Table of Contents:

Welcome from the Editors ................................................................. 4

I. Articles

Exploring Support for Terrorism Among Muslims................................. 5
by Adrian Cherney and Jenny Povey

Controversies of Conversions: The Potential Terrorist Threat of European Converts to Islam ......................................................... 17
by Monika G. Bartoszewicz

“Join the Caravan”: The Ideology of Political Authority in Islam from Ibn Taymiyya to Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria ......................... 30
by Atta Barkindo

Current and Emerging Threats of Homegrown Terrorism: The Case of the Boston Bombings .............................................................. 44
by Rohan Gunaratna and Cleo Haynal

II. Research Notes

The Boston Marathon Bombers: the Lethal Cocktail that Turned Troubled Youth to Terrorism ................................................................. 64
by Anne Speckhard

New Light on CIA “Double Tap” Drone Strikes on Taliban “First Responders” in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas .................................................. 79
by Brian Glyn Williams

III. Resources

230 Websites and Blogs for Terrorism Research ..................................... 84
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes
Literature on Refugee Situations (including Internally Displaced Persons) and Terrorism (incl. other forms of Political Violence and Armed Conflict) ......................................................................................................................99

Compiled and selected by Eric Price

IV. Book Reviews

Counterterrorism Bookshelf ........................................................................................................114

Reviews by Joshua Sinai


Reviewed by David Hensel


Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid

V. Op-Ed

Syria – a Best Case, a Worst Case and two Most Likely Scenarios ..........135

by Philipp Holmann

VI. Announcements

Two Courses on Terrorism – one Free, the other for a Fee .........................147

VII. Notes from the Editor

About Perspectives on Terrorism .................................................................149
Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume VII, Issue 3 (June 2013) of Perspectives on Terrorism at www.terrorismanalysts.com. This issue has been prepared in the journal's European office by the Editor-in-Chief and his team. While the next issue (August 2013), prepared by our American co-editor James J.F. Forest, will be a single theme issue, dealing with the financing of terrorism, the present issue covers various topical themes.

There is, for instance, an Op-Ed by Philipp Holtmann on the conflict in Syria wherein he engages in Horizon Scanning, outlining several scenarios for the future. It makes for bleak reading as he concludes that the best possible scenario is also the most improbable one. Also topical are two articles on the Boston Marathon bombings. While a relatively minor incident when compared to the major daily tragedies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria and several other places, the events in Boston have received saturation coverage for a number of days in mid-April 2013.

Attention, respect, legitimacy and ultimately power is what terrorists want and while few violent individuals and terrorist groups get far beyond attention, massive news coverage is a reward for them and might invite other attention-seekers to engage in copycat crimes. Our public media have yet to learn to distinguish between news coverage of bona fide events and more restrained and responsible coverage of events staged mainly for publicity whereby violence serves as an entry ticket to get into the news system and obtain free media coverage.

This issue also features an original reflection by Dr. Bartoszewicz on the phenomenon of converts to Islam and their potential to fall into the terrorist trap. It goes against the grain of much current thinking and shows the power of a good conceptualisation. There is more that might be of interest to you - see the table of contents below.

Sincerely,

Alex P. Schmid
Editor
I. Articles

Exploring Support for Terrorism Among Muslims
by Adrian Cherney and Jenny Povey

Abstract

In this paper we examine factors that influence support for terrorism, using the PEW 2010 Global Attitudes Survey. We assess aggregate results, drawing on items fielded to all Muslim respondents to identify broad factors that appear to indicate likely support for suicide terrorism. Results from a logistic regression model suggest that being female, having an educational degree, a commitment to certain Muslim beliefs and values, and being a member of the Shi’a minority might be probable indicators of support for terrorism. Some of the results were also counterintuitive. We consider the implications of our findings for understanding passive and active support for terrorism among Muslim communities.

Introduction

The question of Muslim support for Islamist-inspired terrorism has generated a public and political debate as to whether support for terrorism is rooted in Muslim religiosity and faith, particularly through the concept of jihad, which is sometimes interpreted as providing justification for violence against civilians.[1] Scholars have challenged such views, arguing that it distorts Islamic beliefs and principles.[2] In addition, empirical research has shed light on the complexity of attitudinal support for terrorism among Muslims, with some studies indicating it is shaped by a range of factors, least of which necessarily relate to religiosity or Islamic faith[3].

Given the saliency of the issue, it is important that debates and policies on terrorism are anchored in an informed understanding about why some Muslims may have sympathy and support for terrorism. This is not an insignificant issue because, as Sageman argues, the fight against terrorists groups such Al-Qaeda, is largely about winning over the “hearts and minds” of Muslim communities.[4] Doing so requires an understanding of the content of Muslim beliefs as well as factors that shape such attitudes.[5] Also examining support for terrorism can provide insights into whether terrorism is tolerated by co-religious groups. Such implicit support might be able to provide a “cloak of legitimacy” for terrorists and their causes, providing fertile ground for radicalisation, allowing terrorists to conduct operations more frequently and with greater ease.

Research on support for terrorism within Muslim-dominated countries has mainly relied on public polling survey data.[6] There are methodological limitations with such public polling data[7]; one needs to be careful with concluding that results translate into an accurate measure of
active support for terrorism itself. Despite this caveat, such polling data can provide a useful proxy for measuring passive support for Islamist-inspired terrorism (i.e. ideological or attitudinal), given the challenges of conducting large-scale survey work on terrorism.[8]

In this article we examine support for terrorism among Muslims using data from the 2010 PEW Global Attitudes survey (the most recent available PEW data at the time of writing). Our aim is to contribute to the growing understanding about what influences Muslim support for terrorism and examine if there are any significant commonalities. It has been argued that the content of people’s beliefs about salient issues can be quite uniform, with this being the case for groups of particular religious orientations.[9] The PEW global attitudes survey consists of a twenty-two-nation survey conducted in April and May 2010.[10] The survey specifically includes countries that are predominantly Muslim (e.g. Indonesia and Pakistan), or countries with large Muslim minorities. The PEW survey collects data on socio-economic indicators, but also asks questions on a range of social, political and religious issues, including whether Muslim respondents judge suicide terrorism as justifiable (used as the dependent variable measure of support for terrorism in this study). Not all survey items are fielded to all respondents; there is some variation in the types of questions asked across countries e.g. relating to attitudes towards national political issues. Previous published research on support for terrorism among Muslims has relied on earlier PEW datasets than the one drawn on in this article. Such research has mainly examined variations between Muslim countries when it comes to, for example, the link between socio-economic conditions and support for terrorism.[11] In this article we look at overall aggregate results, and draw on particular items that were asked of all Muslim respondents. This will ensure consistency across the sample and increase our overall sample size. We do recognise that such an analysis can obscure variations between groups of respondents, but our aim is to identify general consistencies across Muslim respondents. In the next section we outline the method underpinning this study and describe our different variables, providing a justification for their selection and relevance to judgments about terrorism. Results from a logistic regression model are then presented and discussed. We then discuss the implications of our results and conclude by contemplating what our results mean for understanding passive and active support for terrorism.

**Current Study and Survey Items**

**Data**

As stated, this article employs data from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2010. Although this dataset represents a very general survey of respondents in 22 countries across the globe (n=24,790), this analysis draws specifically on the data from 7 countries that are classified in the Pew dataset as Muslim dominated, namely: Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey; together they comprised 8,003 respondents. More specifically, the analysis
uses the data of respondents who are Muslim in these Muslim countries. The final dataset used for the analyses comprised of 6,998 respondents.

**Dependent Variable:**

All Muslims in Muslim countries were asked the following question: Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified or never justified? Responses to this question comprise the outcome variable in this analyses. Responses ranged from one through to four (1 = “Often Justified,” 2 = “Sometimes Justified,” 3 = “Rarely Justified,” and 4 = “Never Justified.”).

For purposes of descriptive statistics, this variable was recoded such that higher values indicate higher levels of support for this tactic. Thus, upon recoding, this variable took the values of: 4 = “Often Justified,” 3 = “Sometimes Justified,” 2 = “Rarely Justified,” and 1 = “Never Justified.”

For purposes of the regression analysis only, this measure was recoded as dichotomous variable (0 = Never Justified and 1 = Ever Justified) and analysed by using logistic regression.

**Independent Variables:**

Studies on support for terrorism have generally categorised variables that impact on levels of support under five broad headings: social and demographic factors; economic and political factors; Islamic commitment and faith; institutional and political trust and foreign policy positions.[12] While we were limited in the number of variables we could include in our model, given the fact that we only selected items asked across all Muslim respondents, we have aimed to include items that in one way or another tap into factors across these five topic areas.

Important demographic variables such as “sex” (male = 0, female = 1), “age” (continuous 18–85) and “marital status” (all other = 0, married = 1) were included in the model due to the fact that the conventional wisdom is that young, unmarried males are the most likely candidates for participating in a terrorist campaign.[13] However, it should be noted that 71 percent of the respondents were married. While males and females were equally represented (50% for both), 69 percent of the male respondents were married and so were 73 percent of the women. The model also included employment status (unemployed = 0, employed = 1), children under 18 years living at home (no children =1, 1-3 children =2, 4 or more children = 3), and education (incomplete secondary or less =1, complete secondary = 2, complete tertiary =3).

Six indices were created and included in our model as independent variables. The items used in each index were determined by factor analyses, with each index comprising a 1-factor solution. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for these independent variables are presented in Table 1.
The Religious Extremism index is comprised of two items tapping how concerned respondents were with, firstly the rise of extremism in their own country and, secondly the rise of extremism in the world. The responses were recoded as a dichotomous variable (0 = concerned and 1 = not concerned). The index religious extremism is comprised of the mean score for these two items. The aim here is to understand how certain political and ideological positions influence support for terrorism, the assumption being that Muslims concerned about religious extremism are more likely to reject terrorism than those that do not.

The Conservative Muslim index is comprised of four items, tapping whether respondents are in favour or oppose making each of the following items law in their country: (1) segregation of men and women in the workplace; (2) punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery; (3) stoning people who commit adultery; and (4) death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion. The responses were recoded as a dichotomous variable (0 = oppose and 1 = favour). The index Conservative Muslim is comprised of the mean score for these four items. The reason for including this item is that arguments have been presented that fundamentalist Muslim values and beliefs influence support for terrorism, promoted in particular through the “clash of civilisations” thesis and arguments that literal and narrow interpretations of Islamic doctrine are antithetical to Western secular values.[14] Bernard argues that Muslim fundamentalists reject democratic values and desire an authoritarian state that implements Islamic law and morality.[15] This allegedly leads to sympathy for violent acts that aim to defend Islam, such as suicide terrorism.[16]

The empirical reality of such positions needs to be tested so as to ensure there is an informed debate about what might generate support for terrorism. Similar propositions led us to select the next two variables - Women shouldn’t have rights and Religious observance variables. The Women shouldn’t have rights index is comprised of two items, tapping agreement or disagreement to two statements regarding women’s rights (1) women should have the right to decide whether or not they wish to wear a veil; and (2) women should be able to work outside the home. The responses were recoded as a dichotomous variable (0 = agree and 1 = disagree). This index is comprised of the mean score for these two items. The Religious Observance index is comprised of two items, observance to pray and fasting, with each item measured on a different frequency scale. How frequently a respondent prayed was measured on a 7-point scale, ranging from hardly ever to five times a day. This item was recoded into occasional observance (codes 1-4 = 0) and religious observance (codes 5-7 = 1). How frequently a respondent fasted was measured on a 4-point scale, ranging from hardly ever to always during Ramadan and other religious holidays. This item was recoded into occasional observance (codes 1-2 = 0) and religious observance (codes 3-4 = 1). The index religious observance is comprised of the mean score for these two items.
Dissatisfaction with US foreign policy and its perceived injustices towards Muslims is also argued as potentially being relevant to why some Muslims may support terrorism. There have been efforts to shift such perceptions by the current US administration and in this regard we included an Obama International Policy index, comprised of six items tapping the approval or disapproval of the way President Barack Obama deals with the following six issues: (1) international policies; (2) the world economic crisis; (3) the situation in Afghanistan; (4) Iran; (5) the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians; (6) the situation in Iraq. The responses were recoded as dichotomous variable (0 = disapprove and 1 = approve). The index Obama International Policy is comprised of the mean score for these six items.

The link between poverty and terrorism is a popular explanation for the root causes of terrorism. However, it has been discredited by a number of studies. Other explanations point to assessments of societal or national well-being as more relevant to influencing support for terrorism, via judgments about one’s societal, economic and political circumstances. Hence it is more about relative, than absolute deprivation that matters when influencing approval for terrorist attacks. While not a perfect measure of this issue, we included an Economic and Political Situation in one’s own Country index, comprised of three items. The items were recoded as dichotomous variables (0 = good and 1 = bad) and tap (1) how respondents feel things are going in their country; (2) the current economic situation in their country; (3) how good a job their government is doing in dealing with the economy. The index Economic and Political Situation in one’s own Country is comprised of the mean score for these three items.

Six other dummy variables were used in the model: member of Sunni or Shi’a Muslim group; importance of religion; the role of political Islam; whether there is a struggle between modernists and fundamentalists; tension between Sunnis and Shia’s seen as a problem; and US military threat to your country.
**Table 1: Internal Reliability Coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha = CA) for variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of variable</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>No. of items in a scale</th>
<th>CA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious extremism</td>
<td>6097</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Muslim</td>
<td>6011</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women shouldn’t have the right to choose to wear a veil or work outside the home</td>
<td>6574</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious observance</td>
<td>6586</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama international policy</td>
<td>4113</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and political situation in own country</td>
<td>6223</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Data Analysis and Results**

The dependent variable (support for terrorism) is measured dichotomously. A binary logistic regression (LR) model was used to explore a number of possible predictors while including a number of control variables. The results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 2. Among the demographic variables explored in this model (age, gender, marital status, children in the household, education), only gender and educational status turned out to be significant. These results suggest that the likelihood of a Muslim woman supporting terrorism, compared to a Muslim man, was approximately one fourth (22%). Muslims with graduate or post-graduate qualifications were 28 percent more likely to support terrorism than those who had not completed secondary schooling.

Four of the six indices were significant predictors for support of terrorism: religious extremism, women shouldn’t have rights, religious observance, and Obama’s international policy. These indices are continuous, thus the odds ratio refers to a unit change, more specifically a unit denotes 1 for each of the six indices. Muslims who are not concerned with the rise of extremism in their own country and the world are 61 percent more likely to support terrorism than Muslims who are concerned. Muslims who do not support women’s rights to wear a veil or work outside the home are 15 percent more likely to support terrorism than Muslims who do support Muslim women to have such rights. Muslims who actively observe religious rituals such as praying and fasting are 44 percent more likely to support terrorism than Muslims that occasionally observe these religious rituals. Muslims who approve of the way President Barack Obama deals with various international policy issues are 53 per cent more (sic!) likely to support terrorism than Muslims who disapprove of the way he deals with these issues. Members of the Shi’a Muslim
group are 109 per cent more likely to support terrorism than members of the Sunni Muslim group.

Two variables had a negative relationship with terrorism support, such as: perceived struggle between modernists and fundamentalists and tension between Sunni’s and Shi’a’s in the Muslim world is not seen as a problem. Muslims who perceive there to be a struggle in their country between groups who want to modernize the country and Islamic fundamentalists, are 23 per cent less likely to support terrorism than Muslims who do not think there is a struggle between these factions. Muslim's who indicated that the tension between Sunni and Shi’a is not a problem, are 48 per cent less likely to support terrorism than Muslims who indicated that the tension between these groups is a problem.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Logistic Regression Results for the Support for Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women shouldn’t have the right to choose to wear a veil or work outside the home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious observance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama’s international policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; political situation own country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unimportant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggle between modernists &amp; fundamentalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tension between Sunnis &amp; Shias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US military threat to your country one day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not worried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 18 living in the household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 or more children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete secondary/high or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete secondary/high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate/Postgraduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chi² (df=20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Standard errors in parentheses* *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001*

**Discussion and Conclusion**

In summary: among the demographic variables explored in this model only gender and educational status turned out to be important. Four of the six indices were significant predictors for support of terrorism: religious extremism seen as a problem, women shouldn’t have rights to choose to wear a veil or work outside the home, religious observance, and Obama’s international policy.

The Obama international policy result was somewhat counter-intuitive, in that despite approving of how US President Obama was dealing with various international policy issues, some Muslim respondents still reported they supported terrorists’ acts. Hence, while perceptions may be improving among Muslims about how the US might be addressing certain political issues, this may not translate into attitudinal opposition against terrorism – which is a central aim
of US attempts to win the “hearts and minds” of people in Muslim-dominated countries.[21] This conundrum maybe the outcome of other factors that have not been measured here, such as the historical legacy of US foreign policy decisions or the perceived victimisation of Muslims by local and foreign governments, that maybe more difficult to shift despite the efforts of one well-intentioned US president.

One of the more significant factors influencing support for terrorism was being a member of the Shi’a Muslim group as opposed to Sunni. One explanation for this is that our dependent variable measure of support for terrorism (justification of suicide bombing) potentially taps into beliefs about martyrdom, which have a strong tradition and legacy among Shi’a Muslims, and have been identified as promoting support for radicalisation and Islamic fundamentalism among Shi’ite minorities.[22] However, the validity of such results would need to be verified by additional data gathered from Muslim communities that having sizeable Shi’a populations, such as India, Bahrain, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Our results indicate that neither economic and political judgments, nor low levels of formal education appear to influence support for terrorism, raising doubt about the link between socio-economic conditions and the perceived legitimacy of terrorists acts.[23] Two particular results are worth stressing here: (i) the fact that particular values (attitudes on women’s rights – i.e. wearing the veil and working outside the home) and (ii) religious divisions (i.e. identifying as a Shi’a Muslim) did influence support for terrorism.

The implications of these results can be interpreted in a number of ways. One would be to conclude – as many political leaders and media commentators do – that the results show there is something inherently conservative and fundamentalist about Islam that generates support for violent jihad and antipathy towards Western secular values. It follows then that one solution lies in policy responses that promote a “moderate” form of Islam that encourages tolerance and a more liberal interpretation of the Quran. This is problematic, because it should not be up to governments to dictate what form of Islam Muslim people should follow – they should be free to decide for themselves. This does not mean that normative values derived from belief systems among Muslims should not be contended with or challenged when aiming to combat terrorism – the question is how can this be done in a way that does not isolate Muslim communities. This is important to consider because there is an intense debate among Muslims and Islamic scholars as to how elements of the Quran should be interpreted, for instance around the meaning of jihad [24]. Hence while there may be uniformity in the saliency of certain Islamic beliefs (e.g. jihad as a moral and spiritual battle) it does not mean that this will be expressed in similar ways i.e. used to legitimise violence.

Perhaps one solution lies in recognising the types of “sacred values” that underpin Muslim beliefs.[25] Sacred values are morally generated positions that produce devotion to core principles such as the importance of family, country, religion, honour, justice and collective
identity. While they can often have their basis in religion, they can also be derived from core secular values e.g. fairness and reciprocity.[26] What is important is that sacred values drive behaviour in ways that trump individual calculations of self-interest. As Atran and colleagues have argued and shown, the most intractable political disputes and extreme behaviours are the outcome of sacred values, such as those underlying the Israeli and Palestinian conflict.[27] Our results are potentially the manifestation of the impact of sacred values on support for terrorism, namely Shi’a beliefs that have traditionally celebrated martyrdom as a sacred duty and beliefs relating to the female Muslim duty to wear the hijab and remain within the home. Rather than criticise such values or rail against their manifestation, a more productive response is to recognise their inviolability and respect the right of Muslims to have such beliefs, because this can actually lead to concessions on the behalf of those that hold such values.[28] The problem is that this is something that Western governments and their constituencies have found difficult to do when it comes to addressing the problem of terrorism. Our results show that what drives support for terrorism is multifaceted, and that shifting the “hearts and minds” of Muslims about the legitimacy of terrorism must reflect this complexity in a way that does not isolate Muslim communities.

About the authors: Adrian Cherney is a senior lecturer in Criminology in the School of Social Science at the University of Queensland. He holds a PhD in Criminology from the University of Melbourne. One major focus of his work is on institutional legitimacy and cooperation with authorities, e.g. police and government. He is currently undertaking research on community cooperation in counter-terrorism. He can be reached at <a.cherney@uq.edu.au>. Jenny Povey is a research psychologist and fellow in the Institute of Social Science Research, at the University of Queensland. She has experience in test construction, survey development and evaluative research and holds a PhD from the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in South Africa.

Notes


[2] J.L. Esposito (2011) What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam, 2nd Edition, Oxford: University Press. Scholars similarly point out that Islamic fundamentalism also distort Islamic principles to justify their actions. For instance Hafez (2010) argues that Islamic extremists utilize tactics of redefining social identities, so that some Muslims are no longer considered members of the protected in-group, justifying the use of violence against fellow Muslims (which is in violation of the Quran). By focusing teachings on the meaning and importance of piety, Jihadi


[8] Ramsey (2012) ‘Public Opinion Research and Evidence-Based Counterinsurgency’, in: C. Lum and L.W. Kennedy (Eds.), Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy, 301 Springer Series on Evidence-Based Crime Policy, pp. 301-342. Also the public availability of such polling data, e.g. the PEW Global Attitudes survey (see http://www.pewglobal.org) does provide capacity for researchers to examine attitudes towards terrorism using large data sets, particularly in situations where large scale survey work is financially inhibitive.


[27] See Atran, Axelrod and Davis (2007), op. cit.

[28] Ibid.
Controversies of Conversions: The Potential Terrorist Threat of European Converts to Islam

by Monika G. Bartoszewicz

Abstract

This article summarising some findings from a doctoral dissertation discusses European converts to Islam. It explores the conditions under which conversion leads to radicalisation and terrorist violence; it analyses recrudescent concomitances of causal mechanisms of this phenomenon. Furthermore, it explores possible pathways existing between conversion, radicalisation and terrorist violence; identifies key variables pertaining to causal pathways and processes; provides hypotheses regarding the radicalisation pathways, and establishes a typology that can serve as a basis for further studies. By dispelling stereotypes on European New Muslims (ENM) this research note offers a new, contextual approach to the issue under consideration. In doing so it invites the reader to reconsider the concepts of “convert”, “radicalisation” and “potential”- concepts crucial for questioning the widely expressed assumptions that European converts to Islam are a homogenous “risk group” and a security threat.

Introduction

Conventional wisdom regarding European converts to Islam and branding them as a security threat is based on the premise that the majority lack the necessary religious knowledge and are therefore unable to discern between the various interpretations of Islam - thereby constituting easy prey for radicals.[1] Moreover, the idea of “convert’s zeal” contributes to the belief that being ready to prove their dedication to the new faith and community, converts are prepared and willing do to anything, including perpetrating the most atrocious acts of political violence.[2] There are two prevailing pictures of European converts to Islam taken from a security perspective. One presents converts as operational assets for the jihadist circles, whereby the instrumental value of European New Muslims (ENM) is underlined not only in terms of proselytising, logistics or support, but also for planning and carrying out terrorist attacks.[3] Official reports and analyses indicate that radical groups recruited converts because of their ability to cross borders with greater ease or serve as front men for renting accommodation or for providing other logistical support. There is also the notion that many recent converts are women; a factor further complicating establishing a standard profile.[4] The second picture, prevalent in the media, presents converts as disaffected and often troubled young people, who perceive the current wave of Islamic terrorism as the new revolution and join an idealist fight against the evils of the world, against the rich, the powerful, and the unjust.[5] From this perspective, the Quran appears as the new Das Kapital.
This partially explains why, in spite of the small numbers of converts attracted to terrorism, security services are stubbornly focusing on converts, perceiving them as a serious and growing terrorist threat. From such an angle, the supposed road from convert to jihadist is remarkably short and simple and the terrorist potential is immense. It is also suggested that someone new to Islam does not have the cultural bearings or a sound religious grounding to resist radical interpretations of Islam. Such conceptual errors can lead to a false and misleading perception of the causality between European converts to Islam and terrorism.

The Study

In view of such problems and perceptions, I undertook a study aimed at examining which factors determine converts’ non-violent (ideological) and violent (with subsequent engagement in terrorism) radicalisation. Consequently, the research explored what the radicalisation mechanisms are that may lead to such an activity, to determine possible regularities and to analyse viable implications pertaining to countering them. Providing a precise assessment of the potential threat of European New Muslims and a thorough analysis of their conversion processes as well as a typology that can help counter their radicalisation is timely as converts are now viewed by many policy makers, as well as representatives of academia, think-tanks and society at large as remaining at the heart of the terrorist threat which looms over Europe.

The methodology of the research developed over the course of study. It started with a deductive approach based on the available academic literature on European converts to Islam. A majority of experts treats converts as a homogenous group; broad generalisations are conducted whereby converts are presented as gullible individuals, easy to influence and prone to fall into an outbidding spiral when trying to prove their worth to their new brethren. Thus, for the purposes of the research, the working hypothesis assumed an “outbidding spiral” with converts wanting to prove their true “Muslimness” and show without any doubts that in spite of being newcomers to religion they truly belong to the community of believers.[6] The working hypothesis stipulated that converts want to prove that they left behind everything that in their view the West stands for: moral emptiness, hedonism, secularism, shallow consumerism and even a perception of a Western conspiracy against Muslims. During the field work, this claim proved to be erroneous and thus a deductive approach was abandoned in favour of the inductive one. Consequently, the cases were examined to uncover what causal pathways might operate in them and what radicalisation processes are triggered under what conditions. Such combination of cross-case (through a comparative case study) and within case (through process tracing) analysis reduced to a high degree the risk of inferential errors that can arise from using a single method. The typology, on the other hand, sought to group the various kinds of causal mechanisms and pathways that link the independent variables of each type with its outcome. The ultimate aim was therefore to develop a comprehensive typology through a series of case studies and process tracing methods.[7]
Due to my desire to avoid prior assumptions about what constitutes “radical Islam” and a willingness to circumvent the heated debate on the nature of fundamentalist religious ideology and practices as well as due to the nature of the research, radicalisation needed to be conceptualised in the broadest of possible terms. While the criminal nature of terrorism is widely accepted, it is very difficult to find a consensus as to what kind of extremist views should be outlawed and which ones should still be permissible under the premises of the free speech. In other words: being a terrorist is a crime, being a radical is most definitely not. On the other hand, just because some people decide to take things into their own hands and perpetrate terrorist acts, this does not mean that they are more radical in their beliefs than those whose choice of method was different. One’s radicalism cannot be measured in one’s proneness to violent action.[8]

Hence, radicalism as an advocacy of, and commitment to, bringing about a sweeping social, political or religious change and a total, political and social transformation is not necessarily violent. In terms of means used, radicalism can be a perfectly legitimate challenge to the established norms or policies. It does not by itself constitute a terrorist threat and does not necessitate violence. Thus, I understand radicalisation as a process of turning away from mainstream society and a rejection of its norms and values through advocating a way of life that challenges the status quo and rejecting the core fundamentals of liberal democracy with a possible but not necessary engagement in illegal and/or violent activities. Being radical can be described as a desire to have the monopoly over the way life should be lived and society organized. The ultimate marker of deepening radicalisation is not the inclination towards the use of violence but progressing totalism whereby the individual moves from everybody “can”, through “should” to “must” live my way of life. Terrorist violence is understood in the study as an active engagement in the implementation of a terrorist act or the planning of such an act (even if foiled by the interception of the plot preparation or execution by law-enforcement agencies).

Data

Since my research relied entirely on causal stories, which rest on different chains of complex causal relations, I argue that small-n analysis has much higher efficacy for the purposes of the study. It can discover regularities through qualitative analysis and juxtaposition of similar cases. This facilitates addressing the question of causal processes as well as the pathways within each case. The indispensable data reflects the qualitative nature of the research and consisted of four main pillars. The first one was academic literature on various forms of radicalisation and on European converts to Islam. The second group consisted of materials acquired through sustained and systematic archival work with open sources: magazines, newspapers, and Internet websites. This allowed for a surprisingly comprehensive documentation of converts’ background, biographical data, and individual characteristics, including statements and narratives of those converts who were inaccessible for direct interviews. Thirdly, given the nature of the research, primary sources are extremely difficult to acquire and sometimes simply impossible to obtain. As
a consequence, official policy reports published by governments, think tanks, research centres and other publicly available governmental analyses were the best source of information for those cases where a direct interview was not possible due to the demise of an individual under investigation and/or due to national security concerns. The final tier were fieldwork notes from participant observation sessions, reflective diary, and in-depth interviews with European converts residing in the UK, the Netherlands and Poland. These were collected between May 2009 and April 2011. In this respect, the research moved between the theoretical avenues of academia to state documents (reflecting the official discourse on terrorism), and from media accounts to individuals’ own statements.[9]

The study consisted of thirty in-depth, oral interviews, following a flexible but comparable set of open-ended questions. These offered the respondents a certain flexibility that allowed digressions, yet kept them within the perimeter of the study’s interests. Nevertheless, an effort was made to retain maximum consistency across the cases to provide a profound understanding of particular contexts and trajectories of conversion. In addition to interviews, participant observation sessions were conducted for a year in the New To Islam community in Glasgow which in this study served as a representative microcosm of a broader panoply of New Muslims communities. I also attended an assortment of activities in which converts participated: public events like demonstrations, charity dinners or fashion shows but also religious meetings, sermons, lectures, talks, shopping trips and shahadas (Muslim profession of faith, i.e. declaration of the oneness of God and acceptance of Muhammad as God’s prophet). A research diary was kept throughout this phase in order to record and systematise the research materials. The methodology described above allowed for specifying the pathways through which particular types of conversions related to radicalisation. Each pathway was characterized in terms of variables by identifying the conjunctive effects of underlying causal mechanisms operating within specified conditions. This allowed generalisations about possible future instances of radicalised converts who fit the same type of “ideal archetypes”.

