the August issue of our journal which will also feature an article by the winner. The Jury has decided to make the TRI Thesis Award an annual feature. We look forward to receive submissions of high-quality PhD theses completed in 2014. More about this in the next issue of our journal.

The core of the current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism consists of four articles. The lead article is authored by Max Abrahms and addresses the question whether terrorism can be deterred (he will also talk about this topic on an upcoming TED talk). This is followed by a contribution from Michael Loadenthal. He challenges the notion that so-called “eco-terrorists” are terrorists, basing his case on unique empirical material. Also controversial is Ineke Roex’ article. She challenges the notion that all Salafists should be viewed through the lens of counter-terrorism. Our final peer-reviewed article is authored by Senia Febrica. It deals with maritime terrorism in South East Asia looking through the lens of international cooperation.

A Research Note by Sajjan Gohel focuses on Bangladesh and the potential for international terrorism posed by Islamists there. Joshua Sinai, our book reviews editor, offers brief reviews of eight books he found time to read. The Resource sections contains two bibliographies, one on the Arab Spring (a topic on which Judith Tinnes had already published earlier but which she has now updated) and one by another member of our Editorial Team, Eric Price. His bibliography focuses on the personalities of a number of terrorists and extremists. The Op-Ed by Philipp Holtmann seeks to clarify how to differentiate terrorism from jihad – a topic of great confusion. Finally, the editor of this issue summarises some news from TRI’s ten national networks of PhD Theses Writers.

The current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism was prepared on the European side of the Atlantic, while the August issue (PT VIII, 4) will be assembled by Prof. James J. F. Forest, the journal’s American co-editor at the Centre for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS) at the University of Massachusetts.

Sincerely,

Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid

Editor-in-Chief Perspectives on Terrorism
I. Articles

Deterring Terrorism: a New Strategy

by Max Abrahms

Abstract
Terrorists are poor candidates for deterrence. They are difficult to deter because they are motivated by a wide variety of personal and strategic aims. The diversity of these aims practically ensures that many terrorists will derive utility from their actions regardless of how governments respond. In fact, even opposite government responses tend to generate utility for terrorists due to the complexity of their incentive structure. To an extent, however, terrorism may still be deterred by dissuading terrorist supporters since they are critical for mounting large-scale terrorist campaigns. Compared to terrorists, their supporters are more deterrable due to the relative simplicity of their incentive structure. People generally support terrorists for a single reason—to achieve their political demands. Fortunately, a growing body of empirical research finds that terrorism is a losing tactic for perpetrators to induce major concessions from governments. The policy community can help to deter terrorism by teaching its supporters about the tactic’s politically counterproductive effects.

Keywords: deterrence, counter-terrorism

Introduction
Traditional concepts of deterrence try to thwart unwanted behaviour by manipulating adversary incentives. Deterrence-by-punishment threatens to impose costs on the adversary for an undesirable course of action. Deterrence-by-denial seeks to deny him any benefits from it.[1] Clearly, both strategies are based on influencing the adversary by reducing the utility of his actions. Unfortunately, neither approach is likely to succeed since terrorists are generally motivated by such a wide variety of personal and strategic aims that they are liable to derive utility from their actions regardless of how governments respond.

Although traditional concepts of deterrence are unlikely to work against terrorists on any systematic basis, the tactic itself may be deterred with an alternative counterterrorism approach. Deterrence-by-delegitimisation focuses less on deterring adversaries themselves than their support constituencies.[2] This less well-known indirect form of deterrence offers superior counterterrorism promise because terrorist supporters are more likely to be motivated by a relatively straightforward incentive structure. Unlike the perpetrators themselves, their supporters are generally driven by one main goal—the desire to coerce government concessions. In recent years, a growing body of academic research has found that terrorism decreases rather than increases the odds of government compliance. In this fundamental sense, the tactic of terrorism is politically counterproductive. The policy community’s primary contribution to deterring terrorism should be to broadcast this finding in a targeted public diplomacy campaign to terrorist supporters.

The argument of this article proceeds in three sections. In the first section, an explanation is offered why classic concepts of deterrence are doomed to fail against terrorists. The strategies of deterrence-by-punishment and deterrence-by-denial are based on the unrealistic premise that governments can deter terrorists by simply removing the utility of their violent behaviour. This assumption is faulty not because terrorists are categorically irrational actors, but because they do not employ a uniform, consistent metric of success. Indeed, many terrorists seem to regard their actions as fruitful regardless of how governments...
choose to respond. The second section argues that most terrorism is deterrable, however, even if its practitioners are not. This section details the burgeoning academic literature on terrorism’s political ineffectiveness and explains how this finding can be exploited to deter terrorist supporters and, by extension, the tactic itself. The conclusion issues an appeal to the policy community—work closer with the academic community on counterterrorism. Only by sharing our knowledge can we hope to deter the terrorism threat.

Why Terrorists Tend to Be Undeterrable

The conventional approaches to deterrence are actually two sides to the same coin. In deterrence-by-punishment, the threat of reprisal is intended to deter the adversary with unacceptable costs. In deterrence-by-denial, the point is to deter him by removing the potential value of his actions. As Matthew Kroenig and Barry Pavel noted: “Whereas cost imposition strategies threaten retaliation, benefit denial strategies threaten failure. If actors believe that they are unlikely to succeed or reap significant benefits from a certain course of action, they may be deterred from taking it.”[3] When it comes to combating terrorism, however, this objective is intractable because its practitioners seem to derive value from their actions notwithstanding the nature of the government response.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter’s pioneering study on terrorist motives. [4] In “Strategies of Terrorism,” Kydd and Walter report that terrorists are motivated both to coerce government concessions and to provoke government retaliation. Left unsaid is that these government responses are essentially opposites. Terrorism succeeds as a coercive strategy when governments appease the perpetrators by accommodating them with concessions. Conversely, terrorism succeeds as a provocation strategy when governments dig in their political heels and go on the offensive. If Kydd and Walter are correct, then terrorism offers strategic utility to many perpetrators whether governments act conciliatory or not.

The empirical record is replete with evidence that terrorists are indeed motivated by such inconsistent strategic objectives. Members of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, for example, emphasize in public pronouncements that coercing government concessions is an important strategic objective. Al-Qaeda has historically called on the United States to withdraw militarily from the Muslim world and to sever relations with apostate regimes. [5] Al-Qaeda affiliated members have also emphasized these foreign policy goals in private. In October 2001, for instance, a trove of letters written by Osama bin Laden was seized by Scotland Yard. The objectives listed in the letters repeat the coercive goals of driving out U.S. forces from the Muslim world and ending U.S. interference in Muslim politics. [6] Surely, al-Qaeda would declare victory if Washington were to accede to such political demands.

Yet al-Qaeda has an equally rich tradition of trying to elicit the opposite government response. Al Qaeda military leader, Sayf al Adl, said the main goal of 9/11 was not to coerce the U.S. from the Muslim world, but to provoke American military operations there. According to al Adl, President George W. Bush played into this strategy by pursuing the “anticipated response” in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other Muslim countries. In a May 2005 statement, he explained: “What we had wished for actually happened.”[7] Similarly, bin Laden often said the purpose of 9/11 was “for us to provoke and bait this administration.”[8] More recently, Ayman al-Zawahri praised operatives for “provoking” the United States into adopting costly counterterrorism responses at home and abroad.[9] These public pronouncements accord with al-Qaeda’s private statements. In autumn 2001, for instance, a journalist visiting Afghanistan famously recovered Zawahiri’s personal computer with hundreds of correspondences to bin Laden, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, and other 9/11 planners. These correspondences make clear that the al-Qaeda leadership was unworried about provoking a U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. In fact, they hoped the U.S. would respond in that fashion and then get bogged
down in a costly asymmetric conflict.[10]

To gain insight into how al-Qaeda evaluates strategic success, Abrahms and Lula conducted a content analysis of bin Laden's translated statements made in public and private between 1994 and 2004.[11] Collated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, this self-contained compilation of 98 interviews, correspondences, and fatwas is believed by counterterrorism officials to provide reliable insight into al-Qaeda's strategic mindset during that period.[12] The authors examined the asymmetric campaigns exalted by bin Laden Osama as political successes and then categorised them. According to the al-Qaeda leader, the most successful asymmetric campaigns included cases in which the target country was coerced into making accommodations or provoked into adopting the opposite response.

These competing goals of coercion and provocation are hardly confined to al-Qaeda. In fact, they are strategic objectives found across numerous terrorist groups.[13] So, too, are other strategic goals that are equally difficult to reconcile. A common terrorist strategy, for example, is “spoiling” peace processes by ramping up violence during negotiations in order to halt them in their tracks. Whereas coercion is intended to induce politically conciliatory behaviour and provocation is intended to elicit the opposite political response, spoilers seek to destroy any peaceful political movement at all.[14] Scholars may be tempted to conclude that terrorists are thus irrational. The point, however, is that many terrorists are able to derive utility from their actions regardless of how governments respond due to the complexity of their incentive structures. Terrorists are often able to accomplish at least some of their core strategic aims when governments retreat, advance, or do nothing at all. Since almost any conceivable response is liable to generate strategic utility from the vantage of terrorists, they are decidedly poor candidates for deterrence.

In fact, the byzantine strategic goals of terrorists only partially account for their complex incentive structure. People participate in terrorism for an even wider range of personal goals than strategic ones. The personal benefits of participating in terrorism are hardly affected by the nature of government reactions. Research shows, for example, that terrorists are often motivated by the social benefits of participating in a tight-knit group independent of any political progress.[15] For this reason, terrorists routinely reject compromise proposals, eschew superior political tactics, and fight rival groups sharing their given ideology. Such terrorist behaviours may not be politically instrumental. Yet each generates utility for those members who are motivated by the social solidarity of participating in a terrorist group and therefore wish to perpetuate it.

Participating in terrorist groups also supplies members with countless personal benefits beyond social solidarity. For many terrorists, perpetrating the violence helps to give them purpose, end their boredom, facilitate travel to new destinations, gain respect, follow their religious convictions, terminate their miserable lives, or simply harm and frighten others. In the early 1990s, many policy-makers began to recognize that the conventional understanding of terrorist groups needed revision. Whereas past terrorists seemed motivated to achieve their given strategic objectives, the “new terrorists” are increasingly defined by their questionable attachment to them. Since the 1990s, the international terrorism threat has been driven by perpetrators aiming to kill the maximum number of civilians, perhaps as an end in itself. A 1995 National Intelligence Estimate observed that the 1993 World Trade Center bombing was intended "to kill a lot of people, not to achieve a more traditional political goal."[16] Former CIA director James Woolsey similarly noted that “Today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table; they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it.”[17] Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow expanded on this interpretation in a 1998 article in Foreign Affairs, writing that the new wave of “catastrophic terrorism” is not designed to affect policy, but to create destruction in itself.[18] This macabre incentive among international terrorists blossomed after the 9/11 attacks. When news first reached bin Laden and his lieutenants of the human consequences, they were reportedly elated while though the Bush administration was still debating how to respond.[19] For al-Qaeda
leaders, the nature of the U.S. response was secondary if not wholly inconsequential because the bloodshed alone was already cause for jubilation.

But just because terrorists rejoice from an operationally successful attack, this does not mean they can be deterred with a denial strategy. Denying terrorists from carrying out operationally successful attacks is a losing strategy for two main reasons. First, terrorists are manifestly motivated by numerous goals, some of which do not even require attacks at all.[20] Second, a consensus exists within the policy community that terrorists will always finds ways to mount operations, given sufficient resolve. As Stephen Flynn remarks, terrorism “will be perennially in the offing” because “it is an ongoing hazard, something we will never successfully eliminate.”[21] This is true for several reasons. For terrorists, potential targets include anywhere people gather. As such, very little capability is required for carrying out an attack. In the rare cases where targets are effectively hardened, terrorists simply move on to softer targets. Governments may try to play cat and mouse, but are ultimately constrained in their responses particularly within democracies.[22] In sum, the ease of perpetrating attacks virtually guarantees some form of success though is hardly a requirement for it.

For the sake of prediction, scholars tend to model the behaviour of terrorists by attributing to them simple, straightforward incentive structures. In their efforts to achieve parsimony, however, these models are often too reductive. The evidence suggests that terrorists tend to harbour varied, complex, even inconsistent strategic and personal aims. Given the complexity of their objectives, terrorists seemingly derive utility from their actions regardless of how governments respond. The inability of governments to reduce the utility of terrorism seemingly presents an insurmountable challenge for deterring its practitioners.

**Deterring Terrorist Support**

It would be easy to conclude that terrorism cannot be deterred because its practitioners are fundamentally undeterrable. In fact, counterterrorism circles are heavily populated by deterrence naysayers. Richard Betts, for example, contends that deterrence has “limited efficacy…for modern counterterrorism.” Paul Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins likewise assert, “The concept of deterrence is both too limiting and too naïve to be applicable to the war on terrorism.” And President George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy concluded, “Deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy.”[23] This pessimistic outlook is unwarranted. Terrorism may be deterrable even though most of its practitioners are not.

Unlike the strategies of deterrence-by-punishment and deterrence-by-denial, deterrence-by-delegitimisation does not seek to deter the perpetrators themselves. Rather, deterrence-by-delegitimisation aims to deter unwanted behaviour by discrediting the perpetrators in the eyes of their supporters. For counterterrorism purposes, this means our focus should be on deterring terrorist supporters by discrediting the perpetrators. This approach has a large, untapped strategic upside for three main reasons.

First, the ability of terrorists to generate violence depends critically on their level of support. There is indeed power in numbers for producing terrorism.[24] When support from the local population grows, so too does the terrorism threat since its perpetrators are then better equipped to elude authorities and acquire material resources essential for sustaining full-fledged terrorist campaigns.[25] Admittedly, even isolated terrorists are able to inflict some measure of pain because terrorism is the proverbial weapon of the weak. But shrinking the pool of supporters would go a long way towards curbing terrorism since it enfeebles its perpetrators.

Second, supporters of terrorism are potential candidates for deterrence due to the relative simplicity of their incentive structure, which facilitates the manipulation of costs and benefits undergirding the deterrence mechanism. In marked contrast to terrorists, their supporters tend to be motivated by one main goal—
achievement of the terrorist group's political demands. International polls consistently show that when terrorism is seen as strategically advantageous, public support for the perpetrators increases. But when terrorism is viewed as strategically disadvantageous, public support decreases. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is an illustrative example, as local support for it dried up once its attacks were seen as politically costly. Similarly, Palestinian support for Hamas and other terrorist groups in Israel is positively related to perceptions of political effectiveness. When terrorism is viewed as an impediment to Israeli concessions, the Palestinian public invariably turns against the perpetrators, effectively isolating them.[26]

Third, terrorist supporters are deterrable because they systematically overestimate the political value of terrorism. In recent years, a growing body of empirical research has found that terrorism does not actually help the perpetrators to coerce major government concessions. Terrorism is not simply highly correlated with political failure; the tactic appears to have an independent, negative impact on the odds of government concessions. Terrorism can therefore be deterred by educating its supporters about the harmful effects to their political preferences. Below, is a summary of the existing research landscape on terrorism's political impact. Across several methodologies, the evidence indicates that terrorism is a losing political tactic that hampers perpetrators from obtaining their demands.

Terrorism is usually defined as non-state attacks against civilian targets for a putative political purpose.[27] This combination of target selection and objective is, however, in tension. For decades, specialists have noted that terrorism almost never results in strategic concessions. In the 1970s, Walter Laqueur published "The Futility of Terrorism" in which he asserted that perpetrators seldom manage to wring important government concessions.[28] In the 1980s, Bonnie Cordes, Bruce Hoffman, and Brian Jenkins likewise observed, “Terrorists have been unable to translate the consequences of terrorism into concrete political gains…[I]n that sense terrorism has failed. It is a fundamental failure.”[29] Martha Crenshaw also pointed out, “Few [terrorist] organisations actually attain the long-term ideological objectives they claim to seek, and therefore one must conclude that terrorism is objectively a failure.”[30] In the 1990s, Thomas Schelling proclaimed, “Terrorism almost never appears to accomplish anything politically significant.”[31] Sun-Ki Chai remarked that terrorism “has rarely provided political benefits” at the bargaining table.[32] Virginia Held went even further, claiming that the “net effect” of terrorism is politically counterproductive.[33] Since the September 11 attacks, a series of large-n studies has confirmed that only a handful of terrorist groups in modern history have accomplished their political platforms.

In 2006, Max Abrahms published in International Security an article entitled “Why Terrorism Does Not Work”; the first large-n study on terrorism's political effectiveness.[34] The effectiveness of terrorism can be measured in terms of its process goals or outcome goals. Process goals are intended to sustain the terrorist group by attracting media attention, scuttling organisation-threatening peace processes, or boosting membership and morale often by provoking government overreaction. The outcome goals of terrorists, by contrast, are their stated political ends, such as the realization of a Kurdish homeland, the removal of foreign bases from Greece, or the establishment of Islamism in India. An important difference between process goals and outcome goals is that unlike the former, the latter can only be achieved with the compliance or collapse of the target government. The study assessed whether terrorism helps militant groups to achieve their outcome goals, that is, their core strategic demands. To this end, Abrahms analysed the political plights of the twenty-eight Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs), as designated by the U.S. State Department. The analysis yields two main findings. First, the FTO success rate is quite low—under ten percent—compared to other non-state tactics. On average, the FTOs perpetrated terrorism for decades without any visible signs of political progress. Second, and even more importantly, the successful FTOs used terrorism only as a secondary tactic. FTOs are just like other militant groups that exhibit wide variation in their tactical
choices. All of the political winners directed their violence against military targets, not civilian ones. By disaggregating the FTOs by target selection, Abrahms helped to reveal the full extent to which terrorism—defined as non-state attacks against civilian targets—has historically been a losing political tactic.

Subsequent studies have found even lower rates of terrorist success. Seth Jones and Martin Libicki examined the universe of known terrorist groups between 1968 and 2006. Of the 648 groups identified in the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident database, only 4 percent obtained their strategic demands.[35] More recently, Audrey Cronin reexamined the success rate of these groups, confirming that less than 5 percent prevailed. [36] Suicide terrorism is usually more lethal than the conventional type, but its practitioners fail at an even higher rate.[37]

These low figures actually exceed the coercion rate, however, as terrorists may accomplish their demands for reasons other than civilian pain. In fact, all of the studies emphasize that terrorism does not encourage concessions. In his 2006 study, Abrahms concluded that “the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself.”[38] Jones and Libicki contend that in the few cases in which terrorist groups have triumphed, “Terrorism had little or nothing to do with the outcome.”[39] And Cronin observes that the victorious have achieved their demands “despite the use of violence against innocent civilians [rather] than because of it,” and that “The tactic of terrorism might have even been counterproductive.”[40] Hard case studies have inspected the limited historical examples of clear-cut terrorist victories, determining that these salient events were idiosyncratic, unrelated to the harming of civilians, or both.[41]

The tactic does not appear to be epiphenomenal to government intransigence or the result of selection bias. On the contrary, the latest wave of scholarship provides a raft of evidence that escalating violence against civilians impedes non-state challengers from attaining their demands. To demonstrate the political ineffectiveness of terrorism, Abrahms published in Comparative Political Studies a coercion study that scrutinised the political outcomes of 125 FTO campaigns. The study reveals substantial variation in the political success of Foreign Terrorist Organisations depending on their tactical choices. Evidently, FTOs are significantly more likely to coerce government compliance when their violence is directed against military targets instead of civilian ones—even after controlling for the capability of the perpetrators, the nature of their demands, and many other tactical confounds.[42] Virginia Fortna analysed the coercive effectiveness of terrorism within civil wars. After factoring out the relative capabilities of rebel groups, she found they are also more likely to coerce government compliance by refraining from terrorism.[43] Similarly, Anna Getmansky and Tolga Sinmazdemir found that the Israeli government in particular is significantly less likely to cede land to the Palestinians when they have perpetrated terrorism. The authors exploit variation in the operational outcome of terrorist attacks and find that “successful” ones actually prompt Israeli land seizures rather than territorial concessions.[44] Relatedly, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan found that protest groups suffer at the bargaining table when they employ violence against the population.[45] The same is true for militant groups that seize hostages. Militant groups are far more likely to successfully pressure government compliance when they refrain from harming the hostages, particularly civilian ones.[46] With few exceptions, coercion studies thus find that terrorism lowers the likelihood of government concessions.[47]

Terrorism rarely frightens citizens of target countries into supporting more dovish politicians. On the contrary, studies on public opinion demonstrate that terrorist attacks tend to raise popular support for right-wing leaders opposed to appeasement. Based on their dataset of Palestinian attacks from 1990 to 2003, Claude Berrebi and Esteban Klor found that terrorism boosts national support for right-wing parties in Israel, such as the Likud.[48] In a related study, the authors demonstrate that Israeli localities struck by terrorism gravitate to right-bloc parties opposed to territorial concessions.[49] Erica Gould and Esteban Klor also explored geographic variation in terror attacks within Israel and found that the bloodiest ones are
the most likely to induce this rightward electoral shift.[50] Anna Getmansky and Thomas Zeitzoff found that Israelis within range of rocket-fire from the Gaza Strip are significantly more likely to support right-wing candidates.[51] These trends appear to be the international norm, not Israeli specific. Christophe Chowanietz analysed variation in public opinion within France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States from 1990 to 2006.[52] In each target country, terrorist attacks have shifted the electorate to the political right in proportion to their lethality. Related observations have been registered after al-Qaeda and its affiliates killed civilians in Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, the Philippines, Russia, Turkey, and the United States.[53] RAND observes in a précis of the literature: “Terrorist fatalities, with few exceptions, increase support for the bloc of parties associated with a more intransigent position. Scholars may interpret this as further evidence that terrorist attacks against civilians do not help terrorist organisations achieve their stated goals.”[54] By bolstering hardliners, militant groups engaged in terrorist attacks are more likely to be crushed from the backlash they provoked.[55]

To understand why terrorism is a suboptimal instrument of coercion, it is useful to review how this violent tactic is supposed to work in the first place. In theory, terrorism operates as a political communication strategy that signals to the target country the costs of noncompliance; terrorism allegedly coerces government accommodation when the expected cost of the violence against civilians exceeds the expected cost of making the concession.[56] This bargaining logic lacks external validity, however; in fact, terrorism is a poor coercive tactic precisely because it is a flawed communication strategy.

Content analyses of media stories strongly suggest that terrorism struggles to amplify terrorist demands. Michael Kelly and Thomas Mitchell have produced the most ambitious study on the media’s coverage of terrorist demands. Their content analysis of terrorism articles in the New York Times and Times of London reveals that historically “less than 10 percent of the coverage in either newspaper dealt in even the most superficial way with the grievances of the terrorists”[57] Terrorists are unable to broadcast their demands even when the perpetrators emphasise them, are highly educated, and speak the majority language of the target country. As Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf illustrated in the case of the American Weather Underground, “The terrorists could bomb their names on to the front pages, but they could do next to nothing to make sure that the message intended by their bombings was also the message transmitted.”[58] In her analysis of European-based terrorist groups, Bonnie Cordes et al. likewise find that “The violence of terrorism is rarely understood by the public.”[59] Kelly and Mitchell go even further, noting the use of terrorism seems to “sap…its political content.”[60] Anecdotal evidence thus abounds that terrorism is a losing political tactic because it is a poor communication strategy.

In a recent study published in International Studies Quarterly, Abrahms proposed and tested a new psychological theory to explain why terrorism underperforms politically. The Correspondence of Means and Ends bias is a newfound cognitive heuristic in international relations. It posits that citizens of target countries are apt to infer the extremeness of the perpetrators’ political preferences directly from the extremeness of his tactics. That is, terrorists are seen as harbouring extreme, unappeasable ends because of their use of extreme means. Because of this human tendency to confound the extreme means of the perpetrator with his presumed ends, escalating to terrorism or other violent tactics can discredit him as a viable negotiating partner.[61]

To test the Correspondence of Means and Ends bias, Abrahms conducted an online experiment on a large, representative national sample of American adults. All subjects were presented with a simple vignette of an unidentifiable group issuing a traditionally moderate preference through the American media—the release of its imprisoned leaders from U.S. custody in exchange for permanently demobilising. Subjects were randomly assigned, however, to two conditions that differed along a tactical dimension. In the control condition, the
group surrounds a bunch of American civilians, takes them hostage, but does not physically harm anyone in the course of the confrontation. The same information was presented in the treatment condition, except the group escalates tactically by killing the civilians in its custody. To minimise framing issues, the survey instrument paid attention to the formal aspects of the instrument by avoiding any derivatives of the word terror or any other emotive labels to describe either the coercive acts or the actors themselves. The two conditions were thus duplicates, except in the painful treatment the moderate group adopts a more extreme method by killing the civilians instead of releasing them unharmed.

Subjects in both conditions were presented with a series of identical multiple choice and ordinal scale questions designed to assess both directly and indirectly the perceived extremeness of the group's preferences. Specifically, all subjects were asked the following set of questions: (1) to evaluate whether the group is motivated to achieve its demand of freeing the imprisoned leaders in U.S. custody or to harm Americans out of hatred towards them; (2) to rate the group's preferences from 1 to 7 along this continuum;[62] (3) to judge whether the group would in fact demobilise upon achieving its demand to free the imprisoned leaders; (4) to appraise whether the group would derive satisfaction from Americans physically harmed in an unrelated incident that would not contribute to winning back the imprisoned leaders in U.S. custody; and (5) to ascertain whether the group would continue to engage in the same actions against Americans even after discovering a less extreme method that promised to free the imprisoned leaders.

Following a standard convention in experimental research, Abrahms then applied a two-tailed difference of means test to determine whether the tactical manipulation alone yields significant variation in the perceived extremeness of the self-described moderate group's preferences. Answers to each of the five questions are statistically significant at the .01 level or better. Compared to subjects in the control condition in which no civilians were physically harmed, those exposed to the painful treatment were on average: (1) 27 percent more likely to believe the group is motivated not to free the imprisoned leaders in U.S. custody, but to harm Americans out of hatred towards them; (2) 20 percent more likely to rate the group's preferences as the most extreme on a standard 7-point ordinal scale;[63] (3) 23 percent more likely to believe the group would not demobilise upon achieving its demand to free the imprisoned leaders; (4) 33 percent more likely to believe the group would derive satisfaction from Americans physically harmed in an unrelated incident that would not contribute to winning back the imprisoned leaders; and (5) 22 percent more likely to believe the group would continue to engage in the same actions against Americans even after discovering a less extreme method to free its leaders from U.S. custody. The experiment therefore helps to resolve why governments dig in their political heels in the face of terrorism. When groups escalate to this extreme tactic, they are seen as harbouring equally extreme political preferences, undermining confidence in negotiating with them.

For experimentalists in psychology or behavioural science, the quality of a causal mechanism depends less on the scope of confirming cases than on the theoretical construct and its predictive power. As a robustness check, however, the study also tested the mechanism with another vignette, again varying only whether the moderate group escalates tactically by killing the hostages instead of releasing them unscathed. Subjects in both conditions were presented with the same set of questions to further assess whether the extremeness of tactics employed by non-state actors informs perceptions of their preferences independent of their actual demands. Across questions, those exposed to the painful treatment were again significantly (p<.01) more likely to conclude that the perpetrators are motivated to harm the population irrespective of whether the moderate demand were granted.
This is the first controlled experiment on the mechanism of coercion. A concern inherent to this methodology is the sacrificing of external validity for precision. The results appear externally valid, however, in important ways. First, the vignettes in the experiment are not based on hypothetical scenarios. Each tracks closely with the most common international events from ITERATE, a leading dataset on non-state coercion. International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968-2005 (ITERATE 5) contains detailed information from over a thousand international hostage incidents between 1968 and 2005. By far, the two most common demands issued are for governments to cede money or prisoners, which occurred in 16 percent and 11 percent of the cases, respectively. The perpetrators demand prisoners in vignette 1 and money in vignette 2 in accordance with both the relative frequency of these moderate demands and the definition of terrorism itself as an extremism of means though not necessarily ends.[64]

Second, case studies confirm that the publics of target countries are in fact prone to inferring the extremeness of challengers’ preferences directly from their tactics, empowering anti-accommodation hardliners in the face of terrorism. Within Israel, for example, polls show that respondents who perceive the tactics of Palestinians as “mainly violent” are more likely to believe their intent is to “destroy Israel.” Conversely, respondents who perceive the tactics of Palestinians as “mainly nonviolent” are more likely to believe their intent is merely to “liberate the occupied territories.” The Russian public also infers the extremeness of Chechen preferences directly from their tactics, fortifying hardliners against terrorist appeasement. Before the terrorism commenced, Russians favoured granting an independent Chechen state. When terrorism erupted in the late 1990s, however, the Russian public concluded that the Chechens were apparently bent on harming it, shifting popular support away from concessions, while bolstering Vladimir Putin to instead bomb Grozny.
Al-Qaeda’s stated grievances about U.S.-Middle East policies fell on deaf ears for the same reason. Bin Laden and his associates stressed that the purpose of the September 11, 2001 attack was to coerce the United States into withdrawing from the Middle East. But most Americans thought the point was “to harm them” as an end in itself, a perception that fuelled George W. Bush’s strong counterterrorism response in the Arab-Muslim world.[65]

Observational evidence therefore accords with the experimental results that terrorism is an inherently flawed political communication strategy. The Correspondence of Means and Ends bias can account for why terrorism impedes government compliance. Evidently, citizens of target countries do not perceive the means of terrorists as fully independent from their desired ends. Terrorists struggle to induce government compliance because they are seen as unappeasable extremists by dint of their immoderate tactical choices. When a non-state actor escalates violence directed against civilians, citizens of the target country infer that the perpetrator harbours correspondingly extreme preferences, undermining the logic of concessions regardless of whether a bargaining space objectively exists.

