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I. Articles

Characteristics of Lone-Wolf Violent Offenders: a Comparison of Assassins and School Attackers

by Clark McCauley, Sophia Moskalenko and Benjamin Van Son

Abstract

This article is based on the idea that lone-wolf terrorists may have characteristics in common with two other types of lone-actor violent offenders: assassins and school attackers. We used data from U.S. Government-sponsored reports to compare the characteristics of these two groups. Despite obvious demographic differences, results indicate four characteristics common for both school attackers and assassins: perceived grievance, depression, a personal crisis (‘unfreezing’), and history of weapons use outside the military. These characteristics may be useful in distinguishing lone-wolfs from group-based terrorists.

Introduction

Since 9/11 the success of the U.S. and its allies in tracking and disabling Al Qaida and other major terrorist networks around the world has been accompanied by a new concern about home-grown terrorism. Of particular concern is the phenomenon of lone-wolf terrorism – political violence committed by individuals acting alone. The threat of lone-wolf attacks was voiced by President Obama [1] as follows: “….the risk that we're especially concerned over right now is the lone wolf terrorist, somebody with a single weapon being able to carry out wide-scale massacres of the sort that we saw in Norway recently. You know, when you've got one person who is deranged or driven by a hateful ideology, they can do a lot of damage, and it's a lot harder to trace those lone wolf operators.”

One of the most notorious lone-wolf terrorists was Ted Kaczynski, who gave up a position as Assistant Professor of Mathematics at the University of California Berkeley to live in a remote area of Montana. There he felt he could escape the threat of technological progress that he had come to fear and detest. Such progress is made, he believed, only by denying human nature - especially the need for meaningful work - and by crushing individual freedom. He emerged occasionally from his wilderness cabin to hand-carry or mail bombs to people he saw as forwarding the industrial-technological progress he feared.

A very different example is John Allen Muhammad, who, with his young protégé Lee Boyd Malvo, killed ten people and wounded two more in 47 days of sniper attacks carried out in and around Washington, D.C. in 2002. Muhammad was a veteran of seven years in the Louisiana
National Guard and served nine years in the U.S. Army; he was discharged after the Gulf War as a sergeant. He became a convert to Islam and favoured black separatism and, according to Malvo, hoped to extort several million dollars from the U.S. government and use the money to found a pure black community in Canada. Muhammad has not been forthcoming about the origins of this plan, but it appears that he reacted to what he saw as the victimisation of black people in the U.S.

In recent years, lone wolf terrorism seems to have become more frequent. A spate of such attacks demonstrates the breadth of lone-wolf terrorists’ causes and targets. On May 31, 2009, anti-abortion activist Scott Roeder shot and killed abortion doctor George Tiller. On June 1, 2009, African-American Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (formerly Carlos Bledsoe) shot two soldiers - killing one, wounding the other - at a U.S. Army Recruiting Station in Little Rock, Arkansas. On June 10, 2009, James Wenneker von Brunn shot and killed a guard at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. On November 5, 2009, Major Nidal Malik Hasan opened fire on his fellow soldiers at Fort Hood, leaving 12 dead and 31 wounded. On March 2, 2011 two U.S. soldiers died after a lone gunman, Arid Uka, opened fire on them at Frankfurt airport, also wounding two others. On July 22, 2011, Anders Breivik killed 77 people in and around Oslo.

In each case the perpetrator seems to have acted alone for motives that are at least in part political; but beyond this similarity are striking differences in age, background, and motivation. Ted Kaczynski was a mathematician disturbed by the pace of technological progress. John Allen Muhammad, age 42 at the time of his sniper attacks, was an ex-soldier convert to Islam, in the midst of a bitter divorce and custody battle, and aggrieved about the U.S. treatment of African Americans. Scott Roeder, age 51, held blue-collar jobs, participated in anti-abortion activism, and, according to his brother, had a history of mental illness. Muhammad-Bledsoe, age 23, converted to Islam as a teenager, studied Arabic in Yemen, and was reportedly angry about the killing of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan. James von Brunn, age 88, was a university graduate, WWII naval officer, and in his later years a loner who alienated many with the fury of his racist rants.

Although highly salient, lone-wolf attacks remain rare and, like any rare event, difficult to study. Spaaij has identified only 88 lone-wolf terrorism cases across fifteen countries, including the U.S. Of course it is possible that lone-wolf characteristics differ by country or region; Nesser suggests for instance that his 15 European lone-wolf terrorists differ from American cases. Looking just at the U.S., Eby has identified 53 lone-wolf terrorists between 2001 and 2011, while Jasparro has identified 14 specifically jihadist lone-wolf U.S. terrorists. Given the relatively small number of cases available for study, we aim in this paper to learn more about lone-wolf terrorists by looking at two other kinds of violent offender: assassins and school attackers.
Our inquiry may seem at first a surprising stretch; assassins and school attackers are not usually called terrorists. But assassins and school attackers resemble like lone-wolf terrorists in three important ways: they plan and perpetrate violence, the great majority act alone, and, as described below when we discuss our results, the great majority act out of some perceived grievance rather than for material self-interest. Thus we examine two kinds of lone-actor perpetrators of grievance-fueled violence - assassins and school attackers - in order to develop hypotheses about lone-wolf terrorists who are also lone-actor perpetrators of grievance-fueled violence.

One way to conduct our study would be pure bottom-up empiricism, seeking every possible common characteristic of assassins and school attackers. Instead we bring into our study existing ideas about lone-wolf terrorists, using these ideas to give more focus to our comparison of assassins and school attackers. We assume here that bringing ideas about lone-wolf terrorists into our examination of assassins and school attackers can enrich our understanding of all three kinds of perpetrators. Either all three are part of a single phenomenon of lone-actor grievance-fueled violence, or we will learn more about all three by establishing how they differ.

Thus we begin with a brief review of several ideas about the origins of lone-wolf terrorists and subsequently use these ideas in our examination of assassins and school attackers.

**What Makes a Lone-Wolf Terrorist?**

A lone-wolf terrorist plans and carries out an attack without assistance or organisational support. Most analyses of terrorism emphasise the power of group dynamics that can move normal individuals to commit horrific violence [6], but the distinctive aspect of lone-wolf terrorists is that they are moved to violent action without group or organisational support.[7] In this section we consider two possibilities for understanding the actions of lone-wolf terrorists without invoking group dynamics: that they suffer from some form of psychopathology, and that they are moved by the same mechanisms of radicalisation that have been identified for individuals joining a terrorist group.

**Are Lone-Wolf Terrorists Suffering from Mental Disorders?**

Victims of terrorism and mass media accounts of terrorism often see terrorists as suffering from some kind of psychopathology. “Terrorists appear to be insane, because they kill, destroy, and injure for motives that seem utterly incomprehensible to the rest of us.”[8] It is plausible that abnormal crimes, including killing and maiming civilians, must be the work of abnormal individuals, people suffering some kind of mental disorder. Perhaps the best known version of this idea was advanced by Jerrold Post, who suggested that terrorists suffer from narcissistic personality disorder, a diagnosis associated with lack of empathy and paranoia.[9]
Decades of research, however, have made clear - and Post has agreed - that terrorists are no more likely to suffer from psychopathology than non-terrorists from the same backgrounds.[10] Nor are terrorists more economically deprived or disadvantaged.[11] Thus research has turned most analysts away from the idea that there is some profile of individual characteristics that can be used to identify potential terrorists.[12]

It is important to recognise, however, that this research has been predominantly focused on group-based terrorists. This is not surprising because most terrorists operate in groups and lone-wolf terrorists are relatively rare. But given that almost all of the pertinent research has focused on group-based terrorists, it is possible that common characteristics of lone-wolf terrorists may have been overlooked. That is, it may yet be possible to develop a profile for lone-wolf terrorists despite the evidence against such a profile for group-based terrorists. In particular, it might be that some kind of mental disorder is a risk factor for lone-wolf terrorists.

Several well-known examples of political violence make this possibility salient, especially in mass media accounts. Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber, killed 3 and injured 23 between 1984 and 1995 with bombs targeting those he saw responsible for an industrial society that crushes human freedom. At least one psychiatrist found that Kaczynski suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.[13]

On January 8, 2011, Jared Loughner shot and killed 6 people and wounded 13 others, including U.S. Congress Representative Gabrielle Giffords, in Tuscon, Arizona. Loughner saw Giffords as a ‘fake’ and his hostility toward her apparently increased when she did not take seriously a question he asked her in an open forum.[14] He had a history of depression, was diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia, pled guilty after medication made him able to stand trial, and was sentenced to life in prison.[15]

Anders Behring Breivik, who killed 77 people in and around Oslo on July 22, 2011, was at first declared schizophrenic and psychotic, then found to suffer from narcissistic personality disorder. [16] He was declared fit for trial and sentenced to preventive detention for a minimum of ten years.

Kaczynski, Loughner, and Breivik are all lone-actor perpetrators of violence with some degree of political grievance. These examples raise at least the possibility that mental disorder is a risk factor for lone-actor violence, including lone-wolf terrorists as well as lone-actor assassins and school attackers. Here we ask whether signs of mental disorder can be identified among assassins and school shooters.
Are Lone-Wolf Terrorists Moved by the same Mechanisms of Radicalisation that Bring Individuals to Join Terrorist Groups?

McCauley and Moskalenko have recently brought together case history material and social science research to identify twelve mechanisms of radicalisation that can lead individuals, groups and mass publics to political violence.[17] The mechanisms were drawn from, and illustrated in, case studies of terrorism spanning one hundred years and three continents. Relevant to lone-wolf terrorism, the authors identified six individual-level mechanisms of radicalisation. Three group-level and three mass-level mechanisms of radicalisation were also identified; these are not represented here because we are focusing on motives of individuals acting without group or organisational support. We recognize that every individual acts in a larger social context that includes mass sentiments and mass beliefs, but the influence of mass psychology on lone actors is beyond the scope of our study.

In brief, the six individual-level mechanisms are personal grievance, political grievance, slippery slope, risk and status seeking, and unfreezing.

Individuals can resort to political violence as a result of personal grievance, such as perceived mistreatment by the government of self or loved ones. Individuals may also be radicalized by political grievance, a perceived mistreatment of people the individual identifies with but does not know personally. Another mechanism of radicalisation is slippery slope, a gradual desensitization to the idea and experience of violence through slow escalation of illegal and violent acts. Paradoxically, love can move an individual to violence if a loved one - friend, relative, or romantic partner - becomes part of a radical group and asks for help.

Risk and status seeking is perhaps especially common among young males for whom violence may seem the best path to money and respect. Finally, unfreezing occurs when an individual loses the everyday reassurance of relationships and routines: a parent dies, a romantic partner leaves, a job lost, a major illness strikes, or the individual moves far from home. Unfreezing is a personal crisis of disconnection that leaves an individual with less to lose and in search of new directions.

These individual-level mechanisms of radicalisation, derived from the study of terrorism and terrorists, are extended here to ask whether any of these can be identified in the histories of school attackers and assassins.

Reports on Assassins and School Attackers

We have described two possibilities for understanding how individuals can undertake political violence without organisational support or the power of group dynamics. Lone-wolf terrorists may have a mental disorder that interferes with self-interest and rational choice, preservation. Alternatively, they may be moved by some of the same mechanisms of radicalisation that have
been identified for group-based terrorists. In this article we look for these possibilities in relation to assassins and school attackers, and we turn now to examine the two authoritative reports on which our study is based.

School Attackers

The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative (hereafter School Report) was completed in 2002 with funding provided by the U.S. Secret Service and the Department of Education.[18] This report examined 37 incidents of targeted school attacks between 1974 and 2000, with a total of 41 attackers. The authors coded 30 of the 41 school attackers as having attacked alone (81%). Not counted among the 30, four attackers carried out their violence alone but were reported to have had some kind of assistance planning the attack.

Nearly all attackers (39 or 95%) were current students of the targeted school, while two were former students. Over half (59%) of the school attacks occurred during the school day; most attackers used a firearm. These attacks were carried out with a high level of violence, with at least one fatality in 73% of attacks.

Assassins

Assassination in the United States (hereafter Assassination Report) was published in 1999 with support from The National Institute of Justice and the U.S. Secret Service.[19] The report aimed to study "all people who attacked, or approached to attack, a prominent person of public status in the United States since 1949."(p. 322) Persons of public status were defined as persons protected by the Secret Service, other major federal officials and office holders, important state and local public officials, and celebrities such as sports figures and movie, television, radio, and entertainment notables.

The Assassination Report presents results for 74 incidents between 1949 and 1996 in which 83 people had either attacked (46%), or tried to attack (54%), a prominent person in the United States. Of the 83 assassins, 63 (76%) acted alone. Assassins used a variety of weapons including handguns (the most common weapon), rifles and shotguns, knives, explosives, and, in three cases, airplanes. Most of the completed attacks did not produce a fatality or an injury.

The Logic of Comparing School Attackers and Assassins

Our study sought to identify characteristics and motives that are associated with these two forms of mostly lone-actor violence: assassins and school attackers. The two types of crime are tracked over largely overlapping time periods: 1974-2000 for school attackers and 1949-1996 for
assassins. Both forms of violence are extreme in a statistical sense: there are few assassins or school attackers in each decade.

Another similarity is that the violence perpetrated by both school attackers and assassins is planned rather than impulsive. In this they are like terrorists, who plan their attacks, and unlike most perpetrators of homicide, at least in the U.S., where homicide is most often linked with argument and impulse (brawls due to the influence of narcotics or alcohol, disagreements about money or property).[20]

Finally, school attackers and assassins are like terrorists in that both kinds of perpetrators act out of a sense of grievance rather than for material profit. The political purposes of terrorist violence are many, but almost always include representing some larger group or cause, which is seen as unfairly harmed, humiliated, or endangered. In other words, terrorism is fueled by a sense of outrage and desperation - a sense of grievance.[21] As will be shown in our results, outrage and grievance are also salient in the motivations of assassins and school attackers.

Thus the logic of our study is to compare two groups that are like lone-wolf terrorists in perpetrated planned lone-actor violence fuelled by grievance. To the extent that assassins and school attackers share common characteristics, these characteristics may be risk factors for lone-wolf terrorism as well. Of course school attackers are almost all high school age or less, whereas almost all assassins are adults. But the obvious demographic differences between the two groups are actually a strength of our comparison: any commonalities uncovered are the more striking and unlikely to be a reflection of life status or demographic factors.

We acknowledge immediately that, as a study of lone-actor violence, our analysis has an important limitation. Most but not all of the assassins and school attackers were lone actors. Ideally we would examine only the lone actors, setting aside the minority of offenders who acted with some kind of assistance or support. With this goal in mind, we tried to get access to the original files on which the reports were based, but response to our inquiry indicated that the authors of these reports did not have the original files of individual offenders and did not know where or if these files may exist. Thus we compare groups that are predominantly lone-actors, but our comparison is made coarser by the inclusion of a minority of group actors whose characteristics cannot be separated from the characteristics of lone actors.

**Methods**

Despite overlap in the authors of the two reports, the wording of perpetrator characteristics was not always consistent (e.g. one report categorised substance abuse as *history of substance abuse*, one categorised it as *alcohol or substance abuse*). We believe that these small differences in wording do not substantially affect the meaning of the category labels used in our tables, but, in
order that readers may judge for themselves, we present for each of the categories used in our results the corresponding category labels from the original reports (see Appendix).

Of the six individual-level mechanisms of radicalisation identified in the introduction of this article, two (love and slippery slope) require more detailed personal histories than the Assassins Report and the School Report provide. Thus we focus here on four mechanisms: personal grievance, political grievance, status and risk seeking, and unfreezing.

*Personal grievance* is perception of unjust injury to self or loved ones, whereas *political grievance* is perception of unjust injury to a larger group or cause. The two reports did not provide sufficient detail to distinguish individual from political grievances, and we combine these as simply *grievance* in our analysis.

*Status and risk seeking* is a motivation typical of young males. The combination makes sense because, especially for younger males, risk-taking is a means to increased status. Status seeking can be seen in efforts to gain attention and fame; risk seeking can be seen in fascination with guns and violence.

*Unfreezing* is a change in circumstances, especially a sudden change, that leaves an individual in some kind of personal crisis. Examples include financial problems, physical threat, and loss of connection with loved ones. When predictability and control are threatened, individuals become open to new relationships, new behaviours, and new values in trying to regain control. Unfreezing is thus an opening in an individual’s life that decreases the perceived cost of acting on a grievance and increases the value of acting to gain or regain status and respect.

Although neither the School Report nor the Assassins Report refers directly to these three mechanisms, we were able to translate reported motives into grievance, status and risk seeking, and unfreezing. As already noted, the reports differed in the wording of categories of motives. More judgment was required in translating reported motives into mechanisms than was required for translating demographics and history into common categories. We invite readers to examine our translation of report categories into mechanisms in the Appendix before reading the Results.

It is important to note that the percentage of school attackers categorized as suffering from depression and despair, 78% in our Table 1, is not the same as the percentage given in the School Report (p. 22). According to the report, 61% of school attackers suffered from depression or despair. However, the report notes that 78% “exhibited a history of suicide attempts or suicidal thoughts at some point prior to the attack” (p. 22). Since it seems more likely that individuals considering suicide were depressed than that individuals not depressed considered suicide, we represent the percentage of depressed in the School Report as 78%. Also, the School Report did not give any information about marital status or military service. Given that the school attackers were students ranging in age from 11 to 18 (except for two very recent high school graduates) we assume that none was married and none had military service.
Finally, it is worth reliving on the issue of statistical significance in comparing percentages between the two reports. Inferential statistics are not appropriate for these comparisons, because the individuals in each report are not a sample of some larger population. They are, rather, two total populations for particular time periods. Still, it is clear that small differences between the two populations—in percent female, for instance--would be relatively uninteresting and substantively unimportant. Thus, we rely on group differences only when the difference amounts to twenty percentage points or more.

Results

As indicated above, the logic of our inquiry is to look for characteristics and motives that are common to assassins and school attackers. As expected, the demographics of these two groups of offenders are very different—school attackers younger and in school, assassins older and employed.
Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of School Attackers and Assassins (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>School Attackers</th>
<th>Assassins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lone Actor</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age range</td>
<td>11-21</td>
<td>16-73 (M=35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Served in military</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School education or less</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever arrested</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of substance abuse</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of depression or despair</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Percentage assumed, not explicit in School Report
2 Corrected percentage, 41/83=49% where Assassins Report gives 51%
3 Percentage reported having suicidal thoughts or suicidal attempts

Demographic Characteristics

Table 1 shows that both groups of offenders are predominantly male and Caucasian. Unsurprisingly, the school attackers, almost all of them students, are much younger than assassins, who show wide variation in age. The relative youth of school attackers is reflected in several other demographic characteristics. No school attacker served in the military, whereas about half of assassins had served. Also, no school attacker had married, whereas half of assassins had married. The two groups differ greatly in arrest record, with two thirds of assassins having been arrested but only about a quarter of school attackers. It is difficult to interpret this difference without knowing how many assassins had been arrested as teenagers. Last we come to the issue of mental health. Both school attackers (78%) and assassins (44%) show substantial
percentages with a history of depression, despair, and suicidal ideation. The higher rate for school attackers is the more striking because assassins had, on average, twice as many years of life in which to develop such a history.

Mechanisms of Radicalisation

For our second analysis, we coded motivations from the two reports into three mechanisms of radicalisation: grievance, unfreezing, and status and risk seeking.

Table 2. Mechanisms of Radicalisation Identified for School Attackers and Assassins (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>School Attackers (N = 41)</th>
<th>Assassins (N = 83)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grievance</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfreezing</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>“almost half”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status and risk seeking</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of weapons use (excluding military service)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of interest in violence</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows that the incidence of grievance was high for both groups of violent offenders, with school attackers (81%) tending even more than assassins (67%) to have a grievance against their targets. The kind of personal crisis we have called unfreezing was also common for both groups of perpetrators and more likely for school attackers (98%) than for assassins ("nearly half"). Status and risk seeking shows a different pattern. Only a minority of assassins (38%) and school attackers (24%) were coded for this motive. However, fascination with violence can be an expression of risk and status seeking, and about half of both assassins and school attackers have a history of interest in violence (59% and 44%). Perhaps related to fascination with violence is a
history of using weapons outside the military. About two thirds of both assassins and school shooters (71% and 63%) have this kind of history.

Discussion

In the post-9/11 world, operations of violent groups such as Al-Qaeda have been greatly impeded by the successes of the war on terrorism. Lone-wolf attacks, on the other hand, have become more salient and have attracted more attention from policymakers and security officials. In order to learn more about lone-actor violence, we used U.S. Government-sponsored reports to examine two types of predominantly lone-actor grievance-fuelled violent offenders: school attackers and assassins.

Personal and Background Characteristics

Both assassins and school attackers were predominantly white males, and both groups of offenders were preponderantly lone actors (81% and 70%). Beyond that, the two groups were, as expected, very different demographically. Assassins differed from school attackers in education, marriage, service in the military, and history of substance abuse and arrest. These differences are likely attributable to the fact that most assassins are adults who, compared with school attackers, have had more years of opportunity to serve in the military, get higher education, and get married. Despite the expected differences in demographic characteristics, both school attackers and assassins showed high rates of mental health problems. The great majority of school attackers (78%) had histories of depression, despair, or suicidal ideation, and nearly half of assassins (44%) had this history. Indeed the preponderance of lone actors for both groups may be associated with mental health problems. Perhaps their isolation contributed to depression, or perhaps their depression made them unable to connect with others.

Mechanisms of Radicalisation in School Attackers and Assassins

The data compiled in the two reports allowed for coding three individual-level mechanisms of radicalisation: grievance, risk-and-status seeking, and unfreezing. Although it is possible that other mechanisms of radicalisation may have been important in the radicalisation of school attackers and assassins, our analysis was limited by the scope of the reported data.

Grievance was coded from perception of having been persecuted, bullied, threatened, attacked, or injured (school attackers) and any grievance at the time of the Principal Incident (assassins). For assassins no abstract definition of grievance was given, but cited motives included avenging perceived wrong, bringing national attention to a perceived problem (e.g. plight of the working man), and saving the country or the world (e.g. the President is the devil).[22]
The prevalence of grievance was high for both school attackers (81%) and assassins (67%). It appears that feelings of grievance may be common in lone-actor violence, although it is important to recognise immediately that feelings of grievance are common whereas violence is rare. Polls indicate, for instance, that tens of thousands of U.K. Muslims believe that the war on terrorism is actually a war on Islam, but at most hundreds of U.K. Muslims have turned to terrorist violence.[23] It is impossible to tease out from the reports whether the perceived grievances of school attackers and assassins were personal or political, although it seems likely that the great majority of school attackers had some personal grievance against targets seen to have bullied or otherwise maltreated them.[24] Assassins more likely had a mix of personal and political grievances.

As noted in the introduction, grievance is prominent among notorious lone wolf terrorists. Thus Ted Kaczynski laid out his grievance with technological progress and those behind it in his famous manifesto. Anders Brevik also wrote a tediously long manifesto to lay out his grievance with the rate of integration of foreigners into the European culture. John Allen Muhammad’s grievance was with the U.S. government treatment of African Americans. Major Hasan was aggrieved with the Army for deploying him to a Muslim country where he would have to fight against fellow Muslims. Scott Roeder was guided by his deep commitment to the pro-life message and political movement. Von Brunn expressed his grievance against the Jews in his many postings to right-wing websites. Muhammad-Bledsoe was upset about the killing of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Unfreezing was coded from report of experienced or perceived major loss (school attackers) and accident/illness, loss of relationship, or failure/loss of status (assassins). The crises and losses were not specified in the report, and offenders’ perceptions of them are unclear. Nevertheless, the prevalence of unfreezing was high for both groups of offenders: Almost all school attackers (98%) were coded for unfreezing, and “almost half” (the best summary figure available) of assassins showed unfreezing. Unfreezing appears to be more characteristic of school attackers than assassins, but we emphasise that unfreezing is common for both groups of offenders.

Unfreezing also appears as a motivating factor among lone-wolf terrorists mentioned in the introduction. Thus, John Allen Mohammad was unemployed and going through a bitter divorce and a custody battle. Major Hasan had been transferred far from his family to an Army post where he had few connections outside of work. Ted Kaczynski caused his own isolation, cutting himself off from family, friends and his former life.

Risk and status-seeking was coded from report categories of efforts to gain attention or recognition (school attackers) and attention/notoriety as a goal (assassins). Risk-and-status seeking was reported for only a minority of assassins and school attackers (38 percent and 24 percent). More common for both groups of perpetrators is a history of interest in violence and experience with weapons excluding military service. Over half of assassins and school attackers
showed a history of weapons use (71% and 63%) and about half of both groups showed a history of interest in violence (59% and 44%).

The percentages with a history of weapons use are higher than would be expected from national U.S. polling data. Legault used data from the General Social Survey (GSS) to assess gun ownership in U.S. households from 1976-2008.[25] Averaging over years he found that about 43% of respondents reported a gun in the house and 27% reported owning a gun. These statistics give a general baseline for use of guns outside the military. We assume that anyone owning a gun has used it, and that some individuals have used the gun in their house without owning it. Thus between 27% and 43% of Americans have used a gun; whereas weapons use for both assassins and school attackers was substantially higher at 71% and 63%.

Experience with weapons may be common among lone-wolf terrorists as well. Thus, John Allen Muhammad was an ex-soldier who apparently enjoyed the thrill of a hunt as he terrorised the Washington DC population with his sniper attacks. Breivik developed his skill with firearms by joining a gun club. Roeder was convicted of transporting explosives, and von Brunn was a war veteran with a history of fighting and a weapons charge to his record.

Looking back over the results, there are four characteristics that are common for both school attackers and assassins. Nearly half or more of both school attackers and assassins were reported as showing depression, grievance, unfreezing, and history of weapons use outside the military.

The concatenation of these characteristics makes some sense. Depression makes life a pain that can be escaped in action. Grievance highlights and justifies a target of violence. Unfreezing is not itself a motive for violence, but opens an individual to radical change in belief and behaviour. Indeed depression may contribute to unfreezing in breaking old relations and making normal life feel impossible. The combination of depression and unfreezing is likely to leave an individual who sees him or herself—and is seen by others—as a ‘loner.’ Disconnection means that the ‘loner’ feels reduced restraint in reacting to grievance with violence.

Experience with weapons outside the military may be associated with violence for two different reasons: as an indicator of fascination with violence and as a means of attack. In particular it is a history of using firearms that is important: most assassins and school shooters wielded firearms in attempting or committing violence.[26] An individual without weapons experience may have the motive for violence but not the means.

