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I. Articles

Why Right is Might: How the Social Science on Radicalisation suggests that International Human Rights Norms actually help frame Effective Counterterrorism Policies

by Tom Parker

Abstract

Many states appear to turn instinctively to hard power resources when confronted with a terrorist threat. Yet existing research on violent extremism and radicalisation leading to terrorism suggests that such responses might well exacerbate the problem. Terrorist groups actively seek to exploit the push-pull dynamic that drives radicalisation and violent extremism, while one case study after the other indicates that states thereby appear to play actively into their hands. Social science research suggests that international human rights norms assist compliant states to moderate responses, build legitimacy, and ultimately craft effective counterterrorism strategies. A close reading of the literature on radicalisation and terrorist group formation offers qualitative evidence to support this conclusion.

“We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will... That’s the world these folks operate in, and so it’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective”.

– Former US Vice President Dick Cheney.[1]

Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11th, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, US Vice-President Dick Cheney gave an interview to the NBC news program Meet The Press in which he said that the US was going to have to embrace what he termed “the dark side” if it was to triumph against Al-Qaeda. It was a remark that came to encapsulate the approach to counterterrorism strategy adopted by the Bush administration and it still exerts a powerful gravitational pull over the national security debate in the United States over a decade later.

To those accustomed to the exercise of power, there is something both reassuring and seductive to the notion that the unrestrained use of that power can meet any challenge. Indeed for many of the ‘hard men’ in the National Security community this is an article of faith. But is it sound public policy? Social science research suggests that it is not, at least not for democracies. As Nikolai Morozov, one of the earliest theorists of terrorist violence and a leading member of the 19th century Russian anti-authoritarian group Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will), noted in his 1880 essay The Terrorist Struggle: “Force is only dreadful to the obvious enemy. Against the secret one it is completely useless.”[2]
In fact, a review of the most influential social science research conducted on countering violent extremism over the past two decades suggests that the use of unrestrained force may not just be ineffective but might actually be counterproductive and that a more measured response guided by established international human rights principles might be far more effective in countering extremist threats. It is my contention in this article that a close reading of the interviews and case studies that underpin much of the literature addressing both processes of radicalisation and terrorist group formation and longevity, offers plenty of qualitative evidence to support this conclusion.

Terrorists instinctively understand the comparative advantage weakness can offer. By operating from the shadows terrorist groups make a virtue of their small numbers and neutralize the superior military resources of the state. However, they don’t stop there, they actively seek to put these superior military resources to work on their behalf. By forcing the state to adopt a defensive posture terror groups hope to exhaust it through “the continuous tension of its own strength”, to quote another Narodnaya Volya activist, Sergei Stepniak-Kravshinski.[3] Stepniak-Kravshinski went on to stab the head of the Tsarist secret police, Nikolai Mezentsov, to death on a St. Petersburg street in 1878. Osama bin Laden echoed Stepniak’s insight in a 2004 video broadcast: “[I]t is easy for us to provoke and bait…. All we have to do is to send two mujahedin… to raise a piece of cloth on which is written Al-Qaeda in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses.”[4]

By crafting attacks designed to provoke a draconian state response, terrorists also hope exploit the inevitable societal polarization that results in order to attract new recruits to their banner while undermining the state’s own claim to be acting legitimately. We can find clear statements of this intent present in terrorist writings from the 1860s to the present day. The first to articulate this strategy was the Russian nihilist Sergei Nechaev, founder of Narodnaya Rasprava (People’s Justice). His Catechism of the Revolutionist can be considered the first ‘how to do’ manual for aspirant terrorists. Nechaev instructs his readers that violent officials should be “granted temporary respite to live, solely in order that their bestial behavior shall drive the people to inevitable revolt.”[5] This is hardly a secret formula. You can trace this same theme through the words of Irish revolutionaries Pádraig Pearse and Michael Collins, the memoirs of Irgun’s Menachem Begin, Greek Cypriot rebel commander George Grivas and Fatah’s Salah Khalaf, the pamphlets of Carlos Marighela, the writings of Che Guevara, and the public proclamations of Abu Bakr al Naji and Osama bin Laden. It is, quite literally, Terrorism 101.

Indeed terror groups seem to instinctively grasp and exploit some of the very factors that the social science suggests motivates young men and women to turn to violence, while governments seem, almost just as instinctively, to exacerbate them. The purpose of this article is to explore some of the scientific findings around radicalisation, offer evidence that terrorist groups exploit that knowledge while governments do not, and to suggest that the framework provided by human rights law and international humanitarian law can actually play an important role in assisting government to respond both appropriately and effectively to terrorist threats. The former President of Israel’s Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, once observed that although a democracy was often forced to fight with “one hand tied behind its back”, its values nevertheless ensured that it had the upper hand.[6] The metaphor hardly helped support the sentiment. I would argue that a more accurate characterization would be that these same values, when observed, actually
ensure that, rather than swinging wildly, the state acts with greater precision – in fact, to carry an unwieldy metaphor through to its conclusion, the application of these values frees up both hands to work with much greater effectiveness.

There are many pathways to radicalisation and no one given set of criteria has much predictive force. As Adriana Faranda, a member of the post-1960s Italian Marxist group Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades), told the researcher Alison Jamieson: “there were a lot of little steps which led to where I ended up.”[7] A lifetime of academic study led one of the doyens of terrorism studies, Alex Schmid, to a similar conclusion: “Terrorism is not a moncausal phenomenon and there is no silver bullet solution to it.”[8] What I have tried to do in this article is to pull together those insights from the social science literature that I have found most compelling. It is important to note that many of the theories explored below do not necessarily fit neatly together. But what we can say with some confidence is that radicalisation is usually a ‘push-pull’ phenomenon, in which internal and external drivers come together. These drivers differ from person to person. Internal, or ‘push’, factors may suggest a vulnerability to radicalisation but there is nothing inevitable about an individual’s embrace of terrorist violence. The key point is that radicalisation occurs at the point in which the private and public spheres intersect and this provides both challenges and opportunities for state intervention.

**Dehumanizing the Enemy**

A salient characteristic of the Bush administration’s ‘dark side’ approach to the Al-Qaeda threat was a profound lack of interest in the actual character and motivations of Al-Qaeda’s leaders and their supporters. As presidential adviser Karl Rove put it with unconscious hubris: “Conservatives saw what happened to us on 9/11 and said: we will defeat our enemies. Liberals saw what happened to us and said: we must understand our enemies.”[9] Rather than follow Sun Tzu’s much referenced maxim “know your enemy”, President George W. Bush preferred to mischaracterize Al-Qaeda’s followers, as when he told a joint session of Congress in September 2001: “They hate our freedoms.”[10] This was hardly an accurate summary of the grievances that bin Laden had itemized in two very public declarations. Such willful ignorance led to a number of semantic blunders in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, none greater that President Bush’s ill-judged use of the word “crusade” to underscore America’s resolve in meeting the challenge posed by Al-Qaeda. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine reacted presciently to Bush’s choice of words, commenting to reporters: “We have to avoid a clash of civilizations at all costs. One has to avoid falling into this huge trap, this monstrous trap, conceived by the instigators of the assault.”[11]

The dehumanization of ‘the other’ is, of course, a well-reported staple of warfare, so much so that anthropologists Ashley Montagu and Floyd Matson labeled dehumanization “the fifth horseman of the apocalypse”.[12] In his seminal work *Faces of the Enemy*, the philosopher Sam Keen coined the term “hostile imagination” to describe the process by which states dehumanize enemy forces by developing caricatured stereotypes that have a transformative impact on public attitudes and thereby create the space for violence and atrocity to unfold.[13] The German Marxist Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction) member Ulrike Meinhof offered the French journalist Michèle Ray a classic example of a dehumanizing narrative to justify the targeting of
state officials: “Of course we say the cops are pigs. We say the guy in uniform is a pig, not a human being. And that’s how we have to deal with him.”[14] In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, it is possible to trace evidence of this process of dehumanizing the ‘other’ at work in both the western and Muslim worlds – for example, in President Bush’s marked tendency to describe Al-Qaeda in abstract terms: “We’re not fighting a nation; we’re not fighting a religion; we’re fighting evil.”[15] However, for the purposes of this paper it is enough to note that ‘hostile imagination’ is inimical to a nuanced understanding of the opposing side.

**Push Factors**

In actual fact, social science suggests that commonplace psychological processes that we can all relate to, such as self-actualization and empathy, play an important role in radicalisation leading to violent extremism - an important insight. The reality is that terrorists rarely conform to the popular stereotype of the death’s head killer immortalized in Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poem *The Masque of Anarchy*[16] or the “doomed man” of Sergei Nechaev’s Catechism. More often than not they are ordinary men and women who, given a different set of circumstances, could have given much back to their communities. For instance, current Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri, Hamas co-founder Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) founder George Habash all began their careers as medical doctors. Habash and Rantissi were both pediatricians by training.

There are many examples of individuals from privileged backgrounds who have been inspired to turn to violence out of sympathy for a marginal group rather than from direct personal experience. *Narodnaya Volya*, one of the first terror groups of the modern era, counted many sons and daughters of the Russian elite amongst its members, like Vera Figner and Sophia Perovskaya.[17] The American anarchist Emma Goldman argued in *The Psychology of Political Violence* that *attentaters*, like her longtime lover Alexander Berkman who tried but failed to assassinate American industrialist Henry Clay Frick, or Russian noblewoman Vera Zazulich who shot and wounded a senior Tsarist police chief for ordering the flogging of an incarcerated student she had never met, were “high strung, like a violin string” attuned to the suffering of others and that it was this compassion for those less fortunate than themselves which moved them to take action.[18]

The 19th century French anarchist Emile Henry, responsible for the bombing of the offices of the Carmaux mining Company and the Café Terminus in Paris, told the audience at his trial: “To those who say: that hate does not give birth to love, I say that it is love, human love, that often engenders hate.” Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, the British-born kidnapper of *Wall Street Journal* Reporter Daniel Pearl, stated in his confession to the Pakistani police that he had become radicalized while studying at the London School of Economics after watching a BBC documentary about the Bosnia War, which he said “shook my heart.” As difficult as it might be to accept, the decision to participate in violent extremism might be driven more by empathy for the suffering of others than by the callous disregard for human life.

Abraham Maslow’s influential theory of human developmental psychology posits a hierarchy of human needs at the apex of which sits the drive for self-actualization, an internal journey of self-exploration in which an individual strives to develop his or her full potential as human being.[19]
It is perhaps the most universal human rite of passage, and terrorism literature is replete with examples of terrorist actors who have described their actions much in these terms. Jamal al-Gashey, who took part in Black September’s 1972 Munich Olympics operation, described the moment he joined Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement to a reporter: “For the first time, I felt proud and felt that my existence and my life had a meaning, that I was not just a wretched refugee, but a revolutionary figure fighting for a cause.”[20] Franco Freda, an *Ordine Nuovo* (New Order) affiliate and Italian neo-fascist theorist, wrote in his journal *Quex*: “We are not interested in seizing power, not even, per se, in establishing a new order... what interests us is combat, action in itself, the daily struggle to assert our own nature.”[21] Saajid Badat, who was originally paired with failed Al-Qaeda shoe bomber Richard Reid to attack transatlantic airliners, explained how he had become involved in the plot at the 2012 trial of another Al-Qaeda operative, Adis Medunjanin, in New York: “It was almost the glamour factor of it, drawing me in.”[22]

In the field, the failure of a counterterrorist official to appreciate how central a political choice might be to an individual’s core identity can have tragic consequences. Humam Khalil al-Balawi was a Jordanian doctor of Palestinian origin who began his career as a militant jihadist posting his articles on radical websites and chat rooms from his home computer under the alias Abu Dujana al-Khorasani. Slowly the Khorasani persona – named for a celebrated swordsman among the Prophet Mohammed’s companions and a Koranic verse about an invincible Muslim army – seems to have consumed the apparently mild-mannered doctor who wondered aloud in one post: “When will my words taste my blood?”[23] Al-Balawi’s online activities brought him to the attention of the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate, he was recruited as an asset and dispatched to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan to try to infiltrate Al-Qaeda. There he changed sides again and was directed by Al-Qaeda to carry out a lethally effective suicide bombing of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station in Khost, Afghanistan, which killed 9 CIA and allied security personnel and injured 6 more.

Perhaps one of the most explicit examples in the psychological literature on the process of self-actualization at work comes in the form of the *Sozialistisches Patientenkollektiv* (Socialist Patients’ Collective), founded in 1970 by Heidelberg psychiatrist Wolfgang Huber. The Collective embraced political violence as therapy for mental illness. The group was made up of patients from Huber’s clinic who believed mental illness was a condition created by capitalism. They embraced political therapy as a cure, as the group’s bulletin Patient Info Nr. 1 put it: “There can be no therapeutic act, which isn’t first and foremost clearly a revolutionary act... The system has made us sick, let’s give this sick system the death-thrust!” Four former Collective members participated in the takeover of the West German Embassy in Stockholm by the *Rote Armee Fraktion’s* Kommando Holger Meins in April 1975, in which two hostages and two terrorists ultimately lost their lives.

The bottom line is that terrorists are just people driven by many of the same impulses as the rest of us. Understanding this is essential to understanding the push side of the radicalisation equation – it is also essential if a state is to develop effective countermeasures to the threat such people pose. Consider the approach adopted by the Bush administration to interrogating captured members of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Driven by a hyperbolic construct of the enemy, encapsulated in a comment made by the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers in a press briefing in January 2002 that “these are people that would gnaw
hydraulic lines in the back of a C-17 [aircraft] to bring it down”[24], the Bush administration authorized the use of interrogation techniques, such as water-boarding and wall-slamming, that amounted to torture under existing international legal standards. This decision was taken despite the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s impressive track record gaining the cooperation of hardcore Al-Qaeda members - such as Millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam, Nairobi Embassy bomber Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali and bin Laden’s former bodyguard Abu Jandal - using traditional law enforcement techniques.

Proponents of torture contend that it gets results that cannot be obtained using lawful techniques. The counterfactual is of course impossible to prove one way or another, but while undoubtedly some people do cooperate under duress, the historical record clearly shows that others do not. Darius Rejali noted in an extensive study of the Gestapo’s use of torture that this most brutal of organisations failed to break senior leaders of French, Danish, Polish and German resistance groups, and that, compared to the information generated from public cooperation and informers, the leads gained from torture were “pathetic.”[25] Perhaps the best-known example of an individual holding out against torture in the counterterrorism context is that of Henri Alleg, editor of the Communist newspaper *Alger Républicain*, who was arrested in June 1957 by French paratroopers during the Battle of Algiers. Despite being subjected to electric shocks and water torture, burned, beaten, and drugged with sodium pentothal, Alleg did not give up the name of the individual who had hidden him from the authorities.[26] Self-proclaimed 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was subjected to water-boarding 183 times in a CIA ‘black site’, told delegates from the International Committee of the Red Cross who interviewed him in Guantanamo: “I gave a lot of false information in order to satisfy what I believed the interrogators wished to hear in order to make the ill-treatment stop…. I’m sure that the false information I was forced to invent…wasted a lot of their time and led to several false red-alerts being placed in the US.”[27]

Henri Alleg’s account of his treatment in French custody, *The Question*, became a *cause célèbre*, helping to undermine domestic support for French operations in Algeria. Alleg also ruminated on the effect of the use of torture on those doing the torturing, describing the detention center in which he was held as “a school of perversion for young Frenchmen.”[28] The US adoption of so-called ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ proved to be a profound misstep that generated little intelligence,[29] alienated close allies, and provided Al-Qaeda with a propaganda windfall – Guantanamo was mentioned 32 times in Al-Qaeda propaganda messages between 2003 and 2010 and 26 times by affiliate groups.[30] As General David Petraeus observed in an interview in 2010, “Abu Ghraib and other situations like that are non-biodegradable. They don’t go away. The enemy continues to beat you with them like a stick.”[31]

**Pull Factors**

However, it is on the ‘pull’, or external, side of the radicalisation equation that ill-conceived and heavy-handed state countermeasures can be most counterproductive. Studies of voter responses in Israel, Europe and the United States by Claude Berrebi, Esteban Klor and Christophe Chowanietz suggest that electorates respond to terrorist attacks by supporting more hawkish candidates almost in direct proportion to the lethality of the actual attacks themselves.[32] The
angels of our better nature are often trampled in the rush to ‘rally round the flag’ and effective counterterrorism policies suffer as democratic politicians feel constrained to reflect, rather than reshape, public sentiment. US presidential candidate John Kerry discovered firsthand on the campaign trail in 2004 the high political price that those who try to swim against the tide can pay when he characterized Al-Qaeda as “primarily” an intelligence and law enforcement problem. [33] That was not a position the American public was ready to embrace - as Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko have noted, radicalisation can be a two-way street.[34]

Deploying military forces to regional trouble spots is a common counterterrorism tactic designed to both deter potential threats and reassure the general public. Yet this is also a tactic that is repeatedly referenced in personal memoirs and radicalisation literature as a major driver of political violence. In his influential study of micro-mobilization processes in 1970s Northern Ireland Robert White found that Provisional IRA (PIRA) violence increased significantly in months following incidents in which the security forces shot down civilians and in response to the introduction of internment.[35] In a series of interviews with PIRA volunteers, White found that their personal interaction with British troops was cited again and again as they explained their decision to take up arms.[36] Similarly, a senior member of PIRA told John Horgan: “For me anyway, the sight of the B Specials and the RUC [Royal Ulster Constabulary] beating nationalist people off the street in Derry was a big factor in joining the Republican movement.”[37]

Once the British Army was deployed to Northern Ireland in August 1969, foot patrols rapidly became a familiar, and much disliked, presence in Catholic neighborhoods, along with the random stopping and questioning of pedestrians. In 1972 British soldiers searched more than 36,000 homes, in 1973 this number had increased to 75,000. Between April 1973 and April 1974 four million vehicles were stopped and searched at military checkpoints.[38] Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams later commented: “The attitude and presence of British troops was also a reminder that we were Irish, and there was an instant resurgence of national consciousness and an almost immediate politicisation of the local populace.”[39]

George Grivas, the commander of Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organisation of Cypriot Struggle), made much the same observation about the manner in which British troops on Cyprus tried to subdue the underground movement dedicated to driving the British off the island and achieving enosis (union) with Greece: “The ‘security forces’ set about their work in a manner which might have been deliberately designed to drive the population into our arms. On the pretext of searching, they burst into people’s homes by day and night, made them stand for hours with their hands up, abused and insulted them… Anyone who protested had scant hope of getting justice.”[40] In his memoirs, General Grivas mocked British commanders for their over-reliance on conventional military forces, noting: “One does not use a tank to catch field mice – a cat will do the job better.”[41]

Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, has published research suggesting a positive correlation between support for suicide bombings and the number of Israeli checkpoints Palestinians have to pass through as they go about their daily routines.[42] In June 2009 the Israeli military established an average of 70 flying checkpoints in the West Bank every week.[43] Not for nothing has the Palestinian journalist
Zuhair Kurdi observed: “The legal father of the suicide bomber is the Israeli checkpoint, whilst his mother is the house demolition.”[44] Israeli counterterrorism experts are not unaware of the dilemma as the former head of the Israeli security service Shin Bet, Amy Ayalon, has acknowledged: “War against terrorism is part of a vicious cycle. The fight itself creates… even more frustration and despair, more terrorism and increased violence.”[45]

Shikaki’s findings are also echoed by Robert Pape and James Feldman’s research into the causal variables most closely associated globally with suicide bombings. Pape and Feldman found that 95% of suicide attacks from 1980-2003 occurred to eject democratic states from territory viewed by terrorist groups as part of their national homeland.[46] To underscore their point, Pape and Feldman referenced several of the martyrdom videos recorded by the 9/11 hijackers, including this quote from Hamza al-Ghamdi: “And I say to America: if it wants its armies and people to be safe, then it must withdraw all of its forces from the Muslim lands and depart from all our countries. If not, then let it await the men, prepare its coffins and dig graves for its citizens.”[47]

Australian soldier-scholar David Kilcullen has coined the term “accidental guerrilla” to describe the radicalizing impact that military deployments may have on third parties not directly involved in a conflict. Kilcullen describes the effect NATO operations in Afghanistan have had on local communities with no particular sympathy for Al-Qaeda or the Taliban. The lack of cultural sensitivity, limited political understanding and clumsy targeting decisions that are inevitable by-products of expeditionary warfare in unfamiliar territory can alienate, and ultimately inflame, hitherto neutral communities. As Baitullah Mehsud, deceased leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Student Movement of Pakistan), put it: “Every drone strike brings me three or four new suicide bombers.”[48]

Jeff Goodwin argued in No Other Way Out that repressive state practices ‘construct’ revolutionary movements as effectively as the best professional revolutionaries, by channeling and organising political dissent along radical lines.[49] By adopting repressive measures, the regime is also likely to be reinforcing an ideological narrative which aims to show the regime in a negative light, challenge its legitimacy and enhancing the credibility of the terrorist cause - thus contributing to a process labeled “frame amplification” by sociologist David Snow.[50] That states will respond aggressively to a terrorist threat is almost inevitable in the absence of a steady hand on the tiller.[51]. Indeed, Louise Richardson has gone so far as to suggest the existence of a pathology of state overreaction.[52] This is an opening that terrorist groups are actively and explicitly hoping to exploit, as Che Guevara explained in his Message to the Tricontinental: “We must attack [the enemy] wherever he may be… Then his moral fiber shall decline. He will even become more beastly.”[53] The Brazilian leftist group Alianca Libertadora Nacional (National Liberation Alliance) actually went so far as to spell out its intention to create a crisis that would provoke a military response in its founding manifesto.[54]

Anthony Oberschall has noted that at the outset of a terrorist campaign there is often a specific “precipitating incident” that prompts a group to go underground and embrace violence.[55] For German Marxists this precipitating incident was the 1967 death of Berlin student Benno Ohnesorg at the hands of a policeman. Michael Baumann of the anarchist Movement 2nd June described the impact it had on him: “Benno Ohnesorg. It did a crazy thing to me. When his casket went by, it just went ding, something got started there.”[56] For the Italian Brigate Rosse,
it was the 1969 bombing of the headquarters of the Banca Nazionale dell’Agricoltura in Milan’s Piazza Fontana, which killed 17 people and injured 88 injured. The event was used by the Italian authorities to justify a clampdown on leftwing activism – an anarchist framed for the attack, Giuseppe Pinelli, died in police custody. Police Commissioner Luigi Calabresi, from whose office Pinelli plunged to his death, was killed in turn by the leftwing group Lotta Continua (Continuous Struggle). The Piazza Fontana bombing was most likely carried out by right-wing extremists with the connivance of the Italian Servizio Informazioni Difesa (Defence Intelligence Service) making it perhaps the purest example of the unintentional social construction of a terrorist movement by a state.