Academic research on terrorism offers hope that the tactic is indeed deterrable with a delegitimisation strategy. The burgeoning literature on terrorism demonstrates that the tactic hinders perpetrators from achieving—even taking seriously—their political demands. Given their incentive structure, supporters of terrorism may be deterred if only they knew what academics already do: terrorists are uniquely ill-suited for bargaining due to their grisly tactical choices, which have a proven and understandable record of political futility.

Conclusion
The foregoing analysis strongly suggests that most terrorism is deterrable even if many of its practitioners are not. Classical conceptions of deterrence are based on dissuading the adversary from unwanted behaviour by disincentivising it. The problem with deterring terrorists, however, is their incentive structure is so complex they are likely to derive utility from their actions regardless of the government countermeasure. Terrorism may still be deterred, however, by dissuading terrorist supporters. Supporters are essential not for terrorists to wage an isolated attack, but for them to mount a campaign of sustained operations. Terrorism has power in numbers because with greater local support, terrorists are better positioned to elude authorities and obtain material resources, necessary factors for long-term survival. In direct contrast to terrorists, their supporters are deterrable due to the simplicity of their incentive structure. People generally support terrorists for a single reason—to achieve their political demands.

Fortunately, a growing body of research finds that terrorism is a losing tactic for perpetrators to attain their demands. Four main findings attest to terrorism’s political ineffectiveness. First, terrorism is highly correlated with political failure. Historically, a surprisingly small percentage of perpetrators have managed to achieve their political platforms with terrorism. Second, the low political success rate of terrorism is inherent to the tactic itself. Coercion studies rather consistently find that nonstate actors are less likely to achieve their demands when they employ terrorism than other tactics such as guerrilla warfare, and that this correlation holds even after controlling for the capability of the perpetrators, strength of government opposition, and dozens of other potential confounds. Third, electorates do not become more dovish in the face of terrorism. On the contrary, they tend to gravitate towards more hawkish, right-wing leaders opposed to concessions. Finally, terrorism is suboptimal political behaviour because it is an inherently flawed communication strategy. Terrorism obfuscates rather than amplifies the demands of the perpetrators. Notwithstanding their actual nature, terrorists are suspected of harboring extreme political preferences by dint of their extreme
tactics. This perception that terrorists are wedded to radical political views understandably dissuades target countries from trying to appease them.

Policy-makers frequently complain about the irrelevance of contemporary political science research. According to this widespread view, political scientists favour esoteric topics over intrinsically important ones and methodological rigour over clarity.[66] Such allegations may ring true for other areas of the field, but not for counterterrorism. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, academic research has answered numerous questions about terrorism, including its political effects. Initially, many political scientists assumed that groups turn to terrorism because of its effectiveness in achieving their demands. This viewpoint has undergone a sea change, however, once subjected to empirical scrutiny. A consensus is forming that terrorism tends to steel target countries from making concessions. The policy community can help to mitigate the terrorism threat by broadcasting this message to its supporters in a targeted public diplomacy campaign. Supporters of terrorism will be deterred once they know that their actions obstruct their preferences.

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Notes


[20] Jessica Stern has noted, for example, that for many terrorists participating in the organisation is akin to a fun "outward bound experience", regardless of whatever they manage to accomplish once in it. See Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Ecco, 2003), 5.


[38] Abrahms, 2006, 43-44.


[40] Cronin 2009, 203.


[53] See Mueller 2006, 184, 587; Shapiro 2012, 5; and Wilkinson 1986, 52.


[62] Respondents selected 1 if they believed the motive was based entirely on hatred towards Americans; 7 if they believed the motive was based entirely to achieve the moderate demand; and 4 if they believed both motives applied equally. The unlabeled values between these options allowed a more nuanced response. A response of "uncertain" was also an option for all subjects.

[63] Subjects exposed to the painful treatment were also 13 percent less likely to rate the group’s preferences as the least extreme (p<.001). The middling option was selected the fewest times, indicating that the rubric of preferences adequately captured respondent perceptions.


Eco-Terrorism? Countering Dominant Narratives of Securitisation:  
a Critical, Quantitative History of the Earth Liberation Front (1996-2009)  
by Michael Loadenthal

Abstract
The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) has carried out acts of political violence and 'economic sabotage' characterized by a pattern of behaviour reflecting tactical and targeting selections, communications strategies, and geographic location. The movement's attacks typically focus on the destruction of property located in 'soft targets' associated with commercial and residential construction, the automotive industry, and a variety of local, national and multinational business interests. These sites are routinely targeted through a variety of means ranging from graffiti to sabotage to arson. Geographically, the movement has focused its attacks in the United States and Mexico, and to a limited extent, countries on the European, South American and Australian continents. The findings presented in this article were developed through a statistical analysis of the movement's attack history as presented through its above-ground support network. This is discussed in critical contrast to assertions about the movement's alleged terrorist behaviour found in most academic and government literature. This study seeks to present an incident-based historical analysis of the ELF that is not situated within a logic of securitisation. In doing so, it challenges traditional scholarship based on statistical findings.

Key words: Earth Liberation Front, eco-terrorism, single-issue terrorism, quantitative analysis

Introduction
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the often-linked fields of Terrorism Studies and Security Studies have witnessed a boom, accompanied by the more general rise in university studies directed at Islam, political Islam, terrorism and Middle Eastern politics[1]. Subsequently, new approaches have been developed within a host of “critical” fields, including Critical Terrorism Studies[2] and Critical Security Studies[3]. These attempt to problematise and clarify a methodology for those seeking to investigate political violence and responses to it through a non-orthodox, non-realist lens in an attempt to move beyond a purely securitisation focus. These approaches, while offering a host of new points of concern and criticism, often continue to base their study on raw data produced by state institutions. Thus while such studies may critically examine findings, new scholarship is needed that draws its conclusions from the wealth of data offered by the social movements themselves.

Within this post-9/11 era of terrorism scholarship, a new class of “terrorism experts”[4] emerged, poised to corner the academic market, often at the service of law enforcement, state-centric think tanks and a wider statecraft of securitisation. The present study is not meant to serve as yet another quantitative tool for criminal and behavioural profiling. Instead it is meant to act as an example of a methodological break, wherein one surveys the difficult data offered by the practitioners of political violence or their supporters themselves. The analysis contained herein is not meant to be a tool for law enforcement but rather to serve as a counter balance to the statist narrative concerning tactical trends and their relation to the criminalisation of dissent. Overblown, inaccurate, and fear mongering depictions of bomb-throwing masked vigilantes occupies much of the discussion of “eco-terrorism”. In response, scholars have been careful to begin developing counter-narratives to discuss these movements within a more accurately nuanced language. Activist-aligned journalists[5] and academics[6] have also begun to offer critiques of the terrorist framing of these movements.
in an attempt to offer an alternative explanation to state rhetoric. Within state rhetoric, we see the ELF (and its sister entity the Animal Liberation Front) termed “eco-terrorists” since around 2002, when Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Domestic Terrorism Chief James Jarboe invoked the label twelve times in a speech entitled “The Threat of Eco-Terrorism.” The same year, Dale Watson from the FBI’s counterterrorism and counterintelligence division, reported to the United States Senate that the ALF/ELF represented a serious terrorist threat, characterising them as the most active extremist elements in the US.

The ELF has been active in the US since 1996, and through the use of decentralised, self-contained, underground cells of activists, has managed to not only carry out scores of attacks on property, but remain relatively immune from arrest. Activists inspired and motivated by the politics of the ELF are free to carry out acts of property destruction and claim them via the ELF moniker, provided they meet the movement’s guidelines. According to widely circulated guidelines, ELF actions must economically harm the adversary, aim to educate the public, and avoid harming both human and (non-human) animal life. Therefore if an individual, or a small grouping of activists agree with these three simple points, they are encouraged to act independently and to claim their attack through the ELF moniker. This has most often been done through written communiqués bearing the ELF name. In those rare instances when a communiqué is not issued, the letters E.L.F. have appeared in paint at the site of the incident. The various actors and cells that constitute the ELF should therefore we understood as an ideologically-aligned network of autonomous, decentralised nodes, who share a strategic and tactical vision. They are not a unified movement in the traditional sense, nor are they a membership-based organisation. They are a tactical, strategic and praxis-informed tendency supported by a similarly decentralised, ad hoc network. As a result, scholarship that insists on understanding such groupings as nothing more than radical splitters of traditional social movements (e.g. Earth First!) will continue to be inherently flawed.

In exploring these networks of clandestine eco-saboteurs and arsonists, one is often tempted to construct a definition of terrorism, and following that, present one’s case comparatively to that set of parameters. The goal then becomes to decide if the evidence presented qualifies the object for inclusion within the terrorist designation. Conversely, this study seeks to present evidence which can then be held up against a variety of definitions of terrorism that have in common a focus on deliberate attacks against unarmed human beings in order to intimidate, coerce or otherwise influence a larger audience. Therefore the ‘dominant narratives’ this study seeks to challenge are those that present the ELF not as a strategic social movement utilising targeted property destruction, but as a violent terroristic threat to the nation state. It is not the main intention of this study to refute the FBI’s classification of the ELF as domestic “eco-terrorists”, but rather to discuss how data is represented through a divergent lens, and subsequently used to embolden such claims for the purposes of securitisation. The intention of this study is to provide quantitative evidence to public, above-ground activists and scholars who seek to offer support in the creation of counter narratives; explanations of an emergent social movement not based in state-centric terrorism rhetoric.

The following study seeks to determine the tactical, targeting, messaging and associated behavioural characteristics of the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) through a data set drawn from the movement’s self-constructed mouthpiece. This analysis will draw from the movement’s 13 (1996-2009) year history of global attacks in order to answer the question: What does a typical ELF attack look like, and secondly, how often are atypical incidents claimed under the ELF moniker? In order to develop such a behavioural profile, a series of statistical findings will be reviewed. These findings are drawn from an analysis of the movement’s attack history as presented via their above-ground support structure, the North American Earth Liberation Front Press Office (NAELFPO)[7]. All data analysed was gleaned from public (i.e. non-classified) sources and as such, provides little to no utility for law enforcement as such entities compile their own incident databases.
from a host of clandestine (e.g. Law Enforcement Sensitive, Classified, etc.) sources. This attack chronology, documented by the NAELFPO, was used to develop a database of 707 events, each coded for 11 variables. Each attack was coded through a standardised decision tree based on the description provided by the NAELPO, as well as communications issued by the ELF cell directly. The data was then split into six datasets and analysed. These six distinct datasets were developed to account for the presence or absence of repeating events (e.g. one cell breaks the windows of four banks, claimed in one communiqué) and commonly occurring, distinct national locations. Throughout the discussion contained herein, the findings have been compared to studies presented in academic journals, as well as government reports, in an attempt to evaluate the ELF’s attack history in the light of assertions made about the movement’s behaviours.[8]

Methodology: Process & Limitations

The database utilised throughout this analysis was created from the “diary of actions” hosted on the NAELFPO’s website. According to the NAELFPO, “The actions contained on the pages below comprise a complete history of ELF actions in North America and globally.”[9] From the “diary of actions,” a 707-entry database was created, each entry representing one ELF-linked attack. These 707 entries were comprised of 211 distinct events, and 496 repeating attacks (e.g. a single cell vandalising multiple, distinct targets in one outing claimed through a single communiqué) occurring between 14 October 1996, and 23 November 2009. The attacks were carried out across 14 countries, including 28 US states while there were as well four attacks without a clearly discernable location. The data was coded manually, and used to create a database via the “SPSS Statistics 17.0” software suite. Each event was assigned distinct values within 11 variable fields. [10] Many of the attack descriptions and cell communiqués are exceedingly descriptive regarding the tactics utilised and target selection, though in some cases this descriptive richness was lacking. Occasionally, attacks were recorded in the NAELFPO diary with only a single descriptive sentence, making the process of coding for 11 variables difficult. The variable categories were developed with such limitations in mind, and thus, “the goal in developing the [coding] taxonomy was to build a set of classes broad enough to capture the range of terrorist behaviour, but still simple enough to use, given the limitations in the descriptive data available on each individual terrorist incident”[11].

In cases where elements of the description necessary for coding were absent, attempts were made to estimate a reasonable scenario, and to describe it through the most accurate terms available.[12] For example, if a description stated that a laboratory was “attacked,” “trashed,” or “monkey wrenched,” the attack was recorded as an act of “sabotage/vandalism/graffiti,” as the broad nature of this tactic category was developed to allow for the coding of such events; events where the exact nature of the damage and tactics are unclear. If the description stated that the target was “covered in slogans,” “paint bombed,” “tagged” or used similar language, the tactic was recorded as “graffiti,” despite the fact that such a term was not included in the communiqué text. Throughout the coding process, attention was paid to the stated motivation for attacking a target. For example, when a Wal-Mart or Nike shop was attacked and criticised for its global policies, it was recorded as an attack targeting a “multinational corporation,” whereas the office of a regional energy company was recorded as a “business property.” Similarly, two attacks, both targeting automobiles could be coded differently depending on the owner’s position vis-à-vis the larger ELF policy. The vandalism of a sports utility vehicle (SUV) in a dealership was recorded as targeting a “SUV/automobile,” whereas similar vandalism of a specific individual’s (e.g. CEO of targeted company, researcher engaged in controversial experimentation) car, targeted because it belonged to that individual, was recorded as the targeting of “personal property.”

In coding the data, the aim was to use as little interpretation as possible, and to transparently decipher the language of the description and/or communiqué into the coding values through a standardised decision tree.
In order to accurately represent the scale of some attacks, some single events are recorded as multiple entries. For example, if four SUVs are firebombed, the events were recorded as four acts of arson because four targets were attacked.[13] Conversely, the breaking of four windows of one office/SUV/home/etc., was counted as a single attack. However, if one window was broken on each of four separate offices, this was recorded as four attacks since multiple targets serve as the determining factor. Occasionally, the exact number of targets attacked was unclear. If the description stated that “numerous vehicles” or “a row of homes” was attacked, that incident was recorded as two entries despite the possibility that many more targets were attacked. Lastly, if an attack utilised two distinctly different tactics, the event was recorded as two incidents[14]. This was done when both tactics fell outside of the “sabotage/vandalism/graffiti” category, such as in the case of an “animal liberation” that also involved the arson of the building. In this example, the event would be recorded as one “distinct incident” and one “multiple entry”[15]. Because of the tendency for such a coding procedure to artificially inflate the appearance of some attacks, calculations were conducted separately within multiple data sets, one wherein multiple entries are included, and another wherein only distinct (non-recurring) attacks are included. In this second, distinct incident data set, multiple entries were condensed to single attacks.

For example, if saboteurs were to slash the tires of four vehicles and claim it in a single communiqué, this would be recorded as one tire-slashing incident in the distinct incident data set, and recorded as four tire-slashing incidents in the multiple entry data set. For the purposes of analysis, the sample was split into three location-based categories. Each of the three datasets were then split into subsets (multiple entries and distinct incidents). For the purposes of reporting and discussion, these six datasets will be referred to throughout, abbreviated as DB1, DB2, DB3, DB4, DB5 and DB6 and are detailed in the endnotes.[16] All numerical findings were rounded to the nearest whole number when presented in the in-text data tables, and in doing so, some total to more than one hundred percent.

In rare cases, the NAELFPO’s data included attacks that were carried out by a known group that was not affiliated with the ELF. For example, between 10 October 2008 and 31 October 2008, four attacks were carried out in Canada targeting the EnCana Corporation[17]. These attacks were not claimed by an ELF cell despite the presence of a communiqué hosted by NAELFPO, and thus, these attacks were excluded from the sample. Occasionally a cell adopted the ELF name after the initiation of an attack campaign. For example, starting in June 2009, attacks in Mexico ceased to be claimed by the ELF, and were instead claimed by «Eco-arsonists for the liberation of the earth» (EpLT).[18] Thus attacks claimed by the EpLT were excluded from the study sample, and only those prior attacks signed with the ELF name were included. Around the same time, additional attacks in Mexico were being carried out by “Luddites Against the Domestication of Wild Nature,” (LADWN); these were similarly excluded as LADWN represented a distinctly new, non-ELF moniker.[19] However, on 20 July 2009, LADWN announced in a communiqué that it now «form[ed] part of a cell of the Frente de Liberación de la Tierra,”[20] thus from that date onwards, the group’s actions were recorded as attacks of the ELF[21]. Finally, when a group used the ELF name but specified a distinct unit within the movement, this attack was simply recorded as being carried out by the ELF. For example, on 5 March 2001, a graffiti attack was claimed by the “ELF Night Action Kids,”[22] and was recorded in the database as being carried out by the ELF. These methodological decisions were made to allow for focus on the deployment of the ELF moniker—not the wider constituency makeup. For example, despite the ideologically-shared proclivities of the ELF and the EpLT, since the latter chooses an explicitly non-ELF moniker to claim its actions, it is excluded despite tactical, strategic and ideological similarities.

In coding for the “communiqué” variable, the presence of a communiqué linked from the NAELFPO website was recorded as such, just as the lack of a communiqué present on the website was recorded as “no communiqué issued,” despite the possibility that a communiqué was available in another source.[23] In order for an attack to be marked as ELF-linked without the presence of a communiqué, it was required that
the letters “E.L.F.” were left at the scene of the attack either through graffiti, a banner, note, or similar visual/written communication. For example, on 11 October 2004, a “package with the letters ‘ELF,’”[24] was left on a road in Philadelphia and treated as a possible improvised explosive device, thought the box turned out to be harmless. Thus in the database, the attack was credited to the ELF as a “bomb threat.”

Limitations exist in the data acquisition and categorisation methodology employed. Of particular importance are concerns regarding the validity of the NAELFPO’s “diary of actions” as the data was provided by an organisation with vested interests in promoting the best image of the ELF. Despite other databases available, such as those created by the Foundation for Biomedical Research[25][26] the North American Animal Liberation Front Press Office reports[27], and numerous scholarly articles[28], this study sought to utilise a single data source, thus eliminating the need to synthesise conflicting information. In an attempt to remove the judgment of the researcher from the acquisition of a data sample, only the NAELFPO “diary of actions” was used despite the understanding that such a source may contain inherent bias. As previously discussed, the lack of descriptive detail present in accounts of some attacks led to the development of coding categories that were more broadly defined then would have been necessary if complete incident descriptions were present for all attacks. To correct for this tendency, the variable coding categories were defined broadly enough to be inclusive of the uncertainty present in the data, while attempting to maintain distinctions. The categories were designed so that a single event could only be classified within one category. Despite these limitations, the NAELFPO dataset provides a singular and complete source for analysis while avoiding the need for the researcher to decide which sources are legitimate and which are to be excluded. At its best, the “diary of actions” represents an accurate, well-researched history of the ELF and affiliated movements. At its most limited, this study analyses the manner in which the ELF’s press office presents the movement to a wider audience; how the press office frames the cells’ actions via their intended messaging.

Findings & Discussion: Targeting
This first section will analyse the targeting pattern present in the ELF data. Target data was coded within 24 targeting types ranging from the common (e.g. 208 attacks on automobiles) to the obscure (e.g. one attack on an advertisement). The results from the data analysis concerning targeting vary dependent on the portion of the sample utilised. When the complete 707-entry[29] dataset (DB1) is analysed, the following findings emerge as the eight most commonly attacked[30] target types:

- SUV/automobile: 29%
- Phone booths: 17%
- Homes under construction/model homes: 12%
- Company vehicles: 11%
- Construction/industrial equipment: 10%
- Business property: 5%
- Farm/ranch/breeders: 2%
- McDonalds restaurants: 2%

The other 16 target types each account for less than 2% of the total attacks, and collectively comprise only 12% of the total targets.[31]
When the global dataset excludes the multiple entries (DB2), the predominance of attacks on automobiles and phone booths is reduced, as these targets are typically attacked in groups. In the 211 entry DB2 dataset, the 12 most commonly attacked targets are:

- Construction/industrial equipment: 14%
- Home under construction/model homes: 13%
- Business property: 12%
- SUV/automobile: 10%
- Phone booth: 8%
- Business vehicle: 8%
- McDonalds: 5%
- Farm/ranch/breeder: 5%
- GMO experiment/research: 4%
- Government property: 3%
- Trees: 3%
- Government vehicle: 2%

The other 11 target types each account for less than 2% of the total attacks, and collectively comprise only 14% of the total targets.[32]

When these findings are compared to that of prior scholarship, points of congruency and disagreement can be seen. Though no alternative study could be located using the exact sample data source, in an article based on a dataset consisting of “database of [109] ELF attacks,” occurring between 1996-2001, Leader and Probst [33] report that the most commonly attacked ELF targets are:

- “Corporations”: 33 (36%)
- “Urban sprawl/development”: 30 (33%)
- “Logging & related”: 18 (20%)
- “Genetic engineering/biotech research facilities”: 14
- “Facilities that threaten animals”: 6 (7%)
- “Government facilities”: 5 (5%)
- “Symbols of global economy”: 3 (3%)

As one can see, a close comparison becomes quite difficult between the two studies as they adopt different frameworks for categorisation; one based in the nature and identity of the targeted object, and the other in a broader business type category.

Similarly, a US Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-commissioned study, carried out by Helios Global Inc., reported comparable, though more generic results. The Helios study focuses on a conflated history of
the ELF and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) over a longer timeline, from 1981-2005.[34] Because their sample incorporates the ELF as well as the ALF, and their timeframe predates the ELF’s founding by 15 years, an exact comparison is not possible. Regardless of such limitations, according to the Helios study[35], the most frequently attacked “primary targets” of the ALF/ELF are:

1. “Commercial enterprises and/or individuals engaged in housing and urban development
2. Commercial enterprises and/or individuals involved in the logging industry
3. Sports utility vehicle (SUV) dealerships
4. Commercial enterprises and/or individuals involved in the production, sale, and distribution of animal products (leather and fur producers, sellers, and distributors; restaurants; and meat, poultry, and fish producers
5. Animal research facilities and personnel
6. Commercial enterprises and universities involved in genetic engineering…”

From the Helios study, though different terminology is employed, the targeting findings are quite similar to those contained in the present study. Target category 1, overlaps this study’s category termed, “house under construction/mobile home,” whereas the remaining five categories similarly overlap this study’s use of categorical terms such as: “SUV/automobile,” “business property,” “farm/ranch/breeder,” “laboratory” and “GMO crops or research” respectively.

Returning to the data presented herein, in this ELF-specific study, one can now examine the remainder of the datasets concerning targeting typologies. When the dataset is further reduced to only attacks carried out in the United States, including multiple entries (DB3), the results are largely the same, with the same target types occupying the higher echelons. Notable changes include the exclusion of attacks on “phone booths,” as all such attacks occurred in Mexico, as well as the rising presence of the targeting of “trees” (via tree spiking) as the eighth most common target type, comprising 2% of the total attack pool. In the 462-entry DB3 dataset, the most commonly attacked targets are “SUV/automobile”, “House under construction/model home”, “Business property,” “Construction/industrial equipment”, “Business vehicle”, “McDonalds”, “Farm/ranch/breeder” and “Trees: 2%”. The other 13 target types each account for less than 2% of the total attacks, and collectively comprise only 12% of the total targets.[36] When this dataset excludes multiple entries (DB4), the results are largely the same. With the exclusion of multiple entries, the targeting types are more evenly distributed, with 15/20 target types accounting for 2% or more of the total pool. Comparison between these two datasets is displayed below:
### Table #1, Most Commonly Attacked Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Dataset #</th>
<th>DB3%</th>
<th>DB4%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUV/automobile</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House under construction/model home</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business property</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction/industrial equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm/ranch/breeder</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trees</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business property</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMO crops or research</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business vehicle</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDonalds</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The other 11 target types each account for less than 5% of the total attacks, and collectively comprise 21% of the total targets.[37]

When targeting type is further reduced to the pool of attacks carried out only in Mexico, including the incorporation of multiple attacks (DB5), the exceedingly high proportion of attacks on “phone booths” is visible. In this sample, 78% of all ELF attacks in Mexico targeted a Telmex phone booth. This is by far the most singularly-focused targeting seen in any of the datasets. In the DB5 dataset, the second most commonly attacked target type is “business property,” comprising only 7%.[38] When multiple attacks are excluded from the dataset (DB6), attacks on phone booths still remain the most common target type, but only account for 39% of the total attacks. Attacks on business property similarly remain the second most commonly attacked target type, now accounting for 24%.[39]

Throughout the findings in regards to targeting, there is a pattern of ELF cells attacking unguarded, ‘soft target’ sites such as vehicles, phone booths and construction sites. In general, such properties would be located in public areas with little or no security. In contrast, target types such as laboratories, ski resorts, banks and government property consistently occupy the lower levels of target selection, possibly because such areas would more commonly employ electronic surveillance systems or human guards. Regardless of the dataset examined, and independent of the inclusion or exclusion of multiple attacks, business properties and construction sites are routinely targeted. In the US datasets, there is a dominant pattern of targeting homes under construction and model homes, though this pattern is not seen in other national settings. This is likely a reflection of the growing “sprawl” critique as seen in anti-globalisation, anti-gentrification, anti-capitalist and anarcho-primitivist movements in the US, a site where many ELF activists find their ideological groundings.[40] In other nations, such as Mexico, there is no record of the targeting of “sprawl” sites, as Mexican cells have focused their attention on attacking phone booths as part of a larger campaign against Telmex, a company described in communiqués as “earth destroying,”[41] and guilty of “biocide”[42].

Throughout the data collection and coding process, attention was paid to determining if the ELF attack carried out was part of a larger stated campaign, thus leading to the specific location being targeted. In the US, two campaigns were identified. The most prominent was the anti-sprawl campaign in Long Island, N.Y, comprised of eight distinct attacks (42 multiple entry attacks), occurring from September 2000 to January 2001. Such attacks accounted for approximately 8% of the total attacks carried out in the US. Craig Rosebraugh, former ELF spokesman, notes the prominence of the Long Island anti-sprawl campaign, writing that it “constituted the most focused and intensified campaign the ELF had ever undertaken,”[43]
consisting of 11 “major” attacks including five arsons of homes and condominiums under construction [44]. The second largest campaign targeted affiliates of animal research supplier Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS). [45] Six distinct anti-HLS attacks were carried out in the US, comprising less than 2% of the overall attacks. Such campaigns do not appear to be prominent in the ELF’s targeting system as approximately 91% of all US attacks were not part of a stated campaign.[46] In Mexico, this trend dramatically changes, as over 81% of all multiple entry attacks, and over 51% of all distinct entry attacks are part of the campaign targeting Telmex. Mexico also was the venue for one anti-HLS attack.[47]

In examining atypical events, some of the data that comprises the rare incidents, the outliers, though not statistically significant, are deserving of brief discussion. In only one distinct attack a ski resort was targeted, yet despite its rarity, the Vail, Colorado arson is often the most commonly heard of ELF attack, possibly because it caused approximately $26 million in damages [48]. At the time the datasets were being constructed, a photograph of the Vail fire was featured on the ELF’s main page, cataloging the movement’s “diary of actions”[49]. A second atypical targeting discovery focuses on cells’ decisions to target human life and not solely property. Throughout the movement’s 13-year history, only one attack directly targeted a human being. On 3 June 2009, an Australian cell of the ELF “hand delivered” a written threat to the home of a Hazelwood Power Station CEO, located in Melbourne[50]. The note threatened the individual’s property not his person, but because the threat was addressed towards a specific person, the incident was recorded as an attack targeting an individual not their property. Finally, in the targeting of fast food establishments, 15 attacks were directed at McDonald’s restaurants, while in only one attack, a Burger King was targeted. This particular action was taken in 2002 by an ELF cell in the US city of Richmond, Virginia [51].