It is tempting to read the concatenation of the four characteristics as a kind of ‘violence profile’ of mutually reinforcing factors that together push an individual toward violent action. Unfortunately the correlation or overlap of these characteristics is not available in either the Assassins Report or the School Report. The extent to which the four characteristics occur separately or together in individual perpetrators cannot be investigated without data at the individual level, whereas the two reports provide only overall percentages for characteristics reported on.
As an illustration of research at the individual level, we return briefly to the case of Major Nidal Malik Hasan.[27] Major Hasan who turned to the Qu’ran after the death of his parents, appears to have had no close relationships after he was transferred to Fort Hood, and was about to be transferred to Afghanistan (unfreezing). He saw himself discriminated against as a Muslim (personal grievance) and saw the war on terrorism as a war on Islam (political grievance). He brought two weapons to his attack, one a sophisticated ‘cop-killer’ pistol for which he purchased a laser sight – suggesting experience with weapons beyond whatever slight weapons training the U.S. Army provides for physician-psychiatrists. So far as we can ascertain, Major Hasan showed no signs of depression. Thus Major Hasan had three of the four characteristics common to assassins and school attackers: unfreezing, grievance, and weapons experience.

It is important to be clear that we do not claim that the common characteristics of assassins and school attackers—depression, grievance, unfreezing, weapons experience—provide a reliable predictor of violent behaviour. Nor do we claim that three of these characteristics together caused Major Hasan to attack fellow soldiers. Rather the four characteristics identified are hypotheses for future studies of lone-actor perpetrators of rare and extreme forms of violent crime.

Another limitation of our study is that not all of the offenders in the two reports were lone-actor perpetrators. About a quarter of assassins and school attackers had some kind of help, either in planning an attack or in conducting it. Thus our comparison across reports of mostly lone-actor perpetrators can point toward common characteristics but these need to be tested in future research that focuses more precisely on lone-actor perpetrators of violence.

Despite these limitations, results for assassins and school attackers show at least some convergence with results of recent studies of lone-wolf terrorists. We put connections with our results in italics in the brief summaries of these studies in the next two paragraphs.

Looking at his international list of 88 lone-wolf terrorists, Spaaij observed that they tend to interpret personal problems [depression, unfreezing] in terms of some larger political problem or cause [grievance]. He notes that they are often loners [unfreezing] with mental problems [depression].[28] Nesser examined 15 European lone wolf jihadist terrorists and suggests that four had some mental problems [only one case called depression].[29] Eby found some indication of mental disorder [depression?] for ten of his 53 U.S. lone-wolf terrorists.[30]

Looking more narrowly at only jihadist terrorists in the U.S. since 1977, Jasparrro identified 14 lone-wolf perpetrators.[31] “In all cases, religion does not appear to have been an initial driver of the suspects' anger and radicalisation, but helped to shape and direct their thinking and individual struggles” [personal and group grievance]. “At least nine of the suspected lone wolves have been described by investigators or friends and family as loners. Ten had experienced significant life crises, including marital problems, deaths of parents, unemployment or job issues,
financial troubles and drug abuse” [unfreezing]. “At least six appear to have suffered from mental illnesses, ranging from bipolar disorder and schizophrenia to depression” [depression].

In sum, recent studies of lone-wolf terrorists—especially Jasparro’s results—indicate disproportionate levels of grievance, unfreezing, and mental disorder. We believe that this emerging convergence, in which lone-wolf-terrorist characteristics are common also for assassins and school attackers, warrants further research linking these three kinds of violent offender. Experience with weapons has not yet been given much attention in reports of lone-wolf terrorists, but the high levels of such experience for assassins and school attackers suggest that further attention to this characteristic may be warranted.

**Conclusion**

The logic of our study was to find common characteristics of assassins and school attackers that may also be characteristics of lone-wolf terrorists. Depression, grievance, unfreezing, and weapons experience are the common characteristics uncovered, and these deserve attention in future terrorism research. As far as we are aware, there has been no study that directly compared lone-wolf and group-based terrorists. One might compare for instance, home-grown U.S. lone-wolf terrorists with home-grown U.S. group-based terrorists. Our results suggest that this kind of research might usefully seek information about depression, grievance, unfreezing and weapons experience for both the lone-wolf and group-based perpetrators.

If the characteristics that distinguish lone-wolf from group-based terrorists are the same characteristics that are common for assassins and school attackers, the implication would be that lone-wolf terrorism is part of a larger phenomenon of lone-actor grievance-fuelled violence. In this case the specific characteristics of lone-wolf terrorists, if any, would remain to be identified. On the other hand, to the extent that the characteristics of lone-wolf terrorists differ from those of assassins and school attackers, a more specific profile of lone-wolf terrorists may be uncovered.

If confirmed with additional research, the common characteristics of assassins and school attackers identified in our results might serve as a useful guide for channeling resources to minimise the threat of future violence from these types of perpetrators. For instance, school psychologists as well as Veteran Administration (VA) psychological services may be a first line of defence in identifying ‘loners’ who have a mental health problem, a grievance, and experience with weapons. These individuals might then be offered help with counselling, pharmacological treatment, or family assistance.

Most generally, our results suggest that the mechanisms of radicalisation identified by McCauley and Moskalenko in case histories of terrorists [32] may be useful for understanding other kinds of violent crime. At least three of the individual-level mechanisms of radicalisation—grievance, unfreezing, and status-seeking—can be coded from the kind of information available in news
reports and trial transcripts. Indeed these were the sources of data for the *Assassins Report* and the *School Report*. Thus mechanisms of radicalisation to terrorist violence may also be important in moving individuals to other kinds of violent crime, and these mechanisms might be studied in the broader context of criminology.

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**Notes**


[26] R. A. Fein and B. Vossekuil, op. cit., p.323, Table 1; Vossekuil et al, op. cit., p.16.


Appendix: Original Wording of Categories Reported in Tables 1 and 2

Demographics

Education

Assassination Report, p324: “less than high school”.

Lone actors

Assassination Report, p. 323: “six attacks by groups, involving 16 subjects” [lone Actors = (83-16)/83].

School Report, p.15: “attackers carry out the attack alone”.

Ever arrested

Assassination Report, p.324: “no history of arrest as a juvenile or adult”.


Ever treated or diagnosed for a mental health issue.

Assassination Report, p. 325: “ever evaluated or treated by mental health professional”.

School Report, p. 21: “received mental health evaluation and diagnosed with mental health disorder”.

History of depression or despair.

Assassination Report, p. 325: “44% history of serious depression or despair, 21% history of auditory hallucinations, 41% suicide threats, 20% suicide gestures, 24% suicide attempts”.

School Report, p. 22: 78% “suicide attempts or suicidal thoughts”.

History of substance abuse.

Assassination Report, p. 325: “history of substance abuse”.

School Report, p. 22: “alcohol or substance abuse”.

History of weapons use (excluding military service).

Assassination Report, p. 324: “weapons use (excluding military service)”.

School Report, p. 27: “known history of weapons use”.

Mechanisms

Grievance

Assassination Report, Table 10 p. 325: “67% any grievance”; p. 325: “almost all subjects had histories of grievances and resentments”.

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School Report, p. 24: “81% held some sort of grievance at the time of the attack, either against their targets or against someone else”; p. 24: “revenge was a motive for more than half of the attackers”; p. 21: “71% attackers felt persecuted, bullied, threatened, attacked, or injured by others prior to the incident”.

Status and risk seeking

Assassination Report, p. 323: “attention/notoriety as a goal”.

School Report, p. 24: “efforts to gain attention or recognition”.

Unfreezing

Assassination Report, p. 332: “accident/illness, loss of relationship, or failure/loss of status” [10% had major illness, 20% were known to have lost a significant person or relationship and 25% suffered a significant loss of status].

“Significantly then, almost half of attackers and near-lethal approachers are known to have experienced an accident / illness, loss of relationships, or failure/loss of status….”.

School Report, p. 23: “experienced or perceived major loss prior to attack”.
‘Bomb-Making for Beginners’: Inside al Al-Qaeda E-Learning Course

by Anne Stenersen

Abstract

This study explores how terrorists utilise the Internet to learn bomb-making skills. Unlike previous studies, it does not focus on assessing the quality of online bomb recipes. Rather, it discusses the efforts being made by on-line jihadists to help others learn by providing so-called “e-learning courses.” As of today, such courses have few active participants yet they tend to attract large interest – indicating that there is a demand among Al-Qaeda’s online sympathisers for developing this concept further.

Introduction

This article discusses how the Internet may assist terrorists in learning how to manufacture explosives. Explosives remain the most common type of weapon for terrorist groups, with bombings accounting for about one-half of all terrorist attacks worldwide.[1] Previous studies of this kind have tended to concentrate on identifying the content of militant web pages, including what kind of “bomb recipes” are being circulated on these pages, and how technically accurate they are.[2] However, few studies have attempted to explain the actual learning process of terrorists who chose to rely on the Internet. How do real-life terrorists utilise online content to become proficient bomb-makers? What major obstacles and challenges do they face? And what efforts are being made by content producers (terrorist groups, forum administrators or “jihobbyists”) to overcome these obstacles today?

The topic has become one of current interest as one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist networks, Al-Qaeda, is increasingly trying to urge its followers to carry out terrorist attacks at their own initiative without first travelling to a foreign country for training, indoctrination and approval. Before 2001, it was relatively easy to travel to Al-Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan. In fact, it was a central part of the Al-Qaeda leadership’s training doctrine.[3] After 2001 and until today, it has become extremely risky, not only due to the risk of being compromised by security services, but also due to U.S. drone campaigns against known Al-Qaeda hideouts in the Afghan-Pakistani border areas as well as in Yemen. These drone campaigns have increased drastically since 2008 and have killed a number of high- and mid-ranking Al-Qaeda members. These include not only organisers and leaders of international terrorist operations, such as Hamza Rabia al-Masri and Saleh al-Somali. They also include bomb-makers such as Ibrahim al-Muhajir al-Masri, who helped build the bombs for the 1998
East African embassies bombings, and Midhat Mursi (aka Abu Khabab al-Masri), the Egyptian-born chemist who ran his own explosives training camp in Afghanistan during the Taliban’s reign. He is believed to have continued this effort in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan after 2001 until he was killed in 2008.[4]

The study is divided into five parts. First, it discusses Al-Qaeda’s strategic shift towards “individual jihad.” Second, it explores how terrorists learn bomb-making skills more generally. Third, the article takes us inside an “e-learning course” which was held on Shumukh al-Islam, a well-known jihadi discussion forum, in April and May 2011. Fourth, the article discusses the evolution of Al-Qaeda’s “e-learning tools” more generally, and fifth, it looks at a U.S. cell of would-be terrorists who sought to learn the art of bomb-making online.

Studies of jihadi discussion forums have several limitations. First, the members of a discussion forum are anonymous. All we know is their nickname as well as their status and activity on that particular forum. We do not know who they are and what their real life intentions might be. Second, we must assume that part of the course takes place through private correspondence, which is hidden to the outside observer. Nevertheless, there is much to learn from studying jihadi e-learning courses. The above-mentioned course included ten accessible lessons and more than 300 open comments, questions and suggestions from the participants. It gives us a good idea of the content and the dynamics of the course, as well as the obstacles faced by the participants.

**Al-Qaeda’s Shift towards “Individual Jihad”**

Due to the extreme pressure on Al-Qaeda’s current sanctuaries abroad, Al-Qaeda leaders seem to be expanding their strategy to include so-called “leaderless jihad.” The concept is not new. The jihadi strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri wrote and lectured on the idea back in the 1990s, and held several lecture series to trainees in jihadi training camps. The strategic concept developed by al-Suri became known as _al-muqawama al-islamiyya al-‘alamiyya_, “The Global Islamic Resistance.”[5] He praised “lone wolf” terrorist attacks that were conducted by individuals that had no connection to Al-Qaeda Central, but who nevertheless carried out attacks supporting Al-Qaeda’s global ideology. Individuals praised by al-Suri included El Sayyid Nusayr, an Egyptian-American who shot and killed the American-Israeli politician Meir Kahane in New York in 1990, and Ramzi Yusef, who carried out the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993.[6]

Al-Suri was never an official member of Al-Qaeda, but his publications are widely read by jihadists across the world, especially after the U.S. State Department announced a US$ 5 million reward on al-Suri’s head in November 2004.[7] Al-Qaeda’s top leadership has later picked up on al-Suri’s ideas. In June 2011, Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a video speech where he encouraged followers of Al-Qaeda to carry out “individual acts of jihad” in the countries in which they reside, rather than going to battlefields abroad.[8] The video states:
“The door of jihad cannot be closed, and he who wants to launch in his midst with determination and honesty, should not stand [back] in the face of security restrictions nor the difficulty of reaching the fighting fronts, as he could make the place he is in one of the battlefields, and that would be through individual jihad ....”[9]

The video praises several individuals who carried out exemplary acts of “individual jihad” in the past, including Mohammad Bouyeri, who killed the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004, and Nidal Malik Hasan, who shot and killed fourteen U.S. soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas in 2009. The video acknowledges that such acts are regarded as more controversial than travelling to an occupied Muslim territory to fight so-called “classical jihad,” and spends considerable time arguing that the two should go hand in hand.

The second part of the video contains brief operational guidance that focuses on the types of targets that should be attacked, including “the institutions that shape [the country’s] economic joints,” “influential public figures in the Crusader and Zionist government, industry and media,” and “the headquarters of newspapers and the media outlets that mock our religion and prophet.”[10] In addition, the video encourages disruptive activities by way of hacking, such as denial-of-service (DOS) attacks and hacking to disrupt electric power network systems.

With a few exceptions, the video does not instruct the would-be terrorist in how he should train or what weapons to use against the preferred targets. It suggests that jihadists based in the United States should attack with firearms, as these are assumed to be easily accessible. Apart from that, security awareness is the most specific operational guideline, and the video points to resources on the Internet:

“[take] advantage of the wide range of resources available today on the Internet, particularly the various manuals, encyclopedias and course [sic] which deal with the Mujahideen’s operational and electronic security, and security in general.”[11]

The lack of detailed operational guidelines is probably intended – the fear and terror created by a campaign of “individual jihad” stems, in part, from not knowing who will attack, at what time and with what means. Al-Qaeda’s video hints that the attacks should be simple – the “role models” presented all used knives, firearms, or, in one instance, homemade explosives (Ramzi Yusef in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing).

It is notable that Al-Qaeda discourages people from seeking training in foreign countries, even if such training increases the terrorists’ chance of succeeding.[12] Instead, the operatives are to take advantage of opportunities in their home countries, such as procuring firearms legally, and to learn from literature on the Internet. Now and probably more so in the future, Internet stands out as a crucial resource for Al-Qaeda to use to train its operatives without risking compromising their security, due to ease of access anywhere in the world, and the possibility of remaining anonymous.
An article published in 2008 argued that while there is an abundance of training literature on radical forums online, the Internet does not function as a “virtual training camp” for Al-Qaeda – mainly, because there is no organized effort on part of Al-Qaeda Central to train people online. Others have argued that Internet training would never really replace real-life training because the Internet training can only transfer implicit but not tacit knowledge, i.e. the skills that can only come from hands-on experience.[13]

This paper argues that Al-Qaeda Central is still not making a determined effort to train followers online. However, online training courses organized by “jihobbyists” and forum administrators have become somewhat more professionalized over the past three years. The e-learning courses are more organized and include, to a greater extent than before, audio-visual learning materials as well as written compendiums. Their main weakness is their reliance on one or very few online instructors who are not always able to contribute on a regular basis, causing the interest to ebb away. It can be argued that if jihadi groups started using the Internet in a more systematic way, similar to commercial “remote learning” courses, the threat of individual terrorism would be greater than it is today. In principle, it should be possible. Academic literature argues that e-learning can be as effective as classroom teaching if conducted the proper way.[14]

**How Do Terrorists Learn Bomb-Making Skills?**

To discuss whether the Internet would be suitable for teaching bomb-making skills, we first need to establish how terrorists learn. More specifically, what are the conditions that need to be in place for a successful transfer of knowledge? In Al-Qaeda, as well as in other terrorist groups, knowledge has generally been transferred through direct contact, typically, in a training camp or similar settings. In the 1990s, Al-Qaeda started to record and compile knowledge in writing. The first, and most famous of such collections was the *Encyclopaedia of Jihad*, the purpose of which was to record all the experiences from the Afghan-Soviet jihad and to make sure the knowledge was not lost on future generations.[15] But written records are usually partial – they tell less than what is implicitly known by the practitioners of the craft.[16]

Al-Qaeda sought to transfer such knowledge directly, by establishing “explosives courses” that were taught in the training camps in Afghanistan by skilled experts. In the 1990s, Al-Qaeda’s most famous bomb expert was not Abu Khabab al-Masri, as commonly thought (Abu Khabab was a “freelance trainer” for Al-Qaeda operatives, but was not directly involved in Al-Qaeda’s major international operations). Al-Qaeda had as chief bomb-maker an Egyptian with the nickname Abu Abdul Rahman al-Muhajir (real name Muhsin Musa Matwakku Atwah), who constructed the bombs for the East African Embassy bombings in 1998; later he worked as a trainer and bomb-maker for Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.[17]

Al-Qaeda’s bomb-making experts transferred their knowledge to new recruits who could then take over their role as trainers in the future. A recruit named Tarek Mahmoud el-Sawah went to
Afghanistan during the Taliban’s rule and was hired as a bomb-trainer by Al-Qaeda. Having served in the Afghan-Soviet jihad as well as in Bosnia, he had previous experience with explosives. Nevertheless, once employed by Al-Qaeda, he was able to update and refine his skill, presumably, through

“receiv[ing] specialized explosives training, including instruction in building improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and remote detonation devices, from Abu Abdul Rahman al-Muhajir. He went on to receive advanced explosives/electronics training from Abu Tariq al-Tunisi, learning how to make timers for IEDs using Casio watches as remote detonators. Then, from June 2001, he gave instruction in explosives and wrote a four-hundred-page bomb-making manual.”[18]

After 2001, terrorist groups in Europe have preferred to go to a jihadi training camp, usually in Al-Qaeda’s core areas in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. For example, two of the London 7/7 bombers went to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas around 2004. Their training was organized by Al-Qaeda’s then chief of “external operations,” Hamza Rabia’ al-Masri. Yet these training courses were not necessarily run by Al-Qaeda members. Terrorists who attempted to carry out attacks in Europe or the U.S. were trained at various times by Pakistani militant groups (such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Tayba, etc.), the Uzbek-dominated Islamic Jihad Union, or by various local “freelancers.” There are many reasons why would-be terrorists chose to go abroad to train – the prospect of receiving high-quality training is probably only one among several motivations. However, this aspect is beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses strictly on the process of transferring technical knowledge, not broader motivators and driving factors for radicalisation.

For Al-Qaeda’s strategy of “individual jihad” to work, individuals are required to acquire the necessary bomb-making skills themselves, without going to a training camp. There are examples of terrorists who have learned how to make powerful bombs based primarily based on their own efforts and experiments. In 1995, Timothy McVeigh constructed a fertiliser truck bomb which demolished the Murray building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people. McVeigh reportedly acquired the skills to make the bomb by picking up ideas from right-wing literature (among them Hunter, a William Pierce novel from 1989), and by conducting experiments on an abandoned farm.

In July 2011 the Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik constructed a bomb that partly demolished the Government’s head offices in central Oslo, killing seven people. Thereafter he conducted a shooting massacre at a Labour Party youth camp at nearby Utøya, killing 77 more people. Like McVeigh, Breivik is assumed to have acquired the bomb-making skills by his own effort. As Breivik left a detailed diary of all his activities prior to the attack, his case provides rare insight into what it takes to acquire bomb-making skills at one’s own effort, without previous training. Breivik’s case illustrates that success requires more than simply downloading a bomb recipe from the Internet and buying the materials at the nearest grocery store. Rather, it is a meticulous
process requiring high motivation, patience, and intelligence. Breivik claimed to have spent a total of 200 hours over two weeks to locate and study explosives recipes on the Internet, and two months to manufacture the explosives themselves.[19]

While the examples here are taken from the right-wing extremism, this is not to say that militant Islamists would also be capable of doing the same, if they have the necessary personal qualities. Jose Padilla is an example of an Al-Qaeda member who did not have the judgmental skills necessary to conduct such an attack alone: in 2001 he suggested to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to build a nuclear bomb based on recipes found on the Internet. He was instructed to carry out a conventional attack with a better chance to succeed. His final attack plan was designed not by Padilla but by Mohammed Atef. Padilla’s U.S. citizenship was probably the main reason why Al-Qaeda decided to use him - not his scientific knowledge.

Dhiren Barot, a U.K.-based Al-Qaeda member, proved more capable to conduct research and come up with a viable plan. Barot spent months doing research for his plan, the main component of which was to blow up limousines filled with gas tanks in underground parking areas. Many documents were later released by the British police, which give us insight in Barot’s research methods. To devise a viable plan, Barot, like Breivik in Norway, researched multiple sources over a long period of time. Known sources to have been consulted by Barot included scientific articles, books and manuals found in the local library and on the Internet. Barot may have consulted jihadi training literature, but the main source of knowledge appears to have come from other open sources.[20]

This illustrates that a person who is dedicated to learn, and who has the ability to absorb and analyse the knowledge on his own, is not dependent on jihadi forums or Al-Qaeda-produced bomb manuals to find the necessary information. This article argues that the main strength of jihadi forums is not their technical content in itself, but the fact that they offer an interactive learning environment that may attract less dedicated would-be bomb makers - those who do not have the skills and patience to do extensive research on their own. Jihadi e-learning courses remove a major hurdle encountered by most hobbyist bomb-makers, namely, not knowing where to start.

**Al-Shumukh’s “Special Explosives Course for Beginners”**

On 20 April 2011, a user with the nickname ‘Adnan Shukri’ started a new thread on the Shumukh al-Islam forum. Especially designed to attract newcomers, the thread’s title read, “I am a beginner in the science of explosives and poisons, from where should I start? (Special course for the beginner mujahid).”[21] Over the next month, Shukri posted lessons, assigned ‘homework’ and replied to questions both openly on the forum, and through Personal Messaging (PM) with other forum members.[22]
Shukri’s identity is unknown. On the forum, he claimed to be a middleman between the forum’s members and Abdullah Dhu al-Bajadin, the main instructor of the course. Dhu al-Bajadin’s identity is likewise unknown. The name has been used on various jihadi forums since at least 2006 by one or several people posing as self-proclaimed explosives experts. Dhu al-Bajadin is also known as the author of a number of jihadi bomb-making manuals that have been widely distributed on the Net.[23] Participants in the thread displayed great respect towards “Professor” Dhu al-Bajadin and his assistant Adnan Shukri. It increases the probability that the course is authentic because forum members are generally wary of impostors and ‘spies’ trying to infiltrate them. Another sign of authenticity is the fact that Shukri’s thread was approved by one of Shumukh al-Islam’s web administrators and granted “sticky” status on the forum over a period of several months.

The thread was active for six and a half months – from 20 April to 4 November, 2011. As of 11 November 2011 it had a total of 19,198 viewings and was by far the “most viewed” thread in al-Shumukh’s sub-forum for explosives and preparation.[24] However, the actual course lasted little more than one month – from 20 April to 21 May, 2011. After this, Adnan Shukri disappeared from the forum, ending the organized part of the course. A total of ten lessons were posted – eight lessons in “Part One” and the two first lessons in “Part Two” – before the course was abruptly terminated.

During the first two weeks of the course, Adnan Shukri claimed to post lessons and answers to questions on behalf of Abdullah Dhu al-Bajadin. Then, on 5 May 2011, Shukri announced that Dhu al-Bajadin had lost his access to the Internet, for unspecified reasons, and that there would be a short break in the course. But posting of lessons resumed the next day, as Shukri decided he would carry on with the course on Dhu al-Bajadin’s behalf. Forum members continued to show interest in the course and there was relatively constant activity until Shukri’s departure in the end of May 2011 (see Figure 1).
By 21 May 2011, the thread had grown to 324 replies, including the comments and lessons posted by Adnan Shukri. A total of 58 forum members had been actively posting within the thread, but only nine out of them were active on a regular basis, i.e. having posted more than ten comments each; and only six of them submitted answers to the “exam” that was given at the end of Part One of the course. Although the thread had been viewed more than 19,000 times in the end, the number of active participants in the course did not seem to exceed ten or twenty at most. This illustrates that jihadi e-learning courses is an extremely marginal phenomenon – on the other hand, they should not be regarded as insignificant. Al-Qaeda sympathisers are becoming more and more proficient at using modern communication technologies, especially for propaganda purposes. But since 2008, important improvements have been done in the field of e-learning as well.

The Evolution of Jihadi E-Learning Courses

The Al-Qaeda network has a long tradition of promoting remote learning courses, even before the age of the Internet. According to high-ranking Al-Qaeda member Fadil Harun, Al-Qaeda started to offer distant learning courses for new cadres already back in 1999-2000. The courses were part of a comprehensive program held within Afghanistan to educate future Al-Qaeda leaders. While practical skills were taught in training camps and at the Taliban’s frontlines, some of the theoretical courses were offered through letter correspondence.[25] After 2001, training courses started to appear on the Internet – the “Al-Battar” series of Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (first issued in January 2004) being a prominent example.[26] From around 2006, audio-visual training material started appearing on jihadi websites, including detailed instruction videos on how to manufacture explosives. However, these videos were not produced by the Al-
An Example of a Would-Be Jihadist Who Sought Online Training

The court case against Mohammad Zaki Amawi et al provides an example of how real-life militant islamists utilize the Internet for learning. Amawi was the leader of a three-member would-be “terrorist cell” in Ohio, USA. In 2004-2005, the cell tried to obtain militant training in the United States before going to Iraq to fight U.S. forces. They sought the assistance of a...
“trainer,” the former Special Operations Forces soldier Darren Griffin, who in reality worked as an undercover agent for the FBI. The three members of the cell were convicted to lifetime in prison in 2008.[30]

Amawi and one of his co-conspirators, Marwan El Hindi, were both active on jihadi forums on the Internet. Amawi had a large collection of propaganda films from Al-Qaeda, especially from Iraq. The cell’s members met on several occasions and watched videos together. They also attempted to use the Internet to obtain training materials: In early 2005, Amawi downloaded the “Martyrdom operation vest preparation” instruction video (a video originally produced by Hizbullah). Al Hindi also downloaded the video, as well as a slide show entitled “The mujahidin in Iraq and the art of planting explosive charges,” produced by the Islamic Army of Iraq. They also had other, unspecified training manuals on how to make explosives. They discussed the training materials with their “trainer” Darren Griffin, and they expressed interest in learning how to build IEDs.

In February 2005, El Hindi and Griffin visited the al-Ikhlas forum together. The website offered a “Basic training” and an “Advanced training” course. According to the court documents, El Hindi helped Griffin to register for the basic training course. There is no further information as to whether El Hindi or his co-conspirators completed the course, but El Hindi was clearly familiar with its existence.

The case illustrates how real-life radicals may exploit online training material. It is worth noting that Amawi sought to join the jihad in Iraq for the first time between October 2003 and March 2004. It means that he was already radicalised at the time he downloaded the jihadi training materials and accessed the online e-learning course. The purpose of downloading the material was probably to get better prepared before attempting to join the jihad in Iraq a second time. In this case, the jihadi training manuals were not the initial radicalising factor, but they probably served as encouragement in later stages of Amawi’s radicalisation process.