**Findings**

The findings of the study confirmed that “becoming to be,” i.e. conversion to Islam, has an immense impact on the subsequent “being a Muslim”. Therefore, in an attempt to investigate converts’ radicalisation, one needs to look at the conversion stories. These are not mutually exclusive but balance each other and are to be read as complementary parts of a whole. These two elements of an individual’s life are connected and work in concert. For this reason, a consistency approach is put forward; one that considers the issue of the potential terrorist threat of European converts to Islam from a pre-conversion vantage point and that proposes a concurrent, highly contextualised framework linking the converting trajectories with their subsequent influence of post-conversion period in converts’ lives. Thus, the proposed approach
answers to conceptual weaknesses and offers an alternative that deeply affects our conceptions and presumptions about converts.

While carefully distinguishing European converts to Islam from other converting groups, the study weaves together decades of religious conversion research and offers a useful synthesis acknowledging that each conversion process incorporates active, passive, individual, collective, material and spiritual elements. Simultaneously, my proposition is more distinct in terms of research direction while, at the same time as it is more holistic, it avoids overlap and repetition of some of the flaws and biases of earlier models.[10] The main concern of my model is to take into consideration the contextual specificity of a carefully defined social group. I also wanted to portray the full range of the phenomenon of religious conversion indicated by other models, transcending their limitations by incorporating the aforementioned factors into a single model of conversion that can be applied to European converts to Islam.

The framework of the study underpins empirical investigations and it incorporates subjective utilities, recognising the diversity of conversion experiences as well as partially conflicting rationales and goals of changing one’s religious denomination which may range from spiritual to ideological and from social to instrumental. Since conversion is the meeting point between an individual and religion, the model thus takes the human aspect in its actual behaviour either involving the individual self or other social actors open to external social forces on the one hand and the approach to the religious element on the other. This approach casts an invaluable light upon the dynamic relationship between social conditions and religious orientation in the identity transformation called religious conversion. These two crucial factors are complementary, not antagonistic, and stretching the analysis fully between the two poles of individual versus collective aspects of conversion captures the multiplicity of the facets of the conversion experience without creating a faulty impression that it is either one or the other aspect, but rather a dynamically interacting and interwoven whole.
The above meta-theoretical matrix is a viable alternative to existing theories; a meeting point between the two modes of thinking about conversion, between the individual approach focusing on a single person and looking for the ideal type of convert and the collective approach analysing structural factors and trying to capture the ideal mechanism of conversion. It shows unequivocally that converts cannot be treated uniformly as a security risk group. The question arises, however, if there is no ideal convert/conversion model: how can the variance be determined and the potential for violent (or non-violent) radicalisation be assessed?

Assessing the impact of conversion on later life is an extremely challenging and daunting task. In the first place, the conversion narrative is not always available. Secondly, the difficulties of establishing the conversion trajectory notwithstanding, we need to remember that “becoming to be” only shapes “being New Muslim”. The acceptance of Islam as religion by taking shahada is merely a first, albeit the most important, step in being a Muslim. However, the richness of the conversion experience is not limited to this simple act. The shape and dynamics of mechanisms operating throughout the conversion process do not determine its consequences. Yet they undeniably inform the further development and provide the impetus and stimulus for the first stages of the New Muslim life. In other words, the ways of Becoming suggest the possibilities of Being.

Converts are not a uniform monolith and the very name designating them as a group is but another social construct with constantly changing boundaries. Nonetheless, amidst the disparity that can be noted when comparing different converts, a common denominator emerges, namely their identity as European New Muslims, which appears to be a unifying factor that overcomes the divisions and discrepancies. It is crucial to analyse the possible ways of living a New Muslim
life and establish what factors have a key impact on the ideational change and how these interact. With the aim to refine the current conceptualisation of a potential terrorist threat we need to identify not only the types of ascertaining conversion but also the ways of living conversion. If *shahada* brings converts together and their identity as New Muslims sets them apart, the key to understanding the potential terrorist threat of European converts to Islam lies in the identity spectrum of understanding of what it means to be Muslim and to delineate the normative space of belonging. Thus, the ideational dimension renders the impartial knowledge about the factors crucial for security implications.

My proposition of the identity-belonging nexus and its influence on individual’s actions is presented in the following matrix, being an amended version of Sandra Wallman’s four-part social boundary matrix. Wallman’s [11] original proposition does not provide answers to the enriched “me” versus the changed “me” dilemma: Is conversion a putting on of a new layer of clothing or putting on a new garment altogether? Similarly, it leaves unexplained the question of conquering the border: Does conversion enlarge the space or is it a simple crossing where what once was “us” now becomes “them”? The main signifier is the nexus of identity and belonging: is the new self built on a rejection of the old or an acceptance of the new and what is the attitude towards “them” in relation to new “us”? Therefore, the study proposes a highly contextualised typology that allows for capturing the full texture and the dynamic nature of conversion, offering an analytic tool that reflect the nature of the problem and also has the potential to inform policy making. The matrix also develops the understanding of the relationship between the discursive and normative constituents of being a New Muslim and their role in the relationship between the individual and the group. Rejection and exclusion, as well as acceptance and inclusion always take place at the intersection of an enabling environment and a personal trajectory. My own research approach, while sympathetic to psychological pursuits, is oriented more towards a social self that is partially contingent on underlying psychological structures. At the crossroads of personal history and the conducive environment, the interplay of factors within the identity–belonging nexus can trigger radicalisation in varying degrees. Simultaneously, the use of violence is only one of the possible avenues of radicalisation.
Figure 2. The Typology of European Converts to Islam

The identity of a convert, the “New Muslim” identity, is understood here as a part of an individual’s self-concept. The degree to which it permeates life and organises other self-identities varies: It can be subjugated to the fact of being Scottish or Dutch or, conversely, it can overpower the notion of being a woman. Regardless of how rich and complex the importance of group membership is, its impact upon the individual behaviour will depend on positive or negative attitudes towards social identity categorization (what I am vs. what I am not). These are crucial in reference to the way we react towards “the other”.

Belonging, on the other hand, is seen as an emotional attachment, feeling safe and “at home” as defined by Nira Yuval-Davis.[12] In my proposition, belonging, as an act of self-identification, is considered from the cognitive perspective of the dynamics between inclusion-exclusion duality, which reflects the isomorphic nature of the border. Again, the notion of who is incorporated and who remains left out is crucial for determining the direction and intensity of interactions as every boundary must be viewed in a wider societal and political context showing the intricate connection between identity and belonging and the importance of borders. Naturally, one cannot attain a typology without making some sweeping generalisations. It is not the intention of this study to argue that the above convert archetypes are set in stone, i.e. that a person displaying one set of features characteristic for a given ideal type cannot and/or will not move into another quadrant. Furthermore, it needs to be remembered that ideal archetypes identified within the proposed theoretical framework remain ideal, i.e. while capturing the mechanisms and dynamics of social reality, by their nature offer only simplified versions of the real world.
On the individual level the study explored whether the two identities, the national and the Islamic, are conflicted or competing and whether the indigenous cultural element vanishes after crossing the religious border. The framework shows how individuals feeling at ease with their hitherto prevailing identity and who embrace Islam not as the essence of “the other” but as something that completes the wholeness of their personality (acceptance) are far less inclined to proceed to activities that aim at destroying the culture in which they were brought up as opposed to those who, in order to embrace Islam, feel the need to discard in an act of rejection all that they were before the _shahada_. This framework also indicates that when someone not so much embraces Islam, but rejects the West and everything it represents, by excluding the whole sphere of belonging they make themselves more vulnerable towards radicalisation. The first case resembles a situation where a church building is no longer in use for Christian services but can still serve the community as a museum or an art gallery or a mosque. In the second instance the building itself is deemed undesirable and unfit to become a mosque, so it is destroyed to give space for new structures.

_Four Archetypes_

By looking at the converts’ own narratives, the study illustrated the dynamic interplay of the factors crucial during a convert’s life after the _shahada_. Each of the elements shaping the way Islam is lived by European New Muslims was analysed through the proposed conceptual framework in order to reflect upon the complex reality of the converts’ lived lives within the identity-belonging nexus. In this light, particular consideration was given to rejection, acceptance, exclusion and inclusion factors. The Ambassadors narratives show how acceptance and inclusion are instruments for internalising the differences and enhancing the pluralism of ideas countering radicalisation. One respondent called Anna showed how the Ambassador archetype represents individuals for whom conversion is based upon acceptance and inclusion, the reconciliation of the old with the new, with all elements working in unison. “No, it is not important that people know that I am a Muslim. I hope that they will see about my behaviour that I am a Muslim [rather] than I have a label here [pointing to her forehead]. I want to find the similarities. That is what I want to find, because that is what gives us a bond.”[13] As the analysis revealed, Ambassadors are not tussled between contending perspectives. Ambassadors offer a registry of solutions to potential conflicts and represent some sense of a middle path between the other archetypes that stand divided on ideas central to the lives of European converts to Islam and the issue of them being a security issue.

The Lost archetype counters the theories arguing that only the young, socially alienated and economically marginalised individuals convert. It also challenges the unidirectional dynamics of radicalisation and shows how a convert can practice with all the zeal of a new believer, then slowly diminish in his fervour being on the verge of abandoning religion altogether until a proper balance is found in the spiritual and material elements of life. It presents the most ephemeral and
contradictory of the four archetypes where embracing Islam as the new religion based on an acceptance of the new incessantly clashes with the exclusion of the old sense of belonging in their social, cultural and behavioural dimensions. The study argues that the Lost archetype is the most common and at the same time the least stable of the four archetypes. Simultaneously, it can be claimed that it is a conundrum of so many factors that one can hardly refer to the plethora of circumstances and responses as a cohesive archetype as it encompasses such a multitude of idiosyncratic behavioural traits. It is difficult therefore to describe an ideal individual since the variety within the type is based on an overabundance of highly personalised factors. At the same time, it is the ubiquitous archetype and the main challenge it poses from the security perspective is that it can easily lead a convert into any of the other three archetypes depending on which of the push and pull factors prevail in the identity-belonging dynamic. During the interviews a respondent called Asa brilliantly summarised the perils of a lost convert: “As a new Muslim, if you ain’t got no knowledge you are going to do wild stuff...let’s say at that time I became a new Muslim, and I do not know nothing about Islam and I have...no sort of a mentor, someone to guide me in the right path, I could of easily fallen into um, um, extremism, you know? Because I think, I think, that is how they [radicals] target people...”[14] Thus, while what is Lost can sometimes be found and mature as an Ambassador, the Lost archetype can occasionally also become a Bridge archetype and even entirely vanish in the vortex of the new-self and resurface as a Castaway.

The Bridge archetype emerges when one’s identity is created on the foundation of rejection and at the same time, instead of limiting the normative spaces of belonging, be opened towards conquering new territories and include new communities into one’s existential sphere. It often necessitates making hard choices like explained by a respondent called Liliana: “I knew I was going to become a Muslim and I knew the consequences of my choice: that I will not be able to stay at home because it would be hard and that my studies will not help me in anything, in life I mean. I also knew that I would have to leave because most of the [Muslim] guys live abroad, those with whom I would like to be.” [15] Thus, in a sense acting as a Bridge requires both cultural and social bi-location which only is intensified by the interplay between the factors of rejection and inclusion, a prevalent feature of this archetype. The investigation exposes that Bridges are people of concrete deeds and swift actions. The Bridge, although grounded quite firmly in culture, binds the two banks of his religious identity. Simultaneously, however, the Bridge indicates a certain migratory tendency: one does not enter the bridge to remain there forever, a bridge leads somewhere and hence those who can be ascribed to the Bridge archetype are always on the move, never rooted in one place, never fully settled. Symptomatically, even though the Bridges professes a world without barriers, by acting as an intermediary between two communities whom they clearly distinguish from each other, they in fact replicate the divisions. To quote one of them, Laura: “In contrast to Europe where we have stereotyping of Muslims, in the Arab world they are stereotyping Europe, yes they are! And a lot of our Muslims [female
converts] have problems just because they are European. They are rejected...So these are two different worlds, based on their cultures I would say, and converts are just a group in between.”[16]

The Castaway archetype draws upon the stories of individuals whose lives constitute a unique coalescence of rejection and exclusion. That provides favourable conditions for a totality of belief which has the potential of resulting in susceptibility towards terrorist violence. The Castaway archetype is the one that has become emblematic, often being taken as representative of the whole convert community. To define this archetype in one sentence, one could say that instead of living Islam in Europe, the Castaways live Islam instead of Europe. Eric Breininger’s memoires “Mein Weg nach Jannah”[My Road to Paradise] perfectly exemplifies these tendencies: “I knew that I had to take measures against the crusaders who were humiliating our brothers and sisters. Also every Muslim should stand up for a life according to the law of Allah and for that reason that we must build an Islamic state.”[17] The study concluded that the tandem of rejection and exclusion trigger dynamics whereby a desire for a borderless world results in perpetual reaffirmations of existing divisions. It argued that the Castaway is but a minority in the converts’ community and hence the matrix proposed in the doctoral thesis (of which this article forms a partial summary) might help develop policies to target radicalisation vulnerabilities. It invites policy makers to re-think and re-structure current policy approaches to European converts to Islam.

Conclusions

The study’s conclusions amount to an invitation to reconsider the concept of “the convert”. In addition to redefining “the convert”, it also calls for redefining the concept of “the potential”. It stipulates that the lack of understanding of converts’ drives, and the very nature of the process of radicalisation culminates in, an ignorance of the fact that the convert community, en masse, vehemently opposes being labelled a security threat. In particular it is claimed that the potential of the convert community as first and foremost allies in countering terrorist threats, is ignored. This, in turn, raises profound concerns in terms of the efficacy of anti-radicalisation and anti-terrorist policies. Secondly, the more flexible perspective offered in the thesis highlights the interplay of factors indicated in the meta-theoretical matrix and the typology. The research conducted opens up alternative avenues that could be used on the policy-making level in order to inhibit and disrupt processes of converts’ radicalisation. The theoretical framework proposed in the dissertation allows not only for a more flexible perspective and a fuller and more appropriate understanding of potential terrorist threats posed by European converts to Islam, but also shows how these can be translated into concrete security policies. The negative approach aimed at eliminating Castaways should be replaced by a positive one resulting in strengthening and facilitating the Ambassador archetype. The research conducted strongly advocates a nuanced, more accurate understanding of the potential terrorist threat of European converts to Islam. Such
an approach could be more successful than a rigid essentialised approach of a “risk group” that is far too generic to be functional at the policy level.

About the Author: Dr Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz (mgdabrowska@gmail.com) is a Karol Wojtyla Fellow at the Centre for Thought of John Paul II (Warsaw, Poland) specialising in religion in politics.

Notes


“Join the Caravan”: The Ideology of Political Authority in Islam from Ibn Taymiyya to Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria

by Atta Barkindo

Abstract

More than countering merely the violence and the mayhem, the current challenge posed by the Boko Haram conflict is how to clearly define the factors and the actors. Debates continue to rage in the literature regarding what motivates non-state armed groups. Interestingly, the prominent ideological factor that seems to motivate Boko Haram revolves around the concept of political authority in Islam. This ideology, it is claimed, is not only propelled by the teachings of the medieval Islamic scholar, Ibn Taymiyya, but has also encouraged political violence and extremism in the name of Islam. However, it would appear that none of the debates has examined in any detail the extent to which this ideology has influenced the Boko Haram conflict – something which the present article seeks to do.

Introduction

Several contending theories have emerged to explain the Boko Haram uprising, broadly revolving around socio-economic, political and religious issues and the politics of transitional justice and impunity.[1] The latter refers to the implementation of a specific transitional justice mechanism and how the failure to bring perpetrators of crimes to account motivates resistant movements to transform themselves into violent armed groups. This includes the failure of Obasanjo’s Human Rights Violations and Investigations Commissions (HRVIC) [3]. One discourse that has remained less well examined is the theoretical claim that Boko Haram has been deeply influenced by the religious and ideological teachings of the radical medieval Islamist, Ibn Taymiyya [2]. Using historical, interpretive and analytical methods, this article, in addition to addressing socio-economic and political factors, focuses on the influence of Ibn Taymiyya in detail. The reason for this is that, first, some scholars suggest there is probably no other Islamic theologian, medieval or otherwise, who has had as much influence on radical political ideology of Islam as Ibn Taymiyya [4]. Furthermore, the ideology itself is constructed on the concept that a legitimate political authority must be based on the Quran and the Sunna (acts) of the Prophet. Consequently, it becomes a duty for all Muslims to ensure that Islamic law is implemented in society. As such, it is argued that most Islamic theologians, including reformers, revivalists and Islamists (extremists) either from the Sufi or Sunni tradition, from the Wahhabs to Sayyid Qutb and to Osama Bin Laden have in one way or the other attacked the validity of secular political authority. They have also questioned the authority of Muslim but secular political leaders who have failed both in their personal and political lives to uphold correct Islamic ideals.
How do we relate the concept and practice of Ibn Taymiyya’s political ideology to the Boko Haram call for an Islamic state in Nigeria? The intention of this article is not to redefine the historical impression that has come into existence as to who Ibn Taymiyya was. Rather, an attempt will be made to examine the development of the concept of legitimate political authority in Islam. This is followed by an analysis of its radical and violent implications, how it was transited down to Boko Haram and why such ideology is a potent tool for Boko Haram’s mobilisation efforts. Finally, the possible lessons Boko Haram might have learned from the experience of Ibn Taymiyya is outlined.

Ibn Taymiyya and the Ideology of Legitimate Political Authority in Islam

Regarded as a 14th century Islamist, Ibn Taymiyya was born in Harran, an old city within the Arabian Peninsula between Sham and Iraq (Al-Shams is an old name that represents the areas of Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon) in the year 1263 [5]. Ibn Taymiyya became a professor of Islamic law, worked in Bagdad and was forced to flee to Damascus in Syria because of the Mongol invasion in 1258 [6]. His political ideology was very unpopular with political leaders at the time and he was imprisoned in both Syria and Egypt. Ideology as understood and applied in this context is defined as a set of ideas by which men explain and justify the ends and means of organized social action, with the aim of preserving or reconstructing a given reality [7]. In totalitarian systems, for example, ideologies are powerful tools for the mobilization of the masses as well as sources of legitimacy - sources of the sense of mission of a leader or a ruling group [8]. In this sense the ideology of political authority in Islam is more than merely a religion in the narrow sense of theological belief, private prayer and ritual worship. It also serves as a total way of life offering guidance for political, economic and social behaviour [9]. It is safe to suggest that Ibn Taymiyya picked up some religious elements in Islam and turned them into an ideological precept [10]. The development of Ibn Taymiyya’s ideology of legitimate political authority in Islam makes an interesting reading.

First of all, research has shown that pre-Islamic Arab society had a community structure based on tribal customs and traditions [11]. The first signs that political authority in Islam was emerging was when the Prophet and his companions faced severe persecution in Mecca and migrated to Medina. While in Medina, the Prophet drew up a pact known as mitḥaq al-Madina (the Medinan Treaty). This particular treaty was very significant because, it guaranteed full autonomy to all tribes and religious groups like the Jews, the Muslims and other pagan tribes. In addition, it went beyond tribal structures and laid down the principle that if an outside force attacks Medina all will defend it together. Critically, al-Raziq argues that the Prophet’s intention might not have been to give primacy to a political community. Rather, he wanted to build a community based on religious faith. If Muslims evolved into a community that uses its religious faith to respond to political issues, it was accidental rather than essential [12]. Arguably, the distinction is not about the incompatibility or complete separation of the religious and political
communities. Al-Raziq’s analysis reiterates the primacy, not incompatibility, of religion over politics in the Medinan Treaty. The fundamental intention of the Prophet was to establish a religious community tolerant of diversity and responsive to political problems, but not a sovereign political authority.

Elsewhere, Al-Raziq argues that the intention of the Prophet was crystal clear: the Islamic community was to be a community of believers whose common religious bond replaced individual tribal allegiance, which had been based on blood kinship. Allah is the sovereign leader of the state, Mohammad, his messenger on earth. Therefore the successors of Mohammad were to ensure that the faithful were following the divine will as expressed in the sacred revealed law of Islam. The law then provided the blueprint for an Islamic society which served as a guide for every aspect of life - outlining duties to God and duties to one’s fellow Muslims [13]. However, as Islam expanded and came into contact with other civilizations, questions began to emerge whether or not this was to be the only acceptable vision. Was there any principal code in this vision that called for the exclusion and the non-recognition of other forms of governance?

Interestingly, Ibn Taymiyya developed his political ideology in response to such burning questions. He argued that any exercise of authority, be it political or religious, “must be based on the law of Allah” [14]. Thus this can only be legitimate in Islam when it acknowledges this mission and vision of the Prophet, implementing them in every society as the source of law and governance. The process of implementation becomes a religious duty for all Muslims. The development of this ideology by Ibn Taymiyya must be understood against the socio-political context of Ibn Taymiyya’s life during a period of profound spiritual and political upheaval. In 1258, the Abbasid Empire (present day Iraq) was defeated by the Mongol armies and Bagdad was captured. For most Muslims, the defeat of the ruling dynasty was an unmitigated disaster. Bagdad, a renowned city of Islamic learning, suffered the fate of being looted and pillaged [15]. This experience forced Ibn Taymiyya into active politics. His first incursion into political life took place in 1293 [16]. He was so depressed by the atrocities committed by the Mongol invaders against the ideals of Islam that he became one of the reformers of Islam [17]. While in jail in Cairo, he wrote his treatise on juridical policy or legitimate political authority in Islam, the date of which may be put around 1315 [18]. In this book, he expressed clearly the basic elements of his radical political ideology.

First, he argued that the legitimacy of political authority must be based on God’s revelation in the Quran. In addition, the understanding of God must be based on the teachings of the Quran and the prophet. To describe God as he described himself in his book and as the Prophet described him in the Sunna, repudiating at the same time the attributes humans ascribe to Allah, the comparison humans make of Allah with his creatures and the use of symbolic or allegorical exegesis. All creatures for him must leave to Allah the ultimate mystery of things and must submit voluntarily and unconditional to his word and to his prophet [19]. Second, the belief in
the unity and sovereignty of Allah was to be the foundation of the political, social and moral systems propounded by the Prophets. The basic principle of this theory is that human beings must, individually and collectively, surrender all rights of lordship, legislation and exercising authority over others. No one should be allowed to pass orders or make commands in his own right and no one ought to accept the obligation to carry out such commands and obey such orders. He was a ferocious opponent of bid’a (innovation) because the more the innovator tries to be original, the more he distances himself from Allah. Due to the Mongol invasion, he insisted on the defensive jihad and the need to protect Muslim lands from Mongol invasion. For him the command to participate in jihad and its merit are crystal clear in the Quran, deserving no further discussion. With this in mind, he advocated a society where only the law of Allah was to be applied. The reformation of Muslim rulers and their followers would, in his view, only be achieved when the ruler and the ruled collaborate to ensure the law of Allah reigns supreme, as it is clearly stated “collaborate in virtue and righteousness and do not collaborate in sin and transgression” [20]. The application of the law of Allah therefore was the only prerequisite for legitimate political authority and the valid means of defending and reforming all societies.

Implications of Ibn Taymiyya’s Political Ideology

The particular implication of Ibn Taymiyya’s political ideology is that it runs contrary to the demands of the fundamental principles of democracy. He insisted that the source of law that governs society must be derived from the Quran and Sunna of the Prophet. Both the ruler and the ruled are subject to the law of Allah [21], that no person, class or group, not even the entire population of the state as a whole, can lay claim to sovereignty. Allah alone is the real sovereign; all others are merely his subjects. Allah is the real law-giver and absolute legislation rests in him. In modern political terms, this is considered as a religious dictatorship because it does not give space for the existence of other religions traditions and the importance of other forms of political governance. A further comparison shows that the doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya completely repudiates the idea of popular sovereignty, a system of governance where the selection of leaders and public officers and the making of laws is entirely left in the hands of the people. He laid claim only to the sovereignty of God and the viceroy of God on earth. It is what Mawdudi (and others) described as “theocracy” [22] where the Muslim population represented by the viceroy runs the state in accordance with the book of God and the practice of his Prophet.

In addition, the government of the day then becomes only a political agency set up to enforce the law of God. As such it is expected to rule on all affairs of men including the choice of leaders to all public offices, where human reason and guidance does not play much of a role. Thus, this choice must be made not based on human laws and civil constitutions but on principles guided by the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet. Ibn Taymiyya made God the centre and kernel of all forms of political authority in Islam and in the society. He forbade the separation of state and religion. The state is, in his view, created only at the service of religion. The complementarity of
state and religion becomes important only when the state is subjected to the whims and caprices of religion and religious leaders. Finally, Ibn Taymiyya seemed to indicate that both the ruler and the ruled are not only subjects to God’s law but are transformed by it. What is considered as a civil right in democratic society, Ibn Taymiyya saw as a religious duty. When one refuses to exercise his civil right, it is not an offence or a crime. However, when one fails in one’s religious duty, it becomes a serious crime and can be punished by divine decree. This is manifested in the way most Islamists see it as a religious duty to enforce not just the implementation of Islamic law but also to force others to accept it by whatever means, including the use of violence.

In general terms, if the concept of legitimate political authority as proposed by Ibn Taymiyya has to be literally implemented, there are far-reaching consequences not just for Islamic countries, but more importantly for emerging democracies across the developing nations where Muslim populations are growing. The reason is that the foundation of democracy in modern times lies in the sovereignty of the people. In it, the absolute power of legislation rests in the hands of the people. If a particular piece of legislation is desired by the masses, however ill-conceived it may be from the religious and moral point of view, steps have to be taken to place it on the statute book. If, on the other hand, the people dislike any law and demand its abrogation, however just and rightful it might be, it has to be expunged forthwith [23]. As a result, constituent assemblies, representative elections, parliamentary and multi-party systems have all emerged to give people the right to choose and depose their leaders, make or abrogate laws through their representatives so as to ensure equal rights in all civil and political institutions [24]. Halim Rane suggests that it is a system of governance based on the universal principles of social justice, as envisaged by the masses, rather than “crude appeals to the punitive aspects of sharia law or creating an Islamic state in the conventional modern sense” [25]. However, the extreme ideology of Boko Haram does not seem to give space for the plurality of cultures, religions and institutions.

The Transition from Ibn Taymiyya’s Political Ideology to Boko Haram’s Agenda

According to Bonney and Lewis, Ibn Taymiyya’s views on legitimate political authority in Islam greatly influenced the prototype of Takfiri ideology (i.e. the practice of pronouncing others as being infidels) and influenced anti-colonial uprisings that called for the establishment of Islamic governance; such as the Jihad of Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab 1744-1773; the Jihad of Abd al-Qadir in Algeria from 1808-1883 and the Jihad of Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda affiliates. Ibn Taymiyya’s ideology recognised a defensive form of jihad based on the strict observance of a Quranic injunction. Thus his influence within Sunni Islamists (extremists) like Osama Bin Laden could be seen as a link between global takfiri ideology and local contemporary grievances. It is necessary to concede that this form of defensive jihad espoused by Ibn Taymiyya’s ideology is different from other forms of jihad based on mainstream Sufi traditions like the Jihad of the Mahdi in the Sudan from 1844 -1885, the Jihad of Imam Shamil in Russia
from 1834-1859 [26] and that of Othman Dan Fodio in Northern Nigeria in more recent times. These were protagonists of the Sufi tradition whose forms of jihads were also defensive. However, unlike the Taymiyyan jihad, they were built upon consensus and analogy. However, whether these jihads were offensive or defensive and whether they belonged to Sufi or Sunni traditions is disputable. What is clear is that the sense of Ibn Taymiyya’s ideology of legitimate political authority is evident in most of them, albeit in different nature and texture.

In light of these distinctions, evidence suggests that his ideology regained prominence with the activities of Osama bin Laden. Twice Osama cited Ibn Taymiyya in his sermons and communiqués in 2003. On one occasion he said:

The most important religious duty – after belief itself - is to ward off and fight the enemy aggressor. Šayḫ al-Islam (Ibn Taymiyya), may Allāh have mercy upon him, said: “to drive off the enemy aggressor who destroys both religion and the world – there is no religious duty more important than this, apart from belief itself. This is an unconditional rule.” [27].

It is therefore not surprising that north-eastern Nigeria was not left out in the whirlwind of Ibn Taymiyya’s far-reaching influence with the emergence of Boko Haram. According to Abū Abd Allah Al-Sa’dī, one of the leading figures of Al-Qaeda:

The state of šayh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhāb (Saudi Arabia) arose only by ġīhād. The state of the Tālibān in Afghanistan arose only by ġīhād. It is true that these attempts were not perfect and did not fill the full role required, but incremental progress is a known universal principle. Yesterday, we did not dream of a state; today we established states and they fall. Tomorrow, Allah willing, a state will arise and will not fall [28].

