Volume VII, Issue 6
December 2013
Table of Contents:

Welcome from the Editors .........................................................................................4

Announcement: Best PhD Thesis in the Field of (Counter-) Terrorism Studies Annual Award by the Terrorism Research Initiative .................6

Announcement: TRI/CTSS Vienna Conference ......................................................8

I. Articles

Media Metrics: How Arab and Western Media Construct Success and Failure in the ‘Global War on Terror’ .........................................................10
by Sarah V. Marsden

Sri Lanka's Post-Conflict Strategy: Restorative Justice for Rebels and Rebuilding of Conflict-affected Communities ..........................27
by Iromi Dharmawardhane

Salafi Violence and Sufi Tolerance? Rethinking Conventional Wisdom ..................................................58
by Mark Woodward, Muhammad Sani Umar, Inayah Rohmaniyah, and Mariani Yahya

Simultaneous Attacks by Terrorist Organisations ..............................................79
by Kathleen Deloughery

II. Policy Notes

Al-Shabaab's Somali Safe Havens: A Springboard for Terror ..................90
by Josh Meservey

Rethinking International Counterterrorism Assistance to the Greater Horn of Africa: Toward a Regional Risk Reduction Strategy ....100
by Matthew Schwartz, Liat Shetret, and Alistair Millar

III. Research Notes

Research Note on the Energy Infrastructure Attack Database (EIAD) ..................113
by Jennifer Giroux, Peter Burgherr, Laura Melkunaite

December 2013
Risks of Terrorism, Homicide and Illness: a Methodological Consideration ................................................................. 126
by Richard J. Chasdi

IV. Resources

Literature on the Conflict in Syria (2011 – November 2013) .......... 137
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Selected Dissertations and Theses on Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Political Violence, 1980 – 2013 (available in full-text) ............ 166
Selected by Eric Price

V. Book Reviews

“Counterterrorism Bookshelf” – 20 Important Books on Terrorism & Counterterrorism Related Subjects ........................................... 203
by Joshua Sinai

VI. Notes from the Editors

About Perspectives on Terrorism ............................................. 210

December 2013
Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

The Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism is pleased to present to the research community another issue of our peer-reviewed online journal at www.terrorismanalysts.com.

Perspectives on Terrorism was founded in 2007 by Robert Wesley, President of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), in collaboration with Alex Schmid and James Forest. We now have over 120,000 annual visitors to our website from around the world and nearly 4,000 registered e-mail subscribers, making this the most widely-read publication in terrorism studies. Our effort to nurture and grow this field of study includes the coordination of several national and regional networks of PhD thesis writers. In order to stimulate high-quality research we have now created an annual award for the “Best PhD Thesis in the Field of Terrorism Studies”, and in early February 2014 TRI will be sponsoring a conference on the conflict in Syria (see below for details on both of these initiatives).

In this issue of Perspectives on Terrorism we are pleased to present four articles on a variety of timely topics. First, Sarah Marsden offers a comparative analysis of several hundred Arab and Western media sources, highlighting their different conceptualisations of what constitutes ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in the ‘War on Terror’. Second, Iromi Dharmawardhane evaluates several aspects of the post-conflict initiatives in Sri Lanka, and offers recommendations to address shortcomings and persistent challenges. Third, an international team of scholars led by Mark Woodward challenge the perception that the Sufi tradition in Islam has always been tolerant and non-violent while the Salafist tradition is the one consistently associated with intolerance and violence. Finally, Kathleen Deloughery draws from several incident databases to explain how and why simultaneous terrorist attacks are more likely to be successful and cause more fatalities.

This issue of the journal also introduces a new Policy Notes section, in which we will publish relatively short pieces containing informed analysis and policy recommendations on a variety of important topics. Josh Meservey inaugurates this section with a timely analysis of Somalia’s safe havens and their critical importance to al-Shabaab. This is followed by a review of international counterterrorism assistance to the Horn of Africa, authored by three senior analysts at the Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation.

Our Research Notes section begins with a description by Jennifer Giroux and colleagues about a new and important resource on energy security and political violence. Then Richard Chasdi reviews the methodological issues involved in determining whether or not terrorism poses similar degrees of risk as other man-made or natural disasters.

In our Resources section, Judith Tinnes offers an extensive and timely list of literature on the conflict in Syria, and Eric Price has compiled a useful and informative bibliography of dissertations and theses on terrorism and counterterrorism, written between 1980 and 2013.
Most titles are ‘clickable’ and guide the reader directly to the full-text versions of the cited titles. Finally, we conclude with a collection of brief (capsule) book reviews by Joshua Sinai.

This final issue of Volume VII was prepared in the U.S. by the staff of the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, with special thanks to our research assistants Suzzette Lopez Abbasciano and Robert Kerins. The first issue of Volume VIII will be prepared in Vienna, Austria, by Editor-in-Chief Alex Schmid for publication in February 2014.

Sincerely,

Prof. James J.F. Forest

Co-Editor

December 2013
Announcement: Best PhD Thesis in the Field of (Counter-) Terrorism Studies Annual Award by the Terrorism Research Initiative

Among its portfolio of activities, the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) - the non-profit organization that has published Perspectives on Terrorism for seven years - coordinates national networks of post-graduate students who work on their doctoral theses in the field of terrorism/counterterrorism studies. As readers of this journal will recognize, several national and regional networks have come into existence (e.g. in the United Kingdom, the United States, Southern Africa, Russia, Norway, the Netherlands and Flemish Belgium) while others are in the making.

In order to stimulate the search for excellence in academic research, TRI has created an annual award for the best PhD thesis that has been successfully defended at a university. For this purpose, a panel of judges consisting of the three directors of TRI – Robert Wesley, Alex P. Schmid and James J. F. Forest – now invite those who have completed their PhD thesis between January and December 2013 to submit a copy to the panel no later than the end of March 2014. The judges will read and compare the doctoral theses we receive and nominate the finest submission for the ‘Best PhD Thesis in the Field of Terrorism Studies 2013 Award’.

The Award consists of a monetary prize of US $1,000.- and a formal certificate, signed by the panel of judges, declaring the winner’s name and the title of the thesis. The award winner will be announced, and a summary of the thesis will be published in the August 2014 issue of Perspectives on Terrorism. The Terrorism Research Initiative will also assist the award winner in finding a publisher for his or her thesis so that the full results of the award-winning research become available to the scholarly community with minimal delay. The August 2014 issue of the journal will also announce the honorable mention of authors whose theses were judged second and third best.

Eligible for this annual award are scholars who have obtained their PhD degree in the calendar year 2013 from an institution of higher education anywhere in the world. The thesis must be submitted in English (either written in English or translated into English) and should be sent to the chair of the judges panel in electronic form as a PDF. The PhD thesis must focus on terrorism/counterterrorism or closely related forms of political violence and armed conflict. It should be the product of in-depth research and show originality in terms of introducing new methods, theories or data into its analysis. The submitted thesis should be accompanied by a cover letter in which the author outlines the novelty and/or uniqueness of the thesis and its findings.

In those cases where a member of the jury is in any way connected to a person submitting a PhD thesis, the composition of the jury will be changed to avoid a conflict of interest. In such cases, a qualified scholar from the Editorial Board of Perspectives on Terrorism will be invited to take his place.
The judges are looking forward to receiving and reviewing quality submissions for this award before 31 March 2014. Submissions should be sent to the chair of the panel of judges, Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, at <apschmid@terrorismanalysts.com>.
Announcement: TRI/CTSS Vienna Conference

Vienna University, in cooperation with the Terrorism Research Initiative and the Centre for Terrorism and Security Studies (University of Massachusetts) have organised a conference at the Academy of Fine Arts (Semper Depot) in Vienna (Austria) on

The Syrian Conflict and the Promotion of Reconciliation and the Implications for International Security

6 - 7 February 2014

The conference seeks to provide an array of Syrian political actors based in Austria and abroad with an opportunity to offer their insights into the current conflict and explore prospects for reconciliation. It offers a neutral forum for the exchange of perspectives on the interconnected issues of the promotion of civil society, political cooperation and bringing violence to an end, while also addressing their implications for international politics and security. The conference venue, the Semper Depot of the Akademie der Bildenden Künste, will also host the photographic exhibition Syrian Perspectives on War.

Conference Agenda

February 6, 2014 (13:30 – 18:00 hours)

13:30 - 14:00 Opening remarks and introductions by Robert Wesley and Nico Prucha, Terrorism Research Initiative

14:00 - 14:30 Research Briefing by Cengiz Günay, Austrian Institute for International Affairs: “Syria at the Crossroads of Turkey and the EU”

14:45 – 15:15 Political Activism, Badran Farwati, Political Analyst, Tansiqiyya: “Against all Odds versus the Regime of al-Assad”


February 7, 2014 (13:30 – 18:00 hours)

14:00 – 14:30 Research Briefing, Rüdiger Lohlker, University of Vienna: “Social Media – A New Layer in Modern Warfare”

14:45 - 15:15 Islamic Voices of the Revolution, Omer Mushaweh: “The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian Revolution”
15:15 – 15:45 National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (I’tilaf), Kamal al-Labwani: “Threats for Civil-Society, Reclaiming Authority for the People of Syria”

17:00 - 17:30 Austrian Muslim Initiative, Tarafa Baghajati: “Syria before and after the Geneva I and II Talks”

For registration, contact: Nico Prucha at: <nico.prucha@univie.ac.at>.
I. Articles

Media Metrics: How Arab and Western Media Construct Success and Failure in the ‘Global War on Terror’
by Sarah V. Marsden

Abstract
The media has played an important role in the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT), and has received significant scholarly attention as a result. However, the way in which different media represent and construct notions of success and failure has been less well examined. In addressing this gap, this article offers a comparative analysis of several hundred media sources drawn from Western and English language Arab press outlets, published up until the turn of the decade. Through this analysis, the paper examines the way in which different sources understand progress and regress in the conflict. The themes that emerge from this corpus suggest, not only that the two sets of sources demonstrate different conceptualisations of success and failure, but more interestingly, that through construction of specific metrics, they betray very different understandings about the nature of the conflict itself. In turn this constructs quite different interpretations of what ‘winning’ the ‘GWOT’ might mean for the protagonists. In a largely consistent interpretation of the GWOT, Arab media interpret the conflict through the lens of American efforts to assert power and influence on a global stage. Western media metrics, on the other hand, evolve from a largely militaristic confrontation, to an ideological conflict, and finally constructing the GWOT as a global effort to bring down a movement. Notably, according to both Arab and Western measures, the media sources examined here suggest America is losing.

Keywords: media, influence, counterterrorism, perception

Introduction
The 24-hour news cycle played a key role in defining and constructing the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT).[1] Efforts to influence the media agenda have seen governments set up substantial public relation machines to ‘spin’ the news to best effect, and make the case for their policies.[2] Similarly, al-Qaeda has long recognised the need to fight a media battle alongside its violent campaign, setting the propaganda battle at the heart of its strategy.[3] Unsurprisingly therefore, substantial scholarly attention has been paid to the role of the media in the GWOT.[4] However, there has been comparatively less attention paid to the way in which different types of media have understood and represented success and failure in the conflict. What follows addresses this gap, and in doing so takes a comparative approach to understanding how English language Arab and Western media outlets have constructed metrics of success and failure in the GWOT.
The analysis presented below suggests that Arab and Western media outlets interpret progress and regress in the conflict in different ways. Moreover, the way these differing sources construct measures of success and failure betray divergent ideas about the very nature of the conflict itself. Both sets of media construct specific notions of the GWOT which impute the reasons for the conflict, the motivations of the protagonists and concomitantly, what success 'looks like'. The metrics used by Western media evolve through the first decade of the conflict, from a militaristic 'body-count' approach, shifting to an ideological war and then to a global effort to bring down a movement. Arab media interpret the conflict in more geopolitical terms, through the lens of American hegemony and its efforts to spread power, control vital oil resources, and support the Israeli state. Through these constructs, they prescribe particular solutions - one largely military, the other socio-political. Importantly, analysis suggests that according to both sets of measures, America is losing the GWOT. What follows seeks to explore how this media output represents success and failure, and how through this, they construct different interpretative frameworks by which the GWOT is understood. Following a brief exposition of the methodology employed in the study, a series of measures of progress and regress are described. The discussion then turns to explore ways in which these measures construct highly divergent conceptualisations of 'victory' in the GWOT.

Methodology

This analysis is based on 192 articles drawn from English language Arab media sources, and 200 drawn from Western media that cover the first 10 years of the conflict. See Tables 1 and 2 for a breakdown of the number of articles drawn from each source over the nine years of analysis. Because of the focus on English language sources, the specific media outlets were selected on the basis of somewhat different criteria. Arab sources were largely predetermined by the availability of English language publications, ‘Western’ sources on the other hand, were selected to offer insight into primarily American interpretations of success and failure. Hence, those outlets considered most influential in the major American centres of New York, Washington and Los Angeles were selected, along with CNN, which has broader reach across the country. These were supplemented with BBC output, to draw insights from the way these issues were reported more widely.
### Table 1: Arab Media Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Source</th>
<th>2001</th>
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<tr>
<td>BBC Monitoring</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Arab News</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>Al Jazeera</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Asharq Alawsat</td>
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<tr>
<td>LA Times</td>
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<td>NY Times</td>
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<td>24</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Articles were selected through a search of the various sources’ online repositories using the terms: War on Terror and al-Qaeda. This identified nearly 10,000 individual news articles, reduced through a series of filters. First, articles were assessed against two criteria: that they contained sufficient editorial comment, i.e. that they were not solely descriptive news articles, and second that they were of sufficient length to provide a reasonable amount of data. The dataset was further refined according to whether the articles made reference to success and/or failure in the GWOT. A coding frame generated for the purpose was applied to the data identifying all references to verifiable and unverifiable success and failure with respect to America and al-Qaeda.

These data were analysed using thematic analysis,[5] an approach involving a reflexive relationship between the data, prior theoretical knowledge and research experience. Predominantly an inductive approach, it aims to elucidate patterns in the data, and uncover the groundwork of understandings at work. In the initial phase of analysis, sources were read repeatedly, and preliminary categories describing prominent themes were identified. Further analysis and coding produced sub-themes, which led to a distillation of the data into a number of coherent themes that are set out in detail below.[6] Thematic analysis allows greater depth of analysis than techniques such as content analysis, but does not require the much deeper examination of text that, for example, discourse analysis demands. Given the scope of the
analysis and the amount of data that was necessary to offer a sufficiently detailed comparative
analysis, thematic analysis offered an appropriate balance of breadth and depth.

In the process of the research, a number of issues emerged which bear consideration. First, it
was challenging to source a comparable number of English language Arab media articles in
the early years of the conflict, something reflected in the uneven sources over the years. Up
until 2004, there were relatively few mainstream Arab media outlets publishing in English. To
compensate for this, sources were drawn from BBC Monitoring's translation service, and by
over sampling articles from Al-Hayat. Although this means a somewhat different set of
sources, this approach was necessary to ensure similar amounts of data were available for
comparison across the years. Second, there is a liberal bias evident in the Western media
sources.[7] This is important to bear in mind when interpreting the results, as they do not
purport to offer a cross section of the media, but rather focus on particular sources considered
to share a largely liberal political stance. Similarly, there is something of a 'Western,' or at the
very least, Saudi bias in the Arab media data. Al Hayat, Arab News, al-Arabiya and Asharq
Alawsat are all financed, supported or based in Saudi Arabia. This has implications for the
extent to which the analysis presented below can be said to relate to wider Arab perspectives
represented in Arabic language media, a subject which demands further investigation. It is
also important to recognise the broad designations of 'Arab' and 'Western' media are used as
'shand' for the different sources. Here, 'Western,' largely means American and whilst still
encompassing a range of sources, is perhaps more homogenous than the Arab press, which
represents a somewhat more diverse source.

Therefore, this article focuses primarily on the dominant themes that emerged through
analysis. Whilst this potentially masks important minority views and debates, in offering an
overview of the most frequently discussed metrics, the paper focuses on those issues
considered most important in the media. With this in mind, what follows draws out the main
features of the discourse through the years of the GWOT, to shed light on how different media
sources interpret and understand success and failure in the conflict.

**Western Media Metrics**

A unifying feature of Western media discourse on the GWOT is the lack of clarity over
appropriate ways to measure and conceptualise the conflict.[8] As the GWOT progresses,
different types of metrics accumulate, which demonstrate a shifting notion of the 'enemy' and
the character of the war. The early focus on military measures is supplemented in the
early-2000s by the 'war of ideas,' and the related battle for hearts and minds, which in turn
evolves into the language of a global insurgency. These different paradigms paint a shifting
picture. Depending on the measures used, journalists infer al-Qaeda is stronger than ever,
others that the US is making gains. Almost all recognise the difficulty of 'measuring,' in any
meaningful way, who is 'winning' the GWOT. The following discussion highlights the
evolution of Western media portrayals of success and failure.
Metrics of Violence and Military Conflict

The ubiquity of militaristic metrics reflects the language frame of the ‘Global War on Terror’. Such a conceptualisation makes tactical measures highly salient, and they are common in Western media efforts to understand progress. The exceptional nature of the conflict and the necessity for a new and uncompromising military response is particularly prevalent in the aftermath of 9/11. As Michael Kelly observed:

[S]ome (mostly on the left) have persisted in the delusion that we are involved here in something that can be put into some sort of context of normality – a crisis that can be resolved through legal or diplomatic efforts, or handled with United Nations resolutions, or addressed by limited military ‘reprisals’. [9]

Through this frame, political, social and diplomatic solutions are excluded, thereby prioritising a militaristic and retributive response to 9/11. Such an approach is reflected in congruent measures including ‘body counts’, applied to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, other (often ill-defined) ‘enemy’ actors, as well as US and coalition forces. Military metrics in Afghanistan, and then Iraq, include measures of ‘collateral damage’; geographical control; stabilising military gains; shifting levels of violence; number of terrorist attacks; and number of enemy fighters. Disrupting al-Qaeda’s command and control structure and its training and organisational apparatus, and keeping them ‘on the run’ are also regularly applied to assessments of progress. Evidence of success against these measures applies to the home front as well as the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, with the absence of attacks on the US homeland regularly rehearsed as a measure of the GWOT’s positive impact.

Periodically ‘scorecards’ are produced which identify a range of factors, including the number of convictions; detainees in Guantanamo; the financial cost of the conflict; and number of civilians killed. These can be critical, for example, noting the number of detainees who have at some point been at Guantanamo (775) vs. the number of detainees convicted (0). [10] However, they still largely reflect a militarised, counterterrorism framework (such lists do not, for example, detail the number of cross-cultural exchanges undertaken, or shifts in foreign policy). In concentrating so heavily on military factors, the media support the idea that the conflict can best be resolved with violence, measured through battlefield victories or failures. Although this conceptualisation is particularly prevalent early on in the conflict, it maintains throughout the years, tracking initial ‘victory’ in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their deterioration into bloody insurgencies.

The War of Ideas

The ‘war of ideas’ became increasingly prominent from 2004 onwards. In this measure, al-Qaeda the organisation becomes al-Qaeda the theory, a ‘jihadist ideology [which] has spread like a virus around the world’. [11] Against this ideological threat, the US is said to need a defence, ‘a story of its own to counter the one told by opponents, who argue that we are an
occupier with designs to steal [Iraq's] wealth and suppress its faith'.[12] Described as the 'fourth war' (alongside Iraq, Afghanistan and the international war against al-Qaeda), the war of ideas is considered vitally important but largely neglected by the Bush administration. Implicated in this are interim metrics, exemplified in a quote by an anonymous senior military official: '[i]f this is a global battle for hearts and minds, we haven’t even stood up an army yet'.[13] Hence, the need for a vehicle to gain leverage in the ideological war can be seen as a further measure of progress.

Although the ideological battle is poorly defined, it is possible to discern three sub-themes. The first assesses how successful the West is at communicating the 'real' reason for US action in the face of 9/11, and by extension, persuading the audience of the 'true (positive) nature' of America. For example, that the Iraq invasion was designed to free the region of a tyrant, track down Weapons of Mass Destruction, and spread freedom and democracy for the benefit of the Iraqi people. Furthermore, that it was not designed to control oil, expand Western hegemony, and conduct a religious crusade against Islam. The second, and much less commonly discussed set of measures, are largely political and social, and are described by Michael Scheuer in an interview with the BBC:

'Bin Laden is attacking us because a specific set of US policies that have been in gear for 30 years and haven’t been reviewed, haven't been debated, haven't been questioned.' … He cited the apparently unquestioning US support for Israel; America’s presence on the Arabian peninsula; and support for regimes perceived as oppressing Muslims and for Muslim 'tyrannies'.[14]

Efforts to attack al-Qaeda’s message are a final set of measures, including attempts to degrade public support for al-Qaeda and stem the tide of recruitment and radicalisation, particularly as the Iraq war deteriorates. However, clear metrics are hard to discern, beyond efforts to promote ‘acceptable’ and ‘moderate’ Muslim voices, and Bush’s ‘vague pledge to spread democracy’. [15] Despite this, they are considered vital and are increasingly described as superordinate to the militaristic ‘body count’ measures discussed above. According to Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon:

Despite the increasingly frequent avowals from Bush and his aides that we are fighting, in his words, a 'hateful ideology', the sad fact is that the United States still has not provided that opposing narrative. Indeed, it is still fighting against individual men and measuring progress accordingly. By doing so, it continues to foster the notion that our opponents are finite in number and destructible and that, on a good day, we will wipe them out.[16]
Hearts and Minds

Closely linked to the war of ideas is success in the battle for ‘hearts and minds’, establishing ‘the battle for public opinion [as] a new front for the Bush administration.’[17] Whilst popular support was largely taken for granted in the early days of the GWOT, over time, the importance of – largely unfavourable – Muslim public opinion comes to the fore: ‘as polling … demonstrates, the war in Iraq has severely damaged the already poor American image in the Islamic world, and more Muslims are thinking in the terms of the jihadists. Despite our claims to be liberators, they see the U.S. as the enemy of Islam, eager to destroy the faith and subjugate its people.’[18] This becomes an increasing concern. International Pew polls are pored over in the press, drawing out a largely hostile set of attitudes towards the US, a subject the government was not keen to dwell on as one journalist writing in the *Los Angeles Times* puts it: ‘[o]ne metric that administration officials don’t like talking about involves how people in other countries view the U.S.’[19]

Human rights and the impact on civil liberties are important features of the battle for hearts and minds. Western press discourse draws out the increasing dissonance between the values America purports to promote and its behaviour. Measures of Western public support, the opinions of the judiciary and international partners, as well as Muslim public opinion are all used to assess progress, becoming a prominent feature of media commentary: ‘[d]oubts, division and defections have developed among American allies. For many around the world, sympathy for the United States has changed into suspicion and, for some, even into hatred. The prisons at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, the treatment of prisoners, secret prisons and rendition flights all added to this feeling.’[20]

Global Insurgency and the ‘Homegrown’ Threat

Epitomised by John Arquilla’s analogy: ‘[w]e have taken a ball of quicksilver,’ … ‘and hit it with a hammer’, [21] the notion of al Qaeda as a violent social movement begins to take hold in 2004, with the idea of a ‘global jihadist insurgency’ becoming increasingly entrenched as the conflict progresses. In response, an international set of measures are set out to address the threat, described in existential terms: ‘Islamic terrorism may have metastasized into a cancer of independent terrorist cells that, while claiming inspiration from Al Qaeda, no longer require its direction, finance or advice.’[22] This ‘new model of Islamic terrorism’, [23] comes to include the phenomenon of ‘homegrown terrorists’ – an increasing preoccupation of the Western media. Initially confined to the Muslim world, its spread to Europe further expands the threat: ‘[s]o now we face a world of ideologically driven homegrown terrorists – free radicals unattached to any formal organization.’[24]

The Limits of American Power

Midway through the decade, a metric reflecting America’s declining ability to project power emerges, leading to speculation about ‘a crisis of American leadership in the world.’[25]
Related to the battle for hearts and minds, the impact of the GWOT is understood in terms of US standing in the world. Encompassed within this is its perceived legitimacy as a force for good, the ability to project power at the state level, and the image of America in the eyes of its own people. The result is a reflective turn that sees commentators compare US prestige and power before and after 9/11, largely blaming the Iraq war for America's weakening position. For instance, as Michael Hirsch notes:

[A]n administration that had sought to reassert U.S. power now finds itself projecting weakness. An America that was at the top of its game internationally on Sept. 10, 2001 has squandered its prestige. Iraq is draining the most powerful Army in history, America’s moral standing in the world is diminished, and our policies, according to the CIA’s own analysis, may have only helped to foment the jihadi movement globally. We possess less leverage over the nuclear-minded states of Iran and North Korea.[26]

A further related issue is the potentially long-term impact on the character of the United States and its institutions: ‘the price of this president’s military and domestic overreach has been highest in the loss of faith in America itself, in the values and institutions that have historically defined this nation.’[27] Measures of progress question whether the US is true to its own image of a free, liberal democracy. Debates over torture, rendition, civil liberties and the power of the executive all feature heavily. Interestingly, ‘success’ against these measures shifts as the conflict goes on, reflecting public and political debates about the relative importance of different values. In the aftermath of 9/11, protecting the homeland was the number one priority, which meant sometimes advocating suspension of, for example, habeas corpus rights. However, as the conflict progresses, success becomes (re)aligned with defending traditional components of liberal democracy. According to Michael Ignatieff:

When terrorists strike against constitutional democracies, one of their intentions is to persuade electorates and elites that the strengths of these societies … are weaknesses … If this is the logic of terror, then democratic societies must find a way to renew their belief that their apparent vulnerabilities are actually a form of strength. [28]

**Arab Media Metrics**

Unlike Western sources, the Arab media portray a more consistent interpretation of the GWOT, with the nature of the metrics remaining relatively stable over the years of analysis. Measures are conceptualised from the perspective of US and Arab governments, and that of the Muslim peoples, stipulating appropriate responses from civil and political standpoints. This involves defending Islam from those who seek to use it to promote violence, and from
Western attack. Importantly, much greater attention is given to the social, political and economic influences on the origins and evolution of the GWOT, and their interaction with US policy, as one observer in *al-Arabiya* put it:

*It is impossible in analytical or historical terms to separate the four main strands of sentiment and policy that have given birth to the contemporary Salafist terrorist movements we all suffer today: dictatorial or merely corrupt and incompetent Arab and Asian governments; violent and colonial Israeli policies; hypocritical and Israeli-influenced American policies that often manifest themselves in warfare; and the consequent, more recent phenomenon of demeaned and disoriented young Arab-Asian immigrants in Europe.*[29]

The behaviour of political leaders is weighed through the lens of different measures. For example, Bush is criticised for prioritising a military response over political reform and social development, whilst Obama is initially praised precisely because of this change in emphasis: ‘binding himself politically to the course of diplomacy and negotiations whereas Bush bound himself militarily to the course of the war in Iraq and the war on terror.’[30] What follows charts the primary themes by which success and failure has been conceptualised in the Arab media, beginning with the need to defend Islam and address perceived ‘root causes’ of terrorism, moving on to reflect on US policy in the Middle East and the extent to which the GWOT has made the world a safer place, and finally applying the measure of whether America has upheld the standards of liberal democracy it purports to represent.

**Defence of Islam**

Defending Islam and protecting Muslim identity are important issues that recur in the Arab media. Focused on the effort to avoid Islam being conflated with terrorism, the discourse distances mainstream Islam from al-Qaeda, reflecting an effort to protect Islam against Western polemic. Metrics therefore include promoting ‘correct’ interpretations of Islam, and protecting Muslims from being influenced by al-Qaeda’s ideology. Through their commentary, journalists self-consciously seek to develop and defend a “unified Arab position’ to protect pan-Arab identity against ‘Islamic extremism’ and Bin-Ladin’s views.’[31]

Religious, political and civil constituencies are all urged to respond to the threat to Islam, and are berated when they are perceived to fail: ‘[t]he war on terror has reached London. Undoubtedly, its first victim is the Muslim population. Why is it then that, unlike the run up to the war in Iraq, no one single soul, not even a British Muslim, has taken to streets in protest against the spread of terrorism in the capital?’[32] Whilst not necessarily constructing the GWOT as a ‘religious war’, such themes reflect a desire to defend Islam and counter the growing relationship drawn between terrorism and Islam: ‘Muslims and their religious institutions have a major role in portraying the true Islam and breaking the artificial link
between it and terrorism, in addition to getting rid of the effects of 9/11. The U.S. should also halt all the generalizations; for bin Laden is not all the Arabs, and Taliban is not all Islam.'[33]

Addressing 'Root Causes'
The need to tackle 'root causes' is repeatedly discussed as the best way to prevent the alienation described as feeding terrorism, thus prioritising non-military solutions: 'America should have been more restrained and patient, and given diplomacy a chance to succeed ... [and] root out the cause of the disease instead of dealing with its symptoms.'[34] The primary causes of terrorism established in the metrics are social, economic and political, and include the Israel-Palestine conflict. This refutes the ideological and religious roots the West are thought to blame: '[t]errorism is a symptom of other ailments and distortions, and a tool that fanatics use to express themselves and change conditions in society. It is not an ideology that springs out of purely religious milieus and it can be defeated and eliminated only if its underlying causes are recognized and seriously addressed.'[35] Measures of progress are therefore mid and long term approaches, aimed at resolving political crises in order to deprive the terrorists of any legitimacy. This is why tackling the problems of oppression and occupation, along with bolstering development, education and the attainment of a better life, will surely lead to shrinking the human pool that feeds extremism.'[36]

At the heart of much of the Arab media discourse on the GWOT, the Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the primary lenses through which progress and regress is understood. The need to resolve the conflict is both intrinsic and instrumental, perceived as a way of undermining the legitimacy of the 'fanatics', as well as serving long-term US strategy in the Middle East and softening Muslim public opinion towards America. Conversely, Israeli 'terrorism' and 'Zionist propaganda' are conceptualised as impediments to addressing the root causes of the terrorism America experienced.

Despite this heavy emphasis on addressing terrorism's social and political antecedents, there is debate about the implications of claiming these to be causes of terrorism. For example, discussing fundraising which supports terrorism, one journalist argues: '[w]e the Muslims, especially the Arabs, are really quite surprising. We participate in the crimes, [through giving money] and then we justify them by our solidarity with the oppressed people and call these justifications humanitarian positions. But when we find out that these crimes actually killed people, we do not even apologize.'[37] Hence, the extent of Muslim responsibility for terrorism, and the need to stop the funding streams that support it are also operationalised as metrics. Although this is a weaker theme, measures of progress therefore look inwards to the political and civil responsibility of Arabs and Muslims, as well as outward to American and Israeli policy.
**U.S. Policy in the Middle East**

The Iraq war, in particular, is seen through the lens of America’s global political ambitions. Described as ‘Bolshevism’, Nazism, colonialism, and imperialism, US foreign policy is conceptualised as ‘a plan to extend America’s hegemony, which means that it is a proposal to poison the area and delay its development and needed reforms.’[38] Metrics are conceived as the ability of the US to satisfy its geopolitical ambition. In particular, the effort to secure Iraq’s oil, strengthen Israel’s position in the region, and expand US influence and secure its position as the global hegemon. Progress against these aims marks failure for the people of the region but success for America’s GWOT.

There is a paradox in that the US is generally depicted as wishing to ‘consolidate its hegemony over world affairs as the sole superpower’, [39] but in so doing further degrades its image in the Arab world. The implication is either that the US cares little for its public perception, prioritising power over popularity, or that ‘the regnant American ideology is still undergirded by the view that U.S. power is fundamentally benign and altruistic.’[40] Ultimately, the impact of Iraq on the regional political situation is seen as a ‘further weakening of the region’s States and creating better circumstances for the American’s attempt to nibble at the region’s fringes.’[41]

**Making the World a Safer Place?**

Early in the conflict, Arab media reflect on the likelihood that America’s actions are liable to make the world less safe in the long run. Metrics assessing this include the number of terrorist attacks, the strength of militant groups, political instability, and the negative impact on public opinion, all of which are considered likely to provoke the violence the GWOT purported to try and eradicate: ‘[the] US government initiated military action today ... This action may result in strong anti-American sentiment and retaliatory actions against US citizens and interests throughout the world by terrorists and those who are sympathetic to or otherwise support terrorism.’[42]

According to one assessment of the ability of militant groups to organise and recruit: ‘the overt wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the covert wars in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen are mostly inflaming anger and providing new recruits for al-Qaeda and its mutations, making intelligence gathering and ‘terror prevention’ ever more impossible.’[43] Assessed by levels of geopolitical stability: ‘Iran is on the verge of creating a nuclear bomb, China is protecting Sudan, Russia is backing Syria, Hamas is occupying a third of the new Palestine, Iraq is in the hands of extremist religious figures and Al Qaeda is present all over the world.’[44] And measured by the amount of terrorism: ‘[e]ver since the US declared a war against terror, the phenomenon has been on the rise, not the decline, and the number of suicide operations has grown by many times over. The war on terror has failed and this failure will continue because the US is not treating the causes. Instead, the US has helped the phenomenon expand.’[45]
Maintaining Liberal Democratic Standards

America’s commitment to the standards it purports to represent is an important factor in Arab media discourse. Failure to do so is presented as likely to have knock-on effects for a range of factors, including terrorist recruitment; setting standards for state behaviour; Arab public opinion; and civil liberties and human rights. In addition, it is portrayed as fulfilling the terrorists’ aims of provoking a response that is antithetical to the qualities America believes it embodies: ‘al Qaeda’s war will succeed as long as it drives the superpower to act as a renegade state.’[46] One writer sets out why he believes political reform and maintaining the standards of liberal democracy are side-lined in favour of a more aggressive counter-terrorism approach, and why he thinks this balance is so important:

In the Arab world, there is no heritage of freedom, but there is a long heritage of inflexibility and misuse of state violence. That is why respecting the human, his rights and freedoms were priorities of any political reform. … As long as America’s primary ‘interest’ is fighting terrorism, it will be ready to bargain with reform.[47]

Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, extraordinary rendition and torture are all cited as examples of America’s failure in the GWOT. Through these abuses, America provides ‘a model for Israel’s indiscriminate violence against civilians, and its breach of international humanitarian law … [because] When the world’s superpower creates conditions of international anarchy by destroying the checks and balances of the international system, lesser powers feel free to follow suit.’[48] Conversely, positive progress would see: ‘the restoration of the right moral authority to the world that holds the dignity of human life in the highest esteem.’[49] On the international stage, the failure to do so is presented as degrading US capital in the world, reducing the chances of long-lasting peace, and at the national level is considered likely to increase the gaps between communities, ultimately working in the militant’s favour.

