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Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume VII, Issue 2 (April 2013) of Perspectives on Terrorism at www.terrorismanalysts.com. This issue has been prepared at the new Center for Security Research & Technologies (CSRT), at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts (online at www.uml.edu/csrt).

From now on, the two principal editors in Europe and the United States will take turns in preparing the six annual issues of this peer-reviewed online journal. The next issue (June 2013) will be prepared by Alex Schmid and the August issue again by James Forest (which will be a special issue on financial dimensions of terrorism). Journal-related correspondence and submissions for Perspectives on Terrorism should, however, be preferably copied to both editors (< apschmid@terrorismanalysts.com > and < jforest@terrorismanalysts.com >). Occasionally, we will also invite guest editors to join us, especially for thematic issues.

Now in its seventh year, Perspectives of Terrorism has more than 3,200 regular subscribers worldwide and some 100,000 occasional readers and visitors per year. This places it on the forefront of one hundred journals that publish articles on terrorism. Our Editorial Assistant, Dr. Judith Tinnes, has identified and listed all relevant (English-language) journals in the field. The reader can find them in the current issue. This issue also features an article on the interrogation of terrorists. It makes a strong case against the use of torture for gaining information on other than moral grounds alone. Another highlight of this issue is an interview with a leader of a militant group from India. For anyone tempted to join a terrorist group it could serve as a timely eye-opener. Finally, we would like to draw your attention to the national networks of PhD Theses writers of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI). A listing of doctoral dissertations in the making (or recently completed) can be found at the end of this issue of Perspectives on Terrorism.

Sincerely,

James J.F. Forest & Alex P. Schmid
Editors
I. Articles

The Role of Foreign Influences in Early Terrorism: Examples and Implications for Understanding Modern Terrorism

by James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz

Abstract

Globalisation has been linked with outbreaks of political violence and terrorism in the modern world. An analysis of Judean revolts against Rome and the Seleucid Greeks, individual suicide attacks in South and Southeast Asia in the 17th century to the early 20th century, and the Boxer Rebellion in China suggest that the intrusion of foreign influences had similar effects in the past.

Introduction

Analysts of insurgency and terrorism have proposed a variety of explanations for outbreaks of such violence. One of the purported causes for such outbreaks has been the intrusion of foreign economic and/or cultural influences that disrupt local structures and systems. Local groups can react to the intrusion of these outside influences in a number of ways, including all types of political violence. While modern examples have been analyzed, it is possible that there were occurrences in less recent times that represented violent reactions to the impact of foreign influences. More specifically, the occurrence of various kinds of political violence in past eras will be considered. Two thousand years ago, on the Mediterranean littoral, Judea experienced numerous revolts during the periods of Greek and Roman dominance that reflected a reaction against economic and cultural changes occurring in the region. The appearance of Western traders and then conquerors in South and Southeast Asia in early modern times eventually led to Muslim suicide attacks in South and Southeast Asia as a response to the intrusion of Westerners. Finally, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Boxer Rebellion in China will be considered as an example of a violent reaction to foreign influences.

In the post-Cold War modern era it has been suggested that negative reactions to globalisation have increased. Globalisation is a complex process that has been defined in a variety of ways. There is some general agreement on components, including that in the economic sphere it is “the widening, deepening, and speeding up of international connectedness” [1]. Globalisation, however, goes beyond increased economic interactions. It has cultural, military, political, and social dimensions as well as the economic ones [2]. The possibility of such major effects from foreign influences being present and resulting in violent reactions has obviously been much greater with the increased speed of transportation and communication in the modern world. While such effects would have been more muted in the past, it is quite possible that they were...
present, and the examination of the Judean revolts, Muslim suicides, and the Boxer Rebellion can indicate linkages between the appearance of foreign influences and violence. These examples can also have implications for understanding the effects of contemporary globalisation.

**Maccabee Revolt in Judea**

The Maccabee revolt against the Greek Seleucid Empire started in 166 BCE. Judea had been part of one of the Greek successor states to the empire of Alexander the Great since 300 BCE. Initially there were no recorded problems in Judea, but with the passage of time tensions between some Jews and the Greeks began to increase. The trigger for the outbreak of outright rebellion was the decision of Antiochus IV to violate the tradition of religious toleration that had previously existed; in addition, there were efforts to restrict Jewish religious practices as part of a policy of the subsequent Seleucid emperors who attempted to create more cultural uniformity among subject populations, including those in Judea [3]. There was, moreover, an existing current of unrest in Judea that resulted from the fact that many Jews had adopted Greek practices and beliefs. The resort to religious repression that was linked to the actual revolt was actually part of an ongoing effort by the Seleucids to deal with the existing violence that was already challenging the state [4]. The conflict between Jews and Greeks was further exacerbated when Antiochus IV stripped the temple of gold and other wealth in order to build up the imperial treasury. While the desecration of the temple was an important event, much of the wealth of the temple had been promised to Antiochus by the new High Priest as part of his bribe to be confirmed in this religious position with elements of local political leadership [5]. (Such payments had come to be commonplace in Judea under the Seleucids with the post usually going to the highest bidder.) This set of events triggered an open revolt that was led in succession by Mattathias and then by his sons (collectively known as the Maccabees). The rebels relied on guerrilla warfare tactics and terrorist attacks as part of a broader arsenal of strategies to confront the Greeks and their collaborators in Judea [6]. Eventually, the Judean rebels were able to raise field armies and to engage Seleucid troops in conventional battles and managed to emerge as victors.

Clashing religious views were a definite source of contention between the Jewish dissidents and the pantheistic Seleucid state. The conflict also reflected differences within the Jewish community between those who had adopted Greek cultures and those who had not. The upper strata of Jewish society, including some priestly elements were attracted to the Greek culture [7]. The pro-Greek Jews in the ruling circles even welcomed the Seleucid emperor when he briefly conquered Jerusalem [8]. Prior to the rebellion of the Maccabees there were riots in the streets of Jerusalem, which had become the center of Greek culture. The violent confrontations involved street battles between those who had adapted to the Greek culture, and the more traditional religious elements who opposed the outside contamination [9]. In fact, the early attacks by the
dissidents were mainly directed against Hellenised Jews who had assimilated into the dominant Greek culture and focused on population centers such as Jerusalem that had been strongly influenced by Greek culture [10]. The actions of Antiochus IV in seizing the wealth of the temple occurred in an already very volatile situation in Judea but did not create the unrest in the province. His violation of the temple, however, did greatly increase the volatility.

When the actual rebellion began, most of the Jewish elite continued to collaborate with the Seleucids, while other sections of the urban population remained opposed to the rebellion or were unwilling to actively participate on the dissident side. The Jewish collaborators included many members of the upper classes and others who benefited from an early form of globalisation (in this case Hellenisation). By supporting the Greek state, they were attempting to preserve their advantageous positions. The rebels thus attacked not only the Greek officials but started “a campaign terrorizing the Jews of the area who were willing to bow the knee before the Greek authority, and saw nothing amiss in integrating their religion and culture with that of their pagan neighbors” [11]. The rebels under the leadership of the Maccabees had the support of different groups in Jewish society. The very orthodox believers opposed to the pro-Greek leadership in Jerusalem provided early support for the rebellion [12]. Mattathias Maccabee was himself a priest who was at odds with the urban elite and the religious establishment. Other members of priestly groups that had lost status due to changes in the administration of the temple also joined the rebellion [13]. The violent opposition to the Seleucids and their local backers also had support among local villagers and peasants who were faring poorly in economic terms in competition with the Greeks who had penetrated Judean society [14]. All of these groups had already faced status loss or economic decline or were about to face such losses from the intrusion of the Greek social and economic systems. The cultural conflict between Greeks and Jews raged not only in Judea but spread into surrounding areas of the Seleucid Empire. Jews who sympathized with the traditionalists in Judea became targets for persecution and violent attacks by local Greeks in these neighboring provinces [15].

The Jewish revolt against the Seleucids clearly reflected the effects of foreign influences in this part of the world. The incorporation of Judea into Alexander’s empire after the defeat of the Persians introduced new ideas and a different culture directly into the area. Persian culture, like that of Babylonia or Egypt, had presented fewer challenges to Jewish society. Hellenisation, however, brought new cultural and economic influences into the region. The inclusion of Judea into the successor states of Alexander’s empire increased economic links with outside regions. The Greek influence was “more marked in economic life” where the presence of Greek merchants transformed commercial centers [16]. The Greeks established trade fairs as part of an effort to enhance commercial activity and promote local economic activity [17]. The Seleucids, in fact, became great merchants in this era [18]. Their trading efforts extended well beyond the borders of the empire; they developed maritime trading links across the Indian Ocean to South Asia and indirect links to China and the Far East [19].
Trade and the accompanying Greek culture brought advantages and opportunities to some of the inhabitants, but it was threatening the economic livelihood of others. While polytheistic religions in the Fertile Crescent and Egypt could easily adapt to the Greek pantheon of gods, monotheistic Judaism faced greater challenges. There were connections between the economic and societal pressures that came with increasing integration into a wider world. One consequence of the integration into the Greek world was the beginning of the migration of Jewish merchants and others to areas outside Judea. The strong Jewish community that inhabited Alexandria, a uniquely Greek city in Egypt founded by Alexander the Great, dates back to the 6th century BCE. This integration, however, generated opposition. There were rabbis who would not allow local Jews to participate in the trade fairs that came with the Greeks because of the pagan religious ceremonies that were celebrated and the potential for contamination by these foreign religious practices [20]. This fear had a basis in fact since for the Greeks there was a profitable symbiotic relationship between commercial activities and temples and religion [21]. All of these changes that were occurring in the region stimulated tensions that contributed to the outbreak of the revolt. Those in Judea who felt threatened by the foreign religious pressure and economic changes that came with globalisation and Hellenisation reacted violently, beginning with terrorist and guerrilla attacks. The rebels that began with tactics of the weak were ultimately successful in defeating the Seleucids in conventional battles in 141 BCE, creating an independent state.

**Rome and the Judean Revolts**

The independent Jewish state created by the Maccabees, however, lasted less than a century. Then Judea became part of the Roman Empire—first as a client kingdom and then as a province of the empire. The Roman period re-introduced outside influences into Jewish society since the province was once again exposed to greater external cultural and economic influences. The cultural influences remained predominately Greek in the eastern part of the empire. Thus, the victory of 141 BCE over the Seleucids did not survive in a cultural sense with the reappearance of Greek influences that entered Judea with the Romans. Economically and politically Judea was once again absorbed into an imperial state. While the Roman presence was initially accepted, tensions steadily increased as many of these same external influences once again penetrated into Jewish society, leading to three revolts. The initial attacks actually occurred as early as 6 CE (AD) [22]. The first open rebellion was the Great Revolt of 66 CE, the second occurred in 115 CE and was centered in Cyrene, Cyprus, and Egypt, and the third took place again in Judea in 132 CE. All three were put down by Roman troops, but only with some difficulty. All three rebellions, as was the case with the Maccabees, relied on terrorism and guerrilla tactics, as well as conventional field battles.

The Great Revolt itself was preceded by a major campaign of terrorism and guerrilla attacks. The Jewish rebellion included a number of different dissident organisations, but they all assassinated
Roman officials and Jewish collaborators, spreading terror in Jerusalem and throughout Judea [23]. The Zealots, one of the dissident groups, targeted the Roman authorities in an effort to provoke violent responses from the state and to drive a wedge between Romans and Jews [24]. The rebels developed what is often seen as a modern technique, namely the kidnapping of individuals to exchange them for their own group members who had been captured and imprisoned. At one point they managed to capture the son of the High Priest and arranged to trade him for some of their imprisoned comrades [25]. These attacks, including a campaign of assassinations, helped to prepare the way for the full-fledged rebellion. An observer on the scene at the time, noted: “More terrible than the crimes themselves was the fear they aroused” [26]. The pro-Roman elements in Judea were effectively neutralized as it became extremely dangerous to oppose the dissident groups who wanted to separate from Rome. The small Roman garrison in the province could not cope with the unrest, and a relief force sent from Syria was defeated before it reached Jerusalem. It took major military campaigns to re-conquer the province and end the revolt in 70 CE.

Foreign influences increased with the incorporation of Judea into the Roman Empire. Economic interactions in particular rose. Rome dominated the Mediterranean Sea and facilitated commerce by the suppression of piracy. The empire provided for enhanced economic integration and greater commercial opportunities for those inside its borders than had previously existed [27]. The empire by its very presence and structure directly stimulated trade, and both the infrastructure of the imperial state necessary for political control and the imposition of taxation led to increased commerce [28]. Commercial ties outside the empire rose as well. Trade links with India and indirectly with the Far East, inherited from the Greek period, were expanded [29]. The volume of goods transported in these maritime trade routes is generally considered to have peaked in the first century CE. Rome had in fact become the central node in an economy that linked southern Europe, North Africa and parts of Asia [30]. It was in the context of increasing contacts with other parts of the world that the Great Revolt began.

The lines of division within the Jewish community suggest that the dissidents were reacting to the intrusion of foreign influences and some of the negative effects that accompanied them. The Zealots and other dissidents were opposed by collaborators, who included merchants that benefited from the inclusion of Judea in the Roman Empire [31]. The moderate Jews who had accepted inclusion in the empire also counted amongst themselves many priests and others members of the elite [32]. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Jewish elite took a dim view of the militants who threatened their position and status [33]. The established priesthood also benefited from the empire. Members of these groups became the targets for the campaign of assassinations. There is some evidence that the attacks in Jerusalem convinced many in Judea—and even wealthy Jews living elsewhere in the Empire—to provide funds for the rebels in order to avoid becoming targets for assignation themselves [34].
The rebels, in contrast to pro-Roman elements, enjoyed the support of the lower classes that provided many of the recruits for the militant groups [35]. The dissidents even attacked and destroyed archival records, including loan documents that detailed the debts that the poor owed the rich, as a means of gaining the support of working class Jews who were burdened with heavy debts [36]. The anti-elite nature of the dissidents appeared in other ways. One of the dissident groups primarily attacked the local Jewish aristocracy, although all the competing groups joined forces to defend Jerusalem during the Roman siege [37]. Like the Maccabees before them, many of the rebels also included religious extremists opposed to Greek culture and the secularization of Judaism; they wanted to reestablish a Jewish theocratic state led by the High Priest [38]. Rabbis continued to oppose the trade fairs that had continued to be held under the Romans [39]. The Zealots and other militants groups thus drew upon both economic and religious discontent in their revolt against inclusion in the Roman Empire.

The second Jewish revolt began in Cyrene (Cyrenica, northeast Libya) and spread to Egypt and Cyprus, lasting from 114 to 117 CE. While the sources on the causes of this rebellion are more obscure than those for the Great Revolt, it does appear to have been linked to tensions between Jews and the Greek culture in this part of the Roman Empire [40]. The dissidents eventually raised field armies to battle the Romans. Some of the participants in this revolt shared the views of the dissidents who had been involved in the Great Revolt in Judea [41]. There is less information available on the violent techniques used in the initial stages of the outbreak, so the relative importance of guerrilla tactics, terrorism, and conventional military tactics is not clear. The Romans had to mobilize additional troops to deal with the revolt, indicating that the dissidents were able to raise significant conventional military forces. During the earlier revolt in Judea the rebels had attacked Greeks and Greek temples, and during this insurrection the rebels also destroyed Greek temples and slaughtered Greeks when cities were captured [42]. It is noteworthy that the Jewish rebels did not attack other groups or their religious sites [43]. This focus on attacking the dominant Greek culture in this rebellion clearly suggests that foreign cultural influences were important in motivating individuals to join this revolt. This sizeable Jewish community was obviously opposed to the dominant Greek culture, and it is possible that they may also have fallen on economic hard times.

The third and final Jewish revolt was led by Bar Kokba and lasted from 132 to 135 CE. He claimed to be the messiah who had come to reestablish the Jewish religion and the Jewish state. The rebels once again mounted a significant campaign against the Romans and were even able to gain control of Jerusalem for a period of time. It took a major military effort, led by the Emperor Hadrian in person, to defeat the rebels [44]. The end result of this Roman military victory was the dispersion of the Jewish population to other parts of the empire as part of an effort designed to limit the danger of future uprisings. There may have been some economic issues behind this revolt. The Jewish elite, who had once again become attached to the Greek and Roman ways, opposed this rebellion as they had opposed the Great Revolt [45]. The elite obviously continued
to be the economic beneficiaries of the imperial connection. The primary impetus for the revolt, however, appears to have been religious. There was some fear that Rome was going to secularize Judea by officially establishing the Roman pantheon of gods in place of Judaism [46]. There is evidence that the Romans did in fact interfere with the practice of Judaism in this period [47]. While suggestions that the Romans intended to interfere with the local religion may have been exaggerated, the fear of the religious elements in the local population that their beliefs were going to be challenged was all that was needed to raise a rebellion. Perceptions, whether correct or incorrect, can drive political actions. There is no doubt that the Greek and Roman religious practices did constitute a threat to Judaism, given the willingness of many Jews to assimilate to these practices.

All three of these revolts as well as the Maccabean revolt indicated that there were high levels of tension between the Jewish religion and culture on the one hand and the Greek and Roman culture and its pantheon of gods on the other. The intrusion of the Greek influences into the area generated a great deal of local antagonism. In the case of the Great Revolt and the Bar Kokba revolt, there were also obvious economic issues, many of which would have been related to the economic changes that had come with the empire. These economic issues contributed to the tension. The three revolts included a variety of violent techniques, often including terrorist tactics. The case of the Zealots in the prelude to the Great Revolt provides one early, very clear example of a terrorist campaign that for a while successfully neutralised those elements of the population who were loyal to Rome and opposed to a rebellion.

Pagsabil—Individual Muslim Suicide Attacks in Asia

The spread of European merchants and soldiers to South and Southeast Asia and the creation of Portuguese, Dutch, British, and Spanish empires generated protests and anti-colonial violence. There was one form of violence that appeared in the Muslim communities in India and Southeast Asia that began in the 17th century and continued through the early 20th century. It was a somewhat unique form of terrorism in that it largely involved efforts by individuals after local Muslim armies had already been defeated by the Europeans. Conventional military campaigns and even guerrilla warfare had failed to prevent the continuing European encroachment and conquest. Along with European political control came efforts by Christian missionaries to convert local populations. In reaction to these events, individual Muslims would then practice a form of suicidal attack called pagsabil (juramentado in Spanish in the Philippines). An individual would arm himself and attack any Europeans or their local Christian allies or other collaborators that he could find until he was killed. In a few cases two or three individuals would attack as a group. These attacks occurred in Malabar on the Indian coast—against the Portuguese, then the Dutch, and finally the British. These attacks also occurred in Aceh in the Dutch East Indies and in the southern Philippines against the Spanish [48]. The attackers clearly expected to die in their
assaults on symbols of alien rule and culture. The individuals involved in these attacks were apparently seeking to defend the integrity of the local community with its religious and cultural values by intimidating the colonisers. The resulting fear that they inspired in colonial authorities and other Europeans frequently did lead to better treatment of local Muslims and kept the colonial authorities from interfering too much in local Islamic communities [49]. The same techniques used against the Europeans were also later used as well by individual Muslim peasants in the Malabar Coast to obtain better treatment for Muslim tenants from Hindu landlords [50]. Local religious authorities or other leaders often blessed these ‘lone wolf’ attacks, but there was no formal organisation involved in the violence.

The suicide attacks were launched in a cultural context that recognized that this kind of resistance was a defense of the community against the outsiders—the attackers were often considered heroes and martyrs by local populations. These suicide attackers saw themselves as defending local Muslim communities from the non-Muslim occupiers [51]. In the Philippines local Christians often became targets in the defense of the Muslim community since they were seen as collaborating with the Spanish [52]. The response by the local authorities to these attacks was often fairer treatment of local Muslims and the modification of objectionable policies. Since there was turnover among colonial bureaucrats, merchants, and other representatives of the European colonial society, periodic outbreaks of pagsabil were frequently necessary to emphasize the need to respect local religious sensibilities. While the attacks were somewhat unusual when compared to others kinds of political violence that might have been attempted, they were ostensibly effective.

The confrontation of different civilizations and the associated value clash of cultures (in this case colonialism) help to explain this type of violence. The suicide attacks were reactions to the encroachment of new ideas that came with the arrival of the Europeans, first as explorers and traders and then as conquerors. The Europeans, beginning with the Portuguese clearly disrupted the existing political and commercial situations in South Asia and Southeast Asia. Much of the trading activities were in the hands of Muslim merchants, and the Europeans (especially the Portuguese and Spanish) sought to eliminate such middlemen for religious as well as economic reasons [53]. The suicide attacks were a manifestation of the confrontation between the local population and the colonizing Western powers [54]. The violent interaction in these cases provides an example of a clash between different civilizations. The arrival of the Europeans was a direct consequence of the expansion of the global economy. It was the spices and other goods of the Far East that attracted the explorers and the merchants in the first place. While the appearance of the Europeans initially disrupted regional trade, it eventually led to an increase in commercial links in the region. As the European dominance became more firmly established, overall trade increased. By the 1800s the increased Asian trade consisted primarily of the exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods [55]. Even though the Dutch attempted to dismantle the local trading networks in their area of control (today’s Indonesia) and replace them
with Dutch merchants, local traders, however, managed to establish new networks that then co-existed with the Dutch [56]. As the Europeans became more firmly established in the region, the level of exports from the Dutch Indies to Europe increased significantly [57]. Trade between the Dutch territories and India also rose during this period [58].

The Europeans were in the process of creating a new economic system that meant that many local producers and merchants in Asia were losing economic opportunities, wealth, and status. Political conquest obviously changed local patterns of rule. European commercial interests were able to displace local economic activity. European trade with India, for example, contributed to the eventual deindustrialization of India [59]. The arrival of Christian clergy and missionaries from the European countries exacerbated the effects of other changes by increasing cultural tensions between the Europeans and the indigenous populations. Not only was the political independence and economic well-being of parts of the local populations threatened by the expanding global reach of the Europeans, the foreign religion also threatened their religious and social systems. The cultural importance of these attacks was obvious since they persisted into the early 20th century, although occurrences were more rare as time went by [60]. The importance of the religious element in the attacks was obvious because when the United States took over the Philippines from Spain, these kinds of attacks ended once the inhabitants realized that efforts at conversion to Christianity had ceased [61]. Many of the local inhabitants were not specifically opposed to foreign political rule; they were, however, more determined to resist the attempts to convert them.

**The Boxer Rebellion**

China was also affected by the European expansion and imperialism that unsettled populations in South Asia and Southeast Asia, although the effects were felt somewhat later in China. Distance postponed the arrival of Western influences, and China in this period was also withdrawing into itself. Eventually China was pulled into greater interactions with outside powers, and local producers saw European goods displacing those from China [62]. China was required to enter the international economic system through the treaty ports that were forced to be open to European trade. The first Sino-Japanese War over Korea (1894-95) demonstrated Chinese vulnerability, and the German takeover of Tsingao in the Shantung Peninsula (1898) accelerated the pressure on China. As China faced losses in territory, the United States in conjunction with Great Britain worked to maintain the Open Door Policy with regards to maintaining Chinese openness to imports from all foreign producers [62]. The Open Door Policy was designed to permit all countries, including European colonial possessions, to have access to continued trade with China, increasing China’s interactions with the rest of the world.

Almost every aspect of Chinese society was under assault from Western influences during this period. The Chinese economy was disrupted by the arrival of Western merchants and goods, and
by the late 19th century advanced Western military technology. The disruption went beyond economic changes. Social status was threatened by the presence of Europeans. Perhaps the most obvious symbol of the political, social, and economic assault on traditional Chinese society were the extraterritoriality provisions of treaties which required that in criminal or civil cases involving a European (or Japanese) and a Chinese, the case would be tried in a European court of law rather than a Chinese court. This extraterritorial principle indicated that the Chinese legal system was considered inferior and could not provide a fair trial for Europeans. These provisions provided almost daily and demeaning reminders of the position of Chinese in their own country.

One consequence of this forced integration of China into the Western economic and political system was the Boxer Rebellion. Anti-colonial opposition to integration into Western economies did not rely on suicide attacks as had for a long time been the case in South and Southeast Asia. The Boxer Rebellion initially relied on conventional terrorist tactics and eventually on military attacks as part of an effort to drive out European influences that were perceived as undermining Chinese society. The Boxers (the Society of the Righteous Harmonious Fists) originated as a secret society in China. Such secret societies have had a long history in China, but proliferated since the late eighteenth century in response to increased threats to Chinese identity [64]. These secret societies were often willing to use political violence to maintain their position, gain economic advantage, and bring about political change.

