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**Networking**

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About Perspectives on Terrorism
Living with terror, not Living in Terror: The Impact of Chronic Terrorism on Israeli Society
by Dov Waxman

Abstract
This article discusses the impact of chronic terrorism on a targeted society by examining the case of Israeli society during the second Intifada. The Israeli case demonstrates both the extensive effects of repeated terrorist attacks and their limitations. The article argues that while Israelis were seriously affected by Palestinian terrorist attacks during the second Intifada, this did not result in major, lasting changes in Israeli behaviour. Despite being profoundly affected by terrorism, Israeli society was not demoralized by it, and in this respect Palestinian terrorism failed to achieve its aim. This is because the Israeli public grew accustomed to chronic terrorism and possessed a high level of social resilience.

Introduction
At a time when terrorist attacks and thwarted plots regularly dominate the news headlines, when long queues at airport security checks have become all-too-common, and when once innocuous items (drinks, shoes, backpacks) can become the means of deadly attacks, it is clear that the threat of terrorism hangs over us as never before. Terrorism is currently at the top of the national security agenda in the United States and in many other countries around the world. Indeed, terrorism is widely considered to be the greatest security challenge of our time. Many societies around the world are now faced with the prospect of endemic terrorism on their own soil. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in the United States; the March 11, 2004, terrorist attack in Spain; and the July 7, 2005, terrorist attack in Britain these are all unlikely to be one-off events. Rather, the United States and many other Western democracies can expect more terrorist attacks in the future.

What affect will such attacks have on these countries? What kinds of domestic effects are they likely to produce? It is sometimes argued that the effects of terrorism are quite minimal, and that the current concern with terrorism is well out of proportion to the threat that terrorism actually poses. Counting the number of terrorist fatalities and comparing this to the number of fatalities in conventional wars, or even traffic accidents, leads some to claim that the threat of terrorism is wildly exaggerated. But counting fatalities from terrorist attacks is the crudest and most simplistic way to measure the impact of terrorism. The consequences of terrorist attacks often go far beyond the deaths and destruction they cause. The effects of terrorism are not limited to its actual victims. They can be wide-ranging and far-reaching. They include the direct and indirect economic costs of terrorist attacks, the psychological effects of terrorism upon the population, and the social and political impact of terrorist attacks. This article will discuss these different kinds of effects with the aim of presenting a fuller picture of the impact of terrorism on
a society. In doing so, I will draw extensively upon recent research into the effects of terrorism conducted by psychologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists. Brought together, this research into the psychological, economic, social, and political effects of terrorism enables us to develop a more comprehensive and integrated understanding of the overall impact of terrorism. This article, therefore, uses the Israeli experience during the second Palestinian Intifada as a case study to illustrate various effects of terrorism.

Most discussions of terrorism today are concerned with counter-terrorism and the objectives and tactics of terrorist groups, whereas less attention is generally paid to thinking about the impact of terrorist attacks on targeted societies. The focus on counter-terrorism is understandable given the emphasis placed by politicians and the general public on preventing terrorist attacks. We are, however, unlikely to completely eliminate terrorism—a type of political violence whose history dates back thousands of years.[3] It is, therefore, essential that we devote more attention to considering the effects of terrorism, so that we may be better prepared to deal and cope with these effects. In so far as the effects of terrorism can be minimized, the overall effectiveness of terrorism can be reduced. Thus, studying the severity and longevity of the effects of terrorism is crucial to assessing its effectiveness.

There is a growing body of research, especially since the 9/11 attacks, on the effects of terrorist attacks. Numerous studies have now been conducted on the psychological effects of terrorism on individuals. These studies have looked at how terrorist attacks affect people’s mental health;[4] with particular attention paid to the incidence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) following terrorist attacks.[5] Increased rates of depression and substance abuse have also been studied as indications of the psychological effects of terrorism. Another avenue of research has been on the social psychological effects of terrorism, such as the impact of terrorism on xenophobia within a society,[6] on group stereotypes,[7] and on the attitudes and ideological orientation of the targeted population.[8] There have also been some studies on the economic effects of terrorism.[9] These studies have investigated the immediate economic damage caused by terrorism, and the effect on variables such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), unemployment, foreign direct investment (FDI), and the tourism industry. Finally, within the field of political science there is an increasing amount of literature about the political effects of terrorism, mostly focusing on the impact of terrorist attacks on public opinion,[10] elections,[11] government policy, and peace processes.[12] The big question this literature poses is whether and under what circumstances terrorism works. Terrorist attacks are deliberately designed to instil fear and intimidate a population in order to achieve a political objective. But how successful are terrorist groups in achieving their political objectives? There is no agreement among scholars on this critical issue. While some have highlighted the political gains that terrorist groups have achieved,[13] others have argued that terrorism often backfires politically and is not an effective strategy against democratic states.[14]

This article also addresses the question of whether terrorism works, but from a slightly different perspective—it looks at the overall impact of terrorism on the targeted population. To understand how effective terrorism as a strategy is, it is necessary to assess its impact upon the targeted society. Terrorists hope that by sowing fear and panic within the targeted public, this will pressure the government to act in ways they desire. In other words, creating public fear, panic, anxiety, distress etc. is essential to the accomplishment of terrorism’s political strategy.
examining how terrorism affects its audience, therefore, we can gauge the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy. I will do this by investigating the impact of Palestinian terrorism on Israeli society during the second Intifada.

In this article, I hope to contribute to the ongoing scholarly debate about the effectiveness of terrorism in a number of specific ways. First, in considering the economic, psychological, and social effects of terrorism as well as its political effects, the article provides a more complete account of the impact of terrorism than studies that narrowly look at its political effects alone. Terrorism’s political consequences cannot be properly assessed in isolation from its other effects. The political effects of terrorism should be looked at in a broader context.

Second, instead of just examining the consequences of a single terrorist attack, this article investigates the effects of repeated terrorist attacks on the targeted society. A society’s response to a single, large-scale terrorist attack such as occurred on 9/11 might be very different than its response to repeated, smaller-scale attacks. Hence, the effects of ongoing, ‘chronic terrorism’ may significantly differ from the effects of a one-off terrorist attack.[15] This article tackles the question of how societies specifically respond to chronic terrorism. It would seem logical to expect that repeated exposure—direct and indirect—to terrorist attacks and living with the constant possibility of sudden violent death, would severely affect a society. But is this really the case? Do repeated deadly terror attacks create more public fear and insecurity or do they have a progressively weaker affect on the population? Do societies become traumatized by prolonged terrorism or can they learn to live with it? I argue that a society can gradually grow accustomed to chronic terrorism, and consequently, its impact declines. In short, societies can effectively become habituated to terrorism and learn to cope with it.

Third, by using the example of Israeli society during the second Intifada to illustrate this argument, this article offers an in-depth case study of the effectiveness of terrorism—or its lack thereof—and thus complements the more quantitative, statistically based studies that characterize a lot of political science work on this topic. Unfortunately for Israelis, Israel represents an excellent case study for analyzing the effects of chronic terrorism. Although it is not the only country to have experienced endemic terrorism—Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland are two other examples—no country has endured more acts of terrorism over a prolonged period than Israel. From before the state was established in 1948 and ever since then, Israelis have been the targets of terrorist attacks, both within Israel and around the world. Indeed, the history of modern terrorism is linked to the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as Arab militant groups have pioneered new terrorist tactics (notably, airplane hijackings and suicide bombings) and carried out some of the best known terrorist attacks in history (such as the hostage-taking of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic games). The threat of terrorism has long been a fact of life for Israelis. Thus, Israeli society’s experience with terrorism can potentially offer many insights into the impact of chronic terrorism on societies.

Finally, the conclusion of this article emphasizes the importance of social resilience in coping with terrorism. I argue that Israeli society was able to cope with relentless terrorism during the second Intifada and quickly recover from it because it possessed a high level of social resilience. It is therefore essential to recognize the importance of social resilience and understand what
contributes to it in order to better manage the threat of terrorism and maybe even to one day conquer it.

The Toll of Terrorism: Israel during the Second Intifada

In this article, I will focus on the impact of Palestinian terrorism on Israeli society during the second Intifada (sometimes called the “al-Aqsa Intifada”),[16] specifically during the period from the end of September 2000 until the beginning of 2005 (when the second Intifada effectively ended).[17] During this time, more than one thousand Israelis were killed, the overwhelming majority of them civilians (70 percent were civilians, 30 percent members of the security forces).[18] This figure was more than the number of Israelis killed in all terrorist attacks in the thirty-five years prior to the second Intifada.[19] Thus, the second Intifada inflicted a heavy death toll upon Israelis, especially civilians.[20] In all, according to casualty figures calculated by the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem, from 29 September 2000 to 15 January 2005, a total of 431 Israeli civilians were killed inside Israel by Palestinians (including 78 aged under the age of 18), and an additional 218 Israeli civilians were killed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[21] In just over four years of the second Intifada, therefore, a total of 649 Israeli civilians were killed. By way of comparison, throughout more than thirty years of the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland (1969-2001), 1857 civilians of all sides were killed.[22] The impact of Palestinian terrorist attacks upon Israeli society during the second Intifada, however, cannot simply be measured in terms of the number of Israeli fatalities. It was much more far-reaching and profound, as this article will show.

Suicide terrorist attacks were a prominent feature of the second Intifada.[23] Although Palestinians began carrying out these attacks years before the second Intifada (the very first took place in 1989), suicide attacks skyrocketed after its outbreak in September 2000, peaking in the years 2001 to 2003 (4 suicide attacks occurred in 2000, increasing to 35 in 2001, up to 53 in 2002, then dropping to 26 in 2003, and down to 12 in 2004). These suicide terror attacks were responsible for a large proportion of Israeli fatalities.[24] For instance, although less than one percent of all Palestinian attacks against Israelis between September 2000 and August 2002 were suicide terrorist attacks, almost 44 percent of Israeli fatalities from Palestinian attacks were killed in these attacks.[25] Thus, suicide terrorism became the deadliest weapon in the arsenal of Palestinian militant groups (and was widely supported and extolled by Palestinian society during this time[26]). As Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi declared, suicide attacks were “one of our most effective means, which can rival the impact of their F-16s.”[27] In addition to Hamas, many other Palestinian groups (notably, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah and its offshoots Tanzim and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) conducted suicide terrorist attacks in Israel during the second Intifada.[28] Most of these attacks were directed against Israeli civilians (‘soft targets’) and sought to inflict the maximum number of civilian casualties by being carried out in locations where many civilians congregate such as cafes, restaurants, outdoor markets, shopping malls, and public buses. Among the most notorious suicide attacks were the bombing at the Dolphinarium disco in Tel Aviv on 1 June 2001 that killed twenty-one people (most of them teenagers); the bombing at the Sbarro pizza restaurant in
Jerusalem on 9 August 2001 that killed fifteen; and the bombing of the Park Hotel in Netanya on the Jewish Passover holiday on 27 March 2002 that killed thirty.

Apart from the many deaths and injuries resulting from these terrorist attacks, what other effects did they have? In the following sections of this article, I will try to answer this question by discussing the psychological, economic, social, and political effects of terrorism, and describing how these effects manifested themselves in Israel during the period of the second Intifada.

**Psychological Effects**

The first and most immediate effects of terrorism are psychological.[29] Terrorist campaigns can be expected to psychologically affect a sizeable portion of the population of a targeted society, either directly, by harming a person or their family, or indirectly, through the extensive media coverage of terrorist attacks.[30] The greater the number of attacks and the more lethal those attacks are, the more people that will be psychologically affected by them. Terrorism is a form of psychological warfare against a society.[31] It is designed to strike fear into the heart of the targeted society, and it generally succeeds in doing so. Suicide terrorism can be particularly effective in terrifying people because it projects an aura of fanaticism,[32] which makes the threat of future attacks seem more likely. Peoples’ fear of terrorism is both rational and irrational; rational in that there is an ever-present threat of a terrorist attack being repeated, but irrational in the probability assigned to that potential event.[33] Since people tend to overestimate their chances of being a victim to terrorism,[34] the fear of terrorism is widespread in a society. It does not, however, affect everyone to an equal degree. Research has shown that there is a negative correlation between a person’s education and their fear of being a victim of terrorism. This suggests that the more educated a person is, the less likely they are to succumb to the irrational fear evoked by terrorism.[35]

In the case of Israel, a large majority of Israeli civilians have long feared terrorism. Israelis’ personal fear of terrorism has been recorded in public opinion surveys over many years. In a 1979 survey, 73 percent of respondents reported being “afraid” or “very afraid” that they, or their close family members, would be hurt in a terrorist attack.[36] Similarly, 85 percent of Israelis expressed this fear in a poll conducted in 1995, and 78 percent in a 1996 poll.[37] Israelis’ fear of terrorism reached new heights during the second Intifada. In the spring of 2002—when Palestinian suicide bombings inside Israel were most frequent—92 percent of Israelis reported fear that they or a member of their family would fall victim to a terrorist attack.[38] Hence, at this time, almost every member of Israeli society feared for the safety of their family members and themselves. While this fear certainly had some basis, it was not grounded entirely in the facts, since the probability of themselves or a member of their family being killed or wounded in a terrorist attack was actually far smaller than what the Israeli public believed.

Nevertheless, Palestinian terrorist attacks during the second Intifada affected a large number of Israelis. Nineteen months into the second Intifada, 16.4 percent of Israeli adults said they were the victims of a terrorist attack, 22.1 percent had friends or relatives who were victims, and a further 15.3 percent knew someone who survived a terrorist attack without injury. In total, a staggering 44.4 percent of the Israeli population was exposed to a terrorist attack.[39] With terrorist attacks affecting so many people, it is not surprising that they resulted in widespread
psychological problems. More than a third of Israelis who participated in a major psychological study reported at least one traumatic stress-related symptom (TSR), with an average of four symptoms reported per person.[40]

The number and intensity of TSR symptoms reported by the Israeli sample during the second Intifada was similar to the number and intensity reported by Americans following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, even though far fewer Americans were directly exposed to the 9/11 attacks.[41] This suggests that terrorism can psychologically affect people who have no direct connection to a terrorist attack. Indeed, there is no statistically significant association between psychosocial responses to traumatic events and the level of exposure.[42] Being an actual victim of terrorism has little affect on the prevalence of stress-related psychological disorders, while gender and age have a far more acute affect. Hence, a person who is injured in a terrorist attack is no more likely to suffer from psychological disorders than a person whose only connection to the attack was seeing it on television. The extensive media coverage of terrorist attacks can therefore seriously harm people’s psychological well-being.

The psychological effect of terrorism that is easiest to quantify is the prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).[43] PTSD is a potentially socially crippling psychological disorder. One of the major symptoms of PTSD is avoiding people or situations that remind one of the traumatic experience. PTSD can change the way people behave at home and at work; hence neither the private nor public sphere is immune from the harm caused by terror attacks.[44] In the middle of the second Intifada, 9.4 percent of Israelis suffered from PTSD. But the occurrence of PTSD varied considerably between men, women, and children, with 40 percent of Israeli children suffering from this disorder.[45] Women are also more likely to have PTSD than men, and also have a significantly higher chance of having TSRs and depression.[46] Hence, the psychological effects of terrorism are by no means uniform. Different people are affected to different degrees.

The psychological effects of terrorism are not limited to PTSD. For example, those who witness terrorist attacks but are not directly harmed are generally the last to be evacuated from the scene of the attack, since medics typically focus their attention on the casualties.[47] These people typically replay the scenes of carnage endlessly in their heads, and many end up with “hypertension, accelerated pulse, disassociation, and a desire to flee from the slightest noise, such as a car exhaust pipe backfiring or even a slamming door.”[48] In the wake of terrorist attacks, people can become incapable of concentrating on their typical daily tasks. For example, following the 9/11 attacks, 52 percent of Americans polled said that they could not concentrate on their work as a result of those attacks.[49] Terrorism, therefore, has a significant impact on people’s everyday lives, whether or not they are directly exposed to it.

The psychological effects of terrorism are by now well-documented. What is less clear, however, is the psychological impact of repeated terrorist attacks. Do more terrorist attacks result in more psychological damage to the population or does their psychological impact diminish over time? One might think that a wave of suicide attacks would have an increasingly negative psychological impact on the targeted population. After all, it stands to reason that repeated exposure to traumatic events will make the affected public more fearful and more prone to stress-related disorders. In Israel’s case, however, this does not appear to be the case. Despite
experiencing numerous traumatic events during the second Intifada, which should logically cause progressively more psychological damage, the rate of PTSD symptoms among the Israeli population remained at a fairly low level.[50] This was the case despite the fact that 60 percent of Israelis believed that their lives were in danger, and 68 percent believed the same about the lives of their family and friends.[51]

The explanation for this lies in what is known as the accommodation effect.[52] The accommodation effect means that the amount of stress created by recurring traumatic events actually decreases.[53] Hence, as terrorism becomes a regular occurrence, a process of habituation and de-sensitization may occur, and people become able to maintain a semblance of a normal life.[54] This suggests that people can learn to live with terrorism and psychologically cope with it. Further evidence of the ability of the Israeli population to cope with repeated exposure to terrorism is provided in a study of the effect of terrorism on the life satisfaction (happiness) of Israelis between 2002-2004.[55] This study revealed that Palestinian terrorist attacks had a very limited effect upon the overall happiness of Israelis, and that despite living with a high level of terrorism “Israelis were not particularly unsatisfied with their lives when compared to citizens of other, mostly terrorism-free, countries.”[56]

The negligible impact that the campaign of terrorism from 2002-2004 had upon the happiness of Israelis suggests that the psychological effects of terrorism should not be overstated. While they can be severe, they are generally short-lived. Despite experiencing fear, anxiety and stress in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, and even suffering from PTSD, over time most people recover well and are soon able to function normally again (at least within a matter of months).[57] Even repeated exposure to terrorism, as Israelis experienced during the second Intifada, does not have devastating psychological consequences upon a population. To be sure, there is some evidence to suggest that chronic exposure to terrorism is more psychologically harmful than the experience of a single terrorist attack (such as 9/11),[58] but even in this extreme case people demonstrate a great deal of psychological resilience.