However, the case also indicates that the cell’s members were not able to absorb the online training material on their own – indicated by the fact that they sought help from an external “trainer.” Also, they were not able to judge the quality of the online training material. For example, El Hindi said he wanted to use the “Martyrdom operation vest preparation” video to train new recruits, but the instructions in the video are probably too advanced for a beginner with no experience in explosives. [31] Moreover, the video is not suitable if the purpose is to convince new recruits to become suicide bombers. It is strictly informative, and does not contain any of the emotional persuasion tools typical of Al-Qaeda-style recruitment videos (pictures of dead martyrs, images of paradise, religious hymns, etc.). In the end it was Griffin – the FBI infiltrator – who helped the cell’s members receive proper firearms training by renting a commercial shooting range.[32]
Conclusion

Jihadi e-learning courses are a marginal phenomenon, yet they should not be ignored. While there are still very few active participants in such courses, they attract large interest among online jihadists. The quality of the courses has improved over the last few years, and there are dedicated people online who are interested in developing them further. As training in jihadi conflict areas has become difficult, more recruits are likely to try and obtain paramilitary skills before going abroad – or before attempting to carry out a terrorist attack at home. Some of these would-be jihadists might consider joining regular armed forces or private shooting clubs in their home country. A far less risky venture is to seek out jihadi training courses online, because they allow the participants to remain anonymous while conducting their training.

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Notes


“You are held responsible only for thyself – Part 1 & 2,” *al-Sahab*, June 3, 2011.


The *Encyclopaedia* was compiled electronically by Khalil Said al-Deek (aka Abu Ayed al-Filistini), an American-Palestinian with a diploma in computer science from the U.S. Al-Deek’s efforts ensured the *Encyclopaedia*’s continued life on the Internet to this day. Ali H. Soufan, *The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War against al-Qaeda*. New York: Norton, 2011, pp. 132 - 133.


Reference to Personal Messagings (PMs) were made in the public part of the discussion thread. This author has not had access to the PMs themselves.


When the last updates to this article were done on 11 February 2013, the thread was still present on the al-Shumukh forum and it was still the “most viewed” training-related thread – with a total of 21,325 views.


This is apparent as al-Fallujah’s logo has been superimposed on the instruction video.

This information was given to the author by FFI’s Senior Research Fellow Brynjar Lia in November 2011.


An Overview of Geographical Perspectives and Approaches in Terrorism Research

by Karim Bahgat and Richard M. Medina

Abstract

Geographical perspectives and approaches are implemented in some areas of conflict research, but can benefit many more. While the body of geographically-oriented terrorism literature has been growing since the 2001, a geo-spatial focus has traditionally been absent from most research on terrorism research and remains largely unfamiliar to many terrorism researchers. This article explores geographical literature on terrorism and its contributions to the understanding of terrorism as an empirical phenomenon. The article suggests three particular contributions from geographical perspectives:

1) the geography of terrorism is linked to specific places and contexts throughout the world where governance failures lead to grievance and opportunity;

2) the terrorist attack cycle occurs along specific spatial trajectories that can be identified and possibly policed; and

3) terrorist attacks have significant negative impacts but are spatially limited and not as severe as presumed by much of the conventional literature.

These aspects vary, depending on whether the violence is waged by territorial or non-territorial groups. Included in the article is a list of data sources that may serve as a partial guide for future geographic research.

Introduction

The formal study of terrorism originated decades ago and was based on the belief that there is an urgent need to understand and counter this form of political violence. Research was then confined to only a handful of scholars and its set ways of approaching the topic were limited and leading to surprisingly few insights.[1] The attacks against America on September 11th, 2001 greatly expanded this community of terrorism scholars and motivated efforts for new and innovative research approaches from many disciplines, heralding in what some have called a “second wave of terrorism research.”[2] Among these recent publications there are also those that explore terrorism through the lens of geography. There is a considerable body of such geographically-oriented terrorism literature spanning a wide variety of sub-literatures and research agendas that yet remains to be fully recognized.
The purpose of this article is to investigate various geographical approaches, answering such questions as: How and why did geographical research on terrorism come about? What are some of the general topics that have been explored in the literature, and have geographical perspectives contributed any unique empirical insights to these topics? Terrorism here is defined as violence perpetrated by sub-state actors against non-combatants for political gain. It is recognized that violent groups engage in a wide variety of tactics. A group is labeled a terrorist organization when they begin to employ terrorist tactics.

After first describing and explaining the growth of the geographical terrorism literature, the article goes on to conceptualize terrorism perpetrated by both territorial groups in politically unstable countries and non-territorial groups in more stable countries. Such a broad conceptualization enables the unification of a divided terrorism literature and highlights the importance of being critical to, and carefully delimiting, one’s use of terrorism-related data. The article then explores the geographical literature for insights on how terrorism in these two contexts may differ from each other in relation to the spatiality of a) their locations, b) group dynamics, and c) consequences. It is hoped that by exploring these geographical aspects, this article will also help spread awareness of the geographical literature and its contributions, and thus show the usefulness of utilizing geographical perspectives in the study of terrorism.

A Primer on Geography and the Geographical Approach to Terrorism

Geography is a science at the convergence of many disciplines. Almost every research discipline can be approached from a geographic perspective. A few examples are geopolitics, economic geography, and spatial epidemiology. Geography is split into two main study areas – physical and human geographies. In the context of terrorism research much of the effort originates with human geographers, though recent concerns for terrorist motivations involve physical, or at least a combination of physical and human geographies. For example, many are concerned with changing climates, redistribution of resources, and the potential for terrorism in the near future; though these research topics presently make-up only a small proportion of the whole of geographic studies of terrorism. The large majority are from the human geography half. Human geography focuses on a greater understanding of theoretical constructs of space and place, the people, things, and events within and at them, social systems, and connectivities between entities and events. This, in simple terms, is human geography, though it is not all of it.

Approaching a socio-political problem, such as terrorism, through a geographic lens leads to a greater understanding of not only locations of terrorists and their activities, but spatial processes, social network connections, social systemic operations, and changes in space and time. Social, political, and other systems, as well as their agents, operate in specific geographical contexts, whereby they are researched in socio-spatial or geopolitical realms. Influences of place and location on activities become quite clear in these types of research. For instance, traditional
statistical analysis attempts to identify cause-effect relationships but assumes that these hold true across space and time. Considerations of geographic and temporal context allow these relationships to vary. A variable may have a strong effect on another variable in one corner of the world, but this effect might be non-existent elsewhere. Geo-statistical tools have been developed to identify this context-dependent spatial variation in cause-effect relationships.[4]

Geographical perspectives on terrorism do not attempt to rival or substitute other theoretical explanations; they are simply a means by which theories can be tested. For instance, T.R. Gurr’s “relative deprivation” theory [5] can be thought of as being more salient with proximity to relatively wealthier populations, which can in turn be tested with spatial analysis to support the initial theory. It is therefore crucial that geographic perspectives be considered. The locations of terrorists, and the groups they identify with, have specific narratives behind their motivations, which are related to cultures, ethnicities, and historical situations of the terrorists and their constituencies. Their choices and strategies may be based on spatial considerations, or attacks may be the result of geographic context. Even the impacts of terrorist attacks may be highly dependent on the geographic context in which these occur. Understanding these geographical aspects has the potential to provide advance knowledge of future operations, supportive populations, and strengths/weaknesses in the terrorist system.

Terrorism Studies Turn Geographic

The use of geographical perspectives in terrorism research is a relatively recent trend. A lack of cross-disciplinary entrepreneurship among the original terrorism scholars may be one of the reasons for this late arrival of geographical terrorism research. There is little evidence that its earliest scholars were interested in bringing geographical perspectives to their studies. With the exception of a few works in the 1980s that attempted to theorize and observe geographical aspects of terrorism [6], most terrorism researchers have traditionally tended to utilize historical case studies, descriptive statistics, or time-series analysis. The first to systematically examine geographical aspects of terrorism were scholars from the discipline of geography. Professionally trained academic geographers have contributed to many topics and branches of the social sciences, though in the past they were rarely [7] interested in the topic of terrorism. This changed with the attacks against America on September 11th, 2001, which ignited nationalist feelings in the US, increased the popularity of terrorism research, and motivated new research funding [8] that would eventually attract greater attention and efforts from geographers.

Initially the geographic terrorism literature was driven mostly by applied geographers, who were motivated by the perceived benefits that their Geographic Information Systems (GIS) expertise could provide to homeland security.[9] A few sub-literatures of this policy-oriented approach include the works of vulnerability scientists who attempt to predict the spatial distribution of future terrorism risks and vulnerabilities [10]; crime and defense analysts who focus on various
forms of geographic profiling to locate and apprehend those who engage in terrorism;[11] and technical practitioners showing how spatial models and GIS can be useful for the immediate prevention, evacuation, and rescue efforts in the case of a terrorist attack.[12] as well as in the physical recovery efforts for modeling and predicting the worst affected areas and returning targeted environments to living/working order.[13]

While there are many geographers concerned with applied research, in recent decades there has been a substantial growth of geographers that instead engage in philosophical and theoretical critiques of the status quo [14]. It is natural that these geographers would also contribute to a more critical and skeptical research response to counter-terrorism [15]. This view resulted in a variety of engagements. It was particularly popular in the early 2000s to use critical geographic perspectives to debate moral issues and deficiencies with governments’ approaches to counter-terrorism.[16] This resulted in a vast geographic literature on how government security measures are altering the quality of life in cities and putting residents “under siege”[17] by enacting policies that “shrink” the lives of the broader population either publicly by physically modifying the architecture of public spaces and infrastructure[18] or privately by extending the spatial extent of governmental privacy-transgressing surveillance practices.[19] Other topics included acknowledging the state’s role in causing or exacerbating terrorism;[20] showing how we use spatial metaphors to envisage terrorism in our popular discourse, and how these are often left unexplored, tied to existing negative stereotypes of world regions, and driven by political and ideological motivations;[21] and scholars of international law warning of the legal difficulties involved in apprehending terrorists across national borders.[22] More detailed reviews of such critical literatures can be found elsewhere.[23]

Today, these combined waves of geographical research have resulted in a relatively large body of literature at the intersection of terrorism studies and geography; a significant number of doctorate dissertations written on the topic;[24] and even a sizeable selection of geography courses developed on issues of terrorism at various Universities.[25] It is particularly important to explore the geographical contributions, since aside from a few exceptions,[26] most appear to have gone unnoticed by the broader community of terrorism researchers. Even among the geographical literature’s contributing authors there is little mention of the broader geographical turn beyond what is relevant for their specific topical interest. Much geographic research has been focused on offering solutions or critiques to how governments react to terrorism, but there is also a growing body of quantitative and data-driven investigations on terrorist actors and their tactics that should be recognized.

**Quantitative Geography and Terrorism Studies**

Quantitative geography methods were implemented relatively late in the study of terrorism. This may have to do with the timing of prevailing academic currents. In the 1960s, improved
computer technology facilitated the implementation of quantitative and positivist research in geography and inspired the use of spatial modeling throughout various academic fields.[27] By the time terrorism studies began to solidify as a research field in the 1970s,[28] geography’s positivist tendencies were being met with widespread criticisms by behavioral, humanist, and other scholars reacting to, and highly critical of, the earlier positivist and quantitative approaches.[29] Being a relatively young research field, terrorism researchers seemed more concerned with agreeing on a basic conceptual framework than with embarking on geographical inquiry. By the time terrorism studies were conceptually mature and prepared for geographical considerations in the 1980s and 90s the period of quantitative geography had very much passed, and geography as a field had become dominated by postmodern topics.[30] It was not until the early 2000s that terrorism scholars began to adopt geographical perspectives, precisely when improved GIS technology was making geography popular again and terrorism studies seemed mature enough to welcome such approaches, though surely the events of 9/11 played a major role.[31] As geographical perspectives became more common among terrorism researchers, there was less focus on debating counterterrorism policies, and more on empirically describing and explaining terrorist violence or terrorist actors. Figure 1 illustrates this shift in research focus; it shows that while geographers have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of publications in the critical and applied literatures, non-geographers have been the main contributors to the empirically based literature.[32] It is mostly this empirical literature that can contribute to the growth in quality of studies on terrorist violence.

![The Geographic Terrorism Literature](image)

*Figure 1. A comparison of the number of journal articles published by geographers and non-geographers in geographical research on terrorism. Source: Authors.*
Crucial to much of the empirical research on terrorism’s geographical aspects is the availability of spatially explicit data on terrorism. Unfortunately, most terrorist event databases have not recorded precise geographical coordinates. This limits the spatial accuracy of traditional research to national or regional level aggregations. Since the great promise of geographical research hinges on exploring the finer details of sub-national variation, many geographically minded researchers have sought alternative but difficult to access data sources such as police records,[33] or made adjustments to existing databases. It is not the case however, that data at the micro-level are always more appropriate than data at broader scales. Rather, the choice of which scale to use - sub-administrative provinces, equally dispersed grid cells, cities and towns, and even specific street addresses - depends on the specific purpose of the research project.[34] Some have warned about the so-called “local trap”[35] of narrowing one’s focus to only proximate and local factors, thus ignoring important causal factors that can only be seen from broader scales.[36] This article nevertheless maintains its call for more micro-data because most terrorism research has been precisely the opposite, focused on broad national scales.

Due to the difficulties involved and efforts required in geo-referencing data, i.e. assigning locational information, most subnational studies mentioned in this article have been limited to case studies on specific countries or cities. Most instances where large global-level comparative studies have been conducted on geo-referenced terrorism data have required the technical finesse of adept computer scientists, which has meant less focus on actual knowledge production.[37] To aid future research with obtaining geo-referenced terrorism data for their projects, the authors of this article attempted to take stock of the available terrorism data sources and their potential for geo-referencing (26 in total) and have provided a listing of these in Appendix I. For each dataset, note is made on their geographical extent, time coverage, and possibility for geo-referencing if not already available. Currently no freely available terrorism dataset can be geo-referenced to the level of street-addresses, but one dataset is available with prepackaged city-level coordinates attached to each terrorist event. This is the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), which also happens to be one of the more extensive and popular datasets. However, the WITS dataset is presently offline, with no indication of whether and when it may be available again. The most widely used dataset, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), was initially intended for geo-referencing to enable the detection of country and point level distributions and spatially patterned modes of attack,[38] but such spatial information has only recently been included in the online dataset version, and is currently only included for a small subset of the data. The GTD and many other datasets nevertheless contain information about the city name of each event, and these city-names may in turn be geo-referenced with the locational coordinates found online in many freely available city gazetteers, such as GeoNames.[39] Note that even if successfully geo-referenced, all of these data sources are still prone to errors that must be addressed: many use overly broad inclusion criteria and may not represent a clean sample of terrorist-only events. Most are based on open-source newspaper material and therefore exhibit journalistic biases of both under- and
over-reporting on different aspects.[40] Beyond the freely available datasets, there also exists potential in some of the more restricted datasets that emphasise the spatial and GIS compatible nature of their data, such as Jane’s Terrorism Events Spatial Layer; and the Violent Extremism Knowledge Base (VKB). While the list of datasets provided with this article is not comprehensive, the authors have attempted to include many of the geographically based terrorism attack datasets available in the open source. To further remedy the overall lack of awareness and marginal status of geographical perspectives and data the article now turns to exploring some of its contributions with the help of an organizational framework.

**Terrorism and Territoriality: A Tactic Used in Many Settings**

A useful way to make sense of geographical perspectives and contributions in the study of terrorism is to focus on the multiple settings in which it is used. Doing so sheds light on terrorism’s territoriality, conceived here as the desire and achievement for ownership of territory by terrorist actors vis-a-vis the state. It is argued that such an approach has the advantage of potentially bridging a divided research engagement throughout the broader terrorism literature. This division is two-fold: one school of thought states that terrorism is a problem faced primarily by stable democracies and is therefore, as Alex P. Schmid has argued, the “peacetime equivalent of war crimes,”[41] while another school of thought considers terrorism to be the widespread targeting of civilians during internal conflict and civil war. Investigating the territorial links of these two conceptualizations will be the main focus of this section and should help in moving past the conceptual disagreements of what is and should be studied in terrorism research.

Perhaps the most obvious link to territoriality is that terrorism has territorial intentions: if terrorism is political, and policies are typically written for specific use within territories, then it follows that terrorism can be seen as at least partially in terms of a desire to achieve control of territory, geography, and the contested people within political or social boundaries.[42] Indeed, many types of political violence have such desires for territorial control. Some scholars adopting geographical perspectives have therefore suggested that what defines and differentiates terrorism’s territorial desires is more precisely its failure to fulfill them and that this happens mostly in strong and stable countries. This idea constitutes the first view of terrorism and coincides with many common observations made about terrorism. It was first explicitly stated by A. Merari in 1993 and was later popularized by I. Sánchez-Cuenca and L. de la Calle in 2009. [43] The argument is that terrorism occurs when violent groups do not own or control territory, which tends to be the case when the state is strong and successfully prevents oppositional groups from gaining control over territory. This forces the opposing parties to act within the government’s territory and control, causing them to plan and execute their attacks in a secretive manner using light weapons that are not easily detectable, like explosive devices, under which circumstances we tend to describe what happened as terrorism.[44] In such cases terrorists tend
to attack civilians in order to influence or induce the government to enact certain policy changes. [45] This view explains why many scholars have consistently found that most terrorism occurs in democratic societies [46]. This is in line with how scholars originally conceived of terrorism, namely as a form of clandestine anti-state revolutionary violence that was affecting some democracies in Western Europe in the 1970s.[47] Overall, these propositions are supported by various quantitative studies where terrorism is found to be statistically correlated with government strength [48] whereas the onset of civil war (usually dominated by guerrilla warfare tactics) is correlated with government weakness.[49] I. Sánchez-Cuenca and L. de la Calle have created a dataset on rebellious groups and included a variable for whether or not each group controlled territory. Across several quantitative studies they consistently found that non-territorial groups were more likely to engage in clandestine and indiscriminate terrorist tactics.

The second view on terrorism’s territoriality is one which views terrorism as related to conflict-ridden, weak, and failed states and regions,[51] - a linkage that is also found in some quantitative studies.[52] With the government’s failure to control all of its territory, many authors therefore conceive of terrorism as connected to those that are strong enough to liberate or “acquire space”[53] and aim for partial autonomy or secession. It is noted that doing so creates new spaces of self-governance, provides security of sorts, and allows groups to use them as recruiting and training grounds.[54] In stark opposition to how the first perspective sees terrorism as non-territorial, this view focuses on terrorism as territoriality grounded and connected to land-ownership. Many of these countries and separatist areas are characterized by civil war, weak government control and territory-owning groups. Frequently used examples or case studies of such terrorism are the Basque Country, Northern Ireland,[55] Sri Lanka, Colombia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Israel/Palestine.

These two perspectives on terrorism appear to contradict each other; however, a closer investigation shows that what is assumed to be unique in one perspective is actually a shared characteristic of both. Both views can be counted as valid approaches to the study of terrorism, each focusing on a specific type that takes place in a unique territorial context. Proponents of the first view have questioned how the second view links state weakness and conflict with terrorism: after all, clandestine and indiscriminate terrorist attacks are not necessarily taking place in areas where the government is absent and where one can enjoy full territorial control. Some analysts note that weak states should foster territorially bounded guerrillas with a preference for military type attacks rather than terrorism.[56] Yet, on closer inspection it has been noted that when the targets of guerrilla groups are far from home in areas they do not own, control, or have a major presence in, their tactics indeed tend to be indiscriminate and terrorist-like; i.e. that guerrillas sometimes also engage in terrorism.[57] Additionally, having bases in such weak states or areas has been statistically associated as increasing the likelihood of engaging in both domestic and transnational terrorism.[58] Just as civil wars are consistently and statistically associated with
large, mountainous, and tropical areas—features believed to limit the state’s ability to control territory - some geographical research has found that such factors can also facilitate terrorism. However, the finding that rugged terrain facilitates terrorism may apply mostly to politically weak countries affected by conflict and less so in other settings. Geographical research focusing on a mixed analysis of both stable and unstable countries, or only on the targets of transnational terrorism found no such evidence linking terrorism to rugged terrain.

The main claim of the second perspective is that terrorists have a tendency for seeking out areas where the government is weak. This appears to contradict how the first perspective sees terrorists as located in areas characterized by government strength, stability, peace, and inability to permanently control any territory. Yet, there is usually a drive to escape towards the weaker peripheries of government control. Faced with a strong government, non-territorial terrorist organizations take on nomadic lifestyles and often seek to escape towards “old, smaller industrial cities or working class suburbs that lie in the shadow of” bigger central cities; in neighborhoods that provide protection and anonymity through “places where people can get lost;”[61] in slums;[62] and sometimes in geographically remote areas such as sparsely populated jungles, mountains, islands, or deserts.[63] What makes them different from territorial based terrorists is that to the extent that they are able to escape the reach of government control they only achieve partial autonomy and may still be dependent on favorable “socio-geographies” of sympathetic populations to provide hiding or at least to accept their presence.[64]

The lesson from these geographical and related studies is that it is not sufficient to focus on solely weak and conflict-ridden states, or on strong and stable states, in order to study terrorism. Terrorism can be said to come in two varieties: territorial terrorism is present when the perpetrating group controls territory and non-territorial when it does not. This helps explain why, contrary to the view that terrorism is a weapon of the weak, an expanding literature has been investigating the use of civilian targeting by relatively stronger groups in civil wars and views such violence to be intersecting with the concept of terrorism.[65] M.G. Findley and J.K. Young brought a geographical perspective to this literature and found that roughly half of all terrorist acts indeed occur during and inside civil war-affected zones.[66] By implication, their study shows how the other half of acts of terrorism occurs in stable areas with strong governance. Despite the different contexts, both territorial and non-territorial based terrorism is characterized by the same type of clandestine attack tactics and choice of light weaponry that is commonly associated with terrorism.[67] It matters both what kind of violence it is and who uses it.[68] This recognition of two types of terrorism and their different yet similar territorialities may have many important implications for judging and defining the empirical limits of terrorism studies so as to possibly unite the divided views of literature contributors.
A particularly common theme in the geographic literature has been to map, analyze, and explain the locations and spatial distributions of terrorism across the earth’s surface. Where does it occur and why? In the conventional terrorism literature, these aspects are only assumed or claimed without empirical support, or barely explored with simplistic country maps or summary statistics for world regions. Therefore, considerable disagreement abounds as to what exactly its geography is. Following the attacks of September 11th the main focus has been on *transnational* terrorism,[69] which in popular discourse is conceived of as a global threat with instant reach – a threat too ominous and complex to identify on a map. In this view, the transnational terrorist threat is perceived to be completely “de-territorialised,” potentially present anywhere, and structured in networks whose reach is unlimited.[70] Donald Black presented a theoretical argument for how the globalisation of communication, transportation, and weapon technology in the late 20th has not only extended the reach of violence but has also enabled socially different populations in distant locations to be viewed as the cause of local grievances and therefore the targets of terrorist violence.[71] Heralded by the unexpected and complex spatiality of the September 11th attacks,[72] it has been suggested that traditional nationalist/separatist terrorism campaigns have “tangible” geographies and stand in contrast to the present wave of religious transnational terrorism where “no such geographic clarity” exists.[73]

Other scholars have been more optimistic about identifying the geography of transnational terrorism and often locate it along lines, intersections, fault lines, or front lines where social differences and oppositional elements meet and are the most proximate and easily accessible for targeting. Authors of several studies have argued and found that transnational terrorism is most intense on the semi-periphery of the global economic core states, i.e. at the intersection between rich and poor countries where proximity and relative economic deprivation is most pronounced. [74] De Blij invoked such an argument when he mapped patterns of transnational terrorism in Africa and argued that they followed the front lines where Christian and Muslim zones met.[75] Neumeyer and Plümber found weak statistical support for the argument that attacks across the Islam-West divide motivate others to engage in similar attacks, but not that they necessarily followed any particular front lines.[76] Others have suggested more specific places and regions where transnational terrorism has been more common. During the 1990s, a commonly held belief in Western imaginations was that the regions of Southwest Asia and Middle East were the main terrorist hotspots of the world.[77] Yet, empirical studies have shown that terrorism in the 1990s was more evenly distributed across the world’s regions, and that only in the post-9/11 era did the Middle East and South Asia become the leading regions in the world afflicted by transnational terrorism.[78] Blomberg and Hess showed that while country-maps of absolute incidents may suggest most transnational terrorism to be occurring in rich and democratic countries in the Americas and Europe, focusing instead on frequency of incidents relative to total population changes the map considerably towards highlighting the Middle East and authoritarian countries as particular hotspots for transnational terrorism.[79] Goldman similarly suggests that
transnational terrorism is a local phenomenon, and has been increasingly so since the 1990s, using many different proxies for the geographical spread of terrorism. He argues that Al-Qaeda’s “global tendencies should not be perceived as an indicator of the globalization of terror attacks.”[80] All of these findings point to the often local and consistent[81] geographical shapes of a seemingly chaotic transnational terrorism phenomenon.

Despite the common preoccupation with the complexity and the fault lines of transnational terrorism, there is reason to believe that the defining geography of terrorism is rather to be located in the hotspots and regions of domestic terrorism. Not only does domestic terrorism far outnumber the transnational variant, D. Kilcullen has suggested that transnational terrorism is only an amalgamation of unrelated attacks orchestrated by domestic terrorist groups that cooperate with transnational groups only as far as it benefits their own local goals.[82] If we limit our view of terrorism to these local and domestic variants, we may begin to more precisely visualize and identify its locations and spaces. Unfortunately, very little geographical research has been done to substantiate these locational aspects of domestic terrorism, or to compare them with those of transnational terrorism. As a brief exercise, the authors of this article geo-referenced the GTD terrorism dataset to demonstrate that these aspects of terrorism can indeed be visualized and compared. The time frame was set from September 11th 2001 to the end of 2011 (31,591 events). In order to distinguish between domestic and transnational terrorism, the authors coded the country-origin of the nationality of each known perpetrating group in the dataset. Where the group country origin differed from the attacked country, the event was coded as being transnational, otherwise it was set to domestic. The many events where the group perpetrator was unknown (with 18,573 events more than half) were excluded. City statistics and summary variables were then calculated to represent each city for the time-period examined. This city-level terrorism dataset was then geo-referenced using the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s Geonet Names Server (http://earth-info.nga.mil/gns/html/index.html). Roughly 50 percent of all the cities in the domestic data, and 40 percent of the transnational data were excluded in the analysis, as there were no matching locations in the GeoNames database. Note that the final maps included in this article visualize the locations of terrorism as defined in the GTD data only; the data were accepted at face value without any data delimitation and may therefore include some dubious cases of terrorism such as attacks on military forces. There are many possible errors in the resultant maps, including those arising from the coding-process and creation of the group-nationality dataset, as well as a variety of possible geo-referencing errors. It is nevertheless maintained that such crude estimations were necessary due to time-constraints and since the purposes of the resulting maps were mostly for illustrating the feasibility and potential of geo-referencing rather than rigorous analysis.