Findings & Discussion: Tactics

The findings related to the tactics employed by ELF cells show little variation when the different datasets are examined comparatively. In every dataset, regardless of national location or the inclusion of “multiple entries,” the top three tactical choices are: “sabotage/vandalism/graffiti,” “arson” and “graffiti.” When viewed across datasets, the proportionality of these tactics changes, as does their usages vis-à-vis one another (but regardless of these variations), these three tactical choices consistently occupy the top three positions in the tactical tool belt. This cross-dataset trend can be viewed in the comparison chart below (Table #1) wherein the frequency of the three most common tactical typologies are compared across DB1-DB6:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>DB1 %</th>
<th>DB2 %</th>
<th>DB3 %</th>
<th>DB4 %</th>
<th>DB5 %</th>
<th>DB6 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SVG</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graffiti</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In five out of six datasets, “sabotage/vandalism/graffiti” is the most commonly employed tactics, followed by “arson,” and finally, “graffiti.” In only one instance does “arson” calculate as the most commonly employed tactic.[52] After the first three most commonly employed tactics, the breakdown across the various datasets begins to show greater diversity. Below is a comparison (Table #3) of the fourth, fifth and sixth most commonly utilized tactics within the six datasets:
Table #3, Comparison 4th, 5th, 6th Most Commonly Utilised Tactics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commonality of tactic</th>
<th>Dataset #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DB1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th most common</td>
<td>Window</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th most common</td>
<td>At ar, IID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th most common</td>
<td>Tire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When examined together, these tactical trends show some similarity, with the breaking of windows, tree spiking [TS], attempted arsons [abbreviated as “At ar”) and animal liberations proving common in the first four datasets, while the Mexican datasets (DB5-6) show identical results.[53]

The findings concerning tactics of this study can be compared to similar attempts in the scholarly literature. The Helios study summarises the tactical choices of “ecoterrorists,” a broad category including but not limited to the ELF, and represents the totality of such attacks within five tactical typologies. According to the Helios study[54], the tactical breakdown of “ecomilitant tactics carried out between 1981 and 2005,” can be summarised as:

- “Vandalism”: 45%
- “Theft”: 23%
- “Harassment”: 15%
- “Arson”: 10%
- “Bombing”: 7%

The Helios results share some findings with this study, as both agree that “vandalism” (termed “sabotage/vandalism/graffiti” in this study) as broadly defined, is the most commonly employed tactic, and “bombing[s]” (termed “IED” in this study), is the least commonly used tactic. Both studies also agree that within these extremes, “ecomilitants” use other tactics including arson and theft. Though not detailed in the study, one can assume that “Theft” for Helio encompasses the removal (or release) of live animals from slaughterhouses, breeding facilities, laboratories, etc. The Leader and Probst (2003) article reports similar findings but utilises smaller categorical groupings. Based on 92 attacks, according to the article[55], the three most common tactic types are:

- “Vandalism”: 36 (33%) [56]
- “Arson”: 32 (29%) [57]
- “Sabotage”: 19 (17%) [58]

Once again, such findings support those of this study, in that both report the most commonly utilized tactics combine sabotage, vandalism, graffiti, arson and attempted arson.

In attempting to identify inaccuracies within the literature—such as those positioned to embolden security debates—the tactical descriptions of the ELF are likely the most important areas to examine. The Leader and
Probst article asserts “ELF’s prime weapon is arson”,[59] though this claim is not supported by their own data nor the research presented herein, as more general sabotage and vandalism tactics generally show a higher predominance, as they do in datasets DB1-DB5, excluding DB6, where arson does surface as the most commonly utilised tactics in “distinct incident” attacks carried out in Mexico. In Leader and Probst’s own findings, vandalism occurs slightly more commonly than arson, and thus the statement that the movement’s “prime weapon is arson” appears hyperbolic for the sake of rhetoric. Linked to the tactics chosen for attack, are issues of lethality and threat to life. Casualty data was collected for every incident in the datasets. Throughout the 707, multinational, all incident dataset (DB1), and thus all secondary datasets, no ELF attack is reported to have caused any injuries or fatalities to human beings. This finding is supported by the scholarly literature[60] in every example surveyed and places a big question mark as to the rationale for the categorisation of ELF activities under ‘terrorism’.

Findings & Discussion: Claims of Responsibility

The presence of a communiqué documenting an attack is common throughout the different attacking cells. In cases where a formal communiqué is not issued, attackers sometimes leave ELF ‘calling cards’ such as the group’s name scrawled in graffiti, notes, or banners. In the following chart (Table #4), the comparison of communiqués and ‘calling cards’ is shown across the six datasets:

<p>| Table #4, Comparison of the Presence of ELF communiqué or ‘calling card’ |
|--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communiqué?</th>
<th>DB1%</th>
<th>DB2%</th>
<th>DB3%</th>
<th>DB4%</th>
<th>DB5%</th>
<th>DB6%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communiqué present</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No communiqué present</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“ELF” left at scene</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When compared across the six datasets, the trend is relatively uniform. In all cases, communiqués are more commonly issued then not, though their existence has varying degrees of regularity. In the first four datasets (DB1-4), communiqués are issued for more than half of all attacks (56% on average), and when a communiqué is not issued an ELF ‘calling card’ is present in approximately 19% of all cases.[61] In the Mexican datasets, communiqués are issued 100% of the time.[62]

Although this study has focused on attacks carried out by cells self-identifying as members of the ELF, occasionally, attacks are claimed in the name of a cooperative endeavor by the ELF and ALF through either a communiqué or through the NAELFPO’s description of the attack. The following chart (Table #5) shows the proportion of attacks claimed solely by the ELF, as compared to those claimed mutually by the ELF/ALF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table #5, Comparison of Group Claims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group claiming attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF/ALF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This cross-dataset comparison shows that the claiming of ELF/ALF joint actions is marginally more common
in the non-US, non-Mexican arena. In the Mexican-only datasets, such cooperative claims of responsibility are exceedingly rare, accounting for only one attack in the entire country's history.[63]

Findings & Discussion: Location

According to the data collected, the ELF is active in fourteen countries across the continents of North America, South America, Europe and Australia. The highest concentration exists in the English-speaking, ‘Western’ world of North America and Western Europe, though the presence of active cells in Mexico appears to be increasing [64]. In DB1, the countries with the highest rates of attacks are the United States, Mexico, United Kingdom and Canada. The other ten national locations account for less than 2% of the total attacks each, and collectively comprise only 7% of the total events.[65] Making up this collective 7%, are attacks carried out in Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Iceland, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Colombia. When the dataset is reduced, examining only “distinct incidents,” the results are the same, both in the nations identified, as well as their general ranking vis-à-vis one another. The most common countries remain the US, Mexico, Canada and UK and the other ten nations account for less than 1% of the total attacks each, and together comprise less than 3% of the total events.[66] A comparison of these two similar findings is displayed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dataset #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DB1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings are similar to those reported in the Helios study wherein the authors state, “despite their global presence…acts of terrorism appear to be most prevalent in North America and Western Europe”[67]. Helios’ exclusion of Mexico as a target of ELF attacks is expected, as the study was published in 2008, the year when Mexico began to experience activity from ELF cells.

The United States is overwhelmingly the focus of the ELF’s international campaign, despite the fact that the movement as it exists today emerged in England[68]. The availability of information relating to the location of ELF attacks occurring in the US lends itself well to analysis, as there is no need for the researcher to equitable develop categories or to extrapolate variable labels from attack narratives. Data on location as it pertains to state was available for all but one “distinct incidents,” and regional divisions were determined based on mapping provided by the US census report.[69] In the chart below (Table #7), attacks within the US (DB3- DB4) will be compared in regards to region and regional division:
Table #7, Comparison of US Attack Location Regionally[70]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Dataset #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DB3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West South Central</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East South Central</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHEAST</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDWEST</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West North Central</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East North Central</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this data, one can see that the Western region (specifically the five state Pacific division), has been a particular center of activity, concentrated in the states of California, Oregon and Washington. Similarly, the Middle Atlantic three state division within the Northeast region has been particularly active, as numerous attacks have been carried out in the states of New York and Pennsylvania. The least active region appears to be the Midwest despite its large geographic area. The least active regional division is the West South Central, four state grouping of the southern region.[71]

In surveying the literature concerning the ELF, only the Helios study includes a detailed discussion of location as it pertains to regions throughout the US. Although the Helios sample is different from the one employed herein, the findings are similar. The Helios study concludes “ecoterrorists” are “particularly active in the Western and West Coast states. In particular…Oregon, California and Washington…the Midwest and East Coast have a smaller percentage of eco-terrorist incidents”[72]. Certainly, the data contained herein supports the Helios claim that such movements are especially active in the “Western and West Coast states,” and state-specific data supports the claim that high levels of activity is seen in Oregon, California and Washington.[73] The claim, that the Pacific Northwestern region “is the most prominent environmental hot spot in the nation” is also offered, by former ELF spokesmen Craig Rosebraugh[74]. Also, both the Helios study and this study agree that the Northeast (called East Coast in Helios study) and Midwest occupy the lower regions for ELF activity.

**Conclusion**

This article draws on the case study of the ELF to demonstrate the analytical potential of conducting a quantitative tactical analysis of activism of social movement groups in order to debunk hyperbolic tropes of “terrorism.” For example, methodological decisions related to categorisation, coding and data sourcing can be used to skew data towards hyperbole, fear-mongering and securitisation or they can be used to approach greater accuracy, nuance and balance. The preceding dataset challenges the framing of radical environmental groups as terrorist threats to the nation-state. This rhetorical framing—especially that dealing with tactics and targeting—supports the increased government repression of leftist movements through targeted
legislation such as the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006 and the larger atmosphere of the “Green Scare”[75]. Future research can challenge limits to dissent through quantifying movement group actions, and calling into question government tropes about «radical» movements. With such political and methodological concerns in mind, the data presented can allow scholars to develop an incident-driven history of the ELF beyond broad state framings as bomb-throwing ‘terrorists’ and ‘arsonists.’

The ELF, a transnational movement of direct action eco-saboteurs, follows a definitive targeting and tactical pattern, focusing its attacks on unguarded properties associated largely with commercial and residential construction, automobiles (especially SUVs), and various regional, national and multinational business interests. ELF cells target such entities clandestinely, and with low-tech tactics, often striking multiple sites within one target type in rapid succession. For example, it is common for one cell to vandalise dozens of SUVs in one outing. The targeting patterns follow regional indicators concerning campaigns developed through attack histories in that locale. In the US, such attacks have focused on targets associated with “sprawl” and residential development, SUV sales and ownership, and construction sites. In Mexico, attacks have focused on a campaign targeting Telmex phone booths and other affiliated properties. The majority of ELF attacks are not part of larger attack campaigns, though in about 5% of US attacks, and 34% of Mexican attacks, the communiqué stated that the target was chosen as part of a long-term campaign; focusing strikes on a specific set of entities, linked thematically.

Tactically, ELF cells tend to rely on varied combinations of vandalism (including graffiti), sabotage and arson. Throughout all of the data, a combining of vandalism and sabotage has dominated the tactical history, with arson occurring as the second most commonly employed tactic. In extremely rare instances (six attacks out of 707 equaling 0.85%), cells have used tactics that direct violence against humans, or present the threat of violence against humans through the use of improvised explosive devices, bomb hoaxes, and written threats.

Through a combined analysis examining targeting as it compares to tactics, one witnesses the defining modus operandi of ELF cells.[76] When distinct attacks are examined globally, the arson of residential units, as well as the sabotage and vandalism of construction vehicles and other business properties emerges as the most dominant attack patterns.[77] When the US is examined separately, one sees the same pattern of homes being targeted through arson, business properties targeted through sabotage and vandalism, and SUVs targeted with graffiti.[78] In the purely Mexican context, targeting and tactics collide at the vandalism, sabotage and arson of Telmex phone booths, and to a far lesser extent, the arson of construction and industrial equipment.[79]

Concerning cells’ claims of responsibility for attacks, in the global context, attacks are claimed via a formal communiqué sent to either an aboveground press office or other media outlet more than 70%, of the time.[80] In other instances, the ELF name is left at the scene of the crime to indicate the movement’s claim of responsibility. In only approximately 17% of ELF attacks is the incident linked to the movement, but not formerly claimed via a communiqué or other form of communication.[81] The ELF movement rarely reports that its cells have jointly carried out attacks cooperatively with cells affiliated with the Animal Liberation Front. The ELF/ALF cooperative moniker is seen globally in approximately 6% of cases, with a greater frequency seen in attacks occurring outside of North America.[83]

Trends in attack location indicate that the ELF, while focused primarily in the United States, is having an expanded sphere of activity in Mexico. Other sustained areas of activity include Canada—centered in Ontario province—and the United Kingdom—especially within England. Within the US, attacks have focused on the eastern and western coastal areas, centered in the states of California, Oregon, Washington, New York and Pennsylvania. Outside of North America and the UK, sparse attacks have been documented in the continents
of Europe (especially Western Europe and Scandinavia), South America and Australia. At the present time, there are no reports of ELF attacks within Antarctica or the African or Asian continents.

Finally, the preceding analysis has attempted to diagram the attack history of the ELF through a transparent methodology. In doing so, one is able to comparatively evaluate its findings alongside that of other, more opaquely-authored studies. While it is true that the preceding findings were constructed around an a-priori agenda—namely providing defensible data for furthering nuanced and well-informed debates regarding emergent social movements—this is no different than scholarship that came before or will likely come after. If the critical analysis of state and academic scholarship is seen as ‘having an agenda’ could one not say the same thing of well-circulated papers built around an a-priori agenda of securitisation? For example, the 2013 DHS-funded report authored by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), while academically rigorous, cannot be described as politically impartial. The report explicitly describes its mission in the opening pages stating:

*This report is part of a series in support of the Prevent/Deter program. The goal of this program is to sponsor research that will aid the intelligence and law enforcement communities in assessing potential terrorist threats and support policymakers in developing prevention efforts.*[83]

Studies such as those conducted by START or Helios are funded by, and produced explicitly for, the policing of dissent, as they are identified as projects of the DHS. The collection and publication of such data fits into a larger American, post-9/11 shift in domestic policy—a shift from *policing to national security.* Scholarship of this nature can be as rigorous (or manipulative) as any academic pursuit, but to contend that it does not possess a pre-existent ideological framework and political agenda is to misunderstand statecraft as a neutral endeavour.

The data suggests that the label “eco-terrorism” has been misapplied to a form of political militancy that falls short of what can reasonably be called “terrorism” since there have been practically no deliberate deadly attacks on civilians that would warrant the use of such a loaded term. While the actions of the perpetrators are often unlawful since these tend to involve acts of vandalism, arson or sabotage, and while these acts are meant to convey a message to a wider audience, that is still a far cry from the bloody terrorism of, for example, salafist jihadists. The terrorism label loses its potency if it is stretched beyond credibility. It should be used sparingly, rather than loosely and be limited to certain categories of gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law – roughly the peacetime equivalent of war crimes.[84]

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about political violence, or conspiring to build a better world.

Appendix: Definition of Abbreviations and Terms, Targeting and Tactics

Targeting Abbreviations & Terms

**SUV car** = Sports utility vehicle (SUV) or car located in dealership or residential area

**Phone** = Telmex owned phone booth

**House** = Home under construction or model/sample home advertising to potential buyers

**Bus veh** = Vehicle owned by a business

**Const equip** = Construction/industrial equipment (e.g. bulldozer, excavation drill)

**Bus prop** = Business property other than a vehicle (e.g. office, retail location, warehouse)

**Farm** = Farm/ranch/breeding facility to reproduce animals (e.g. mink breeder, horse corral)

**McD** = McDonalds restaurant

**Govt prop** = Federal government property other than a vehicle or a research facility (e.g. military recruiting station, political party office)

**Tree** = Series of trees

**Ski** = Ski resort or equipment associated within a ski resort (e.g. chair lifts)

**Bank** = Bank branch or bank corporate office

**GMO** = Crops/research facility associated with the research of genetically modified organisms

**Per veh** = Personal vehicle targeted due to owner’s identity (e.g. government/business position)

**Govt veh** = Vehicle owned by federal government

**Golf** = Golf course or equipment associated with a golf course

**Lab** = Laboratory or research facility, privately owned, not affiliated federal government or educational institution

**Per prop** = Personal property, excluding vehicles, targeted due to owner’s identity (e.g. government/business position)

**MNC** = Retail location of multinational corporation targeted due to the company’s policies (e.g. Wal-Mart, Nike)

? = Target type is unclear or unknown

**BK** = Burger King restaurant

**Ad** = Advertisement (e.g. billboard, posted sign)

**Human** = Human being

**Edu** = Educational institution (e.g. college or university) excluding research faculties affiliated to an
educational institution.

**Tactic Abbreviations & Terms**

**SVG** = Some combination of sabotage, vandalism and graffiti (e.g. cutting cables/wire, breaking windows, pouring dirt in machine intake)

**Arson** = Use of an improvised incendiary device, “fire bomb”, Molotov cocktail, or manual application of accelerant/flame

**Graffiti** = Application of paint, by hand, aerosol, or the throwing of paint-filled projectiles

**Window** = Breaking/damage windows through projectiles, striking, or the application of glass etching solution

**At ar, IID** = Attempted arson or the intentional placement of incendiary devices (inert or active) without ignition

**Tire slash** = Cutting or puncturing of vehicle tires

**Animal lib** = Theft or release of animals held in a laboratory, research facility, breeding facility or other location

**TS** = Tree spiking—placement of metal or ceramic nails/spikes into tree trunks to discourage cutting or damage cutting equipment

**IED** = Detonation of an improvised explosive device

**w threat** = Threat issued in writing (e.g. banner, letter)

**b threat** = Threatened use of a bomb or the intentional placement of a fake bomb (e.g. box wrapped in electrical tape with wires protruding).

**Appendix: Charts for Targeting, DB1-DB6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target type</th>
<th>% of attacks</th>
<th># of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUV car</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone booth</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus veh</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Const equip</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus prop</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McD</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt prop</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>10</td>
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**Chart 2: DB2, Targeting**

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<td>8</td>
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<td>Human</td>
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**Chart 3: DB3, Targeting**

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<td>Bus prop</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>McD</td>
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### Chart 4: DB4, Targeting

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<td>SUV car</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>Const equip</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>Bus prop</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus veh</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>McD</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm</td>
<td>6.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMO</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tree</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lab</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Govt veh</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per prop</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank</td>
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### Chart 5: DB5, Targeting

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<td>9</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt veh</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus veh</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edu</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per veh</td>
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### Chart 6: DB6, Targeting
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<td>Const equip</td>
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<td>Govt veh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bus veh</td>
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<td>Edu</td>
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<td>SUV car</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per veh</td>
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<td>?</td>
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**Appendix: Charts for Campaign Datasets DB3-DB6**

**Chart 7: DB3, Campaign**

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<td>Anti-sprawl, LI NY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-HLS campaign</td>
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**Chart 8: DB4, Campaign**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No campaign</td>
<td>92.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-sprawl, LI NY</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-HLS campaign</td>
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**Chart 9: DB5, Campaign**

<table>
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<td>Anti-HLS campaign</td>
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**Chart 10: DB6, Campaign**

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**Appendix: Charts for Tactics Datasets DB1-DB6**

**Chart 11: DB1, Tactics**

<table>
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<td>SVG</td>
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<td>Window</td>
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<td># of attacks</td>
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<td>Arson</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>74</td>
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<td>Graffiti</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Animal lib</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>At ar, IID</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Window</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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**Chart 13: DB3, Tactics**

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<td>31.0</td>
<td>143</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graffiti</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>85</td>
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<tr>
<td>Window</td>
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<tr>
<td>At ar, IID</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>TS</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Animal lib</td>
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<td>7</td>
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**Chart 14: DB4, Tactics**

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<td>36.6</td>
<td>49</td>
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<td>Graffiti</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>TS</td>
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<tr>
<td>At ar, IID</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Animal lib</td>
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**Chart 15: DB5, Tactics**

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<th># of attacks</th>
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<td>SVG</td>
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### Chart 16: DB6, Tacticts

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<td>Graffiti</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
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### Appendix: Charts for Communiqués, DB1-DB6

#### Chart 17: DB1, Communiqués issued?

<table>
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<td>‘Calling card’</td>
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#### Chart 18: DB2, Communiqués issued?

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#### Chart 19: DB3, Communiqués issued?

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<td>No</td>
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#### Chart 20: DB4, Communiqués issued?

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#### Chart 21: DB5, Communiqués issued?

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<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>‘Calling card’</td>
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#### Chart 22: DB6, Communiqués issued?

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<tbody>
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### Appendix: Charts for Group Claim, DB1-DB6

**Chart 23: DB1, Group claim**

<table>
<thead>
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</table>

**Chart 24: DB2, Group claim**

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<td>ELF/ALF</td>
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**Chart 25: DB3, Group claim**

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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>94.8</td>
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<td>ELF/ALF</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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**Chart 26: DB4, Group claim**

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<tr>
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<th># of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>ELF/ALF</td>
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</table>

**Chart 27: DB5, Group claim**

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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**Chart 28: DB6, Group claim**

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF/ALF</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Appendix: Charts for national location DB1-DB2

**Chart 29: DB1, National location**

<table>
<thead>
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<th># of attacks</th>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
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</table>
Chart 30: DB2, National location

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<th>Region</th>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix: Definition of Abbreviations and Terms, Region and Division

Region Abbreviations & Terms

**West:** Washington, Oregon, California, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, Alaska, Hawaii

**Midwest:** North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio

**Northeast:** Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania

**South:** Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, Washington DC, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida

Division Abbreviations & Terms

**West-Pacific (P):** Washington, Oregon, California

**West –Mountain (M):** Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico

**Midwest-West North Central (WNC):** North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri

**Midwest-East North Central (ENC):** Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio

**South-West South Central (WSC):** Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana
South-East South Central (ESC): Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama

South-South Atlantic (SA): Delaware, Maryland, Washington DC, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida

Northeast-Middle Atlantic (MA): New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey


Appendix: Charts for US state (region and divisions), DB3-DB4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chart 31: DB3, US state region and division</th>
<th>% of attacks</th>
<th># of attacks</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WEST</td>
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<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>42.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>9.99</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>19.05</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West South Central</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East South Central</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>14.94</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHEAST</td>
<td>17.97</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
<td>14.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>New England</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chart 32: DB4, US state region</th>
<th>% of attacks</th>
<th># of attacks</th>
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<tr>
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<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>11.19</td>
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<tr>
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<td>23.13</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.24</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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### Appendix: Charts for US state individual, DB3-DB4

#### Chart 33: DB3, US state individual

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Region</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>% of attacks</th>
<th># of attacks</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>W P</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>140</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
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<td>Oregon</td>
<td>W W</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>Virginia</td>
<td>S SA</td>
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<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>S SA</td>
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<td>Colorado</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>W P</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>S ESC</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>NE MA</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
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<td>W M</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>W M</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3</td>
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#### Chart 34: DB4, US state individual

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<th># of attacks</th>
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<td>W P</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>W M</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>MW ENC</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>S SA</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Direction</td>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Median</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>NE</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Utah</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>S</td>
<td>ESC</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Maryland</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>MW</td>
<td>ENC</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>W</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>WSC</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td>Ohio</td>
<td>MW</td>
<td>ENC</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>NE</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>ESC</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td>Montana</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>WNC</td>
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Appendix: Tactic v. Target Charts 35-40, Datasets DB1-DB6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SVG</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graffiti</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Window</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At ar, IID</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tire slash</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal lib</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w threat</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b threat</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL # of attacks</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Target | SUV | Phone | House | Bus | Const | Bus | Farm | McD | Govt | Tree | Ski | Bank | GMO | Per | Govt | Golf | Lab | Per | MNC | ? | BK | Ad | Human | Edu |
|--------|-----|-------|-------|-----|-------|-----|------|-----|------|------|-----|------|-----|------|------|-----|-----|----|----|----|-------|-----|
| SVG    | 50  | 93    | 5     | 56  | 53    | 14  | 0    | 5   | 2    | 0    | 0   | 8    | 4   | 6    | 3   | 6   | 1   | 3   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 1   | 0   | 0   |    |
| Arson  | 23  | 24    | 75    | 19  | 10    | 9   | 7    | 2   | 5    | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 1   |    |
| Graffiti | 71  | 5     | 5     | 1   | 1     | 4   | 0    | 5   | 1    | 0    | 0   | 0    | 5   | 1    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 2   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |    |
| Window | 25  | 0     | 0     | 0   | 0     | 0   | 0    | 3   | 0    | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |    |
| At ar, IID | 14  | 0     | 2     | 0   | 4     | 5   | 2    | 0   | 0    | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |    |
| Tire slash | 25  | 0     | 0     | 1   | 0     | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |    |
| Animal lib | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0   | 0     | 0   | 0    | 7   | 0    | 1    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |    |
| TS     | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0   | 0     | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 10   | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |    |
| IED    | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0   | 0     | 1   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |    |
| w threat | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0   | 0     | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |    |
| b threat | 0   | 0     | 0     | 0   | 0     | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |    |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL # of attacks</th>
<th>208</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

SVG: SUV, Car, Phone, House, Bus, Const, Bus, Farm, McD, Govt prop, Tree, Ski, Bank, GMO, Per veh, Govt veh, Golf, Lab, Per prop, MNC, ?: BK, Ad, Human, Edu.
### Chart 36: DB2, Tactic v. Target

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>Const equip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVG</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graffiti</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal lib</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At ar, IID</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Window</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tire</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
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<tr>
<td>w threat</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>b threat</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL # of attacks</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

### Chart 37: DB3, Tactic v. Target

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Target</th>
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</thead>
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<td>SVG</td>
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<td>Arson</td>
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<td>Window</td>
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<td>TOTAL # of attacks</td>
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<td>TOTAL # of attacks</td>
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### Chart 39: DB5, Tactic v. Target

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<th>Target</th>
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<th>Bus</th>
<th>Const</th>
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<td>SVG</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graffiti</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>TOTAL # of attacks</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>7</td>
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### Chart 40: DB6, Tactic v. Target

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<td>TOTAL # of attacks</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**


[7] Since completing the data collection for this study, the website of the North American Earth Liberation Front Press Office has been taken offline. While much of the data is available at other sources such as the North American Animal Liberation Press Office (http://animalliberationpressoffice.org/NAALPO/) and Bite Back Magazine (http://www.directaction.info/) I also have access to an offline archive of the NAELFPO website as it appeared on 15 January 2010.

[8] In August 2013, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), affiliated with the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Center of Excellence at the University of Maryland issued a comprehensive study of ELF and ALF bombings and arson. While a complete comparison between these findings and the findings presented herein is not included, in brief, START’s findings are surprisingly similar when a similar data parameters are added to my data set. Though this study examined only the Earth Liberation Front, START also reviews Animal Liberation Front activity as well. A comparable dataset was produced from my own research fitting START’s requirements: 1.) a bombing or arson 2.) occurring between 1995-2000, 3.) in the US, 4.) and fitting a radical environmental or animal liberationist politic. Including these parameters, I located 285 incidents. The START study includes 239. The similar number of incidents points to similar methodologies for locating resources as described herein as well as in START’s report. A complete comparison of these findings will be discussed in a subsequent paper.


[10] The variables recorded for each attack are: 1.) date, 2.) group responsible, 3.) tactic type, 4.) target type, 5.) casualties, 6.) national location, 7.) state or province for attacks occurring in the US and Canada, 8.) damage estimate in USD, 9.) multiple or distinct incident, 10.) presence of communiqué or other claim of group responsibility, and lastly, 11.) was the attack part of a larger ELF campaign? Distinct values were assigned in all cases except for #8, damage estimate in USD, as this data was often not provided and could not be estimated.

NB: The dataset analyzed in this study is a subset of a much larger project to be analyzed and published at a later date. The larger dataset is comprised of approximately 30,000 global “eco-terrorist” incidents, occurring from 1972-present, and coded for twenty-two variables.


[12] Vague dates were estimated in a standardized manner, thus when only a month and year were given in the description, the 15th was chosen as it represents the middle of the month. For example, a date reported as “06/04-07/04” was recorded in the database as occurring on 15 June 2004.

[13] In the case of multiple attacks, when damage estimates were available, the dollar value for the damage incurred was divided evenly between the events, thus an arson spread across four targets, causing $10,000 in damage, was recorded as four arsons of $2,500 each.


[15] Ibid., 587.