Economic Effects

The economic effects of terrorism can be broken down into its direct costs, associated with the destruction caused by an act of terrorism, and its indirect costs, which affect nearly every aspect of a targeted state’s economy. The most direct economic effect of a terrorist attack is the damage caused to life and property at the site of the attack. As an example, a suicide attack in a supermarket would cause direct economic damage in four different ways. First, it would damage the infrastructure of the building and destroy products. While the costs of rebuilding or repairing the building and restocking goods might be significant to the store in question, they do not have any affect on the economy at large. Second, the supermarket would probably have to shut down, at least temporarily. With no income generated by the store, national economic output would fall. This would also have no major impact upon the national economy. Even in a small country like Israel there are 470 supermarkets controlled by the main three supermarket chains, hence the damage to one of them is not going to affect Israel’s economy.[59] Third, if the terrorist attack killed people, one must also take into account the lost lifetime earnings of each individual killed. Since the numbers of people killed in individual terrorist attacks are relatively few (compared
with the amount of deaths in civil wars or inter-state conflicts) this is also an insignificant cost for the national economy. Fourth, if the terrorist attack results in many casualties, then the wounded both lose earnings and need to pay for medical procedures (the cost to an economy does not change if the cost of medical procedures is borne by the wounded themselves or by their government), but this too has no real impact on the national economy. Thus, the direct economic impact of a terrorist attack is minimal. Even 9/11, the most devastating terrorist attack in modern history, had a direct cost of roughly $27 billion.[60] In comparison, World War II cost the U.S. government over $15 trillion, when adjusted for inflation.[61]

The indirect economic costs of terrorist attacks, however, are potentially more significant. The indirect economic effects of terrorism are many and varied, yet they are very difficult to accurately gauge. Terrorism can affect an economy in numerous ways. A long-running terrorist campaign can definitely impact a state’s GDP, as happened to Israel during the second Intifada. [62]Israel’s GDP growth dropped sharply following the outbreak of the second Intifada. Israel’s GDP growth slowed from an average of 5 percent in the two years prior to the Intifada to -0.8 percent in the first two years of the Intifada.[63] Only by the fourth year of the Intifada, did Israel’s GDP growth rebound.[64] A terrorist campaign can make an economy more unstable, which in turn increases risk in the economy. With a higher risk and the same or slightly lower potential return, foreign direct investment in the targeted country’s economy can decline. Since foreign investors have a large choice of countries to invest in, any kind of uncertainty, even one resulting from minor terrorist acts, can lead to a drop in the inflow of foreign funds.[65] In Israel, FDI dropped sharply from $5.01 billion in 2000 to $1.72 billion in 2002, before recovering to $3.7 billion in 2003.[66] Finally, the perceived risk of future terrorist attacks can lower confidence in the economy, which in turn affects consumer spending, an integral part of an economy.[67]

A country’s tourism industry is particularly hard hit by terrorism since tourist destinations can be easily substituted, and dangerous ones usually become instantly unattractive to foreign tourists. [68] Even a small risk of terrorism leads potential tourists to travel elsewhere. Thus, the more reliant a country’s economy is on tourism, the more it will be affected by terrorism. In Israel’s case, terrorism in the second Intifada had a significant impact on the country’s tourist industry. The amount of foreign tourists in Israel declined from 2.7 million in 2000 to 718,000 in 2002, before recovering slightly to 1.25 million in 2004.[69] Yet since tourism is only responsible for about 1.5 percent of Israel’s GDP, a decline in foreign tourists (who comprise roughly 30-35 percent of tourists in Israel) does not have a great effect on the overall health of the Israeli economy.

Ultimately, the economic effects of terrorism depend upon many factors. Significant economic costs are unlikely to be incurred as a result of a single terrorist attack, but a prolonged campaign of terrorism can negatively impact a country’s GDP, especially in the case of a small country in which tourism is a large sector of the national economy.[70] Of course, relatively wealthy countries are more able to absorb the economist costs of terrorism than poorer countries, where any loss of national income can have immediate repercussions on the population’s living standards. In Israel’s case, while terrorism definitely hurt the Israeli economy during the second Intifada, it soon recovered and Israel’s economic development continued.
Social Effects

Whereas the economic impact of terrorism ranges from minimal to moderate, the same is not necessarily the case with the social impact of terrorism. The social effects of terrorism can be pronounced and far-reaching, influencing many different aspects of a society. The starting point for the impact of terrorism on a society is the affect that terrorist attacks have upon people’s beliefs and attitudes. Major events influence people’s beliefs and attitudes. Shavrit et al. explain that: “terror attacks are negative, threatening events. Considerable evidence from psychological studies has shown that negative information tends to be more closely attended, better remembered, and have a stronger impact on evaluations and judgments than positive information.” Thus, since terrorist attacks are events of a highly negative nature, they can lead to changes in people’s beliefs and attitudes. One such belief concerns how people view other societies, especially the society which the terrorists belong to. In a situation of inter-group conflict, terrorist attacks increase negative beliefs about and hostile attitudes toward the opposing group the terrorists claim to represent.

A sense of victimhood is common to a society experiencing terrorism. Civilians are not expected to be victims of political violence (whereas military casualties are expected); hence, a public feels victimized when it is the target of political violence (i.e. when it experiences terrorist attacks). The more the civilian population is targeted, the more this sense of victimhood increases. This sense of victimization in turn leads to a de-legitimization of the terrorists and the people they claim to represent. Consequently, the targeted society becomes unwilling or unable to consider the other side’s grievances and objectives. No longer is the opposing group believed to have rational objectives and/or justifiable grievances; instead, the worst views become ‘common sense,’ especially those concerning its propensity towards violence. Thus, while 39 percent of Israeli Jewish respondents perceived Palestinians as violent in a 1997 survey, by the end of 2000 after the onset of the second Intifada, this figure had risen to 68 percent of Israeli Jews.

The threat of terrorism increases a group’s reliance on stereotypes, leading to more negative stereotyping by members of the targeted society. There have been numerous instances of this such as the rise of “Islamophobia” in the United States following the 9/11 attacks, and the increase in anti-Arab sentiments in Spain in the wake of the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Likewise, in Israel during the second Intifada, Israelis held extremely negative stereotypes of Palestinians, viewing them as dishonest, violent, and having little regard for human life.

Another major social effect of terrorism is a rise in ethnocentrism and xenophobia as a group increases its solidarity in the face of violence. Hence, identification with, and support for, the in-group rises as a result of terrorism, while identification with, and support for, any out-group decreases. This was apparent in Russia in the wake of terrorist attacks carried out by Chechen militants, when ethnic Russian identity became more salient, while xenophobia rose. This also took place in the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, when there was a surge of patriotic sentiment (evident, for instance, in the numerous American flags that adorned windows in New York City—a place where such overt displays of American patriotism are generally less common than elsewhere in the country). So too, in Israel during the second Intifada repeated Palestinian...
terrorist attacks led to a renewed sense of national unity among Israeli Jews. A public opinion survey taken in March 2002, for example, posed the question: “In your opinion have recent events, including terrorist attacks and operation ‘Defensive Shield,’ strengthened or weakened the sense of national unity in the Israeli-Jewish public?” Eighty-six percent of Israeli Jewish respondents answered that the events strengthened national unity.[85] As one Israeli commentator put it: “Israeli (Jewish) society in Israel has returned to a state of cohesiveness.”[86]

While Israeli Jews experienced a renewed sense of solidarity in the face of the wave of Palestinian terrorism unleashed in the second Intifada, Arab citizens of Israel became the object of intensified suspicion and hostility.[87] Israeli Arabs were increasingly perceived as a security threat and a potential ‘fifth column’ in Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians.[88] As more and more Israeli Jews came to view Israeli Arabs as the enemy (because of their general identification with, and support for, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza), popular support increased for policies that would promote their voluntary emigration or even force them to leave Israel. In one survey in 2003, for example, 57 percent of Israeli Jews expressed support for the government encouraging the emigration of Arabs from Israel, and 33 percent favored their expulsion.[89] Growing intolerance of Israeli Arabs was evident not only in social attitudes, but also in government legislation aimed at them. For example, the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) passed a bill in 2002 that curtailed the freedom of expression of Arab political parties and Knesset members by allowing the Central Elections Committee to ban parties and individuals that supported (in action or speech) “the armed struggle of enemy states or terror organizations” against the State of Israel.[90] Another law passed on July 22, 2002, lifted the parliamentary immunity of Knesset members who violated this restriction, thereby allowing them to be legally prosecuted.

Just as Muslims in the United States and Europe have complained about suffering from intolerance, harassment, and discrimination in the aftermath of recent terrorist attacks (most notably 9/11),[91] Arabs in Israel during the second Intifada made similar complaints. Although official and unofficial discrimination against Israeli Arabs long predates the second Intifada and cannot simply be attributed to Palestinian terrorism, there is evidence that Palestinian terrorism during the second Intifada did increase discrimination against Arabs in the Israeli labor market.[92] More generally, Palestinian terrorist attacks increased anti-Arab attitudes within Israeli-Jewish society[93]—the most blatant expressions of which were the calls of “Death to Arabs” in soccer stadiums and at the sites of terrorist attacks, and in slogans like “No Arabs – No Terror Attacks” appearing in graffiti and on car bumper stickers.[94] Hence, Palestinian terrorism undoubtedly exacerbated the already tense relationship between the Jewish and Arab communities in Israel.

Beyond these specific effects of Palestinian terrorism on Israeli society are the less obvious, but no less real, social repercussions of persistent political violence. In Israel’s case, it has been argued that the stress that terrorism creates manifests itself in a rise in violent crimes (homicide and robbery), and a general “brutalization of Israeli society.”[95] The fact that criminal homicide in Israel increased by 28 percent from 2000-2001 (i.e., from the year before to the year after the beginning of second Intifada) and robberies increased by 11 percent offers some evidence—though by no means conclusive—to support this argument.[96] Although it is difficult, if not
impossible, to prove a causal connection exists between terrorist attacks and societal violence, further support for this linkage comes from the discovery by scientists of a positive relationship between stress and aggression.[97] Aggressive social behavior in Israel may, therefore, be linked to the high threat of terrorism Israelis face.[98]

**Political Effects**

The extensive social effects of terrorism described above often have political implications. The unifying effect that terrorism had upon Israeli-Jewish society during the second Intifada is typical of what is known as the “rally around the flag” syndrome, which is common to societies experiencing terrorism.[99] The “rally around the flag” syndrome generally leads to a muting of public criticism of the government and its policies. This public reaction to terrorism is also in line with “system justification theory,” according to which threats increase social conservatism (the desire to defend and maintain the status quo).[100] The role that terrorism can play in strengthening conservatism was demonstrated in a study that compared Spanish attitudes before and after the Madrid train bombings, which found that the bombings increased adherence to conservative values.[101]

In some cases, the political effects of terrorism are clear-cut and pronounced, but often they can be difficult to accurately assess because specific political outcomes cannot be casually linked to terrorism due to the multiplicity of potential causes. A government’s policy or a particular political decision may be the result of any number of factors, and can therefore rarely be definitively attributed only to a terrorist attack or series of attacks. Take the case of the Sharon government’s adoption of the policy of disengagement, which brought about the complete withdrawal of Israeli settlers and soldiers from the Gaza Strip in September 2005. *Was this policy the result of Palestinian terrorist attacks, as many Palestinians at the time believed?* Even if Palestinian terrorism was a factor, it was certainly only one of a number of reasons behind the Sharon’s government decision to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza.[103]

While the political impact of terrorism is often hard to pinpoint, nevertheless it can hardly be doubted that terrorism has political effects and influences the political process, at least in democratic and partially democratic states. The most obvious way in which terrorism can influence the political process is by bringing about changes in public opinion, which governments then tend to take into account when formulating their policies.[104] It can be very hard for governments to resist the pressure from public opinion for a strong reaction in the wake of a terrorist attack. For an elected policymaker, the political costs of under-reacting to a terrorist attack are always higher than the political costs of overreacting. The failure to prevent future attacks due to inaction can be fatal to a politician’s career, while failing to prevent them after having taken strong measures can be justified as having done everything possible.[105]

The impact of terrorism on public opinion, however, is not as straightforward or predictable as one might imagine. There is no uniform public response to a terrorist attack. Numerous factors affect how a public responds to a terrorist attack, such as the nature and scale of the terrorist attack, and the context in which it occurs. Moreover, different groups within the general public respond in different ways to a terrorist attack. People with different political orientations are likely to have different responses since existing political orientations serve as a mechanism
through which new information is received and processed.[106] Nor do terrorist attacks necessarily change people’s political opinions. The greater a person’s confidence in their views, the less likely they are to change as a result of a major event, like a terrorist attack.[107] Finally, people’s views are more likely to be influenced by a terrorist attack when it receives a lot of media coverage since this serves to increase its perceived importance.[108]

In Israel’s case during the second Intifada, Palestinian terrorism definitely had an impact on Israeli public opinion concerning the conflict with the Palestinians and the prospects for peace with them (although, of course, it was not the only factor affecting Israeli public opinion).[109] Prior to the second Intifada while the Oslo peace process was ongoing, a large majority of the Israeli public was optimistic about the possibility of achieving peace with the Palestinians (according to one survey in 1999, 68 percent of Israeli Jews believed that peace between Israel and the Palestinians would be achieved within three years).[110] Israeli hopes for peace were dashed by the collapse of the peace process and especially the outbreak of the second Intifada. [111] The surge of Palestinian terrorist attacks between the years 2001-2004 contributed to a significant change in Israeli Jewish beliefs about Palestinian intentions and the prospects for peace.[112] Whereas in 1999 less than 50 percent of Israeli Jews thought that the Arabs wanted to conquer the State of Israel, in 2002 this number had risen to 68 percent, and by 2004 it reached 74 percent.[113]

Palestinian terrorism helped convince Israeli Jews that, in the oft-repeated phrase first used by their Prime Minister Ehud Barak, they had “no partner for peace.”[114] Although a majority consistently continued to support a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there was little hope that such a solution could be reached in the foreseeable future. In a March 2001 survey, for instance, 72 percent of Israeli Jews thought that the Palestinian Authority (PA) was not interested in a peace treaty with Israel.[115] Similarly, in a 2002 survey, 68 percent of Israelis thought that it was impossible to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians, and only 26 percent thought that signing peace treaties would mean an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict (compared to 30 percent in 2001, 45 percent in 2000, and 67 percent in 1999).[116]

Accompanying the change in Israeli views of the Palestinians and the possibility of achieving peace with them, was greater public support for the use of more aggressive military measures against the Palestinians and less support for continuing peace negotiations. Prime Minister Barak’s premiership became a casualty of this change in Israeli public opinion. He was attacked by his political opponents on the right for not responding to the Intifada with the force necessary to quell it (slogans like “Let the IDF win” and “Barak is humiliating Israel” became popular). Whilst Barak was accused abroad (and by some in Israel) of excessive use of force against the Palestinians, he was assailed by the right for insufficient use of force. Increasingly unpopular with the Israeli public, Barak eventually suffered a massive defeat in the February 2001 election for prime minister at the hands of right-wing Likud party leader Ariel Sharon.[117]

Disillusioned with the Oslo peace process and convinced of the futility of further negotiations with the Palestinians (at least with its current leadership), the Israeli public elected a strong, hard-line leader who they hoped could bring them greater security (by implementing a policy of severe military retaliation for Palestinian terrorist attacks).

Palestinian terrorism during the second Intifada clearly affected the political preferences of the
Israeli electorate. Sharon’s resounding victory in the 2001 election was one indication of this effect. Another was the Likud’s party decisive win in the 2003 Knesset elections, doubling the number of its seats in parliament (from 19 to 38), while the rival center-left Labor party lost seven seats (dropping from 26 to 19 seats). Not only did Palestinian terrorism boost the electoral appeal of the political right in Israel, it also helped to bring about a rightward shift in the political positions of the Israeli public. In general, more Israelis identified themselves as right-wing and fewer as left-wing. On the specific issue of ‘land for peace’ (that is, the idea of returning territories in exchange for peace), Israeli-Jewish support for it dropped from 50 percent in 2000 to only 37 percent in 2002. This shift to the right was also evident in the increased number of Israeli Jews who were opposed to removing any Jewish settlements in the event of a peace agreement—a ten percent increase in just one year from 2000-2001 (from 26 percent to 36 percent of Israeli Jews). Nevertheless, these changes in Israeli-Jewish public opinion were not lasting—support for the principle of ‘land for peace’ gradually rose after 2002 as the level of violence decreased, reaching 48 percent in 2005 at the end of the second Intifada. Likewise, opposition to the removal of Jewish settlements also declined after 2002. This suggests that Palestinian terrorism only had a temporary impact on the political views of Israeli Jews. It initially had a pronounced affect on Israeli-Jewish public opinion, but gradually this affect lessened over time.

Although Palestinian terrorism only had a short-term impact on Israeli-Jewish political opinion (concerning things like their willingness to compromise for the sake of peace, and their positions regarding a permanent solution to the conflict with the Palestinians), it had a major impact on their attitudes towards the use of force against Palestinians. Israeli Jews became much more militant and ‘hawkish.’ Terrorist attacks increased Israeli public support for strong military actions. The militancy of Israelis rose during periods when there was an upsurge in terrorism, and declined in periods of relative quiet. The rise in militant attitudes among Israelis was clearly apparent during the early years of Sharon’s tenure as prime minister at the height of the second Intifada. Angry and embittered by the seemingly endless series of gruesome Palestinian suicide bombings inside Israel, the vast majority of the Israeli public staunchly supported the Sharon government’s offensive military measures against the Palestinians. In 2001, for instance, 89 percent of Israeli Jews supported the Sharon government’s policy of “targeted assassinations” of Palestinian militants involved in terrorism against Israel; the following year the number was 90 percent; and in 2003 it had risen to 92 percent. The overwhelming public support for Prime Minister Sharon’s tough policies towards the Palestinians revealed the emergence of a new national consensus in Israel. According to Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar: “This consensus is reflected in widespread mistrust of the Palestinians’ commitment to make peace with Israel, and in the common conviction that so long as Palestinian terror continues, Israel must resort to arms in order to protect the lives of its citizens.” Palestinian terrorism undoubtedly played a role in creating this new national consensus in Israel.