The outcome of the exercise can be seen in Figure 2 and suggests innovative approaches to visualizing transnational terrorism’s fluid nature. Tentatively, the maps support the notion that the targets of transnational terrorism overlap to a large extent with those of domestic terrorism,
rather than occupying distinct geographies as expected by some. While transnational terrorism differs somewhat in terms of its origins and far-reaching travel-lines, many of these cases appear to be limited to regional country-neighborhoods. Note that the former shows average people killed (since transnational events are believed to be more focused on high media visibility), while the latter shows the total count of incidents. Terrorism appears to be originating in specific areas throughout the world, in both developing and developed countries, and in weak and strong states. Regional hotspots include (parts of) South and Central Asia, the Middle East and Caucasus, Europe, Central Africa, northwestern South America, and Southeast Asia.
Figure 2. A comparison of (a) the origins, flows, and targets of transnational terrorism, n=1,158 events across 497 origin-target trajectories, with (b) the locations of domestic terrorism, n=10,369 events across 7,427 place-names, data source: Global Terrorism Database.
Identifying the geography of terrorism in more specific terms than this is beyond the scope of this article. Rather, it seems more useful to explore the reasons why such spatial patterns appear in the first place: to enable the investigation of what it is about those places that drives people to resort to terrorism.[83] Domestic terrorism may result from some of the same root causes that drive other violent strife. However, given that terrorism has been found to be a largely ineffective tactic for achieving political demands,[84] it would appear unlikely that it is used for self-aggrandizement. What makes terrorism unique from other violent tactics is that it may be driven solely or mostly by grievances. Mustafa argued that the spatial patterns of government injustice may become engraved onto certain territories, shaping opinions and discourses of injustice, which we may in turn “map…on to the geography of terrorism.”[85] In this way, landscapes of government injustice, repression, and neglect are believed to fuel popular support, sympathy, motivation, and increased likelihood of terrorist attacks.[86] Even in resource-rich provinces, the geography of government corruption is argued to lead to underdevelopment and grievances that in turn give rise to terrorism’s geography.[87] Though some conventional studies have found terrorism to be unrelated to economic conditions,[88] studies that have spatially disaggregated economic activity to the level of separatist regions,[89] provinces,[90] and minority group territories[91] do find economic characteristics to be important indicators of grievances based on economic inequalities and discrimination that may lead to reactions in the form of terrorism. The focus on grievances is supported by how A.B. S. Bravo and C.M.M. Dias found exactly such a dominance of grievance-related causes in their quantitative study on terrorism across two Eurasian regions.[92] Attention to government policies may therefore be one way to illuminate and model terrorist grievances.

While territorially based terrorists may draw their grievances from poor local conditions and discrimination against the rural areas where they originated, the type of grievances that cause terrorism when actors do not control territory may be unique to the world’s urban areas. Scholars focusing on this urban aspect of terrorism argue that cities’ increasingly dense and built-up infrastructure makes it difficult to stage large-scale rebellions or control territory in urban environments and thus forces any violent disagreement to take the form of clandestine terrorism.[93] They find that such violent disagreement is a particularly pertinent feature of newly and rapidly developing cities since they attract people of many different cultures and backgrounds into close vicinity without always being able to provide the necessary support systems, resulting in grievances between competing social groups that become manifest in demands and struggles against state authorities.[94] Whereas grievances may be the primary cause of non-territorial terrorism, economic and greed-related motives may play a slightly larger role in cases of territorial terrorism. In such settings, characterized by groups operating in conflict settings, terrorism appears sometimes to be used strategically to ensure security, autonomy, and compliance within the territories, resources, and activities they control in order to ensure financial resources, power, and the survival of their organization and purpose.[95] For instance,
in Afghanistan illicit drug production has been found to finance and motivate the resort to terrorist attacks on civilians at the provincial level as an attempt to silence any political opposition.[96]

In this section, attention has been given to how a sizeable literature attempts to identify and describe the geographical layout of terrorist attacks, and how their findings suggest increased focus on domestic terrorism by charting the predominantly local and shrinking geography of terrorism in the world, and thus, countering popular perceptions and fears of transnational terrorism. Other parts of the literatures have attempted to explain the geography of terrorism, i.e. what causes its locations and how it does so. Their geographical approaches have utilised spatial disaggregation and attention to sub-national correlations, and this section showed how they helped identify context-specific causes that are characteristic of non-territorial and territorial terrorism. This has been beneficial over conventional research methods since the local-level presence of causes and outcome of terrorism must somehow connect and link together spatially for causal arguments and theories of terrorism’s root causes to be more accurately verified.

**How Terrorist Groups Function and Operate**

Other geographical research focuses more on those who engage in terrorism. Acts of terrorism can be performed by “lone wolfs” or orchestrated by network-like structures in the case of non-territorial terrorism, and by centralized land-based organizations in countries where terrorists are able to control a territorial homeland. Whereas conventional terrorism literature on terrorist organizations, members, and activities has focused mostly on sociological and psychological inquiries, the geographical terrorism literature has uncovered additional details on the micro-dynamics and internal workings of how organizations plan and conduct terrorist attacks that have been previously unknown in the literature. Concerted terrorist attacks usually follow and presuppose networks of contact and interaction between willing perpetrators that have been driven together by their environment, context, and own choices. Understanding the development of these relations and network structures in such a manner as to give rise to terrorist attacks thus becomes a crucial mode of inquiry. Network analysis entails studying connections, structures, interactions, and flows among and between entities. It is common in many disciplines and fields. Terrorist network studies from a strictly sociological perspective are common,[97] but relatively few researchers place the network in a geographical context, even though social activity and geographic location are often interdependent. New approaches to terrorism research are being developed that focuses on social networks of non-territorial terrorists rendered to geographic space. I. C. Moon and K.M. Carley created a visualized social network on a representative global map and a simulation model of geographical aspects of social networks including interaction, proximity and relocation.[98] R.M. Medina and G.F. Hepner published a study that for the first time studied terrorism through the “socio-spatial network” framework describing networks that
operate in a conceptual hybrid space where multiple spaces are considered in operations and activities.\[99\] They found a relationship between geographic proximity and social closeness for terrorists within the Islamist global network, which is a crucial finding where some question the importance of geography in today’s information age.\[100\]

Assuming that a group of individuals know each other through the previously mentioned networks, how do they go about planning and preparing for an attack? This was one of the questions asked by B.L. Smith et al. who investigated the known patterns of preparatory activities among captured domestic terrorist perpetrators within the U.S.\[101\] Their report found that most of them had lived and engaged in the majority of their preparatory activities within a 30 mile radius from their intended target. Limited spatio-temporal analysis suggested a pattern of surveillance close to the target early in the planning phase, after which the rest of the preparatory behavior would move far away from the target, only to move gradually closer again as the attack date approached. These findings highlight the importance of having bases of operation. Proximity to such safe havens is considered to increase the risk of future attacks, as first suggested by R.V. Clarke and G. R. Newman in 2006.\[102\] D.K. Rossmo and K. Harries used detailed police data reports and found that in Turkey, terrorists acting on behalf of rural guerrillas tended to establish cells within 4 miles of each other and the closest one only half a mile from the targeted area.\[103\] They propose a specific geographical model that can be used by intelligence offices to predict future attacks or nearby cells. Very similar spatial relationships were found by C. Berrebi and D. Lakdawalla for terrorist cells in Israel.\[104\] These findings highlight the local nature of planning and execution of terrorist attacks.

Perhaps the most popular topic for spatial analysis in the group dynamics literature has been to investigate the spatial logics of terrorist attack strategies and how they evolve over time. The focus on attack strategy refers to the choices and intentions of terrorist groups, not the contextual factors and root causes that motivated these actors in the first place (see section titled “The Geography of Terrorism”). In the conventional literature, terrorist attacks are often thought to target an enemy group or sub-category thereof but as being otherwise randomly executed and “unpredictable.”\[105\] Contrary to such a notion, the geographical literature has shown that terrorist attacks are carried out according to certain spatial logics. Increasingly, many observers are noting, for instance, how cities of high population and administrative worth to the government appear to have become among the main targets of modern-day terrorism for a variety of strategic and cost-effectiveness reasons.\[106\] This relationship has been verified by statistical\[107\] and GIS based studies,\[108\] some of which indicate that that sixty percent of all terrorism is targeted at cities and resulting in ninety percent of all injuries.\[109\] Other times, locations are selected for their symbolic meaning and value.\[110\] For instance, cities with global or regional status are found to be particularly meaningful targets for signaling government vulnerability and humiliation.\[111\] With a focus on the specific goals of terrorist groups, we may therefore see religious groups targeting civilian sites of perceived amoral activities;\[112\] right-
wing groups targeting political, government, and military locations;[113] oppressed groups targeting sites of exclusion and wealth such as nightclubs, cafes, and shopping malls (e.g. in Palestine and Ireland);[114] to exploited groups targeting the means of exploitation, such as the oil tankers that are perceived as exploiting local resource wealth in Nigeria. The basic logic of both strategic and symbolic targeting is not one of random hit-and-run, but rather one of staging repeated attacks against the same location, a pattern known as reinforcement.[115] In several sub-national GIS studies, previously attacked locations are particularly prone to experience future attacks.[116] By geo-visualizing terrorist attacks in New York, Jerusalem, London, and Istanbul, Savitch similarly observed how terrorism tends to gravitate toward a critical downtown area or center using concentrated and repetitive attacks.[117] The aim of this tactic may be to intimidate, psychologically alienate, weaken the confidence, and drive out people from certain public places, as Mustafa has suggested.[118]

The logic of terrorist targeting then is spatially dependent and results in self-reinforcing hotspots across a given landscape. Yet these patterns are never quite stable over time, giving rise to other spatial patterns. Earlier in the article, it was noted how the literature has emphasized that terrorism can exist in both territorial and non-territorial settings. One major difference between these two types of terrorism can be seen in the dynamics of their targeting strategies. Thus, we may observe two main targeting strategy dynamics.[119] First, terrorism at the hands of territory minded actors tends to result in patterns of gradual spatial diffusion to close and nearby areas of convenience (i.e., contiguously/contagiously).[120] Contagious diffusion of terrorist attacks tends to occur when the government is weak and the terrorists are tied to territory and are on the defensive. In such situations their strategy often aims to ensure control of their own territory, strengthen their support base, and mobilize the population in their close vicinity.[121] For instance, LaFree et al. were able to detect such a pattern in Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) related attacks in Spain during the early phase when attacks centered in and around the Basque Country, often in spatio-temporal bursts of localized violence, as found by Behlendorf, LaFree, and Legault.[122] Conflict and insecurity may help spread terrorism across borders as geo-statistical methods have shown the existence of a regional spillover effect, where regions of transnational terrorist attacks increase the likelihood of attacks spreading to neighbouring countries.[123] Second, in peaceful settings dominated by a strong government, non-territorial groups tend to resort to terrorism in a more spread-out manner characterized by multiple hotspots. Since they do not control any territory, the tactic is more focused on targeting key enemy locations throughout their vast operating ranges. As new hotspots begin to appear far away from each other, we are observing a pattern known as hierarchical diffusion,[125] where new targets are selected based on a hierarchy of preferred target characteristics, as discussed previously. Figure 3 illustrates these two patterns with an overview of terrorism in the United Kingdom. Perhaps resulting from many different groups involved or different levels of territorial control, the map highlights a contagious pattern in Northern Ireland and a hierarchical pattern in Great Britain. These patterns
appear as expected, given the higher level of instability and territorially-minded groups in Northern Ireland. To examine the reasons for these differences more in-depth and across different cases can be a useful avenue for future research.

Figure 3. Two aspects of spatial patterns to terrorist attacks, n=248 events across 78 place-names. Data source: Global Terrorism Database.

Although the conventional literature has provided many insider examples based on fieldwork with terrorist groups and members, the geographical literature mentioned in this section has been unique in suggesting the spatial dimensions of terrorist activities. Some of these activities, like
networking, planning, and attack execution have been studied mostly with a focus on non-territorial terrorism contexts; how these practices differ when looking at territorial terrorists remains an interesting topic for future research. The research on targeting strategies, however, has given some detailed insights into the differences between territorial and non-territorial terrorism. When considering the possibility of multiple terrorist groups with different territorial capacities and goals, the resulting attack pattern is likely to be quite complex and makes it necessary to have data that consistently identifies the group responsible for the attacks in order to compare each group’s territorial nature with the resultant attack patterns.[126] Doing so may help bolster the finding reported here that territorial and non-territorial contexts influences groups to target different places through different patterns. However, the instances in which this finding does not hold should be explored further, illuminating such intervening factors as organizational infighting taking precedence over territorial aspirations.[127] Partially predictable patterns of terrorist activities have been used by some researchers to model and infer group responsibility with regard to specific attacks.[128]

**Terrorism’s Impact on Society**

Despite our best efforts to understand and prevent terrorism, this asymmetric form of conflict-waging is not likely to disappear entirely as a viable form of politics of contention conducted by various societal actors. Realizing this, a third group of geographically minded scholars have rather focused their efforts on helping people, institutions, and society to cope with, prepare for, and mitigate the negative effects of terrorist attacks. Such efforts require an understanding of terrorism’s associated processes of societal change and effect, parts of which the conventional literature has already explored. But without knowing their spatial manifestations and scopes of influence, our understanding can only remain limited. The contribution of the geographical literature has been to further our understanding of how the consequences of terrorist attacks play out across space, how they change the spatial workings of society, and thus what it means for a world that may have to live with terrorism.

One of the most widely-held assumptions about terrorism is that it achieves change in the personal and psychological realms of individuals in terms of fear and terror. Yet new publications are beginning to put this into question.[129] While terrorism’s effects on national levels of threat perceptions have been well studied in the past, only recently have its sub-national local effects been explored. Studies on risk perception have traditionally looked at demographics and psychological factors to explain why some people are more or less worried about, and impacted by, terrorism. Recently however, trauma research has begun to incorporate spatial queries using both quantitative and qualitative methods. It was generally found that terrorism risk perceptions are limited to those people within close proximity to real or perceived targets of terrorist attacks. [130] Since in the case of real attacks “the events themselves [would] saturate…life most
intensely in their immediate proximity, through personal stories, physical reminders, and direct experiences,”[131] the usual explanatory factors for risk perceptions, such as demographics, are found to function merely as *moderators* of the more primal distance effect.[132] Thus, the terrorizing effects of terrorism are confined to the immediate vicinity of (perceived) targets. Health efforts to calm anxious populations may be better off focusing on those specific locations rather than on specific demographic groups as most people appear to be unaffected.

Concurrently other studies have highlighted people’s resilience against terrorism; that is, their ability to partially move beyond the fear-inducing effects of terrorism and restore the normalcy of everyday life.[133] This message is conveyed through studies suggesting that terrorism’s effect on people’s residential preferences and housing lets are only minor and mostly short-term. [134] It was also suggested that although terrorism decreases tourism, tourists simply relocate to less troubled vacation spots nearby.[135] Yet, it should not be doubted that terrorism significantly affects people in other ways, such as altering their daily routines, general welfare, and even safety, and geographical perspectives have helped to highlight how. When terrorists belong to a minority group, the resentment it produces is likely to result in discrimination and harassment of the implicated group, such as in public places like bus stops and shopping malls. Qualitative GIS visualization techniques have been used to show how this causes minorities to limit their time spent outside and change their routines to avoid certain areas of the city.[136] As such, the negative social effects may function mostly as a backfire effect against the terrorists’ own alleged constituents rather than at their intended targets.

Economic activity is another factor greatly affected by terrorism. Yet this impact may be considerably more local and less ominous than previously thought. H. Gong and K. Keenan demonstrated that the September 11th attacks, and worries that followed, entered into the locational considerations of financial firms in downtown New York as many were relocating to the suburbs. Yet this was mostly temporary and followed by a move back to the downtown area a few years later. In the process, these firms adopted new modes of decentralization and dispersal, initiating a break from the previously centralizing tendencies of globalization.[137] Although such shifts toward non-permanent, spread out, and duplicate offices of operation initially hurt business economics, management studies have also argued that doing so can provide the best resistance against the shocks of terrorist attacks.[138] In addition to changing the mindsets and behaviors of *existing* businesses, R. T. Greenbaum, L. Dugan, and G. LaFree showed in their disaggregated study of Italy that terrorism also scares away *new* business formations and expansions, but that this may be mostly limited to reducing employment and hurting the economy at the local level.[139] J. de Sousa, D. Mirza, and T. Verdier found that part of the economic damage actually is self-inflicted by the heightened security response of governments and the economic obstacle this poses to businesses, and that it is this security-business trade-off that tends to spread from the targeted country to its neighbors in a ripple wave of fear and security reactions.[140] Other research suggests that terrorism’s disruptive effects on local
economies are greater in regions that are already underdeveloped and poor, as N. Ocal and J. Yildirim found in their subnational study of Turkey.[141] While it appears that terrorism in the long run shrinks urban extents and urban land-use,[142] this may just as well be a result of counter-terrorism responses as argued in the critical literature. These findings suggest that while it seems clear that terrorism at least harms local economic activity, prior economic development seems to provide a partially protective shield against terrorism and that affected areas grow increasingly resilient against these damaging effects.[143]

Perhaps the direst consequence of terrorism is that it can influence a population’s political sympathies by “thrusting” political debates into apolitical spaces, thus creating politicized places, which initiates changes in the local political climate.[144] In cases where (reported) levels of terrorism are relatively low, as in China, it has been observed that spatial proximity to the attacks correlates with tolerance and understanding of terrorist grievances and less support for harsh counter-terrorism policies.[145] This fits with C. Berrebi and E.F. Klor’s finding that terrorism may solidify left-leaning voting behavior as long as it stays below a certain threshold.[146] However, once levels of terrorism escalate in frequency and intensity, local populations are driven towards the political right. Berrebi and Klor studied terrorism’s impact on local voter behavior in Israel and found that if the violence is sufficiently frequent voters shift towards the right in the hope that the right bloc will militarily root out the terrorists.[147] Similarly, in Turkey, A. Kibris found that attacks against security forces weakens the vote for the affected district’s ruling party and generally strengthens the vote for right-wing parties.[148] This has implications for national-level political dynamics during terrorist campaigns. Since terrorism tends to be spatially concentrated in certain parts of a country, the population will tend to be divided between those who are threatened and those who are safe. If, as suggested above, proximity to terrorism matters, we should therefore expect to see a polarization of political sympathies on the national scale, where the safe population turns leftist and the threatened population turns rightist.[149] This political polarization might be what explains how terrorism is sometimes used in peaceful settings with the intention for escalation into more widespread civil war, overthrow of the government, and large-scale social change.[150] Other politically detrimental effects of terrorism include how, as shown by GIS studies, patterns of past political violence and local climates of unrest may lower the threshold for resorting to terrorism and even inspire or motivate others to attack the same locations, thus influencing the locations of future terrorist tactics.[151] This is beginning to be accounted for in statistical studies, where the motivating effect of previous terrorist attacks on terrorist patterns at a given point in time can be separated and excluded from the effect exhibited by structural characteristics of the targeted areas and thus help in identifying and measuring the root causes of terrorism.[152]

Only three of terrorism’s many societal impacts have been mentioned here. The most dramatic impacts were noted for conflicts where the terrorists are territorially grounded. The political effects may prove to pose the greatest despair. By polarizing political climates in fragile
societies, and incurring invasive government security measures, terrorism shrinks the spatiality of everyday lives, mobility, opportunity, and cosmopolitan aspirations that we commonly associate with globalization and prosperity. Yet, in these same countries the marginal economic and social effects suggest some hope for surviving terrorism, especially where violence is more widespread yet better adapted and accustomed to. People, economic development, and globalization itself may be inherently adaptable and resilient against terrorism, suggesting a continuation of globalizing tendencies, resiliency, and hope. The various effects of territorial terrorism, then, somewhat keep each other in a balance that prevents its negative consequences from taking over. Ironically, people from highly developed and stable countries tend be more concerned about non-territorial terrorism, which appears to be the overall least dramatic and worrisome in terms of impacting societies. In either case, if there is one impact that both types of terrorism consistently have on societies, it is that they highlight the persistence of resiliency and cohesion in the targeted communities.

**Conclusion and Prospects for the Future**

This paper has traced the origins and recent appearance of geographical research on terrorism, and has shown how spatial perspectives contribute to our understanding of terrorism. Through the organizational framework of territoriality, three main topics were explored and their contributions highlighted. First, the specific geographies and root causes of terrorism were explored, suggesting that understanding the roots of terrorism requires a geographic attention to local-level failures of governance that may give rise to grievances and opportunities in terrorist “black spots” in both the developing and developed world. Second, although insider studies of terrorist groups have been conducted in the past, empirical studies from a spatial perspective can help construct a detailed spatial narrative of the attack cycle and therefore also ways to police and prevent specific attacks. Third and last, spatial perspectives can help in understanding that while terrorism has many negative impacts on society, these are spatially limited, and its other effects seem much less malevolent, so as to give hope for positive resilience since the negative impacts are spatially and temporally limited, identifiable, and potentially possible to mitigate. For each aspect, great differences were found between territorial and non-territorial related terrorism, suggested that future research should accept and be explicit about their focus on both these types of terrorism. Geographical research has been crucial for informing this framework.

In the beginning of this article it was noted that geographical perspectives in terrorism research remains highly unrecognized. Despite this, it appears that increasingly many scholars are beginning to notice, spread awareness, and encourage the future potential for using geographical perspectives and methods. Gary LaFree recently suggested that the future of terrorism research holds great prospects for “geospatial analysis” where descriptive point maps and advanced
computer analysis of spatial data could be useful avenues for future research. Emphasizing the crucial role of terrorist event databases to spatial analysis, he hinted that there should be a greater focus on “their spatial characteristics” as opposed to the more traditional focus on “their temporal characteristics.”[155] One group of researchers held a special seminar discussing the need for spatial data and analysis of terrorism.[156] The focus on geo-referenced datasets and GIS has indeed been at the core of many of the original methods and insights found in the geographical terrorism literature. Such data and methods have enabled greater attention to local factors and experiences. This, in turn, has led to more informed understandings of the terrorist system.[157]

By showing contributions from spatial perspectives and approaches to the study of terrorism, this article hopes to make terrorism scholars and others more aware of this considerable, and yet widely unknown, body of literature. Just like time and history, space and geography are quintessential aspects of our social world that cannot be ignored.[158] Given that conventional terrorism studies has been criticized and described by some critics as stagnant, and conducted largely from the perspectives of time and structure, we may better understand why space has recently been incorporated as a consideration in the study of terrorism. “War,” comedian Paul Rodriquez said, “is God's way of teaching us geography.”[159][160] While this was meant to be joke, the truth is that conflict drives research on people, places, and interactions. Scholars are likely to continue embracing geographical perspectives and providing original contributions in the study of terrorism. It would be greatly beneficial if these geographical contributions and perspectives are met, welcomed, and engaged with by the broader community of terrorist researchers.

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**Appendix I.** Selected terrorism datasets suitable for geo-referencing. Source: K. Bahgat and R.M. Medina.
Notes


[3] Only the most relevant journal articles, books, working papers, and organizational project reports relating to terrorism as a social phenomenon is included; the article is generally not concerned with other forms of publication or research pertaining to government counter-terrorism practices and issues.


[25] Examples of places offering courses on the geography of terrorism include Park University in Missouri, Texas A&M University, University of Utah, George Mason University, and Pennsylvania University. For detailed coverage of what goes on in one of these classes, see the recent online article by Jessica Folkema, “Interim: The Geography of Terrorism,” *Calvin College*, [http://www.calvin.edu/news/archive/interim-the-geography-of-terrorism](http://www.calvin.edu/news/archive/interim-the-geography-of-terrorism) (accessed June 12, 2011).


[30] Amidst a tide of humanist, structuralist, and feminist writings, an “outgrowth” of positivist geography called behavioral geography did continue to hold some sway but was focused mostly on how humans psychologically cognate and interpret space: Phil Hubbard, Rob Kitchin, Brendan Bartley, and Duncan Fuller, Thinking Geographically: Space, Theory and Contemporary Human Geography. New York: Continuum, 2002: 35.


[32] The figure is based on data representing journal articles collected by the authors during the search for literature while writing this paper. Journal articles were included in the ‘Geographers’ category if at least one of the authors had one of their degrees in geography, was affiliated with a geography department, or showed evidence of prior publications dealing with geography. Articles were excluded from chart if background information on author (s) could not be obtained. In determining whether an article belonged to the critical, empirical, or applied literature, a subjective comparison was made to each literature's distinctive characteristics, as they are described in this paper. Articles that seemed to overlap several of the categories were assigned to the one that it resembled the most.

[33] For instance, after reviewing existing terrorist/terrorism databases, Rossmo and Harries found their spatial precision to be inadequate for their purposes and had to circumvent the problem by obtaining geo-referenced terrorism data directly from the Turkish National Police. D. Kim Rossmo, and Keith Harries, “The Geospatial Structure of Terrorist Cells,” Justice Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2011): 221-48, 229.


[36] Examples include the important effects that the policies of national governments or global loaning institutions can have on the rise of terrorism in particular locales, as well as the broad focus necessary to understand and explain the wide reaches of transnational terrorism.


[55] While a host of geographical studies have looked at violence in Northern Ireland, very few of them have framed the violence as terrorism and are therefore not included in this article. See for instance: Michael Poole, "Has It Made Any Difference?: The Geographical Impact Of The 1994 Cease-Fire In Northern Ireland," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 3.


[68] This offers a solution to recent debates about whether to define terrorism in the action or the actor sense. For instance, the action-centered approach is defended by Findley and Young in response to Sanchez-Cuenca and De la Calle’s call for a more actor-centered approach: Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, "Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal Approach to a Conceptual Problem," Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (2012).

[69] Transnational terrorism is commonly thought of as terrorism that crosses national borders in one of several ways, including but not limited to: groups consisting of members from multiple nationalities and having goals that apply to entire regions or the entire globe; groups operating beyond the borders of their home-country; perpetrators and victims being from different countries regardless of the location of the attack; attacks on embassies; airplane hijackings, and so on. These criteria must be carefully selected when choosing a definition, because transnational terrorism is not a singular phenomenon; it can be divided into various sub-types ranging from regional, internationalized, and global. Cf.: Jaideep Saikia, and Ekaterina Stepanova (eds.), Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalization (New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2009).


the core of the world system is most frequent during times of hegemonic decline. Omar A. Lizardo, and Albert J. Bergesen, “Types of Terrorism by World System Location,” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 27, no. 2.