[16] The DB1-DB6 abbreviations used throughout constitute:

- **DB1**: All countries, multiple entry inclusive dataset, (707 incidents)
- **DB2**: All countries, "distinct incident" dataset, (211 incidents)
- **DB3**: US only, multiple entry inclusive dataset, (462 incidents)
- **DB4**: US only, "distinct incident" dataset, (134 incidents)
- **DB5**: Mexico only, multiple entry inclusive dataset, (150 incidents)
- **DB6**: Mexico only, "distinct incident" dataset, (41 incidents)


[19] The exact name of the group, in Spanish is “Ludditas Contra La Domesticacion de la Naturaleza Salvaje.”

[20] “Frente de Liberación de la Tierra,” is the Spanish term for the ELF, literally translated it is ‘Front of Liberation of the Land’ (FLT)


[23] No additional data sources were searched (outside of the NAELFPO “diary of actions”) to determine if a communiqué was issued.


[26] In addition to the "Illegal Incidents Map," the Foundation for Biomedical Research was contacted via email and provided over 70 pages of data it had collected documenting attacks carried out by the ELF and the Animal Liberation Front targeting the ‘medical industry.’ This data was excluded from the sample.


[29] In addition to the "Illegal Incidents Map," the Foundation for Biomedical Research was contacted via email and provided over 70 pages of data it had collected documenting attacks carried out by the ELF and the Animal Liberation Front targeting the ‘medical industry.’ This data was excluded from the sample.

[30] For the purpose of discussion, percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number. The exact percentages as well as the actual number of attacks they represent are included in the corresponding data tables provided in the appendix.

[31] For the complete targeting DB1 data table, see appendix chart 1.

[32] For the complete targeting DB2 data table, see appendix chart 2.


[34] The dataset used in the Helios study, is likely most similar to the DB2 dataset, as it represents a global movement and makes no mention of a multiple entry feature factoring into their calculations.


[36] For the complete targeting DB3 data table, see appendix chart 3.

[37] For the complete targeting DB4 data table, see appendix chart 4.

[38] For the complete targeting DB5 data table, see appendix chart 5.

[39] For the complete targeting DB6 data table, see appendix chart 6.


[45] The campaign against Huntingdon Life Sciences has been led aboveground by Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), and most anti-HLS attacks have been claimed by the Animal Liberation Front. Generally, within this campaign SHAC helps to identify and publicize HLS-related primary and secondary targets, and attacks are carried out against these entities by underground, clandestine cells with attacks often being claimed by the Animal Liberation Front. An example of a SHAC produced targeting list, visit: http://www.shac.net/action/current_targets.html

[46] For the complete campaign DB3-DB4 data tables, see appendix, chart 7-8.

[47] For the complete campaign DB3-DB4 data tables, see appendix, chart 9-10.


[52] These entries have been marked by *s in the data table #1.

[53] For the complete tactical data tables DB1-DB6, see appendix charts 11-16.


[56] Defined as “low level damage such as breaking windows, spray painting of slogans, etc.” (Leader and Probst, 41)

[57] Defined as "Deliberately starting a fire or attempting to start a fire to cause property damage." (Leader and Probst, 41)

[58] Defined as "deliberate damage to equipment, vehicles, crops, buildings etc." (Leader and Probst, 41)


[61] For the complete communiqué data tables DB1-DB4, see appendix charts 17-20.

[62] For the complete communiqué data tables DB5-DB6, see appendix charts 21-22.

[63] For the complete group claim data tables DB1-DB6, see appendix charts 23-28.

For the complete national location data table DB1, see appendix charts 29.

For the complete national location data table DB2, see appendix charts 30.


Descriptions of the US regions and divisions are taken from the US "Census Regions and Divisions" as of 14 June 2000. A graphical version of this breakdown, including the regional and divisional splits is available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/reps/maps/us_census.html

The appendix’s “Definition of Abbreviations and Terms, Region and Division” contains all necessary formation regarding the territorial breakdown of the US census regions and regional division terminology.

For the complete US state regional and divisional data tables DB3-DB4, see appendix charts 31-32.


For the complete, US state individual data tables DB3-DB4, see appendix charts 33-34.


For a complete series of tables relating TACTIC to TARGET, for DB1-DB6, see appendix charts 35-40.

These calculations are based on the DB2 dataset.

These calculations are based on the DB3-4 datasets.

These calculations are based on an average of all (DB1-DB6) datasets.

Cf. Alex P. Schmid. ' Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism'. Terrorism and Political Violence, 16 (2), 2004, 197-221.
Should we be Scared of all Salafists in Europe? A Dutch Case Study

by Ineke Roex

Abstract

European governments consider the Salafi movement to be primarily a security threat. Yet developments in the Dutch Salafi movement reveal that quietist and political Salafists distance themselves from coercion and violence in the European context and also respect democratic authority. The movement manifests itself in very different ways worldwide. A more nuanced and contextual approach is necessary in order to assess and interpret potential threats. The peaceful branch of the movement should be understood as orthodox in nature, with the accompanying social and societal problems, but not by definition as a threat to the democratic rule of law.

Keywords: Salafism, The Netherlands, Jihadism

Introduction

The Salafi movement is an orthodox Sunni Islamic movement. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, it has been rooting itself in Europe since the 1980s, due to the arrival of Islamic activists from the Middle East [1]. In the past decade, the movement has gained notoriety for acts of violence that are attributable to jihadist Salafism, a violent offshoot of the movement. Filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered in the Netherlands in 2004, and there were bombings in London (2005) and Madrid (2007) by Islamists. More recently, in 2012 and 2013, jihadists operating as individuals or in groups have carried out acts of violence in Belgium, France and England [2]. As a result, the Salafi movement as a whole is viewed as a security threat [3].

In this article, it will be shown that important sections of the Salafi movement distance themselves from violent extremism. In recent years, prominent Salafi religious leaders have condemned acts of violence committed in the name of Islam. They have also spoken out against young Europeans who go to Syria to fight [4, 5], and have also criticized groups that call for the introduction of Sharia (Islamic law) in Europe [6]. This has led to confusion: radical Salafists are the product of the Salafi movement, but the very same movement is making concerted efforts to stop extremism. How should we understand these anti-extremist attitudes? Are these moderates merely wolves in sheep's clothing? What are their ambitions and views regarding Sharia and jihad? Should we continue to consider the Salafi movement primarily as a security threat, now that parts of it are distancing themselves from violence?

This article is based on the PhD dissertation Living Like the Prophet in the Netherlands. About the Salafi Movement and Democracy [7]. It sought to answers these questions on the basis of extensive fieldwork carried out within and around the Dutch Salafi movement. Although it provides insight into how the Salafi movement has developed in the Netherlands, it is also relevant to the manifestation of the movement in other parts of Europe. Indeed, the movement has a strong transnational character and exists throughout the continent. It will be shown that the Salafi movement can manifest itself in extremely diverse ways and is developing in various directions. This is apparent in its religious and political organisation and participation, as well as on the ideological level. Given the continuous evolution and diversity, it is at the very least problematic to present Salafism by definition as a threat to democracy. Indeed, some Salafi groups respect democracy and are explicitly committed to combating violent factions.[8]. According to Quintan Wiktorowicz, all Salafi currents have the same belief (aqidah) but use different strategies alongside given answers to contextual political issues. He distinguishes three currents: purists (quietists), politicos and jihadis. The dissertation research summarised in the present article consisted of participatory observation.
within organisations and the Salafi community at large, and informal conversations and interviews with religious leaders and other people [9]. More than 50 participants in the networks around the As-Soennah mosque in the Hague, the El Fourkaan mosque in Eindhoven and the youth organisation Alfeth in Roermond were interviewed while a few other Dutch Salafi organisations (see following section) were also visited. These networks and organisations can be categorised as either purist or political. However, during fieldwork, it was found that a few jihadists also visited the facilities mentioned on an incidental basis.

This study is unique since it describes both the organisational forms and the ideology proclaimed by religious leaders as well as the multifaceted daily religious practices of those who connect to the Salafi movement. Other researchers in Europe have described the ideological developments and historical roots of Salafism, but either they do not provide an insight into the movement in practice [10] or they largely failed to look at internal arguments and existing oppositions within the Salafi movement [11]. Research that did reveal the internal ideological arguments and conflicts in Salafism failed to adequately address their practical implications in the daily lives of European Muslims [12]. Research into the Salafi movement in the Netherlands touches primarily on the organisational level of Salafism [13], focusing only on the context of Salafism, omitting the religious and organisational embedding or concentrating on individual cases [14]. It also failed to deal with the question how the Salafi movement relates to democracy [15].

Forms of political and orthodox Islam, including Salafi Islam and its relationship with democracy, are generally considered problematic [16]. The Salafi movement is seen as anti-democratic because its teachings supposedly legitimise hate, coercion and violence, and promote the repression of women and those who think differently. There is concern that the Salafi movement poses a threat to the democratic rule of law because of its anti-democratic and anti-integrative character, which emerges from Salafi dogma and can result in intolerant isolationism, exclusivism and the creation of parallel social structures (based on Sharia).

In addition to the fact that the Salafi movement is considered a potential hotbed of radicalisation to violence, the non-violent aspects of the movement are also seen as problematic. There is concern that Muslim enclaves in which democratic freedoms are not recognised will be formed in the midst of Western societies [17]. The Salafi movement is primarily perceived as a security threat since Salafi Jihadists are held responsible for violent acts in many countries [18]. In short, the jihadist movement is viewed as only the tip of the iceberg of the much larger problem of political or jihadist Islamism [19].

In various models of explanation for terrorism, it is assumed that processes of non-violent radicalisation precede acts of violence [20]. The policy consequence of this assumption is that non-violent groups are by definition suspect, being viewed as potential terrorists. As a result, forms of expression that occur in the Salafi movement – such as the wearing of the niqab (face veil), informal marriages and the refusal to shake hands with persons of the opposite sex – are considered as potential indicators of a political security threat [21]. In the first place, a clear distinction must be made between social and societal problems (socioeconomic disadvantage, dealing with cultural and religious diversity, etc.), which require a social policy, and security problems (such as coercion and violence), for which a judicial approach is required. Should the entire Salafi movement be looked at from the perspective of security? And how is non-violent Salafism related to this jihadist movement?

To answer these questions, empirical research was conducted on the following aspects of quietist and political Salafi networks in the Netherlands in the light of the threat of jihadist Salafism: 1) religious disciplining, 2) forms of organisations, 3) political views and 4) forms of participation. Relevant questions asked were: Do these networks legitimize coercion and violence in their religious disciplining? Can the movement be characterized as a sect that isolates itself from the rest of society? Is it worrisome that the movement is becoming professionalised? Do the Salafists want to implement Sharia law? Does participation in the
movement lead to clear-cut radical identities, isolation and the development of Muslim enclaves in which democracy is not recognised?

**Religious Disciplining: Intolerant Perfectionism, Tolerant Behaviour**

The Salafi movement is a Sunni reform movement that pursues the restoration of 'pure' Islam through the moral re-education of the Muslim community, a literal reading of the Koran and *hadith* (report of the words and deeds of the Prophet and other early Muslims), the rejection of religious innovations, and the imitation of Mohammed and his companions in the early days of Islam [22]. Salafists claim that their religious interpretation is the only one that is true to Islam. They seek to form a moral community of true believers and claim to be the representatives of the only legitimate Islam [23]. The movement has developed in a multitude of forms around the world and is particularly characterised by internal polemics, theological disputes and conflicts despite but also due to its quest for religious purity. The movement includes both violent and non-violent branches, also in Europe [24]. A few Salafi networks have rooted themselves in the Netherlands since the 1980s, and some of these have a more formal character, such as the As-Soennah Foundation/Centre Sheikh al Islam Ibn Taymia in the Hague (in which Abou Ismail and Imam Fawaz Jneid are the best known figureheads; the latter was recently fired), the El Tawheed Foundation in Amsterdam, the Islamiitische Stichting voor Opvoeding en Overdracht van Kennis (ISOOK -Islamic Foundation for Education and the Spread of Knowledge) in Tilburg (led by Suhayb and Ahmed Salam) and the Al Waqf al-Islami Foundation/El Fourkaan mosque in Eindhoven. In addition, there is a quieter network around Imam Bouchta, based on a scholar named Madkhali, and there are about ten smaller Salafi-oriented networks and organisations, such as Alfeth (led by Ali Houri, alias Al Khattab) in Roermond and Stichting Moslimjongeren (Foundation of Muslim youth) in Utrecht. During fieldwork all of these were visited.

The moral re-education and reformation of the Dutch Muslim population form the basis of the Salafi movement’s activism in the Netherlands. The Salafi movement is a utopian movement that attempts to reorganise Muslims’ daily lives according to an idealised image of the past. Salafists create a way of life that they experience as more satisfying and just, contrasting it starkly with a world of immorality, repression and temptation [25].

One of their instruments is religious disciplining, which flows from the principle of *hisba* (commanding good and forbidding bad – *al-amr bi-l-ma'ruf wa-l-nahy 'an al-munkar*). It takes a variety of forms. The Salafi movement assumes to be in possession of a superior truth in its interpretation of Islam. Because of this, the movement allows no room for moral or religious pluralism. According to Salafists, this pluralism does not exist in Islam; there is only one correct interpretation of the faith [26]. This suggests that there might be an unequivocal authority within the movement, but this is not the case. Paradoxically, in its endeavour to attain moral purity, the movement is strongly fragmented. Because of the endless internal disputes over the precise content of this truth – which is a result of Salafist rejection of blindly following Islamic scholars or schools of law, and their search for direct evidence based on the Quran and the Sunna, which led to contesting religious leadership – there is in practice no single authority, which can place moral boundaries to the discussion. The recognition of moral and religious pluralism is an important condition for a democratic system [27]. This implies that a person may believe in an apparently objective moral authority or a superior truth. From a normative democratic perspective, however, this individual may not conduct him- or herself in such a way that the political rights of others are violated. People must recognise democratic rights and refrain from using violence or coercion. However, do Dutch Salafists legitimise coercion and violence in the disciplining of their followers?
According to Sharia law, there are indeed punishments (corporal and otherwise) for committing sins, apostasy and failure to follow Islamic rules. This indicates that there are formal means of coercion in the Salafi movement. Nonetheless, Dutch quietist and political Salafists in the researched networks insist that these punishments should never be carried out in a Dutch context. In the eyes of Salafists, da'wa (Islamic missionary work, the call to Islam) and nasiha ('friendly' advice) are the only permitted means of confronting Muslims with their bad behaviour and sins, and non-Muslims with their non-belief. In their view, individuals can only be tried according to Sharia law in an Islamic state. This means that Muslims may not take the law into their own hands, and must subject themselves to the prevailing democratic authority. Nonetheless, Salafists will never approve of acts that are forbidden by Islam. They justify this by appealing to their freedom of speech and religion [28]. Therefore, Dutch Salafists make a clear distinction between their position in a European context and in the context of an Islamic country.

Takfir is the process by which a Muslim is accused of apostasy. In the international Salafist movement, this is an important theme and it has led to internal arguments and schisms [29]. The discussion about takfir is important because it often forms a crucial part in the justification for the use of violence [30]. Salafi networks agree on the conditions that can lead to denunciation, but differ regarding the definition and interpretation of these conditions. The various interpretations can be ambiguous [31]. In recent years, the Salafists in the networks that were researched here have presented themselves as non-extremist, ‘moderate’ Muslims, condemning the practices of takfir prevalent in jihadi circles. In their rhetoric of moderation, they oppose groups that, in one way or another, connect their persona with takfir. The Salafi networks that were approached during fieldwork maintain that takfir is a matter for scholars and Islamic states to decide, and is not for ‘average’ Muslims to be carried out. A far-reaching consequence of denunciation is that a Muslim can be sentenced to death or violence against the apostate person can be justified. In the networks researched here, however, the Salafists interviewed expressly stated that these punishments may only be imposed by Islamic judges in Islamic states, and not in the context of democratic states [32].

Self-discipline and self-perfection are stressed, and coercion in religion is not to be permitted [33]. Nevertheless, Salafists use the warning of God’s wrath and his unknown punishments in this world and the hereafter to discipline one another. Coercion occurs only if the warning has sanctions attached to it or when it generates fear, and if this religious interpretation is believed. There is no legitimation of actual coercion through sanctions, violence or explicit pressure, but there can be a strong level of social control. This is expressed in practice through da'wa (the call to Islam), nasiha ('friendly' advice) and the pressure to conform through persuasion, but should always be non-violent. The strongly held view is that participation and the observance of rules should be voluntary and self-chosen based on a pure intention. As a result, belief is experienced in a strong individual sense [34].

In concrete terms, this means that practices such as not praying, not wearing a headscarf and being homosexual are condemned according to Salafi ideology. Nonetheless, this intolerance may not lead to physical or verbal violence or coercion [35]. Moreover, conformism to religious dogma is considered to be a matter between each individual and God. This differs in some Islamic countries where Sharia is implemented (either in part or entirely), and where conformism to religion is enforced through formal means of coercion, such as the criminalisation of dissociation from Islam, adultery and homosexuality. In those contexts, freedom of religion as a democratic right and the autonomy of the individual are not respected. This is why a contextual approach to the Salafi movement is essential. The movement makes a clear distinction between the position of Islam in a European context and in the context of Islamic countries. Instruments of coercion, punishment and violence are not legitimised in a European context. This is where quietist and political Salafists differ from jihadist Salafists, who legitimise violence in some situations. Although coercion and
violence are not permitted in quietist and political Salafist networks, its actual existence cannot be excluded despite the fact that it is explicitly condemned by Salafi leaders.

**Types of Organisations: Formal Translocal Organisations and Disputed Leadership**

The Salafi movement is also diverse at an organisational level since it is not run by a single elite group or organisation. Although religious leaders and organisations sometimes collaborate informally, there is also internal competition and strife. The religious authority in the Salafi movement is diffuse, pluriform and subject to change [36]. The Internet is not only used by the movement as a means of religious disciplining but also as a platform where religious authority is challenged and questioned [37]. In a context of internal fragmentation, each Salafi religious leader tries to portray himself as a representative of Islam. Because *taqlid* (blindly following scholars or schools of law) is forbidden, their views are continuously checked by other Salafists for ‘truth.’ Many religious leaders are accused by outsiders of speaking with forked tongues when they distance themselves from violence, but such behaviour is difficult to hide. A religious leader cannot afford to act in this manner if he wants to maintain his credibility among his more critical followers. When religious leaders change their opinion on a socio-religious issue, some of their followers may not react positively [38].

The categorisation of the Salafi movement as a sect is problematic because doing so ignores both the diversity of the production and consumption of religious authority and its ideological diversity. The forms of organisation and participation and the status of the various religious leaders are ambiguous, constantly changing and in need of being renegotiated which means there is never uniform commitment or a degree of exclusivity and separation that could justify the analytical use of the concept of a ‘sect.’ There is no communal life (such as in the utopian societies that Kanter has described [39]) in which the members’ daily activities all take place at one location and are all coordinated by a central power apparatus. Neither the environment nor the structure of the Salafi movement lends itself to complete isolation. Religious leaders, organisations and networks conduct themselves in what one could call a ‘translocal’ manner. Unlike in a community that manifests itself in one place, the commitment of participants is temporary and multiform, and physical isolation is hardly an issue. One can, however, argue that Salafists isolate themselves from society in an ideological way. Nevertheless, on the ideological level, there is disagreement on issues such as participation in society and contacts with ‘disbelievers.’ There is an inherent paradox hidden in *da’wa* (the call to Islam): on the one hand it entails reaching out to disbelievers and on the other distancing oneself from disbelief. In addition, all organisational levels manifest diversity in the ethnic and linguistic background, age and gender of the participants. There are competing organisations and networks, and this results in a constantly changing and diverse movement. For instance, the network around quietist Salafi Bouchta is controversial among the participants in the network around the As-Soennah mosque and Ahmed Salam, and vice versa. During fieldwork, a dramatic change in the organisational structure of the As-Soennah mosque occurred: a famous imam, Fawaz Jneid, was fired as a result of internal tensions. This was one sign indicating that the Salafi movement is constantly developing and changing at an organisational level [40].

According to security agencies, the Salafi movement is continuously professionalising [41]. Indeed, some of the informal organisations have now established education, welfare and broadcasting subdivisions to broaden their *da’wa* activities. Is this worrisome? The formation of organisational structures and the professionalisation of the Salafi movement have a paradoxical effect on the movement’s threat to democracy. Organisations tend to become more transparent to the outside world, and board members and other officials can be called to account in cases of suspected misconduct (related to violence and coercion). Organisations are also better equipped than informal networks to enter into formal and informal forms
of collaboration, and it is more difficult for them to isolate themselves. Concretely, the Salafi mosques and networks investigated were collaborating to varying degrees with their local (non-Salafi) environment. Such collaboration related to issues of health, education and security and took place with welfare organisations, religious organisations, politicians, policy-makers and the Dutch police. Although their disciplinary function will become more professional and extensive through better organisation, it will not necessarily lead to more unity among the Salafi networks. Informal networks can operate more easily outside the public eye and are more difficult to monitor. Potential abuses such as coercion and violence escape external control more easily in informal than in a more formal organisational structure with a centralized authority [42]. Consequently, the isolation of Salafi networks is not in the public interest because a lack of control and transparency might give anti-democratic powers free rein.

**Political Views: Criticism of Violent and Sharia Groups**

It is often taken for granted that Salafists reject the democratic rule of law and want to introduce Sharia law [43]. The rejection of democracy as a matter of principle is based on the Salafi conviction that Islam is the superior religion and on the Salafi interpretation of *tawhid*: Allah is the only legislator, and everything that deviates from his law is deemed inferior. A person who does not acknowledge this unity of Allah is guilty of *shirk* (idol worship)—the worst sin that a Muslim can commit. It is not immediately clear what these theological principles imply in practice. Although the principle of *tawhid* and the banning of *shirk* are central to the ideologies of all Salafi networks, there are considerable differences in the interpretation and the effects of the concept on contemporary political issues, such as the life of a Muslim in a Western democracy where Muslims are in a minority position, and on their political participation. In fact, the application of Salafi principles leads to endless discussions in Salafi circles [44].

In practice, fieldwork in the Netherlands showed that the rejection of democracy as a matter of principle does not automatically imply the rejection of political participation or disobedience to democratic authority. Nor did fieldwork indicate that the belief that Salafist ideology by definition leads to political radicalisation or is a root cause of violence or terrorism is justified [45]. There is considerable diversity in the degree and form of political involvement. In their daily practices Salafists respect Dutch political rights. They believe they have entered into an 'covenant' with the countries in which they live as minorities and in which they enjoy sufficient freedom to practise their faith (although this continues to come under increasing pressure). This is why they think they must respect the prevailing laws [46]. The laws must also be respected because otherwise *fitna* (chaos) would ensue. The motto is ‘better a poor leader than no leader at all’.

In the Netherlands, quietist and political Salafists form the majority of the Salafi movement; jihadis are a marginal phenomenon. Exact numbers are not available, but a national survey found that 8 per cent of Dutch Muslims are susceptible to Salafism [47]. Quietist and political Salafists appear to respect democratic legislation and the existing political rights in the Netherlands. They also reject violence and coercion to bring about the realisation of their ambitions and views, political and in other fields [48]. That said, their attitude towards obedience to democracy is conditional. The question remains how this pragmatism will develop in the future. Will it become a position held for reasons of principle?

Dutch quietist and political Salafists do not seek the implementation of Sharia law in the Netherlands and the rest of Europe, nor do they seek the establishment of a worldwide caliphate like Hizb ut Tahrir. They think this is an unrealistic and undesirable endeavour, given their position as a minority in Europe. They give priority to the moral reform of the individual daily lives of Muslims. The Salafi movement in the Netherlands vigorously challenges and criticises groups (such as Hizb ut Tahrir, Sharia4Belgium/Holland) which aim
for such an objective. They also criticize groups that organise ‘street da’wa’ and political demonstrations (groups like Straatdawah and Behind Bars). The above-mentioned groups sometimes employ violence (verbal or otherwise), which is wholeheartedly rejected by Dutch quietist and political Salafists. [49]. The Salafi movement calls for people to respect political rights in the Netherlands and to demand these rights when the rights of Muslims are violated. It also calls for its followers to respond in a non-violent manner to accusations, insults and acts of violence against Muslims. To accomplish this, they primarily make use of religious means: invocations, patience, rectitude, emigration and detachment, of which the last two are realised only with considerable difficulty. Hijra (emigration) is desired by many but achievable to only a few, because of a lack of financial resources and due to the belief that no Islamic country is totally organised according to the Salafists’ high standards. Finally, the detachment from society is difficult to combine with their da’wa activities and their daily contact with non-Salafi relatives, colleagues, neighbours and so forth [50].

Jihad as a violent means to protect, defend and spread Islam is soundly rejected by quietist and political Salafi religious leaders in the context of the Netherlands and other Western, non-Islamic countries. These types of Salafist organisations commit themselves to combating the legitimisation of violence in various ways. They devote many video clips and flyers and much preaching, education and website content to the refutation of Al-Qaeda’s actions and ideology. Nonetheless, during fieldwork it was possible to encounter a few believers in and around the Salafi networks who sympathise with jihadist ideas and legitimise violence. Despite communal efforts to steer youngsters away from extremism, these few young hotheads were found to approve, for instance, of the murder of Theo van Gogh [51].

In regard to defensive jihad in the context of Islamic countries, the networks visited assume a more ambiguous position. In some networks, the current situation in, for instance, Syria is designated as jihad, yet at the same time they call on followers not to go there. On their webpages and during their Friday sermons, political Salafists of the As-Soennah mosque (Fawaz Jneid and Suhayb Salam) call on youngsters to stay at home and not participate in jihad. There are other quietist Salafi networks that contend there is no jihad whatsoever going on in Syria [52]. According to the Dutch security services (AIVD), around 100 Islamic youngsters from the Netherlands are actually participating in the ongoing conflict in Syria. On this issue too, both quietist and political Salafi networks strongly disagree with the Sharia4 groups and Behind Bars. It is from the ranks of these groups that many young Muslims left the Netherlands to follow the path of jihad in Syria.

To summarise, quietist and political networks in the Salafi movement tend to respect democratic authority in Europe, do not want to institute Sharia law, react non-violently to critical statements about Islam and do not call on their followers to engage in jihad. The political detachment of some Salafists (who refuse to participate in the political system or to react politically to dissatisfaction) can result in societal detachment, but it is not primarily a security problem. Jihadists, on the other hand, violate democratic values by calling on people to commit violent acts in certain circumstances. For this reason, it is important to distinguish between the various Salafi strands in terms of security policy.

Participation: Opposition, Variability and Pluriformity

Participation in the Salafi movement is often equated with the pursuit of segregation, distancing and isolation [53]. Yet does participation in the Salafi movement really lead to societal isolation and a clearly defined identity? Does the Salafi movement distance itself from societal participation in Europe, and are, through them, Muslim enclaves in which democracy is not recognised coming into existence?

To answer such questions, one has to keep in mind that Salafi organisations attract a diverse audience whose
members manifest differing levels of involvement. Participants also differ in background and motivation for participating in the activities that the Salafi organisations offer. As a result, heterogeneity exists in participation [54]. At the same time, Salafists invest in a uniform group identity and express this by stressing brotherhood and sisterhood through their clothing, language and religious practices. For instance, Salafists can distinguish themselves by wearing certain clothing: women wear the khimar (a veil that hangs down to just above the waist, covering the hair, neck and shoulders, but leaving the face clear) and the niqab (a veil for the face that leaves the area around the eyes clear and is worn with an accompanying headscarf) and men wear baggy, short-legged trousers. They frequently use Islamic terms and expressions and follow ritual practices like the salat (daily prayer) with precision. These group symbols are used in many ways and sometimes only temporarily: they are subject to debate and thus to change. For instance, there is no agreement on the obligation and desirability of wearing the niqab in the Netherlands. Only a few women choose this style of covering themselves and many of those who do, wear it only some of the time. The diversity in the use of group symbols makes the group boundaries unclear [55].

Even if the dividing lines between the various Salafi schools of thought are not always clearly demarcated, each Salafi network tries to present itself as the representative of the only true Islam in contrast to other Muslims who have ‘gone astray.’ In addition to ritual behaviour, clothing and language, this is also expressed in the labels they give themselves. Self-definition is a powerful means to construct symbolic boundaries (moral and otherwise) and to create and reinforce a feeling of community in the process [56]. Self Definitions determine the position that Salafists assign themselves in relation to society and other Muslims [57]. But distinctive self-definitions are controversial, multiform and subject to change in practice [58]. Some Salafists call themselves selefies (a practice engaged in by some quietists), other prefer more neutral labels like ‘Muslim’ or ‘Muslim following the Quran and the Prophet and the first three generations’. They choose to use more neutral terms as an expression of personal modesty. In addition, these more neutral terms express the claim of being not a sect in Islam, but the only true Islam itself. Paradoxically, the term Salafist is highly controversial among Salafists and they rarely use it. As a result, group boundaries in terms of group labels are fluid and there is no clearly defined commitment or group. Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish clearly between insiders and outsiders of the Salafi movement.