The powerful influence that Palestinian terrorist attacks could have upon Israeli public opinion and consequently Israeli government policy toward the conflict with the Palestinians during the second Intifada was most evident in the spring of 2002. March 2002 was the bloodiest month of the second Intifada for Israelis. During that month, Palestinian suicide bombing attacks killed at least eighty Israeli civilians and wounded or maimed some 420 people. In one week alone,
Palestinian suicide bombers struck at a restaurant in Haifa, a Jerusalem supermarket, a café in Tel Aviv, and a hotel in Netanya, the latter during a meal for the Jewish holiday of Passover (this last attack killed thirty people and wounded over 140). This devastating series of suicide bombings unleashed a wave of public shock, fear, and anger. The militancy of the Israeli public reached new heights. In a poll taken in April 2002, 71 percent of Israeli Jews agreed with the statement “every military action that Israel initiates is justified,” and 80 percent believed that “all means are justified in Israel’s war against terror.”[130] It was in this climate of opinion that the Sharon government initiated two large-scale military operations in the West Bank (Operations “Defensive Shield” and “Determined Path”). These military offensives into the West Bank—in which Israel’s military reoccupied large parts of the territory—received overwhelming support from the Israeli public.[131]

The massive Israeli public support for the construction of a security barrier between the West Bank and Israel was also a direct result of Palestinian terrorism during the second Intifada, as Israelis became desperate to find a way to stem the relentless tide of Palestinian suicide bombing attacks.[132] The idea of building a wall or fence to separate Israel from the Palestinian territories was not new, but it was Palestinian terrorist attacks that propelled the idea to the top of the political agenda. In October 2001, a new political movement called “Fence for Life” emerged with the aim of increasing public support for a security barrier.[133] The Israeli public enthusiastically embraced the idea of a security barrier between the West Bank and Israel. Faced with a steadily mounting civilian death toll from suicide bombing attacks, Israelis fervently hoped that such a barrier would at least greatly reduce the chances of successful suicide attacks by making it much harder for suicide bombers to enter Israel (not only would there be a high concrete wall or electrified fence for them to surmount, but also ditches, razor wire, electronic motion sensors and armed guard posts).[134] Growing public support for a security barrier eventually led the Sharon government in June 2002 to adopt the idea and announce its plans to begin building the barrier,[135] despite Prime Minister Sharon’s initial opposition.[136]

**Conclusion: Social Resilience and Coping with Terror**

This article has discussed the different effects of terrorism and described how many of these effects occurred in Israel as a result of Palestinian terrorist attacks during the second Intifada. In doing so, it has sought to emphasize the many effects of terrorism—psychological, economic, social, and political. To varying degrees, terrorism can affect the psychological health and well-being of a country’s population, its economy, its societal beliefs and attitudes, and its politics. These effects can range from minimal to severe, depending on a host of other factors. In the case of Israel discussed here, Palestinian terrorism during the second Intifada had a profound and far-reaching impact upon Israeli society. The frequency of terrorist attacks, especially at the height of the second Intifada in 2002-2003, spread fear and anxiety among Israelis, hurt the Israeli economy, affected social attitudes and intra-societal relations, influenced Israeli public opinion and domestic politics, and the actions and policies of Israeli governments. Life in Israel was conducted under the shadow of terror during the years of the second Intifada—the most visible sign of this was the ubiquitous presence of armed security guards at the entrances of malls, retail...
stores, restaurants and cafes, who inspected people’s bags and if necessary tried to prevent potential suicide bombers from entering these public spaces.

Given the many effects that Palestinian terrorism had on Israeli society during this period, one might conclude that it was highly effective. This is true in so far as it exacted a heavy toll on Israelis. But the purpose of terrorism is not just to kill people, inflict material damage, or frighten an audience. Terrorism seeks to alter the social and political dynamics of the societies it targets. In the words of one scholar, terrorism is “a form of psychological warfare against the public morale, whereby terrorist organizations, through indiscriminate attacks, attempt to change the political agenda of the targeted population.”[137] One of the key objectives of terrorism, then, is to demoralize the targeted society—to induce a widespread sense of helplessness and hopelessness and feeling of despair among members of the society. If the targeted society does not become demoralized, terrorism fails in this respect.

By this criterion, Palestinian terrorism during the second Intifada was ineffective because it did not succeed in demoralizing the Israeli-Jewish public. While Israelis were certainly fearful of terrorist attacks, they did become despondent and dispirited.[138] Rather, Israelis demonstrated resolve and steadfastness in the face of relentless terrorism. Indeed, any visitor to Israel during the second Intifada could not help but be struck by the seemingly nonchalant manner with which Israelis lived with the constant threat of terrorism. Instead of panic and public hysteria, there was stoicism and fortitude.[139] Israelis did not allow the threat of terrorism to dominate their lives. Although they experienced high levels of stress and fear, they went on with their lives. They did not retreat into their homes, nor did they significantly alter their daily routines.[140] Instead of allowing their lives to be seriously disrupted by terrorism, Israelis only made minor changes in their behaviour. They continued to go out to cafes, for example, but made sure that they sat far from the entrances where suicide bombers might blow themselves up if stopped by a security guard from entering. Those Israelis who regularly used public buses continued to do so,[141] others avoided buses that had been repeatedly targeted by terrorists, while some chose to take taxis instead. Although less people would go to restaurants and cafes or travel on public buses in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack (within the first few days), as time passed these activities would resume to normal levels.[142]

When one considers the huge toll in Israeli lives that Palestinian terrorism during the second Intifada took—from September 2000 until May 2004, 1030 people had been killed, and 5788 injured in more than 13,000 terrorist attacks, which means that approximately 0.1 percent of Israel’s population was injured or killed (the same percentage in the United States would equate to a staggering 295,000 people being injured or killed)[143]—the ability of Israeli society to cope with this terrorism is quite remarkable.[144] How did Israelis cope with ongoing terrorism despite suffering enormously from it? There are no doubt many factors that are responsible for this, but three are particularly worth noting here. First, acclimatisation to chronic terrorism. In other words, Israeli society basically became accustomed to terrorism and adapted accordingly. [145] The threat of chronic terrorism simply became part of normal life in Israel during the second Intifada. Second, media attention to terrorist attacks declines during chronic terror—repeated terrorist attacks receive less television coverage and less television viewing. This occurred in Israel during the second Intifada.[146] Thus, since exposure to media coverage of terrorist attacks has been shown to generate symptoms of anxiety and distress,[147] as the media
pays less attention to terrorism, this helps the society to become less affected by it. Finally, and most importantly, social resilience got stronger. Resilience is a characteristic of both individuals and societies. Like individual resilience, social resilience involves the “ability to withstand adversity and cope effectively with change.”[148] Thus, with regards to terrorism, social resilience prevents terrorism from seriously disrupting the normal functioning of a society. It means that a targeted population is able to cope with the threat of terrorism and not be intimidated or demoralized by it.

The concept of social resilience, therefore, helps explains why Israeli society was not demoralized by repeated terrorist attacks, despite the serious affects these attacks had on Israelis. Israeli-Jewish society demonstrated a high level of social resilience during the second Intifada. [149] One factor that contributes to social resilience is social cohesion.[150] Israeli-Jewish society is still very cohesive, notwithstanding its serious political, cultural, and social divisions. There is a strong sense of social solidarity among Israeli Jews. Although this sense of solidarity has declined over the years, it rises during times of external conflict (as mentioned earlier, this occurred during the second Intifada). Hence, war and terrorism bolster social cohesion in Israel, which helps it to cope with these violent episodes. Social trust is another factor behind social resilience.[151] In Israel’s case, the high level of trust that Israeli Jews have in the country’s army and security services boosts their social resilience. During the second Intifada, the Israeli-Jewish public had confidence in the Israeli military and believed that quick and effective actions were being taken against Palestinian militant groups that were carrying out terrorist attacks (at least during the tenure of the Sharon government). In this respect, Israel’s counter-terror actions helped prevent Israeli society from becoming demoralized. Finally, Israelis Jews are very patriotic[152]—this is most apparent in their high level of willingness to perform military service—which also contributes to their social resilience.[153]

In sum, the case of Israel during the second Intifada suggests that societies can become inured to prolonged terrorism and that the more resilient a society is, the less it will be demoralized by terrorism. Although terrorist attacks do succeed in causing mass fear and anxiety, they do not necessarily undermine a society’s morale and willpower. Terrorism tests a society’s unity and resolve. Israeli society essentially passed that test in the second Intifada due to its social resilience. As such, it offers a useful example that other societies faced with the threat of terrorism can potentially learn from. Whether the case of Israel is typical or exceptional of societies living with chronic terrorism should be the subject of further study. Future research should also be devoted to exploring the causes of social resilience and ways of strengthening it. [154] Understanding social resilience has important implications for how we think about terrorism and how we deal with it. It may even ultimately help us to win the ‘war on terror’ that we are currently engaged in—not because we stop all terrorist attacks (perhaps an impossibility), but because we are not greatly affected by them.

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Notes

[1] This article adopts the U.S. State Department’s definition of terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience,” see <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/2419.htm>. This definition is consistent with that used by many scholars of terrorism. See, for example, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).


[17] Although the second Intifada had no clear, definitive end, many analysts consider it to have ended in early 2005 after Mahmoud Abbas was elected President of the Palestinian Authority in January of that year (after Yasser Arafat’s death) and he then made a truce with Israel at a summit meeting in February 2005.


[21] It is worth noting that in this same period, more than 3,000 Palestinians (combatants and non-combatants) were killed by Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza. See, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3694350.stm>. Accessed on 17 March 2008.


[23] For an analysis of the Palestinians’ use of suicide terror attacks during the second Intifada and Israel’s efforts to stop them see, Yoram Schweitzer, “The Rise and Fall of Suicide Bombings in the Second Intifada,” *Strategic Assessment* 13, no. 3 (October 2010): 39-48.


[29] Psychological effects are limited to those that affect individuals, not society as a whole. For example, stress is a psychological effect, while xenophobia belongs in the social category.


[34] Part of the reason has to do with the disproportionate coverage terrorism receives in the media. See Hoffman 2006, 189.
According to the Anxiety Disorders Association of America, PTSD is “a condition that results from experiencing or witnessing an unusually distressing event; symptoms range from repeatedly reliving the trauma, such as in dreams or flashbacks, to general emotional numbness, which often causes sufferers to withdraw from family and friends.” Anxiety Disorders Association of America <http://www.adaa.org/gettinghelp/glossary.asp>. Accessed on March 4, 2008.


Bleich et al. 2003, 11. It is also possible that there is a gender bias in the reporting of these disorders.


Ibid.

Huddy 2002, 496.

Bleich et al. 2003, 10.

Ibid. 9.

Ibid. 10.

Ibid. 10.

[64] Ibid.
[66] Morag 2006. It must be noted that during the same time period, global FDI fell from $1.388 trillion to $560 billion. The second Intifada was therefore certainly not the only reason for the sharp decline in FDI flowing into Israel.
[67] Ibid. 499.
[72] Sharvit et al., 4.
[77] Ibid. 16.
[87] In 2003, two-thirds of Israeli Jews felt that Palestinian Israelis were disloyal to the state. Asher Arian, *Israeli Public Opinion on National Security* 2004 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, October 2003), 34.
[89] In 2002, these figures were 53 percent and 31 percent, respectively. Arian, *Israeli Public Opinion on National Security* 2004, 30.
[96] Ibid, 34.


[108] Ibid. 4.

[109] The collapse of the Oslo peace process, especially the failure of the July 2000 Camp David summit meeting between Barak and Arafat, and the way this failure was publicly interpreted and ‘framed’ by Prime Minister Barak also had very important influences on Israeli public opinion. Eran Halperin and Daniel Bar-Tal, “The fall of the peace camp in Israel,” *Conflict and Communication Online* 6, no. 2 (2007).


[111] A public opinion poll carried out by the School of Education at Tel Aviv University showed that it was the violence that broke out in September 2000 far more than the failure at Camp David that eroded Israeli faith in the peace process. Akiva Eldar, “The revolutionary road to 194,” *Ha’aretz*, July 22, 2002.

[112] In a poll taken at the end of January 2001, 54 percent of Israeli Jews responded that they did not believe that the Oslo peace process would bring about peace between Israel and the Palestinians in the coming years. Yaar and Hermann, “Peace Index – January 2001.”


[117] Sharon received 62.4 percent of the vote to Barak’s 37.6 percent. This margin of victory—almost 25 points—was the largest in any Israeli election.


[119] Berrebi and Klor have shown that terrorist attacks influenced Israelis to vote for right-wing parties, see Berrebi and Klor, “Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism?”
[122] Ibid, 77.
[123] Ibid, 74-75.
[124] Ibid, 77.
[125] Ibid, 83.
[134] Some 63 percent of Israelis Jews believed that the barrier could significantly reduce the number of Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel, and another 19 percent believed that it could stop terrorism altogether. Yaar and Hermann, “Peace Index – October 2003.”
[137] Ganor, 2.
[138] Zussman et al., “Does Terrorism Demoralize?”
[139] Nothing expresses this popular attitude better than the inscription on a memorial outside the site of one of the worst terrorist atrocities during the second Intifada (the Tel Aviv disco where 21 young people were killed)—“We won’t stop dancing.”
[140] The only time that daily life in Israel was seriously disrupted by terrorism was during the first few months of 2002 when suicide bombings were taking place in Israeli towns and cities every few days—there were five attacks within just ten days in March 2002 killing a total of 51 Israelis. During this period of unrelenting terrorist attacks, people avoided crowded places and stopped going out to cafes and restaurants. They didn’t take buses or go shopping in malls. They stayed indoors. Palestinian terrorism was succeeding in terrorizing Israelis and disrupting their normal lives. However, this was short-lived. When the volume of terrorist attacks declined, life in Israel returned to normal.
[142] Ibid.


[149] For a detailed examination of the resilience of Israeli society during the second Intifada see, Meir Elran, “Israel’s National Resilience: The Influence of the Second Intifada on Israeli Society,” (Tel Aviv University Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Working Paper No. 81, January 2006) [Hebrew]. See also the “National Resilience Project” conducted by the Center for the Study of National Security at the University of Haifa, which uses regular surveys of the Israeli public to measure its national resilience over time.


[151] Ibid.


[153] Ben-Dor et al.

What Have We Learned about Lone Wolves from Anders Behring Breivik?
by Raffaello Pantucci

Abstract
Anders Behring Breivik’s massacre on July 22, 2011 showed the danger that a well-organized Lone Wolf could cause. The methodical and calculated way with which he prepared and justified his act awoke security services the world over as to the potential menace that this form of terrorism can pose. As they revise their strategies, this article casts a preliminary eye on the case using a particular Lone Wolf prism of analysis to try to see what lessons can be learned from the case. Drawing on Breivik’s own writing and public sources, the article analyses his biography, the ideology he used to justify his act, the degree to which he seems to have been connected to others, his effectiveness, what role the Internet played and his mental competence all to try to draw some early lessons from the case. In concluding it offers some possible lessons learned that might offer practitioners some ideas of how to counter this sort of a threat in the future.

Introduction
Anders Behring Breivik’s heinous massacre in Oslo cast a light once again on the dangers and potential dangers posed by ‘Lone Wolf’ or ‘Lone/Solo Actor’ terrorists.[1] Governments and security agencies have to reconsider their counter-terrorism approaches to try to figure out how it is possible to counter or detect such individuals. This article will examine what lessons can be drawn at this early stage from Norway’s experience with Breivik that may be applicable or relevant for future planning.

Before proceeding, a caveat must be included to state that at this stage many details are still unknown. It seems clear that Anders Behring Breivik was responsible for the atrocities in Oslo and he has admitted as much, but a court case is still underway.[2] However, it is still possible to draw some early conclusions to understand him and the broader phenomenon better. Using a structure first laid out in the ICSR paper “A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists,”[3] this short article seeks to apply some of the lessons from there to Anders Behring Breivik before drawing some conclusions that might be useful from the perspective of trying to counter such individuals in the future. Admittedly, any recommendations are drawn from a very limited dataset, but analyzing an individual as effective as Breivik in a methodological manner is doubtless useful in preventing such acts in the future.

Biography
The first point in understanding Breivik as a Lone Wolf is to understand his personal biography. Unless otherwise indicated much of Breivik’s information is taken from his self-published manifesto, “2083: A European Declaration of Independence” that is available online.

Anders Breivik appears to have come from a broken home, though it does not seem to have been an outwardly traumatic experience. Born in London in 1979 to an economist at the Norwegian
Embassy and a nurse, Breivik’s parents split up a year after he was born. He moved back to Norway with his mother, while his father moved to Paris and re-married (it appears to have been his father’s third marriage). According to Norwegian contacts, Breivik lived in a relatively affluent area though was not in an affluent household himself. Breivik reports making a number of visits to his father in Paris, but these slowly faded over time.[4] He claims his father cut off contact when he was fifteen years old (he says his father was not happy with ‘his graffiti phase’ when he was 13-16) and when Breivik tried to get back in touch was told that, ‘he [his father] was not mentally prepared for a reunion due to various factors, his poor health being one.’ Nevertheless, Breivik is clearly fixated by a patriarchal society, dedicating a section of his screed to defining it and its importance.

In 2006, he decided to move back in with his mother in an attempt to save money, though he seems to have been paying rent to her. He is quite cold to her in his ‘compendium’, saying that she ‘was infected by genital herpes by her boyfriend (my stepfather) when she was 48,’ something brought on by her ‘lack of good judgment and moral[s].’ This sense of revulsion towards his mother was something that she later reported him reacting on in person as well, accusing her of infecting him and wearing an antiseptic mask around the house.[5] He also says his sister has suffered from venereal diseases due to her loose morality and described them both as having ‘not only shamed me but they have shamed themselves and our family.’ Both of his parents have been quoted as being shocked at their son’s actions and his father in particular said his son ‘should have committed suicide’ after his act.