Discussion

The GWOT has been described as a ‘macro-frame’ within which the political debate takes place.[50] Although both Arab and Western media critique the GWOT concept, no alternative paradigm competes with it as an organising construct, remaining the predominant frame by which the actions of a diverse array of agents, identity groups and causes are understood. The GWOT therefore comes to be described as an ‘Orwellian nightmare, an ill-defined conflict with a fractious group of terrorists that seems to be ever-escalating.’[51] Many of these issues demonstrate the well-worn debate over declaring war against a tactic, as one journalist puts it: ‘President Franklin Roosevelt … did not declare a war against U-boats and kamikaze pilots.’[52] Consequently, the GWOT construct comes to be portrayed as damaging to the project it set out to encapsulate. Reflecting this, it became a contested term, its increasingly problematic nature marked in journalistic discourse by surrounding it in quotation marks, putting it in italics or adding prefixes such as the ‘so-called’ War on Terror. Despite this, both
sets of media operate within the GWOT framework, developing distinct discourses in the metrics they set out, and making different issues about the character and reasons for the war salient. This is important as the audience sees ‘what the system and frames within them allow us to see’ [53] through a press which mediates between social and political actors and the public.[54]

Although the GWOT came to comprise multiple conflicts, [55] it began with an act of terrorism. In response, the US government had a range of options – political and diplomatic initiatives, economic measures, overt military action, covert operations, and law enforcement. [56] All of these ‘instruments of statecraft’ are represented in the GWOT. However, Western and Arab media give different priorities to these various approaches in their discussion of success and failure. For the Western media, the conflict was a confrontation with a global ‘phantom enemy’ waged through covert and overt military operations, alongside a public relations effort. For the Arab media, the GWOT was an extension of US power and a result of social, political and economic ‘root causes’, implying political and diplomatic responses.

These differing ideas about the nature of the war are reproduced in the measures used to assess progress, and importantly, reflect different concepts of victory. The American government approach was predominantly militaristic, something echoed in the Western media.[57] Hence, metrics of violent conflict are the most common way of understanding success and failure in the Western press, and resonate in the war of ideas and the battle for hearts and minds. Achievement against these measures lies in the audience accepting that a military response to 9/11 was appropriate, and that with success will come the ‘hearts and minds’ of Muslim, Arab, and Western audiences. ‘Winning’ therefore involves US military victory on a global scale, alongside the acceptance of an assertive American power, able to attract public support for its version of global governance. In focusing on the social, political and economic aspects of the conflict, the Arab media instead concentrate on the perceived causes of terrorism and longer-term solutions. In this construction, a positive outcome involves tackling important socio-political issues, including the Israel-Palestine conflict and American military interventionism.

Nevertheless, despite conceptualising success and failure in very different ways, both sets of media normalise the GWOT as an organising framework. In so doing, they produce and reproduce particular discourses about the nature of the conflict that embed boundaries between widely dispersed identity groups. For example, Mona Makram Obeid, writing in Al Hayat suggested that ‘the U.S. under the current administration seems to be dividing the world in two: the civilized world and the developing world (the other world) that should be changed by force, without any consideration for the value of cultural specificities.’[58] Whilst Roger Hardy for the BBC argued that ‘[w]hile coping with Muslim suspicion of the West, the president also has to deal with the other side of the coin – Western suspicion of Islam. Many still believe that what’s under way is a clash of civilisations.’[59]

In their construction of the conflict, the media frame their audience’s experience of events and normalise particular sets of responses. As Richard Jackson argues ‘the language of the ‘war on
terrorism’ normalises and reifies the practice of the ‘war on terrorism’ (italics in original).[60] Culturally and politically bound, [61] Arab and Western media perspectives naturalise US policy in the GWOT, but in crucially different ways. The Western media normalise military conflict as a largely appropriate response given the existential threat from a globalised enemy, and the concomitant need to protect the homeland. The Arab media naturalise these same responses as a by-product of American desire to assert its global power and secure the resources and political capital that go with it. In this way, it is possible to see how particular attributes of the actors come to be associated with specific issues: US hegemony with violent conflict and occupation, and international terrorism with the need to assert global power and increase military reach.

Discussion of al-Qaeda’s aims and achievements is comparatively overlooked. Coverage is dominated by US actions, demonstrating that the GWOT framework takes America as the primary agent. This means it is largely through US progress and regress that success and failure in the GWOT is understood. In this regard, both Arab and Western media suggest that at the turn of the decade, America is losing. However, they present different reasons for why this is the case. For the Western press, America’s military project has led to a degradation of US power and standing in the world, eroded its image of itself, and has betrayed those standards it wished to impart to other countries. The Arab press perceive failure in the misdirection of power; America is losing because it prioritised a military response over working for social and political change, and by asserting its hegemony through military might. By most of these metrics, the US is judged to have failed. Despite the absence of a major attack on the American homeland, the world is widely presented as a less safe place for America and its allies, and the Arab and Muslim peoples. Notably, the main area of synergy between the two sets of media is the need to focus on human rights, democracy and freedom in order to win the GWOT. As one journalist writing in Al Arabiya puts it: ‘[t]he major reason that the massive wave of sympathy for Bush and the US following 9/11 has changed to worldwide anti-Americanism, was that the US abandoned its core values in pursuit of the terrorists.’[62]

Comparative interpretations across such a range of diverse and dynamic sources are bound to neglect important nuance and context. However, in examining the way Western and Arab media conceptualised metrics of success and failure in the years when the GWOT paradigm was at its most salient, this article has demonstrated not only that different sources construct different metrics, but also that they develop different notions of success and failure. Through this, they come to normalise the US response to international terrorism by seeing the GWOT as either a military or a geo-political confrontation. Above all else, this analysis demonstrates the power of the ‘Global War on Terror’ as an organising framework by which an array of actors’ behaviour is interpreted and contextualised.

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Support for this research was provided by the Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, through the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Homeland Security. The author would like to thank Rashmi Singh for her support in the preparation of the paper, and Daniel Stojanovski for his valuable work compiling the data on which this analysis is based.

Notes


[3] Zawahiri famously stated that ‘We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media…[W]e are in a media battle for the hearts and minds of our Umma.’ (July, 2006). See Payne, K. (2009). Winning the battle of ideas: propaganda, ideology, and terror. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 32, (2), 109-1128.


[8] The range of analogies applied are just one indication of this, ranging from the Cold War, the Vietnam War and World War II, as well as efforts to paint the GWOT as an entirely ‘new war’: ‘[t]here are no historical precedents, no flattering parallels with Churchill or JFK that can be readily appropriated now. We have to figure this one out for ourselves.’ (italics added). Judt, T. (2002, October, 20). The wrong war at the wrong time. The New York Times. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/20/opinion/the-wrong-war-at-the-wrong-time.html


[57] Ryan, M. (2004). Framing the war against terrorism: US newspaper editorials and military action in Afghanistan. Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies, 66, (5), 363-382. It is worth noting that many of the measures identified in the Western press are similar to US government metrics. Indeed, the argument that the Western media used its reach to make the case, in particular for the Iraq war, has found support, see: Ryan, M. and Switzer, L. (2009). Propaganda and the subversion of objectivity: media coverage of the war on terrorism in Iraq. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2, (1), 45-64.


Sri Lanka's Post-Conflict Strategy: Restorative Justice for Rebels and Rebuilding of Conflict-affected Communities

by Iromi Dharmawardhane

Abstract [1]

Following the Sri Lankan Government's military defeat of the internationally proscribed terrorist organisation, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009, Sri Lanka embarked on an essential and long-term twofold post-conflict strategy: (i) rehabilitation and reintegration of former LTTE combatants, and (ii) the rebuilding of the conflict-affected Tamil communities of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The rehabilitation program was by many counts a success, with demonstrated cognitive transformation in attitudes and behaviour of most of the (formerly) radicalised combatants. Reconciliation initiatives were implemented to fulfill the urgent social, political, and economic needs of the conflict-affected communities of the North and East. These reconciliation efforts continue to be implemented and comprise different measures taken in: (1) resettlement and humanitarian assistance, (2) reconstruction of key transport, economic, health, and social infrastructure for reintegration, (3) political engagement, and (4) various types of peace-building work. Sri Lanka's post-conflict strategy adopts a holistic approach, seeking the contribution of the public sector, private sector, community organisations, international organisations, NGOs, and private individuals from different segments of society in Sri Lanka. However, despite the many effective state-led and other reconciliation efforts undertaken by Sri Lanka, the author is able to present a number of recommendations to the government of Sri Lanka to overcome shortcomings in the rehabilitation and reconciliation programs adopted, as well as other challenges faced by Sri Lanka, such as the relentless disinformation campaign against the Sri Lankan state pursued by the remnant LTTE cells surviving internationally. To understand the complex nature of the Sri Lankan conflict and the skillful disinformation campaign pursued against the Sri Lankan state by the LTTE's transnational network, a comprehensive introduction is provided as a part of this article.

Introduction to the Post-Conflict Circumstances and History of the Sri Lankan Conflict

The three decades long “Sri Lankan conflict” came to a conclusive end in May 2009, following the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, an internationally proscribed terrorist organisation. The LTTE was notorious for its vile terror tactics such as the use of suicide bombers in carrying out attacks on civilians and the country's leadership[2], the abducting of children for recruitment as child soldiers[3], forced money collection from Tamils with threats to life in case of non-compliance[4], attacks on the country's economic infrastructure such as the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and the only international airport, “ethnic cleansing” of Sinhalese and Muslims from the North and East of Sri Lanka[5], the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the assassination of Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa, the systematic assassination of more than 40...
prominent mainstream Tamil political leaders, including the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar[6], and deliberately inflicting casualties by holding civilians as human shields during the final phase of the war and shooting at those who attempted to flee [7].

However, some news reports that have appeared internationally in the post-conflict years, have attempted to undermine the moral legitimacy of the present Sri Lankan government, by charging war crimes due to alleged high numbers of Tamil civilian casualties and cases of torture. They do not attribute names to their sources[8], and choose not to call for the prosecution of the LTTE cells and front organisations which continue to operate outside of Sri Lanka [9]. These statements have not only dampened Sri Lanka's hard-won victory over one of the world's most lethal terrorist groups[10], it has brought suspicion over some remarkable and globally unprecedented post-conflict reconciliation efforts undertaken by the Sri Lankan government.

It is instructive to explore these grave allegations briefly, so that some very effective reconciliation measures adopted by the Sri Lankan state can be appreciated fully. The number of civilian causalities in the last phase of the war presented by different sources varies greatly. Fundamentally, the civilian casualty figure of the Sri Lankan war remains unknown.[11]

Gordon Weiss, a former United Nations official in Sri Lanka, estimated 7,000 civilian deaths in 2009, but this figure was not accepted by Sir John Holmes, the then UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, who said this figure was “unverified and unreliable”. [12] The United States government had received information from an unnamed organisation that 6,710 people - civilians and LTTE combatants - had died from January 20 to April 20, 2009.[13] Sri Lanka's Defence Seminar 2013 revealed that the civilian death toll is likely to have been between 2,000 and 3,000 in the final phase of the war in May 2009.[14]

The two “leaked” United Nations internal reports, the Darusman Report in March 2011 and the Petrie Report in November 2012, claimed 40,000 civilian casualties and 70,000 individuals “unaccounted for”. Both gained much media attention. No sources were named in these reports to substantiate this very high number of civilian casualties.[15] Sri Lanka views these two documents as unjust in their treatment of the Sri Lankan conflict and unsubstantiated in their content.[16] An article of the British newspaper The Guardian noted that, “...privately, UN staff admitted they were puzzled by the methodology used to achieve the new death toll”, and that one official stated that “Someone has made an imaginative leap and that is at odds with what we have been saying before...It is a very dangerous thing to do to start making extrapolations.”[17] Sri Lanka is also plagued by the call by the United Nations Human Rights
Commissioner for an international inquiry, “in the absence of meaningful progress on accountability” with regard to civilian deaths during the last phase of the war.[18]

Given the fact that the LTTE was a despotically run militant organisation[19] that directly threatened the sovereignty of Sri Lanka and the security of its people, the Sri Lankan government asserts that these views do not take into account the “principles of self-defence or reasonableness of retaliation, proportionality, or a technical analysis of the trajectories of the shells allegedly fired, to determine their source.”[20] It also has to be kept in mind that the LTTE was the only guerrilla-cum-terrorist group in the world which had an infantry (“Military”, which included an elite fighting wing and the “Black Tigers” suicide commando unit), a maritime wing with a shipping fleet (“Sea Tigers”), an air wing (“Air Tigers”), a highly secretive intelligence group (“Snow Tigers”[21]), as well as international political and procurement offices.[22]

The British television station “Channel 4” produced three documentaries in 2011, 2012, and 2013[23] which include video footage of the victims of the Sri Lankan war, among them children and patients in hospitals, from the final phase of the war. It is conspicuous that these reports do not explain that the LTTE deliberately used civilian posts such as hospitals and schools to operate heavy weaponry during the final phases of the war.[24] These videos contain evidence of manipulation such as upside-down editing, sequences being reversed, and individuals likely to be LTTE combatants being depicted as members of the Sri Lankan Army.[25] These Channel 4 productions have also been accused of “mix[ing] footage with comment from unnamed sources with distorted voices and shadowed faces” and that the commentaries were “intemperate and partisan, and it was all held together by assumptions.”[26] Jacques de Maio, Head of Operations for South Asia for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), stated that, “the LTTE had tried to keep civilians in the middle of a permanent state of violence. It saw the civilian population as a ‘protective asset’ and kept its fighters embedded amongst them.”[27] In 2011, the Sri Lankan government stated that, “it was impossible in a battle of this magnitude, against a ruthless opponent actively endangering civilians, for civilian casualties to be avoided.”[28]

News reports of alleged torture, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)’s “Tamils still being raped and tortured in Sri Lanka” by Frances Harrison (November 9, 2013)[29], have also been produced and circulated internationally. In the Frances Harrison video report, twelve people, including former LTTE combatants, are identified as victims of torture and rape. Their faces are shown, but names are withheld. The Sri Lankan High Commission in the United Kingdom has made a statement in response, saying that: “...It is not fair to ask for a response on claims based on anonymous testimony,” the individuals who claimed to be victims were likely “paid to discredit Sri Lanka” and are likely to have been tortured by the LTTE in the past. The Sri Lankan government has firmly refuted that it has engaged in systematic torture and rape or deliberate targeting of civilians during or after conflict, and asserts instead that members of the LTTE have fabricated testimonies to seek asylum in Western countries[30].[31].
It seems that the Sri Lankan government may be battling a propaganda war conceptualised by LTTE elements surviving abroad. It has been assessed that “the LTTE international propaganda war is conducted at an extremely sophisticated level.”[32] In order to counter the LTTE’s “propaganda war effort”[33], diplomats and politicians of the Sri Lankan state have only relatively recently begun to appeal to foreign governments and expatriate Sri Lankans, including politically mainstream Tamils, in an effort to project ground realities in Sri Lanka and expose the systematically propagated disinformation campaign of the LTTE. Presently, the LTTE primarily exists overseas in the form of the Nediyavan faction (“Oslo group”)[34], Joe Emmanuel faction (“London group”: Global Tamil Forum and British Tamils Forum)[35], Rudrakumaran faction/Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (“New York group”) [36], and Vinyagam faction (“Brussels group”).[37],[38] The LTTE has a presence in 44 countries outside Sri Lanka, with established structures in twelve of them.[39] Some of the most active pro-LTTE lobby groups are located in Canada, the United Kingdom, Norway, United States, Switzerland, and France.[40] Pro-LTTE front organisations exist also in India, Germany, and Australia, corresponding to the large number of diaspora Tamils that have settled in the respective countries.[41] The Tamil diaspora provided the LTTE with approximately US $300 million a year[42]; 90-95% of the LTTE’s funds in Sri Lanka came from overseas.[43]

However, despite the LTTE’s powerful disinformation campaign, issues of civilian casualties and incidents of torture are grave allegations that call for an immediate response by the Sri Lankan authorities. Although Sri Lanka’s government is indignant about unscrupulous reporting, to dismantle false narratives and work towards a sustainable peace for Sri Lanka, it must strive to adopt a strategic public relations campaign to portray an accurate depiction of the end phase of the conflict to international audiences. Investigation into allegations is paramount also so that perpetrators of violence, such as rape and torture, can be prosecuted. Like in Pakistan, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Iraq, isolated cases of atrocities by government forces are likely to have occurred in Sri Lanka as well.

The many facets of the Sri Lankan conflict make its contextualisation complex.[44] This is due to the protracted nature of the LTTE terrorist insurgency, the LTTE’s international network, the ancient, pre-colonial, and colonial history of Sri Lanka, domestic political and social developments in the past 40 years, and the nature of international politics.

The post-colonial grievances of the Sinhalese preceded those of the Tamils. The British pre-independence support of Christianity and the English language[45] had led to the powerful state sector being dominated by the urban class of English-educated Christian Tamils and Burghers[46], as well as Christian Sinhalese in Colombo during colonial rule.[47] Under British colonial rule, English-language medium level schools were also established in Jaffna[48] by the British administration and were thus attended by the Tamils in Jaffna.[49] However, 95% of the then 6.6 million Sinhalese population lived away from Colombo and were educated in Sinhalese.[50] Most of the Sinhalese were thus prevented from obtaining white-collar jobs in the state sector, for example, civil service entrance examinations were conducted only in English. As a consequence of the British colonial administration’s “divide
and rule” tactic, the Sri Lankan Tamils were also treated as a “majority community” and given equal (not proportionate) political representation to the Sinhalese during British colonial times[51] – despite the fact that they accounted for only 12% of the country's population while the Sinhalese accounted for 70% of the population.[52] Being the majority and having functioned in a Sinhala-Buddhist social context for millennia, the Sinhalese were less inclined to adopt English as their first language or Christianity as their religion.

Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's post-Independence government sought to change opportunity structures and include the marginalised Sinhalese into the economy and administration of the country through the Sinhala-Only language policy,[53] it was not fair to the Tamils and other minority communities. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who succeeded her husband as Prime Minister and leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in 1960[54], followed the Sinhala-Only language policy aggressively. She removed Article 29 of the 1948 Constitution, which contained special provisions for minorities. In 1972, the constitution was changed, making Sri Lanka a republic, with no elements of federalism. The Sirimavo Bandaranaike government introduced the Standardisation Policy which made university admission criteria lower for Sinhalese than for Tamils (the score was “standardised” relative to members of other ethnic groups)[55], as there was an overrepresentation of Tamil students in higher education institutions at this time (e.g. in the Engineering and Science fields, the percentages of Tamil students were 48% and 49% respectively)[56].

The Sinhala-Only state policies triggered a wave of Tamil aspirations for a separate state. There grew a Tamil militant underground movement supported by Tamil youth, collectively known as the Tamil Tigers.[57] The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)[58] led by Velupillai Prabhakaran was founded in 1972, and was the most dominant among the several separatist, mostly militant, groups that existed at the time.[59] The LTTE was responsible for the killing of the (Tamil) Mayor of Jaffna in 1975, a supporter of the SLFP mainstream political party.[60]

The 1977 elections made J. R. Jayawardene of the United National Party (UNP) the head of government. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was the largest oppositional party in parliament at the time. Jayawardene changed the constitution in 1978, replacing the parliamentary government with a presidential system.[61] The 1978 Constitution included substantial provisions for Tamils in an effort to secure peace, by giving Tamil the status of a national language and allowing Tamil to be used in administration and education at several levels, abrogating the Standardisation Policy which had made it more difficult for Tamil students to enter university, offering top positions in government to Tamils including Minister of Justice, and calling for an All-Party Conference to resolve the country's ethnic tensions.[62] However, the Tamil Tigers increased their terrorist attacks on the Sinhalese civilian population in their call for a separate state, which led to Sinhalese counterattacks against Tamils, and served to put a halt to any negotiations through an All-Party Conference.[63]

In 1983, the most gruesome ethnic riots erupted leading to the deaths of hundreds if not thousands of Tamils in Colombo by the hands of organised Sinhalese extremist gangs.[64] The
Sinhalese mob violence began as a reaction to the ambush of a Sri Lankan Army patrol in Jaffna by the LTTE, which killed thirteen Sinhalese soldiers. The nature of the atrocities was extremely savage. Similar atrocities were inflicted on the Sinhalese who lived in Tamil areas. Approximately 150,000 Tamils fled Sri Lanka after the (Black) July 1983 ethnic riots, forming the Tamil diaspora (presently numbering approximately 800,000 people).

Meanwhile, between 1977 and 1987, the LTTE took control over the Northern areas by fighting the Sri Lankan Army and murdering any Tamils who opposed them – killing many more Tamils in this process than the (predominately Sinhalese) Sri Lankan Army. The LTTE's first terrorist attack was carried out in 1987 with a suicide bombing at a Sri Lankan Army camp in Jaffna, which killed 40 members of the Sri Lankan security forces. The LTTE's first terrorist attack against civilians occurred in 1984, targeting civilian settlements at Dollar Farm and Kent Farm in Jaffna, killing 62 civilians, including women and children. The LTTE has carried out about 400 suicide attacks between 1987 and 2009, killing hundreds of civilians and injuring many more. Between February 2002 to April 2007, the LTTE violated ceasefire agreements 3,830 times, while the Sri Lankan government (in turn) violated ceasefire agreements 351 times.

The LTTE simultaneously followed an aggressive disinformation campaign overseas to raise funds for its operations in Sri Lanka, accusing the Sri Lankan government of discrimination and ethnic genocide. The LTTE's disinformation campaign included the map of an invented “Tamil Eelam” territory inside of Sri Lanka, as the Tamil homeland in the North and East of the island (covering more than one-third of Sri Lanka's land mass and two-thirds of its coastline). However, historically all parts of the island were known to have been multiethnic in composition from earliest recorded history. The Eastern Province was 58% Sinhalese and Muslim in ethnic composition in 1985, prior to the “ethnic cleansing” of Sinhalese and Muslims from the North and East by the LTTE. At present, the population of the commercial capital of Colombo is approximately evenly divided between the Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims. Although two-thirds of the Tamil population of Sri Lanka lived in the South and other parts of Sri Lanka throughout the years of conflict, from its inception until its last days in May 2009, the LTTE did not propose anything other than the demand for a separate state for Tamils.

Although there was a consensus among Sri Lankan Tamils in the 1970s and 1980s regarding the creation of a separate state for Tamils, the majority of the Tamils living in Sri Lanka have relinquished the separatist agenda, as state policies have changed significantly during the past 40 years, with no overtly ethnically discriminatory state policies currently in place. Most Tamils in Sri Lanka also renounced their support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgency due to the increased use of terror tactics. Supporters of the LTTE live mainly outside of Sri Lanka, as described above. These include Tamils that left Sri Lanka during the past 50 years due to the change in the language policy, ethnic riots during the 1950s and the early 1980s, as well as for economic reasons. One common factor that binds these individuals is that they harbour painful memories of Sri Lanka, which has grown into a hatred.
for the government, irrespective of constructive domestic political and social progress. LTTE cells overseas and supportive diaspora groups continue to call for a separate state within the island's land mass. However, there is a second, smaller group of Tamils living outside of Sri Lanka, who politically oppose the LTTE. This group is most prominent in London (which includes the Expatriate Tamil Association); it holds regular demonstrations against the LTTE there.[82]

It is also crucial to understand the historical and cultural realities of Sri Lanka.[83] Due to its history as a trading centre since ancient times, Sri Lanka's culture has been described as having a "strong cosmopolitan flavour" and "multicultural ethos".[84],[85] To illustrate, two of the major religious sites of Sri Lanka, Sri Padha/ Adam's Peak[86] and the Katharagama temple, are sacred to followers of several faiths at once; the former for the Buddhists (who are Sinhalese), the Hindus (who are Tamil), and the Muslims (who are ethnic Moors and others), and the latter for the Buddhists and the Hindus.[87] Pilgrims of the different religions/ ethnicities have always visited these sites side by side in mutual respect. Further, the Sinhalese and Tamils (and other ethnic groups) lived peacefully in the country throughout the years of conflict (except for some border Sinhalese villages which the LTTE regularly attacked and raided, killing and torturing the villagers in the process[88]). It is notable that there were no incidents of communal violence against Tamils by the Sinhalese, despite the LTTE's regular terrorist attacks targeting the Sinhalese civilian population since 1984.[89] Hence, the post-colonial ethnic riots of the 1950s and 1980s seem a stark aberration to the traditionally harmonious ethnic relations between the majority of Sri Lankans.

Sri Lanka has suffered tremendously between 1983 and 2009, and pronouncedly so due to systematic terrorist attacks targeting civilians and, during the final phase of the war, when many civilians were trapped in gunfire. Altogether, more than 70,000 lives were lost over the three decades of conflict[90] - a figure that is not disputed. The Sri Lankan government must make every effort to heal these wounds, especially of those who suffered the most as a community, the conflict-affected, predominately Tamil population in the north. While much remains to be done, it is also apparent that the Sri Lankan government is making strides in its efforts to rebuild the war-torn country.

This article seeks to describe some of the bold and hopefully enduring steps taken by the Sri Lankan government through a twofold post-conflict strategy: (I) restorative justice for former LTTE combatants, and (II) rebuilding of the conflict-affected, predominantly Tamil communities living in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Sri Lanka's post-conflict strategy has also embraced a holistic approach to national reconciliation by seeking the contribution of the private sector, community organisations, international organisations, NGOs, as well as private individuals from different segments of society in Sri Lanka. In September 2013, during the 24th Session of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), many UNHRC member states[91] commended the significant progress made by the Sri Lankan government in the areas of rehabilitation, resettlement, resolution of land issues, demining, livelihood development, and issues of accountability.[92]
Sri Lanka's Innovative Rehabilitation Program for Former LTTE Combatants

Restorative justice for former LTTE combatants involved the rehabilitation, reinsertion, and reintegration of 11,481 former LTTE combatants, including 594 child soldiers (as of January 2013). This figure includes 10,329 of the approximately 12,000 LTTE members who surrendered or were detained at the end of the conflict, and were rehabilitated and reintegrated into society by October 2011. These rehabilitees were reintegrated into the community within the two-year stipulated period, while child beneficiaries completed their rehabilitation and reintegration within one year. The Presidential Amnesty issued in support of restorative justice for LTTE members at the end of the conflict, an act which directly promotes reconciliation, stands in opposition to retributive justice which seeks to punish individuals for their wrongdoing through the judicial and prison systems. Despite Sri Lanka being a nation which suffered severe damage to its social, political, and economic development due to the LTTE's decades-long insurgency, Sri Lankans were able to identify many members of the LTTE as victims of radicalisation. Sri Lankan society has always known about the LTTE leadership's long-established and calculated strategy of indoctrinating a violent separatist ideology into Tamil people. It was also well-known that the LTTE propagated what many considered disinformation among the Tamil community in the North and East of Sri Lanka and the Tamil diaspora living abroad. Sri Lankans were also familiar with the LTTE's ruthless tactic of abducting school children for recruitment as child soldiers.

Restorative justice is not new to the country; it is very much a part of the Sri Lankan spiritual heritage of forgiveness, which understands that social development involves the transformation of individuals, not their prolonged imprisonment or death. It should be noted that, unlike in Sri Lanka, in some countries, such as Jordan and Yemen, the lack of sustained political will and popular support undermined the sustainability of similar rehabilitation (deradicalisation) programs.

The program “Way-Forward on Rehabilitation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration” (W-RRR) of Sri Lanka's Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (BCGR) was designed in compliance with international principles, guidelines, and best practices, as well as with due consideration to the unique requirements emerging from the context of the Sri Lankan conflict. In one of the world's most developed rehabilitation programs for radicalised combatants, each beneficiary (i.e. former combatant) was first subjected to psycho-social and socio-economic profiling and categorised as belonging to a “low”, “medium”, or “high” risk groups, according to the depth, period, and activities of her/his involvement within the LTTE organisation. The 24 Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centres (PARCs) in different parts of Sri Lanka were managed by Sri Lankan Army personnel, while the approximately 254 staff who directly interacted with the rehabilitees were primarily professional educators or school teachers from the Army Cadet Corps who were trained in psychological counseling. Approximately USD 9,136,370 was spent by the Sri Lankan government for the rehabilitation of former LTTE combatants between January 2009 and September 2012. This sum does not include the (initial) smaller contributions in funds.
and other resources made by the United Nations International Organisation for Migration (IOM), UNICEF, international NGOs, several Western and other governments, local NGOs, and Sri Lankan private sector organisations.

Several United Nations and humanitarian agencies, notably the IOM and HALO Trust, assisted the Sri Lankan government in the rehabilitation of former combatants through a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program (DDG) in 2009, as well as in the resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The IOM, trusted by the Sri Lankan government, had access to IDP welfare and rehabilitation centres throughout the combatant rehabilitation process.[104]

The components of the Sri Lankan “6+1 Model” rehabilitation program included: (1) Educational Rehabilitation, (2) Vocational Rehabilitation, (3) Psychosocial and Creative Therapies for Rehabilitation, (4) Social, Cultural, and Family Rehabilitation, (5) Spiritual and Religious Rehabilitation, (6) Recreational Rehabilitation, and (+) Community Engagement. An aftercare system was also put in place for the rehabilitees who required livelihood support once the rehabilitation program was completed. This was in the form of guaranteed wage employment in the newly established Civil Defence Force and Navy Coastguard in the government sector, or support for self-employment through micro-finance facilities and business support services.

The rehabilitation program in Sri Lanka was led by two internationally experienced Sri Lankan psychologists, Malkanthi Hettiarachchi and Peshali Fernando[105]. It was designed according to the rehabilitation model developed by Singapore’s International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR).[106] The research staff from ICPVTR which included experts in rehabilitation from the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) of Singapore, assisted the Sri Lankan government in designing and implementing its rehabilitation program from October 2009 onwards.[107] However, the rehabilitation program was “indigenised” to suit the Sri Lankan culture.[108] The IOM provided crucial technical assistance for the vocational rehabilitation and reintegration programs. It also facilitated study tours for relevant Sri Lankan government officials to study the rehabilitation programs in Colombia.[109]

The components of the Sri Lankan “6+1 Model” rehabilitation program are described in detail in an article entitled “Sri Lanka’s Rehabilitation Program: A New Frontier in Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency”, recently published in PRISM: Journal of the Centre for Complex Operations by Malkanthi Hettiarachchi[110], lead psychologist of Sri Lanka’s rehabilitation program. Some details relating to the components of the rehabilitation program provided in the following paragraphs are based on the PRISM article.

The Educational Rehabilitation included providing formal education to beneficiaries under 18 years of age within a residential school environment for the General Certificate of Education (G.C.E.) Ordinary and Advanced Level Examinations, as only 60% of the beneficiaries under 18 had studied up to the national standard of Ordinary Level (Grade 10). Adult supplementary
education was also provided, as 10 - 25% of adult beneficiaries could not read and write in the Tamil language, and the majority did not understand Sinhala or English.

Vocational Rehabilitation included skills development for Agriculture, Carpentry, Masonry, Motor Mechanics, Beauty Culture, Garment and Textiles, Information Technology, and other industries for which there is a (labour) market demand. The forty-two vocational training programs conducted were also based on the beneficiaries’ interests, their families’ traditional vocations and businesses, and regional vocational opportunities. The vocational programs were partly held within the rehabilitation centres, and partly externally run by local and foreign NGOs, private businesses, state ministries, and volunteer organisations. Several Sri Lankan blue chip companies supported the vocational training programs by building the vocational skills of former combatants, and by providing them with employment in the companies upon completion of the rehabilitation program. The beneficiaries’ desire for vocational training and employment was seen to gradually increase as their period in rehabilitation progressed.

A major component of the Psycho-social and Creative Rehabilitation program was the in-house counseling provided to beneficiaries. The Centre staff was trained in psychological counseling and advanced psycho-social skills by a clinical psychologist, a counseling psychologist, counselors, therapists, and other professionals in psychology. The Mentorship Program was a part of the Psycho-social Rehabilitation program, in which well-respected persons of the Sri Lankan Tamil community acted as mentors for the beneficiaries. Creative therapies, known to have a healing effect on many, helped many beneficiaries to express their inner thoughts and feelings through artistic means.

Social, Cultural, and Family Rehabilitation included social and educational tours to different parts of Sri Lanka to gain an understanding of the diversity within the island. These included visits to universities, schools, and other developments in Colombo, the ethnically diverse commercial capital of Sri Lanka.[111] Family Rehabilitation consisted of visits by family or next of kin in a friendly atmosphere conducive to rehabilitation, writing and receiving of letters, and visits to home villages in the event of a celebration, illness, or a death in the family.

The Spiritual and Religious Rehabilitation was seen to have a strong impact in helping beneficiaries to emotionally and morally reconcile with their past and develop a state of inner peace, so that they are psychologically in a position to look to the future. The spiritual programs that were conducted included yoga and meditation sessions, also encompassing mindfulness (vipassana) training. Group religious ceremonies with rites and rituals were conducted, based on a beneficiary’s faith. These ceremonies were led by religious leaders of the respective Hindu, Christian, and Satya Sai faiths.

Recreational Rehabilitation included beneficiary participation in team sports such as cricket, volleyball, and traditional team sports. Recreational Rehabilitation also included engaging in other forms of physical exercise for an allocated period of time each day.
The rehabilitated former LTTE combatants were “reinserted” (resettled) in their original homes with a three-month reinsertion assistance package that was meant to meet their preliminary basic needs in terms of shelter, food, clothing, and healthcare. This process sought to rely on community-based support structures. The final phase of the W-RRR program, the reintegration of former combatants into their home communities, constituted the two aspects of social integration and economic integration. The (+1) Community Engagement component of the rehabilitation program helped to work towards social integration. Community engagement was vital to overcome the anger and resentment held by some members of the Tamil community living in villages in the North and East, who were persecuted by the LTTE or had been held hostage by the LTTE during the final stages of the war. In this way, the mentoring and further mainstreaming of former LTTE combatants was meant to constitute a natural and gradual transfer to their respective local communities. The initial contact between a beneficiary and her/his home community was established in degrees, beginning with a series of visitations, letters, and phone conversations as part of the Community Engagement program.

Economic reintegration was to be achieved by providing employment or support for self-employment through the aftercare system, and by ensuring employability of rehabilitees through catch-up programs in education and vocational training as described above. However, effective reintegration, especially economic reintegration, could not be achieved for all rehabilitated former combatants. Thus, the need for the establishment of a continued monitoring and mentoring system of rehabilitated combatants exists, in order to evaluate the progress of, and support for, the reintegration component of Sri Lanka’s W-RRR program (this topic is discussed in greater detail below under “The Continued Challenge of Economic Reintegration” heading).

Rehabilitation Programs for Child Combatants
The rehabilitation programs for child beneficiaries involved additional facets such as an emphasis on further education and the inclusion of Boy Scouts and Girl Guides programs. Approximately 40% of child beneficiaries had not studied up to the national standard of the Ordinary Level Examination (Grade 10); many were in fact illiterate. All child beneficiaries were admitted into a prominent school near Colombo (Ratmalana Hindu College), with the exception of those who preferred to undertake vocational training.