The feelings expressed in the above quote demonstrate the fact that extremists like the followers of Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram are not lying low in their effort to establish Islamic rule and that the ideological influence of the writings of Ibn Taymiyya, even if taken out of context, cannot be overlooked. Before the emergence of Boko Haram, some scholars have tried to link the extremist nature of the Maitatsine sect to Ibn Taymiyya. Maitatsine was a group led by Muhammad Marwa who claimed to be more powerful than the Prophet with a divine mission to save Nigeria [29]. He banned the use of modern technology. By 1980, Maitatsine presented Nigeria with its first case of violent Islamic radicalisation [30]. This call to religious duty in ensuring the rule Allah as advocated by Ibn Taymiyya, though frowned upon by some fraction of Muslims in Nigeria, has likely become the central mission of Boko Haram.

Some commentators have argued that though plausible, it is still difficult to establish the extent to which Ibn Taymiyya’s ideology has influenced Boko Haram. First of all, most of what is regarded as information about the group is tainted and does not consist of reliable first-hand evidence [31]. Second, there is no evidence to suggest that the core leaders of Boko Haram read the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and have been deeply influenced by it. However, to be influenced
by a particular ideology does not necessarily suggest that one must have read the original text of the ideology itself. Yet the principal witnesses in this case whose evidence would have been most reliable are the thousands of corpses that littered the landscape including that of the leaders of the movement who, in the eyes of the public were victims of judicial murder by the security agents. However, it is a fact that there are many audio-tapes in circulation purported to be recordings of their leader’s sermons where he directly quotes Ibn Taymiyya. Yet how and where these recordings were made and by whom – that has not yet been verified. Some have claimed the influence of Ibn Taymiyya’s ideology is linked to the emergence of Boko Haram. Fundamental to this discourse in northern Nigeria is Suleiman who wrote:

We will be betraying the cause of Islam and the integrity of the Muslim umma if we fail to discharge our obligations to Muslims. These obligations entail, among other things, the establishment of Islam as a complete polity and the dismantling of all western influences as they affect us [32].

Many analysts suggest that Boko Haram emerged as a non-violent socio-religious movement in 1995 known under the name “The People Committed to hijra and the Prophet’s Teachings (ahl al-sunna wa jama’a al-hijra).” In 2002, the group declared the entire city of Maiduguri intolerably corrupt and irredeemable. Under a new leader, Ali Muhammad, they embarked on hijra; along the lines of the Prophet, from Maiduguri to a village called Kanama in Yobe state. In December 2003, a community dispute regarding fishing rights led to a siege of its mosque by the Nigerian army and the brutal execution of the leader, Mohammad Ali, and seventy others. Under the leadership of Muhammad Yusuf, the survivors returned to Maiduguri, recruited and expanded their network across the north-eastern states. However, sustained security pressure culminated in an assault on Boko Haram in 2009. Dozens of people were then rounded up and executed without trial, including Yusuf. Last argues that there is no doubt the suppression operation of 2009, and the killing of Muhammad Yusuf by Nigerian security forces in July of 2009 (sic), was a turning point for Boko Haram. This turning point, according to Cook, is reflected in the ideological, structural and operational changes within the group. This is likely so because, since 2009, the group has tactically transformed itself into a violent sect, driven by a desire for vengeance against the state and western related institutions.

Sources indicate that the acclaimed founder of Boko Haram Muhammad Yusuf received a western-style education. Other sources suggest that he completed a basic education in Quranic studies in Niger and Chad [33]. Yusuf was reportedly a member of the Borno State Shari’a implementation committee under Governor Mallah Kachallah, and was an active participant in Islamic debates on television and radio [34]. Suggestions indicate that when he lost out with the government of Ali Modu Sheriff (later to become Senator Modu Sheriff), he preached a return to the original sources in Islam and called for the rejection of all currents from abroad. He totally rejected the political and social principles on which modern civilization, particularly of the western nations, are built [35]. The original name of Boko Haram itself, Jama’atul Ahlu Sunna
Lidda’Awati wal Jihad, or People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad [36], seemingly reinforces Ibn Taymiyya’s call to return to the basics of Islam belief and the duty to implement such beliefs. Yusuf compared Western education and modern statecraft with the Mongol invasion during the time of Ibn Taymiyya. Political leaders in Nigeria, especially in Northern Nigeria, professed to be Muslims but deep down they were committing atrocities that were antithetical to Islamic ideals and values.

In what looks like an impressive furtherance of Ibn Taymiyya’s ideology, Yusuf preached, “Our land was an Islamic state before it (sic) was turned it into a land of kafir (infidel), the current system is contrary to true Muslim beliefs” [37]. Experts like James Forest suggest that this was a clear-cut message to fight the secular government in Nigeria; a government compared to the Mongol invaders of Ibn Taymiyya’s time. In addition, it well known that they preached openly in places like Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Maiduguri and other places. According to Kukah, they were obviously contemptuous of the state and its agents and agencies and they openly said so in their sermons. They abused other Muslims whom they considered to have abandoned the paths of Islam. They rejected the corrupting influence of the secular world, they railed against the corruption within the so-called Islamic community. They abused the political class openly. Like all millenarian groups, they spoke and looked forward to a future of living in an Islamic state. They believed that a truly Islamic state was possible even though they were ignorant of the real world beyond them [38].

Similarly, the news of the heroic exploits of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban would naturally have been a sign that progress was being made in the quest towards an Islamic world. In parts of the Northern states, settlements have been renamed new Mecca, new Afghanistan, Basra, Karbala etc. In his sermons, Yusuf maintained that socialism, capitalism, military dictatorship, western education and modern statecraft have all failed because God was excluded from these systems. The solution therefore was to return to the noble, honourable, moral and perfect principles of the rule of Islamic religion, which is infinitely more accomplished, more pure, more glorious, and more complete than all that have been discovered earlier by political and social theorists. Thompson argues that the dire economic stress, the greed, corruption, unemployment, naked poverty all combined into a living testimony of the failure of the modern statecraft in northern Nigeria. More so, Boko Haram seemingly became an attractive platform for a political opposition experiencing fears of arrest, harassment or intimidation.

Consequently, like Ibn Taymiyya, Boko Haram believed that the reformation of Islam and the implementation of Islamic law remains the only valuable option for social justice and prosperity. It is not surprising that recently, markets in the towns of Kafanchan and Michika in the north-central and north-eastern regions respectively were segmented divided into Christian and Muslim markets, at least administratively. This has many implications not only for the drive towards dialogue and integration, but also the continuous creation of conflict and prejudice. As important
as these observations are, it is safe to suggest that violence on the side of both the government and Boko Haram will not bring a lasting solution. It becomes imperative that political dialogue be considered. From the ideological point of view, it will be wise for Boko Haram members to rethink some features of the Islamic religion and consider how much Islam has to offer the world in terms of peace, tolerance and mutual coexistence.

The Question of Change and Moderate Voices in History: Lessons for Boko Haram

Immediately after the death of Prophet Muhammad in Madina, Islam flourished rapidly, especially during the Umayyad caliphate and the Abbasid caliphates. Then there emerged the powerful Safavid Empire in Persia, the Mughal Empire in the Indian subcontinent and the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East which lasted till 1923. However, with the abolition of the caliphate in 1924 by Ataturk in Istanbul, Turkey, a process of western colonization which intensified during the First World War, set in. Thus for the first time in history, many parts of these once mighty Islamic empires found themselves subjugated and ruled by foreigners who were unbelievers. Empires were fragmented and divided into nation states, weakening the Islamic community and initiating a long process of imposing western values and in some cases democratization in the Muslim countries. As the 20th century progressed, Muslim political fortunes began to change with the rise of independence movements, the shedding of colonial rule and the beginning of constitutional debates regarding the status of Islam as a state religion, its ideological role in national governance, the place of Islamic law in the state’s legal system. Also discussed was the question of separation of state and religion, especially in judicial and educational systems and the change in status of women through the reform of Muslim family law. Was the legitimate political authority as demanded by Ibn Taymiyya capable of accommodating other forms of political authority and ensuring the coexistence of different faiths in a multicultural society?

To respond to these historical challenges, there emerged a radical change in the political, economic, social, and moral mentality of many Muslims societies. For example, there emerged in most of the Islamic countries a new generation of Muslim political parties like Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP), Malaysia’s People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat; PKR) and Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; PKS). Such parties are Islamic in orientation and identity but base their political programs on universal principles such as democracy, social justice, rule of law, human rights, pluralism. Today there are Islamic political parties in Muslim countries like Algeria, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Pakistan [39]. Al-Hakim observes that the Islamic world is passing through a devastating period of transition. A period of economic and scientific change which took Europe five hundred years is, in the Muslim world, being squeezed into a couple of generations. Only thirty five years ago the capital of Saudi Arabia was a cluster of mud
huts, as it has been thousands of years. Today’s Riyadh is a hi-tech mega city of glass towers, coke machines and gliding Cadillac cars [40].

Writers like Allawi noted that a journey from Riyadh to Dubai, to Bahrain and the cities in the Gulf shows rampant commercialism, brand worship, gigantism, strict class segregation and a calendar of festivals and events designed by marketers to promote frantic capitalism, relegating to the background the traditions and the Islamic legacies of the people [41]. Many visions developed in these cities are clearly antithetical to Islam. It is what the urban critic Mike Davis has termed, a place where “Speer meets Disney on the shores of Araby” [42]. Allawi noted further that sometimes these developments are conceived on the basis of exclusion, isolation, fear and imitation. The ridiculous names of these developments like the Lagoons, Fortuna Towers and Residences, the Villas at Bay Village, are nearly all drawn from American real estate marketing manuals. It is these models of developments in the Gulf cities that are being exported to other Islamic cities such as Islamabad, Cairo, Karachi, Casablanca, Khartoum and Tunis [43].

How will Muslims live out their Islamic identity as they come into contact with modern democracy and secular ideas associated with the West? Can the individual Muslim jettison his or her worldview, the demand for complete practice of Islamic law as advocated by Ibn Taymiyya and demonstrated by members of the Boko Haram Sect in Northern Nigeria without a traumatic break with the past? How are members of Boko Haram to acquire virtues embodied in democratic civilization without seriously compromising or abandoning their own ideals of Islamic legacy? What aspects of Western democracy and secular ideas are they to acknowledge as foundations of modernity and the need to implement them to achieve Islamic governance, the Judeo-Christian heritage? [44]. Evidently, many Muslim countries, particularly the younger generations are beginning to accept the valuable contributions western democracy can make in improving the standard of living for all human beings irrespective of religion, colour or region, seeing in them the prototype of all that is vital and progressive. Can Boko Haram not begin to see the same thing in Northern Nigeria? Why will Boko Haram not consider transforming itself into a genuine political party?

One of the moderate voices worth considering here is that of Ali Al-Raziq. In the debate that followed the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, Al-Raziq offered a contribution entitled Islam and the Bases of Power, which led to his condemnation by a council of Islamic scholars at the famous al-Azhar University, Cairo, Egypt [45]. Al-Raziq argues that there is no need for an Islamic state in the contemporary Muslim societies as advocated by Ibn Taymiyya and others. To defend his position, he rejected the essential or internal connection between prophecy and kingship. The only connection is not in meaning but in roles. The fact that one is a prophet does not always necessarily mean that he has to physically fight for the deliverance of his people. He further contends that sometimes God raised prophets without actually making them kings. The fact that Prophet Muhammad was a head of Islam as a religious unit cannot be denied and that as
head of that unit, he preached with word and sword, obtained divine revelation and was aided by
divine forces is also not denied by his believers. However, all these activities of Prophet
Muhammad were not in any way a process of establishing an Islamic state. They were activities
meant for the formation of the Islamic religion [46]. He contends that even in the Quran, the
prophet had nothing to do with political royalty. He makes references to Quran 80, “He who
obeys the prophet obeys God. As for those who turn away we have not sent you to be their
guardian” [47] and “Your people have denied it. Though it is the truth, say, I am not in charge of
you, for every announcement there is a term and you will come to know” [48]. Even human
reason, according to him, forbids us to accept that the prophet was a political king and that he
was sent by God to massacre people, attack caravans, exile the Jews and establish a kingdom.
The unity which existed at the time of the prophet was in no respect a political unity. It was a
unity based on faith and religious dogma, free from the admixture of politics.

Secondly, the utterances of the Prophet made no allusion to an Islamic state or an Arab state. If
his mission was also the establishment of a political kingdom, how come he did not pursue the
most fundamental elements and the details of organizing and establish such an Islamic state?

The central teaching of Islam is the principle of unity - the oneness of Allah. As such there is
one universe and one humanity. This lack of distinction, segregation and discrimination in God
should be reflected in the universe and in humanity. Jihad should stand for self-control and the
struggle to excel in what is good. This should be the basic pillar of the community.

Conclusion

The article has tried to illuminate the radical, if not violent, political ideology of Ibn Taymiyya
and its influence on the ideological motivations of Boko Haram. It has also examined the
implications of his ideas for Boko Haram agenda. The goal of Boko Haram today in northern
Nigeria is not only to fight a modern state but to ensure that Islamic law is the basis of political
organization and civil life in Nigeria, especially Northern Nigeria. However, whatever the
grievances of Boko Haram are, the radical and violent views embedded in the ideology of Ibn
Taymiyya are not the solution to the problems of Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society. As Al-Ashmawi
noted, “each human being is the word of God and is entitled to every human right because
humanity is one community” [49]. It is time that Boko Haram joins the caravan for peace in
Northern Nigeria.

About the Author: Atta Barkindo is a Researcher at the Department of Politics and
International Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He
worked briefly with the Inter-Religious Dialogue Commission, Catholic Archdiocese of Jos,
central Nigeria. He was involved in the training of community leaders in areas of peace and
conflict resolution, especially in the Catholic Diocese of Yola, North-Eastern Nigeria. He
studied political Islam and Islamic cultures in Egypt and obtained his MA in Islamic Studies.
at the Pontifical University for Islamic Studies, PISAI, Rome. He also obtained an MSc degree at SOAS. His current PhD thesis research addresses issues of impunity, memory and the politics of terrorism in the transformation of the Boko Haram sect in north-eastern Nigeria.

Notes


[27] Ibid., p. 23.


[38] Kukah, op. cit., pp. 3-4.


[44] Ibid., p. 245.


Current and Emerging Threats of Homegrown Terrorism: The Case of the Boston Bombings

by Rohan Gunaratna and Cleo Haynal

Abstract

On April 15, 2013, two coordinated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) exploded near the finish line of the famous Boston Marathon. The fatalities were low but the symbolism was high: more than a decade after 9/11, the United States is still not safe from militant jihadist terrorist attacks. The bombers, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev had planned on killing and dying in the name of the global jihad after their second set of attacks on New York’s Time Square. They were stopped before getting to New York where the fatalities could have been much greater. The two brothers were self-radicalised homegrown terrorists. At this moment of writing, existing evidence points to the fact that, while inspired by militant jihadism and in loose contact with terrorists in Dagestan, they operated alone. This is an analysis of the radicalisation process that led those two young men to adopt violent jihad, and the failures of U.S. counterterrorism efforts that enabled them to kill three people and injuring some 250 others. This analysis shows that much still needs to be done in international inter-agency collaboration and in community engagement to prevent further attacks of this sort from happening on U.S. soil.

Introduction

On April 15, 2013, another attack shook the United States. Two coordinated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) exploded near the finish line of the famous Boston Marathon. This marked another significant event highlighting the continued danger posed to the United States by extremist ideologies. In 2012, a survey had shown that the U.S. population was less concerned about terrorism,[1] but this attack reminded them and the world that terrorism is an on-going threat. Furthermore, the attack was the work of two immigrants who had spent the last decade living in the United States; the ideological radicalisation that led them to adopting militant jihadism was done at least in part in the U.S. Their radicalisation process was complex and is worth an in-depth analysis. Building on intense feelings of isolation and failure, they found purpose through personal and online contacts with militant jihadists. They did not belong to any organised terrorist organisation but felt kin to the global jihad. The two brothers aimed to kill and die. They believed that it would be their ticket to heaven, a better life in the afterlife. In Inspire’s recent issue, a full page image features Tamerlan Tsarnaev writing an SMS to his mother saying “My dear mom, I will lay down my life for Islam.”[2] The two brothers had extremist Islamist beliefs and resented the U.S. government for its policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet they were not the instruments of a formal terrorist group. Evidence points to the fact that, while inspired
and guided by Al-Qaeda related militant jihadist materials and in loose contact with terrorists in Dagestan, they operated alone.

Since the attacks, it has been revealed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) had alerted the FBI and the CIA several years prior to the attacks to share suspicions about the two brothers. It was also found that Tamerlan, the older brother had visited Dagestan in 2012 and that he had links to radical Islamists both there and in the United States. Tamerlan - the apparent mastermind of the attacks - had been put on the U.S. Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database, but being one of over 400,000 people on the list he was not followed closely. Some radical comments in his mosque in the U.S., his trip to Dagestan and the FSB intelligence point to gaps in the U.S. and international counterterrorism efforts. The U.S. needs to emphasize transnational collaboration against transnational threats and must acknowledge the need for community engagement both to prevent such attacks and to deflect the potential backlash resulting from such acts of violence.

The Context

The Boston bombings took place on April 15, 2013. At 2:49 PM local time (EDT), the first bomb exploded. 10 seconds later another one went off. Three persons were killed and 264 injured.[3] Quickly, the Boston community came together. While bystanders and first-responders mobilized to evacuate and heal those who were maimed, the rest of the world held its breath, waiting to hear who would claim the attacks. The media response was controlled and did not feed the ambient fear. The IEDs, the coordinated multiple explosions, and the high-visibility symbolic location pointed to an Al-Qaeda style-attack. But, the lack of statement claiming the attacks went against the Al-Qaeda modus operandi; while they don’t always claim the attack, they are often eager to point out their successes especially abroad. Indeed, since then Tamerlan’s ideological sympathies were exposed and he was featured as martyr in a full-page tribute of Al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine.

Three days after the attacks, on Thursday, April 18 at 5 PM Eastern Time the FBI released the pictures of the two suspects.[4] That evening, the two brothers, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev hijacked a car and shot an MIT police officer, which led the police to their trail. During an exchange of fire with the police in the early hours of Friday morning, Tamerlan died and was run over by his wounded brother during the latter’s escape. The city of Boston was put on lockdown while the police tried to find Dzhokhar. He was eventually found when a resident of a suburban neighborhood of Boston saw something suspicious on his boat stored in his backyard whereupon he called the police. When apprehended, Dzhokhar had multiple wounds and was immediately taken to the hospital. He has since been transferred to a cell and is awaiting trial.
The Boston Bombers’ Background

The two Boston bombers, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev were respectively 26 and 19 year old brothers of Chechen origin who had been living in the U.S. for the last decade. Tamerlan Tsarnaev was born in 1986 in Kalmykia when it was still part of the former USSR. The family soon after moved to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, where the father, Anzor Tsarnaev, landed a job in the prosecutor’s office. Dzhokhar, the younger brother, was born in 1993 in Kyrgyzstan. In 1999, as the Russians tried to stop an insurgency in Chechnya, Tsarnaev was fired from his job, allegedly the result of political discrimination against people of Chechen origins.[5] The family then moved to Dagestan.[6] In 2002, the family sought political asylum in the U.S, claiming that they feared deadly persecution based their ties to Chechnya.[7]

Life in the United States was difficult for the Tsarnaev parents; Anzor could not practice law and took a job as an unlicensed mechanic while his wife tried making a living by giving home care and later worked in cosmetology.[8] Their oldest son Tamerlan had always dreamed of becoming a boxer, and as a teenager he showed promise. He won a New England Golden Glove championship but was eliminated at the first round of the Golden Gloves Championship in Salt Lake City in 2009.[9] Before he could give another shot at the National Championship the rules changed and only U.S. citizens could partake.[10]

Tamerlan then quit boxing but his studies at the regional community college did not go well. He soon dropped out. He married Katherine Russell, a middle-class U.S. citizen. She was a Christian who converted to Islam and they had a child in 2010. Tamerlan was unable to keep a job for long and was denied U.S. citizenship. Unable to support his family, his wife was the main breadwinner. It was during that period of turmoil, which began in 1999, that he increasingly turned to religion, encouraged by his mother, Zubeidat.

On September 11, 2011 one of his friends, Brendan Mess, was murdered; the case is still unsolved.[11] It is likely that it affected Tamerlan. During the same time Zubeidat and Anzor divorced in 2011 and both moved back to Dagestan; first the father went back to Dagestan, sick with cancer. Then Zubeidat left the U.S. after being caught shoplifting and subsequently skipped bail.[12] Those subsequent losses as well as the estrangement from their sisters who moved to New York, brought the brothers closer together.

Around that time, in March 2011, the Russian Intelligence Service (FSB) warned the FBI of the potential danger posed by Tamerlan. After having interviewed him, the FBI added him to the TIDE database but did not find anything that would indicate him as a threat to the U.S. In the fall of the same year, the FSB reached out to the CIA to warn again of the potential malevolent intents of Tamerlan.

In January 2012, Tamerlan flew to Dagestan for a stay that would last six months. One of the overt goals of the trip was to renew his Russian passport. He stayed with his father who reported that Tamerlan spent his time sleeping, praying at the mosque or reading online.[13] As the
investigation continues there are suspicions of possible links between Tamerlan and William Plotnikov,[14] and other Dagestani insurgents as we will be discussed below.

In the meantime, the quiet Dzhokhar started college at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth in the fall of 2011.[15] He was majoring in Marine Biology but it seems that he spent more time smoking pot than studying. He became a U.S. citizen on September 11, 2012. He and his brother remained in close contact. The younger brother looked up to his older brother and their relationship became closer after their parents had left the United States.

According to Boston Police officials interviewed, the brothers first planned on fulfilling their militant jihadist mission by attacking the celebrations on Charles River and police stations on Charles River on Independence Day (July 4), 2013.[16] When it turned out that putting together the bombs was easier than planned they decided to move the attack up. In February 2013, they purchased the fireworks from New Hampshire as detonators.

They decided to attack the Boston Marathon, a target of opportunity, to be followed by Times Square in New York. They planned on detonating the bombs and dying with the second set of attacks. On April 15, 2013, the Boston bombs went off. Three days after the attacks, they hijacked a car and were heading for Times Square. They had planned to die in Times Square while exploding their six remaining IEDs. The police caught up with them when they stopped to refuel the car en route. Tamerlan died in the shootout with the police and Dzhokhar was apprehended eighteen hours later. From the way that Tamerlan confronted the police it was very clear that he was aiming to kill and was ready to die. The conviction of their belief that they were going to paradise apparently motivated the two brothers. Dzhokhar is now in police custody and has admitted that he and his brother planted the bombs.

The Islamist Radicalisation Process

Several elements must be set in place to enable ideological radicalisation. Islamist radicalisation does not necessarily lead to violence. Recently, John Horgan has been extensively quoted saying that “The idea that radicalisation causes terrorism is perhaps the greatest myth alive today in terrorism research.”[17] Taken out of context, this made a great headline for Rolling Stone. Professor Horgan explains that watching YouTube videos alone does not make a terrorist and that “the overwhelming majority of people who hold radical beliefs do not engage in violence.”[18] We agree with John Horgan that many who hold radical ideas are not violent. However, adopting a radical ideology that holds that the only answer to the woes of this life is violent jihad defines the actions of the Tsarnaev brothers. Thus, when describing the process of radicalisation we will use the term to describe fanatically adopting a violent Islamist belief.

In 2007, the New York City Police Department published a comprehensive study of Islamist radicalisation. This study, entitled Radicalisation in the West: the Homegrown Threat [19] sought to explain the process that leads to Islamist radicalisation. Its authors divided the phases of
radicalisation into four: pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization.
[20]

In the pre-radicalisation phase, before the radicalisation process happens, there must be a void to be filled by the ideology. Psychology professor Arie Kruglanski, referring to the pre-radicalisation and self-identification phases, explains the incentive for terrorism as a response to a “significance quest.”[21] Radicalisation happens after an individual suffers from a strong loss of significance (perceived or real). This lays the ground for radicalisation.

In the self-identification phase, the radical ideology is then perceived as giving an opportunity to regain that significance.[22] The individuals “gradually gravitate away from their old identity and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals and adopt this ideology as their own.”[23]

The indoctrination phase solidifies the now all-encompassing ideology and the individual embraces the idea of militant jihad as the only solution. The NYPD report states that this is more easily done with the guidance of an individual or leader.[24] But a combination of influences and the belonging to online groups can also spur this process outside of a formal terrorist group framework. In 2008, Mark Sageman’s book *Leaderless Jihad* already explored that idea of dissociated radicalisation.[25] In a subsequent article, he explained, “They have no physical headquarters or sanctuary, but the tolerant, virtual environment of the Internet offers them a semblance of unity and purpose.”[26] Tamerlan found this unity and purpose online and that led him to Dagestan where he solidified his resolve in militant jihadism.

**The Radicalisation of Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev**

In the case of Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, there were at least five factors that lay the ground for radicalisation, but new information is still coming in. This is a preliminary analysis of what led the brothers to adopt this fanatical view of jihadist Islam. Several events shook Tamerlan and Dzhokhar’s sense of identity, creating a vulnerability to an extremist ideology. In the case of the two brothers it is clear that the aspects of the “significance quest” described by Arie Kruglanski were present. The social and familial context, growing up in a restive region of the world, the lack of integration in American society, the personal failures of Tamerlan – all these created a sense of stigmatization and loss. To fill that void and overcome this deep sense of loss, Tamerlan found radical Islam. Dzhokhar saw his brother as his most important role model. Especially with the departure of his parents and the distancing of his sisters, the older brother took on a greater importance. The extremist ideology was introduced through influence of personal links with radical individuals as well as through online media; it was solidified by Tamerlan’s trip to Dagestan. We flesh out below some of the factors that led to the two brothers’ radicalisation.
Growing up as a Member of a Discriminated Minority in a Conflict Zone

Growing up during the collapse of the USSR and being part of a religious or ethnic minority wherever they lived, certainly laid the ground for the feeling of alienation that would never leave the Tsarnaev brothers. The collapse of the USSR opened the door to ethnic revival in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. With it, the Russian government’s fear of separatism and of religious fundamentalism led to extremely repressive tactics. Today in Dagestan it is not unheard of to get searched just for having a beard, while in Kyrgyzstan both Christian and Muslim need not to be too vocal about their religious beliefs. Both of the Tsarnaev parents are Muslim; Zubeidat is Chechen while her ex-husband Anzor is Avar, an ethnic group native to the Caucasus and predominant in Dagestan.

Zubeidat and Anzor who had studied law saw a brief glimpse of potential social upward mobility in Kyrgyzstan when Anzor started working for the prosecutor in Bishkek. This perspective was quickly denied to them as the regional tensions grew; discriminations against the Chechen minority in Kyrgyzstan became more frequent. The Tsarnaev’s ethnic background most likely contributed to the change in circumstances and the firing of Anzor in 1999.

The family was granted political asylum in the U.S. but the parents could not practice in the legal field. Anzor worked as a car mechanic while Zubeidat became an esthetician. The family struggled to support their four children. The fall in their social status must have been felt by all in the family. The father had been talking about moving to the U.S. since their days in Kyrgyzstan but the Promised Land ended up being less of a dream. Not being able to achieve their dreams could have also fed resentment towards the country that earlier looked like the answer to their woes.

Personal Grievances

Tamerlan’s teenage years and twenties were marked with many failures. He failed to become the boxer that both he and his father wanted him to be. There are contradictory reports about whether he really would have had the talent to go to the Olympics and to what extent the lack of U.S. citizenship blocked his ascent in the sport. What matters, is that in this young man’s mind the U.S. government barred him from a chance at the Olympics.

In his 2010 photo essay interview with a student magazine, Tamerlan said, “I don’t have a single American friend, I don’t understand them.” This was after having spent eight years in the United States. Tamerlan still felt alien and alienated. He was quoted as saying that he would box for the U.S. if he were granted citizenship. Following his admission of having hit his girlfriend and the concerns from the FSB, his U.S. citizenship was put on hold indefinitely. The citizenship was never granted and Tamerlan was barred from entering the U.S. National Championship.
Tamerlan also failed to get into university and then failed to finish community college. The abandonment of his boxing career and the loss of interest of any particular career path coincided with his increased religiosity and probably fed a vicious circle of detachment and retreat into Islam. He was unable to hold a permanent job or find a career purpose.

He married and his wife converted and gave birth to a daughter but he was still not capable of supporting his family. He worked the odd shift delivering pizza but mostly stayed at home and took care of their daughter while his wife worked. In 2010, the youth unemployment rates hit record highs in the U.S. A disaffected college-dropout probably had few options for work that he thought was appropriate for him. For a self-professed traditional and religious man, this must have felt like a failure. The only way he could remedy that was to justify it to himself as part of his path towards jihadism: the same reasons that make sense of why he left his family for six months in 2012 to go to Dagestan.

External Influences

There are still uncertainties as to the extent of the external influences of the various people who contributed to Tamerlan’s adoption of an extreme strain of Islam.