Emblematic incidences of state repression can also foreshadow significant escalations in pre-existing conflicts. The killing of 13 unarmed demonstrators at a Londonderry protest march on 30 January 1972 when soldiers from the British Parachute Regiment opened fire on the crowd, provoked a furious response from the Republican community. The public coroner in Londonderry accused the paratroopers of “sheer unadulterated murder.”[57] In Dublin an enraged mob responded to “Bloody Sunday” by storming the British Embassy burning it to the ground.[58] However, of most significance was the dramatic escalation of Republican terrorist tactics. In an explicit response to the events of ‘Bloody Sunday’, the Official IRA left a 280lb car bomb outside the Officer’s Mess of the Parachute Regiment in Aldershot, Hampshire.[59] The blast killed seven people – the first deaths on the British mainland as a result of ‘The Troubles’. Deliberate attacks on civilian targets by the Provisional IRA on the British mainland soon followed, including four simultaneous car bombs left in London in March 1973, bombs at mainline London railway stations in September 1973 and in public houses in Guildford and Birmingham in the autumn of 1974.

Similarly, the application of the death penalty in terrorism cases can rebound on states that employ it. In December 1893 Auguste Vaillant bombed the Chamber of Deputies of the French National Assembly to protest the execution of the anarchist François Claudius Koenigstein, better known as Ravachol. The attack injured 20 deputies. Vaillant was executed in turn, despite the fact he had killed no one – the first Frenchmen executed in 19th century for a non-fatal crime – provoking outrage on the left. Emile Henri bombed the Café Terminus in Paris in an explicit act of revenge, killing one diner and wounding twenty. He later justified his action thus: “You have hanged us in Chicago, decapitated us in Germany, garroted us in Xerez, shot us in Barcelona, guillotined us in Montbrison and Paris, but what you can never destroy is anarchy.”[60]

The British decision in 1916 to execute the ringleaders of the Easter Uprising gave fresh impetus to the Irish struggle for independence, as Michael Collins himself acknowledged: “that valiant effort and the martyrdoms which followed it finally awoke the sleeping spirit of Ireland.”[61] The French decision to execute two Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front) members, Zabane and Ferradj, led to the outbreak of the Battle of Algiers in 1956. FLN commander Ramdane Abane ordered his subordinate in Algiers, Saadi Yacef, to “kill any European between the ages of eighteen and fifty-four” and within seventy-two hours forty-nine French civilians had been murdered in retaliation.[62] In August 1966 the Muslim Brotherhood theorist Sayyid Qutb was sent to the gallows by the regime of Gamal Nasser following a failed assassination attempt on the Egyptian leader. Qutb was offered several opportunities for
clemency but refused them all telling his sister: “My words will be stronger if they kill me.”[63]

Qutb was defended in court by Ayman al Zawahiri’s uncle, Mahfouz, and Osama bin Laden attended public lectures given by his Qutb’s brother, Muhammad, at King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Sayyid Qutb’s prediction about the force of his posthumous legacy was correct. This does not bode well for the US decision to make the death penalty available for sentences based on Military Commission hearings in Guantanamo.

Less lethal forms of repression can have equally disastrous consequences. Psychologists have long posited that prolonged isolation can strengthen group bonds, creating “totalistic groups” that become all-consuming for their members.[64] Historically, the practice of indefinite detention appears to have served to accelerate this effect. The confinement of hitherto peaceful Zemlya i Volya (Land and Liberty) activists for several years in grim Tsarist prisons in the 1870s, during which dozens died of disease or suicide, radicalized a significant minority to establish Narodnaya Volya under the leadership of Alexander Michailov.[65] Internment camps also serve radicalisation’s purpose by bringing together militants from far-flung places who might otherwise never have met, creating bonds among them that long survive their eventual dispersal. After the failure of the Easter Uprising, the British interned almost 2,000 Irish nationalists in a prison camp named Frongoch in rural Wales. Frongoch would later become known in Ireland as ollscoil na réabhlóide or the University of Revolution. It was there that Michael Collins was elected head of the Frongoch contingent of the Irish Republican Brotherhood that would go on to pioneer urban guerrilla warfare with the creation of The Squad. In the words of his biographer Tim Pat Coogan: “When the Frongoch gates swung open he was in a position to ensure that the spores of revolutionary violence blasted into the air above the [General Post Office] in Easter Week would be wafted into every corner of Ireland.”[66] Indeed, Collins’ legacy spread far beyond Ireland. The German terrorism expert Peter Waldmann has posited a “contagion effect” for successful terrorist strategies [67] and Collins inspired national liberation movements around the world by his example. One notable admirer was future Israeli Prime Minster Yitzhak Shamir, who as leader of the Zionist terrorist group Lohamei Herut Israel (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), adopted ‘Michael’ as his nom de guerre during his struggle against the British mandate authorities - in explicit homage to Collins.[68].

Sins of Omission

It is not just purposeful state action that can pull more hostile actors into an existing conflict. Radicalisation is a phenomenon in which sins of omission can be just as damaging as sins of commission. The failure of a state to grapple with underlying social problems and inequalities can also be a significant driver of violent extremism. Social exclusion, boredom and a demographic youth bulge are all powerful potential predictors of radicalization. When coupled to a strong sense of community and a well-framed grievance, this can be an explosive mix.

In his seminal study Why Men Rebel (1970), political scientist Ted Gurr posited that, although poverty was not directly correlated with political violence, significant income inequality coupled with a sense of injustice about the disposition of wealth and privilege often was – a concept he termed ‘relative deprivation’ and defined as the “perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and value capabilities.”[69] For instance, Catholics in Northern Ireland in the 1960s
and 70s compared their situation to Ulster Protestants and not to that of Catholics south of the border in economically more backward Eire. Gurr also considered a significant or dramatic adverse alteration in status to have a similar effect on groups and individuals. Here one might consider the radicalizing impact that the Tsarist decision in the early 1870s to withdraw university scholarships from poorer students had on young liberals. The decision effectively pushed more than half of these educated young men and women onto the streets. Many of them ended up in communes of former students where radical ideas spread like wildfire.[70]

Relative deprivation is a factor that can be identified especially in class-based struggles. Susanna Ronconi was a founder of the Italian Marxist-Leninist terrorist group Prima Linea (Front Line). She was linked directly to three murders, to the planning of six more, and to the notorious kneecapping of ten business students at the School of Industrial Management in Turin. Ronconi justified her actions in terms that Gurr would have recognized: “I did not, and do not see myself as a violent person, but I believed that under certain conditions, when one class held power and the other didn’t, the use of violence was legitimate.”[71] Although Gurr subsequently somewhat backed away from the concept of relative deprivation, the personal accounts of many of the individuals who turned to violence in the anti-authoritarian and Marxist waves of terrorism suggest that it continues to offer a useful insight into radicalisation processes. Che Guevara’s memoir of traveling around Latin America as a young medical student, The Motorcycle Diaries, is an apt example – repeatedly encountering great disparities in wealth and circumstance, typified in one passage by ‘blond’ American tourists photographing Peruvian Indians picturesque in their destitution, Guevara concluded: “I knew that when the great guiding spirit cleaves humanity into two antagonistic halves, I will be with the people.”[72]

One might also extend the concept of ‘perceived discrepancy’ rather further than Gurr intended, to argue that a similar process is at work when states fail to abide by the standards that they publicly espouse. Government hypocrisy is a frequent complaint in terrorist statements. Ayman al Zawahiri addressed this point in his book Knights under the Prophet’s Banner: “The West is not only an infidel but also a hypocrite and a liar. The principles that it brags about are exclusive to, and the personal property of, its people alone. They are not to be shared by the peoples of Islam.”[73] Khalid Sheikh Mohammed also touched on the same theme in a statement submitted at his first Military Commission hearing in 2008: “You have violated all laws of war, and in particular, your treatment of prisoners of war, in Afghanistan and Iraq. We are the best example of such violations and your "Black Sites" for torturing prisoners.”[74] Similarly, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) bomb maker Ibrahim al-Asiri told an interviewer that he turned against the Saudi state after he was interdicted and imprisoned while trying to make his way to Iraq to join the insurgency against US forces: “They put me in prison and I began to see the depths of [the Saudi] servitude to the Crusaders and their hatred for the true worshippers of God, from the way they interrogated me.”[75]

Social exclusion is another side of this same coin. The societies we create and the actions we take can be a prime driver of radicalisation, especially when minority ‘out groups’ feel excluded from the opportunities afforded to those considered part of mainstream society. Forensic psychiatrist Marc Sageman’s study of 172 self-proclaimed jihadists found that 80% were “cultural outcasts living at the margins of society” as unassimilated first- or second-generation immigrants in majority non-Muslim countries.[76] Mohammed Merah, the Al-Qaeda-inspired
The gunman who murdered seven people in the French city of Toulouse, in 2012 had previously tried unsuccessfully to join the French Army and the French Foreign Legion. An old school friend, Faoud, told the New York Times: “Our passports may say that we are French, but we don’t feel French because we are never accepted here. No one can excuse what he did, but he is a product of French society, of the feeling that he had no hope, and nothing to lose. It was not Al-Qaeda that created Mohammed Merah, it was France.”[77] The aunt of British-born Al-Qaeda shoe bomber Richard Reid attributed his radicalisation to precisely this type of alienation: “He was so lonely, his life so empty… he found solace with his Muslim brothers.”[78] In his youth Reid had been abandoned by his father, placed in foster care, convicted of multiple petty crimes, and incarcerated in two different prisons.

Social exclusion can also operate at the international level. The internationalization of Palestinian nationalist terrorism in the 1970s was driven in large part by a sense that the world was ignoring the plight of a community languishing marginalized and forgotten in refugee camps scattered around the fringes of their former homeland. PFLP founder George Habash explained to the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci the logic behind his group’s decision to target international air travel: “The world has been using us and has forgotten us. It is time they realized we exist.”[79] At the beginning of 1972 the Palestinian Liberation Organisation wrote to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) seeking to field a Palestinian team at the 1972 Munich Olympics.[80] The IOC ignored the letter, setting in motion the chain of events that would lead to the Palestinian group Black September holding hostage members of the Israeli Olympic team in the middle of the competition, and ultimately to the deaths of eleven Israeli athletes and five members of Black September. In a statement released by Black September entitled The Will of the Munich Guerrillas, the hostage takers sought to justify their actions in the following terms: “There is a people who have been suffering for years under the yoke of an enemy who has his place at this tournament. So, let the games stop for a few hours.”[81] Salah Khalaf, the PLO Intelligence chief better known as Abu Ayad who had participated in the planning of the attack, noted that the Munich operation had ensured that “world opinion was forced to take note of the Palestinian drama.”[82]

Political scientists Jack Goldstone and Gary Fuller have suggested that a ‘youth bulge’ can be a major risk factor for violence, with Fuller drawing a correlation between the 15-to-24-year-old age group exceeding 20% of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka and a surge of Tamil Tiger activity in the late 1980s.[83] Recent studies suggest that this factor is particularly exacerbated when coupled with either social exclusion or modernization and rising expectations.[84] In the years preceding the first Intifada, the number of Palestinian men with 12 or more years of education doubled while their real wages declined by 30% and unemployment climbed as high as 50%. Field research undertaken by Scott Atran in North Africa and David Kilcullen in Afghanistan has identified boredom as a powerful causal factor in youthful radicalisation.[85] Kilcullen describes an ambush in Afghanistan in which a US unit was attacked first by Taliban forces and then by unaffiliated local youths. The youths later told Kilcullen that their intervention in the firefight was not motivated by any personal animosity towards the United States: “When the battle was right there in front of them, how could they not join in? Did we understand just how boring it was to be a teenager in a valley in Central Afghanistan? This was the most exciting thing to happen in their valley for years.”[86]
The work of Marc Sageman has popularized the importance of social networks to the development of terrorist organisations.[87] His studies demonstrate the role of certain individuals as organisational hubs connecting disparate activist nodes. “Small world” social networks can draw heavily on family and community connections – for example, the 1993 World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and 9/11 architect Khalid Sheikh Mohammed are nephew and uncle - making them difficult to penetrate. Political scientist Max Abrahms argues that individuals who join terrorist groups are in essence ‘solidarity seekers’ driven to violence as much by social networks as by ideology[88]. Psychiatrist Jerrold Post reported finding “an overarching sense of the collective consumes the individual” in his interviews with incarcerated terrorists.[89] Sociologist Scott Atran has reported that groups like Hamas have set up youth soccer teams in disadvantaged areas like Hebron’s Wad Abu Katila neighborhood, precisely so they can take advantage of this dynamic.[90] The Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom) similarly looked to recruit new members from youth mountaineering clubs.[91]

A powerful sense of belonging can trump other, more practical, considerations – the German militant Michael Baumann described how he kept faith with his comrades despite his own deep misgivings: “I saw that it was going to go a hundred percent wrong… I only participated out of solidarity.”[92] Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko recount the personal history of Adrian Michailov who was sucked into the terrorist campaign unleashed by Narodnaya Volya against senior Tsarist officials out of a sense of loyalty to his radical “family,” when he would have preferred to return to the countryside and resume efforts to raise the political consciousness of the peasantry.[93] An anonymous member of the Brigade Rosse told Donnatella Della Porta that the sense of shared sacrifice was a large part of the appeal of participating in the Italian underground: “We shared the idea that the armed struggle… was also an occasion to build human relations which had to be… absolute, based on a readiness to die, the opposite of everyday life, of the individualization of a capitalist society.”[94] When asked by the FBI agent interviewing him in Guantanamo why he had remained in Al-Qaeda even though it had targeted so many innocent people, Osama bin Laden’s driver Salim Hamden replied: “when one is part of that home, from the inside it is very difficult to think of what is happening on the outside.”[95] Sociologist Chester Barnard termed this subordination of the individual to the collective the ‘condition of communion’. [96] The implications of the social science research in this field for public policy are profound.”[97]

Martha Crenshaw has argued that a thirst for revenge generated by violent government action can become an end in itself - what she terms “a modern form of feuding” - and of course such action also further serves to amplify the anti-government frame within which militant groups operate.[98] Louise Richardson identified ‘revenge’ as one of the ‘three Rs’ of terrorism – the others being ‘renown’ (for which we might substitute self-actualization) and ‘reaction’. Scott Atran cites the example of Elza Gazueva, one of the so-called Chechen “Black Widows”, who in November 2001 walked into the headquarters of the Russian commander who had ordered the torture and execution of her husband and brother, and detonated a suicide vest killing them both. [99] Ami Pedahzur noted that the elimination of Palestinian leaders in the 1970s and 1980s “heightened the desire for revenge against the Israelis and were a shot in the arm for the localization of terrorism.”[100] On 31 December 2000 the IDF ambushed and killed Dr. Thabet
Thabet, a Fatah member and suspected leader of a Tanzim cell, as he drove through his home town of Tulkarem. In an explicit act of revenge for the killing of his uncle, Dr. Thabet’s nephew, assisted by other members of Fateh, murdered two Israeli businessmen in Tulkarem on 23 January 2001.[101]

The fact that targeted killing has emerged in the past decade as an increasingly utilized counterterrorism tool is, in the light of the above, a great cause for concern. In recent years Turkey, Colombia, Russia, Israel and the United States have all carried out targeted killings of alleged terrorist suspects overseas. Past experience suggests that even if, as the Israeli Defense Force has claimed in testimony before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, some “useful” tactical benefit is gained by the elimination of a key terrorist figure,[102] at the strategic level operations of this nature are only like to provoke further terrorist attacks. In 2001, Israel assassinated Abu Ali Mustafa, Head of the PFLP, one of the five most prominent figures in the PLO at the time. Mustafa was killed on August 27 in a helicopter strike on his office. The PFLP responded by killing the Israeli Minister of Tourism, Rehavam Zeevi, in October of the same year, breaking the post-9/11 ceasefire declared by Yasir Arafat.[103] The reported June 2012 elimination of a senior Al-Qaeda member, Libyan-born Abu Yahya al-Libi, by a US drone strike in Pakistan, was, within hours, followed by a bomb attack on the US mission in Benghazi, Libya. A local Islamist group operating under the nom de guerre The Brigades of Imprisoned Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, claimed responsibility for the attack, stating explicitly in online posts that it had been carried out in response to the US strike on al-Libi.[104]

Jenna Jordan’s research on so-called leadership decapitation strikes found that decapitation was effective in only 17% of the cases in her dataset but that in the vast majority of cases decapitated groups actually had a slower rate of decline than groups whose leadership remained intact.[105] She also found that decapitation strikes were likely to have “counterproductive effects in larger, older, religious, and separatist organisations.”[106] David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum have observed that it only took 18 days after the killing of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, for Al-Qaeda in Iraq to resume operation under new leadership.[107] It is also worth noting that innocent people and third party nationals are often caught in the crossfire of such actions – the Israeli Operation Wrath of God, launched against Fateh and the Black September Organisation in response to the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, also accidentally claimed the lives of a Moroccan waiter, a British Student, a French nun and an elderly Italian woman before it was finally discontinued.

The Moral Deficit

When a country adopts counterterrorism policies that contravene human rights norms or accepted international legal practices such as targeted killing or coercive interrogation not only is it likely to reinforce, or amplify, the narrative frame that its targets are using to attract support, thus pulling more individuals into the fight, but it is also likely to make it increasingly difficult for allies, at least those wedded to democratic values, to work as closely with it as before.[108] In an influential constructivist study of US-Israeli relations, Michael Barnett found that US support for Israel was strongest when the values underpinning the national security cultures of the two countries were most closely aligned.[109] In the past decade, we have seen European support for
US counterterrorism measures drastically impacted by policies that would fall foul of the European Convention of Human Rights. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this is the in absentia conviction of 23 US agents in an Italian court for the role they played in the extraordinary rendition of radical imam Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr from Milan to Cairo in 2003.[110] Criminal investigations involving US counterterrorism officials have also been initiated in Spain and Germany.

The British authorities have been surprisingly open about the difficulties this divergence has caused for the transatlantic ‘special relationship’. The Director General of the Security Service (MI5), Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, acknowledged in testimony before the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) in 2007: “We certainly now have inhibitions… greater inhibitions than we once did.”[111] Sir John Scarlett, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), similarly reported that his agency sought “credible assurances” that any action taken by the US on the basis of intelligence provided by UK agencies would be “humane and lawful” and that when such assurances were lacking “we cannot provide the information.”[112] The decision by Polish prosecutors to charge the former Head of Polish Intelligence, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, with “unlawfully depriving prisoners of their liberty” because of the alleged role he played in helping to establish a CIA secret prison in Stare Klejkuty, north-eastern Poland, in 2002-2003, will undoubtedly have had a chilling effect on the predisposition of many US allies to work closely with American covert operators.[113]

Conclusion

As the United States began to frame its aggressive response to the 9/11 attacks, White House counsel Alberto Gonzales notoriously dismissed some of the protections afforded detainees in the Geneva Conventions as “obsolete” and “quaint”. [114] The prevailing view amongst the Bush administration was that concepts such as international humanitarian law and universal human rights would only obstruct an effective attempt to meet the threat posed by Al-Qaeda. As the former Head of the CIA’s Clandestine Service, Jose Rodriguez, told reporter Lesley Stahl: “We needed to get everybody in government to put their big boy pants on and provide the authorities that we needed.”[115]

However, a cursory review of the terrorism literature outlined above ought to have given even the most ‘gung-ho’ member of the Bush administration pause for thought. Social science research findings support the contention that observing the human rights norms that guarantee due process, equality before the law, and equal access to basic services, while outlawing torture, indefinite detention, the death penalty and targeted killing, can actually help ensure that states avoid falling into practices that can serve as drivers of radicalisation. As I have sought to demonstrate above, personal testimony from individuals who have actually become involved in terrorist violence consistently references coercive state action, or discriminatory treatment, among the factors contributing to a decision to take up arms. This is not something that any policymaker seriously committed to defeating terrorism can afford to ignore.

Grievances do not fall fully-framed from the heavens. They start somewhere and, more often than not, that starting point is an individual’s interaction with an agent, or agents, of the state. A grievance may be amplified or in a sense pre-conditioned by social, structural or developmental
factors such as group membership, organised discrimination or personal exploration - but it is very rarely fixed in amber. Grievances are by their very nature dynamic and discursive, and while they can be subject to amplification, mitigation is also a possibility - if not necessarily for hardcore members of terrorist groups, at least for their sympathizers without which they cannot operate for very long.

Getting the public policy response to emerging terrorist threats right is therefore absolutely crucial. The use of torture may have tipped the balance for the French armed forces in the Battle of Algiers but it ultimately further radicalized Algerian Arabs, alienated the French public, and eroded good order and discipline within the French army to the point that France was ultimately politically defeated by the *Front de Libération Nationale*. [116] It can also be argued that only once the British government managed to bring its counterterrorism strategy in Northern Ireland more or less within the framework of human rights norms, after a series of embarrassing reversals at the European Court of Human Rights, did it become possible for the British to build a partnership for peace with the Irish government, based in large part on shared values and mutual interests, which ultimately persuaded the Provisional IRA to abandon the armed struggle. [117]

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks some commentators, most notably Conor Gearty and Michael Ignatieff, speculated that the world might be entering a period in which concern for human rights would be forced to take second place behind the demands of greater security.[118] The implicit assumption was that respect for human rights norms would inevitably prove to be an obstacle to effective counterterrorism policies, and historically this has proved to be an enduring narrative. I have drawn on anecdotal evidence and personal statements from terrorist actors from different time periods, far flung regions and disparate ideologies to suggest that in fact the opposite is true. Inevitably, some of these examples will be more persuasive to the reader than others, but my purpose here is simply to point the way for further research.

Radicalisation is not an ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ issue – states are actors in the radicalisation process and how they respond to threats and the policies they adopt can – for better or worse - make a real difference. Asymmetrical warfare is all about turning an opponent’s strength into a weakness. Terrorist groups around the world have been extraordinarily successful at doing just that. International human rights standards can help states moderate their responses so that they do not play into the hands of those who would seek to do them harm and, quite literally, turn themselves into their own worst enemies. In other words, as far as the struggle against terrorism is concerned, right is quite literally might.

*About the Author: Tom Parker* is Policy Director for Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Human Rights at Amnesty International, USA. The views expressed in this article are entirely his own, and should not be taken to represent those of the Amnesty movement.

**Notes**
[54] Louise Richardson, op. cit., p. 199.
[63] Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, op. cit., p. 188.
[64] Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, op. cit., p. 130.
[70] Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, op. cit., p. 111.
[82] Daniel Byman, op. cit., p. 47.
[87] See Marc Sageman, op. cit., p. 77.
[92] Martha Crenshaw, op. cit., p. 130.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Scott Atran, op. cit., p. 327.