Breivik describes his teenage years as ones where he was popular and dabbled in what he calls the ‘hip-hop movement,’ meaning graffiti communities and rap music culture. This led to some clashes with police and community services. However, by the time he was sixteen, he claims to have noticed that his peers in this movement were failing academically and he abandoned them to focus on his schoolwork. This account was disputed by friends quoted in the press who denied he was as successful or popular as he claimed and that while he did get into some trouble with the police for his involvement in graffiti gangs he got out of it by informing on friends.[6]

At around this time he claims to have fallen out with Arsalan, his close Pakistani Muslim friend whom apparently told another person to punch Breivik for ‘no reason.’ This attack is the second he records from his youth by Muslims and seems to be something of a breaker in his mind. According to Arsalan’s father quoted in the press, this account does not accord with the facts and the two of them (Arsalan and Breivik) were only friends at primary school.[7]

Two other claims from his personal biography about his youth are that at age 15 he chose to be baptized and confirmed in the Norwegian State Church and that he avoided military service at age 18 ‘because I didn’t feel any loyalty to the ruling political parties.’ Neither have been verified or denied in the press.

He appears to have maintained an interest in politics throughout his late childhood. At 16-17, he says he joined the Progress Party Youth Organization (FpU) who were ‘anti-immigration and free-market.’ But he seems to have rapidly become disillusioned with political parties in Europe and by 2000 ‘realized that the democratic struggle against the Islamisation of Europe, European multiculturalism was lost.’ By his own account, it was his government’s involvement in the attacks on Serbia (NATO bombings in 1999) that ‘tipped the scales.’ However, he continued to
be involved with mainstream politics and in 2003 claims to have been a candidate for the Oslo City Council on behalf of the Oslo Progress Party. He was also on the board of a local school and retirement home, both of which he claims were political positions he chose to bolster his candidature.[8]

By the early 2000s he had concluded what he wanted to do with his life ideologically (more on that in a later section), and apparently focused on making money to fund his cause. He worked as a ‘mid level leader’ in a customer service company while running his own outsourcing programming services company on the side. He claims this was so successful that by May 2003 he had quit his day job and focused on his company called ‘E-Commerce Group’ that had two employees in Norway, two in Russia, and one each in Romania and Indonesia. This was a success and by age of 24 he claims to have earned his ‘first mill’ in Norwegian Kroner. By 2005-2006, the economic recession hit and he shut the company down filing for bankruptcy after withdrawing what funds he could. He then says he spent three years focused on writing his ‘compendium’, while also playing World of Warcraft ‘part-time’ for the first 12-month period. He also admits to having lost considerable funds trying to play the stock market between 2005-2008.

In his ‘compendium’ he starts to keep a relatively regular diary in the autumn of 2009, during what he describes himself going into a ‘phase shift.’ In November 2009 he spends some time trying to help develop a newspaper, then he spends two months ‘email farming.’[9] This is mostly a period of isolation, but he reports hanging out with friends and deceiving them about what he is up to with stories of being fixated with online games or letting rumors spread that he has a secret homosexual relationship. Living at home with his mother towards the end of his operation, she reported that he became obsessive in talking about politics and history and displayed all sorts of paranoid behavior in the run up to the attack.[10]

Aside from his active interest in politics and his terrorist plotting, none of this is a particularly distinct public biography; by many accounts Breivik was a typical Norwegian boy who appears to have veered way off the path.

Analysis:

- Breivik came from broken home and had strained relationship with his father.
- He seems to have been obsessed with his mother as unclean (according to one report in the press, he described his mother as his ‘Achilles heel’ and a person who would make him very emotional)[11].
- Breivik encountered issues early in his career that sent him in a different direction. His career as a politician was squashed after he was defeated by a rival, leading him to abandon mainstream politics altogether.
- Breivik tried to work within the system but ended up being betrayed by it. Having worked and sought a position in political life from a young age, when he tried to graduate into a real political position, he was unable to.
- Nevertheless, Breivik was able to function seamlessly in society prior to his action.
Ideology

At this stage of the investigation, it looks like Breivik was acting alone (see below for more details on his connections), but he was driven to carry out, or attempt to carry out, an act of terror deploying a rationale that was dictated by an extremist ideology. Using what information is at this moment available, this section will explore what we currently understand about Breivik’s ideology. Some caveat must be added here to say that this assessment might be confused by Breivik’s ‘insanity’ ruling, but at the same time, his ideology is worth analyzing given its complete and considered nature.

Much has been written in the press about Breivik’s motivation for carrying out his heinous act. Most of this is drawn from his own supposed writings that appeared on the Internet in the hours prior to his attack on Oslo. The document is entitled “2083: A European Declaration of Independence” and is referred to throughout as a ‘compendium’. Drawing heavily on online sources and websites (he is a particular fan of a number of prominent right-wing, anti-Muslim or anti-immigrant bloggers and writers), the document is a distillation of this information describing the battle Breivik sees in Europe between advancing hordes of Muslims and the indigenous Christian populations on the continent. Dotted with his own experiences, the vast majority of the document quotes others, with much of the rest made up of a detailed manifesto for what his perfect society and army should look like. He goes into particular detail providing future followers with an outline of how they should go about building bombs, weaponry and military equipment.

Breivik sees himself as a crusader warrior fighting for Christendom. He claims to be a member of a secret society that was “re-founded” in April 2002 in London under the name Pauperes Commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici (the poor fellow-soldiers of Christ and the Temple of Solomon, PCCTS) or more succinctly the Knights Templar or, as he continuously refers to himself, a “Justiciar Knight.” In this medieval light, Breivik’s concerns are focused around the growing Islamicisation of Europe and the ‘cultural Marxism’ that is allowing Europe to let itself get taken over by Islam.

At what point in his childhood Breivik developed his fixation with the Islamicisation of Europe is unclear, but in his own narrative he suggests that this moment may have come during his early teenage years when he claims to have had some Muslim friends. He describes how they start as friends, but as they grow older they drift away towards their own cultures and in some cases he describes how his ethnically Norwegian friends got attacked and robbed by gangs of Muslim boys. He describes hearing stories of Norwegian girls being referred to as “whores” by the Muslim community and how one Pakistani he knew was part of a group who gang-raped an ethnically Norwegian girl in the mid-1990s and got away with it. He further describes how a number of Muslim girls he went to school with disappeared as their families sent them back home, fearing they had become “too Norwegian.”

These experiences seem to have had an impact on him from a relatively young age and his first political experiences (detailed above) were all with right-leaning parties that had strong anti-immigration platforms. Breivik is eager not to paint himself as a racist though, highlighting that “I have always been terrified of the prospect of being labeled as a racist, to such a degree that I have put significant restrictions on myself, not only verbally but concerning all aspects of my
social image. And I know this is the case for a majority of Europeans. I would say I have allowed myself to be paralyzed by fear.” He goes on to condemn neo-Nazi’s and national socialists saying that they are either ignorant or that they are unreliable hooligans. In Breivik’s eyes, he is different from these individuals as he sees himself as a defender of a European identity that is being overwhelmed by Muslim masses, rather than someone who despises anyone that is not of European stock like him.

Serbia plays an important role in Breivik’s ideological formation. He stoutly declares that the NATO war on Serbia in 1999 was the “tipping point” for him to go in the ideological direction he went – though this is somewhat contradicted by the fact that he remained active in mainstream Norwegian politics for a number of years yet; something that suggests that he had not gone completely down the path of violence yet and something of a post-facto determination on his behalf. He claims that in 2002 he travelled to Monrovia, Liberia where he sought out an individual Serbian nationalist who was living there and he was obviously very impressed by him. At other points in the book he praises Radovan Karadžić as a great man and lists him as one of his most revered leaders. He sees the wider victimisation of Serbia within Europe as a fundamental part of Europe’s surrender to Islam.

There is also a strong strain of Christianity in his ideological framework. He reports choosing religion at age 15 and his imagery is all drawn from the Crusader canon. At one point in his journal, he admits praying, and admits to how long it had been: “I prayed for the first time in a very long time today. I explained to God that unless he wanted the Marxist-Islamic alliance and the certain Islamic takeover of Europe to completely annihilate European Christendom within the next hundred years he must ensure that the warriors fighting for the preservation of European Christendom prevail.” This neatly summarizes the underlying ideology that Breivik ascribes to.

Most salient for the purposes of this article, however, is the heavy reliance in Breivik’s text and ideology on the notion of the Lone Warrior, or as he defines them “solo martyr cells.” Given the vanguard nature of the struggle he is fighting – he repeatedly highlights that people will probably hate him after his act – he recognizes the need for intense secrecy and of not trusting anybody. He even nods towards small cell structures that he calls “clandestine cells…..it is not in any way lead under a fixed, fragile hierarchy but works as an extremely distributed movement, a resilient network made up of small, autonomous groups or cells. Each group is led by a cell commander, often working solo, who makes all the decisions based on fixed fundamental principles. We therefore avoid the use of electronic communications.”

While this discussion is made within the context of laying out what he believes to be the structure of the resistance army he is part of should look like, he talks about his own experiences, highlighting the importance of this aspect to his ideological formation:

“I have never in my life felt that I have done anything more meaningful than what I am doing now regardless of the lack of moral support from my founding brothers or other armed resistance fighters.”

“I have managed to stay focused and highly motivated for a duration of more than 9 years now. I feel really happy about my current course.”
“Learning the ability/rituals to motivate yourself and being able to follow this ritual on a daily basis is perhaps the most essential aspect of our armed resistance effort in phase 1.”

All of the things he prepares for are individual acts, like self-interviewing himself or preparing himself for future media interviews he expects to give, “philosophizing”, going for long walks, listening to motivational music.

“Becoming and maintaining the position as a self-sufficient Justiclas Knight sleeper cell involves the capability to motivate/indoctrinate yourself over a prolonged period of time. Self-financed and self-indoctrinated single individual attack cells, is the backbone of the Knights Templar Europe.”

This is the archetypal lone wolf attacker of any ideological stripe, and the image he paints is undoubtedly the one that most concerns security planners when they are assessing the threat matrix.

What is intriguing about Breivik’s narrative is the fact that he makes no mention of Louis Beam or Uluis Louis Amoss, the men who first laid out the notion of “leaderless resistance” that best provides a strategic framework within which to consider the strategy of Lone Wolf terrorism. While Beam advocates for small cell resistance, he does also mention individuals taking up arms by themselves. The correlation comes in the notion that the individual or small cells are going to be scattered around and out of contact with each other, and consequently need to act on their own – an approach that lends itself conveniently to individuals pursuing a path of Lone Wolf activity. It could be that he simply did not come across them – something that would be surprising given what an assiduous Internet user Breivik seems to have been. Or it could be that he did not want to be associated with Beam, a notorious racist leader of the Ku Klux Klan. At the same time, however, he could have simply referred back to Beam’s source material, coming from Amoss, a US intelligence officer who first coined the strategy as a final resort should communism successfully invade mainland America. This anti-communist message would have resonated with Breivik and it is curious that he did not use it.

**Ideological Analysis:**

- Religion plays a role in Breivik’s life – while it is unclear whether he considers himself a holy warrior or rather the identity of a crusader is useful as an image of someone defending European identity (that happens to have religious connotations), he does see Islam and Muslims in Europe as opponents, something that highlights that religion is something that he focuses on.

- His teenage years were important in the formation of his religious identity: Breivik reports being baptized and confirmed at age 15.

- He is captivated by the global clash of cultures and ideologies that have been a defining feature of the past ten years – specifically through what he sees as the Islamicization of Europe.
• He further seems to have personally experienced the issues – he may discuss them quite breezily, but Breivik lists nine specific instances over a decade in which Muslim youths have attacked him, suggesting a quite strong personalized rage in reaction.

• Breivik is clearly in the ideological thrall of the anonymous older Serbian whom he apparently met in Monrovia. The fact he made such a long and expensive journey to meet him suggests previous contact as well.

• In Breivik’s ideology he repeatedly paints himself as a lone vanguard and lone warrior and he seems to be content in this role.

• Yet at the same time, there is no clear evidence that he was planning on dying in the course of his action. He continually accepts this is a possibility (at one point he says: “I know I will die fighting…and that’s not a problem for me at all.”), but he is also constantly preparing himself for what happens were he to be captured.[12]

• Breivik claims to have been thinking about his big plot for almost a decade, certainly his direct attack planning took over a year at least, with some time before that dedicated to ideological formation and raising of funds.

Connections

This element has been touched on to some degree in the ideology section, but within the context of him as a Lone Wolf it is important to highlight the exact extent of his connections and contacts.

Breivik appears to have operated on the fringes of an extremist community. Aside from being an active participant in online forums focused on far right or anti-Muslim views, he also appears to have been in contact at various points in his past with other individuals and groups operating on the far right fringe. When arrested, Breivik seems to have alternatively claimed that he was alone and that other cells existed that would follow his action. Subsequently, he maintained this story, claiming that “two more cells” were working with him.[13] However, at time of this writing there has been no evidence of this, suggesting that these other individuals either did not exist or that Breivik had overestimated their dedication to the cause that led him to carry out his act.

Nonetheless, Breivik’s own treatise explaining his act offers a long list of individuals whom he claims to have had contact with, including a secretive network of “Justiciar Knights” with whom he was inducted into the reformed Pauperes Commilitones Christi Templique Solomonic (PCCTS). In his text he lists them as: two Britons, and single individuals from France, Germany, Holland, Greece, Russia, Norway, Serbia – as well as a missing Swede, Belgian and European-American. Presumably Breivik is the Norwegian he is referring to. According to Breivik they met in London in April 2002 in separate groups of four founding members and a host as a precautionary security measure. Breivik reports that at 23 years old, he was the youngest one at the meeting. The groups were told not to stay in contact and to go away and “cut off contact indefinitely.” One of the British men takes a mentor role with Breivik; he anonymises him by calling him “Richard.” But aside from him and the Serbian living in Monrovia, it is unclear that Breivik knows the identities of the other participants. At one point Breivik reads a newspaper story about the theft of the “Arbeit macht frei” sign from the entrance to Auschwitz by a Swedish
group, and wonders whether this might be a Swedish “sister cell” presumably formed around the Swedish individual. However, he dismisses this notion quickly though it is unclear whether this is because he knows the identity of the Swede or because it becomes clear it is a clumsy neo-Nazi effort.

For the most part, however, Breivik is very careful not to name people in his document out of a sense of operational security. Whether this is a genuine concern or whether he was delusional is unclear at this point, but there is some evidence that Breivik was in contact with British anti-Muslim extremists like the English Defence League (though Breivik does dismiss them as naïve in his writing). He appears to have attended some of their marches and was Facebook friends with a great many. He further seems to have quite a fixation with the United Kingdom – his chosen name was clearly British (maybe a nod to the fact he was actually born there), his mentor “Richard” was a Briton, he gave London as the dateline for his magnum opus (the ‘compendium’), he expresses great anger at British political parties in particular in his text, and of course his indoctrination into the PCCTS took place in London. All of which sent security services in the UK off to busily track his contacts down, suggesting as it did an active network in the UK.

As was highlighted before in the ideology section, however, it seems clear that Breivik was eager to paint himself as a lone warrior who was a single sleeper cell that was self-indoctrinated and planned over a period of nine years with minimal interaction with others. His own account of obtaining equipment suggests he did this by himself with no outside support. He is also meticulous in building cover stories for himself prior to purchasing items that are commonly available but could raise suspicions if bought abruptly and in large quantities. From an ideological standpoint some key meetings seem to have helped form his worldview, specifically his meeting in London in April 2002, though a number of key interactions appear to have taken place online as well.

**Analysis of Possible Connections:**

- Based on current information, Breivik was acting alone.
- He was, however, on the periphery of the far right and anti-Muslim ideological community in Europe with some links and interaction with such groups. He seems to have drawn some ideological sustenance from interactions with them, though he seems also to have concluded that they are not to be trusted with information and do not necessarily share his goals.
- He also seems to have believed he was part of a wider network that he does not appear to have much immediate interaction with or knowledge of where they are currently located.

**Effectiveness**

A key element of any terrorist plot or attack is the degree to which it is able to disseminate terror or chaos. Understanding how effective an attack is, or might have been, offers analysts a metric by which to classify a terrorist attack.
Breivik’s attack was clearly a highly successful one. If reports in the press of his statements are to be believed, he himself was surprised at the success he was able to achieve, expecting to be either captured or cut down in the wake of his bombing of Oslo’s political heart. However, he was able to carry out a solo twin-attack with a grim efficiency at a cost of 77 lives. The attack itself was clearly planned far in advance (according to Breivik’s own writing, he had started to formulate his plan almost nine years prior to action) and had the hallmarks of a clearly conceived and executed plan.

His operation had two phases to it, first a bombing in Oslo’s political district; and second, a mass shooting on an island where the youth wing of the ruling Labor party was holding an annual conference. In a particularly cunning move, Breivik was dressed as a policeman when he arrived on Utoya Island where the aspirant politicians were staying, claiming in the first instance to have come to talk to them as a result of the bomb blast in Oslo. Having gathered some around him, he then opened fire, marching methodically around the island for almost an hour and a half shooting people as he found them. According to eyewitness reports from the island, he walked around and calmly shot individuals who were running away. He furthermore went around methodically shooting bodies he found on the ground suspecting, correctly, that some were individuals who were masquerading as dead to evade him. He appears to have attempted to lace his bullets with nicotine poison, though it is unclear how effective this was.

In preparing for his act, Breivik was careful both in obtaining the necessary weapons and bomb making materials without raising security officials concerns. One dubious chemical purchase he made from Poland in March 2011 did raise red flags, but at the same time, according to the head of the Norwegian intelligence service, there had not been enough evidence to investigate this further.[14] Breivik describes trying to go to Prague to purchase weaponry, a trip that was a failure and resulted in him instead utilizing legitimate avenues to purchase weaponry in Norway.