The Boxer Rebellion broke out at the end of the nineteenth century. The Boxers were intent on driving all foreign influences out of China. They were able to draw upon the increasing discontent with the foreign presence in China that appeared in the 1890s. In the earlier years there had been riots that targeted foreigners and Chinese Christians [65]. These attacks were supported by both local officials and secret societies as they shared the same antipathy towards Western influences [66]. The Chinese regarded Christian missionaries as the vanguard of a movement to attack Chinese culture. Chinese Christians came to be seen as part of this attack, and in point of fact missionaries and converts were used by European powers as a means of gaining greater influence in areas of possible colonial expansion [67]. The Christians, as a consequence, were attacked for cultural rather than religious reasons.

The actions of the Boxers were a continuation of previous actions protesting the intrusion of Western products and values into Chinese society. It is worth noting that the Boxers originated in the Shantung area where Germany had recently established a sphere of influence and founded a small colony [68]. The Boxers, like earlier groups, attacked the foreigners and Western inventions such as railroads and the telegraph. Chinese Christians continued to be targets [69]. The Boxers eventually escalated the violence and attacked the foreign diplomats in the capital of Peking [70]. These attacks led to the intervention of a multinational military force from the European countries, Japan, and the United States. These modern Western forces were able to defeat the Boxers and the Chinese military units that joined them with the encouragement of the Chinese monarchy. When the Western forces reached the Chinese capital and raised the siege of
the foreign legations, the Chinese government was forced to pay reparations for the damages done. This violent response to Western penetration had failed.

The Boxer Rebellion clearly represented a clash of cultures or civilizations just as the suicide attacks by Muslims in the earlier example did. The Boxer uprising was a spontaneous uprising of those Chinese to the increasing Western presence in China, and it had strong support from the Chinese who had been displaced by the modern technology that came with ‘globalisation’ in the form of imperialism [71]. The involvement of the Chinese displaced by Western technology in earlier violence and the Boxer Rebellion itself was a direct consequence of economic penetration. While the Boxer Rebellion has often been portrayed as a unique episode in Chinese history, in fact, it was just one episode among many violent responses to the intrusion of foreign influences [72]. The involvement of court officials and elements of the military who later joined the rebellion reflected a “last desperate attempt to preserve the integrity of Chinese civilization” [73]. The failure of the Boxer Rebellion started the process that led to the end of the Chinese monarchy.

**Implications for Understanding the Links between Globalisation and Modern Terrorism**

The above examples from earlier times can be related to the effects that foreign influences and globalisation can have on outbreaks of contemporary terrorism. Today an increasingly integrated global economy has meant that countries are now more connected to each other. Economic globalisation has led to increased prosperity in general, but the resulting gains have not been equally or equitably distributed [74]. The spread of market capitalism that often accompanied globalisation has modified and in some cases almost destroyed the structure of local economies [75]. Further, there are indications that globalisation in the 20th century has led to greater inequality among countries and within countries [76]. Globalisation can have the most negative impacts for lower classes as well as for poorer states since they are least able to take advantage of the opportunities that come with greater interactions [77]. Clearly the inclusion of Judea in the Greek and Roman empires resulted in gains for some and losses for others. The economic networks that expanded under Roman auspices, in fact, “might properly be seen as a classical form of globalization” [78]. The intrusion of European traders and conquerors in South and Southeast Asia and China also resulted in major disruptions.

Globalisation has generated stress on local societies in other ways. Socially dissimilar groups come into closer physical proximity to each other [79]. Increased proximity can generate tensions between groups that would not otherwise exist. The interactions of Greeks with Jews generated major animosities that appeared in the Judean revolts, and social and cultural conflicts were underlying the *pagsabil* attacks and the Boxer Rebellion. Regions that are already more integrated into the modern global system may have increased stability, but those countries first undergoing the process of integration will be likely to suffer greater disruption and difficulties.
The societal and economic stress that comes with globalisation can generate new opposition from groups in society at the same time that the process has weakened local government. In the historical cases above, the process of integration involved major disruptions of local societies, but the dissidents were often facing powerful governments.

In the modern world globalisation has resulted in changes that have been linked with outbreaks of political unrest, including terrorist violence, from a variety of groups. Left-wing terrorist groups which were prevalent in the second half of the twentieth century focused on the evils that accompanied the spread of global capitalism. They attacked multinational corporations that were increasingly viewed as symbolic of economic (capitalist) globalisation, similar to the economic disruptions. Groups with right-wing ideologies have also reacted to what they see as the negative effects of globalisation. They have opposed the migration of workers from culturally and religiously dissimilar areas. Current immigration debates in the United States and Europe reflect these concerns, and some of the more extreme groups in these industrialized regions have adopted terrorism as one response. Ethnic terrorism can be a reaction to globalisation. Smaller ethnic communities can see their cultures in danger of being overwhelmed or absorbed by the homogenizing trends that are associated with globalisation, and they sometimes react violently. In the historical cases there were clearly violent reactions to the appearance of other ethnic groups.

Both early and contemporary globalisation has also generated opposition from various religious groups. The intrusion of foreign ideas and beliefs has been seen as undermining traditional religious values in many traditions. Capitalism that has been associated with contemporary globalisation has undermined spiritual and moral frameworks. Muslim groups have focused on the threats that globalisation presents to their interpretation of Islam. Clearly the pagsabil attacks reflected such a response to external threats. Islam, however, is not the only religion to see external threats from globalisation. Militant Hindus in India have attempted to drive out foreign religious influences. Christian groups in the United States have negatively reacted to the supposed evils of secular humanism that has spread throughout much of the world, challenging their own values. Jewish extremist groups in Israel have not only targeted Palestinians; there have also been occasional isolated attacks against other Israeli citizens who are considered to be too secular. The Aum Shinryko cult in Japan was concerned about cultural and religious deterioration that was attributed to globalisation.

Conclusions

The above case analyses have indicated that foreign influences had a number of obvious negative impacts on societies and economies in the past and contributed to outbreaks of violence, including terrorism. The foreign influences almost always went beyond economic effects, to include significant cultural and social effects as well. The penetration of external cultural forces...
and economic activities were important sources of political discontent and the resulting violence. The various Judean revolts, the *pagsabil* suicide attacks, and the Boxer Rebellion all clearly represented reactions to both economic and cultural threats that came with globalisation, but the greater threat appears to have been cultural in these cases. The Boxer Rebellion had a similar trajectory in terms of cultural conflict and the clash of civilizations that reinforced the economic dislocations and threats to the well-being of important indigenous groups. The individual Muslim suicide attacks in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines reflected a clear clash between different civilizations. There is, however, also some evidence about economic deprivation as a contributing factor of this violence. In the case of Malabar in India, the fact that Hindu landlords became targets would suggest that economic concerns were of greater relevance.

The spread of foreign influences has obviously had negative effects on a number of political systems in past centuries. Yet the ways in which the intrusive activity created problems has varied. It is apparently not so much the absolute level of these influences that would be important as the relative level of change that occurred. In periods of active foreign penetration or globalisation, small changes would not trigger larger effects had these not come on top of previous changes. Small changes, however, could have a greater impact when there have been relatively fewer external influences as was the case in the past. In the above examples, the changes were large in relative terms and sometimes in absolute terms as Judea, South and Southeast Asia, and China were drawn into increased interactions with outside areas. When the effects from foreign events or linkages are new, the economic displacement or the creation of disadvantages for some important groups in various societies is more likely. At least some of these groups may then respond violently.

What the above analysis could not answer is why foreign influences or in current parlance, globalisation, leads to outbreaks of terrorism in some cases but not in others. What are the other factors that contribute? What are the roles of religious differences and the clash of cultures? It does appear from the above cases that political violence and terrorism occur when there are religious, and associated cultural, differences involved (Jewish versus Greek; Muslim versus Christian; Chinese Confucianism versus Christian). Factors other than foreign influences, however, can be important in such outbreaks. Economic disruption reinforced by such religious/cultural differences or religious/cultural disruptions reinforced by economic disruption appears to constitute an important confluence of factors that frequently led to such outbreaks in the past, and suggest that such a confluence could also contribute to contemporary as well as future political violence.

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Notes


[45] W. Reich, op. cit., p. 263.


[50] Ibid., pp. 48-9.


[54] Ibid., p. 56.


[61] Ibid., p. 54; T. M. McKenna, op. cit., p. 193.


[70] Ibid., p. 40.

[71] Ibid., p. xvii.


Analysis of Al-Qaeda Terrorist Attacks to Investigate Rational Action
by Daniel P. Hepworth

Abstract
Many studies have been conducted to demonstrate the collective rationality of traditional terrorist groups; this study seeks to expand this and apply collective rationality to Islamic terrorist groups. A series of statistical analyses were conducted on terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organization; these were then compared to two more conventional terrorist groups: the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). When viewed through the context of the groups’ various motivations and objectives, the results of these analyses demonstrates collective rationality for those terrorist groups examined.

Introduction
After 9/11, many people in the West believed that anyone who would commit an act of terrorism, especially suicide terrorism, must be deranged; research has shown this not to be the case. [1] Most research indicates that terrorists are not insane, and some research indicates that many of them are generally neither poor nor uneducated, although these debates are certainly not settled. [2] Most terrorist groups do not attack indiscriminately. As Brian M. Jenkins said, “terrorists want a lot of people watching […] not a lot of people dead.” [3] Some groups will even issue public apologies if an attack kills too many, especially civilians. [4] Many terrorist groups dissolve not because of military might but because the group either attains (some of) its goal(s) or after continued failure, its members abandon the tactic of terrorism. [5] Each of these choices indicates the rationality of terrorists groups. [6]

However, some thirty years after his initial statement, Brian Jenkins’ more recent statement that some terrorist groups want many people watching and many people dead [7] is consistent with the growth of mass casualty terrorist attacks and the fact that Osama bin Laden sought nuclear weapons to use against the Western world. [8] James Piazza [9] found that terrorist groups motivated by religious and/or millenarian goals (especially those which are Islamic) are much more dangerous than more traditional terrorist organisations.

This article examines terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda and affiliated Islamic, religiously motivated terrorist groups (hereafter referred to as the Al-Qaeda network, AQN), and seeks to establish that the AQN operates in a rational fashion. In order to clearly demonstrate the rationality of the AQN in the context of its character as a religiously motivated terrorist
organisation, their operations are compared to those of the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), both more conventional terrorist groups.

**Defining (Suicide) Terrorism**

The most cursory examination of the literature will show that there is no universally accepted definition terrorism. However, after examining a wide range of definitions and drawing upon commonly occurring elements, one has been constructed for the purpose of this article. [10]:

_Terrorism is a violent act (or threat of one) carried out by a sub-state individual or group against a civilian population (including police, other governmental workers and non-combat-ready military personnel) for the purpose of striking fear in the surviving population in order to bring about political change._

The other important term on which a definition needs to be settled is suicide terrorism. Crenshaw defines suicide terrorism as “acts of terrorism that require the death of the perpetrator for successful implementation.” [11] Upon examination of the literature, it is clear that while use of this definition is not unanimous, [12] it is by far the most accepted and as such, used for this research. [13]

**Rational Action Theory**

At present, one popular theoretical approach to explain collective terrorist behavior is rational action theory. [14] A good deal of research has found that terrorist groups act in a “collectively rational” manner, learning from failure and from one another. [15] They apply cost-benefit concepts to examine the risks and rewards of their potential choices, taking what is seen as the most efficient route to reach their goals. [16] Rationality theorists refer to this type of instrumental rationality, as “an instrumental relationship between ends and means.” [17] This approach has been successfully applied to terrorist hijackings and kidnappings, [18] the operational strategies of terrorists in Chechnya [19], Palestinian terrorists in Israel, [20] and suicide terrorism in general. [22]

Two caveats should be noted in the discussion of the application of rational action theory to terrorist organisations. First, as with any theoretical explanation for a phenomenon, research exists that raises questions about the applicability of this particular theory that should be considered. [23] Gregory Miller makes a very valid case for questioning not only the rationality of terrorist organisations, but also the value of applying rationality theories. [24] He points out that different people within an organisation have different goals (perhaps different from those of the organisation itself) and that “rational” behavior can be rooted in either hedonistic self-interest or socially conscious morality, which means that almost any behavior may be explained as “rational.”
Second, no theory should be construed as a catchall explanation for all behavior. As applied to terrorist organisations, rational action theory is used to explain, at least in part, the behavior of the group as sanctioned by its leaders. However, decisions may be made at any level of the organisation and each of these decision-makers may be aware of different information, leading to different “rational” decisions. Additionally, not all decisions are made rationally, especially when made by those who are reactive and/or emotionally compromised. These concerns must be kept in mind when considering this and other research on the rationality of any organisation.

**Terrorist Groups**

The present study focuses on the unique nature of Al-Qaeda and related groups. Al-Qaeda has the general, short-term goal of repulsing the Western influence allegedly assaulting the Muslim world while its long-term goal is the complete restoration of the caliphate and the establishment of a worldwide Muslim community. [25] These goals set the Al-Qaeda Network (AQN) apart from traditional terrorist groups, which are typically motivated by more tangible objectives, such as national separation from an existing state. [26] The nature of these objectives and other factors tend to force conventional terrorist groups to limit the number of casualties they inflict, especially on civilians lest they risk alienating their support-base. In this sense, the traditional terrorist group is almost like a politician who cannot take too many unfavourable actions for fear of alienating voters.

Al-Qaeda members have no compunction against mass killings. Sheikh bin Laden made it clear that God wants them to slay the infidels and that God will reward this behaviour on earth and in the hereafter. This assumed obligation to serve the will of God combined with His command to slay nonbelievers [27] distinguishes this religious Islamist terrorist group and its affiliates from most other terrorist groups.

ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna – Basque Fatherland and Freedom) and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka) are/were traditional non-religiously motivated terrorist organisations, seeking a separate homeland for their respective peoples. Both groups were relatively active during most of the time under consideration, making them sound choices as comparison groups. The LTTE was also specifically selected because it is one of the few examples of a more conventional terrorist organisation, which utilised suicide bombings. [28]

**Study Hypotheses**

As an indication of collective rationality on the part of the AQN, it is hypothesised that due to the group’s goals and methods of achieving those objectives, bombings conducted by the AQN will, on average, result in significantly more fatalities than those carried out by the comparison groups. It is also surmised that the AQN will attack civilian targets at a rate higher than other
target types and that attacks on these targets will, on average, result in the highest number of fatalities. Due to their size, prevalence, and lack of direct governmental strategic value, civilian targets are not only ripe with victims but security protection is most often minimal at best, making them easier targets for the AQN. It is expected that bombings conducted by the comparison groups will, in contrast, focus more on governmental targets in both frequency and severity, given their more traditional motivation of creating terror and demonstrating governmental weakness while creating a relatively low number of casualties.

Additionally, it is hypothesised that both groups which utilize suicide bombings, the AQN and LTTE, will conduct them primarily against specific target types: the AQN against civilian targets in order to create maximum damage and the LTTE against military targets, applying the presumably most effective method against the hardest and most valuable target type. It can be assumed that any terrorist group (especially one steeped into a particular version of Islam, given its condemnation of suicide) would not use such a tactic unless it was effective. Thus, according to rational action theory, this technique, would not be used unless it granted large dividends, primarily in the form of casualties.

Data

Data for this study was taken from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/). The GTD defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation”. [29]

The present study examines more terrorist groups than just Al-Qaeda proper. The GTD contains a series of Terrorist Organisation Profiles (TOPs), which were used to compile a list of 18 Al-Qaeda-associated organisations, [30] which was utilized by this study. These organisations make up what is referred to here as the aforementioned Al-Qaeda Network (see Appendix A for a list of its members).

A number of factors were used to screen out certain attacks. Only attacks that have been classified as “unambiguous” by the GTD were used. Second, only attacks carried out by the AQN between the beginning of 2002 and the end of 2007 were used. There were few Al-Qaeda attacks before 11 September 2001, with a sharp increase in the period that followed. At the time this study began, GTD data ran through 2007, making that the cut-off point. Third, only bombings were examined in order to ensure a level of consistency across all attacks, as the number of victims was a primary factor in this study.

In order to allow for comparisons of the attacks carried out by the AQN, similar data was recorded for ETA and LTTE attacks. The data covering ETA and LTTE attacks differed slightly.
from those of the AQN. First, in order to obtain a sufficient sample size, ETA data was collected between 1996 and 2007. Also, due to statistical reasons, attacks carried out by the LTTE were limited to the years of 2005 – 2007. There is nothing inherently important about the 2002 – 2007 timeframe of AQN attacks; this is merely when they became the most active, thus minimising concern over the differing attacks dates for the comparison groups.

Variables and Coding

For attacks carried out by each terrorist group, the year of the attack was recorded. Attacks were coded as successful or not (e.g. the bomb did or did not detonate), and suicide or not. The GTD defines a suicide attack as an attack “where there is evidence that the perpetrator did not intend to escape the attack alive.” [31] This definition does not fit exactly with the preferred definition of suicide terrorism, which requires the death of the attacker, but it works here all the same, especially as this study will only consider bombings. This definition is deemed acceptable here because in most situations, it is incredibly difficult to determine whether or not the terrorists intended to die; thus the best that can be done is to look to the evidence surrounding the attack and make an educated guess.

The classification of the victim type was recorded for each attack as military, police, other government, and civilian. For the AQN data only, the country in which the attack occurred was recorded as was the determination of whether or not the United States was a target. For the ETA and LTTE data, all attacks occurred in one country only (Spain and Sri Lanka, respectively) and neither group ever attacked an American target. The number of victims from an attack was coded in two ways: fatalities and injuries.

Data Issues and Transformations

After variable analysis, the fatalities variable was used to determine the severity of the attack (in most analyses) due to the number of cases in which the number of injuries was unknown (in the AQN data 30 of 405 cases, or 7.41%, were missing for injuries compared to four of 405, 0.99%, for fatalities). A z-score analysis was run on the fatalities variable to test for outliers. The maximum z-score for the AQN data was high at 7.677, however, because of the nature of the data, the nature of the hypotheses, and the presumed accuracy of the data, these scores were left in place for the analysis. This must be kept in mind when reading the analyses and results. Also, the AQN fatalities variable had a skewness score of 4.147, due in large part to the high number of cases in which zero fatalities were reported, which dictated the use of negative binomial regression. The same issues with the fatalities variable occurred with the LTTE data and the same solution was applied.
In order to run regression analyses, two variables, target type and country, were recoded. The initial target type coding was compressed into a dichotomous variable for the regression analyses. As military, police, and other government classifications are all government targets and considering that multiple hypotheses look specifically at civilian targets, this variable was recoded into the binary categories of all government and civilian. [32]

The country in which AQN attacks occurred was used strictly as a control variable. This variable was divided into two categories: countries with ten or more attacks and countries with less than ten, which were grouped together as an “other” category. This allowed for a solid separation of countries with a practically significant number of attacks and those with only a few. Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, and the Philippines fell into the former category and were dummy coded (with Afghanistan used as the reference point). [33] The remaining “other countries” response was also added to the dummy coding.

One issue with the ETA data was that of the 203 attacks analyzed, only 19 resulted in any fatalities, with a maximum number in any attack of three. Thus, the fatalities variable was dichotomized into either no fatalities or fatalities (i.e. 0 = no fatalities, 1 = fatalities). The injuries variable was also recoded (and used in one analysis, as explained later) into an ordinal level variable with four values of no injuries (0), few injuries (defined as 1-5), a medium number of injuries (defined as 6-25), and many injuries (defined as 26 and up, with a maximum score of 95).

Results

Descriptive Statistics

There were 405 recorded, categorized bombings carried out by the AQN in 17 countries between 2002 and 2007. Over half (216, 53.33%) took place in Afghanistan, followed by Iraq (70, 17.28%). Most were successful (388, 95.80%) and one-third (135, 33.33%) were suicide bombings. Almost half (191, 47.16%) were targeted at civilians (see Table I). The United States was targeted less than five percent of the time (18, 4.44%), none of the AQN attacks occurred within the borders of the United States during that time.

The ETA attacked civilian targets most often at 134 times (66.01%). Of the 203 attacks, 160 (78.82%) were successful. Fifty-two (34.43%) of 151 LTTE attacks were carried out against civilian targets and almost all attacks (142, 94.04%) were successful. While the LTTE did employ suicide attacks, it did so at a very low rate (7 of 151, 4.64%).
Table I: Frequency of attack by target types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>AQN</th>
<th></th>
<th>ETA</th>
<th></th>
<th>LTTE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>14.07</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>18.52</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>33.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Government</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17.53</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>47.16</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>66.01</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>34.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>405</td>
<td></td>
<td>203</td>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As expected, attacks carried out by all groups produced far more injuries than fatalities on average. Al-Qaeda network attacks produced the most fatalities on average, followed by the LTTE, and ETA (see Table II).

Table II: Descriptive variables of fatalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Skew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities, AQN</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>19.71</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>4.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities z-score, AQN</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.4411</td>
<td>7.677</td>
<td>4.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities, ETA</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities z-score, ETA</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.293</td>
<td>6.564</td>
<td>3.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities, LTTE</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>5.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities z-score, LTTE</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.391</td>
<td>7.582</td>
<td>5.995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Analyses

Nonparametric chi-square analyses were conducted on the target type variable for each terrorist group. Significance was found in all tests (AQN, $\chi^2(3, 404) = 110.020, p < 0.001$; ETA $\chi^2(3, 198) = 200.303, p < 0.001$; and LTTE $\chi^2(3, 151) = 20.894, p < 0.001$). Standard two-variable chi-square analyses were conducted to test the relationship between suicide and target type for AQN and LTTE attacks. A statistically significant relationship was found for AQN attacks ($\chi^2(3, 404) = 13.554, p = 0.004$) with military targets attacked by suicide bombers at the highest percentage (28/57, 49.12%) and civilian targets were struck by this tactic at the smallest percentage (48/190, 25.26%). The same test with LTTE data also yielded significance ($\chi^2(3, 151) = 10.544, p = 0.014$) with military and other government targets each attacked by suicide bombers three times, civilians once, and police never (see Table III).
Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of AQN Attacks

A negative binomial regression analysis was conducted to test the lethality of AQN attacks (fatalities) against suicide and target type. Control variables included the year of the attack, the country in which the attack occurred, whether or not the United States was the intended target of an attack, and success. After verifying that the data passed the necessary statistical assumptions, [34] overall significance was found (likelihood ratio chi-square = 227.489, overall $p < 0.001$). Both suicide and target type were found to be statistically significant ($b = -1.017$, Wald chi-square = 33.998, $p < 0.001$ and $b = -0.730$, Wald chi-square = 15.871, $p < 0.001$, respectively). [35] These results indicate that, controlling for the other factors, suicide attacks carried out by the AQN produced more fatalities than non-suicide attacks and that AQN attacks on civilian targets generated a significantly higher number of fatalities than those against other targets. The negative value of the predictor coefficient, $b$, as seen in this analysis and the regression of LTTE attacks (as seen in Tables IV and VI, respectively) for variables, such as success, suicide, and target type, indicate positive correlation of the variables due to the logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable inherent in negative binomial regression. Other variables that were found to be significant contributors to the number of fatalities included success, whether or not the United States was the target of the attack, [36] and various countries (but not all of them) (see Table IV).

Table III: Chi-Square results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Group</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Pearson Chi-Square*</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio</th>
<th>$P$</th>
<th>Cramer’s V</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AQN</td>
<td>Target Type*a</td>
<td>110.020*</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQN</td>
<td>Suicide by Target Type</td>
<td>13.554*</td>
<td>13.461</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>Target Type*a</td>
<td>200.303*</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Target Type*a</td>
<td>20.984*</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Suicide by Target Type</td>
<td>10.544*</td>
<td>10.810</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant with $\alpha = 0.5$.

*a Single variable nonparametric chi-square analysis.
Table IV: Negative binomial regression, AQN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable as related to fatalities</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Wald Chi-Square</th>
<th>$P$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>5.118</td>
<td>0.951</td>
<td>28.942*</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>-1.863</td>
<td>0.591</td>
<td>9.951*</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide</td>
<td>-1.017</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>33.998*</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Target</td>
<td>1.157</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>6.725*</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Type$^b$</td>
<td>-0.730</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>15.871*</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia$^c$</td>
<td>-1.427</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>10.210*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq$^c$</td>
<td>-1.543</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>51.517*</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan$^c$</td>
<td>-0.435</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>1.806</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines$^c$</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>1.748</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries$^c$</td>
<td>-1.082</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>18.551*</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.770</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant with $\alpha = .05$.
$^b$Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square = 227.489, overall $p < 0.001$.
$^c$Variable Target Type dichotomized.
$^d$Dummy coded variables for the variable Country.