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[111] Intelligence and Security Committee, op. cit., p. 47.

[112] Ibid.


Assessing Psycho-Social Resilience in Diplomatic, Civilian & Military Personnel Serving in a High-Threat Security Environment during Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorism Operations in Iraq

by Anne Speckhard, Gino Verleye & Beatrice Jacuch

Abstract
Currently thousands of military, diplomatic and civilian personnel are deployed under NATO, UN, and other multi-national, as well as national auspices in high-threat security environments, including active conflict zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Soldiers are generally well trained and prepared psychologically to face armed conflict. Civilian contractors and diplomats, on the other hand, often are not. Moreover in today’s high-threat security environments terrorists, insurgents and even child soldiers may be the opposing force, creating a more uncertain and anxiety provoking environment and more difficult to identify security threat. These facts have serious implications for the psycho-social resilience of diplomatic, civilian and military personnel deployed in such environments. This article investigates psycho-social resilience in a small exploratory sample of US embassy staff, contractors and US forces serving in Iraq during 2007, a time when Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), roadside bombings, mortar attacks, kidnappings, murders and sniper fire were an everyday occurrence in Iraq.

Introduction
During the period 2005-2007, the US Embassy in Iraq was responsible for a staff of approximately five thousand; the majority being civilian contractors supporting diplomats and military staffed there. At the time the US State Department was just beginning to consider the psycho-social ramifications of deploying a large share of its personnel in high-threat security zones where they would be separated from family members and work long hours on a daily basis. Training at that time for deployment to Iraq for US State Department personnel included security and first aid training and a brief introduction to handling the psychological stress of dealing with serving in a war zone and facing terrorist threats (including car bombs, mortar attacks, and suicide bombers). In a similar fashion, US Department of Defense contractors underwent pre-deployment training; however their training units had no briefing on handling psychological stress responses to a high-threat environment. In 2007 the State Department had no mandatory debriefing for those coming out of high-threat security environments [2] and no study had been done to assess if diplomatic and civilian personnel were resilient working in active conflict zones or becoming psychologically traumatized during their service in Iraq. There was no good data collection on psycho-social resilience in civilian and diplomatic personnel serving in Iraq (only the military was conducting studies) and consequently no way of assessing if civilian and diplomatic personnel were suffering from negative psychological and social responses to being deployed under threat situations combined with the additional stresses.
of working long hours and being deployed for long periods of time away from family members and social support networks. This study was a first attempt to remedy that situation.

Two of the authors (Speckhard and Verleye) were at the time serving on the NATO Human Factors & Medicine, Research and Technology Task Group (140) – Psycho-social, Organisational, and Cultural Aspects of Terrorism. This Task Group had the study of civilian and military resilience to terrorist and insurgent threats as one of its mandates. In addition, the lead author’s spouse (Speckhard) was at the time serving as the US Deputy Chief of Mission in Iraq while she was going in and out of Iraq herself as a military contractor (designing and pilot testing the US Department of Defense’s Detainee Rehabilitation Program). The confluence of these circumstances created an attractive opportunity for carrying out an exploratory pilot study on the psycho-social resilience of US civilian, diplomatic and military personnel serving in Iraq during those days. The current article describes the results of the author’s efforts to conduct a Internet-based, low budget exploratory study of the psycho-social resilience of US diplomats, civilians and military service personnel working in a high-threat security environment (facing terrorist attacks and insurgent operations).

Assessing psycho-social resilience to deployment in a high-threat security environment is a challenging endeavor and requires creativity and the willingness to potentially confront danger in order to learn. In this case the researchers decided that there were two important questions to explore: (i) how resilient are our civilian and military personnel while serving in Iraq, and what variables influence positive and negative resilience, and (ii) is it possible to carry out a study of resilience to a high-threat security environment using available technology (Internet and web-based technology) without having to enter the threatening environment to carry out the survey?

The lead researcher (Speckhard), a psychologist who had traveled to and been working inside Iraq on three different occasions had a fair idea of the challenges faced by those serving there. She was thus able to build upon previous work of the team in studying and modeling psycho-social resilience to terrorism to design a resilience survey to reflect the “boots on the ground” experiences while the other team members were able to turn this survey into an Internet based tool that could provide an assessment from afar. The steps in carrying this out included: theoretically defining resilience in a manner that applied to a threatening security environment, designing a survey tool that reflected the variables, and doing so in a manner that appealed to very busy professionals, turning this survey into a web-based design, identifying a sample, inviting participants, collecting results and analyzing them. This article describes the process of this exploratory study and its outcomes.

**Theoretically Defining Psycho-Social Resilience**

The concept of resilience implies adaptability and a certain ability to “bounce back” in the face of a challenge or stressor. In this study the resilience model builds upon previous work of the authors studying societal resilience to terrorism in Belgium whereby the concept of resilience is defined as a dynamic variable, influenced by many co-variates (defined below), and existing on a continuum of adaptability [3]. According to this definition an individual who is resilient to serving in a high-threat security environment must retain, or in the best-case scenario even show gains in flexibility, adaptability, functionality and empathy. To show any losses in function,
flexibility, adaptability or empathy is to show a loss in resilience. A loss of resilience likewise is indicated by the appearance of pathological symptoms interfering with normal functioning including symptoms of posttraumatic stress (including flashbacks, high arousal states, loss of concentration, irritability, etc.), dissociation (a separation of normal cognitive functions, emotional numbing, inability to think, etc.), anxiety, depression, and panic, all of which interfere with and create a loss of normal functioning. Likewise a gain in xenophobia (hatred of outsiders such as Muslims or Arabs in this case) is also assessed in this model as contributing to a loss of resilience.

According to the model of resiliency used here, there are ten main covariates of resiliency. These include the following main categories: Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), World Assumptions, Perceived Risk and Fear, Personal Preoccupation, Attitude towards Government Communications, Social Buffering, Social Capabilities, Life History, Sense of Mastery and Xenophobia. These concepts and the entire model of resilience is elucidated further in other publications and space here does not allow for a lengthy explanation.[4] However, it is important to note that PTSD, a challenge to world assumptions, perceived risk and fear, and personal preoccupation all relate to how the individual may lose functions in the face of a high-threat security environment, and become fearful and preoccupied by it. The life history, sense of mastery and social capabilities variables relate to previous challenges the individual has encountered (for good or for bad) and skills and losses that occurred as a result. Social buffering and attitude towards government communications has to do with how well social ties and government communications aid in coping with a high-threat security environment. Lastly xenophobia is included because it can be an ill effect of experiencing or witnessing terrorism that has been linked with Islam or other “outsider” groups, as in the case of the US and 9-11 for instance; this too is related to a loss of resilience (i.e. beginning to hate an ethnic or religious group as a result of exposure to terrorism). These ten variables both affect resilience to a stressor and may also be affected in turn by a traumatic stress event. They are defined at length in another paper (Speckhard, 2010) and the statistical clusters of variables that were examined are also discussed further in the results section of this paper. This paper focuses on the acute, posttraumatic and other psycho-social sequelae that occurred in response to serving in a threatening environment and being exposed to terrorist event(s) both of which resulted in a loss of resilience among portions of the sample.

Method

The design of the present study was to explore the concept of psycho-social resilience to a high-threat security environment for civilian and military personnel in theater while also exploring the assessment possibilities of carrying out the study via a web-based assessment tool served over the Internet. The use of an Internet based survey might prove a method to reach as large and varied a sample as possible within the high threat space, thereby keeping the costs low and bypassing the necessity to send survey researchers into a violent environment while also exploring how this method might work.

Web-based Survey
The survey instrument was constructed from previous work by the authors building upon their multidimensional model of resilience to terrorism. In this case the questionnaire was designed to query about exposure to terrorist and insurgent acts as well as multiple questions covering the ten main categories of interactive variables.[5] Where possible, questions were closely matched to already existing items from previously validated tests (i.e. items for assessing posttraumatic stress disorder) in order for the present items to have validity. However, the researchers rejected the use of whole scale batteries of standardized assessment tools because the idea was to have a coherent questionnaire that would appeal to respondents and flow smoothly as it questioned them about their responses to serving in a high-threat security environment. Offering a battery of psycho-social “tests” was judged as unlikely to garner a good response rate as it is an unappealing way to approach respondents who were already dealing with a great deal of stress. While the researchers had clusters of variables pre-defined at the outset of the study they were also interested to learn which variables would statistically cluster once the data was collected.

**Sampling**

The resulting questionnaire was then put into a web-based design to function as a web page questionnaire. A website was designated and a letter was sent out by e-mail through contacts that the first author had in both civilian and military circles, inviting participants to log onto the website and take part in the study. The letter outlined the study’s rationale, risks of taking part and ways of making contact with the researchers in order to receive help for any adverse reactions to participating as well as simply to give further feedback or to ask for help in dealing with the high-threat security environment. Likewise it requested potential subjects not only to take part in the survey but also to e-mail the invitation to participate to their circle of contacts serving in Iraq. As a result the sampling frame followed a snowball method. The letter also made clear to the participants that the study was being conducted by a multi-national university team (Belgian and United States) that was completely independent of both the US Department of Defense and the State Department and the results would be reported in aggregate, thus the participants could take part in the survey without any worries of negative reporting of individual results inside the work place.

**Results**

The Internet-based aspect of the study design turned out to be a double-edged sword. While the web-based design was attractive and allowed for automatic scoring of the results it turned out that the Internet speeds provided by the Multi National Forces in Iraq were too slow to support this aspect of the study design. Within the first days of inviting study participants over one hundred potential participants had logged onto the website and completed two to three pages (of the total ten pages) indicating interest in the study was high. However, only twenty percent of these participants finished the entire survey, most abandoning it because the web pages were too slow in opening for the subjects to complete the survey (some subjects told us that the pages took up to ten minutes to open at times). When this problem was discovered the survey was
immediately repackaged as a word file and resent to all the original invitees asking them to please give the survey another try in a new easier electronic format and to e-mail it to invite participation of their contacts as well. This design worked, although many potential subjects were lost with the first technology failure resulting in a smaller sample size.

The final result was a sample of fifty-three participants who took part in the survey during the time period of March 15 to April 1, 2007. This was enough for an exploratory study of the psycho-social responses of individuals serving in a high-threat environment and large enough to receive feedback on the survey design as well as the high-tech methodology used to conduct it but it lacked the size to conduct regression analysis of the results. The participants not only filled out the survey but over half also took the opportunity to provide detailed feedback to the research team, often in long letters explaining why certain items did not capture the full impact of what they were experiencing, nuances that they wanted to give to their answers, or how the study needed to be expanded to cover the additional stresses caused by separation from family for long periods of time and the long hours and weeks without breaks that many of the participants were working. It was clear that the participants trusted the researchers as independent as they made many intimate comments about their work places, colleagues and the challenges of working inside Iraq.

**Sample**

The final sample resulted in fifty-three participants, between the ages of twenty-seven and sixty-three. Nine were in active combat duty, the rest were diplomats and civilian support personnel. Thirty-eight were male, fifteen female. Eighteen were single, twenty-eight married and seven divorced.

**Exposure to High-Threat Events**

By virtue of serving in Iraq everyone in the sample had exposure to multiple high-threats including: mortar fire, improvised explosive devices (IEDs - vehicular and human borne); bombings of buildings; roadside bombings and sniper fire in some areas. Exposure varied from witnessing on television, to learning from a witness, to witnessing a high-threat event in person or being personally involved in the event. With IEDs, mortar and sniper fire and explosions occurring near the workplace at least weekly, and sometimes daily, all of the respondents had multiple exposures to high-threats. For instance US embassy workers lived in trailers nearby to the embassy, one of which received a direct hit and was burned up during the time period of the study. Small cement bunkers for sheltering from incoming mortar attacks were located along the walkways to and from work and alarms were sounded frequently to alert of incoming mortar. Respondents also said they could feel the impact of bomb explosions (occurring outside the International Zone) while in their trailers at night and in the mornings. Workers traveled in convoys with heavy protection but still suffered roadside bombing and IED attacks.
Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Responses to the High-Threat Security Environment

After indicating the high-threat events they had some level of exposure to, the respondents were asked to think of the one event that had impacted them most and to which they had the strongest response and to answer all of the acute and posttraumatic stress response questions keeping that event in mind. Regarding reference to their exposure to the threatening event, 70 percent said they felt fear, horror and a sense of helplessness (with 46 percent endorsing these emotions on the sometimes, often and always level). This indicates that the majority of the sample experienced a stressor capable of causing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Moreover, 47 percent of the respondents endorsed that they felt detached from the traumatic event as it occurred, even as if watching from outside of themselves. This type of response is known as peri-traumatic dissociation, and is often a predictor of PTSD.

To learn about their acute and posttraumatic stress responses, the respondents were asked to reply to questions closely matched to items from standardized measurements of acute and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The six main axes of PTSD include: exposure to a traumatic stressor as defined by the PTSD criteria; psychological numbing and avoidance; flashbacks, intrusions and nightmares; hyperarousal and loss of concentration; inability to function in a significant aspect of life and duration of symptoms lasting beyond one month.

Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Symptoms

A high portion of the sample evidenced posttraumatic and acute stress symptoms in the first month following exposure to the traumatic event. All of the PTSD diagnostic criteria were endorsed as present by at least some portion of the sample and in some cases items were endorsed by as high as forty-seven percent of the sample for the first month after exposure (See Table 1). All of the responses in this section relate to the first month after exposure.
Re-experiencing

28 percent of the respondents felt physiological responses (sweaty palms, heart racing or irregular breathing) upon reexposure to reminders of the event.

Avoidance

In regard to the traumatic event(s) 37 percent of the sample said in the first month after exposure they tried not to think about it; 38 percent avoided talking about it; and 26 percent avoided reminders of it. 38 percent changed their behaviors to avoid similar danger and 21 percent avoided work assignments that could place them in such danger. This latter type of avoidance is

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Table 1: Endorsement of Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Symptoms in the First Month Following Exposure to a Traumatic Event(s) in the High-Threat Security Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion A: Traumatic Event</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Total Endorsement as Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fear, horror and sense of helplessness</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45.9 (with rarely 70.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peri-traumatic Dissociation</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criterion B: Re-experiencing</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criterion C: Avoidance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoided reminders of it (C-1)</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tried not to think of it (C-1)</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tried not to talk about it (C-1)</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed behaviors trying to avoid danger of this type</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoided work assignments that could place me in a similar situation (C-2)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I had trouble remembering all of what had happened (C-3)</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I felt alienated or isolated from others (C-5)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I felt emotionally numb (C-6)</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unease and uncertainty about the future (C-7)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criterion D: Increased Arousal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard time concentrating (D-3)</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criterion F: Clinically significant Distress or Impairment in Functioning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trouble working or doing normal tasks</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social life affected negatively</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Health Problems</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
likely positive coping but it could also evidence impairment in ability to function well as a worker in the high-threat security environment. 13 percent of the sample had trouble recalling the whole event; 17 percent felt isolated or alienated from others; and 47 percent felt emotionally numb. 22 percent felt unease and uncertainty about the future in response to the event.

Increased Arousal
27 percent had trouble concentrating in the first month following the event.

Clinically Significant Distress or Impairment in Functioning
22 percent of the sample had trouble working or doing normal tasks in response to the event; 8 percent said their social life had been negatively effected; and 13 percent reported physical health problems as a result.

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms
As could be expected the acute and posttraumatic stress responses damped down in the months following the event and less of the respondents’ endorsed symptoms in the present time for when they were filling out the survey (i.e. more than one month out from the attack and still in the high-threat security environment when answering the survey – i.e. anywhere from two to twelve or more months following exposure). Despite the decrease in numbers of respondents reporting symptoms of postraumatic distress a significant portion of the sample evidenced PTSD symptoms enduring beyond a month in response to the traumatic event(s) they had been exposed to while working in a high-threat security environment. While symptoms decreased over time for the participants evidencing diminishing distress across the sample, all of the PTSD diagnostic criteria continued to be endorsed at the level of present beyond one month after exposure frequently in ranges as high as 30 percent of the sample (see Table 2). All of the responses in this section relate to responses enduring beyond one month following exposure.

Re-experiencing
21 percent of the respondents evidenced thoughts of the traumatic event intruding in their minds, and 9 percent felt physiological responses (sweaty palms, heart racing or irregular breathing) upon re-exposure to reminders of the event. Interestingly, only 4 percent had nightmares, although we must keep in mind that as the respondents continued to be serving in the high-threat environment they may have kept nightmares at bay until returning to safety. Likewise, the author learned from conversations with many embassy workers and contractors that due to working long hours and their high-arousal states which made it difficult to fall and stay asleep, many made use of psychotropics to sleep. When one looks to arousal issues it is clear that sleep was disturbed.
Avoidance

In regard to the traumatic event(s), 26 percent of the sample said they tried not to think about it; 27 percent avoided talking about it; and 21 percent avoided reminders of it. 13 percent of the sample avoided work that could place them in similar danger; 6 percent felt isolated or alienated from others; and 32 percent felt emotionally numb. 21 percent felt unease and uncertainty about the future in response to the event.
Increased Arousal

30 percent of the sample said their sleep patterns were disturbed in response to the event; 19 percent had difficult falling asleep; 15 percent had trouble concentrating; 30 percent were jumpy or easily startled; and 19 percent were easily agitated or angered beyond one month following exposure to the traumatic event.

Peri-traumatic Dissociation

Peri-traumatic dissociation was reported even beyond one month following the traumatic exposure with 35 percent of the subjects still reporting feeling detached as if viewing it from outside of themselves. This effect perhaps persisted given that the subjects continued to be exposed to the high-threat security environment and dissociation continued to be a useful defense mechanism.

Clinically Significant Distress or Impairment in Functioning

22 percent of the sample reporting having trouble working or doing normal tasks in the month immediately after the event, this decreased to only 2 percent who reported such trouble in the months after the exposure. A constant 7 percent continued to report that their social life had been negatively effected; and 11 percent continued to report physical health problems that occurred in response to traumatic exposure.

Other Posttraumatic Responses

Fear

Additional posttraumatic responses were reported by the sample with the most reported symptom being fear that it could happen again; reported by 57 percent of the sample in the first month after exposure, with that diminishing to 20 percent beyond one month after exposure.

Psychosomatic Symptoms

Psychosomatic symptoms included more than normal fatigue (38 percent diminishing to 23 percent); stomach distress or nasea (21 diminishing to 10 percent); general aches in the body (15 diminishing to 8 percent); headaches (12 diminishing to 9 percent) dizziness or difficulty breathing (6 diminishings to 4 percent); and panic attacks (7 diminishing to 3 percent).
Depression

General depression was reported by 22 percent of the sample which diminished to 4 percent after the first month, and participants reported feeling sad for whole days (21 diminishing to 4 percent) and feeling worthless (6 diminishing to 4 percent) after exposure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Types of Posttraumatic Responses</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Total Endorsement as Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>22.6 (4.3)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22.6 (4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I felt sad for whole days</td>
<td>11.3 (2.0)</td>
<td>7.5 (2.0)</td>
<td>1.9 (0)</td>
<td>20.7 (4.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I felt worthless</td>
<td>3.8 (3.8)</td>
<td>1.9 (0)</td>
<td>1.9 (0)</td>
<td>5.7 (3.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychosomatic Responses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panic Attacks</td>
<td>7.5 (2.9)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.5 (2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psycho-Somatic Responses</td>
<td>7.5 (7.7)</td>
<td>3.8 (1.9)</td>
<td>1.9 (1.9)</td>
<td>2.9 (11.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than Normal Fatigue</td>
<td>11.3 (15.1)</td>
<td>22.6 (5.7)</td>
<td>3.8 (1.9)</td>
<td>37.7 (22.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headaches</td>
<td>9.4 (7.5)</td>
<td>3.8 (1.9)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.2 (9.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stomach Distress or Nausea</td>
<td>15.4 (5.9)</td>
<td>5.8 (3.9)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21.2 (9.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Aches in my Body</td>
<td>11.5 (5.8)</td>
<td>3.8 (1.9)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.3 (7.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dizziness or Difficulty Breathing</td>
<td>3.9 (4.0)</td>
<td>2.0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.9 (4.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear and Obsessive Responses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear that it could happen again</td>
<td>26.4 (14.5)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.1 (5.8)</td>
<td>56.6 (20.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couldn’t stop talking about it</td>
<td>13.2 (3.8)</td>
<td>5.7 (1.9)</td>
<td>5.7 (1.9)</td>
<td>24.8 (7.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Fearlessness and Danger Seeking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I became more fearless</td>
<td>22.6 (17)</td>
<td>3.8 (3.8)</td>
<td>1.9 (3.8)</td>
<td>28.3 (24.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I became excited by danger and sometimes sought it out more than before</td>
<td>13.7 (9.6)</td>
<td>5.9 (5.8)</td>
<td>0 (1.9)</td>
<td>19.6 (17.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.

Obsessive Need to Talk about It

Obsession in the sense of feeling the need to talk obsessively about the event is a posttraumatic response that is sometimes overlooked. In this sample 25 percent endorsed the item, “I couldn’t stop talking about it” for the month immediately after exposure diminishing to 8 percent for the months after the first month.

Fearlessness and Danger Seeking

An effect often noted in youth exposed to conflict and gang violence is increased fearlessness and danger seeking. This seems to be a way to gain control over high-arousal states – if one seeks out danger the bodily arousal matches what one has chosen to confront by his or her own volition (Saltzman, 2001). Becoming fearless was endorsed by 29 percent of the sample in the first month after exposure diminishing to 25 percent of the sample in the months following.
Likewise 20 percent of the respondents said they became excited by danger and sought it out more following the exposure in the first month with this diminishing to 17 percent for the months following beyond one month (see Table 3 for a Complete List of Other Posttraumatic Responses).