Some beneficiaries were able to enroll in university education, and several also entered the very competitive medical schools in national universities. The rehabilitation program conducted for 273 former LTTE child combatants at the premises of the Ratmalana Hindu College, in partnership with community organisations and private individuals, was found to be particularly effective due to its special English Language program and Girl Guides and Boy Scouts programs. English was taught using the comprehensive Montessori Method which
embraces different learning styles and student-centred learning through non-traditional, non-competitive, and collaborative teaching methods.[120]

Seventy-eight boys and girls completed the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides programs, which were adapted to meet the requirements of the rehabilitation program.[121] These programs helped former child combatants to overcome trauma and past negative experiences through a system of holistic education. The programs promoted social responsibility and integration, team spirit, and ethnic and religious harmony through the values they promoted, activity-based learning, rewards for good behaviour, and practical training useful for resettlement into society, such as knots training, carpentry, electronics, and first aid training.[122] The rehabilitation program for child beneficiaries at the Ratmalana school also included opportunities to visit Colombo for water therapy and other activities.[123]

**Demonstrating Effectiveness of Cognitive Transformation**

The effectiveness of the deradicalisation of the Sri Lankan rehabilitation program was assessed using: (1) interviews with beneficiaries, (2) review of past records, (3) observations noted by staff, and (4) formal assessment in the form of psychometric testing.[124] Assessment Battery psychometrics were used, based on a radicalisation index and several psychological and social psychology scales.[125] Observed cognitive transformation is attributed both to the core components of the rehabilitation program as well as to the strong informal interpersonal relationships built between beneficiaries and centre staff.[126] When trying to assess the effectiveness of the rehabilitation program, it became evident that the radicalisation levels of members of a control group not exposed to the rehabilitation program shifted only minimally. This led to the conclusion that time alone was not sufficient for their deradicalisation.[127] Two components that were observed to be most effective were psychological counseling and mindfulness training, although the effectiveness of one component cannot be assessed in isolation as all beneficiaries underwent all six components of the rehabilitation program.[128]

An independent assessment of the effectiveness of the rehabilitation program was conducted by leading psychologists in the field, Arie W. Kruglanski and Michele J. Gelfand of the University of Maryland (USA), which included a baseline survey to assess the changing attitudes and opinions of the beneficiaries.[129] Kruglanski and Gelfand used several attitude questionnaires and personality measures to survey the beneficiaries’ support for armed fighting against the state, their “embeddedness” to the LTTE terrorist organisation, their attitudes toward the Centre’s staff members, and their attitudes toward the rehabilitation program, among other psychological variables.[130] Responses of over 9,000 rehabilitees were obtained.[131] Many beneficiaries of the rehabilitation program were observed to have undergone a significant transformation in their attitudes and behaviour towards other ethnic groups as well as the mainly Sinhalese security forces personnel over the course of the first seven months of rehabilitation.[132] The assessment made by Kruglanski and Gelfand demonstrated three
main findings[133]: (1) “Significant decline in the detainees’ support for violence toward the Sinhalese from the moment they joined the deradicalisation program at Time 1 to seven months later toward the end of the program at Time 2”; (2) “Evidence that this generalised decline in support for violence and armed struggle is even more pronounced for the most extreme terrorist members of the organisation;” and (3) that two key ingredients which made the Sri Lankan rehabilitation successful were: “dignity and adequacy”. [134] Kruglanski and Gelfand believe that “dignity” was a significant aspect of the rehabilitation program where the beneficiaries developed genuine friendships with centre staff and guards, and the feeling of being respected led to deradicalisation. [135] Kruglanski and Gelfand believe that the perception of “adequacy” of the rehabilitation by the beneficiaries was also significant, i.e. the adequacy of the attributes of the rehabilitation programs such as the vocational training component which would help them reintegrate into society. [136] While long-term effectiveness can only be assessed in later years, the study by Kruglanski and Gelfand is very significant, especially as scientific research into the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs for violent extremists has thus far been cited as a shortcoming of rehabilitation programs adopted previously by several other countries, including the expansive rehabilitation program in Saudi Arabia. [137]

Thus, the Sri Lankan rehabilitation program can be assessed to have been successful in countering the LTTE’s violent, ethno-nationalist ideology which demonised the Sinhalese and Muslim communities of Sri Lanka. Therefore, not only was the Sri Lankan rehabilitation program able to “disengage” the former combatants, apparent through the zero rate of recidivism, they were “deradicalised” owing to their cognitive transformation. In this the Sri Lankan rehabilitation meets the “Key Components of Successful Deradicalisation Programs” in the article entitled “Deradicalising Islamist Extremists” by Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez, Christopher Boucek, published by the RAND Corporation. [138] Sri Lanka’s rehabilitation program can potentially serve as an effective and low-cost solution for deradicalising members of a terrorist organisation for other countries emerging from similar conflicts. Sri Lanka’s rehabilitation program which has cost less than USD 20 million [139], stands in contrast with others such as in Afghanistan with a budget of over USD 220 million, [140] with a much less effective outcome (although the nature of Afghanistan’s on-going conflict presents much greater challenges to reintegration). It also shows that a program supported by vast funds such as in Saudi Arabia [141] may not be required for the cognitive transformation of beneficiaries. In undertaking a relatively effective rehabilitation program for former LTTE combatants, Sri Lanka has fulfilled a recommendation made in the country’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) report produced in November 2011. However, it can be noted that although there have been no incidents of recidivism or terrorism related crime since the reintegration of rehabilitated combatants,[142] Sri Lanka’s robust security platform which continued post-conflict is likely also to be a strong factor for this post-conflict stability.
The Continued Challenge of Economic Reintegration

Economic reintegration of rehabilitated combatants continues to be a challenge due to the lack of satisfactory employment opportunities in conflict-affected areas or insufficient livelihood support through the aftercare program.[143] The three-month reinsertion package was not offering sufficient financial and material assistance for those rehabilitated former combatants who did not opt to be employed in the Civil Defence Force or Navy Coastguard. Those employed in the Civil Defence Force and Navy Coastguard receive a monthly salary of Rs. 19,500[144] (approximately USD 148.68), which is higher than the minimum wage of Rs. 13,000 (approximately USD 99.12) in the public sector[145]. However, this amount is still considered to be low with the high cost of living in conflict-affected areas,[146] and in Sri Lanka in general. Employment and self-employment prospects are low due to the limited qualifications and skills of former combatants, as well as the few job opportunities in the formal sector of local economies in the underdeveloped conflict-affected areas.

Thus, the economic reintegration component of Sri Lanka's W-RRR program was not successful for many rehabilitated combatants, although 100% success in economic reintegration may be deemed beyond the scope of a developing country such as Sri Lanka. In August 2013, the Sri Lankan government allocated a further Rs. 525 million (approximately USD 4.01 million) for loans for assistance in livelihood projects for rehabilitated former combatants, with a maximum loan of Rs. 250,000 (approximately USD 1,911); authorities have already received 4,700 loan applications from rehabilitated combatants.[147]

Economic reintegration may have been better achieved if private sector organisations were formally a part of the aftercare system of the rehabilitation program, in which rehabilitated combatants would also have guaranteed employment in the private sector of Sri Lanka. The variety in employment opportunities would have also led to greater job satisfaction among the newly employed beneficiaries. The lack of jobs or livelihood opportunities post-rehabilitation has been cited as a major vulnerability of the rehabilitation programs undertaken by several countries such as Afghanistan (Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program)[148], Algeria[149], and Pakistan[150]. While the social reintegration of former combatants overtly seems to be less of a challenge, more research should be undertaken through a monitoring and mentoring system to gauge its effectiveness through the W-RRR program, especially in light of some members of the beneficiaries' home villages initially being opposed to the return of former LTTE combatants back to their villages.

Rebuilding the Conflict-affected Communities in the North and East

Reconciliation initiatives to relieve the conflict-affected, predominately Tamil communities of the North and East have been implemented to fulfill their urgent social, political, and economic needs. These reconciliation initiatives continue to be implemented and comprise measures taken in: (1) resettlement and humanitarian assistance, (2) reconstruction of key transport, economic, health, and social infrastructure for reintegration, (3) political
engagement, and (4) other reconciliation initiatives relating to the emotional, social, and economic aspects of reconciliation.

Humanitarian assistance was provided to more than 300,000 displaced persons by the Ministry of Resettlement of Sri Lanka, assisted by international organisations, NGOs, and private individuals. This ministry has resettled approximately 280,000 internally displaced individuals within 2.5 years, while 6,031 persons remain in resettlement camps (as at May 2012).[151] Grants, cooked meals, and dry rations were provided for six months or more after resettlement. The Sri Lankan Army has contributed to the resettlement effort by building 1,766 houses, and in undertaking the essential, painstaking, and dangerous task of demining conflict-affected regions.[152] Demining has been completed entirely in the Jaffna Peninsula, while demining activities continue in some areas of the Northern and Eastern Provinces.[153] Public services such as water, sanitation, electricity, education, and health facilities were restored to an extent in the North and East in the initial stages of resettlement. More than 12,000 houses are under construction or have been constructed by the Indian government as of May 2013. India plans to build a total of 50,000 housing units for the resettled families in the North and East.[154]

Reconstruction of Key Economic and Social Infrastructure

The Central Bank of Sri Lanka has kept record of government-directed transport, health, and economic infrastructure reconstruction programs in the conflict-affected areas of the North and East[155], the details of which have been included in the next paragraphs as they help to grasp the extent of reconstruction and development work required to rebuild a war-torn and underdeveloped region. Key transport infrastructures have been rebuilt in conflict-affected areas in the North and East of the country, including the Paranthan-Pooneryn Highway, the A32 and A35, as well as 250 km of railroad.[156] The water supply was restored through the Jaffna Peninsula, and Mannar-Vavuniya water supply schemes and ten main water tanks were reconstructed in the Eastern Province. More water tanks are being rebuilt, including the Iranamadu water tank destroyed by the LTTE.[157] Electricity has been restored through the Sampur Coal Power Project, with a power supply extended to Mankulam, Kilinochchi and Vavuniya, and a new electrification scheme in Vavuniya. More than 2,400 power lines have been installed.

Reconstruction of key economic infrastructure included increased banking and finance facilities in the North and East: 385 private and public bank branches and extension offices had been established by 2011, while all banks had branches with microfinance schemes and loan facilities with credit guarantee schemes in the North and East. Self-Help Groups (SHGs), organised by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, were formed in the Northern and Eastern Provinces to improve financial inclusiveness of low-income groups.[158] The traditional fishing industry has been able to rebound as harbours have been upgraded, fishing restrictions removed. In addition, several tax and other concessions were made in government budgets.
(from 2012) to encourage investment in agriculture and fisheries in the North and East. Several hundred private companies[159] have supported social and economic reintegration in the North and East through large-scale business investments or grassroots level initiatives. [160]

A smaller-scale, yet notable, social reintegration initiative was undertaken in November 2012 by the Sri Lankan Army in its recruitment of 100 young Tamil women between the ages of 18 and 22 years from the Northeast (Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu areas) as Sri Lankan Army soldiers.[161] This program helped these young women and their families to overcome socio-economic hardship faced by the still underdeveloped region, and prevent their possible entry into prostitution due to the lack of employment opportunities in the area. The families, although initially reluctant, believe employment in the Sri Lankan Army brings income and social status to their children’s lives.[162] The new recruits were enlisted into the Civil Affairs Division and are to fill the communication gap between the generally Sinhala-speaking Army officers and the Tamil-speaking communities in which they serve.[163] The recruits have received a unique reconciliation-oriented military training in a friendly environment, which included field excursions to Colombo with opportunities to establish new friendships with university students in Colombo.[164]

Some important examples of social development programs have been undertaken by community and charity organisations in conflict-affected areas. The North Empowerment Project of the Foundation of Goodness serves 50,000 beneficiaries and aims to empower communities with developmental projects in healthcare, education, business development, and sports. Sri Lanka Unites, a youth movement for reconciliation, works to motivate young leaders in schools across the country and in the Tamil diaspora to engage constructively in reconciliation efforts in post-conflict Sri Lanka. “Happiness Centres” conduct psychosocial programs in schools in the North and East through centres equipped with arts and craft material, sports equipment, musical instruments, and a library including TV/DVD resources to support children in overcoming trauma, while providing a Children’s Accelerated Trauma Therapy Training course for teachers and supervisors of the Happiness Centres.[165]

**Political Engagement and Other National Reconciliation Initiatives**

A notable strategy adopted by the Sri Lankan government for political engagement with the Tamil community is the integration of former LTTE leaders in the ruling United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition government. The break-away former LTTE commander of the East, Vinayagamurthi Muralitharan, also known as Karuna, a former child combatant, joined the Sri Lankan government as the Vice President of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), and entered into mainstream politics with his appointment as the Deputy Minister of Resettlement. Similarly, the rehabilitated LTTE leaders Selvarasa Pathmanathan, also known as KP, former leader of the LTTE’s international network for fundraising and weapons procurement, and Velayutham Dayanthi, also known as Daya Master, former LTTE
spokesman and leader of the propaganda wing, are due to enter national politics through membership in the SLFP.[166]

The government has appointed an all-party Parliamentary Select Committee to discuss the implementation of the recommendations of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) report submitted in November 2011, including the contested 13th Amendment to the constitution[167] and the subject of devolution of power to the provinces. Challenges remain as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) political party has declined its participation in the Committee, fearing its participation will be construed as agreement to possible decisions made by the Committee based on a majority consensus (which the TNA believes it will be in opposition with). Presently, the main oppositional Tamil political parties such as the TNA are not viewed as effectively engaging with the Sri Lankan government or genuinely committed to the national reconciliation process, as they are ethnic-based sectarian parties which sympathise with the separatist ideology of the LTTE.[168] TNA leaders also openly associate with pro-LTTE organisations working against the Sri Lankan state outside the country, such as the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) and Global Tamil Forum (GTF).[169] With the LTTE having systematically assassinated many prominent and popular Tamil political leaders in Sri Lanka, there is a great need for a new generation of mainstream Tamil politicians who are willing to serve all ethnic communities, and assume national leadership roles in Sri Lanka (such as Lakshman Kadirgamar, the two-time Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka and likely presidential candidate who was supported by all ethnic groups of Sri Lanka, and was assassinated by the LTTE in August 2005 for that very reason).

In September 2013, elections were held in the conflict-affected, Tamil dominated Northern Province for the first time in 25 years.[170] However, the majority of the northern Tamil population voted for the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which had an election manifesto that espoused the self-determination of the Tamil people, thereby rejecting the ruling coalition government. While conducting provincial elections is a great step towards establishing normalcy in conflict-affected areas, the election results clearly reveal that the Sri Lankan government has not reached the “hearts and minds” of the Northern population, despite its many large-scale projects for economic development in the North.[171] Firstly, to earnestly engage the conflict-affected Tamil population, the Sri Lankan government must provide means to achieve immediate livelihood relief. A survey conducted in August 2013 showed that much of the conflict-affected population continues to suffer from food insecurity.[172] Additionally, there is much more the Sri Lankan government must provide to the Northern population to promote reconciliation in the North, such as allowing local participation in the implementation of development programs,[173] vocational training programs for the people (for goods/services with a market demand), psychological counseling for victims of violence, and recruiting a sufficient number of Tamil-speaking police officers, hospital staff, and government officials to the North to effectively serve the local population. It is encouraging that 900 Tamil police officers and 1,500 Tamil-speaking Sinhalese police officers have been
stationed in the Northern and Eastern Provinces recently, so that Tamil residents are able to make statements to the police in Tamil.[174]

Other initiatives in reconciliation efforts include the commission established in August 2013 by the president of Sri Lanka to investigate cases of missing persons, including abductions and disappearances, in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.[175] The commission is to produce a report within six months.[176] If conducted sincerely and transparently, as with the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission report of 2011[177], the work of this commission has the potential to greatly increase the trust between the Sri Lankan government and the conflict-affected community of the North and East. Also in 2013, the University Grants Commission of Sri Lanka (UGC) began to establish Harmony Centres in universities to promote harmony and reconciliation among university students belonging to different ethnic and religious groups.[178] The Education Ministry of Sri Lanka announced in July 2013 that no new schools are to be established on the basis of ethnicity.[179] This policy decision is meant to support national reconciliation efforts, as roots of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka also lie in the segregation of communities from childhood through ethnically or linguistically segregated schools.

The National Reconciliation Unit at the Office of the Adviser on Reconciliation to the President, Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha, has conducted more than a hundred events promoting national reconciliation.[180] The Sri Lankan Reconciliation Youth Forum of the National Reconciliation Unit disseminates information and exchanges ideas, views, and suggestions on Sri Lanka’s post-conflict reconciliation and development process.[181] A series of National Conferences on Reconciliation are organised by the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies (under the purview of the Ministry of External Affairs) to foster reconciliation and further constructive dialogue, in accordance with its objective of “engaging and promoting peace and addressing post-conflict issues” as per the Institute’s Act.[182] Sri Lanka has also embarked on many other impactful state- and non-state led national reconciliation initiatives.[183]

**Recommendations to Address Shortcomings in National Reconciliation Programs and the Lasting Challenge Posed by the LTTE’s International Disinformation Campaign**

There are many aspects to reconciliation that remain to be strengthened, including the aftercare system for rehabilitated combatants, economic development of conflicted-affected areas, provision of public services to their population, and overarching reconciliation programs. The establishment of an ongoing monitoring and mentoring mechanism to support reintegrated former combatants is imperative for these vulnerable individuals, as they are targets of re-radicalisation by existing remnant members of the LTTE domestically and overseas. A monitoring mechanism is also important to ensure the security of the resettled former combatants, who may be harassed by members of their communities as a reaction to violence inflicted on them by the LTTE in the past. An assessment technique such as Multi-
attribute Evaluation (ME) can also be developed to gauge the outcomes of Sri Lanka's rehabilitation program (W-RRR), and to check whether its planned goals and objectives have been met.[184]

More government support must be given to secure basic needs, as the (six-month) care package after resettlement was not sufficient for the survival of the resettled communities due to the lack of livelihood opportunities in the conflict-affected areas. Similarly, the three-month reinsertion package provided was also not sufficient financial and material assistance for resettled and rehabilitated former combatants. Many households in the conflict-affected zone are still believed to be food insecure,[185] despite the government's initiatives for the conflict-affected households to adopt home-gardens and animal husbandry. Thus, sustainable economic development programs that can immediately improve the living standards of the conflicted-affected population should be adopted by the state as soon as possible. In the future, the government should also ensure that there is more local participation in implementing development programs.[186] District secretariats must be empowered to implement reconciliation initiatives, including local economic development through small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). More support is needed for small and medium scale industries in the conflict-affected areas.[187] In studying how to achieve successful economic reintegration of the conflict-affected people, Sri Lanka can study the Malaysian approach more closely, where significant improvement in the socio-economic conditions of the vulnerable population was identified as a key to preventing their exploitation by extremist elements in society.[188]

Psychological counseling and assistance should be provided systematically through government-NGO partnerships for the conflict-affected population, beginning with victims of violence and vulnerable groups such as war widows and children. There should also be quicker implementation of the government's trilingual language policy[189], so that, for example, the conflict-affected population has access to Tamil-speaking public officers serving in hospitals and in government offices.[190] An overarching, specialised government infrastructure for national reconciliation initiatives, with a monitoring and evaluation mechanism, should be established as soon as possible. The failure to move more quickly in the implementation of the National Human Rights Action Plan (as well as the trilingual language policy) has been attributed to the absence of a dedicated ministry for reconciliation.[191] An overarching body for reconciliation can engage with, and facilitate collaboration between, the different sectors and segments of the country to bring about meaningful changes.

The government should work more proactively with private sector organisations to increase investment in conflict-affected areas and to encourage more north-south business partnerships. More public-private partnerships and tax concessions and finance for key industries are needed to spur economic growth in the conflict-affected areas. Linking the economies of these regions to the national economy may be the most organic, effective, and sustainable approach to unite the country. Reconciliation cannot be achieved by state directives alone. For this, more transport infrastructure needs to be developed by way of a railway connection that provides direct connection between Jaffna and Colombo.
National reconciliation and interethnic harmony can perhaps be achieved most effectively through education and culture. Firstly, there must be an increase in the quality of education, including higher education, to meet international standards throughout Sri Lanka, so that the generations to come can more easily enter local and global job markets. To foster reconciliation, it is imperative that educational courses in interethnic studies and studies in comparative religion in the context of Sri Lanka be introduced into school and university curriculums. Restoring and reviving the cultural heritage of all communities, especially that of the Tamil community, is an urgent and integral part of the national reconciliation process.

To gain the goodwill of the northern Tamil people, it is also necessary to reduce the military presence in the North. At the same time, the necessary measures for national security should be retained so that a resurgence of terrorism can be prevented. State recognition of those perished due to the conflict, including in the end phase, is important for reconciliation. In this regard, it is very encouraging that the Sri Lankan government has recently announced that a nationwide census will be conducted to determine the number of lives lost during the 26-year long conflict.

Lastly, strengthening principles of democratic governance by investigation into alleged crimes committed by individual members of the Sri Lankan security forces, politicians, and gangs is essential to regain the trust of the whole population as well as the international community.

While the government of Sri Lanka faces such significant challenges in achieving post-conflict reconciliation, the most formidable threat to its hard-won peace remains the LTTE’s remnant factions, front organisations, and financing and propaganda units that have survived abroad. Although the LTTE is militarily defeated, second and third tier leaders and cells operating in southern India and Western countries are attempting to create unrest, revive terrorism, and hamper economic development in Sri Lanka. They continue to present a distorted view of Sri Lanka and continue to radicalise Tamil youth living outside of Sri Lanka.

As a measure to counter the LTTE’s tech-savvy and multi-lingual propaganda machine and its worldwide mass dissemination of separatist ideology and disinformation, the Sri Lankan diplomatic arm should, without further delay, embrace new information communication technologies (ICTs) in its conduct of public diplomacy as well as in day-to-day diplomatic work. While traditional measures to ensure the security of information and communication should not be forsaken, ICTs will increase the speed, reach, and effectiveness of communication by officials of Sri Lanka’s bureau of foreign affairs. This will also enhance the state’s capacity to engage with the Tamil diaspora, counter reporting against the Sri Lankan state by ill-informed or ill-willed NGOs and other institutions, circulate positive news items of stories of post-conflict Sri Lanka, as well as normalise relations with nations hosting large communities of diaspora Tamils. The LTTE’s leadership has been rightly described as “masters of deception”: the LTTE’s penetration into civil society and legitimate governments in the West remains unparalleled by other terror groups due to diaspora constituency pressures.

Post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction is by nature a long-term process. Thus, Sri Lankans, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, and the world must allow the democratic, culturally
developed, and traditionally ethnically harmonious country to heal itself in an organic, sustainable, and responsible manner, in a period of time that is roughly proportional to the more than 25 years it grappled with a terrorist insurgency that also fuelled inter-communal mistrust.

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Notes
[1] An earlier version of this article was published in the ICPVTR Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis (CTTA) magazine in March 2013 (5-3).


[16] Ibid;


[30] It is also believed that some former LTTE combatants and others who have sought asylum in Western countries have assumed new identities, while they continue to be considered “missing” in Sri Lanka.


The leader/’Prime Minister’ of the TGTE, Visvanathan Rudrakumaran, was the international legal advisor to the Liberational Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) terrorist organisation and Velupillai Prabhakaran, the late (former) leader of the of the LTTE as well as responsible for the LTTE’s international affairs.

[37] The Vinyagam faction is primarily an LTTE criminal network:


[41] Ibid.


[46] Descendants of the Portuguese and Dutch who settled in Sri Lanka during colonial times (many intermarried with the Sinhalese and Tamils)


[48] Anglicized “Yarlpanam”.


[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.


[54] Sirimavo Bandaranaike was the world’s first female head of state.


[58] The LTTE was later also known as the "Tamil Tigers" as a shortened form of the group's name.


[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.


[66] Ibid.


Although the Sinhalese and Tamils have a long history of living harmoniously in Sri Lanka, they have a culturally distinct heritage and identity. The Sinhalese first came to the island in the 6th century B.C.E. from Orissa in the north-east of India, followed by waves of migration from different parts of India in ancient times. Sri Lanka, then regionally known just as Lanka, was at that time already inhabited by some indigenous tribes whose identity was neither Sinhalese nor Tamil. The northern Sinhalese kingdoms were infrequently invaded since the 2nd century B.C.E. by South Indian kingdoms and in the 14th century a Tamil South Indian dynasty established a kingdom in the northern most part of Sri Lanka, which is now known as Jaffna. The Jaffna Peninsula comprises much of the land mass of the medieval Jaffna Tamil kingdom.

Large stretches of north-central jungles separated the Sinhalese and the Tamils at this time, and as a result the Tamils developed a more “distinct and confident” culture, reinforced by the revival of Hinduism in India. They looked to South India for culture and tradition.

Generally, both the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils view themselves as being unique due to their language, ethnicity, culture, and religion. They regard their culture as fundamentally different from “foreign” cultures, reinforced by the revival of Hinduism in India. They looked to South India for culture and tradition.

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interviews with over 9,000 rehabilitees. A rehabilitation program can be assessed through Kruglanski and Gelfand’s study of Sri Lanka’s rehabilitation program, which is based on assessments made with relation to the effectiveness of the rehabilitation program. Six primary interviews were conducted for the next section on the rehabilitation of child combatants, specifically to gain more information on the program which included the special English Language program and Girl Guides and Boy Scouts programs, as sufficient information was not available through secondary sources. Interviews were with rehabilitated combatants who were not conducted; this was due to constraints in time as well as due to the fact that the impact of the rehabilitation program can be assessed through Kruglanski and Gelfand’s study of Sri Lanka’s rehabilitation program, which is based on interviews with over 9,000 rehabilitees.


[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid.


[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid.


[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid.


[116] Some of the information cited in the preceding paragraphs included in the passages dealing with the rehabilitation of former combatants above were obtained through primary interviews with Sri Lanka’s (former) Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, Brigadier Dharshana Hettiarachchi, and the Lead Psychologist of Sri Lanka’s rehabilitation program, Ms. Malkanthi Hettiarachchi as indicated by the corresponding endnotes (Brigadier Dharshana Hettiarachchi and Ms. Malkanthi Hettiarachchi share the same last name, but are not related to each other). Brigadier Dharshana Hettiarachchi was interviewed to verify the total number of rehabilitated combatants and related details (up to January 2013 when the interview was conducted). Ms. Malkanthi Hettiarachchi was interviewed for clarification on psychological assessments made with relation to the effectiveness of the rehabilitation program. Six primary interviews were conducted for the next section on the rehabilitation of child combatants, specifically to gain more information on the program which included the special English Language program and Girl Guides and Boy Scouts programs, as sufficient information was not available through secondary sources. Interviews were with rehabilitated combatants who were not conducted; this was due to constraints in time as well as due to the fact that the impact of the rehabilitation program can be assessed through Kruglanski and Gelfand’s study of Sri Lanka’s rehabilitation program, which is based on interviews with over 9,000 rehabilitees.

[118] Ibid.


[122] Ibid.


[126] Ibid.

[127] Ibid.

[128] Ibid.


[131] Ibid.


[134] Ibid.

[135] Positive ratings were also reported by former combatants, namely: positive perceptions reported of the rehabilitation center staff (96.43% of beneficiaries), the rehabilitation center (70.14% of beneficiaries) and the rehabilitation center guards (94.57% of beneficiaries); Malkanthi Hettiarachchi, "Sri Lanka’s Rehabilitation Program: A New Frontier in Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency," *PRISM: Journal of the Center for Complex Operations* 4, no. 2 (2013), 105 - 119.


Development Goals model villages in the North and East with the active participation of a Ministry also implements grassroots level participatory development programs, and has launched plans for the establishment of Millennium poultry have been distributed to households in promotion of sustainable livelihood opportunities by the Ministry of Resettlement. A large number of motor boats and nets have been distributed to the fishing community and several thousands of cattle, goats, and fi

18,123 loans were disbursed amounting to Rs. 818 million in the Eastern Province between the years 2008 and 2011. Through the Self-Help Groups (SHGs) program, 8,534 loans were disbursed amounting to Rs. 459 million in the Northern Province and 14,539 latrines. In addition, 10,891 water wells have been cleaned.

Five major irrigation schemes and 115 minor irrigation schemes are being developed. Health services have been restored through the reconstruction of the Iranamadu Domestic Airport in Kilinochchi in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka was completed. Mannar Bridge and causeway, Sangupidy Bridge, Navakkuli Bridge, and many smaller bridges have been completed. In June 2013, the Paranthan Bridge, Trincomalee Bridge, Th

Ministry of Resettlement.

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118 Through the Self-Help Groups (SHGs) program, 8,534 loans were disbursed amounting to Rs. 459 million in the Northern Province and 18,123 loans were disbursed amounting to Rs. 818 million in the Eastern Province between the years 2008 and 2011. The private sector organizations included Brandix Lanka, John Keells, Hayleys, Virtusa, Nestle, Lanka ORIX Finance, 99X Technology, Academy of Design, and Mt. Lavinia Hotels.

A large number of motor boats and nets have been distributed to the fishing community and several thousands of cattle, goats, and poultry have been distributed to households in promotion of sustainable livelihood opportunities by the Ministry of Resettlement. The Ministry also implements grassroots level participatory development programs, and has launched plans for the establishment of Millennium Development Goals model villages in the North and East with the active participation of affected communities and other stakeholders.


[156] Reconstruction of key transport infrastructure included road reconstruction in the North and East including the completion of the Paranthan-Pooneryn Highway, A32 (Puttlam to Mannar), A35 (Paranthan to Mullaitivu), and reconstruction of 250 km of railroad (Vavuniya-KKS, Madawachchiya-Madhu, Madu-Thisalimannar, and Omanthei-Pallai). The Paranthan to Poonakari, Mannarkulam to Mullaitivu, and Jaffna-KKS roads are under construction, and the Kandy-Jaffna A9 highway has commenced development from Galkulama to Madawachchiya, from Vavuniya to Mankulam, and Nawatkiy to Mannar as at January 2012. The Kinniya Bridge, Trincomalee Bridge, Mannar Bridge and causeway, Sangupidy Bridge, Navakkuli Bridge, and many smaller bridges have been completed. In June 2013, the reconstruction of the Iranamadu Domestic Airport in Kilinochchi in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka was completed. Five major irrigation schemes and 115 minor irrigation schemes are being developed. Health services have been restored through the construction of 164 health institutions in conflict-affected areas. A large number of small-scale sanitation constructions have been built, including 14,539 latrines. In addition, 10,891 water wells have been cleaned.

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[160] A large number of motor boats and nets have been distributed to the fishing community and several thousands of cattle, goats, and poultry have been distributed to households in promotion of sustainable livelihood opportunities by the Ministry of Resettlement. The Ministry also implements grassroots level participatory development programs, and has launched plans for the establishment of Millennium Development Goals model villages in the North and East with the active participation of affected communities and other stakeholders.
Economic zones and industrial parks have been established in the North and East, and the government has set-up vocational training centers and technical colleges for skills development, including opportunities for youth to develop entrepreneurship skills. The “Northern Spring” program is being implemented by the Ministry of Economic Development to develop the Northern Province with regard to infrastructure development, agricultural and fisheries development, livelihood promotion, housing, and educational facilities and a Work Task Force under the Ministry inspects and conducts the development projects. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) extended a loan of USD$ 154.4 million to reconstruct 120 km of provincial roads as part of the Northern Road Connectivity Project in 2010.

[161] Interviews with two new Tamil female recruits from Kilinochchi and Mannar into the Sri Lankan Army (names withheld); Face-to-face Interviews, “Enhancing Knowledge and Virtues” program conducted by the Office of the Director of Social Development Affairs to the President, Presidential Secretariat, Colombo, Sri Lanka, January 11, 2013;

Brigadier Manoj Mudannayake, Chief Coordinator, Face-to-face Interview, “Enhancing Knowledge and Virtues” program conducted by the Office of the Director of Social Development Affairs to the President, Presidential Secretariat, Colombo, Sri Lanka, January 11, 2013;


[162] Ibid.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Ibid.


[167] The implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution is contested in Sri Lanka as it was not adopted constitutionally. Although the bill on the 13th Amendment to the Constitution was passed with 136 votes for and 11 votes against it in Parliament in 1987, a referendum was not held to seek the people’s approval as per the then majority decision of the Supreme Court. It is believed that the then Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayawardene adopted the 13th Amendment due to rising internal pressure (terrorism) and external pressure (threat from India), and suppressed public opposition to the 13th Amendment prevailing at the time. On 8 July 2013, the President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa, communicated to the visiting Indian National Security Advisor, Shiv Shanker Menon that devolving land and police powers to the provinces as provisioned by the 13th Amendment was problematic for a country small in size such as Sri Lanka. It is believed that the central government of India continues to feel pressure from the southern state of Tamil Nadu to push Sri Lanka to adopt the 13th Amendment. During a one-to-one meeting on the same day with the Indian National Security Advisor, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Defence Secretary of Sri Lanka, stated unequivocally that the repeal of the devolution of police powers to the provinces under the 13th Amendment was "non-negotiable." The Sri Lankan Secretary of Defence stated that devolution of police powers to the provinces will undermine the national security of Sri Lanka and that it will thus not serve to alleviate (political) grievances faced by the Tamil minority community in Sri Lanka. The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka decided unanimously on 26 September 2013 that land powers are vested in the Central Government and not the Provincial Governments, according to the 13th Amendment to the Constitution;


[176] Ibid.


[182] The National Conferences on Reconciliation Youth Forum are conducted to engage the diverse sectors of society. The Kadirgamar Institute has conducted seven National Conferences on Reconciliation thus far: Inaugural National Conference on Reconciliation (November 24, 2011), National Conference on the Role of the Business Community in Reconciliation (January 24, 2012), National Conference on the Role of Education in Reconciliation (March 13, 2012), National Conference on the Role of Women in Reconciliation (July 23, 2012), National Conference on the Role of ICT in Reconciliation (September 18, 2012), the National Conference on the Role of Youth in Reconciliation (January 2, 2013), and the National Conference on the Role of Arts and Culture in Reconciliation (May 16, 2013). Post-conference policy papers with recommendations to the Government on how to facilitate different segments of society in reconciliation efforts have been developed by the institute.

[183] Taking the National Reconciliation Conference series outside of Colombo for the greater benefit and participation of the conflict-affected community, the University Grants Commission (UGC) of Sri Lanka and the University of Jaffna organized the National Conference on the Role of Higher Education in Reconciliation on June 13-14, 2013 in Jaffna, northern Sri Lanka, marking the university community’s commitment to the national reconciliation process.