Analysis:

• Breivik is an example of what an effective lone wolf attack can look like.
• Breivik was meticulous in his long-term planning for every aspect of his operation. Having defined what he is going to do, he then goes about preparing for it building cover stories at every stage. If he is to be believed this was his focus for nine years, though it is likely that actual planning was conducted over a much shorter time period.
• Breivik appears to have been interested in utilizing chemicals to enhance the damage he inflicted, but it is unclear how successful he was in doing this.
• He was also very effective in using the Internet (as shown in next section) to establish a database of individuals who would read his text and maybe agree with parts of it and who would help further disseminate it. In this he appears to have been very successful.

The Internet

Often with Lone Wolves or Lone Actors, it is the Internet that acts as a catalyst or plays a supportive role in pushing the individual from radical thought into action. This plays out in a
number of ways: lost individuals can find fellow believers through the Internet, networks can establish themselves over long distances without the individuals ever knowing each other and individuals seeking to conduct some malicious attack can find operational guidance and support using the Internet.

The Internet appears to have been a key tool for Breivik, both in ideological terms and operational terms. In the first instance, it seems clear that his treatise is based mostly upon research he conducted on the Internet, mostly trawling through right-wing and anti-Muslim forums. It has since been reported in the press that he was an active participant in discussions online, though other participants or moderators highlight that he did not particularly distinguish himself as being an extremist. In his ‘compendium’, Breivik mentions that he spends time online ideologically guiding others in these discussions – clearly seeing himself as a more active participant. He seems particularly impressed with a blogger named Fjordman, though a number of other individuals appear regularly in his citation lists.[15]

In some cases, he appears to have tried to shift online interactions into real world ones. He claims to have tried to meet with Fjordman, but failed. He also says that he met a community of Serb conservatives online whom appear to have played a crucial part in his ideological formation. One is the unidentified Serb who lives in Monrovia, but he appears to have found a community online of such individuals who had a considerable influence upon him. So much so that he was willing to travel to Monrovia to meet the individual.

He also appears to have been quite innovative in his use of the Internet as a tool to obtain material and information to support his action. When planning his trip to Prague to buy weapons he used a Hyundai discussion forum for tips on how to make the trip from Oslo to Prague by car. He reports that alibaba.com, a Chinese website linking Chinese manufacturers to global retailers, is a particularly good source of chemicals and materials. He also used eBay and a number of sellers in the UK to purchase chemicals and tools.[16] He uses a wide array of different websites to locate different tools and to collect information on building bombs, chemical mixtures, ideal body armors to use and so on. In addition to using the Internet as a source of material, he claims to have raised much of the money he uses in his action through establishing companies whose business model is based around e-commerce.

The Internet not only plays a role in his information collection and fundraising, but also in information dissemination. He uses Facebook as a tool to locate ideological fellow travellers or potential supporters and spends considerable time ‘email farming’ by ‘friending’ individuals whom he believes hold views similar to his and then once they have accepted, collecting their email addresses off their profiles. He creates two profiles to do this from and apparently uses up his daily allowance of 50 friend requests regularly in trying to gather this data. Presumably, he also does this through identifying individuals from his regular visits to far right or anti-Muslim websites and forums.

Finally, the Internet also appears to play a key role in his downtime. Breivik regularly admits to enjoying playing computer games, and in particular demonstrates a fixation with multiplayer role-playing fantasy games. At one point he admits that this was practically his entire occupation for a whole year.
As a modern man brought up in an Internet age, Breivik appears to have been very much at home using the Internet and was able to navigate ideology and operational information with ease. He repeatedly demonstrates a knowledge of Internet masking technology and at a number of points says that he destroys his hard drives to hide any evidence of what he is doing or of having security services somehow compromise him.

**Analysis:**
- There is evidence that Anders Breivik sought ideological and operational support online.
- Breivik demonstrated a high level of Internet savvy and capacity to mask his online activity.
- However, it was an online purchase from a foreign country that did put Breivik on Norwegian intelligence’s radar.

**Mental Competence**

A further complicating factor when looking at Lone Wolves or Lone Actor terrorists is how to separate and distinguish them from those individuals who for their own perverse reasons decide to open fire on crowds of random foreigners. What is the distinct feature of individuals who are motivated by an ideology to carry out a terrorist attack versus individuals who launch mindless orgies of violence due to some chemical imbalance? This is a difficult line to draw and this author is conscious of the deficiencies in his own analysis in this aspect. In an earlier paper, this author concluded with the possibility that some sort of social inadequacy and general sense of alienation from society might leave an individual prone to going to seek radical ideas that might in turn lead to terrorism.[17] Following this line of analysis and the subsequent official Norwegian report that seemed to indicate Breivik may have been mentally unstable, this section will analyze the degree to which at this point the individual’s mental competence has been called into question or issues have been highlighted.

Breivik’s sanity has been questioned by his own lawyer. And an early assessment by Norwegian professionals concluded that it was unlikely he is going to be declared legally insane given how hard it would have been for someone insane to carry out an act with such methodological effectiveness.[18] However, a subsequent psychological evaluation did conclude that “Anders Behring Breivik during a long period of time has developed the mental disorder of paranoid schizophrenia, which has changed him and made him into the person he is today....[they uncovered] grandiose delusions whereby he believes he is to determine who is to live and who is to die.”[19] The immediate result of this is that it is unlikely he is going to serve his time in a prison, but it is not clear what the value of this assessment is within the context of trying to understand Breivik as a Lone Wolf terrorist. On the one hand, it does help de-fang the impact of his attack from an ideological perspective and would depress Breivik who sees himself as a warrior rather than a madman, but on the other hand, it is unclear whether it would impact potential copycats or others who read his text and find it convincing. Doubtless for them, this assessment would be seen as part of a grander conspiracy.
But this post-fact analysis apart, there is no evidence that Breivik was not able to function perfectly in everyday Norwegian society. Some stories have emerged of him as a cruel and duplicitious child, but it is almost impossible to verify these in the current overheated climate surrounding his act. In a subsequent interview, his mother revealed that as early as 2005 he had demonstrated some strange activity, moving back home talking obsessively about politics and history “totally beyond reason and [believing] all the nonsense he said.” By April 2011 he was still living at home and had started acting in an even stranger manner, wearing an antiseptic mask around the house, refusing to eat food she had cooked for him and calling the family doctor accusing her of infecting him with some illness.[20]

Breivik’s act clearly seems the actions of a sociopath – his methodical murder of young people in cold blood and willingness to commit mass murder for a cause he knows is unpopular. However, he says that he is outwardly appalled by his own acts, but that they were “necessary.” All of which suggests at the very least a deep lack of empathy (at the same time, stories from Utoya Island indicate that he did spare some individuals who pled for their lives in front of him).

Breivik demonstrates a high level of narcissism and he is reported to have told people he had plastic surgery to look more Aryan.[21] Something he subsequently is reported to have regretted, having concluded that he previously “had a great Nordic nose.”[22] Throughout his text he talks constantly of how good he looks and he mentions how easy it would be for him to get girls because of his charm and good looks. The posed pictures he places at the end of his ‘compendium’ – pictures that have become the standard images of him in the public domain - show him as he clearly wants to be seen. And prior to conducting his act, Breivik not only prepared how he wanted to be seen by the world, but he also practiced drilling himself for possible interviews he might have to undergo. All of which demonstrates a very high level of self-obsession.

Analysis:

• Currently, Anders Behring Breivik has displayed no evidence of obvious insanity beyond the official preliminary Norwegian psychological report. The ideological framework (as currently understood) he offers holds up as a driver for his actions with some coherence.
• Breivik was, however, clearly a narcissist and obsessed with his own image. As we see in previous sections, he spent a lot of time preparing for what would happen post-event and appears to have undergone cosmetic surgery to improve his image. This all suggests a high level of self-involvement and obsession.
• In his chosen targets, he demonstrated a specific anger at the government and the ruling Labor Party in Norway – both in their Oslo offices, and in their summer camp. This reduces the lunacy claim, but does emphasize the importance of conspiracies in his outlook.

Lessons Learned
Using the typology identified in my earlier paper, Breivik fits the Lone Wolf profile since he has demonstrated substantial connections to other far right and anti-Muslim communities globally. Yet at the same time it is unclear that they have any operational command and control with regards him. It is not even clear that his PCCTS network of individuals has any idea of what he was planning or would have known – it seems like the group set up before disbanding for security reasons so that the individuals could all go plot by themselves.

Breivik’s action demonstrates the potential danger that can be posed by a Lone Wolf attacker. Intelligent enough to be very cautious in how he goes about his action, he is able over a long period of time to assemble a large and effective bomb and gather weapons and ammunition. He withdrew from the world moving to a farm where he prepared his bomb. From an operational counter-terrorism perspective this is not that useful a conclusion – identifying individuals who suddenly drop off the radar is by definition hard to do. And particularly when there is little evidence in their previous behavior that this is what they are about to do.

Breivik relied heavily on the Internet to provide him with motivation and operational information. Breivik went online to find fellow believers and supporters and seems to have found his way into the PCCTS through the Internet. He also appears to have been active in far right and anti-Muslim forums and websites and was apparently an avid consumer of the type of literature that they churn out. None of this is that useful from an operational counter-terrorism perspective except if technology exists that is able to somehow connect online surfing behavior of individuals who are active on extremist forums with their online purchasing patterns. This might have detected Breivik at an earlier stage, though the careful manner he claims to have operated online and build cover stories for his purchases also suggests that this may not have been possible.

Carefully planning notwithstanding, Breivik did come into contact with security services when he attempted to purchase a specific chemical online. This action generated an official reaction, but was too low level to result in deeper investigation. All of this is positive to some degree from a counter-terrorism perspective as it suggests that some level of detection is possible – it then ends up being down to the laborious task of following up every lead (possibly a very high number).

Offering another potential avenue for detection, Breivik did purchase actual munitions and was not reliant on completely homemade devices. Given the usual high level of vigilance around weaponry this also offers itself as a detection point – though he used legal methods to obtain his weapons. He started down the illicit path, but recognizing it as too hard, instead went down the legal route and was successful. Clearly, however, unless nations want to pursue situations of zero weapons tolerance for civilians to own weapons it would be hard to strengthen things to the point of detecting someone like Breivik who goes out of his way to fit the correct profile.

However, the weapons point does offer another interesting analytical consideration. Looking back at the cases of Lone Wolves historically, it seems as though the vast majority of those took place in nations that have available guns seek to use or gather traditional weapons at some point. Organized and trained terrorist cells seem to sometimes shun such weaponry recognizing that this will potentially bring them to the attention of security services or bring them into interaction with the criminal underworld which, in turn, might also lead to detection. Lone individuals in
nations where such weapons are available to the public, however, seem to choose to try to obtain such weapons whether they use them or not. Certainly in many cases described as ‘Lone Wolf’ in the United States, guns are purchased and used.[23] In contrast, in most European nations where guns are hard to obtain or unavailable, individuals resort to homemade weapons – for example in the UK the separate cases of home bomb makers Andrew Ibrahim and Nicky Reilly and attempted MP murderer Roshonara Choudhry (and none of this is not to consider the growing number of home bomb makers demonstrating far right ideological inclinations). This suggests a detection tripwire for some countries – though clearly, as Breivik showed, there are ways around it if careful enough.

A final point on ideologies is important. This Lone Wolf case demonstrates the importance of the Internet in disseminating extremist ideology and operational material. But at the same time, it also shows how individuals can become involved in a global ideological battle that they see swirling around themselves and how, with a little effort, they can become quite actively involved in it in a manner that is dangerous to the society in which they are living.

Breivik’s case shows the danger of the virulent anti-Muslim rhetoric that sometimes pollutes the political discourse in the West. Written in self-justifying terms that distance it from racism and Islamophobia and portrayed as a defense of a European identity that is being subsumed by waves of Muslim immigrants, it nevertheless is clearly open to different interpretations if they are sought. As analyst Marc Sageman correctly put it in the New York Times in the wake of Breivik’s act, “this rhetoric [that of anti-Muslim writers] is not cost free.”[24] Breivik’s repeated use of specific websites and writers highlights their importance in shaping his ideology and while these writers cannot be held accountable for what he decided to do with the ideas that they were circulating, they must bear some responsibility for fostering the backdrop against which an individual like Brevik can find the justification for his horrendous act.

From the perspective of countering people going down Breivik’s path, it is almost impossible to imagine solutions without moving into the space of curtailing individual free speech rights something that is clearly counter-productive. However, some recognition of the potential for such virulent language to be taken further into action by certain individuals is important. Mainstream political parties should make greater efforts to counter it through debate when they see it emerge. A parallel case to be considered in this light is that of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords in the US. She was shot by a man who thought he was doing his part to support the extreme right of his party that had attacked Congresswoman Giffords as a traitor for holding certain views. Ideas and words have great power and in a world where we can see the ease with which terrorist operations can be launched by individuals without much outside direction, consideration must be paid to the fact that such extreme ideas might resonate in different ways than they are intended. While stamping out such ideas and thoughts is going to be impossible, currently in some European countries, such ideas have been allowed to slowly move into the mainstream with little confrontation from established political entities. More effort could be expended to confront such ideas and prevent them being mainstreamed. The result otherwise is likely to be more Lone Wolf attacks in the future with a few managing to get through with results as spectacular and tragic as Anders Behring Breivik’s.
About the Author:

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Notes

[1] The reference to Lone/Solo Actor is a nod to the fact that it is a known preferred nomenclature amongst security agencies.


[8] While these details are not all confirmed, the Progress Party has confirmed that he was a member between 1999-2006, “Norway’s right-wing on defensive after attacks,” Associated Press, August 3, 2011.

[9] Email farming involves using the Internet and social networking sites to obtain email addresses.

[10] “Anders Behring Breivik was insane five years ago, mother says,” Telegraph, November 30, 2011.


[12] Within this context, some consideration must be given of the fact that during his shooting on Utoya Island he made a pair of calls to the police stating that he was a “Norwegian anti-communist resistance commander” and that he wanted to surrender. In both instances, however, he hung up. “Norway massacre: tape of Breivik call to police aired,” BBC News, November 25, 2011.


[15] It is worth pointing out that the majority have completely distanced themselves from Breivik’s act, and in some cases, have closed down sites that he claims to have drawn inspiration from.


[20] “Anders Behring Breivik was insane five years ago, mother says,” Telegraph, November 30, 2011.


[23] Madeleine Gruen and Alfredo Kuilan, “Lone-Wolf Shooters Motivated by Al Qaidist Ideology,” *NEFA Foundation Target America series*

Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: some CT Approaches Addressed
by Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf

Abstract
After a brief discussion of the epistemological and phenomenological difficulties associated with the concept of lone wolf terrorism, a number of possible counter-terrorist approaches are discussed. Lone operator terrorist acts should be considered ‘black swan’ occurrences that are almost impossible to categorize or systematize, let alone forecast. Thus, not the profile of the perpetrator, but the modus operandi offer clues for a better response to this particular threat. Furthermore, almost all lone operators do display a degree of commitment to, and identification with, extremist movements – providing leads for preventing new rounds of radicalization within this potential group of sympathizers or followers. With the apparent increase of Islamist lone wolf terrorism and fears for right-wing extremists wanting to follow the example of the Norwegian mass murderer A.B. Breivik, new questions need to be posed, addressing the role of virtual communities with which lone operators identify themselves.

Introduction
After the cold-blooded murder of 77 people in Oslo and Utoya (Norway) on 22 July 2011, the threat of lone wolf terrorism has quickly moved (further) up on the agenda of counter terrorism officials. Two questions were raised in the aftermath of the horrible killings by Anders Breivik: (i) could it have been prevented? and (ii) how to discover new plots, possibly by individuals who want to answer Breivik’s explicit call to follow his example? Both questions are difficult to answer. The Norwegian authorities are investigating the first question, which has already resulted in the arrest of the owner of an online trading business who is suspected of supplying chemicals to the Norwegian killer. Finding satisfactory answers to the second question – is it possible to discover and prevent future cases – is even more difficult. ‘Probably not’ is perhaps the most frank and honest answer, but an unacceptable one at that. In this article, we address seven possible counter-terrorist approaches to the threat posed by lone wolf terrorism with an eye on reducing chances of deadly attacks like the one experienced in Norway. First, however, we have to define lone wolf terrorism.

Defining the Concept
The term ‘lone wolf’ was popularized in the late 1990s by white supremacists Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis as part of an encouragement to fellow racists to act alone for tactical security reasons when committing violent crimes.[2] Other terms that have been used to describe similar or comparable forms of political violence include ‘leaderless resistance’[3], ‘individual terrorism’[4] and ‘freelance terrorism’[5].

In this article the definition proposed by Burton and Stewart in a STRATFOR essay functions as the point of departure. They define a lone wolf as “a person who acts on his or her own without orders from — or even connections to — an organization.”[6] They stress the difference with
sleeper cells, arguing that sleepers are operatives who infiltrate the targeted society or organization and then remain dormant until a group or organization orders them to take action. In contrast, “A lone wolf is a stand alone operative who by his very nature is embedded in the targeted society and is capable of self-activation at any time.”[7]. However, by stressing the absence of connections with a broader network or organization, Burton and Stewart neglect the ideological connections individuals might have with other networks or organizations, either through personal contacts or inspirational content on the Internet.

We focus our attention in this article on the operational aspect of lone wolf terrorism. Even though some lone wolves have been linked to larger (underground) networks, such as Baruch Goldstein (who has been linked to Kach) and Timothy McVeigh (who has been linked to several right wing-groups), they decided, planned and performed their act on their own, rather than as having followed instructions from some hierarchical command structure.[8] In our view, a definition of lone wolf terrorism has to be extended to include individuals that are inspired by a certain group but who are not under the orders of any other person, group or network. They might be members of a network, but this network is not a hierarchical organization in the classical sense of the word.[9]

No Single Profile

Infamous examples in the United States, Israel and Europe include Baruch Goldstein, an American-born Israeli citizen who was responsible for the death of 29 Muslims praying in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron; the Austrian Franz Fuchs who used letter bombs to kill four persons and injure 15 more; US army major Nidal Malik Hassan who is accused of a mass shooting at Fort Hood where 13 people died and 30 others were wounded, and the American mathematician Theodore Kaczynski, also known as the ‘Unabomber’, who engaged in a mail bombing spree that killed three persons and wounded 23 others. In addition, there have been several assassinations of political leaders committed by lone wolves. Think of Yigal Amir, the assassin of Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin, or Volkert van der Graaf who killed the Dutch politician Pim Fortuijn.