In a movement that propagates purity and unambiguity, the daily and religious practices of Salafi believers are also less black-and-white than one might assume. This is not only because Salafists are surrounded by a pluralistic society, but also because their belief system is accompanied by all sorts of contradictions and is implemented and experienced in so many different ways – leading to even more ambiguity. As a result, the Salafi identity is not clear-cut or easy to recognise. In their practice of the ideal Salafi lifestyle, Salafists walk a tightrope between values and interests (for instance, ‘being a good Muslim’ and educating people about Islam versus being successful in their professional careers and avoiding conflicts, fitna), which leads to a considerable friction.

The construction of the perfect moral self, which is favoured by the Salafi movement, is surrounded by contradictions, variability and temporality, both ideally and in practice [59]. For instance, the call to Islam is at variance with the endeavour to attain purity because it implies contact with the ‘impure other’. Many Islamic rules are difficult to observe, too. For example, it is difficult to keep the two sexes separate at school, at work, on public transport and so on. Finally, those who manifest their Salafi identity through their clothing and behaviour often encounter negative sentiments: family members, friends and colleagues can be very critical about it. Salafists have to make compromises every day. The purity, the unity and the moral framework propagated by the Salafi movement result in tensions in the daily lives of Muslims [60].

The above remarks lend substance to criticism of those who unjustly represent the religious moral
frameworks as a coherent and clearly demarcated whole. Those who portray them like that have insufficiently examined the ambivalence, contradiction and ambiguity of the moral frameworks themselves and how they work in practice.

The impact of involvement in the Salafi movement on social relationships with friends and family and on male–female relationships is not straightforward. Involvement does not always lead to exclusivity of social relationships and isolation, not even among those who strive for segregation. Contact with people who think differently is unavoidable. In their daily practice, Salafists attempt to find a balance between their religious life and society at large [61]. The level of involvement in the Salafi movement and the extent to which the Salafi lifestyle is practised can change over time. Salafists can and do modify their religious interpretation or practice, or even eschew the Salafi movement [62]. Muslims also form mixed groups, in which they combine Salafi ideas with those from Sufism or from the Maliki school of law [63]. Participation in the Salafi movement is not uniform or life-long, nor is it straightforward in nature.

Participation in the Salafi movement does not always go hand in hand with societal isolation and segregation, and only a minority aspire to distance themselves from the non-Salafi environment. It is true that there can be isolationist trends, about which the AIVD (Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) expressed concern in various publications [64]. However, a clearly defined counterculture [65] and Islamised spaces or anti-democratic Muslim enclaves [66] do not exist; intermingling, negotiation and compromise all take place.

Longitudinal research is required to investigate the changes Muslims undergo throughout the various phases of their lives and explore the future of children who grow up in Salafi families. There is currently no explicit exclusivity or isolation in the Dutch context. This is because forms of participation are frequently non-binding, diverse, contradictory and temporary. Due to the fact that diversity among participants exists, the boundaries of group identity are broken down, and there is inclusiveness of social relationships and societal participation. Nonetheless, the autonomy of children in Salafi families who do not go to or have not yet started school and women in informal marriages can be put under pressure when they are completely isolated from their surroundings. Although the Salafi movement does not call for the abolition of the autonomy of women and children, it does not stimulate such autonomy. Isolation sometimes does occur, but occasionally it is self-chosen. At the same time, women can join the Salafi movement in order to achieve autonomy from their parents, family members or partners, and to break with traditions, like forced marriages, that hinder them in their personal development. There is no direct connection between the Salafi movement and the violation of women’s autonomy.

**Conclusion: the Salafi Movement is not by Definition a Threat to Democracy**

In the Dutch context, quietist and political Salafists reject violence and coercion. In their religious, societal and political practices, they respect democratic freedoms. These conditions apply only to the majority of Salafists who are present in the Netherlands today—not to those Salafists who sympathise with jihadist ideas and consider the use of violence legitimate. There is no clear and strong occurrence of isolation, nor are there anti-democratic Muslim enclaves. However, even if isolation from Dutch society is not propagated or violence legitimised, the existence of disciplining practices, for example, forcing women to wear headscarves, cannot be excluded even though the practice is not legitimised by their ideology. Yet this particular problem is a societal one, and does not pose a security risk. The question whether it is fair to consider the entire Salafi movement as security threat, and a threat to the democratic system, must, at least with regard to the Netherlands at this moment in time, be answered negatively.

The Salafi movement in the Netherlands does not encompass a homogeneous, clearly delineated group that
forms an unequivocal threat to the rule of law. When one studies the Salafi movement in its local contexts, its internal diversity becomes visible. The representation of all manifestations of political Islam as an early stage of, or initial step towards violent jihadism and terrorism, has found no corroboration in this case study; it does not reflect Dutch reality. The large majority of Dutch Salafis, while adhering to orthodox and fundamentalist opinions, eschew acts of violence. So far, the existence of anti-extremist forces in important parts of the Salafi movement has been largely ignored and the movement as a whole has been discredited to prematurely.

It is important that academics, journalists and politicians guard against the careless use of the term ‘Salafist’ as a uniform label. Both the practices and the ideology of the Salafi movement are variable, heterogeneous and contradictory. The Salafi movement is not a unitary entity with clearly demarcated group boundaries. It is inadvisable to judge the Salafi movement and enact policies with regard to it only on the basis of certain ideological Salafi positions. In reality, the practices, the internal social relationships and the relationships with the outside world are decisive for the proper assessment of the movement. These relationships are currently variable, multiform and contradictory. There is internal disagreement on important issues like sharia and jihad, as well as regarding social and political participation in Dutch society. It is also important that the Salafi movement and its members are not excluded from Dutch society. Placing restraints on them (such as instituting a ban on burkas or headscarves) can facilitate isolation, even when such measures are intended to encourage participation in society [67].

Finally, the Salafi movement ought to be encouraged to participate in politics. Its spokesmen should be invited to join public debates and participate in political parties. They should also be allowed to stage public demonstrations. Political participation is beneficial in that it allows them to building civic competence while de-legitimising the use of violence as a political instrument. It is important that quietist and political networks are given a platform to explain their anti-jihadist position vis-à-vis those who sympathise with jihadist ideas. It ought to be the responsibility of the community and its imams, religious leaders, educators, as well as friends and families to discourage the legitimisation of violence whenever they come into contact with it.

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Notes
[4] Personal communication by phone with quietest imam from Madkhali network, the Netherlands, 24 April 2013.
May 2013.


[7] I. Roex (2013), *Leven als de profeet in Nederland*. The dissertation focused on answering the question how the Salaﬁ movement is related to the democratic value of individual freedom. This was done by an analysis of exit options. The research was based on intensive anthropological fieldwork conducted within and around Salaﬁ organisations and networks in the Netherlands.


[9] The majority of the fieldwork was performed between December 2007 and September 2008 within the framework of the study *Salafisme in Nederland. Aard, omvang en dreiging* (Salaﬁsm in the Netherlands. Nature, Scale and Threat), which was carried out together with Jean Tillie and Sjef van Stiphout of the Institute for Migration and Ethic Studies (IMES) commissioned by the Research and Documentation Center (WODC) at the request of the Dutch counter-terrorism coordinator (NCTb). A number of interviews were held and observations made after this period of time.


[33] See e.g. a quotation from a text by the Saudi scholar Fawzaan: ‘One is expected to invite people to convert to Islam with wisdom and in a good and gentle manner. On the contrary, the use of violence, fanaticism and defamation is not part of Islam. [http://www.al-yaqeen.com/va/vraag.php?id=515; retrieved 4 January 2012]; and a quotation from a text spoken by a preacher at the As-Soennah mosque in The Hague: ‘My job is solely to communicate the news. This is what God says in the Koran: it is your job to communicate it, but it is God’s job to lead and it is God that leads people astray.’–I. Roex, op. cit. (2013), p. 169.


[35] For example, they explicitly reject homosexuality and simultaneously reject violence (verbal or otherwise) against homosexuals (I. Roex, op. cit. (2013), p. 185).


[41] See e.g. AIVD, op. cit. (2007).


[43] See e.g. AIVD, op. cit. (2007).


[52] Personal communication by phone with quietist imam from the Madkhali network, The Netherlands, 24 April 2013.


[63] Based on observations and interviews during fieldwork in Antwerp (Belgium), May 2–3, 2013; see also S. Hamid, op. cit. (2009), p. 401.


[67] This is already happening in Belgium. During recent fieldwork among various Salaﬁ networks in Antwerp, the author met several Muslim women wearing the niqab (face veil) who isolate themselves from society because of the so-called burka ban. In the Netherlands, there is currently no such ban in place.
Securing the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas from Maritime Terrorism:  
a Troublesome Cooperation?
by Senia Febrica

Abstract
The security of the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas is of great importance for the international seafaring community. As a result, lack of adequate cooperation in this area has raised some concerns over the safety and security of navigation in the waterways. This article focuses on Indonesia and the Philippines role in securing the waters and the behaviour of these two countries when it comes to cooperation. It investigates why they have joined a number of cooperation arrangements while rejecting others. Most scholarly works point at sovereignty concern as the main reason underpinning their decision. Rather than focusing solely on sovereignty infringements, this article argues that Indonesia’s and the Philippines’ decisions towards cooperation initiatives are informed by the calculation of (both the sovereignty and implementation) costs and benefits, and the level of their control over the cooperation outcomes.

Keywords: Indonesia, the Philippines, maritime terrorism, Sulu-Sulawesi Seas

Introduction
The Sulu-Sulawesi Seas are not only important to facilitate cross border movement between people living in the southern part of the Philippines and northern part of Sulawesi, Indonesia, but also for international navigation. The Sulu-Sulawesi Seas that border the two countries are considered a safer route for super tankers. Bigger tankers navigating to and from East Asia and the Middle East have to divert through this waterway due to the depth constraints of the Straits of Malacca.[1]

In the aftermath of 9/11 Indonesia and the Philippines cooperation to secure the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas was put under further international scrutiny. Acts of maritime terrorism in this area generated international concern. In the Sulu Sea, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), both based in the southern part of the Philippines, have been indicted for carrying out attacks against ships to generate income.[2] The waters bordering Indonesia and the Philippines have been viewed as gateways for terrorists travelling from one part of Southeast Asia to another. Members of the Jamaah Islamiyah, a Southeast Asian terrorist group, and other Islamic militant groups from Indonesia use this route to travel to training camps in the Philippines.[3] They travel from Kalimantan Timur to Sabah (Malaysia) and then proceed to Tawi-Tawi and Sulu/Mindanao (the Philippines).[4] In mid-September 2013, the Moro National Liberation Front attacks on Zamboanga City and clashes with the Philippines military in Jolo Island have forced 30,000 civilians to flee their homes, destabilising order and security in Sulu area.[5] These circumstances put more pressure on enhancing security cooperation in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas.

External powers, particularly the United States, have pressed for greater security cooperation in this waterway. The U.S. has made a number of efforts to develop multi-national cooperation in the Seas. The U.S. Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), for instance, was introduced to Asia-Pacific countries in 2004. Indonesia and Malaysia strongly opposed the initiative after Admiral Fargo’s statement before Congress was made public through various media reports. In a Congressional hearing on March 31st, 2004, Admiral Fargo explained that as part of the RMSI, the U.S. was “looking at things like... putting Special Operations Forces on high-speed vessels, potentially putting Marines on high-speed vessels...to conduct effective
interdiction.”[6] Concern over sovereignty infringement has often been pointed out both by the media and scholars as the reason underpinning Indonesia and Malaysia’s rejection of the RMSI. Although sovereignty costs can have some bearing on understanding states behaviour towards cooperation, a more comprehensive analysis on the reasons underlying their disposition is required. As an Indonesian MoD official that took part in the formulation of Indonesia’s policy on the RMSI explained, despite media reports on the U.S. plan to send its vessels, the administration understood that direct patrols by the U.S. Marines were not part of the cooperation activities that Washington offered to Indonesia.[7] Indonesia opposed the initiative because of the design of the institution that was perceived as overly militaristic and the lack of its government’s influence over the design of the initiative.

Following the failure of the RMSI, from 2005 onwards, the United States, together with Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Australia, has been involved in a series of negotiations under the Asia Pacific Regional Security Forum to find an acceptable cooperation regime for the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas.[8] During the Multinational Interagency Maritime Security Workshop that was held in Cebu, the Philippines from 27-29 August 2007, the U.S. continued to push for formal multinational cooperation to address maritime terrorism concerns regarding the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas. Nevertheless, the U.S. anti-terrorism proposal did not gain much support from the littoral states.

Given the current difficulties to improve cooperation in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas, it is important to look at the design of existing cooperation arrangements and the reasons underpinning Indonesia and the Philippines’ attitude towards these institutions. Many analyses point to the issue of sovereignty as the primary cause of limited cooperation.[9] By over-emphasizing sovereignty concerns, these studies overlook Indonesia and the Philippines keenness to join maritime security arrangements, including those that involve cross-border sea patrols, and provide other states access to their port facilities, airspace and land territory. This article argues that concern over sovereignty infringement alone does not determine Indonesia’s and the Philippines’ behaviour towards cooperation. The evidence shows that control over the course of negotiations and the calculation of costs and benefits play important roles in shaping cooperation by Indonesia and the Philippines. This article makes an empirical contribution to the literature by analysing how Indonesia and the Philippines secure borderless areas in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas. Most scholarly works on maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia tends to focus on management of security in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea; as such there is a lack of attention given to study cooperation to address maritime terrorism in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas.

The article begins by explaining the concept of legalisation, its relations to the calculation of costs and benefits in the International Relations (IR) literature, and the method used to assess these variables in this article. It proceeds by mapping Indonesia’s and the Philippines responses to the U.S. global war on terror. It then expands the analysis by exploring the institutional designs of cooperation initiatives in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas, gaps in cooperation practices and ways to remedy the situation. This article then concludes with the key points to take away from the analysis presented.

Why Cooperate?

Given the transnational nature of maritime terrorism cooperation between states that share common borders is very important. Among various strands of International Relations (IR) thoughts that have shaped the discussion of cooperation, neoliberal institutionalism provides a useful insight into states’ attitudes towards cooperation. Neoliberal institutionalism points out that the degree of legalisation associated with an international institution informs the calculation of gains and therefore, the cooperation outcome.
Neoliberal institutionalism argues that state behaviour towards cooperation is informed by the calculation of absolute gains. [10] States will cooperate if the overall benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs. The costs of cooperation are constituted by the sovereignty and implementation costs. [11] The sovereignty costs are symbolic and material costs that are associated with the lessening of national autonomy. [12] The sovereignty costs are seen as the unintended consequence of legalisation sovereignty costs. [13] Thus, in assessing the sovereignty costs this article examines the degree of legalisation associated with an institution.

Legalisation is defined by a set of characteristics that a cooperation institution may or may not possess. [14] This set of characteristics comprises of three dimensions: obligation, precision and delegation. [15] Obligation refers to the degree to which a set of rules or commitments constrain the behaviour of states. [16] Precision implies the extent to which rules define what a cooperation arrangement requires, authorizes and proscribes to contracting parties. [17] Delegation is the extent to which states delegate authority to third parties such as courts, arbitrators and administrative organisations to apply and interpret rule and to settle dispute. [18]

In this article, the degree of obligation is grouped into two categories: high and low. A high level of obligation invokes mandatory requirements for the contracting party and calls for the traditional legal formalities of signature, ratification and comes into force. [19] On the other end, cooperation initiatives with low levels of obligation have rules or regulations that serve as “recommendations” or “guidelines” and do not create legally binding requirements. [20]

The level of precision is also grouped into two categories: high and low. A high level of precision shows the presence of determinate rules that only leave narrow possibilities for contested interpretations to arise. Under this condition an agreement provides a specific intended objective and means of achieving it. [21] In contrast, a low level of precision reveals vague and general rules without specifying particular means or procedures to achieve cooperation objectives. [22]

The degree of delegation is grouped into two: high and low. A high level of delegation implies that a state is granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules, resolve disputes and make further rules to external authority. [23] Low levels of delegation take place when states do not delegate authority for monitoring, settling disputes and enforcing rules to an external authority.

The level of sovereignty costs corresponds with the strength or weakness of these three dimensions of legalisation. Sovereignty costs make states hesitate to accept hard legalisation of international cooperation particularly when it involves significant degree of delegation. [24] Sovereignty costs are measured in two categories: high and low. Sovereignty costs are high when a cooperation arrangement reveals a high degree of obligation, precision and delegation. Under the condition of high sovereignty costs, states have to accept external authority over significant decision making or, in more extreme conditions, an external authority interfering in the relations between the state and its citizens or territory. [25] The sovereignty costs are low when one or all the three components of obligation, precision and delegation are low. Under the conditions of low sovereignty costs, Indonesia and the Philippines are not required to make significant legal and governance changes at domestic level or accept external authority in its decision making process. [26]

The second component of costs that need to be considered are the implementation costs. This type of cost is incurred in “the process of putting international commitments into practice: the passage of legislation, creation of institutions (both domestic and international) and enforcement of rules.” [27] Accordingly, implementation costs are measured into two categories: high and low. High implementation costs occur when a state needs to carry out extensive policy changes, make substantial adjustments at domestic level and therefore, spend economic resources to meet cooperation requirements. Low implementation costs take
place under a circumstance where an international commitment is already compatible with current practice. Thus, adjustment is “unnecessary and compliance is automatic.”[28]

The term benefit in this article is defined as the net advantages obtained by participants from cooperation. [29] While an abundance of IR academic texts devote their attention to explaining the costs of cooperation, the concept of benefits has been overlooked. The aggregate benefits of cooperation are categorised into two groups: high and low. High benefits emerge when the incentives of cooperation are tangible/concrete and are not available elsewhere. In contrast, low benefits occur when there are no identifiable benefits or if the benefits of cooperation are available elsewhere.

This article argues that another plausible explanation for the Philippines and Indonesia behaviour is the degree of control that the two countries have in shaping cooperation institutions. The level of control is high when both countries have the ability to influence the negotiations and shape the term of agreement to meet its own concerns. In cases where Indonesia and the Philippines have control over the negotiation process, the benefits of cooperation will likely exceed the costs. The level of control is low when the two countries were not involved in designing the terms of agreement and primarily face with the two options: to join or not to join a cooperation institution.

The calculation of gains and the degree of legalisation associated with it, as well as the level of control that Indonesia and the Philippines have over cooperation outcomes shape their behaviour.

**Indonesia's and the Philippines' Varying Attitudes towards the War on Terror**

In the aftermath of 9/11 the United States (U.S.) began to express its concern that “Muslim extremists in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand” were a possible threat to world trade navigating through Southeast Asian waterways.[30] Parallel to this the U.S embarked on a global campaign against terrorism. Identifying and intercepting maritime terrorist threats before they reach the U.S. became the goal of U.S. maritime strategy in the war on terror.[31]

Responding to the U.S. war on terror campaign Indonesia and the Philippines had different approaches to terrorism and, therefore, the way they dealt with sea robbery and maritime terrorism was different. The Philippines government treated maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships as intertwined issues. [32] In the Philippines, militant groups such as the MILF and the ASG have both used terrorism as their method of warfare in separatist struggles. These groups conducted attacks against vessels plying through the Sulu waters. In 2000 the MILF claimed responsibility over the bombing of Our Lady of Mediatrix in Ozamis City.[33] On February 27th, 2004 the ASG announced their involvement in the explosion/fire incident on board MV Super Ferry causing the death of 116 of the 900 passengers and crew.[34] In comparison, the Indonesian government perceived sea robbery and maritime terrorism issues as not inter-related. The government carefully differentiated the two issues in order to avoid any form of internationalisation of terrorism issues that may invite foreign intervention to secure its waters. Officials also deny the presence of a maritime terrorism threat to Indonesian waterways.[35]

These different approaches to maritime terrorism influence the varying responses taken by the two governments. The Philippines, on the one hand, is an ally of the U.S. in the war on terror in the region. The first U.S. policy program in Southeast Asia was expressed through assistance to the Philippines. Their government received $100 million in training assistance, military equipment, and maintenance support for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).[36] In 2002, 660 U.S. Special Forces were dispatched in the Southern Philippines to combat the ASG.[37] The Philippines and U.S. government labelled the military
operation in Luzon as a Balikatan training exercise, in order to circumvent the constitution of the Philippines which forbids the presence of foreign forces on Philippine territory, despite the fact that the U.S. forces were armed and authorised to return fire if attacked.[38] By early 2005, U.S. troops were still assisting the Philippines in their counterterrorism operation.[39] The Philippines is among the very few ASEAN member states that joined a U.S. led maritime security initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) in 2005. An initiative aimed to improve international cooperation to prevent and interdict the smuggling of WMD materials. As part of the Philippines bilateral cooperation with the U.S. in 2012 in order to improve Manila’s naval capabilities the U.S. pledged to transfer two vessels to the Philippines navy, deploy fighter jets and a coastal radar system.[40]

In comparison, Indonesia’s counter terrorism policies have been low key and mainly focused on intelligence sharing.[41] Indonesia rejected participation in a number of U.S. led initiatives to deal with maritime terrorism, including the PSI and the Container Security Initiatives. Nevertheless, at bilateral level Indonesia cooperates closely with Washington. To formalise the bilateral defence cooperation, the two states signed the U.S.-Indonesia Defence Framework Arrangement in June 2010. The defence arrangement requires Indonesia and the U.S. to work together to improve Indonesia’s capacity-building in maritime security and ensure cooperation in the area of operational support and military supplies.

From 2006 to 2008, through the defence cooperation, Indonesia received U.S. $57 million to support the establishment of an Integrated Maritime Surveillance Systems (IMSS).[42] The IMSS covers more than 1,205 kilometres of coast line in the Straits of Malacca and approximately 1,285 kilometres of coast line in the Sulawesi Sea.[43] An Indonesian security expert confirmed that information gathered from the U.S. installed IMSS was also shared with the U.S.[44] Indonesia’s willingness to increase cooperation in defence logistics with the U.S. shows that the government was willing to cooperate and was not preoccupied with sensitivity over sovereignty concerns. However, as an Indonesian former high government official explained, the government felt that it was important to maintain a careful balance between halting terrorism and cooperating with foreign countries without going against the will of the Indonesian public.[45]

Indonesia-the Philippines: Real Politics and the Existing Cooperation Institutions in Sulu-Sulawesi Seas

Terrorism is not a new issue for Indonesia and the Philippines.[46] In the Philippines, militant groups such as the MILF and the ASG have both been using terrorism as their method of warfare in separatist struggles. In Indonesia, the Free Aceh Movement, as well as other armed separatist groups in Papua (OPM), and East Timor (Fretelin/Falintil) have perpetrated terrorist violence to gain greater autonomy from the central government.[47] At least 34 bomb attacks have taken place in Indonesia since the resignation of Suharto in May 1998.[48] Since the hotel bombings in 2009, terrorist groups in Indonesia have shifted their target from attacking foreign embassies and other Western iconic symbols to local targets.[49] This can be seen in attacks against NGOs workers in Aceh, local Christian communities in Central Sulawesi (Poso), churches in Central Java, and police across various parts of Indonesia, including Poso, Purworejo, Kebumen, Hamparan Perak and the south of Tangerang.[50] Police investigations reveal strong links between terrorist groups in Indonesia and their counterparts in the Philippines. Some of the perpetrators of terrorism have received training in terrorist camps in Mindanao and weapons used for training and attacks in Indonesia were smuggled from the Philippines.[51]

Despite the Indonesian and the Philippines long history of terrorist incidents it was only after 9/11 that governments around the world began to highlight the possibility of terrorist attacks in Sulu-Sulawesi waters. There is a growing uneasiness among the international community regarding the lack of cooperation in the
Sulu-Sulawesi Seas. The real politics in the region has been pointed as one of the reasons underpinning this condition. Up until now Indonesia and the Philippines have not settled their maritime boundaries in this area.

On December 13th, 1957 Indonesia laid down the country’s system of archipelagic baselines. Indonesian Prime Minister Djuanda declared that “all waters surrounding, between and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesian state and therefore, parts of the internal or national waters.”[52] Following Djuanda’s declaration, the government enacted a national law on February 18th, 1960 to formalize the archipelagic doctrine. The act promulgated straight baselines connecting 196 outermost points of the outermost islands in its archipelago.[53] In a similar vein, the Philippines Presidential Decree No. 1599 of 11 June 1978 establishes its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles (nm) from their archipelagic baselines. The Indonesian and the Philippines’ system of archipelagic states eventually gained international recognition at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and included in the 1982 Convention.[54]

Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, both Indonesia and the Philippines are allowed to claim a 12 nm territorial sea and a 200 nm EEZ measured outward from their archipelagic baselines. Nevertheless, no part of the sea reaches more than 200 nm from the nearest coast.[55] It would be difficult for Indonesia to enter into negotiation as long as the Philippines asserts its claim over all the waters within its treaty limit.[56] This is because Indonesia’s Pulau Miangas (Palmas Island) is located within the treaty limit.[57] The International Court of Justice decision in the late 1920s confirmed Miangas as part of Indonesia.[58] Yet, the borders on waters surrounding the island have not been settled. Despite the absence of open confrontation over the waters between the two governments, in February 2009, the issue concerning Miangas became the centre of attention during a coordination meeting held by the National Central Bureau and the Interpol Indonesia, at the National Police Headquarters in Jakarta, on February 11th, 2009.[59] Deputy Head of North Sulawesi Regional Police, John Kalangi pointed out that the Philippines Tourism Authority has published a map that included Indonesia’s northern most islands in Sangihe and Talaud Regencies including Miangas, Marore and Marampit as part of the Philippines.[60] Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hassan Wirayuda toned down the debate by pointing out that the Philippines government has not made any official claim.[61] Currently there has been no maritime border settlement agreement between the two countries. Despite the absence of maritime boundaries arrangement Indonesia and the Philippines have embarked on a series of cooperation agreements to address maritime terrorism. These include a defence agreement, two sub-regional arrangements and a regional convention to counter terrorism. The following part of this section examines the sovereignty costs resulted from the degree of legalisation of each agreement, the implementation costs, the benefits of cooperation and the two countries’ ability to influence the terms of agreement in the three cases.

**Indonesia-the Philippines’ Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA)**

On August 27th, 1997 Indonesia and the Philippines Ministry of Defence enhanced the security cooperation between the two countries by signing the Agreement on Cooperative Activities in the Field of Defence and Security. It requires parties to carry out joint and combined military training and exercises, border patrol operations, and exchange of information.

Assessment of the obligation, precision and delegation of this agreement highlights the low level of sovereignty costs. Despite the high degree of precision, this agreement only has low degrees of obligation and delegation. Based on the cooperation requirements it is argued that the agreement has non intrusive
obligations. The agreement only creates weak legal responsibility because it requires parties mainly “to endeavour” to take measures to cooperate, “to encourage” cooperation, and “to promote” bilateral relations. It introduces soft commitments since it does not regulate a responsibility to make reparations when breaches of an agreement cause losses to the other party. In addition, the agreement has escape clauses that enable parties to avoid their legal responsibility. Under the agreement participants are allowed to review and amend the agreement at any time through mutual consent. The bilateral agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines also enables states to file their withdrawal after giving the other 90 days notice.

The agreement was drafted with a high degree of precision. It articulates mandatory duties for each state, the forms of cooperation that states can perform under the bilateral cooperation, procedures regarding exchange of intelligence information, methods to exchange classified information and equipment, and measures to solve disputes and publications to the media. This agreement explains courses of action that governments cannot take. Such actions include exercising any competence or functions that exclusively belong to the other party's authority, interfering in internal affairs of the other state, and transferring intelligence information to a third party without written approval from both states.

The level of delegation of the agreement is low. Although it establishes a Joint Defence and Security Cooperation Committee to deal with any matter arising from the interpretation, application or implementation of the agreement, this committee does not operate independently from the two governments. A group of individuals that form the committee are nominated by concerned states. The tasks of the committee are limited only to identifying potential cooperation activities, recommending policies and procedures, implementing mutually agreed policies, coordinate, monitor, and evaluate policies and activities to improve future programs. Settlement of any dispute arising from interpretation and implementation of the agreement is managed through consultation and negotiation between the participating governments.