Multivariate Regression Analyses of ETA Attacks

A binary logistic regression analysis was conducted on ETA attacks with the dichotomized fatalities variable serving as the dependent variable (DV), the dichotomized target type variable the Independent Variable (IV), and the year of the attack and success as control variables. However, the standard error was 5962.537, due to the extreme number of zeroes in the data set. The error-ridden results of this test will not be reported; instead, it will simply be said that it is clear that most ETA attacks did not produce any fatalities.

Due to the limitations of the fatalities variable in this data set, a second multivariate regression analysis was conducted to better understand how severely the ETA attacked each target type. This linear regression was conducted with the same independent and control variables as the previous regression, but with the recoded injuries variable (as described above) as the DV. Changing the DV in this fashion is clearly not ideal because it cannot be used to serve as a direct comparison between the ETA and AQN. Those killed in a terrorist bombing are often specifically targeted either as individuals or as members of a group, where many of those who are injured are often simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. The same could be said of additional fatalities from an attack, but this is more common among those wounded but not killed. That said, given the limitations of the data, this analysis does allow for a better understanding of ETA tactics. After verifying that the DV passed the necessary assumptions and requirements, [37] the regression
was run and overall significance was found, \( R^2 = 0.077, F (3, 198) = 5.349, p = 0.001. \) Significance was also found with the IV, \( \beta = -0.192, t (198) = -2.690, p = 0.008. \) This analysis indicates that governmental targets suffered significantly more injuries than civilian targets (see Table V).

Table V: *Linear regression, ETA*\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable as related to injuries, recoded</th>
<th>( b )</th>
<th>( SE )</th>
<th>( \beta )</th>
<th>( t^* )</th>
<th>( p )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>2.423*</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>2.421*</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Type(^b)</td>
<td>-0.301</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>-0.192</td>
<td>-2.690*</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>1.757</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant with \( \alpha = .05 \).

\(^a\)Adjusted \( R^2 = .357, \) Overall \( p = 0.001. \)

\(^b\)variable Target Type (dichotomized).

**Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of LTTE Attacks**

A final negative binomial regression analysis was conducted on the LTTE data testing similar variables (DV = fatalities, IV = dichotomized target type and suicide, control variables = success and a dummy coded year variable). Statistical assumptions were verified and the overall model was found significant (likelihood ratio chi-square = 85.716, overall \( p < 0.001 \)). Suicide and target type were significant (\( b = -1.206, \) Wald chi-square = 7.769, \( p = 0.005 \) and \( b = -1.225, \) Wald chi-square = 33.138, \( p < 0.001 \), respectively). [38] Suicide attacks were again more lethal and attacks against civilian targets begot the most fatalities (see Table VI).
Table VI: Negative binomial regression, LTTE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable as related to fatalities</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Wald Chi-Square</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>1.702</td>
<td>0.6334</td>
<td>7.218*</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>-1.284</td>
<td>0.5706</td>
<td>5.063*</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide</td>
<td>-1.206</td>
<td>0.4327</td>
<td>7.769*</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Type&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-1.225</td>
<td>0.2128</td>
<td>33.138*</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.510</td>
<td>0.3915</td>
<td>14.884*</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.375</td>
<td>0.2254</td>
<td>2.761</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant with α = .05.

<sup>a</sup>Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square = 85.716, overall p < 0.001.

<sup>b</sup>Variable Target Type dichotomized.

<sup>c</sup>Variable Year dummy coded with 2007 as reference.

**Discussion**

While several studies have found that terrorists groups differ significantly in their operations by their classifications, [39] our research supports the notion of rationality of the AQN. [40] This terrorist organisation, in order to wreak maximum havoc, used suicide bombings far more often and in doing so, created far more fatalities than other groups, even the LTTE. It was expected that the more traditional ETA would not use this tactic and that the LTTE, while certainly an anomaly insofar as this non-religious group used suicide bombings, utilized it at much lower rate as neither group sought to cause too many fatalities.

Attacks carried out by the Islamic religious AQN were far more deadly than those attacks carried out by either secular, conventional group. The regression analyses indicate that, all else being equal, attacks conducted against civilian created an especially high number of fatalities and, while the AQN attacked civilian targets at a lower rate than the ETA, the AQN did attack civilians more often than any other single target type. Once again, these results indicate rational action on the part of the AQN as the death of as many unbelievers as possible is required in order to attain both short- and long-term goals. Not only did the AQN kill far more individuals than conventional terrorist groups, but the most lucrative targets were attacked more often than any other.

One unexpected result was that the AQN utilised suicide bombings against military targets at the highest rate (49.12%) and civilian at the lowest (25.26%). One possible explanation for this comes from Daniel Byman [41] who noted the value of striking targets that demonstrate the weakness of the target government, namely highly secure areas. If suicide bombings are more successful (this study failed to confirm or deny this due to the low number of recorded unsuccessful attacks), then Byman’s point may explain this finding. If the group believes a
successful attack on a hardened military target is valuable enough, it would use a tactic deemed to have the best chance of success. This may also be explained by the fact that the AQN may view suicide attacks against civilian targets as less necessary as these targets are softer and of lower risk.

Policy Implications

When combined with research of how terrorist groups have been successfully defeated in the past, this research suggests that counterterrorism policy applied to the AQN must be primarily designed in a combat-oriented fashion. [42] Diplomatic negotiations with religious terrorist groups have been historically unsuccessful and this research indicates that this trend will continue. When terrorists’ goals are nothing short of global dominance, no amount of negotiation will appease them. Instead, coalition forces must continue to operate as they have with a combined effort to both destroy and contain the terrorists militarily and to remove, as much as possible, their support within local populations.

Next, civilian targets must be hardened. The AQN is targeting civilians at an alarming rate and with potentially devastating effect. Dynamic steps must be taken to protect valuable civilian locations, especially those that terrorists have struck in the past (e.g. airports, centers of economic activity).

Finally, this research suggests that Al-Qaeda’s leadership truly aims at mass casualty attacks. And while bin Laden is dead, it would be foolish to believe the drive for obtaining weapons of mass destruction died with him. And while it is true that it is very difficult to obtain and use such weapons, [43] Al-Qaeda leadership is seeking them and this research strongly suggests that if they obtain even one such a device, it may be used. That stated, it is also possible that possession of such a weapon may cause the organisation to shift tactics, perhaps using it for deterrence or blackmail, such as the removal of Western troops from the region. It goes without saying that even though the odds against such an attack may be very small, if one were deployed against the United States the damage and number of casualties would likely reduce the 11 September 2011 attacks to a historical footnote.

About the Author: Daniel P. Hepworth (PhD, University of Illinois at Chicago) is a professor of Criminal Justice at Murray State University. His research is primarily focused on a better understanding terrorist behavior and the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies in North Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East.
Appendix A: Terrorist groups of the Al-Qaeda Network (AQN)

Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades, Abu Sayyaf Group, Al-Qaeda [Core], Al-Qaeda in Levant and Egypt, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda Organisation in Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Land of Two Rivers (a.k.a. Al-Qaeda in Iraq), Ansar al Islam, Ansar al Sunna Army, Islamic State of Iraq, Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan, Jaish e Mohammed, Jund al Sham, Laskar e Jhangvi, Salafia Jihadia, Takfir wa Hijra, Taliban, Tawhid and Jihad.

Notes


[14] Other names for this modified theory, which has also been applied to other collective actions, such as rioting, include rational actor theory and strategic logic theory. See Anthony Oberschall, “Explaining Terrorism,” 27-30; Domenico Tosini, “A Sociological Understanding of Suicide Attacks,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 26 (2009): 72-78; Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (2005): 30-31.


[23] See Alessandro Orsini, “Poverty, Ideology and Terrorism: The STAM Bond” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 35 (2012) 665-692, which argues that the ideology of the terrorist organisation can so much influence its members that behaviour may seem entirely irrational to an outside observer.


[30] The author would like to express thanks and appreciation to James Piazza for help and advise in finding this information. Piazza conducted a similar study of terrorist group classifications in his article, “Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous?” He assembled a collection of groups using the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) to determine which were associated with Al-Qaeda. This TKB database has since been merged into the GTD and is now the TOPs database, which was used in the present article. Piazza’s classifications, taken from the TKB, can be found in Appendix A of his article.


[32] This is not without precedent; see Lisa McCartan et al., “Logic of Terrorist Target Choice,” 65-66.
[33] Dummy coding procedure allowed for proper statistical control of the countries. Countries found to be statistically significant indicate that attacks carried out in those countries (or groups of countries) were significantly different from the comparison country, which is this case was Afghanistan.

[34] Namely linearity, non-multi-collinearity, and independence of errors.

[35] For this analysis, the dichotomized version of the target type variable was used with all government targets = 1, civilian = 2.

[36] Quite unexpectedly, it was found that when the United States was the target of an attack on foreign soil, there were actually fewer than average casualties.

[37] Linearity, homoscedasticity, normality, and independence of errors.

[38] For this analysis, the dichotomized version of the target type variable was used with all government targets = 1, civilian = 2.


Military Interrogations: Best Practices and Beliefs
by Matthew D. Semel

Abstract
This study was designed to address some of the gaps in knowledge about interrogations conducted by military interrogators and provide information about methods from their perspectives, based on their experiences. Kassin et al. (2007) conducted the first self-report survey of best interrogation practices and beliefs of law enforcement officers. This study followed that model, using a different population from which to obtain the sample: military interrogators. Like Kassin’s study, this survey asked participants to address and self-report on a number of issues, some in common with law enforcement and others that apply specifically to military interrogations. Participants were asked to estimate, rate and self-report on seven facets of their work. (Like the law enforcement study, the goal here was to obtain common practices, observations, and beliefs about interrogations directly from military interrogators). Subsequent research can test the interrogation methods that the subjects of this study believe are the most effective and focus on practices and beliefs unique to the military context. This study empirically supports, for the first time, the hypothesis that experienced interrogators favor rapport-building approaches over all other available techniques.

Introduction
In the twelve years since the attacks of 11 September 2001, methods employed by the United States to procure intelligence from human subjects have undergone increased focus and debate. The process of obtaining intelligence from captured subjects is known in the military as human intelligence collection or HUMINT and the practice has undergone unprecedented attention and review. [1] While there is self-reported, official, and anecdotal evidence of practices and procedures approved for use and allegations about techniques actually used, it is difficult to separate fact from fiction. What is clear, however, is that there appears to be no published empirical support for any of the interrogation practices officially approved by the United States military for personnel who interrogate prisoners of war or suspected insurgents and terrorists.

As a result of this focus, the United States and some of its most important allies have debated the use of torture and its effectiveness. This debate has obscured more important empirical questions about counterterrorism interrogations. What do military interrogators believe are the best practices when questioning suspected or confirmed terrorists? Do the current methods put in place by the Army succeed in extracting accurate and truthful information? Do these methods work quickly? Do military interrogators operate with some of the same misconceptions held by
law enforcement interrogators? The literature on law enforcement interrogations has established, for example, that police interrogators are overly confident in their ability to detect deception but are correct at rates slightly better than chance. [2] Training appears to have a negligible effect on detecting deception [3] but increases confidence in the ability to do so. [4] Do military interrogators also overestimate their ability to determine if a subject is lying or engaging in deceit?

Social scientists have studied law enforcement techniques for a number of years and a large body of literature exists on this subject. The law enforcement literature has dispelled many myths about police interrogation techniques and highlighted more reliable and efficacious practices.

The goal of military interrogations can differ from those in law enforcement. Military interrogators generally look to gather information about future events or to plan future military operations; law enforcement interrogators usually seek to elicit a confession from a suspect about a past crime and to gather evidence about this crime. However, military interrogation techniques are based in part on a law enforcement model and personnel may be subject to the same myths that affect police interrogators.

Most of the existing literature about interrogations in a military context supports five overall principles: the stresses of war and capture generally have a negative effect on a prisoner's ability to provide truthful and accurate statements to his/her interlocutor; both the conditions of confinement and the application of psychological pressures, such as isolation or sensory deprivation, negatively affect a prisoner's ability to provide accurate and actionable intelligence; rapport building, while often time consuming, is the best technique for extracting accurate intelligence from a prisoner; and, historically, many individual interrogators, including the participants in this study, generally claim that rapport building is the best approach for eliciting accurate intelligence from a prisoner, if a direct approach fails. Most military interrogators assert that there is no “magic bullet” that quickly induces compliance and cooperation in every interrogation subject.

Police investigators routinely interrogate people suspected of committing crimes. There is a large body of literature examining procedures used by law enforcement, the perspectives of investigators conducting an interrogation, (for example confidence that the person they are interrogating is the perpetrator), [5], experienced police officers’ inability to detect truth from non-truth [6] [7] [8], the fact that training increases confidence but not ability to detect deception [9] and the psychology and state of mind of the person under interrogation. [10] A great body of literature also exists on the impact of “confession” evidence on prosecutors, judges, and juries. [11] It has been further shown that as the coerciveness of an interrogation increases, there is a greater likelihood of inducing a false confession. [12] [13] [14] Traditionally, sources for studying police interrogation techniques and confessions have included both archival and real-life material and experiments. [15] [16]
A body of descriptive literature exists, chronicling the experiences of military interrogators and some of the techniques they have employed over the course of a number of conflicts. In addition, official manuals used by military intelligence officers are widely available both from online booksellers and general sites on the Internet. Journalists [17] and human rights groups [18] have also reported extensively about military interrogations and have described practices sanctioned by the military as well as methods that the U.S. military has not officially approved. This does not mean that all official techniques are known or are available from open sources and official policy may allow the military’s special forces to employ techniques that have not been publicly exposed.

**A Study of Military Interrogators**

Kassin [19] conducted the first self-report survey of best interrogation practices and beliefs of law enforcement officers. This study followed a similar model, using a different population from which to obtain a sample: military interrogators. Kassin’s survey [20] was adopted and modified to conform to the specific strategies employed by military interrogators, as described in the Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual. [21] The participants were asked to estimate, rate and self-report on seven facets of their work: (1) their ability to detect truth or deception; (2) their own opinions and practices with regard to 21 of the general approach techniques authorized by the Field Manual; (3) the importance of rapport building to extract information from a subject; (4) the applicability of law enforcement techniques to interrogations of terrorists; (5) the frequency, length and timing of interrogations; (6) training, and (7) their observations, if any, of others using torture or unapproved techniques during interrogations and, if so, with what frequency. Like the law enforcement study, the goal here was to obtain common practices, observations, and beliefs about interrogations directly from military interrogators. Subsequent research can test the interrogation methods that the subjects of this study believe are the most effective and focus on practices and beliefs unique to the military context. This study sheds additional light on interrogation practices currently in use by the United States military. This study also empirically supports, for the first time, the hypothesis that experienced interrogators favor rapport-building approaches over all other available techniques except the direct approach, asking an interrogation subject direct questions.

**Method**

**Participants**

The participants in this study were 132 United States military interrogators, from the Army, Air Force and Marines. Six participants identified themselves as members of a Joint Terrorism Task
Force (JTTF). The breakdown of subjects based on demographic variables is presented in Table 1. Subjects were recruited in a variety of ways. Many participants were guided to the study, posted on SurveyMonkey, by known contacts in the United States military. Other subjects were recruited through the social networking site, Linked In or by the principal investigator. Interrogators anonymously and individually entered the survey using a password provided by the contacts or the principal investigator. The survey took approximately twenty minutes to complete and participants were assured that the survey collected no identifying data. The survey did not save Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.

The Questionnaire

The survey instrument used here was adapted from the one used by Kassin and his colleagues [22] in their national investigators’ study (see Appendix A). Some of the questions were taken directly from that survey instrument with slight modifications and others were redesigned to meet the needs of this study’s sample. The initial three questions on the survey here collected demographic information.

The next series of questions, four through seven, asked interrogators to provide information about admissions from interrogation subjects. These questions were constructed to provide a context for the question about deception detection. In addition, the questions sought to measure the degree to which military interrogators assume that the subject of an interrogation was actually involved in terrorist activities.

Questions eight through eleven sought to elicit basic information about interrogations in the military context. This series of questions was designed to further develop the knowledge base about interrogations in this context. For example, Question nine asked about the average number of times a particular interrogation subject is interrogated. Question ten asked interrogators to estimate the average length of an interrogation in hours.

Question thirteen asked interrogators to self-rate their ability to detect deception. The law enforcement literature has established that law enforcement officers are overconfident in the ability to detect deception in an interrogation subject. This overconfidence can affect the tenor of an interrogation and imperil suspects who are actually innocent. This study hypothesized that military interrogators are also overconfident in their ability to detect deception and question thirteen was included to measure the confidence levels of this study’s participants.

Questions fourteen through seventeen were again included to expand the empirical knowledge base about military interrogations. For example, question seventeen asked military interrogators if their units regularly record interrogations. Gudjonsson [23] and Kassin [24] have long advocated that, in the interest of justice for all parties, law enforcement interrogations, in their
entirety, should be videotaped. At the time of the survey’s creation, it was unknown whether or not military interrogators regularly videotaped the interrogations that they conducted.

Question eighteen was a multi-part question. This question tracked interrogation approaches described in the *Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual* [25]. Section 8-20 of this Field Manual [26] lists specific approaches that military interrogators should use when attempting to induce cooperation in an interrogation subject. Question eighteen asked interrogators to self-rate these interrogation approaches as well as others commonly used by law enforcement on a 1(= never) to 5 (= always) scale. One of the central hypotheses of this study was that military interrogators believe building rapport with an interrogation subject is the best way to gather accurate intelligence. Question 18P specifically addressed this hypothesis.

Other parts of Question 18 were created based on information reported by journalists. For example, Q18U asked study subjects if they limited the sight of the people they questioned. This part of question eighteen reflected widespread news reports that intelligence interrogators regularly limited the senses of interrogation subjects. [27] Photos have also depicted this practice. [28]

**Results**

As indicated, the first series of questions on the survey collected demographic data. Table 1 presents frequencies and percentages for demographic variables. The next set of questions, 5, 6, 7 and 8, asked for specific information about the interrogation of terrorists. Question 5 asked, over the course of your career in the military about how many subjects involved in terrorism or who have knowledge about terrorist activities have you conducted, alone or with other interrogators. Answers ranged from zero to one thousand. It is unlikely that one interrogator questioned one thousand people who were involved in terrorism or had knowledge of terrorist activities. It is more likely that this respondent was referring to the number of interrogation subjects in general he interrogated during his twenty-two year military career.
Table 1: Frequencies and Percentages for Demographic Variables (N=132)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active duty</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTTF</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For those eleven survey respondents who answered zero in response to Question 5, this answer is deceptive. It is likely that these respondents interrogated subjects who might be characterized as insurgents, detainees, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), irregular forces or members of a foreign military force even if they did not interrogate anyone they believed to be a terrorist. In future surveys, the focus on terrorism should be eliminated.

Questions 9 through 12 and 14 and 15 collected data about the characteristics of the interrogation process. For example, Question 9 asked, in your own experience what would you say is the average number of times an individual subject is interrogated. Almost 32% of the survey respondents said the average number of interrogations of one individual was three. Almost 24% answered that individual subjects were interrogated an average of ten or more times, the next biggest group. Fifty subjects skipped this question.

Question 11 asked what is the longest interrogation you were involved and answers ranged from two hours to one month.

Question 10 inquired about the average length of an interrogation. Of the 73 respondents who answered this question, most put the length of the interrogation between two and three hours. The time ranged from a half hour to five hours. Table 2 includes descriptive statistics for interrogation measures.
Deception Detection

Question 13 reads how skilled are you at knowing if a subject who denies involvement in, or knowledge of, terrorist activities during an interrogation is telling the truth or lying. Sixteen respondents out of the seventy-two who answered said they had a deception detection rate of 85% or better. The most frequent answer was an 80% confidence rate; twelve respondents provided this answer. The lowest rate of confidence was 10% and one respondent wrote that truth or lying cannot be “judged;” the highest level of confidence was 100%. Fifty-five of the seventy-two respondents who answered this question rated their confidence level at above 50%. The mean score was 70.98% and the standard deviation was 19.841. About 60% of the respondents reported that they knew when a “subject who denies involvement in or knowledge of terrorist activities during an interrogation is telling the truth or lying” 75% or more of the time.

Special Training, Videotaping and Language Skills

Question 14 asked the subjects if they had received special training about how to conduct interrogations. Twenty-eight of the sixty-eight people who responded in the affirmative had taken the Reid course on interrogations and interviewing. (Thousands of law enforcement officers have been trained in the Reid Technique despite the doubts experts have about its value.) Two respondents had done some interrogation training with the Israelis and several had participated in a British interrogation course. Seven or 9.3% of the sixty-eight respondents said they had not received special training.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Interrogation Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of interrogations</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0 to 5000</td>
<td>300.13</td>
<td>691.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of all subjects who:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitted full involvement</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0 to 95</td>
<td>16.39</td>
<td>23.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitted partial involvement</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0 to 175</td>
<td>34.93</td>
<td>32.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not admit any involvement</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0 to 200</td>
<td>42.68</td>
<td>36.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of subjects involved in terrorist activities who:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitted full involvement</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0 to 90</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>25.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitted partial involvement</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0 to 95</td>
<td>29.92</td>
<td>31.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not admit any involvement</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0 to 100</td>
<td>38.02</td>
<td>34.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of subjects not involved in terrorist activities who:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitted full involvement</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0 to 100</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>18.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitted partial involvement</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0 to 100</td>
<td>14.17</td>
<td>25.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not admit any involvement</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0 to 100</td>
<td>51.43</td>
<td>42.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogations per suspect</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1 to 10</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours per suspect</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0 to 12</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longest interrogation (hours)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0 to 72</td>
<td>9.56</td>
<td>12.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage correctly identified truth or lie</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0 to 100</td>
<td>67.16</td>
<td>22.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 15 asked if the subjects’ units videotaped interrogations. Experts in the United States have long advocated that law enforcement interrogations should be recorded. Among the seventy respondents who answered this question, there was almost an even split: 54.3% reported that interrogations were videotaped and 50% said they were not. In some cases the written responses were contradictory. For example, one subject reported that as of 2009, there was no army-wide videotaping. This subject, a male with twenty-seven years of service remarked that no “good” interrogators would avoid having the interrogation taped. Another respondent, a twenty-five year Army veteran, said that interrogations were taped for a number of purposes, including training and in case of claims of abuse. In most cases, when interrogations were taped, the tapes were destroyed after a short period of time. One person answered that this information was classified.
Question 16 asked if the interrogators were fluent in a language other than English. Of the seventy-six respondents who answered this question, fifty-three or 69.7% answered in the affirmative. Languages included Arabic, Serbo-Croatian, German, Tagalog, Russian, Spanish, French and Vietnamese. Fourteen subjects described themselves as fluent in Arabic. A retired four-year Army veteran noted that at one time interrogators were required to attend the Defense Language Institute in Monterey California for language training but this requirement had been eliminated. Another subject indicated that he could conduct a screening in Arabic but relied on his interpreter “95%” for interrogations. When asked in Question 17 about the use of an interpreter, thirty-six subjects, 50% of the sample who answered this question, stated that they always used an interpreter during an interrogation.

Self-Rating Approaches Advocated by the Field Manual

Question 18 was a multi-part question that asked interrogators to self-rate different approach techniques that are described in the Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual. [30] The question lists twenty-one approach techniques: those methods designed to encourage an interrogation subject to speak to his or her interlocutor. Seventy study participants answered at least part of this question. The top three methods for getting an interrogation subject to talk were rapport building, Q18P, identifying contradictions in an interrogation subject’s story, Q18D, and appealing to the interrogation subject’s self interest, Q18K. Fifty-two interrogators, 75.4% of the study participants who answered this question, indicated that they always tried to build rapport with the subject of an interrogation and gain his or her trust. The range of scores for rapport building was two to four and the mean score was 3.80. The standard deviation was .443. Of all the respondents who answered this question, 98% used the technique of building rapport and gaining trust often or always. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for interrogation measures.

The emotional love approach, advocated in the Army Field Manual [31], also garnered support based on responses to Question 18M. Forty-one interrogators, 59.4% of those that answered this question, used this approach often. This approach was also discussed by interrogators in Questions 20 and 21 and will be addressed further below. Ten interrogators always used this approach during an interrogation. This means that 73.9% of the subjects who answered this question use this approach often or always. Scores ranged from two to four and the mean score for this question was 2.97. The standard deviation was .610.