A “National Program Promoting Ethnic Harmony and Developing Leadership Skills of Students from Conflict-affected Areas in the North and East and Difficult Areas in the South” (“Sisu Diviya National Program”) has been in operation since 2006, and is conducted by the Office of the Director of Social Development Affairs to the President, Presidential Secretariat. The program is aimed at reducing post-traumatic stress, reviving the education of children who have been displaced and whose education was disrupted by LTTE activities, developing leadership skills of youth, and promoting interaction between ethnic groups to contribute to national interethnic and interreligious harmony. The office of the Director of Social Development Affairs to the President together with the University Grants Commission of Sri Lanka are presently planning the establishment of Harmony Centers in all universities, schools, and districts to conduct activities in reconciliation.

An outstanding example of a non-state initiated reconciliation program in Sri Lanka are the dance performances undertaken by the Ara Sri Art Theatre. This theatre, founded in 2004 by Mrs. Arunthathy S Ranganathan, promotes ethnic harmony through visual and performing arts and has conducted numerous dances and multicultural concerts with this goal. These performances include the Oriental Music Orchestra performance in Sri Lanka on March 6, 2012, in which 100 young musicians from all districts of Sri Lanka performed in unison. Ara Sri Art Theatre also held a dance festival in Bintaan, Indonesia, on April 12-13, 2012 and in Singapore on April 14, 2012, where Sinhalese (Buddhist and Christian) and Tamil (Hindu and Christian) dancers presented dances together under Hindu themes in performing two classical Bharathanatyam compositions and the Cosmic Dance of Shiva.


[187] Ibid.


[191] Ibid.


[194] For example, pro-LTTE groups such as “Boycott Sri Lanka” (http://www.boycottsrilanka.com/) work to discourage the purchase of goods produced in Sri Lanka;


Salafi Violence and Sufi Tolerance? Rethinking Conventional Wisdom

by Mark Woodward, Muhammad Sani Umar, Inayah Rohmaniyah, and Mariani Yahya

Abstract

It is often assumed that there is a strong correlation, if not a causal relationship between varieties of Muslim thought and violent tendencies. Salafism is often associated with intolerance and violence and Sufism with tolerance and nonviolence. In this article we demonstrate that these assumptions are baseless. Based on analysis of historical and contemporary cases from Southeast Asia and West Africa, we show that there is no significant correlation between theology and violent tendencies. Some violent groups are Sufi and others Salafi, while some non-violent groups are Salafi, others Sufi. Policy makers are therefore ill-advised to use theological orientation as a factor in assessing the violent potential of Muslim movements and organisations.

Keywords: Sufism, Salafism, violence, West Africa, Southeast Asia

Introduction

In policy oriented and (to a lesser extent) academic literature on political Islam there is a pervasive assumption that Salafism, especially its Wahhabi variant, is tied to violent extremism and that Sufism (Muslim mysticism) is inherently tolerant and peaceful. These assumptions are virtually axiomatic and rarely subject to serious scrutiny. The academic literature on Sufism tends to focus on classical texts by Rabi'a al-Adawiyya (713-801), Muhyi'l-Din ibn'l-Arabi (1165-1240), Jalaluddin al-Rumi (1207-1273) and other gnostic Sufis whose major themes were the love of God, the quest for union with the divine and the equivalence of all religions. This orientation is mirrored in the anthropological literature that champions popular Sufism for acceptance of local cultures and the role of peaceful Sufi syechs and merchants in the spread of Islam. Carl Ernst observes that there has been a tendency for western scholars to view Sufism as a peaceful alternative to an inherently violent orthodox Islam since the early nineteenth century. Salafis are typically depicted as exclusivist, intolerant of local cultures and other religions and, particularly in the post-9/11 literature, as being the embodiment of inherently violent Islam, and are associated with “conversion by the sword.” Ibn Saud’s 18th century wars of conquest and Rumi’s 13th century verses about churches, mosques and synagogues as houses of God have become archetypes in contemporary Western discourse about Salafis and Sufis.

These views are perhaps most clearly articulated in the writings of Ed Husain and Stephen Schwartz and others located on the cusp of scholarship and advocacy journalism. Even though they are highly polemical, their works are important because they are more widely read, and
arguably have greater influence on the policy community, than those of more objective academic authors.

Schwartz has written that: “Sufis seek mutual civility, interaction, a cooperation between every human being.” He describes Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), the founder of the Salafi sect that carries his name, as “a simpleton from the wilderness,” whose teachings inspired: “Al-Qaida on September 11, 2001, as well as in Iraq and everywhere else the terrorist conspiracy sheds blood.” He characterizes al-Wahhab’s principal theological work, Kitab Tawhid (The Book of the Unity of God), as: “a handbook for the interrogation and punishment of ‘thoughtcrime.’” [5]

Husain states that: “Almost all Salafis believe and constantly remind each other of the need to be loyal only to Muslims, and to hate, be suspicious of, not work in alliance with, and ensure only minimal/necessary interaction with non-Muslims. This attitude is underpinned by the Salafi creedal belief in al-wala wa al-bar, broadly translated as fidelity to Muslims and hatred for non-Muslims.” [6] Madawi al-Rasheed [7] and Quintan Wiktorowicz [8] are more nuanced but retain the view that Salafism is inherently intolerant, makes pervasive use of demonisation and other forms of symbolic violence, and the ideology if not practice of jihad. Wiktorowicz, for example, distinguishes between reformist and jihadi Salafis but maintains that reformist refrain from violence only because the Muslim community is not yet ready for jihad.

In this article we make two basic points about the violent Salafi/peaceful Sufi dichotomy: 1. It is factually incorrect. 2. Theological orientation cannot be used as a predictor of either violent or nonviolent behaviour. Broadly defined theological orientations including Salafism and Sufism are not prime movers or causal factors leading to either acceptance or rejection of violence against religious others as a political strategy. They can, however, be used to legitimate a priori dispositions towards both. In the case of violent movements many theologies become tools for the demonisation of designated enemy others. The very same theologies can be used to promote tolerance, and even acceptance of religious diversity.

The analysis presented here relies on ethnographic, historical and survey data and methods for modeling Muslim social movements developed at the Centre for the Study of Religion and Conflict at Arizona State University based on objective criteria that do not reference the theological issues central to debates between Salafis and Sufis.[9] We draw on examples of violent and nonviolent Sufi and Salafi movements in Southeast Asia and West Africa we have observed since 2008 and on historical cases from both regions dating to the 17th century. These regions are significant because they are home to some of the world’s largest Muslim populations, and strategically important because of concerted efforts by the Saudi state, Saudi-sponsored non-governmental organisations and private donors to spread Salafi teachings. Violence is taken as a dependent variable and we made no a priori assumptions concerning independent variables. In this paper we report on negative findings. Theological factors, including the difference between Sufism and Salafism are not associated with violence or non-violence. Our findings parallel those of the US government sponsored Political Instability

December 2013
Taskforce, according to which religious differences are not statistically significant factors in models forecasting internal conflicts such as civil wars and rebellions.[10]

Our analysis is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in both regions and is framed by works of other scholars concerned with the history of Islam in these areas and the Middle East. Comparative ethnographic research was guided by cross-regional consultation and the use of common research protocols. In this paper we examine ways in which Muslims of both theological orientations alternatively reject and embrace violence relying on a combination of ethnographic and historical data.

Salafism and Sufism in Islamic Thought and History

The distinction between Salafism and Sufism is one of the most basic in Sunni Islam. Both affirm the Quranic teaching of the Unity of God (monotheism) and take for granted the view that Islam is submission to God. They understand these teachings very differently. Salafism is behaviourally oriented. For Salafis, Islam is primarily the performance of rituals defined by Shari'ah as obligatory or recommended, and the regulation of social behaviour. Many, though not all, Sufis share these concerns but are also concerned with cultivation of spiritual states and the development of an experiential relationship with God. Many, though not all, Sufis approach God through the intercession of religious leaders and saints. Salafis maintain that nothing should stand between people and God. These differences are rarely reconcilable. Both Sufism and Salafism are diverse traditions with deep roots in Islamic scripture and history.[11]

Varieties of Sufism

Sufism is what Anne Marie Schimmel called “the mystical dimension of Islam.”[12] It is grounded in individual experience of, and self-identification with, God. The Sufi quest is often described as a journey (sair illallah) beginning with withdrawal from the world and reflection on religious and social truths. Reflection leads to meditation (muraqaba) cultivating such virtues as repentance, morality, and trust in God. When the cultivation of one virtue is complete, the traveller receives signs urging her/him to move on to another. The final destination is the state of al-fana (annihilation): overcoming the ego, erasing will and volition and emptying the self so that it can be filled with God’s vision, love and will. This leads to bliss, a sense of being one with God and the cosmos, appreciation of the meanings of life and Islam, heightened ethical consciousness and patterns of social relations rooted in it. Sufism can assume a myriad of ethical, philosophical and institutional forms.

Ethical Sufism is based on the concept of ihsan (goodness). Husn, the root from which ihsan is derived, refers to positive qualities in general. God is al-Muhsin, the doer of ihsan. The Qur’an also connects ihsan to everything praiseworthy, including sincerity, trust in God, worship, love and good deeds.[13] Ethical Sufism dates to the first centuries of the Islamic era. It began as a moral protest against political triumphalism, rigid legalism and ritualistic piety in
the early periods of Islamic history. Its most basic themes are renunciation of individual will and everything other than God. It took several distinctive forms. Hasan al-Basri (642-728) stressed abandoning concern with the material world; Rabi’a al-Adawiyya (713-801) is renowned for her all-consuming love of God and efforts to aid the poor despite her own poverty; Al-Harith ibn Asad Al-Muhasabi (781-857), developed strategies for introspection and the cultivation of virtue. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali wove these themes together in his *Alchemy of Happiness*, considered by many to be the classical formulation of ethical Sufism. [14] An overarching theme is that love of God should come before desire of worldly and otherworldly rewards.

Ethical Sufism is basically apolitical, though it often leads to protests against manifest injustice. The writings of the early Ethical Sufis, especially those of al-Ghazali are read and admired throughout the Muslim world. Even Wahhabis who are unrelenting in their opposition to philosophical and institutional Sufism, are drawn to these ethical teachings.[15]

**Philosophical Sufism** focuses on attaining insight into spiritual meanings of Islam, the metaphysical foundations of existence and relationships between creator and created. It teaches that there is only one reality of which everything else is an expression. This Absolute Being is often called *al-Haqq* (The Truth). It is undivided, eternal, and unknowable by ordinary means. It manifests itself in creation through which it is known; hence it is manifest in and hidden from creation. The Sufi journey leads to realisation of this truth.

Sufi thinkers express their insights into these questions in quite different ways. Four of the most influential are Muhyi’l-Din ibn al-Arabi (1165-1240), known for his complex, esoteric formulations of Sufi teachings; Jalaluddin al-Rumi (1207-1273), widely acknowledged as the greatest of the Sufi poets; Khawaja Muhammad Hafez-e Shirazi (1325-1390), a Persian poet whose works are widely know throughout Asia as well as his native Iran; and Mansur al-Hallaj (858-922), known for bold, seemingly heretical statements concerning relationships between humanity and divinity and disregard for rituals including the five daily prayers required by the *Shari‘ah*. While they differ in detail, these Sufi luminaries share a unitarian conception of reality and the view that the mystical path culminates in union with the divine.[16]

Ibn al-Arabi wrote at least four hundred books in which he formulated complex mystical-doctrinal systems. He claimed they were divinely inspired and Prophet Muhammad had dictated some of them to him. Ibn al-Arabi’s most basic contribution to Sufism was the doctrine of *wahdat al-wujud* (Unity of Being). According to Ibn al-Arabi, creation is the self-manifestation of the Truth, and the cosmos is a mirror image of the Creator. Divinity and humanity are only superficially distinct. The divine is the inward aspect, while the human form is the outward aspect of the Truth. Humans are microcosms of the whole of creation. An individual attaining the highest level of mystical consciousness becomes *al-insan al-kamil*, the Perfect Human and the fullest manifestation of Divine Reality. One of the implications of *wahdat al-wujud* is that ultimately nothing is real except the Divine. This is a Philosophical Sufi interpretation of *tauhid*.[17]
While Ibn al-Arabi relied on scholastic logic, Rumi relied on poetic and narrative forms and appealed to emotion. Rumi combined the doctrine of the unity of being with an emphasis on divine love that unites the created with creator, often referred to as lover and beloved. For Rumi, duality and division are illusions. It follows that sectarian differences, even those between Muslims and “unbelievers” are at once illusionary and an unfolding of Divine Truth. Hence his statement that the person of God is “beyond infidelity and religion.” [18] Rumi also describes those traversing the mystical path as being without religion or ethnicity, in a shared quest for, and love of the One. Rumi’s popularity in Europe and North America is among the factors contributing to the belief that Sufism is inherently peaceful and tolerant.

Ibn al-Arabi, Rumi and most other philosophical Sufis offered only muted critiques of orthodox piety. Al-Hallaj, on the other hand, offered vocal, public critiques of outward piety. Like other Sufis, he distinguished between the outward form (zahir) of Islam associated with the Shar‘iah and the internal essence (batin), associated with Sufism. His lack of concern with externality led him to flagrant violation of Shar‘iah to make the point that true piety is more than ritualistic compliance with Shar‘iah. He is also famous for verbal outbursts contradicting basic Islamic tenets such as: “I am the Truth” for which he was executed, or martyred, depending on one’s point of view. While most Muslim religious authorities hold such views to be scandalous, they are nonetheless an enduring element of philosophical Sufi discourse and of popular Sufism, especially in South and Southeast Asia [19] Works by Rumi and Ibn al-Arabi are part of the curriculum in many Islamic schools in Southeast Asia and West Africa. They are also discussed in public religious talks, especially during the fasting month of Ramadan.

Institutional Sufism emerged gradually. Its origins are obscure and complex. By the 12th century it took the form of hierarchically organised religious orders known as tariqa.[20] Each has a particular formulation of the mystical path and set of devotional practices adopted from ethical and philosophical Sufism. Other beliefs and practices are rooted in local cultures. Some of these religious orders remained local, while others spread throughout the Muslim world. They were also among vehicles through which Islam spread in Africa and Asia.[21] Today Sufi religious orders continue to play important roles in Muslim life nearly everywhere even in countries where they have been outlawed and forced underground by Salafi (Saudi Arabia) or secular (Turkey) governments. There are also increasingly globalized Sufi networks that rely on the Internet to telescope relationships between local devotees and their globally oriented leaders.

Saint veneration is an important component of institutional Sufism and popular Islam nearly everywhere. People believed to have journeyed far on the mystical path are revered as saints (friends of God). Saints are thought to have mystical or magical powers and the ability to bestow blessing (barakah) and healing and to help their devotees with the problems of daily life. The quest for barakah also motivates pilgrimage to the graves of saints (ziyarah), one of the most popular forms of Sufi piety in West Africa, Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Muslim world. Others visit graves simply to show respect to the holy woman or man.[22]
Differences concerning the propriety of saint veneration are among the most contentious issues in contemporary conflicts between 

Sufis and Salafis. In Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Mali, Malaysia and Indonesia 

Salafis have earned the undying enmity of Sufis for destroying holy graves. The emotional intensity of these conflicts cannot be overstated.

From the 13th century until the rise of Salafi movements in the 19th century Sufism permeated Muslim discourse. Institutional Sufism was particularly influential. [23] In West Africa and Southeast Asia Sufis still constitute substantial majorities of the Muslim populations. In Indonesia, for example, a survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Religion and Conflict at Arizona State University in 2013 indicated that 77.5% of Muslims regard the core 

Sufi devotional practice of visiting graves to be essential or desirable, while only 2.1% responded that it is essential not to do. In Nigeria a survey conducted in 2011 showed 78.3% of Muslims regard visiting graves as essential or desirable while 15.4% responded that it is essential not to do.

In societies in which the validity of mystical insight is widely accepted, those who possess it easily acquire enormous moral authority and social influence that can easily be translated into political authority. Many historical and contemporary rulers have sought moral authority through the patronage of Sufi orders; some go to the extreme of depicting themselves as saints. [24] In Southeast Asia and West Africa Sufi sultanates that have limited (Yogyakarta, Indonesia) or no (Sokoto, Nigeria) formal authority continue to exercise enormous moral authority and political influence. Sufi moral authority has also been used for grassroots social mobilization, including the instigation of rebellions and insurgencies.[25] The most recent example is an invasion of the Malaysian state of Sabah by claimants to the throne of the Sulu Sultanate in the Southern Philippines.

### Varieties of Salafism

Salafism is a conservative, behaviourally oriented form of Islam. Wahhabism is a variety of Salafism founded in Arabia in the 18th century, and is the official religion of Saudi Arabia today.[26] Linguistically, Salafi is an abbreviation of al-salaf al-salih (the pious ancestors). Salafism seeks to preserve or re-establish visions of Islam believed to have been practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. It focuses primarily on “correct” religious and social behaviour. Salafis focus on Sunnah (the practice of the Prophet Muhammad as recorded in Hadith), as a model for subsequent generations of Muslims. Anything other than this is considered religiously reprehensible innovation (bida). Non-salafi Muslims also value Sunnah but distinguish between commendable and reprehensible innovation. Salafis have little use for the Sufi cultivation of intuitive knowledge of God.

Salafism has been a persistent strand in Muslim discourse since the 9th century. It has taken many forms, and debates about who are the true Salafis are bitterly contested. Three related concepts—scriptural literalism, scriptural theology, and a revivalist ethos—are central to all forms of Salafism. Salafis regard scripture as God’s clear commands that require
implementation. Other Muslims regard scripture as communication from God that must be studied and understood prior to implementation. Many Salafis condemn Sufism and local cultural practices as unbelief that negates Islamic identity. This practice, known as takfir is among the doctrinal roots of Salafi radicalism.

There are other beliefs and practices on which Salafis differ. The most politically salient difference is that between pacifists who emphasize personal, social and ritual purity in their own communities, and activists who seek to impose their views on others. Activist strategies include preaching, the use of print, broadcast and electronic media as tools for proselytization, participation in electoral politics and violent jihad, among others.

Most variants of Salafism can be traced to the teachings of the 8th-9th century jurist Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780-855). Subsequent Salafi luminaries, whose works remain influential, include the 13th-14th century Hanbalite jurist Ibn Tamiyyah (1263-1328) and Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) the founder of the Wahhabi sect. There are many others who are not as well known.

Ibn Hanbal maintained that only the Qur'an and Hadith are legitimate sources of law and theology. He rejected Aristotelian logic that began to influence Muslim thought in the 8th century and metaphorical readings of scripture. He was particularly concerned with maintaining the “purity” of ritual practice and religious belief. He regarded post 7th century developments to be unacceptable bida.[27]

Ibn Tamiyyah was the systematiser of Salafi thought. He reaffirmed Ibn Hanbal's scriptural conservatism and introduced an uncompromising literalist interpretation of tauhid. He taught that worship and devotion should be directed to God without any intermediary. For Ibn Tamiyyah, seeking the blessings of angels, saints and righteous people, and pilgrimage to tombs of saints is polytheism (shirk). This is the gravest sin in Islam, which if not recanted, leads to eternal damnation and can be punished by execution. This position rapidly became one of the defining features of Salafism. It is extremely controversial and brings Salafis into conflict with most other Muslims, for whom these practices are central elements of Muslim piety.[28]

Early Salafi thought was not inherently political, but became so because it challenged the established orthodoxy tied to institutional Sufism. Ibn Hanbal avoided the sectarian controversies that divided the Muslim community of his day. The contentious nature of these debates had made heresy a grave concern in intellectual circles and the community at large and hence to the political leadership that valued stability. Ibn Taymiyyah, on the other hand, was known for heated polemics that led to conflict with religious and political authorities. He was jailed for his polemical teachings five times and died in prison.

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was the first Salafi scholar to have the opportunity to establish his theological views as socio-political reality. He was born into a family of Hanbalite jurists in Najd, a remote region in Eastern Arabia. He studied with leading Hanbali scholars in Syria,
Iraq and Iran as well as in Mecca and Medina. He returned to Najd in 1750 and began preaching against customs and religious practices he considered to be *shirk*. His major contribution to *Salaфи* thought was *Kitab al-Tawhid*, in which he summarized Ibn Taymiyyah’s understanding of *shirk*. He distinguished between greater and lesser *shirk*. Both lead to eternal damnation but only greater *shirk* is punishable (by death) in this world. Greater *shirk* includes the use of amulets, traditional healing practices and saint veneration. Lesser *shirk* is belief in causality other than that of God and public displays of religious piety including the collective devotional practices of *Sufi* orders.[29]

Initially Ibn Abd al-Wahhab failed to convince the people of Najd to accept *Salafism*. He then contracted an alliance Muhammad Ibn Saud (d. 1765) the Emir of Dar‘iyyah in northeastern Arabia. The alliance stipulated that Ibn Saud would support Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s religious program in return for his endorsement of Ibn Saud’s political agenda. Saudi conquests of most of Arabia led to the establishment of a *Wahhabi* theocracy in which the coercive power of the state is used to enforce *Salafi* norms.[30] It is important to note that many Saudi-Wahhabi social norms, especially restrictions on women’s public roles, are rooted in Najd Bedouin culture as much as in Islamic scripture, if not more so.

Like *Sufism*, *Salafism* is not inherently political. *Salafi* moral authority flows from the claim that it seeks to restore Islam to its pristine condition. If this claim is accepted, *Salafism* becomes a powerful basis for social mobilization against grievances including colonialism, corruption, economic inequality, political disenfranchisement and other forms of injustice.

The oil boom of the 1970s and 1980s enabled the Saudi government and foundations backed by the royal family including the Muslim World League (Rabita al-Alam al-Islami/MWL) to devote enormous financial resources to attempts to spread *Salafism*.[31] The League has played a crucial role in promoting *Salafism* in Southeast Asia and West Africa. MWL provides scholarships for students to study at Saudi Arabian Islamic Universities and supports schools and mosques that graduates establish when they return home.[32]

**Religious Orientations and Violence: Southeast Asian and West African Cases**

*Wahhabism* and *Salafism* have been associated with violence and terrorism because *Al Qaeda* and related terrorist organisations embrace the synthesis of *Wahhabi* religious teachings and Muslim Brotherhood activism formulated by Sayid Qutb.[33] There are Southeast Asian and West African *Salafi* groups that share this orientation and others that steadfastly oppose violence. There are also violent and nonviolent organisations rooted in *Sufi* teachings in both regions. There are also groups of both religious orientations that have alternated between participating in, and opposing, violence in shifting political contexts. There is also a tendency for *Salafis* to seek accommodation with other Muslims on social and religious issues that do not compromise their understanding of *tauhid*. There are *Salafi* movements in West Africa and Southeast Asia that originally engaged in harsh *takfir* that now view their *Sufi* opponents...
as Muslims of a different type with whom they share common social and sometimes political agendas. This is what Woodward (et al) have described as the “domestication” of Salafism.[34]

**Salafism in West Africa and Southeast Asia**

The origins of Salafism in West Africa and Southeast Asia are complex and predate the growth of Saudi influence by nearly three centuries. Ulama (Muslim religious scholars) from both regions participated in the 17th/18th century revivalist Ahli Hadith (traditions concerning the speech and actions of the Prophet Muhammad) movement that also contributed the development of Salafism in Arabia, North Africa and South Asia. Sufis concerned with reconciling Hadith based piety and mystical practice and traditional legal scholars also participated in this movement.[35] Mecca and Medina were the centre points of the network, but it was not an Arab movement. During this period, the Holy cities were extremely cosmopolitan. Knowledge, not ethnicity was the criteria for entry into the Islamic religious elite. Ulama with diverse theological views taught at the Great Mosque in Mecca, the Prophet’s mosque in Medina and in private academies surrounding them. Students came from throughout the Muslim world. Most eventually returned home, though some of the most erudite settled permanently in the holy cities. The intellectual networks and lineages of the day were also complex and transcended conventional theological boundaries.[36]

This circle contributed to the development of Salafism and exerted an equally strong influence on the development of Shar’iah centric Sufism. Ibrahim al-Kurani (1616-1690) was among the most renowned 17th century Ahli Hadith scholars. He was known for mastery of Hadith and his exposition of Ibn al-Arabi’s Philosophical Sufism. He was the founder of Salafi and Sufi lineages that are influential in Southeast Asia and West Africa to this day.[37] The West African lineages gravitated toward Salafism and those in Southeast Asia towards Shar’iah centric Sufism.

Salih al-Fulani (1753-1803), from present day Guinea, was one of the leading figures in the Ahli Hadith movement at the end of the 18th century. He was a contemporary of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, though the nature of their relationship is not known. West African scholars from this lineage including Abd al-Rahman al-Ifriqi, (1908-1957) and Umar al-Falata (1925-1999) figured significantly in the Saudi religious establishment in the 20th century.[38] Southeast Asian ulama were prominent in Sufi orders and Shafite legal scholarship in Mecca and Medina throughout 19th and early 20th centuries.[39] Most returned to their native lands after the Saudi conquest of the holy cities in 1926. Organised Salafi movements first developed in Southeast Asia in the mid-19th century and in West Africa a century later. In both regions these movements focused on local concerns as well as on the trans-regional Salafi issues of theological and ritual purity.
West African Cases

Subbanu al-Muslimin (Muslim Youth) was the first West African Salafi movement. It was founded in Mali in 1951 by graduates of Cairo's al-Azhar University who had been exposed to Saudi Wahhabism while on the hajj. It was structured as a modern civic organisation, combined religious and nationalist agendas and became a model for later West African Salafi movements. It established modern Islamic schools as alternative to colonial schools that stressed secularism and French culture. It strongly opposed Sufi orders and religious and social practices rooted in Sufism and African cultures, including saint veneration and traditional healing practices.

Subbanu al-Muslimin has been most successful in urban areas. It is a middle class movement, appealing primarily to modern elites and merchants. Salafi movements have also resonated with the urban middle class in Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Niger.[40] Subbanu al-Muslimin’s anti-Sufi rhetoric has sometimes led to violent confrontations with supporters of Sufi orders, who remain the majority in West African Muslim societies. By the 1990s the frequency and intensity of these clashes had diminished as the ethos of confrontation gave way to one of what Kaba terms “the new ethic of disagreement” in which Sufis and Salafis understand each other, not as kafir, but as different kinds of Muslims.[41] There have been similar developments throughout West Africa.

Jama‘atu Izalat al-Bid‘a wa Iqamat al-Sunna (the group removing bida and restoring the Sunna/ Izala) is the largest and most influential Salafi movement in West Africa.[42] It was founded in Jos, Nigeria in 1978 and has branches in neighboring countries. Like other West African Salafi movements Izala sponsors modern Islamic schools, opposes Sufism and traditional cultural practices, and often engages in harsh takfiri rhetoric.

Izala also has features reflecting its north Nigerian origins. For example, its organisational structure and performative style reflect the political culture of the military regimes that ruled Nigeria for extended periods (1969-1979, 1984-1999). Izala is hierarchically organised with a centralized top-down leadership. It also has a security force whose members wear military-style uniforms. They serve as guards and escorts for Izala officials to whom they give military style salutes at public events.

Izala was founded by al-Shaykh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi (1922-1992). He was educated in traditional Islamic schools in Nigeria and developed his Salafi ideas independently in the 1940s. He was especially concerned with bida and the purification of ritual practice. He studied in the Sudan during the 1950s and became closely associated with the Saudi Wahhabi establishment in the 1950s-1960s. He was Grand Kadi (judge) of Northern Nigeria (1962-1976). He was also a founding member of WML and was instrumental in securing scholarships for Nigerian students to study in Saudi Arabian Islamic universities. Gumi made effective use of modern mass media, especially radio and newspapers to spread Salafi ideas,
most notably vehement takfiri denunciation of Sufi orders. A Sufi backlash in the mid-1970s led Gumi’s followers to establish Izala as a formal organisation.

Like many Salafi movements Izala is prone to factionalism. Some splinter groups moderated their views and sought accommodation with traditionalist Muslims in the same way that Subbanu al-Muslimin did. Others became even more militant. There have been occasional violent confrontations between Salafi and Sufi groups throughout West Africa. Boko Haram is the only Salafi organisation to employ violence as a strategy for spreading Salafi teachings and practices; it also challenges the legitimacy of the state. It is a breakaway Izala faction established in 2001. Its goal is to implement Izala discourse of takfīr by waging violent campaigns against opponents.[43] It espouses a radical anti-western and anti-modern ideology that defines modern western education and government employment as religiously unacceptable. Since 2003 more than 3,000 people have been killed in confrontations between Boko Haram fighters and Nigerian security forces and in incidents of sectarian violence. It is important to note that other groups based on similar teachings chose to isolate themselves from what they perceive to be a corrupt society. Significantly other Izala factions strongly oppose Boko Haram violence.

Southeast Asian Cases

Exactly when Salafism came to Southeast Asia is debatable. Colonial scholars attributed the Padri War in West Sumatra (1803-1837) to Wahhabi influences, but recent scholarship suggests that the insurgents were Sufis who supported Shari’ah and opposed local social practices not in keeping with it.[44] The Kaum Muda (New Group), a broadly based Salafi movement, emerged in the late 19th century. It was active throughout Southeast Asia and stressed nationalism, modern education and ritual purity. Tension between puritans and modernists is an enduring theme and source of factionalism.[45] Organisations combined these themes in distinctive ways. The two most influential are Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam.

Ahmad Dahlan founded Muhammadiyah in 1912 in Yogyakarta in what is now Indonesia. It is the largest Southeast Asian Salafi movement with approximately forty million members and branches throughout the region. Muhammadiyah combines Salafi religious teachings with commitments to rationalism and modernity. Ibn Tamiyya, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the Egyptian modernist Muhammad Abduh [46] are often mentioned as progenitors. Since the 1920s Muhammadiyah’s critiques of Sufism and traditional cultural practices have described them as being bida and irrational. Textbooks used in Muhammadiyah schools refrain from takfiri rhetoric and extol the virtues of pluralism, nationalism and democracy. It is more accepting of local culture than many other Salafi movements and maintains close relations with the Sufi oriented Yogyakarta Sultanate. Muhammadiyah avoids direct involvement in politics and opposes violence. It has included revivalist and modernist factions since the 1920s.
Persatuan Islam (Persis/Unity of Islam) founded in the 1920s by Indonesian and Singaporean scholars. It is not a mass organisation but has exerted great influence on Southeast Asian Salafi thought. [47] Persis takes very strong positions opposing bida, Sufism and local cultures, and engages in harsh takfiri rhetoric. While some early Persis leaders were Pan Islamists who considered the idea of the state to be un-Islamic, others—especially Mohammed Natsir (1908-1993)—were proponents of Shariah based nationalism. Activists from Persis backgrounds have adapted a range of political strategies, ranging from electoral politics to terrorism.

Natsir was perhaps the most important Southeast Asian Salafi intellectual of the twentieth century. He maintained relationships with Islamic nationalists, including non-Salafis, regionally and globally. Politically he was a pragmatist. He was Prime Minister of Indonesia (1950-51) and leader of the Islamic political party Majelis Syuro Muslim Indonesia (Masyumi) from 1945 until it was outlawed in 1960. He was imprisoned between 1960 and 1966 for involvement in an ethno-religious rebellion. After his release he founded Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for the Propagation of Islam/DDII).[48]

Like his Nigerian counterpart Gumi, Natsir was a prominent figure in MWL. DDII is a conduit through which MWL funds flow into Indonesia. It works closely with Lembaga Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies/LIPIA), which is a public diplomacy arm of the Saudi Arabian government as well as an Islamic school, and Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh.[49] Efforts by Natsir and DDII contributed to the emergence of Salafi organisations and movements with diverse political orientations. Of these the campus based Tarbiyah (Islamic Education) movement that developed in the 1980s is particularly significant. It is a broadly based social movement that gave rise to numerous organisations including the non-violent Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, The Justice and Prosperity Party) that participates in elections and Hizbut Tahir Indonesia that does not.[50] DDII has never been implicated in violence but was associated with violent groups operating in Eastern Indonesia between 2000 and 2002, and now support groups engaging in attacks against members of the Ahmadiyah sect.

Pondok Pesantren Imam Bukhari (PPIB) in Surakarta is one of many Salafi schools supported by MWL. It was founded by Ahmad Faiz after he completed his studies at Imam Ibn Saud University in 1994. The curriculum focuses on Wahhabi religious teachings and preparing students for the afterlife. There are approximately two thousand students. Most are Indonesians; others are from Malaysia and Singapore. Faiz rejects terrorism and other forms of religiously motivated violence and in an interview stated that: “Terrorists use Islamic norms to justify their sins.”

As in West Africa, some Southeast Asian Salafi communities live in self-imposed social isolation. Some were formerly jihadi but renounced violence when Saudi ulama declared that it was no longer justified. They lead pious lives and avoid contact with what they consider to be a hopelessly defiled world. Some have established villages in remote areas and support
themselves by selling herbal medicines. There are small communities with similar religious orientations in Malaysia and Singapore. They are more integrated into economic life than their Indonesian counterparts, but avoid contact with religious others. In some parts of Malaysia, Salafis have a larger public presence and control as many as a third of the mosques.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is the most significant violent Salafi organisation in Southeast Asia. It is a transnational terrorist group established in 1993 with the goal of establishing a Wahhabi Caliphate that has operated in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore.[51] Many JI members studied at schools supported by DDII. They acquired violent Salafi ideologies at schools linked to the "Nguruki network" of schools that combine Salafi and Jihadi teachings.

Abu Bakr Ba'asyir (b. 1938) is widely regarded as JI's spiritual mentor and was one of the founders of the Nguruki network. He is a former DDII activist who spent 17 years in Malaysia and Singapore spreading violent Salafi teachings. Ba'asyir was also one of the founders of Majelis Mujahedeen Indonesia, an umbrella group for radical organisations. Prior to being convicted on terrorism charges in 2011, he used extreme takfir rhetoric in sermons, stating that 90% of Indonesian Muslims are actually kafir. In an interview he stated that "jihad is more important than prayer."[52]

**Sufism in West Africa and Southeast Asia**

Sufism has been the dominant form of Islam in West Africa and Southeast Asia for many centuries. The traders who brought Islam to Africa and Asia, and the warriors who established kingdoms, empires and Caliphates were Sufis. Varied and complex combinations of Ethical, Philosophical and Institutional Sufism have contributed to the development not only of Islam as bodies of religious teachings and practices but of distinctive Islamic civilizations in both regions. The idea that Sufism is particularly peaceful can be found in contemporary discourse, especially in Senegal and Indonesia but is a decidedly post-colonial development, often framed in terms of the Western Violent Salafi/Peaceful Sufi distinction.