Shattered World Assumptions

A common effect of traumatic exposure is to have one’s world view deeply shaken. This generally occurs in regard to one’s sense of predictability, safety in the world and sense of the goodness of others and is referred to as a shattering of world assumptions (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). While a complete shattering of world assumptions did not occur in this sample, the threat events did deeply shake the sense of predictability, safety, and sense of goodness that respondents felt after experiencing a high-threat event. In this sample 45 percent endorsed feeling that the world is less safe in reference to the month immediately after the trauma with this effect persisting in 39 percent of the respondents for the months following that; 26 percent said it made them trust others less for the first month after exposure with this effect persisting for 20 percent of the respondents. 43 percent disagreed with the statement that their world is relatively safe for the month after exposure with this persisting and increasing to 54 percent of the respondents for the following months. 36 percent disagreed with the statement that life is fairly predictable and this also increased to 45 percent of the respondents in the months following. 4 percent of the sample disagreed with the statement that people are basically good in the month immediately following exposure and this increased to 13 percent in the longer time period. Clearly traumatic exposure(s) within the high-threat security environment shook many of the respondents world views and continued exposure to threats and traumatic events appears to have shattered these world assumptions were even more as time went on (see Table 4).

| Table 4: Shattered World Assumptions Following Traumatic Exposure One Month and Longer After the Event* |
|-------------------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Shattered World Assumptions                      | Sometimes        | Often               | Always           | Total Endorsement |
| It made me feel that the world is less safe.     | 26.4 (23.5)      | 13.2 (11.8)         | 5.7 (3.9)        | 45.1 (39.1)      |
| It made me trust people less.                    | 15.1 (15.7)      | 5.7 (2.0)           | 5.7 (2.0)        | 26.3 (19.7)      |
| My world is relatively safe                      | 3.8 (11.3)       | 39.6 (43.4)         | -                | 43.4 (54.7)      |
| Life is fairly predictable                       | 9.6 (18.9)       | 26.9 (26.4)         | -                | 36.5 (45.3)      |
| People are generally good                        | 0 (1.9)          | 3.8 (11.5)          | -                | 3.8 (13.4)       |

*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.
Suicidal Ideation and Self Harm

Suicide out of despair and inflicting harm to oneself in order to be sent home has been a large concern for military leadership but has not been something State Department or contractors have had to consider up to now. In this sample, one person endorsed seriously considering suicide, inflicting self-harm and thought that it would be better to die than to continue to face the high-threat security environment. Likewise 8 percent of the respondents entertained thoughts that it might be better to get injured and sent home than to continue to face the threatening environment. State Department’s protocol is to medically evacuate those who present themselves as deeply distressed and it appears (from speaking to the medical unit’s psychiatrists) that more medical evacuations for PTSD related effects occur in the posting following the high-threat environment posting than during it. This is perhaps because once out of the high-threat environment the dissociative defenses relax allowing the person to feel the full impact of what he or she has witnessed. Likewise, once in a “normal” setting high arousal states, flashbacks, traumatic nightmares avoidance etc. can suddenly appear very abnormal where when working long hours, using psychotropics to sleep, working among others who feel the same way, etc. may mask these effects (see Table 5 for a Listing of Suicidal Ideation and Self Harm Effects).

| Table 5: Suicidal Ideation and Self Harm Responses to the High-Threat Security Environment One Month and Longer after the Event* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Suicidal Ideation and Self Harm Items | Sometimes | Often | Always | Total Endorsement as Present |
| I sometimes thought it might be better to get injured and go home than continue to face this. | 3.8 (3.8) | 3.8 (1.9) | 0 | 7.6 (5.7) |
| I sometimes thought it might be better to die than to continue to face this | 1.9 | 0 (1.9) | 0 | 1.9 (1.9) |
| I sometimes considered hurting myself or putting myself in a situation where I would surely be hurt to be sent home | 1.9 (1.9) | 0 | 0 | 1.9 (1.9) |
| I seriously thought about suicide | 1.9 (1.9) | 0 | 0 | 1.9 (1.9) |

*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.

Posttraumatic Growth

Traumatic events also present opportunities for growth or positive resilience. In this sample 64 percent reported a sense of increased love and appreciation for those close to them in the first month after exposure with this persisting in months following for 57 percent of the respondents.
This follows closely with observations of increased community orientation and high attachment following other varied traumatic events ranging from the 9-11 events to earthquakes and fires. In this sample, 45 percent felt a sense of hope for a good outcome and 46 percent tried to look for positive meanings and what they could learn from the traumatic event, with these effects persisting for the respondents beyond the first month following exposure (see Table 6).

### Coping Mechanisms

The sample were queried on a range of both positive and negative coping mechanisms. In terms of using positive coping mechanisms, 57 percent reported using humor when talking or thinking about the traumatic event; 32 percent reported working out more; 38 percent used television or unrelated reading to distract themselves; 30 percent sought out more information to understand what had occurred and 11 percent watched or participated in sports more. In terms of negative coping, 22 percent (diminishing to 11 percent in following months) reported eating more than usual and 19 percent (diminishing to 15 percent in following months) drank more alcohol than usual. A constant 6 percent reported increased sexual activities in all the time periods following traumatic exposure (see Table 7).

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**Table 6: Positive Posttraumatic Growth One Month and Longer After the Event**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Posttraumatic Growth</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Total Endorsement as Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sense of increased love and appreciation for those close to me</td>
<td>26.4 (21.2)</td>
<td>22.6 (11.5)</td>
<td>17 (25.0)</td>
<td>64.0 (57.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felt a sense of hope for a good outcome</td>
<td>17 (17.3)</td>
<td>17 (11.5)</td>
<td>11.3 (17.3)</td>
<td>45.3 (45.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I tried to look for the positive meanings in it, for what I could learn from it</td>
<td>9.4 (7.5)</td>
<td>18.9 (15.1)</td>
<td>18.9 (18.9)</td>
<td>47.2 (41.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.*
Attachment Relationships

Attachment relationships often form a buffer for traumatic stress, although they can also be a source of distress as well. In this sample 45 percent of the respondents agreed that it was very important for them to get in touch with loved ones following exposure to the traumatic event. 24 percent said that discussion with loved ones calmed them while another 34 percent disagreed with this statement making it clear that for some, discussion is useful whereas for others, it is not. Talking about the attack was helpful for 29 percent of the respondents, whereas 27 percent found it unhelpful to talk about it. It may be that the type and emotional tenor of the discussion is the deciding factor here or that individuals vary in whether or not talking after traumatic exposure is useful for them. 68 percent of the respondents felt it very important to reassure themselves that loved ones had not become victims of the attack. 17 percent of the sample said that distress from their loved ones was hard to detach from and that it transferred to distress for them (see Table 8).

Table 7: Positive and Negative Coping Mechanisms for Dealing with a High-Threat Security Environment One Month and Longer After the Event*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coping Mechanisms</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Total Endorsement as Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Used humor when talking/thinking about it</td>
<td>30.2 (26.4)</td>
<td>17 (15.1)</td>
<td>9.4 (9.4)</td>
<td>56.6 (50.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working out more</td>
<td>18.9 (13.5)</td>
<td>5.7 (1.9)</td>
<td>7.5 (11.5)</td>
<td>32.1 (26.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watching or participating in sports more than before</td>
<td>5.7 (7.7)</td>
<td>3.8 (1.9)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>11.4 (9.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cope by distracting myself with tv or unrelated reading</td>
<td>11.5 (13.7)</td>
<td>19.2 (7.8)</td>
<td>7.7 (3.9)</td>
<td>38.4 (25.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in sexual activities more than usual</td>
<td>3.9 (3.9)</td>
<td>2.0 (2.0)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sought out information to understand</td>
<td>18.9 (17.0)</td>
<td>5.7 (3.8)</td>
<td>5.7 (5.7)</td>
<td>30.3 (25.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ate more than usual</td>
<td>13.2 (5.7)</td>
<td>7.5 (3.8)</td>
<td>1.9 (1.9)</td>
<td>22.6 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drank more alcohol than usual</td>
<td>9.6 (9.6)</td>
<td>7.7 (3.8)</td>
<td>1.9 (1.9)</td>
<td>19.1 (15.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talked to chaplain, counselor or doctor to cope</td>
<td>7.5 (3.8)</td>
<td>1.9 (1.9)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.4 (5.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.
Posttraumatic Interventions

The sample was queried about potential and actual posttraumatic interventions. 17 percent reported they would have liked someone to have explained to them the normalcy of their posttraumatic responses; 23 percent endorsed that they would have liked if their unit had some group discussion about such thoughts, feelings and responses. 8 percent endorsed that they would have liked individual counseling to help with posttraumatic responses. These figures remained steady over time (see Table 9).

Table 8: Attachment Relationships Effect on Coping with a High-Threat Security Environment in the Month Following the Event

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items about Attachment Relationships</th>
<th>Totally Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Totally Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total Presence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important to get in touch with loved ones after</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion with loved ones calmed me</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>23.8 agree 34.6 disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking about the attack was helpful for calming myself</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>28.5 agree 26.8 disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is very important to me to reassure myself that loved ones are not victims</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distress from loved ones transferred to me</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.

Table 9: Preferences for Posttraumatic Stress Interventions to Aid in Coping One Month and Longer after the Event*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I would have liked someone to explain these symptoms as normal</td>
<td>5.7 (7.5)</td>
<td>3.8 (5.7)</td>
<td>7.5 (5.7)</td>
<td>17.0 (18.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would have liked if our unit had some discussion about such thoughts, feelings and responses</td>
<td>11.3 (9.4)</td>
<td>3.8 (7.5)</td>
<td>7.5 (5.7)</td>
<td>22.6 (22.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would have liked individual counseling to help me with my responses</td>
<td>0 (3.8)</td>
<td>1.9 (3.8)</td>
<td>5.7 (3.8)</td>
<td>7.6 (8.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.
Correlational Analysis

Correlational analysis was conducted for all of the variables in relationship to having been personally involved in a terrorist event; witnessed it in person, heard about it from the actual victims and witnessed it on television. There were 17 variables that turned up with significant correlations at the p<.05 level of significance. Personal involvement in a terrorist event correlated to depression (.34); coping by engaging in sexual activities more often (.39); becoming excited by danger and sometimes seeking it (.39), feeling it better if one was injured and sent back home (.57); feeling it might be better to die than continue to face the high-threat security environment (.53); and strongly endorsing feelings of horror, helplessness and terror (.45). Personally witnessing events had strong correlations to family distress with reports of children having many posttraumatic symptoms (.56); with spouse or significant other having many posttraumatic symptoms (.64) and reporting that the spouse or significant other copes so differently that it caused distress (.63). These relationships likely reflect that when an individual in a threatening environment personally witnesses violence his/her family is also likely to be traumatized when they learn of it and their distress can cause more stress for the individual in the threatening environment. These same relationships were reported at similar levels for having learned of the trauma from another witness or having watched on television. Having personally witnessed the traumatic event was also correlated to being afraid that the self or loved ones would be hurt in such an incident (.29) (see Table 10 for a complete list of all the correlations with these four variables at the p<.05 level of significance).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10: Correlation Table: Significant at p&lt;.05000. Personally Involved (PI); Witnessed in Person (WP); Heard about from actual victims (HAV); Witnessed on TV (WOTV) in the First Month Following the Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I became detached from it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I couldn’t stop talking about it to the others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I became depressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I engaged in sexual activities more often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I became excited by danger and sometimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes thought it might be better if...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes thought it might be better if I...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For me being exposed to these events was...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My children back home had many of these</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My spouse or significant other had...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My spouse or significant other copes so...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People are generally good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m afraid I or those I care for will...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m afraid I or those I care for will be</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Composite Variables

Analysis of the clusters among variables revealed four potential composite variables. Dimension One consisted of seven variables:

- Thoughts of it keep intruding into my mind
- I found it hard to go to sleep.
- My sleep patterns were disturbed
- I was jumpy or startled easily.
- I felt afraid it could happen again.
- I drank more alcohol than usual.
- I tried to cope by distracting myself

Clearly this first dimension is made up of hyper-arousal, avoidance and re-experiencing which are all symptoms of PTSD.

The second dimension that emerged was made up of four items:

- For me being exposed to these events was traumatic.
- I avoided work assignments that could place me in a similar situation.
- I had panic attacks.
- It made me feel the world is less safe.

This second dimension appears to reflect a shattering of the world assumption that the world is a fairly safe place with panic, avoidance and fear clustering in this dimension.

The third dimension was made up of four items:

- I engaged in sexual activities more often than usual.
- I had headaches after
- I had general aches in my body after
- I had dizziness or difficulty breathing

These are all psychosomatic responses.

The fourth dimension was made up of three items:

- I felt sad for whole days
- It made me trust people less.
- I changed some of my behaviors to try to avoid danger of this type.

This appears to be some level of depression and avoidance with alienation.

The fifth dimension concerned suicide ideation and self harm and consisted of two items:

- I seriously considered hurting myself
- I seriously thought about suicide.
Conclusions

Our exploratory study demonstrates that it is possible to design and conduct a useful study administered from afar using Internet as a means of reaching subjects while minimizing danger to the researchers. The web-based automatically scored survey did not work given the slow Internet speeds in Iraq necessitating tooling down to a Word document that was e-mailed to participants and then hand scored when received. This made assuring anonymity impossible since participants e-mail addresses were linked to the return of their survey but confidentiality still was assured. It was clear that many individuals were willing and tried hard to participate. Over one hundred respondents tried to respond using the web-based survey in the first days.

Even with the difficulties it appeared clear from comments and even long letters that participants attached to their returned surveys that they appreciated that an independent research group was interested to study their psycho-social welfare and that they trusted in the confidentiality of the study enough to give what appeared to be honest and reliable answers. We especially trusted their candor as many participants took the time to write detailed comments at the end of the survey about their responses to the high-threat security environment. Some also commented on how to improve the survey. Some respondents even continued to correspond with the lead author over the year following it, sharing their experiences coping with having served in Iraq and about how they fared upon return. From the comments it appeared that the respondents appreciated that the survey and researchers were not attached to the US government and that answering honestly would have no potential detrimental effect on their security clearances – a comment that also came up frequently in informal follow-up interviews with some of the respondents. Thus the researchers concluded that ensuring anonymity, confidentiality and, if possible, being independent is a valuable attribute to such research attempts.

Many who included comments stated that it was not only the threatening security environment but the posting away from family and long hours with few, if any weekends free, that also caused them significant distress. Some responded to the questions about increased xenophobia stating their response was opposite: they had watched their Iraqi counterparts suffer and some had deaths among their staff that distressed them greatly and as a result they had come to strongly admire the Iraqi people they worked with.

Many also pointed out that the researchers had tried to ask too many questions and the questionnaire needed to be shortened. With analysis of the composite dimensions it is possible to omit some questions and tighten up the survey to better model psycho-social resilience in a high security threat environment.

The reality of military, diplomatic and civilian government service today is that it often involves serving in high-threat security environments. While military members have more training to deal with these threats, diplomats and civilian contractors have less pre- and post-deployment training and often lack previous experience with high-threat environments. Comparing the responses of the few soldiers who took part in the survey (n = 9) it appears that the contractors and diplomats were less prepared in terms of training and prior experience coping with security threats and far more vulnerable to more stress responses than were their military counterparts who for the whole evidenced far less distress.
Individuals cope with the rigors of working in high-threat security environments in different ways and the hope is that few will suffer major psychological consequences. However this study reveals that under the conditions of today’s often high-tempo operations, with long separations from family and loved ones, potentially significant numbers of diplomats and the civilian contractors that serve along with military personnel are subject to acute and post-traumatic responses and other psychological and behavioral health issues brought on by the threatening environment. From our exploratory study it is clear that diplomats, contractors and even military personnel (though to a far lesser degree) serving in high-threat security environments suffer to some degree acute and posttraumatic and psychosomatic responses to traumatic events, including depression; anxiety and fear responses; threats to world assumptions; obsessive need to talk; and even suicidal ideation and self harm responses. Coping methods vary from positive to negative and significant numbers stated that simple tools like learning that acute and posttraumatic responses are normal, and offering group and individual counseling would be helpful. Likewise from the responses of some, including negative coping, it appears that referrals for psychological help should in some cases be made. It should be noted that there was also evidence of positive resilience with positive coping methods employed and gains occurring as a result of service in the high threat environment.

On the whole, from this exploratory study it is possible to conclude that the present resilience model and preliminary survey is a useful one for measuring such effects and that an Internet-based approach to studying psycho-social resilience in a high-threat security environment works. Individuals participate and appear to appreciate the effort and the care put into a survey that asks them how they are doing while serving in a threatening security environment. Improvements need to include shortening it; obtaining a larger, more representative, sample; and including items that take into account other factors that also cause significant distress other than the high-threat security environment (i.e. family separation and long work hours).

While funding was not available for a follow-up survey of those who returned from Iraq, the lead author did make many informal face-to-face interviews with diplomats who had participated in the survey as well as with others who had not taken part. She learned from these interviews that all of those interviewed described their most difficult posttraumatic responses arising only after they had been removed from the high-threat security environment and that more than a few requested med evacs and intensive psychological treatment for overwhelming posttraumatic arousal and emotionally painful flashbacks on the posting following their deployment in Iraq. It appears that once in safety and when no longer immersed in working a heavy schedule (sometimes working long shifts seven days a week) the defenses that had been erected while on duty were relaxed, and for some, a flood of posttraumatic recall occurred, causing significant enough distress that some respondents curtailed onward assignments to be flown home for intensive short-term psychological assistance. Others also referred to a period of intense emotional recall and distress upon leaving the high-threat security environment that they worked through while seeking psychological help over a period of months. Some also referenced difficulty weaning themselves from sleeping aids that they had become dependent on during their deployment in the high-threat security environment or finding the need to take anti-anxiety or anti-depressant medications upon return for a period of time. These interviews underline the
need to study the same population not only while deployed but in the months following deployment to understand the challenges and needs they face in terms of resilience.

It is our recommendation to construct a tighter version of this resilience survey based on the tested questions in this model to be used in Iraq as well as other similar high-threat security theaters (eg. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, etc.) where diplomats, civilian contractors and soldiers are serving. It could then be used to sample larger populations and used on a yearly basis for monitoring, comparing and benchmarking responses to working in such environments. Such a tool would be useful for designing improved services before, during and after deployment.

About the Authors:

Anne Speckhard, Ph.D. is Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Georgetown University Medical Center, former Chair of the group that sponsored this research – the NATO Human Factors & Medicine Research and Technology Research Task Group (HFM-140/RTG) on the Psycho-social, Cultural and Organisational Aspects of Terrorism.

E-mail: Anne.Speckhard@gmail.com

Gino Verleye is Professor of Statistics at the University of Gent, Belgium.

Beatrice Jacuch is a graduate of Leiden University (2007). She has been serving as a research assistant to Prof. Speckhard during the years 2004 – 2012.

References


Verleye, G., Maeseele, P., Stevens, I., & Speckhard, A. (2012, in press). Resilience in an Age of Terrorism: Psychology, Media and Communication [in this study an earlier, jointly authored model of resilience was presented and tested in Belgium. The present model has been developed as a result of that earlier work and owes much to the contributions of Gino Verleye, Pieter Maeseele, Isabelle Stevens and Anne Speckhard].
Notes


[2] A high-threat security environment in regard to deployments for US State Department, US DOD and contractors includes, for our purposes: (i) active combat zones as well as (ii) areas with insurgent activity, (iii) high level of criminal activity/violence against persons and (iv) high probability of terrorist incidents.

[3] To our knowledge, none of these concepts, other than looking at acute and posttraumatic stress responses, has been used by others as applied in studies of resilience to terrorism. Resilience itself is a concept that has multiple definitions, depending upon the population in which it has been studied. For this reason, our study began first with developing a comprehensive model of resilience in response to terrorism. Verleye has also successfully applied a version of this model to studies focusing on first responders.


[5] The survey was ten pages long and consisted of over 400 questions. Based on cluster analysis it is possible to considerably shorten it in future iterations.
Hizballah in Africa
by Carl A. Wege

Abstract:
There is a gap in the existing literature on Hizballah which has rarely been examined: Hizballah and Iran's recent roles in Africa. The African continent, particularly countries below the Sahara, is characterized by a large number of failed states and/or effectively ungoverned regions. Hizballah exploited the opportunity presented there to create strategic depth for the organisation in Africa. Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC - Sepahe Padan-e Inqilal-e Islami, Pasdaran), allied with Hizballah, utilizes the strategic space Africa affords to advance Iranian national objectives. Given the expanding US presence on the continent in pursuit of international Salafi jihadists affiliated to Al-Qaeda, it is worthwhile also to take note of the history of Hizballah' role and recent activities and those of Iran in Africa.

Introduction
Africa’s state system, exploited by Hizballah and Iran for a generation,[1] more recently became an arena in which transnational criminal organisations and international Salafi jihadists turned into globally relevant players. Africa has now also become an important area of operations for the United States which created an African Command (Africom) in 2007 as part of the war against Al-Qaeda and in order to assist African security forces in their counterterrorism efforts.[2] This has changed the operational opportunities for transnationally operating terrorist organisations in Africa in general and those of Salafist orientation in the Sahel in particular.

The Sahel region transects Africa across the southern reaches of the Sahara and contains vast natural resources that, once developed, would offer revue streams that could, if unchecked, be siphoned off by terrorist organisations.[3] Islamist activists in multiple varieties - from the benign to globally dangerous jihadists - are the primary drivers of social mobilization across the Sahel. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is active in the Sahel in Mali where an AQIM affiliate recently seized power in the northern half of the country. It has also reached out to the Horn of Africa where Al-Shabab has emerged as an important Al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia. Arméd non-state actors and organisations that previously would have been isolated from one another - such as Hizballah and AQIM - are now more likely to interact with one another. However, the presence of the US African Command (Africom) creates a series of “tripwires” or nodes across the continent, reaching from the Sahel’s Africom Ouagadougou base in Burkina Faso and to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.[4] A secondary and originally unintended effect of this system of “tripwires” has been an increased awareness of, and potential engagement with, Hizballah and its state sponsor Iran.

The analytical approach taken here conceptualizes Hizballah and Iranian networks as a series of geospatial layers that overlap one another, creating a matrix in the African space. The layer that defines Hizballah’s network and creates revenue is primarily located in two spaces; one is an arc stretching from West Africa along the coast reaching down toward the Congo while the other is a
circle encompassing the Horn of Africa which falls more under the operational control of Iran. Conceptually, the Iranian geospatial layer can be visualized as a circle encompassing the Horn of Africa seeking to influence the Middle Eastern theater. Iranian arms smuggling infiltrations from that circle reach into Nigeria, Kenya, and the central African spaces. Add to that the counterterrorism mission of the US Africom layer with a focal point in Djibouti with lesser nodes circling into the central African spaces and spread across the Sahel. If we think of these layers covering one another creating a three dimensional matrix, this can help inform our thinking with respect to counterterrorism efforts in Africa.

Hizballah, though born in Lebanon and an increasingly dominant power at home, is not synonymous with the Lebanese state, being denied the overt governmental instruments of power. [5] In part as a consequence of this, Hizballah designed covert infrastructures, often anchored in Shi’a diaspora communities around the world, both to support Hizballah’s organisation in Lebanon and at times also to act abroad in partnership with Iran. Hizballah has built its covert infrastructure across Africa to provide the organisation with financial and operational support but also to further its alliance with Iran. Hizballah’s African infrastructure consists of a relatively small number of genuine Hizballah operatives and large numbers of Hizballah associates and sympathizers engaging in activities that help sustain the organisation in Lebanon from Africa.