A number of practices that are used in fictionalized accounts of interrogations were disfavored by a majority of the interrogators who answered this question. 48 subjects, 70.6% of the total, said they never physically intimidated an interrogation subject. Fifty-four interrogators, 78.3%, said they never limited the interrogation subject’s sense of sight. Forty-seven interrogators said they never threw objects in the interrogation booth or room, 67.1% of the total who answered this question. On the question’s five-point scale, the technique with the highest average score was
building rapport, with a mean score of 4.74. Ten interrogators said that they always used this approach.

Table 3: *Descriptive Statistics for Interrogation Methods*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isolating subject from family and friends</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolating subject from other prisoners</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confronting subject with evidence of involvement in terrorist acts</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying contradictions in subject’s story</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrupting subject’s denials and objections</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically intimidating the subject</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1 to 4</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducting the interrogation with more than one interrogator</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretending to have independent evidence of terrorist involvement</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yelling at subject</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throwing physical objects in interrogation room</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appealing to subject’s self-interests</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appealing to subject’s religion or conscience</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appealing to subject’s love of family, comrades, or homeland</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appealing to subject’s negative feelings toward his group/leaders</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convincing subject he has nothing to fear by cooperating</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing rapport and gaining subject’s trust</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressing impatience, anger, or frustration at subject</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showing subject photographs of victims of terrorist attacks</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convincing subject that resistance to questioning is futile</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promising subject something of value in return for cooperation</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limiting subject’s sense of sight</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Higher scores indicate more frequent use of method.*
Use of Prohibited Approaches

Question 19 asked if interrogators had ever observed interrogators using techniques prohibited by the Army Field Manual. Of the seventy-one subjects who answered this question, fifty-seven or 69.5% said they had never observed this. Seventeen or 20.7% of those who answered said that they had seen this on “rare occasions”. Seven respondents, 8.5% said they observed interrogators using prohibited techniques sometimes. One respondent said that he observed interrogators often use techniques prohibited by the Field Manual. No one answered always.

Questions 20 and 21 were opened ended questions designed to allow interrogators to comment in a more expansive way about techniques. Question 20 generated the lowest response rate of all the questions in the survey. Only fifty study subjects answered this question. Question 20 asked interrogators to describe any effective interrogation techniques that were not included in Question 18. This question was somewhat ambiguous and this is reflected in some of the comments. This survey gathered data about approach techniques: those methods that induce an interrogation subject to cooperate. The interrogation, or interview as described by some, itself comes after using a successful approach technique or techniques. As a result of the ambiguity of the question, answers varied. One subject number responded that he had seen interrogators crossing the line but “that was steadily and effectively fixed in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandals, at least within the military.”

In answering Question 20, almost all the respondents took the opportunity to list approach techniques that they believed were the most efficacious and answers varied widely. For example, several subjects emphasized that rapport building is an essential approach technique.

A number of subjects advocated the direct approach, or asking an interrogation subject straightforward questions. One respondent said that this works “95% of the time. Another study subject argued, “The most effective technique has always been direct questioning.” This study subject, a retired Army male with over four years experience added, “If the interrogator, interpreter (sic) and subject are all laughing together information is generally more reliable.” Another subject, a retired Marine with twenty eight years of experience, stated, “During the Vietnam War, the most effective means of obtaining information was through the Direct Approach.” A male, twenty-seven year veteran of the Army, endorsed the direct approach for enemy prisoners of war. This subject added that “for Islamic terrorists, trickery and ruse. Absolutely the best and quickest way to get information from a genuine high-value target.” Many of the respondents specifically decried torture.

An active duty Army male with nineteen years of experience emphasized that information, not a confession, was the goal of the interrogation. This subject noted “If the bad guy does not want to admit he is bad but wants to share reliable information in order to try and convince me he is a good guy then it would be foolish of me to focus on his guilt.”
One subject, a male Army veteran who left Army service after four years, listed sensory deprivation, sleep deprivation, the “control slap,” stress positions and shackling as effective techniques. This respondent acknowledged that with an “inexperienced” and “uneducated” interrogator these techniques could quickly “get out of hand,” but further commented that it was “bull shit” that these methods are “prohibited army wide.” He stated that these approaches “have their time and place and should be allowed by experienced, well-trained, skilled collectors.” This was the only subject, number 110, who advocated techniques specifically prohibited by the Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual. [33]

Question 21 generated similar types of responses. It asked what three techniques do you believe are the most effective to gather actionable intelligence. Again, subject number 110 was the only subject, out of the sixty-nine who answered this question, to advocate techniques forbidden by the Army Human Intelligence Collector Field Manual. [34] This subject wrote that “limiting the approaches an interrogator can use in the name of humanity or any other PC consideration is complete horseshit. I’m not saying we should beat every detainee, but what I am saying is sometimes the only breaking point for a detainee is a restricted approach.”

One subject recommended sleep deprivation as an effective tool to break an interrogation subject and win his compliance. This study subject was an Army reservist with just over fourteen years of experience. The answer was given without any further elaboration about the use of sleep deprivation. It should be noted that the Army Human Intelligence Collector Field Manual [35] allows for limiting detainees’ sleep to four hours in a twenty-four hour period, a practice that some prominent interrogators believe constitutes inhumane treatment, if not torture.

Twenty-one subjects, out of seventy-nine, recommended a specific approach contained in the Army Human Intelligence Collector Field Manual [36]: the emotional love approach. The Field Manual states that to be successful with this approach, the interrogator must “focus on the anxiety felt by the source about the circumstances in which he finds himself.” [37] The interrogator further works to exploit the love that the interview subject feels for family, country or comrades. One study subject, however, a seven year Army reservist, dismissed the emotional love approach as worthless and only practiced by what he described as “poor” interrogators.

Twenty-six study subjects advocated a rapport-building approach to interrogations, sometimes in combination with other strategies. An Army reservist with seven years of experience wrote, “Rapport building, which takes a lot of time, will work with [al]most any subject.” A twenty-six year Air Force reservist, recommended “establishing trust and rapport through displays of cultural finesses and the appearance of genuine concern for the detainee’ interests.” An active duty male with nineteen years of experience, wrote, “[B]asic rapport building is the most effective. This is in part because many of the ‘hardened terrorists’ we capture expect physical and verbal abuse. When we offer a cup of tea instead it takes them out of their comfort zone.”
Discussion

Rapport-Building

One of the central premises of this study was that military interrogators believed that building rapport with an interrogation subject is the best way to induce cooperation and gather accurate intelligence from that subject. This premise was supported by the data. This may have been a self-fulfilling prophecy driven by this particular sample but the overwhelming support for rapport building suggests otherwise. When recruiting a sample, the principal investigator contacted a number of interrogators who were outspoken in their support of rapport building as a primary interrogation technique. A number of these contacts helped recruit subjects for the study. It is possible that these contacts associated themselves with like-minded interrogators who tended to eschew more coercive interrogation techniques. The sample is not large or diverse enough to generalize this finding to all military interrogators but there is reason to be cautiously optimistic. The fact is that this sample used rapport building more than any other technique or approach, with perhaps the exception of the direct approach, which is also non-coercive.

In light of the controversy over the use of coercive interrogation techniques, this finding is perhaps the most important in the study. One of the striking things about the national discussion about this issue after September 11th was the fact that interrogators themselves appeared to be shut out of the conversation. According to internal administration documents, the Bush Administration’s internal debates did not include experienced interrogators [38]; initial support for coercive techniques came from officials with little knowledge of the day-to-day challenges faced by interrogators in the field. This study does provide empirical support for the idea that, among experienced interrogators, rapport building is best for generating cooperation from an interrogation subject and the gathering of accurate information. All but one of the respondents in this study rejected coercive techniques and those prohibited by the Army’s Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual [39].

Because interrogators who actively spoke out against coercive techniques recruited the bulk of the sample, it is likely that the sample suffered from selection bias. This is especially true in light of numerous reports that many U.S. military interrogators were prepared to use coercive techniques and in fact did. [40]

One theory, which informed this study, was that military interrogators regularly confront interrogation subjects with false information to “break” them. Law enforcement interrogators also use this tactic and Kassin [41] described this practice as implying or pretending to have independent evidence of guilt. That study found that this technique was rated 9th out of the 16 techniques rated. [42]
An additional theory upon which this study was based held the following: military interrogators believe that disorienting an interrogation subject through sensory deprivation will break that subject and lead to accurate and actionable intelligence. This general hypothesis was prompted by news reports that showed goggled and hooded detainees being transported to and from detention facilities. Sensory deprivation was also an interrogation technique advocated by the Bush Administration. [43] This practice was not favored by the sample here. In fact, one source argued that actual use of these forms of sensory deprivation was limited to certain high value detainee facilities, Special Forces facilities and “the facilities of a few errant big Army units.” In actuality, combat units hooded detainees to prevent them from seeing where they were going, who was with them and to prevent them from speaking to each other. According to this source, hooding and sensory deprivation were not used as interrogation tactics and were not favored by military police, who helped operate detention facilities.

**Deception Detection**

Like their law enforcement counterparts, study participants here displayed overconfidence in their ability to detect deception in an interrogation subject. Given what is known about law enforcement officers and their ability to detect deception, [44] this is a potentially troubling finding. More research is needed to further examine this issue. Hypothetically, military interrogators may be better at detecting deception than their law enforcement colleagues. If this is the case, military training and field experience may have positive effects on an interrogator’s ability to detect deception. It is also possible that there is something characteristically different about people who choose to become interrogators in the military that accounts for higher than average abilities to tell the truth from falsehood, if these abilities even exist. This is fertile ground for experimental research that would be of great benefit to the United States military.

**No Silver Bullets**

Many experienced interrogators have argued that the subject being questioned can influence the tenor of an interrogation. The study sample here believed that when it comes to interrogations, “one size does not fit all.” This idea was also supported by some of the narrative data. For example, one interrogator wrote in response to Question 20, “There is no ‘silver bullet,’ the reason why we have an array of approaches is because everyone’s breaking point is different.” Another offered, “Each interrogation is different. That’s why there are different techniques employed.” In response to Question 21, an interrogator stated that the techniques used depended on the “individual detainee.”
Lack of Empirical Knowledge

There is so little contemporary empirical knowledge about intelligence interrogations that the very existence of this study is a contribution to the literature. As stated earlier, it appears that this study is the first of its kind. It is notable that the subjects of this study, as guarded and suspicious of outsiders as they may be, provided valuable and important data about a subject of significant importance to the security of the United States. Great efforts were made to secure a viable sample and the subjects who chose to participate in this study revealed rich details about the art and science of intelligence interrogations. This research project represents an important first step in a process that can lead to improvements in interrogation approaches. It is this researcher’s hope that projects such as this will allow the men and women who collect human intelligence to use science as a catalyst for the most effective interrogation approaches possible. In this way, social scientists and the United States military can work together for the benefit of the intelligence community, soldiers in the battlefield and the safety of the country itself.

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Notes


[16] This is also discussed by S.M. Kassin, C.A. Meissner & R.J. Norwick, op. cit.


[34] Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual, op. cit.


[40] For example Mayer, op. cit., discusses this at length.


Appendix A

Military Interrogators Survey

Gender: M F (circle/highlight one)

1. How long have you/did you serve in the military or reserves?
   _____________________ years, ___________________ months

2. Current Status: Active Duty Reserves Retired (circle/highlight one)

3. With what branch of the United States Military did you/do you serve?
   _______ Army
   _______ Navy
   _______ Marines
   _______ Air force

4. Over the course of your career in the military about how many interrogations of subjects involved in terrorism or who have knowledge of terrorist activities have you conducted alone or with other interrogators? Please estimate as best you can.
   ________________________

5. Considering all the interrogations in which you have been involved, approximately (please estimate as best you can) what percentage of all subjects:
   Admitted partial involvement in or knowledge of terrorist activities ______
   Admitted full involvement in or knowledge of terrorist activities ______
   Did not admit or concede anything ______
   100%
6. Considering all the interrogations in which you have been involved, approximately what percentage of subjects who were involved in terrorist activities:
   Admitted partial involvement in or knowledge of terrorist activities
   Admitted full involvement in terrorist activities
   Did not admit or concede anything

   __________  __________  __________

   100%

7. Considering all the interrogations in which you have been involved, approximately what percentage of subjects who turned out to be uninvolved in terrorist activities:
   Admitted partial involvement in or knowledge of terrorist activities
   Admitted full involvement in terrorist activities
   Did not admit or concede anything

   __________  __________  __________

   100%

8. In your own experience, what would you say is the average number of times an individual subject is interrogated?
   0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 or more

9. In your own experience, what would you say is the average length of an interrogation?
   __________ (hours)

10. What is the longest interrogation you were ever involved in?
    __________ (hours)
11. As best you can, try to estimate the percentage of subject interrogations you were involved in that took place within each of the following time intervals:

0800 to 1200 __________
1200 to 1600 __________
1600 to 2000 __________
2000 to 2400 __________
2400 to 0400 __________
0400 to 0800 __________

100%

12. How skilled are you at knowing if a subject who denies involvement in or knowledge of terrorist activities during an interrogation is telling the truth or lying?

__________ % correct

13. About how often does your impression turn out to be right?

__________ % correct

14. Have you ever received special training (seminars, workshops, etc.) on how to conduct interrogations?

__________ No

__________ Yes (please describe) ___________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________________
15. Does your unit videotape interrogations?
   ________ No
   ________ Yes _________ % of all interrogations are videotaped

16. Are you fluent in a language other than English?
   ________ No
   ________ Yes (please describe) _______________________________

17. Please estimate how often you use an interpreter during an interrogation. Circle a number on a 5-point scale (1= never, 2 = on rare occasion, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always).
   1               2               3               4               5

18. Listed below are a number of interrogation techniques that are recommended and/or used interrogations. Please estimate how often you have used each technique. For each circle a number on a 5-point scale.
    (1 = never, 2 = rare occasion, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always).
    A.  Isolating the subject from family and friends.
        1               2               3               4               5
    B.  Isolating the subject from other prisoners.
        1               2               3               4               5
    C.  Confronting the subject with evidence of involvement in terrorist activities.
        1               2               3               4               5
    D.  Identifying contradictions in the subject's story
        1               2               3               4               5
    E.  Interrupting the subject's denials and objections
        1               2               3               4               5
    F.  Physically intimidating the subject
        1               2               3               4               5
G. Conducting the interrogation with more than one interrogator
   1  2  3  4  5

H. Implying or pretending to have independent evidence of terrorist involvement
   1  2  3  4  5

I. Yelling at the subject
   1  2  3  4  5

J. Throwing physical objects in the interrogation booth
   1  2  3  4  5

K. Appealing to the subject's self-interests
   1  2  3  4  5

L. Appealing to the subject's religion or conscience
   1  2  3  4  5

M. Appealing to the subject's love of his family, comrades or homeland
   1  2  3  4  5

N. Appealing to the subject's negative feelings toward his group, soldiers or leaders
   1  2  3  4  5

O. Convincing the subject he has nothing to fear by cooperating
   1  2  3  4  5

P. Establishing rapport and gaining the subject's trust
   1  2  3  4  5

Q. Expressing impatience, anger, or frustration at the subject
   1  2  3  4  5

R. Showing the subject photographs of victims of terrorist attacks
   1  2  3  4  5

S. Convincing the subject that resistance to questioning is futile
   1  2  3  4  5

T. Promising the subject something of value in return for cooperation
   1  2  3  4  5
U. *Limiting the subject's sense of sight*

1 2 3 4 5

19. Have you observed interrogators use techniques prohibited by the Army Field Manual?

__________ No

__________ Yes. If yes, with what frequency? (1 = never, 2 = rare occasion, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always).

1 2 3 4 5

20. If there are other techniques that you use and find effective that are not described in the previous question please describe these in the space below.

21. What three techniques do *you* believe are most effective at acquiring accurate actionable intelligence from an interrogation subject?
22. **Did you ever use techniques during an interrogation that you later regretted using?**

__________ No.

__________ Yes. If yes, please describe below.

Thank you!
II. Research Notes

Forecasting the “Arab Spring” of 2011: Terrorist Incident Data from 2000-2010 Offered No Early Warning

by Richard J. Chasdi

Introduction

One of the single most predominant questions associated with the so-called “Arab Spring” is whether or not any social research indicators associated with terrorism data are available with predictive value for such profound structural political changes. The underlying aim of this “Research Note” is to take a first pass at the terrorism data and to compare certain terrorism data trends for four countries that experienced successful regime change in 2011, namely Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, to terrorism trends in nine countries where political strains and tensions did not result in full blown regime change. In this essay, those countries include Bahrain, Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, UAE, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. From the start, it should be clear that even though there was non-violent protest in many of these countries, this analysis places singular attention on what both Gurr and Ross and Miller call “oppositional” or “insurgent” terrorism where terrorist assaults are directed at state governments.[1]

In this research note, Iraq is considered a special case with dynamics at work elicited from the American occupation of Iraq in 2003. Therefore data on Iraq are excluded from the analysis for fear those data will skew results to the detriment of analysis of countries that experienced change primarily from internal factor influence as well as “contagion effect.”[2] Plainly, even though a more extensive analysis, inclusive of a broader range of explanatory variables and their influence on whether or not “regime change” happens, is beyond the scope of this article, the preliminary results offered here should offer a springboard for further analysis of terrorism data and equally important, broader political/social data trends such as rates of “political protest/violence” data, unemployment, and inflation rates that could serve as such indicators.

Data and Methodology

The data used for this analysis draw primarily on data compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, with supplementary data culled from United States Department of State “Patterns of Global Terrorism” reports. The data categories used for the analysis draw from START data categories found in the “Global Terrorism Database” that have theoretical value for forecasting wider political events and those data categories include “Incidents over Time,” “Target-Type,” and
“Fatalities.” Plainly, there are some other descriptive categories found in that database that are theoretically more useful than others but indeed, some data categories as “weapons-type” and “assault-type” essentially remain theoretically threadbare in terms of serving as the basis for predictive hypotheses and theoretical relationships.[3]

The methodology used here for this first pass at “Arab Spring” terrorism predictors is relatively straightforward. With respect to the “Arab Spring” that commenced in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, each of the foregoing countries in the Middle East will be sorted out into “starter” and “non-starter” categories. First, there is hand-count tabulation of the frequency of terrorist events for a ten year period (2000-2010) for each “starter” and “non-starter” country prior to “Arab Spring” 2011 political events. In each case, the total number of terrorist assaults is summed and divided by ten to establish a mean for terrorist event frequencies. Next, I sum the total number of terrorist assaults for the two year interval (2008-2010) and divide by two to establish a mean for the two year interval (2008-2010).

The T tests revolves around whether or not a statistically significant difference of means exists for terrorist incident frequency when the “middle-run” 2000-2010 period is compared to the “short-run” 2008-2010 for each “starter” state. The central notion is that unspecified political factor effects might be associated with transformative events of 2011 and reflected by higher rates of terrorist assaults in that “short-run” period with greater intensification of political instability and social unrest as measured in terrorist events. One underlying assumption is the two year interval under consideration provides the time necessary for such explanatory factor effects to work themselves through the political system.[4]

As these are “paired samples” or “dependent samples,” we know the general theoretical direction of the hypothesized effects, namely that the 2008-2010 period prior to the “Arab Spring” should be characterized by a higher mean of terrorist assaults. Therefore, a “one-tailed” T test is conducted to determine if it is possible to reject the null hypothesis of no relation (i.e., no statistically significant difference of means). In a similar vein, I repeat this process for two other means of variables that might serve as indicators of structural political change, namely frequency of terrorist assaults with police and military targets and frequency of terrorist assaults with fatalities.

I had hoped to use another set of T tests to determine whether or not there is a statistically significant difference of means between “starter” states and “non-starter” states for the 2008 - 2010 time interval. However, there was substantial variation in the sample sizes for states suggesting the samples for “starter” and “starter” states were not normal bell shaped distributions but skewed instead. That condition and the very small difference in means observed, precluded the possibility of conducting independent T tests for independent samples across countries.
Explanatory Variable One – Frequency of Terrorist Assaults

The first possible terrorism indicator that might serve as a predictor of structural political change is the frequency of terrorist events. There are four “starter” countries in the Maghreb and Mashreq regions of the Middle East under consideration. A hand-count of terrorist assaults determined all “starter” countries had a mean of terrorist incidents for the 2008-2010 interval that was larger than the mean for the 2000-2010 period for “frequency of terrorist events.” As previously mentioned, it is found that the difference of means observed within the category of “starter” states was in most cases and with the exception of Yemen, very small. There was also variation with respect to the number of cases for each “starter” state with Yemen in the data set. That is a strong indication the distribution of the data set for “starter” states is not a normal bell shaped distribution but highly skewed, which limits even further the analysis possible.

To be more specific, the observed difference of means was extremely small to very small in the cases of Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. For Libya, a mean of .2 terrorist events is found for the ten year period from 2000-2010 (2 events from 2000-2010) in comparison to a mean of .5 found for the “short-run” two year period between 2008-2010 with one chronicled terrorist assault. [5] For Tunisia, a mean of .7 is found for the ten year “middle-run” interval (7 terrorist events from 2000-2010) by contrast to a mean of 1 found for the “short-run” two year interval that preceded the “Arab Spring” (2 events from 2008-2010). Likewise in Egypt, a mean of 1.4 is found for the “middle-run” ten year period (14 events from 2000-2010) as compared to a mean 2.5 terrorist events in Egypt from 2008-2010 (2 events from 2008-2010).[6] In contrast, Yemen experienced greater numbers of terrorist assaults. For Yemen, the total number of terrorist assaults recorded from 2000-2010 is 206 events, by contrast to 112 incidents from 2008-2010 and therefore, the mean for 2000-2010 is 20.6, while the mean is 56 for the “short-run” 2008-2010 interval.[7]

Knowing that such small differences in means suggests that finding a statistically significant difference in means is highly unlikely, it is still possible to conduct a “one-tailed” T test because in the case of “starter” states, the samples are “dependent samples” otherwise known as “paired samples.” A “one-tailed” T-test was performed for “starter” states to determine whether or not there was a statistically significant difference in the means of terrorist assaults for the ten year period prior to the “Arab Spring,” (2000-2010) and for the two year period prior to the Arab Spring (2008-2010). At a theoretical level, it is anticipated that the means for terrorist assaults in the two year interval will be higher because of their proximity to the “Arab Spring.” We want to test if the difference between the means for the ten year “middle-run” period and the two year “short-run” period is statistically significant. The T obtained was 1.064 at 3 d.f. (d.f. = n_p-1 =3) and it was not possible to reject the null hypothesis at the .05 (95% confidence level) as T “critical” for a “one-tailed” T test at the .05 level at 3 d.f. is 2.353., In addition, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis at the .10 level (90% confidence level) as T “critical” at 3 d.f. for a “one-tailed” T test is 1.638 at .10.[8]
In summation, there is no statistically significant difference of means found for terrorist incidents in “starter” countries when the “middle-run” from 2000-2010 and the “short-run” from 2008-2010 are compared. Put another way, there is no meaningful difference in the average number of terrorist assaults that happened in the interval immediately prior to the “Arab Spring” when compared to a much longer ten year period prior to the “Arab Spring” and it is necessary to conclude this terrorism data indicator, namely the rate of terrorist events, cannot be used as a broader indicator of structural political change to forecast “Arab Spring” political events.

Additional Explanatory Variables—Terrorist Assaults with “Police” and “Military” Targets; “Terrorist Assaults with Fatalities”

In similar fashion, two other explanatory variables from the START data coding framework scheme are tested to determine their suitability to predict “Arab Spring” events based on the difference of means T tests for “middle-run” and “short-run” intervals. Those two variables are “police” and “military” targets, and “terrorist assaults with fatalities.” As before, “one-tailed” T tests are conducted because the skewed nature of the data, the variation in the number of terrorist incidents across states examined, and the anticipated theoretical direction of change. The categories “police” and “military” targets were recoded and conflated in the process (i.e., “police/military”) to reflect attacks on the state. The central notion is that on the cusp of the “Arab Spring,” there should be an increase in terrorist assaults directed against targets representative of the state and its coercive capacity for “symbolic” reasons inclusive of anger and other similar sentiments.[9] The same underlying notion of an increase in fatal terrorist events prior to the “Arab Spring” applies here.