First, one of the most important persons in Tamerlan’s life was his mother. She had turned again to Islam, coming back from an earlier non-religious period. She admits to have urged him to pray while he was going through the beginning of his period of distress in 2009. She became more pious as he became more radical. She says that she hoped it would steer him away from drinking alcohol and smoking. Since the beginning of the investigation about the Boston bombings, we learned more about her. She knew about the radicalisation of her son; it was an intercepted conversation between him and her that led the FSB to warn the FBI about Tamerlan. She too was in the TIDE database and had been banned from coming back to the U.S. after skipping bail after the theft of over $1,600 worth of clothes. In an interview after the bombings she declared, "I don't care if my youngest one is going to be killed today. I want the world to hear this. And I don't care if I am going to get killed too. And I will say Allahu Akbar!"[38]

In addition, early on after the bombing, Tamerlan’s uncle, Ruslan Tsarni, claimed that a certain “Misha”, an Armenian extremist Muslim “just took [Tamerlan’s] brain.”[39] The uncle believed that that friend had contributed to Tamerlan’s shift towards radical Islam. The man (his real name is Mikhail Allakhverdov) was subsequently questioned by the news media and by the F.B.I. and although he admitted to praying with Tamerlan, he denied having anything to do with the promotion of violent jihad.[40] Misha was an Armenian Christian but converted to Islam. Many new converts show more cut-and-dry beliefs; there were reports that he had pointed Tamerlan toward the more strict Salafi beliefs that forbid playing music for example.[41]

Another important connection was William Plotnikov, a Russian-born Canadian boxer who returned to Dagestan in 2010 to wage violent jihad only to be killed in July 2012. It is easy to
imagine why Tamerlan identified with William, given that they were both expatriates belonging to an ethnic minority and shared a common passion for boxing. William’s radicalisation preceded Tamerlan’s only a short period of time. Some people have declared seeing the two together in Dagestan while others deny that there were any face-to-face connections. If the two did not meet during their overlapping time in Dagestan, they did have online contacts.

**Tamerlan’s Trip to Dagestan**

The Tsarnaev parents claimed that Tamerlan only slept and read while he was in Dagestan. It has come to light that what he read was the Quran and, according to his aunt, he was becoming more pious. This period led him to come into contact with several key Dagestani terrorists. It was also reported that Tamerlan visited the radical Kotrova mosque in Makhachkala. This mosque is known for preaching an extremist form of Salafi Islam. Moreover this could have been a place for Tamerlan to enter into contact with local insurgents.

Tamerlan’s third cousin, Magomed Kartashov, is an Islamist political activist in Dagestan. The two met during Tamerlan’s stay in Makhachkala. According to Zubeidat, “the two became very close.” Magomed Kartashov’s organisation called “Union of the Just” seeks the implementation of Shari’a law and often bashes the U.S. government and American foreign policies. It has officially renounced violence but several members have close links with militants. Being interrogated by the FSB, Kartashov (via his lawyer) asserted that Tamerlan came to Dagestan with aspirations of violent Jihad and that Kartashov tried to dissuade him. Whether or not Kartashov’s claims are true, Tamerlan’s links with the “Union of the Just” apparently opened many doors. Some publications have recently claimed that there is no way that Tamerlan could have befriended militants just by wandering the streets of Makhachkala.”

A Russian investigative newspaper, *Novaya Gazeta*, has reported that Mahmud Mansur Nidal was one of Tamerlan’s contacts. With little corroboration or denial from either the FSB or FBI, it is hard to gauge the extent of the ties between the two men. Mahmud Nidal was a suspected recruiter for Islamist militant forces in Dagestan. He died at the age of 19 on May 19, 2013, in Makhachkala, killed by the Russian security forces. The death of Nidal could have rattled Tamerlan and that of Plotnikov most certainly precipitated Tamerlan’s return to Boston. Most likely, this also confirmed in his eyes the importance of his role in the violent jihad.

**Online Radicalisation and Training**

Tamerlan’s social media trail shows that he was viewing the speeches of Sheikh Feiz Mohammad, a radical Muslim preacher from Australia. He was also influenced by Anwar al-Awlaki’s sermons online. The American-Yemeni Al-Qaeda preacher was killed in 2011 but he lives on in his online video recordings. His appeal to Tamerlan and other American youths is
that he preached in English and Arabic. Professor Bruce Hoffman explained, "All over the world I've encountered people who've got his sermons about marriage and fidelity. The fact that he wasn't exclusively about terrorism and violence against the West ensures he has a certain resonance."[53] Both Sheikh Feiz and Anwar al-Awlaki preach often about daily lives, marriage, or even boxing, and moral issues in a way that makes them attractive to youths seeking guidance. Georgetown professor Dan Byman adds, "These videos make these ideas seem more relevant, powerful and legitimate and as a result we'll see from time to time some young men embrace them. It will be hard to stop."[54]

Tamerlan had subscribed to *YouTube* channels under the keywords terrorists and Islam and one channel entitled “Allah is the One.”[55] While choosing those channels would not be the ground for putting someone on a watch list, they sustained his ideas in the radicalisation process. The importance of the online tools to create contacts and radicalise individuals cannot be overemphasized. Even if Tamerlan was indeed influenced by Misha and by his own mother, it is through an online forum that he came in contact with William Plotnikov. Additionally, it was through online readings and through online videos that he sustained the conviction of his beliefs. Most importantly, investigators said that most likely it is online that he learned to build the bomb from an online source[56] which resulted in the death of two adults and one child while wounded some 250 other people. At first, news reports pointed to the 2010 article of Al-Qaeda’s famous *Inspire* magazine called “How to Make a Bomb in Your Mother’s Kitchen” that Dzhokhar said taught them how to construct a pressure cooker bomb.[57] *Inspire* magazine claims that this is the best way to create IEDs and it is a fact that instructions from *Inspire* have been increasingly used in the Af-Pak region. Investigators noticed, however, some changes in the design of the explosives.[58] This points to either alternate source of information or Tamerlan’s own experimentations during his long periods of time alone at home.

**Political Dissatisfactions**

Both brothers expressed real dissatisfaction with the U.S. government’s foreign policy. Dr. Sageman’s description of “The Next Generation of Terror” that “consists mostly of would-be terrorists, who, angered by the invasion of Iraq, aspire to join the movement and the men they hail as heroes”[59] is proving rather accurate. Tamerlan expressed profound antipathy towards the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the process of radicalisation, Tamerlan started to believe more far-fetched conspiracies such as that the United States had instrumented the 9/11 attacks to propagate hate of Muslims. He gained those ideas through reading online propaganda and conspiracy theories.

Becoming religious after living a much less religious life and finding his identity and a catalyst for his grievances might have had a powerful effect on Tamerlan’s worldview. Nevertheless, no single factor explanation can account fully for his radicalization towards
extremism and terrorism. Put it differently, the cumulative effects of the points raised earlier could be the cause and not a “cut and paste version of Islam.” As for Dzhokhar, Tamerlan’s overwhelming influence on him could be the single most important factor, which compelled him to turn to terrorism.

The Warning Signs

The Russian Intelligence

The FSB intercepted calls between Tamerlan and his mother talking about militant jihad and the possibility of Tamerlan joining the fight in Palestine. Subsequently, the FSB signaled to the FBI that they were concerned about Tamerlan’s increasingly extremist religiosity.[60] The FSB also mentioned that they believed Tamerlan “had changed drastically” since 2010 and was preparing to leave the United States “to join unspecified underground groups.”[61] They did not tell the FBI that the intelligence came from intercepted calls. The FBI now claims that Russia did not respond to the later inquiries for more details from them. The FBI interviewed Tamerlan but did not find any cause to put him on the terrorist watch list. In the fall of 2011, the FSB reiterated its concern, this time to the CIA. Neither of those prevented Tamerlan to leave the country for six months and re-enter it in July 2012. Senator Lindsey Graham declared on April 22, 2013 that a misspelling of Tamerlan’s surname enabled him to exit the country unnoticed by the FBI.[62] This fact was not corroborated by the FBI. Either way, the fact that one of the people in TIDE can “disappear” for six months and reenter the country without increased suspicion should raise eyebrows.

U.S. intelligence blames the lack of resources that does not allow them to follow up on the hundreds of U.S. residents flagged in the TIDE database. They must prioritize and the Russian tip did not raise the level of concern about Tamerlan high enough. Although his U.S. citizenship was put on hold, he was not followed more closely.

The repeated Russian intelligence was not given high priority. The U.S. and Russian interests do not always align. However, in this case, the Russian warning does not lend itself to any easily assessable ulterior motives. Tracking a two-people cell across continents is very difficult - if not impossible - in the midst of the thousands of other suspects of radicalisation. It is always impossible to rewrite history and it is plausible that even with heightened vigilance the two brothers could have still executed their operation. In the United States people are less willing to give up liberties for increased security and the intelligence agencies are still supposed to operate within strict laws protecting the privacy of civilians.
The Community Environment: Radical Language and Behavior

The lack of communication between the Muslim community and the city of Boston or the state of Massachusetts was another failure that led to these bombings. Tamerlan’s radical ideas did not go unnoticed at the mosque that he frequented. He interrupted the imam to insult his leniency. According to attendees, Tamerlan was enraged that the imam would praise Martin Luther King and lashed out saying "you cannot mention this guy because he’s not a Muslim!"[63] The mosque elders admonished Tamerlan for it but never really engaged him in a discussion about his beliefs.

The Islamic Society of Boston released a statement saying, "in their visits, [the Tsarnaev brothers] never exhibited any violent sentiments or behavior. Otherwise they would have been immediately reported to the FBI."[64] The two brothers were only infrequent visitors of the mosque; it was too moderate for their taste. It was therefore less visible to the clergy that their beliefs had radicalised. This points to the importance of engaging in conversation with dissatisfied youths. The increasingly radical Tamerlan was not addressed in his beliefs. Although the mosque thought it was addressing the problem it just caused Tamerlan to keep his believes to himself. The mosque’s community missed an important sign by not encouraging Tamerlan to speak and engaging him in respectful conversations.

Assessing the Responses

Media

Terrorists need an audience. The media are often responsible for propagating and amplifying the terror element in terrorism. In her 1985 speech to the American Bar Association, former U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had explained, “we must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend.”[65] Of course, terrorist attack are dangerous intrinsically but what produces the terror is the audience and the propagation of the idea of general vulnerability; the media helps spread the feeling that we are all at risk of terrorist attacks while only professional military and those living in conflict zone are at risk from conventional wars. This amplifies the effect of an attack that in terms of lives lost is less lethal than most other violent attacks happening every day, except in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Syria.

Several aspects make the Boston bombings an irregular terrorist attack. First, it was conducted by two dissociated youths without direct sponsorship from a formal terrorist group. It is true that they were inspired by Islamist movements; Inspire’s latest issue claims them as one of their own, [66] but there is still no real ties to any cell structure. There were no real political claims or exhortations following the explosions. However, in the uncertainty that followed the attacks, with few exceptions, news reports resisted amplification and conjectures. The media did not start
pointing fingers based on conjectures nor did they spread panic; they reported information as it came in and urged calm and patience.

**Community and Law Enforcement**

In a similar vein, community efforts and law enforcement were calm and effective. There are numerous pictures of people aiding each other after the bombings. Professor Bruce Hoffman noted the increased preparedness of the U.S. police, saying that after September 11, “There’s been a complete cross-fertilization across the United States with, in many respects, the New York City Police Department serving as the exemplar and model,”[67] When the police ordered a citywide curfew, the people of Boston complied. The search for the two responsible attackers was rather fast even though their baseball caps and sunglasses inhibited the use of facial recognition software. Spreading their picture around spooked them and prompted their eventual capture.

**The Potential Fallouts**

In the aftermath of such attacks, there are several heightened dangers. First, the relative success of the Tsarnaev brothers may inspire others. Their attack exposed vulnerabilities in the U.S. intelligence system. Secondly, the attacks may provoke a backlash against ethnic or religious minorities related to that of the culprits.

**Inspiring Others**

9/11 and the subsequent ill-named “War on Terror” contributed to make the name popular among radical youths. Being able to wage attacks of this size and putting a whole country on alert was no small feat. Since then, the Al-Qaeda affiliated groups have multiplied and Al-Qaeda inspired a generation. Every time there is a major attack against one of the “evil” foreign powers, it reinforces the belief in others holding similar beliefs that they too can wage violent jihad.

Therefore, every successful militant jihadist event becomes an example for radicalized youth that may have been hesitant to act through violence. Contrary to many people’s beliefs in the United States in particular, and in the West more generally, this inspiration is mostly independent from the ultimate fate of the perpetrators. The fact that the brothers were apprehended after the fact does not make the event less of a success in the eyes of like-minded extremist jihadists. In addition, this shows that despite years of increased emphasis on security, there is often a way to circumvent professional intelligence agencies.

**Free Publicity for Radical Videos Online**

Sheikh Feiz Mohammad never had as much publicity as in the days following the attacks. When Tamerlan’s social media trail came out, it was immediately reported that he was following
Sheikh Feiz Mohammad’s sermons. That day, the influential mentions of his name on Twitter increased sevenfold.[68] While the peak on Twitter did not continue, the increase in followers on the top YouTube channels that disseminate his videos increased greatly. Furthermore, the frequency of uploads of videos increased as well.[69] The preacher took advantage of this moment of fame to reinforce his brand. The Facebook fan pages linked to Sheikh Feiz tell an interesting story. The two most prominent pages about him (‘Sheikh Feiz’ and ‘Fans of Sheikh Feiz’) had the biggest number of new recruits in the summer of 2012. However, they had the most activity on those pages in the weeks since the attacks.[70] This could lead us to think that those who were already inclined to follow him may rally around those new events. The Facebook page called ‘Sheikh Feiz’ has over 10 thousand “likes” and there are more than 500 “fans” of Sheikh Feiz. Furthermore, the Facebook demographic analysis tool shows that for both pages the average age is between 18 and 24 years old. This also was the age range of the bombers when they radicalized. This ought to ring alarm bells and give us a sense of the potential new recruits getting radicalized (or already being so).

The name Inspire has become famous almost as much among those who fear Al-Qaeda’s influence as much as among those who welcome it. Talking so much about that magazine may have given it too much publicity. On April 23, 2013, in the wake of the attacks, John M. Berger contributed an article to Foreign Policy explaining that Inspire magazine had become “the worst kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, in which our collective worries about terrorism magnified our enemies' reach.”[71] He rightfully argues that we may increase the popularity of an extremist propaganda tool by demonizing it. Here he points to magazines but the same is valid for the preaching of Sheikh Mohammad.

**Mitigating the Risks**

The numbers can be disputed, but according the START Database from the University of Maryland, there have been over 210 incidents of violence or attempted violence perpetrated by Al-Qaeda and associate groups and individuals in the United States since 1990.[72] Trevor Aaronson in his writings about how many of apprehended terrorist plots were actually FBI entrapment cases estimates that about half of the 500 cases of terrorist prosecutions since 9/11 were led by the FBI: which still leaves us with several hundred attempted acts of terrorism.[73] A conservative estimate published in Slate magazine is that since September 11, 2001, suspected perpetrators for 52 cases were apprehended.[74] Either way, the events of April 15 in Boston remind us that the threat has not disappeared. It is important to assess what can be done to mitigate the risks of a militant jihadist attack.
Community Engagement

Community engagement can and should be used to prevent radicalisation. It provides an early general intervention mechanism, providing a platform to prevent extremist Islam to fill the space created by discontent and isolation. In his speech to the ADAMS Muslim Community Center in Virginia, Denis McDonough, deputy national security advisor to U.S. President Barack Obama, stressed the need to partner with communities to counter violent extremism.[75] Yet community engagement efforts are complex and still need to be redoubled.

Community engagement includes heightened communications between the city and the religious communities, between the Muslim community and other religious communities, and within the mosque’s followers. Imams should be encouraged to interact with and listen to those within their communities expressing radical interpretations of Islam.

When he spoke up at his mosque and insulted the imam, Tamerlan was not pushed to have a conversation about his beliefs; a practice that Sheikh Musa Admani from London explains is crucial to prevent radical acts. The Sheikh and the Luqman Institute organise a place where debate can happen and work to engage radicalising youth in controversial debates.[76] Instead of repressing and alienating them, the clerics work on countering the ideology. This also permits a higher visibility into the intentions of those who hold violent discourses.

A key target audience that should be included in community programs are the migrant communities. The engagement could help prevent or lessen ideological slippage between the migrant communities and citizens of host countries. It also keeps in check social developments and changes such as anti-Western sentiments and adoption of radical doctrines in communities of immigrants. The economic crisis in the U.S. has heightened anti-immigrant sensitivities and hence it is important to enable conversations between residents and newcomers to avoid alienation on one side and scapegoating on the other.

This is not to dismiss the work already being done by various organisations in the United States. Several community-based organisations as well as the U.S. chapter of Religions for Peace work on inter-faith dialog and integration. They have provided a moderate voice to counter the extremist Muslim-bashing discourses that only help feed radicalisation. In the wake of the Boston bombings, Nihad Awad, executive director at the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), announced, "American Muslims, like Americans of all backgrounds, condemn in the strongest possible terms today's cowardly bomb attack on participants and spectators of the Boston Marathon.”[77] His statement was seen as a preventive gesture of goodwill and an attempt at mitigating backlash.
International Collaboration between Intelligence Agencies

Modern terrorism in its present form is often a transnational issue. The non-state actors that have been threatening civilians are numerous and are not bound by the traditional frontiers. It is important that the means of countering this threat mirror it and incorporate international collaboration. Some experts in international security have criticized the centralization of intelligence and contrasted it to the network structure of the adversary. Therefore, it is important to point out that international cooperation does not mean centralization. It means a fluid structure that allows for both community engagement and the sharing of information. It means that when a terrorist group moves across borders, the agencies of that nation can use information gathered by others and do not have to start from scratch.

Conclusions

The Boston bombings were a horrific event because of the location, the timing, and the victims. Most media have done well in their restraint from making blanket comments, conjectures or amplifying the consequences. While we should not make more of this than is necessary, lessons should be learned. As written in Slate magazine, the difference between this event and the 52 other attempts of the last decade is that “for the first time, terrorists actually were able to assemble and detonate bombs.”[78] More than bad luck, some mistakes were made and some red flags were ignored. This event should be taken as an opportunity to reflect on how we can prevent radicalisation in the U.S. This is another proof of the mounting dangers of homegrown terrorism.

While new information about the exact motives for the attacks and process of radicalisation and execution of the bombings is still coming in, two clear lessons can be drawn out. Firstly, community engagement must be emphasized and involve the different segments of the population. This should be a two-way process and those working with communities at risk should listen to the youths and let them express their beliefs. Secondly, transnational collaboration between intelligence agencies is vital to counter this transnational threat. Progress has been made in the United States’ counterterrorism response; what is still lacking is operational proficiency in making this a collaborative effort – both within the United States and internationally.

About the Authors:

Rohan Gunaratna is a specialist in the global threat environment, with expertise in threat groups in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The Head of Singapore’s International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR,) Gunaratna is Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He also serves on the advisory board of the International Centre for Counterterrorism
in The Hague, the International Institute for Counter Terrorism in Israel and is a member of the Steering Committee of George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute.

Cleo Haynal is an analyst at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) in Singapore. She is also a research consultant for Howard’s Global Solutions and is finishing a graduate degree in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. She holds a B.A. in Political Science from U.C. Berkeley.

Notes


[18] Ibid.


[22] Ibid.


americas/i-dont-have-a-single-american-friend-photo-essay-titled-will-box-for-passport-reveals-profile-of-boston-bombing-suspect-tamerlan-tsarnaev-8580575.html


[34] Allan Cullison et al.; ibid.


[43] Ibid.

[44] Jean-Francois Ratelle. Ibid.

[45] Jean-Francois Ratelle. Ibid.


[47] Simon Shuster. Ibid.


[49] Simon Shuster. Ibid.


[53] Margaret Coker. Ibid.

[54] Margaret Coker. Ibid.


[64] Jaweed Kalim. Ibid.


[68] Data retrieved through a search on Topsy for variation of the name Sheikh Feiz Mohammad show that influential tweets defined as containing a link or being re-tweeted increased from below 100 per day to almost 700 on April 18, 2013. http://analytics.topsy.com.

[69] This data was gathered using simply measured YouTube competitive tool.

[70] This data was gathered through Facebook’s native analytics tool. The data is publically viewable on each fan page of the Sheikh.


II. Research Notes

The Boston Marathon Bombers: the Lethal Cocktail that Turned Troubled Youth to Terrorism

by Anne Speckhard

Abstract

The Tsarnaev brothers came from the war-torn Chechen diaspora and found asylum in the United States. The elder brother, Tamerlan, carried actual memories of fleeing from the 1994-96 Chechen war. He also lived in Dagestan for a year at the time when the Chechen warlord Basayev was engaging in a campaign of more than thirty suicide attacks, including mass hostage takings. When Tamerlan made it to the United States, he tried to assimilate but failed to make it. The family struggled hard to make a living in the U.S.; but in the end the parents divorced and the father returned to Dagestan. Dzhokhar, the younger brother, made it into an American university but Tamerlan did not succeed in higher education, trying to pursue a boxing career instead. When his immigration status precluded a boxing career, he became disillusioned. Meanwhile his mother, concerned about his descent into smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol, arranged an Islamic tutor for him. The ingredients for the lethal cocktail of terrorism came together when Tamerlan's individual vulnerabilities made him seek online contacts via the Internet and brought him in touch with offline mentors, militants and extremists who glorified Al-Qaeda's global jihad. Through these channels he became receptive to the terrorist ideology, found a jihadist group with global reach to align with, received technical instructions from the Inspire magazine and found enough support for executing the Boston marathon attack, pulling his younger brother along and dying in the process as he had expected.

Introduction

Since 9-11 the U.S. has been spared any successful Al-Qaeda inspired attacks on its own soil, although some serious plots have been attempted—and a few have been carried out. With the Boston marathon bombings, Americans are once again confronted with what looked first like homegrown terrorism. They are still puzzling over the motivations of the Tsarnaev brothers, what inspired them and what made them into terrorists.

Days after the event, writing answers from his hospital bed, nineteen-year-old Dzhokhar Tsarnaev admitted to federal investigators that he and his older brother Tamerlan had placed the bombs. He explained that they acted alone and had received no training or support from outside terrorist groups and planned their attack following instructions from the Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula’s online magazine Inspire [1]
From Dzhokhar’s statements it appears that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was the main instigator behind the Boston marathon bombings—bringing his younger brother along with him into his murderous acts.

After interviewing over four hundred extremists and terrorists, their family members and close associates and even their hostages in many countries all over the world (Gaza and the West Bank; Morocco, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Belgium, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Russia and Belarus) I have come to the conclusion that there are four essential elements to concocting the lethal cocktail of terrorism:

1. A group with political motivations willing to use terrorism to try to achieve its aims;
2. An ideology that is used to justify intentionally targeting and killing civilians to create terror and thereby advance the group’s political goals;
3. Some level of social support from the constituency that the group purports to represent; and
4. Psycho-social vulnerabilities within individuals that motivate them to join and activate into terrorist groups.[2]

I also found in my research that terrorism is highly contextual and that the psycho-social vulnerabilities that motivate individuals into terrorism can be broken down by those that live in conflict zones versus those that live outside conflict zones. Inside conflict zones individual motivations are driven by violence—and terrorism on the individual level is very revenge and trauma driven, with additional motivations mixed in, including frustrated aspirations; blocked life paths; losses of power, territory, resources, etc. But in most cases the killing, torture or injury of community members—particularly of loved ones—alongside the exposure to a terrorist group, social support for that group and its ideology are sufficient to motivate individuals into taking part in terrorism. In conflict zones the perceptions of threat are usually high and this often also contributes to high levels of social support for endorsing terrorism as a potential answer. In other words, the lethal cocktail leading to acts of terrorism in conflict zones is quite straightforward.[3]

In non-conflict zones where terrorists arise—such as in cities like Antwerp (Belgium), Casablanca (Morocco), or Boston (Massachusetts)—the individual motivations are quite different. Individual motivations in non-conflict areas relate much more to issues of identity and those who get involved in terrorism often feel disempowered, alienated, marginalized, discriminated against and have frustrated aspirations. They also often harbor a desire for adventure, wish to obtain a sense of life’s meaningfulness and a longing to belong. Terrorist groups relate to these desires and vulnerabilities by delivering a strong sense of positive identity, belonging and purpose alongside of conveying a sense of the manly, heroic and sense of standing up for the collective.[4]
Recruiters operating in non-conflict zones also adeptly bring the conflict zones into the mix—by showing their potential recruits disturbing videos and pictures of those hurt or oppressed inside conflict zones. And in doing so they take advantage of feelings of empathy and create an identification with the traumas of those oppressed elsewhere. Thus, they evoke a sense of secondary traumatization via witnessing traumas and channel the resultant feelings into a desire for revenge and to act “heroically” in the so called “defense” of others. In militant jihadi, or Al-Qaeda inspired groups, the terrorist narrative claims that Islam and Islamic lands and peoples are under attack from the West. It also claims “fictive kin” with all Muslims worldwide while it urges those who heed the call to stand up to fight in behalf of the oppressed. It’s a powerful message and infects many living far from warzones who are manipulated into violent action supposedly in behalf of others.[5]

The Lethal Cocktail of Terrorism

In the case of the Tsarnaev brothers we see the four levels of the lethal cocktail of terrorism coming together in a new and unusual way. Firstly, in terms of individual vulnerabilities Tamerlan, at least, had lived briefly inside a conflict zone (Chechnya) and had exposure to Dagestan which also was fast becoming a conflict zone. As an ethnic Chechen he was likely well aware of the traumatic nature of the conflicts there. But he also evidenced many of the same individual vulnerabilities that we have found among first and second-generation immigrants living in Europe and the U.S. who have activated into terrorism. He was a first generation immigrant, was having trouble assimilating and realizing his potential in the United States. At the same time he became exposed to those who glorified the militant jihad as an alternative life path and may have also wanted to embrace “martyrdom” as a way to “cleanse” himself of “bad” habits he picked up in the West. Troubling in the Tsarnaev case is that their exposure to a terrorist group, it’s ideology and social support appears to have occurred in large part via the Internet—showing the power of extremist communities to radicalise and activate online recruits—although the full story on that is still being uncovered.

Terrorist Group

In the case of the Tsarnaev brothers there was at first a great deal of confusion over what terrorist group they related to. Their ethnic Chechen background and Tamerlan’s travels back to Dagestan immediately raised questions at to whether the Chechen terrorist groups active in their country of origin, and extremism that had spilled over into the region (infecting Dagestan and Ingushetia as well), would have turned the U.S. into a target for terrorist attacks.

The answer on that is—highly unlikely. The terrorist group active in Dagestan put out a statement in the days immediately following the discovery of the Tsarnaevs’ participation in the
attacks, denying any involvement. Likewise the history and motivations of the Chechen terrorist groups does not lend much support for that hypothesis.

If one looks at the evolution of the Chechen terrorists groups it becomes clear that the Chechen militant “jihad” and its spillover into the region began first with a secular nationalist uprising in 1991. In that year the Chechen people wished to separate from what was left of the USSR and gain the same freedoms as afforded to Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the other republics that had declared and were given their independence from the former Soviet Union. Chechnya however, having existed uneasily inside the Russian Federation for more than a century, did not receive permission to secede nor did it receive support from the West to do so. The Chechen leader Dudaev had in 1991 declared independence and, after his assassination by Russian armed forces, Chechen warlord Basayev led the rebel movement that culminated in the first Chechen war of independence with Russia (1994-1996) followed shortly thereafter by a second war (1999-2004).

It was in between these two wars that former Afghan militant jihadis arrived in Chechnya to support the Chechen uprising. These foreign fighters were still euphoric from winning their war with the former Soviet Union. One of them, Saudi born, Khattab befriended Basayev and convinced him to take up the “martyrdom” ideology of Al-Qaeda, incubated in Afghanistan, to transform the Chechen movement into a militant jihad. Convinced of the “martyrdom” ideology, Basayev began a campaign of terrorism against Russia, starting from the year 2000 onward, with the Chechen terrorist groups sending over 112 suicide bombers to carry out over thirty suicide attacks. These included truck and car bomb suicide attacks, suicide bombings on regional trains and in the Moscow metro, two female bombers exploding themselves on internal domestic flights. Their most dramatic attacks were the Nord Ost hostage taking in Moscow in which eight hundred theatergoers were held hostage by forty Chechen suicide bombers as well as the infamous Beslan school hostage taking in which over 1200 mostly mothers and children were held for three days by suicide terrorists. In both cases hundreds of hostages were killed.[6]

In 2005 the Chechen terrorist movement had already spread across the North Caucasus and Basayev announced the formation of the Caucasus Front. Their aim was to break free from Russia and establish the Caucasus Emirate in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya. The Chechen terrorists use the Kavkaz website as their main mouthpiece and have been very vocal about their aspirations. While they have made statements such as “our enemies are the enemies of Islam”, they only named the Russians as their actual enemies and have never made attacks at any Western power.

The Chechen groups have also never formally joined Al-Qaeda. They do, however, have a great deal of crossover with the “martyrdom” ideology that was imported directly from Al-Qaeda. And Chechens individually have joined Al-Qaeda and been active in Afghanistan and elsewhere, involved in training and as recruiters and operators for Al-Qaeda. Indeed, ethnic
Chechens working as Al-Qaeda operatives have been arrested in Western Europe as well in recent years. When Chechen immigrants were found to be involved in the Boston attacks many wondered if this was the first sign of a merger of Al-Qaeda with the Chechen terrorists and if Tamerlan Tsarnaev had been launched out of Dagestan to attack the U.S. on behalf of Al-Qaeda. From all available data, including a very clear disavowal by the Dagestani militant group, it appears not the case.