[94] Savitch and Ardashev found three groups of cities that were experiencing terrorism: those that were attacked from the outside for their global or regional status to gain publicity; those that had populations ready to be mobilized for violence, such as prisoners, unemployed, and people from segregated communities, as well as leaders with access to weaponry; and those that were poorly managed and failed to provide for large parts of their populations, thus creating substantial grievances that motivate some to resort to terrorism. It is the second and third group of cities that are interesting here since they focus on how cities can be the breeding ground and root cause of its own terrorism. However, the first group is of interest later in the article when the focus is on how some cities are the targets but not the cause of terrorism. H. M. Savitch and Grigory Ardashev, “Does terror have an urban future,” Urban Studies 38, no. 13 (2001). If cities cause terrorist-related grievances by bringing together socially diverse peoples, this may explain why a study on Turkey found the number of ethnic groups to be a predictor of terrorism at the provincial


[128] Such experimental work could potentially lead to useful solutions to the problem of missing data on the group perpetrator variable that is plaguing many terrorism event datasets. See: Joshua Hill, "Classification of Terrorist Group Events in the Philippines—Location, Location, Location," White Paper (The Institute for the Study of Violent Groups, Huntsville, Texas, 2010), http://www.academia.edu/232522/Classification_of_Terrorist_Group_Events_in_the_Philippines.-_Location_Location_Location accessed December 3, 2012.


[147] Ibid.


[150] Findley and Young mention this rationale and observe how in certain countries terrorism has been more frequent prior to and leading up to civil wars: Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, “Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal Approach to a Conceptual Problem,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (2012).


[157] This parallels Mary Parker Follett’s philosophy that greater understanding of the success of democracy hinges on greater attentiveness to the voices and experiences of local communities, and incorporating these into decision-making. Maria Veronica Elias, “Governance from the ground up: Rediscovering Mary Parker Follett,” Public Administration and Management 15, no. 1 (2010).


[160] The origin of this quote is unclear, but believed by some to be part of a comedy act by Paul Rodriguez in 1987. There seems to be no credible evidence that the quote is from Ambrose Bierce, who is also believed to be the originator of the quote. For further information please see http://www.ambrosebierce.org/notices.html (accessed December 19, 2012).
Conceptualising Terrorism Trend Patterns in Pakistan - an Empirical Perspective

by Muhammad Feyyaz

Abstract

Terrorism continues to be viewed conventionally in Pakistan. However, the phenomenon has assumed a structured formation driven by rational choice perspectives. This article attempts to identify distinct trends and patterns of terrorism within prevailing environments of Pakistan. In doing so, it also examines the validity of seasonality dimensions of routine activity theory (use of summer months and earlier days of week) for terrorist acts. Eight trends are identified tentatively. Using empirical data and analytical discourse, the findings confirm the assumed trends in terms of their typology, structure, operational system and rallying themes. In addition, the article finds support for the hypothesis of terrorism being a strategic approach rather than an ordinary form of violence. It is further found that changed patterns of violence warrant a revisiting of earlier assumptions regarding the applicability of routine activity theory within the Pakistani context. By implication, the study also suggests a variation of terrorism under different regime types, i.e. military or democratic.

Introduction

For more than a decade, Pakistan is in grip of rampant violence. The Taliban’s attack at Peshawar Airport on 15 December 2012 is a recent development in an ongoing wave of terrorism. While the history of violence in Pakistan spans several decades, the prevailing environment reveals the emergence of terrorism as a structured phenomenon driven by rational choice expectations. Conventional approaches and traditional mindsets that continue to view terrorism as a customary form of violence have prevented the growth of critical thinking which is essential to conceptually grasp and deal with the menace effectively. [1] This fact is evident from both the ritualism prevalent in political rhetoric in response to acts of terrorism as well as from the absence of epistemological rigour in much of the national terrorism scholarship. [2] Anthologies, books, monographs, policy papers and journal articles by Pakistani writers on terrorism in Pakistan abound but only few are substantively novel and painstakingly investigate roots and myths behind the current cauldron of violence.[3] One glaring weakness lies in examining the violence in cause and effect frameworks only. Being a-theoretical many authors fail to challenge the existing inertial discourse and the prevailing policy dispositions. Together with a few national writers (such as Moonis Ahmar, Muhammad Waseem, Abdul Siraj and Amir Rana,[4]) immigrant Pakistani academics (most notably Ishtiaq Ahmed, Tahir Abbas, Tahir Andrabi, Asim Khawaja,
Moeed Yousuf as well as others), have produced commendable publications on religious conflicts, seminars, radicalisation and political violence. But with the exception of Ishtiaq and Moeed, they have somehow either sparingly made Pakistan focus of their intellectual experimentation or have eschewed contextualized theorization of terrorism. [5]

A recent dissertation "Terrorism in Pakistan: Incident Patterns, Terrorists’ Characteristics, and the Impact of Terrorist Arrests on Terrorism" by US-based Ejaz Hussain measurably breaks new ground by utilizing insights from modern research paradigms.[6] His findings relate to temporal dimensions of routine activity theory i.e., trend, cycles and seasonality of terrorism in Pakistan. This dissertation is innovative, but already partly obsolete due to the rapid flux in the currents of violence.

Against this backdrop, the present article is a modest attempt to make a threefold contribution; (i) it builds and employs hypothesized thematic trends as the organizing lens to understand terrorism; (ii) it claims that in the wake of terrorism surfacing as a strategic tool, the routine activity postulate that held out vis-à-vis traditional forms of violence in the past is no longer applicable in its entirety;[7](iii), by implication of the above two, it suggests that terrorism in Pakistan shows a surge during military regimes compared with democratic civilian rule.

In this article, terrorism is defined as violent acts by religious, sectarian and nationalist non-state actors against unarmed civilians, law enforcement agencies including security forces, government officials, public leaders, journalists, civil society activists, foreigners and public infrastructure anywhere within Pakistan. In terms of methodology, the discourse initially encompasses identification of tentative trends by discerning, disaggregating and analytically locating empirical data relevant to each trend. A multidisciplinary approach has been followed in building themes of the trends, namely in terms of a human-political syndrome, infrastructural and criminalized warfare, regime and system’s change, normative-cultural, ideological-real politik anarchism, spatial conquests, non-seasonal and strategic. The findings conceptualise and categorically synthesize main contours of the discussion to ascertain the veracity of the hypothesized trends. Broadly, the research design is longitudinal in nature whereby the transformation of various dimensions of violence is analysed over time, covering the period between 2006 and mid-October 2012, a period bisected by three years of military and civilian rule respectively.

The article uses three components of time series i.e., trend analysis which is the long term movement in a series; the cycles that are regular non-seasonal fluctuations and seasonality which is a component of the series that is dependent on time of the year e.g., winter or summer months as well as week days.[8] Consequently, incidents, timelines (months and week days), locations (spatial distribution), methods, fatalities and cost effect are employed as indicators. This constitutes the analytical framework for the discussion. Incidents used are of two types: all terrorist acts regardless of the number of fatalities in order to determine human losses; and
second, those involving up to and beyond 15 fatalities per incident. These are denoted as High Casualty Terrorist Bombing (HCTB). Based on territorial and demographic size, socio-political significance and development profile, locations have been grouped into six categories, namely capital cities, major cities, medium cities, small cities, sizeable towns and remote areas, on a scale of 1-6 respectively. For example, an incident occurring at any one location is assigned a specified numerical value (e.g., a single incident in Islamabad or in a provincial capital has been coded as 1, and will be aggregated depending upon the number of total occurrences in other capital cities, if any). Three sources have been used for statistical data – those of the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) for the number of incidents, months and fatalities; those from the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) for fatalities and timelines (months, weekdays); and those from the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) for HCTB along with their locations. Other complementary sources have been used to plug quantitative gaps and tighten qualitative dimensions of terrorism.

Trend 1: Human and Political Syndrome

The trigger generating a new generation of violence was provided by a US-led drone strike on a religious seminary belonging to TNSM (Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi) in the village of Chenegai in Bajaur Agency. It took place on 30 October 2006 and killed up to 69 children, among a total of 80 civilians.[9] This attack set into motion a change in the existing paradigm of violence by heralding TNSM into an anti-state antagonism hitherto confined to strife in the sectarian milieu. The immediate suicidal retaliation took place on 6 November 2006 and led to the killing of 42 army recruits at Dargi training camp of the Punjab Regimental Centre of Pakistan’s Army located near Malakand Fort in KP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).[10] That was followed by the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) fiasco at Islamabad in July 2007. Intensified attacks by TNSM cadres and Tehrik-e-Taliban Swat (TTS) members resulted in huge losses of life as well as property. The Taliban, later TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) also joined hands. While thus far pursuing essentially an anti-government policy it also began to foment sectarian violence in Kurram Agency. In addition it also began engaging in discriminate killings of captured shia soldiers of the Frontier Corps (FC).[11] Apart from the unison operations by TNSM, TTS and TTP, a major impact on the evolving scenario was thronging in the ranks of Taliban and TNSM by sunni zealots from LeJ (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) as well as fanatics (both male as well as females) from among common and tribal citizenry. Some independent groups also emerged. For example, in October 2006, Pakhtun militants who fought against the US-led invasion of Afghanistan formed a new anti-Shia militant organization led by Mufti Ilyas and Hazrat Ali of Darra Adam Khel. It had no links with other militant groups, including the banned LeJ; it became active in Quetta, Karachi and other major cities in Pakistan.[12] Afridi Taliban led by Commander Tariq Afridi started an identical anti-shia campaign in Darra Adam Khel by targeting shias commuting between Peshawar and Kohat.
Generally, however, sectarianism even though involving new actors, remained a subtext of the main trend. Unlike in the past when language and sectarian motivations explained about 70% of terrorism in Pakistan,[13] sectarianism now accounted only 4.96 percent of the total fatalities (1850 out of 37226 victims) from 2006 until 2011.[14] A study by Junaid Bhatti and his group for the period from 2002 to October 2009 assessing ‘epidemiological patterns of suicide terrorism in the civilian population of Pakistan’ based on 198 events empirically established the yearly shifting trend of attack targets from foreigners (in 2002) and sectarian (between 2003-2005) to government functionaries, general public or security forces (in the period 2006-2009) (Figure I). [15]

*Figure 1 – Variations in Targets*

![Variations in Targets](image)

*Source: International Journal of Injury Control and Safety Promotion, September 2011*

From 2006 onwards security forces were targeted consistently; a trend that reached a high mark during 2009 followed by the victimization of the general public. However, attacks on public installations (mosques, etc.) or political gatherings resulted in a significantly greater number of deaths (22 vs. 8) and injuries (59 vs. 24) per event compared with security installations.[16] The year 2009 was the most destructive in which all types of targets were attacked by suicidal terrorists throughout the country. The incidents vis-à-vis fatalities correlation was proportionate in case of civilians and inverse involving attacks against security forces; this was possibly due to
the protective profile of the latter. A hindsight perspective of terrorism cycles over the last 34 years is captured in Figure II; it helps to understand the trend and character of contemporary human-centric and political violence in Pakistan.

The last cycle shows an extraordinary rise at the end of the graph, indicating the beginning of a very powerful cycle.[17] It peaked in 2009 as mentioned earlier but has undergone a downward trend ever since (Figure III), indicated by a 24 percent decrease in violence during 2010-2011. [18]

Figure II- Trends and cycles in number killed and wounded

Source: Terrorism in Pakistan: Incident Patterns,
Auto regression in yearly terms of incidents and fatalities does not provide any intelligible correlation due to fluidity of environment (Figure IV).

Source: PIPS, South Asia Terrorism Portal

Terrorists’ Characteristics and the Impact of Fatalities data up to 14 October 2012

Terrorist Arrests on Terrorism
For example, during 2009, the mean average of daily fatalities was 32 lives lost, each incident causing in the average four deaths in that year. The same pattern can be identified during 2006-7 and in 2011. On the whole, the yearly trend is sustained nowhere, while cycles fluctuated with far more frequency in weeks than in months compared to the last 34 years where such pattern formation could be clearly detected. Systemically the terrorism campaign during 2006-2009 aimed at creating conditions for anarchy leading to civil war in the country through widespread fear and panic in society by trivializing the government in the eyes of masses.

**Trend II: Infrastructural and Criminalized Warfare**

In addition to heightening violence, the Lal Masjid episode of July 2007 in Islamabad marked the advent of another mode of warfare by the Taliban – the economic and infrastructural terrorism mainly in Swat but also in suburbs of Peshawar, Nowshera and Mardan. TTP, TTS, Al-Qaeda, and several leading Pakistani mullahs used the Lal Masjid incident (which cost the lives of 154 people, including 70 militants, and triggered the Third Waziristan War) to instigate an armed uprising against the Pakistani state. ‘Zawahiri used its storming by the Pakistani Army as a rallying cry to fight the US-backed Pakistan government and its military’. [19] During the active period of conflict spanning over 21 months in Swat, education, farming and tourism sectors bore the main brunt and suffered widespread devastation. After the imposition of the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation in April 2009, around 4,000 schools providing education to over 40,000 girls were
shut down in Swat.[20] About 8% (i.e., 427 out of 5,347) facilities in KP that included schools, educational residences and hostels, were damaged; of which 237 were completely damaged and 190 were partially damaged. These included 149 completely and 66 partially damaged girls' schools. The total damage was estimated at Rs 2,696 million (US $ 27.9 million).[21] In terms of physical infrastructure, 5,934 housing units were destroyed and 7,280 were damaged to varying degrees; damage to housing stock was the highest in the Swat District. In the energy sector, the total damages amounted to Rs. 2,406 million (US $ 24.9 million). Major damage was also done to the immovable assets and stocks of the Peshawar Electrical Supply Company (PESCO). The direct damages were estimated at Rs. 769 million (US $ 7.7 million) whereas indirect losses (revenue loss during the crisis period) were estimated to be Rs. 1,045 million (US $ 10.8 million). In effect, all main resources of revenue in the affected areas were hurt, including agriculture, tourism industry, manufacturing and small-scale industry. Pakistan thus not only lost precious lives and infrastructure; according to official estimates, it also suffered a loss of around US $ 35-40 billion between 2001 and 2009 – a figure that has now risen to around US $ 78 billion.[22] Broadly speaking, the degradation and destruction of physical infrastructure cost $ 1.72 billion between 2001/02 and 2010/11.[23]In Balochistan the warfare on infrastructures is carried out against selected targets of national importance such as electricity supply lines, grid stations, gas fields, railway tracks etc. Dera Bugti, Kech, Panjgur, Jaffarabad and Naseerabad continued to remain common target locations of these attacks. Figure V shows a more or less consistent pattern of intensity since 2006, barring the year 2010. The entire campaign aims at destroying the economic potential of the country.
Figure V - Attacks on the Quetta Electric Supply Company (QESCO), Sui Gas and Railway Installations: 2005 - 2011

Source: Home Department, Govt. of Balochistan March 2012

Rarely witnessed in the history of armed conflicts in Pakistan, the economic motivation became in recent years a key feature in the terrorist campaign. Almost simultaneously, as the anti-state jihad appeal found a considerable constituency among part of the youth, the violence paradigm began to overlap with crime. As Col. R. Killebrew put it: “Not only that terrorism and crime merged, partly turning religious entities into criminal organizations to fund their operations, expand their reach -- and make the people on top extremely rich, lower-level zealots continued to be recruited for suicide and ordinary missions.”[24]In addition to the criminal generation of revenue by TTP in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) from multiple sources, the TTS under Fazal-u-ullah alone accumulated rents to the tune of Rs. 708.6-819.6 million (US $ 7.34-8.49) between November 2007 and May 2009 through extortions.[25]The violence was turned into a market commodity and its perpetrators transformed from rebels into conflict entrepreneurs. This rent seeking behavior has refused to go away; its perpetuation nonetheless has suffered considerably since the military operations in Swat and FATA.
Trend III: Regime and System’s Change

The years 2006 to 2009 were significant in witnessing another change in the targeting philosophy of terrorist actors. Several symbolic targets were hit during this time. Apart from the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, these included a suicidal blast at a meeting venue of Ifitkhar Mohammad Chaudhry, the Chief Justice of Pakistan, and Chaudhry Aitaz Ahsan, the leader of the lawyers movement (July 2007), the killing of General Mushtaq, surgeon general of the Pakistan Army (February 2008), a sniper’s attack on the cavalcade of former Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani (September 2008) and a raid at the parade lane Mosque at Rawalpindi during Friday prayers, collaterally killing and injuring high level personalities such as Major-General Bilal and the retired General Muhammad Yousuf respectively (December 2009).[26] Heads of mainstream political parties were not spared either: notably Asfandyar Wali (Oct 2008), the central president of the Awami National Party, Aftab Ahmed Sherpao (December 2007), head of Pakistan People’s Party Sherpao Group and Amir Muqam, a prominent leader of the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (November, 2007). Later, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, head of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam- Fazal (JUI-F), Maulana Noor Muhammad Wazir, Maulana Merajuddin (former members of parliament from South Waziristan Agency of JUI-F), the Governor and Chief Minister (CM) of Balochistan were targeted by the Taliban, BLA (The Baloch Liberation Army) and LeJ.[27] Almost all of these terror operations (less the attacks on Rehman, parliamentarians, Governor and CM Balochistan) were planned and executed under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the TTP until his death in a drone strike in August 2009.

Trend IV: Normative-Cultural Terrorism

Several incidents like military operations in tribal areas between 2006 and 2009, in the Swat region during May 2009 and kinetic strikes by Pakistan’s Air Force and CIA-drones in FATA stimulated conditions for retaliation by armed non-state organizations. The killing of Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009 was the principal trigger that brought fore a normative or cultural factor spawning heightened violence. The motive of TTP was transformed from usurpation of power envisioned by Baitullah Mehsud to avenging the death of the fallen leader, retaliation against Operation Rah-e-Nijat 2009 and the drone attacks. Energized by the notion of ‘badal’ (revenge), war was being waged by the Taliban not as an ideological contest but rather as score settling-regardless who the victims are, whether in or outside FATA.[28]

TNSM, TTP and TTS all have their origin embedded in pakhtun culture which is inspired by Pakhtunwali, a societal code of conduct that governs the whole array of social life of Pathans and more specifically of tribesmen. It is their informally binding and socially guiding framework. Among others, ‘the central term in Pakhtunwali is nang: honour and shame, dignity, courage and bravery’[29], and badal (the right of blood feuds, revenge or vendetta) is its operationalised
form. Proverbially, it is said that “He is not a Pakhtun [sic] who does not give a blow for a pinch.”[30] Almost in all agencies of FATA, Swat, Dir, Frontier Regions of FATA, [31]outstanding individuals (i.e. tribal leaders, heads of anti-Taliban militia, government functionaries, journalists, clergy), groups, clans or tribes opposed to the Taliban ideology as well as those suspected as government supporters or as spies for extra-regional forces deployed in Afghanistan, were subjected to arbitrary public executions, assassinations, tortured deaths, enmasse assaults, suicidal attacks, ambushes etc.[32] The TTP attack on the Mehran Naval base in Karachi on 22 May 2011 and the one on the Kamra airbase on 17 August 2012 were meant to avenge the deaths of Osama bin Laden and Baitullah Mehsud.[33] Similarly, several other instances exemplify this trend e.g., the raid at parade lane Mosque allegedly carried out by TTP Punjab chapter was primarily meant to kill the son of the former Corps Commander Peshawar Lieutenant General Masud Aslam. The same applies to the attempt on the life of Aftab Sherpao during March 2012 as payback for supporting operations in the Orakzai agency as were suicidal bombings against renegade Taliban commanders, targeted killings of journalists from leading national dailies and TV channels (the News, the Nation, Frontier Post, Daily Pakistan, Ausaf, Khyber News Agency, Geo, Express, Waqt TV) in Swat and FATA, the near assassination of the brave young girl Malala in Swat on 9 October 2012 by the Taliban, routine ambushes of NATO convoys etc.[34] In a similar retaliatory strike at Quetta during September 2011, 25 persons were killed and 40 others received injuries in two attacks by suicide bombers at the residence of the Deputy Inspector General of FC, Brigadier Shahzad to avenge the deaths of three central Asian citizens targeted by FC a few months ago.[35] TTP claimed responsibility for this ferocious action in which the brigadier’s wife was killed at point blank range.[36] A distinct feature of this vendetta mindset can be observed in the now almost customized retaliatory strikes of militants following drone attacks or major military operations by Pakistan’s Army as well as by paramilitary forces.

**Trend V: Ideological and Realpolitik Anarchism**

Compared to late 1990s and beginning of the current decade, both the terrorist ideology and its ideologues have been replaced with a new generation of proponents and leadership, with each propagating his own creed. TTP erstwhile a purely mono-ethnic group, now blends elements from other nationalities such as Punjabi, Seraiki, Kashmiri, Baloch and Urdu-speaking operatives who are managing regional setups in each province with quasi-central command under Hakimullah Mehsud. Splinter groups from Kashmir-focused militant organizations (like Lashkar-e-Taiba as well as Jaish-e-Muhammad - JeM) have cut off ties with their parent organizations, calling them puppets of state agencies; they have developed a relationship with Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.[37] Because of that nexus, the narrative of the Punjabi sectarian groups changed to include regional
and international politics. Some writers argue that “JeM and LeJ are now subsumed in TTP” while others take a more cautious line by calling this a “coming together of the major Sunni radical groups in ways that are far more dangerous and far more threatening than they were two or three years ago”. [38] Samina Ahmed from the International Crisis Group, however, opines that “[t]hese groups have their separate identities and goals which could be local, regional and trans-regional, but there is a close alliance relationship and there is a flow of everything from funding to training to recruitment and methodology.” [39]

Rebecca Winthrop and Corinne Graff are also of the view that drawing sharp distinctions between these militant factions in Pakistan has become more difficult due to the growing number of links between them: Al Qaeda now provides support to sectarian factions carrying out attacks within Pakistan; some Kashmiri militants operate in Afghanistan and have participated in other international conflicts; and traditionally sectarian groups are increasingly supportive of the Taliban’s efforts to take over or assume control of local government structures through “Talibanization.” [40] Reportedly a large number of militants from Punjab-based sectarian outfits have in recent years revived contacts or joined hands for the first time with Afghan groups and are inciting sectarianism in Afghanistan. [41] Killing of at least 55 Shia Muslims on 6 December 2011 in a suicide bombing at a crowded Kabul shrine and another four in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif by Pakistani militant outfit-Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al Almi epitomizes this newly found alliance. [42]

Moreover, within FATA, changes have been phenomenal in terms of growth of militant organisations. Amir Rana, an expert on religious movements in Pakistan, claims over 100 militant and Taliban groups and foreign terrorist networks are now operating in and from the tribal areas of Pakistan, while there were only 26 during 2009. [43] Previously, Taliban militants in Khyber, Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat were influenced by Panjpiri Salafism [44]. The groups led by late Baitullah Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadar and Maulvi Nazir Ahmed in North and South Waziristan agencies followed a Pashtun version of the Deobandi school of thought, under political patronage of JUI-F. Even though both these streams are guided by varied sources of belief, worshiping ‘God alone and God direct’ (Tauheediat) provided a confluence for cooperation. Subsequently, their monotheistic thought relented in the face of two competing dynamics, integration and fragmentation, triggered by in-fighting, sustained military operations and realpolitik considerations. The resultant broad amalgam of TTP and Salafists by allegiance to a mutually inclusive cause(s) has impacted on the Deobandi narrative of TTP to integrate theological elements of Ahle hadit, Wahabis, Hanblis, Salafis and of late somewhat of barelvis which is evident from the assassination of Shahbaz Bhatti, the Minister of State on Minority Affairs.

On the other hand, Deobandi Taliban and militant factions broke away into splinters to embrace particularistic tendencies. Several of the renegade cadres of TTP and those from Waziri groups have engaged in intra-Deobandi violence. This is evident from continuous violent attacks by
unknown networks from within the ranks of the Taliban against JUI-F generally known for its pro-Taliban disposition.[45] The primary cause triggering this opposition is ascribed to JUI’s becoming part of the government, supporting military operations in Swat and FATA, as well as its alleged engagement with the United States for its efforts to restore peace in Afghanistan. [46] From 2008 forward dozens of JUI-F leaders have been killed. Besides, there are numerous cell-centric outfits, almost amorphous and unknown to each other, operating rather on individualistic impulses and theological interpretations that have only a nominal association with major terrorist organizations; these accept no central authority.[47] This indicates not only a splintering among main militant organizations -which is a further cause of societal instability - but also the formation of new groupings motivated either by hate against their traditional political supporters or in search of a new jihadi agenda in Pakistan. Structurally, this ideological-cum-organisational transformation can be conceptualized as institutionalized franchise formation of terrorism within and across Pakistan.

In a similar way, madrassahs have generally been mapped as recruitment centres for potential militants. A trend previously confined to FATA and Swat is now replicating in mainstream Pakistan wherein madrassahs are emerging as a source of glamorized social status and political power afforded to relatively young religious leaders commissioning from the madrasahs. This religious leadership, Saeed Shafqat argues, is ‘not necessarily well-versed in religious scholarship but is enthusiastic in instrumentalising Islam by increasingly becoming assertive and uncompromising in projecting their own form of Shari’a’.[48] Deteriorating socio-economic and political conditions have created opportunity structures in the form of meta-securitization contexts for neo-Islamists eager to replace state and political elites. Joshua White’s thesis based on patterns of Islamist response to the Lal Masjid crisis, that “the line between persuasive and compulsive Islamism is likely to remain blurred in Pakistan for some time”, has now by and large crystallised.[49] Not only the Malala episode but the warning by the Wifaqul Madaris-all Deobandi confederation of seminaries, issued in Karachi to the MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement- United National Movement) during October 2012 to stop it from prying into their madrassahs to know who was studying there is a robust indicator of the change which, was the first time ever that the Wifaq was ominously challenging the MQM in a physical showdown in Karachi.[50]

Moreover, a new secular-religious nexus has also emerged in the past few years to further a common agenda – the collapse of the state of Pakistan. The convergence of the LeJ Balochistan chapter, followed by the Iran-based “Jundullah’s “Soldiers of God”…alliance with BLA and TTP is a case in point.[51]In its entirety, the depicted scenario likens to a veneer constituted by a classical ideological and power politics anarchy – a situation that offers opportunities but also more challenges.
**Trend VI: Spatial Conquests**

In terms of space, after entrenching itself firmly in FATA, the reach of terrorist groups gradually expanded to adjacent settled areas (southern districts of KP) into its hinterland; later they engulfed all major and medium size urban centres of the country. This trend persisted from 2006 until 2009 and then experienced a reversal now confined mainly to remote areas and sizeable towns (FATA, Swat, smaller districts of KP and Balochistan). Figure VI (suicidal violence only) depicts the origin of spatial patterns from 2002 until 2009. Barring an exceptional incidence at Jhal Magsi in Balochistan, it shows a territorial sprawl (blackened, grayish and light grayish shaded) with FATA as the epicenter, spreading northeast (Hangu, Kohat), east (Bannu, Charsadda, Mansehra, Bhatgram), southeast (Islamabad, Sialkot), south-southeasterly (Lucky Marwat, D.I.Khan, Rawalpindi, Chakwal, Sargodha, Faisalabad, Lahore), concomitantly enfolding Quetta and southern Balochistan (Kalat, Khuzdar, Lasbela). After the attack on French engineers during May 2002, Sindh escaped suicidal bombing for long time.