As before, a hand-count of terrorist assaults for both time periods for both variables was conducted and the mean was calculated for terrorist assaults with “police/military” targets and “terrorist assault fatalities” for the two time intervals under consideration. As before, there were small and in some cases exceedingly small differences in observed means between time intervals and variation in the numbers of terrorist assaults carried out in “starter” states.[10] For “starter” countries, a “one-tailed” T test is performed because these are “dependent samples” and the anticipated change or theoretical direction is a rise in the mean of terrorist events with “police/military” targets in the 2008-2010 period. The T test produced a “T” statistic of 1.049 at 3 d.f. which fell short of the critical “T” value of 2.353 at 3 d.f. at the .05 level (95% confidence level) and the critical “T” value of 1.638 at the .10 level (90% confidence level). Hence, it was not possible to reject the null hypothesis.[11] Hence, there is no statistically significant difference of means of terrorist events with “police” and “military” targets found for “starter” states when the 2000-2010 and 2008-2010 periods are compared.

In a similar vein, the same procedure is used to examine whether or not “terrorist assaults with fatalities” is a useful predictor for “Arab Spring” events. [12] Here too there was no statistically
significant difference of means found for the 2000-2010 “middle-run” period that preceded the “Arab Spring” by ten years and the “short-run” two year period immediately prior to the “Arab Spring.” That “one-tailed” T test produced an “obtained” T score of .9737 at 3 d.f. (d.f. = n_p-1 =3) and that does not exceed T “critical” that is 2.015 at 3 d.f. at the .05 level. Indeed, it does not exceed T critical at the .10 level (90% confidence level) for 3 d.f. which is 1.638. Therefore, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that no statistically significant difference of means exists between the “short-run” and “middle-run” intervals under consideration. Accordingly, lethal terrorist assaults are also found to be useless as an indicator of “Arab Spring” events in addition to the indicators “frequency of terrorist events,” and “frequency of terrorist events involving military and police targets.”

Plainly, those terrorism social indicators are not useful predictors of “Arab Spring” events at least as data indicators to capture the profound and lasting political changes associated with the “Arab Spring.” Still, it might be possible that terrorism indicators might be relevant as an intervening variable(s) and thus as a predictor of political dynamics that influence the shape and frequency of terrorism. Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida suggested that international terrorism contagion effect is “hierarchal” in nature, essentially spreading from a nation state with “higher levels” of “diplomatic ranking” to countries with “lower levels of diplomatic ranking” when the scope of contagion under consideration is “regional.”[13] For Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida, the spillover effect or “contagion” effect between Germany and Italy in the 1970’s was an example of such “hierarchal” transmission in the region of Western Europe.[14] For Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida, that condition of “hierarchal” transmission contrasts with “reverse hierarchy” processes in place when “international terrorism” moves from the “developing world” to the “developed world.” In the case of “reverse hierarchy” processes, terrorism in the “developing world,” such as the activities of the Tupamaros in Uruguay, served as inspiration and elicited affiliation by disaffected groups or persons in “developed” nation-states. These contagion effects are worth exploring as it might be possible to cast some parameters of intervening factor effects that would be worth testing in future research.

It seems that Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida’s “hierarchal” process of international terrorism contagion in a specific region of the world, namely the Maghreb and Mashreq portions of the Middle East, is primarily of interest here because it is possible to tweak the model to first look at the interaction of political protest and government reaction. Because a country such as Egypt is an example of high “diplomatic ranking” and “international status” the authors suggest it is more likely that its patterns of protests as well as its patterns of violence would be “imitated” by groups in other countries. But patterns of terrorist violence are influenced by internal factors such as government policies of repression, or ad hoc acceptance or degrees of acceptance of protest and only then would those terrorism outcomes be replicated in other countries and addressed by government policies. [15]
It follows that the choice by government to accept political protest or degrees of political protest or repression would by contrast, lead to an increase or a decrease of terrorist assaults and related activities that in turn would lead to more or less in the sphere of “Arab-Spring” like events. Accordingly, those dynamics essentially place terrorism as an intervening variable in the dissemination process, which in turn, according to the Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida model, influences terrorism patterns in that sequential process in other nation-states.

How terrorism patterns are influenced by political protest and government response to those protests in Country A, shapes activities in the first period of contagion in Country B but insofar as policies differ in various countries because of “contextual factor” effects, terrorist outcomes will be shaped by independent protests and policies in Country B in t+ 1 where in some cases more or less terrorism would be elicited. Those “contextual factors” include cultural factors and other factors such as specifics of economic and political marginalization, and what the authors call “group dynamics,” and “physical contacts.” [16] Plainly, it is that configuration of relationships and their connections that would help determine if patterns of terrorism resemble what Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida called a condition of “reinforcement” where terrorism reappears in a specific country at a later date, “constancy” where presumably levels of terrorism remain the same, or a condition of “decline.” Further efforts at exploring the role of terrorism as an intervening variable between political protest and increases or decreases in government repression in other countries within the context of Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida’s model might prove fruitful.

Final Reflections

The underlying aim of this research note was to determine whether or not terrorism incident data can be used as predictors for profound structural political changes such as “Arab Spring” political events. It is clear that analysis of the START data on “starter” and “non-starter” countries has not illuminated any statistically significant difference of means in overall terrorist event frequencies, terrorist assaults characterized by attacks against “police” and “military” targets, and terrorist assaults with fatalities. That is the case for a “short-run” two year interval immediately preceding the “Arab Spring,” and a “middle-run” ten year interval preceding “Arab Spring” political events.

What appears to be a skewed distribution of the terrorist assault data is suggested by the large variance in sample means found and the very small to exceedingly small difference of observed means for “starter” states between those two time periods. That emergent reality constrained the framework of analysis employed. It is probably no exaggeration to say that makeshift and incomplete data might have contributed to the results; to be sure, this is no reflection on the quality of START data but more reflective of existing conditions for many developing countries, especially for those Middle Eastern countries shaped by the “Arab Spring” where more complete
data compilation is difficult because information is sketchy on more “pedestrian” terrorist assaults that might be reported in insufficient detail or ignored outright.[17]

It is possible that rates of terrorism and its “attributes” in specific countries might be an intervening variable in the dissemination process of profound and lasting political changes and that might explain why terrorism indicators are not able to illuminate patterns of change in time intervals immediately preceding the “Arab Spring” which would be useful for predictive purposes. Alternately, other social and economic indicators such as the thirty five year length of authoritarian rule, stagnant economic conditions, the level of political protest/demonstrations, and other unspecified political and economic variables might be more direct and better indicators of the profound and lasting change that has swept across much of the Middle East. It might be useful to build on the Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida model, perhaps by means of path analysis, to determine if a case can be made that terrorism serves as an intervening variable with respect to transnational dissemination of full blown political change or reform. It might be even more useful if data on governmental acts of repression would be collected next to data on non-state actors so that the two datasets can be juxtaposed. More often than not, it is violence that begets violence and one cannot understand non-state violence without studying the use of force – both the legitimate use and illegal uses – by state actors. We should also look at social and economic indicators: data on (youth) unemployment, government corruption, human rights violations, income distribution, and combating insurgencies could be usefully looked at. In this way, quantitative data might yield better results and our ability to forecast confrontations could be greatly enhanced.

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Notes


For each “starter” and “non-starter” country under consideration, data from the Global Terrorism Database produced by the “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) were used as primary data for analysis (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd).

In the case of START’s data category “Incidents over time” which I recode as “Average Number of Terrorist Assaults,” I also performed a “one-tailed” T test with data for “starter” states for a four year interval from 2006-2010; I could not reject the null hypothesis of no statistically significant difference of means.

Those terrorist assaults in Libya include: (1) an “Unknown” event, #200703300012, “Date: 2007-03-30,” (2) a “Sudan Liberation Movement” event, #200802260001, “Date: 2008-02-26.”


Those patterns continue to hold in the case of the nine (9) “non-starter” states under consideration. The observed difference in means is also exceedingly small and many “non-starter” cases such as United Arab Emirates, Syria, Bahrain, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait had very low rates of terrorism. In the UAE, there is a mean of .10 for the 2000-2010 interval (one act) while a mean of .5 is found for the 2008-2010 interval (one act). For Syria, a mean of .4 for 2000-2010 reflects four chronicled incidents while a mean of 1 for 2008-2010 in Syria reflects two recorded incidents. In the case of Jordan, a mean of 1.3 acts is tabulated from 13 acts chronicled from 2000-2010 while a mean of 1 reflects the two (2) incidents chronicled from 2008-2010. With a mean of .5 for 2000-2010, Bahrain also experienced very little terrorism with 5 acts over ten years; it experienced three (3) events from 2008-2010 for a mean of 1.5. A mean of .80 was found for Kuwait with a total of eight (8) events from 2000-2010 and a mean of 0 with zero (0) events from 2008-2010. For Morocco, a mean of 1.1 is found with 11 chronicled terrorist acts from 2000-2010 and a mean of 0 is found from the 2008-2010 period with zero (0) events. By contrast, Saudi Arabia experienced 43 events from 2000-2010 for a mean is 4.3 as compared to 3 terrorist assaults from 2008-2010 (a mean of 1.5). In contrast, Algeria experienced a much higher rate of terrorism than other “non-starter” states in both time periods under consideration. The mean for 2000-2010 is 122 and the mean for 2008-2010 is 157.5 as there were 1,220 recorded terrorist assaults from 2000-2010, and 315 chronicled for 2008-2010. In a similar vein, 152 acts are chronicled for Lebanon from 2000-2010 for a mean of 15.2 while 78 events are recorded for Lebanon from 2008-2010 prior to the start of the “Arab Spring” for a mean of 39.
[8] R. Mark Sirkin (1999), Statistics for Social Sciences. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 293-294, 250. There are four pairs of means examined here for the countries under consideration (n_p=4). First, Sirkin tells us to calculate the sample s (or standard deviation) which is the square root of s^2 (the variance). Here, the variance is 227.4 so the standard deviation is 15.08.

[9] For coding purposes, when there were combinations of “target-type” in the START data such as “business, military,” “police, maritime,” and “police, other” for example, targets were coded as single rather than multiple “police/military” target terrorist events in each case. In the case of “military, military” targets, the act was also coded as a single event. Incident examples include “Search Results – Yemen”: (1) an “Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)” event #201010110002, “Date: 2010-10-11,” (2) an “Aqmur (suspected)” event #201005160012, “Date: 2010-05-16,” (3) a “Southern Mobility Movement (Yemen) (suspected)” event # 201009040006, “Date: 2010-09-04,” (4) a “Southern mobility Movement Yemen” event #201007270009, “Date: 2010-7-27,” (5) an “Unknown” event #200807070041, “Date: 2008-07-07.”

[10] For example, in the case of terrorist assaults with “police and military targets,” Tunisia has a mean from 2000-2010 of .3 (3/10) and 0 (0/2) for the 2008-2010 period. For Egypt, the mean from 2000-2010 is .10 (1/10) and .5 (1/2) for the 2008-2010 period. For Yemen, the mean from 2000-2010 is 8.5 (85/10) by contrast to a mean of 39 (78/2) for the 2008-2010 interval.

[11] In the “one-tailed” T-test, the 10 year mean (2000-2010) constitutes the “before” sample and the 2 year mean (2008-2010) constitutes the "after" sample. In the case of the 10 year mean, Tunisia = .3; Egypt = .1; Libya = 0; Yemen = 8.5. In the case of the 2 year mean, Tunisia = 0; Egypt = .5; Libya = 0; Yemen = 39. The variance is 159.45 and the standard deviation is 12.62.

[12] Tunisia experienced 5 terrorist assaults with fatalities from 2000-2010 (5/10 = .5) for a mean of .5. There were no fatal terrorist assaults in Tunisia from 2008-2010. Egypt experienced 7 lethal terrorist events from 2000-2010 (7/10 = .7) with one (1) terrorist assault with fatalities from 2008-2010 (1/2=.5). In Libya, there were no fatal terrorist assaults chronicled from 2000-2010. Yemen experienced much higher rates of lethal terrorism with 112 acts from 2000-2010 (112/10 = 11.2) and 95 acts from 2008-2010 (95/2= 47.5). The variance is 250.26 and the standard deviation is 15.81.


[14] Ibid., p. 280.


Words Matter: Peer Review as a Failing Safeguard
by Tom Quiggin

Abstract [1]
Peer review is intended to support the quality and standards of academic work. The peer review process has been questioned recently in a number of different arenas. Source reliability and information credibility can be a problem when an academic scholar or an academic product steps into the public realm through a court case. In these circumstances, it is not just the credibility of the academic community that is being tested: lives and liberty can be at stake. Peer-reviewed article must provide a basic standard of trustworthiness. At a minimum, the peer review process, though a fact checking process, should be able to assure the reader that the sources of the information are reliable and the information provided is credible.

Testing Reliability
Some years ago, information from a peer-reviewed journal paper was rejected by the Federal Court of Canada in a terrorism-related court case. The judgement of the court identified that a component of the paper depended on sources of questionable reliability.[2] Additionally, the judge raised concerns about other information entered into court in the same case which had a patina of academic credibility.[3] The case is significant, in that the judge also determined that the accused in question had spent six and a half years in detention on a national security certificate without ever actually being a threat.[4]

Consider the following sentences from an article used in this court case that was earlier published in a peer-reviewed journal.[5]

“The terrorists who attacked the London transport system in July 2005 [6] were subsequently found to have been in possession of a large cache of illicit identity documents. The police investigation that followed uncovered a veritable trove of fraudulent passports, visas, and forged identity documents, sufficient, it was said, to supply several terrorist cells.”[7]

Whether these words are read by an academic, an average citizen or by the mythical ‘reasonable person’[8] in a court room setting, it would seem fair to make the following observations about this statement:

1. Terrorists attacked or attempted to attack the London transport system in July 2005.
2. A police investigation occurred subsequent to the terrorist attack.
3. These terrorists in question were found by the police to have in their possession a large amount of illicit identity documents.

4. The police investigation determined that the illicit documents in their possession consisted of a large amount of fraudulent passports, visas and forged identity documents.

5. The number of documents in the possession of the terrorists and found by the police would supply several terrorist cells, thereby inferring that more terrorist activity was planned by this group or its associates.

The information presented in this statement, however, is misleading. The documents referred to were not found by the police. The documents were not found in the possession of the terrorists. The persons finding the documents were not connected to the failed 21 July 2005 attacks to which the article refers nor were they connected to any “subsequent police investigation.” There was no “veritable trove” of fraudulent passports, visas, and forged identity documents found in the possession of the terrorists who attempted to attack the London transport on 21 July 2005. There was no indication in the case that suggested these terrorists were planning another attack or were supplying passports or visas to others.

Source Reliability and Information Credibility

How can a statement made in a peer-reviewed journal be rejected by a court?[9]

At this point, it may be instructive to authors, peer reviewers and other readers to examine potential pitfalls in source reliability and the closely related issue of information credibility in an academic article. In this case, the endnote [10] provided to substantiate the claim that the police investigation had uncovered a trove of fraudulent passports refers the reader to a Washington Times article with the title of 7 more arrested in Britain.

Several problems immediately arise upon examination of this source. The first issue is that it is a newspaper. This is not to say that newspapers should or should not be used as sources in peer-reviewed academic articles. Newspapers, as with any other endeavour, are known to vary widely in their quality and may have an agenda. An agenda is not necessarily a problem if it is identified to the reader up front. In this particular case, the paper is the Washington Times.

The Washington Times was formed in 1982 by the Reverend Sun Moon of the Unification Church (the Moonies). The paper, according to various sources, has a reputation for an agenda such as was reported in the University of Columbia’s Journalism Review.[11] At the 20th anniversary of the paper, the Reverend Sun Moon gave an hour long speech in which he stated: “The Washington Times will become the instrument in spreading the truth about God to the world.”[12]
In the press article used in the academic paper, the *Washington Times* journalist bases part of his information on a “security source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.”[13] The source is not identified and neither is the agency or company for which the source works. Additionally, no explanation is offered as to how the source came to possess the information. While the practice of using unidentified sources with no explanation of how they came into possession of certain information may be an acceptable practice for journalists, it should be a significant flag of warning for the academic author. It is necessary to avoid using such information until some sense of reliability of the source and the credibility of the information can be established.

In the *Washington Times* article, the journalist also qualified his own statement by noting that “the source offered no substantive evidence of additional cells.”

As for the discovery of the documents, the *Washington Times* journalists writes:

> The travel bag was stuffed with visas, forged documents supposedly from the British Home Office, bank cards and work permits. It was handed over to police after a taxi driver found them and passed them to investigative journalist Mazher Mahmood.

The journalist does make it clear that the documents in question were not found by police as part of a subsequent investigation. Rather it was a passing taxi driver, Gary Saunders, who found them and turned the travel bag over to a journalist. They were found about a mile from Heathrow airport which has no physical proximity to the attempted attacks. Mr. Saunders turned the documents over to a journalist. The journalist in turn brought them to the attention of the authorities.[14] It is clear that the documents came to the attention of the police due to good practices of a taxi driver and a journalist, not due to an investigation.

The *Washington Times* article provides us only the information that the journalist in question was Mazher Mahmood. Further research reveals that, at the time, Mr. Mahmood was working for the *News of the World*. Again, this should be a flag to the reader or potential author. The *News of the World* is a ‘red top’ paper or tabloid with a reputation for sensationalist articles. At best, extraordinary caution should be used when quoting from a tabloid paper. With respect to peer-reviewed articles, it may be advisable to avoid any source material from tabloids without establishing the credibility of the information via another source.

To be clear and to be fair to the *Washington Times* journalist, it should be noted that the newspaper article in question states in the opening paragraph that:

> Police investigating a wave of transit system bomb attacks yesterday arrested seven more persons and separately uncovered a large cache of faked identity documents, spurring fears that additional terror cells are waiting to strike. [15] (emphasis added, TQ)

The author of the newspaper article states directly in the first sentence that the discovery of the documents in question was a separate action from the police investigation into the transit system.
bomb attacks. It is clear that the author of the newspaper article did not intend to say that the police investigation of the transit system bomb attacks uncovered the documents. However, the first sentence does weakly infer that the police did find the passports in question, even if the article later clarified that was not the case. While the Washington Times journalist does attempt to link the two issues, (documents and terror cells) he is clear that it was fear, not facts, the spurred the observations.

The journalist does go on to clarify the opening statement and explains that the documents in question were not found by the police. They were actually reported to have been found by a taxi driver. They were never in the possession of the 21 July 2005 terrorists and no connection to their case has been identified. Additionally, no subsequent information has appeared that would clearly determine if the passports and other documents were part of an immigration fraud ring, a criminal organization or a terrorist group.

As such, the statement in the peer-reviewed article is false and misleading. The sources for the information lacked credibility and even at that, the article manages to distort and misrepresent the information that was originally provided by the journalists in question.

Ironically, the same Washington Times article also made the following statement about Osman Hussain, who was one of the terrorists convicted in the July 2005 London transit attempted bombings case:

*The British internal security service also faced criticism after it was revealed that Mr. Hussain had managed to escape the country aboard the Eurostar train through the Channel Tunnel to France. He traveled using his regular British passport five days after the failed July 21 bombings.*

This information from the Washington Times article used by the author of the peer-reviewed journal actually leans more towards disproving the general thesis of the article, rather than proving it. As such, the source for the peer-reviewed article in this case not only does not support the claims made in the article, it contradicts the main thesis of the argument in question.

An examination of the remainder of the peer-reviewed article reveals that the other examples used in the paper are also misleading. Under the subsection in the academic article titled (d) Passport Forgery, there is the statement “Al Qaeda operatives arrested in the United Kingdom were found in possession of hundreds of fraudulent travel documents.” The reader is directed to endnote 78 to confirm the source of this information which was a Sunday Times (London) article of 29 February 2004. When the 2000 word article is read, it can be found to say only in the second to last paragraph that:

*Two Al-Qaeda terrorists, jailed in Britain in July 2003, were discovered with hundreds of fraudulent travel documents that had been used to open bank accounts, get bank loans and claim benefits.*
No source is identified in the article as to how many passports the terrorist might have had nor are they identified. However, further research beyond what is provided in the newspaper article or the academic article reveals that the two individuals involved were Brahim Benmerzouga and Baghdad Meziane. It appears that Mr. Mezaine was found with one passport in the name of Cyril Jacob and Mr. Benmerzouga was found with three fake passports. The primary focus of their conviction was for "entering into a funding arrangement for the purposes of terrorism" and for this they were found to have hundreds of bank cards.[20]

According to reporting based on the judgment of Mr. Justice Curtis, Mr. Benmerzouga and Mr. Meziane were found to have the “names and credit card details of almost 200 different bank accounts on computer discs and envelopes found littered around their homes and cars.”[21]

Press reporting speculated that Mr. Meziane may have been involved in the distribution of false visas based on emails found on his computer that referred to washed and unwashed clothes. This, however, was speculation and did not refer to passports themselves as the journalists make clear when they state that the information was “thought to have referred to doctored travel visas.”[22]

**The Outcome**

The overall impact of the lack of reliability of the sources and the lack of credibility of the information is clear. Refereeing specifically to the misuse of identity documents, the judge determined that the article had:

...relied on secondary or tertiary sources of information, such as newspaper articles, of questionable reliability.[23]

The judge made a further observation on the issue of reliability and credibility in the same judgment. The judge states that the author, also appearing as a witness, was:

*cross-examined closely on the accuracy of sources he had referenced in his report, including a Washington Times article dated August 1, 2008 (Ex. R-3),[24] an article on the use of deception by Raymond Ibrahim (Ex. R-4) and the Encyclopaedia of the Afghani Jihad (Ex. A-7). The content of the Washington Times article did not support the statement for which it was used as a reference. There is no explicit reference in the Encyclopaedia to support the statement that it encourages Al Qaeda members to deceive the court.” (the witness) acknowledged that Mr. Ibrahim’s perspective may be biased.[25]*

In this case and other related court cases, numerous other examples have been found in which misleading information has been entered into court with at least the patina of academic credibility. This may be the subject of another article on how circular reporting (including that of the academic world) allows unreliable information to enter into mainstream thinking.
Peer Review

Academics claim to have a special or privileged position in society. As with other professions such as doctors or lawyers, academics are presumed to have an area of competence. This is enforced in the public mind by a number of formal mechanisms (degree granting, research and teaching positions, tenure, etc.) and by informal mechanisms such as ceremonial and dress conventions. The credibility of the field is believed to be maintained by enforcement actions such as peer review, article retraction or the loss of tenure.

Peer review, at least publicly, is presented as a key part of the process of ensuring the quality of academic research work. However, despite its long history, peer review is frequently questioned. Note the comments of Richard Horton, editor of the medical journal *The Lancet*:

> Editors and scientists alike insist on the pivotal importance of peer review. We portray peer review to the public as a quasi-sacred process that helps to make science our most objective truth teller. But we know that the system of peer review is biased, unjust, unaccountable, incomplete, easily fixed, often insulting, usually ignorant, occasionally foolish, and frequently wrong.[26]

Other comments on peer review have been considerably less kind than those of Richard Horton![27]

One of the problems with peer review is that no clear definition explains the process and the standards that should guide it. A general consensus appears to exist on the view that those doing peer review should be knowledgeable in the field of endeavor under examination and that the peer review process is intended to improve the quality of the work involved. However, peer review, contrary to some views, does not necessarily ensure the correctness of the work presented.[28]

As a part of the research into this article, an email was sent to the publishers Taylor and Francis on 03 February 2013 which asked the following question:

> Peer Review: As a general rule, does the process of peer review at a journal ensure the correctness of the general thesis of the article and the facts contained within it? Or would it be fair to state that it is more of a process of quality control?

The answer (email of 04 February 2013) provided by the Production Coordinator was “Visit [http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk](http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk) for further help and resources.” This page provides a link to another page titled “What is peer review?” The page describes the peer review process at Taylor and Francis but does not address the question of whether or not peer review ensures the correctness of the main thesis of the article or the facts within it. It does state that peer review can “alert you to any errors or gaps in the literature you may have overlooked.”
What Should Be Expected of Peer Review?

Peer review is fraught with difficulty, especially in areas such as terrorism and national security. These fields often have a lack of clarity in defining many of the most commonly used terms and the nature of the subjects tends to bring out value-laden terms. No one should expect the peer review process to sort out such complex problems and the wide variety of analytical views which result.

However, the reader should expect at least source reliability and information credibility. The information provided by the author should then link to the general thesis of the article in question. While it is difficult to expect that academic work can provide absolute ‘truth’ or ‘pure facts’ in the nebulous and value laden subjects of terrorism and national security, it is not unreasonable to expect source reliability and information credibility.

What to Watch and What to Avoid

Assessing the value of a peer-reviewed article can be difficult, especially if the reader is not an expert in the field of study. However, there are key indicators and warnings which may alert the reader to potential problems. The first of these is to actually check the source given in an endnote. Does the source exist as described and can the source be assessed as reliable? Does the source have a known agenda? Often overlooked is the next step, which is to measure the credibility of the information provided. While a source may be well known, it does not infer that the information itself is credible. This needs to be determined separately.