**Terrorist Ideology**

Al-Qaeda—specifically Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—is the group that is responsible for inspiring the Tsarnaev brothers to attack against the U.S.—although from all reports it appears that no one from this group ever met with either Tsarnaev brother in person—all contact was virtual and indirect. Speaking to FBI agents, Dzhokhar admitted that he and his brother studied and found their inspiration, as well as their logistical instructions for their terrorist attacks in *Inspire*, the online magazine of AQAP. They also found ideological inspiration from listening to and watching sermons given by AQAP’s Anwar al Awlaki who was already dead at the time they were watching his sermons. The Spring 2013 issue of the *Inspire* magazine exulted in that they had inspired the Boston bombings, lionizing the two brothers as heroes of the global Al-Qaeda movement.[7]

Awlaki, the ideologue, as well as Samir Khan responsible for *Inspire* magazine had been killed on September 30, 2011, in Yemen by a U.S. drone strike but their writings and video presence are unfortunately immortal as they continue to appear in what Al-Qaeda scholar Reuven Paz labels as their Internet based “University of Jihad”. [8]

In order for a terrorist to carry out his (or her) evil intents s/he must be convinced that joining a terrorist group is a good thing and more importantly that carrying out attacks of terrorism—intentionally attacking civilians for the purpose of creating terror in the hope of advancing the groups political goals—is justified. To be effective in convincing a potential adherent, a terrorist ideology must resonate with his or her internal psychic needs and offer him or her a positive identity in his or her new role as terrorist.

The militant jihadi ideology of Al-Qaeda-linked groups and the martyrdom ideology, in general, fit well with Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s individual psyche as will be discussed further on. Tsarnaev, as an ethnic Chechen who had lived inside and nearby a conflict zone bought on to the Al-Qaeda narrative that Muslims around the world are oppressed and under attack by Western powers. He posted to his You-Tube channel a video glorifying a Dagestani terrorist group and also one that showed Assad’s crushing of the Syrian rebel movement resulting in many civilian casualties. Clearly as a Chechen, and having witnessed many stories of the human rights violations in Chechnya and the crushing of their independence movement, Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s mind easily resonated to the Al-Qaeda narrative.
When he expanded his views to believe that terrorism—attacking innocent civilians, and Americans in specific, was justified is still not fully understood. It is likely he took that understanding partly in Dagestan from nonmilitants who believed in a global jihad and from Inspire magazine after returning from Dagestan. Tsarnaev, encouraged by the writings and the sermons of Awlaki, took on the call to strike out at Western powers, including the United States on behalf of downtrodden Muslims—a narrative that AQAP and Awlaki in his continued online presence still promotes.

Social Support

There is usually some degree of social support that makes it possible for individuals to become terrorists. As all human beings are social creatures we rely on others as reference groups and look to them for social mirroring in terms of whether our choices are good or bad. In some places such as the West Bank and Gaza social support for being part of a militant or terrorist group is high. Tamerlan traveled to Dagestan where there is also a much higher degree of social support for being involved in rebel and terrorist activities. In the U.S. he likely found little social support, but now, given the worldwide links available on the Internet he could find social support via a virtual community—a troubling development when one considers how to dampen homegrown terrorism in Western nations.

Regarding social support, it has been discovered that as Tamerlan became more radicalised and began moving down his terrorist trajectory he had begun corresponding with William Plotnikov, a boxer, who was himself also a first generation immigrant from Russia. Plotnikov ultimately decided to give up boxing and went to join the Dagestani rebel movement where he became a member of the Mujahideen of the Caucasus Emirate.[9] It’s likely that through Plotnikov, Tamerlan also entertained a new life course as a militant. Via Plotnikov’s example, he found the way to enact it—traveling first to Dagestan, making contacts with militants there and ultimately hoping to be accepted into one of their groups.[10]

Tamerlan also appears to have become radicalised through contacts in Boston, as his mother in the 2008-2009 time frame appears to have encouraged him to back off of partying—drinking and smoking marijuana—and return to a stricter Islamic lifestyle. She apparently encouraged a teacher who introduced him to a stricter Salafi form of Islam and she also went on this journey with him. She began covering herself more and wearing the Salafi headscarf, a nonindigenous Chechen style of Muslim dress.

Individual Vulnerabilities

In the area of individual vulnerabilities the Tsarnaev brothers, particularly Tamerlan fit into both categories, of those who come from conflict zones and also of those feeling alienated in a non-conflict zone. During their childhoods, the Tsarnaevs had lived outside of Chechnya—likely
due to Stalin’s historical deportation in 1944/45 of the entire Chechen nation. The family had later moved back to Chechnya but fled again to Kyrgyzstan after the first Chechen war of independence broke out in the Caucasus. Tamerlan’s kindergarten teacher recalled that when he arrived in Kyrgyzstan following the outbreak of the first war in Chechnya, he was over-reactive to fire crackers—an indication of some sort of war trauma already in his young psyche. This teacher also recalled his parents as educated professionals, highly supportive of their sons’ educational activities. Tamerlan earned high marks throughout his schooling there.[11] Tamerlan apparently studied music at some point because he was an accomplished piano player as well. With the outbreak of the second Chechen war Tamerlan’s father had lost his government job—possibly because he was a Chechen. The family moved again, this time to Dagestan and Tamerlan’s parents and Dzhokhar went ahead to the United States claiming asylum there. Tamerlan stayed behind at the tender age of fourteen with his sisters to wait for another year for his chance to come to the U.S.[12]

Tamerlan arrived to Boston in 2003 on an asylum visa at age fifteen. Although his parents, and later he also, received social welfare benefits from the state’s department of transitional assistance,[13] the family was struggling to make ends meet. His mother free-lanced as a cosmetologist and their father, once a professional man, was reduced to repairing cars outside on the street in the cold Boston winters. The brothers apparently took to Boston and began to find their way in the diversely ethnic neighborhood they lived in. Both became known for “normal” teenage behaviors—including partying, drinking and smoking marijuana.[14]

While Dzhokhar made it into the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, Tamerlan, when he graduated from high school was not admitted into the university of his choice. He also dropped out of a community college after three semesters (2006 to 2008), opting to concentrate on a career in boxing instead. His father, who was also a good boxer, encouraged Tamerlan, to pursue boxing and he excelled at it winning the New England Golden Gloves heavyweight championship in 2009-10.[15]

Around 2008-2009, as mentioned previously Tamerlan’s mother encouraged him to refrain from drinking and partying. During this time he fell under the influence of a Muslim convert named Misha who apparently led him into a stricter Salafi interpretation of Islam.[16] Tamerlan’s mother reports that he became involved in “religious politics” around the same time.[17] Both he and his mother changed their style of dress, Tamerlan quit drinking although by some reports he continued to smoke marijuana. He began espousing more conservative radical views: Tamerlan at one time even angering his uncle by calling him an “infidel”.[18]

Tamerlan also asked Katherine Russell, the American girl he was dating, to convert to Islam and to wear the hidjab. They married in 2010 and had a baby the same year. The Tsarnaev brothers attended a Boston mosque associated with radical elements that allegedly espoused views that embrace a narrative of Muslims around the world being under attack alongside a duty
to aide them.[19] This background, along with his Islamic tutor, appears to have exposed Tamerlan to extremist ideology.

Having fled Chechnya as a young boy and having spent impressionable teenage years in Dagestan, aware of the troubles there, Tamerlan was already sensitized to the plights of Muslims living under oppression—making the Al-Qaeda narrative of Muslims under attack by the West easy for him to relate to. As an ethnic Chechen, and having lived in and fled from Chechnya at the outset of the first war of independence, as well as having later lived in Dagestan during a time of turmoil, Tamerlan had to be well aware of the many human rights abuses that occurred to Chechens during Putin’s crushing of their independence movement. He was also likely aware of Basayev’s embracing of the “martyrdom” ideology and the onset of a campaign of Chechen suicide terrorism from the year 2000 onward—a time when he was still living as an impressionable youth separated from his parents in Dagestan. As a boxer in 2010 he made clear to journalists that as long as Russian troops continued to be present in Chechnya he preferred to box for the U.S. versus the Russians and wished with his new citizenship to earn a place on the U.S. boxing team.

Known at his local boxing club as a proud boxer and flamboyant dresser, Tamerlan was dealt a devastating blow in 2010 when the rules were changed for the qualifying matches.[20] As a non-passport holder, he was barred from competing,[21] dashing his dreams of self-actualizing as a boxer for the U.S. Olympic teams. According to his boxing coach, Tamerlan—reflecting the mores of the country he had immigrated from (where conspiracies and fixing championships are commonplace)—he felt that he was the victim of a conspiracy to prevent him from entering the U.S. Olympic team, believing that he was barred to favour some native American boxer.

As his life aspirations were ruined, Tamerlan’s parents were also going through difficult times. In a short space of time, nearly all of Tamerlan’s stability, hopes and dreams for a bright future in American suddenly slipped away. Tamerlan’s father quarreled with his wife over her increasingly strict Islamic ways. The neighbors complained about him as he was working on cars on the street outside their apartment, and he became ill with cancer.[22] Tamerlan’s parents divorced and his father returned to Dagestan. In 2010, Tamerlan’s first child was born and Tamerlan—either too depressed to work, unable to get employment, or still smoking marijuana—didn’t care. He stayed home to take care of their young daughter while his wife worked seventy plus hours per week to support the family. Seeing little hope for his future, and perhaps wanting to escape all that was painful around him, Tamerlan slipped even deeper into extremist thoughts picked up from Internet websites.

Tamerlan’s mother derailed during this time period as well, clinging to religion while repeating to her cosmetology clients conspiracy theories about 9-11 that her son had told her. In 2011 she texted to Russia stating that her son was willing to die for Islam.[23] Later, however, she said that she never intended for him to become a terrorist. It is unclear whether or not she
was in fact encouraging Tamerlan into “martyrdom” or simply hoping to keep him away from alcohol and drugs as her own married life unraveled. In 2012, she was arrested for shoplifting over a thousand dollars worth of merchandise after which she returned to Dagestan, evading her court hearing.[24]

Perhaps Tamerlan’s strongest link to the militant jihad was his connection over the Internet with William Plotnikov, a Canadian immigrant from Russian and also a boxer who was disillusioned like him. A recent convert to Islam, Plotnikov was also casting about for a meaningful life and decided to go to Dagestan to fight with the rebels there. In a video taken in his militant hideout in Dagestan, Plotnikov clearly glorifies the militant jihad, terrorist killings of unbelievers and “martyrdom”, portraying that as a victorious life outcome.[25]

As a boxer, Tamerlan had also befriended Brendan Mess a young man who liked to smoke marijuana and was allegedly involved in marijuana sales. It’s unclear whether or not he was Tamerlan’s supplier, or if Tamerlan or Dzhokhar also dealt in drugs. They were known to be good friends as evidenced by statements made both by those who trained together at the Wai Kru Mixed Marital Arts gym and by Brendan’s girlfriend who recalls always serving halal food for when “Tam” came to visit.[26]

On 9-11, 2011, a bizarre crime occurred. Brendan Mess, the young man who Tamerlan had introduced at his gym as his “best friend” along with his two Jewish roommates Erik Weissman and Raphael Teken were murdered. They had their throats slit from ear to ear with each young man nearly decapitated. The police were not sure what to make of the crime as there was no forced entry—it appeared the young men had opened their door to a known person. Five thousand dollars was left behind and money and marijuana was sprinkled over the bodies of the dead men.[27] Their bodies were only discovered on September 12th and the local police did not think at the time that these were likely symbolic murders—having occurred on the anniversary of the 9-11 attacks, involving near beheadings, with no clear motive such as theft, and with drugs sprinkled over their bodies in what looked like a peculiar form of communication.

No one connected Tsarnaev with the murders at the time. He notably had argued with his friend about his lifestyle; he also did not go to his best friend’s funeral. He also stopped going to the gym.[28] Recently, following the Boston Marathon bombings, the case has been reopened with Tamerlan Tsarnaev featuring as a prime suspect. When viewed through the lens of a militant jihadi crime, it seems the murders—the way they were committed and the date they occurred—were possibly meant to convey a message about the corrupting power of the West and its tolerance for drugs, providing a militant jihadi answer—of annihilation and destruction.

Chillingly, when FBI agents questioned Ibragim Todashev, also a Chechen and sports associate of Tsarnaev about the murders he allegedly attacked the agents leading to an altercation in which he was shot and killed. While the FBI asserted that Todashev made statements
implicating both himself and Tsarnaev before attacking the agents, the case remains unsolved—but with significant tracks pointing to the elder of the Tsarnaev brothers.[29]

Following the murders, Tamerlan took off to Dagestan within three months. His boxing dream shattered, his parents having divorced and moved away and with no clear life path laid out before him he was perhaps considering following in the footsteps of Plotnikov. And if he had committed the murders of Brendan Mess and his roommates—over his own, his brother’s, or his friend’s use of marijuana—Tsarnaev had already crossed a serious red line. He may have been blaming the “decadent” west for corrupting he and his brother—no one knows. Yet after it had occurred, it appears he had begun his new quest—turning his back on the West—and perhaps going off to “cleanse” himself by joining the Dagestani “martyrs”.

In Dagestan, William Plotnikov is reported to have spent about six weeks in a village before he was accepted into the rebel groups.[30] If Tamerlan was hoping to join the rebels he would likely have a similar wait—having to be also vetted by them—a wait he spent visiting his father’s home. Tamerlan spent a great deal of his time in Dagestan with his cousin, a leader in the ideological resistance movement and also with others who also had extremist mindsets. He also continued in his flamboyant ways leading many at the Dagestani mosque to question if he would get arrested—attesting to his continued narcissistic need for attention—which was likely off putting to the rebels there.

Whatever aspirations Tamerlan had to join the rebels, the group he had approached was apparently crushed when Plotnikov and his associates were suddenly killed in an ambush by the authorities. Tellingly, Tamerlan fled Dagestan within two days of the assault, flying back to the U.S. via Moscow. When questioned after the Boston bombings about the reasons for Tamerlan’s trip to Dagestan his father stated that he had come to Russia to apply for his passport. However Tamerlan’s haste to exit Dagestan was so imperative that he returned to the U.S. without the paperwork having been completed.[31]

Again his life trajectory had been thwarted—apparently Tsarnaev did not manage to join the Dagestani rebel group. Back in the U.S., he continued in his previous pattern of staying home to take care of their child while his wife worked long hours. He may have continued to smoke pot, at least that is what some reports say. According to his brother Dzhokhar, Tamerlan continued to seep himself in the video-recorded sermons of the late Anwar Awlaki—who lives on immortal on the Internet—and to study the writings of Inspire magazine.

The Lethal Cocktail—Bringing it all Together

Clearly Tamerlan Tsarnaev was a young man seeking glory in one form or another and had a strong psychological need for attention. Having come as an asylum seeker from a war-torn area, he was sensitive to the plight of Muslims in other parts of the world and likely easily drawn into the Al-Qaeda narrative that declared that Muslims were oppressed. Aware of Putin’s crushing of
the Chechen rebel movement and Assad’s attempts to crush the Syrian rebels (evidenced by a video he had uploaded on his You Tube account) he had fallen under the teachings of Awlaki who pointed the finger at the U.S., accusing America for civilian deaths of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan. As he got drawn via the Internet into militant jihadi ideologies, he was likely also upset to learn that both Samir Khan who wrote *Inspire* magazine and his virtual mentor Anwar Awlaki were killed by a U.S. drone attack just months before he had left for Dagestan.[32]

As many other first and second generation immigrants who fall prey to militant jihadi groups and their ideology, Tamerlan was living in a Western country, but unable to find the way to actualize a positive identity. He tried but did not make it in higher education. He tried and was blocked in his boxing aspirations—due to his immigration status. When at his mother’s urging he tried to give up his drinking and marijuana smoking habits, he turned back to Islam and found a stricter interpretation of what is permitted and what is not. There was also a mentor to help him along, but apparently he stumbled into the militant jihadi ideology, either via the mentor or simply via the Internet. In Al-Qaeda’s ideology he found an answer for his malaise—short-term psychological first aid. The militant jihadi ideology provided him with a new identity, a “heroic” sense of purpose and belonging. This most likely infused him with the euphoria many terrorists report when they commit themselves to “self cleansing” and going down the road to “martyrdom”.

Once drawn into the militant jihadi ideology and its narrative regarding Muslims being under attack by Western powers, Tsarnaev deepened his identification with his oppressed “kin” in Dagestan and Chechnya and returned to join them. Even in this role, however, Tamerlan found himself blocked. When he tried to join the Dagestani rebels—where the issues were more clear-cut and the enemy more clearly defined—his contacts were killed leaving him without a way to self-actualize as a rebel/militant in Dagestan.

The extremists that Tamerlan spent considerable time with in Dagestan also influenced him. They held a much more global view of the militant jihad and viewed the West—including the U.S.—as an enemy. Most likely they encouraged the same view in the impressionable Tsarnaev. During his time in Dagestan, Tamerlan wanted to join their movement but also began to identify with the entire Muslim ummah, beginning to view them as fictive kin for whom he felt a responsibility. He probably began to view himself as a heroic militant jihadi figure with a responsibility to conduct an attack somewhere—even if it be America.

Dzhokhar, the younger brother reported that when his brother made up his mind, Tamerlan was upset with the U.S. and planned to attack Americans due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, if he wanted to self actualize as a militant jihadi and become a “martyr” and could not do so in Dagestan he needed to widen his view of the enemy and generalize his revenge for what he had seen happen under Putin in Chechnya, to include perceived crimes carried out by the U.S. against his Muslim “brothers” and “sisters” in Afghanistan and Iraq as well.
A young man in search of a positive identity, fully armed with a virulent ideology and having received social support among his Boston contacts and his extremist contacts in Dagestan for global jihad [33] as well as with Plotnikov and the charismatic virtual mentoring of the already dead Anwar Alwaki who continued to “live” on in the Internet—here a confluence of forces came together and probably made Tamerlan virtually signed on to the worldwide global militant jihadi movement that had emerged from Al-Qaeda.

Thwarted in Dagestan, Tamerlan decided, after his return to America, to attack in the U.S.—a place that had never fully been home to him and—where he had never fully acclimated. According to his younger brother, Tamerlan finished his quest for a positive identity and self-actualization by following the instructions for “lone wolf” terrorists that he had found in *Inspire* magazine. This must have led him to cook up his scheme to bomb the Boston marathon and from there proceed to Times Square in New York to explode more bombs there, thereby creating a path of destruction until such time as he could “blissfully” enter the realm of “martyrdom” by being killed.

By most Islamic accountings Tsarnaev only ended up dead and is not considered any type of hero or deserving entry into paradise for his acts. This however is not the view taken by *Inspire* magazine which had inspired him. There in the Spring 2013 edition, he is hailed as a hero and as a real Islamic “martyr”. Tamerlan dragged his promising younger brother down alongside him. Dzhokhar will now likely serve a lifetime sentence in prison.

Both young men fought a battle with trying to assimilate in a Western country after coming out of a more conservative Muslim surrounding and fleeing a war-torn country. Without his brother’s negative influence, Dzhokhar likely would have made it. Tamerlan however, was especially sensitized to war trauma and had a hard time finding his way in the U.S. Both brothers got into drugs and alcohol. Tamerlan, frustrated in many ways and perhaps hurt by the disintegration of his family as well as his own failure to achieve, finally decided to “cleanse” himself by rejecting the West and crawling into a virulent ideology and group that promised to make something out of him—that is, if he was willing to give up his life for it and to take the lives of others. Tragically his brother and many others will continue to suffer from his turning to the militant jihad and many look for answers about how this tragedy that killed three and wounded dozens of innocent people, could have been avoided.

*About the Author: Anne Speckhard, Ph.D. is Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry in the Georgetown University School of Medicine. She has interviewed terrorists worldwide and is the author of ‘Talking to Terrorists: Understanding the Psycho-Social Motivations of Militant Jihadi Terrorists, Mass Hostage Takers, Suicide Bombers & “Martyrs” to Combat Terrorism in Prison & Community Rehabilitation’ (published by Advances Press, 2012).*
Notes


New Light on CIA “Double Tap” Drone Strikes on Taliban “First Responders” in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas

by Brian Glyn Williams

Abstract

This Research Note provides the first overview of the CIA’s controversial policy of follow up drone strikes on targets previously targeted for drone strikes. While this policy has been widely criticized, it is argued here that the follow up (or double tap) strikes are aimed at Taliban who have a policy of cordoning off drone strike zones and retrieving their dead or wounded comrades; in other words: they are not targeting civilians.

Introduction

One of the most controversial practices of the CIA in its drone war on Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists and insurgents in Pakistan’s FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Agencies) has been the so-called ‘double tap’ strike tactic. [1] This involves follow up drone attacks on those who rush to a drone strike location to save victims buried in the rubble of targeted hujras (guest houses) or compounds. Perhaps no aspect of the drone campaign has caused as much furor as this tactic. Christof Heyns, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial Executions, captured the nature of this controversy when he stated “Allegations of repeat strikes coming back after half an hour when medical personnel are on the ground are very worrying. To target civilians would be crimes of war.” [2] UK’s Daily Mail reported

An authoritative joint study, by Stanford and New York Universities, concludes that men, women and children are being terrorised by the operations ‘24 hours-a-day’. And the authors lay much of the blame on the use of the ‘double-tap’ strike where a drone fires one missile – and then a second as rescuers try to drag victims from the rubble. One aid agency said they had a six-hour delay before going to the scene. The tactic has cast such a shadow of fear over strike zones that people often wait for hours before daring to visit the scene of an attack. [3]

The above-mentioned study by Stanford and New York Universities concludes that double taps by U.S. drones raise

- crucial moral and legal concerns. Not only does the practice put into question the extent to which secondary strikes comply with international humanitarian law’s basic rules ... but it also potentially violates specific legal protections for medical and humanitarian personnel, and for the wounded. As international law experts have noted, intentional strikes on first responders may constitute war crimes. [4]

This report further states “secondary strikes have discouraged average civilians (emphasis mine, BGW) from coming to one another’s rescue, and even inhibited the provision of
emergency medical assistance from humanitarian workers.” [5] A report by Britain’s Independent similarly states “Researchers said people in Waziristan – the tribal area where most of the strikes take place – are “acutely aware of reports of the practice of follow-up strikes”, and explained that the secondary strikes have “discouraged ordinary civilians (emphasis mine, BGW) from coming to one another’s rescue.” [6]

There has been no group more active in shedding light on this double tap strike policy than the UK-based Bureau for Investigative Journalism. In February 2012 the Bureau released a damning publication that was picked up by the British Sunday Times, the New York Times, and newspapers across the globe. The article titled “Obama terror drones: CIA tactics in Pakistan include targeting rescuers and funerals” reported that the drones had killed numerous civilians who were trying to help those who were previously targeted by drones. [7] A New York Times account of the Bureau investigation titled “US Said to Target Rescuers at Drone Sites” stated:

British and Pakistani journalists said Sunday that the C.I.A.’s drone strikes on suspected militants in Pakistan have repeatedly targeted rescuers who responded to the scene of a strike, as well as mourners at subsequent funerals. The report, by the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism, found that at least 50 civilians had been killed in follow-up strikes after they rushed to help those hit by a drone-fired missile. [8]

Anti-drone activist Clive Stafford-Smith, a lawyer who heads a British American charity called Reprieve, said that such strikes “are like attacking the Red Cross on the battlefield. It’s not legitimate to attack anyone who is not a combatant.” [9] Such reactions were typical among readers who doubtless envisioned the drones firing on responding paramedics and concerned civilians trying to dig fellow civilians out of the rubble of drone strike.

What most stories in the media that covered the Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s investigation did not report were the further details found on their website. This website analyzed the first “double tap strike” in depth and the report is telling. According to the Bureau’s site;

The first confirmed [drone] attack on rescuers took place in North Waziristan on May 16 2009. According to Mushtaq Yusufzai, a local journalist, Taliban militants had gathered in the village of Khaisor. After praying at the local mosque, they were preparing to cross the nearby border into Afghanistan to launch an attack on US forces. But the US struck first. (emphasis mine, BGW)

A CIA drone fired its missiles into the Taliban group, killing at least a dozen people. Villagers joined surviving Taliban as they tried to retrieve the dead and injured. But as rescuers clambered through the demolished house the drones struck again. Two missiles slammed into the rubble, killing many more. At least 29 people died in total. “We lost very trained and sincere friends,” a local Taliban commander told The News, a Pakistani newspaper. ‘Some of them were very senior
Taliban commanders and had taken part in successful actions in Afghanistan. Bodies of most of them were beyond recognition.’ [10]

In other words, the civilians killed in the above drone strike were assisting Taliban militants who had been “preparing to cross the nearby border into Afghanistan to launch an attack on US forces” before the drone struck them. The Taliban then bemoaned the loss of “some very senior Taliban commanders” in the strikes. The “villagers” who ran to the rescue were thus aiding and abetting active Taliban that the Pakistani, Afghan and US governments consider terrorists who engage in suicide bombings and other mass casualty outrages. In this context, it should be stated that the US government had dropped leaflets in the FATA warning local tribesmen that if they assisted the militants/terrorists they would share their fate. [11] And make no mistake it is the Taliban and Al-Qaeda that the drones are targeting.

A study by the Jamestown Foundation demonstrated that the vast majority of those who are killed in drone strikes are militants and only 5% of those killed were civilians. [12] A study by the Long War Journal similarly found that there have been 2,507 militants slain in drone strikes in Pakistan and just 153 civilians. [13] A study by the New America Foundation similarly found that in 2010 approximately 5% of those killed in drone strikes were civilians. [14] Thus the odds are high that those being dug out of the rubble from drone strikes are Taliban or Al Qaeda militants/terrorists, not civilians.

In addition, in many, if not most, cases, those who are removing the victims from the rubble are themselves Taliban (there are very few if any EMT paramedics or first responders in this undeveloped area). The first responders are not, as the Living Under the Drones report states, “average civilians.” The Taliban militants are the de facto authorities in most the targeted regions (most notably North and South Waziristan) so this is not surprising.

This point can be easily demonstrated. For example, there are numerous reports of the Taliban “cordoning off” drone strike zones and “conducting recovery operations.” [15] A typical account of such a recovery operation reads “A local resident said he was woken by two loud explosions around 4 a.m. on Thursday. Militants rushed to the site immediately after the attack to clear the rubble and retrieve the bodies, he said, speaking on the condition of anonymity.” [16] A second source states, "Eight militants were killed and two wounded. Militants have surrounded the (targeted) compound and are removing the dead bodies." [17] A third report similarly states “First a volley of four missiles hit a compound in the village of Mizar Madakhel. After Taliban fighters cordoned the area and began to recover bodies, a second volley was fired. Initial reports indicated that 12 Taliban fighters were killed.” [18] A fourth report of the aftermath of a drone strike on May 30, 2013, which killed Wali ur Rehman, the number two in the Pakistani Taliban hierarchy, states “A local resident, reached by phone, said that shortly after the strikes, three pickup trucks carrying fighters rushed to the site to retrieve bodies and look for wounded militants.” [19] Another local Pashtun source claims “The reason why these estimates about civilian ‘casualties’
in the US and Pakistani media are wrong is that after every attack the terrorists cordon off the area and no one, including the local villagers, is allowed to come even near the targeted place. The militants themselves collect the bodies, bury the dead and then issue the statement that all of them were innocent civilians.” [20] A BBC story similarly reported “Officials say that local Taliban militants immediately cordoned off the [strike] area and closed the road in the aftermath of the attack.” [21]

There are many such accounts in the Pakistani press which make it clear that the Taliban have a policy of cordonning off drone strikes impact zones as they are moving to assist or retrieve their wounded or dead comrades. It is, by contrast, all but impossible to find reports in the Pakistani press of average civilians rushing to the scene of a drone strike on Taliban terrorists/insurgents to help out wounded militants or retrieve their bodies. So well known is the Taliban’s propensity to cordon of areas where their comrades have been killed or wounded in a drone strike that a FATA-based Pakistani official even offered the Americans some advice on how to kill more Taliban using drones. According to Al Jazeera “He explained that after a strike, the terrorists seal off the area to collect the bodies; in the first 10-24 hours after an attack, the only people in the area are terrorists. You should hit them again - there are no innocents there at that time." [22]

Clearly the CIA has taken the above advice and, based on numerous precedents where the Taliban have rushed to the scene of drone attacks to save their buried or wounded comrades, begun targeting those who arrive at drone strike locations to rescue wounded militants or retrieve the bodies of their comrades. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism must have realized that in the vast majority of cases those who are killed or wounded in CIA drone strikes are themselves Taliban and that those who are killed in follow up strikes on those trying to rescue or retrieve their comrades are more than likely Taliban. Yet they chose to completely omit this important detail in their scathing report which was widely picked up by the media.

Regardless of the actual facts, the notion that CIA drones strikes deliberately target “average civilian” first responders for extrajudicial execution has become one of the more enduring myths of the drone war and has certainly helped shape the perception that the drone strikes are beyond the pale of humanity. In this respect this policy could, for all of its effectiveness in targeting militant responders who are aiding their comrades and thus dissuading villagers from assisting wounded Taliban, end up being a prime recruiter for the enemy.

About the Author: Brian Glyn Williams is Professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth and author of ‘Predators. The CIA’s Drone War on Al Qaeda.’ (Washington DC, Potomac Press, 2013) and numerous articles on drone strikes in Pakistan which can be found on his interactive website at: brianglynwilliams.com. He has considerable field experience in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia, including research in the tribal areas on the Af/Pak border.
Notes


[2] Ibid.


[5] Ibid., page 89.


[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.