**West African Cases**

Sufism has been an important force in West African Islam for more than a millennium. Many famous saints cultivated the piety and self-purification that are the hallmarks of Ethical Sufism. Sufism has also been the mainstay of Islamic learning in West Africa, where the bifurcation between jurists and mystics common in the Middle East is rare. Foundational Islamic texts from West Africa such as Ta’rīkh al-Sudān, (History of West Africa) by al-Sa’di (1655) refer to Sufi themes such as saints, asceticism, gnosis and blessing.[53]

From the seventeenth-century onward, Institutional Sufism has provided a framework for organising religious communities, educational institutions, social networks, and economic collectivities tied to rural agriculture. In the course of its historical evolution in the region,
Sufism has been both pacifist and violent. The West African Sufi jihads provide convincing refutations of the idea that Sufism is intrinsically peaceful. For more than 250 years (1645-1900) Sufi leaders (marabouts) waged a series of jihad in attempts to establish Islamic theocracies. Nasir al-Din (d. 1674) led the first of these in what is today southern Mauritania. It was followed by many others, the most theoretically significant of which are those of Usman dan Fodio (1754-1817)—leading to the creation of the Sokoto Caliphate in present day northern Nigeria—and al-Hajj Umar Tall (1797-1865), which led to the Toucouleur Islamic Empire in parts of what are now Guinea, Senegal and Mali.

The West African jihads were complex events. Ethnic relations and tribal warfare, tensions between Islamic scholars and political elites, slave-raiding to supply the Atlantic slave trade, the involvement of European powers (eventually through colonialism) and the end of the slave trade all contributed to the origins and decline of this pre-modern jihad tradition. Scholars debate the contributions of these factors to the development of a jihad centred political culture. There is, however, a consensus concerning the roles played by Sufi leaders, the importance of Sufism in West African jihad ideologies and the use of master-disciple relationships and tariqa Sufism as tools for social mobilization and as the basis for the construction of collective identities in the theocracies the jihads sought to establish.

Usman dan Fodio, the founder of the Sokoto Caliphate provides a clear example. He had a vision in which he saw the Prophet Muhammad, his companions and other prophets and saints, including al-Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (1077-1166), the founder of the Qadiriyya tariqa to which dan Fodio belonged. According to dan Fodio’s account of this vision, al-Jilani anointed him as the leader of saints (Imam Al-Awliyaa), and enjoined him “to command what is good and to forbid what is reprehensible.” Then al-Jilani decorated dan Fodio with the “Sword of Truth” and ordered him to “unsheathe it against the enemies of God.” (54) For dan Fodio, this was the spiritual and moral authorization for his jihad.

Al-Hajj Umar Tall invoked the doctrines of the Tijaniyya tariqa in his articulation of the doctrinal basis of jihad. In his magnum opus Kitab rimah hizb al-rahim ‘ala nuhur hizb al-rajin (“The Book of the Lances of the Party of Allah the Merciful against the Necks of the Party of Satan the Accursed”), he employed the sectarian Tijani discourse of spiritual election to legitimise his military and political agendas. This discourse proclaims that the Tijaniyya supersedes all other Sufi orders because of the exclusive guarantee of salvation Ahmad al-Tijani, its founder, received from the Prophet Muhammad for himself and his followers. Umar Tall also employed the Tijani doctrine of inkar that demonises all who reject the Tijani doctrine of spiritual election to refute his opponents.

The Tijani demonisation of other Sufi jihads is an example of the ways in which Sufi doctrine can be used in contentious discourse about the differential legitimacy of jihadi movements and theocracies. This discourse also figured significantly in the rivalry between leaders of the Sokoto Caliphate and the Borno Empire. Polemical theological exchanges between them
began in the nineteenth-century and have continued until the present, spanning pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods in West African history.

The establishment of colonial rule c. 1880s-1910s effectively ended this series of jihads and incorporated the Sufi theocracies into colonial regimes, or abolished them altogether. In these contexts, the West African Sufi orders were transformed in many ways. While the legacy and rhetoric of the Sufi theocracies provided a framework for anti-colonial resistance, most of the Sufi orders preferred strategies of avoiding colonial regimes. They created an Islamic public sphere outside of the colonial system. By the end of the colonial period in the 1960s, the image of the Sufi orders as pacifists had effectively replaced the earlier image of the Sufis as jihadi empire builders. With the rise of Salafi movements in the region, the new idea of Sufi pacifism gained even more credibility.

Sufi radicalism was transformed but not totally abandoned. This is particularly true of the Tijaniyya order. Exclusivist discourses of spiritual election and the demonisation of others remain constant sources of tension between Tijanis and other Muslims. The Qadiriyya order has engaged this exclusivist discourse by constructing an alternative discourse of spiritual election. Given the high stakes in the intra-Sufi discourses and counter-discourses (i.e. spiritual salvation, religious authority, control of mosques, generating and controlling mass followings) there have been instances of intra-Sufi violence. Confrontations between different Tijaniyya branches were also common during the 1950s and 1960s. Intra-Sufi tension and conflicts ended only after the Salafi threat against all Sufis became clear during the 1970s. In this context, Sufi radicalism redirected itself to counteract the denunciation of Sufism as “totally un-Islamic” in Salafi takfiri discourse. Contemporary Sufi radicalism takes the form of more flamboyant observance of the very practices—reverence for saints, visiting their shrines, celebrating their birthdays, etc.—condemned as un-Islamic by the Salafis. With salvation threatened, validity of the worshipped questioned, and religious communal identity castigated, the stakes are high enough for the tension between Sufis and Salafis to erupt into violence. Sufi radicalism in West Africa remains, but finds new forms in changing contexts, just as Salafi radicalism does.

Southeast Asian Cases

Sufism has been one of the building blocks used in the construction of Islamic civilisations in Southeast Asia since the coming of Islam in the 14th century.[55] Many early Southeast Asian Muslim texts refer to Sufi concepts including asceticism, blessing and sainthood. Others including the 18th century Serat (Book of Cabolek) concern relationships, and sometimes conflict, between proponents of Philosophical and Shar’iah based Sufism.[56] Chronicles and oral tradition credit conversion both to warrior Sultans and peaceful saints (wali). Sufi orders have been present almost as long as Islam, but are not the dominant force that they are in West Africa. Sufism is institutionalised in state systems and networks of schools (pesantren/pondok) that teach law (fiqh) and theology (aqidah) as well as Sufism.[57] Many Southeast Asian
Muslims practice Sufism independent of organised tariqa. As is true in West Africa, many jurists are also Sufis.

Responses to European intrusion beginning in the 16th century included bitter protracted wars in which Muslim rulers appealed to concepts of authority rooted in Philosophical Sufism and later to rebellions based on similar principles led by princes and ulama. Among the most protracted anti-colonial struggles were the Java War (1825-1830) and the Aceh War (1914-1973). [58] In both cases Sufism and jihad legitimised resistance and were used for social mobilization. In Aceh resistance to Dutch colonialism and the Indonesian state continued until 2004. Smaller scale rebellions predicting the expulsion of kafir and coming of a Just King (Ratu Adil) occurred in Java until the 1940s.[59] Social movements based on similar principles are still encountered. Most of the hundreds of traditional Muslim states in the region came to terms with colonialism, and developed ritual systems, based on Sufi principles, including putative royal control of barakah.[60] Many of the ulama retreated to the countryside, where, as in West Africa, they avoided conflict with colonial states and established alternative public spheres based on Sufi principles.

Nadhlatal Ulama (NU), with approximately eighty million followers, is the largest Southeast Asian Sufi movement. It was founded in 1926 partly in response to the Wahhabi occupation of Mecca and Medina. [61] It is based in east Java in Indonesia. NU is led by kyai, charismatic figures combining the attributes of Shar’iah oriented ulama and Sufi syeahs. Many kyai are reputed to have great mystical powers. There are more than 15,000 pesantren (boarding schools) affiliated with NU, many of which are linked to Sufi religious orders. NU piety emphasizes prayers for the dead (tahlilan), pilgrimage to holy graves (ziyarah) and the recitation of salawaat (poetry invoking the Prophet Muhammad), which are popular among Sufis everywhere.[62]

NU has stridently opposed terrorism and other forms of violence and promoted religious pluralism since Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009) assumed its leadership in 1984. Wahid also maintained that inter-religious dialog and cooperation are obligatory for all Muslims. He was especially concerned with social justice and minority rights.

NU’s position on violence has been consistent for three decades. This does not, however, imply that its theology is incompatible with violence. NU leaders and the rank and file have resorted to extreme violence when convinced that the organisation and Islam were threatened. In 1965 NU played a major role in the mass slaughter of Indonesian communists. To this day, many NU leaders who participated in the killings believe that they were necessary to defend Islam. [63]

Today, Banser, NU’s paramilitary wing, is used to support pluralist policies. It has been deployed to provide security for Christmas services and NU Sufi religious celebrations threatened by violent Salafi groups. Banser leaders make it clear that they will not tolerate interference with these events and will respond with force if necessary. At an event we
attended in 2012 a Banser commander called on NU supporters to employ “all necessary physical and spiritual power to combat anti-Sufi movements.”[64]

Banser is a hybrid force. Members are armed with bamboo staves and high-powered slingshots. They are also trained in pencat silat, a Javanese martial arts tradition that combines physical and spiritual training. Some are thought to have the power of invulnerability and the ability to overcome opponents without resorting to physical force. They acquire these powers through repeated pilgrimage to graves and other holy places associated with saints and sultans, meditation and amulets obtained from kyai. Experts in this mystical-martial tradition are sometimes referred to as “NU Special Forces.” They do not carry weapons because, it is said, they do not need to. Banser inspires awe and respect from people it serves and protects, and fear in the hearts of its enemies.

In Malaysia, a group based on similar Sufi principles carried out one of the most serious jihadi attacks in the country’s history. Persaudaraan Ilmu Dalam al-Ma’unah (The al-Ma’unah Brotherhood of Spiritual Knowledge) was established by Mohammed Amin Mohammed Razali, known to his followers as Ustad (religious teacher) Amin or Syech in 1999. Razali had studied mystical healing and pencat silat at an Indonesian pesantren. He claimed to act on the authority of God and saints dwelling in a mystical dimension, to walk on water and to have the power of invulnerability. The group’s motto was “Jihad is our path! Islam will triumph!” In July of 2000 he and a group of 29 followers seized a military arms depot and proclaimed a jihad against the Malaysian government. They subsequently surrendered to authorities. Most received prison terms but Razali was convicted of waging war against the king and hanged. [65]

The clearest contemporary Indonesia case of violent Sufism is Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front – FPI). Its motto is “Live honorably or die a martyr.” Rezieq Syihab and Misbahul Anam, both of whom are Sufis, founded FPI in 1998. Most rank and file members are from NU backgrounds. Rituals conducted at FPI headquarters in Jakarta closely resemble those common in NU communities. FPI members we interviewed described Rizieq as a syech who cleanses the souls of his followers.

FPI describes itself as a movement committed to combating sin, vice and heresy. It is known for attacks on those it deems “deviant” and for “sweepings” (ransacking) of nightclubs, bars, massage parlours and other establishments promoting what it considers to be immoral activities, especially during Ramadan. FPI actions have yielded few fatalities but many victims have been severely injured. More violent attacks in which there have been fatalities have been directed against the Ahmadiyah sect of Islam which is widely condemned for heresy because of the belief that its founder Mirza Gharam Ahmad (1908-1935) was a prophet.[66]
Conclusions and Policy Implications

For a decade now, think tanks including the RAND Corporation, the Heritage Foundation, the Libforall Foundation and the Nixon Centre have promoted peaceful Sufism as an alternative to violent Salafism and suggest that the US should encourage the spread of Sufi teachings as an ideological component of the “Global War on Terror.” [67] In a conference report by the Nixon Centre, Alex Alexiev, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Security Policy, argued that:

... the conflict between Sufis and Wahhabis is emblematic of a larger struggle between fundamentalism and syncretism, a struggle for the very soul of Islam.

One important difference between the two is the interpretation of jihad: in Sufism, it is a striving for personal spiritual purification; while for Wahhabis it represents the struggle for the worldwide victory of Islam.[68]

Invoking scholarly authority enables Alexiev and others to establish an aura of authenticity for baseless claims about religiously justified violence and the theology of jihad. We have shown that the categorical distinction between peaceful Sufism and violent Salafism is untenable. The claim that Sufis subscribe to the teachings of the greater, peaceful jihad and Salafis to the violent, lesser jihad is also incorrect. All Muslim theologies, including Wahhabism, subscribe to the notion that the greater jihad is the struggle against the self.

Proponents of Sufi policy often invoke the works of scholars concerned with the classical texts of philosophical Sufism and Sufi leaders committed to countering violent extremism and invite them to speak at policy-oriented conferences. Salafis and Wahhabis with similar political agendas receive far less attention. Policies and policy recommendations based on the “peaceful Sufi”/“violent Salafi” distinction are fundamentally misguided. The cases examined in this article clearly show that both Sufism and Salafism are used to justify peaceful and violent political action. Policy makers and policy-oriented scholars would be well advised to abandon the quest for theological roots of violence and theological tools for combating it. More attention should be paid to variables that measure political attitudes and behaviour, particularly tolerance of religious diversity, as well as the extent and types of political change that religious movements and organisations seek to accomplish.

The widely acclaimed book The Illusion of an Islamic State: How an Alliance of Moderates Launched a Successful Jihad Against Radicalisation and Terrorism in the World’s Largest Muslim-Majority Country, edited by Syaafi Maarif and Abdurrahman Wahid, and published by the Libforall Foundation provides an ironic illustration.[69] The book is a strident criticism of violent, intolerant variants of Indonesian political Salafism but ignores violent intolerant variants of Indonesian political Sufism. Both editors champion diversity and tolerance as religious virtues and sound policy. Maarif is former general secretary of Muhammadiyah—a Salafi organisation. Wahid was general secretary of Nadhlatul Ulama—a Sufi organisation.
They were close friends; shared commitments to democracy, social justice, tolerance and nonviolence mattered more to them than theological difference. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Rizieq Syihab, who is a Sufi, and Abu Bakr Baasyir, who is a Salafi, have both served on the editorial board of the Islamist tabloid Suara Islam (Voice of Islam) that demonises “liberal” Muslims and encourages violence against the Ahmadiyah and other “deviants.” Again, political orientations and shared commitments to intolerance matter more than theological differences.

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Notes


Simultaneous Attacks by Terrorist Organisations

by Kathleen Deloughery

Abstract

While terror attacks that are a part of a coordinated effort receive attention in the popular media, they have not received much attention in the academic literature. The decision to carry out simultaneous attacks should be examined as one of the choices a terrorist organisation makes about the method of attack. Determining the impact of simultaneous attacks vis-à-vis a single attack can explain why groups would use this method. Up to one quarter of all attacks coded in two major databases, GTD and ITERATE, may be part of a simultaneous campaign. Empirical analysis shows simultaneous attacks are more likely to be successful and cause more fatalities, though not in a one-to-one fashion. These results underline the importance of considering simultaneous attacks in empirical analysis.

Keywords: violence, data analysis, database, impacts of terrorism

Introduction

Why do some terrorist organisations group their attacks close together, while others spread them out? For instance, Al-Qaeda is well known for carrying out simultaneous attacks—that is, having different terror cells hit more than one location at approximately the same time. It is accepted in the literature that terrorist organisations choose the method and location of their attack in order to achieve political or economic destabilization of the targeted government and to garner media attention for their cause. To carry out a single attack versus a simultaneous campaign is a decision for terrorists to consider, yet researchers have not examined these decisions closely. This article will examine why groups would carry out simultaneous campaigns over single attacks: what are the benefits?

In two of the largest terrorism datasets, International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) [1] and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [2], attacks are coded as single events, even when they are carried out as part of a coordinated campaign.[3] Unfortunately, neither dataset specifically denotes whether or not attacks are coordinated. In order to complete any analysis, this project will first determine which attacks formed part of a coordinated campaign.

Since the most commonly used datasets disaggregate simultaneous attacks, the empirical literature on terrorism has a dearth of academic studies on this type of attack. Theoretical papers have examined the scale of terrorist attacks. Past research shows that the scale of a terrorist attack can help the targeted government to estimate the size of the organisation’s resources.[4] Coordinated attacks are by definition of a larger scale. The terror attacks of
September 11, 2001 (a simultaneous attack with four component attacks), was of a scale not seen before.[5] Economic impact models of terror attacks have shown that simultaneous attacks can magnify the impact of a terror attack.[6] This article will differentiate between simultaneous attacks and single attacks using empirical analysis. In the past, empirical investigations of terrorism have largely ignored the presence of simultaneous attacks in the ITERATE and the GTD datasets. Not recognising that these attacks can be very different from single attacks may have biased the results of many past studies.

Potentially biased studies fall into two main categories: examining the level of terrorism or examining the impact of terrorism. In the former, terrorism is the dependent variable, while in the latter it is the independent variable. When a researcher is predicting the level of terrorism in a country/region/year given certain attributes, each attack, even if part of a coordinated effort, is coded separately. This coding is potentially problematic since attacks that are part of a coordinated effort are made under the same decision making process. For instance, terrorist organisations consider military expenditures when choosing a country to attack; that decision should only matter one time for a coordinated campaign. If all attacks are thought to be single attacks, then the terrorist organisation would be making that decision every time they carried out an attack. Therefore, the dependent variable would be systematically higher than the true value when coordinated attacks are present in the system. Such a measurement of the dependent variable is problematic, but only detrimental to the predictions of the past models if the measurement error is correlated with the independent variables, thus biasing the parameter estimates. It is highly likely that simultaneous attacks, the source of the measurement error, are correlated with some of the variables that factor into the resulting level of terrorism.

Potentially more problematic are the implications for studies assessing the impact of terrorism. For instance, there have been studies looking into the impact of terrorism on tourism [7], urban development [8], public opinion [9], and industry.[10] In these studies, terrorism is used as an independent variable to explain another phenomenon. Therefore, if any of the attacks coded are part of a coordinated effort, then that independent variable will be measured with error, i.e. the measure of terrorism will be overestimated. This counting system assumes that the individual attacks within a simultaneous effort have a one-to-one additive effect, which may not be true. For instance, if a coordinated attack consists of two attacks, then this counting system implies that each of the two attacks have the same impact as a different single attack. If an independent variable is measured with such an error then this can lead to biased estimates of the parameters. Therefore, the impact of terrorism that these empirical studies are obtaining may not be the true parameter estimates.

Given the potential for bias in results ignoring simultaneous attacks, it is worthwhile to explore how common this type of attack is in terrorism datasets. First, the theoretical arguments surrounding simultaneous campaigns and impact of attacks are discussed. Second, the data used in the analysis will be presented. Third, follows an examination of the
methodology and results from the empirical analysis. Finally, suggestions will be offered for future research and analysis on simultaneous attacks.

**Theoretical Arguments**

Which is better for the terrorist organisation, carrying out many individual attacks throughout the year or concentrating on one large simultaneous set of attacks? To make an assessment of this, we must start from the assumption that terrorist organisations are choosing their optimal number of attacks given their budget constraints and the role that attacks play in their main goals: destabilization, media attention, and recruiting new members.[11] Due to budget and training constraints, organisations must decide whether to apply their resources to single attacks spread out over time or devote time and energy to a smaller number of coordinated attacks.

Coordinated attacks are likely to kill more people than single attacks. First, since these attacks usually take place in two or more separate locations, there tends to be an increase in the total number of potential victims. Additionally, individuals with greater skills and capabilities are assigned to harder terrorist attacks and these individuals tend to be both more successful and kill more people on average.[12] Simultaneous attacks require more planning and coordination; everything else being equal, they are harder to execute than single attacks, thus individuals with more advanced abilities will be assigned to these tasks. As a result, coordinated attacks should cause more deaths than single attacks.

Similarly, coordinated attacks could be more successful than single attacks. There are two ways to calculate the success of simultaneous attacks. First, one can use the maximum success of all attacks within the campaign. Only one portion of the attack needs be successful in order to incite fear and create direct victims. Second, the average of the success of each attack within the coordinated effort can be used to accurately measure the effectiveness of the campaign. Simultaneous attacks should be more successful than single attacks for two reasons. If a single attack that is part of a coordinated effort is unsuccessful, the campaign can still be a success if one of the other parts of the effort is successful. Additionally, more able individuals are assigned to harder tasks [13]. Therefore, due to planning and coordination issues, more able individuals should be assigned to coordinated terrorist efforts, thus leading to more successful simultaneous attacks.

If simultaneous attacks tend to produce more fatalities and are more successful, these attacks should receive more media coverage. A single unsuccessful attack may not receive media attention, but a coordinated campaign with one unsuccessful component is likely to be reported. Additionally, the higher the number of casualties, the greater amount of media attention the attack is likely to receive.[14] Therefore, if coordinated attacks do generate more fatalities, then simultaneous attacks in developed countries are more likely to garner media attention than single attacks. This increased news coverage can have the effect of bringing the motives of the terrorist organisation to the forefront, thus satisfying one of their main goals. In
fact, the coordinated attacks on September 11\textsuperscript{th} had a permanent effect of increasing the number of news stories on terrorism.\[15\]

Based on these reflections, two hypotheses concerning the impact of simultaneous attacks will be tested in the empirical section:

H1: Simultaneous campaigns tend to kill more people than single attacks.

H2: Simultaneous campaigns tend to have higher success rates than unsuccessful campaigns.

\textit{Data}

Data for this project were derived from three main sources. Data on terrorist attacks come mostly from the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD is a comprehensive dataset covering both domestic and transnational terrorist events from 1970 until 2007 and beyond to the present day. It is one of the very few datasets with a worldwide coverage that also contains information on domestic terror events. Therefore, by using the GTD, we are able to obtain a fuller picture of the total amount of terrorism occurring in the world.\[16\]

However, this dataset is not without its shortcomings. First, the information in the GTD was collected entirely from open sources. Therefore, bias could be introduced to the model if attacks are not reported in public sources. Attacks that are stopped in the planning stages and not reported to the media are also not included. Additionally, the GTD does not contain full data for the year 1993. Finally, the GTD uses an operationalised definition of success, resulting in over 90 percent of attacks being coded as successes.

The ITERATE dataset, which was developed by Edward Mickolus, contains more granular information on the success of terror attacks. In ITERATE, success is coded on a 0-6 scale, with information on attacks stopped in the planning stages, attacks executed unsuccessfully, and attacks carried out as intended. For instance, the four attacks comprising the events of September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001 are all coded as successes in the GTD. However, ITERATE codes the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as successes, but the crash of United Flight 93 is coded as an attack that was executed, but unsuccessfully. This information provides a much sharper picture of the difference in success between different attacks than the information in the GTD. Therefore, the analysis on the success of simultaneous attacks vis-à-vis single attacks will be carried out using ITERATE.\[17\]

Since neither dataset separately denotes when attacks are a part of a coordinated event, the available data was used to construct which attacks are most likely to constitute simultaneous attacks. Several different definitions of coordinated events were considered; however, in order to not overstate the effects of simultaneous attacks in this article, the strictest definition of simultaneous attacks was chosen. In order for two or more attacks to be considered part of a
simultaneous campaign, the attacks must be carried out on the same day, in the same country, by the same group, using the same method.

*Figure I: Number of Terror Attacks per Year*

![Number of Terror Attacks per Year](image)

Under this definition, approximately 25 percent of the attacks coded in the GTD are part of a simultaneous campaign. The breakdown of simultaneous campaigns by year can be seen in Figure 1. This definition probably understates the proportion of simultaneous campaigns in the dataset. By definition, if the group perpetrating the attack is unknown, the attack cannot be part of a simultaneous campaign. Approximately 38 percent of all attacks in the dataset were carried out by unknown perpetrators. Relaxing the definition of simultaneous attacks to only consider the day, location, and method of attack shows approximately 30 percent of all attacks listed in the GTD as being part of simultaneous campaigns. Additionally, groups can carry out coordinated attacks in different countries. For example, in 1998 local members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (affiliated with the global Al-Qaeda network) carried out coordinated truck bombs in Kenya and Tanzania. Since these attacks took place in separate countries, they will not be coded as simultaneous attacks. However, relaxing the definition of simultaneous attacks to only consider the day, method, and group, shows 26 percent of all attacks listed in the GTD are part of simultaneous campaigns. Using the strictest definition may exclude some attacks that are part of coordinated efforts, but it should minimise the number of single attacks which are incorrectly classified as part of a simultaneous campaign.

When utilising the information from ITERATE, the same technique is used to define simultaneous attacks – the attacks must have taken place on the same day, location, method, and group. Approximately 13 percent of the total attacks in the ITERATE dataset are part of a coordinated campaign. This number is lower than the corresponding calculations in the GTD.
dataset. ITERATE only contains information on transnational terrorism, therefore suggesting that coordinated campaigns happen at higher rates in domestic attacks than in transnational attacks. However, this finding may be due to peculiarities of the data available. Transnational attacks can occur in many different countries, while domestic attacks must by definition take place in the same country where the group is located. Therefore, since the definition of a simultaneous attack in this article requires that the attacks occur in the same country, we may be undercounting the number of transnational simultaneous attacks. For this reason, the data from ITERATE will only be used when testing Hypothesis H2 – calculating the impact of simultaneous attacks on success or failure of attacks.

A third set of data is derived from the Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD I) dataset.[18] This dataset codes information on terrorist group characteristics. The dataset contains a snapshot of each terrorist organisation at one point in time between 1998 and 2005. Information offering insight into group capability includes data on age, size, ideology, territorial holdings, and number of alliances. Information from BAAD will be used to control for the characteristics of terrorist organisations that may lead to more terror fatalities.

Results

First the number of fatalities will be examined. Since some terrorist organisations do not intend to kill individuals with their attacks, group characteristics from the BAAD dataset will be added to this analysis. Figure II shows the number of fatalities in single attacks and attacks that are part of a coordinated campaign. II.
Since the early 1980s, attacks as part of a coordinated effort have led to more fatalities. In order to verify this relationship, other characteristics that also determine the number of fatalities must be added to a regression equation. When information from the BAAD dataset is used in the regression analysis, only attacks carried out by perpetrators in the BAAD dataset between 1998 and 2005 are included, which further restricts the sample. While this subsample is non-random, the groups in the BAAD dataset were not selected based on whether or not they carried out simultaneous attacks. Therefore, it is plausible that the subsample is random on the known characteristics, and especially our characteristic of interest – simultaneous attacks. In Figure II, the time period from 1998-2005 records a larger divergence in fatalities from single attacks versus coordinated campaigns than earlier time periods. This divergence may indicate that coordinated campaigns are different in this time period than earlier. However, in Figure I, this time period experienced fewer attacks that were part of a coordinated effort. These issues need to be remembered when generalisations are made.

In this regression, the number of people killed in each attack will be a function of whether or not the attack was simultaneous, whether or not there were regional effects, year effects, attack type effects, group ideology, number of allies, and whether or not the attack was a suicide attack. The number of people killed is censored at 0 – meaning that many attacks result in no fatalities, so a Tobit model will be employed. The Tobit model allows the econometrician to account for different types of 0’s in the dependent variable.[19] In this case, the number of
people killed may be 0 because the attack was unsuccessful in killing anyone or because the group never had any intention of causing casualties.

The results from the Tobit estimation can be seen in Table I. The coefficient of simultaneous is positive and significant, implying that attacks that are a part of simultaneous campaigns tend to kill more people. On average, 45 percent more fatalities occur in simultaneous campaigns than in single attacks, all else being held constant. Note that while the number of people killed increases with simultaneous attacks, the increase is not one-to-one with the scale of the attack. By definition, a simultaneous attack must have at least two attacks as components. However, the number of people killed in a coordinated effort less than doubles. This finding lends credence to the issues raised earlier, namely that using counts to measure the impact of terror attacks could lead to biased results when single and simultaneous accounts are treated the same way.

Table I: Number of Individuals Killed by Terror Attack 1998-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous</td>
<td>25.24***</td>
<td>(5.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Mission</td>
<td>52.70***</td>
<td>(5.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist Only</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>(5.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion Only</td>
<td>10.17**</td>
<td>(4.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Only</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>(13.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>39.70**</td>
<td>(15.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>2.10***</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Time FE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type FE</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-100.74</td>
<td>(17.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2851</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistically significant at 10% level
** Statistically significant at 5% level
*** Statistically significant at 1 % level

Next, how simultaneous attacks impact the success of terrorist attacks was examined using the ITERATE dataset. Since information on group characteristics are not used to explain success, the regression is no longer restricted to only the years where BAAD data is available. The impact of simultaneity on success is weaker, as can be seen in Table II, but provides evidence that simultaneous attacks are more successful than single attacks.
Three specifications of the model were run. For each specification, attacks that are part of a coordinated effort are combined to count as a single attack and denoted as “simultaneous”. Other variables in the regression that may characterize success include location of attack, method of attack, and year of attack.

Country and year fixed effects are included in this regression. The level of success by year varies from a low of 4.5 to a high of 5.8 on a six point scale. The average level of successful terror attacks in individual countries varies between 2.5 and 6.0 on a six point scale. Therefore, differences between different countries and years need to be taken into account in the regression model. One reason for these differences in success may be the level of deterrence by the targeted country; this should help determine success. Therefore, countries that spend more on deterrence should experience fewer successful attacks. The amount of money spent on deterrence depends on the country’s determination of the risk they may face. Controlling for the year of attack will control for differences in deterrence by year. However, deterrence spending is not the only factor that determines success. Method of attack also plays a role. For instance, suicide attacks may be harder to deter than other methods. ITERATE codes the method of attack into twenty-five broad categories including assassination, bombing, hostage taking, hijacking, and armed assault, etc. The average success by type of attack varies from 2.5 to 5.9 on ITERATE’s six point scale.

Three models, referring to three ways to operationalise success, are presented in Table 2. In Model 1, success of a coordinated campaign is assigned the value of its most successful component. In a coordinated campaign, only one component of the attack has to be successful in order for the public to view the attack as a success. Since the dependent variable is an ordinal variable between 0 and 6, an ordered logit estimation is run. In this model, simultaneous attacks are more successful than single attacks. Next, success of a coordinated
campaign is assigned the value of the average success of each of its components. This definition of success is the most intuitive in operational terms, but it is more difficult to address empirically. The success variable is still between 0 and 6, but for simultaneous campaigns the variable is not necessarily an integer. In Model 2, a Tobit estimation is run on the average success variable. Tobit was used since there are many censored variables at both the upper and lower limits of the success scale. The results of this estimation model show no relationship between simultaneous attacks and success. In Model 3, the average success of each terrorist campaign is still used, but this number is rounded to its nearest integer value, allowing an ordered logit regression. Model 3 reveals a positive relationship between simultaneous attacks and success. Examining the odds ratio for Model 1 and Model 3 reveals that a coordinated campaign increases the probability of success by between 46 and 172 percent.

Both hypotheses, H1 and H2, were supported by the empirical analysis – simultaneous campaigns generate more fatalities and are more successful. However, the number of fatalities increases by only 45 percent, while the number of attacks involved at least doubles. The impact of the simultaneous attack is greater than the impact of a single attack, but in a smaller proportion to the increase in size. If the goal of the terrorist group is maximizing the number of deaths on a specific day, then it would make sense to use simultaneous attacks. If the goal of the group is to maximize the total number of fatalities in a year, single attacks may be more worthwhile. Hypothesis H2 is also supported, though results depend on how success for coordinated campaigns is defined. A terrorist group that is interested in successfully carrying out their planned attacks may be more interested in using simultaneous campaigns. Given the support for H1 and H2, considering each part of the campaign individually, as has been done by the past literature, may not be appropriate.

Conclusions

Simultaneous attacks have been largely ignored by the empirical literature on terrorism. In this article, several specifications are considered to classify which events are a part of simultaneous campaigns. The strictest definition - same day, group, location, and type of attack - is used in all analyses to protect against incorrectly classifying attacks as simultaneous.

The goal of this article was to examine the impact of simultaneous attacks. The hypotheses stated that simultaneous attacks would be more successful and lethal. The empirical results suggest that simultaneous attacks have a higher probability of success. Additionally, simultaneous attacks generate more fatalities, but not on a “one-to-one” basis. This research has established that single attacks are different from attacks that are part of a coordinated effort, even though these two types of attacks are treated the same by the empirical quantitative literature. This difference should be considered in the future to ensure that results obtained from using terrorism counts are not biased. A closer look should also be given in future analyses with regard to the definition of “success”. An attack, or a set of attacks, might
be “successful” in tactical terms but be a strategic failure. Beyond the “success” of individual or coordinated acts of terrorism, there is the issue of long-term effects. Terrorism as a mode of conflict waging has a poor record of achieving its ultimate objectives. [20]

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Notes
[3] For instance, both datasets code the events of September 11th, 2001, as four separate attacks.
[13] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[19] A zero inflated negative binomial was also run. The results are robust and available upon request.
II. Policy Notes

Al-Shabaab’s Somali Safe Havens: A Springboard for Terror

by Josh Meservey

Abstract

Al-Shabaab’s recent terror attack on the Westgate mall in Nairobi is not, as some have argued, a sign of the group’s desperation, but rather reveals its strength. Its most radical leader recently consolidated his control of the group, and the AMISOM offensive has stalled, ceding safe havens within the country that allow al-Shabaab to regroup and prosecute the insurgency it has launched. But the anti-Shabaab coalition has neither a sufficient number of troops nor the trained counterinsurgent forces required to root out the group. The coalition instead has to find a way for now to keep al-Shabaab off-balance in its sanctuaries, perhaps with elite unit and UAV strikes, while the international community trains adequate indigenous forces. The ultimate solution to the al-Shabaab challenge is the long-term project of building a legitimate Somali government; but in the meantime, Shabaab cannot be allowed to gather its strength to launch more attacks from its sanctuaries.

Keywords: al-Shabaab, Somalia, AMISOM, terrorist safe havens

Introduction

The terrible tragedy at the Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya, is now ended. The final toll is still unclear, but at the time of this writing 72 people are confirmed dead, well over 150 injured, and more than 60 still missing.[1] Kenya and the other countries that lost citizens are now left to mourn, while their leaders face the task of preventing another such attack.

Analysts are still grappling with what this assault tells us about the Somali terrorist group, al-Shabaab, that claimed the attack. Ken Menkhaus, the eminent Somali expert, posted an article describing the attack as a sign of “desperation” by the group.[2] But others argued that the episode instead reveals al-Shabaab’s strength, rather than a desperate bid to claw back some relevance.[3]

Those making the latter argument better capture the group’s trajectory. It is true that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) offensive in Somalia hurt al-Shabaab. The coalition’s[4] capture of Kismayo and Mogadishu damaged the group’s income as it is no longer able to rely on the taxes from Kismayo’s port or Mogadishu’s Bakara Market, making it difficult to provide the same sort of financial benefits to its fighters that induced many of them to join in the first place.[5] This and other factors have led to waves of defections.[6] Furthermore, al-Shabaab has lost much of the infrastructure it used for transmitting propaganda, such as several of its radio stations, another happy outcome of the coalition’s
offensive. And while there are no solid numbers on just how many insurgents have been killed in the offensive, they are likely significant.