Details are everything. If the details of an argument do not withstand examination, then the entire argument becomes subject to questions of reliability. In a court of law, these flaws will be exposed and subject to an aggressive cross examination. Check the details!

Readers should also be aware of the often used writer’s trick of placing two concepts side by side and allowing the reader to make the association. Consider the following: “The 9/11 attacks on America must not be allowed to stand. We must attack Iraq so we fight them over there rather than fighting them over here.” Clearly, there was no linkage between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the 9/11 attacks, but politicians, journalists and academics will use this rhetorical trick to lead the reader into making an assumption. If such an observation is made in an article, then the entire argument of the article or paper should be closely examined for validity.

Conclusions

While the concept and bounds of peer review remains contested, it should be expected to meet some form of minimum standard. In terms of surviving cross examination in court, this means ensuring the reliability of the source involved and the credibility of the information provided by
that source. Following that, the arguments advanced must actually support the claims made. Even if the arguments of the article do not carry the day in court, the author and the article can retire from the legal battlefield with their credibility intact while enhancing the integrity of the academic profession. If they do not, then both the author and academia suffer.

In short, words matter.

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Notes

[1] A short piece of a similar nature was published by the same author in Global Brief magazine in February 2010. It was titled Words Matter: Academia, Terrorism and National Security. It can be found online at: http://globalbrief.ca/tomquiggin/2010/02/21/words-matter-academia-terrorism-and-national-security/ (downloaded on 04 March 2012 at 04:53 EST).


[3] See also paragraphs 283 and 284 in the same decision above.

[4] The key paragraph [504] of the judge’s conclusions in his findings states: Having considered all of the information and other evidence presented to the Court, I am satisfied that Hassan Almrei has not engaged in terrorism and is not and was not a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe has, does or will engage in terrorism. I find that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that Hassan Almrei is to-day, a danger to the security of Canada. Thus, I find that none of the grounds of inadmissibility in subsection 34(1) of the Act have been made out and, accordingly, I find that the certificate is not reasonable and must be quashed. The decision is available online at: http://web.archive.org/liveweb/http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2009/2009fc1263/2009fc1263.html. (downloaded on 03February 2013 at 17:58 EST).

[5] The journal in question is Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. The title of the article is Misuse of Passports: Identity Fraud, the Propensity to Travel, and International Terrorism. The publishers of this journal, Taylor & Francis, make the following statement concerning peer review on this particular publication: “All research articles in this journal have undergone rigorous peer review, based on initial editor screening and
refereeing by two anonymous referees.” This statement can be seen online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/action/aboutThisJournal?show=aimsScope&journalCode=uter20 . The peer review process of Taylor & Francis is further described at: http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/review/peer.asp . (downloaded on 4 March 2012 at 04:55 EST).

[6] This article does not refer to the attacks on the London Tube system of 05 July 2005, but rather the later failed attempt on 21 July 2005. This fact is not made especially clear in the article.

[7] These sentences can be found on page 96 of the article Misuse of Passports: Identity Fraud, the Propensity to Travel, and International Terrorism as published in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31:2, 95-110. The article also has an online publication date of 01 February 2008. DOI:10.1080/10576100701812803.

[8] The term is used herein the context of common law and can be defined as a hypothetical person in society who exercises average care, skill, and judgment in conduct and who serves as a comparative standard for determining liability. A further explanation of a reasonable person can be found in the Canadian Supreme Court ruling R. v R.D.S. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484.

[9] It should be noted this was the Federal Court of Canada. The standard of evidence used in the Federal Court is less challenging than that used in a criminal court in Canada. It is all the more distressing that the statements from this article did not meet the standards used in the Federal Court.


[11] For an overview of issues raised by a newspaper having an agenda, see the article by Dante Chinni, a senior associate at the Project for Excellence in Journalism, Columbia University, Graduate School of Journalism titled The Other Paper as published by the Columbia Journalism Review, 01September 2002.


[14] See the article titled EVIL ON OUR STREETS: WE FIND FAKE PASSPORTS NEAR AIRPORT as reported by the News of the World (London), Jul 31, 2005; Mazher Mahmood investigations; p. 2. Copies of the article can still be found online at: http://z13.invisionfree.com/julyseventh/index.php?s=f854a41a35253ce6e84edcd8033ac57&act=Print&client=printer&f=18&t=128


[16] For more on the taxi driver see the article of Tuesday, 02 Aug 2005 at 14:02:51 titled Fake Indian passports found in holdall. It is available online at: http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com/Archive/Soc/soc.retirement/2005-08/msg01049.html (downloaded on 28 January 2013 at 2215 EST.)

[17] The individual in question has had his name reported as Hussain Osman, Hussein Osman and Osman Hussain. According to a BBC profile of him, his name was originally Hamdi Isaac Adus. For further on his background and conviction, see the BBC Profile: Hussain Osman dated Monday, 9 July 2007, 15:45 GMT 16:45 UK. It is available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm, (downloaded 13 February 2013 at 09:24 EST).


[20] See the BBC article Terror-link pair jailed as published on Tuesday, 1 April, 2003, 15:42 GMT 16:42 UK. It is available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/2887953.stm (downloaded 13 February 2013 at 11:07 EST). See also the BBC article Hundreds arrested, few convicted published Friday, 11 March, 2005, 14:29 GMT. It is available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3290583.stm (downloaded 13 February 2013 at 15:14 EST).

[21] Al-Qaida terrorists jailed for 11 years, attributed to Staff and agencies at The Guardian, Tuesday 1 April 2003 16.56 BST. The article is available online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2003/apr/01/terrorism.alqaida (downloaded 13 February 2013 at 11:18 EST).

[22] Ibid.


[24] The exhibit noted the date as 2008 which was the year in which the peer-reviewed article was published. The year of the Washington Times article was 2005.


[27] See the comments of Drummond Rennie as quoted in Glenn W. Suter II, Ecological Risk Assessment, CRC Press, 2006, Second Edition, page 133: “There seems to be no study too fragmented, no hypothesis too trivial, no literature too biased or too egotistical, no design too warped, no methodology too bungled, no presentation of results too inaccurate, too obscure, and too contradictory, no analysis too self-serving, no argument too circular, no conclusions too trifling or too unjustified, and no grammar and syntax too offensive for a paper to end up in print.”

[28] Notes the comments by Paul Ginsparg of Cornell University in his short article Can Peer Review be better Focused? (paragraph two of second section). He notes that “Outsiders, and even some insiders to the system are sometimes surprised to learn that peer-reviewed journals do not certify correctness of research results.” See the full text of the article online at http://people.ccmr.cornell.edu/~ginsparg/blurb/pg02pr.html (downloaded 15 February 2013 at 09:20 EST).
III. Resources

An Annotated Interview with Sashadhar Choudhury, Foreign Secretary, United Liberation Front of Assom [Assam]

by Rajeev Bhattacharyya and Nikhil Raymond Puri

Introduction

The United Liberation Front of Assom (ULFA) was founded in the spring of 1979, guided by a desire to liberate the north-eastern state of Assam from the “neglectful” and “exploitative” tendencies of Indian control. The group’s objectives dovetailed with the nationalist fervour of the Assam Movement (1979-85), which sought to resist the perceived influx into Assam of illegal immigrants, and opposed what it considered a state-sanctioned policy of enfranchising these (mostly Bengali) “foreigners.” [1] While the Indian state succeeded in absorbing the majority of agitators into the political mainstream through the Assam Accord of 1985, ULFA persisted with a militant struggle aimed at secession from the Indian union. Towards this end, the group was able to capitalise on a critical mass of individuals dissatisfied with the terms of the Accord. A quantitative indicator of the group’s salience resides in the assortment of statistics capturing the impact of militancy in Assam. Official and unofficial data sources suggest that more than 4,000 civilians, and approximately 800 security personnel succumbed to militant activity in the state during the two decades spanning 1992 through 2011. [2] In absence of a continuous record of ULFA-specific incidents, scattered repositories place the group’s relative responsibility for this death toll between 20 and 26 percent of civilian fatalities, and between 32 and 43 percent of fatalities in the case of security personnel. [3] In absolute terms, these estimates suggest that between 800 and 1,040 civilians and between 250 and 350 security personnel died in the context of ULFA activity during this period. But ULFA’s assault has not been unilateral. Deploying the combined strength of its military, paramilitary, and police forces, the Indian state has achieved considerable success in its effort to weaken the group. According to one source, as many as 855 ULFA operatives were killed in the period from 1992 through 2001. [4] Coupled with these coercive measures, the state’s provision of financial incentives to surrendering militants has induced a great many to disengage.

In the latter part of 2009, Indian authorities relied on the good-neighbourly cooperation of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government in Bangladesh, which agreed to apprehend and hand over key ULFA leaders present in the country. Amongst them was the group’s foreign secretary, Sashadhar Choudhury, who was subsequently released on bail as a quid pro quo for his willingness to support peace negotiations – initiated by ULFA chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa – with the Indian state. Owing to his high rank, Sashadhar Choudhury was privy to many policies
devised by ULFA’s leadership over the years, including those aimed at scouting out and motivating new recruits, maintaining discipline, and preventing disengagement. In his capacity as foreign secretary, he was responsible for establishing links with like-minded militant groups and securing patronage from foreign governments. In addition to his knowledge of the group’s internal dynamics and external linkages, the intimacy and duration of his involvement afford him a unique prism through which to contemplate the full range of interaction between one’s militant engagement and personal (family) life. Intent on eliciting some of his insight, the authors (Rajeev Bhattacharyya and Nikhil Raymond Puri) conducted the following interview with Sashadhar Choudhury in Guwahati on November 5, 2012.

Question: Your most recent position in ULFA has been that of foreign secretary. Can you describe the responsibilities associated with this role?

Sashadhar Choudhury: The role of foreign secretary involves linking up with other militant organisations and other countries. Linking with other organisations is not a problem. They are of the same caste. By this I mean they are insurgents so they understand the interests and motivations of other insurgent outfits even if they operate in a different region with a different ideology. We see things similarly. The second part of a foreign secretary’s role involves dealing with states – with that part of the government which will take care of insurgents or talk to insurgents. Every state is self-interested. It might deal with insurgent groups, but it will do so only to further its own ends. This was evident during the Cold War era when both players [the United States and the Soviet Union] used insurgents to undermine one-another. But the [patronised] insurgent group can also use state support for its own purposes, to target its own enemy. So a foreign secretary tries to promote the group’s interest by establishing contacts with other militant groups and also with governments.

Question: Can you walk us through ULFA’s efforts to establish ties with other militant groups and with foreign governments?

Sashadhar Choudhury: I joined ULFA in 1985. My first foreign trip as a junior member was to Kachin Land in Myanmar. ULFA went to Kachin Land with the help of the Nagas. [5] We hoped that we could further rely on the Nagas to facilitate our transit to China since Nagas had spent time in China during the Mao Zedong era. [6] They were trained and given arms and ammunition. But the Nagas had failed to obtain Chinese support after 1971, when their links with the government of China were snapped. [7] So ULFA went to Kachin Land, intent on establishing links with the Chinese government. A meeting was held in Nagaland where various groups operating in the northeast decided they would go to China and ask for help for the whole of [India’s] north-eastern region. I was not at this meeting myself, but heard from senior leaders that it was attended by [Thuingaleng] Muivah, [Isak] Chisi Swu, and [Rajkumar] Meghen who is
now in jail. ULFA was also there. Most people publicly deny that any such meeting ever took place. Leaders of ULFA and Manipuri groups returned to Assam and Manipur for fundraising purposes and to reorganise their operatives. Meanwhile, Muivah and his men went to China.

**Question:** In which year was this?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** This was in 1986. Muivah went there and failed to meet Chinese leaders. He also suffered a heavy loss of his operatives owing to the treacherous terrain. Then ULFA went there followed by Meitei groups. ULFA failed to make any direct contact with China, and was forced to get indirect Chinese support through the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the rebel groups with which it was allied. We stayed with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) for two and a half years. I wore the KIA insignia and operated under their command. The understanding was that KIA would train us while ULFA would give its host anywhere between 40 to 60 percent of the arms it collected. KIA was a very big guerrilla organisation at the time. It had a 16,000-strong army.

**Question:** Were you also expected to fight for the Kachin cause?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** Yes absolutely because we wanted arms, which we collected while fighting. Our position was: “we don’t want to know your cause, but we will be with you as an army and fight for you.” What ULFA learned from the Kachin rebels was diplomacy. While we were fighting for their army, KIA engaged in insurgent diplomacy with RAW [Research and Analysis Wing, India’s external intelligence division]. KIA told the Indian government that it would stop helping ULFA. “We will send ULFA back but you must give us arms and other logistics to fight the Burmese junta.” India agreed, so we retreated from Kachin Land. This was ULFA’s first lesson in diplomacy.

**Question:** The lesson being that you cannot trust anybody?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** That you cannot trust anybody. But more importantly, that if others can use us for their purposes, we can also use others for ours. ULFA left Kachin Land and penetrated into Bangladesh where it connected with ISI [Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence].

**Question:** How did you establish these links with ISI?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** I don’t know. I was not the person in charge at the time. But ULFA connected with ISI. ISI is a potent, dedicated, organisation. If they say they will do something, they will do it. In ULFA we understood that ISI was the only organisation we could rely on. I was in the first batch of ULFA militants trained by ISI. In 1991, I went to Pakistan to receive
commando training in Darra Adam Khel. I was there for six months. I also went to Khost [Afghanistan]. I also spent seven months in Rawalpindi. I was the only person [from ULFA] trained by ISI in intelligence.

**Question:** Did your comrades only receive weapons training?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** Yes. I was the only person trained in intelligence. Intelligence has many parts. Gathering intelligence is Indian. RAW relies disproportionately on gathering intelligence. But ISI focuses equally on motivation. To them, intelligence means gathering information from you, but also motivating you. You may be a researcher, you may be from a well-do-do family, but I want to use you as a thief. ISI trains people to commit suicide without knowing their cause. Indian intelligence officials cannot obtain information even after paying people money. That is the difference. It is a different type of intelligence. When you establish a relationship, it is generally an attachment of sand and sand. You can mix sand and sand, but also separate the grains. But for ISI, a relationship is made of water and water. Once mixed, you cannot separate it. That is their philosophy.

**Question:** You spent time in Myanmar’s Kachin camps, in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Bhutan. What were the key lessons you drew from each of these foreign experiences?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** They are all very different. People in Burma are similar to us in terms of their culture and habitation. They are simple, whether they be Kachin, Mon, Pa’O, Palaung, Karen, or even Burmese. They are very simple. They live in jungles and often don’t have access to roads. The main thing I learnt from the Kachin rebels was their discipline. They drank. But they obeyed their command. You cannot imagine their discipline. We only trained two ULFA batches in Kachin camps.

**Question:** What about Bhutan?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** Bhutan is very different. It is mostly jungle. There is hardly any population. You don’t really have the chance to mingle with people. You might find two or three households per village. People are not very educated and rely mostly on a barter system for their livelihood. But the Bhutanese have a good relationship with us. When we were in Bhutan, we felt like we were in Assam. We could always see our land from Bhutan and we had access to food from Assam. It was also easy to travel back and forth. We had 5,000 operatives in southern Bhutan and relied on the hospitality of local villagers. But we did not have much to learn in Bhutan. They are a peaceful people. Their love for peace was not very useful to a militant group.
**Question:** Did you receive any support from the Royal Bhutan Army?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** We did not receive any support from Bhutanese authorities. Officials came to our camp but failed to do anything for us. [11]

**Question:** Tell us about the lessons you drew from your time in Bangladesh.

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** Bangladeshis are extremely well informed. They are also very enterprising. You can find Bangladeshis anywhere you go. In the beginning of 1991, I was living in Bangladesh. We ran guns through Bangladesh. One day my Bangladeshi cook put too much chilli in our meat so I rebuked him. He told me not to complain. I asked him what he’d do. He said he was going to Singapore as soon as his passport arrived so my complaints were useless. In Assam you can give a person a passport, money, and a university degree and a trip to Singapore might still be impossible. Bangladeshis are different. If you give them money, they will smuggle guns. It is very tough to find people who will smuggle guns. A gun weighs 5 kilos. If a person smuggles a gun he might get 10,000 rupees (US$ 180). But if he smuggles 5 kilos of gold he will get closer to 2,00,000 rupees (US$ 3700). Why would someone smuggle guns? People would much rather smuggle heroin. But Bangladeshis will smuggle guns. Bangladeshis will take risks that nobody else will. They are risk-takers.

**Question:** And what did you learn in Pakistan?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** Their determination to fight India. They hold on to principles.

**Question:** As the leader of a militant group, what measures do you take to motivate recruits, and to prevent disengagement?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** It is very difficult. We tried but we failed. You may succeed in recruiting one member. He may join due to patriotism, or frustration, or anything else. He might land up in a base camp in Bhutan. We will expose him to political thoughts, we will give him history lessons. We will also give him military training. This is all easy. It is like a picnic. But sooner or later he will be sent for an operation. When he gets involved in operations he will realise that he has to keep doing this until his death and that he will not get much for it. You are sent on operations with two days worth of rations, bullets and a gun. It is not easy. In Assam, if you get into politics instead, you will get a secretary, you will get promotions, and might eventually make it to Parliament. In insurgency, promotions are value-less. If you are promoted to a commander you have to go in front. That means ULFA will use me until death. Then I will be discarded. There is little benefit. The problem in insurgency is that there is a big gap between
leaders and operatives. There are five or six leaders. They have been there more or less since the beginning. But when you join an insurgency, your fight can result only in surrender or death. [12] When junior members descend from camps and go home, they often get involved in love affairs. Marrying in a militant camp is not that easy. [13] [Intent on staying home] they will then try to contact the government or police. The government will provide them money and they will surrender. [14]

**Question:** Apart from monetary incentives, what other government measures have prompted surrender of ULFA members?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** The police have killed ULFA leaders’ family members. They killed my brother. They killed our publicity secretary’s entire family. [15] They killed Paresh Baruah’s brothers. [16] They started targeting the lower level operatives as well. So the lower level operatives will say “I should surrender so they do not kill my relatives.” The government has used every weapon against us.

**Question:** Were there any measures that ULFA’s leadership took to reduce the rate of disengagement?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** No, we eventually concluded that it is not our burden. If you want to surrender, go ahead. It is impossible to motivate people to stay. When a person is young and energetic, he thinks of sacrificing for two causes: 1) for his offspring, and 2) for his motherland. And when they become old, they forget about the motherland. They will only remain engaged for money. This is how it is everywhere. But you cannot say all people have surrendered. Some people are there. We have been there for 27 years.

**Question:** You mention the energy associated with youth. What role does age play in the decision to disengage, and when does a militant become too old?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** You cannot do anything once you get older. What will I do if I go back to the jungle? You cannot endure hardship. You cannot fight. Guerrilla service is finished at the age of 30. After the age of 30 you cannot do anything. [17]

**Question:** So surrender is almost inevitable after the age of 30?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** Yes. It is a life of hardship.
Question: How does ULFA cope with the fact that the average militant will disengage due to age or fatigue?

Sashadhar Choudhury: We have to keep recruiting. Somebody will go and somebody will come. It is an ongoing process.

Question: We would like to ask you some questions about the manner in which your experience as a militant impacted, and was impacted by, your family.

Sashadhar Choudhury: I have completely snapped my relationship with my own family – with my father and mother. It is very difficult to maintain relations.

Question: Why did you do that?

Sashadhar Choudhury: You cannot maintain a relationship. Intelligence officials are always there. If it is known that your relatives are communicating with you, then they might be killed. It is very dangerous.

Question: So it is in the interest of your relatives to stop communicating with them when you become actively involved in militancy?

Sashadhar Choudhury: How is it possible to communicate? If you make a telephone call, it is tapped. The next day they [your relatives] will be picked up and given a good beating. If you never interact with your relatives, the cops will not bother them.

Question: Can you talk about the specific difficulties your relatives endured during your time as a militant?

Sashadhar Choudhury: Yes. My father died of that. He was a teacher. Every night they would come and slap him. “Have you communicated with your son? Do you have any contact with him?” Bogus questions. There was a former DGP [Director General of Police] named Srivastava. He is currently a security advisor in Guwahati. He killed my brother. My brother was innocent. He was a government employee. Many Assamese people have been killed in secret killings. They have killed all ULFA leaders’ loved ones.

Question: It is understandable that you should stop communicating with your parents for practical reasons. But did you also break your emotional ties with them?
Sashadhar Choudhury: No. Nobody does that. Emotionally you cannot snap ties with your father and mother. It is not possible. But when you become a guerrilla, things are very different. When you become a militant, it is a very different world.

Question: Did you ever experience conflict between your desire to contact your parents and your inability to do so?

Sashadhar Choudhury: I am telling you, guerrillas are born. You cannot make a guerrilla. Our heart is very different from yours. We are very different people. I have a daughter. I have a wife. If someone comes and tells me “your daughter has died,” it will be very different than if someone tells an ordinary person the same. People die. For me, that is life. I love her. But things are meant to be. I think we are born to curb the emotion.

Question: This is your perspective. But how did your parents feel? How did your militancy impact them emotionally?

Sashadhar Choudhury: No, they are ordinary people. When I saw them in jail, they would become extremely emotional. I know that they always cried when they talked to others about me.

Question: So you have the heart of a guerrilla but your parents were very normal people. They reacted emotionally to your circumstances,

Sashadhar Choudhury: Yes. It is not possible for them to respond the same way.

Question: When did you get married? After you joined ULFA?


Question: And how did your marriage influence your ability to participate in militancy?

Sashadhar Choudhury: It had no impact because my wife was also a member. I married within the organisation.

Question: Would it have been possible for you to marry someone outside the organisation?

Sashadhar Choudhury: It is difficult. Why will she give you to die? Why will she give you to take risks? When you go abroad with false documents there is a risk of long-term imprisonment if you get caught. It is difficult. It might be possible. I’m sure you can find cases where it happens. But for me it would be very difficult.
**Question:** You mentioned you have a daughter. What would you think if your child pursued the same route as you did?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** No, she will not pursue this route. She has been born and brought up around the gun. She knows that her father is a guerrilla. He killed so many people. He has done so much fighting, and she knows it is a bad thing. But she never expresses it. They [children of militants] have seen and heard things you cannot imagine. So her condition is very different. No guerrilla’s family members want to become guerrillas because they know the hardship involved.

**Question:** You joined ULFA as a young man. Individuals change with time. How has your ideology evolved over these years? Has there been a shift?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** I am a very different person. I am a spiritual man. You may expect otherwise. I get up at 4am and meditate. All these years I have been doing this. I am 50 years old now. From 4am to 5am I meditate. Then I do yoga for another hour. Then I read. Then it is ULFA business after breakfast. I do ULFA business the whole day. Then after 4pm I exercise again. I lift weights for an hour. Then I rest for one hour until 6pm. After 6pm I give time to family. I play with my daughter or talk to my wife. Let me tell you one thing. It is not possible for you to understand peace, because you are in peace. You may understand anxiety and tension. But you cannot understand peace. I have spent 27 years in violence. Killing, violence, insecurity, anxiety – that is all I have seen these years. I will probably live another 20, maybe 30 years. All I want for these years is peace. Nothing is more precious for me now. If and when there is a settlement with the Government of India, I will not talk to any scribe. I don’t want to be a powerful man. I want to live a low-profile life. I don’t want anything else. I will even discard my cell phone.

**Question:** You want that now, possibly due to fatigue.

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** No, from the very beginning. Of course when I joined the movement as a youngster, things were very different. But soon after I joined ULFA I understood peace. People always ask “why don’t you write an autobiography?” But I don’t want to. When you go for this, it will again smash, again violate your peace. You have to withdraw completely.

**Question:** Would you still support violent means if, say, the next generation of Assam’s youth chooses to use violence to achieve its objectives?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** If somebody comes to me and says “I want to be a guerrilla,” I have no option but to say “you can do it, but these are the pros and these are the cons. It’s your own choice, but these are the conditions you have to meet.” And I don’t believe an ordinary person
can easily meet these criteria. You’ll spend five or six years doing it and then bounce out. It is very difficult.

**Question:** So what is it about you, about Paresh Baruah, about Arabinda Rajkhowa that allows you to endure these difficulties for so long?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** I cannot speak for others. Within ULFA I have no such personal relationship with others that I can speak for them. Except for Raju Baruah. [18] He was my friend. He was a commander. I don’t ask others what they are doing. It is organisational business only. It is purely professional.