III. Resources

230 Websites and Blogs for Terrorism Research

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Abstract

This resource collection lists 230 websites and blogs which are deemed to be valuable information sources for serious researchers in the field of (counter-) terrorism studies. The first part lists websites run by academic, governmental, non-governmental, and private institutes, organisations, companies, as well as individual experts. The second part of the collection comprises blogs, many of them containing analyses of primary source materials as well as up-to-date news.

Introduction

The following resource collection lists 230 websites and blogs that are likely to be useful for students, researchers, and professionals in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism. It is update as of end of May 2013. The first part comprises websites run by a broad spectrum of actors in the field, including academic, governmental, and private institutes, organisations, companies, and individual experts. Many of the sites contain so-called “Grey Literature”, i.e., non-conventional publications such as reports, working papers, or research briefs. Generally, grey literature is often harder to locate than conventional literature (such as journal articles or books) because it is “neglected by most library catalogs and databases”[1]. It encompasses a broad range and variety of materials. Many of the publications are original, covering topics in a thorough, in-depth fashion – often surpassing in length conventional journal articles. To find publications at a particular website, researchers are advised to search for the relevant section (often entitled “Publications”), which can be retrieved either by browsing or via the site map. A Google search with the site operator (e.g.: publications site : ctc.usma.edu) may also deliver satisfactory results.

The second part of this resource collection covers blogs maintained by terrorism experts. In the dynamic field of terrorism research, blogs are an invaluable information source as they provide users topical and thematic information. Many terrorism research blogs publish well-founded analyses of primary source materials (e.g., statements, video, and audio publications by terrorist organisations), point to news sources or expert literature and also provide links to additional relevant websites (so-called “Blogroll”). Several bloggers in the field run accompanying Twitter accounts where they tweet news headlines and information on newly released publications by terrorist and counter-terrorist organisations, enabling readers to track events in nearly real-time.
The resources assembled here were identified by scanning a variety of information sources such as bibliographies, institutional resource guides and expert blogs. Like every hand-searched resource collection, this one reflects subjective choices. Since the information requirements of researchers differ, the present resource list should not be used as single source for website and blog retrieval in the wide interdisciplinary field of terrorism studies. Especially for disciplinary sub-topics, researchers are advised to look out for additional online resources tailored to their specific needs. Readers should also keep in mind that this list focuses mainly on English-language resources. However, there is a growing amount of Internet resources available in other languages for those who have the necessary language skills.

**Websites**

Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), The  
[http://aan-afghanistan.com](http://aan-afghanistan.com)

Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD)  
[https://www.aivd.nl](https://www.aivd.nl)

American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Critical Threats  
[http://www.criticalthreats.org](http://www.criticalthreats.org)

Analytic Services Inc.  
[http://www.anser.org](http://www.anser.org)

Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (AI Lab)  
[http://ai.arizona.edu](http://ai.arizona.edu)

Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)  
[http://www.ahrc.ac.uk](http://www.ahrc.ac.uk)

Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)  

Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (ACIPSS)  
[http://www.acipss.org](http://www.acipss.org)

Bangladesh Centre for Terrorism Research (BCTR)  

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs  
[http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu)

Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC)  
[http://bipartisanpolicy.org](http://bipartisanpolicy.org)

Brookings Institution, The  
[http://www.brookings.edu](http://www.brookings.edu)
CATO Institute – Foreign Policy and National Security
http://www.cato.org/research/foreign-policy-national-security
CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter
http://www.cbrne-terrorism-newsletter.com
Center for American Progress – Terrorism
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/terrorism/view
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
http://www.cnas.org
Center for Applied Counterterrorism Studies
https://securitystudies.uncc.edu
Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS)
http://www.fhs.se/en/research/research-centres-and-programmes(center-for-asymmetric-threat-studies
Center for Asymmetric Warfare (CAW)
http://www.cawnps.org
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)
http://cisac.stanford.edu
Center for Security Research and Technologies (CSRT)
http://www.uml.edu/Research/CSRT
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
http://sis.org
Center for Strategic Communication (CSC)
http://csc.asu.edu
Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS)
http://www.cetisresearch.org/index.html
Center for Terrorism Law (CTL)
https://www.stmarytx.edu/academics/law/centers/ctl
Center for Unconventional Security Affairs (CUSA)
http://www.cusa.uci.edu
Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC)
www.ccc.nps.navy.mil
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC)
http://www.globalct.org
Center on Law and Security, The – NYU School of Law
http://www.lawandsecurity.org
Center on Terrorism, The – John Jay College
http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/centers/terrorism/index.php
Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CTIW), The
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CTIW/index.html
Centre for Advanced Security Theory (CAST)
http://cast.ku.dk
Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS)
http://www.caps.af
Centre for International and Strategic Analysis (SISA)
http://strategiskanalyse.no
Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT)
Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation Processes (CIR) [discontinued]
http://cir.au.dk/en
Centre for the Study of Terrorism (CFSOT), The
http://www.cfsot.com
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (HCSTPV)
http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv
Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP)
http://ctcp.uow.edu.au
Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT)
http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/index.htm
Charity & Security Network (CSN)
http://www.charityandsecurity.org
Chatham House
http://www.chathamhouse.org
Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST), The
http://cpost.uchicago.edu
CNA
http://www.cna.org
Combating Terrorism Center (CTC)
http://www.ctc.usma.edu
Committee on Homeland Security
http://homeland.house.gov
Consortium for Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CCFT)
http://www.c-cft.org
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
http://www.cfr.org
Counter Agro Terrorism Research Center (CATRC)
http://www.catrc.org.il
Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG)
http://www.medicine.virginia.edu/clinical/departments/psychiatry/sections/cspp/ciag
CTC Leiden, Database Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Radicalization
http://www.terrorismdata.leiden.edu
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
http://www.diis.dk
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), The
http://www.dtic.mil
Demos – Violence and Extremism
http://www.demos.co.uk/violenceandextremism
Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft Vorderer Orient für gegenwartsbezogene Forschung und Dokumentation e.V. (DAVO)
http://www.davo1.de
Digital Islam
http://www.digitalislam.eu
FATA Research Centre (FRC)
http://www.frc.com.pk
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), The – Terrorism
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) – Congressional Research Service Reports on Terrorism
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/index.html
Flashpoint Partners
http://www.flashpoint-intel.com
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
http://www.fpri.org
Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI)
http://www.ffi.no
Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD)
http://www.defenddemocracy.org
Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT)
http://insct.syr.edu
Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict (ISAC)
http://www.asymmetricconflict.org
Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG)
http://www.isvg.org
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS)
http://www.ipcs.org
Institute of Terrorism Research and Response (ITRR)
http://www.terrorresponse.org
Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (IFSH)
http://www.ifsh.de
Institut für interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung (IKG)
http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg
IntelCenter
http://www.intelcenter.com
INTELWIRE
http://www.intelwire.com
International Assessment and Strategy Center (IASC)
http://www.strategycenter.net
International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP), The
http://www.iacsp.com
International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS)
http://www.potomacinstitute.org/international-center-for-terrorism-studies
International Center for the Study of Terrorism (ICST)
http://www.icst.psu.edu
International Center of Terror Medicine (ICTM)
http://www.terrormedicine.com
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)
http://www.icct.nl
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), The
http://www.pvtr.org
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), The
http://icsr.info
International Crisis Group (ICG)
http://www.crisisgroup.org
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)
http://www.ict.org.il

International Relations and Security Network (ISN ETH Zurich)
http://www.isn.ethz.ch

International Relations and Security Network (ISN ETH Zurich) / Partnership for Peace (PfP) –
Learning Management System (PfP LMS)
https://pfp.ethz.ch

International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO)
http://www.isodarco.it/index.html

Internet Haganah

Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT), The
http://www.investigativeproject.org

Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies (ITSTIME)
http://www.itstime.it

James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy
http://www.bakerinstitute.org

Jamestown Foundation, The
http://www.jamestown.org

Jihadismstudies.net
http://www.jihadismstudies.net

Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Berlin, Germany
http://www.berlin.de/sen/inneres/verfassungsschutz/index.html

Manhattan Institute for Policy Research (MI)
http://www.manhattan-institute.org

Maritime Terrorism Research Center
http://www.maritimeterrorism.com

(George C.) Marshall European Center for Security Studies
http://www.marshallcenter.org

Mediterranean Council for Intelligence Studies (MCIS)
http://www.mcis-edu.org

Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, (MIPT)
https://www.mipt.org

Michael Scheuer's Non-Intervention.com
http://non-intervention.com
MICROCON
http://www.microconflict.eu
Middle East and North Africa Research Group (MENARG)
http://www.menarg.ugent.be
Middle East Forum (MEF)
http://www.meforum.org
Middle East Institute (MEI)
http://www.mei.edu
Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), The
http://www.memri.org
Middle East Observatory (MEO)
http://www.meobservatory.com
Middle East Virtual Library (MENALIB), The
http://ssgdoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de
Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP)
http://www.miis.edu/academics/researchcenters/terrorism
Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV)
http://www.nctv.nl
National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE)
http://create.usc.edu
National Center on the Psychology of Terrorism (NCPT)
http://www.terrorismpsychology.org
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), The
http://www.start.umd.edu/start
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
http://www.nctc.gov
National Terrorism Preparedness Institute (NTPI)
http://terrorism.spcollege.edu
NEFA (Nine Eleven Finding Answers) Foundation, The
http://www.nefafoundation.org [discontinued]
NEIL DOYLE
http://neildoyle.com
Netzwerk Terrorismusforschung
http://www.netzwerk-terrorismusforschung.de
New America Foundation – Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative
http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net
NSI
http://www.nsiteam.com
Österreichisches Institut für internationale Politik (OiIP)
http://www.oiiap.ac.at
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
http://san-pips.com
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)
http://www.prio.no
Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research, Inc. (PIPVTR)
http://pipvtr.com
Phil Taylor's Web Site
http://ics-www.leeds.ac.uk/papers/index.cfm?outfit=pmt
Policypointers.org – Defence, Terrorism & Security
http://www.policypointers.org/PolicyAreas/Item/Defence_terrorism_and_security
Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM)
http://www.e-prism.org
Project on Violent Conflict (PVC)
http://www.albany.edu/pvc/index.shtml
Quilliam Foundation
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org
RAND Corporation – Terrorism and Homeland Security
Real Instituto Elcano (RIE)
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org
registan
http://registan.net
Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS)
http://www.rieas.gr
Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) – Mathematical and Computational Methods in Counterterrorism
http://www.rit.edu/cos/sms/cmmc/index.php
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
http://www.rusi.org
Russia-Eurasia Terror Watch (RETWA)
http://www.retwa.com
Security Explorer
http://www.security-explorer.de
SITE Intelligence Group
https://www.siteintelgroup.com
Social Science Research Network (SSRN)
http://www.ssrn.com
Society for Internet Research (SOFIR)
http://www.sofir.org
Society for Terrorism Research (STR)
http://www.societyforterrorismresearch.org
South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG)
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
http://www.rsis.edu.sg
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
http://www.swp-berlin.org
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
http://www.sipri.org
Supranational Criminology
http://www.supranationalcriminology.org
Teaching About Terrorism
http://www.teachingterror.com
Terrorism and Political Violence Association (TAPVA)
http://tapva.com
Terrorism & Preparedness Data Resource Center (TPDRC)
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/TPDRC
Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC)
http://www.trackingterrorism.org
Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College (TRC)
http://trc.uark.edu/index.php
Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC)
http://tracec.gmu.edu
Terrorism Watch & Warning
http://www.terrorism.com
Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law (TTSRL)
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu

94

June 2013
Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security (TCTHS)
http://tcths.sanford.duke.edu
United States Institute of Peace (USIP)
http://www.usip.org
University of Warwick / Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) – New Security Challenges
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/newsecurity
US Army War College (USAWC) / Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil
USC Center on Public Diplomacy
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org
U.S. Department of State – Country Reports on Terrorism
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rls/crt
Violent Intranational Political Conflict & Terrorism (VIPCAT) Research Laboratory
http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/vipcat/index.php
Washington Institute, The
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org
Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center (WHEMSAC)
http://whemsac.fiu.edu

Blogs
Abu Muqawama
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama
Abu Susu's Blog
http://www.abususu.blogspot.de
Activism, Religion & Media
http://research.carmenbecker.net
AfPak Channel, The
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com
Albar Sheikh
http://albarsheikh.com
All Eyes on Jihadism
http://alleyesonjihadism.wordpress.com
All Things Counter Terrorism
http://allthingscounterterrorism.com
About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., studied Information Science and New German Literature and Linguistics at the Saarland University (Germany). Her doctoral thesis dealt with Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents. Currently she works in the research & development department of the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID) (http://www.zpid.de). She also serves as Editorial Assistant for ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.

Notes

Literature on Refugee Situations (including Internally Displaced Persons) and Terrorism (incl. other forms of Political Violence and Armed Conflict)

Compiled and selected by Eric Price

NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterix [*] only have a clickable table of contents.

Monographs & Edited Volumes (published since 1979).


99


Rashid, S. (2010) *Once a happy valley* Pakistan: Church World Service


**Non-conventional Literature**


PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM  Volume 7, Issue 3


Prime Journal Articles
Abdel-Khalek, A.: Neither Altruistic Suicide, nor Terrorism but Martyrdom: A Muslim Perspective Archives of Suicide Research 8 (1, January–March) 2004 pp.99-113


Brundtland, G.H.: Mental health of refugees, internally displaced persons and other populations affected by conflict Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 102(3, October) 2000 pp.159-61


Crpeau, F.: Anti-Terrorism Measures and Refugee Law Challenges in Canada Refugee Survey Quarterly 29 (4) 2011 pp.31-44

Curtis, F. & Mee, K.J.: Welcome to Woodside: Inverbrackie Alternative Place of Detention and performances of belonging in Woodside, South Australia, and Australia Australian Geographer


Drury, J. & Williams, R. Children and young people who are refugees, internally displaced persons or survivors or perpetrators of war, mass violence and terrorism Current Opinion on Psychiatry 25(4, July ) 2012 pp.277-84


Friedman, A.: The psychiatric effects relating to the war in former Yugoslavia: psychiatric disorders and psychosocial problems in residents and refugees from former Yugoslavia in Austria European Psychiatry 12 (3) 1997 pp.122p.


Hayes, R. J.: "A Free Black Mind is a Concealed Weapon" Institutions and Social Movements in the African Diaspora Souls 9 (3, July) 2007 pp.223-234

Jeff, V. (et al.) Psychological Factors Associated with Support for Suicide Bombing in the Muslim Diaspora Political Psychology 33 (6, 1 December) 2012 pp.791-809

King-Irani, L.: Exiled to a liminal legal zone: are we all Palestinians now? Third World Quarterly 27 (5) 2006 pp.923-936

Kinzie, J.D.: Some of the Effects of Terrorism on Refugees Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma 9 (3-4) 2005 pp. 411-420 [*http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1300/J146v09n03_12#.UYe3bqJTB8E]


Sidel, V.: War, terrorism and the public's health *Medicine, Conflict and Survival* 24 (1) 2008 pp. 13-25


Sirseloudi, Matenia The Meaning of Religion and Identity for the Violent Radicalisation of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24 (5, 1 November) 2012 pp. 807-824


See also resources on the Internet:


*Journal of Refugee Studies* – University of Oxford [http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/jrs]

Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence [http://www.massviolence.org]


*Studies in Forced Migration* – University of Oxford [http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/studies-in-forced-migration]

About the Compiler: Eric Price is a Professional Information Specialist who for many years worked for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since his retirement he works as an Editorial Assistant for Perspectives on Terrorism.
IV. Book Reviews

Counterterrorism Bookshelf

Reviews by Joshua Sinai

The following are capsule reviews of important books recently published on terrorism and counterterrorism-related topics.


The contributors to this edited volume examine in a comprehensive manner all aspects of the Taliban’s insurgency in Afghanistan, including those related to Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. They examine issues such as the distinctions between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, as well as the fractures within each organization; how the Taliban recruits and moves its fighters into Afghanistan; the effectiveness of the United States-led counterinsurgency campaigns against the Taliban (including the impact of the drone strikes against Taliban operatives), as well as the tensions (but also, at times, cooperation) between the Pakistani security services and the Taliban. Also discussed are the political and religious forces shaping the Taliban’s insurgency in the Northwest Frontier Province.


A highly insightful discussion of the motivations of primarily Palestinian suicide bombers, especially women and children, and the male operatives who recruit and dispatch them on their martyrdom operations against Israel. The author, an Israeli criminologist and retired Lt. Colonel in the Israeli military, has spent many years interviewing Palestinian security prisoners at their jails, including the operatives whose suicide missions had failed, resulting in their long prison sentences. Fluent in Arabic and Arab culture, she was able to gain their trust and speak with them intimately. Their identities, as a result, are disguised (a disappointment for those who wish to follow up on these cases) – but readers will nevertheless benefit from the wealth of personal and operational details that are revealed by such first-hand field work.


An account of the evolution of the European Union’s (EU) counter measures against terrorism from the late 1970s until the end of the first decade after 9/11. Case studies discuss the EU’s
responses to international terrorism in 9/11 in New York and Washington, the attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005; the nature of the EU’s member-states’ security and counter-terrorism cooperation in light of the new directions in counterterrorism policies produced by these attacks. The concluding chapter assesses the effectiveness of the EU’s counterterrorism measures and suggests avenues for further theoretical and empirical research.


Drawing upon primary sources, the authors analyze the origin and evolution of the Haqqani network, the powerful guerrilla organization that fights alongside the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where it is based in the Waziristan tribal frontier. The authors provide extensive details about its role in the establishment of the global jihadi movement and Al-Qaeda in the early 1990s, detail how the network is organized (for example, like a traditional Pashtun clan, it is led by its founder, Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his son Sirajuddin Haqqani), how it raises funds to mount its insurgency, and also focuses on its links with the Pakistani intelligence service. Although densely written and overly academic in tone, and not as critical as one would wish in discussing an insurgent organization that ruthlessly pursues an agenda of anti-modernism and religious intolerance, this book is recommended for its comprehensive account of the Haqqani network.


The contributors to this important volume provide a detailed “how to” guide to conducting fieldwork in terrorism studies. As opposed to library research, field research entails numerous challenges, including ethical questions involved in interviewing former and (if possible) current terrorists (including those serving prison sentences) and traveling to dangerous conflict zones where terrorist groups operate. For academics, in particular, a major challenge is obtaining approval from their university review boards to ensure that their subjects will be protected from any future harm arising from the research. A further challenge, once a researcher is in the field, is whether to coordinate such research with local governments and their security services that may be monitoring them, including sharing the results of one’s findings with them. To answer these and other questions, the editor has brought together top experts in the field who explain how to utilize different disciplines and methodological approaches, as well as the crucial regional specializations that are necessary to conduct such field research. The volume is well organized, with each contributor providing a road-map to their own research, describing planning and preparation phases, the formalities involved in getting into conflict zones and gaining access to sources. Providing such a practical guide makes this volume essential for all those involved in conducting research on terrorism.

The contributors to this innovative volume discuss the use of terror by states since the end of the Cold War. Case studies include Saddam Hussein’s campaign against the Kurds, Indonesian terror against East Timor, and terror in Rwanda in 1994, as well as the nature of the international responses to these campaigns. The concluding chapter discusses how the late Paul Wilkinson’s books on these issues, such as Terrorism versus Democracy, apply to advancing current thinking on these issues.


This is one of the finest and most important handbooks written on the discipline of terrorism investigations. It discusses what investigators need to know about terrorism in terms of how terrorism is defined from an investigator’s perspective, the different categories of terrorist groups, including religiously-based terrorism, how terrorists operate and how they differ from other types of criminals, what terrorists attempt to know about law enforcement (for instance, by reading security-related manuals about them), effective interrogation techniques to be used against those who are apprehended, how to create and maintain databases on terrorist suspects to aid in investigations, conducting undercover surveillance of suspects, using informants, managing terrorist incidents once they occur, including collecting physical evidence at such sites, and how to prepare prosecutable cases against terrorist suspects. The author is a former FBI agent who conducted numerous terrorist investigations, so readers will greatly benefit from his extensive practitioner knowledge of counterterrorism.


The author is an associate professor at the University of Massachusetts, Lowell, and co-editor of “Perspectives on Terrorism.” In this volume, he has assembled his class lectures to comprehensively discuss and explain the history of terrorism, its root causes, how terrorist groups organize, as well as the frameworks that analysts use to determine the scope of a terrorist threat. Divided into four parts, the chapters cover topics such as definitions, the history of terrorism, underlying contexts that motivate and facilitate terrorism, such as grievances, the process of radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism, terrorism and the internet, financial and criminal dimensions, different categories of terrorist groups, tactics and weapons, and the components of effective counterterrorism.

This is a comprehensive examination by leading academic experts of the conducive environments and interactions between international organised criminal and terrorist networks. A majority of such interactions take the form of temporary organisational alliances (what is termed “customer-supplier relationships”) over a specific type of transaction, such as document fraud or smuggling humans, drugs or weapons across a particular border. In the process, the contributors point out, organized criminal and terrorist networks collaborate, share knowledge and learn from each other which serve to expand and upgrade their operational capabilities. The book contains broad conceptual articles, historical analyses as well as case studies that highlight different facets of the intersection between crime and terrorism. Understanding the variety of these relationships’ dynamics at the individual, organisational, and contextual levels sheds light on understanding the magnitude and types of security threats posed by the interactions between terrorists and criminal networks and how to respond to such threats more effectively.


A collection of articles by experts in homeland security, terrorism and counterterrorism studies (including a chapter by this reviewer). Chapters cover topics such as defining the terrorist threat, the nature of homeland security, responding to the threat through organisational resilience at the federal, state, and local levels, the relationship between public security and civil liberties, and challenges in homeland security, such as lessons from other countries in preventing natural catastrophes and terrorism.


A study of the origins and motivations underlying terrorism, which are not assumed to be merely “metaphysical creeds.” The author explores terrorism as a form of “zealotry” throughout history, explains how terrorism is presented in fiction, the “metapolitics” of radicalization into terrorism, the “hybrid metapolitics” of religious terrorism, and Islamism as a “mazeway resynthesis.” The concluding chapter presents the author’s “rethinking” of the nature of terrorism. This is a well-written and interesting analysis, although one has to get used to the author’s terminology.

The contributors to this interesting and important volume discuss the evolution of terrorism and counterterrorism since the first historical wave of modern terrorism in the 1880s (although the first chapter by Richard Bach Jensen argues that the first wave actually started in 1905 and ended in 1914 – a point that is not addressed by the editors in their introduction). The chapters, which are written by prominent experts, cover terrorism conflicts and government responses in cases such as West Germany in the 1970s, France from 1968 to 1974, Italy in the 1970s and 1980s, Bengal, Mozambique, Chad and Libya. Also covered are Al-Qaeda’s terrorism campaigns and the United States response to terrorism. In such a selection of case studies, however, one wishes that other important cases would have been covered as well, such as Britain in Northern Ireland, Israel and the Palestinians and Sri Lanka and the Tamils. This would have shed important light on lessons learned in formulating effective counterterrorism campaigns. The concluding chapter by David Rapoport is of special interest for its discussion of his notion of the four historical waves of modern terrorism – although, disappointingly, it does not refer to the volume’s other case studies.


This is a comprehensive and detailed examination of al Shabaab, the preeminent terrorist organisation in Somalia. The author, a Norwegian academic who has conducted extensive field work in Somalia, discusses how al Shabaab began as an offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union and became an Al-Qaeda affiliate. Al Shabaab’s organizational success, the author writes, is due to its close links to local clan structures, to Somali clans in Kenya, and to diaspora Somali clans in Europe and America, from whom it recruits its “foreign fighters.” The book would have benefited from a chapter on the counter-measures by the Somali government (however weak) against it, as well as the measures by Western governments to monitor the activities of diaspora Somalis who travel to Somalia to fight for al Shabaab.


In this important study of the convergence between terrorist and criminal organizations, the author demonstrates how these organisations operate with a sophistication that is usually associated with multinational corporations, although, unlike legitimate businesses, their operations are clandestine and criminal in nature. The author, a retired U.S. Air Force Colonel, and an expert on national security, is well placed to examine how these issues intersect through the case studies of Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, FARC, drug cartels, violent gangs, as well as domestic U.S. groups such as the Sovereign Citizens.

The author, a former senior domestic terrorism analyst at the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A), presents a critical account DHS’ coverage of the threats posed by far-right terrorist and extremist groups in the United States.


An examination of the underlying causes that drive individuals to become suicide terrorist bombers and rampage shooters (i.e., active shooters). The author finds that, based on their suicide notes, love letters, diary entries, and martyrdom videos, such mass killers are driven to carry out their suicidal acts for reasons such as depression, anxiety, marital strife, or professional failure. Of special interest is the author’s typology of the four types of suicide terrorists: conventional, coerced, escapist, and indirect (when operatives, often unknowingly, will be detonated remotely by their dispatchers). Also of interest is the concluding chapter on how to prevent suicide terrorism.


The contributors to this important edited volume discuss the activities of the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood’s affiliates in Europe, where its missionary programs have gained considerable influence among the continent’s Muslim communities. Case studies examine the evolution of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe and the Middle East, the attempt by European Islamists to give the organisation a ‘European’ orientation, and the organisation’s activities in Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Germany. While one might not agree with some of the contributors’ assertions that the European Muslim Brotherhood has incorporated “democratization and secularisation” into its religious ideology, this is nevertheless a valuable collection of chapters about how this organization has managed to become a central force in European Muslim society.


An examination of the trans-border connections between ethno-nationalist and Islamist terrorist and criminal networks and the largely dysfunctional states in which they operate. Case studies include the PKK in Turkey, the civil war in Bosnia, militant nationalism and the “criminalized” state in Serbia in the 1990s, Islamist terrorism in Algeria in the 1990s, and the
state and crime syndicates in Bulgaria. Lyubov Grigorova Mincheva is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Sofia, Bulgaria, and Ted Robert Gurr is University Professor, Emeritus, at the University of Maryland, and author of the classic book “Why Men Rebel.”


The author is a retired officer in the Metropolitan Police Service in London, who had served in its Special Branch as head of the Muslim Contact Unit. Now, as an academic lecturer and researcher, he is in a position to write his inside account of the projects he had established to reduce Al-Qaeda-inspired extremism and terrorism in London by partnering Muslim community groups with police forces. These projects were so successful that they empowered the local Muslims to exile the Egyptian Sunni extremist preacher Abu Hamza and his violent supporters from Finsbury Park Mosque in North London and diminished the influence of the extremist clerics Abu Qatada and Abdullah el Faisal. This pioneering and innovative book is highly recommended as an important case study for counterterrorism and countering extremism practitioners.


Homegrown “lone wolf”-type terrorism has become a pervasive form of terrorist low-intensity warfare in Europe and North America, because it is difficult for organized terrorist groups to operate due to the effectiveness of governments’ counterterrorism measures. The author is a professor at the Air War College, and specializes in writing about “lone wolf” terrorism. In this authoritative study he discusses the spectrum of “lone wolf” terrorism together with “leaderless resistance,” another aspect of such warfare, in which small cells operate without the need for leadership by an outside organization. To explain this phenomena, the author discusses the evolution and strategy of such warfare, which are applied to the case studies of extremist far-right groups in America and Europe, including the Norwegian Anders Breivik, environmental and animal rights extremists, Islamist “lone wolves” such as Major Nidal Hasan, and the likelihood of such cells and individuals to obtain weapons of mass destruction.


An authoritative and informative “insider” account by a former high-level official at the CIA and FBI about how both agencies substantially upgraded their counterterrorism capabilities following the U.S. government’s failure to prevent Al-Qaeda’s catastrophic attacks on 9/11. It is a highly informative primer on the components that constitute effective counterterrorism. Mr. Mudd explains that a measure of success in counterterrorism is not merely “who [is] captured or...
killed…but whether operations [break up] plots and destroyed the networks that could sustain long-term training and planning resulting in another strategic strike.” Successful counterterrorism requires not only effective intelligence and military operations against terrorist networks, but solid analytical products to guide the nation’s top decision makers. As an “insider”, Mr. Mudd provides a revealing portrait of how the “threat matrix” – a snapshot summary of the threats facing the country on a daily basis – is produced, the difficulty of piecing together fragments of disparate intelligence information about terrorist cells and their operatives, how intelligence analysts attempt to be careful about prioritizing threats, since lots of unfounded rumors invariably make their way as “raw intelligence” – but all of which need to be considered, given the difficulty of penetrating terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda to uncover their imminent plots. With governments’ attention focused on understanding how the “homegrown” Tsarnaev brothers were radicalized into bombing the Boston Marathon, Mr. Mudd’s book also provides important insight on how the agencies examine the activities of individuals who are suspected of possible future involvement in terrorism. While a majority of those who are radicalized are clusters of “angry young men” who “think about doing something,” but never take action, the key to determining their proclivity to becoming terrorists, he writes, is to “Find the key players; find how they communicate; find their overseas contacts; determine their access to weapons, explosives, training; find who radicalized them, and who they’d radicalized.” Mr. Mudd’s “Takedown: Inside the Hunt for Al Qaeda” is one of those very few insightful books about counterterrorism that only a veteran practitioner could write, making it essential reading for those with an interest in this field.


This two-volume reference set is a comprehensive compilation of entries (to which this reviewer contributed three entries) on some of the primary issues involved in combating terrorism. The first volume covers issues such as defining terrorism and insurgency, case studies on significant counterterrorism campaigns around the world, and key issues affecting counterterrorism strategies, such as the psychology of those who become terrorists, countering radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism, curtailing terrorists’ funding, and intelligence, law enforcement and military countermeasures. The second volume presents overviews of the world’s top counterterrorism forces, chronologies of major counterterrorism operations, and profiles of major terrorist organisations and prominent terrorists.