The group also recently experienced an extraordinary spasm of internecine violence. In mid-June, Shabaab factions met in a series of clashes in southern Somalia; after the dust settled, it was clear that the group's Emir, Ahmed Abdi Godane, had moved swiftly and with extraordinary ruthlessness against several challengers. His men killed at least two prominent leaders of the group, including a fellow founder. Another founder fled to the shelter of his clansmen, and the group's spiritual leader tried to defect to the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and was arrested. A month later, Godane's men finally caught up with the group's most prominent foreign fighter, an American named Omar Hammami, and killed him as well. Al-Shabaab was reeling.

But the purge also left Ahmed Abdi Godane, its most radical and ruthless leader, firmly in control of the group. Godane is a fanatic, a true believer in the worst excesses of the violent Islamic sub-sect known as Salafi-Jihad, and is committed to the idea of global war against any who do not agree with his narrowly defined beliefs. The Westgate slaughter was likely both a very public reminder of his new supremacy within the group to anyone who questioned it, as well as a signal of his willingness to prosecute jihad more vigorously in the region.

And while AMISOM made excellent progress against the group, their offensive is now stopped in its tracks. In June of this year, AMISOM switched to a “protection-of-civilians” strategy that consists of consolidating its gains and proactively protecting civilians under its control. Protecting civilians is a critical piece of any counterinsurgency strategy, but AMISOM may also have calculated that pushing further into Shabaab-held territory would leave its troops stretched too thin to effectively hold the areas it has already liberated, opening up a dangerous opportunity for Shabaab.

That is why al-Shabaab’s Westgate attack should be understood as a warning, rather than as a death rattle. The parts of Somalia out of which the group has yet to be pushed serve as safe havens where it is free to rest, regroup, and plan attacks in service of the insurgency it has launched against the SFG and its allies.

Safe havens are an obvious problem for counterinsurgents. Insurgents that have them have historically been far more difficult to defeat than those kept on the run: the Afghan Taliban’s ability to safely ensconce itself in sanctuaries in Pakistan is one of the major reasons ISAF has struggled to bring order to Afghanistan, while the Viet Cong enjoyed the safety of Laos and Cambodia for most of the Vietnam War. Fortunately, all of Somalia’s neighbors are committed to defeating Shabaab and denying it a safe haven within their borders, but the group does not need to look that far afield for sanctuary; it has found it in the forbidding forests of Lower Jubba near the Kenyan border and the Galgala Mountains in the North.

Counterinsurgency doctrine has much to say about how terrain and cover of the type found in those areas is highly appealing to insurgents looking for an area in which to hide and negate
their foe’s advantages in conventional weaponry. Gebru Tareke, a historian at Yale University
who has studied the Ethiopian insurgencies, describes the “ideal terrain” for insurgents as an
“expansive area of forests, marshes, or mountain ranges and gorges,”[15] another author
speaks of “swamps, mountains, and forests,”[16] while the USMC Small Wars Manual warns
that Marines should expect to battle insurgents in “mountainous, wooded terrain.”[17]

A number of history’s most infamous insurgencies have avoided destruction by retreating to
mountain and forest redoubts. Since inception, the FARC has hidden in the thick jungles of
Colombia,[18] and the Malayan Races Liberation Army was so adept at jungle warfare that in
response the British began a school that became known as the Jungle Warfare School.[19] The
Taliban escaped to the Tora Bora mountains from which it launched its insurgency,[20] while
the Viet Cong hid so deeply in the jungle it was “virtually impossible” for the U.S. military to
hunt them down, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua survived the U.S.’s best efforts to eliminate
them, in part because they made ample use of a mountain surrounded by jungle terrain.[21]

The forests of Lower Jubba are on par as an ideal safe haven with all of those examples. They
have served as a traditional sanctuary for Somali extremists for nearly 20 years, and have been
described as “a vast area of inaccessible jungles” and “remote bush.”[22] These areas have
already caused the coalition problems. The Kenyan Defence Force’s (KDF) advance towards
Kismayo was slowed when its mechanized units had trouble navigating the forests, while the
Shabaab guerrillas made good use of the ample cover to avoid the KDF’s superior firepower.
[23]

Perhaps more concerning is the mountainous Galgala region of Puntland and its network of
caves and training camps. The area is notoriously inaccessible and has explicitly been
compared on more than one occasion to Afghanistan’s Tora Bora mountains.[24] Stratfor
released a report pointing out that the vegetation is so thick in the mountains, and the weather
hot enough during the day, that fighters may be able to evade targeting systems from weapons
platforms, including infrared targeting.[25] Its proximity to Yemen has in the past made it an
ideal base from which to both send and receive weapons and fighters across the Gulf of Aden;
reports of boatloads of fighters in that area, and of skiffs stuffed with weapons likely meant for
al-Shabaab, suggests the group is utilizing this traditional smuggling route.[26]

Worse yet, a radical militia led by Yasin Kilwe operates in that area and hosts several hundred
al-Shabaab fighters, including senior leaders.[27] The Puntland authorities have never been
able to subdue Kilwe’s group, and it has reportedly even captured parts of the Galgala region
while also launching a deadly attack against a military base in Puntland. In February 2012, the
militia formally joined al-Shabaab.[28]

These realities suggest that there is a critical need to keep pressing the attack against al-
Shabaab and root it out of its sanctuaries, but also that it will not be easy. To begin with, more
troops will be needed. A RAND study found that the average troop level during
counterinsurgency campaigns in permissive environments was 2 soldiers per 1,000 residents,
while for non-permissive environments it was 13 soldiers per 1,000 residents.[29] Somalia is
only a permissive environment in certain places, so as a very conservative estimate, 7 soldiers for every 1,000 residents is necessary. The CIA estimates that the Somali population is currently about 10.2 million people; it is unclear if that number includes Somaliland's 3.5 million people,[30] but we will subtract that from the number as Somaliland generally does a good job of providing its own security. For 6.7 million people, then, the country requires about 47,000 troops.

As of June 2013, AMISOM was at full troop strength with just under 18,000 soldiers in the country,[31] though the African Union wishes to bump that number up to about 24,000.[32] Diplomats estimate that Ethiopia has about 8,000 soldiers inside Somalia, though no one knows the number for sure.[33] And it is difficult to determine how many troops currently serve in the Somali National Army; there are “theoretically” 10,000, though the likely number is far lower.[34] There are also a number of allied militias whose numbers are similarly vague: in early 2010, U.S. intelligence officials estimated Ras Kamboni had between 500 and 1,000 fighters, and in 2012 a Stanford University project estimated that Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama had around 2,000 fighters.[35] Numbers for the various other militias are even more difficult to find.

Whatever the actual force levels at the coalition's disposal, they are too few for AMISOM to continue its push against al-Shabaab. And in some ways the numbers are irrelevant as al-Shabaab is no longer interested in testing AMISOM in a conventional battle for superiority, as evidenced by the group's tactical decision over the last two years. When the KDF advanced into Kismayo in late 2012 it proceeded slowly, and its eventual final push featured a night-time amphibious assault spearheaded by Special Forces troops with Somali security forces bearing down from the interior.[36] But resistance was surprisingly light; al-Shabaab had abandoned the city, its final major stronghold and biggest source of funding, practically without offering serious resistance.[37]

Al-Shabaab's Kismayo withdrawal reflected the same decision the group made one year earlier in Mogadishu, suddenly withdrawing from a city for which it had battled for years.[38] Both choices were strategic decisions to avoid a devastating confrontation with a suddenly robust, reinvigorated AMISOM force that possessed far superior conventional military capabilities. After the fall of Kismayo, an al-Shabaab commander said as much: “We got orders from our superiors to withdraw from the city... this is part of broader military tactics we have set for the enemy.”[39]

The “broader military tactics” to which the commander was alluding are guerrilla tactics. According to several reports, the group had been planning to switch to an insurgency strategy for more than a year at the time of the Kismayo withdrawal,[40] and abandoning fixed positions in the cities was in keeping with their new strategy. And it was not just the major cities that al-Shabaab abandoned; it declined to defend nearly all areas it held in the face of approaching troops.[41]
An al-Shabaab commander, Sheikh Mohamed Ibrahim, articulated the strategy further when speaking of the group’s withdrawal from Mogadishu: “Now we are saving money, while the enemy pays more and more to secure land it seized, recruit new soldiers, pay for services. Do you think really they can continue like that forever? Already we are in Mogadishu every night, carrying out attacks.”[42] There is a self-serving element to his statement as al-Shabaab did not want to appear weak after its withdrawal from Mogadishu, but it is also an articulation of classic insurgency strategy. Ibrahim’s words echo Robert Taber’s arresting metaphor for an insurgent:

_The guerrilla fights the war of the flea. The flea bites, hops, and bites again, nimbly avoiding the foot that would crush him. He does not seek to kill his enemy at a blow, but to bleed him and feed on him, to plague and bedevil him, to keep him from resting and to destroy his nerve and morale._[43]

There is a further complication for AMISOM. It takes forces trained in counterinsurgency and with a different mindset from the conventional warfighter’s, a certain “flair for dealing with civilians,” to be effective against an insurgency.[44] The U.S. Marine Corps believed so strongly in the necessity of training troops specifically for fighting insurgents that its _Small Wars Manual_ devotes an entire chapter to the subject.[45]

Without such training, the results can be damaging indeed. The Nigerian army is currently having extreme difficulty suppressing Boko Haram in the northern parts of the country, in part because its soldiers are untrained in counterinsurgency tactics.[46] President George W. Bush’s administration focused on building a U.S. force designed for conventional conflict, which left it ill-equipped to go about necessary counterinsurgency activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, and contributed to the Iraqi population turning against the American presence. [47] And in the war that haunts the United States still, Vietnam, part of the blame for the loss has been pinned on the fact that U.S. servicemen were untrained in counterinsurgency tactics. [48]

The bulk of the troops trying to suppress al-Shabaab have no training in the specific skill set necessary to succeed in this new tactical environment. Kenya’s elite forces in Somalia, the Rangers and Special Forces, have had some counterinsurgency training from the British and Americans.[49] Yet the rest of Kenya’s forces have not. In fact, one KDF soldier offered to a journalist the following worrisome analysis for fighting insurgents: “In guerrilla warfare you don’t need training…You just need to know how to shoot and duck.”[50] And one of Kenya’s allies in the current fight, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, publicly questioned whether the Kenyan military was prepared for guerrilla fighting.[51]

The records of the other security forces that make up the coalition are mixed, but none are crack counterinsurgent forces. Ethiopia has fought a number of domestic guerrilla movements in its Oromia, Afar, and Ogaden regions,[52] but failed to quell the Shabaab-led insurgency
that began in 2006 after the Ethiopian National Defense Force invaded the country, resulting in them ultimately being driven out.[53] The Ugandan army has experience fighting insurgents in the north of its own country, but its actions there have been stained by credible allegations of human rights abuses, and it remains feared and disliked by some Ugandans in those areas.[54]

And Somalia’s national security forces have a whole host of problems that make them unsuitable for a counterinsurgency campaign, not least because they are largely composed of “groups of untrained young men” used to the power a weapon brings.[55] Many of these youths may well be proficient asymmetric fighters as Somalia has for decades been a harsh training ground in such types of combat. Yet they lack the necessary discipline and regard for the protection of civilians that is critical for successful counterinsurgency, and already have been credibly accused of a range of human rights’ abuses.

Human Rights Watch has issued several reports that are cause for serious concern in this respect, including one in March 2013 concerning the plight of IDPs in Somalia:

*Members of displaced communities in Mogadishu faced serious human rights abuses including rape, beatings, ethnic discrimination, restricted access to food and shelter, restrictions on movement, and reprisals when they dared to protest their mistreatment. The most serious abuses were committed by various militias and security forces, often affiliated with the government.[56]*

The BBC documented abuse in IDP camps as well, reporting that 1,700 women were raped in 2012 in the camps, and quoted a U.N. estimate that “men in uniform” perpetrated 70% of the assaults.[57]

Human Rights Watch has also reported on “summary executions and torture” inflicted by pro-government militias in Beletwayne and Baidoa,[58] and in December 2012 urged Kenyan authorities not to repatriate Somali refugees to liberated areas because of “ongoing fighting and abuses against civilians in areas controlled by Kenyan forces and allied militias.”[59]

Several cases of coalition abuse against civilians were egregious enough to spark an international outcry. One case, in January 2013, is particularly concerning as it suggests the government tried to cover up a crime committed by government security forces and then engaged in reprisals against those who reported the abuse. A woman who reported being raped by members of the Somali security forces was charged along with several others for “insulting a government body,” among other charges.[60] The charges against her were eventually dropped, though the journalist involved in the case remained in jail for months afterwards.[61]

In April 2013, President Mohamud in a speech to police cadets in Mogadishu admitted for the first time that Somali security forces had engaged in rapes against civilians—he went on to say
that security forces who rape and rob Somalis need to be fought the same as al-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{[62]} It was an important and helpful step by the president, and will hopefully serve as a credible warning that mistreatment of civilians will not be tolerated. But the human rights abuses highlight the broader issues of poor discipline that make the Somali security forces thoroughly ill-equipped to help AMISOM dislodge al-Shabaab insurgents from its safe havens.

The international community is aware of the urgent need to train Somalia's indigenous security forces, and in fact have been working on it for years—Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and the European Union have all spent time trying to whip various Somali National Army and militia forces into shape. But most of the training appears to be for fundamentals\textsuperscript{[63]} and not the more sophisticated counterinsurgency training that is necessary. International donors are designating funds for police and other security force training,\textsuperscript{[64]} which is positive, but much more will be required.

AMISOM and the SFG are thus caught on the horns of a nasty dilemma: allowing al-Shabaab to continue unmolested in its safe havens means the group will be able to continue to marshal its strength to fight its enemies, as well as plan the sorts of terror attacks it launched at Westgate. But restarting the offensive will leave AMISOM too thinly stretched in the areas it has already liberated. Furthermore, chasing Shabaab into the heavy forests of Lower Jubba, or the mountains of Galgala, will mean AMISOM's conventional military superiority will be largely neutralized, allowing Shabaab to fight on a more or less equal footing, a classic guerrilla strategy.

AMISOM needs, then, to find a way to keep the terrorists off-balance but avoid committing troops who are untrained for this sort of combat and who will get chewed up. It should conduct short, sharp strikes by Kenya's elite units who are trained in asymmetric warfare\textsuperscript{[65]} —UAV strikes could also help, though the daunting terrain may make them less effective. Reliable and accurate intelligence will be critical, so AMISOM should be looking to its Somali counterparts to develop strong sources among the local communities. Meanwhile, the international community should redouble its efforts to train Somali security forces, as bringing in even more foreign troops to address the troop level shortfalls runs the risk of antagonizing Somalis.

Ultimately, the al-Shabaab problem is a political one that will require a political solution. Until there is a government in Somalia that can prove to Somalis it is their best hope for prosperity and stability, Shabaab will be able to garner some level of support from among the population, despite its general unpopularity. Yet building a state is a long-term project, and the immediate challenge of al-Shabaab's sanctuaries in Somalia remains, and it requires a smart counterinsurgency approach.

As U.S. Representative Tom Cotton recently remarked in a speech about al-Qaeda, “When you have to worry about personal security, you barely have time to plan a meal, much less plan and execute a mass attack.”\textsuperscript{[66]} Al-Shabaab, safe in its sanctuaries, had the time to plan a sophisticated and, by the evil metrics terrorists use, extraordinarily successful attack in
Nairobi. AMISOM and the rest of the international community must devise a way to again pursue al-Shabaab, not only to give the SFG more time for state-building, but also to deny al-Shabaab the safe haven it needs to plot such horrors as we witnessed recently in Nairobi.

About the Author: Josh Meservey recently joined the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council as the Assistant Director. He is co-author, with James Forest and Graham Turbiville, of a monograph on the al-Shabaab insurgency to be published by the U.S. Joint Special Operations University. Sections of this article have been adapted from the forthcoming monograph.

Notes


[4] The “coalition” as used in this article refers to all of the different military forces fighting al-Shabaab: AMISOM, the Ethiopian National Defense Force, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama, Ras Kamboni, Somali National Army, and other militias and various armed groups.


Rethinking International Counterterrorism Assistance to the Greater Horn of Africa: Toward a Regional Risk Reduction Strategy

by Matthew Schwartz, Liat Shetret, and Alistair Millar

Abstract

The Horn of Africa has long been a recipient of foreign security assistance, with significant funds increasingly devoted to supporting subregional civilian-oriented counterterrorism efforts over the past decade. Despite efforts to better coordinate delivery, counterterrorism programming in the subregion generally remains fragmented, short-term, and siloed in implementation. This article argues that it is time to rethink the international community’s approach to counterterrorism assistance to the Horn of Africa and calls for a cohesive regional approach that not only bridges the gap between security and development, but also the gap between counterterrorism and human security. It emphasizes that the international community must not only better coordinate existing streams of counterterrorism assistance to the region, but also rethink how this assistance is designed and the ways it can be delivered to complement broader subregional development and security agendas. After a brief introduction to international counterterrorism assistance to the Horn of Africa, the article examines linkages across three thematic streams of programming being delivered to the subregion: anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism; criminal justice capacity building assistance to counter terrorism; and, countering violent extremism. This discussion will highlight the need for a regional risk reduction strategy for the Horn of Africa that not only builds on the interplay of different streams of counterterrorism assistance, but on synergies across broader subregional development and security agendas as well.

Keywords: anti-money laundering, capacity building, countering the financing of terrorism, countering violent extremism, criminal justice, counterterrorism, East Africa, Horn of Africa, human security

Introduction

As communities in the Horn of Africa struggle to overcome a range of deeply complex development and security challenges, persistent threats posed by violent extremism and transnational terrorism remain serious national security concerns both for the subregion and the international community. Though the subregion has long been a recipient of foreign security assistance, international support for subregional counterterrorism efforts has become increasingly civilian-oriented over the past several years. While the shift toward civilian-oriented counterterrorism can be credited with a number of significant gains, its long-term impact on reducing terrorism-related risks in the subregion remains to be seen.

As the nature, scope and extent of civilian counterterrorism assistance to the greater Horn of Africa has become increasingly diverse, the time is ripe to reflect on where counterterrorism fits in the long view of the development and security challenges of the subregion. It is time to
rethink the international community’s approach to counterterrorism assistance to the Horn of Africa. This article offers a starting point for this discussion. A cohesive regional approach that not only bridges the gap between security and development, but also the gap between counterterrorism and human security, is essential to sustainably reduce terrorism-related risks in the subregion. The international community must not only better coordinate existing streams of counterterrorism assistance to the region, but also rethink how this assistance is designed and the ways it can be delivered to complement broader national and subregional development and security agendas.

Our discussion begins with a brief introduction to international counterterrorism assistance in the Horn of Africa. This will be followed by a more in-depth exploration of the linkages across three thematic streams of counterterrorism programming being delivered in the greater subregion:

- anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism;
- criminal justice capacity building assistance to counter terrorism; and,
- countering violent extremism.

Greater integration across these streams of assistance, already being delivered by a multiplicity of international actors is an important first step to strengthening national resilience to terrorism-related risks in the subregion. However, international counterterrorism assistance alone cannot sustainably address the challenges posed by terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Aligning this assistance with mutually reinforcing local, national, and regional development and security efforts is essential for long-term impact. Each thematic discussion offers a sampling of constructive ideas for adapting existing programming priorities for greater alignment with local development and security objectives. Following the conclusion of these thematic discussions, we highlight a selection of widely-supported, but often overlooked practices for donor governments delivering civilian counterterrorism assistance in the greater Horn of Africa subregion.

It is impossible to cover the depth and complexity of the development-security nexus of the greater Horn of Africa in the form of a single journal article. Accounting for these complexities in accordance with the local contexts is essential for effective development and security cooperation, and we encourage readers to refer to our extensive footnotes for additional information and resources on issues we may have been unable to address more extensively in the text.

**Background**

The greater Horn of Africa has made a number of promising economic and political gains in recent years. Several countries have been riding a wave of rapid economic growth, and despite lingering conflict, South Sudan secured independence following a successful public
referendum in 2011, and a new Federal Government of Somalia has been inaugurated with overwhelming support from the international community. Nevertheless, the subregion faces an array of ongoing challenges stemming from underdevelopment, weak governance, widespread poverty, intermittent violent conflict, and other sources of human insecurity, including transnational terrorism and organized crime. Pressures to decisively address these transnational terrorist and criminal threats are testing the limits of national capabilities and resilience. Governments are often unable to meet the basic needs of local communities, let alone the challenges posed by complex transnational terrorist threats.

How can this cycle be broken? Part of the solution is already in place. The greater Horn of Africa has been a key geographic focus of bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism-related assistance since the 1990s. This is not surprising given the transnational security risks emanating from Somalia and Yemen, and long-held concerns over the danger posed by the al-Qaeda cells based around the greater subregion over the past two decades. Particularly over the last five years, international capacity building and technical assistance to the greater Horn of Africa and elsewhere has increasingly focused on civilian counterterrorism assistance activities. While at times articulated in the context of broader strategic frameworks, assistance may end up ultimately being fragmented in implementation. Even when conceptualized to achieve high-level strategic objectives, donor counterterrorism assistance can often get lost in translation by the time it reaches the ground. Indeed, many counterterrorism projects are designed with inadequate consideration of the sectoral capacity deficiencies of local government institutions, or the complexity of society-state relationships, and have been largely disconnected from broader development and security initiatives being undertaken across local, national and regional contexts.

Though there have been some signs of improvement in the strategic coordination of such programming, the field remains somewhat ad-hoc and short-term in scope. To address this challenge, multilateral initiatives such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), established in 2011, and its Horn of Africa Working Group under the leadership of the European Union and Turkey, have been working to bring coherence to civilian counterterrorism assistance efforts across the greater subregion. However, strengthening coordination of diverse counterterrorism initiatives is only half the battle. Aligning this assistance to complement broader development and security agendas will be essential for sustainably addressing threats posed by terrorism in the long term.

**Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism**

Despite the challenges confronting the subregion, a number of countries in the Horn of Africa have been experiencing tremendous economic growth in recent years. Ethiopia, for example, ranked the 12th fastest growing economy worldwide in 2012, outpacing economic powerhouses like China and India, and was the 4th fastest in Africa with an average GDP growth of 10.7 percent per year over the past decade. However, the lack of a robust anti-
money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulatory regime may threaten to deter foreign investment and leave financial flows vulnerable to criminal exploitation. In the context of the massive financial growth in the Ethiopian example, an independent report by Global Financial Integrity estimates that the country lost over 11.7 billion dollars in illicit financial outflows over the last decade.[6] These assets, which might have served in the further expansion of Ethiopia's economic and human development potential, have instead been redirected for purposes unknown. Indeed, portions could have been funneled in support of international terrorism and criminal activities including a range of illicit enterprises such as human trafficking rings or the financing of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. These challenges are not unique to Ethiopia, and many countries in the subregion, including Ethiopia, have made significant strides in strengthening their AML/CFT regimes over the past few years.

Curbing criminal and terrorist access to financial support depends on the financial integrity of all members of the international community. Strengthening national AML/CFT regimes, as well as regional cooperation on AML/CFT throughout the Horn of Africa, has been a key area of focus of international counterterrorism assistance to the subregion. Common AML/CFT program activities can include a range of legislative and policy related technical assistance and institutional capacity building projects—particularly the strengthening of national financial intelligence units. A cross-section of international support, particularly from Denmark and the United States, has served in enhancing platforms for subregional dialogue, awareness, technical assistance and capacity for strengthening national and regional AML/CFT infrastructure.[7]

Effective AML/CFT regulatory regimes also depend highly on the capacity of national criminal justice systems and strong cross-border legal cooperation to properly investigate and prosecute financial crime and prevent the financing of terrorism.[8] Due to the cross-border nature and transnational risks posed by money laundering and terrorist financing, a multi-sectoral regional approach is thus required to sustainably reduce the risk of illicit financial flows in the subregion. Robust financial oversight and reporting standards and expansive formal banking and revenue collection infrastructure provide the most advantageous environment for the implementation of a comprehensive regulatory oversight regime. However, the economic infrastructure and degree of financial inclusion across the subregion varies widely between rural and urban markets and across national contexts. Local economic activity for a vast majority of the subregion's population is overwhelmingly cash-based, though mobile money platforms are increasingly penetrating the region expanding financial access.

Ultimately, safeguarding the integrity of regional financial flows through regulatory and monitoring mechanisms will have limited impact on reducing the risks associated with money laundering and terrorist financing if not informed by a risk-based approach to AML/CFT, and aligned with efforts to strengthen financial access and inclusion, for example, through:
i) Supporting the development of national and regional guidance and good practices for the implementation of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards in the context of cash-based, low-income, and high-poverty economic contexts. There is a dearth of technical guidance on AML/CFT regime development in the context of the subregion's economic and risk environment. The development of detailed and practical case studies and guidance notes on implementing the FATF standards in the developmental and fragile contexts of the Horn of Africa would be extremely beneficial for national authorities in the subregion.[9]

ii) Facilitating dialogue and deepening a regional knowledge base on ways to strengthen regulatory oversight without restricting financial access or compromising financial inclusion. The heightened international pressure on the subregion and evidence of growing internal momentum for stronger AML/CFT in some national contexts, must not be at the expense of greater financial inclusion and poverty alleviation objectives.[10] Support for national and regional dialogues on enhancing financial integrity in a way that protects and economically empowers poor and marginalized populations can serve as the basis for developing innovative locally-owned solutions to regulatory challenges.

iii) Exploring trade-based financial, value-transfer, and remittance corridors across the greater subregion. While a baseline study of regulatory regimes and financial flows in the context of AML/CFT has already been undertaken in Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states by the IGAD Security Sector Program, a deeper understanding of the risks related to informal financial flows in neighboring Tanzania and Yemen would be useful for the delivery of targeted risk-based assistance and a more effective strategic approach to AML/CFT in the subregion.[11]

Criminal Justice Capacity and Cooperation to Counter Terrorism

Strengthening cross-border legal cooperation, information sharing, and investigation capacity has been a core component of civilian counterterrorism assistance to states in the greater Horn of Africa. This focus can be attributed to the transnational nature of terrorist activity in the subregion and revelations of ties between terrorist operatives in the Horn of Africa to attacks abroad.[12] Recognizing the need for a common legal cooperation framework to bring transnational criminals and terrorists to justice, the IGAD Council of Ministers approved Conventions on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) in 2009 to help serve as the basis for cross-border criminal justice cooperation based on transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. Though the implementation of extradition and MLA agreements continues to be the focus of a number of international technical assistance agendas, effective legal cooperation based on domestic legislation requires strong interagency coordination at the national level and is subject to internal regulations, safeguards, and standard operating procedures in each respective national jurisdiction.[13]
In addition to the highly technical field of cross-border legal cooperation, international counterterrorism assistance to the subregion has increasingly focused on enhancing criminal justice capacities to counter terrorism ‘in accordance with the rule of law while protecting human rights’. Isolated from national justice and police reform initiatives, the impact of these efforts remains unclear. Though far from unique to the Horn of Africa, the pretext of counterterrorism has been used in different contexts to persecute minority groups and political opposition, silence critical voices in the media and civil society, and has served as the basis of measures which have exacerbated the insecurity of vulnerable communities.[14] This can add increased tension to already strained relationships between certain local constituencies, their governments, and the broader national community that encompasses them.

Often regardless of context, justice and security development assistance to the Horn of Africa—as elsewhere—generally focuses on enhancing the security and capacity of governments over the safety and empowerment of communities, and the same can be said of counterterrorism assistance.[15] Yet, the strengthening of state enforcement and external cooperation capacities as priorities of counterterrorism assistance, even in the context of ‘human rights’ and ‘rule of law’, are not substitutes for improved justice and policing for populations in the greater subregion.[16] As suggested in the opening of the GCTF’s Rabat Memorandum, effective criminal justice practices to counter terrorism “must be built on a functional criminal justice system that is capable of handling ordinary criminal offenses while protecting the human rights of the accused.”[17] Creating synergies between counterterrorism programming and broader national justice and security development initiatives is essential for building basic criminal justice capacity to address everyday challenges and institutional competence to address new challenges as they arise.[18] There are a number of opportunities to strengthen both core criminal justice service delivery, as well as enhance national interagency capacity and coordination and regional cooperation to counter transnational terrorism. The following ideas can help guide such an approach:

i) Exploring linkages between counterterrorism and justice and security development needs. Capacities essential for an effective criminal justice system, such as evidence gathering and forensics, standard operating procedures, case management, criminal procedure, interagency and police-prosecution cooperation, management and administration, as well as oversight and accountability mechanisms, are equally essential for countering terrorism. Where these core capacities are weak, assistance may be better delivered through broader support to national justice and security system development initiatives.[19]

ii) Developing national and regional training capacity in human rights-compliant criminal justice practices. Claims that investigation techniques grounded in human rights and the rule of law are both strategically and tactically superior to coercive techniques are too infrequently supported by concrete practical instruction.[20] Stronger long-term partnerships should be made with states in the region to strengthen law enforcement
training infrastructure capable of disseminating these practices, not only in the context of countering terrorism, but as a core element of good policing for public security.

iii) Supporting community-police partnerships to address local security concerns, and encouraging professional and accountable policing. Law enforcement capacity for counterterrorism can be either strengthened or hindered on the basis of a community’s relationship with local police forces. Supporting direct upstream community-police partnerships can help enhance public safety, strengthen police accountability and professionalism, and improve local perceptions of state legitimacy, providing a stronger foundation for more effective national and subregional criminal justice cooperation.[21]

Countering Violent Extremism

The threats posed by al-Shabaab and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and their continued ability to attract recruits across borders have been significant factors behind the CVE-focus of international counterterrorism programming in the greater subregion. A UN report in July 2011 suggested that non-Somali Kenyan youth formed a particularly active role within al-Shabaab.[22] There have since been increasing concerns that marginalized segments of the subregion’s growing youth population could be particularly vulnerable to violent extremism.[23] Reports have described how radical clerics and small circles of dedicated followers lure local youths of poor marginalized communities by offering a sense of belonging, a compelling world-view, and a small stipend (with the promise of more) to join al-Shabaab’s cause by taking up arms in Somalia, abroad, or even closer to home.[24]

At the same time, terrorist groups in the subregion have become well-known for their use of the internet and social networking platforms to effectively reach out to wider global audiences. Following Kenya’s intervention in southern Somalia in late 2011, Al-Shabaab took the battle to the world wide web, engaging in a drawn out war of words on Twitter with the Kenya Defence Force spokesman.[25] Their latest Twitter account was shutdown in the immediate aftermath of the September 2013 Westgate attack.[26] Anwar al Awlaki, former editor of AQAP’s English-language periodical Inspire, whose extremist rhetoric was widely circulated among radicals world-wide via the web, was based in Yemen for a number of years before being killed by an American drone strike in 2011.[27] The savvy use of new media by extremist groups in the subregion, if not a prime factor behind local terrorist recruitment, has figured prominently in influencing the ideas of violent extremists and terrorists well beyond the greater Horn.[28]

International CVE and CVE-related assistance in the Horn of Africa is diverse in character, often delivered through grassroots level programming in collaboration with civil society, and in some cases, directly in partnership with local communities.[29] CVE programming at the community level can be an extremely sensitive endeavor, and must be carefully tailored according to the context in which being implemented. The dynamics of an individual’s connection to their community, community perceptions of the state, and the nature of these relationships in a broader socio-economic and political environment, are of particular
relevance in the context of efforts to counter violent extremism.[30] The sometimes contentious nature of community relations with national governments may impede the development and implementation of CVE activities in certain subregional contexts.[31] However, government capacity building is not an area to be neglected and there are international assistance projects aimed at equipping local officials to, for example, better respond to CVE challenges in a way that enhances their credibility and legitimacy among local communities; as well as programs to support special detention programs aimed at disengaging incarcerated violent extremists from their former cause.

The effectiveness of CVE programming in the Horn of Africa—as elsewhere—will depend on the extent to which it is fit for purpose and tailored to context. It is not possible to attribute a single set of ‘push’ or ‘pull’ factors to explain why certain individuals are attracted to violent extremism and driven to engage in acts of terrorism.[32] Defining entire demographics by a presumed vulnerability to violent extremism may risk securitizing already marginalized communities rather than addressing potentially dramatic sources of community insecurity. CVE-related programming may be best approached through needs-based community or civil society programming designed to achieve CVE-objectives indirectly. The following ideas for grassroots-level engagement can help inform preliminary steps toward such an approach in certain contexts:

i) Frame interventions in partnership with communities in accordance with their perceptions of insecurity. Mapping community perceptions of local sources of insecurity can help inform the design of grassroots-level programming to address CVE-related objectives tailored to local context.[33] Mapping studies should be undertaken by locally credible researchers or by community members themselves using a mixture of methods in a highly-localized setting within the specific community that will benefit from the program.

ii) Facilitate trust-building, and joint training activities between communities, civil society and local authorities. Facilitating direct community member-police officer collaboration in the joint development of community safety strategies, or through joint community-police training activities can serve in empowering community members and local authorities as mutually accountable partners for the betterment of their shared community.[34] When community-police relations are built on trust and mutual respect, community members will have a greater willingness to cooperate and share information with local officers for more effective crime and terrorism prevention.

iii) Support localized and high-impact civic education, empowerment, leadership, and entrepreneurial initiatives for marginalized populations. While not directly related to risks of violent extremism, many communities in the greater Horn of Africa face conditions of acute deprivation and socio-political marginalization. Alleviating these conditions through dynamic grassroots projects can help strengthen community cohesion and resilience to a range of internal and external stresses, including violent
extremism. Small grants to support credible local projects on civic engagement, education, or entrepreneurial activities can have an enormous impact on a community’s sense of empowerment, particularly contexts of fragility and marginalization.[35]

**Toward a Regional Risk Reduction Strategy**

The evolving complexity of development and security challenges in the Horn of Africa has led to the elaboration and refinement of subregion-specific strategies meant to guide the delivery of coordinated development and security assistance.[36] Indeed, some of these assistance packages have come to incorporate specific civilian counterterrorism and CVE-oriented objectives alongside or encompassed within broader assistance strategies. However, a rift continues to exist between conceptualizing these relationships on paper and practically linking them in program delivery. The following overarching principles, while not at all meant to be comprehensive, should be taken into special consideration by donor governments providing counterterrorism assistance to the greater subregion:

i) Set priorities, develop objectives and design programming in collaboration with local partners in accordance with local context and local needs. ‘Promoting local ownership’ cannot be left until after program priorities have already been formulated. The most crucial period for local partners to assert ownership over an initiative is during the inception and design phases where core local stakeholders can directly influence the terms and objectives of a program.

ii) Formulate whole-of-government approaches to assistance delivery in alignment with goals defined by partners. Donor governments should work to ensure coordination across different domestic agencies delivering international assistance in national and regional contexts. The formulation of overarching national and regional strategies that link integrated activity- and component-specific objectives under larger strategic goals can help bring logical coherence to donor assistance. Intra- and inter-governmental communication for coordinated assistance delivery in the field through country missions across the subregion can serve to enhance the tactical coordination of assistance delivery, and provide an important feedback loop to ensure strategic alignment under a common regional perspective.

iii) Conduct more rigorous assessments and evaluations with the aim of building a stronger regional community of practice. Context-specific needs assessments and program evaluations are essential for measuring progress and identifying remaining gaps. This information should be used to build a stronger regional community of practice and knowledge-sharing for the delivery of more effective and targeted assistance partnerships among local and international partners.
Conclusion

This article highlighted a number of starting points for a critical reexamination of existing counterterrorism assistance efforts to the Horn of Africa, and how they might be better aligned for sustainable impact. If terrorism is a long-term challenge, then sustainable support for long-term solutions is required to address it. The challenges posed by various manifestations of terrorism in the greater Horn of Africa are deeply intertwined with those related to good governance, economic development, and human security. As the nature, scope and extent of civilian counterterrorism assistance to the greater Horn of Africa has become increasingly diverse, the time is ripe to reflect on how counterterrorism fits in the long view of the development and security challenges of the subregion.