These individuals and their violent acts exemplify the variations in targeting and modus operandi within lone wolf terrorism, as well as the variety of political and ideological backgrounds of the perpetrators. Anarchist revolutionaries, religious zealots, environmental and animal rights extremists, white supremacists and jihadists all have engaged in lone wolf attacks. When it comes to religious backgrounds we also see a variety of motivations. Among those who claim or justify their acts in the name of a religion are individuals of all faiths. Muslim lone wolves like Nidal Malik Hassan and Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad who opened fire on a US military recruiting office, as well as anti-Semitic/Christian-identity adherents like Buford Furrow who attacked a Jewish Community Center and Eric Rudolph, also known as the Olympic Park Bomber, who killed two people and injured at least 150 others. Lone wolf terrorism also includes radical Roman Catholics like James Kopp and radical Protestants like Scott Roeder who both killed a physician who performed abortions.

Obviously, there is no single profile for a lone wolf. Nonetheless, it is possible to distinguish between different categories of lone wolf terrorists based on their ideological or religious

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background. In addition to this distinction, there are a few common characteristics shared by many lone wolves. One of the problems for both counterterrorism practitioners and academics is the relatively low number of terrorists who act their own without orders from – or even connections to – an organization. According to a study by COT/TTSRL, a total number of 72 lone wolf terrorist incidents accounted for only 1.28 percent of the total number of terrorist incidents in the US, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Canada and Australia. This statistical \( \text{quantité négligible} \) turns these incidents into the typical ‘black swan’ occurrences that are almost impossible to categorize or systematize, let alone preview. However, the number of incidents linked to lone operator terrorists seems to be on the rise.

**Encouraging Lone Wolf Terrorism**

The increase in lone wolf terrorism in the United States in the last three decades can partly be explained by the adoption and dissemination of the lone wolf tactic by and amongst right wing extremists. For example, in the late 1990s the white supremacists Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis explicitly encouraged fellow extremists to act alone when committing violent crimes. A few years earlier, white supremacist Louis Beam, a former Ku Klux Klan and Aryan Nations member, popularized the strategy of *leaderless resistance*. He envisaged a scenario where ‘all individuals and groups operate independently of each other, and never report to a central headquarters or single leader for direction or instruction’.

Also, in Islamist circles the idea of support for small-scale, loosely organized terrorist attacks can hardly be called new. In 2003, an article was published on the extremist Internet forum *Sada al Jihad* (Echoes of Jihad), in which Osama bin Laden sympathizers were encouraged to take action without waiting for instructions. In 2004, Abu Musab al-Suri (or: Mustafa Setmamian Nasar), a dual citizenship Spanish-Syrian who had been in the inner circle around Bin Laden but fell out with him after 9/11 due to differences on strategic issues, published a “Call for Worldwide Islamic Resistance,” on the Internet. In this sixteen hundred pages manuscript, al-Suri proposes a next stage of jihad, characterized by terrorism created by individuals or small autonomous groups, which he also labelled “leaderless resistance”. These individuals will wear down the enemy and prepare the ground for the far more ambitious aim of waging war on “open fronts” – an outright struggle for territory.

In 2006, Al Qaeda leader Abu Jihad al-Masri followed suit with a call to arms, entitled "How to fight alone" circulated widely in jihadist networks.

The 1,518 page-long manifesto of Anders Breivik can also be regarded as a guide into the workings of lone operator terrorism. In one part of his manifesto, Breivik explains how to publish documents on the Internet and how to use social media for recruiting purposes. Moreover, he shows the tricks he himself used to circumvent European custom agents and describes in detail how he manufactured the explosives he used to blow up the government building in Oslo. Breivik also points at the possibilities of the use of unconventional weapons, such as Radiological Dispersal Devices, or so-called dirty bombs.

**The Challenge of Fighting Lone Wolf Terrorism**
Attacks by lone operator terrorists provide the most puzzling and unpredictable form of terrorism. Lone wolf terrorists are a nightmare for the counterterrorism organizations, police and intelligence communities as they are extremely difficult to stop.

First of all, lone wolves are solitary actors, whose intentions are hard to discern since they usually avoid contact with others. This makes identifying, monitoring, and arresting a lone wolf extremely difficult. Compared to (conventional forms of) group terrorism or network-sponsored terrorists, lone operators have a critical advantage in avoiding identification and detection before and after their attacks since most of them do not communicate their plans with other people. When militants operate in a cell consisting of more than one person, chances increase substantially that law enforcement authorities will be able to foil a terrorist plot. Breivik was well aware of this. He even warns other potential terrorists they will increase their chance of being apprehended by 100% for every other person they involve in their plans: “Don’t trust anyone unless you absolutely need to (which should never be the case). Do absolutely everything by yourself”, he writes in his manifesto.[17]

Second, even if lone wolves like Breivik make references to existing political or ideological discourses, they remain very hard to pinpoint as political terrorists/activists. This pose some problems to CT practitioners since insights into the disenfranchised, alienated or frustrated movement behind individual terrorists often provides clues as to their modus operandi, target preferences or outreach and/or propaganda activities. Lone wolves, by definition, are idiosyncratic. They display a variety of backgrounds with a wide spectrum of ideologies and motivations: from Islamists to right wing extremists, and from confused suicidal psychopaths to dedicated and mentally healthy persons. This vast array of expressions and visions, ranging from ideological ramblings on the Internet and hate mail to fully-fledged acts of terrorism, hardly gives away anything in the sense of patterns or recurring methods behind lone wolf’s attacks.

Third, it is particularly difficult to differentiate between those lone operator extremists who intend to commit attacks and those who simply express radical beliefs or issue hollow threats (hoaxes). In Western countries in general and in the United States in particular, the freedom of speech is a fundamental freedom which limits possibilities to investigate radical scenes unless they are violent. While most terrorists are radical but not all radicals are terrorists, it is extremely difficult to single out lone wolves who will carry out an actual attack before they strike, even with the help of the most sophisticated technical intelligence gathering tools.

Fourth, lone wolves inspire copycat behavior and become role models for other alienated youngsters; they often invite bandwagon attacks. Kazcynski’s manifesto still circulates on the Internet, as do Bouyeri’s letters. And it is likely that we will see the same of Breivik’s ‘European Declaration of Independence’ ten to twenty years from now. In addition to this, certain tactics – shooting sprees, bomb letters, arson attacks or anthrax letters – also have a tendency to continue over a long period of time – although not necessarily by the same perpetrator.

Finally, although lone operator terrorists have the disadvantage of lacking the means, skills, and ‘professional’ support of terrorist groups or networks, their attacks nonetheless have proven to be very lethal — Anders Breivik and Timothy McVeigh are cases in point.
**Possible CT Responses**

How to deal with the threat of lone wolf terrorism and the challenge of identifying, targeting, and arresting persons who act entirely on their own? The question has not yet been sufficiently answered and poses the problem of how to reconcile fundamental principles of open societies with guaranteeing security to citizens. One thing, however, is clear: the challenge is enormous, especially when confronted with a person like Anders Breivik who used years to meticulously prepare his horrible attacks – the Oslo bombing (8 killed) and the Utoya massacre (69 killed).

Nonetheless, the above described commonalities and challenges provide some clues as to where to start with CT responses.

First of all, according to Alex Shone of the Henry Jackson society, a British-based think-tank, the key factor of the UK’s CT response concerning locating lone wolf attacks is in knowing not who will carry out an attack (almost an impossibility) but rather in knowing how such attacks are formulated. In his essay, Shone stresses the need to learn about the radicalization processes of lone wolves. He shows that insight into these processes open up possible avenues for effective CT measures to prevent or counter the threat of lone wolf terrorism.[18]

Knowing how lone operator attacks are formulated requires a far more sensitive detection system at the tactical, sharp-end of operations than most CT organizations currently use. According to Shone, CT services need to be far more attuned to those signals, as minimal as they might be, that any individual with a terrorist intent will inevitably give off in preparing his attack. This requires not only effective data capture and exploitation enabled by efficient overall information management, but also fused intelligence products. This requires intelligence analysts and collectors to work in far closer union.[19]

Secondly, given the ‘commonality’ shared by many lone wolves that there is a degree of commitment to, and identification with, extremist movements and that their radicalization process does not take place in a vacuum, it is important to both investigate and cooperate with afflicted communities. And given the general agreement that an effective counter radicalization strategy depends on effective community engagement, it is essential to promote passive and active aversion towards the terrorist seed in these communities with the help of influential community members.

In the third place, even a seemingly spontaneous combustion of violence is often triggered by some catalyst event. It could be rewarding to study and compare the nature of potential triggers or catalyst events in the radicalization processes of lone wolves. Are they located within the private domain or are they provided by outside political developments? Or are triggers even mastered by ‘entrepreneurs of violence’ who use them to call upon their anonymous followers to become active?

In the fourth place, exactly because lone wolves – although operating alone – draw inspiration from other extremists or ideologues, disseminating counter narratives ought to be an important element of an effective CT strategy. A crucial ingredient of counter narratives is the de-legitimisation of perpetrators and their acts and the falsification of their ideologies.

In the fifth place, although lone wolves are not part of hierarchical organisations, they do formulate their acts in a certain context. Awareness programs for parents, schools, universities
are worth considering – obviously without launching large-scale public campaigns that only serve to create a moral panic.

A sixth clue as to where to start with CT responses also involves communication processes. On the one hand, communicating the potential threat of lone wolves to relevant target audiences is very important. At the same time, it is important to refrain from handing them the public theatre they strive for. Handling lone wolves without giving them any positive public status should be one core principle. Of course, much depends on the channels used by the perpetrator. In the days of Kaczynski, one could, at least for a while, successfully prevent the publishing of his manifesto. Today, the Breivik case in Norway has shown that a lone wolf can send an email to possible supporters and post his video and the 1,500 pages of his manifesto on the Internet in the last remaining hour before he detonates the explosives and heads for his destination to engage in mass murder.

Lastly, perhaps the most concrete clue concerning lone wolf operators and their tactics is their modus operandi. In recent cases of shooting sprees (including high school shootings and mall shootings) all perpetrators were male and all had a license to possess (semi-automatic) firearms. This specific group of people who are allowed to keep firearms – of which the overwhelming majority are law-abiding citizens who use their weapon for hunting or sport shooting – needs special scrutiny. The same holds for the procedures for applying for a weapon permit and membership of a shooting club.

**Final Remarks**

As stated above, the challenge to prevent lone wolf terrorism is enormous and any CT response can only partly reduce this particular threat or limit its impact. As with other forms of terrorism, it is not possible to reach 100% security against this threat. Obviously, there is still a long way to go in preventing lone wolf terrorism. Potential answers on the ‘how?’ question regarding the modus operandi of lone wolf terrorists and their radicalization processes are still preliminary, needing further investigation. And with the apparent increase of Islamist lone wolf terrorism and fears for right-wing extremists wanting to follow the example of Breivik, new questions need to be posed, for instance about the role of the Internet or the possible impact of attacks on minority groups in society. The fact that there are – fortunately – few cases we can learn from does not make the task to know more about the ‘how’ of lone wolf terrorism any easier. Therefore, sharing experiences, data and ideas regarding this particular terrorist threat between practitioners, policymakers and researchers is essential to be able to develop at least some viable responses to lone wolf terrorism.

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Notes

[1] This article is based on an ICCT article on lone wolf terrorism by the same authors; it is available at www.icct.nl. With profound thanks to Liesbeth van der Heide for her research assistance.


[7] Ibid.


Abstract

U.S. officials have recently claimed that the CIA has sharply reduced the number of civilian casualties resulting from covert Predator and Reaper drone strikes in the Taliban-controlled agencies of Northwest Pakistan. Critics, especially in Pakistan, along with human rights NGOs have, however, questioned these claims. This article examines independent databases tracking the drone strikes and finds that there is significant support for the U.S. officials’ claims, or at least for their more moderate assertions. It also briefly reviews the explanations that have been offered for the declining civilian death toll from drone strikes. It shows that there is reason to believe that this development is the deliberate result of adjustments to CIA targeting procedures and improvements in spy networks and technology, and thus is likely to prove broadly sustainable at least for the immediate future.

Introduction

U.S. officials have been widely cited in recent months claiming that the CIA has sharply reduced the number of civilians killed in its covert drone program in Pakistan even as it rapidly increased the overall number of strikes. Some reports in the Pakistani and international press, however, have continued to claim very large numbers of civilian fatalities, and some NGOs have expressed skepticism about American officials’ claims, citing in particular a lack of independent corroboration. This begs the question of who is correct, those who claim that the drones are “killing 99% civilians” in their strikes, or U.S. government officials who speak confidently of a drastic decline in drone deaths? [1] Is there any corroboration of the U.S. government’s claims that the drones are now killing fewer civilians than before?

This article is devoted to answering these questions. It will demonstrate that several independent studies on drone strikes in Pakistan point to a declining civilian death toll that broadly supports the more cautious claims of U.S. officials. The databases also, however, contradict U.S. officials’ boldest public claims which include assertions that the drone strikes have avoided civilian casualties entirely for periods of up to a year. The databases also show that the proportion of civilian casualties has crept up slightly in the first three quarters of 2011 in comparison with the standard of accuracy achieved in 2010. Nonetheless, on the basis of reported explanations for the improved precision of strikes, most of which are connected with tactical and technological adaptations on the part of the U.S., this article suggests that the bulk of the improvement is likely to be sustainable at least for the immediate future. By consequence, U.S. officials have, and are likely to retain at least for a time, a powerful case for maintaining or even intensifying the strikes.

The article begins with a brief overview of the drone program (Section 1) followed by a summary of some of the controversy, and especially legal controversy, surrounding it, which illustrate the centrality and importance of the issue of civilian fatalities (Section 2). It then turns
to a more detailed review of contrasting claims regarding the actual number of civilian casualties being caused by drone strikes in Pakistan (Section 3), followed by a review and analysis of the independent evidence currently available (Section 4). Finally, it turns to the possible explanations for the changing civilian death toll and the likelihood of maintaining the new rate (Section 5).

1. The Drone Campaign

On June 18, 2004, the United States began what could be described as its “most extensive targeted assassination campaign since the Vietnam War” by killing a Pashtun tribesman, Nek Muhammad, in the village of Wana in South Waziristan. [2] Muhammad was finishing dinner at the house of his friend, the local tribal leader Sher Zaman Ashrafkhel, and talking on his cell phone when a Hellfire missile exploded in the midst of the festivities killing at least five of the diners. In addition to Nek, Zaman and at least one Taliban militant were reported among the dead, along with Zaman’s two sons (aged 16 and 10). [3] The source of the Hellfire missile that killed the five was a Predator drone.

In the seven years that have followed, similar drone strikes are reported to have killed at least 1661 people, and probably closer to 2000, in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). [4] The strikes have been aimed at leaders, local commanders and operatives of Al-Qaeda and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and associated networks which carry out attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan. The Long War Journal, a database set up by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy which tracks U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, reports that 63 “Senior Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders” have been killed by drones thus far, the vast majority (45) from Al-Qaeda (followed by 8 Taliban and 4 Haqqani Network leaders). [5] Other suspected militants killed are reported to include low-level operatives of Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban (i.e., the Quetta Shura), the Haqqani Network, and an increasing number of the Pakistani Taliban (or Tehrik-i-Taliban). [6]

The U.S. government does not officially acknowledge these attacks, which are generally carried out covertly by the CIA, but they have been widely reported in the Pakistani and international press and have been unofficially acknowledged by U.S. officials. Indeed, Peter Bergen, CNN’s National Security Analyst and the author of The Longest War, has described them with only mild exaggeration as “the world’s worse-kept secret.” [7]

Naturally, these lethal covert attacks on the territory of an ally have provoked controversy. The Pakistani government has repeatedly condemned the strikes as violations of its sovereignty. On November 14, 2008, for example, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari complained of the drone campaign that “it’s undermining my sovereignty, and it’s not helping win… the hearts and minds of the people.” [8]

Evidence has emerged over the last two years, however, which tends to cast doubt on the sincerity of the Pakistani government’s denunciations of the drone strikes. On February 12, 2009, for example, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairwoman of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, revealed that Predator drones were flown out of a base in Pakistan, presumably with the permission of the Pakistani government. [9] Pakistani officials denied Feinstein’s claim but five days later The Times of London published satellite images obtained from google.earth that
showed Predator drones on a runway in Shamsi, Baluchistan, Pakistan. [10] Indeed, it has now come to light that in 2006 President Bush obtained permission from Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to use Predator drones to kill senior Al-Qaeda targets, albeit only in FATA. [11] Similarly, on November 12, 2008, the new Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari privately told the Director of the CIA to “kill the seniors” (i.e., Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders). [12]

There is strong evidence then that Pakistani authorities have given consent to drone strikes in the FATA. It has also been widely reported that Pakistani military and intelligence officials have fed information to the CIA which has supported targeting operations, and may even have picked some targets of drone attacks. [13] All of this tends to cast doubt on charges that the strikes constitute violations of Pakistani sovereignty. Pakistani government officials’ condemnations of the strikes appear to be principally intended for popular consumption to avoid a popular backlash at home.

2. The Drone Debate

The drone strikes have also been challenged on a number of other strategic, ethical and most importantly legal grounds. But all of these critiques converge on the problem of excessive civilian casualties. The following discussion focuses on the legal issues, and in particular the key question of the proportion of civilians being killed. In the final stages of the examination, however, it also draws on the strategic and ethical critiques to reinforce the centrality of this issue.