An important and first-of-its-kind comprehensive and detailed account of how Al-Qaeda’s threat within the United States has evolved, by profiling all Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorists who were convicted in U.S. courts (federal and military) or who participated in suicide attacks against the U.S. homeland between 1997 and 2011. The authors profile 171 individuals by providing statistical analysis on their background (such as age, nationality, occupation, education and whether they were religious converts); data relating to types of offenses, type of charge and their subsequent sentence. Also discussed are individual connections to other known terrorists or designated terrorist organizations. In addition it studies those individuals who had received terrorist training or had combat experience.


This is an important contribution to the study of “lone wolf” terrorism, which has become a significant threat in the United States and Western Europe because of the difficulty organised terrorist groups face operating in these well-defended societies. Despite these hurdles, however, the author points out that the pervasiveness of the Internet is providing an ideal “breeding ground” for such isolated individuals with terrorist proclivities to be radicalized into “going operational” on behalf of violent extremist causes. It is important to note that these “lone wolves” are not just Islamist extremists, but are found among the spectrum of political and religious ideologies. Although few women have turned to “lone wolf” terrorism, the author suggests that this is likely to change in the coming years. Finally, although it is generally believed that little can be done to identify “lone wolves” prior to their attacks, the author finds that innovative strategies and policies, such as tracking their activities on the Internet, can be developed to prevent this type of non-organized group terrorism.


With the United Kingdom confronted by various types of terrorism for more than a century, its government has developed an extensive counterterrorism capability to counter such threats. This volume examines the evolution of these counter-terrorism measures through case studies on the threat posed by Northern Ireland (primarily the Provisional Irish Republican Army) and Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist operatives and through personal insider accounts by leading counter-terrorism policy makers, prosecutors and practitioners. The volume’s primary author, Andrew
Staniforth, is a former Special Branch detective, and its editor, Fraser Sampson, is Chief Executive and Solicitor for the West Yorkshire Police Authority, and a widely published author on these issues.


Germany has been threatened by terrorism since the 1970s, but in its formative period it was primarily the target of far-leftist militant groups. Beginning in the 1990s, however, as Germany’s Muslim population expanded, Muslim extremism began to take root in the country, exemplified by the Hamburg cell which played a major role in 9/11’s attacks against America. Since then, the militant Islamist threat has escalated, with German jihadists becoming, in the author’s words, “Europe’s most dynamic,” with many of them traveling to Turkey, Chechnya, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to join Al-Qaeda-affiliated forces. The author, a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, is considered one of his country’s leading experts on terrorism.


A textbook of how to systematically conduct academic research in terrorism studies through selected theoretical, methodological, and empirical approaches. This volume is part of a series of what are called “Critical Terrorism Studies” (CTS) - an approach that seeks to distinguish itself from more traditional “Terrorism Studies” (TS) by being more “critical” than the rest. Chapters include one on “Postcolonial and Feminist Approaches to Terrorism” and another on the “Ethnography of the Terrorist Subject.” The chapter on “Discourse Analysis” includes a discussion on “Critical and Poststructural/Foucauldian.” Despite the authors’ extensive use of jargon, the alternative analysis that is presented here is worth considering.


In this edited volume, the contributors explore the utility of what is termed the concept of “affordance” to analyze the underpinnings of terrorist-type political violence. This concept refers to “how the quality of an environment or object allows an individual to perform a specific action,” which in this case refers primarily to terrorist criminal behavior. Although the discussion is highly theoretical, the methodologies presented by its academic contributors are highly useful for those involved in counterterrorism studies.

In this edited volume, the contributors examine far-right extremist terrorism in America and Europe, beginning with the nature of the threat, their ideologies, how adherents become radicalised into extremist violence, and how some of the members of such groups can be influenced to disengage from violent activities. Case studies cover far-right extremists in America, England and Northern Ireland, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Anders Breivik’s attacks in Norway. A separate chapter compares far-right extremism with Jihadi violence. A concluding chapter places the European experience within the larger framework of the Arab Spring’s protest movements.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.

**Reviewed by David Hensel**

In February 2011, then-Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi attempted to blame the growing rebellion against his regime on Al-Qaeda, charging that its operatives had incited Libyan youths by putting hallucinogens in their milk and Nescafe. While Al-Qaeda leaders may have preferred to have a more dashing tactic ascribed to them than drugging teenagers’ coffee, they no doubt wished that their influence had been such a central cause of the uprisings against authoritarian governments throughout the Middle East and North Africa – what came to be known as the Arab Spring. Most observers and analysts agree that jihadist organisations had little to do with fomenting the initial populist revolts of the Arab Spring or Awakening (which initially were led by liberal-secular youth and/or economically-deprived sectors of society). Yet this dramatic shift in the Muslim world’s sociopolitical landscape created a pivotal moment with existential implications for Al-Qaeda and its associated movements (AQAM). In two recently published books, Arabinda Acharya and Abdel Bari Atwan assess the current state and future prospects of AQAM in light of these eventful times (which have included the killing of Osama bin Laden by the US military), as well as conducting reviews of AQAM’s organisational evolution and international counterterrorism efforts. While the two authors’ analyses overlap in many areas, their conclusions differ in important ways.

Arabinda Acharya, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, has written a wide-ranging assessment of the global jihadist movement and international attempts to combat it since the attacks on New York and Washington, DC, on 11 September 2001. He begins by outlining how the interplay between terrorism and counterterrorism during this period resulted in a “globalization of violence” that has grown to define much of the international security environment. After describing the organisational, strategic, and tactical characteristics of the modern jihadist movement, Acharya provides a conceptual and practical critique of the “global war on terror” before exploring a number of ideas about how conflict between the international community and AQAM might end. In short, Acharya argues that, although attempts to counter the jihadist threat have suffered many setbacks since 2001, AQAM is under significant stress. Successful counterterrorist operations have taken a toll on the movement’s leadership and organisation, and too many instances of indiscriminate violence by its operatives have led to internal dissention and loss of public support. Acharya suggests that the Arab Spring has strong potential to undermine jihadist credibility by demonstrating that political change is possible through non-violent means, and he asserts that international efforts at combating terrorism are back on track and beginning to yield positive outcomes.
Abdel Bari Atwan is editor-in-chief of the London-based, pan-Arab newspaper *Al Quds al-Arabi*. He personally interviewed Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s, and has maintained access to sources within the jihadist community over the last fifteen years. Atwan’s latest book is a very accessible (though sometimes personally colored) overview of AQAM, including an account of the movement’s development over time, an assessment of the impact of Osama bin Laden’s death and ongoing counterterrorist activities against it, and an appraisal of the challenges and opportunities that the Arab Spring presents for jihadists. Atwan argues that post-bin Laden AQAM is “stronger and more widespread than ever,” having evolved into a decentralized movement that is highly capable of resisting government attempts to quash it (Atwan, p. 13). It is sustained by a new generation of members who are even more radical and ruthless than their forbears, and who are motivated by grievances that they perceive to be undiminished. According to Atwan, rather than discrediting the jihadist movement, the unfolding Arab Spring has provided AQAM with opportunities for expansion by taking advantage of a strong Islamist preference among the people of the Arab world and by creating security vacuums that have enabled AQAM elements to acquire armament and safe haven territory. While a pragmatic AQAM may moderate somewhat and even enter the political process in areas where Islamists are likely to ascend to power, Western interference or political disappointment in transitioning Arab Spring countries could validate the jihadist worldview and stoke greater radicalism and public support for AQAM.

**Evolution and Survivability of AQAM**

The evolution of Al-Qaeda over the years from a relatively small, centralized cadre of operatives working under the direct supervision of Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants to today’s far-flung family of affiliates, associates, allies, and inspired followers is, by now, a familiar subject, and Acharya and Atwan give considerable treatment to this topic. Both authors note this transformation into a decentralized network, unified as much by ideology as by coordination, as a major achievement that has enabled the Al-Qaeda movement’s survival, despite significant attrition at the hands of international counterterrorism forces. This diffusion of AQAM’s organisational structure meant that, by the time of his death, Osama bin Laden’s role in the organisation was more as a figurehead than as an operational commander; therefore, rather than being a crippling blow, “bin Laden’s ‘martyrdom’ enhances his legend and has immortalized him as an icon, a role model and a rallying point for jihad” (Atwan, p. 13).

In his description of the “construction of the adversary,” Acharya outlines the characteristics that have contributed to AQAM’s growth and resilience over the last decade, emphasizing a organisational flexibility and a unifying ideology of religious absolutism in the face of perceived onslaught by the West and its allies. He highlights the debate among terrorism scholars over whether the jihadist movement has turned almost entirely to the “leaderless jihad” model described by Al-Qaeda ideologue Mustafa al-Suri, or whether Al-Qaeda’s more traditional organisational structures have persisted, and still play an important role in facilitating successful
operations (Acharya, pp. 41-47). Acharya also discusses how AQAM has refined its tactics over time, such as expanding into the cyber domain, prioritizing economic targets, and increasing focus on maritime operations (pp. 66-79).

Atwan places even greater emphasis on AQAM’s organisational history and development, dedicating much of his book to an explication of the process by which AQAM developed into a complex, dispersed-yet-interwoven organisation. He describes how Al-Qaeda leaders—Ayman al-Zawahiri, in particular—orchestrated the formation of a broad-based network of Al-Qaeda franchises, allies, and associated organisations, based on tribal connections, intermarriage, operational and logistical collaboration, and shared ideology. He likens the movement that resulted from this process to a mature tree, explaining that “[t]he problem for those prosecuting the ‘war on terror’ is that cutting off a branch (even big branches like bin Laden…) does little to weaken the roots which are nurtured by a fertile mix of grievances and aspirations” (Atwan, pp. 14-15). Atwan dedicates chapters to detailing the development of several major Al-Qaeda affiliate and ally relationships—Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Somalia’s al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and both the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans—and he provides shorter overviews of several of what he claims are as many as forty Al-Qaeda-connected jihadist groups (p. 212).

Despite the expenditure of more than a trillion dollars on counterterrorism efforts by the United States and its allies, Atwan argues that “the ‘war on terror’ has failed” (p. 32). He credits AQAM’s survival in the face of such determined efforts to destroy it to several causes. First, the size, complexity, and dispersion of the network make it very difficult to target in a strategically debilitating way. Most elements of AQAM have adopted horizontal leadership structures with established succession plans that enable them to weather the loss of key leaders, thus rendering ineffective the popular counterterrorism approach of “decapitation.” Second, the jihadists apply the ancient Islamic concept of *hijra* (flight or migration), switching battlefields or going into hiding when they believe they cannot prevail and biding their time to re-engage their enemy when they have an advantage. Third, AQAM effectively have incorporated surprise into their operations, whether in their pioneering use of simultaneous suicide bombings or their increasing success at recruitment from unexpected populations (such as affluent segments of society or native-born citizens of Western countries). Fourth, AQAM have greatly improved their intelligence collection capabilities over the years, colluding with or infiltrating law enforcement agencies in many Muslim countries (pp. 32-35). Finally, AQAM have become highly proficient at navigating the “digital battleground,” using the Internet to conduct clandestine communications, to recruit new adherents, and even to conduct cyber-attacks (pp. 238-239).

Another key element of Atwan’s assessment of today’s AQAM is the rise of what he terms the “next generation” of jihadists. These younger militants are less interested in Islamic scholarship, are technologically savvy, are more likely to include natives of Western countries, and have
benefited from the lessons learned over more than a decade of direct confrontation with the West. Perhaps most significantly, Atwan claims that the “new generation” tends to be more uncompromising and ruthless than their predecessors (a trait that has been recognized and commented upon by some senior members of AQAM as well) (pp. 263-264).

 Criticising the War on Terror

 Acharya and Atwan agree that, while the so-called global war on terror has achieved some success at causing attrition within the ranks of AQAM, in many ways the conduct of the war has been counterproductive, playing into the hands of jihadists by perpetuating the grievances that constitute much of their raison d’être and basis for recruitment. Civilian casualties resulting from drone strikes, perceived human rights abuses, crimes committed by “rogue soldiers,” and ongoing military incursions into Muslim countries have fueled discontent within the Muslim community, generating sympathy for the jihadist cause and eroding the standing of the US and its allies.

 Acharya takes a deeper look at the consequences of the ways in which the US and its allies conducted the war on terror, reviewing a number of practical and conceptual debates surrounding the topic. Acknowledging that a military response to jihadist attacks is a necessary component of counterterrorism strategy, he argues that these responses have been out of balance, and that over-militarization of attempts to combat terrorism (especially in the years immediately after 9/11) prevented the US and its allies from correctly identifying the need to address the grievances of the Muslim world in order to undermine support for the jihadist agenda and achieve a long-term solution to the conflict (Acharya, pp. 83-85). Acharya goes on to examine the societal impacts of declaring a “war on terror” and analyzes US strategy in light of just war theory. He concludes that escalating the fight against jihadists to the level of a “war” and adopting policies such as “preemption” unnecessarily raised the stakes of the struggle and had negative domestic consequences for Western societies, hurt relations between Muslims and the West, and weakened the overall international legal system (Acharya, pp. 85-94).

 The Future of AQAM

 Acharya and Atwan part ways in their predictions regarding the future of AQAM. Acharya takes the position that “there is no reason to believe that the jihadist movement will be a long or generational conflict…our fight against the jihadist threat appears to be on track as it begins to yield results, and we are increasingly getting back in control” (Acharya, p. xi). Atwan, on the other hand, commenting on the state of post-bin Laden AQAM, notes that “optimistic voices have fallen silent as the terror group and its allies return to the headlines, seemingly able to fight on several fronts at once and launch serial ‘spectaculars’ whilst posing a continual threat to the West” (Atwan, p. 257). The two authors differ in their assessments of the effectiveness of
counterterrorist efforts to dismantle the AQAM network, the significance of internal dissention within the jihadist movement, and the likely impact that the Arab Spring will have on AQAM’s status within the Muslim community. It is in these central elements that weaknesses in their arguments, and signs of possible arbitrariness, begin to appear.

**Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Efforts**

In support of his positively toned central thesis, Acharya asserts that “the jihadist movement itself is now under severe strain due to loss of organisation [and] decapitation of its leadership…” (Acharya, p. xi). As summarised above, however, he dedicates much space in his book to describing the ways in which the jihadist movement has evolved in ways that make it resilient and adaptive. In his chapter entitled “Ten Years After: Bringing the Conflict to an End,” Acharya fails to demonstrate that, despite the contrary evidence he himself presented in his earlier description of AQAM, international counterterrorism efforts have put AQAM up against the ropes. He points out, probably correctly, that many senior AQAM leaders have been killed or captured, that Al-Qaeda elements have greater difficulty performing operational and logistical functions, that they have failed to execute attacks on the scale of 9/11, and that a large number of planned attacks have been thwarted or resulted in failed attempts. In linking these factors to an argument that the Al-Qaeda network is fundamentally weak, however, Acharya relies largely on public statements made by American officials, including President Obama, but not on facts on the ground. (pp. 105-106).

To his credit, Acharya also offers a strong counter-argument to his own thesis, noting that “despite military attrition, the jihadist enterprise…has proved resilient” (p. 106). He goes on to cite an overall increase in the quantity of terrorist attacks around the world, continued recruitment gains, and worsening public perceptions of the war on terror within both Muslim and non-Muslim populations (pp. 106-107). In the end, it seems as though Acharya’s commitment to intellectual balance ends up undermining his ability to defend his own position. Based on the strength of his argumentation, at least, wishful thinking appears to have played a role in his selection of an overall conclusion.

As discussed above, Atwan flatly rejects the notion that the West’s counterterrorism efforts have been able to cripple the Al-Qaeda movement. He perceives that “AQAM seemingly has the resources to maintain a relentless onslaught…” (Atwan, p. 18). Rather than being marginalized and on the run, “Al-Qaeda remains deeply entrenched around the globe…[and] AQAM is an unprecedented phenomenon: a terror organisation with the clout—and many of the resources—of a state actor” (p. 267). His statements may be too strongly worded, however, considering the limited success that AQAM has had since 2001 in conducting attacks against its number one “far” enemy, the United States. At the same time, Atwan’s position is in keeping with his arguments that AQAM have contributed to disappointing political and military outcomes for the
US in Iraq and Afghanistan, that they continue to expand through productive recruitment, and are stepping up their activities against the “near” enemies of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes in the wake of the Arab Spring’s instability.

**Dissention within the Jihadist Movement**

Acharya devotes his concluding chapter to highlighting what he believes is AQAM’s greatest vulnerability: internal disagreement within the jihadist movement, and the related problem of dwindling support among the Muslim public. Referencing the widely publicized documents captured by the US military during the raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that resulted in Osama bin Laden’s death in May 2011, Acharya describes the growing friction between core Al-Qaeda leaders and the leadership of key affiliates and allies. The captured documents reveal that bin Laden and some of his senior lieutenants were frustrated by the actions of groups such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), AQAP, AQIM, al-Shabaab, and the Pakistani Taliban. Due to lack of operational discipline and, most importantly, a growing number of attacks that killed Muslim civilians, Al-Qaeda leaders worried that these satellite organisations were becoming liabilities to the overall movement, sullying the Al-Qaeda name and turning the Muslim community against it. A number of prominent Muslim clerics, including ones typically known to be sympathetic to the jihadist agenda, also have publicly denounced AQAM’s excessively violent activities. Acharya reinforces this argument by citing a number of polls conducted by respected research organisations that demonstrate waning support for radical Islam and widespread opposition to jihadist tactics within majority-Muslim populations (Acharya, pp. 121-125).

Interestingly, Atwan seems to shrug off the well-documented dissention within AQAM’s ranks. He briefly acknowledges it in his book, but does not identify it as a significant risk to the stability or longevity of the jihadist movement. Atwan mentions concerns within AQAM that the name “Al-Qaeda” may have gained some negative connotations over the years, but he portrays this as a mere branding challenge, rather than as a major threat to the movement (Atwan, pp. 261-262). Rather than discussing polls - such as the ones cited by Acharya - that reveal weaknesses in Muslim popular support for jihadists, he sticks to referencing polls that show growing antagonism towards the West, insisting that, across the Muslim world, there is a resurgent Islamist movement and a growing emphasis on the notion of a unified Muslim umma (community) (Atwan, p. 261). In light of Atwan’s puzzling decision not even to offer a counter-argument to well-known information suggesting a weakening of AQAM’s influence and popular support, it is hard not to suspect him of selective use of evidence.

**Impact of the Arab Spring on AQAM**

The Arab Spring’s uprisings against authoritarian rulers throughout the Middle East and North Africa apparently caught jihadists by surprise. The popular revolts threaten to undermine the
appeal and validity of AQAM’s ideology by demonstrating to the Muslim community that there is an effective path to social and political change by means other than violent jihad. It already is clear, however, that the democratic transitions envisioned by early protestors did not go as they originally had hoped. Unrest in Libya and Syria quickly degenerated into protracted civil war; the rebellions in Bahrain and Yemen were suppressed with the tacit or active support of the United States and Saudi Arabia; and even Egypt’s and Tunisia’s relatively peaceful political transitions have been characterized by conflict and frustration. The final outcomes of these tumultuous events have yet to be seen, but Acharya and Atwan present distinctly different views of the Arab Spring’s implications for AQAM.

Though elements of AQAM had little, if any, involvement in instigating the initial Arab Spring revolts, it did not take long for many Al-Qaeda leaders to begin expressing solidarity with the protestors and attempting to take some form of credit for the overthrow of authoritarian regimes which they had for years designated as the “near” enemy, yet had been unable to unseat. Acharya sees this as the desperate action of a movement that realizes that it has been dealt a serious strategic setback. He believes that, even if Islamist governments wind up rising to power, they will not represent the same sort of uncompromising religious absolutism that drives jihadist ideology. While it is true that AQAM elements may benefit initially from the chaos and power vacuums created by the fall of strong state security apparatuses, and disappointment may breed further radicalization among the populace if democratic transitions fail, Acharya argues that, on balance, the Arab Spring will prove to be disadvantageous for the jihadist movement. When combined with growing disapproval of jihadist methods within the Muslim community, the Arab Spring’s demonstration of possible alternatives to harsh jihadist prescriptions gives the people of the region more incentive to withhold their support from AQAM (Acharya, pp. 113 - 119).

Atwan considers the same range of possibilities for the Arab Spring’s impact on AQAM with the addition of one: active jihadist participation in the political process. He predicts that Al-Qaeda eventually will form a political wing (probably under a different name), and, given the right circumstances, sees this as the most feasible way in which elements of AQAM might give up terrorist violence as their primary modus operandi. As mentioned earlier, Atwan is convinced that the majority of the Arab body politic has Islamist leanings, and therefore is inclined to elect parties with which a pragmatic AQAM might be willing to interact peacefully. This turn of events would only be possible, Atwan argues, if Arab countries are able to develop their own unique government system - free from outside interference. Therefore, he believes that integration of the jihadist movement into a peaceful political process is extremely unlikely, due to the fact that “the West seems unable to refrain from involvement with the region’s efforts to reinvent itself” (Atwan, p. 260).

In the meantime, AQAM will continue to reap the benefits of the instability caused by the Arab Spring, capitalising on power vacuums in places like North Africa and Yemen to expand its
territorial control, establish operational bases and training camps, and procure weapons. Jihadists will insinuate themselves into ongoing resistance movements in places like Syria—if the conflict there is not resolved soon, which Atwan foresees as a novel replay of the Afghan-Soviet War of the 1980s in which the jihadist mujahideen end up fighting as proxies of the West (p. 258). AQAM also will stand by, ready to take advantage of opportunities for radicalization and recruitment of disillusioned Arabs who are angered by broken promises for democratic reform or by Western interference in Arab Spring political transitions.

Conclusion

Arabinda Acharya and Abdel Bari Atwan have written timely books that address a question that preoccupies policy-makers and analysts equally: what is the current state of the jihadist threat, and what are its prospects for the future? While the two authors agree in much of their analysis, they arrive at significantly different conclusions on some important points. Taken together, the two books provide a good overview of the range of current thinking on Al-Qaeda and its associated movements. Their points of disagreement, however, highlight the difficulty of assessing a complex, shadowy movement operating in a constantly changing global environment.

About the Reviewer: David Hensel is an officer in the United States Army, currently studying international affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.

**Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid**

This book, written by Jonathan Matusitz, Associate Professor in the Nicolson School of Communication at the University of Central Florida, discusses in 16 chapters the central role of communication in terrorism. It is advertised as the “first single-author core text to introduce how to understand terrorism from a communication perspective” (blurb on back-cover). It focuses, inter alia - to list some chapter titles - on the audience, on framing terrorism, the social construction of reality, stereotyping terrorists, interpreting terrorism through rhetoric, euphemisms for terrorism, diffusion of innovations and crisis communication. However, it goes beyond terrorism’s central communicative dimensions, also featuring chapters on terrorist group dynamics, organisational structure and leadership in terrorism, globalisation of terrorism and, closer to its main communication focus, hostage negotiations.

The author aims to provide a ‘critical introduction’ but he is, in this reviewer’s view, rather uncritical when it comes to accepting distinctions like “old” and “new” terrorism, the “old” one allegedly “striking only selected targets” and the “new” one “causing as many casualties as possible” (p. xvii, p.11). The latter statement also contradicts the author’s assertion that “…the goal of most terrorism is not killing but change….” (p.35). His allegedly “most universally accepted” definition of terrorism as “the use of violence to create fear (i.e. psychic fear) for (1) political, (2) religious, or (3) ideological reasons” (p. xvii & p. 4) is rather vague and broad. It is far from widely accepted and lumps together various forms of violence other than terrorism while excluding several types of terrorism, e.g. single issue terrorism, vigilante terrorism, and acts of terrorism perpetrated by criminals and lunatics. Regime terrorism is also excluded as Prof. Matusitz view of terrorism involves, “…in modern times…the killing of humans by nongovernment political actors…..” (p.2). On the other hand, he accepts amorphous terms like “media terrorism” which he uses to “….refer to media’s use of fear, whether the incidents are real or imaginary, to frighten and pressure the masses…..” (p.66). He further describes online radicalisations as a form of “techno-terrorism”, which he defines as “….terrorist means of satellite communications, e-mail, and the World Wide Web” (p.349) “Cyberterrorism”, in turn, he defines as “….the use of information technology to launch attacks and capture attention from the state” (p.352).

While there is plenty of cyber-crime, cyber-fraud, cyber-sabotage and cyber-hacking going on online, this reviewer has yet to see the first case of cyber-terrorism (defined in terms of the deliberate killing of civilians to impress, coerce or intimidate third parties by means of the Internet). Some of the contradictions in the author’s text stem from the fact that - while surveying a broad range of the literature on violence as communication - he is going along with various authors who head in different directions.
The volume is a large synthesis of much of the literature on terrorism and the media. That is its chief strength as a textbook. Yet at times the sub-chapter headings reads more like a glossary, explaining to the novice in the field a plethora of concepts and terms used by a great variety of authors in their efforts to come to grips with terrorism as non-verbal communication. On top of that, the volume features a 43 pp. glossary at the end. The amount of literature consulted is impressive: Dr. Matusitz book has almost 1,800 endnotes. Yet the volume has its shortcomings. If it were true, as Jonathan Matusitz states, that “…over the past few years, face-to-face-radicalization has been replaced by online radicalization” (p. 349), one would expect a greater focus on the role of the Internet; but only 13 out of 499 pages deal with that. Among the many views on the relationship between terrorism and communication reviewed in this volume, this reviewer has not been able to detect the author’s own “critical” position on various controversies. However, as a very readable textbook for undergraduate students, the volume serves its purpose very well.

About the Reviewer: Alex P. Schmid is Editor-in-Chief of Perspectives on Terrorism and Visiting Research Fellow with the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) in The Hague.
Syria – a Best Case, a Worst Case and two Most Likely Scenarios
by Philipp Holtmann

A decade after the bad seeds of sectarian conflict and instability have been firmly planted in Iraq, it takes little imagination to see them growing even worse in Syria. The mayhem in Syria defies every description: mass-murders and individual atrocities are committed every day and the domestic conflict is spilling over to most of its neighbors. Let us try to sketch a few scenarios; the worst, the best and the two most likely that may come out of the Syrian conflict.

A few preliminary thoughts: Syria is arguably the key that either opens or closes the gate of hell in the super-strategic Middle East region. Who controls Syria controls or disrupts the Shiite axis from Iran, via Syria to south-Lebanon and Hezbollah’s terrestrial supply route. With a democratically elected Shiite-majority government in power and again troubled by fratricide, Iraq is much now closer to this axis. If the U.S. manages to install a pro-American regime in Syria, it will have near-complete strategic control over the Levant and the Gulf (other U.S. full or partial allies in the Levant being Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, and further down the map, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states). The Syrian conflict bears – to use Mike Davis’ analogy - a Russian-doll-like complexity (“wars within wars”). On the ground, this fragmentation is a bloody and tragic affair, but on a strategic level it makes the region weak and also potentially uncontrollable. A highly complex web of alliances creates a diplomatic framework, within which small escalations can draw much bigger players into the conflict (possibly resembling the situation in 1914, when an assassination on a hot, sunny day in Sarajevo on June 28, triggered the First World War).[1] The millions of internally and externally displaced masses deprived through this destructive war could become, in Hanna Arendt’s sense, the receptive masses for the origins of a new totalitarianism.[2] Against this background, here are four scenarios.

The Best Possible (but Improbable) Scenario: National Reconciliation, Collective Trauma Treatment and Democratic Elections

The best scenario can be described in short, for it is the simplest, but unfortunately also the least likely one. Outside actors will refrain from direct intervention until the ammunition of the warring factions in Syria runs out. This might take between two and three years of further bloodshed if arms embargos against all conflict parties are strictly adhered to. In the end, there will be between 160,000 and 300,000 direct and indirect fatalities - the majority of them civilians. Foreign intervention plans will be suspended, since foreign powers have understood that the grand Arab trauma, reflected in the secular and religious narratives of modern Arabs, is the loss of sovereignty and imposed heteronomy.[3] The Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) is probably the historic event that most strongly evokes collective Arab feelings of humiliation and
betrayal: Before the end of the First World War, France and Great Britain secretly divided Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire among themselves, creating artificial (non-nation) states, and drawing the lines of borders across ethnic and religious affiliations.[4] This process is now being reversed almost one hundred years later. The “immense significance” of the present upheaval in Syria and the wider region is that throughout “the region the ethno-religious community is coming back, the European-style nation-state is disintegrating.” Especially the artificial states created by the colonial powers “with no consideration to ethno-religious realities” are hit hard by his process, with the result that “ethno-religious sects are uniting – against each other.”[5] Proposals, such as the one by US Republican Senator McCain to create a humanitarian corridor inside Syria, will thus be wisely discarded (courageously the former Republican presidential contender recently sneakied into northern Syria to have his picture taken with some of the rebels). After the war, multi-national peacekeeping forces will assist in the rebuilding of Syria, which will probably end up with a weak central government and quasi-autonomous sectarian and ethnic regions, as Michael O’Hanlon and Sean Zeigler have argued (“Civil wars and Syria: lessons from history”).[6] A return and resettlement of refugees will be accompanied by de-traumatizing programs, which are overseen by United Nations bodies and NGOs like the Children and War Foundation. The traumatologist David Berceli, for example, who has developed a simple, but effective method to release trauma through body tremors [Trauma Release Exercises (TRE)] will also participate with a team of several hundred skilled practitioners (among them also psychiatrists, psychologists, art-therapists and Alexander-Technique teachers). These programs can be applied to large numbers of people and will pave the way for the acceptance of country-wide truth-finding committees which work in combination with traditional local reconciliation mechanisms (sulh, musalaha, cem). The strongest shared factor of social cohesion will be popular culture. Mediators will assist in setting up cultural programs, which refer to values like reconciliation, solidarity, equality and progress. This will help to rebuild fragile social structures.