*Figure VI – Spatial Patterns of Terrorism 2002-2009*

Source: *International Journal of Injury Control and Safety Promotion, September 2011*

The evolving pattern becomes more transparent in Figure VII.
It appears that three types of locations, situated on extreme ends of the spatial spectrum, have constantly been visited by terrorists - capital cities, sizeable towns and remote areas. These were least attacked during 2006, simmered during 2007 and recorded marked violence during 2009-10. Intensity however, decreased after 2010 in capital cities while it is now stabilising in remote regions and escalating in sizeable towns which include various locations in FATA and the districts of KP. In numerical terms, highlighted figures in Table 1 also form this pattern, besides indicating geographical to and fro flow of terrorism in Pakistan. During this period, major cities (Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Mardan, Multan) were engaged intermittently, with Rawalpindi witnessing repeated incidences of HCTB (five times from 2007-2009). During 2009 all categories received heavy punishment except a few remote areas and sizeable towns, indicating relative calm in FATA and enhanced concentration in urbanized terrain. Seemingly, KP and Swat in particular appeared as the foremost targets for conquest, leading to subsequent establishment of Taliban control.
Table 1 - Civilian Casualties 2007- May 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>KP</th>
<th>FATA</th>
<th>Balochistan</th>
<th>Sindh/ Karachi</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Islamabad</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1319</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>1580</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>483</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>1580</td>
<td>1580</td>
<td>483</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>483</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>1580</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>4491</td>
<td>8110</td>
<td>4478</td>
<td>7589</td>
<td>4478</td>
<td>7589</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies 2012
**Trend VII: Non-Seasonal Terrorism**

Scholars have subscribed to routine activity theory in order to explain the increase in crime in summer months, attributing it to the availability of more outdoor victims due to good weather and longer daytime hours. Ejaz tested and validated this theoretical postulate by drawing upon data of seasonal (months and week days) distribution of terrorism incidents in Pakistan from 1974-2007 (Figure VIII).[52] Apart from locating maximum terrorist activities during summer season, (May until October), he found Monday being the leading day for terrorism in Pakistan, with 20% of all incidents, followed by 15% on Sunday, 14% on Saturday 14% while Friday recorded the lowest number of incidents i.e., 11%. Friday is the day of peace, rest, and prayers for Muslims; it remained a weekly holiday in Pakistan for many years. Ejaz further noted that since private citizens and the government institutions as preferred targets for making victims, are available less on holidays therefore, the choice of Monday by terrorists makes sense: due to being the first day of the week, more activity is expected.[53] By implication, a correlation is suggested between summer months and earlier days of the week, thereby endorsing routine activity assumption within temporal spheres. These are indeed novel but plausible findings.

However, the scene of violence in Pakistan during the period 2006-2012 makes this construction of seasonality somewhat suspect. Different and sometimes vague patterns emerge when terrorist incidents are studied in temporal terms, spatial contexts or from a spatio-temporal perspective. For example, the winter months (February and March) of 2012 saw hectic terrorist activity in Pakistan, dropping in April and then marginally rising in May (Figure IX). The number of fatalities was substantially higher in February, moderately higher in March but not significantly less in April.
Figure VIII – Monthly Distribution of Terrorist Incidents 2012

Source: Terrorism in Pakistan: Incident Patterns
In the year 2011, except for Karachi, all other provinces experienced heightened terrorist activity during the winter months (February to March). Balochistan, a relatively cold region, maintained a consistent profile in the first five months of the year (Table 2). In earlier years i.e., during 2009, the month of April was the most violent one, with 55 terrorist and operational attacks in Balochistan. For the year 2008, barring minor variations, no let up is observed in the recorded violence during all the winter months (Table 2).[54]
Table 2 – Terrorist Attacks in Balochistan 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Security Report 2008
Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies

The above, somewhat transactional (annual-cum-regional) perspective assumes a different graphical configuration when the data of the last seven years are holistically synthesized. (Figure X).
However, when identified in terms of more intense months, it becomes clear that the activity is spread unevenly across summer and winter months i.e., March, April, Jan in 2006; Oct, Nov, Dec in 2007; Jan, August, Sep, Oct and Nov in 2008; Jan, Feb, May, June, Oct and Nov 2009; Jan, March, April, May, June, July in 2010; Jan, March, April, May, June, July, Aug, Nov 2011 and Jan, Feb, March, May, Jun, Aug 2012. In essence, March, May, July, Aug and Nov stand out prominently as the seasonal entities experiencing the most intense terrorist activity in a year (Figure XI).
Five winter months, i.e., January, February, March, November and December have seen no less than 2,500 incidents each during all these years. This makes the notion of climatic seasonality nearly redundant. The data reflect a provisional shift in earlier seasonal patterns of terrorism established by Ejaz. When compared to the past, where the monthly baseline remained at 216 incidents per month (total 2,590); in the present case this base line has risen upto 3,535 incidents (out of a total of 42,423). A possible explanation for this change is the increased armed confrontation between government and non-state forces as well as the presence and role played by extra regional dynamics (NATO intervention in Afghanistan) in this escalation. In addition, none of the embattling regions lie in snow-bound terrain, affording equal spatial mobility to the warring sides. To ascertain pattern of terrorists’ engagement in the course of the week, four years (2009-2012) worth of data of terrorist on incidents, broken down by weekdays, were extracted from SATP (Figure 11). The analysis indicates that most terrorist attacks were carried out on a Thursday followed by Monday, Friday, Saturday and Wednesday with Tuesday and Sundays receiving least attention.

Source: Author’s compilation

A comparison of week day terrorism of the study referred to above and fresh data points towards a major shift in the selection of days for terrorist action (Table 3).
Thursday and Friday being days of large scale visits to shrines and prayers respectively, are a rationale choice for terrorists wishing to produce mass casualties. Tuesday does not show any variation vis-à-vis Sunday which now has the lowest priority with the militants. In fact, Sunday has been a holiday for many decades, with Friday being a holiday only during the military rule of Zia (Friday was discontinued as a holiday by the government of Nawaz Sharif on 23rd February 1997). The presented data belie Friday’s significance as a day of peace. Instead, the incidence profile reveals Friday as an important day to hit a larger number of human beings at prayer time, partly also to seek divine providence. During 2012 alone Thursdays and Fridays in Pakistan have seen more suicidal bombings than the first days of the week.[55] Both spatial as well as temporal analysis of terrorist campaigns reveal clear preferences.

**Trend VIII: Strategic Terrorism**

A further development as an evolved variant of the infrastructural warfare is the degradation of the strategic capability of the Armed Forces and the tarnishing of the national image of Pakistan. Several incidents can be interpreted in this way. First, this trend could be witnessed during the sophisticated assaults at Islamabad’s Marriott Hotel (“Pakistan’s 9/11”), during the ambush of the Sri Lankan cricket team, the attacks on Lahore’s Police Academy and at the GHQ.[56] Subsequently, the attacks on the Mehran naval air base and the Kamra air base against AWACKs (Airborne Warning and Control System) operated by the Pakistan Air Force can be seen as part of such a rationale. Some writers have explained Kamra attack as a demonstration of righteousness by the TTP.[57] This weird assessment lacks credibility for two reasons; first, no Pakistani would approve of any organization or entity howsoever religious to take on national assets, and second, TTP would be least interested in proving its so-called righteousness by
selecting a target which symbolizes pride of an Islamic country, maintained against the arch
enemy India.

In almost all these instances planning innovation and stealth tactics synchronized in time and
space has been demonstrated by the terrorist attackers; they outwitted the electronic warning
systems and overcame the physical barriers erected at these facilities and installations. Most of
the attacks were carried out by Punjabi militants - a characteristic feature of their experiential
prowess gained in Indian-held Kashmir against Indian security forces (Pakhtun fighters are more
adept at tribal warfare which is characterized by more simple military tactics).

Conclusions
Terrorism has touched every aspect of national life in Pakistan. Critically observed, the entire
spectrum of violence has been multi-faceted and multilateral in nature, graduating from lower to
upper rungs on the ladder of escalation in a calculated, calibrated and efficient manner. The
targets included humans (ordinary people and key functionaries) as well as institutional,
organizational, infrastructural and material assets. The levels touched reaches from sub-tactical
(citizenry) to tactical (infrastructure), from operational (police, FC, army) to strategic
(leadership, defence assets, strategic organizations, state organs). In temporal domains, an
unrestrained impetus is visible in the series of recorded violent incidents. The observed trends
authoritatively contextualize these manifestations. While varied in its structure, operational
system and rallying themes, both state and society of Pakistan have been the terrorists’ ultimate
objective, posing an existential threat to their survival. The typology suggested at the beginning
of this article turned out to be a valid heuristic tool.

In conceptual terms, terrorism can be expressed through eight narratives: (i) as expression of
religious constructions; (ii) as a protest and rallying symbol (ideological); (iii) as instrument of
policy (political); (iv) as violent criminal behavior (organized crime); (v) as a warfare implement
(spatiotemporal swathe); (vi) as propaganda tool (visual warfare through media); (vii) as
vengeance (norm); and (viii) as vigilantism (state functionalism).

Trend persistency depends on extra-systemic interventions or dynamics such as policy initiatives
by government to mitigate and manage the conflict or lack of it, or changed scenarios in
Afghanistan and Iran. With minimal variations and adjustments, all trends are likely to endure for
the present except Trend II which has considerably lost its original steam, and Trend V which is
still evolving.

Randomness than certainty, is the hallmark of spate of violence in Pakistan. Time patterns i.e.,
trends, cycles and, seasonality do not offer themselves to linear determinism. Precepts of good
weather and longer hours in general and week days’ sequential pattern of terrorism has not been
established, warranting further enquiry. Auto regression in ideal sense thus is handicapped given
fluid nature of violence. Suggestion made at the outset about inapplicability of routine theory is largely supported by cited evidence.

What has, however, emerged is a widespread alienation of the masses of people from the Taliban. There is a discernable unanimity with regard to the fight against terrorism among polity and public alike, something that was missing under the dictatorship. This has legitimized the use of the military instrument under civilian control, has created its popular ownership, checked its undemocratic use and has brought non-military stakeholders into conflict resolution deliberations. However, a historical review will be required to generalize with regard to military versus democratic rule in terms of its impact on terrorism. That apart, the institutionalized franchise formation of terrorism identified in this article portends a response dilemma for policy and decision-making hierarchies.

While all above forms of terrorism are comprehensible to an extent, the trend (VIII) about the destruction of vital national assets is perplexing. Ideologues like Ayman al-Zawahiri regard the strategic assets of Pakistan important to furthering their own vision. He dreams of a future jihad encompassing the southern Russian Republics, Iran, Turkey, and wants to unite a nuclear Pakistan with the gas-rich Caspian region to form a powerful base serving jihad.[58] The America-Israel and Indian nexus figures prominently in Zawahiri’s discourse titled “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner”. [59] In addition to Chechnya and Afghanistan, Kashmir and Pakistan with its nuclear programme occupy key places in his narratives as they can serve as counterweight to the US-Israel nexus.[60] Paradoxically however, the attack on Pakistan’s naval air base was construed by many as a punitive strike to avenge death of Osama bin Laden by Al-Qaida.

This setting projects three possibilities. First, TTP has outsourced its expertise to a state inimical to Pakistan which is evident from the type of target selection, degradation of which is least beneficial to Taliban. Secondly, it is probable (and more likely) that the present leadership of TTP having lost its organizational sting, is discreetly colluding with elements within Al Qaeda. For it to materialize, it is imperative that Zawahiri should no more be in effective command of Al Qaeda, and its leadership lay into multiple power centres consisting of foreign elements sympathetic to those who lost their lives in FATA as a result of US drone strikes. It is also possible that it signals a shifting in the agenda of Al Qaeda—a shift away from South and Central Asia to the Arab world and North Africa where the current turmoil caused by the Atab Awakening can be exploited. [61] Almost all statements by Ayman al-Zawahiri since 2011 focused on the Arab Spring[62] and he is urging volunteers to fight in Syria. As a result, TTP has become totally autonomous in articulating violence. A third and less likely possibility is that Gul Bahadur, commander of the Taliban in North Waziristan has jumped in since he will be the most affected party in case of new military campaign. That said, all of these possibilities are debatable.
This article has tried to demonstrate that some traditional modes of addressing the issue of terrorism are outdated. Due to the advent of a new generation of ideologues, militant leadership and a variety of terrorist organizations and networks, the security landscape of Pakistan is unlikely to change for the better in the near future. An innovative and context-sensitive response to national security challenges in Pakistan is called for. The strengthening of democratic institutions, good governance as well as the development of a home-grown epistemology of terrorism analysis are imperative to bring the country closer to a secure peace from within and without.

About the Author: Muhammad Feyyaz is a faculty member at the University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Pakistan.

Notes


Ibid, see 29-30 for details on activity theory.

Ibid, see 19 for detailed explanation of time series.


*Fidayeen* (Suicide Squad) Attacks in Pakistan, 2006 (serial 6), *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, [http://www.satp.org/satporgt/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgt/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm)

FC (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) is a federal paramilitary force with its headquarters located at Peshawar. It guards Pak-Afghan border in addition to its participation in counter terrorism operations alongside the army.


Syed Ejaz Hussain, 23.


[16] Ibid.


[21] ADP&WB, “Pakistan NWFP & FATA: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment-Immediate Restoration and Medium Term Reconstruction in Crisis Affected Areas,” FATA Secretariat, November 2009. All US $ values have been calculated on the basis of the exchange rate valid as of 8 December 2012.


[31] Areas between the settled districts of KP and FATA are called frontier region (FR), divided into six such segments.


100

February 2013


[37] Zia Ur Rehman, “Punjab's sectarian outfits find new friends in FATA and Kabul”, Friday Times, August 31-September 06, 2012, XXIV, no. 29.


[41] Zia Ur Rehman.

[42] Ibid.


[44] Pangpiri salafism is a local variant of Deobandis originating from Pangpir village of Swabi District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. They are another hardliner group who believe and manifest muscle power in imposition of strict code of Islam, propounded by their innovator, Maulana Panjpir who was educated at Deoband during pre-partition period.


[46] Ibid.


[52] Hussain, Syed Ejaz.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Data has been calculated on the basis of the annual security reports of 2008, 2009 and 2011, as published by PIPS (Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies), Islamabad.


[57] Arif Rafiq.


II. Research Notes

Sources and Information in Academic Research: Avoiding Mistakes in Assessing Sources for Research and during Peer Review

by Tom Quiggin

The credibility of academic publications has come under attack in a variety of circumstances. Newspaper headlines such as “Scientific fraud is rife[1]” and “McGill University finds scientists published ‘falsified’ images[2]” are not helpful in maintaining the credibility of the academic community. Additionally, a cottage industry appears to be growing in websites that specialize in identifying papers which publishers have been forced to retract.[3] The website Retraction Watch has identified one case in which a publisher has retracted 172 papers from one author and may eventually retract 183 papers in total. The website Copy Shake and Paste makes a series of references to PhD dissertations and professorial habilitations which have been questioned or rescinded due to plagiarism. [4] One of the PhDs in question was written by a German Minister of Education and Research.[5]

A responsibility comes with publishing papers in the academic community. The papers can shape the views of the individuals that read them and will – on occasion – be used in official proceedings such as during court room trials or in commissions of inquiry. Academic credibility also comes into play in the public realm when academics give media interviews or appear before governmental committees.

Preserving the credibility of research into issues related to terrorism and national security can be especially daunting for academics. In addition to all of the normal problems with source reliability, the various governmental agencies involved often have an obsession with secrecy, making information difficult to confirm. Interviews from those who have played a role in a terrorism or national security cases can often be tainted by their beliefs or actions. Government agencies and groups may have agendas which they are willing to advance by providing ‘off the record’ briefings to the unsuspecting or willingly naive academic researcher.

Given these problems, how should forthright academic researchers go about assessing the reliability of their sources and the information upon which they base their research product? The problem can be especially difficult when faced with information coming from websites on the Internet. Was the website you are considering using in a footnote created by a reliable source based on credible information, or was it written by www.14-year-old-Johnny-sitting-in-his-parents-basement.org? Worse still, was it created by an agency, group or person deliberately attempting to spread false information?
This research note will provide two tools that are potentially useful for those faced with the challenge of assessing the validity of sources and information for research or for doing a peer review exercise of a paper submitted to an academic journal for publication. The first is the A1-E5 method for assessing the reliability of a source of information as well as the credibility of the information provided. The second is an example of a generic guide for assessing the validity of information found on websites. In both cases, the intent is to assist authors or peer reviewers in coming to their own conclusions about the reliability of sources and the credibility of information.


Merely quoting a source of information is not enough. The source has to be reliable and additionally the information provided has to be credible. As such, it is at least a two step process to determine if you should include a particular source as a footnote or declare it to be valid in a peer review exercise.

The A1-E5 methodology[7] can be employed to assist in fulfilling these two requirements. The source of the information is assigned a level of reliability based on a scale of A (high) to E (unknown). The information that is being presented is rated on a scale of 1 (highly credible) to 5 (credibility unknown). Once this is done, the material is assigned a rating such as A1 or B3.

Both parts of the method are important, in that it is frequently believed (sometimes wrongly) that if a source is deemed reliable, then the information must be credible. Unfortunately, this is not the case. All too often, a source that is reliable may be misinformed, out of date, subject to unconscious biases or – worst case scenario – using their perceived credibility to advance an agenda or support an ideology with information that is not credible.

Using the A1-E5 Method to Assess the Source

The first step is to assess the reliability of the source involved. This can be an individual, a group or an organization. All of these entities provide an opportunity for the researcher or peer reviewer to assess their track record. In the case of a perceived conflict or disconnect (i.e. a normally reliable institutions but a doubtful author) then the lower of the two assessments levels should be used.

Authors are advised to remain in a critical frame of mind when assessing source reliability. A well-known professor or researcher may have highly entertaining classes or provide great stimulation at a conference. Being well known does not necessarily infer being reliable. In addition, caution is always urged when using media sources. Some newspapers have a well-known and advertised bias which can be factored in when assessing reliability and credibility. Other papers may not. For instance, the Washington Times is owned by organizations related to...
the Unification Church of the Reverend Sun Moon of Korea. This does not mean you should or should not use the paper as a source, but rather you should ask yourself if there is a specific agenda in reporting on the particular story you are quoting.[8] The question should be asked for all such newspapers and magazines.

The rating scale for assessing reliability of a source is listed below. By asking the right questions, it should be possible to form a clearer picture of source reliability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>This is a well-known source that has a long record of providing credible information. The information over time has been proven to be reliable and factual and the author or source is known to be operating within a given area of expertise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>This is a well-known source that has proven to be reliable, but the source has provided information in the past which has been shown to be slightly out of date or misinterpreted. The source, which is operating in a normal area of expertise, believes the information was accurate at the time of delivery, but the information has not proven to be completely accurate over time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>This is a source that appears to have some record of presumed factual reliability, but the lack of a long track record does lend doubt. Caution is advised when using this source and the researcher may wish to look for confirmation from another source. The author or source may not be operating in their normal area of expertise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>This is a source of doubtful reliability that has a track record of providing false, biased or misleading information in the past. Additionally, the information being provided may be deliberately or subconsciously tainted by the agenda or ideology of the group or individual involved. This source should not be used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>This is an unknown source. As such, there is no way of determining the track record. Caution is advised and another source for this information should be found.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Information Provided by the Source

In a separate exercise, the information provided must also be verified for consistency and internal logic. The information must be analyzed to see it fits with a known body of knowledge or known patterns in the past. If it does, then the credibility of the information may be considered as high. If it does not, then questions must be raised and an assessment must be made.
to see if the inconsistencies represent a change in the situation or the discovery of new information. Or perhaps it is a flawed analysis. It is possible that a further examination of the credibility of the analysis must be made.

New or different does not mean wrong! Peer review and research standards should not be seen as a means of enforcing orthodoxy or preventing challenges to status quo in a given field of inquiry. But if the information provided is new or startling, then the researcher or peer reviewer should be especially alert to possible problems.

The rating scale for assessing the credibility of information is below. By asking the right questions, it should be possible to form a clearer picture of information credibility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The information in this report appears credible. It is information that fits with a known and proven background of previous information that has been reliable in the past. It has internal consistency and logic and conforms to ideas of inductive or deductive reasoning. The variables in play are known and it is possible to determine how they would react under a known set of circumstances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The information appears to fit a known pattern and compares well with other known facts. However, variations exist from known patterns. This may be an alert for the researcher to conduct further research to either confirm or disregard the information. Applying other methods of assessment may be useful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The information provided appears to contradict known facts or normal patterns with no known visible or viable explanation of why this is so. Without an explanation of the differences, this is cause for concern. Either the information is incorrect, or a further investigation is required for an explanation of the inconsistencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The information in this report does not make sense based on all previous knowledge of the issue. It is highly doubtful and should not be given any credibility unless external supporting information can be found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The information might be credible, but no way exists to compare it to any other known background information. It cannot be confirmed by analogy or by other logical means. It is totally new and no means exists to compare it to other known facts. As such, it should be read with a sceptical mindset and extreme caution is advised when using it as a source without identifying the problems identified to the reader.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Outcome

When an examination of a source and its information provides an A1 result, the author or peer reviewer can be generally confident about allowing the use of this information. If, however, there is a C or lower and/or a 3 or lower, then a serious re-examination of the source and its information should be made. This may involve further research, follow up questions or perhaps the source should be discarded in favour of an alternative source. For the peer reviewer, this may be a signal to ask the author for further confirmation of the source or the information provided.

Using Web Based Sources

Using information from a website can be particularly challenging. One of the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the World Wide Web is its anonymity. For the researcher or peer reviewer, this is a metaphorical minefield full of potentially destructive information that can destroy or undermine their work.

However, a combination of experience and research has produced methodological guides which can assist the author or peer reviewer in assessing web-based information. A researcher or peer reviewer can use a relatively simple guide to assist him or her in determining whether or not web based information can be cited as a valid source. Keeping in mind the A1-E5 system above, researchers are additionally advised to ask the following questions:

1. Who wrote the material on the page?
2. Is it authoritative?
3. Is it objective?
4. Is it current?
5. What is the coverage of the page and can you see all the information on that page?[9]

The following is an example of a framework produced by Jim Kapoun[10] which may help guide the researcher or peer reviewer in assessing a web source. It is similar to other such guides, some of which have already been discussed in court cases to assist the judge in determining the reliability of information.[11] Multiple others exist, although most of them include similar questions to those raised here.
## Five Criteria for Evaluating Web pages[12]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation of Web documents</th>
<th>How to interpret the basics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Accuracy of Web Documents</strong></td>
<td><strong>Accuracy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Who wrote the page and can you contact him or her?</td>
<td>• Make sure author provides e-mail or a contact address/phone number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What is the purpose of the document and why was it produced?</td>
<td>• Know the distinction between author and Webmaster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is this person qualified to write this document?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Authority of Web Documents</strong></td>
<td><strong>Authority</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Who published the document and is it separate from the &quot;Webmaster&quot;?</td>
<td>• What credentials are listed for the authors?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Check the domain of the document, what institution publishes this document?</td>
<td>• Where is the document published? Check URL domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does the publisher list his or her qualifications?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3. Objectivity of Web Documents</strong></td>
<td><strong>Objectivity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What goals/objectives does this page meet?</td>
<td>• Determine if page is a mask for advertising; if so information might be biased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How detailed is the information?</td>
<td>• View any Web page as you would an info-commercial on television. Ask yourself why was this written and for whom?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What opinions (if any) are expressed by the author?</td>
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<td><strong>4. Currency of Web Documents</strong></td>
<td><strong>Currency</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• When was it produced?</td>
<td>• How many dead links are on the page?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• When was it updated?</td>
<td>• Are the links current or updated regularly?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How up-to-date are the links (if any)?</td>
<td>• Is the information on the page outdated?</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Evaluation of Web documents

5. Coverage of the Web Documents
   • Are the links (if any) evaluated and do they complement the documents' theme?
   • Is it all images or a balance of text and images?
   • Is the information presented cited correctly?

How to interpret the basics

Coverage
   • If page requires special software to view the information, how much are you missing if you don't have the software?
   • Is it free or is there a fee, to obtain the information?
   • Is there an option for text only, or frames, or a suggested browser for better viewing?

Putting it all together

• Accuracy. If your page lists the author and institution that published the page and provides a way of contacting him/her and . . .
• Authority. If your page lists the author credentials and its domain is preferred (.edu, .gov, .org, or .net), and . . .
• Objectivity. If your page provides accurate information with limited advertising and it is objective in presenting the information, and . . .
• Currency. If your page is current and updated regularly (as stated on the page) and the links (if any) are also up-to-date, and . . .
• Coverage. If you can view the information properly--not limited to fees, browser technology, or software requirement, then . . .

You may have a Web page that could be of value to your research!

Conclusion

Determining whether or not a source is reliable and whether or not the information is credible can sometimes be challenging to the researcher or peer reviewer. However, it is possible to apply a simple set of methodologies for the purpose of focusing in on the questions of reliability and credibility. Information derived from websites on the World Wide Web provides an extra layer of difficulty given the practice of anonymity or attempts to mislead.

For the younger researcher, caution is advised on the trap, noted above, of assessing information as credible simply because the source is well known or has a Wikipedia entry. Unfortunately, a number of individuals who publish do so with a certain agenda or bias at work which may consciously or unconsciously shape their work. Separating the source and the information as a separate exercise as noted in the A1-E5 methodology is critical in determining whether information from a given source should be included.
About the Author: Tom Quiggin, (M.A, C.D.) is a court qualified expert in “the reliability of intelligence as evidence in court” (Federal Court of Canada) as well as the “structure, organization and evolution of the global jihadi movement” (Criminal Court and Federal Court). He has 20 plus years of practical intelligence experience in a variety of positions. These include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Armed Forces, the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (War Crimes), the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (The Hague), and the Privy Council Office of Canada. He was also a qualified arms control inspector for the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the Vienna Document. He holds a Masters Degree in International Relations and is a certified knowledge management practitioner. He has a sole author book publication titled Seeing the Invisible: National Security Intelligence Requirements in an Uncertain Age (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007) and has numerous publications and book chapters in Canada, the USA, the UK, Germany, Singapore and the Netherlands on his name.

Notes

[1] Pete Etchells and Suzi Gage (University of Bristol) Scientific fraud is rife: it's time to stand up for good science, Friday 2 November 2012 07.00 GMT. The article is available online at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/blog/2012/nov/02/scientific-fraud-good-science. (downloaded on 30 January 2013 at 1340 EST)


[6] The A1-E5 methodology was originally developed by the intelligence community. For more on this method see Thomas Quiggin, Seeing the Invisible - National Security Intelligence in an Uncertain Age. Singapore: World Scientific Press, 2007, pp.170-173. This method has expanded into popular use and multiple variations exist.
Various versions and adaptations of this methodology exist. See a slightly different version of this model in the brief article *The Value of Information* which is available online at: [http://www.abchs.com/pdf/board/the_value_of_information.pdf](http://www.abchs.com/pdf/board/the_value_of_information.pdf). This is the website of the American Board for Certification in Homeland Security.