**Hizballah’s Support Infrastructure in Africa**

Lebanese diaspora communities emerged in West Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These were initially made up primarily of Lebanese Christian immigrants who were historically encouraged by British colonial policy to settle in places like Sierra Leone. [6] Ultimately both Lebanese Sunni and Shi’a emigrants entered Africa’s diaspora communities in large numbers. The outbreak of Lebanon’s civil war in 1975 coincided with Shi’a immigrants of Lebanese extraction beginning to dominate the illegal diamond trade between Sierra Leone and Liberia. In West Africa, as in Lebanon, family and clan structures became the prevailing modality of social and business interactions.[7]

In West Africa, the Lebanese Shi’a rival to the Hizballah (“Party of God”) was called the Lebanese Resistance Detachments (*Afawai al Muqawamah al Lubnaniyyah* or AMAL); it initially controlled the illegal diamond trade Hizballah would ultimately dominate. The Sierra Leone born Shi’a Lebanese Nabih Berri assumed leadership of Lebanon’s AMAL party in 1980. He eventually became Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament. Berri and Shahid Mohammed Jamil, an ally of Sierra Leone’s President Siaka Stevens (1971 - 1985), maintained a mutually beneficial political relationship.[8] This liaison gave Lebanon’s AMAL militia an entré into the Sierra Leonean Shi’a community which was to prove useful both for fundraising and for the smuggling of diamonds. AMAL associate Sayed Ali Ahmad, of the Lebanese Ahmad clan’s Sierra Leone branch, invested money for Berri at the Antwerp end of the diamond trade. This was done through a maze of front companies the Ahmad’s controlled, including Sierra Gem Diamonds, ASA International, and ASA Diam. The decade-long civil war that devastated Sierra Leone from 1991 until 2002 facilitated large-scale diamond smuggling with assistance from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), backed by Liberia.[9] However, that civil war weakened AMAL’s local advantage in West Africa, thereby increasing concurrently the opportunity for
AMAL’s rival Hizballah to improve its position in the Shi’a community and eventually gain control of much of the illegal diamond trade.[10] Hizballah and RUF cooperation in the illegal diamond trade has been documented by the US Congressional Research Service [11]. In other parts of West Africa such as the Congo, other Shi’a traders in illegal diamonds became subjugated to Hizballah men through middlemen, broadening further the revenue stream to finance the organisation.[12] Hizballah’s successful blended the illegal diamond trade with legitimate business enterprises; this also helped to disguise finances that supported Hizballah activities in Lebanon.[13]

The flow of money to Hizballah from the Congo region made use of multiple corporate networks.[14] The Shi’a Lebanese Tajideen network, for example, reportedly used corporations such as Tajco Ltd. and Ovlas Trading operated through Ali Husayn and Kassim Tajideen along with diamond and food trading enterprises in Gambia, the Congo and Angola to launder money for Hizballah.[15] These Tajideen-linked corporations engaged in legitimate business but were also facilitating the movement of monies and goods to Hizballah and Hizballah-linked entities in Lebanon. Likewise they could provide cover in the form of employment abroad, establishing also safe havens for Hizballah operatives on the run from security services in the Middle East.

Activities of Hizballah that are less often mentioned include Hizballah’s direct participation in organised crime to generate financial support for the organisation. The two major elements of this type of criminality are Hizballah shakedowns of Lebanese merchants in the African diaspora and its cooperation with narco-trafficking organisations. A less significant factor is Hizballah’s involvement in various fraud schemes.

Hizballah has institutionalized a framework for shaking down “donations” from Lebanese businessmen in the African diaspora. As described by Douglas Farah, Lebanese-owned businesses across West Africa were assessed by Hizballah for a “contribution” on a yearly or semi-annual basis whereby the amount to be contributed was a defined fraction of revenue for any given Lebanese-owned business. Those contributions were collected, generally in cash, by Hizballah bag men who often moved the monies to the Middle East by courier.[16] Some contributions were likely to have been genuine voluntary donations meant for political and social service organisations run by Hizballah, but many such contributions were little more than extortions.[17]

Some types of Hizballah-associated criminality required specific religious dispensation. A special fatwa issued by Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah in the mid-1980s, for example, gave Hizballah a spiritual go-ahead to engage in narco-trafficking.[18] The organisation became involved in illicit narcotics enterprises in several areas of the world, including both North and South America.[19] In the Americas, the increasing strength of Mexican drug cartels over the last decades precipitated a shift by South American drug traffickers toward Africa – very much to the advantage of Hizballah. West Africa became a storage and transshipment region used by transnational organised crime groups for major illicit narcotics shipments from Latin America to Europe, as documented by the US Drug Enforcement Administration.[20] A complex set of relationships emerged between Hizballah and other terrorist organisations and various transnational drug-trafficking organisations as well as with local criminal organisations. Those relationships were based on critical services each could
provide to its partners - with all parties making a profit.[21] The local West African model of organised crime (sometimes called the ‘Nigerian model’) is not hierarchical; rather it consists of “project-based” networks that would coalesce and dissolve as opportunities warranted.[22]

Guinea-Bissau for instance, can be described as a narco-state it is one of the more significant drug trafficking hubs in West Africa. Guinea-Bissau-based Lebanese working on behalf of Hizballah have directly engaged the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC) due, in part, to the geography of the ninety island archipelago.[23] Narcotics are moved from Guinea-Bissau to Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, and then transshipped to Northern Africa’s Mediterranean coast and from there on to final destinations in Europe.[24] The Liberian state under Charles Taylor (President 1997-2003) was a kleptocratic enterprise. Taylor’s Liberia used state institutions to protect and further the activities of favored criminal enterprises, cooperating with organised crime groups from multiple countries – Israeli criminals as well as Al-Qaeda and Hizballah were operating in the same geographic space without much friction.[25] The aftermath of Taylor’s resignation ending a civil war in 2003 saw multiple claims to the Presidency although Ellen Sirleaf was ultimately elected President in two 2006. Nonetheless the status of Liberia as a major drug trafficking hub has persisted with Al-Qaeda and Hizballah essentially using the same Liberian smuggling networks in subsequent years.[26]

**Hizballah and Iran**

Some elements of Hizballah’s African archipelago support radical Islamist groups at the behest of Iran. These groups are sometimes Sunni but nonetheless share common interests with Iran and Hizballah in their opposition to Western interests. Iran’s interests in Africa have likewise changed over time with early revolutionary fervour devolving to the pursuit of more mundane national and commercial interests. Irrespective of the quite real Sunni-Shi’a jurisprudential differences, both Hizballah and Iran have proven quite adept at working with Sunni radicals when they share common interests.

The Nigerian case demonstrates how local grievances can potentially be exploited by Iran, Hizballah or Al-Qaeda. While the geography of the state of Nigeria has been defined only since independence in 1960, Islam penetrated portions of that space very early. The borders of the modern Nigerian state are transected with Islamic influence defining the culture of Northern Nigeria and separating it from the non-Islamic South. The non-Islamic Southern regions of the countries are the basis for Nigeria’s oil-based wealth while the Islamic North is economically much less developed. That North-South divide is a rather fundamental one, strongly shaping Nigeria’s polity.

The geographic space that now includes the Northern portion of Nigeria boasts a history of Sunni Muslim activism dating back to the ninth century. One consequence of that history of activism is that various Muslims sects from the Northern part of the country ultimately came to dominate the Nigerian army. Shedrack Best [27] has identified two significant Sunni Islamist movements in Northern Nigeria: (i) the *Izala* was a defined as a *da’wah* type movement striving for spiritual purification and orthodoxy but with no explicit intent to establish an Islamist state and (ii) the *Maitatsine* movement which, by contrast, has engaged in ongoing, Islamist-inspired violence.
against the police and other symbols of the Nigerian state. *Maitatsine* terrorist operations however were less intended to build Islamist institutions as to target Nigerian state institutions. Nonetheless, as the 21st century began, Sunni activists persuaded the Nigerian government in Abuja to allow twelve of its Northern States to make Shariah law the official standard for criminal justice procedures. Northern Nigerian states then saw the emergence of a *Hisbah* militia enforcing Shariah law. More recently, Boko Haram, founded by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf in 2002, has become more vociferous. Rabidly Islamist and engaging in widespread violence in the North of Nigeria Boko Haram is ideologically compatible with many of the regional Salafist groups and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Boko Haram’s operational capacity is currently limited but has the potential to become much more challenging, particularly if armed and funded by Iran.

In addition to potentially exploiting local Islamist radicals, Iranian assets have also tried to build an arms smuggling network in Nigeria and throughout Africa. In doing so it was not always successfully. Iran’s efforts to use Nigeria for covert arms distribution backfired in October 2010 when the Nigerian State Security Services, probably tipped by Western agencies, intercepted a ship in Lagos port of Apapa. The ship came from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and was operated through the French container company CMA CGM Group, carrying contraband freight consisting of thirteen containers of heavy arms with a listed destination of Banjul Gambia. It became clear that an Iranian businessman Azim Aghajani who was managing the shipment in Nigeria was in fact a Iranian IRGC agent intending to forward the arms to support dissident factions in several countries, including Nigeria itself. It appears that part of the shipment was to be diverted to the Hisbah militia in Nigeria’s own North. A fraction of the shipment was going to support the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamanche (MFDC) rebel movement in Southern Senegal and another part was to go to rivals of Gambian President Jammeh. Gambia’s President Yahya Jammeh had been a faithful ally of Iran for some years, himself making a reasonable income buying arms from Tehran and reselling them. Senegal and Gambia, both of whom previously reported good relations with Tehran, took offence at the Nigerian discovery and broke diplomatic relations with Iran in 2011.

Kenya, while having more sophisticated security services, also offers rich opportunities for Iran. Iran’s intent to use the opportunities Kenya presented was demonstrated in 2012 when Kenyan police arrested Sayed Mansour Mousavi and Ahmand Abolfathi Mohammed, both Iranian nationals, for smuggling more than one hundred kilograms of cyclonite (RDX) to a warehouse in Mombasa, Kenya. The Iranians may have been attempting to strike back at Kenya due to the military incursion by its armed forces to stabilize parts of the Jubaland area of Somalia ruled by Al-Shabab. Iran seems to prefer instability in the Horn of Africa, even under the auspices of Sunni Islamists like Al-Shabab, to gain and maintain Iranian influence in the region. The US government, through its embassy in Nairobi, tries to acts as a counterpoint to Iran, deploying substantial resources to promote stability in Somalia. In addition, Manda Bay in Kenya serves as part of the *Africom* tripwire system for the United States. US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) forces use the Kenyan military base to conduct stability operations across the Horn of Africa. While these operations are aimed primarily at Al-Qaeda affiliates functioning in the region, they inevitably impact on Iran’s interests. *Africom* also
utilizes facilities in Nzara (South Sudan). This too might generate apprehension in Iran’s IRGC Force’s North African Department.

While arms’ trafficking is a significant component of Iran’s West African operations, the main focus of Tehran’s efforts has been the Horn of Africa, given the proximity of the Horn to the Middle Eastern theater. This is also a focal point of Africom’s counterterrorism efforts through the vehicle of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) which is based on the old French military compound camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. While Western attention for the Horn has focused primarily on pirates and on Al-Qaeda’s links with Al-Shabab, Iran has quietly continued its long-term efforts to exploit conditions there to further its own interests. The center of Iran’s efforts in this regard has been Sudan and, to a lesser extent, Somalia. Iran’s efforts began a generation ago, following the 1989 Islamist coup by Hassan Turabi’s National Islamic Front in Sudan. Iran traded money for influence in Khartoum and Sudan became a focal point for Iranian intelligence officers liaising with networks of Sunni Islamists. By 1999 the US State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism referred to Sudan as a central hub for terrorist groups - from Lebanon’s Hizballah to Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda.[38]

Concurrent with Iran’s mentoring efforts with the Khartoum government, Tehran had established a Somali Revolutionary Guard in Sudan, trained under the tutelage of both Iranian and Hizballah personnel and intended to act as an Iranian proxy in Somalia.[39] However, Iran’s efforts to leverage its presence in Sudan to project influence into Somalia became problematic. Somalia had not retained a functional government since 1991, making the Somali geographic space a constellation of competing tribes, warlords, militia factions and their affiliated criminal entities. When the Iranian-trained and Sudan-based Somali Revolutionary Guard was inserted into Somalia’s ungoverned spaces, its revolutionary pretensions dissolved into nothing. The Somali Revolutionary Guard became yet another faction fighting on Somalia’s battle ground. Iran and it’s al-Quds elements ultimately supported multiple factions in Somalia, including the Somali Islamic Union Party, a Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) then led by General Muhammed Abshir and Abdel al-Rahman who controlled parts of the Somaliland area. While these factions never constituted any coherent fighting force or established any consistent form of Islamic governance, they did two things: they allowed Iran’s entré into Somalia and they managed to stop the United Nations aid organisations from stabilizing the country - thereby preventing establishment of any Somali government conflicting with Iranian interests.[40]

The Islamic Court Union (ICU, also called Council of Islamic Courts), initially a device for local leaders to control small geographic areas under generic Shariah law, grew strong enough to assert control over Mogadishu and the trade routes inland.[41] A brief 2006 Ethiopian intervention into Somalia degraded whatever hope the Islamic Courts Union had for a government, although a splinter faction of the ICU called Al-Shabab under Mukhtar Robow Ali (Abu Mansur) continues the fight and lately has affiliated itself with Al-Qaeda. Consequently, Al-Shabab is attracting significantly more US attention, reportedly in the form of drone strikes if not ground level support for Somali factions. The 2006 Ethiopian incursion had resulted in the creation of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) favored by the United States. The TFG created a Somali National Security Agency headquartered at the Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu.[42] An Alpha Group within the Somali National Security Agency supported US activities in Somalia with “snatch” operations, direct combat operations against Al-Shabab, and
interrogations of prisoners, some rendered from adjacent countries.[43] In the Puntland region of Northeast Somalia, US JSOC personnel, sometimes flying directly from Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, have assisted Puntland forces in combating Al-Shabab.[44] In addition to Somali’s internal players, affiliates of Iran and allies of the United States as well as some Al-Qaeda elements are active in the Somali space.

Sudan, ruled by Omar Hassan al-Bashir, has become a safe haven for some wanted Middle Eastern terrorists, allowing some of them to rejoin the struggle by going from Khartoum first to Iran and then infiltrating back into operational areas of the Middle East.[45] In 2008 Sudan’s role in Iran’s arms smuggling networks[46] was enhanced by a defense agreement signed by the Defense Ministries of both countries.[47] This expanded Sudan’s role as a regional center for larger Iranian arms trafficking operations. In these efforts Hizballah members, acting on Iran’s behalf and often with the cooperation of Sudan’s Abadba tribe, transported weapons north through Egypt and into the Sinai where Bedouin smugglers would move them on into Gaza. With both Sudan and Iran under international arms embargos, Jonathan Schanzer has argued in Foreign Policy that Iran might wish to shorten its supply chain supporting radical Islamists by manufacturing arms in the Sudan.[48] Efforts to establish local arms production facilities by Iran in the Khartoum area of Sudan are a possible result of a secret codicil in the 2008 agreement. Sudan already had weapons production facilities operating under its Military Industrial Corporation that could be revamped under the tutelage of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps for Tehran’s designs in the region.[49] Israel was concerned enough about the volume and quality of weapons moving north to risk an international incident by attacking a convoy ferrying Iranian weapons in 2009 that was en-route to the Gaza Strip via Egypt.[50] At the end of the day, however, what remains is a substantive Iran-facilitated arms smuggling network, aided by Hizballah operatives, which is moving large quantities of arms through Africa into the Middle East. Some of these arms are smuggled to Hizballah in Lebanon, some to Hamas in the Gaza, and some further Iranian local interests in Africa.

This arms supply chain inevitably led to a confrontation with Egypt as Hizballah’s relations with Egypt, never good, began to degrade following the 2006 Israel-Hizballah Summer War in Lebanon. In November and December 2008 Egypt arrested 24 men accused of links to Hizballah and later expanded the search to 49 individuals.[51] The political nature of Egypt’s charges against the men became evident early on when charges shifted from financing Hamas to Red Sea shipping reconnaissance to operational preparations for an attack on Israeli tourists. The real confrontation between Hizballah and Egypt, however, involved Iranian facilitated arms smuggling networks that crossed Egypt on the way to Gaza.[52]

**Conclusion**

With the revolution in Egypt and the ensuing internal power struggle, it is an open question how much and how fast things will change in which direction. The Egypt military establishments still depends on the United States while President Mursi is seeking to revive relations with Iran, planning a state visit to Tehran in August 2012. The outcome of the power struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian military as well as the outcome of the civil war in Syria
will co-determine what opportunities are left or will open up for Hezbollah and Iran to meddle in African affairs.

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**About the Author:** Carl Anthony Wege is a Professor of Political Science at the College of Coastal Georgia in Brunswick, Georgia. He has taught political science for twenty year and has published a number of articles on Lebanon's Hizballah and related topics. E-mail address: twege@ccga.edu

**Notes**

[1] Hizballah (“the Party of God”) created a support infrastructure as far back as its first generation in West Africa. In the 1980s, Hizballah cells provided logistical support for the organisation by accessing French embassies in Guinea, Gabon, and Senegal through Lebanese Shi’a contract workers who stole French passports and identity cards that were sent to Lebanon. See “Hezbollah Seen Setting Up Terror Network in Africa” *Los Angeles Times*, 27 November 1989.

[2] Africom’s Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa symbolized the US commitment to this program by moving nearly 2,000 men into the former French military base at Camp Lemonnier to deal with the especially difficult circumstances on the Horn of Africa. France also maintains the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion in Djibouti.

[3] Earlier efforts by the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (formerly the Pan Sahel Initiative) were ultimately of limited utility and demonstrated the need for the broader mission of Africom.


[5] Hizballah was created at the behest of Iran through the Sepahe al-Quds element of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Pasdaran) in the midst of Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Allied with Iran and facilitated by Syria, Hizballah eventually became the most significant actor in the Lebanese political system. Hizballah, as a non-state actor, became an amalgam of proxy and ally for Iran’s international ambitions.

[6] The West African Lebanese diaspora near the turn of the 21st century included roughly 100,000 Lebanese in Cote d’Ivoire, 20,000 in Senegal and a few thousand left in Sierra Leone (from approximately 30,000 residents before Sierra Leone’s civil war).

[7] Sierra Leone’s Koidu region has the richest diamond deposits. Many of the Lebanese families in the diamond trade originate from the area of Nabatiyeh in South Lebanon.

[8] AMAL (Afwâj al-Muqâwama al-Lubnâniyya) and Hizbullah were rival Lebanese Shi’a organisations who were shooting at one another in Lebanon in 1988-1989. Of the two, AMAL was the more secular in its orientation and more influenced by Syria while Hizballah was more Islamist and oriented towards Iran. In the 21st century there is much more cooperation between the former rivals although Hizbullah is clearly the dominating party. Berri was elected head of AMAL in 1980 and became Speaker of Lebanon’s Parliament in 1992 while Hizbullah currently holds several Ministerial posts.
The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was neither revolutionary, nor united, nor a front. It is best defined in terms of amorphous and shifting groups of criminals, sometimes with political pretentions, engaging in combinations of war crimes and common crimes spanning a couple of decades in the geographic region of Sierra Leone. RUF was best known for kidnapping children and amputating the limbs of its opponents and others who crossed its path. Foday Sankoh, an illiterate photographer, and a couple of the original “members” spent time at Gaddafi’s “Revolutionary University” in Libya, providing the closest thing to a political pretension the group ever expressed. RUF’s primary impact was that of a destabilizing element in the larger civil conflicts that engulfed Sierra Leone. It should be noted that since much of West Africa is characterized by weak states and ungoverned spaces, constellations of rival and affiliated militias interact without regard to unguarded national borders.


Ibid., “Digging Up Congo’s Dirty Gyms” Washington Post, 30 December 2001. Farah has elsewhere noted that the “blood diamond” trade at its peak in West and Central Africa ran at roughly $200 million per year. However, only a fraction of that amount would be supporting Hizballah. Hizballah’s involvement in drug trafficking is ultimately more lucrative for the organisation. Conflict or “blood” diamonds are thought to account for only a few percent of a worldwide $10 billion diamond trade.


A Tripartite Plus Intelligence Fusion Cell that could have been helpful in this regard was located in Kisangani in the Democratic Republic of Congo. While underutilized by local services which it was originally intended to assist, it might have been better utilized for creating analytical products that monitored Hizballah-linked revenue streams.


It should also be noted that during Lebanon’s civil war (1975-1989) many of Lebanon’s Maronite, Druze, and Sunni militias likewise ran shakedowns within their own ethnic communities in the diaspora. However, none of these were as well organised as those of Hizballah.

Fadlallah who died in 2010 is generally described as the spiritual guide of Hizballah although he was more closely associated with the Da’wah (Islamic Call group). Fadlallah never exercised direct control over Hizballah.

For example in operation Titan the DEA in 2008 shut down a drug smuggling and money laundering operation between Columbian cartels and Hizballah which run through the Lebanese middleman Shukri Mahmud Harb. Likewise DEA’s 2009 operation Mountain Express documented Hizballah affiliated trafficking of methamphetamine from Canada into the United States.


Marco Vernaschi “Guinea-Bissau Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda and the Lebanese Connection”. Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, 19 June 2009. At one point in time, the headquarters for this network was alleged to operate out of the Palace Hotel in Bissau then owned by the Lebanese financier Tarek Arezki. The Lebanese managed administration and finance for the drug movement while Nigerian and local criminals operating under the supervision of alleged kingpin Bliri Augustus were responsible for labour.
“Drug seizure in West Africa prompt fears of terrorist links”, Observer, 29 November 2009. The movement of illicit drugs out of Guinea-Bissau into north Africa and Europe is thought to be facilitated in part by Al-Qaeda and its affiliate Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

“Al-Qaeda's Growing Sanctuary”, Washington Post, 14 July 2004. Leonid Minin, a Jewish arms dealer originally from the Ukraine, and Aziz Nassour of Hizballah, for example, crossed paths in Liberia and elsewhere without difficulty.

Douglas Farah, “Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States.” Prism (2) 2011, p. 22. These “shared services” are obviously not secure from infiltration as they are anchored in profit rather than ideology. However, they are nevertheless not much more accessible to intelligence agencies than they are to law enforcement. To a terrorist organisation such shared services are useful as long as their security limitations are kept in mind.

Prof. Best is a political scientist who served as the Director of the Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies at the University of Jos, Nigeria. www.unijos.edu.ng/ccomps/?q=node/4


“Iranian guns and a king in Banjul,” Africa Confidential, 3 December 2010.

Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamanche is a faction seeking independence from Senegal. They were found to be using some weapons of Iranian origin in 2011 when Senegalese soldiers were killed.

“Did Jammeh Sell Iranian Arms To Hizballah?” Freedom Online, 26 February 2011. The story alleged that Jammeh worked through a Lebanese businessman and General Counsel to Lebanon, Mohammad Bazzi, who was said to coordinates the exchange. The arms were apparently stored at Kanilai Farms in President Hammeh’s home village. Bazzi allegedly used a bank he created in Gambia, the Prime Bank, for the financing. Prime Bank was a subsidiary of the Lebanese Canadian Bank which the US Treasury listed in February of 2010 as a money laundering concern with links to Hizballah.

Perhaps something in the winds of the Arab Spring was blowing against the fortunes of Hizballah in 2011. The Lebanese Ambassador to Cote d’Ivoire, Ali Ajami, who for all intents and purposes was the Ambassador for Hizballah as well as Lebanon, foolishly attended the swearing in of deposed and generally despised former President Laurent Gbagbo. This led to widespread threats against Lebanese in the country and resulted in emergency evacuations of hundreds expatriate Lebanese back to Lebanon. - See “1,000 Lebanese Evacuated from Ivory Coast” YaLibnan 11 April 2011.

Kenya is particularly poignant for Americans, with the Embassy in Nairobi one of the first successful attacks by Al-Qaeda against the United States in 1998.

“Kenya police: Iranian terror suspects shipped 100 kg of explosive to hit Western targets” Washington Post, 10 July 2012. - See also ‘Iranians were targeting British High Commission in Kenya’, The Telegraph, 3 July 2012.


Ibid., see also Shaul Shay, Red Sea Terror Triangle.

Shaul Shay, Somalia Between Jihad and Restoration, pp. 61-64.

M.A. Mohamed Salih, “Transnational Islamist (Jihadist) Movements and Inter-State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa”. The Nordic Africa Institute, Policy Notes 2011/2. - The United States supported a counter organisation called Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism. That organisation was unsuccessful.


Ibid. It should also be noted that this conflict as others nowadays is supported by a significant number of private military companies. In this instance, Bancroft Global Development has also played an important role. See “US Relies on Contractors in Somalia Conflict”, New York Times, 10 August 2011.
[44] “Obama’s Not-So-Secret Terror Wars”, The Daily Beast, 24 July 2012. Ironically, Puntland also became an area of influence for the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), led now by Abdullahi Yusuf of the Darod clan which was at one time supported by Iran.


[47] “The Drones Club”, Africa Confidential, 5 September 2008. In 2008, Sudan would see Iranian produced Ababil III UAV’s operating in the Dufar region, probably using Iranian technicians, while Sudanese personnel were attending Iran’s Military University.


[49] The facilities include the Alshagara and Yarmouk Complexes, the Zargaa Engineering Complex, the Eishaheed Ibrahim Shamseldeen Complex for Heavy Industries, and the Safat Aviation Complex.

[50] “Israeli drones destroy rocket-smuggling convoys in Sudan”, Sunday Times, 29 March 2009 and Chau Donovan, “US Counterterrorism In Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs, Cultures, and Conflicts.” The Letort Papers, p. 18. - Israeli Air Force assets including Hermes drones out of Palmachim air base near Tel Aviv accompanied by Eitan UAV carried out at least two separate operations in January and February of 2009. They attacked two separate convoys carrying Fajr 3 rockets intended to be smuggled from Egypt for use by Hamas in Gaza. It appears that dozens of smugglers and Iranian escorts were killed in the operation. US DOD Special Operations Task Forces (88/145) also covertly engaged Al-Qaeda across the Horn of Africa following the 1998 Embassy bombings.

[51] The numbers themselves are a bit incredulous. Typical terrorist cells consist of 5-7 persons. Discovering a terrorist cell made up of 49 persons rings false.

[52] “Egypt Accuses Hezbollah of Plotting Attacks and Arms Smuggling to Gaza”, New York Times, 14 April 2009. Many of those arrested, including acknowledged Hizballah operative Mohammed Yusuf Mansour, would escape in a mass prison break in the midst of Egypt’s 2011 Revolution. The role of arms smuggling as the root of the episode was also confirmed by Salah Ghosh, the head of the Sudanese Intelligence and Security Service.
Interview with Egyptian Islamist Scholar Abd al-Mun‘im Moneep
by Nico Prucha

Introduction

Abd al-Mun‘im Moneep and I met for the first time in mid-2011. We took time for a long, unrestricted discussion in a public space. An open discussion on controversial issues like Islamism and Jihadism while sipping tea in a typical Cairo coffee shop felt awkward at first but it turned out that almost everyone was busy talking politics shortly after the stepping down (or ousting) of Egypt’s long term president Hosni Mubarak. Abd al-Mun‘im Moneep is a scholar who has dedicated much of his life to the study and documentation of Egyptian Islamist and Jihadist movements. His personal life has become entangled with these movements; he had been arrested for the first time when he was 16 years old in the wake of president Sadat’s assassination in October 1981. He describes himself as a traditionalist, as a Sunni Muslim, who is devoted to the study of, and proper religious conduct according to, divine texts, avoiding the term “salafist” due to the potential misunderstanding this term is likely to evoke among Westerners. He has published four books - all of them on Islamist and Jihadist groups and movements.

Mr Moneep distinguishes three main schools of thought with regard to the manifestation of Islamic movements in contemporary times:

(i), there is a general ‘Islamic movement’, a kind of ‘umbrella’ to describe a spiritual commonality among its adherents; it is not necessarily properly organized. Rather, this is a strong identification marker and driver to for those who seek to live by Islamic social standards – values that may be in conflict with values imported from the West into Arab-Islamic societies.

(ii) the second school of thought views the historical establishing of Islamist movements – organized entities with members and active military as well as political wings – as a result of the Arab defeat (al-hazima) in the six-day war of 1967. This defeat confirmed and reaffirmed for the Islamists the failure of Arab post-revolutionary governments.

(iii) The third school of thought traces the manifestations of Islamist movements to the fall of the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 which resulted in the introduction of secular forces into the Islamic world, leading to secular republican governments.

Abd al-Mun‘im Moneep describes these developments very thoroughly in his book Guide to the Egyptian Islamist Movements (2010). As he analyses particular groups and their personal, ideological and operational relationships, he also documents their differences and diversions. The Egyptian contribution and the role of Egypt as a major starting point for what would become known from the 1990s onwards as ‘Global Jihad’ is essential for an understanding of its ideology, the more so that the current leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is an Egyptian whose involvement in jihadist operations forced him to flee and join international jihadists in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Mr Abd al-Mu‘im Moneep is a regular contributor for various Egyptian newspapers and also frequently publishes articles on his nahu al-tajdid blog which can be read in Arabic at: http://
moneep.blogspot.com/. The interview was held in Arabic in the summer of 2012. What follows is an authorized translation.

NICO PRUCHA: Your name has been associated with the Egyptian al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya. When did you join this Islamist organisation?

ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP: I have never been a member of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya. You probably mean when did I join the ‘Islamic Movement’ (al-haraka al-Islamiyya)? Egypt has a general Islamic Movement, a term that serves as an umbrella for many Islamic organizations. Some of these ‘organizations’ are just intellectual or political trends rather than organizations in the proper sense of the word. An example is the Salafist stream, which, in turn, has multiple side-streams. Some of these groups have specific organizational and group dynamics that ought to be elaborated in more detail. These features, in addition to their specific Islamic methodology (manhaj), distinguish them from other groups. Such organizations (munazzimat) have clear and well-known names, mostly referred to as groups (jama’a), and include the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun)[1], al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, the Group for Salafist Invocation (da’wah) [2] or the al-Qutbiyyun Group.[3] These groups have existed in Egypt for a long time, some date back to the beginning of the 20th century. Other organizations were founded after the revolution of 2011, such as the Free Islamic Coalition (al-itilaf al-Islamiyyi al-hurr)[4] and the Salafi Front (al-jubha al-salafi).[5]

In my book A Guide of Egyptian Islamic Movements [6], I have outlined in great detail many of the Egyptian groups and organizations. As for myself, I have not joined any organization linked to these groups. Intellectually, I associate myself with the general ‘Islamic Movement’ as I just outlined it and adhere to the overarching Islamic idea. I call myself not a Salafist but a “Usuli”, adhering to the original sources of Quran and Sunnah. There are tens of thousands like me. Even those whom we can consider independent from specific organizations can be included in the ‘Islamic Movement’ in a broader sense. However, I consider myself an independent Islamic writer. I have published four books; these are dealing with political matters, media-usage, missionary work (da’wah), and judicial (shari’ah law) matters of Islam. I am an Islamic writer, independent from any organizations but have specialized in the study of Islamic movements and have written extensively on the subject.

NICO PRUCHA: Can you tell us something about your personal life history?

ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP: I became committed to Islamic thought and creed (‘aqidah) at the age of 14 when I was in secondary school. Because I had a personal relationship with one of the leaders of Tanzim al-Jihad (al-Jihad Organization) at the mosque where I performed my prayers, I became a political detainee following the assassination of Sadat in October 1981 at the age of 16. In 1984, after I was released from jail, I enrolled in the History Department of the Faculty of Arts of Cairo University. I graduated in 1990 and then worked as a journalist for several newspapers, the last one being the opposition newspaper al-Sha’ab (the People).[7] I worked there until 1993 when I was again arrested for political reasons.

During my imprisonment, I appeared twice before courts - in 1993 and 1999. In both trials, the court ordered in a final verdict that I be released. However, the authorities never fulfilled the
court’s ruling and I was not released until August 2007. Ever since, I have worked as a journalist in several newspapers, including the independent Al-Dostor (the constitution)[8] newspaper. I am currently studying to obtain my Masters degree in modern history from Cairo University. The working title of my thesis is The Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian Cause. While in detention, I obtained a B.A. in Islamic Studies and another B.A. in Islamic Economy. However, security authorities prevented me from pursuing my Master studies while in detention. My book outlining Islamic Movements, “The Roadmap of Islamic Movements” was nevertheless published in 2009.[9] 


NICO PRUCHA: What are the decision-making mechanisms within Islamic movements in general, and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya in particular?

ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP: Decision-making mechanisms within Islamic movements differ from one organization to another; each has its own procedures. As for the Muslim Brothers, decisions are taken by the Guidance Council (Majlis al-Irshad), which is elected by the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura). The Majlis al-Shura members are elected from the general members of the organization. The Majlis al-Shura takes the crucial decisions for the organization.

Decisions in al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya are made by its Majlis al-Shura, which is the highest authority in this organization. It was an appointed body in the past, but after the 2011 Egyptian revolution and the coming into existence of new civil liberties, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya[12] was able to elect its Majlis al-Shura by means of a free secret ballot by its general membership. Therefore, each Islamic group has its own mechanisms.

NICO PRUCHA: When was the decision of resorting to violence taken in the 1980s and ‘90s? How was such a decision taken within al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya?

ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP: The decision of resorting to arms against the regime of ousted president Hosni Mubarak was taken in the late 1980s and early 1990s by four Egyptian Islamic trends:

The first trend: al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya. Decisions were made by its Majlis al-Shura.

Second trend: Egyptian Tanzim al-Jihad. The decision-making process was dominated by its leadership group, which at the time was residing in Peshawar, Pakistan.

It was a generally accepted opinion that violence was the most beneficial way to stop the repression, torture and violent means of the Egyptian regime against the Islamist movements and in particular the Jama’a al-Jihad and Jama’a al-Islamiyya.

Third trend: Shawqis organization, the Shawqiyyun. Decisions were made by the group’s leadership. This group remained inside of Egypt and did not go abroad as many other groups had to do after the Sadat assassination. They were centered in the al-Fayyum province where they also originated. Armed fighting broke out with the Egyptian police, with casualties on both sides. The decision to resort to violence was, in contrast to al-Jihad’s and Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s
reasoning on violence, a spirited and emotional rather than a thoughtful decision. The Shawqiyyun lacked the structure and the intellect of other groups.

Fourth trend: multiple small Islamic groups; here the decisions were taken by their leaders.

The reasons behind taking up arms against the regime of the ousted president Mubarak were its autocratic and violent nature, arrests, repression, torture and physical liquidations of members of these four trends by the Mubarak regime.

NICO PRUCHA: Was there internal criticism regarding the decision to resort to violence?

ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP: The four trends were convinced of their course to resort to armed actions because of the dictatorship, repression and torture systematically practiced by the Mubarak regime against all Islamic trends in Egypt.

But of course there was also criticism and there always had been an opposition to violence within of al-Jihad and Jama’a al-Islamiyya. Ayman al-Zawahiri and his supporters opposed armed operations in 1993. However, the pressure of the violent means employed by the State Security on prisoners associated with the Islamist and jihadist groups was used by the members on the outside as an excuse to exercise pressure on the regime of Mubarak by armed operations. The expectation was that the regime would stop the torture and the abuse of the prisoners and release them at one point.

NICO PRUCHA: What do you think of the renunciation of violence, especially in reference to Jihadists’ ideological revisions? How have your own views been affected by the fall of Mubarak and the establishment of new political parties?

ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP: Of course, this is the result of the 2011 Egyptian revolution that has proven to the people the existence of other ways to successfully achieve political change – by popular revolution.

NICO PRUCHA: Who were, in your opinion, the most influential intellectual and military figures during the 1970s and 1980s?

Intellectually, Sayyidd Qutb [d. 1966] and Ibn Taymiyya [d. 1328]; militarily, Saleh Sariyya and ‘Issam al-Qammari [d. 1988]. Sariyya and al-Qammari are two of the most renowned symbols; they were avant-gardists in both their actions and personal commitments.

[Note: Saleh Sariyya was a Palestinian who fled with his family in the wake of the al-nakbah, the “catastrophe” of the establishing of the state of Israel in 1948 to Iraq. He was born in Haifa and later became a student of the sharia faculty in Baghdad where he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and was soon engaged in the Palestinian cause. He moved to Cairo in 1971 and met with prominent Muslim Brotherhood figures, such as Zaynab al-Ghazali and Hasan al-Hudaybi. He formed a jihadist group that was labelled by al-Zawahiri the “Military Technical Academy Group” since he had managed to recruit members of that academy of the Egyptian army. However, in 1974 the attempt by the “Military Technical Academy Group” to overthrow Sadat failed. Saleh was executed and the rest went underground and joined other groups.”]
divisions prevented Sariyya to pursue this line of thought. Hazim al-Amin in his book *The Orphaned Salafist*,[16] credits Sarriya with the idea of ousting the Egyptian regime in order establish a true Islamic state and to liberate occupied Palestine afterwards, as Sariyya wrote in his now forgotten ideological work *al-Risala al-iman*, where he calls for “jihad to establish an Islamic state”. This idea would later be nourished and advocated by ’Abdallah ‘Azzam in the 1980s; he used Afghanistan and Pakistan as a new rallying base for jihadists from all over the world with the ultimate aim to liberate Palestine by first removing the “near enemies” in the Islamic countries.[17]

‘Issam al-Qammari had been a personal affiliate of Ayman al-Zawahiri and part of the first generation of jihadists that sought to topple the Egyptian military regime of Anwar Sadat. After the assassination of Sadat in October 1981 and the massive reprisals by his successor Mubarak, the Egyptian *al-Jihad* movement had scores of their members flee to Pakistan and Afghanistan to evade imprisonment and torture. Prominent figures, however, had been detained in the aftermath of the assassination, among them Ayman al-Zawahiri.[18]

‘Issam al-Qammari was a decorated tank commander of the Egyptian army and was praised as such by Ayman al-Zawahiri in his book *Knights under the Banner of the Prophet*, originally published in 2001. In this work, al-Zawahiri wrote a full chapter about him. Al-Qammari was a personal companion and al-Zawahiri claims that “the most important jihad group that was discovered by the [Egyptian] security apparatus was ‘Issam al-Qammari’s group, may God have mercy with him.”[19] He used his military position to provide weapons and explosives as well as tactical maps of army locations in Cairo. His smuggling activities were discovered in February 1981 and he was forced into hiding afterwards. Al-Zawahiri recalled later: “….during the last quantity of weapons from my clinic [in Cairo’s al-Ma’adi district] to the warehouse (...) the man carrying the bag was arrested. Issam sensed the danger before being caught and escaped.” Al-Qammari planed to attack the US-President while he attended Sadat’s funeral. Al-Zawahiri recounts with pride that al-Qammari shocked his father by telling him he joined the military so he can lead a military insurgency against the regime (p. 46). In 2008, answering questions addressed to al-Zawahiri on the Internet in “an open interview” by al-Qaeda’s media department “as-Sahab”, al-Zawahiri praised al-Qammari and the Sadat assassin Khalid al-Islambuli as brave and true Muslims of the Egyptian army, stating that it was permissible to attack and kill well-chosen individuals of the Egyptian armed forces but holding that one should refrain from general attacks.[20]

NICO PRUCHA: What were the roles of Shura Councils, Emirs and members inside prison?

ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP: No one pays attention to this issue except for the remnant of the *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya*. The role of the groups’ emirs inside the prisons did not matter much for the rest of the organizations.

NICO PRUCHA: Can you explain in detail the process of swearing allegiance to the Emir [bay'ah] and tell us whether decisions are taken by consensus or by a majority of votes? Can an Emir take a decision unilaterally, even if it is against the opinion of the majority?
ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP: These matters differ from one group to another and from one period in history to another. Nowadays, after the Egyptian revolution and with increasing freedoms, different Islamic groups tend to rely more on councils and free voting and generally adopt the opinion of the majority.

Before the 2011 revolution, Islamic groups were trying to keep a low profile in order to keep their members safe from the oppression of the ruling regime. Therefore, it was difficult during that period of repression to hold elections and consultative (shura) sessions.

NICO PRUCHA: Is it permissible for any member to leave the Islamic Movement? If so, will you describe how this was done?

ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP: This is a very normal matter and an everyday occurrence. It does not have to follow a prescribed procedure. One’s commitment to the Islamic Movement or any Islamic organization is just a personal and voluntarily choice or initiative, consequently, anyone can give up such a choice at any time.

NICO PRUCHA: Is there a reorganization of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya taking place at present? With the official political party established, would a group like al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya – in its traditional organizational form - still continue to exist? Who is the person in charge?

ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP: The question is unclear. If you mean the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya organization, which is one of the streams that belongs to the Egyptian Islamic Movement, the answer is that this organization exists and is led by a freely elected al-Majlis al-Shura chaired by Mr. Essam Derballa. The group has an officially recognized party called al-Banna’ wa-l-Tanmiyya. The party took part in the parliamentary elections in alliance with two Salafi parties: the “al-Nur (Light) Party”[21] and the “al-Asala (Authenticity) Party”.[22]

NICO PRUCHA: Do you think that Sharia laws will be applied in the future in Egypt?

ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP: I think so.

NICO PRUCHA: If the autocratic regimes will indeed collapse in the wake of the Arab Spring, do you think the Islamic nation [ummah] will be united?

ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP: This will be difficult, especially in the short term, but might be possible in the medium term.

NICO PRUCHA: What is your understanding of Egyptian Salafism? What makes someone a ‘Salafist’? From which social class do Salafists come from? Who are the Salafist mentors in Egypt?

ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP: Egyptian Salafism consists of many different streams represented by a number of organizations. It is essential for all Salafist organizations to adhere to the understanding and application of Islam according to the acts, deeds and statements of early Muslims. The term “salaf” refers to the “ancestors”, the early Muslims, the companions of the Prophet and their followers throughout the first centuries after the hijra [the migration of Muhammad and his companions from Mecca to Medina in 622 C.E – the first year of the Islamic calendar]. For contemporary Salafists, to imitate and re-enact their methodology (manhaj) is an obligation. They consider adhering to this manhaj as the only reason why Islamic leaders of the early centuries were able to conquer the world. For the first Islamic leaders indeed professed
Islam in its true and righteous form and therefore had been able to craft the best civilization ever to be witnessed by mankind throughout history. It is a civilization that was founded on right and justice (al-haqq wa-l-adl) and on the principle of “commanding good and forbidding evil” (al-amr bi l-ma’ruf wa-l-nahiyy ‘an al-munkar).

By emulating early Muslims, contemporary Salafists aim at approximating themselves [religiously, socially, politically and traditionally] to the high status of their ancestors and their understanding of Islam as religion and civilization. That is to say, modern Salafists want to elevate themselves on a similar status [social, political and religious] as their role models. However, they do not want to go back in time and live under the historical conditions and circumstances of these early Muslims. To follow them is to live by the values they achieved and lived for, not the circumstances of their existence. Salafism is not to seed the past in present soil, but it is rather – according to this view – following the true values of Islam, to establish and to restore the true religion and the Islamic world.

One of the most prominent foundations of the Salafists’ methodology is the prioritization of [Islamic] scriptures [Quran and Sunnah] over reason. Salafists rely on the Islamic scriptures and adjust their reasoning according to their interpretations of the scriptures. Their understanding is based on the thought that Islamic Shari’ah approves reasoning and does not reject it. The companions of Prophet Muhammad and the followers of their methodology are, according to the Salafist view, the ones who most fully understood Islamic Shari’ah rules. This reflects one of the main differences between Salafists (or historically Sunni Muslims) and other Islamic schools that relied on theology for the understanding of dogma and religion. The latter believe that Islam should be interpreted to suit their views if it contradicts their logical opinions.

The Sunni Muslims who today adhere to Salafist methodology consider themselves circumventing the deviations of [modern] life by following the divine texts. This is in contrast to theologians – and those similar like the Mu’tazilah[23] school – who seek to interpret text to fit their desired way of living.

Salafists also think that an appeal to reason in disputed religious matters is not the right course of action. As minds vary from one person to the other, such an action can lead to bewilderment and differences in outcomes since each person would claim that his own opinion is sounder than the other.

The Salafist approach has its own conditions, advantages and traits that distinguish it from other theological or philosophical schools. Among these conditions: inference should be clear, evident and supported by verses from Qur’an and Sunnah – the tradition based on the conveyed acts and deeds of the Prophet. Salafists do not believe in reason because, in their opinion, it may be misleading. Instead, Salafists believe in divine texts and actions as suggested by the texts. The texts are divine, they are God’s direct word through the Qur’an and in the Prophet’s traditions as contained in the Sunnah. The texts serve as the basis prescribing Islamic life; this is acceptable to the Salafists. Divine scriptures are the clear guidance and guidelines for the Salafists’ manhaj and course of actions in this world. Reasoning may change, but the perseverance of close proximity to the divine texts is thus considered as the only appropriate form of adhering and implementing divine principles and commandments.
There are many scholars who represent Salafism such as Dr. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Maqsud, Dr. Muhammad Isma’il al-Muqaddim, Muhammad Hasan, Muhammad Hussein Ya’qub, Abu Ishaq al-Hueiny, Mustafa al-‘Adawi and others. Salafis come from all Egyptian social classes.