**Question:** So there are no friendships within ULFA?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** No. It is like the relationship with your teacher. Emotion will not work. Inside a guerrilla movement there is no option to make such an emotional friendship. Nobody wants to interfere in your personal life.

**Question:** What allowed you to stay involved for so long?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** I am a very determined person. I will always do what I say. If I say I will do so and so, I will do it. That is a personal characteristic. That is all. I have stated to ULFA that I will be with ULFA. If required, I will go to the jungle again. I have no problem. Then I will not search for peace.

**Question:** How would you assess your career with ULFA, keeping the group’s objectives in mind?

**Sashadhar Choudhury:** In one way I can say “no we have not succeeded, everything has gone in vain.” On the other hand, we have tested all means permitted to us in this life. We have tried everything. We have done as much as men can do. So we believe that we have succeeded as human beings in trying our best. That is sufficient. I am sure the group’s objectives will not be fulfilled in my lifetime because the world has changed. When we went there in 1985 the world was different. It was a bipolar world. India’s condition was different. Assam was different. Demographic conditions were different. The social structure was different. Everything was different.

**Question:** What are the qualities the leader of a militant group must possess?
Sashadhar Choudhury: First, you cannot be a hypocrite. Let me give you a hypothetical example. I am a commander with ten people under my command. We have to take shelter in different homes. I hear that one of my boys has molested a girl. Usually, for molestation ULFA’s policy is that the person will be demoted one rank. If he is a private, then he will be caned instead since there is no room for demotion. But if he has seen you doing similar things, then it is difficult to punish and discipline. He will get a group of his friends together and say “I have also seen the commander molesting someone.” And these are all gun-toting elements. When you sleep at night he might kill you. So who will take the risk? It is a problem. In the army, it is impossible for a soldier to kill a captain. After all, where will the soldier go? But in ULFA’s case, if a junior member kills a senior leader, he can surrender and get remuneration from the government. It is a problem. When a crime is committed, you have to punish. But you also have to take care of yourself. So sometimes you have to ignore wrongdoing by your juniors. It is easy to be killed in a jungle camp. Second, a good leader should never backbite. All guerrilla history has one vice – backbiting. That means when you fail then somebody will say, “we failed because of him or him.” Guerrillas only build up egos. Guerrillas never build up self-esteem. Self-esteem and ego are very different.

Question: When did you first kill someone? And how did you reconcile yourself with the act?

Sashadhar Choudhury: It is very difficult. The hardest feeling in the world is in the wake of murder. When you kill somebody because of his anger or something he has done, you can justify it. But it is more difficult when you follow orders, which can’t be questioned. You don’t know the person or why he had to die. I was 23 years old the first time. It was very difficult. I remember every person I have killed, when I have killed him, how I have killed him, even the appearance of his face. If I was an artist, I could draw each one of them. When I meditate I can travel from one incident to the other. But I don’t know the names.

Question: Now, a question we meant to ask in the beginning. How much of your initial involvement was motivated by your cause, and how much was for want of adventure?

Sashadhar Choudhury: We were motivated. We came from the Assam movement. The majority of the movement at the time was highly motivated. We did everything on our own. But of course, without adventurism, it isn’t possible to be a guerrilla.

Question: So are you now equally motivated but low on adventurism?

Sashadhar Choudhury: Adventurism is still with me, but not to kill people. Now it is to go travel with valid documents. There are so many places to explore.
About the Authors: Rajeev Bhattacharyya studied history at the University of Delhi and journalism at the University of Westminster. He is currently the managing editor of Seven Sisters Post, an English daily in Assam, India. His recent book is ‘Lens and the Guerrilla: Insurgency in India’s Northeast’ (Manas Publications, 2013); Nikhil Raymond Puri is a D.Phil candidate in politics at the University of Oxford. His research interests include madrasa education, state-madrasa relations, and the relationship between education and terrorism in South Asia. His fieldwork is also directed towards the study of disengagement from terrorism.

Notes


[2] As per data sheets compiled by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), militant groups in Assam killed 2,465 civilians and 613 security personnel in the ten-year period from 1992 through 2001. India’s Ministry of Home Affairs reports the number of fatalities for the following decade at 1,661 civilians and 187 security personnel. SATP data sheets are available on the web at: http://www.satp.org. SATP also provides brief overviews of militant groups active in South Asia. The Ministry of Home Affairs reports are available on the web at: http://www.mha.nic.in.

[3] The lower limits of these ranges are based on data obtained from India’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). According to MHA reports, ULFA was responsible for 43 of the 207 civilian and 11 of the 34 security personnel deaths inflicted by militancy in Assam during the years 2009 and 2010. The upper limits of the ranges derive from data compiled by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). According to SATP, ULFA was responsible for 648 of 2,465 civilian and 269 of 613 security personnel fatalities inflicted by militancy in Assam during the decade from 1992 through 2001.


[5] Other ULFA members interviewed by Bhattacharyya have suggested that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur facilitated ULFA’s transit to Kachin camps. E.g. Kiran Barua (senior functionary, ULFA), interviewed by Rajeev Bhattacharyya in Guwahati on May 11, 2011; and Lohit Deuri (staff officer, ULFA), interviewed by Rajeev Bhattacharyya in Guwahati on March 30, 2010.


[7] According to accounts provided by Naga insurgents, training facilities in China’s south-western Yunnan Province existed until the late 1970s. They were dismantled after India’s then foreign minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Beijing and urged the Chinese leadership to cease support for rebels from Northeast India. Input provided by Lhouvitsou (functionary, Naga National Council), interviewed by Rajeev Bhattacharyya in Kohima on June 23, 2009.
As mentioned in note [6], Chisi Swu and Muivah were the founders of the Naga group NSCN-IM. Rajkumar Meghen is the chairman of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), a militant group based in the Indian state of Manipur with a socialist ideology and secessionist goals. For a brief overview of UNLF available on the web, see South Asia Terrorism Portal (http://www.satp.org).

Meitei is the name of the Hindu community inhabiting Imphal Valley in Manipur.


This response conflicts with information provided by Lohit Deuri, a former ULFA staff officer, suggesting that ULFA did in fact receive support from Bhutanese army officials. Lohit Deuri, interviewed by Rajeev Bhattacharyya on March 30, 2010.

The interviewee’s response suggests that ULFA’s organisation allows little opportunity for effective role migration. Junior operatives intent on securing leadership positions will most likely meet disappointment. For a discussion of role migration and role qualities, and their implications for disengagement, see John Horgan (2009). Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements. London: Routledge, p. 10.

In this particular scenario, it is unclear whether the desire to establish a family prompted physical disengagement, or whether psychological disengagement encouraged the operative in question to search for a good reason to physically disengage – in this case by establishing a relationship. For a more elaborate distinction between psychological and physical disengagement, see John Horgan, op. cit., pp. 31-36. Bjorgo views the desire to establish a family life as a potent (pull) factor underlying many instances of disengagement. See, Tore Bjorgo (1999). Processes of disengagement from violent groups of the extreme right, in (Eds.) Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan. Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement. London: Routledge, pp. 30-48.

The provision of financial incentives for surrendering militants is organised through two schemes funded by the central government: Scheme for Surrender-Cum-Rehabilitation of Militants in the North-East: Government of Assam (1998), and Revised Scheme for Surrender-Cum Rehabilitation of Militants in the North-East (2005). Incentives for surrendering militants include: a grant of 150,000 rupees (US$ 2,750), a monthly stipend of 2000 rupees (US$ 40) for a period of 36 months, and lodging facilities in a rehabilitation camp. These schemes have been fairly successful, despite frequent complaints by surrendered militants of delays in delivery of the promised incentives.

The interviewee refers here to ULFA's publicity secretary, Mithinga Daimary, who was arrested and handed over to Indian authorities by the Royal Bhutan Army in 2003. He has subsequently supported chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa’s ongoing peace initiative with the Indian government.

Paresh Baruah is currently the chief of staff of ULFA's anti-talks faction.


Raju Baruah was ULFA's military spokesperson. He is a participant in the ongoing peace talks with the Indian government.
100 Core and Periphery Journals for Terrorism Research
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Abstract
This resource collection lists journals that are deemed to be most helpful for serious researchers. It contains both subscription-based and open-access journals, most of them peer-reviewed. These journals were identified by a variety of techniques, including citation analyses, to optimize results.

Introduction
The following up-to-date (end of March 2013) resource collection lists one hundred core and periphery journals that are likely to be of significant importance for students, researchers, and professionals in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies. A core journal – as defined by Avishag Gordon – is “a mainstream journal in a discipline, [that] is dedicated to the central themes of the specific scientific field. It carries the name of the field in its title (in most cases).”[1] Core journals produce a substantial percentage of the total amount of literature available in any given field. In contrast, a periphery journal “occasionally publishes articles about terrorism but is dedicated mostly to another field of study. This type of journal could be a mainstream publication in a discipline such as economy or sociology; and because it publishes material about terrorism from time to time it is considered a peripheral journal for terrorism subject-area.”[2]

Studies have shown that terrorism research has a large research periphery.[3] Therefore, relevant resources are scattered over a broad spectrum of academic journals. This makes efforts to retrieve them more laborious. The listed journals - most of them are peer-reviewed - were identified by using keyword searches on publisher homepages, scanning journal lists, bibliographies and reference lists as well as engaging in citation analyses. In addition to the division into core and periphery journals, the list is further split into subscription-based and open-access (i.e. freely available) journals. Like every hand-searched resource collection, this one reflects subjective choices. Since the information requirements of researchers differ, the present resource list should not be used as single source for journal retrieval in the wide interdisciplinary field of terrorism studies. Especially for disciplinary sub-topics, researchers are advised to search for additional journals tailored to their specific needs. The reader should keep in mind that this list is largely confined to English-language publications. However, there is a sizeable literature written in other languages; it is growing in importance and offers a valuable counter-weight to the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon literature.
Core Journals for Terrorism Research

Open-Access Journals

Combating Terrorism Exchange
https://globalecco.org/journal

Counter Terrorist Trends & Analysis (CTTA)

CTC Sentinel
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/publications/sentinel

Defence Against Terrorism Review
http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/index.htm

Journal of 9/11 Studies
http://www.journalof911studies.com

Journal of Terrorism Research
http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/index

Perspectives on Terrorism

Security & Terrorism Research Bulletin [discontinued]

Spotlight on Terror [discontinued]
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta

Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base
http://www.terrorismelectronicjournal.org

Terrorism Focus [discontinued]
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta

Terrorism Monitor
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta
Subscription-Based Journals

Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rirt20

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science
http://www.liebertpub.com/bsp

Counter Terrorism
http://www.iacsp.com/publications.php

Counter Terrorist Magazine, The
http://www.thecounterterroristmag.com

Critical Studies on Terrorism
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/17539153.asp

Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways Toward Terrorism and Genocide
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/17467586.asp

inSITE
https://insite.siteintelgroup.com

International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism
http://www.igi-global.com/journal/international-journal-cyber-warfare-terrorism/1167

International Journal of Terrorism and Political Hot Spots

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wasr20

Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/rpic

Militant Leadership Monitor
http://mlm.jamestown.org

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20

Terrorism and Political Violence
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20
Periphery Journals for Terrorism Research

Open-Access Journals

Anthropoetics
http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu

conflict & communication online
http://www.cco.regener-online.de

CyberOrient
http://www.cyberorient.net

Disarmament Forum

Ejournalist
http://ejournalist.com.au

Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, The [Online Edition]
http://www.fletcherforum.org
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/_Fletcher-Forum

Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition
http://www.gmj.uottawa.ca/index_e.html

Global Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition
http://globalmedia.emu.edu.tr

Global Security Studies
http://globalsecuritystudies.com

Homeland Security Affairs
http://www.hsaj.org

International Journal of Conflict and Violence
http://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv

International Journal of Safety and Security in Tourism/Hospitality
http://www.palermo.edu/economicas/cbrs/ijssth.html

Internationale Politik (IP)
New Media and Mass Communication
Pakistan Journal of Criminology
http://www.pakistansocietyofcriminology.com/publications.php
Parameters
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters
per Concordiam
Policy Review
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review
PRISM
http://www.ndu.edu/press/prism.html
Small Wars Journal
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/recent
Strategic Insights
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/handle/10945/11071
UNISCI Discussion Papers
http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/UNIS
Wilberforce Quarterly
http://www.wilberforce.edu/cdsp

Subscription-Based Journals
Aggression and Violent Behavior
http://www.journals.elsevier.com/aggression-and-violent-behavior
American Behavioral Scientist
http://abs.sagepub.com
Brown Journal of World Affairs, The
http://www.bjwa.org/index.php
Conflict Management and Peace Science
About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., studied Information Science and New German Literature and Linguistics at the Saarland University (Germany). Her doctoral thesis dealt with Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents. While working for several research support organisations, she has gained expertise in information retrieval, librarianship and electronic publishing. Currently she works in the Research & Development department of the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID) (http://www.zpid.de) for the open-access publishing project PsychOpen (http://www.psychopen.eu). In her spare time, she works as an Editorial Assistant for ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.

Notes


[2] Ibid.

Literature on Kidnapping for Ransom and for Political Concessions

Monographs, Edited Volumes, Non-conventional Literature and Prime Articles published since 1970
Compiled and selected by Eric Price

NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterix [*] only have a clickable table of contents.

Monographs and Book Chapters


Bozkurt, A. R. (2003) *When I was Saddam's hostage* Bloomington, IN: 1st Books Library


Council of Europe. Committee of Ministers. (1983) *Measures to be taken in cases of kidnapping followed by a ransom demand*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe


Katz, R. (1980) *Days of wrath: the ordeal of Aldo Moro, the kidnapping, the execution, the aftermath*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday


Peterman, R. (1975) *Held for ransom: the Kronholm kidnapping* Wheaton, Ill.: Tyndale House Publishers


Stendal, C. (1989) *The guerrillas have taken our son* Burnsville, Minn.: Ransom Press International


Vincent, I. (1995) *See no evil: the strange case of Christine Lamont and David Spencer* Toronto: Reed Books Canada


Non-conventional Literature


Mei, P. Y. Iu (2004) *Arch fiends and moral shipwrecks : police work, criminal insanity, and masculinity in the Leopold-Loeb (1924) and Hickman (1927) kidnap-murder cases* [thesis] University of California, Los Angeles


**Prime Journal Articles**


Borbieva, N: Kidnapping Women: Discourses of Emotion and Social Change in the Kyrgyz Republic  *Anthropological Quarterly* 85 (1, February) 2012 p.141-169


Hertzberg, H.: The talk of the town: Kidnapped The New Yorker 78 (1, February 18-25) 2002 p. 057


Jong, de, K.: Conflict in the Indian Kashmir Valley I: exposure to violence Conflict and Health 2 (1) 2008 pp.10 [http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/2/1/10]


Leheny, D.: Terrorism risks and counterterrorism costs in post-9/11 Japan Japan Forum 22 (1-2, June) 2010 pp.219-237


Liu, (et al.): Kidnapping offenders: Their risk of escalation to repeat offending and other serious crime Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 19(2, June) 2008 p.164-179 [*http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/28024/]


Sundberg, J.: Operation Leo: Description and analysis of a European terrorist operation Terrorism 5 (3) 1981 pp.197-232

Tracy, P. E.: Terrorism Research in Criminology: Current Topics and Future Prospects Crime Delinquency 58 (September) 2012 p. 647-662 [*http://cad.sagepub.com/content/58/5/647.extract]

Trulson, C. R. D.: Institutional Misconduct, Delinquent Background, and Rearrest Frequency Among Serious and Violent Delinquent Offenders Crime Delinquency 57 (September) 2011 p. 709-731 [*http://cad.sagepub.com/content/57/5/709.abstract]


Some additional entries on the Internet:

Articles on kidnapped from TIME Magazine [http://search.time.com/results.html?Ntt=kidnapped+and+terrorism&x=14&y=22]


Terrorism Statistics/ Convention on hostages (most recent) by country – NationMaster [http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/ter_ter_con_on_hos-terrorism-convention-on-hostages]

About the Compiler: Eric Price is a Professional Information Specialist who for many years worked for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since his retirement he works as an Editorial Assistant for Perspectives on Terrorism.
IV. Book Review


Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid

Scandinavia is not only home of some of the world’s leading centers for the study of armed conflict but has, in the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), also one of the best terrorism research institutes. Under the supervision of its research director, Brynjar Lia, Petter Nesser wrote a remarkable doctoral dissertation, based mainly on in-depth, inductive analyses of case studies. 15 jihadist cases were selected from 28 serious plots, 44 seemingly serious but less documented ones and 23 vague plots registered in Europe. The jihadist plotting cells varied, with two exceptions, from 2 to 10 core members. In 13 out of the 15 cases the foreign ties with the European jihadists were strong or probably strong. At least 5 of the 15 cases were clear-cut suicide operations and in only three cases the perpetrators planned to escape. Their operatives came, in declining frequency, mainly from Algeria, Pakistan, Morocco, Jordan, Turkey, Iraqi and India and were between 18 and 32 years old. In all plots studied, at least one core member had spent time in a foreign-based terrorist training camp. The role of the Internet as a virtual training camp, Nesser found, was, at least for the period he investigated, still minor. He discovered that “real-life cases rarely agree with simplified models” (p.499) and concluded that “the dismissal of an al-Qaeda recruitment apparatus in Sageman (2004) appears too categorical, and is probably wrong” (p.519).

The author distinguished various types of cell members: terrorist entrepreneurs and their protégés on the one hand, and the more numerous foot soldiers who tend to be misfits and drifters, on the other hand. Each type joined the jihad for somewhat different reasons. This differentiation, linked to different motivational drivers (religions-ideological, political and social) has important implications for inducing members to dis-engage from terrorism and, on the counter-radicalisation side, for preventing disenfranchised and under-employed Muslim youth in Europe from joining jihadist groups to begin with. However, Dr. Nesser also stresses the importance of conflict resolution efforts in countries of origin (e.g., Pakistan) of Muslim radicals in European diasporas as a way of reducing terrorism. Based on a wide range of open sources, sharp thinking and nuanced judgment, this study breaks new theoretical and empirical ground. One can only hope that its commercial publication is not further delayed or that an electronic version is made available to the research community in the near future. The same is true for many other worthy dissertations but this one, in particular, stands out head and shoulders for its clear thinking and counterterrorism policy implications.
About the reviewer: Alex P. Schmid is editor-in-chief of ‘Perspectives’ on Terrorism and Visiting Research Fellow of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT).
V. News from TRI's Country Networks of PhD Theses Writers

Preliminary and Partial Inventory of PhD Theses and their Authors

(as of April 2013)

by the Coordinators of TRI’s National Networks

The mission statement of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) is “Enhancing Security through Collaborative Research”. TRI has been encouraging young scholars who are in the process of writing their PhD theses to link up and collaborate with fellow researchers in their own countries. As a result, post-graduate students have begun to interact for their own mutual benefit and for the good of the wider research community. In fact, in a number of cases several senior, post-doctoral scholars have also joined TRI’s national networks of those studying terrorism, political violence and armed conflict, and ways to prevent and counter such threats to human security.

Presently national (and in some cases sub-regional) networks exist (or are being developed) in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands (including the Flemish-speaking parts of Belgium), South (and Southern) Africa, Canada, the United States, Russia, Australia and Norway. Their growth is an indication that there is a need felt among those engaging on doctoral research to team up with others who are in the same situation.

While most PhD thesis writers are familiar with the nascent research of their immediate colleagues in the same university department, they have often no clear idea who does what in other universities. Someone else might have chosen the same or a very similar thesis topic, or is using the same data, methodology or theory. In such cases a division of labour or collaboration is of mutual interest. In fact, there are a number of advantages to being part of a national network:

1. You find out who does what in your country or sub-region;
2. You identify common problems and subsequently address them together;
3. You identify common interests and share relevant information;
4. You can prepare projects together and submit these to funding agencies;
5. You can approach experts from TRI’s international network for advice;
6. You can organise workshops, seminars and conferences, on- or offline;
7. You can receive collegial support in the research- and writing phases of the thesis preparation (e.g. when someone has a writer’s block).

Each country or (sub-region) has a country coordinator who, in most cases, is him- or herself also working on a PhD thesis and serves as hub of the national network. The coordinators also act as liaison with the directors of TRI and receive from them various types of relevant reports and
articles which they can pass on to other members of their network. Admission to TRI’s country networks is open to all bona fide academic and professional researchers of post-graduate level working on (countering) terrorism, political violence and armed conflict.

To date, the following national networks have come into existence in:

**The United Kingdom**
Country coordinator: Gordon Clubb; E-mail: <G.Clubb@leeds.ac.uk>;

**The Netherlands and Flanders (Belgium)**
Country coordinator: Daan Weggemans; E-mail: <dweggemans@icct.nl>;

**Russia**
Country coordinator: Yulia Netesova; E-mail: <julianetesova@gmail.com>;

**The United States**
Country coordinator: Neil Shortland; E-mail: <ndshortland@gmail.com>;

**Canada**
Country coordinator: Nick Deshpande; E-mail: <nick.deshpande@gmail.com>;

**South Africa**
Country coordinator: Petra Harvest; E-mail: <petra.harvest@absamail.co.za>;

**Australia**
Country coordinator: Levi-Jay West; E-mail: <lwest@csu.edu.au>;

**Norway**
Country coordinator: Cato Hemmingby; E-mail: <cathem@phs.no>.

Should you be a post-graduate researcher from one of these countries and wish to join your national TRI network of theses writers, you should contact the country coordinator directly. In all other cases, contact TRI’s Director, Alex P. Schmid (E-mail: <apschmid@terrorismanalysts.com>) who will then explore with you and other members of the national TRI network how best to set up a PhD thesis writers network in your country.
TRI has asked its country coordinators to provide the readers of *Perspectives on Terrorism* with a list of PhD theses (and, in some cases, other research projects) which are in the process of being written. In each case, we asked for the title of the thesis or project, the name of the writer, the expected date of completion and the name of the university or institution where the thesis (or project) is being written. Here is what we have received so far (with apologies for the reporting format variations):

**South and Southern Africa**

The PhD students in the broad field of armed conflict participating in the southern African network are drawn from all corners of South Africa and a number of other African countries. Most, but not all of them are studying at South African universities. Owing to their geographic dispersal, this network depends largely on online communication / 'virtual workshops'. During the March 2013 online forum, issues discussed included radicalisation, revolution vs. insurrection, and terrorist / insurgent targeting. – Petra Harvest

Samuel Adotey Anum  
University of Pretoria, Gauteng Province, South Africa  
The New Insurgencies and Mass Uprisings in Africa and International Involvement: Selected Case Studies (of the Arab Spring, LURD and RUF)  
[Expected] Date of completion: circa 2016/17

Andrews Atta-Asamoah  
University of Cape Town, Western Cape Province, South Africa  
Transnational Security Challenges and Statehood in Africa (case study of Ghana)  
[Expected] Date of completion: Don't know

Anneli Botha  
University of the Free State, Free State Province, South Africa  
Radicalisation to Commit Terrorism from a Political Socialization Perspective in Kenya and Uganda  
[Expected] Date of completion: Don't know
Charles Nyuykonge
University of Zululand, KwaZulu-Natal Province, South Africa
A Review of International Administration of Justice:
The Relevance of the Rwandan GaÇaca Restorative Justice System for Global Peace and Security
[Expected] Date of completion: Don't know

Happy Kayuni
University of the Western Cape, Western Cape Province, South Africa
The Westphalian Model and Trans-border Ethnic Identity:
The case of the Chewa Kingdom of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia
[Expected] Date of completion: Don't know

Lyle Pienaar
University of Pretoria, Gauteng Province, South Africa
Serious Crime as a National Security Threat in South Africa since 1994
[Expected] Date of completion: circa 2014

Maiendra Moodley
University of Pretoria, Gauteng Province, South Africa
An Analysis of the Indicators of Terrorism: Selected Case Studies
[Expected] Date of completion: Don't know

Savo Heleta
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (formerly known as University of Port Elizabeth), Eastern Cape Province, South Africa
Post-war Reconstruction and Development: A Collective Case Study
(focus on Bosnia, South Sudan and Somaliland)
[Expected] Date of completion: 2013

Shakespear Hamauswa (NB: no 'e' after Shakespear!)
University of Zimbabwe, Mount Pleasant, Harare, Zimbabwe
The Role of the United Nations in Protecting Civilians in Conflict Situations
[Expected] Date of completion: Don't know
Petra Wiese  
University of Pretoria, Gauteng Province, South Africa  
The Psychological Dimensions of Contemporary Insurgency and Terrorism:  
Selected Case Studies  
[Expected] Date of completion: 2014

The Netherlands (& Flanders)

Constant Hijzen  
Leiden University  
Intelligence and Security Services / Dutch security culture  
[Expected] Date of completion: Fall 2013

Bart Schuurman  
Leiden University  
Explaining the rise and development of the Hofstad group: a multi-level analysis of the life-cycle of a homegrown jihadist terrorist group  
[Expected] Date of completion: Late 2015

Tinka Veldhuis  
University of Groningen  
Detention and reintegration of terrorism offenders  
[Expected] Date of completion: Spring 2014

Merel Kahmann  
Leiden University  
Relation between Moroccan government and Moroccans living abroad  
[Expected] Date of completion: Summer 2012

Wietse Buijs  
Erasmus University Rotterdam  
Terror and torture in the wake of 9/11, legality in reacting to terrorism and striking new balances in the separation of powers  
[Expected] Date of completion: Winter 2017
Liesbeth van der Heide
Leiden University
Terrorists on Trial
[Expected] Date of completion: Summer 2016

Jessica Dorsey
University of Amsterdam
The Geographic and Temporal Scope of International Humanitarian Law, especially with respect to transnational conflicts involving states and non-state actors
[Expected] Date of completion: Summer 2016

Daan Weggemans
Leiden University
Deradicalising and reintegrating violent extremists
[Expected] Date of completion: Summer 2017

Norway

Cato Hemmingby
Norwegian Police University College
The Terrorist Target Selection Process: Influencing factors with regard to terrorists' choice of targets.[Expected] Date of completion: 2016

Anne Siri Johnsen
University of Stavanger
Helicopter Emergency Medical Services in Major Incidents: Patterns of use and influence on outcome.
[Expected] Date of completion: 2019

Jacob Aasland Ravndal
Norwegian Defence Research Institute, Terrorism Research Group.
[Expected] Date of completion: 2016
Russia

Julia Sveshnikova
National Research University “Higher School of Economics”, Moscow
Problem of Power in Iran and the Iranian Nuclear Program
[Expected] Date of completion: Autumn 2013

Catherine Vinogradova
Moscow State Pedagogical University
Communication management of the ALBA states in their EU policy
(in the beginning of the 21st century)
[Expected] Date of completion: 2013

Georgy Misrkiy
National Research University “Higher School of Economics”, Moscow
[Thesis title undetermined]

Denis A. Zhuravlev
Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow
International Terrorism in Informational-Communicational Space of World Politics

Evgeny Pashentsev
The Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Communication Management Centre at the Russian-German Graduate School of Management

Darya Yu. Bazarkina
Lomonosov Moscow State University

Alexander I. Shumilin
Institute of USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Science
Russian and American Strategies in The Great Middle East: Problems of Confrontation and Cooperation
Date of Completion: 2009
United Kingdom

TAPVA, the UK network of TRI, has an extensive database of academic and PhD students, their contact details and areas of expertise. Below is a list of our PhD students, their university affiliation, and PhD title. Correspondence with regard to the full UK database can be directed at tapva@leeds.ac.uk - Gordon Clubb

Khin Ma Ma Myo
University of Aberdeen
Political Violence in Burma

Roy Revie
University of Bath
Government and Military Communication in the Age of Web 2.0

Cerelia Athanassiou
University of Bristol
How is the Obama administration discursively disempowering the Global War on Terror?