For an overview of issues raised by a newspaper having an agenda, see the article by Dante Chinni, a senior associate at the Project for Excellence in Journalism, Columbia University, Graduate School of Journalism titled *The Other Paper* as published by the *Columbia Journalism Review*, 1 September 2002.


For more about Jim Kapoun see [http://antiochcollege.org/academics/faculty/jim-kapoun.html](http://antiochcollege.org/academics/faculty/jim-kapoun.html)


OSCE’s Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism

by Reinhard Uhrig

In December 2012, participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the world’s largest security organisation, adopted the OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism. This Consolidated Framework builds on previously adopted decisions, commitments and mandates over the past ten years. The document constitutes an important milestone for the Organisation. OSCE has contributed considerably to efforts of the international community aimed at effectively countering terrorism while adhering to the rule of law and upholding human rights standards.

The Consolidated Framework provides a new blueprint for the OSCE's contribution to global efforts against terrorism. It was discussed for more than one year before being adopted by the 57 participating States of the Organization during the OSCE Ministerial Council in Dublin in December 2012. The document identifies the operational principles and strategic focus areas for the anti-terrorism work of the different executive structures of OSCE. It builds on the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism adopted in 2001, which can be seen as the starting point for the active engagement of the OSCE in support of the fight against terrorism.

Why is the Consolidated Framework important? Three answers…

The Consolidated Framework is bringing the acquis of previous political decisions into a single strategic statement/vision. This helps to communicate in clear language to States and international partners what the profile, comparative advantages and unique organisational strengths of the OSCE are. This is particularly important at a time when fewer resources are available whilst an increasing number of actors seek to contribute to the global efforts against terrorism.

The Consolidated Framework underlines the importance of close collaboration to achieve comprehensive security - collaboration that is indispensable on multiple levels: between countries, within countries, and among international organisations. As a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, co-ordination and co-operation with the United Nations and relevant specialised organisations is key for the OSCE, in particular with a view of an effective implementation of the international legal framework against terrorism and the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy.

The Consolidated Framework identifies strategic focus areas for counter-terrorism activities of the OSCE and its executive structures. The organisations’ main role is to assist its participating States in fulfilling their international obligations and political commitments. The executive
structures – in particular, the Secretariat and its Transnational Threats Department, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and several of the Organization’s field operations – run numerous programmes that contribute to strengthening States’ capacities to prevent and combat terrorism. The Consolidated Framework provides political guidance on how to prioritise this work while taking into account that the threat of terrorism is multi-faceted and evolving. Such prioritisation will ultimately help to enhance donor co-ordination, which is important as most OSCE activities to counter terrorism require extra budgetary funds.

The Way Ahead…

In 2013, under the Chairmanship of Ukraine, the OSCE will be working towards the implementation of the Consolidated Framework. The Transnational Threats Department will work with other OSCE executive structures and the participating States to further operationalise this vision and enhance the Organization’s effectiveness and value added. (The Consolidated Framework can be found at: http://www.osce.org/atu)

About the Author: Reinhard Uhrig is Deputy Head and Programme Co-ordinator, Action against Terrorism Unit, Transnational Threats Department, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
III. Resources

Literature on Al-Qaeda since 2001

Monographs, Edited Volumes, Non-conventional Literature and Prime Articles published since 2001
compiled and selected by Eric Price

NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterix [*] only have a clickable table of contents.


Alexander, M. (2011) *Kill or capture: how a special operations task force took down a notorious al Qaeda terrorist* New York: St. Martin's Press

Almdaires, F. A. (2010) *Islamic extremism in Kuwait: from the Muslim Brotherhood to al-Qaeda and other Islamist political groups* Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge


Castagnera, J. (2009) *Al-Qaeda goes to college: impact of the war on terror on American higher education* Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers


Coolsaet, R. (2005) *Al-Qaeda, the myth: the root causes of international terrorism and how to tackle them* Gent: Academia Press


Cram, I. (2009) *Terror and the war on dissent: freedom of expression in the age of Al-Qaeda* Dortrecht; New York: Springer


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Combating Terrorism Center (2006) *The Islamic Imagery Project* Combating Terrorism Center at West Point [http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-islamic-imagery-project]


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Madu, I. V. (2008) Islamic extremism and the West: Expounding the negative implications of the clash between Islamic extremists and some Western nations [thesis] Morgan State University


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Anon.: *Algeria: Al Qaeda Connection* *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series* 43(9) 2006 pp.16790-16791


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Bergen, P. (et al.): Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat to America and American Interests *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 34 (2) 2011 pp.65-101

Binder, L.: Comment on Gelvin's Essay on Al-Qaeda and Anarchism *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20 (4) 2008 pp.582-588


Devji, F.: Al-Qaeda, spectre of globalisation *Soundings* 31 (2) 2006 pp.18-27

Doran, M.: The Pragmatic Fanaticism of al Qaeda: An Anatomy of Extremism in Middle Eastern Politics *Political Science Quarterly* 117 (2) 2002 pp.177-190

Evans, R. & Pantucci, R.: Locating Al Qaeda's Center of Gravity: The Role of Middle Managers *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 34 (11) 2011 pp.825-842

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Hoffman, B.: The Global Terrorist Threat: is al-Qaeda on the run or on the march? *Middle East Policy* 14 (2) 2007 pp.44-58


Holbrook, C. & Fessler, D.M.T.: Sizing up the threat: The envisioned physical formidability of terrorists tracks their leaders’ failures and successes *Cognition* 127 (1, April) 2013 pp.46-56


Hopkins, P. O.: Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam *Iran and the Caucasus* 13 (1) 2009 pp.227-228


Jackson, B.: Groups, Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (3) 2006 pp.241-262

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Loidolt, B.: Managing the Global and Local: The Dual Agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 34 (2) 2011 p.102-123
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Page, M. (et al.): Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Framing Narratives and Prescriptions *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23 (2) 2011 pp.150-172
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Phillips, A.: How al Qaeda lost Iraq *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 63 (1) 2009 pp. 64-84

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Porter, P.: Long wars and long telegrams: containing Al-Qaeda *International Affairs* 85 (2) 2009 pp.285-305


Raufer, X.: Al Qaeda: A Different Diagnosis *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26 (6) 2003 pp. 391398


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Torres Soriano,:M.: The Evolution of the Discourse of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Themes, Countries and Individuals Mediterranean Politics 16 (2) 2011 pp.279-298
Torres Soriano, M.: The Road to Media Jihad: The Propaganda Actions of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Terrorism and Political Violence 23(1) 2011 pp.72-88
Whelan, R.: Al-Qaeda's Theorist Survival 53 (2) 2011 pp.159-166

Wiktorowicz, Q. & Kaltner, J.: Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11 Middle East Policy 10 (2) 2003 pp.96-92


See also Resources on the Internet:

Al Qaeda news, Latest – Yahoo [http://uk.news.yahoo.com/al-qaeda/]

Al-Qaeda / Organisations – AlJazeera [http://www.aljazeera.com/category/organisation/al-qaeda ]


Al-Qa’ida (The Base) Intelligence Resource Program - FAS [resources] [http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ladin.htm]

The Clean IT Project - Reducing the impact of terrorist use of the internet - EU [http://www.cleanitproject.eu/documents/]

FRONTLINE Hunting Bin Laden [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/]


JIHADOLOGY - A clearinghouse for jihādī primary source material and translation service [http://jihadology.net/]

Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence [http://www.massviolence.org/]

RAND Experts Use Decades of Terrorism Research to Assess al Qaeda after bin Laden [http://www.rand.org/feature/bin-laden.html]


UN Action to Counter Terrorism [http://www.un.org/terrorism/index.shtml]

About the Compiler: Eric Price is a Professional Information Specialist. Until his retirement he served at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna; since then he joined ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’ as an Editorial Assistant.
Literature on Terrorism and the Media (including the Internet): an Extensive Bibliography
compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

This bibliography is intended to serve as an extensive up-to-date resource for studying and researching the multi-faceted relationships between terrorism and the media, including the Internet. It contains over 2,200 records covering academic or professional journal articles (most of them peer-reviewed), book chapters, reports, conference contributions, books, theses and other text publications, mainly in English and German. To keep the bibliography manageable, smaller, more informal publications, e.g., blog posts, research briefs, commentaries, newspaper articles, or newsletters, were not considered – with a few exceptions of contributions containing ideas or subjects that were underrepresented in long-form academic or professional literature.

The vast majority of resources included date from the 21st century, as after 9/11 – the biggest single media event in history – the amount of publications on the relationship between terrorism and the media has increased considerably. However, terrorist use of the media is as old as terrorism itself and has been researched since the beginning of terrorism studies. Therefore, this bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to early February 2013.

Thematically, the bibliography covers many aspects of the relationship between terrorism and the media, including these:

- terrorist use of the traditional media (TV, radio, newspapers);
- terrorist use of the new media, especially the Internet (E-Jihad, Cyberterrorism);
- online radicalization;
- 9/11 as a media event;
- media-oriented counter-terrorism measures;
- the psychological impact of media exposure to terrorist attacks;
- the portrayal of Islam and Muslims after 9/11;
- the depiction of terrorism in literature, movies and the arts;
- media-oriented hostage-takings.

Formally, the bibliography has been subdivided into two main sections: “Books and Theses” and “Articles”; the titles in each section are alphabetically arranged, usually by authors. The Articles section has been structured by sub-sections for each alphabetic letter, starting with a heading consisting of the particular letter preceded by a hash key to enable readers to quickly access it.
(e.g., when searching for the letter C, open the search window of your text processing software by hitting <control> + <f> (on a Mac: <command> + <f>), then enter #C). A third short section at the end of the bibliography lists websites and blogs that regularly publish analyses of primary source materials (especially jihadist online publications). All websites were last visited on 18 February 2013.

To provide readers with reliable information to locate the references, a detailed citation style (including full author first names, journal issue numbers, book series titles, and full URL paths to resources) was used. Where available, DOIs have been added. A DOI (Digital Object Identifier) is a unique and permanent identifier for electronic entities. It takes the form of a two-part character string (e.g. 10.1080/10304310302733): The first part identifies the registrant (in our example 10.1080 for Taylor & Francis), the second part identifies the particular electronic object (here: 10304310302733 for the journal article "September 11 and the Logistics of Communication" by Michael Galvin). In the bibliography, all DOIs were provided in a clickable format to enable readers to directly access the landing page associated with them. DOIs secure a more stable linking than traditional web addresses (URLs), which often alter or disappear, causing so-called 404 error messages. Nevertheless, it might happen that a DOI is defunct. In this case, the user of this bibliography should insert the title of an article – enclosed with quotation marks – into a search engine like Google to retrieve the publication's landing page.

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints) it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

To provide a balanced pool of references, a broad scope of resources and different search strategies were used to retrieve the bibliographic content. 23 free or subscription-based terrorism research journals were searched for articles by browsing their tables of contents manually in order not to miss important content. This core journal list was extended by 71 multi- or interdisciplinary journals of significant importance for terrorism researchers. These journals were identified by using keyword searches on publisher homepages, scanning journal lists, bibliographies, reference lists as well as citation analyses. For these journals, the tables of contents for the last decade were browsed manually; older back files were checked by using the automatic keyword search function on the journal’s or publisher’s homepages.

Furthermore, 136 websites, blogs, and publication lists of governmental, and non-governmental institutions, private companies, academic, professional, or individual experts were identified and
manually browsed for relevant content (especially to retrieve gray literature such as reports or working papers, but also other literature types), or to get alerted with regard to new publications. As terrorism research is an interdisciplinary field with relevant publications scattered over a large scope of publication outlets, the compiler of this bibliography used cross-searches to extend the body of resources. 10 homepages of commercial academic publishers (amongst them Taylor & Francis, SAGE, and Wiley) were automatically searched for relevant content by using the advanced search features offered at their company websites. To keep the amount of results manageable, the keyword search was restricted to the abstract, title, and keywords fields (instead of full-text search).

The scope of the search was further extended by using 13 abstracting and indexing services (including Google Scholar, the Directory of Open Access Journals, and EBSCO) for publisher-independent, multi-disciplinary cross-searches. Results were filtered by employing advanced search functions. In addition, the compiler conducted searches with Google Books and WorldCat to retrieve books, edited volumes, and theses.

Due to the large amount of publications and the decentralisation of information resources in the modern publishing world, this bibliography, while extensive, cannot be totally comprehensive. Due to its length, it is only available in PDF format, not, as usual for contributions of Perspectives on Terrorism, in both HTML and PDF format.

The complete PDF of the bibliography can be viewed here.

About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., studied Information Science and New German Literature and Linguistics at the Saarland University (Germany). She wrote a comprehensive doctoral thesis on the Internet usage of Islamist terrorist and insurgent groups (focus: media-oriented hostage takings), based on a large set of research data obtained through long-term tracking of Islamist websites, which she had been conducting since early 2006. She has worked for several research support organizations where she gained expertise in information retrieval, librarianship, and electronic publishing. At present, she works at the research & development department of Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID) (http://www.zpid.de) in the open-access publishing project PsychOpen (http://www.psychopen.eu). In her spare time, she is an Editorial Assistant with ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’ where she contributes to the Resources Section.

- All quoted websites were last visited on February 18, 2013 -
IV. Book Reviews

Paul Cruickshank (Ed.) Al Qaeda.


Five Volumes, 2,304 pages, ISBN: 978-0-415-58174-5, $1,280.00 (Hardback)

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

Compiled by Paul Cruickshank, a New York-based investigative journalist and one of CNN’s top correspondents on terrorism, this monumental 5-volume collection of scholarly research and journalistic articles that were previously published in various publications by leading experts on Al-Qaeda is, to date, the most comprehensive resource published on the terrorist organization and its worldwide affiliates. Chronicled here are the acts of warfare against their own Muslim societies and the non-Muslim countries of Western Europe, America, and elsewhere.

Mr. Cruickshank introduces each of the five volumes with a 20-page editorial overview designed to place events in their historical and political context. On their own, his 100 pages of text constitute an invaluable information resource about these subjects. The collection’s 108 chapters were written by more than 80 individual authors, with several of them contributing several articles each. Notable authors include Peter Bergen, Bruce Hoffman, Brian Michael Jenkins, and Marc Sageman.

The five volumes cover Al-Qaida’s evolving threat, Al-Qaeda before and after 9/11, the spread of Al-Qaeda’s affiliates (or “franchises”) around the world, the root causes underlying its insurgency, the organization’s aims and strategies as well as its administrative organization. Also included are analyses as to how it raises funds, how its ideology was influenced by extremist interpretations of Islam, and an analysis of its influential ideologues, led by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (who also greatly influenced the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, currently governing Egypt).

Of particular note are articles that address the means Al-Qaeda uses to disseminate its propaganda via the Internet, how it radicalizes its supporters and recruits them into terrorist activities, the new trend of “homegrown” extremists in Western societies (many of whom have a loose affiliation with Al-Qaeda), the role of safe havens in maintaining Al-Qaeda’s viability, and how it trains its recruits. Interestingly, as Mr. Cruickshank points out, with Al-Qaeda’s safe havens under constant bombardment, its training programs in Pakistan and Yemen have become compressed, resulting in less capable operatives; many of whom (such as Najibullah Zazi, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and Faisal Shahzad) subsequently failed to successfully execute attacks.
Numerous insights presented by the volume’s contributors help us understand the magnitude of the threats posed by Al-Qaeda. First and foremost, the Al-Qaeda threat is defined as “the danger posed by Al-Qaeda, the Jihadist-terrorist groups affiliated with it, and individuals inspired by its ideology.” (Vol. I, p. 1) Here, it is important to understand how Al-Qaeda has attempted since its inception, as explained by Vahid Brown’s chapter on “Al-Qa’ida Central and Local Affiliates,” “to position itself as a vanguard within the broader milieu of violent Sunni Islamism.” (Vol. III, p. 27) As he writes:

“Defining itself as the forefront standard-bearer of global jihad, al-Qa’ida has worked for over two decades to rally disparate groups and individuals from throughout the Muslim world behind its vision of inter-civilizational conflict. Given this self-definition, al-Qa’ida’s core organizational objectives have as much – or more – to do with influencing processes of violence as they do with initiating them. Since the early 1990s, al-Qa’ida has pursued this quest for influence through an aggregation strategy, an ongoing effort to enlist a variety of jihadist groups operating in different parts of the world under the al-Qa’ida banner and in pursuit of al-Qa’ida’s global aims.” (Vol. III, p. 27)

However, as Brown points out, this strategy of aggregating with other Islamist militant groups to form a unified vanguard under its leadership failed in the 1990s, with most of the groups with which it had a relationship choosing to go their own way and pursue their own localized agendas. Only one group, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), moved “ever closer to al-Qa’ida’s global jihad…” (Vol. III, p. 33)

While Al-Qaeda may have failed to achieve the “elite vanguard status it sought” prior to 9/11, as Brown and the other contributors to the volumes discuss, an important theme running throughout the volumes is that following the expulsion of Al-Qaeda from its safe haven in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 and additional setbacks, such as the killings of many of its top leaders, including Usama bin Laden, it nevertheless has succeeded in reconstituting itself as a viable transnational terrorist “corporation.” One of the ways it has achieved this revival has been by franchising its “brand” to local organizations that act on its behalf in disparate places such as Iraq (AQI), Saudi Arabia and Yemen (AQAP), Somalia (al Shabaab), and the Maghreb (AQIM).

Its “franchises,” in fact, even have succeeded in re-asserting its global “brand” by exploiting the revolutionary upheavals and weakening of the security apparatuses of previously autocratic “secular” regimes created by the Arab Spring in countries such as Egypt, where their fighters have reconstituted themselves in the Sinai Peninsula, and Libya, where they maintain strongholds in the ungoverned eastern parts of the country. In fact, according to Mr. Cruickshank, Al-Qaeda fighters have succeeded in moving weapons from Libya to their brethren in the anarchic Sinai Peninsula, in order to conduct warfare against Israel, one of Al-Qaeda’s primary enemies, although their likelihood of mounting major attacks against Israel is considered minimal.
Finally, the fall of former Libyan ruler Muammar Qadhafi also resulted in the well-armed Tuareg mercenaries previously employed by the Libyan government fleeing to Mali, where they ignited a Tuareg rebellion. The resulting upheaval was subsequently exploited by Ansar Dine, an Al-Qaeda-linked group, which took control of much of northern Mali by the summer of 2012, and poses a major threat to regional stability. Although this occurred after the compendium was published, in late January 2013 Ansar Dine’s growing insurgency in Mali forced France to deploy troops against, with the United States reportedly providing logistical and other support.

In Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, an offshoot of Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq, together with other foreign elements, has succeeded in joining – and even spearheading – the wider Sunni insurgency against Bashar Assad’s regime, leaving many to wonder how they will be contained in the new government that might be formed once the Alawite-dominated regime is toppled.

At its initial center of gravity in the aftermath of 9/11, Al-Qaeda has succeeded in reconstituting itself in Pakistan’s tribal regions (where the central governments exerts little control) where its primary affiliate, the Taliban in its various configurations, are conducting a terrorist insurgency against the Afghan government and the U.S.-led military coalition. However, with the U.S.-led coalition scheduled to depart most of its forces from Afghanistan in 2014, Mr. Cruickshank writes that “The prospect of the Taliban entering a power-sharing arrangement in Afghanistan or it again seizing control of southern provinces could offer Al-Qaeda greater opportunity to once again operate in the country and strengthen its position in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.” (Vol. V, p. 22)

Despite its ability to reconstitute itself in these parts of the world, however, Mr. Cruickshank and his contributors point out that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are still subject to critique by fellow Salafists and suffer from a popular backlash. In the Middle East, for example, the revolutionary forces unleashed by the Arab Spring may not “move their way” with their tactics not necessarily “winning the hearts and minds” of young Muslims, who may opt for other, more responsible, movements to lead them. Nevertheless, their operatives and supporters are still present in these societies, where internal disorder provides them space to operate with relative ease in which to launch their attacks, as demonstrated by the latest events in Libya, Mali, Syria, and Yemen.

At a time when multi-volume printed reference sets are disappearing slowly with the rise of e-books and at a time when younger generations are accustomed to finding content for free via online encyclopedias such as Wikipedia, where the content is uneven at best, there still is no substitute to reading reference sets such as Mr. Cruickshank’s “Al Qaeda.” With its carefully selected and definitive chapters, readers who crave comprehensiveness and accuracy and are willing to pay for it will not be disappointed.

*This is a revised and expanded version of a review that initially appeared in The Washington Times on January 4, 2013. Reprinted with permission.*
Adam Lankford. The Myth of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Suicide Bombers, Rampage Shooters, and Other Self-Destructive Killers
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Review Essay by Zubair Qamar

Introduction and Overview
In his book, Adam Lankford, a criminal justice professor at the University of Alabama, sheds light on an often neglected dimension of suicide terrorists – the psychological/suicidal dimension. He does this by providing specific examples of terrorists who were suicidal and asks for the debate to go beyond religious radicalism and political ideology. Lankford goes through “case studies, suicide notes, love letters, diary entries, and martyrdom videos” (pp. 17, 18) to make his case. The first chapter is an Introduction to the book, which explains how, according to Lankford, the experts did not understand the 9/11 hijackers correctly, and how he embarked on research for his book. Chapter-2 extends the discussion from Chapter-1 on how, according to Lankford, the experts have been wrong on understanding suicide terrorists. Chapter-3 discusses Lankford’s sample of some 130 suicide terrorists and his claim that they exhibit suicidal traits. Chapter-4 illustrates Lankford’s “psychological autopsy” of Mohamed Atta, the alleged ringleader of the 9/11 attacks. Chapter-5 explores Lankford’s thoughts on differences between genuine heroes and suicide terrorists. Chapter-6 compares suicide terrorists with perpetrators of murder-suicide, including workplace killers and rampage shooters. Chapter-7 discusses Lankford’s four categories of suicide terrorists (conventional, coerced, escapist, and indirect). Finally, Chapter-8 presents recommendations to predict where suicide terrorism is more likely to happen. This book review essay touches upon key aspects of the book, including the intentions of suicide terrorists, the suicide traits to suicide connection, Lankford’s psychological autopsy of Mohamed Atta and other 9/11 suicide terrorists, Lankford’s convenience sample, Lankford’s accusation against certain scholars of being incorrect, demonstration of some of Lankford’s subjective and dubious reasoning, followed by the conclusion.

Words that Mask the Truth
Lankford advises the reader not to listen to what comes out of the mouths of suicide terrorists to understand their true motives, adding, “… you can’t believe everything you hear” (p. 20). Indeed, believing everything you hear from a suicide attacker, or his/her family, can lead to incorrect understandings and conclusions. Lankford tells us that because suicide bombers claim to be self-sacrificing for a claimed cause does not necessarily make it so. However, using
Lankford’s approach, one can also ask: Why believe that they are suicidal if they may have the capacity to make rational decisions to kill themselves for non-suicidal, perceived noble causes? Intentions behind actions are difficult to ascertain, and words and actions do not always allow one to be absolutely certain about root causes of one’s self-killing. Moreover, Lankford’s assessment is limited to the psychiatric realm without offering an equally substantial treatment of other possible causes of suicide. The “situational” factors are mentioned in passing by Lankford without seriously considering and elaborating on the influences and effects they have on suicide terrorists. (See, for example, pages 13, 32, 116, 131, and 148). It is surprising that the effects of military occupation, befriending of regimes with poor human rights records, and poor economic growth and prosperity in certain majority Muslim regions have little to no consideration in Lankford’s analysis of suicide terrorism. Neither does religion and ideology. A more detailed analysis of social-cultural factors is also missing. According to Lankford, mental illness seems to be the main driving force that makes suicide terrorists do what they do, which makes his analysis incomplete.

**Suicidal Traits to Suicide**

In addressing the issue of words by suicide terrorists that may mask the truth, Lankford expresses confidence in the “suicidal traits-to-suicide” link at the level of mainly soft indicators. Yet these are common to millions, if not more, people. Predicting suicide from such an assessment is highly prone to false positives. Lankford appears to approach these complex matters in a simplistic way. James Christopher Fowler (2012) from the Baylor College of Medicine found that

> “...despite decades of research, accurate prediction of suicide and suicide attempts remains elusive. The American Psychiatric Association (APA) Guidelines on Suicidal Behavior (APA, 2003) concluded that predicting suicide appears impossible in large part due to the rarity of suicide, even among high-risk individuals such as psychiatric inpatients. Beyond statistical challenges posed by low base rates, longitudinal prediction using relatively distal variables such as psychiatric diagnoses, demographics, and self reported psychological states consistently yield high false-positive prediction rates, limiting their predictive value (Goldsmith et al., 2002; Rudd et al., 2006; Oquendo, Halberstam, & Mann, 2003). Complicating the assessment strategy is the fact that most studies assess single risk factors, leaving clinicians and expert panels to estimate how risk factors interact to influence outcomes.”[1]

Fowler (2012) also states

> “Assessment of psychological vulnerabilities...seemed a logical approach, yet a review of empirical literature yielded mixed results for the most consistently studied psychological constructs of impulsivity/aggression, depression, anxiety,
While no assessment is immune to false positives, a less meticulous assessment like Lankford’s is certainly more prone to false positives, especially when emphasis on psychological vulnerabilities has achieved mixed results in other studies. A more careful risk assessment is therefore necessary to differentiate and target those who are at substantial risk of suicide over the masses who possess similar soft traits. For example, past suicide attempt, which is the “[s]trongest consistent predictor for both suicide attempts and completed suicide across many studies”[3] should be examined. When the reviewer asked Lankford how many individuals in his sample of 130 suicide terrorists attempted suicide in the past, he responded: “That's a good question, but I don't have the answer on hand.”[4]

**Lankford’s “Psychological Autopsy” of Mohamed Atta and other 9/11 Hijackers**

Lankford’s “psychological autopsy” of Mohamed Atta demonstrates the weakness described above. Lankford tells us that the

> “psychological autopsy has revealed that Atta’s struggles with social isolation, depression, guilt and shame, and hopelessness were very similar to the struggles of those who commit conventional suicide and murder-suicide” (p.83).

What can be concluded from similarities between Atta and those who commit conventional and murder suicides at the level of such indicators? Not much, especially when Atta, according to Lankford himself, never considered “hanging himself, slitting his wrists, or putting a bullet through his brain” (p.75). In other words, Atta had no known past suicide attempts. The implication from Lankford that those traits led Atta to commit suicide is unsubstantiated. Furthermore, Lankford writes that Atta’s individual psychology, and the traits that form it,

> “explain why Atta behaved so differently from the millions of Islamic fundamentalists and tens of thousands of terrorists and terrorist leaders who have not carried out suicide attacks – and never will” (p.85).