**NICO PRUCHA:** What is your message to the Egyptian youth?

**ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP:** To learn their religion and history in a correct and well-suited manner so that their choices become wise in this important stage of the history of our Islamic ummah.

**NICO PRUCHA:** How do you imagine or visualize the Islamic State in the future?

**ABD AL-MUN’IM MONEEP:** I imagine an Islamic State in the future based on several elements. First and foremost, the Islamic state shall be based on justice and freedom. Political decision-making processes should be subjected to the principles of the al-Majlis al-Shura while acknowledging varieties of Islamic jurisprudence, creeds, and political pluralism.

**NICO PRUCHA:** Thank you for sharing your views with the readers of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.

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**About the interviewer:** Nico Prucha holds an Mag. Phil. degree in Oriental Studies from the University of Vienna where he is also working on his PhD. He is the author of “The Voice of Jihad” - Al-Qaeda’s first online magazine.

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**Notes**

[1] “Ikhwan online”: [http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Default.aspx](http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Default.aspx); corresponding links to Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and a RSS-feed are available on the website

[2] Jama’a al-Da’wah al-Salafiyya, represented by prominent scholar Yasir al-Barhami. For an interview in Arabic with al-Barhami on details of the Jama’a al-Da’wah al-Salafiyya: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_7euMplqyQ&feature=related](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_7euMplqyQ&feature=related). Al-Barhami maintains a website, sawt al-salaf ([www.salafvoice.com](http://www.salafvoice.com)), where he frequently publishes fatwas (legal opinions) and articles. The website also serves as a platform to publish statements (bayan) of the al-Da’wah al-Salafiyya Group. “Anna Salafi” (“I am a Salafist”) is the most prominent website for the al-Da’wah al-Salafiyya movement, online at: [www.anasalafy.com/index.php](http://www.anasalafy.com/index.php).

[3] Al-Jama’at al-Qutbiyun was founded in prison after the 1965 sentences of scores of Muslim Brotherhood members. Sayyid Qutb is considered the main thinker and spiritual counselor for historical as well as contemporary Islamist and jihadist groups. A prominent writer, Sayyid Qutb shaped the Islamists’ ideology with his two main works, his renowned Milestones and his commentary on the Quran In the Shade of the Quran. He was arrested in 1965 and executed in 1966. A small group of Muslim Brothers under the leadership of Sayyid Qutb’s brother, Muhammad, parted from the Brotherhood as they differed with regard to strategies on how to properly conduct Islamic work and missionary activities. Nowadays their numbers do not exceed 1,000 members. Muhammad Qutb is a professor at the Umm al-Qura University in Mecca and his writings are frequently published on jihadist websites such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, [www.tawhed.ws](http://www.tawhed.ws). His writings can also be accessed directly via [http://tawhed.ws/a?a=pum8ossa](http://tawhed.ws/a?a=pum8ossa).

[4] Their website is currently under construction ([http://www.fic-25.com/](http://www.fic-25.com/)), the main activities are on their Facebook group, [http://www.facebook.com/Islamic.Coalition](http://www.facebook.com/Islamic.Coalition). Their number and role in Egyptian politics seem rather marginal; this is also reflected by the small number of “likes” on Facebook (1.300).


[8] [http://dostor.org](http://dostor.org)


[12] Official website: [http://www.egyig.com](http://www.egyig.com). The recantations made in prison were available on the website both before and after the revolution of 2011. Since then, however, old ideological materials – carefully selected – have resurfaced. New are open demands calling for the release of its ideological leader ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman who is imprisoned in the United States. Al-Jama’at al-Islamiyya established its own political party, the Hizb al-bana’ wa-l-tanmiyya, (“the Building and Development Party”). The official party’s website is available at [http://benaaparty.com](http://benaaparty.com). A Facebook group (over 3,000 “likes”) has been set up as well, [http://www.facebook.com/benaawatanmia](http://www.facebook.com/benaawatanmia).


According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “It is the second Salafi party after al-Nour to gain official recognition in Egypt. Al-Asala is a member of the Democratic Alliance.” Furthermore, the party’s program consists of: “Supporting an Islamic religious state in Egypt; - Supporting reforms that will move the Egyptian state and society toward Islam” and of “Rejecting the Camp David Accords and peace with, or recognition of, Israel”, [http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/20/al-asala-authenticity-party](http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/20/al-asala-authenticity-party).
[23] This line established the dogma that the Quran is created and hence not co-eternal with God. This contrast with the orthodox Sunni view, that the Quran is the direct word of God (kalimat allah). The Mu'atizilah flourished from the 8th to the 10th century in Baghdad and Basra.
II. Resources

Trends and Developments in Terrorism: a Research Note
by Richard J. Chasdi

In the current issue and in future ones, Richard J. Chasdi, member of the Editorial Board of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’ and author of three large monographs on terrorism (including “Counterterror Offensives for the Ghost War World” [2010]), will share with readers of this journal statistics, graphs and tables, based on newly released quantitative data in order to depict developments and trends in terrorism and political violence.

Introduction

For some years now, the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has produced high-quality figures on global, regional, as well as national developments in the field of terrorism. Certain broader trends emerge from the NCTC data. While in 2010 there were some 11,200 terrorist assaults worldwide, the figure for 2011 has fallen to around the 10,000 incidents level – a decline of nearly 12 percent. This is in line with a continuing declining trend since 2007 when roughly 14,000 terrorist attacks were recorded. Put differently, the figure for 2011 represent an almost 29% decrease compared to those for 2007. Even though those roughly 10,000 incidents for 2011 represent the trough for the past five years interval on a global scale, terrorist assault rates in “the Western Hemisphere” and “Africa” nevertheless peaked at “five years highs.” The large majority of all assaults, however, take place in “South Asia” and “the Near East” - with roughly 7,500 terrorist attacks accounting for 75% of the 2011 world total.[1]

Nowadays, political events in countries like Pakistan, Egypt, and Syria demand the increased attention of foreign policymakers concerned with political instability and social unrest and the implications of those dynamics for both “insurgent” and state terrorism. [2] In Pakistan the government’s commitment to combat Taliban and Al-Qaeda near the border with Afghanistan remains episodic and inconsistent. Pakistan also suffers from acute bouts of domestic terrorism carried out by mainly Sunni extremists, and sectors of the government are suspected to continue to support Kashmiri “freedom fighter” actions in Indian held Kashmir. In Egypt, the prospect of “state” and “insurgent” terrorism in response to expansion of Egyptian military political power remains a lurking calamity and as internal instability grows apace, terrorism that emanates from the Sinai continues to pose a threat to Israel. In Syria, full blown “state” terrorism against civilians carried out by Bashar el-Assad’s regime poses profound and lasting challenges both to countries in close proximity to Syria such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel.

A presentation of some empirical trends in broader political instability and terrorist assault characteristics in the narrower sense provides some perspective about antecedent conditions prior to some of the immediate crises and suggests possible associations between variables that researchers might wish to take a closer look at in the future. In addition, such broader trends can also provide some “food for thought” in terms of possible future patterns in those states.
The basis for the following presentation are data produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace “Global Peace Index” (GPI) and the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) annual reports for 2010 and 2011 with supplementary data from the “Failed State Index” produced by the Fund for Peace. The framework of discussion involves a description of several metrics for those three countries and preliminary efforts to tie together some of those findings for a time interval of several years that is more comprehensive and therefore able to provide a greater understanding of each country’s terrorist assault attributes and political context.

**Broader Empirical Trends**

The “Global Peace Index” (GPI) scores for particular countries are based on 23 indicators, such as “respect for human rights,” “number of displaced people as a percentage of population,” and “volume of transfer of major conventional weapons” that themselves revolve around “external peace” and “internal peace” conditions.[3]

In the IEP chart “Risers and Fallers” (IEP, 2012, 2) those five countries experiencing the most positive and negative change in the “Global Peace Index” are showcased. What seems significant here is that Egypt and Syria dropped in the rankings for “peaceful” countries. Egypt experienced the greatest decline in standing with a change of +0.215 in GPI score and a drop of 40 places to a rank of 111/158 countries in 2012. [4] In a similar vein, Syria registered the largest change (+.0523) and dropped 31 places in the rankings to a position of 147. In turn, Tunisia registered less change with +0.193 and dropped 29 positions for a ranking of 29 out of 158 states under consideration. For the corporate authors at the Institute for Economics and Peace, “…all five of the biggest fallers were caught up in the events of the Arab Spring, with Syria and Libya being impacted the most.”[5]
Likewise, the “Failed State Index” that was recently released by the Fund for Peace, cites Egypt (score: 90.4; ranked #31), Syria (score: 94.5; ranked #23), and Libya (score: 84.9; ranked #50) as countries characterized by “increased pressures” on state institutions and “groups” as measured by 12 ordinal political and economic indicators (range 1-5) and many more “sub-indicators” derivate.[6] In Manning’s article, “Pressure Mounts on Syria,” which is included in the Fund for Peace study, the graph, “Syria, 2005-2012” offers a seven year appraisal of Syria’s “failed state” status, highlighting what amounts to some cyclic variation in “failed state” situations: the scores highlight overall “improvement” in Syria’s ranking position from 2005 through 2007, some deterioration from that level (88) to a score of (90) from 2007-2009, some improvement from 2009-2011, before an enormous deterioration of its “failed state position” into the “Alert” zone from 2011 onwards. In ways that echoes “GPI” interpretation of results, Manning tells us about the “Arab Spring” and reports, “….many of its effects have been registered in the 2012 Failed States Index – Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen all saw their scores seriously worsen.”[7]

In the case of terrorism data, clusters of data in bar graphs in “Chart 1 – Victims and Attacks by Region” found in the 2010 National Counterterrorism Center Report (NCTC 2010, 11)
informs us that “South Asia” and “the Near East” were the two most dangerous geographical hotspots for terrorism in 2010. For WITS, “South Asia” ranked first with the greatest number of terrorist assaults at 5,537, followed by “the Near East” with 3,416 terrorist assaults. In a similar vein, the death rate for “South Asia” ranked highest with 6,172 terrorist assault deaths followed by the rate for “the Near East” with 3,750 deaths linked to terrorist assaults. In comparison, the number of wounded in terrorist assaults was lower in the case of “South Asia” with 10,350 injured, by contrast to 12,781 persons injured in “Near East” attacks. Interestingly enough, there was less variation in hostage situations across those two regions with 1,748 in the case of “South Asia” and 1,206 for “the Near East.” What seems significant here is that Africa had the highest rate of hostage/kidnap situations with 2,661 incidents. In contrast, the “Western Hemisphere” is
found to have the lowest rates for terrorist attacks (340), number of fatalities (279), number of injuries (480), and number of hostage/kidnap situations (190).[8]

The 2011 American National Counterterrorism Center-Report on Terrorism provides more specific data on frequency of terrorist assaults by country in two charts entitled, “Attacks, Top 15 Countries (2011)” and “Deaths, Top 15 Countries (2011)” (NCTC, 2011, 9). [9] Not surprisingly, data found in these bar graphs reveal that Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan hold the top three rankings with respect to frequency of terrorist assaults and number of deaths. This WITS study chronicled 2,872 terrorist attacks and 3,353 deaths for Afghanistan, 2,265 terrorist assaults and 3,063 deaths for Iraq, and 1,436 attacks and 2,033 deaths for Pakistan. The rate of terrorist assaults in Iraq was a little over three-quarters of the rate (78.8 %) found in Afghanistan for 2011, while the death rate in Iraq comprised a full 91.3% of the death rate for terrorist assaults found for Afghanistan. Plainly, while the ratio of deaths to terrorist assaults is higher for Iraq (1.35) than for terrorist assaults in Afghanistan (1.16), the ratio of deaths to terrorist assaults for Pakistan is the highest of these three states at 1.41. It should be noted that the terrorist assault death rate for Syria was 52, presumably for “insurgent” or “oppositional” attacks as according to WITS guidelines, “a group will be included in WITS only if it has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the Department of State.”[10] To be sure, that analysis fails to capture dynamics associated with the state terrorism practiced by President Bashar el-Assad against perceived enemies among the civilian population.
Clearly, the foregoing data suggests that South Asia and the Middle East have high rates of terrorist assaults and that Pakistan, Egypt, and Syria fall into high risk geographical conflict zones and are themselves characterized by political instability and social unrest. Additional data from the 2011 National Counterterrorism Center Report on Terrorism presents specific terrorist assault trends and death rates in the graph “Trends in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan: Attacks and Deaths 2007-2011” (NCTC 2011, 10). In the broader sense, the data suggest cyclic trends that are not unusual in terrorism time-series data. For the four years under consideration, Iraq had the highest frequency rate of terrorist assaults with 2007 as a peak year with 6,210 acts and 2011 as a trough year with 2,265 acts. In the case of terrorist assault deaths in Iraq, the results were the same: 2007 was a peak year, while 2011 was a trough year. In turn, Afghanistan ranked second in terrorist assault frequencies for the years 2007, (1,122 acts), 2009 (2,124 acts), 2010 (1,346 acts), and 2011 (2,872). The same results for deaths were found: Afghanistan ranked second for 2007 (1,952 deaths), 2009 (2,779 deaths), 2010 (3,205 deaths) and 2011 (3,353). In contrast, Pakistan’s terrorist assault frequency and death rate exceeded those of Afghanistan in 2008 with 1,837 terrorist acts and 2,293 deaths.

As Pakistan, Egypt, and Syria all have populations comprised of Sunni majorities, it is probably no exaggeration to say that a breakdown of “perpetrator type” characteristics, inclusive of political or religious affiliation by deaths from terrorist assault deaths would be informative. Such analysis is useful because it puts the lethality of assaults by groups with different political/religious ideologies in perspective and offers the possibility to test the widely-held assumption that Sunnis and Shi’ites play a predominant role in terrorist events in many parts of the world.
In the NCTC pie Chart “Deaths Grouped by Perpetrator Type (2011)” presented below, (NCTC 2011, 11), what is most noticeable is that for all recorded deaths in terrorist assaults chronicled by the National Counterterrorism Center for 2011, 8,886 were attributed to “Sunni Extremists” while 1,926 terrorist assault deaths were related to terrorist groups described as “secular/political/anarchist.”[11] Terrorist assaults deaths that were not attributable to NCTC standards of direct attribution or “inference” accounted for the third largest cluster of deaths related to terrorist assaults with 1,519 deaths. By contrast “Neo-Nazi/Fascist/White Supremacist” organizations were linked to “only” 77 deaths.[12] In turn, 170 terrorist assault deaths were attributed in the NCTC report to terrorist group “perpetrators” with “Other” political or religious backgrounds.

To be sure, such findings point to the predominant role of Sunni extremists in more lethal terrorist assaults. However, such data are somewhat narrow precisely because they tend to downplay the importance of less lethal terrorist assaults with often important symbolic and psychological repercussions. In addition, that NCTC analysis revolves around a specific focus on
terrorist organizations with no mention made about “lone wolf assailants.” Indeed, the underlying issue of what constitutes the boundaries or threshold between “lone wolf assailants” on the one hand and terrorist organizations on the other would be useful, especially in an age of thickened cyberspace interconnections where for example, “perpetrators” such as Fort Hood assailant U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hassan and Northwest Airlines assailant Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab were directed or otherwise “inspired” on-line by the late terrorist chieftain Anwar al-Awlaki of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

The pie chart entitled, “Deaths by Victim Categories, Top Nine (2011)”, the 2011 NCTC report provides a breakdown of “victim-type” based on “Civilian,” and “Government” targets with separate categories for “Military/Security Forces,” and “Police,” victims with “political” or “business” background, “Children,” “Unknown,” and “Other Types.” While some of these categories are not mutually exclusive and seem to detract from the analysis (e.g., “civilians” and “children”; “government” and “police”; “politically affiliated” and “civilians”) “civilian” victims ranked highest with 6,418 deaths, followed by “police” victims with 2,423 deaths. Deaths for “Military/Security Forces” ranked third with 1,389. At the other extreme, those broadly categorized as “Politically Affiliated” ranked lowest with 166 deaths, followed by “Business” and “Other Types” with 358 and 484 deaths respectively.[13] Trends found for “civilian” targets and what amounts to “government” targets in the broader sense seem consistent with previous
work that reveals a preference for civilian targets typical for terrorist groups. Such attacks against the defenseless generates “abject fear” but also underlying revulsion among the constituencies terrorists claim to fight for. They also generate and sustain anger and rage among those who identify with the victims and might lead to over-reactions by security forces which in turn can lead to spirals of tit-for-tat terrorism and counter-terrorism.[14]

Clearly, there are associations between political instability and social unrest, state terrorism and domestic terrorist assaults sometimes elicited in response to those state actions. Such associations point to the need to delve in more detail into “political context”. Indeed, scholars of ethnic conflict such as Robert F. Melson and Mahmood Mamdani have also suggested a set of interconnections between state terrorism in a particular country and regional or international conditions or both.[15] Plainly, the “Arab Spring” and its regional effects is an example as good as any of those linkages as is the pre-planned state terror carried out in Rwanda by the Hutu government in the 1994 genocide in response to perceived Tutsi threats to “Hutu power.” What seems significant here is the notion that “contextual factors” act as drivers to give structural shape to terrorist assaults and campaigns. Empirical studies of such factors in Pakistan, Egypt and Syria could provide greater insights into ways to craft foreign harm-reduction policies.[16]

Non-state terrorism cannot be studied without constant attention to the kind of policies states enact towards their populations or sectors thereof. While datasets on terrorism are improving - and WITS is a primary example of this – we have yet to see databases that look simultaneously at both/all sides in domestic and transnational conflicts and pay attention to terrorist acts as well as other acts of political violence and also take into account the impact of non-violent campaigns and mainstream politics and state repression on trends in non-state and state terrorism.

The interplay between terrorism and counter-terrorism, both in its aspects of force and in its propaganda dimensions, calls for data which at this moment are not available in an integrated format. In the following issues of Perspectives on Terrorism we will continue to discuss findings of a quantitative nature and explore past and emerging trends and developments.

About the Author: Richard J. Chasdi is an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at Wayne State University and an Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Windsor.

Notes


[4] Ibid., 2.

[5] Ibid., 53.


[10] Ibid., 7.


[12] Ibid. For NCTC, “when reporting provides detailed information, a confidence level as to the identity of the perpetrator of ‘likely,’ ‘plausible,’ or ‘unlikely’ can be cataloged.”


Twelve Rules for Preventing and Countering Terrorism

by Alex P. Schmid

(Director TRI & former Officer-in-Charge of UN Terrorism Prevention Branch)

1. Try to address the underlying conflict issues exploited by the terrorists and work towards a peaceful solution while not making substantive concessions to the terrorists themselves;
2. Prevent radical individuals and groups from becoming terrorist extremists by confronting them with a mix of 'carrot and stick' tactics and search for effective counter-motivation measures;
3. Stimulate and encourage defection and conversion of free and imprisoned terrorists and find ways to reduce the support of aggrieved constituencies for terrorist organizations;
4. Deny terrorists access to arms, explosives, false identification documents, safe communication, safe travel and sanctuaries; disrupt and incapacitate their preparations and operations through infiltration, communication intercept, espionage and by limiting their criminal- and other fund-raising capabilities;
5. Reduce low-risk/high-gain opportunities for terrorists to strike by enhancing communications-, energy- and transportation-security, by hardening critical infrastructures and potential sites where mass casualties could occur and apply principles of situational crime prevention to the prevention of terrorism;
6. Keep in mind that terrorists seek publicity and exploit the media and the Internet to propagate their cause, glorify their attacks, win recruits, solicit donations, gather intelligence, disseminate terrorist know-how and communicate with their target audiences. Try to devise communication strategies to counter them in each of these areas.
7. Prepare for crisis- and consequence-management for both 'regular' and ‘catastrophic' acts of terrorism in coordinated simulation exercises and educate first responders and the public on how to cope with terrorism.
8. Establish an Early Detection and Early Warning intelligence system against terrorism and other violent crimes on the interface between organized crime and political conflict;
9. Strengthen coordination of efforts against terrorism both within and between states; enhance international police and intelligence cooperation, and offer technical assistance to those countries lacking the know-how and means to upgrade their counter-terrorism instruments.
10. Show solidarity with, and offer support to, victims of terrorism at home and abroad.
11. Maintain the moral high-ground in the struggle with terrorists by defending and strengthening the rule of law, good governance, democracy and social justice and by matching your deeds with your words;
12. Last but not least: counter the ideologies, indoctrination and propaganda of secular and non-secular terrorists and try to get the upper hand in the war of ideas – the battle for the hearts and minds of those terrorists claim to speak and fight for.
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Monographs, Edited Volumes, Non-conventional Literature and Prime Articles, selected by Eric Price

NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterix [*] only have a clickable Table of Contents or limited further information.

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About the Compiler: Eric Price is a Professional Information Specialist who worked for many years for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Currently he is an Editorial Assistant to ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.
Three Bibliographies
(i) Drones and Targeted Killing,
(ii) Prosecuting Terrorism, and
(iii) Enhanced Interrogation Techniques v. Torture
compiled by Jaclyn A. Peterson

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**Nonconventional Sources**


**About the Compiler: Jaclyn A. Peterson** is a freelance research analyst and editor, based in Wilmington, Delaware. She obtained her Juris Doctor in 2010 from Widener University School of Law-Delaware. She also holds dual Bachelors of Science degrees in biology and psychology from West Virginia University and is currently completing her Master’s in Criminal Justice and Homeland Security. Dr. Peterson specializes in open source research and analysis. E-mail address: japeterson17@gmail.com
III. Book Reviews


In this comprehensive edited volume, Hall Gardner and Oleg Kobtzeff, both of the American University of Paris, France, offer a range of perspectives on the origins and prevention of the war. Their take on this topic is explicitly inter-disciplinary and is based on ‘polemology’, an approach to war studies largely (though not exclusively) based in France and devoted to understanding the confluence of forces (political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, psychological, legal and even dialogical) that impact on the causes of conflict and war. The explicit commitment of those working with this approach is to utilize a wider historical lens which moves the story of war beyond structure and agents to an examination of all forces that set the stage for armed conflict, even in ways that were not fully evident to the participants themselves. The result is a volume which consistently takes a long view on the origins of conflict, and aims for synthetic observations rather than testable empirical theories.