Andrew Day
University of Buckingham
The Evolution of the al Qaeda Threat to the UK

Giles Wollenmann
University of Buckingham
The security threats arising from a host nation’s perception of a failed state endorsed multiculturalism – (Expected] completion: 2014

Ronnie Dewar
University of Dundee
Terrorism as Discourse

Jerome Drevon
University of Durham
Egypt between Da'wa and Jihad, the Evolution of al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah and Jama'ah al-Jihad
Yanan Song
University of Durham
The US Commitments to NATO in the Post-Cold War Period

Muqarrab Akbar
Glasgow Caledonian University
Pakistan at Crossroads: War against Terrorism and International Law

Kari Mariska Pries
University of Glasgow
Security Policy Making in Times of Crisis: A Comparison of Actors and Actions in El Salvador and Guatemala

Tom Smith
University of Hull, UK and De La Salle University, Manila
The Global Jihad: Network of Radicalisation, Individual Insurgencies or Global Ethical Movement?

Martin Bayly
King’s College London
Imagining Afghanistan: British Foreign Policy and the Afghan State, 1831-1893

Bhaskar Dasgupta
King’s College London
Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets

Francis Grice
King’s College London
Rightful father or illegitimate parent? A critical examination of the true impact of Mao Tse-tung on past, current and future insurgent conflicts

Raphael Marcus
King’s College London
“Learning Under Fire: Military Innovation and Insurgency Adaptation in the Israel-Hizbullah Conflict”
Nina Musgrave
King’s College London
The Missed Messages of Hamas

Sofiane Ouaret
King’s College London
The Management of extra-parliamentary extreme left-wing actors in the European Union

Ariane Tabatabai
King’s College London
The Strategic Implication of the Legality of Nuclear Weapons Under Islamic Law

Ben Wilkinson
King’s College London
Narrative and Counter-Narrative: Countering Extremism in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen

Noman Hani
University of London
The Securitisation of Hizb ut Tahrir (Liberation Party)

Kate Wicker
University of Leeds
How is expertise warranted in conditions of uncertain knowledge? An analysis of experts in counter-radicalisation policy networks in the UK

Gordon Clubb
University of Leeds
Social De-Radicalisation and the Decline of Militancy in Northern Ireland

Joshua Skoczylis, JP
University of Leeds
The local prevention of terrorism in strategy and practice: ‘CONTEST’ - a new era in the fight against terrorism

Rupert Brodersen
London School of Economics
Rage, Rancour and Revenge
Filippo Dionigi  
London School of Economics  
The Impact of International Norms on Islamist Politics: the Case of Hezbollah

Kathryn Marie Fisher  
London School of Economics and Political Science  
From 20th Century Troubles to 21st Century International Terrorism: Identity, Securitization, and British Counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011

Jacob Parakilas  
London School of Economics  
Decentralised Networked Violence and Drug Warfare in Mexico.

Jared Ahmad  
University of Manchester  

Joshua Shurley  
University of Manchester  
AFRICOM and the Human Terrain.

Wuttikorn Chuwattananurak  
Dimitrios Anagnostakis  
University of Nottingham  
United States and European Union: A transatlantic counter-terrorism regime?

Ethem Ilbiz  
University of Nottingham  
The Impact of EU Conditionality on Turkish Counter-terrorism Policy.

Ali Abdullah Wibisono  
University of Nottingham  
Articulation of political identity in terrorism and responses to terrorism; case study of Indonesia and the Philippines.
Conor Browne
Queen's University Belfast
Epistemic communities in the new biological security environment.

Ludovico Carlino
University of Reading
Global Jihadi Cyber Activism.

Mark Pope
Royal Holloway, University of London
Cosmopolitanism in UK News Discourse

Ali Fathollah-Nejad
SOAS, University of London
A Critical Geopolitics of Iran in an Emerging New World Order

Chamila Liyanage
SOAS, University of London, Co-supervision: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR), King's College
Leviathan Revisited: Nation-State against Transnational Terrorism: Searching the Third Pillar of Counter Terrorism

Laura Kilby
Sheffield Hallam
The discursive construction of terrorism: A critical discourse analysis

Hagar Taha
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)
The Local Element of Peace: Role of Indigenous Civil Societies in Intervention and Conflict Resolution - Cases of Darfur (Sudan) and Somaliland (Northern Somalia)

John Edward Conway
University of St Andrews
Political Risk in Central Asia
Martin Gallagher  
University of St Andrews  
Terrorism and Organised Crime: Cooperative Endeavours?

Nicole Ives-Allison  
University of St Andrews  
Filmic representations of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland

Rikard Jalkebro  
University of St Andrews  
Finding a Juncture between Peace and Conflict Studies and Terrorism Studies – The Case of the Mindanao Conflict

Sarah Marsden  
University of St Andrews  
How terrorism ends: a relational approach to understanding the political and organisational outcomes of violent political contestation

John K. Tsukayama  
University of St Andrews  
Fractured Ideals—A study of the lived experiences of American military veterans involved in abusive violence.

Surekha Talari  
University of St Andrews  
Developing an Effective Framework of Counter-Terrorism Measures in Criminal Justice

Samantha Cooke  
University of Surrey  
To what extent has the interpretation of religion affected the compatibility between Islam and Feminism?

Ciaran Gillespie  
University of Surrey  
Measuring Third Party State Intervention in Civil Conflicts
Jose V. Gallegos
University of Sussex
The Effect of Civil Conflict on Women’s Labour Force Participation: A Causal Mechanism Approach

David Mair
Swansea University
The Articulation and Presentation of the Threat of Cyber-Terrorism

Andrew Whiting
Swansea University
Investigating how fictional and media accounts have organised the meaning of cyber-terrorism

Dr Jyoti Belur
University College London
Police Use of Deadly Force: A Case Study of Police ‘Encounters’ in Mumbai

Xuezheng Chen
University of Warwick
Kleptocracy, Democratization and International Interventions

Allen Newton
University of Warwick
Talking to Terror: Iraq, Afghanistan and Rebel Leadership

Oguzhan Bilgin
University of York
The relationship between conservatism and new entrepreneurial classes in Turkey

United States

The efforts to launch the United States strand of the TRI PhD network began at the start of March 2013. Below details the actions that have been taken so far, the results of these early actions and the immediate next steps to continue the development of this network.
**Actions:**

1) Contacting authors: 140 previous authors from the journals *Perspectives on Terrorism* and *Terrorism and Political Violence* have been contacted.

2) Contacting academic centers: Over 30 academic centers for the study of terrorism, based in the United States, have been contacted.

3) Wider releases: A call for participants was published through the University and Agency Partnership Initiative, part of the Naval Postgraduate School.

4) Social Media: The TRI PhD twitter account currently has 91 followers.

**Network Overview:**

The United States strand of the TRI’s National Network of PhD theses writers currently contains the details of 30 scholars. In accordance with the previously established TRI networks, information pertaining to their PhD Thesis, University and academic department has been collated, along with their expected year of completion and contact information. While the United States Network is focused on writers of PhD theses, it has not been confined to them. We have therefore sought information regarding individuals who have also recently completed their PhDs. Based on feedback from early requests for participants, this term has since been refined to ‘Early Career PhD’s’ and is currently defined as ‘any individual who has received his/her PhD in the past 3 years’. At this stage, and in accord with the focus of this network, the majority of members are yet to be awarded their PhD (75.86%).

The network currently includes scholars from 23 United States universities. With regards to the regions of the United States within which these scholars study, 2 scholars are based in the West (9.09%), 4 scholars are currently based in the Mid-West (18.18%), 1 is based in the North East (4.45%) and 15 are based in the South (68.18%). Two members of this network are also active United States Armed Forces servicemen who are also undertaking a PhD.

**Next Steps (short-term):**

A call for participants will be published in the April newsletters of both the International Center for the Study of Terrorism and START. The ICST newsletter has roughly 560 subscribers; assuming that the START newsletter has a similar subscriber base this will significantly increase awareness of the United States TRI PhD network amongst US based terrorism researchers. – Neil Shortland
Maya Hess
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Criminal Justice
Translator, Traitor: A Critical Ethnography of a U.S. terrorism trial
[Expected] Date of completion: 2013

Max Abrams
John Hopkins University, Political Science
The political consequences of terrorism, its motives and counterterrorism implications
Date of completion: 2010

Katherine A. Boyd
John Jay College of Criminal  Justice, Criminal Justice
Ecology of Terrorism: Cross-National Comparison of Terrorist Attacks
[Expected] Date of completion:

Nina A Kollars.
Franklin & Marshall College, Political Science
Field Level Innovation
Date of completion: 2012

Igoe Walsh
University of North Carolina, Political Science
Drone Strikes and counterterrorism; natural resources and armed conflict
[Expected] Date of completion: 2015

Rebecca Hill
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Turning Points and Terrorists: using multinomial logistic regression to examine the life course and criminality of far-right, religious and eco extremists
[Expected] Date of completion: 2014

Ryan Shaffer
Stony Brook University
Neo-Nazi and post-war extremist youth movements
[Expected] Date of completion: 2013
Molly Iman
University of Maryland
Ethnic politics, Federalism and violent conflict
[Expected] Date of completion: Government and Politics, International Relations and Comparative Politics

Kim Fletch
Kennesaw State University, International Conflict Management
Measuring Conflict Vulnerability: Theory Practice and Policy
[Expected] Date of completion: 2013

Brian J. Phillips
University of Pittsburg, Political Science
How terrorist organizations survive: cooperation and competition in terrorist networks
Date of completion: 2012

Karen Walker
University of Maryland, Communication/Rhetoric
Rhetorical Dimensions of Soft Power
[Expected] Date of completion: 2013

Brian McFadden
Indiana University, Political Science
The interaction between terrorist groups’ organizational structures and their political environments.
[Expected] Date of completion: 2013

Douglas Bryd
Utah University, Political Science
Minority Language Rights in Europe: Conflict and Change
[Expected] Date of completion: 2013

Michael Weintraub
Georgetown University, Department of Government
Pattern of competition and cooperation among armed non-state actors in civil war
[Expected] Date of completion: 2014
Caitlan Scuderi
Rutgers University, Political Science
Hyper Segregation and Terrorism
[Expected] Date of completion: 2014

George Nelly
Northcentral University, Homeland Security
Evaluating airline pilot attitudes towards the federal flight deck officer program
[Expected] Date of completion: 2011

John Powell
University of South Florida, Division of Public Safety
Terrorism incident response education for public safety personnel in North Carolina and Tennessee: An evaluation by emergency managers. - Creating a learning organization for state and local law enforcement to combat, violent extremism in the United States, & The role of medical intelligence for fusion centers in the United States
[Expected] Date of completion: 2014

Amanda Sharp
University of South Florida, Criminology
Examining the preparation of law enforcement against cyber terrorism
[Expected] Date of completion: 2013

Colin Clarke
University of Pittsburg, Graduate School of Public Policy and International Affairs
“Throwing in the Towel”: Why Terrorists Negotiate
Date of completion: 2012

Randall Hanifen
Northcentral University
The needed knowledge, skills, and abilities of the fire department personnel assigned to liaison with local EMA and homeland security
[Expected] Date of completion:
Erik Iverson
Fletcher School At Tufts University
Networked Resilience: Achieving Inter-organizational and Intergovernmental Collaboration
[Expected] Date of completion: 2013

Weishe Jang
University of New Orleans, Political Science
[Thesis Title undecided]
[Expected] Date of completion: 2016

James Burch
Colorado Tech University: Management and Homeland Security
Assessing the Viability of Creating a Domestic Intelligence Agency
[Expected] Date of completion: 2013

Diane Maye
George Mason University, Public and International Affairs
Counterterrorism in the Levant/Jordan/Israel
[Expected] Date of completion: 2015

Sarah Lyons
University of Maryland
The Psychological Foundations of Homegrown Terrorism: a study of immigrant culture and exclusion experiences
[Expected] Date of completion: 2014

Paxton Roberts
University of Arkansas, Public Policy and Criminal Justice
Spatial Analysis of Terrorist Attacks
[Expected] Date of completion: 2015

Erin Kearns
American University, School of Public Affairs
Relationship between terrorism and human rights violations
[Expected] Date of completion: 2016
James Spies
George Mason University
Efficacy of different approaches used by insurgent and rebel groups when accounting for environmental and social factors
[Expected] Date of completion: 2016

Scott Scheidt
Trident University International
Determinants of Distributive Justice in Recipient Response to Appraisal Outcomes
[Expected] Date of completion: no information provided

Susan Fakey
University of Maryland, Criminology
Political Instability and Terrorism
Date of completion: 2010
Countering Al-Qaeda’s Single Narrative
by Philipp Holtmann

What form should a counter-narrative to al-Qaeda’s single narrative take? Its claim “Islam is under attack” successfully integrates multiple Muslim grievances into one meta-narrative. It has found credibility beyond an extremist fringe of Muslim societies and has been far more successful and attractive than any counter narrative that has been devised so far by Western counter-terrorist strategists. The question if al-Qaeda’s meta-narrative merely creates an external scapegoat for problems that are to a great extent internal to Arab and Muslim societies should be the subject of an intensive, if not heated discussion within the counter-narrative debate.

Notwithstanding the establishment of de-radicalization and counter-radicalization programs in nearly three dozen countries (including Austria, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States) there is still considerable confusion about the goals, methods, actors and ideas that should be employed for this ideological battle. To make matters worse, none of the existing programs has so far been presenting reliable data on how many extremists have been “healed,” how many attacks have been prevented, and how much appeal Al-Qaeda’s narrative has lost – if any. Saudi Arabia established one of the earliest de-radicalization and counter-narrative programs (“Sakina”), but could never be sure that those who were outwardly disengaging from terrorism, showing signs of moderation, did not remain extremists inside. A good number of them are back on the battlefields of jihad.

*Conceptual Confusion Standing in the Way of a more Convincing Counter-narrative*

The first problem to tackle is continuing disagreement among academic experts, policymakers and counter-terrorism professionals regarding key concepts. Radicalism, extremism, political violence and terrorism are often equated. But not every critical radical is a fanatical extremist nor is every militant protest a prelude of terrorist violence. Alex Schmid has just written a groundbreaking contribution to the debate, which should be required reading for any policy maker who deals with the topic (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013). Processes of radicalization since 9/11 have also taken place on both sides, with some hitherto liberal Western states engaging in arguably illegal tactics, involving torture, targeted killings, international kidnapping (renditions),
while often denying basic fair trial rights to real and alleged ‘enemy combatants.’ One of the first steps in devising successful counter-narrative policies has to do with the recognition that Western reactions to terrorism have oftentimes been counter-productive, fostering further radicalization to extremist violence among young Muslims in Western Diasporas as well as in Muslim-majority countries.

**American Efforts**

The United States are at the forefront of global counterterrorism efforts but have not been the most credible source of communicative strategies against Al-Qaeda. Being war weary and wary, many policy makers in Washington cannot hear the word “jihad” anymore. The Pentagon spends one billion dollars on “strategic communication” (0,25 percent of the overall military budget), much more than the State Department which has to do things on the cheap. One contractor of the State Department trains voluntary individuals in Muslim at risk communities in online story-telling (“Viral Peace Program”) to present alternative role models and narratives. An obscure private firm trains servicemen in psychological and information operations on the Internet to weaken anti-U.S. narratives and spread pro-U.S. propaganda with fake online identities (“sock puppets”) via a “Multiple Online Persona Management Software.” This appears to be an extension of “Operation Earnest Voice,” the U.S. psychological warfare program to combat online jihadi propaganda in Iraq – an effort that has disastrously failed. Such American efforts inspire other major actors, notably the European Union to try and do likewise. One can only hope that the EU will do a better job. The best U.S. initiatives sometimes come from laymen, but are often quickly spoiled, such as the American embassy in Cairo’s courageous Twitter feed against the arrest of the comedian Bassem Youssef by the Egyptian government.

**Intercultural Communication**

If one wants to devise adequate counter-narratives, one has to enter into, and draw from, larger socio-political and cultural debates. Necessarily, this should involve elements of self-criticism by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, including debates across the lines on individual, communal and national levels. On the community level, the biggest challenge is posed by Muslim Diaspora youths in the West, because they are the ones who are caught between two cultures and tempted to embrace an extremist agenda. Communities at risk need advisors familiar with their culture who can guide their members towards greater empowerment. Such advisors should not be perceived as representatives of the state. When it comes to counter-narratives, cultivating local grassroots voices can be more effective than parachuting in outside consultants. A good example is the Texas-based Bayyina Institute, whose Muslim scholars develop rational religious counter-narratives; another is
the “My Jihad” campaign by the Chicago office of the Council on Arab-Islamic Relations. With advertisements in the local transportation system, the campaign tries to reclaim from the jihadists that alternative key meaning of jihad, namely, making a valiant “effort toward a commendable goal.”

In general, cosmetic changes, such as spending modest amounts of money on creating seemingly plausible “counter-narratives” and promoting “de-radicalization” in online social networks do not contribute much toward reducing deep-rooted suspicions and mitigating conflicts between Muslim Diasporas and host societies, or between Muslims and non-Muslims in the larger ideological battle. It is doubtful that radicalization on the Internet or in real life can be countered this way. However, some steps in the right direction have been made. An example is the EU’s “No Hate Speech Movement” to further human rights awareness – yet hardly anyone has ever heard of it, which does not attest to an effective marketing strategy.

*Any Successful Narrative has to be Backed up by Actions*

This rule of thumb should take absolute priority. If you cannot walk the walk, do not talk the talk! Some local and national de-radicalization programs reinforced their narratives with genuine actions, but the narratives of many others against Al-Qaeda continue to suffer from a credibility gap between words and deeds, declaratory policies and realities on the ground. Realizing this gap should be the starting point for any counter-radicalization policy. “Selling” policies via a strategic communications approach will fail if one does not follow them up with deeds. This also means: First listen to the intended audience and seek dialogue with those deemed receptive to Al-Qaeda’s single narrative!

*Real Experts Needed*

Way into the twelfth year after 9/11 - where is the expert body in Europe that is able to counter the jihadist narrative? There are many academics with solid Middle East experience, cultural sensitivity and the appropriate language skills in the EU. Yet few of them have been invited to get involved in imaginative counter-radicalization work. They could give a helping hand in mediating between governments and communities at risk, crafting original counter-narrative programs and monitoring their effects on vulnerable youth – a youth that is exposed to the ideological onslaught of global jihad rhetoric on the one hand and anti-Islamic right-wing narratives on the other. While states are prepared to spend large sums on counter-terrorist hardware, including of the lethal kind, soft power approaches has been under-funded, allowing the terrorist narrative to continue to
dominate the Internet and through it, the minds of vulnerable members of Muslim diasporas.

**Literature cited:**


A narrative refers to “a spoken or written account of connected events” empowered by “the art of telling stories.” Simply speaking, a narrative relates to how something is being told so that it “sticks” (Halverson/Goodall, Jr./Corman, 2011). An ideological narrative is linked to an overarching strategic goal “to win hearts and minds” and to provide a clear meaning to confusing events. By its nature it is hardly ever balanced, consisting of half-truths and big lies, serving the goal to mobilize mass support for a cause. As an instrument of psychological warfare, a narrative tries to make sense of (parts of) the world by mythologizing the own community, degrading enemies, often through conspiracy theories, and fostering salvation themes. A narrative is thus a powerful, culturally embedded story, which consists of a mosaic of coherent stories and employs all semiotic levels. This includes familiar symbolisms, evocative imagery, emotive music, popular tales and imperative theology/ideology. In a conflict, a narrative serves the goal to mobilize support for a cause in the battle (of ideas) with an enemy.

A counter-narrative also serves the strategic objective “to win hearts and minds” but has to be of greater veracity, credibility and legitimacy than the narrative it seeks to challenge.

Al-Qaeda’s single narrative encapsulates al-Qaeda’s ideology and provides a unified framework of explanations for many humiliated Muslims by telling an emotionally satisfying story to make sense of the world in which they live. The narrative contains a basic grievance, namely that Islam is under attack by the near and the far enemies at the same time. The near enemy refers to “corrupted Muslim governments and their collaborators,” who are on the payroll of the far enemy – “the zionized Neo-Crusader alliance” (NATO), which is allegedly commanded by the Americans, but controlled by the Jews.” There is a vision of a good, peaceful society, in which war is absent, and a path from the grievance to the vision is sketched by putting focus on struggle (jihad) on all levels against the alleged source of evil. Al-Qaeda’s single narrative claims to provide “true believers” with a strong sense of identity and brotherly love, enabling them to rationalize past personal or collective failings and to justify the use of violence against those who are either considered “guilty” or simply stand in their way to regain the supremacy Islam enjoyed in a glorious past (A.P. Schmid, 2010).
About the Author: Philipp Holtmann received his PhD from the University of Vienna. He does in-depth research on media jihad as well as on Muslim conflict and reconciliation issues and is a Research Associate with the Terrorism Research Initiative. His publications include ‘Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s Jihad Concept’ (2009), Virtual Leadership: How Jihadis Guide Each Other in Cyberspace (2012), The Symbols of Online Jihad (2013), and “The Use and Genre of Huda’ (encouraging battle songs) versus Anashid (praiseful hymns) in Jihadi Propaganda (2013).”
VII. Notes from the Editor

About Perspectives on Terrorism

Perspectives on Terrorism (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Security Research and Technologies (CSRT), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at www.terrorismanalysts.com. It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

Perspectives on Terrorism has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles - but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.

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