Legal critics of the U.S. government’s use of drones for targeted killings have attacked it from a number of angles. The UN Special Rapporteur for Summary, Arbitrary and Extrajudicial Executions has argued, for example, that the U.S. has violated its “IHL [international humanitarian law] obligations to provide accountability and transparency for targeted killings.” [14] Human rights NGOs like Amnesty International have criticized some U.S. drone strikes in harsher terms as extrajudicial killings (albeit most notably in reference to a November 2002 strike in Yemen). [15] A number of influential scholars of international law, including Christine Gray of Cambridge University, have also characterized U.S. drone strikes as assassinations. [16] But the most emphatic, outspoken and effective of these legal critics has been Mary Ellen O’Connell of Notre Dame University who has argued (i) that the strikes have mainly taken place outside of a situation of established armed conflict in which alone they might be justified; and even if this point were overlooked that they still (ii) clearly violate the humanitarian law (of armed conflict) principle of humanity and (iii) the principle of proportionality. [17]

By contrast, an impressive array of legal scholars has also advanced arguments that support the legality of the strikes. In response to O’Connell’s first point, for instance, several leading legal scholars have argued that a state that has experienced an armed terrorist attack, or is imminently threatened with one, emanating from the territory of another state which is unwilling to prevent the attack, may employ narrowly-focused military force against the terrorists on the other country’s territory in self-defense regardless of whether an established state of armed conflict exists. Ruth Wedgwood, the Burling Professor of International Law at Johns Hopkins University, writes for example,
If a host country permits the use of its territory as a staging area for terrorist attacks when it could shut those operations down, and refuses requests to take action, the host government cannot expect to insulate its territory against measures of self-defense. [18]

Wedgwood’s key point here is that where states fail in their responsibility to protect other states from attacks emanating from their territory, the right to act in self-defense, including with the calibrated use of military force, reverts to the threatened state. This occurs independently of whether any established state of armed conflict exists.

Yoram Dinstein, emeritus professor of law at Tel Aviv University and perhaps the leading contemporary interpreter of the law of war, elaborates the point in the latest (fourth) edition of his seminal *War, Aggression and Self-Defense*. He employs two imaginary states, Arcadia and Utopia, for purposes of illustration:

Should Arcadia not grant its consent to a Utopian offer to send military forces into Arcadian territory, in order to eliminate the terrorist threat…. Arcadia must be prepared to bear certain unpleasant consequences. Just as Utopia is entitled to exercise self-defence against an armed attack by Arcadia, it is equally empowered to defend itself against armed bands or terrorists operating from within Arcadian territory…. The situation amounts to an international armed conflict since Utopia resorts to forcible measures on Arcadian soil in the absence of Arcadian consent…. But there is no war between Arcadia and Utopia: the international armed conflict is ‘short of war’. [19]

For Dinstein, the surgical use of military force in self-defense itself creates a state of international armed conflict (albeit short of war between the host and threatened state). Moreover, Dinstein stresses that Utopia’s right of action is no less compelling if Arcadia is simply “too weak (militarily, politically or otherwise) to prevent these [terrorist] operations” on its territory. [20]

In fact, in the words of Jordan Paust, Professor at the Baker Law Center of the University of Houston,

the vast majority of writers agree that an armed attack by a non-state actor on a state, its embassies, its military, or other nationals abroad can trigger the right of self-defense addressed in Article 51 of the UN Charter, even if selective responsive force directed against a non-state actor occurs within a foreign country. [21]

Paust moreover leaves no doubt about the ramifications of the right of self-defense specifically for the U.S. use of drone strikes in Pakistan:

It is also clear that the U.S. has the right to use drones in Pakistan under Article 51 of the Charter in self-defense to protect U.S. troops from a continual process of al Qaeda and Taliban attacks on U.S. Military personnel and others in Afghanistan that have emanated or been directed partly from territory in Pakistan for several years during a continuing international armed conflict and when al Qaeda and Taliban fighters move back and forth across the porous border that neither country effectively controls. [22]
Moreover, Paust stresses that such “self-defense could be permissible outside of the context of war and without consent of the territorial state from which non-state attacks emanate.” [23] Finally, it is worth noting that this appears to be precisely the argument which undergirds the claim advanced in March 2010 by U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh (an influential scholar of international law in his own right) before the American Society for International Law that U.S. drone targeting is “consistent with its [the U.S. government’s] inherent right to self-defense under international law.” [24]

All of this suggests that the U.S. government can offer a potent rebuttal to the first charge leveled by legal critics like O’Connell. This does not necessarily mean that the U.S. has not potentially violated international law by carrying out drone strikes in Pakistan. It rather indicates that the question is an open one – that is, one on which the law is not yet settled. Moreover, given the typically slow evolution of international law, the deeply disputed character of the law relating to self-defense, and the powerful interests at stake over this question, it may very well be that the law will not be settled any time soon. At the moment, however, if Paust’s assessment of the balance of legal opinion is accurate, then O’Connell appears to be in the minority in insisting that the right to use drones is restricted only to arenas where an established armed conflict is already in progress.

There is also little compelling evidence that the strikes violate the second element of the law of armed conflict invoked by Professor O’Connell, the principle of humanity. Ironically, of all the fundamental governing principles of humanitarian law, the principle of humanity is perhaps the least formally recognized and least frequently invoked. This is perhaps because it expresses the essential spirit of humanitarian law rather than a specific provision within it. It finds expression, however, in some attempts to synthesize the law of armed conflict, for example in the United Kingdom’s The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, which broadly “forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.” [25]

The legitimate objective in question here is the U.S. government’s desire to protect its nationals and its allies from attacks that are being planned and prepared at bases in Pakistan. There is little evidence that the United States has more humane, or even plausible, alternatives for preempting terrorist strikes than relying on remote control drones to kill the enemy in the remote tribal region. Consequently, it is unclear that the United States is violating the principle of humanity by using drones to accomplish this legitimate military purpose. This becomes especially obvious if one contrasts the use of drones against the dangers of the main alternative tactic the U.S. has tried in the FATA – that is, the insertion of ground troops to capture or kill enemy forces. For example, the best known U.S. commando raid into FATA occurred on September 3, 2008. [26] The Special Operations Team sent in was reported to have encountered resistance and was forced to fight their way out. The result was reported to have been around 15 or 16 civilians killed, including three women and four children, according to Geo TV. [27] The head of the Pakistani Army, General Ashfaq Kayani, harshly condemned the U.S. operation and vowed that the Pakistani Army would resist such violations of sovereignty “at all costs.” [28] In the next two weeks, Pakistani troops were reported to have fired warning shots at U.S. helicopters and ground troops near the border. [29] By comparison, the costs and dangers of carrying out drone strikes
seem slight. This analysis suggests that the U.S. government can offer a potent rebuttal to the second charge leveled by critics like O’Connell.

The crux of the legal issue then seems to come down to the third charge leveled by O’Connell concerning the number of civilians killed in CIA drone strikes in Pakistan. That is fitting, because this charge that the drone strikes in Pakistan do too much harm to civilians also represents the core of the strategic and ethical critiques of the drone campaign. On the strategic front, for example, David Kilcullen (a former counterinsurgency advisor to General David Petraeus) and Andrew Exum (who served as an Army Ranger in Iraq and Afghanistan) argued in an influential *New York Times* Op-Ed for a “moratorium on drone strikes.” Their central argument was that “every one of these dead noncombatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased.” [30] Similarly, the harm to civilians represents a central concern of ethical critics of the drone strikes in Pakistan. According to the editors of *The Christian Century*, for instance, the apparently high numbers of civilians killed in the drone strikes “raise troubling questions to those committed to the just war principle that civilians should never be targeted.” [31]

But the issue is put most urgently and specifically by legal critics like O’Connell. She charges that the strikes violate one of the most basic and sacred principles of humanitarian law – that is, the principle of proportionality. This humanitarian principle is clearly formulated in Article 57 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (1977). It states that parties to a conflict must,

refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. (Art 57(2)(iii))

Under the law governing the conduct of war, each military operation must comply with this standard.

Unfortunately, the limited information available concerning the covert drone strikes makes it difficult to determine whether any individual operation violates this principle. Such assessments depend, for example, on what civilian harm the planners could and should reasonably have foreseen given the information they had, the importance that they should have attached to the mission’s objectives given what they knew, etc. Since we know little about what they knew, it is difficult making these assessments on a case-by-case basis.

Nonetheless, a general sense of compliance can be gained by looking at the operations as a whole, and comparing the number of civilian casualties to the number of high value targets and lower level militants killed in the campaign. While the proportion of civilian casualties does not prove that any particular operation did or did not violate the principle of proportionality, a high proportion lends credibility to those that suggest that some operations must have, while a low proportion supports those who insist that none have. So the question of the proportion of civilian casualties has assumed an important position in the debate over the legality of U.S. operations. The following section highlights some of the recent debate swirling around the issue.
3. Contrasting Counts of Civilians Killed

U.S. officials’ claims of “reduced civilian casualties” in spite of “increasing the frequency of strikes” in Pakistan have been widely cited over the last year. For example, in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in July-August 2011, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann report U.S. government representatives claiming that between May 2008 and May 2010 there were “fewer than 30 civilian deaths” produced by the drone program. [32] In an earlier article in *Foreign Policy* in April 2010, the same authors reference a U.S. official in December claiming that “just over 20” civilians had been killed in the prior two years while “more than 400” fighters had been eliminated, a ratio of just under 20 militants killed per civilian killed. [33] Similarly, a July 22, 2010, BBC story reported a senior U.S. official claiming that under Obama 650 militants had been killed as compared to only 20 civilians - a ratio of militant to civilian fatalities of 32.5 to 1. [34] Again, in an article published on *Bloomberg* on January 31, 2011, an unnamed U.S. official is reported to have claimed that “The 75 strikes launched in the ungoverned tribal region since the drone program accelerated in mid-August have killed several hundred militants without causing any deaths among civilian non-combatants” – that is, without any collateral fatalities whatsoever. [35] If this were not enough John Brennan, the U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and President Obama’s Chief Adviser on Counterterrorism, further stated,

> One of the things President Obama has insisted on is that we’re exceptionally precise and surgical in terms of addressing the terrorist threat. And by that I mean, if there are terrorists who are within an area where there are women and children or others, you know, we do not take such action that might put those innocent men, women and children in danger. In fact I can say that the types of operations that the US has been involved in, in the counter-terrorism realm, that nearly for the past year there hasn’t been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities that we’ve been able to develop. [36]

Mr. Brennan made this claim on June 29, 2011, so his assertion that there have been no civilian casualties resulting from U.S. counter-terrorism operations in almost a year would extend back from that day to close to the middle of 2010.

Despite these emphatic statements from U.S. officials, however, widespread skepticism remains. [37] Some reports in the Pakistani Press, for instance, have sharply contradicted U.S. claims. A March 26, 2011, report in Pakistan’s *The Nation* insisted that “There is mounting evidence that those killed are ordinary Pakistani citizens, and the Al-Qaeda masterminds thus killed are few and far between.” [38] On March 11, 2011, *The Pakistan Observer* reported, “The US drones or the predator planes which have been on the killing spree in Pakistan’s northern belt since August 2008 and have so far killed over fourteen hundreds people with the big majority as the innocent civilians (as admitted by the international watch dogs) [sic].” [39]

Such claims are echoed and amplified in popular Pakistani discourse. In a typical statement on March 7, 2011, Maulana Samiul Haq, the chief of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (the Community of Islamic Scholars), a Pakistani Islamist party, insisted at a conference in Lahore that U.S. drone strikes kill “dozens of innocent people daily.” [40] Similarly, Muhammad Ahmed of the *Buzz*...
Pakistan website, one of the country’s most popular political blogs, wrote that the “USA did more than 100 Drone attacks in Pakistan in the past 3 years, if you read news about these drone attack you will see that in these drone attack only 1% terrorists was killed and other 99% people who died in these attack was innocent civilians of Pakistan. 75% of them were 10 to 15 year old teenagers [sic].” [41]

While not embracing the critics’ counter-claims, some leading NGOs have also expressed caution about taking U.S. claims at face value. Asked to comment on U.S. claims, Ali Dayan Hasan, a Pakistani representative of Human Rights Watch, pointedly stressed that U.S. officials have provided no evidence to back up their claims. “We’d like to believe the U.S.,” Hasan remarked, “but we have no reason to do so.” In particular, he emphasized the absence of “independent investigations of the casualty reports.” [42] In a 2010 report entitled “As if Hell Fell on Me: The Human Rights Crisis in Northwest Pakistan,” Amnesty International also raised doubts about the kind of casualty figures claimed by U.S. officials and called for the U.S. government “to ensure... that sufficient information is made available to the public to ensure accountability.” [43]

So who is right here, the U.S. Government or its critics? Have the numbers of civilians killed been rising or falling with the intensification of CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, or is it true, as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International suggest, that there are no independent investigations or evidence bearing on the claims made by U.S. officials?

4. Independent Data on Drone Accuracy

In fact there are at least three independent databases which track the impact of CIA drone strikes in FATA, based on Pakistani and international press reports. Overall, these separate databases independently provide general support for U.S. officials’ claims that civilian casualties have sharply declined over the last year and three quarters, although not the claims that no civilian have been killed over periods as long as a year.

The agreement of these databases is particularly striking because, while they share some common data sources (most notably the Pakistani dailies and international newspapers of record), they also differ in some important ways. In particular, they place emphasis on different sources, employ different methodologies to arrive at their final numbers, and classify their data into different categories. For example, the Long War Journal relies heavily on U.S. intelligence sources, while the New America Foundation tries to report the full range of (often differing) numbers presented in all news reports, and the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth Research on Operational Neutralization Events (Umass DRONE) database aims for the most detailed, best sourced and most updated news reports and relies primarily on those. Also, when confronted with the deaths of persons whose status (i.e., combatant or civilian) is difficult to determine, the Long War Journal seems to lean towards treating them as combatants and the New America Foundation towards treating them as civilians, whereas the UMass DRONE database introduces a separate category of “unknowns” to avoid the necessity of either erring towards one side or the other. The key point here is that where the findings of these quite different databases overlap, there may be a heightened confidence as to their accuracy.
The three databases offer strong evidence that the accuracy of CIA drone strikes in Pakistan has improved significantly in the last year and three quarters. As Table 1 indicates all three databases show a sharp drop in estimated civilian deaths from 2009 to 2010 (from 163 to 40 for the New America Foundation, from 43 to 14 for the Long War Journal, and from 39 to 13 for UMass DRONE). This drop in civilian fatalities occurred in spite of a sharp increase in the total number of strikes from 2009 to 2010 (from 53 to 118 according the New America Foundation, from 53 to 117 according to the Long War Journal and from 54 to 131 according to UMass DRONE). Correspondingly, the proportion of those killed in the drone strikes who appeared to be civilians fell very noticeably in each case (from 29.8% to 5% according to the New America Foundation, from 8.5% to 1.72% for the Long War Journal, and from 6.7 to 1.51% for UMass DRONE). In sum, the sharp drop in civilian casualties which registered across all three databases provides some clear support for U.S. officials’ claims of improved accuracy at least for 2010.

It is also noteworthy that some of the claims advanced by American officials appear to receive further independent corroboration from the cache of data recovered from Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad following the operation that led to his death on May 2, 2011. For example, some of the material seems to support U.S. officials’ claims that the drone campaign is eliminating a significant number of Al-Qaeda operatives (and not only a few leaders). Of course, it must be remembered that the full trove of data has not been released to the public, and that what is known are selections reported by U.S. officials. Still, what is known does suggest that the drone campaign is proving generally effective. For example, according to an article by Greg

### Table 1: CIA Drone Strike Databases Reporting of Civilian Deaths [A4]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Total Strikes</th>
<th>Total Killed</th>
<th>Estimate of Civilian Deaths</th>
<th>“Unknowns”</th>
<th>Civilian Deaths as Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New America</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>294*</td>
<td>144*</td>
<td>49.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>547*</td>
<td>163*</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>800*</td>
<td>40*</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(to Sept. 30)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>399*</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long War Jl.</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(to Sept. 30)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>7.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMass DRONE2008</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>5.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(to Sept. 30)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The New America Foundation presents their data in terms of high-low estimates. These numbers represent the average of those ranges, rounded off where necessary.
Miller in *The Washington Post*, “Over the past year, the Al-Qaeda leader fielded e-mails from followers lamenting the toll being taken by CIA drone ‘explosions’ as well as the network’s financial plight.” [45]

Miller also cites evidence that Al-Qaeda’s leadership is being frightened and significantly disrupted by the drone strikes:

One of bin Laden’s principal correspondents was Atiyah abd al-Rahman, who served as No. 3 in Al-Qaeda before bin Laden’s death. A 2010 message from Rahman expressed frustration with the CIA drone campaign, a source of particular concern because many of his predecessors in the third-ranking slot had been killed in strikes by the unmanned aircraft.

“He was saying in the letter that their guys were getting killed faster than they could be replaced,” the U.S. counterterrorism official said. [46]

In fact, it appears that bin Laden was compelled to approve “the creation of a counterintelligence unit to root out traitors and spies” who, it was suspected, were contributing to the precision and effectiveness of the drone program. However, despite killing dozens of suspected informants, the leader of the new unit is reported to have written to bin Laden in frustration over their campaign’s lack of apparent effect in slowing the drones down. [47]

In sum then, independent databases tracking media reports of the effects of drone targeting broadly support U.S. officials’ claims of improved drone accuracy, especially for the year 2010. Moreover, some of the data recovered from bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad provides further support for some of U.S. officials’ claims, particularly concerning the accuracy and impact of drone strikes.

Two reservations should, however, be noted. In the first place, the data for 2011 shows that numbers for civilian casualties began creeping up again. On all three databases, the numbers for the first three quarters of 2011 show a significant increase in the proportion of civilian casualties in comparison with the low standard obtained in 2010, albeit not back to the levels seen in 2008 and 2009. The New America Foundation, for example, shows an increase from 5% to 6.5%, while UMass DRONE shows an increase from 1.51% to 2.61%. The *Long War Journal* data shows an even more striking increase from 2010 to 2011 both in the proportion of civilian casualties (from 1.72% to 7.94%) and in the actual numbers of civilians killed (from 11 to 30). Still, this remains below both the proportions and actual numbers of civilian deaths recorded in 2008 and 2009 (31 killed or 9.78% of the total in 2008 and 43 killed or 8.5% of the total in 2009). So all three databases show the 2010 improvement in drone strike precision diminishing in 2011, albeit according to two of them the diminution was rather small.