The agreement also poses low implementation costs. Most activities governed by the defence agreement are not new to Indonesia and the Philippines. The two countries’ maritime agencies have carried out these activities prior to the signing of the agreement. Bilateral cooperation between the two countries to address maritime terrorism has been established in the form of the Indonesian and the Philippines Joint Border Committee forum since 1975. The JBC cooperation forum covers a broad range of issues including armed robbery against ships, smuggling, illegal fishing and illegal immigration. The two countries carry out various activities under this forum, including a Marine Policing Exercise that involves the Indonesian Ministry of Transport and the Philippines Coast Guard, the two navies coordinated patrol called CORPAT PHILINDO, joint search and rescue exercise, information exchange and border crossing control. The coordinated maritime patrol involving patrol vessel and maritime reconnaissance aircraft to secure the waterway between Southern Mindanao and northern Sulawesi, for instance, has been established since 1989, many years before maritime terrorism receives worldwide attention after 9/11 attacks. A Philippine official claimed that the two countries have carried out cross border pursuit to deal with armed robbery attacks at sea for many years. This mechanism allows a vessel from each country’s maritime agency to transgress to the other's territory when pursuing sea robbers although such vessel is not equipped with power of arrest.

The defence agreement brings high benefits for Indonesia and the Philippines. A former Indonesian Navy official explained that “for Indonesia the bilateral agreement with the Philippines is important to increase law enforcement presence in our common maritime borders... to deal with illegal fishing and smuggling.” Cooperation with the Philippines’ authority was seen as central strategy to assure the success of Indonesia’s national attempts to curb smuggling of weapons to those provinces that have experienced ethnic and sectarian conflicts. When the agreement was introduced in 1997 communal and sectarian conflicts had flared
up in a number of locations in Indonesia.[69] Smuggling of arms from the Philippines to the North Sulawesi (Miangas Island) has been responsible for exacerbating violence in the conflicts across the country.[70] For the Philippines cooperation with Indonesia is required to intensify sharing of information and address weak points in their anti terrorism efforts. The Philippines military has identified that a number of Indonesian JI leaders have assisted the ASG members in creating security disturbances in western part of Mindanao and trained them, particularly in making explosive devices.[71] The JI was responsible for two bombs in 2003 at the Philippines Davao airport that killed 38 people and injured 200.[72]

Indonesia and the Philippines expected a high degree of influence over the terms of agreement in the negotiation of the defence agreement. The bilateral agreement was discussed exclusively among these countries. Governments of the two countries specifically shaped the terms of cooperation to add value to their counter terrorism and sea robbery operations and efforts in dealing with undocumented migration and smuggling.[73] Both agreements took into account Indonesia’s and the Philippines’ needs in gaining support for its maritime patrol, dealing with arms smuggling to its territory, and developing defence technology.[74]

The Brunei Darussalam- Indonesia- Malaysia- The Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA)

Indonesia and the Philippines together with Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia launched the EAGA in 1994 to address the development gap within the member countries.[75] Although the cooperation initiative is driven by economics, after 9/11 efforts to strengthen both transport security and maritime borders became one of the focuses of the BIMP-EAGA.[76]

In 2007 the member states of the EAGA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Establishing and Promoting Efficient and Integrated Sea Linkages. The 2007 Sea Linkages MoU requires parties to: designate their gateway ports for facilitation of maritime trade and movement of people, update each other on latest Customs, Immigration, Quarantine and Security (CIQS) facilities, procedures and requirements, establish a database on the EAGA maritime trade, produce a projection report for maritime flows and coordinate the establishment and modernisation of the CIQS facilities in gateway ports.

Following the implementation of the MoU on Sea Linkages, the four states launched the MoU on Transit and Interstate Transport of Goods in 2009. It requires member states to ensure that vehicles engaged in cross-border traffic are registered in their home country, bear identification marks, carry a valid certificate and comply with safety and equipment requirements of transit and host countries.

The two EAGA initiatives brought low sovereignty costs. The Sea Linkages MoU and the Transit and Transport of Goods MoU introduce weak legal responsibilities. The two MoUs allow parties to withdraw from these agreements after a six month notice period. Neither MoU includes a responsibility to compensate others when one party breaches the agreement, bringing injury or loss to other parties.

The MoUs’ requirements show a high level of precision. These agreements articulate regulations on designation of EAGA ports in great detail. They stipulate implementing arrangements for contracting parties in various cooperation activities. These agreements also regulate procedures to conduct consultations, reviews and amend the MoU, settle disputes and terminate cooperation.

Both MoUs also display a low degree of delegation. These agreements do not delegate authority for dispute resolution arising from interpretation and implementation of the MoU to an independent third party or a tribunal. Review processes, amendments of the agreement and dispute settlement are conducted through negotiation and consultation.
As explained above regarding the degree of obligation, levels of precision and delegation associated with both MoUs confirms low sovereignty costs. The two agreements also do not pose high implementation costs to Indonesia and the Philippines. The MoUs are built on existing bilateral cooperation links between member states customs, immigration and law enforcement agencies.[77] Indonesian officials confirmed that Indonesia has long standing cooperation with the neighbouring EAGA states to curb various illicit activities including the smuggling of goods, arms and people.[78] The two agreements are already in line with both governments’ policies in dealing with maritime terrorism and in developing the central and eastern part of Indonesia for Jakarta and the Southern Mindanao for Manila.[79] These two MoUs serve as both legal frameworks that govern cooperative activities between Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines and burden sharing initiatives to secure waters along their common borders.

Not only do the two MoUs bring low costs, the BIMP maritime initiatives are beneficial for Indonesian and Filipino maritime agencies capacity-building as it provides training and exercise opportunities. These activities are important to ensure the success of actual coordinated border patrols as well as customs and immigration cooperation between the maritime agencies of participating states.[80] By January 2010, under the CIQS forum, member countries had held 11 maritime exercises to enhance coordination, partnership and improve their capacity to deter terrorism and secure their ports.[81] Under the BIMP framework Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei also regularly hold joint cross-border patrol exercises to strengthen their response against terrorism and smuggling.[82] Through this cooperation the Indonesian and Filipino Navy and other maritime agencies received support during patrols along the coast of Sulu-Sulawesi Seas. This included vessels and aircraft accompanying ships on patrol and coastal coordination provided by customs, immigration and security agencies of Brunei and Malaysia.[83] Cooperation arrangements under both MoUs fitted with pre-existing goals that Indonesia and the Philippines had been unable to successfully achieve. Coordination and designation of points and ports of entry and exit and transit routes among the four member states assists Indonesia and the Philippines in monitoring the illegal movement of people and goods. The two MoUs help to identify, detect and prevent “movement and possible apprehension of undesirable travellers” and goods.[84]

The two EAGA MoUs confirm the ability of the Philippines and Indonesia to influence the terms of agreement. Indonesia and the Philippines were able to explore potential cooperation activities, formulate agreement drafts, propose new sea routes and project plans, choose its designated gateway ports and convey its disagreement towards other states’ request under the EAGA framework.[85]

**The Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures**

The Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia formalised a tripartite cooperation agreement to strengthen maritime security cooperation in the tri-border sea areas of the Sulu and Sulawesi Sea by signing the Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures agreement on May 7th, 2002, to which Thailand and Cambodia later acceded.[86]

The agreement obliges each party to establish communication networks, share information, inform the arrest of a national of other parties, and establish a Joint Committee to carry out administrative and operational tasks. The agreement requires parties to share passenger lists, provide access to each other’s fingerprint databank, consult each other on visa waiver lists of third country nationals, share blacklists at visa-issuing offices, strengthen border control through designating entry and exit points and sea lanes, harmonise legislation to combat terrorism and conduct joint public diplomacy to counter terrorists’ propaganda.

The degree of obligations, precision and delegation shows that the agreement poses low sovereignty costs.
requirements of the agreement show that it has non intrusive obligations. The agreement reserves the right of each party to refuse to exchange “any particular information or intelligence for reasons of national security, public order or health.”[87] It enable parties to escape from legal responsibility as it allows states to suspend the agreement “temporarily, either in whole or in part” after providing 30 days notification.[88] In addition, the agreement does not include any obligations for a party to compensate others if a breach of the agreement causes loss and injury to others.

The agreement shows a high degree of precision. It provides a detailed account of states’ rights and duties, administrative and organisational procedures to set up communication between parties, logistical and funding arrangements, duties and the line of reporting for the Joint Committee, procedure to settle disputes, amend and terminate the agreement. The agreement explains what parties to the agreement are allowed and not allowed to do. It does not allow a party to disclose confidential documents, information and other data received from other parties. The agreement has a low degree of delegation. Any disputes regarding the interpretation and the implementation of the agreement are settled through friendly negotiation. The agreement points out that the enforcement of rules is made “without reference to a third party of international tribunal.”[89]

The agreement also does not introduce high economic costs to participating states. Since the early 1960s the concept of Maphilindo (Malaysia- the Philippines- Indonesia) cooperation has been introduced.[90] Before the establishment of this agreement in 2002, the three governments have carried out various cooperation activities in the field of maritime security.[91] It does not require Indonesia and the Philippines to make substantial changes on the national level because the two countries had installed radars and allocated maritime agencies personnel, patrol vessels and surveillance aircraft to monitor its shared maritime borders with Malaysia.

The agreement is beneficial to Indonesian and Filipino law enforcement agencies, including the Navy, Police, Customs and Immigration agencies because they receive support in carrying out counter terrorism efforts from their Malaysian counterparts. These supports include information exchange, sharing of airline passenger lists and access to databases on fingerprints, visa waiver lists of third country nationals and issues related to forged or fake documents. Support from the Malaysian authorities is the most useful cooperation to prevent, detect and capture JI members and other Islamic militant groups travelling to training camps in the Philippines via Indonesian Kalimantan Timur and Sabah, Malaysia.[92] This cooperation initiative provides capacity-building opportunities for both Indonesian and the Philippines maritime agencies. These include the establishment of joint training and exercises on combating terrorism and other transnational crimes. Such exercises are expected to increase the security presence in the region and improve the degree of cooperation during maritime patrols.[93] The agreement aims to set up formal and direct communication channels between these states to enable a rapid response and improve coordination among them.[94] It formalises and improves logistical arrangements for exchanges of information and communication between the three countries to uncover terrorist networks.[95]

Indonesia and the Philippines anticipated high degree of influence over the course of negotiations. The two governments shaped the terms of cooperation to add value to their counter sea robbery efforts and assist in dealing with illegal seaborne migrant and smuggling.[96] The agreement took into accounts their needs for gaining support for maritime patrol and dealing with arms smuggling to its territory. Article III of the agreement shows that areas of cooperation covered by the initiative take into account not only terrorism but also various maritime security issues deemed important by the two countries including smuggling, marine resources theft and illegal immigration. The text of the agreement brings to attention concerns related to smuggling of firearms and illegal immigration. The agreement repetitively mentioned the two issues using
different terms such as “smuggling of goods including explosives and arms”, “illicit trafficking in arms”, “smuggling of persons”, “trafficking of persons”, and “illegal entry [of migrants]” under different categories of cooperation[97].

**ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism**

In November 2007, the ASEAN member states including the Philippines and Indonesia signed the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. The Convention requires participating states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over criminal acts of terrorism in their land or a vessel flying their flag, guarantee fair treatment to any person who is taken into custody, carry out investigations, prosecute or extradite alleged offenders, notify the ASEAN Secretary General regarding incidents and detention of offenders, establish channels of communication between agencies, share best practices on rehabilitative programs, provide mutual legal assistance, designate a coordinating agency at national level, and preserve confidential information, documents and other records.

The assessment of the degree of legalisation required by the agreement shows that it generates low sovereignty costs. This is because the Convention poses a low degree of obligation, precision and delegation. Requirements of the convention show non-mandatory obligations. This agreement provides room for parties to avoid the strictures of the cooperation requirements. It obliges parties to carry out their duties under this convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign and territorial integrity. It reserves the right of each state to perform counter terrorism actions in its own territory. The Convention also enables states to withdraw from the agreement after 180 days notification to the ASEAN Secretary General. In addition, there are no provisions on compensation regarding breaches of the agreement.

The cooperation requirements show a high degree of precision. The Convention outlines: obligations for states, scope of the agreement, state jurisdiction over any terrorist offence, procedures to deal with an alleged offender, rights of the alleged offender; mechanisms to inform the ASEAN Secretary General and other parties, procedures to grant refugee status, provide assistance in investigations and criminal proceedings, extradition of an alleged offender, review and monitor the implementation of the agreement, solve disputes, and withdraw from the arrangement. The agreement also explains exceptional conditions that render the agreement irrelevant. Article five of the Convention for instance explains that this agreement is not applicable where the offence is committed in a single state, and both the offender and victims are citizens of this state.

The Convention displays a low degree of delegation. The document does not delegate the dispute settlement function to an independent third party or an international tribunal. The Convention articulates parties' commitment to preserve the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, and maintains that the authority to implement and settle disputes lies solely with participating states to this Convention.

Economically, this agreement is not costly for Indonesia and the Philippines. The two countries had intensively cooperated in the area of counter maritime terrorism with other states in the region through bilateral and sub regional channels. As early as December 2002 Indonesia and the Philippines had discussed possible inclusion of marine police and immigration agencies in border monitoring, primarily involving the Navy and the Coast Guards.[98] Before the establishment of the ASEAN Counter Terrorism Convention, a number of counter terrorism institutions in the region have facilitated cooperation among states. These institutions include the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism which was established in Malaysia in 2003 and Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation and Bomb Data Centre, both set up in Indonesia in 2004. These institutions serve as a regional hub to carry out counter terrorism training, as well as monitor and disseminate intelligence information.
The benefits gained from joining the Convention far exceed the costs. It facilitates exchanges of information and provides assistance to prosecute and extradite terrorist perpetrators. [99] A number of successful attempts to capture terrorist ring leaders have already confirmed the importance of cooperation among the Southeast Asian states. In February 2003 the Indonesian police arrested Mas Selamat Kastari, head of the Singapore branch of JI, after they received information from their Singaporean counterpart.[100] Similarly, the arrest of Umar Patek, a JI senior leader in Pakistan in 2011 was also derived from information sharing between Indonesian and Philippines authorities.[101]

In the case of the ASEAN Convention Indonesia and the Philippines took part in negotiating and drafting the agreement.[102] Through Indonesia’s and the Philippines’ involvement in the negotiation they could shape the agreement to assist them in investigating incidents, extraditing alleged perpetrators, developing de-radicalisation programs and dealing with other security concerns including illegal seaborne immigration that it deemed as closely linked to terrorist activities. The porous borders in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas are often used as a staging point for refugees from the Middle East and South Asia that travelling to Australia. [103] Indonesia particularly raised concern that some of these refugees may have links with terrorist organisations. Concerns over the linkage between these two issues were taken into account as the Convention obliges participating states to “take appropriate measures...before granting refugee status for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist attacks.”[104]

Gaps and Way Forward

There are two main gaps in the existing maritime cooperation in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas. These are the absence of a multilateral coordinated patrols and a lack of a cooperation institution that incorporates extra-regional states.

Multilateral Coordinated Patrol Arrangement

Currently there is no cooperation institution that regulates coordinated patrol procedures among the littoral states of the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea. In August 2012 during a meeting between the Philippine Defence Secretary Voltaire Gazmin and his Indonesian and Malaysian counterparts, the idea of coordinated patrol was mentioned.[105] The Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia are still considering coordinated patrol along their shared borders in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas.

In order to fill this gap a similar arrangement to the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) agreement in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore could be emulated to govern cooperation in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas. The MSP coordinated patrol entails year-round sea patrols. The agreement allows patrol ships from a participating country to enter into another country’s territorial waters up to five miles when pursuing a ship involved in maritime crime, provided the patrol ship does not open fire or conduct any form of military action.[106] As part of the MSP agreement Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are also required to undertake a combined air patrol. Under this program each state is obliged to take turns in providing two maritime patrol aircraft each week to patrol the Straits seven days a week.[107] Personnel from all member states must take part in each air patrol. Like the sea patrol, the air patrol will be able to transgress boundaries, flying up to three nautical miles inside the territorial waters of other participating states.[108]

If the littoral states of the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas are willing to draw a lesson from the coordinated patrol arrangement in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the establishment of multilateral patrol agreement can be accelerated. The MSP arrangement is not a form of costly cooperation. It does not introduce many changes
to existing counter sea robbery cooperation among the littoral states of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Nor does the initiative introduce intrusive obligations. It does not entail duties to make reparation or restitution if a party fails to deliver on its commitments or causes loss to the other. The MSP is mainly built on the network of bilateral patrols between the three states. In the context of the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas the coordinated patrol arrangement can be set up using networks of existing bilateral and sub-regional cooperation. Two littoral states of the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas: Indonesia and Malaysia are also parties of the MSP agreement. Therefore, the two countries are very familiar with the MSP code of conduct in the field. A coordinated patrol agreement in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas can serve as an avenue for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei to share the burden of improving the security of the Seas.

Multinational Engagement

There is not much by way of multinational initiatives introduced to secure the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas. As explained earlier the RMSI was an exception. However, when it was launched in 2004, Indonesia strongly opposed this initiative. Scholars point to concerns over sovereignty infringement as the reason underpinning Indonesia’s non-cooperation in the initiative.[109] In contrast to this argument a careful examination of the institutional design of the RMSI shows that the initiative introduced low degree of sovereignty costs.

The requirements of the RMSI indicate that the initiative has non intrusive obligations. Duties of states were articulated as shared intentions. The initiative points out that the conduct of activities, including “information sharing with other states or acting against a threat remains voluntary and sovereign for each participating nation.”[110] Therefore, the ultimate decision for member state to join any maritime security activity including information sharing and intercepting threats is entirely voluntary.[111] The RMSI is imprecise. The initiative does not specify the procedures or expected behaviour for member states in terms of the sharing of information, conducting of maritime exercises and training, coordinating policies particularly when interception at sea takes place as well as punishing member state for acts of non-cooperation. The RMSI shows a low degree of delegation. It does not delegate autonomy to interpret and enforce rules to a third party or a tribunal.[112] Viewed as a whole, the assessment of obligations, precision and delegation confirms the low sovereignty costs generated by this initiative. This suggests that concern over sovereignty costs cannot explain Indonesia’s rejection of the RMSI.

Following the failure of the RMSI, despite the growing interest of user states including the United States, Australia and Japan to assist in the maintenance of security in this waterway, however, there is no cooperation institution set up to incorporate these states. Most assistance from these countries to improve the security of the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas is provided through bilateral channels. An inclusive model of cooperation where users and littoral states can share information and contribute to improve the safety and security of the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas is required. This form of institution is not without a precedent. In the region, the Co-Operative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was already established since 2006.

The Co-Operative Mechanism is a key institution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore for the Strait states, user states and businesses to discuss and share costs to improving navigational safety and marine pollution control.[113] Although this cooperation mainly focuses on the safety of navigation and pollution control and prevention, littoral states can gain tangible assistance from user states and businesses. Prior to the establishment of the Co-Operative Mechanism the burden for maintaining the safety of navigation and pollution prevention was primarily left to the Strait states (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore); for example these states are required to allocate resources to prevent and deal with the aftermath of accidents caused by the high volume of traffic in the Straits. The substantial burden sharing provided by user sates through the
Cooperative Mechanism means that the government can have greater flexibility to use its budget and invest more resources to improve the capacity of Indonesian maritime agencies.[114] Burden-sharing cooperation in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas is important. The littoral states bordering the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas, particularly Indonesia and the Philippines, are developing countries that do not have sufficient resources to equip their naval forces and finance their round-the-clock operations. If maritime agencies of these states struggle to fund their operations, the safety and security of the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas also suffers.

Conclusion

The discussion in this article has shown that securing the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas is complicated by the rampant illicit cross border activities and the disputed maritime boundaries in this area. Yet, despite these challenges, the two littoral states cooperate closely through bilateral, sub-regional and regional arrangements, both with other littoral states and also with external power, particularly the U.S. In doing so, the evidence presented in this article challenges the argument which points to the littoral states, especially Indonesia's reluctance in dealing with the issue of maritime terrorism because of its alleged concern over sovereignty infringement.

There are three institutional features that can be seen from the existing bilateral, sub-regional and regional cooperation. These are: first, the existing cooperation in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas shows a low degree of legalisation and consequently, a low degree of sovereignty costs. Second, all successful cases of cooperation in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas show that the benefits offered by these cooperation initiatives exceed the costs. Finally, Indonesia and the Philippines joined those agreements where they could exercise a high degree of control over the course of negotiations.

The existing cooperation to secure the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas, including bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and the Philippines, the two EAGA MoUs, the trilateral exchange of information and the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism – these all pose low sovereignty costs due to the near absence of legal sanctions in case of non-compliance. Most of these agreements do not set compulsory obligations for its participating states and do not delegate authority to enforce rules or settle disputes to an independent third party. Given the unsettled maritime boundaries between Indonesia and the Philippines, a loose form of legalisation is the preferred solution for the two littoral states. Low degree of legalisation is a strategy chosen by the littoral states of the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas to share burdens in securing their waters without complicating the status of their disputed maritime boundaries.

All successful cases of cooperation to secure Sulu-Sulawesi Seas provide substantial benefits and generate low implementation costs. These benefits include assistance to trace terrorist movements, support to deal with smuggling of weapons and people across their border from neighbouring states, and opportunities to improve their maritime agencies capabilities through training and exercises. There is a significant continuity in Indonesia and the Philippines existing counter terrorism practices. The bilateral, sub-regional and regional initiatives do not require Indonesia and the Philippines to make substantial adjustments or investments at domestic level to comply with the arrangement. This leads to the conclusion that the initiative posed only low implementation costs.

The Philippines' and Indonesia's degree of influence over the terms of agreement is another feature familiar from other successful cases of cooperation. In the bilateral defense agreement, the sub-regional EAGA initiatives, the agreement on exchange of information and the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, Indonesia and the Philippines were able to negotiate every aspect of these agreements, propose drafts and tailor these initiatives to address not only maritime terrorism but other transnational crimes that they deemed as pressing security concerns. These states' control over cooperation outcomes have increased the
likelihood to gain desirable benefits.

Despite the success of the existing cooperation currently in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas, a cross-border patrol arrangement and an institution that can incorporate external powers are still lacking. In comparison to the Philippines government which has been a strong supporter of U.S. led maritime initiatives, Indonesia has refused to join Washington's sponsored arrangements such as the RMSI and the PSI. In contrast to scholarly arguments regarding concern over sovereignty infringement, Indonesia's rejection of a cooperation agreement was not always compatible with the sovereignty costs posed by such agreement. As shown in the case of the RMSI, the initiative brought low sovereignty costs because of its low degree of legalisation. Yet, Indonesia was unwilling to join the initiative because the benefits offered by the initiative were not much better than the status quo, the implementation costs were high and the government has low ability to tailor the terms of cooperation. Indonesia could gain the benefits offered by the RMSI from existing cooperation with the U.S. Through bilateral cooperation with the U.S., Indonesia can exercise greater influence to tailor the terms of the agreement to meet its security needs. More importantly, the implementation of this initiative would bring high costs as the government anticipated problems generated by societal actors. Radical factions such as the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia had stated their intention to expel American troops from Indonesia's key Straits.  

Jakarta's attempt to prudently placate domestic politics concerns could be problematic in the future as it provides room for terrorist groups to maneuver. As explained in this article, in recent years terrorists that have carried out attacks against local Christians and police in various parts of Indonesia that have strong links with terrorist organisations and arms suppliers in the Philippines. As a matter of urgency, Indonesia needs to exercise decisive intervention to secure the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas either through coordinated patrols with the littoral states, greater multinational cooperation, or both in order to halt terrorists' cross-border operations. Lack of decisive responses would deepen grievances in deeply segregated communities, particularly in Central Sulawesi which has experienced sectarian violence since the late 1990s and continues to witness violent attacks from extremists. More worryingly, lack of determination may contribute to increased terrorist attacks beyond the Central Sulawesi region, as shown in a range of attacks against local targets such as churches and police stations that have occurred in Java and Sumatra after 2009.

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II. Research Note

Bangladesh: an Emerging Centre for Terrorism in Asia
by Sajjan M. Gohel

Abstract

This Research Note examines the political developments that have occurred in Bangladesh in 2013 and explores how these have fed into the rise of religious militancy. The ongoing conflicts not only intensify the instability and schisms within the country, but also illustrate that there is a rise in religious militancy that the country can ill afford at this juncture. Furthermore, it highlights how some members of the Bangladeshi diaspora in the United States and United Kingdom have been recruited by al-Qaeda and its affiliates to plot mass casualty attacks. Significantly, it is argued that all these threads are tied together because of the murky role of Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JEI), which is Bangladesh’s largest religious political party. A further deterioration of Bangladesh’s democracy and political stability could create additional space within which Islamist militants may be increasingly free to operate not just for domestic terrorist activity but for preparing internationals plots as well.

Keywords: Terrorism, Bangladesh, Jamaat-e-Islami, Ansarullah Bengali Team, Hefazat-e-Islam

Introduction

Bangladesh has received little attention in comparison to other countries in South Asia such as Pakistan or Afghanistan. As the fourth largest Muslim state in the world, Bangladesh’s progress has been encouraging. The functioning but flawed democratic system has been in place since 1990, coupled with a vibrant civil society movement. Bangladesh’s democracy, however, faces a number of security-related challenges. The main opposition, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), refused to take part in the 5th January, 2014 general elections, claiming they were illegitimate.[2]

The build-up to the elections saw bouts of political, social and religious violence by political opposition parties as well as militant groups. Commentaries on contemporary Bangladesh give increasing attention to the role of religion in politics, particularly its more fundamentalist form. In addition, the conflicts that are spilling onto the streets not only intensify the instability and schisms within the country, but also illustrate that there is a rise in religious militancy that the country can ill afford at this juncture.

This Research Note examines the political developments that have occurred in Bangladesh in 2013 and how they have fed into the rise of religious militancy. It also assesses the diverse array of terrorist challenges Bangladesh faces from domestic threats and the fact that it is a safe haven for extremists. Furthermore, it highlights how some members of its diaspora in the United States and United Kingdom have been recruited by al-Qaeda and its affiliates to plot mass casualty attacks. Significantly, it is argued that all these threads are tied together because of the murky role of Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JEI), which is Bangladesh’s largest religious political party. The JEI is intrinsically tied to how Bangladesh has evolved as a country. The country’s nationalist characteristics have been undermined by a movement that has arguably served as an antechamber for terrorism.[3]
**The Shahbag Protests**

The February 2013 protests in Dhaka brought hundreds of thousands of young Bangladeshis out onto the streets of the capital, seeking punitive action for alleged war crimes committed by some members of the JEI during the Liberation War of 1971, when the country secured independence from Pakistan following a violent war of secession. The “Shahbag protests,” as they came to be known because the protestors would congregate at the Shahbag intersection in Dhaka, were propelled by online social networking sites.

When Bangladesh split from Pakistan in 1971, it endured a brutal reprisal from the Pakistani army. It is estimated that between 1-3 million people were killed and 200,000 to 500,000 women were raped in a coordinated military crackdown that also led to assassinations of intellectuals. In encouraging and arranging these killings, the Pakistan army found willing collaborators in the form of a minority of Bengalis who did not wish to secede from Pakistan, some of whom became part of the JEI.

Few collaborators were ever brought to justice for their part in these crimes against humanity and against humanitarian law. To the consternation of many Bangladeshis who had lived through the Liberation period, the BNP included JEI as its coalition partner in the 2001-2006 government. When the Awami League won the general election in 2009, its leadership initiated the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh to deal with unfinished business arising from the 1971 Liberation War.

On February 28, 2013, the Tribunal sentenced Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, vice president of the JEI, to death for his involvement in the 1971 murders and war crimes. On September 17, 2013, the Bangladesh Supreme Court found Abdul Qader Mollah, assistant secretary-general of the JEI, guilty of murders and other war crimes and ordered his execution, converting his previous life sentence to a death sentence. On October 1, 2013 BNP Member of Parliament Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury was sentenced to death for his part in the 1971 atrocities. On December 2012, Mollah was executed which resulted in street battles between security forces and supporters of the JEI, sparking fears of a descent into disorder.

The tribunal’s establishment has sparked backlashes among religious political parties and groups. In an effort to save its senior leaders being found guilty in the tribunal and also to save itself from being banned, the JEI attempted to divert the focus from the war crimes trials through online propaganda, claiming that the Shahbag movement was “a movement by atheists.”

Trouble began on February 15, 2013, when prominent blogger and civil rights activist Ahmed Rajib Haider, who had helped coordinate the protests, was hacked to death, allegedly by members of an offshoot faction of the JEI's student wing Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) known as the Ansarullah Bengali Team (ABT). Haider was one of those who the JEI and its affiliates have accused of mocking Islam. Relatives and friends blamed JEI for the murder. On March 2, 2013, Bangladesh's Detective Branch arrested five students from North South University, in connection with Haider's murder. Detective Branch spokesperson Monirul Islam said the five murdered Haider on directions of an ICS leader: “They [the suspects] said killing Rajib [Haider] was their Iman (religious) obligations.”