There have been a number of significant achievements in civilian counterterrorism assistance to the Horn of Africa. To capitalize on these gains and contribute toward sustainably reducing risks posed by terrorism in the long term, more must be done to ensure counterterrorism assistance is aligned with broader efforts to address the complex development and security needs of both governments and communities in the subregion. A regional risk reduction strategy must deconstruct the conceptual barriers that have long siloed the counterterrorism, human security, national security and development assistance agendas in the subregion. This requires an approach that not only builds on the interplay of different streams of counterterrorism assistance, but on synergies across the broader local, national, and subregional development and security initiatives as well.

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Notes

[1] In this policy brief, the greater Horn of Africa refers to Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda; as well as Tanzania and Yemen.


[9] Note that FATF’s guidance on “Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures and Financial Inclusion” (2013) offers useful insight on the application of FATF recommendations in the context of financial inclusion in developing countries. This guidance is in scope, and gives less attention to the technical challenges of institutional regime development in heavily cash-based economies with limited formal financial infrastructure.

[10] An instructive literature review undertaken by Andrew McDevitt at the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre's (GSDRC's) Research Helpdesk suggested that “AML initiatives are seen as particularly inappropriate for preventing and detecting money laundering in predominantly cash-based economies or in countries where reliance on parallel or informal transfer systems is the norm, as is the case in many developing countries. They are also seen as unduly restrictive on financial service providers working with low-income people, such as micro-finance institutions.” - Andrew McDevitt, “Helpdesk Research Report: Money Laundering and Poverty Reduction,” GSDRC (4 Nov 2009) [http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HDD425.pdf].


[19] There is a consensus on the need to interlink mutually reinforcing streams of justice and security programming, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (2007).


[34] The Danish Demining Group’s ‘Community Safety in Somaliland’ project is an instructive example, see: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, ”DDG Community Safety Programme: Somaliland Case Study” (Sept 2012) http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/AVR/AVR-Somaliland-DDG-case-study-Sep2012.pdf.

III. Research Notes

Research Note on the Energy Infrastructure Attack Database (EIAD)

by Jennifer Giroux, Peter Burgherr, Laura Melkunaite

Abstract

The January 2013 attack on the In Amenas natural gas facility drew international attention. However this attack is part of a portrait of energy infrastructure targeting by non-state actors that spans the globe. Data drawn from the Energy Infrastructure Attack Database (EIAD) shows that in the last decade there were, on average, nearly 400 annual attacks carried out by armed non-state actors on energy infrastructure worldwide, a figure that was well under 200 prior to 1999. This data reveals a global picture whereby violent non-state actors target energy infrastructures to air grievances, communicate to governments, impact state economic interests, or capture revenue in the form of hijacking, kidnapping ransoms, theft. And, for politically motivated groups, such as those engaged in insurgencies, attacking industry assets garners media coverage serving as a facilitator for international attention. This research note will introduce EIAD and position its utility within various research areas where the targeting of energy infrastructure, or more broadly energy infrastructure vulnerability, has been addressed, either directly or indirectly. We also provide a snapshot of the initial analysis of the data between 1980-2011, noting specific temporal and spatial trends, and then conclude with a brief discussion on the contribution of EIAD, highlighting future research trajectories.

Keywords: energy infrastructure vulnerability, non-state violence, database, targeting

Introduction

Attacks aimed at energy infrastructure have increased over the last decade, a trend that is correlated with the growing political and economic instability in oil and gas producing regions. Terrorism, insurgent tactics, maritime piracy, sabotage, targeted activism, etc., are part of the bouquet of violent phenomena where energy infrastructures have been targeted. Despite this, research on the targeting of energy infrastructure has remained in various research silos, particularly the study of terrorism or resource conflict studies, without branching out across other areas of research on violent phenomena in general, and the targeting behaviours of violent non-state actors (VNSA) more explicitly.[1] In one attempt to fill this gap the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich in collaboration with the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) developed the Energy Infrastructure Attack Database (EIAD): a compilation of data from 1980 through 2011 on reported (criminal and political) attacks/threats to energy infrastructures by non-state actors—which includes the range of actors from politically motivated groups (e.g. terrorists) to other criminal actors such as those committing acts of maritime piracy and armed banditry.
This fully searchable database (contained in an Excel datasheet) contains over 8,000 coded incidents, spanning the globe. In addition to including attacks (both successful and unsuccessful) that aim to cause physical harm or damage, when possible other threats such as plots are also included so to capture the full breadth of (non-state) threats to energy assets. Furthermore, it is not just devoted to attacks aimed at the oil and gas sector (both onshore and offshore), but across all energy sectors (Biomass, Coal, Geothermal, Hydropower, Nuclear, Solar, and Wind) and electricity in general. Furthermore, within these sectors energy infrastructures (EI) include all human (energy sector personnel), physical (energy sector physical assets) and information (energy sector cyber systems supporting operations) infrastructures.

This Research Note on EIAD aims to introduce this new dataset and our analysis on the targeting of energy infrastructure. We continue this discussion by first examining some key research themes where the targeting of energy infrastructure, or more broadly energy infrastructure vulnerability, has been addressed, either directly or indirectly. In this respect, we try to make the case that EIAD, and the ideas built emerging from its development, are interconnected with various research discussions and thus hope that its future utility will encourage cross-fertilization of research and analysis. Following this discussion we provide a snapshot of our initial analysis of the data between 1980-2011, noting specific trends and assessments. Finally, we conclude with a brief discussion on the contribution of EIAD and highlight future research trajectories.

Why EIAD?

When examining VNSA threats to Energy Infrastructures (EI), academic and policy discussions are often focused on terrorist threats to EI (part of which is connected to debates on energy security) or the relationship between conflict and natural resources, the latter of which is more about the conditions in which national resource abundance is related to conflict. There has also been a growing body of literature focusing on how businesses should operate in conflict-affected areas. In the process to develop the targeting energy infrastructure project the EIAD research team decided to look beyond ‘terrorist targeting’ in order to capture other types of non-state, violent phenomena. In doing so, we found these various research strands to be relevant for not only building up our understanding of this area but also positioning our analysis and where we see EIAD being particularly useful to further studies and analysis.

Previous Work

One of the more notable, earlier studies in this field of research was carried out by Kjøk and Lia (2001) and examined non-state threats against petroleum infrastructure. Using the ITERATE database of international terrorism, the authors found that 79 per cent of terrorist strikes against petroleum infrastructure (between 1922 to 1999) were made by domestic
terrorist groups. In addition, the authors also noted a general increase, over time, in the number of attacks against petroleum infrastructures.[5] Another study, published in 2008, looked more specifically at the interest and capability of al-Qaeda attacking ‘economic targets’ (particularly EI),[6] an attempt not too dissimilar from other efforts in the post 9/11 era.[7] Mihalka and Anderson (2008) linked the analysis to global energy security concerns, found that despite verbal overtures global jihadists affiliated with al-Qaeda have not made EI, and economic targets more broadly, a serious priority. More recently, a 2010 study, “Terrorist Targeting and Energy Security,” sought to uncover the general patterns and characteristics of contemporary terrorist targeting of EI.[8] Though Toft et al (2010) found a certain geographic concentration of attacks, similar to Simonoff et al (2005) [9], they did not find a correlation between energy rich countries and the number of EI attacks, nor did they observe a correlation between certain terrorist ideologies and EI targeting. Outside of these larger studies, there have also been some case studies that take into account dynamics or factors at the local level. Studies on specific countries,[10] regions,[11] or terrorist groups or Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) [12] have rendered some interesting insights; however, they continue to fall short of looking at the community interplay with other VNSA in regions where violence is prevalent and EI is vulnerable. Furthermore, all of these studies tend to focus on threats to the oil and gas sector, while EIAD is a dataset that captures threats to all energy sectors.

A second area of research - the resource conflict literature - is a useful resource for capturing some of the conditions in which energy infrastructure becomes vulnerable. In many cases, one can see a correlation between the increase in attacks aimed at petroleum infrastructure and the growing instability in oil producing/exporting states.[13] However, such studies have met some criticism. A subsequent study by Lujala et al (2007) found that it is not so much about the hydrocarbons per se, but rather the existence of conflict in areas where oil is located that may lead to, or exacerbate, conflict and thus, by extension, increase vulnerability.[14] Looking at the impact to oil and gas supplies during conflict, Luciani (2011) found that oil and gas installations are relatively resilient in armed conflict; but such conflicts tend to hinder investment and reduce revenues.[15] Of course, as demonstrated by numerous studies, such debates, correlations and linkages are certainly not new but nevertheless useful when assessing the spaces where EI vulnerability is directly or indirectly addressed.[16]

A third literature strand examines how businesses, particularly multinational corporations and those in extractive industries, are rather normative in the way debating how companies should operate in conflict-affected areas. The underlying theme in such debates is that business actors are significant players in the host environment, not only serving as partners with the host government but also with the host community where they require the social license to build and operate the infrastructure to carry out their activities. In this respect, through their operations they become intertwined with the different social and technical spaces, often meaning that they operate in or around conflict zones and may even contribute to conflict by the sheer expectations their activities create. This creates enormous challenges as not all state ...
actors have the capacity or the will to provide security, giving way to the potential for business actors to incur “substantial war damages and rising security costs” and risk “being publicly associated with bloodshed and human rights violations”.[17] Yet, even in this discussion there is little research that examines the challenges that arise from businesses having to engage (or inadvertently engaging) with VNSAs, particularly when their assets are threatened. Business actors bring the capacity to build large compounds, oftentimes well-equipped and developed, to house their staff, bring in large machinery to develop complex facilities and other infrastructures to conduct their business activities. They are responsible for extraction and production activities as well as bringing mineral products to the global market. All of this is supported by business operations, which include a capable staff and infrastructure. Meanwhile, community members continue to live without the same access to such services. The lack of electricity or access to decent roads, or any roads at all, creates a sense of tension that gives way to the formation of grievances which may in turn lead to violence aimed at the energy sector.

Brought together, when reviewing this literature not only did we find a gap in the types of violence and energy sectors considered within studies on the targeting of energy infrastructure (with an overwhelming focus on terrorist threats to oil and gas assets) but we also found that very few studies examined how violence emerges and evolves within a complex socio-technical space where infrastructural imbalances are both a large driver of conflict and influence the targeting behaviours of VNSAs. As a result, rather than using terrorism datasets to analyze trends, we decided that a new dataset needed to be developed to include other energy sectors as well as other types of violence carried out by non-state actors. Furthermore, given the growing extent and intensity of the non-state threats to EI, more comprehensive tools for risk assessment and management in the field of energy security are needed. Acknowledging the absence of an integral open-source that deals explicitly with attacks aimed at EI, the EIAD was developed to fill this research gap.

EIAD Structure, Data Collection, & Analysis
To be clear, EIAD is not a complete departure from existing open source datasets on non-state violence. If anything, we view EIAD as a contribution to research on the targeting behaviours of non-state actors and the vulnerability of energy infrastructure as well as a resource that serves as a connection point with other open source datasets. What sets EIAD apart is the inclusion of all forms of non-state violence aimed at energy infrastructure, which is defined as ‘all human (energy sector personnel), physical (energy sector physical assets) and information (energy sector cyber systems supporting operations) infrastructures in fossil energy chains (oil, natural gas, coal), hydro and nuclear power, new renewable technologies (e.g. solar, wind, biomass, geothermal) as well as electricity infrastructures. However, given the broad utility of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [18] and the extraordinary efforts that have gone into developing and maintaining this dataset, the GTD was used as a basis for EIAD and thus we adopted a similar structure and methodology. With that, all of GTD’s data on terrorist attacks
aimed at energy infrastructure are included in EIAD and coded and sourced accordingly. Where EIAD departs from GTD is in its inclusion of other forms of non-state violence. This requires the use of various kinds of open source information (databases such as the International Maritime Bureau Piracy reports, news articles, etc.) to gather information on other (namely non-terrorist related) incidents where energy infrastructures have been targeted. In addition we have begun to receive incident information on the targeting of oil and gas infrastructures, in particular, from private sources such as companies and governments.

At present, EIAD contains reported threats (plots, hoax, etc.) and attacks (successful, failed and foiled) on EI throughout the world between 1980 and 2011. Each coded incident in the database has its geo-reference, which will allow the visualisation of data by means of mapping tools and Geographic Information System (GIS) software, allowing the geo-statistical analysis to identify spatial patterns and hotspots. Another unique aspect of the EIAD is that we do not code for motivation but rather for attack type (e.g., assassination, assault, bombing, etc.) and instrument used (e.g., firearms, explosive-dynamite, arson/firebombing, etc.). The aspect of motivation was omitted due to errors in reporting as well as the fact that the motivation of the perpetrator is not always obvious and in many cases not known/reported. Nevertheless, EIAD includes a category for ‘Perpetrator Group/Actor’, which can help with identifying motivation/intent.

**Data Collection & Verification**

The data collection for the EIAD follows standard coding procedures: human coders collected information through open-source (non-commercial) databases, books, and other available online resources. In order to ensure the accuracy of the data, researchers used standardised data entry formats. The standardised data categories include *Incident Date* (including extended incidents such as hijacking and kidnappings); *Incident Location* (location, including geo-coded information); *Incident Information* (summary, event type, and whether event was part of a multiple attack); *Attack Information* (attack type, instruments used, combination attack, second attack type); *Target Information* (specific target, energy sector, energy infrastructure, second target); *Perpetrator Information* (individual/group, group type); *Incident Consequences* (casualties and fatalities, reported downtime, infrastructure impact, hostage information); *Additional Information*; and *Source Information* (media reports, social media, cross-reference to other databases, etc.). Except for incident date, summary, additional information and sources, all of the categories have standardized data entry lists to select from. Furthermore, in the development of our categories we kept close to the format used by GTD to maintain synchronicity and compatibility where possible. In terms of energy sectors and subsectors we drew from other resources to create a comprehensive list for data entry.

Given that we used data drawn from the GTD as well as other databases and resources, the first step of the database development process involved gathering, structuring and aggregating data from various sources. This allowed us to merge duplicate data as well as address...
This step involved combing through the coded data to address duplications and also fill gaps in information where possible. During this step we also addressed any incidents that contained multiple attacks, disaggregating them when and where necessary. By disaggregation we are referring to our decision to have single incidents which involve multiple type or locations of an attack to be disaggregated such that each attack within the incident is recognized as both connected to another incident (by being marked as a 'multiple attack') as well as having its own incident ID. After consultation with various experts during the development of EIAD’s coding methodology we determined that the tendency for VNSA to carry out small, oftentimes multiple attacks in confined periods of time best reflected the nature of the threat and the capability of the threat actor. Single incidents that involve large damage are represented in EIAD; however, they are less frequent than the smaller types of attacks, most of which are targeting numerous points across a pipeline, or various connecting electrical pylons, for example.

Once we had our master dataset, another reviewer examined the data to address incorrect data entry or irregularities as well as another person that carried out the quantitative analysis. Overall, while such a massive data collection, aggregation, and structuring will render some overlaps or errors we have attempted to mitigate such lapses through these steps of verification and review. It is also our intention to continually maintain EIAD as a living database, one that through feedback from users can continuously be improved.

Most of our incidents contain one source, though we have aimed for two sources in the interest of verification. For all incidents where verified data sources have been cited, such as GTD or the International Maritime Bureau, typically one source has been referenced. In addition we have also received some data from companies and governments, which provide data that is often not found in media sources. In such cases, we list the source as “private”, if there is an agreement of confidentiality, or list the actual name of a source provider if permitted. However, this issue of sourcing brings up two limitations of the data. For one, we need more primary data in order to increase the robustness and accuracy of the incident information. In many cases we only list ‘explosives’ (for example) as the attack type or instrument used as opposed to having access to more detailed information on the type of explosive. First of all, this type of specific information, which is difficult to access as it commonly remains in the confidential knowledge bank of governments and companies, is important for research as it enables analysis on the behaviour and tactics of violent actors over time. Secondly, this type of more detailed information would provide more exact information on the location of attacks. Most of our geo-coded information on the location of attacks refers to a city or in some cases a region. This is due to the lack of specific, geo-coded reporting from open sources. In comparison, the information that we have received from primary data sources has offered more specific geo-coded information, which in turn can be helpful for not only visualising hotspots at the micro level and tracking the movement patterns of violence but also for improving qualitative analysis on the area where violence emerges.
Analysis

The present analysis of EIAD includes 8,602 data records encompassing the years 1980–2011. [19] In the 1980s and 1990s a total of 1,808 and 1,508 events were recorded, whereas in the 2000s with 4,223 events it more than doubled. The two years available for the 2010s already amount to 1,063 EI attacks, indicating that a further increase could be expected if no drastic changes in the overall situation and/or boundary conditions will occur in the next few years.

Figure 1 shows the annual numbers of attacks for this period as well as the respective decade averages. The apparent overall upward trend in EI attacks is also statistically confirmed by a non-parametric Man-Kendall test \( n = 32, Z = 3.16, p = 0.01 \). It is worthwhile to note that the year 1993 appears to be a substantial outlier to this trend with only 14 attacks; however it does not affect the prevailing pattern. This can be illustrated by replacing the 1993 value by the average of 1992 and 1994, which increases the decade average by a modest 10%.

The low 1993 value can be explained by the fact that EIAD uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) as one of its key primary information sources for terrorism related incidents. The data for 1993 were lost prior to the compilation of GTD and despite several efforts could not be recollected (GTD Codebook).[20] Cumulated country level statistics in the Appendix of the above cited GTD document suggest that GTD should contain almost 5,000 incidents for 1993. Within our ongoing EIAD coding efforts we were also not able to obtain a better coverage of individual EI attacks for 1993, which is why EIAD currently has the same data gap for 1993 like GTD.

Figure 1: Annual number of EI attacks and decadal averages over the period 1980 – 2011.
The vast majority of EI attacks in the period 1980-2011 were classified as successful (8,211), distantly followed by foiled (175) and failed (203) attacks. The remaining 0.15% was categorized as threat (8), plot (3) and unknown (2). Though we code for hoaxes, we do not have any incidents coded as such in the database. This high share of successful attacks can be explained by several factors. Certain energy infrastructures such as pipelines and transmission lines are due to their "linear" nature relatively easy targets, and are therefore exposed to a high attack pressure. Furthermore, production and transit of energy carriers takes place in or passes through less developed countries that do not have the financial means to harden such infrastructures and provide high protection levels. Finally, we can safely assume that we are not capturing a completely comprehensive picture, given that many attacks go unreported and thus do not surface in the media. This may be more important for foiled and failed attacks, and particularly threats, plots and hoaxes, which are also not the main focus of EIAD. In fact, most companies would prefer to keep threats to their assets as quiet as possible. Of course, this is one of the consequences, and indeed drawbacks, of relying on public or open sources for information, particularly as it concerns threats to energy infrastructures that are often owned/operated by private actors.

The Cano Limon pipeline in Colombia provides an example of how guerrilla attacks by Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) could be significantly reduced from 2002 to 2004 due to a strong militarisation of the area as well as the demobilisation and reintegration of paramilitaries in Colombia [21]. However, this improvement in security was at the expense that exploration of new reserves came practically to a standstill. More recently, approaches involving engagement of local communities have been adopted by industry and affected countries to increase local support through participation processes, socio-economic benefits, and protection of the environment. In contrast, “point sources” such as refineries or power plants are thus easier to protect against physical and cyber-attacks. EIAD data clearly supports this notion with close to 50% of attacks attributable to electricity transmission lines and sub-stations, followed by oil pipelines (ca. 15%), oil transports by road tanker and natural gas pipelines (each in the order of 7%). Finally, a rather large amount of almost 40% or 3413 of EI attacks were considered multiple attacks. The multiplicity of attacks within a specific country points to the power of 'tactical contagion' within certain contexts and which contribute to the crests of the wave. For example, to identify the motivational complexity of such cases, fieldwork carried out by Giroux in 2012 in Nigeria and Colombia, two prominent locations in EIAD where EI has been frequently targeted (tactical contagion), revealed that though many of the attacks were carried out by political motivated groups, such as the FARC in Colombia, the motivation for attacks were various. Some attacks were carried out as a way to send political messages while others were motivated by pure economic reasons (e.g. threats to EI as a form of extortion).

Among the EI attacks in the observed period of time, 80.4% were carried out with some type of bombing device, followed by several other attack types with more than 100 events that cumulatively amount to 15.0% (Figure 2). Siege and hostage events contribute a low 0.4%,
whereas armed attacks, cyber-attacks and vandalism with a share of 0.1% are practically negligible.

The low levels of cyber incidents capture the coding challenges within this area. Due to lack of information, particularly on the actor (state or non-state), including incidents, such as the infamous Stuxnet worm that targeted supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems in the energy sector,[22] is a hurdle. For one, the actor of this event, like many cyber attacks, is unknown and may very well be a state actor, which would mean that it does not meet EIAD's coding criteria. Other incidents, such as hijacking typically refer to vessels carrying energy (e.g. oil or gas products), offshore whereas assassination attacks involve the targeting of specific energy personnel. Lastly, it should be noted that 4.1% of all events could not be assigned to a specific category because of incomplete information in the available incident summary, and thus are classified as unknown.

![Figure 2: Classification of EI attacks by attack type (1980-2011; n=8602)](image)

Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of EI attacks by country for the years 1980-2011 (Only events that could be accurately geo-referenced were considered, which is why only 6990 out of all 8602 EI attacks are shown in the figure). It is in the visualisation of EIAD incidents and the breakdown of attacks by country that the role of tactical contagion comes to life, illuminating the specific areas (or hotspots) where EI attacks have been particularly common.
The information in this figure can be summarized as follows:

The top 3 countries were Colombia (1.381 EI attacks), Iraq (1.085) and Pakistan (1.009) accounting for 49.7% of all EI attacks in the years 1980 - 2011.

- Another 25.7% were attributable to El Salvador, Peru, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Chile (200+ attacks each)
- India, Angola, Philippines, Thailand and Russia (100+ attacks each) contributed another 11.8%.
- Spain, Turkey, Yemen and Guatemala (50+ attacks each) sum up to 3.8%.
- The remaining 69 countries for which data were available accounted for the remaining 8.9%, and roughly two thirds of them contributed 0.1% or less.

Figure 3: Spatial distribution of EI attacks in the period 1980-2011 (n = 6990).

Figure 4 illustrates the top three country clusters (Colombia, Iraq and Pakistan), and provides additional information on the temporal dynamics as well as involved energy sectors and infrastructure types in each cluster. The combined representation of these two factors with the temporal aspects allow for a more subtle differentiation of country hotspots.

In the case of Colombia, three distinct peaks of EI attacks can be observed from 1988-1992, 1999-2002 and 2005-2007. It is worthwhile noticing that the first peak is less pronounced than the two others, and that after the second peak the annual numbers of attacks do not decrease again to similar low levels as before. The peak from 1988-92 is clearly attributable to the petroleum sector and attacks on the Cano Limon pipeline. The second peak comprises a combination of attacks on oil pipelines and transmission lines, with attacks on the former dominating in 2001, and on the latter in the years 1999, 2000 and 2002. The strong decrease in
attacks on oil pipelines between 2002 and 2004 is then due to the previously mentioned militarisation of the Cano Limon pipeline region.

Iraq exhibited a clear peak from 2004 to 2007, with 2005 and 2006 having more than 300 and 250 attacks, respectively. Overall, oil pipelines and transmission lines were most often attacked, followed by attacks directed at energy and government personnel. Across the years included in this analysis, there were some shifts in patterns of infrastructures predominantly affected, i.e. oil pipelines in 2004, oil pipelines and transmission lines in 2005, personnel in 2006, and all categories about equally in 2007.

In Pakistan, between about 70 and 140 attacks per year occurred from 2005 to 2010, and then the number of attacks nearly doubled to 270 in 2011. The actual impacts on Pakistan's energy sectors and infrastructures can be divided as follows. The lower peak period concerned mostly transmission lines (2005-2009) and natural gas pipelines, whereas the high peak in 2011 is a combination of transmission lines, oil transport by road tanker and natural gas pipelines. As illustrated by these top three cluster countries, it is important not only to look at spatial clustering (hotspots), but also to analyze the temporal patterns and underlying mechanisms creating these clusters through time.

![Figure 4: Annual numbers of EI attacks for top three countries, including identification of temporal attack peaks in the period 1980-2011.](image)

**Contribution & Future Research Trajectories**

In all, EIAD provides a comprehensive foundation for the analysis of energy infrastructure attacks by VNSAs. In our analysis we evaluated the spatial and temporal patterns and
conceptualized the patterns of clustering as type of ‘tactical contagion’ within specific areas or locales as well as across regions. In other words, we denote a common pattern whereby attacks on energy infrastructures are often multiple events and concentrated both in time and space, resulting in distinct hotspots. We also found that attacks predominantly take place on “linear” energy infrastructures (e.g. pipelines and transmission lines) that are difficult to protect and often pass through remote areas. Therefore, consequences in terms of fatalities and casualties are mostly minor, although when attacks occur frequently (in terms of multiple and connected events), they can result in substantial business and supply disruptions. For example, in Iraq, between January and August 2013 there were over 30 bombings aimed at the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, which led to repeated downtime for repairs.

Looking ahead, there are multiple avenues for future research that can adopt and develop other conceptual approaches to understand trends as well as continue to improve EIAD’s utility. For one, EIAD has room for further development, particularly in the area of fostering avenues for a community of interest – made up of public and private partners – to provide and help improve the quality of information. This can help address some of the information shortcomings discussed earlier. In addition, given that we have identified discernible patterns in the data (i.e. ‘tactical contagion’ or hotspots) there is the potential to use EIAD to forecast likely future clusters. This will require further analysis on the correlating factors across regions that lead to clusters, and would be a worthwhile endeavor. At a micro-level more cases studies are needed to add depth and breadth to EIAD – simply analysing the data at a macro level has already revealed some interesting insights and illuminates some of the context-specific factors and nuances that can, in turn, inform policy prescriptions and recommendations.

About the Authors:

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Notes

[1] Acts of war against energy infrastructures by states are not covered in EIAD
[3] Overall the EIAD consists of 10 main categories and sub-categories to be discussed in the section 'EIAD Structure, Data Collection, & Analysis'.


[19] This is a snapshot of a larger data analysis and study that was supported by the United States Institute for Peace in partnership with our host institutions. The full data analysis with case studies will be featured in another publication.


Risks of Terrorism, Homicide and Illness: a Methodological Consideration

by Richard J. Chasdi

Abstract

A recurring question posed to researchers is whether or not terrorism poses similar degrees of risk as other man-made or natural disasters. There are some specialists, such as John Mueller, who argue that somewhat ironically, the threat of terrorism is vastly exaggerated.[1] This begs the question: compared to what? The underlying aim of this Research Note is to point out some basic methodological and contextual issues to consider, rather than making an attempt to provide hard answers regarding relative individual and collective risks. However, an effort is made to place some empirical findings into appropriate political and social contexts. The framework for discussion includes: basic conceptual problems regarding the notion of “risk”; a comparison of certain basic terrorism incident rates with rates for homicides and illness; and identification of possible future directions to gauge risk assessment within the context of a more holistic systems perspective.

Introduction

The conceptualization of risk requires much more than a delineation of type of risk from specific threats. Indeed, John Monahan suggests that even within the realm of terrorism studies, terrorism is a necessary but insufficient term that clusters a wide ranging group of phenomena, thereby in effect working to provide impediments to meaningful research about explanatory variables for specific (sub-) types of terrorist assaults.[2] For Monahan, it follows there should be efforts to standardize understandings of seminal concepts such as whether terrorist assaults comprise “a process” or are composed of discrete “events” or perhaps are either or both under certain select circumstances.[3] Still another critical issue that Monahan points to is that scholars must differentiate between the risk of terrorist assaults associated with recruitment of terrorist activists by contrast to the risk of terrorism with recruitment of constituency groups in what Monahan calls “supply roles.”[4]

Equally important, there is no one generally recognizable and widely shared conceptualization or definition of the broader notion of “risk.”[5] As David Shields at Walsh College puts it, “there is a difference between ‘risk to’ and ‘risk of’ conceptualizations.” To extrapolate, what seems significant in the case of the “risk to” notion is that underlying emphasis is placed on the object of risk (i.e., what will happen to that object), by contrast to the “risk of” notion that places emphasis on the sources and origins of “risk” as a driver of action.

At the same time, “risk to” is a more active, temporal, and proximate conceptualization of the risk condition, while “risk of” is a more dormant condition or tense that has inherent potential for change into a more active form. Moreover, there is also a range of risk “perception or
misperception” that in some circumstances might contribute to an increase or decrease of overall risk, whatever that risk is all about.[6] Put another way, there must be some way to account for “subjective risk” appraisal that essentially amounts to a random variable in data testing in survey (i.e., questionnaire) formats for example.

Seen from a slightly different angle, Monahan also notes there is a clear distinction between “risk reduction,” a concept that requires almost singular focus on “causal factors” as Kraemer et. al. (1997) put it, and “risk assessment,” that in turn revolves around “likelihood” or “probability.”[7] Indeed, what is significant here is Monahan suggestion that there are fundamental differences between threat assessment of victimization - which is the focus of this Research Note - and assessment of risk focused on the individual, namely those who are deemed to present various degrees of threat or potential threat to society as political terrorists do.[8]

Disparate Measures of Terrorism and Other Calamitous Threats

Much of what is available to the researcher when thinking about “risk assessment” with respect to terrorist assaults is a set of disparate empirical studies about patterns or trends of terrorism or related phenomena that all too often rely on aggregated data results with limited utility.[9] To be sure, those broader patterns are useful, as trend assessments of terrorism have at least some predictive value for public policy initiatives.[10] Nonetheless, such aggregate results do precious little to help illuminate individual or collective risk for terrorist assaults at specific geographical locales at specific moments in time.[11]

For instance, a range of empirical results about terrorism compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is presented by the U.S. Department of State for the evaluation of terrorism trends in 2012, presumably to help gauge risk for a variety of actors. Those data are as good an example as any of broad types of data with a range of problems that include the implicit assumption that different types of targets share the same degree of threat even at different geographical locales and at different periods of time.[12] For example, consider the chart from the START- U.S. Department of State data reproduced below.

Such relative frequencies by country are important findings that articulate the basic parameters of terrorism: the ten highest numerical amounts of terrorist assault incidents per country. As this report points out, the top four countries, namely Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and India are found in Asia, with three out of four of those countries with over 1,000 incidents. In addition, the Philippines in South East Asia ranks ninth out of the ten countries that experienced the highest number of terrorist assaults in 2012.[13]
While these findings are useful, what is also significant is that the foregoing are aggregated measures of attacks by country that do not distinguish between urban and rural locales, region of the country, locales rich with precious metals and other natural resources, neighborhood clusters, and individual neighborhoods. [14] The variation in the range of “average numbers killed per attack” from .41 in the case of India, to 4.94 persons killed per incident in the case of Syria underscores the importance of “contextual factors” intrinsic to specific operational environments such as the “civil war” in Syria that began in 2010.[15] What seems significant for our purposes, namely to acquire some rough assessment of risk from available data, are mean number of deaths and injuries that result from terrorist assaults. Plainly, the mean rates are comparatively low when terrorism is compared to other broader forms of political violence and armed conflict that do not have a clear beginning, middle, and end point as do terrorist assaults or other specific acts of force.

For example, Syria, in the throes of a full blown civil war where the highest means of death and injury were found, had a mean for death of only 4.94 persons killed (657/133) per attack, by contrast to a rate of injuries over 2.7 times as large, but still with a mean of only 13.44 (1,787/133). In turn, the average rate of death in Afghanistan, itself characterized by an insurgency between the Taliban and affiliate groups against the Karzai government and its ISAF allies, experienced terrorist assaults where the mean for deaths, presumably over the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Attacks</th>
<th>Total Killed</th>
<th>Total Wounded</th>
<th>Average Number Killed per Attack</th>
<th>Average Number Wounded per Attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1848</td>
<td>3643</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>2.59</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2436</td>
<td>6641</td>
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<td>3715</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>3.63</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Although terrorist attacks occurred in 85 different countries in 2012, they were heavily concentrated geographically. Over half of all attacks (55%), fatalities (62%), and injuries (65%) occurred in just three countries: Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. *
*The highest number of fatalities occurred in Afghanistan (2,632); however the country with the most injuries due to terrorist attacks was Iraq (6,641).
*The average lethality of terrorist attacks in Nigeria (2.54 deaths per attack) is more than 50 percent higher than the global average of 1.64. The average lethality of terrorist attacks in Syria (4.94 deaths per attack) is more than 200 percent higher than the global average.
*The average number of people wounded per terrorist attack was especially high in Syria, where 1,787 people were reportedly wounded in 133 attacks, including four attacks that caused 670 injuries. 
*In contrast, the rates of lethality for India (0.42 deaths per attack), the Philippines (0.77 deaths per attack), and Thailand (0.78 deaths per attack) were relatively low among the countries with the most attacks.
entire country, was only 2.57 (2,632/1,023), in comparison to the mean for injuries that was not much higher at 3.63 (3,715/1,023). Clearly, these are rather crude indicators for the reasons previously mentioned, but it is probably no exaggeration to say that the likelihood of victimization by means of a terrorist assault is less than the likelihood for certain other discrete acts of political violence such as sustained warfare or large scale natural disasters like floods or pandemics.[16]

To reiterate, the problems associated with an assessment of accurate measures of risk across different types of “man-made” or natural phenomena is from the start hampered in many data compilations by the absence of more specific disaggregated data for specific geographical locales and political factors such as holidays or commemoration of landmark events that are inextricably bound up with increased risk.[17] Put another way, political events are a dynamic and critically important part of any “contextual environment” and commemoration of major or minor political events, landmark events, religious holidays, or secular holidays as well as reactions to government assassinations or war may increase - or conceivably decrease by means of “augmented security” - the likelihood of terrorist assaults and victimization.