The essays in this volume cover an admirable range of topics, including the evolution of modern warfare, the role of gender in conflict, the role of the state and Anarchist critiques of warfare, cyber-conflict, child soldiers, and the future of asymmetric conflict. Many of these essays are useful summaries of the literature and would be a valuable resource for students beginning to work in those areas. Moreover, the volume offers a select series of studies of major wars or types of wars, including chapters on both World Wars, the Russian-Ottoman Conflict (1876-1878), and surveys of warfare in the Hellenic world and the Middle Ages. There are some important omissions here – for example, there are no full cases on wars that made the Cold War hot (such as Korea or any of the Third World proxy wars for the United States and the Soviet Union), near-miss conflicts (such as the Cuban Missile Crisis) or more contemporary wars (such as Afghanistan or Iraq). These omissions are more forgivable given the sweep of the volume and its admirable effort to engage the literature both thematically and with case studies.

Some of the essays work remarkably well. Azar Gat’s discussion of how violence is hardwired into human beings and evident in societies that pre-date modern states is bound to be controversial, but is compelling. He makes the counter-intuitive argument that the advent of modern state warfare actually decreased mortality rates in conflict, in clear contravention of much of the work on war-making and the state based on the scholarship of Charles Tilly (p. 77). The essay by Debra DeLaet provides a useful overview of the role that gender plays a role within armed conflict. The overview of Anarchist thought provided by Andrew Robinson is similarly exhaustive, if less well-organized. Some of the case studies are equally well-done, including a fair-minded survey of the origins of the conflict in the Middle East and of the Napoleonic wars, both written by Marco Rimanelli.
More generally, the volume runs into problems when it comes to covering some key research areas within the social scientific approach to the study of war and with its application of the ‘polemology’ framework. Some of the key works on the origins of war – for example, the work of Robert Jervis on misperception and the security dilemma, and some of the more classic rationalist accounts of the origins of war from Stephen Van Evera and Geoffrey Blainey are ignored or given short shrift here. More problematically, there is little if any discussion of the influential bargaining model of the onset of war, pioneered by James Fearon. To some extent, this is an oversight driven by the theoretical preoccupations of this volume, but it undercuts its claim to be a comprehensive overview of the literature. Moreover, the work by Alexander L. George on prevention of conflict, and early warning systems for conflict, is largely ignored here. Much of the quantitative work on war, deriving from David Singer’s ‘Correlates of War’ and the Uppsala Projects, are also not covered here, which undercuts the value of the volume for doctoral students seeking to use this volume as a guide to the key works in the field. Even if the authors find little value in these contributions, some explicit discussion of them, and their limits, is warranted if the volume aims to be fully comprehensive.

Second, the volume takes an important step forward by translating the writings of some key French thinkers on war, such as Jean-Paul Charnay, while bringing the insights of others to the attention of English-speaking audiences (e.g., Kobtzeff’s chapter on the “Time of Troubles,” drawing from the work of Pierre Chaunu). This is important because there is relatively little effort by English-speaking experts to engage with the work of French writers, due in part to the fact that many of their works remain un-translated. They have also done a service by placing these writers alongside contributions by George Modelski and William Thompson, who share their long cycle approach to understanding conflict. Yet there is not enough context placed for much of their work, leading one to be a bit lost if not already familiar with them. The essays by Charnay on Islamic warfare and meta-strategy are particularly hard to follow, because (one suspects) they have been extracted from much larger and more detailed monographs. More generally, the polemological approach adopted here is difficult to pin down, as it includes almost every relevant causal factor for armed conflict and tends to rely on sweeping generalizations. For the reader, the issue with this volume is not one of quality of research or novelty of argument but rather one of theoretical position. If one wishes to adopt or even learn more about the polemological approach, these essays are fascinating. Yet if one is skeptical, many of these essays will not convince them, as many of the authors simply assume the approach is valid without a discussion of contending vantage points. This makes the volume less a research guide on war – especially on the question of prevention, which receives less attention than is needed here – than a series of essays on armed conflict that have a distinct, but often provocative, theoretical flavor.

About the Reviewer: Michael J. Boyle holds degrees from Cambridge and Harvard Universities. He taught International Relations at St. Andrews University and currently teaches Political Science at La Salle University, Philadelphia. Dr. Boyle is a member of the Editorial Board of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. E-mail: boylem@lasalle.edu
Clive Walker. Terrorism and the Law.
Reviewed by Amos N. Guiora

Clive Walker’s latest book is an impressive achievement both in scope and detail. The author, Professor of Criminal Justice Studies at the School of Law, University of Leeds, and former special advisor to the British Parliament, covers a wide range of issues. The work’s primary contribution to existing literature is the detail with which it addresses issues germane to terrorism. It is divided in five parts: (i) a conceptual Introduction, followed by sections on (ii) Investigation and Policing, (iii) Criminal Law and Criminal Process, (iv) Other Legal Control and, finally, (v) Other Jurisdictions. While focusing primarily on the UK, Professor Walker includes examples from additional jurisdictions (including Ireland and Scotland) thereby giving the book a comparative dimension. That said, the book is not a study of comparative approaches to terrorism but rather helpfully incorporates non-UK examples (especially European) while consistently highlighting UK laws and statutes.

Prof Walker is clearly qualified to write this book; a widely recognized scholar, who taught and published on both sides of the Atlantic as well as in Australia, he is, without doubt, a subject matter expert with a deservedly sterling reputation. His years of research, writing and thinking about terrorism law and legal practice are manifestly evident in every page in this comprehensive volume.

Terrorism and the Law is very detailed, carefully citing statute, case law and specific examples; nevertheless, the book does not ‘bog down’ the reader and leave him or her with a sense of ‘over-information’ unnecessarily included. Accordingly, the book can serve multiple purposes: it can be adopted both as a primary text in a course (Law School, under-graduate or graduate program) and as a secondary, supplemental text which can also be a most helpful resource for policy makers akin to a desk-top manual.

Clive Walker views terrorism as a conventional crime (this reviewer holds a different positions on this question); the book’s approach carefully and thoroughly reflects that position and provides substantial information and material mirroring that perspective. Given disagreements amongst academics on cutting edge issues including, for example, appropriate forums to try terrorists (regularly constituted terror courts or national security courts) a second edition would benefit from fuller inclusion of scholarship holding viewpoints distinct from Prof Walker’s. That said, readers benefit from the footnotes and bibliography as both are expansive and thorough.

Clive Walker’s approach - expansive, thorough and detailed - reflects the book as a whole; topics covered include “Investigations”, “Arrest and Treatment of Detainees”, “Criminal Offenses”, “Court Processes”, “Extremist Organizations, Expressions and Activities”, “Terrorist Funding and Property” and “Protective Security”. In other words, it encompass an extraordinarily broad range of issues highly pertinent to a sophisticated and thorough discussion of terrorism. That is, in many ways, Professor Walker’s most important contribution: in one volume he is able to include the ‘must’ issues of terrorism in a coherent, cogent, and highly organized manner. While
always possible to include additional issues, there is, in the mind of this reviewer, little doubt that Professor Walker carefully weighed what issues to address and what is best left either to others or to another day.

In covering a broad range of issues, there is always the possibility that too short a discussion will be given to some items; the discussion regarding investigations, arrest and judicial process is more in-depth and exhaustive than that allotted to chapters addressing extremist organizations, terrorist funding and protective security. However - and this is essential to the book’s success - the manner in which later chapters are addressed is sufficiently detailed to satisfy most readers. The book is not, based on this reviewer’s assessment, intending to address all issues relevant to each chapter subject. Nevertheless Prof Walker’s treatment of each subject in conjunction with detailed footnotes provides the reader with sufficient information both to better understand the issue and to create a clear mental roadmap facilitating further research and reading.

This volume deserves wide reading; it makes an important contribution to existing literature on the subject of terrorism and the law. It is well written, thoroughly researched, clearly presented and filled with readily accessible invaluable information. Readers - whether subject matter experts, students or the interested public - owe Prof Walker a debt of gratitude. Congratulations are also due to Oxford University Press; the book’s format is remarkably user friendly.

About the Reviewer: Amos N. Guiora is Professor of Law at SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, United States.
The Business of Martyrdom is a thoughtful and enlightening take at the problem of suicide bombings; it offers more than its title suggests. Lewis, an instructor at Ohio State University, provides an overview of the modern history of suicide bombing starting with its use in Imperial Russia, using a framework of analysis that interprets suicide missions as a technology. Lewis defines technologies not merely in their narrow, physical, sense but more broadly as "processes that integrate behavior, thinking, and physical materials and transform them into goods or services of greater utility" (p. 7). His understanding of technology is informed by Arnold Pacey's framework, who sees technology as an interactive process, combining technical aspects, culture/society, and organisation (pp.12-17). Lewis substitutes the technical aspects of Pacey's definition with the human suicide attacker, although he considers organisations to be the most critical of these three nodes because suicide bombings allow for organisational control of "what would otherwise be an individual act" (p. 4). Cultures and societies play a role not only in constructing martyrs, but also in the diffusion of this tactic. The spread of suicide bombings, as is true of any tactic, is heterogeneous, embraced or rejected depending on the technology's ability to "solve problems consistent with their values and norms" (p. 7).

The book is structured in accordance with the life cycle of technological systems. Part I of the book examines the innovation phase, during which new technologies are developed, and includes insightful chapters on suicide bombings in Imperial Russia, Lebanon, and Sri Lanka. Lewis argues that suicide bombings used by Russian anarchists foreshadowed the contemporary forms of suicide attacks. Unlike today's 'human bombs,' however, the bombs were not yet fully integrated with the bombers, allowing for the possibility of the attackers' survival. The chance of surviving the suicide mission afforded to Russian Anarchists was eliminated with the Japanese Kamikaze/Tokkotai, whose martyrdom operations more closely resemble contemporary tactics for that reason (61). The appropriation of the suicide bomber by organisations was completed by Hizballah and other groups in Lebanon during the 1980s.

Lewis' chapter on Sri Lanka might not offer much information that is new to the specialist, but his discussion does offer a fresh take on this particular case. Using his framework, Lewis convincingly explains why the first suicide bombing in Sri Lanka was followed by a three year hiatus—namely due to a lack of "dedicated organisational component for preparing and exploiting suicide attacks on a regular basis" (p. 107). He also distinguishes the use of suicide bombings by the LTTE from those employed by other groups by arguing that suicide bombings reinforced the political power of a single person, namely LTTE Leader Vellupilai Prabhakaran—a fact that, Lewis argues, also helps explain why LTTE suicide attacks essentially declined along with the LTTE leader's death (p. 111).

In Part II of the book, Lewis tackles the diffusion of the technology of suicide bombing. Lewis argues that the spread of suicide bombings depends on several factors, most importantly on the innovation's compatibility with the culture of the new society and the degree to which the
innovation is perceived to be "better for solving a given problem relative to other solutions" (pp. 139-140). To be sustainable, suicide attacks require "careful cultural construction and management" (p. 111). Lewis shows that such construction was lacking in the case of the Provisional Irish Republican Army's campaign of 'proxy bombings'. The degree of the IRA's reverence for its martyrs simply did not meet the minimum required threshold, rendering suicide bombings "inconsistent with IRA cultural norms" (pp. 116-117).

Part III of the book, "Commodification," examines the global spread of suicide bombing, the signature technology of the global jihad movement. Lewis points at a tension in the most recent wave of suicide attacks. The more systematically organisations control the use of suicide bombings, the less 'authentic' martyrdom seems to broader audiences. This tension essentially plays the tactical aspect of suicide bombings off against the strategic dimension. Global jihadists have turned out to be poor managers of this contradiction, which helps explain the recent decline in the number of suicide bombings, at least when compared to the previous decade.

The book's dual purpose is to offer both an intellectual synthesis of the existing debate, as well as to formulate a new interpretation of suicide missions. Although it achieves both goals, the book could have benefited from a more thorough analysis of the existing literature and The Business of Martyrdom's place in it. The author does discuss some of the more important debates in the field early on in the book (pp. 13-17), but the academic readership would have been well served had Lewis revisited that discussion in the conclusion, in light of the book's main arguments. Such discussion would have been particularly helpful because Lewis' explanation does not amount to a radical new theory of suicide attacks, but rather to a reinterpretation that, thought-provoking as it is, closely relates to existing multi-causal approaches to understanding this phenomenon.

Some non-specialist readers may be deterred by the rather intricate nature of the book's main argument. Perhaps precisely because of its merit and strong explanatory power—after all, complex problems require complex explanations—Lewis' interpretation of suicide bombings is multifaceted, lacking the elegant simplicity of other explanations of suicide missions.

These minor points aside, Lewis has provided a highly valuable service to the field of terrorism studies. The Business of Martyrdom is a thoroughly researched, well written, and well-argued book – one that ranks among the most important and comprehensive works published on this topic to date.

About the Reviewer: Assaf Moghadam is Senior Lecturer, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy and Senior Researcher, International Institute for Counterterrorism (DC), Herzliya.
Kent Roach, a law professor at the University of Toronto, has written extensively in the fields of comparative anti-terrorism law, miscarriages of justice and the prosecution of terrorists. *The 9/11 Effect* continues along the same line of research through a critical comparison of state responses to the 9/11 terror attacks. *The 9/11 Effect* compares anti-terrorism legislation drafted by the United Nations (UN), five countries with robust pre-existing anti-terrorism legislation (Egypt, Syria, Israel, Singapore, Indonesia), and the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. A final chapter examines common themes found among the examined case studies and identifies a number of future challenges facing those countering terrorism.

Using reports, bulletins and legal documents as the source of his data, he provides a legal analysis of each case in minute detail. He typically begins each analysis by tracing the evolution of anti-terrorism legislation through the pre-9/11 historical context, followed by the immediate reactions to 9/11, responses to major post-9/11 events (UN Security Council Resolutions, the London Bombings, etc.), and up until very recent developments in counter-terrorism law.

Roach’s analysis of each case is extremely dense and detailed. However, each chapter in *The 9/11 Effect* can be summarized into broader themes surrounding each international/state entity’s response to 9/11. In the case of the UN, the 9/11 terror attacks caused member states to adopt what Roach terms an unprecedented role “in leading global counter-terrorism efforts” (p. 21). He critically examines the shortcomings of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, which he describes as “panicked global legislation” (p. 31). The chapter devoted to the five countries (Egypt, Syria, Israel, Singapore, Indonesia) which did not immediately respond to UN Resolution 1373 examines in a comparative way each case in detail, focusing on previous experiences with terrorism, their pre-existing anti-terrorism legislation/policies, and any adjustments that came to pass in response to UN Resolution 1373 (2001).

Roach’s analysis of the US response is characterized as “American exceptionalism”, leading to “conduct that was extralegal or skirted very close to the edges of the law” (p. 236). Additionally, Roach identifies other pertinent factors within the American case study: ambivalence about international law (Miranda rights and Guantanamo Bay, etc.), the dominance of national security issues by the executive branch of government, and a shift away from criminal law as a means to get hold of terrorists. The United Kingdom’s response to 9/11 is rooted in its experience in dealing with “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland. This has caused the UK to commit itself “to a legislative war on terrorism that is prepared to impose robust limits and derogations on rights normally enjoyed in the non-terrorist context” (p. 238). The Australian response is described by Roach as “hyper-legislation”, influenced by the wider global counter-terrorism drama surrounding 9/11. Lastly, the Canadian response is concerned with border issues and American accusations of being a “terrorist safe haven”, and relies heavily on immigration law to counter terrorism. As Roach explains, “the need for Canada to keep goods and people flowing over the
border it shares with the United States remains a driving force in post 9/11 Canadian security policy” (p. 362).

In the final chapter, Roach critically examines three issues stemming from the global counter-terrorism responses to 9/11. He begins by identifying a number of post 9/11 mistakes made by the UN and individual state actors examined in the case studies. The second issue Roach identifies is the sheer complexity of combating terrorism in a post 9/11 world. He concludes the final chapter by broaching some counter-terrorism challenges going forward.

The 9/11 Effect is a meticulously crafted, extremely detailed and academically rigorous comparative study of the responses that followed the September 11th attacks. Roach’s experience as an academic lawyer shines in his in-depth analysis of the relevant legislation and the complex political and juridical interplay between nations. Roach’s observations in the conclusion about past failures and future challenges in counter-terrorism ring true in the light of his lengthy analysis. Roach’s minute attention to detail is, however, somewhat of a detriment, as the book sometimes delves into complexities that may confound those reader without a working background in law and politics. This may deter a general audience from gaining anything concrete from reading The 9/11 Effect. Policy makers, seasoned academics or those readers interested in complex legal or political analyses will find The 9/11 Effect an engaging and worthwhile read.

About the Reviewer: David C. Hofmann is a Ph.D. candidate in the department of Sociology and Legal Studies at the University of Waterloo, Canada. He is also a Research Assistant at the Terrorism Research Initiative.
To say that lone wolf terrorism is a neglected field of research is an understatement. Lone wolf terrorism has so far engendered few empirical studies or government reports and little textbook information. Nor is there a professional consensus on the definition of the crime. Such a void is troublesome, given that lone wolves have proven to be especially challenging for police and intelligence communities because they are extremely difficult to detect and to defend against.

Ramon Spaaij’s *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism* is therefore an important contribution to the literature. Spaaij begins this thoughtful and meticulous analysis by offering a concise four-part definition of lone wolf terrorism that clearly distinguishes the phenomenon from terrorist activities carried out by underground organisations or states. Based on this definition, Spaaij examines the leading international databases and identifies 88 cases of lone wolf terrorism in North America, Europe and Australia between 1940 and 2010. The cases resulted in 198 attacks claiming 123 lives and injuring hundreds more. Spaaij then employs a case study analysis and concludes that while there is no standard profile of the lone wolf, radicalisation tends to result from a combination of individual processes, interpersonal relations and socio-political and cultural circumstances—a view that is consistent with a wider body of terrorism research showing that there is no specific “conveyor belt” to radicalisation. In this respect, Spaaij makes five ground-breaking observations.

First, Spaaij found that lone wolves tend to create their own ideologies that combine personal frustrations with broader political, social or religious grievances. Though important, this finding also highlights the difficulties of assigning clear-cut motives for the terrorist attacks. Second, and contrary to research indicating that terrorists do not suffer from any identifiable psychopathology, Spaaij shows that lone wolves are likely to suffer from some form of psychological disturbance. Third, lone wolves are inclined to suffer from social ineptitude: to varying degrees, they are loners with few friends and prefer to act alone. Fourth, even though lone wolves are by definition unaffiliated with a terrorist organisation, they may identify or sympathize with extremist groups and may have been members of such groups in the past. These organisations provide “ideologies of validation” for lone wolves and function as communities of belief by transferring personal frustrations onto the transgressive “other.”

Fifth, and most important in terms of prevention, lone wolf terrorism does not take place in a social vacuum. Instead, radicalisation can manifest itself in an activist stance involving the expression of one’s political beliefs and a hyperactive search for both physical and verbal confrontation with adversaries. In other words, lone wolves tend to broadcast their intent to commit violence. A classic example is the “Unabomber Manifesto”—written by Theodore Kaczynski at his log cabin in the Montana wilderness and sent to the *New York Times* with a
warning that his terror would continue until the Manifesto was published, leading to Kaczynski’s arrest and the end of his 20-years long bombing campaign.

The tendency to distribute ideas and manifestos to the outside world extends to each case of lone wolf terrorism examined by Spaaij. And it applies to cases occurring since his research. For example, before he shot US Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and 19 of her supporters in 2011, Jared Laughner displayed his contempt for government in numerous Facebook postings. Laughner also posted two YouTube videos; in one he is seen burning an America flag, and in the other he parrots popular themes of the radical right and provides his own definition of terrorism (his videos now have over 2 million hits). Laughner derided Giffords as a “fake” to classmates and even exchanged letters with the Congresswoman.

It is commonly assumed that lone wolves have a critical advantage in avoiding detection before and after their attacks because most of them do not communicate with others regarding their intentions. As US Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano once noted, lone wolf terrorist attacks are “the most challenging” from a law enforcement perspective, “because by definition they’re not conspiring. They’re not using the phones, the computer networks…they’re not talking with others” (p. 3). It appears that they are doing precisely that.

About the Reviewer: Mark S. Hamm is a member of UNICRI, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, a Senior Research Fellow, Center on Terrorism, John Jay College, the City University of New York and a Professor of Criminology at Indiana State University.
IV. News from TRI's National Networks of PhD Theses Writers

Update by Alex P. Schmid

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) is in the process of setting up additional national networks of PhD thesis writers. These are run by the PhD students themselves with the help of country-based, TRI-affiliated researchers who are often themselves post-graduate students working on their thesis or who have recently completed a doctorate. Admission is open to all bona fide academic researchers of post-graduate level working on (countering) terrorism, political violence and armed conflict.

So far seven national networks have come into existence in

- the United Kingdom
  (country coordinator: Gordon Clubb; E-mail: <G.Clubb@leeds.ac.uk>);
- the Netherlands and Flanders (Belgium)
  (country coordinator: Rene Frissen; E-mail: <r.frissen@forum.nl>);
- Russia
  (country coordinator: Yulia Netesova; E-mail: <julianetesova@gmail.com>);
- The United States
  (country coordinator: Jason Rinehart; E-mail: <jrineheart@gmail.com>);
- Canada
  (country coordinator: Nick Deshpande; E-mail: <nick.deshpande@gmail.com>);
- South Africa
  (country coordinator: Petra Harvest; E-mail: <petra.harvest@absamail.co.za>);
- Australia
  (country coordinator: Levi-Jay West; E-mail: <lwest@csu.edu.au>).

Should you be a post-graduate researcher from the UK, the Netherlands (and Flanders), the USA, Russia, Canada, South Africa or Australia and wishing to join your national academic TRI network, you should contact the country coordinator directly. In all other cases, contact TRI’s Director, Alex P. Schmid (E-mail: <apschmid@terrorismanalysts.com>) who will then explore with you and other members of the TRI network in your country how best to set up a national network.

The benefits of being a member of a national TRI networks include (but are not confined to):

(i) Enhanced awareness as to who is working on which topic at other national universities and in think tanks and foundations;
(ii) Bi- and multi-lateral exchange of information between members of the network;
(iii) Opportunity to engage in collaborative projects;
(iv) Organisation of workshops, seminars and conferences;
(v) Developing joint grant proposals;
(vi) Providing collegial support to each other in the research- and writing- phase of the thesis preparation;

(vii) Advice from TRI’s national and international network of subject matter experts.
About Perspectives on Terrorism

PT seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the field of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. It invites them to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) could be characterized as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than fee-based subscription journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles - but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal is peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT is not supporting any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles we expect contributors to adhere to.

Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism:

- **Alex P. Schmid**, Editor-in-Chief;
- **Joseph J Easson**, Associate Editor;
- **James J.F Forest**, Associate Editor;
- **Tim Pippard**, Assistant Editor;
- **Eric Price**, Editorial Assistant

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