The ABT is ideologically motivated by the Al-Qaeda doctrine and has been trying to resuscitate the local extremist groups in Bangladesh. The ABT’s ultimate goal has been to take control of Bangladesh through an armed jihad and implement Sharia rule.

On August 12, 2013 Bangladesh authorities arrested radical cleric Mufti Jasimuddin Rahmani, an ideological leader of ABT, along with dozens of his followers in Barguna, a south western district of Bangladesh. Rahmani and the ABT have established a strong presence on the Internet and have engaged in not just spreading the group’s propaganda but also translating and distributing material produced by Al-Qaeda and
the American-Yemeni ideologue Anwar Al-Awlaki who had been killed in October 2011 in Yemen by a drone strike.[18]

Despite these arrests, the problems of extremism show no sign of abating in Bangladesh. On May 5, 2013, Bangladesh's largest radical Islamic movement, the Hefazat-e-Islam (HEI), led by Shah Ahmad Shafi, organized a demonstration in Dhaka of more than 500,000 supporters that left seven people dead. Hundreds of shops were also set alight.[19] They demanded the application of 13 Taliban-esque measures, including punishment to all bloggers who “insult Islam,” cancellation of the women development policy and the removal of sculptures.[20]

The HEI gained new recruits following the Shabhag protests and the death of Haider. Since the May 5, 2013, protests the authorities have failed to make any progress in the dozens of cases that accused the HEI of creating anarchy in Dhaka.[21] On November 8, 2013, the civil society movement, Ekatturer Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee, released a report in which it described the HEI as “the B-team of JEI.”[22]

**The Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS)**

The JEI could not function effectively without its student wing, the ICS, which remains its main recruitment ground. ICS members are strong in many educational campuses in Bangladesh. Rajshahi University, Chittagong University, Shahjalal University of Science and Technology, Khustia Islamic University, Jahangirnagar University and North South University are considered “strongholds” of the ICS.[23] The JEI placed its party members at crucial positions in universities and the Public Service Commission during its time in coalition government with the BNP and was able to appoint its cadres and sympathizers to various universities in Bangladesh and civil services, marking its presence in the educational institutions and bureaucracy.[24] Some students affiliated to ICS opt for subjects that are taught by teachers belonging to JEI, which enables them to receive preferential treatment. In addition, due to the system of recruitment, some of these students are recruited as faculty members. [25]

The members and workers of the JEI contribute 5% of their monthly income as a contribution to the party. [26] The JEI uses its political and religious ties with Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations to enable its supporters to obtain employment in these countries as well as provide a platform for those that seek further ideological guidance. These workers tend to contribute generously to the party fund (Baitul Maal).[27] To financially sustain their organisation, the JEI are involved in a number of economic enterprises ranging from large financial institutions to household level micro credit schemes, from mosques and madrasas to news outlets and IT businesses. The estimated amount of annual net profit generated by these enterprises is a staggering $200 million.[28]

**Links with Domestic Terrorism**

The JEI has a murky relationship with militant outfits in Bangladesh. It could be argued that it has served as the antechamber towards terrorism, especially with outfits like the Jamaatul Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB), a domestic terrorist group founded in 1998 and committed to establishing an Islamic state in Bangladesh through violence. The JMB gained international notoriety when it coordinated an audacious countrywide bombing campaign on August 17, 2005.[29] The group detonated approximately 460 bombs at 300 locations in 63 of the 64 districts in Bangladesh. Leaflets were found as the scene of the blasts in which the JMB asked the government to establish Islamic rule or face a ruthless offensive.[30]

In the wake of the countrywide bomb blasts of 2005, the authorities arrested seven members of the JMB.
All had been members of either the JEI or its student wing, the ICS.[31] In March 2006, when the former director of the Islamic Academy, Maolana Fariduddin Masud, was detained for suspected links to militancy, he shockingly alleged to a Dhaka court that a huge amount of information would be revealed if the then Industries Minister and JEI leader, Motiur Rahman Nizami was investigated.[32] Nizami, had openly stated in the past that the JMB was a fictitious imagination of the media and foreign powers to malign Bangladesh’s image as a moderate Islamic state.[33] Nizami is currently being held as a suspect while standing trial for war crimes in 1971 at the Tribunal. He was the supreme commander of the militia group al-Badr which aided the Pakistani military during the Bangladesh Liberation War.[34]

In a separate development, on January 30, 2014, a Bangladesh court sentenced 14 people connected to the JEI to death, including Nizami, over a substantial arms smuggling racket ten years earlier. Nizami, was sentenced to hang after being convicted over the racket involving 10 truckloads of arms seized by police from the southern port city of Chittagong.[35]

In October 2005, the law courts and judges were targeted in another series of bomb blasts in Chandpur, Chittagong, Sylhet and Lakshmipur. [36] The situation escalated when the JMB killed two senior assistant judges and wounded three others in a suicide bomb attack in Jhalakathi on November 14, 2005.[37] Police investigations discovered that the Jhalakathi bomber, Hasan Al Mamun, and his family members were closely linked to the JEI. Al Mamun was also an activist of the ICS.[38]

Shortly after these incidents, authorities apprehended more than 700 suspected members of JMB and its affiliate party, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB). In March 2007, the Bangladeshi government executed a number of JMB’s leaders, including its leader, Shaikh Abdur Rahman (more commonly known as Bhai).[39]

The International Terrorism Dynamic

Bangladesh does not attract as much Western attention as some other South Asian countries like Pakistan or Afghanistan. As a result many important issues end up being overlooked by the international community. For example, Usama bin Ladin issued a fatwa on February 23, 1999, that called for a jihad against “the Jews and Crusaders.” The fatwa was endorsed by Fazlul Rahman, a Bangladeshi religious leader commonly identified as “the Amir of Jihadi movement in Bangladesh,” in his capacity as leader of the Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI).[40] Yet the domestic and international reaction to this reputed Al-Qaeda link was surprisingly overlooked. It took until April 2004 for the U.S. Department of State to designate HUJI as a terrorist organisation. And Bangladesh took even longer to follow suit, because the Khaleda Zia government maintained that HUJI was ‘not present’ in the country which can be attributed to JEI’s presence and influence in the government.[41] However, in the wake of the 2005 bomb blasts, the BNP government was forced to ban the HUJI and the JMB in August 2005.[42]

Another largely overlooked incident involves Bangladesh’s terrorist connection to Southeast Asia. Prior to being captured in Thailand in August 2003, the former operational planner of the Jemaah Islamiya (JI) terrorist group, Hambali, who helped organise the 2002 Bali night club bombings which resulted in the deaths of 202 people, had made a decision to shift JI elements to Bangladesh in response to recent counter-terrorist activity in Southeast Asia. Hambali identified Bangladesh as a safe refuge and a place where sleeper cell of future leaders in Pakistan could be set up.[43]

In October 2003, The Central Bank of Bangladesh ordered the country’s commercial banks and financial institutions to freeze the accounts of several Malaysian nationals associated with the JI for their suspected
involvement in financing terrorists. Some of those were senior members of the JI, including Noordin Mohammad Top, Azahari Bin Husan and Zulki Marzuki.[44]

**Terrorist Recruitment in the West**

Although more heavily monitored by the authorities now, the JMB continues using the Internet and social networking forums to recruit new members online, luring university students to its fold and this has potential repercussions for the West. Rajib Karim, a member of JMB, lived in the United Kingdom and was employed as an information technology expert with British Airways. Karim's activities involved raising money and making propaganda videos for JMB. Yet Karim eventually came under the influence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in particular, the operative Anwar al-`Awlaqi, the Yemeni-American cleric based in Yemen and involved in a number of terrorist plots against the United States.[45]

Karim then attempted to switch jobs within British Airways, applying for a position as a member of the cabin crew with the intention of smuggling an explosive device on-board a trans-Atlantic flight. However, British authorities arrested Karim, who eventually received a 30-year prison sentence in February 2011.[46]

On 13th August, 2009, a US court found Ehsanul Islam Sadequee guilty. He was convicted of conspiracy to materially support terrorists where the Internet was used to plot attacks and form a loose network connecting North America, Europe and South Asia. Sadequee was sentenced to 17 years in prison. Sadequee, although the son of Bangladeshi immigrants and raised in Roswell, Georgia, spent a considerable amount of time in Bangladesh, plotting terrorist activities connected to the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Bosnia & Herzegovina. Sadequee had even tried to link up with the Taliban.[47]

On 9th August, 2013, Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis, a Bangladeshi national, was sentenced to 30 years in prison after pleading guilty to terrorism charges for trying to blow up the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. Nafis was arrested after he tried to detonate what he thought was a 1,000-pound truck bomb outside the bank in October 2012. He pleaded guilty in February 2013 to attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction and for attempting to provide material support to Al-Qaeda.[48]

Nafis had come to the United States in January 2012 on a student visa and enrolled at a Missouri college to study cyber-security. However, his real motivations were more sinister. Prior to coming to the United States, Nafis had been expelled from North South University in Bangladesh in 2012 after he had performed poorly in examinations. North South University was the same institution where the assassins of blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider studied at. In his trial it was stated that Nafis became radicalised at North South University and came to the US with aspirations of jihad.[49]

**Conclusion**

The growth of the JEI in the democratic political process has also provided an atmosphere for the growth of extra-parliamentary militancy. A centrifugal problem is emerging in Bangladesh that threatens trouble for the region and beyond if left unchallenged. Yet so far it has been largely unnoticed in the West.

Bangladesh had endured a wave of violent radicalisation during the 1999-2005 period. The emergence of groups like ABT illustrates that a new generation of violent extremists are emerging. As in other countries, the Internet is increasingly becoming their lifeblood, enabling extremists to spread their doctrine and establishing clandestine networks.

The secular and nationalist foundations of moderate Bangladesh are being undermined by a culture of
political violence and the rise of Islamist extremists. Although the JEI was banned by the government from taking part in the general elections, it still commands a significant and loyal following. It is not about to disappear anytime soon even if the war crime tribunals causes some discomfort for its leadership.

A further deterioration of Bangladesh’s democracy and political stability could create additional space within which Islamist militants may be increasingly free to operate not just for domestic terrorist activity but for preparing internationals plots as well. Such developments may have destabilising implications for Bangladesh, South Asia, and beyond. They also have the potential to affect U.S. and European policies in combating international terrorism.

This concern is being highlighted by the fact that European nationals of Bangladeshi origin are travelling to fight with Al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria. The proliferation of this activity raises a number of security concerns because it creates a potential nexus and blow-back between Europe, Bangladesh and Syria.

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[20] Ibid., The HEI was formed in January 2010, in opposition to plans to give women the same rights of inheritance as men.


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III. Resources

Bibliography: Arab Spring (Part 2)
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism - BSPT-JT-2014-3]

Abstract
This follow-up bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the Arab Spring/Awakening/Uprisings. To keep up with the rapid changing political events, more recent publications have been prioritized during the selection process. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, Arab Spring, Arab Awakening, Arab Uprisings

NB: All websites were last visited on 25.05.2014. This subject bibliography is preceded by an earlier part (Part 1). To provide new content, the author only considered literature not contained in Part 1 (Exemption: Meta resources, such as bibliographies, were included in both parts). Literature on the Syrian conflict was excluded; it was covered in an earlier issue of Perspectives on Terrorism; an update on Syria is planned.–See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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The-struggle-for-citizenship-the-key-to-understanding-the-Arab-uprisings


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Terrorists, Extremists, Militants: Selected Biographies, Autobiographies and related Documents and Writings

Compiled by Eric Price

[BSPT - EP -2014-3]

NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterix [*] only have a clickable table of contents/only more information.


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Non-Conventional Literature


Prime Journal Articles


Dillon, M.: *Patriotism and valour are in your blood: necropolitical subjectivities in the terrorist* (1999) *Studies*


See also Resources on the Internet:


Infamous terrorists–Biography Channel [http://www.biography.com/people/groups/terrorists#awesm=--oCsTKz9IreUZt]

Nazi Biographies; Hitler and his henchmen [http://www.auschwitz.dk/id4.htm]

Terrorists Biography – Barnes & Noble [http://www.barnesandnoble.com/s/?csrfToken=aDXE pzmye1JhSqvD OgVSCeHG1OTdIge2&sort=R&size=65&category_id=328835]

The Top 10 Terrorist of All-Time – NewsOne [http://newsone.com/1206695/top-10-terrorists-of-all-time/]

About the Compiler: Eric Price is a Professional Information Specialist who worked for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) before he joined, upon retirement, ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’ as Editorial Assistant.
IV. Book Reviews

“Counterterrorism Bookshelf” – Eight Books on Terrorism & Counter-terrorism Related Subjects

by Joshua Sinai

Note: This column consists of capsule reviews. Future columns will continue to review books by publishers such as Palgrave Macmillan, Routledge, Springer, Stanford University Press, and the University of Chicago Press.


This comprehensive and authoritative handbook about Hamas is the first book in several years to be published about this important Palestinian militant organization. It is divided into three parts. The first part presents a 40-page historical overview of Hamas’s evolution from a Palestinian extension of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to its current role as the Gaza Strip’s ruling party (with the rival Palestinian Authority in control of portions of the West Bank). Also covered are Hamas’s historical origins and its organizational structure, which is discussed in great detail, including in a highly informative chart. The second part – and the handbook’s longest portion at approximately 570 pages – consists of more than 300 entries about Hamas that are listed in alphabetical order, such as detailed biographies of its leaders and operatives, military units, funding fronts, relations with state sponsors such Iran. The third part (approximately 60 pages) is composed of four appendices – the movement’s charter, a table containing data about its Legislative Council members, and a listing of major terrorist attacks carried out by its operatives against Israeli targets. Also included is a detailed bibliography of books and articles about Hamas. With significant new developments involving Hamas since the book’s publication, it is hoped that a new and updated edition will be published that is also better organized with more clearly differentiated sections, including an index. Nevertheless, this handbook is highly recommended as an indispensable reference resource on Hamas. The author has served as an officer and head of training in the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) history department.


A comprehensive examination of effective governmental counter-terrorism strategies to reduce the terrorist threat based on best practices drawn from a crime prevention perspective. This is important, the author points out, because "terrorist violence is a serious form of crime and should be treated as such…" (p. 2) As part of the measures required to reduce the threat of terrorism facing a targeted government, the author has developed a holistic model that integrates what are traditionally viewed as the separate tracks or activities of ‘prevention’ of terrorism and ‘responses’ to terrorism. In this unified model, nine key preventive mechanisms are identified to enable those involved in countering terrorism, whether as governmental action officers or academic analysts, to conceptualise systematically how to prevent and reduce terrorist outbreaks. These nine preventive mechanisms, which are adapted from criminology (and which constitute the book’s major portion), consist of (1) establishing normative barriers to committing criminal acts, such as terrorism; (2) reducing recruitment into terrorism, for instance, by reducing the root causes that might drive individuals into such violent activity; (3) employing deterrence measures through the threat of punishment to get potential perpetrators to refrain from engaging in terrorist acts; (4) disrupting potential terrorist acts during their pre-incident phases; (5) protecting potentially vulnerable targets by reducing the opportunities to attack them; (6) reducing the harmful consequences of terrorist attacks; (7) reducing the rewards from terrorist acts;
incapacitating or neutralizing potential perpetrators from being able to carry out terrorist attacks; and (9), where possible, employing desistance, disengagement and rehabilitation measures to facilitate the re-integration of previous terrorists into a ‘normal life.’ (pp. 11-12)

The author points out that when these nine sub-strategies are applied to actual terrorist threats facing a country at the national and local levels, one needs to determine how the various preventive mechanisms will function to reduce a specific terrorist problem, determine which measures or methods can be used to activate these mechanism, identify the principal actors to implement the various methods, identify the target groups for the various strategies and their measures to apply against, and, in the final two applications, identify the strengths and limitations of the effects of these preventive measures. (p. 24).

The author concludes that in preventing terrorism one of the major challenges is “to find an appropriate balance between short-term and long-term prevention strategies, and between the repressive and constructive measures.” (p. 96). To do so, he recommends employing “multiple preventive mechanisms and their pertinent measures instead of focusing on a narrower range of mechanisms and measures [in order to make it] possible to reduce the pressure from each individual measure.” (p. 97). By providing such a comprehensive, systematic and integrated framework to identify the components that constitute an effective counter-terrorism campaign, this short book is bound to be considered as one of the classical works in the discipline of counterterrorism studies. Prof. Alex Schmid, this journal’s editor, wrote the book’s Foreword. This book is part of the publisher’s Palgrave Pivot series of books at lengths between a journal article and a monograph. Dr. Bjogo, the author, is Professor of Police Science at the Norwegian Police University College and Adjunct Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.


This is the second edition of the authors’ textbook which was initially published in 2010, when it gained wide acceptance as one of the leading textbooks used by governmental intelligence agencies on structured techniques for intelligence analysis [the first edition was reviewed in a previous column published in the journal’s Vol. 7, No. 2013 issue]. In this substantially revised and expanded edition, five new structured analytic techniques were added to the previous edition’s 50 techniques. The new techniques consist of AIMS (Audience, Issue, Message, and Storyline), Venn Analysis, Cone of Plausibility, Decision Trees and Impact Matrix, with the previous Quadrant Crunching technique split into two parts – Classic Quadrant Crunching and Foresight Quadrant Crunching. Four other previous techniques were revised – Getting Started Checklist, Customer Checklist, Red Hat Analysis, and Indicators Validator. Also scattered throughout the textbook are new discussions of topics such as intuitive versus analytic approaches to thinking, a discussion of where structured analytic techniques fit in to various intelligence-related topics, and how such techniques can be used to deal with what the authors describe as “cognitive biases and intuitive traps” that might be encountered by intelligence analysts. (p. xviii). The authors also discuss new directions how structured analytic techniques might be employed in the future. The book provides numerous applications and methodologies for effective structured analysis of terrorism- and counterterrorism-related subjects. The authors are former high-ranking CIA officers who had developed some of the analytic methodologies discussed in the volume themselves. Currently, Mr. Heuer is a private consultant and Mr. Pherson is President of Pherson Associates, LLC, of Reston, Virginia, a provider of training on intelligence analytic techniques.

This handbook provides highly useful guidance for writing analytic papers, whether for governmental intelligence, military or law enforcement agencies, public policy research institutes, or other entities such as businesses. Since the objective of effective analytic reports, regardless of their length, is to inform their intended reader audiences – who may be busy or preoccupied with other tasks – it is crucial for writers of such papers to be able to communicate the main points of their ideas, information and recommendations in a clear and concise manner. To accomplish this objective, the handbook’s chapters cover topics such as how to organize one’s analysis (e.g., creating a mission statement, developing an “analytic line of march,” and preparing a detailed outline), writing the first draft (e.g., building paragraphs around important topic sentences, ordering the supporting information, and treating peripheral information separately), and refining the draft (e.g., reviewing paragraphs for analytic coherence, ‘economizing’ on words, and conducting a final review). A glossary covers commonly used terms, proofreading symbols, and recommended readings. Both authors are former high-ranking CIA officers. Mr. Kaiser is an associate of Pherson Associates, LLC, of which Mr. Pherson is the President.


A highly authoritative, extensively researched and richly detailed examination of the origins and evolution of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA), which was instrumental in the successful insurgency against Serbian rule over Kosovo in the late 1990s. The book’s chapters cover topics ranging from its role as an underground guerrilla army during the period 1950 to 1990, its further evolution in the 1990s (in parallel with other insurgent movements in the former Yugoslavia) against what it perceived as the harsh rule of former Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic. It deals also with its alliance with NATO and its demobilization once Serbian control ended and the newly independent republics of the former Yugoslavia were established. Also discussed is the situation in Preshevo (the Albanian majority inhabited areas of southern Serbia) and Macedonia in 2000-2001. The book’s epilogue updates the discussion through 2010, and includes a terrifically insightful discussion of the strategic and tactical successes and weaknesses of the KLA’s insurgency within the larger context of modern insurgencies, whether following the model of Mao Tse-tung or what the author terms “the classic Titoist Partisan” paradigm that was based on the Bolshevik experience. (pp. 251-252) The author teaches Balkan history at St Cross College, Oxford University.


This is a highly comprehensive, informative and authoritative examination of the origins and evolution of the Taliban, the main insurgent movement in Afghanistan. Written as a textbook, the book’s chapters cover general topics and also provide fascinating capsule biographies of key Taliban leaders, tables that highlight significant issues (such as the traits of a failed or failing state and its applicability to Afghanistan), and chapter summaries. General topics covered range from the landscape of Afghanistan’s history, the nature of its population and Islamic religion, the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the founding of the Taliban in the 1980s (including what the author terms “the mind of the Taliban” in terms of the blend in its religious ideology of Salafism, Deobandism, and Sharia), the nature of the Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, its overthrow by the United States-led coalition following al Qaida’s 9/11 attacks (which originated in Afghanistan under Taliban patronage), the reconstitution of the Taliban in Pakistan, the creation of Taliban ‘self-governing’ institutions in Pakistan’s tribal regions, and the launch of its
insurgency campaign against the newly-formed Kabul government. The author’s discussion of the Taliban’s ‘self-governing’ structures in Pakistan, as well as its intelligence and security apparatuses and sets of tactics and targeting in its warfare, is one of the best accounts available. Also highly useful is his discussion of what he terms “Taliban Inc.” – the vast criminal enterprises run by the Taliban – based on the country’s narcotics growing and trafficking trade – that have made it one of the world’s wealthiest insurgent movements. The Taliban’s affiliated insurgent groups are also covered, with valuable overviews of al Qaida, the Haqqani network, Tehrik i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as well as the connections between the Taliban and al Qaida and Pakistan’s security services.

The final chapter discusses the effectiveness of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, which is filled with numerous insights, including an innovative table that outlines the legacy traits of the three epochs of counterinsurgency in the Philippines, Malaya, and Vietnam and their application to Afghanistan. Also highly useful is the author’s formulation of seven rules of effectiveness in counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and an additional table that outlines metrics of progress in achieving them. With the United States and its coalition allies scheduled to draw down their involvement in Afghanistan after 2014, this book serves as an indispensable handbook for those interested in understanding the extent of progress made so far and the likely security challenges that lie ahead. The author is a veteran senior analyst in a United States Army intelligence agency with extensive experience in covering Afghan affairs.


A well-researched and extensively documented examination of the nature of the ideological and organisational links between the Taliban and al Qaida since the formation of their respective organisations (and their predecessors) more than 40 years ago. To accomplish their objectives, the authors divide the book into discreet historical periods in Afghanistan since 1970 in which the two organisations and their predecessors played significant roles. It is important to study such links, the authors write, because of a prevailing view which they attempt to debunk that the United States-led coalition’s involvement in Afghanistan has been predicated on the assumption that defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan would deny al Qaida a sanctuary in Afghanistan in which to plan and launch its attacks its worldwide. (p. 334) The authors argue that such an assumption is also faulty because the Afghan Taliban are generally not focused on “internationalist jihadi rhetoric” and, with the exception of Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant to the United States who had plotted – and subsequently failed – in September 2009 to bomb the New York City subway system, no Afghans have been “involved in an act of international terrorism...” (p. 334) While this contention can be challenged idiomatically as a ‘splitting of hairs’ since, as demonstrated by the case of Faisal Shahzad, the ‘failed’ Times Square bomber in May 2009, he was actually dispatched by the Pakistani (and not the Afghani) Taliban, can one really contend, as do the authors, that the warfare aims of the Afghani Taliban and al Qaida “diverge more often than they converge”? It is likely that the Pakistani Taliban and al Qaida’s operatives remaining in Pakistan are likely to cooperate in many ventures. Once the Afghan Taliban succeed in increasing the territory under their control in the coming years, al Qaida’s influence (and perhaps presence, as well) in those regions will also likely increase. Aside from such quibbling over the actual linkages between the Afghan Taliban, their Pakistani counterparts, and al Qaida in Pakistan, there is much to commend in this important book, which is well-written, well organized, and, based on the authors extensive field work in Afghanistan, reads like a truly inside account of the Afghan Taliban. The authors, who have worked in Afghanistan since 2006, are the founders of AfghanWire, an online research and media-monitoring group that focuses on local Afghan media.

A highly innovative conceptually and empirically-based examination of the role of military coups in causing regime changes, including the overthrow, in certain cases, of democratically-elected governments. To develop his theory of coup dynamics and outcomes, the author conducted extensive interviews with previous coup participants, and, as part of the study's empirical component, compiled a dataset of 471 coup attempts worldwide from 1950 to 2000. Based on such data, which is discussed the book's third chapter, the author finds that it is essential to analyse the role and dynamics of discreet military factions, which he categorizes in terms of three types of coup origination, as coups from top military officers, coups from the middle ranks, and mutinous coups from low level soldiers. One of the author’s findings is that successful coups are characterized by a military faction that projects a sense of impending victory at capturing control of their targeted government. The analysis of successful military coup attempts, the author writes, is also applicable to the study of counter-insurgency strategy, as he notes that “During a civil conflict, the side that can gather more popular support is more likely to win, even if civilian support is neither necessary or sufficient.” (p. 229)

At the same time, he cautions, it is imperative for a new regime to address the expectations and needs of the civilian population because otherwise any popular support will quickly diminish. This was, for instance, the case in Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's unpopular regime, when such dissatisfaction led to the breaking out of a new insurgency against the new political order. This study's findings are especially relevant in the current period following successful coups by the militaries in Egypt and Thailand and the many challenges facing these new rulers in addressing the needs of their populations. The author is an Assistant Professor of international security studies at the Air War College in Alabama.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.
V. Op-Ed

Terrorism and Jihad: Differences and Similarities

by Philipp Holtmann

What many Westerners call criminal terrorism is, in the eyes of many Islamists, legitimate jihad. They say they are opposed to terrorism but by this they mean certain uses of force against one target but not again another. Are we talking about different phenomena when we talk about terrorism and jihad or are these basically the same? Jihad is sometimes translated as holy war, i.e. religiously sanctioned warfare. In Islam, jihad has been around for more than 1300 years. Terrorism as we know it is, as a doctrine, little more than 200 years old when we take the Terreur phase of the French revolution (1793-1974) as point of departure, or little more than 140 years old when we look at non-state propaganda-by-the-deed type terrorism of the anarchist sort. In the meantime, both terrorism and jihad have evolved, at least to some extent.

It is well-known that the United Nations has not managed to arrive at an internationally binding legal definition of terrorism. This has been mainly due to the ambiguity of war doctrines of Western states during the Cold War and the opposition from Islamic and Arab regimes who were eager to allow certain Islamist and leftist liberation movements to engage in dubious tactics against Israel and India – tactics they would not permit if used against their own regimes. There is a greater degree of agreement on a definition of terrorism in the academic world where a consensus definition has emerged, characterising terrorism as a “... conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.” [1] That is the practice side of terrorism. However, terrorism also refers to a doctrine of unconventional or irregular warfare and indeed, jihad can contain elements of terrorism – in terms of ideology, strategy and tactics. At the same time, it also has various different meanings in modern Muslim culture, such as an effort towards a “religiously commendable goal,” or simply a “crusade,” such as “a crusade against smoking,” which might, for example, be used as a slogan in a Muslim country to boost a public health campaign.

Some modern Muslim scholars claim that the goal of true jihad is to “establish a just social order”; others add that the way to realise this objective is through violent struggle. [2] In addition, some classical and modern Muslim thinkers divide jihad into a “struggle by the heart and soul” (fighting evil), “struggle by the tongue and pen” (spreading the word of Islam), “struggle by the hand” (political action or protest), and “struggle by the sword” (armed fighting). Yet the dominant meaning of “jihad” in Sunni Muslim culture remains “Islamic warfare,” which refers to war, more specifically to fighting with the intent to kill (qital). This interpretation of jihad is paramount in Islamic texts and has been addressed in Islamic juridical sources since the very beginning of the canonisation of Islamic law.

The canonised body of Islamic law texts (Quran, traditions, interpretations and legal opinions by the four main Sunni law schools) that surrounds the concept of “jihad” is much larger and more developed than similar concepts of holy war in other religions.[3] This idea materialises in thousands of stipulations and allegedly “sound” (i.e. authentic) traditions by the Prophet and his companions. It refers to conduct in war, treatment of civilians or incitement to jihad. These have been collected around two centuries after Muhammad’s death, but some are even older.