**The Worst Scenario: A Jihadi Super-region from the Euphrates to the Nile and all along the North African Coast and an Extremely Hot Cold War in the Middle East**

After the downfall of Assad’s regime and the dispersal of his forces, multiple Sunni-Jihadi factions will enter into fragile warlord-coalitions. This mobilises Jihadis in Iraq, Jordan, Yemen and Egypt eager to ignite civil wars in their home countries. Over the next ten years, a jihadi super-region will emerge that reaches from the Euphrates to the Nile and stretches all along the North African Coast, reaching south into the African Sahel region and beyond. Sooner or later, inner-political strife and civil war will also befall Turkey, one of the most important strategic partners of the West in the Middle East. The starting points of this development lie in Syria and in Tunisia.[7] A Tunisian-Syrian axis of Salafi-Jihadis has already emerged and causes a wave-like motion of Salafi-Jihadi currents from the east and from the west to converge in the middle, maybe in Egypt. Thus, after the Levant has fallen, North Africa will follow; first Tunisia, whose
Salafi-Jihadis have a major input in the Syrian war, then Libya (where the Jihadis of Mali regroup) afterwards Algeria and Egypt. In parallel, a massive Shiite-Sunni conflict will devastate the whole region to the east of the Mediterranean coast, especially in the Shiite Crescent that stretches from Lebanon via Syria and Iraq to Iran. Sectarian killings between Sunnis and Shiites and ethnic cleansing will be daily news. There are indicators that this process has already started in May 2013, when Shiite militias and Syrian government troops cleansed the Syrian village of Bayda and the city of Baniyas from Sunnis, killing hundreds of them. Turkey’s closeness to the Syrian conflict and its bridging role to Europe might make it a pathway for a massive migration of Jihad volunteers from Europe. They are either adventurers or truly feel that they have to demonstrate their solidarity with fellow Muslims. European countries with a high number of naturalised Muslim citizens will feel the repercussions of this development, when volunteers return battle-hardened from the Middle Eastern fronts, carrying the idea of global jihad ever stronger into European-Muslim communities.

Due to the involvement of other major players in proxy wars in the region, notably Russia and China, the United States loses its quasi uni-polar position and slides into a Middle Eastern Cold War. The U.S. plan to re-structure the Middle East and create ethnic minority states (divide et impera) backfires. One of the problems is that Russia knows with whom it wants to team up, while the U.S. and their allies cannot clearly decide whom to support, because they are trapped in dichotomous thinking - good democracy versus evil Salafism - which deprives it of real-politic strategic imagination. Other major Middle Eastern actors will come forward with unexpected strategies. For example, Iran and Pakistan, while supporting the Shiite-Sunni divide tactically on the ground, might disregard it on the geo-strategic level, because a common front against the West looks more important. Pakistan thus might join a Russian-Chinese-Iranian bloc that opposes the United States, its remaining moderate Sunni allies in the region and France and Great Britain. Saudi Arabia will be protected by U.S. forces, and Israel will entrench itself behind the concrete wall it claims it has originally built to hold back suicide attacks [8], unless some serious trouble is in the offing, in which case Israel will count on the involvement of the United States or use its own nuclear weapons if challenged in its very existence.

The First Most Likely Scenario: Assad Loses Power, Syria Breaks up into Different Regions with both Turkey and Israel being Badly Affected by the Consequences

After Assad has lost power, forced population displacements (ethnic and religious cleansing) will lead to the establishment of new territorial entities.[9] Older partitions of the Levant, such as the Ottoman administrative divisions, or the colonial patchwork of six separate mini-states created under the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, are superimposed from above. But new territorial entities will only superficially resemble this structure.[10] For example, the downfall of the Assad regime isolates Lebanese Hezbollah geographically from Iran, which encourages Israel to re-open its northern front. The Israeli pressure northwards will be met with
Hezbollah’s effort to establish a continuous territorial entity, together with Syrian Alawites near the Lebanese border and the approximately half million Arab Alewites in south-eastern Turkey at the border with Syria (not to be mistaken with Turkish Alevis, who have a different background). All communities that stand in the way of this constellation will be compelled to cooperate or will be suppressed and driven from their homes in campaigns of ethnic-/religious cleansing. As a result, the Lebanese state, one of the most fragile artificial constructs in the history of colonialism, breaks apart. Iran will be adamant that the new Shiite entity, which includes the remnants of Assad’s government forces, adopts the Iranian religio-political doctrine and drops the Ba'ath nationalist ideology.

A division of Syria into sectarian-ethnic enclaves may look attractive to outside players, but France, Great Britain, Russia, China, the U.S., Turkey and Germany will quickly see that this is no guarantee for more permanent influence. Proxies will frequently turn against their patrons and no deal will be good enough to secure true loyalty in the Syrian-Iraqi-Lebanese conflict zone.[11] Weapon smuggling across the borders of both countries is a lucrative business and will form the backbone of large organized crime networks. For many members of these networks, the sectarian factor will be irrelevant, as long as the arms are being paid in hard currencies and the cash flows. Chemical and possibly biological weapons of the former Syrian regime will be spirited away in the back channels of these criminal networks. With the increased involvement of Christians in the conflict, also the influx of international Christian volunteers into militant scenes in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq will become a fact. The violence against Christians in the Middle East (i.e. of the Eastern Rite) will lead to fighting alliances between Assyrian, Turkish, Arab and Kurdish Christians (Copts, Maronites as well as Orthodox) who organize their own fronts in the conflict. [12] Once more a regional conflict will be one (as in Lebanon between 1975 and 1991), in which members of the three monotheistic religions battle each other.

In this dangerous situation, Turkey needs to keep its own Sunni-Jihadis in check - those who hitherto trained and fought in Chechnya, Pakistan and Afghanistan.[13] Turkey’s best option is to continue to support the moderate Islamists among the Syrian Sunnis, but soon there might be none left. Turkey also wants to thwart alliances between Sunni-Jihadis and Kurds, such as can presently be found in the Turkish-Syrian border town of Ra's al-'Ain. Yet as the Turkish state becomes more authoritarian, public consensus at home breaks down and ignites a major secular opposition movement. Some of the myriad of extremist and terrorist groups, which existed in Turkey in the 1970s and 1980s, might revive and exploit this instability. As a result, Turkey will be drawn heavily into the conflict, facing dramatic domestic political changes. One possibility is that, as external and internal pressure grows, Turkey switches sides and joins a Russian bloc, becoming again friendlier towards Shiite powers and actors.

This situation is a downright encouragement for apocalyptically minded Sunni-Jihadis from all over the region to become heavily involved in the Syrian civil war and bring this civil strife
back to their home countries. For example, the Lebanese cleric Ahmad al-Asir has announced the formation of the Lebanese Sunni-Salafi “Free Resistance Brigades” (Kata‘ib al-Muqawama al-Hurra, KMH) in April 2013 in order to counter foreign and local Shiite forces in Syria. In addition, al-Asir vowed to revenge Hezbollah’s killings of Sunnis in Syria by attacking Hezbollah in Lebanon. Al-Asir is thus one of the many local sheikhs and clerics who use the theological argument of the 1980s Jihad ideologue Abdullah ‘Azzam: international participation in “the defensive jihad” of an attacked Muslim country is an individual religious obligation for every capable Sunni-Muslim. But in addition, al-Asir gives the theological command to Sunnis to “secretly form small groups of five to six in Lebanon, arm themselves and prepare for the struggle with Hezbollah.” This double strategy in Lebanon and Syria resembles the global jihad concept of Al-Qaeda strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (who was released from a Syrian jail by the Assad regime in early 2012!). It further ignites sectarian strife, causes anarchic chaos in the region, out of which new Islamic orders will arise, extending the reach of the Iraqi Al-Qaeda to Syria and Lebanon. It would be interesting to know who sponsors al-Asir. However, this is just a little detail. What matters most is the possibly disastrous spillover effect of this constellation. Put into practice, this means the combined effects of 1980s Afghan Jihad (internationalisation), the 1990s Chechnya, Bosnian and Algerian Jihads (with their excommunication practices and massive civilian killings), the present Iraq Jihad (brutalization and professionalisation of tactics including propaganda). According to Syrian president Assad, this is “a new style of war: terrorism through proxies.” In fact, we are speaking about dozens, if not hundreds of groups on both the regime side and the one of the rebels; and the most powerful groups which emerge at the moment are religious doctrinaire groups.

In this scenario as in the other three, one of the most likely spillover effects will be Sunni and Shiite attacks against Israel, which will be answered by air strikes. But there is a problem. Let us assume that Assad, before he left Syria with his closest entourage to an Iranian or Russian beach-resort, gave his Russian rockets as well as his chemical weapons to Shiite militias and Hezbollah. In addition, Sunni rebels, equipped with surface to air shoulder-fired missiles obtained from France and Great Britain might turn these against Israeli civilian planes isolating the Jewish state from its allies. In response, and going up higher on the ladder of escalation, in the plain words of an Israeli intelligence officer “If something serious happens to us, this time we will take all of them with us!” The question remains if this stops or motivates religious extremists, once they have acquired larger quantities of Sarin nerve gas out of Syrian stocks and the rockets necessary to deliver it. This could either open the door to an apocalypse or create a fragile deterrence equilibrium.
The Second Most Likely Scenario: Assad Retains Power and Re-opens the Golan Front for a Lengthy War of Attrition with Israel

Assad retains power but suffers huge territorial losses[18] and utilises Russian, Iranian and Hezbollah’s support to rebuild his influence in the region. He does by no means exercise the level of control prior to the break up of Syria. Basically, the whole center and east of Syria - large parts of which are unproductive desert - will no longer be under his control. Everything to the east of the Euphrates will be ungovernable, uncontrollable and unwanted: a safe-haven for militant groups and a new hotbed of Sunni extremism. Shiites in the West near the Mediterranean coast will be geographically isolated from Shiites in the East, in Iraq and in Iran. By re-instituting air supply lines and diplomatic support for Assad’s smaller but stronger power base, Iran gains more influence in the region. The Western bloc will concentrate on exerting influence in traditional bases in Turkey, Israel, Lebanon and Jordan.

The Institute for the Study of War argued in a recent report (“Iranian Strategy in Syria”) that the Syrian government does not need to keep control of the whole Syrian territory to play an important role in the region. “This combined force [remnants of the Syrian Army and pro-government militias], allied with Lebanese Hezbollah and Shi’a militant groups like AFAB [Liwa' Abu Fadl al-'Abbas], can continue to compete for limited territory within Syria and ensure that Iran remains able to project its force necessary to provide strategic depth and deterrence.”[19] This constellation will leave Lebanon intact, but Hezbollah will play a much more dominant role in Lebanese politics than it already does.

After Assad’s position has been stabilized, he calls upon volunteers from all over the Arab world to join the struggle against Israel. In this case, he plays the pan-Arab and Shiite cards at the same time.[20] The re-opening of the Golan front for a war of attrition will divert the focus away from Assad as major bogeyman and refocus hostility towards Israel. Assad will keep his chemical weapons supply as a deterrent against larger retaliation. Many Sunnis, especially foreign volunteers, will be likely to join, or at least, become more sympathetic to Assad. Hezbollah similarly tries to regain bonus points, which it earned among Sunnis through its battle against Israeli ground troops in the 2006 war, but lost - some say irrevocably - in the current Syrian civil war, when supporting Assad’s murderous campaigns, for example, in the taking and destruction of al-Qusayr. As long as the war on the Golan does not threaten the very existence of Israel, the United States will not intervene. After a while though, the U.S. might signal with aerial attacks that it is prepared to crush Assad’s stronghold for good (remembering the high costs of leaving Saddam Hussein in power in 1991 and ousting him at much greater costs in 2003). At this moment, Russia enters the game and risk, with its anti-air defences placed in the remainder of Syria, an intense air-confrontation. This show of force will either keep all major players at check and lead to a power equilibrium or the U.S. remains unimpressed and destroys Assads stronghold for good. This leads us back to consider the worst case scenario, or the most likely scenario 1,
Conclusion

The international Geneva II conference on Syria (following Geneva I of June 2012) – if it materializes[21] – is the last chance to bring the fratricidal conflict in Syria to a halt. If it fails, the Syrian conflict might well spread like a wildfire over the whole region. The future then becomes highly unpredictable while at this moment it still can to some extent be planned if the members of the Security Council with veto powers and the key players on the ground can come to terms. This should include Syrian civil society actors who have not taken up arms.[22] Moreover, a political deal can only work if the U.S., Russia, Iran, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are involved. One possible solution could be “Guiding Principles” based on the original Geneva text, to which all parties commit: “the territorial integrity of Syria; provisions for the political transition; cessation of violence; no further militarisation; and access for humanitarian aid.”[23] To achieve this, the United States should pressure Qatar and Saudi Arabia to exert influence on their Syrian proxies to agree to a ceasefire; they should invite Iran to Geneva II; and Turkey should return to its “good neighbour” policy and become the major diplomat between the fronts. [24]

The brave front which Obama, Putin and Cameron put up at the recent G8 Summit could point toward such a conciliation on the Syria issue. But there is no indication that a non-binding show of goodwill and the blatant disregard for facts on the ground will be a game changer. The Western bloc desires a “public act of capitulation by the [Syrian] government delegation followed by a handing over of power to the opposition," which Russia objects. This condition sounds like an illusion from a fairy tale, considering the diverging interests of the main players. If the G8 were really to reach an agreement without Assad that binds in Russia and non-G8 UNSC member China, then this would probably add up to drafting a UNSC resolution, a total arms embargo and a heavy military strike against the regime. Yet that would still not solve the problem that the seeds of Jihadi and sectarian warfare have firmly taken root in the region. This concerns, among other factors, the influx of international militants into disturbed and war torn ethnic-religious communities.

The scenarios sketched here indicate the great potential for mayhem if no cease-fire is reached. While none of the scenarios sketched above is likely to come close to what is exactly going to unfold in the months and years to come, they can nevertheless serve as eye-openers for the dangers ahead unless some settlement can be reached in the near future.

About the Author: Philipp Holtmann is an analyst specialized on the Middle East. He has lived and worked for five years in different countries of the Middle East. He does in-depth research on media jihad as well as on Muslim conflict and reconciliation issues and is a Research Associate.

Notes:


[3] Secular Arab nationalists, religious rebels and regime loyalists all hate the idea of foreign intervention into internal affairs; they foster prejudices against groups which profited from past interventions, such as the Lebanese Maronite Christians, when the French League of Nations Mandate power cut its part of “Greater Syria” (Bilad al-Sham in contemporary Islamist and Salafist terminology) into six pieces -(the states of the Greater Lebanon, Damascus, Alepppo, of the Alawites, of the Jabal Druze and the Sanjak of Alexandretta. The Syrian loss of the Golan Heights to Israel in 1967 adds to this, not to speak of the trauma caused by the Palestinian expulsions in 1947/48 and 1967.

[4] Before the end of WW I, as it became clear that the Entente would win, France and Great Britain divided large parts of the Ottoman Empire’s Arab territories among themselves (Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and parts of the Arabian Peninsula). The secret agreement was made public by Russian Bolshevists in 1917. The French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon after WW I was an outcome of an agreement negotiated between the French diplomat Francois Georges Picot and his British colleague Mark Sykes.


[7] Thousands of Tunisians are probably already fighting in Syria; they have the support of Tunisian Salafi-Jihadi clerics as well as the Tunisian government, which is eager to export its ultra-radical opposition abroad, similar to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. The theological underpinning for the “divine command” to join jihadis is provided by popular Sunni mainstream clerics, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who revives the doctrine of the pioneer architect of Al-Qaeda, Abdullah ’Azzam (1945-1989), and his call to join an international jihad.

[8] The border wall and fence have also created facts on the ground that thwart any fairly negotiated solution with the Palestinians.

[9] There are already strongholds of Shiites and old-regime loyalists in western and in south-western Syria at the borders with Lebanon and Israel, Kurdish enclaves in northern Syria, Christian enclaves at the border with Lebanon and in the center, as well as the Druze in the southwest of Syria. They will have to choose sides between the powerful Sunni or Shiite players. The Sunni-Shiite conflict may also force more Iraqi Sunnis and Christians to migrate to former Syria, Jordan and Turkey which will exert tight pressure on everyone involved, but especially on Shiite communities in eastern Syria at the border with Lebanon. Syria is a Sunni majority and Iraq a Shiite majority country. For decades the dictators in both countries were members of the religious minority. Assad in Syria is an Alewite-Shiite, and Hussein in Iraq was as a Sunni Muslim. This unequal constellation and the traumata caused by the former regimes will nurture a transnational Sunni-Shiite conflict. Both groups nurture
narratives of victimization and conspiracy against each other. Shiite militias from Lebanon, Syria and Iraq are already merging and operating together in Iraq and Syria. The same goes for Sunni groups.


[11] Russians, Iranians and possibly Chinese will have a much easier hand to play in order to exert influence on their hierarchically and centrally organized Shiite proxies than the West will have with the Sunni proxies. The U.S. will have to decide if supporting the Sunni-Jihadis is the lesser evil than allowing the creation of a more stable Shiite bloc. The other Lebanese and Syrian minority communities (Christians, Druze, Kurds and Yazidis) will cling to any opportunity or partner that promises to secure their existence. One example is the Sunni-Jihadi “Defence Front” (Jabhat al-Nusra (li-Ahl al-Sham - JAN), which is already splintering into a pro-global jihadi Al-Qaeda faction led by outsiders and locally oriented Islamist fighters. Fighters from less extremist groupings under the umbrella of the “Free Syrian Army” (FSA) are frequently defecting to JAN.

[12] There are an estimated 300,000 Iraqi-Christian refugees in Syria, who now find themselves under pressure in the new war zone. Also Lebanese Christian paramilitaries of the notorious Phalanges Party (Hizb al-Kata’ib al-Lubnaniyya) will not sit idle while their state disintegrates. The Phalangists became notorious in the Lebanese civil war for their massacres and brutality, weapons they buried after the Ta’if Agreement in 1991 will be quickly dug out and they might become military leaders of Christian alliances.

[13] Turkey wants to prevent a unilateral intervention in Syria without international consensus. However, a spillover of the conflict into Turkey’s territory, triggering the anger of Turkey’s Arab Alawites, is a nightmare for Ankara. The same goes for an escalation of the Kurdish question; Turkey wants to prevent at all costs the autonomy of the Syrian Kurds as this could become a stepping stone to a Kurdish state in the region. See Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Turkey and Syria’s Jihadis: More Than Free Passage?”, accessed June 10, 2013, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2013/130522A.html.

[14] At the moment, Sunni groups from Lebanon and Tunisians are getting more heavily involved in Syria, as well as Shiite groups from Lebanon, Iraq and Iran. Thousands of individual volunteers, often in small cells, are adding to this. In addition, the large Salafi and Jihadi scenes in Jordan are getting prepared to throw their lots into the militant sectarian lottery for power that wages throughout the region. We also need to keep in mind that the spillover to Iraq is in full swing. In April alone, more than 700 people died in terrorist attacks in Iraq, which is directly linked to the developments in Syria and reflects Sunni and Shiite extremists’ wishes to exploit the Syrian turmoil and to accelerate the spill-over of the Shiite-Sunni conflict to the rest of the region.

[15] His goal is first of all to battle Hezbollah in Syria and at home. But the fight of his group also included taking aim at the Abu Fadl al-’Abbas Battalion (Liwa’ Abu Fadl al-’Abbas, LAFA), which merges international Shiite groups in Syria (i.e. from the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iraqi Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the Iraqi Kata’ib Hezbollah.) Another foreign Shiite group fighting in Syria is the Iranian “al-Quds Force,” which has the mission to export Iranian-style revolutions abroad.


[17] Recently, pro Al-Qaeda rebels, allegedly in possession of considerable quantities of Sarin, were arrested in southern Turkey. At the beginning of June, the U.S. announced a shift of policy to arm the rebels over the alleged use of chemical-weapons by the Syrian regime. But rebels might also fake organophosphate poisoning and produce appropriate media footage in order to provoke this reaction. According to Jamestown analyst
Nicholas A. Heras, the U.S. are totally unclear if, for example in the battle of Qusayr, opposition or regime forces were using nerve gas. Thus, the U.S., according to Heras, is rather looking for the “systematic use” of chemical weapons, which would cross their red line. “Al-Qusayr: On the Road to Damascus,” April 28, 2013, accessed June 19, 2013, at http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidesyria/2013/04/201342872735993198.html.

[18] The regime’s power center remains Damascus. and it will foster a Shiite-Alawite belt via Homs, Hama, Aleppo, the mountainous coastal region around Latakia in northern Syria and stretches of territory towards the western banks of the Euphrates. The majority Sunni population in this territorial axis and the large Christian community in Aleppo will either be forced to cooperate or flee. Reports point into this direction, there are tales about sectarian cleansing in Sunni enclaves in the northern coastal region by pro-government militias, as well as stories on the buildup and training of a new Alawite “national defence force” with the help of Hezbollah and the Iranian al-Quds Force.


[21] The U.S. and their allies are trying to convene a second conference in Geneva to find a solution to the Syrian crisis. But not only the hosts of the Geneva conference have problems to find a common agenda and bind in the Russians, also the political and military wings of the Syrian opposition are deeply divided. The conference date was initially set for June 2013, but canceled for these reasons. At the same time, Iran boasts that it will shortly host an own conference on the Syrian crisis with more than 40 countries willingly attending.


Info-Box: The Syrian Conflict (2011-2013)

There are many frontlines within fronts and armed conflicts within conflicts in the Syrian war. Five levels - communal, local, national, regional and global – of these conflicts intermix and multiple militias fight these out. Patrick Cockburn correctly observed: “Five distinct conflicts have become tangled together in Syria: a popular uprising against a dictatorship which is also a sectarian battle between Sunnis and the Alawite sect; a regional struggle between Shia and Sunni which is also a decades-old conflict between an Iranian-led grouping [Hezbollah] and Iran’s traditional enemies, notably the US and Saudi Arabia. Finally, at another level, there is a reborn Cold War confrontation: Russia and China v. the West.”[1] Israel is an active party in this struggle and has a strong interest – now that the Assad regime appears weakened - to crush the Shiite axis that has been stretching from Iran via Syria to southern Lebanon since the early 1980s.

The United States might see here a new chance for its strategy to restructure the Middle East, force Iran to cancel its alleged nuclear arms program and secure American strategic influence in the Persian Gulf region for the future. Yet the U.S. and Israel find it difficult to decide what the lesser of two ‘evils’ is: Shiites or Sunnis. Their lack of decision is partly compensated by France and Great Britain; both appear more ready to rush forward in reversed colonial style, mixed with democratic enthusiasm, to provide weapons to “freedom fighters.” This is likely to bring about absurd looking quasi-alliances, which have yet to be tested. For example, support of Sunni-Jihadis may benefit the Israelis if it can crushes the Assad regime, while at a later stage an alliance with Shiite forces might be advantageous to protect its vulnerable northern borders. Inside Syria, different players are involved in national, regional and international conflicts. In fact, there is a national war theatre in which some Shiites are battling some Sunnis who are engaging Christians who are fighting Druze and vice versa - in multiple local constellations. Moreover, religious zealots are fighting secular actors. Then there is an ethnic dimension to the conflict: Arabs, Kurds, Turks and Persians are partly cooperating, partly fighting each other. The regional dimension of the conflict involves the question who will gain regional hegemony in that part of the Muslim world, with Iran and Turkey being the strongest contenders. Together with Russia, Iran supports the Assad regime. Under their patronage, very well trained Shiite groups (integrating Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanese fighters), whom we may call “Mahdist-Jihadis,” are using Iran’s (and Russia’s) protection to further ignite the sectarian conflict, in an effort to change the ethno-religious landscape of the region and create new borders. Turkey is a
NATO-partner and has no interest in any conflict escalation, but would rather side with “moderate” Sunni actors in the neighbour’s civil war. The Turkish position stands in stark contrast to that of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Tunisia - all eager to widen their sphere of influence and directly supporting Salafi-Jihadi groups in Syria. The conflict also touches the older global rivalry between the U.S. and Russia, which could possibly turn into a proxy-war in Syria.

As a consequence, the conflict is not only about sectarian divisions, but also about old rivalries and influence spheres in the Persian Gulf Region. The Western bloc finds allies in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, countries opposing Assad’s Syria, Hezbollah and its sponsor Iran, which in turn is supported by Russia and, to a lesser degree, China. This might be a road to catastrophe if Iran acquires weapons of mass destruction, or Israel is using its nuclear arsenal if it sees its national existence threatened. Russia as well as the U.S. - in a display of power influenced by the still prevalent Cold War mentality (at least on the side of President Putin) may get entangled in the conflict if its aircrafts or aircraft carriers come under attack. Many things could go wrong at any given moment and there might be no lucky escape as during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

In terms of global energy strategy, influence in the oil-rich Middle East could be irrelevant, if we want to believe neo-liberal conservative predictions that energy-independence and an energy revolution through fracking and the exploitation of undersea methane were imminent. In reality, Russia is much more independent on the energy front. U.S. self-sufficiency in energy is predicted only for the end of the decade [Sol Sanders “Woe is not us: From one new energy revolution (shale gas) to another (fire ice)""] but the United States (and even more so Western Europe) are not yet there. While global power might shift to the Pacific in the years to come, the present conflict between Muslim and their non-Muslim allies makes clear that for the moment the world’s stability still stands or falls with the Middle East.

Notes:

VI. Announcements

Two Courses on Terrorism – one Free, the other for a Fee

I. Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Comparing Theory and Practice

A free online course by Leiden University

Coursera is a new partnership of some of the world’s leading universities, offering free online courses on a wide range of subjects to anyone without formal entrance exam requirements. In September 2013 the Centre for Terrorism & Counterterrorism (CTC) of Leiden University will offer a five-week course on terrorism. This free-of-charge course, offered by CTC’s Director Prof. Edwin Bakker, consists of three parts:

1. Part I: First it explores the phenomenon of terrorism, including the reasons why it has been so hard to define. Part I also focuses on terrorism as an instrument meant to achieve certain political goals.

2. Part II provides an overview of the state of research in terrorism and counter-terrorism studies. Since ‘9/11’ terrorism studies have grown exponentially, reflecting the rise in perceived threats. Yet what new insights has academia come up with? What theories, beyond popular assumptions and conventional wisdoms, has social and political science produced that can be of help in understanding and controlling terrorism? Here the emphasis is on examining and comparing findings based on empirical evidence with the aim to debunk myths and establish what the state of the art is.

3. Part III focuses on the implications of academic and think tank research for policy making.

Each of the five 'weekly' sessions includes one hour long video lecture, a number of video-based quizzes as well as work with questionnaires. There will also be a weekly quiz- and discussion round plus an on-line forum. For more information, see: https://www.coursera.org/course/terrorism.

II. Summer Programme: Countering Terrorism in the Post-9/11 World

Summer Course, 26 – 30 August 2013, The Hague, organised by the T.M.C. Asser Instituut - Centre for International & European Law and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague

Based on successful courses in previous years, for those who prefer an intensive one week on-site course with unique networking opportunities, the T.M.C. Asser Instituut and ICCT offer a rich programme of lectures and interactive discussions. Moreover, the programme includes excursions to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and to Eurojust, both based in The Hague. While
the course has a strong focus on the legal aspects of terrorism and counter-terrorism (CT), it also includes discussion on issues like radicalisation to, and prevention of, terrorism and the role of international and non-governmental actors in CT. The course is aimed at professionals who want to expand their knowledge in this domain, as well as advanced graduate students who wish to pursue a career in CT. It will provide an environment for dialogue and interaction with some of the leading experts in the field, including eminent CT- practitioners and seasoned academics such as (amongst others):

Prof. Dr. Richard English, University of St Andrews

Ms. Joanne Mariner, Senior Crisis Response Advisor, Amnesty International

Dr. Alex Schmid, ICCT – The Hague

Mr. Maajid Nawaz, Co-Founder and Chairman Quilliam Foundation

Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker, Leiden University / ICCT – The Hague

Mr. Richard Barrett, former coordinator UN Al-Qaida / Taliban Monitoring Team

The course is fee-based. For more information and to see the full programme visit: www.asser.nl/summerprogrammes or www.icct.nl/activities/upcoming-events
VII. Notes from the Editor

About Perspectives on Terrorism

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Security Research and Technologies (CSRT), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at [www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com). It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles - but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.

**Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism:**

- Alex P. Schmid, Editor-in-Chief
- James J.F. Forest, Co-Editor
- Joseph J. Easson, Associate Editor
- Tim Pippard, Assistant Editor
- Joshua Sinai, Books Reviews Editor
- Eric Price, Editorial Assistant
- Judith Tinnes, Editorial Assistant
Legal Note: Perspectives on Terrorism (PT) hosts articles that reflect a diversity of opinions. The views expressed therein, and the empirical evidence cited in their support, remain the sole responsibility of the contributing authors; they do not necessarily reflect positions and views of the journal’s Editorial Team and Editorial Board or PT’s parent organizations, the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and the Center for Security Research and Technologies (CSRT).