**Homicide Rates Worldwide**

As if that were not enough of a problem, there is no standardized unit of measurement to compare terrorism assault rates of death to rates of death for other calamitous events. To the best of my knowledge, this appears to be the case for measurement across countries and within particular countries, as there is no completed data set I am aware of that uniformly drills down to “city-suburb/town/village” designations within regions of a country for the broad spectrum of assaults under consideration, that also simultaneously promotes standardization efforts across data compilations.[18] For example, the “Global Peace Index-2013” (GPI) produced by the Institute for Economics Peace, reports that homicide rates in the world increased precisely due to the fact that murder rates in South America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central America have risen, “....skewing what is the declining trend for the rest of the world.”[19] In the Global Peace Index -2013, “Figure 1.14” provides a rather broad brushed appraisal of the mean homicide rate for chosen GPI countries that presumably derives from United Nations data.[20] The aggregate mean for the basket of GPI countries reflects an average of relative frequencies of homicide per 100,000 of the population for the 2008-2013 interval.
This chart reflects findings where a basket of GPI countries had a mean of 6.7 murders per 100,000 of the population in 2008, by contrast to slightly less in 2009. A spike begins from 2009-2010, and the murder rate per 100,000 people continues to increase with an average rate of 10.9 per 100,000 in 2013. At this moment in time, there is no effective way to compare data on terrorism offered by START’s GTD- Department of State cited earlier to the aggregate country homicide rates provided by the “Global Peace Index 2013” study because of standardization measurement problems.[21] In the broader sense, this is an underlying problem with many data sets that makes comparisons of relative frequencies of events and next, calculating accurate risk assessment exceedingly difficult.

At the same time, it is probably no exaggeration to say that while environmental infrastructure effects, such as economic blight, overcrowding and crime, coupled with family and small group interactions motivate a very small percentage of individuals to “act out” based on political motivations (i.e., terrorism) by contrast to a somewhat larger percentage who engage in common criminal activity, the number of people exposed to economic blight conditions and disruptions in family and social circles but who somehow navigate through by means of self medication (i.e., drugs or alcohol) is far greater.[22] In turn, that suggests that such effective and sustained environmental pressures have greater effects on a larger segment of society with continuous duration thereby in effect making rates of homicide, rape, and suicide as well as other crimes a more significant cause for concern than terrorism when thinking about the chances of victimization.
A Comparison: Intentionally Inflicted Deaths and Other Forms of Violent Death

Much of the data compiled in the “Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011” report are consistent with the aforementioned data compiled by the “Global Peace Index”. [23]

In the broadest sense, those findings chronicle that out of 526,000 violent deaths worldwide from 2004-2009, some 75.285% or 396,000 were classified as “intentional homicides,” by contrast to 54,000 or some 10.26% of the total that are classified as “unintentional homicides.” In turn, 21,000 deaths or almost 4.0% of the total amount are classified as “killings during legal interventions,” defined by the “Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011” report as “...violent deaths of civilians by law enforcement and state security forces during legal interventions...” [24] What seems significant here is that only some 10.45 % of violent deaths (55,000/526,000) happened within the context of “direct conflict deaths” (i.e., “terrorist activities” and/or “conflict settings”) and that is only 1,000 more chronicled cases compared to the 54,000 “unintentional homicides” chronicled. [25] At the same time, the term “terrorist activities” is an extremely imprecise and nebulous term; it might conceivably include deaths of civilians in counterterror assaults or civilian deaths as terrorists prepare explosives improperly. That sort of imprecision might skew results in data replication efforts. Notwithstanding that, based on “Global Burden of Armed Violence” data, the amount of death associated with common criminal activity (i.e., “interpersonal violence,” “gang violence,” “economically
motivated crime”) far exceeds, by a factor of at least 7.2, the amount of death associated with terrorism (55,000 X 7.2 = 396,000).

In turn, additional data from the “Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011” provides a breakdown by country and region of “violent death per 100,000 of population” from 2004 to 2009.” It identifies 58 countries with 10 or more violent deaths per 100,000 of a country’s population. The five countries that are found to have the highest annual “violent death” rate per 100,000 of the population are: El Salvador (62.0), Iraq (60.0), Jamaica (58.1), Honduras (49.0), and Colombia (44.5). In addition, those data illustrate that many countries with comparatively high rates of “violent deaths” per 100,000 of the population are found in the developing world. The glaring exceptions are Puerto Rico and the Russian Federation that are found to have a “violent death” rate of about 20 per 100,000 of the populace and 17.2 per 100,000 respectively.[26] To put those results in some perspective, the World Health Organization (WHO) “Leading Cause of Death” global statistics for 2011 report that the risk of “lower respiratory infections” that result in death is “46 deaths per 100,000 population, ” by contrast to “43 deaths per 100,000 population” elicited by “chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.”[27]

The WHO report illustrates that almost one third of those countries (27.5% or 16/58 states) has been characterized by a “main armed conflict” or one that has recently passed into eclipse. In 10 of those 16 states, “...the incidence of homicide is actually greater than the number of direct conflict deaths.”[28] The underlying focus on intra-national violence as opposed to interstate war dovetails well with the perspective taken by Cooper, Merz, and Shah’s work where specific sets of empirical findings are framed by descriptions and statistics that point to a general decrease in international conflict and the intensity of warfare deaths in the contemporary world.[29]

*The Interlocking Condition of Natural Disasters, Illness, and Violence*

Turning to the matter of comparison between murder rates, other forms of violent events, and deaths from illness and environmental factors, it is clear that illness and deaths from so-called “natural factors” are inextricably bound up with one another; man-made environmental factors or “natural” ecological dynamics are influenced by human behaviour.[30] For example there are a series of cities in China where it is commonplace to note that cancer rates and, by extrapolation cancer related deaths are extremely high. Such figures point to the ineluctable conclusion that a more holistic or systems-wide set of approaches for thinking about risk is called for, to elicit the generation of cumulative statistics of deaths for a more accurate appraisal of death risks. Indeed, it is entirely possible that government negligence or malfeasance associated with environmental disaster areas could spawn political terrorism or deaths related to criminal activities in some countries. To be sure, the Chinese example also underscores the essential need for analysis by region or city clusters including efforts to isolate
and identify modalities between types of death outcomes and complex sources and origins of causal factors.

Much of the data available from IGO and NGO sources about death from illness is also comprised of aggregate data by country or region.[31] At the same time, it is probably no exaggeration to say that disaggregated data is more intrinsic to methodologies in this public policy domain as specific geographical locales afflicted with such problems are oftentimes almost the sole focus of many studies. In the case of broader overviews of death rates from illness by region, WHO statistics for the single most predominant causes of death provide numerical amounts and percentage rates.

For example, there were 1,018,000 “cardiovascular diseases” related deaths in the “African Region” in 2011 or 10.7% of the total number of deaths (9,538,000) across articulated “cause” categories. In a similar vein, there were 1,859,000 cardiovascular disease related deaths in the “Region of the Americas” that comprised 29.5% of the 6,302,000 deaths total across categories. Plainly, we can extrapolate that the scope of deaths for illness by region eclipses rates for terrorist assaults.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>African Region</th>
<th>Region of the Americas</th>
<th>South-East Asia Region</th>
<th>European Region</th>
<th>Eastern Mediterranean Region</th>
<th>Western Pacific Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>857,980</td>
<td>938,465</td>
<td>1,830,391</td>
<td>899,443</td>
<td>604,475</td>
<td>180,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHE 2012 cause category</td>
<td>Deaths (000s)</td>
<td>% total</td>
<td>Deaths (000s)</td>
<td>% total</td>
<td>Deaths (000s)</td>
<td>% total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Cardiovascular diseases</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>3,651</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Rheumatic heart disease</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hypertensive heart disease</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ischaemic heart disease</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Stroke</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cardiomyopathy, myocarditis, endocarditis</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Other circulatory diseases</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Respiratory diseases</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Asthma</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Other respiratory diseases</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Digestive diseases</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Peptic ulcer disease</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cirrhosis of the liver</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Appendicitis</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other digestive diseases</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Genitourinary diseases</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Kidney diseases</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hyperplasia of prostate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Final Reflections**

There are several underlying themes throughout this Research Note that deserve attention. First, there is a significant difference between risk appraisal and the presentation of cumulative
statistics about terrorism, related events, and a variety of natural calamities caused by illness - be it directly or as a result of other natural events such as tornadoes, flood, earthquakes, or hurricanes. All too frequently, there is no standardized unit of measurement available to make even the roughest comparisons between frequency rates, let alone intensity magnitude rates.

As if that were not enough of a problem, there are different ways of appraising risk: the notions of “risk of” and “risk to” that Shields described are only two conceptualizations of risk. Indeed, that condition parallels the many and competing definitions of the notion of “resiliency” found in the literature.[32] In future endeavors, scholars might have to develop parallel conceptualizations of risk appraisal for what Zinnes would call “integrative” studies.[33] This is also warranted by the fact that relative occurrences of terrorist attacks and/or death, homicide and different types of illnesses are usually associated with broader “conflict conditions” - a term which itself is problematic as all societies are plagued with social, economic, and political inequalities and consequently, a host of “conflict conditions.”[34]

At the same time, the problem or set of challenges and opportunities is much more fundamental and even more complex. Plainly, we can extrapolate from some of the data presented to see how “feedback loops” between disease and malnutrition (e.g., malnutrition leads to illness; a mother who is ill cannot provide for children who become malnourished), indirect pathways of effect between “disease” and “malnutrition,” and “educational attainment” influence outcomes.[35] Indeed, it is not difficult to see how links between lack of educational attainment, and the low socio-economic status (SES) that follows, can lead to a condition of “frustration-aggression” that for some, but certainly not all, may lead to criminality and for a smaller number, to terrorism or other forms of political violence.[36]

As previously mentioned, it is not difficult to conceive of a situation where government mismanagement or malfeasance with respect to public policy (e.g., pollutants, resource distribution) could trigger both non-violent demonstrations and the use of force from those affected directly or indirectly. What this means is that in the future, more holistic models that take into account different frameworks (e.g., issue areas such as malnutrition, illness, suicide, socioeconomic status, terrorism, refugee and internally displaced persons) and the set of interconnections within each and across such frameworks, should be crafted with standardized units of measurement, thereby in effect working to delineate sub-systems of cause and effect.[37] Such a “systems approach” to thinking about the effect and risk of terrorism, whether it uses a “complex” pathway analysis methodology over and beyond one directional path analysis, or some other methodology, is a goal worthy of future research endeavors.

About the Author: Richard J. Chasdi is Associate Professor of Management in the Department of Management at Walsh College, Troy, Michigan. He is a participating faculty member in the newly established Center for Strategic Analysis and Assessment (CSSA) led by Professor Sheila R. Ronis and Walsh College. The CSSA derives from the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), a bipartisan Washington, DC based policy group focused on national security reform.
Notes


[4] Ibid., p. 16.


[13] Ibid.

[14] One research project that attempts some of this is the “Global Black Spots – Mapping Global Insecurity Program”, conducted at Syracuse University in the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Dr. Bartosz Hieronim Stanislawski Research Fellow, Moyinihan Institute of Global Affairs and Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism e-mail correspondence, November 29, 2010; December 14, 2010.


[18] This type of “geo-spatial analysis” with “integrative” approaches to analysis of “contextual factors” is now undertaken at Argonne National Laboratories. At Walsh College, the newly established Center for Strategic Analysis and Assessment (CSAA) will partner with Argonne National Laboratories to conduct a series of research projects that use a systems analysis approach to delve into broader national security policy issues.


[20] One would expect that for homicide, the quintessential crime, reliable data are available worldwide. However, that is not the case. As Jan van Dijk has pointed out, “...police-recorded homicide rates suffer to some extent from the same flaws of underreporting and poor recording as other police-recorded crime statistics. In countries where security forces are among the main perpetrators of violent crimes, reporting and recording will be low. In many developing countries, administrative systems and communication infrastructures of police services preclude proper recording of even the most serious types of crime. ...” in developing countries, even for as serious a crime as homicide, a significant proportion of crimes committed is never reported to the police or never recorded. In many developing countries, even police-recorded homicides have their dark numbers.” – J.S. Dijk. The World of Crime: Breaking the Silence on Problems of Security, Justice, and Development Across the World. Los Angeles, Sage Publications 2008, pp. 75-76.

[21] An additional problem is the quality of medical services: Attempted murder rates in two countries might be the same but in the country with better medical emergency services the survival rate is likely to be much higher.
“parochial altruism.” or reinforce what Choi and Bowles (2007) call because religious frameworks, but not necessarily religious observance, essentially cra

hypothesis” that religion serves as an indirect explanatory factor in suicide terrorist assaults. Monahan suggests that is the case precisely “sub-systems approach” is articulated by Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan (2009) who inform us in their “coalitional commitment

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Laboratories, Argonne IL; University of Chicago, Chicago, IL., 1-13; Molly M. Ginty (2013). “ Analysis: pollution risks worse for developing


news/world-22685208#story_continues_1


www.visionofhumanity.org/pdf/gpi/2013_Global_Peace_Index_Report.pdf); “Global Peace Index 2013: the full list.” Datablog: Facts are


Presumably, these terms refer to “violent,” namely physical conflict, but of course violence is a continuous variable marked by degrees; it is not a dichotomous variable. The terms “domestic conflict,” “local conflict,” as well as “international conflict” are used in that publication for example,

[33] Zinnes (1976a); Zinnes (1976b).


[31] For example, see “Lifetime odds for selected causes, United States 2009” where the top three conditions that elicited death include (1) “Heart disease 1 in 7 (14.2%)”; “Cancer 1 in 7” (14.2%); (2) “Chronic lower respiratory disease 1 in 28” (3.6 %) (3) “Intentional self-harm 1 in 106” or a little less than 1.0%. (http://www.gawkerassets.com/img/18uzs80jqw7agif/original.gif). To be sure, those empirical results would be more informative if underlying distinctions were made by race, gender, socio-economic status, region, and urban/rural distinctions to reflect subtleties and nuances.


[26] Ibid., p. 53.

[25] Ibid. We are told that, “the GBAV database – a comprehensive database on lethal violence covering the years 2004-09 highlights that, on average, an estimated 526,000 people died violently....”

[24] "Global Burden of Armed Violence" (2011), pp. 44 & 51. In contrast, “intentional homicides” are defined in this compilation as, "...deaths as a result of interpersonal violence, gang violence, economically motivated crime -..." In turn, "unintentional homicides" are defined as, "...deaths as a result of 'accidental killings' -..." Lastly, “direct conflict deaths” are defined as "...deaths as a result of armed conflicts, political violence, and terrorism -...” This last category seems problematic as both "and" and "or" appear to be used in that “Global Burden of Armed Violence” report.


[21] “Global Burden of Armed Violence” (2011), pp. 44 & 51. In turn, “intentional homicides” are defined in this compilation as, “...deaths as a result of interpersonal violence, gang violence, economically motivated crime -...” In turn, “unintentional homicides” are defined as, “...deaths as a result of ‘accidental killings’ -...” Lastly, “direct conflict deaths” are defined as “...deaths as a result of armed conflicts, political violence, and terrorism -...” This last category seems problematic as both “and” and “or” appear to be used in that “Global Burden of Armed Violence” report.

[20] Ibid. We are told that, “the GBAV database – a comprehensive database on lethal violence covering the years 2004-09 highlights that, on average, an estimated 526,000 people died violently....”

[19] Ibid., p. 53.


[14] For example, see “Lifetime odds for selected causes, United States 2009” where the top three conditions that elicited death include (1) “Heart disease 1 in 7 (14.2%)”; “Cancer 1 in 7” (14.2%); (2) “Chronic lower respiratory disease 1 in 28” (3.6 %) (3) “Intentional self-harm 1 in 106” or a little less than 1.0%. (http://www.gawkerassets.com/img/18uzs80jqw7agif/original.gif). To be sure, those empirical results would be more informative if underlying distinctions were made by race, gender, socio-economic status, region, and urban/rural distinctions to reflect subtleties and nuances.


www.visionofhumanity.org/pdf/gpi/2013_Global_Peace_Index_Report.pdf); “Global Peace Index 2013: the full list.” Datablog: Facts are


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IV. Resources

Literature on the Conflict in Syria (2011 – November 2013)
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Abstract
This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the Syrian conflict. To keep up with the rapid changing political events, more recent publications have been prioritized during the selection process. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

NB: All websites were last visited on 17.11.2013. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, Syria, conflict, uprising, civil war, Assad regime

Bibliographies and other Resources


Brown Moses Blog (2012-). URL: http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/


Syria Deeply (2012-). URL: http://beta.syrriadeeply.org

Books and Edited Volumes


Theses


Back, Peter (2013, June): ”We are all Hamza Alkhateeb”: En analyse af voldelige billeder og sociale medier i den syriske borgerkrig. (Master’s Thesis, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark). URL: http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/11034


Corro, Megan Catherine (2013, March): The Arab Uprisings and the Unveiling of the Shiite Crescent. (Master’s Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington DC, United States). URL: http://m.repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/558369


Eivazian-Tabrizi, Arby (2012, Fall): The Role of Foreign Intervention in Revolutions. (Master’s Thesis, San Diego State University, San Diego, United States). URL: http://sdsu-dspace.calstate.edu/handle/10211.10/3203


Journal Articles and Book Chapters


140 December 2013


Demir, Sertif; Rijnoveanu, Carmen (2013, Summer): The Impact of the Syria Crisis on the Global and Regional Political Dynamics. Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi, 8 (1), 55-77. URL: http://www.egeweb.ege.edu.tr/tdid/files/dergi_13/09.pdf

Demirtaş, Birgül (2013, Spring): Turkish-Syrian Relations: From Friend “Esad” to Enemy “Esed”. Middle East Policy, 20 (1), 111-120. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12008


Doornbos, Harald; Moussa, Jenan (2013, August 1): Blue-Eyed Jihad: An Exclusive Conversation with European Radicals Fighting for an Islamic State in Syria. Foreign Policy. URL: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/01/we_will_win_this_fight_european_jihadists_syria


Lister, Charles; Smyth, Phillip (2013, October 31): Syria's Multipolar War. The Middle East Channel. URL: http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/31/syrias_multipolar_war


Grey Literature


160 December 2013


**Note for the Reader:**

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of preprints). Such texts might not (yet) have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

**About the Compiler:** Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., studied Information Science and New German Literature and Linguistics at the Saarland University (Germany). Her doctoral thesis dealt with Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents. Currently she works in the research & development department of the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID) (http://www.zpid.de). She also serves as Editorial Assistant for ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.
Selected Dissertations and Theses on Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Political Violence, 1980 – 2013 (available in full-text)

Selected by Eric Price

NB: some of the items listed below may have access requirements; please see your librarian.

Ahmed, Shamila Kouser (2012) The impact of the 'war on terror' on Birmingham's Pakistani/Kashmiri Muslims' perceptions of the state, the police and Islamic identities. University of Birmingham, U.K.

[http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/3635/]


[http://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/o.o.i.s?id=12683&postid=26860]


[http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.411353]


[http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.336062]


[http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-04202001-163258/]

Al-Harbi, Adnam Noori (2005) A comparative study of Western and Middle Eastern newspaper responses to 9/11 and the 'War on terror'. University of Ulster, U.K.

[http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.421767]


[http://hdl.handle.net/10179/3418]


[http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2009-12-7331]


[http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N1567.html]

Altenbern, Mikaila Ellis Fethke (2013) Prospects for resolving conflicts involving religious terrorists: Afghanistan, the Taliban, and strategic jihad. George Mason University, U.S.A.

[http://hdl.handle.net/1920/7991]


[https://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:6064]

Alzubairi, Fatemah (2011) Kuwait and Bahrain’s anti-terrorism laws in comparative and international perspective. University of Toronto, Canada.

[http://hdl.handle.net/1807/30158]


[https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10036/70953]

Asthappan, Jibey (2009) Stealing their thunder: The effectiveness of military force in deterring terrorism. The American University, U.S.A.


[http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.436461]


[http://hdl.handle.net/10822/555896]


Bagans, Laura (2011) *Crises in the tourism industry and their effects on young travelers*. HAAGA-HELIA Ammattikorkeakoulu, Finland.

Bakar, Ayhan (2011) *Justice and home affairs: impact of the European Union on the internal security of Turkey*. University of Nottingham, U.K.


Bartlett, Brian Christopher (2010) *Do less-free countries produce more terrorism?* Georgetown University U.S.A.

Battaglia, Adria (2011) *The rhetoric of ‘free speech’ regulating dissent since 9/11*. University of Texas - Austin, U.S.A.


[http://hdl.handle.net/10138/38235]

[http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/889]

[http://hdl.handle.net/10355/16521]

[http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/546799698.pdf]

Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2009) *Counter-terrorism and international power relations: the EU, ASEAN and hegemonic global governance.* University of Hull, U.K.
[https://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:2394]

Biggio, Nancy Connors (2002) *The rationality of the use of terrorism by secular and religious groups.* University of Alabama, U.S.A.
[http://classify.oclc.org/classify2/ClassifyDemo?swid=52615487]

[http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.434613]

[http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/dissertations/2012-0614-200540/UUindex.html]

Boukalas, Christos (2007) *Empire and Reich: War on terrorism and the political metalaxis of the U.S.* Lancaster University, U.K.
[http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=1&uin=uk.bl.ethos.507088]

Bradshaw, Renee (2008) *The public's view of terrorism in their communities as related to media-viewing habit.* University of Texas - Arlington, U.S.A.
[http://hdl.handle.net/10106/1061]

[http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/342]

Buckle, Christopher (2011) *The 'War on Terror' metaframe in film and television.* University of Glasgow, U.K. [http://theses.gla.ac.uk/3014/]


Carley, Stephen (2007) *Testing the President’s hypothesis: Are terrorist attacks the result of freedom in the world?* Georgetown University, U.S.A. [http://hdl.handle.net/10822/555820]


Cetin, Hakan (2010) *The effectiveness of the witness security program in the fight against organized crime and terrorism a case study of the United States and Turkey.* Rutgers University, U.S.A. [http://hdl.rutgers.edu/1782.2/rucore10002600001.ETD.000052832]

Chadwick, Elizabeth (1994) *The utilization of international humanitarian law and, in particular, the Geneva Convention Treaty Régime, to deter acts of international terrorism, with special reference to armed struggles by "Peoples" for their right to self-determination.* University of Nottingham, U.K. [http://etheses.nottingham.ac.uk/924/]


Chang, Yih (2011) *Comprehensive security and cooperative security in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s and the ARF’s responses to non-traditional security issues in the post-Cold War era.* University of New South Wales, Australia. [http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/51770]


[http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/51358/]

Chehade, Ghada (2013) *Anti-terrorism discourse and the war on dissent: A critical analysis.* McGill University, Canada.


Cheong, Marc (2013) *Inferring social behavior and interaction on twitter by combining metadata about users & messages.* Monash University, Australia.


[http://hdl.handle.net/1807/18238]


[http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/1694/]

Clarke, Colleen Margaret (2006) *Police response to anti-terrorism policy.* University of Toronto, Canada.

[http://sbs.mnsu.edu/government/faculty/clarkevitae.doc]

Clutterbuck, Lindsay (2002) *An accident of history? The evolution of counter terrorism methodology in the Metropolitan Police from 1829 to 1901, with particular reference to the influence of extreme Irish Nationalist activity.* University of Portsmouth, U.K.

[http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.247489]


[http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.325441]

Cockley, David (2009) *The media spectacle of terrorism and response-able literature.* Texas A&M University, U.S.A.


Cooper, Robyn (2011) *Assessing the social contract equilibrium in a Post 9/11 world: An Australian perspective.* Murdoch University, Australia.

[http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/6212/]

[Cottles work URL]


[Coxes work URL]

Cozine, Keith (2010) Transgovernmental networks as a tool to combat terrorism: How ICE attachés operate overseas to combat terrorist travel. Rutgers University, U.S.A.

[Cozines work URL]


[Cunninghams work URL]

Cuong, Pham Cao (2009) US security engagement with Southeast Asia during the Clinton and Bush administrations. University of New South Wales, Australia.

[Cuongs work URL]


[Dahlins work URL]

Dalby, Andrew Keith (2004) European integrationist influences on member states’ counter-terrorist co-operation and co-ordination. St Andrews University, U.K.

[Dalbys work URL]


[Dalla-Pozzas work URL]


[Daviss work URL]


[DeFosters work URL]


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*About the Compiler: Eric Price* is a Professional Information Specialist who, after a career with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), joined Perspectives of Terrorism as Editorial Assistant.
V. Book Reviews

“Counterterrorism Bookshelf” – 20 Important Books on Terrorism & Counterterrorism Related Subjects

by Joshua Sinai

This review column is the first in a series of columns that will provide a selective listing of important books by leading publishers on terrorism and counterterrorism-related subjects. The listings of publishers and their books are arranged in alphabetical order by publishers’ names, with their imprints included in their particular section. Within each section, the books are listed in alphabetical order, according to the lead author’s last name. Although most of the reviewed books are current, a few were published within the last several years, but are still considered to be important. Future columns will review books by publishers such as CRC Press, Hurst, Oxford University Press, Routledge, Stanford University Press, Springer, and University of Chicago Press.

**ABC Clio/Praeger**


A comprehensive and authoritative examination of the IRA’s ideological and organizational origins and evolution and how these trends have influenced its terrorist warfare until the beginning of the peace process that resolved the Northern Ireland conflict. Chapters cover topics such as the philosophy and theology of Irish Republicanism, a history of Ireland and the emergence of the IRA, the transformation of the IRA into PIRA (Provisional IRA), strategic and tactics, weapons and targets, organization and structure, the imprisonment of IRA operatives, the role of Sinn Fein (its political front), and funding. Although these topics are well covered, one of the book’s flaws is its lack of coverage of the peace process that was led by the British and Irish governments, which enabled PIRA and its leaders and operatives to re-integrate into Northern Ireland society and politics, thereby depriving the book of a wider context in which to understand the latest developments affecting IRA/PIRA. The author, a visiting research fellow at Queens University in Belfast, is a veteran analyst on terrorism and counterterrorism in Northern Ireland.


An examination of whether and under what circumstances the theology and ideology of religion (whether Christian, Jewish, or Islamic) "causes" terrorism, when the same religious texts and traditions may be utilized by different elements to promote peaceful or violent objectives. To validate this hypothesis, the author examines how religion-based terrorism has
manifested itself throughout history, including how it compares with other forms of terrorism. One of the book’s findings is that the “real causes” of religion-based terrorism are influenced by other forces in society, such as authoritarianism, global power imbalance, foreign invasion and occupation, globalization of the world economy, rapid modernization, and group psychology. The author is an assistant professor at Westfield State University, Massachusetts.

*Amsterdam University Press*


An examination of the origins and evolution of Hizballah’s ideology since its founding as a Lebanese Shi’ite organization in 1978. The volume covers topics such as Hizballah’s history from 1978 to 2005, changes in its religious and political ideology, and the implications of such changes on its political program and militant activities. The book is based on the author’s doctoral dissertation. The author is Associate Professor of Islamic Studies at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands.


A valuable compilation of primary documents about Hizballah’s political program, beginning with the party’s 1985 “Open Letter to the Oppressed in Lebanon” through its November 2009 Political Manifesto. These documents, which provide a firsthand portrait of Hizballah’s political evolution over the years, are accompanied by an introductory chapter, extensive footnotes, commentary, background information, glossary, and chronology. The author is Associate Professor of Islamic Studies at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands.


An examination of the historical origin and evolution of Hizballah’s political program, including its attitudes toward terrorism and suicide martyrdom operations, as well as involvement in Lebanese politics. The author is Associate Professor of Islamic Studies at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands.


An innovative and interesting exploration of the dynamics of the Salafi movement worldwide and how these dynamics are reflected in the actions of their networks in Lebanon. The author is Ph.D. candidate at the Faculty of Humanities, Utrecht University, the Netherlands.

A conceptually important examination of the interplay between Islamic beliefs, political activism, society and law in twelve Islamic countries since the 1970s.

**Ashgate**


The contributors to this important volume examine how violent extremism proliferates in society and the types of measures (including policing) required to counter extremism at the international and community levels. Chapters cover topics such as the origins and psychology of extremism, the nature of extremist groups and organizations, and the relationship between extremism, counterterrorism, and policing.


A critical examination of the nature of Britain’s role in the “war on terror” and how, according to the author, the military component became the dominant theme of what is basically an ideological and political conflict. To examine this thesis, the author discusses Britain’s strategic framework for conducting the “war on terror”, al Qaida’s strategic framework for its political, religious, and military warfare, the decision of the British government to intervene in Iraq in 2003 and its involvement in the country through 2009, British strategy and operations in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2010, and British countermeasures against the terrorist warfare waged by al Qaida and its affiliates in the United Kingdom. The author is Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, UK, and Visiting Scholar at the International Centre for Muslim and non-Muslim Understanding, University of South Australia.


The contributors to this important volume examine issues involved in financing terrorism and the countermeasures required in response. Chapters cover topics such as the theory and typology of different sources of terrorist financing, as well as case studies of financing by terrorist insurgents in Iraq, the Lebanese Hizballah, the Kurdish PKK, the Pakistani LeT, the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Sri Lankan LTTE, terrorist groups in the Philippines, the Loyalists in Northern Ireland, Islamist militants in Albania, and the FARC and ELN in Colombia. The concluding chapter discusses how to “think critically” about terrorist...
financing. Michael Freeman, the volume's editor, is an Assistant Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School.

**Bloomsbury**


The contributors to this volume examine the repercussions at the regional and international levels of the inability of the international and multilateral community (such as the United Nations) to resolve the conflict in Somalia, particularly the failure (also by local actors) to establish a stable government in this war-torn country. Chapters cover topics such as the effectiveness of international and regional peacekeeping forces in Somalia, the nature of the “Jihadi” insurgency in Somalia and the involvement in foreign fighters in its warfare, the threat posed by Somali piracy and its links to international crime, the nature of involvement by the United States, Japan, China, and the European Union in Somalia, and recommendations for new intervention measures that may be more effective at resolving the conflict in Somalia.


An examination of the utilization of the Internet by militant Jihadis for objectives such as propaganda, radicalization and recruitment of new adherents. Using both Arabic and English primary source materials, the author examines the interaction between the “producers” of such content and their “consumers” in order to demonstrate how Jihadism is practiced in cyberspace. Also discussed are the measures used by those who are opposed to such extremist activities. The author is Lecturer at The Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St Andrews.

**Columbia University Press**


An examination of the effectiveness of Britain’s counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, where (the authors contend) they failed to defeat the insurgents, particularly in Basra (in Iraq) and Helmand (in Afghanistan). One of the authors’ conclusions is that “an ‘indirect’ means of intervention, centered on advising, training, and employing a foreign fighting force rather than on relying primarily on your own troops” (page 156) may be more effective than conducting “direct” counterinsurgency campaigns, since it is the local actors who must be responsible for defending themselves against their own internal threats. David
Ucko is associate professor at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University, and Robert Egnell is visiting associate professor and Director of Teaching in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, both in Washington, DC.

**Cornell University Press**


An important, field research-based examination of the state of the Protestant Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, almost a decade after the signing of the peace accords that ended the conflict. The author discusses the problems that plagued the demilitarization of the Loyalist paramilitaries, which were due to factors such as internecine personal and political divisions and rivalries and reluctance by some to give up their criminal enterprises. Others, nevertheless, sought to utilize the peace process to rebuild their communities and participate in the political process. All these factors are crucial in understanding the current situation in Northern Ireland’s post-accord era from the Loyalists’ vantage point. The author is Associate Professor, School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC.


A well-informed account of the nature, motives, tactics and effectiveness of the many groups that formed the insurgency in Iraq and the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign against it, following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in March 2003. The author is Associate Professor in Security Studies at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore (but taught at the U.S. Naval War College when the book was published).


An innovative account of the methods and tactics used by rebel groups to finance their activities in order to obtain weapons, ammunition, and other vital supplies, which is an important factor in understanding the trajectory of their capabilities and options in conducting their insurgencies. The author argues that rebel groups often fail to obtain what they require, with this thesis examined in the cases of civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire. The author has extensive experience working with NGOs in West Africa and is currently a senior analyst with BAE Systems.

A valuable discussion of the difficulty of applying international humanitarian law in distinguishing between combatant and civilian in warfare – whether regular or irregular, such as terrorism. The author is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin–Madison.


A theoretically important examination of the nature of “governance” by rebel groups when they succeed in seizing power, whether over a portion of territory or an entire state, because such an aspect of insurgencies is generally overlooked by the literature on insurgency and its aftermath. Components of rebel governance are examined, such as the capacity to deliver public services to the populations under their control, ranging from police and courts, schools, hospitals, and taxation systems, as well as symbolic expressions such as adherence to “official” flags and anthems, in order to generate and sustain compliance to their rule. This framework is applied comparatively to the case studies of three diverse insurgent organizations—the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) in Congo, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Sudan. The author is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of Africana Studies at Vassar College.


A conceptually innovative account of how conflicts that are considered to be primarily “internal” wars often spill across their national boundaries, with rebel organizations finding sanctuaries among supporting elements in neighboring countries, with such spillover potentially giving rise to wider regional conflicts and diplomatic and military disputes between such states. To examine this thesis, the author formulates a theory of transnational rebellions which is based on cross-national datasets and case studies of cross-border insurgencies, such as the Contra bases in Honduras and Costa Rica (which facilitated the Nicaraguan civil war), the Rwandan civil war (which spilled over into the Democratic Republic of the Congo), as well as the Kurdish PKK and Taliban forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The concluding chapter presents a summary of findings, recommendations for improving theories of conflict, and policy implications. The author is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas.

A highly interesting account of the modern origins of the revolutionary political violence known as terrorism through the persona of Dmitry Karakozov, a revolutionary anarchist, who pulled out a pistol and shot at Czar Alexander II, on April 4, 1866. Although the shot missed, this “unheard-of-act” of rebellion against authority served to change the course of Russian history and inaugurated the first wave of terrorism’s modern era. The author is Assistant Professor of Modern European History at George Mason University.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.
VI. Notes from the Editors

About Perspectives on Terrorism

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at [www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com). It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as 'nontraditional' in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles - but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.
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