On the contrary, it is more convincing to believe that many non-suicidal terrorists do possess such traits because the traits are not necessarily factors required for suicide to take effect, and are traits common to millions of people. In addition, Lankford’s “psychological autopsy” is also based on certain misunderstandings and unverified assumptions, which further compromise its quality. For example, in discussing depression, Lankford zeroes in on the symptom of *appetite and/or weight changes*. He writes that

> “…Atta would complain when other members of his group would bring home delicious food, which seems odd considering the lack of a true religious justification for this stance” (p.74).
While Sunni Islam does not prohibit healthy eating, and while Atta exaggerated in expressing displeasure with the act of eating, Islam does teach Muslims to eat in moderation and avoid gluttony. The Qur’an states, “And eat and drink and be not extravagant; surely He does not love the extravagant” (Al-A’raf 7:31). It is probable that Atta had a twisted understanding of Islam, as extremists do, including with the stated verse of the Qur’an and sayings of Prophet Muhammad on eating. If this is true, then contrary to Lankford’s understanding, Atta was displaying extremist religious behavior and was not necessarily depressed. It is odd that Lankford did not entertain this interpretation as a possibility.

Lankford also fails to explain that depression may not always be an important risk factor for suicide according to certain scholars. For example, Matthew Nock, the same 2011 MacArthur Fellow who Lankford uses for support in Chapter-8 when explaining his computer test with “predictive powers”, had a different understanding. Nock says: "But what our data show is depression isn't a strong predictor of suicide"…[5]. Lankford should mention that suicide scholars have different conclusions from data on predictors of suicide. His book makes it appear as if his explanation is the only way to understand the matter, which is clearly not the case. Similarly, Lankford’s psychological analyses of a few other 9/11 hijackers were based on cursory details, weak suicide risk assessment, and overly ambitious conclusions that they were mentally impaired. Lankford’s “psychological autopsies” lack the required strength to support his opposition to scholars who held the view that the 9/11 hijackers were by and large normal.

**Lankford’s Convenience Sample**

On pages 49 to 51, Lankford cites the research of Ariel Merari (an Israeli clinical psychologist) on suicide bombings and supports his sample.[6] However, Merari’s sample was a convenience sample that presents a host of problems. Some problems in a convenience sample include sampling bias and the sample being unrepresentative of the population. In other words, there are limits to making inferences and generalizations of the population from such a sample that can be contradicted by results from a more representative sample. The same problems are associated with Lankford’s convenience sample of 130 suicide terrorists (STs). Lankford said, “The 130 STs described in Ch3 and Appendix A are probably more of an opportunity sample than a geographically representative sample. I just tried to find every case I could.”[7]

Lankford’s sample of 130 suicide terrorists, however, must be taken with a grain of salt. In footnote-61 in Chapter-3, Lankford writes,
“All efforts have been made to reduce the chances of redundancy. However, since some of these individuals are not identified by name, it is possible that a few cases appear on this list more than once” (emphasis added) (pg.208).

In other words, Lankford admits the possibility that his sample could be different in number than the 130 suicide terrorists. When the reviewer read the list of suicide terrorists in Appendix-A, the following was noted:

- Unidentified Males: 10
- Unidentified Females: 8
- Unidentified sixteen-year-old boy: 1
- Multiple unidentified attackers: Stated 5 times, each with multiple attackers
- Multiple teenage boys: Stated 1 time

(Appendix-A, p.177)

How does one know if the unidentified individuals really existed or not, or if there could be repeats in counting them, as Lankford considered above? While some researchers wish to keep certain names anonymous to protect the identities of attempted suicide terrorists and their families, it also provides leeway to incorporate manufactured “evidence.” Even if the evidence is genuine, the anonymity of the data makes it less convincing to be taken seriously. (As a side note, it is curious why Lankford lists Mir Aimal Kasi as a suicide terrorist. After killing CIA staff in 1993, he fled to Pakistan, was later found, and legally executed in 2002 by the US government. He never attempted suicide, but committed terrorism. After he fled the crime scene, he was in hiding and still did not attempt suicide in any form (Appendix-A, p.180).

An “opportunity” or convenience sample, as explained above, limits inferences and generalizations of the population. Robert Brym, a Canadian political sociologist, expressed this concern with Lankford’s sample as he did with Merari’s sample:

“Are the thousands of suicide attackers who are not in his sample different from those who are included? Could they perhaps have been driven by political conditions and social factors that have nothing to do with their psychological predispositions? We don’t know, and therefore we don’t know whether any of the inferences Dr. Lankford draws from his sample are valid.”[8]

Lankford’s optimism and expectations give him reason to believe that a more representative sample of suicide terrorists would corroborate his findings. Lankford says,

“The broader question is whether or not my findings are representative of what we’d expect to find in STs around the world, and I think they are” (emphasis added).[9]

But to “think” what further research might (or might not) illustrate is not the same as what it would illustrate. While Lankford’s optimism is admirable, it is based on faith rather than hard data. The results of more research need not support Lankford’s expectations. This can only be
known once a representative sample is taken and analyzed. Until then, Lankford’s optimism that
most suicide terrorists worldwide are suicidal is premature. Lankford is eager to push the cart
before the horse, and seems to use evidence to support what he already assumed to be true.

Did Lankford keep an open mind? The discussion so far appears to indicate that he probably had
a biased outlook from the outset. This may partially explain why he used a convenience sample.
When this reviewer asked Prof. Lankford why he did not use a random sample, he replied that:

“…random sampling could be valuable. But random sampling also inevitably
limits the amount of evidence you're considering, because you'll be ignoring
certain important cases because a random number generator has not selected them.
Given the scarcity of evidence currently available, I am hesitant to take any
approach which limits the evidence further. In an ideal world, we'd have evidence
on thousands of cases, and could then randomly sample and still be analyzing a
sample large enough to be valid.”[10]

But random samples address both the known and unknown variables and are likely to give a less
biased and more accurate representation of the population. When the reviewer asked Prof. Brym
to comment on Lankford’s thoughts, he responded:

“Of course random sampling ignores some cases – the whole point of random
sampling is to be able to generalize reliably from some cases to the relevant
population. We don’t have to have data on the entire population to make reliable
estimates about its characteristics precisely because the sample has been drawn
randomly.”[11]

Adam Lankford may have had fewer cases through a random sample, but his research would
have been taken more seriously in the view of this reviewer.

Accusing Experts of Being Wrong

Lankford is also critical with studies and statements of many other scholars in the field. He
impugns Robert Brym (pp. 5, 35, 50), Scott Atran (pp. 5, 58),[12] Robert Pape (pp. 5, 6, 29, 30,
65), Jerold Post (pp. 5, 35, 66, 109), Ellen Townsend (pp. 5, 27), Riaz Hassan (pp. 5, 29),[13]
Adel Sadeq (p. 5), Larry Pastor (pp. 6, 110), and Mohammed Hafez (pp. 6, 109).

For example, he criticizes Ron Paul who used Robert Pape’s research for saying that 95% of
suicide attacks are caused by foreign occupation. Lankford writes, “Paul is confusing an indirect
cause with a direct cause” (p.161). When the reviewer asked Prof. Lankford what his evidence
was that 95% of suicide attacks in the areas/regions Paul referred to refer to suicidal terrorism, he
responded:

“As to what I argue is actually going on, I think that’s pretty clear throughout the
book. [Zero]/130 who I’ve examined are motivated purely by ideology, including
anti-occupation ideology.”[14]
Lankford uses his sample of 130 suicide terrorists to conclude that Pape’s conclusion is incorrect. However, as stated earlier, nobody can confidently use a small convenience sample and speak for the general population of suicide terrorists. A clear limitation of a convenience sample is that it may not at all be representative of the total population of suicide attackers. Also, even if Pape is incorrect in his conclusion, does it make Lankford correct in his conclusion? No. While accusing Pape of not conducting extensive studies of the biographies of suicide attackers in his (Pape’s) study, Lankford did not either. Therefore, how can Lankford know if Pape is wrong or not? He cannot. It is another example of Lankford’s rush to judge a matter without being fully cognizant of the facts.

While portraying Pape as being oblivious of the psychological/suicidal dimension of suicide attackers, Lankford neglects to mention that, according to Pape’s research,

“The data shows less than 5 percent of suicide attackers experience major depression associated with ordinary suicide.”[15]

This is no superficial study. Robert Pape’s groundbreaking study in *Cutting the Fuse* “surveys and analyzes over 2,200 suicide attacks and 2,500 suicide attackers around the world since 1980, based on over 10,000 documents in English and native languages and nearly every available martyr video in existence.”[16] Lankford either did not understand Pape’s research results or chose to ignore most of it.

Lankford has also been unable to respond to Pape’s excellent point that

“while mental illness and ordinary suicides occur in every country at fairly constant rates, suicide attacks are highly concentrated in specific areas of foreign occupation – typically starting when the occupation begins and sharply declining when it ends – patterns that strongly refute mental illness as a major cause as they confirm the main findings of *Cutting the Fuse*.”[17]

When Israel left Lebanon in 2000 and suicide attacks by the Lebanese ceased, was it because their “psychological instability” and “suicidal” tendencies also ceased?[18] Lankford’s views are difficult to square with such facts and with common sense.

**Subjective Views and Dubious Reasoning**

Adam Lankford also forms his own subjective understandings of terms from which he bases his analyses.[19] Regarding *heroism*, for example, he writes that

“…some suicide terrorists may have legitimately done heroic things during their lives” (p.106)

He then continues,
“But…carrying out a suicide attack wasn’t one of them. Even if you believe in their God, their cause, and their right to fight, the act of killing itself is not heroic – for any reason” (p.106).

However, Lankford’s statement is controversial in light of other definitions of heroism. For example, David Lester, former President of the International Association for Suicide Prevention, said,

“It all depends on your definition of a hero. In my note, I use Zimbardo's, and I reckon that some suicide bombers could fit his definition” (emphasis added).[20]

Lester further said that

“Restricting the venue to the conflict(s) in the Middle East, it is clear that suicide bombing is part of a war. The acts may, therefore, fit into the military hero category proposed by Zimbardo, but the agents may also be viewed as martyrs since they are working for a clear political and religious cause” (emphasis added).[21]

Lankford fails to mention that being a hero and martyr are not straightforward matters as he portrays. Using the definitions and understandings of other scholars, there would not necessarily be a “myth of martyrdom.” When Lankford is subjective, he sounds more like a propagandist than an objective scholar. Lankford also violates his own approach by using the statements of suicide terrorists arbitrarily. He writes,

“By definition, this…means that their attacks cannot be considered a true ‘sacrifice,’ because the suicide terrorists are not forfeiting ‘something highly valued.’ Even according to their own statements, they are trading something they put low value on (their lives in this transient, unhappy, and corrupt world) for something they value highly (heaven and paradise). There is nothing noble or brave about that kind of bargain” (italics added) (p.8).

Lankford admonishes us not to take the words of suicide terrorists at face value, yet has no problem doing so in their claims of what they attribute high and low value to. Lankford also classifies “conventional,” “coerced,” “escapist,” and “indirect” people who kill themselves as “suicide terrorists” (p.130). This is a subjective definition of “terrorist” that is not shared by most, or many, terrorism experts who relate such violent acts to mainly political goals. Lankford needs to define these terms before using them. Otherwise, many suicidal people would receive the “terrorist” label.

Lankford’s book includes a discussion of social stigmas associated with suicide, but this is mainly in reference to Arab culture (see, for example, p.26, p.60, p.152, p.160, p.173). However, Lankford exaggerates the link between the social and religious stigmas of suicide with a suicide attack as an escape route. While this is true in some cases, it is not true in most Arab regions. In addition, Lankford fails to consider how family and religion act as social support rather than social pressure. Ziad Kronfol, a psychiatrist at Weill Cornell Medical College in Qatar, says
“I already mentioned stigma and ignorance and their negative impact on mental health. However, factors such as family and religion could have a positive impact. Family ties are strong in the Middle East and this can play a positive role to the extent that they are used as social support rather than social pressure. Similarly, the impact of religion could be positive to the extent that it induces good deeds and protects the person from harm, including self-inflicted harm. In other words, religion can be a protective factor against suicide” (italics added).[22]

By overlooking the positive potential of family and religion in Arab regions as protective factors against suicide, Lankford portrays Arabs in a distorted and negative manner. He also seems to convey that Arabs who do suicide attacks are doing it solely due to negative social stigma without entertaining other possible causes adequately.

Some of Lankford’s statements are, in this reviewer’s opinion, bordering on the absurd. For example, Lankford writes,

“The raw materials for prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns are virtually all here. In the United States, approximately thirty-four thousand people commit suicide each year. So there is plenty of suicidal intent to harness, along with tens of thousands of people who could be coerced into becoming suicidal” (p.166).

This is unrealistic alarmism. Lankford does not provide any evidence to substantiate his claim that “tens of thousands of people…could be coerced into becoming suicidal” in the United States. Furthermore, while explaining that Mohamed Atta was not fully obedient to Osama bin Laden’s orders, as he had prioritized his own preferences instead, Lankford concludes:

“He was not so blindly committed to the cause, so in awe of bin Laden, or so brainwashed by terrorist teachings that he simply did what he was told” (p.66).

Because Atta differed on key matters with bin Laden does not necessarily mean Atta was not committed to the cause. Two or more people can differ in certain respects and still be committed to the same cause. Even more bizarre is Lankford’s allusion that Atta’s cause stemmed from his supposedly psychologically abnormal mind without any convincing evidence to substantiate the claim:

“No – the truth is that Atta had his own agenda. Like many suicidal people, he was not willing to take his own life until he was ready: he wouldn’t be rushed into it, and it needed to be on his terms. In fact, unlike a professional soldier or ideologically committed Green Beret, he was willing to jeopardize the mission’s success in order to meet his own objectives” (p.67).

As discussed earlier, Lankford’s portrayal of Atta as one who had suicidal tendencies is unconvincing. Lankford also misrepresents his sources. For example, he writes,

“Pew Research Center surveys indicate that more than two hundred thousand Americans believe that suicide attacks are “often” or “sometimes” justified” (p. 163).
He means Muslim Americans, not “Americans” in general, as his statement appears to imply. Lankford is also unaware of other polls that illustrate what Americans, in general, think about violence against civilians. When Americans were asked if violence against civilian targets, such as bombings, are justified, “an astounding 24% said they believe that bomb attacks aimed at civilians are ‘often or sometimes justified’ and 6% feel they are ‘completely justified.’ In other words, American Muslims are between four and six times less likely than other Americans to endorse violent acts against civilians” (italics added).[23] Being fixated on suicide terrorism over terrorism against civilians in general is to prioritize the lesser threat over the greater threat. Mentioning a poll that illustrates the views of Muslim Americans on violence without explaining the polls of Americans in general is to portray Muslim Americans in a skewed manner.

Conclusion

While Lankford’s recommendations in the end of the book are important, most have already been stated by countless scholars before him, and can be included in recommendations to counter terrorism in general. This includes keeping an eye on the Internet and interviewing family members of suicide terrorists. Lankford could have included more recommendations in his last chapter, including Alex Schmid’s recommendations on countering terrorism.[24] Lankford’s recommendation to authorities to monitor psychologically compromised individuals and deduce the probability of suicide terrorism using “every resource they can” (p.167) seems to be a shot in the dark and a terrible waste of valuable resources considering the very low probability of suicide terrorism in the United States, and the difficulties associated with predicting suicide terrorism. Along similar lines, Lankford places too much hope in Matthew Nock’s five-minute computer test, which can detect individuals who have attempted suicide in the past, and predict which individuals are likely to commit suicide within six months (p.171). While praising this technology, Lankford stretches its utility by saying, “This could be an incredibly powerful security screening tool for identifying anyone who is contemplating a suicide attack” (p.172). Yet predicting suicide and predicting suicidal attacks is not the same matter, and the link between suicide and a suicide attack is more complex. Furthermore, Lankford acknowledges that “false positives” are still possible: “Of course, there would be some false positives. Some suicidal individuals who have no terrorist inclinations whatsoever would also be flagged. But encouraging them to get help wouldn’t be a bad thing either.” (p.172).
Lankford is to be reminded that predicting suicidal individuals is already a very difficult task, predicting suicide attackers is even more challenging, and making our security officials turn into mental health specialists may not be such a great idea.

While focusing on the psychological dimension is urgent, Lankford makes the same mistake as those whom he accuses. While he blames suicide terrorism experts of over-emphasizing the political/ideological dimension, Lankford overemphasizes the psychological/behavior dimension over other variables that are just as, if not more, important. While the book makes some interesting points, understanding suicide terrorists as mainly mentally unstable individuals, if followed, may channel the efforts of national security professionals away from more relevant causes and triggers of suicide terrorism, and terrorism in general. This can be dangerous for a country’s national security.

Lankford’s study does allow readers to understand the lives of some terrorists more fully. While useful, extrapolating premature generalizations from an unrepresentative sample can lead to an incorrect understanding of the motivations of most suicide terrorists, as well as of the effective ways to counter them. Moreover, it can also absolve those terrorists who commit premeditated acts of violence to maim and murder by labeling them psychologically unstable. It may be more important to stop the leaders who motivate both psychologically stable and unstable individuals to commit suicide terrorism, and to focus on the nationalist, political, and extremist religious interpretations, motivations, and triggers that Lankford spends only few words discussing in his book.

Martyrdom by suicide terrorists may be a “myth” according to Lankford, but not to many suicide terrorists themselves. Academic scholars too might recall the Thomas theorem (“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” [25]) and define and understand such attacks differently, based on other criteria and contexts. Overall, the book’s conclusions are based on certain unverified assumptions that require further study alongside the many studies that have already been undertaken beyond the psychological/behavior aspects. It is therefore recommended that Lankford’s conclusions not be accepted at this time until further research determines the way forward.

Acknowledgments: The author thanks Adam Lankford, Robert Brym, David Lester, and Riaz Hassan for their correspondence, thoughts, and clarification on issues related to suicide terrorism.

About the author: Zubair Qamar is a staff member with a US Government contractor based in Washington, DC, with most work experience in the United Nations. His research and interests primarily focus on economic development and countering extremism using traditional Sunni Islam.
Notes


In this paragraph, Fowler (2012) cites:


[2] Ibid. Fowler. pg. 83. In this paragraph, Fowler (2012) cites:


[6] Lankford defends Merari’s sample:

“For instance, sociologists Robert Brym and Bader Araj have claimed that Merari's sample may not be representative of the larger population of suicide bombers. However, this is a wholly unsubstantiated critique, and Brym and Araj admit that if Merari's sample is somehow not representative, it is likely in ways that are still 'unknown'.” (Adam Lankford. The Myth of Martyrdom. pp. 49-50)

Brym comments on Lankford’s criticism of his and Araj’s criticism of Merari’s sample:

“Even Professor Merari acknowledges that he drew a convenience sample (in which cases are chosen based on their accessibility) rather than a representative sample (in which cases are chosen so their characteristics match the characteristics of the population of interest). Our criticism is therefore a matter of fact. To say it is “unsubstantiated” suggests that Dr. Lankford lacks even an elementary understanding of sampling, including the fact that all convenience samples are necessarily unrepresentative in ways that are unknown.” (Robert Brym. Personal communication, Feb.11, 2013)

Robert Brym says, "Ariel Merari developed the same idea as Lankford in *Driven to Death* (Oxford University Press, 2010).” (Robert Brym. Personal communication, Feb. 11, 2013)
Even if Merari’s sample was somehow valid, it is interesting to note that Lankford remained silent in his book about the other weaknesses Brym and Bader Araj expressed with regard to Merari’s study:

“First, the interviewers may have sought out signs of depression, leading to overdiagnosis. Overdiagnosis of depression is an increasingly common problem in psychology and psychiatry, and as Merari notes, the view that depression and suicidality lead to suicide bombing in certain contexts has been a pet theory of his for more than 20 years, well before he had any evidence to support the hypothesis….”

“A second potential source of bias resides in the fact that the respondents were political prisoners serving life sentences in Israeli jails. That circumstance may have led them to exhibit a higher rate of depression and suicidality than one would find outside the prison system….”

“Third, it may be relevant that at least six and perhaps more of Merari’s fifteen respondents failed to complete their suicide mission because they lacked the resolve to do so. Some depressive and suicidal tendencies may have resulted not from a preexisting condition so much as the respondents’ failure to execute their plan, thereby disappointing their organizational sponsor, the Palestinian public, and themselves, resulting in a depressed state….”

“Fourth, the interviews and tests were conducted by authority figures who[m] respondents likely viewed as part of the coercive apparatus of an Israeli penal institution. This situation may have led prisoners to respond less than candidly. The present authors find evidence of lack of candour in one of the tests Merari and his associates conducted….” (Robert J. Brym & Bader Araj. (2012). “Are suicide bombers suicidal?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35:432-443. Available: http://projects.chass.utoronto.ca/brym/suicidal.pdf.


[12] Scott Atran had responded to Lankford in response to his Op-Ed on Dec. 18, 2012:

“Mr. Lankford argues that suicide terrorists like the 9/11 attackers or other jihadists share a triad of psychological peculiarities: mental health problems, sense of personal victimization, desire for glory. I’ve interviewed failed and would-be suicide terrorists, their families, and friends across Eurasia and North Africa. Apart from desire for glory, highly developed among jihadists and their ilk but less so among lone-wolf killers like the Newton murderer, there is little similarity. Field interviews and controlled psychological experiments by my research teams and others indicate that members of violent extremist groups are parochial altruists whose personal identity is fused with that of their primary reference group, often a small network of action-oriented friends. They are motivated by a cause (but so are millions of others who fail to act), yet kill and die for and with their friends and fellow travelers (which is why only a very few act, and always together, even if only via internet). They show no reliable history of psychopathy, suicidal tendencies, sociopathy or any of the other psycho-social problems frequently associated with lone-wolf killers. Our research also shows that personal humiliation and victimization are negative predictors of martyrdom. Rather, moral outrage over perceived threats and
injustice by an outgroup toward family, friends and ingroup drives violence. We must make every effort to understand what motivates mass murder in order to stop it, but simple and superficial comparisons will not assist.”

(Scott Atran. Personal communication, Feb.10, 2013).

[13] When this reviewer asked Riaz Hassan for his thoughts on Lankford’s criticism, he responded, “I don't know much of Dr Lankford's work. But his contention that suicide bombers are suicidal goes against…the evidence about the phenomenon” (Riaz Hassan. Personal communication, Feb.11, 2013).


[16] The quote is from Robert Pape’s response to Lankford in the Huffington Post:

“It is unfortunate that Adam Lankford has gone ad hominem in criticizing my work, but readers should not doubt the commitment and credibility of the scholarship behind Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How To Stop It published by the University of Chicago Press. The research represents years of work by a research team at the University of Chicago, was funded by the Department of Defense and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, has been endorsed by the both heads of the 9/11 Commission, the current Chief of the U.S. Navy and numerous other prominent policy makers and scholars, and published by one of the leading university presses in the country after a lengthy peer-review process.

“Cutting the Fuse surveys and analyzes over 2,200 suicide attacks and 2,500 suicide attackers around the world since 1980, based on over 10,000 documents in English and native languages and nearly every available martyr video in existence. The analysis examines the data as a whole and conducts detailed studies of every important suicide terrorist campaign and numerous studies of the specific motives of individuals (eg, the 9/11 Hamburg cell, July 2005 London bombers, and Moroccans who carried out suicide attacks in Iraq).

“The overwhelming picture that emerges is that foreign occupation is the main cause of suicide terrorism, accounting for over 95 percent of the thousands of attacks since 1980. Of course, this finding is startling. It would be much easier to come to terms with the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, which produces devastating attacks like 9/11, if it could be explained as the result of psychological illness carried out by emotionally disturbed individuals as Dr. Adam Lankford would have us believe. We do like our villains to be monsters and it may be true that mental illness is responsible for some suicide attacks. However, the percentage is low; the data shows less than 5 percent of suicide attackers experience major depression associated with ordinary suicide. And, while mental illness and ordinary suicides occur in every country at fairly constant rates, suicide attacks are highly concentrated in specific areas of foreign occupation -- typically starting when the occupation begins and sharply declining when it ends -- patterns that strongly refute mental illness as a major cause as they confirm the main findings of Cutting the Fuse.

“The strength of this scholarship and the transparent basis for its conclusions has led many in Washington and around the world to take the findings seriously. If, as we believe, the evidence shows that foreign occupation is the main cause of suicide terrorism, than Americans and other policy makers should take this seriously into account and pursue future courses of action accordingly.

[17] Ibid (Pape).

[18] This question is asked by the author, based on Pape’s following point: “But since Israel withdrew its army from Lebanon in May 2000, there has not been a single Lebanese suicide attack.” Robert Pape. (2010). ‘It’s the Occupation, Stupid.’ Foreign Policy. Available: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/18/it_s_the_occupation_stupid


Conference Announcement by the Terrorism and Political Violence Association (TAPVA)

Horizon Scanning: 21st Century Insecurities
London, June 14-16th 2013

TAPVA’s first international conference is a collaborative effort between academic, Think Tank and government partners, offering an opportunity to explore policy-relevant contemporary security threats. Hosted by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, the themes of the conference have been selected after consultations with policy makers at the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, alongside Think Tanks such as the Quilliam Foundation and the Foreign Policy Centre.

The conference will involve panels consisting of established academics, policy-makers and representatives from Think Tanks. The aims of these sessions are:

- to have informed, in-depth, and accessible discussions;
- to be policy-relevant and have a high impact; and
- to encourage future research collaboration between academia and non-university partners.

Further details on the programme and on registration will be made available at www.tapva.com, any queries can be directed at tapva@leeds.ac.uk

Panels will explore the nature of threats in the following areas:

- Radicalisation in Africa
- Preventing Terrorism: De-Radicalisation and Disengagement
- Cyber-Terrorism
- (Counter-)Terrorist Co-operation, Networking and Organisation
- Measuring the Success of Prevent; Community-Based Approaches
- Drone Warfare and Technology
Academic Participants:

Alex P. Schmid, Terrorism Research Initiative
Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, University of Hull
Andrew Silke, University of East London
Michael Boyle, La Salle University
Francesco Cavatorta, Dublin City University
Tore Bjorø, Norwegian Police University
Brian M. Jenkins, Advisor to President of RAND
Nick Rengger, University of St Andrews
Raphaello Pantucci, RUSI Senior Research Fellow

Clive Jones, University of Durham
Paul Gill, UCL
Basia Spalek, University of Birmingham
Assaf Moghadam, IDC Herzliya
Lee Jarvis, Swansea University
Tahrir-ul-Qadri, Nobel Prize Nominee
Tom Wuchte, Head of OSCE Anti-Terrorism Unit
Adam Hug, Director of Foreign Policy Centre

Funded by the University of Leeds and the British International Studies Association
*TAPVA is part of the international network of scholars of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI).
TRI’s mission is to enhance security through collaborative research
VI. Notes from the Editor

About Perspectives on Terrorism

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Security Research and Technologies (CSRT), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at [www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com). It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles - but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.

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