Traditional references to jihad are often confusing and contradicting each other. It must be assumed that different Muslim leaders tried to protect their own interests by forging traditions in order to improve their
standing in the intra-Muslim conflicts during the rampant factionalism in the early centuries of Islam. Between the 11th and 13th centuries, new legal works on jihad, for example by the scholar Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126-1198) or by the puritan renewer Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) emerged. Averroes explained the positions of all four major legal schools in Islam on jihad. Ibn Taymiyya expounded on the religious and moral doctrine of jihad, first and foremost as expansionist Islamic warfare, but also as defensive warfare against rulers and invaders who were only Muslims in name (like the Mongol invaders). Jihad was also used when referring to the quelling of rebellious Muslim groups. This indicates that Muslims were in need of clarification regarding the Islamic core concept of jihad. It also shows that changing circumstances led to dynamic changes in the interpretation of jihad. Modern Salafist jihadis have taken bits and pieces out of classical legal debates to justify what are essentially terrorist tactics, sometimes in the name of “defense,” at other times as an instrument of “deterrence,” but also to justify aggressive, i.e. “offensive” measures. Yet the psychological element that underlies all three of these justifications remains the same: causing fright, fear and panic that goes beyond the direct targets of violent attacks – something that terrorism tries to achieve too.

Specific elements of endemic warfare and tribal culture have influenced the classical Islamic worldview and doctrine of war. The early Islamic ummah saw itself as a tribe at war with the surrounding non-Muslim rulers and empires. In such a situation, Muslims saw it as their duty to expand the Islamic territory and to bring as many new converts under its rule as possible. The classical core concept of jihad is thus one of war for the purpose of imperial conquest, embellished by a religiously beneficial ideology. Moreover, the normal state of affairs among pre-Islamic Arabic tribes was one of constant warfare, interrupted by temporary truces. Codes of chivalry of tribal fighting forbade the killing of some categories of non-combatants, especially children and women. These rules were incorporated into the Islamic legal doctrine of war, the development of which was largely completed by the end of the second (8th century CE) century after the hijra (emigration of Muhammad from Mekka to Medina).[4]

Yet, such chivalry had its limits. The vast corpus of Islamic traditions on war contains numerous cases in which the Prophet Muhammad or other influential opinion leaders of the original Muslim community allowed the killing of prisoners, non-combatants and civilians–either for deterrence or in the form of acceptable collateral damage; there are specific rules on both in Islamic law. There are, however, conflicting legal opinions on these issues in the different legal schools of classical Islam.

These old debates are still relevant when it comes to the question: what exactly is the role of terrorism in jihad? The suppression and consequent radicalisation of Islamist oppositional groups in the second half of the 20th century in the Middle East and North Africa ushered in a period of simplified and politicised theological interpretations as Islamic warfare doctrines were re-interpreted by young revolutionaries without a formal religious education. These Islamists were soon joined by educated clerics who had become radicalised themselves. Most of them had emerged from the Salafist fundamentalist strands of Sunni Islam. These sub-state actors adopted and adapted bits and pieces from classical jihad concepts to their needs – e.g. the justification of assassination and terrorist tactics, as was, for instance, demonstrated in the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat on October 6, 1981.

Their theological justification of “jihad” as “legitimate terrorism” (irhab mashru’) continues to this day. Since the 1990s, this has been leading to a shift away from the mere use of terrorist tactics to the formulation of genuine terrorist strategies. Doctrinaire “jihadis” regard terrorism as “legitimate,” since their goal–establishing a “just” Islamic order–allegedly justifies indiscriminate political violence. Revolutionary and militant Muslim actors like Osama Bin Laden and Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri have formulated specific doctrines merging terrorism and jihad. One oft these ideologues, Dr. Fadl, wrote a handbook on assassination tactics and issued the general guideline that “terrorism is part of Islam.” [5] When this Egyptian jihadist ideologue
was caught and imprisoned, he and four other historical leaders of al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya (IG) had second thoughts and called Al-Qaeda’s jihadism an unlawful and murderous deviation from the traditional interpretation of jihad.[6]

Yet terms that are frequently translated as “terror” and “terrorising” appear also in the Quran. For example, Surat al-Anfal 8:60, commands the following: “Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know.” [7] Numerous legal interpretations by classical and modern Islamic scholars have treated this injunction to justify deterrent and frightening war tactics. Modern extremists have come to the conclusion that this verse legitimises terrorism and the killing of civilians. Yet, this extremist view cannot stand up to a careful weighing of arguments, such as advocated by a reformed Islamic jurisprudence. The terrorist jihadists overlook that the classical stipulation merely commands to “prepare” terrorising, frightening tactics—as a psychological weapon to facilitate conquering the enemy or defeating him, which is a classical war tactic. This particular Sura is therefore not a blank endorsement for the indiscriminate killing of civilians.

Cherry-picking such verses from the Quran, seemingly provides salafi jihadists with a licence to kill indiscriminately. They have thrown all scrupels, all rules and any notions of mercy over board in their attempt to achieve with their atrocities all-pervasive shock and fear. Their doctrinaire jihadist terrorist strategy is based on a theologico-political justification of “legitimate terrorism” which includes “terrorist deterrence” strategies and specific terrorist tactics. The formulation of such concepts has certainly been influenced and continues to be supported by some of the extremist members of fundamentalist ideologies of Sunni Islam (Salafism and Wahhabism). However, there are salient differences between the extremist terrorist jihad concept and the broader Islamic warfare concept. In the broader concept, the question whether civilians may or may not be attacked is subject to debates and qualifications. The broader concept of Islamic warfare is not a revolutionary one but is dominated by an imperialist worldview which has as its goal the conquest of territory. In the broader concept of Islamic warfare, “terrorism” is but one element and it is mainly used for deterrence and for tactical purposes. Classical expansionist jihad is first and foremost a collective duty (fard ‘ala al-kifaya), which is considered to be fulfilled once a certain number of warriors appointed by the ruler are sent into battle. Contemporary terrorist jihad, on the other hand, is mostly interpreted by sub-state actors as an individual religious obligation (fard ‘ala al-‘ayn) that depends on personal initiative and on “God’s guidance.”

Yet, both concepts may merge if jihad becomes defensive and Muslim people are subject to attack and not capable to defend themselves: in that case, the legal schools stipulate that all Muslims who are capable to assist their brethren under attack must do so. Numerous Sunni Muslims, including state-clergy in Islamic countries, refute terrorist jihad, although they would most certainly support an official jihad-war in case their country’s leader authorises it. In such a case, they might also be willing to support terrorist tactics. A good example of scholarly flexibility is the role of Egypt’s official al-Azhar clergy in the 1970s. In the 1973 “Yom Kippur War” with Israel the clerics were at the forefront of declaring this conventional offensive war a “jihad,” advocating the “instillation of fear and terror in the enemies hearts.” Yet only a few years later, some of the very same clerics also managed to find theological justifications for the U.S.-brokered peace treaty with Israel in 1979 (sulh, musalaha).[8]

In conclusion, “jihad” stands for a broad culture of Islamic warfare by state and, more recently, sub-state actors. On the one hand, it includes clearly formulated concepts related to terrorism and psychological deterrence. Yet, on the other hand, it also includes clearly formulated rules regarding the safeguarding of civilians and non-combatants in times of war. In the mainstream interpretation of jihad by the four primary
Sunni schools of law, individuals and non-state actors cannot declare jihad; this is the sole prerogative of political authorities of a state. However, like other religious doctrines, the concept of jihad is malleable and prone to abuse by those religious and revolutionary entrepreneurs who manage to impose their idiosyncratic definition of power on the concept. In the hands of fanatic true believers, jihad becomes not just an instrument of warfare but a recipe and licence for terrorism and war crimes.

Let me conclude with a word of caution: we should be very careful not to regard “Islamic warfare” practices per se as worse, less humane and more unethical than their Western equivalent. While many Westerners regard Islam’s martial culture as inferior due to its gruesome connection to terrorism, this view does not stand the test of careful historical analysis but is based on cultural bias. War crimes, including terrorism, have been, and continue to be, frequent occurrences in Western forms of conflict-waging. Propaganda tends to blacken the historical record of an adversary’s culture and whitewash one’s own past. This tends to be true for all sides involved in armed conflict.

About the Author: Philipp Holtmann is an analyst specialising in the Middle East, where he has lived and worked in several countries. Dr. Holtmann conducts in-depth research on jihadist media as well as on Muslim conflicts and reconciliation issues. He is a Research Associate of the Terrorism Research Initiative. His publications include ‘Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s Jihad Concept’ (2009), ‘Virtual Leadership: How Jihadis Guide Each Other in Cyberspace’ (2012), ‘The Symbols of Online Jihad’ (2013), ‘The Use and Genre of Huda’ (encouraging battle songs) versus Anashid (praiseful hymns) in Jihadi Propaganda’ (2013), and ‘Countering Al-Qaeda’s Single Narrative’ (2013).

Notes


[2] The above quote is from the Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman Malik. Another Muslim scholar, Mahmoud Ayoub, claims that the goal of true jihad is to achieve harmony between Islam faith and righteous living. But other Muslim interpreters of jihad hold that this harmony can only be achieved when all unbelievers have been defeated. – M.C. Jon. Jihad – The Four Forms and the West, accessed June 8, 2014 at http://www.islam-watch.org/home/165-ion-me/1447-jihad—the-four-forms-and-the-west.pdf.

[3] There are also texts that discuss rules of engagement, looking for solutions to regulate conduct during warfare in the Old Testament or in the Indian Sanskrit text Mahabharata. Yet, these are not to the same degree developed as in Islamic texts. One of the reasons for this is that Christian culture before the 18th century enlightenment period was characterised by a stronger separation, but also competition, between political and religious spheres. As a result, the formulation of concrete warfare doctrines belonged mainly to worldly thinkers like Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645). Such a separation of politics and religion is alien to classical Islam which postulates a seamless connection between state and religion, encompassing faith, politics, society, governance and law – all based on Islamic precepts, core sources and authoritative interpretations.


VI. News

News from the Country Coordinators of TRI’s Network of PhD Theses Writers

by Alex P. Schmid

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) seeks to improve the quality of research on terrorism and counter-terrorism as well as related research on political violence and armed conflict. One instrument is TRI’s annual award for the best doctoral dissertation in this field. Another is the maintenance of national or regional networks of post-graduate students working on their PhD theses.

Currently there are ten such networks in place and there has been some interest of creating additional ones. Each network has a local coordinator, often a PhD candidate him- or herself, in some cases an academic professor or professional with a PhD degree. One of the objectives of local networks is to make the writing of a doctoral thesis a less solitary experience and to allow young scholars to reap the multiple benefits of cooperation – in line with the mission statement of the Terrorism Research Initiative “enhancing security through collaborative research”.

Some of our national and (sub-)regional networks are more active than others. Below a summary of progress reports received from three networks: the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries and Sub-Saharan Africa.

(i) TAPVA: TRI’s UK Network (based on report by Dr. Gordon Clubb, coordinator TAPVA)

Over the last year, the Terrorism and Political Violence Association (TAPVA) has concluded the first phase of its Knowledge Exchange project, which involved creating research partnerships within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office and a range of other partners. This project had secured over £10,000 in funding. A second phase of the project will be announced in September 2014. Details on one aspect of the project–building links with professional services–can be found at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2013/12/17/professional-service-sector-pathways-to-impact/

Members of TAPVA across the UK have also been involved in writing a book which is due to be published in early 2015 -http://www.amazon.co.uk/Terrorism-Political-Violence-Caroline-Kennedy-Pipe/dp/1446272818 .The Foreword to the volume has been provided by the coordinator of the country networks, Alex P. Schmid

TAPVA's energetic team of Research Assistants has hosted two successful events at the University of Leeds, seeking to engage undergraduate students with cutting-edge terrorism research. The first event saw Paul Rogers and Jason Ralph deliver presentations on ‘Obama’s War on Terror’. The second event, ‘The IRA’s Ceasefire: 20 Years On’, saw presentations from Jonathan Tonge, Paul Morrison, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Aaron Edwards, Sophie Whiting and Gordon Clubb.

Over the coming year, TAPVA plans to re-invigorate its PhD theses writers network. It will also announce details about its second international conference in 2015, following the success of the 2013 Horizon Scanning conference held in London where Prof. Alex Schmid gave the keynote address. The UK country coordinator, Gordon Clubb completed his PhD thesis on “Disengagement and De-Radicalisation in the Irish Republican Movement” in June 2014. Shortly thereafter he has been appointed as a Lecturer in International Security at the University of Leeds in the School of Politics and International Studies.
The Norwegian & Nordic network of PhD theses writers remains a small circle, as there are very few PhD-project opportunities, at least in Norway – and this even after the 22 July 2011 attacks by Anders Behring Breivik in Oslo and Utoya. The outcome of the recent Norwegian national research grants round (SAMRISK II), setting the course for the next five years, is not likely to change this situation. Outside the Norwegian Police University College and the Norwegian Defence Research Institute (FFI), there are few funded opportunities for terrorism research for PhD theses writers.

Some members of the Nordic network, in particular Jacob Aasland Ravndal (FFI) and Cato Hemmingby, have been quite active with regard to participation in conferences and workshops at home and abroad. The coordinator has approached two more potential candidates for the TRI network at FFI. Yet they have not yet confirmed their participation. There is also a PhD-candidate in Bergen who might join the network in the near future. He is working under Prof. Jan Oscar Engene, on counter-jihadist movements. The coordinator sees the benefits of closer links with other Nordic countries and has linked up with Hans Brun in Sweden. Brun is a PhD-candidate working with Prof. Magnus Ranstorp, although he is placed at Kings College in London.

PhD theses in the making in the Nordic network include

Name of author: Hans Brun (Sweden).
Thesis title: The Use of Hard Power and its impact on the IRA’s operational capabilities.
University, institution: Kings College, Dep. of War Studies.
Expected date of completion: Late 2014

Name of author: Cato Hemmingby
Thesis title: The Terrorist Target Selection Process: Influencing factors with regard to terrorists’ choice of targets.
University, institution: Norwegian Police University College
Expected date of completion: 2016

Name of author: Anne Siri Johnsen
Thesis title: Helicopter Emergency Medical Services in Major Incidents: Patterns of use and influence on outcome.
University, institution: University of Stavanger
Expected date of completion: 2019

Name of author: Jacob Aasland Ravndal

**University, institution:** Norwegian Defence Research Institute, Terrorism Research Group.

**Expected date of completion:** 2016

(iii) Southern and Sub-Saharan Africa Network (based on report by Coordinator Petra Harvest)

While there have been no joint workshops in the past year, the African network is expanding. Tonie Botha joined the network in 2013. He is working on a thesis with the title «Broadening the Concept of Security to Include Threats Other Than Military Threats» is conducted at the University of Pretoria and will probably finish in 2015.

A postgraduate student from Nigeria, Emeka Thaddues Njoku, is working on «Counter Terrorism and Civil Society in Nigeria» at the University of Ibadan. He is still at the beginning stages of the thesis. Lyle Pienaar, who is studying at the University of Pretoria and whose thesis is on organised crime as a national security issue, will complete his PhD thesis before the end of 2014. Anneli Botha, who is working on «Radicalization to Commit Terrorism from a Political Socialization Perspective in Kenya and Uganda», is planning to complete her thesis this year, graduating by early 2015 at the University of the Free State, South Africa. Petra Harvest also hopes to complete her thesis in early 2015.

Leaza Jernberg, is studying at the University of the Witwatersrand. Her thesis on the security of sea lanes will still take some time to complete due to the fact that she recently gave birth to twins. Andrews Atta-Asamoah, from Ghana, who is studying through the University of Cape Town, and whose topic is “Transnational Security Challenges and Statehood in Africa. Case Study: Drug Trafficking in Ghana”, is planning to complete the thesis later this year, graduating by early 2015. Samuel Adotey Anum, from Ghana, is studying through the University of Pretoria. His topic is “The new insurgencies and mass uprisings in Africa and international involvement: Selected case studies”. Since he was recently posted abroad, this has slowed the progress of his thesis.

Charles Nyuykonge, who is studying through the University of Zululand, and whose topic is «A review of international administration of justice: The relevance of the Rwandan GaÇaca restorative justice system for global peace and security», is very close to the completion of his doctoral thesis. Happy Kayuni, from Malawi, who is studying at the University of the Western Cape and whose topic is «The Westphalian Model and Trans-border Ethnic Identity: The case of the Chewa Kingdom of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia» will be completing thesis work by September 2014.

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NB: All thesis writers who complete their PhD in 2014 are encouraged to submit their doctoral dissertation for the competition for the annual TRI award for the best PhD thesis in terrorism and counterterrorism (Deadline: 31 March 2015).

**List of Country/Regional Coordinators of the PhD Thesis Writers Network**

- The United Kingdom. Country coordinator: [Gordon Clubb](mailto:Gordon.Clubb@un.org)
- The Netherlands and Flanders (Belgium). Country coordinator: [Daan Weggeman](mailto:Daan.Weggeman@un.org)
- Russia. Country coordinator: [Yulia Netesova](mailto:Yulia.Netesova@un.org)
• The United States. Country coordinator: Neil D. Shortland
• Canada. Country coordinator: Nick Deshpande
• South Africa. Country coordinator: Petra Harvest
• Australia: Country coordinator: Levi-Jay West
• Norway. Country Coordinator: Cato Hemmingby
• Spain. Country Coordinator: Miguel Peco
• Brazil. Country Coordinator: Jorge Lasmar

PS: If you want to participate in the creation of other country/regional networks, contact Dr. Alex Schmid, Coordinator TRI Theses Writers Network at apschmid@terrorismanalysts.com. If you want to join an existing one, contact the country coordinator.
VII. Notes from the Editors

About Perspectives on Terrorism

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at [www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com). It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as 'nontraditional' in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.

*Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism*

Alex P. Schmid, Editor-in-Chief
James J.F. Forest, Co-Editor
Joseph J. Easson, Associate Editor
Joshua Sinai, Books Reviews Editor
Eric Price, Editorial Assistant
Judith Tinnes, Editorial Assistant
Members of the Editorial Board

The Editorial Board of Perspectives on Terrorism currently consists of 20 experienced researchers. They are (in no particular order):

Shazad Ali (Karachi, Pakistan)
Joost Augusteijn (Leiden, The Netherlands)
Jeffrey M. Bale (Monterey, USA)
Michael Boyle (Philadelphia, USA)
Jarret Brachman (North Dakota, USA)
Richard Chasdi (Walsh College, USA)
James ‘‘Chip’’ O. Ellis (Vancouver, Canada)
Leah Farrall (Massey University, New Zealand)
Paul Gill (University College London)
Jennifer Giroux (ETH, Zürich, Switzerland)
M.J. Gohel (Asia-Pacific Foundation, London)
Beatrice de Graaf (Utrecht University, The Netherlands)
Thomas Hegghammer (Stanford University, USA)
Bradley McAllister (Washington, DC, USA)
John Morrison (University of East London)
Assaf Moghadam (ICT, Herzliya, Israel)
Sam Mullins (Wollongong, Australia)
Thomas Riegler (Vienna, Austria)
Simon Shen (Chinese University, Hong Kong)
Anne Speckhard (Georgetown University Medical School, USA)

Currently there are several vacancies on the Editorial Board. Readers of Perspective on Terrorism are invited to submit names of possible candidates. Selection will take place on the basis of the publication record of those nominated, taking also into account their contribution to a better gender and geographical balance of the Editorial Board.

Members of the Editorial Board act as peer-reviewers for articles submitted to Perspectives on Terrorism. In addition, the Editorial Board relies on the special expertise of other experienced researchers. In particular we would like to acknowledge the contributions of

Dr. Dean Alexander
Dr. O. Shawn Cupp
People Behind the Terrorism Research Initiative

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) has three Directors: Robert Wesley (President), Alex P. Schmid and James J.F. Forest. TRI has an International Advisory Board (currently 11 members), a Consortium of Participating Institutions (currently 17 institutions and centers) as well as Group of Individual Researchers (currently 110) guiding and supporting its efforts. They are listed below.

International Advisory Board of the Terrorism Research Initiative

Adam Dolnik, University of Wollongong, Australia.

Javier Jordán is a Professor at the Universidad de Granada, Spain, and Director of Athena Intelligence.

Gary LaFree is a Professor of Criminology at the University of Maryland and the Director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

David Rapoport is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at UCLA, a Mellon Foundation Emeritus Fellow, Founding and Co-Editor of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence.

Marc Sageman is a Consultant on transnational terrorism with various governmental agencies and foreign governments and the author of Understanding Terror Networks and Leaderless Jihad.

Michael Scheuer is currently a Senior Fellow with The Jamestown Foundation, prior to which he served in the CIA for 22 years where he was the Chief of the bin Laden Unit at the Counterterrorist Center from 1996 to 1999.

Yoram Schweitzer is a Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and Lecturer at Tel Aviv University.

Michael S. Stohl is Professor of Communication at the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB).

Jeff Victoroff is an Associate Professor of Clinical Neurology and Psychiatry at the Keck School of Medicine, University of Southern California.

Peter Waldmann is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Augsburg, Germany, and a long time member of the Advisory Board of the German Ministry of Development.

Leonard Weinberg is Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada.

Consortium of Participating Institutions

Athena Intelligence, Spain.

Center on Terrorism, John Jay College, USA.
Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC) at Campus The Hague of Leiden University, Netherlands.

(Handa) Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP), University of Wollongong, Australia.

Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, USA.

Defense & Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Department of International Relations, University of Minas (PUC), Brazil.

Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTRC), Monash University, Australia.

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore.

Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University, USA.

The Institute of International and European Affairs, (IIEA), Dublin, Ireland, with a branch in Brussels.

Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), Athens, Greece.

Research Unit, Political Violence, Terrorism and Radicalization, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Denmark.

University of the Pacific, School of International Studies, USA.

University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh Institute for the Study of Religion, Violence and Memory, USA.

**TRI’s Individual Participants**

**Mahan Abedin** is a former editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor and currently the Director of Research at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism, London. He is editor of Islamism Digest - a monthly academic journal specialising on the in-depth study of Islamic movements.

**Gary Ackerman** is Research Director at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

**Shaheen Afroze** is Research Director and Head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Division at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS).

**Abdullah Alaskar** is Professor of History at King Saud University, columnist, Riyadh daily newspaper.

**Mustafa Alani** is a Senior Advisor and Program Director in Security and Terrorism Studies at the Gulf Research Center, UAE.

**Rogelio Alonso** is Professor in Politics and Terrorism at Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid, where he holds the position of Ramón y Cajal Fellow in Political Sciences.

**Ramiro Anzit Guerrero** is a Senior Advisor in the Argentine National Congress and Professor at the University del Salvador and University del Museo Social Argentino.
Victor Asal joined the faculty of the Political Science Department of the University at Albany in Fall 2003 and is also the Director of the Public Security Certificate at Rockefeller College, SUNY, Albany.

Omar Ashour is Director, Middle East Studies, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies University of Exeter

Scott Atran is Presidential Scholar at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City, Visiting Professor of Psychology and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, and Research.

Edwin Bakker is Professor of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies at the Campus The Hague of Leiden University and Director of its Center for Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. He is also a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague

Daniel Baracskay is a full-time faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Valdosta State University, where he also teaches public administration courses.

Michael Barkun is professor of Political Science in the Maxwell School at Syracuse University.

Shazadi Beg is a Barrister in the United Kingdom and an acknowledged expert on Pakistan.

Gabriel Ben-Dor is Director of the School of Political Sciences and Head of the National Security Graduate Studies Program at the University of Haifa, where he teaches and conducts research in the fields of political violence, civil-military relations and national security.

Eddine Benhayoun is a Professor of Cultural Studies and Director of the Research Group on Culture and Globalisation, Abdelmalek Essaadi University, Tetuan, Morocco.

Andrew Black is the Managing Director of Black Watch Global, an intelligence and risk management consultancy headquartered in Washington, DC.

Mia Bloom is Professor of Security Studies at the University of Massachussetts (Lowell Campus).

Randy Borum is a Professor at the University of South Florida and a behavioral science researcher/consultant on National Security issues.

Anneli Botha is a senior researcher on terrorism at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, South Africa.

Amel Boubekeur is a Research Fellow and the leader of the Islam and Europe programme at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, focusing on Political Islam in Europe and North Africa.

Jarret Brachman is a member of the faculty of North Dakota State University and an independent Al-Qaeda analyst. He runs a jihadist monitoring blog

Jean-Charles Brisard is an international consultant and expert on terrorism and terrorism financing.

Francesco Cavatorta is a lecturer in International Relations and Middle East politics at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland.

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Erica Chenoweth is Assistant Professor of Government at Wesleyan University and a visiting scholar at Stanford University, California.
David Cook is an Associate Professor of religious studies at Rice University, specializing in apocalyptic literature and movements, radical Islamic thought and West African Islam.

Victor D. Comras is an attorney and consultant on terrorism, terrorism-financing, sanctions and international law. He served as one of five International Monitors appointed by the Security Council to oversee the implementation of measures imposed against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated terrorist groups.

Maura Conway is the MA Programme Director at the School of Law & Government, Dublin City University.

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Vera Eccarius-Kelly is an Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics at Siena College in Albany, NY, specialized in Latin American and Middle East politics, and, in particular, on revolutionary and social movements in Central America and Muslim Minority activism in Europe.

Rodney Faraon is Director of Intelligence and Threat Analysis for the Walt Disney Company's Global Security Division.

Shabana Fayyaz is an Assistant Professor with the Defense and Strategic Studies Department at the Quaid-IzamUniversity, Islamabad and is also a Doctoral Candidate at the Political Science Department, University of Birmingham, UK.

James Forest is one of the three directors of the Terrorism Research Initiative and co-editor of Perspectives on Terrorism. He is Director of the Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts at its Lowell Campus and was the first director of the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University in Tampa, Florida.

Jennifer Giroux is a CRN Researcher in Terrorism and Political Violence at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, Switzerland.

Sebestyén L. v. Gorka is the Founding Director of the Institute for Transitional Democracy and International Security (ITDIS) Hungary, and the Director for Policy Studies at the Educational Initiative for Central and Eastern Europe (EICEE), USA.

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Bob de Graaff is Socrates Foundation Professor for political and cultural reconstruction from a humanist perspective at Utrecht University and former Director of the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism at Campus The Hague/Leiden University.
Stuart Groombridge holds a Masters of Justice (Strategic Intelligence) from Queensland University of Technology, specialising in Organised Crime and recruitment methodologies utilised by Islamist Terrorist Groups. He is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Wollongong’s Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention.

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Dipak K. Gupta was, until his retirement, Fred J. Hansen Professor of Peace Studies and Distinguished Professor in Political Science, San Diego State University.

Abdulhadi Hairan is a Kabul-based researcher and security, governance and terrorism analyst.

Irm Haleem is an Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department at Seton Hall University, currently researching and publishing on Islamist extremism in the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe.

Muhammad Haniff Hassan is an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

John Horgan is Director of the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Lowell Campus.

Brian K. Houghton is an Associate Professor of Public Policy & Management at BYU-Hawaii, and the former Director of Research at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.

Russell Howard, a former US Army General, is currently at the Monterey Institute of Non-Proliferation Studies.

Richard Jackson is founding editor of the journal *Critical Studies on Terrorism*.

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Jorge Lasmar, is head of the Department of International Relations at the University of Minas, Brazil.

Faryal Leghari a researcher at the Gulf Research Center, UAE.

Ambassador Melvyn Levitsky is a retired Career Minister in the U.S. Foreign Service. He teaches international relations at the University of Michigan's Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy and is Senior Fellow of the School's International Policy Center.

Pete Lantini is Co-founder and Director of the Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTReC), Monash University, Australia. He is currently researching neo-jihadism; extremism and terrorism in Australia and Russia.

Brynjar Lia is Associate Research Professor at the University of Oslo and also Adjunct Research Professor at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI). He is a historian by training.

Douglas Macdonald has taught at Colgate University for twenty years and Director of its International Relations Program.

Lieutenant General Talat Masood served in the Pakistan Army for nearly 40 years with his last assignment being Secretary for Defence Production in Ministry of Defence. Since retirement he is closely associated with think-tanks and universities regionally and globally, working to promote peace and stability in the region.

William McCants is the founder of Jihadica and also co-founder of Insight Collaborative, a Washington, D.C. -based company that provides education and expertise on Islamism.

Andrew McGregor is the Director of Aberfoyle International Security in Toronto, Canada.

George Michael is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Administration of Justice at the University of Virginia's College of Wise.

Mansoor Moaddel is a Professor of Sociology at Eastern Michigan University, where he teaches sociology of religion, ideology, revolution, Islam and the Middle East.

Fathali M. Moghaddam is Professor of Psychology at Georgetown University and author of Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context.

Gregory Miller is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma and is one of the Director's of the Summer Workshop on Teaching about Terrorism (SWOTT).

Will H. Moore is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Florida State University with research interests in violent political conflict within and between countries.

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