A second reservation is that none of the three databases suggest that the number of civilian casualties was zero for the period of June 2010 to June 2011, as claimed by John Brennan and other U.S. officials. The New America Foundation data, for example, reports that on March 17, 2011, 13-24 “others” were killed (along with 11-12 militants) in a drone strike near Datta Khel, North Waziristan. On April 22, 2011, another 3-9 others are reported killed, along with “some” (up to 2) on December 28, 2010. [48] The UMass DRONE data shows 7 civilians killed on August 23, 2010; 4 on September 8, 2010; 2 killed on December 17, 2010; 2 killed on March
17, 2011; and 9 killed on April 22. Finally, the Long War Journal’s reports for the first 6 months of 2011 indicate at least 10 civilians were killed (7 on August 23 and 3 on April 22). [49]

The data indicating some civilian casualties over this period has received further corroboration from an investigation recently reported in The New York Times. [50] The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a not-for-profit organization based at City University in London, has published its own data, based in at least some cases on witness testimonies and field reports. This data indicates that during the period in which Deputy National Security Advisor Brennan had insisted that there were no civilian casualties, there were in fact 45, resulting from at least 10 independent strikes. [51] These strikes include a March 17, 2011, attack near Datta Khel, North Waziristan, which killed between 19 and 42 civilians, and a May 6 attack near Dwa Tooe, North Waziristan, in which six civilians were reported to have been killed. [52]

Nonetheless, even with these two reservations in mind, there remains substantial evidence supporting U.S. officials’ claims of a significant improvement in drone accuracy since the beginning of 2010. Indeed, even the generally skeptical Bureau of Investigative Journalism acknowledges that much. [53] Moreover, according to two of the databases the sharp improvement in 2010 has been mainly carried over into the first three quarters of 2011, although the third database (the Long War Journal) does show a steeper fallback in the direction of earlier civilian casualty rates.

All of this suggests that U.S. officials can present a forceful rebuttal to the third charge leveled by Mary Ellen O’Connell and echoed by some experts on military strategy like David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum and some ethical critics like the Christian Century - who all protest that the drone strikes are simply killing too many civilians. Moreover, contrary to the suggestions of some human rights NGOs, there is significant independent evidence that the drone strikes are hitting relatively few civilians, and are in fact eliminating a great many militants, especially in the Al-Qaeda ranks, and are doing great harm to that organization. Insofar as this charge of high civilian casualties comprises the heart of the legal critique of the drone strikes (not to mention the strategic and ethical critiques), the Obama administration would then appear to be in a position to forcefully defend the policy. Moreover, U.S. officials can vindicate the President’s repeated public commitments to conduct the struggle against violent extremism in ways consonant with the rule of law at least with regard to his intensification of drone strikes in Pakistan. [54]

It is worth asking, however, will the administration be able to maintain this strong position in the future? In particular, insofar as there is some evidence of an erosion in the level of targeting accuracy achieved in 2010, it is important to consider whether targeting precision can be sustained. The key to answering this question lies in understanding how the improved accuracy was achieved in the first place.

5. Possible Explanations for Improving Drone Accuracy

Several explanations for the improved accuracy of CIA targeting have been suggested. First, U.S. officials have pointed to improved intelligence. [55] Most importantly, there are said to be “increased numbers of U.S. spies in Pakistan's tribal areas”, presumably producing more and
better targeting information. In September 2010 *The Washington Post*, for example, reported that the CIA had begun to run a program from bases in the border region of Pakistan where they controlled spies in the FATA. These spies reported the whereabouts of Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants to the CIA drone operators who then took them out.

There have also recently been some interesting reports suggesting that intelligence based on the data recovered from bin Laden’s compound may itself be contributing to the improved accuracy of drone strikes. In a piece in *The Atlantic Wire* in May, John Hudson speculated as follows:

> Days after U.S. Navy SEALs took hard drives, memory sticks and personal computers from Osama bin Laden’s hideout, both Pakistan and the U.S. have launched major offensives against suspected Islamic militants. On Friday, a U.S. drone strike reportedly killed 12 militants in Pakistan and another U.S. drone strike in Yemen, the first since 2002, killed two suspected Al Qaeda operatives. And, as reported minutes ago, Pakistani forces have rounded up 40 people in Abbottabad suspected of having connections to bin Laden. Is the massive data trove recovered from bin Laden's compound already paying off?

Officials have certainly indicated that the data recovered dealt with many aspects of operational detail, and that it is their intention to identify this data and to use it to roll up as much of the network as possible. It is difficult to imagine a more devastating source of intelligence than bin Laden’s own computers.

There are also reports of new and improved technology being introduced to improve the accuracy of drone strikes, most notably the use of “Pathrai” homing beacons. The use of such beacons was recently described by Brian Glyn Williams in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*:

> These small transmitter chips have been given to Pashtun tribesmen -- who for money or out of conviction are spying on the Taliban -- to be placed in or near the enemies’ houses, convoys, hujras, madrassas or compounds. The drones then home in on them with their lasers and deliver their missiles from miles away with incredible precision.

It is easy to imagine how such devices could contribute to a sharp diminution in the percentage of civilians being killed in drone strikes in Pakistan.

There are also some indications that the CIA is being more careful to avoid attacks that might endanger civilians. For example, Ken Dilanian reported in a *Los Angeles Times* article at the end of February that according to both U.S. and Pakistani officials, “the CIA passed up a chance to kill Sirajuddin Haqqani, the head of an anti-American insurgent network… when it chose not to fire a missile at him from a Predator drone because women and children were nearby.” The article mentions two other opportunities to hit high-value targets that were passed up for similar reasons. There are also separate reports that new safeguards have been introduced into the CIA program. In particular, U.S. officials have claimed that now “each strike is approved by either CIA director Leon Panetta or his deputy, Michael Morell.” All of this suggests a heightened level of caution and restraint.

There are also reports that the CIA has shifted to using smaller, more precise missiles on its drones. Specifically, Joby Warrick and Peter Finn reported that the CIA had shifted from relying...
primarily on 100-pound Hellfire missiles to carry out attacks to using more precise 35-pound missiles called “Scorpions,” especially in urban settings, in a move that has “kept the number of civilian casualties extremely low.” [62]

In addition, the CIA has begun to make increasing use of a new generation of killer drones known as Reapers which are able to stay aloft longer than the smaller Predator drones and are better able to track ‘pattern of life’ movements (i.e., more rigorously distinguish between innocent civilians and those militants/terrorists engaged in such activities as transporting ammunition and weapons, driving in convoys, training with weapons in terrorist camps, etc.). It is in part the CIA’s ability to spend hours patiently waiting above potential targets and monitoring them with increased precision optics that allows them to direct precise Scorpions into buildings or convoys and do remarkably little damage to those who are not the intended target.

As a typical account of a Reaper strike states,

The growing reliance on the Reaper becomes apparent in the account of one operation on 29 August last year [2009]. US soldiers on the ground studied the live video, from the Reaper’s camera thousands of feet up, of a fighter “pulling weapons from a cache site in a culvert under the road.” He rode his motorbike to an underground cellar in a compound, "carrying weapons back and forth".

The US soldiers waited until he met a group of men, signaling back via satellite to the pilot controlling a joystick thousands of miles away in a Nevada bunker, who loosed a missile on to their vehicle. The US claimed a kill of three insurgents. [63]

These reports suggest two important points. First, the improvement in the accuracy of CIA drone targeting in Pakistan appears to be the product of a range of deliberate tactical choices and possibly a hard-won opportunity (that is, the seizing of bin Laden’s data cache). Second, even if the opportunity involved in reading bin Laden’s personal files has an expiration date (after which the operational intelligence in the cache will become obsolete), the tactical choices (such as smaller missiles and a more cautious authorization process) appear to be fully sustainable over time.

These points suggest that U.S. officials may be able to preserve a potent overall case for the use of drones to target Al-Qaeda the Taliban and their affiliates in Pakistan for the immediate future. Of course, in a dynamic conflict like that unfolding in Northwest Pakistan it is always possible that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates will successfully adapt to improved U.S. targeting – for example, by far more extensive use of human shields – thus giving renewed salience to criticisms based, for example, on drone strikes involving excessive endangerment of civilians. But such tactical adaptations may well impose strategic costs on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban as well (for example, in terms of alienating local sentiment). Moreover, until Al-Qaeda and the Taliban successfully adapt (if they do) the Obama administration has a strong rationale for maintaining and even intensifying the pressure on them produced by drone strikes.

6. Conclusion

This article has reviewed some of the controversy revolving around the U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan. It identified the question of civilian casualties as the effective heart of the debate over
the drone strikes, and examined three independent databases devoted to tracking the strikes with emphasis on their impact on local civilians. It showed that these databases contradicted the most exaggerated claim articulated by U.S. officials that civilian casualties were reduced to zero between June 2010 and June 2011. It also showed that all three databases show the proportion of civilians creeping back up in 2011, one of them quite sharply.

Nonetheless, it argued that these databases provide overall corroboration for U.S. officials’ claims that the strikes have achieved significantly improved accuracy since the beginning of 2010. It also showed that there are strong arguments that this improved efficiency has been the deliberate result of American policy, technology, and increased and improved personnel on the ground. Moreover, it argues that most of the factors which have been reported as contributing to the improved accuracy of drone strikes are sustainable over time. As a consequence of this sustainability, the proportion of civilian casualties resulting from drone strikes is likely to remain relatively low for the immediate future, although the possibilities for error and misjudgment can never be wholly eradicated. As a further consequence, the U.S. is likely to continue to have a powerful justification for maintaining or even intensifying the strikes in the immediate future. In sum, the evidence examined here strongly supports the view that the drone strikes over the last year and three quarters have generally been effective and precise and probably the most humane self-defense option available to U.S. officials.

Yet there remains at least one sense in which these findings are moot. The consensus in the Pakistani press and public discourse has long been that the drones are targeting unprecedented proportions of civilians. Correspondingly, a Gallup Poll recently found that 67% of Pakistanis are opposed to the drone strikes, while 24% have neutral feelings towards them and just 9% favor them. [64] The coverage of the Long War Journal, the UMass DRONE database and the New America Foundation study have been rather limited in Pakistan’s press and does not seem to have changed conventional wisdom on drones and civilian deaths in that country. [65] One Pakistani general stationed in the targeted tribal zones, Major General Ghayur Mehmood, did come out and state,

Myths and rumors about US predator strikes and the casualty figures are many, but it’s a reality that many of those being killed in these strikes are hardcore elements, a sizeable number of them foreigners. Yes there are a few civilian casualties in such precision strikes, but a majority of those eliminated are terrorists, including foreign elements. [66]

General Mehmood, however, represents the minority opinion in his country and he was attacked by Pakistani critics for his comments. The exception here seems to prove the rule. Despite the fact that the CIA may be waging the most precise “bombing” campaign in history, it is nonetheless alienating millions of average Pakistanis. Pakistanis are prone to conspiracy theories and there is little chance that U.S.-based researchers can shift the paradigm in this country that drones almost exclusively kill innocent Pakistani civilians.

Moreover, as long as the U.S. government continues to conduct the campaign in secret, refusing to divulge any information on it or even acknowledge that it carries out these strikes at all, its officials cannot even enter the conversation. Unfortunately, as Christine Fair has observed, this leaves the field free for the very groups who are being targeted to report the impacts on the
ground and to frame the strikes for the Pakistani public. [67] In-so-far as the American objective is to isolate and degrade Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and their affiliates, this represents a serious problem. [68] To the degree the target groups are able to disseminate a common sense of victimhood to the Pakistani public, it is America rather than its enemies which is likely to be increasingly isolated in the Pakistani political conversation. Thus, for all the best intentions, the unprecedentedly accurate covert CIA drone strikes may lead to a strategic setback even as they gain a tactical success by surgically killing hundreds of FATA-based Taliban and Al-Qaeda extremists every year.

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Notes


[4] The Long War Journal estimates 2218 people killed since the beginning of 2006; (http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php); the New America Foundation puts the number since 2004 between 1661 and 2601 (http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones), and our own UMass Drone database showed 2076 killed by mid-May.


[22] Paust, pp. 250-1.
[23] Paust, pp. 244.


[42] Cappacio and Bliss, “U.S. Said to Reduce Civilian Deaths after Increasing CIA Pakistan Strikes.”


[44] One further dataset is provided by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Unfortunately, because the case-by-case data it provides fatality data in a range (from maximum to minimum estimates) but their annual data is provided in specific numbers it is impossible to identify their totals to September 30, 2011 to match with the other databases. But their data also confirms the same sharp improvement in the proportion of civilian casualties in 2010 followed by a slight falling back in 2011 (to November 17, 2011) that appeared in the other databases. Specifically, their numbers suggest that the proportion of total fatalities who were civilians were 21.24% in 2008, 16.07% in 2009, 9.02% in 2010 and 11.28 in 2011. These percentages are based on numbers available at http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/resources-and-graphs/ (accessed November 29, 2011).


[48] Specifically, they report 0-2 others on December 17 and December 6, 2010, 0-1 on October 4, 2010, 0-4 on September 27, 0-7 on August 23, 2010 and 0-2 on March 11, 2011 and 0-1 on 6 May 2011.


[55] Cappacio and Bliss, “U.S. Said to Reduce Civilian Deaths after Increasing CIA Pakistan Strikes.”


[60] Dilanian, “CIA Drones May be Avoiding Pakistani Civilians.”

[61] Cappacio and Bliss, “U.S. Said to Reduce Civilian Deaths after Increasing CIA Pakistan Strikes.”


[67] Christine Fair, “Drone Wars.”

Requirements and Facilitators for Suicide Terrorism: an Explanatory Framework for Prediction and Prevention

by Adam Lankford

Abstract

When it comes to explaining, predicting, and preventing suicide terrorism, there is a lot more important work to be done. This paper draws on the most recent evidence about where suicide terrorism occurs and why to propose a basic explanatory framework. Taking a bottom-up approach, it first identifies the minimum requirements for a suicide terrorism attack, and then outlines additional facilitators for the deadliest attacks and most prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns. Next, it applies these variables to clarify popular misunderstandings about foreign occupation as the primary cause of suicide terrorism. Finally, it shows how security officials can use this framework to develop a series of short term and long term countermeasures and begin to reduce the prevalence of suicide terrorism worldwide.

Introduction

There has been a great deal of previous research which has attempted to explain the psychology of suicide terrorists, the patterns among their attacks, and the best countermeasures for stopping them [1]. However, with the exception of the fence Israel built to keep suicide terrorists out of its cities, it is not clear that efforts to combat this deadliest of threats have actually been successful. The United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs recently met to address the question “Ten Years After 9/11: Are We Safer?” Its answer was a resounding ‘yes,’ and given the lack of a suicide attack on U.S. soil since 9/11, it is possible that the committee was correct [2]. On the other hand, political proclamations of this type should be viewed with skepticism, given the speakers’ potential agendas, which may be to reassure the populace, protect their own jobs, and appear tough on terror. For comparison’s sake, if a government committee had met the day before 9/11 to discuss the terrorist threat, it may have similarly framed its assessment in positive terms, unaware of the terrible danger that was right around the corner. Furthermore, on a global scale, suicide terrorism attacks have significantly increased over the past decade [3].

Ultimately, when it comes to explaining, predicting, and preventing suicide terrorism, there is a lot more important work to be done. This paper draws on the most recent evidence about where these attacks occur and why to propose a basic explanatory framework. Taking a bottom-up approach, it will first identify the minimum requirements for a suicide terrorism attack, and then outline additional facilitators for the deadliest attacks and most prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns. Next, it will apply these variables to clarify popular misunderstandings about foreign occupation as the primary cause of suicide terrorism. Finally, it will show how security officials can use the proposed framework to develop a series of short term and long term countermeasures and begin to reduce the prevalence of suicide terrorism worldwide.
Minimum Requirements for Suicide Terrorism

It is critical for scholars and security officials to first identify the minimum requirements for suicide terrorism, because these variables dictate when a single attack is even possible. If one of these variables is missing or successfully neutralized, officials can sleep soundly at night, knowing that, at the very least, a suicide attack will not occur in that specific context. On the other hand, as long these factors are present, the threat of a suicide terrorist attack persists, no matter how much progress is made in other areas of the broader counterterrorism struggle.

It is often said that for a crime to be committed, three things are needed: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the lack of a capable guardian [4]. In the counterterrorism realm, similar principles apply. At the bare minimum, there are three main requirements for a suicide attack: (1) suicidal intent, (2) access to weapons, and (3) access to enemy targets. If these three factors are present, a suicide attack can be launched. It may be limited in sophistication or magnitude, but it can occur.

Suicidal Intent

Psychologically, an individual only needs to have suicidal intent to potentially carry out a suicide attack. Past research on both conventional suicide and suicide terrorism has shown that this intent may be the combination of individual, social, and situational factors [5]. Sometimes people develop suicidal intent due to their own individual problems, such as mental illness, substance abuse disorder, or a personal crisis, and then decide to carry out suicide attacks for those reasons [6]. For instance, a preemptively arrested suicide bomber known as Zuheir had a horrible family life which led him to “such a state of despair that I wanted to kill myself” [7]. As he explains, “I used to stand in front of Israeli tanks, hoping they would shoot me. I tried more than once, but it didn’t work….I developed a mental complex from thinking a lot whether to commit suicide or not” [8]. Ultimately, Zuheir decided to carry out a suicide attack “not because I belonged to the organization, but to realize my wish to die” [9]. On the other hand, sometimes an otherwise psychologically healthy person may become suicidal due to extreme social pressures, which could range from explicit threats or coercion to perceptions of peer pressure. In addition, otherwise psychologically healthy individuals sometimes become suicidal because of extreme situational factors, such as being cornered by police [10]. As long as the individual intends to orchestrate his or her own death, that qualifies as suicidal intent [11].

However, the vast majority of people never develop suicidal intent, and thus would never seriously consider carrying out a suicide attack. A number of recent studies have shown that there appear to be fundamental psychological differences between those who volunteer for suicide missions and those who do not, as with any sample that is primarily self-selected [12]. For instance, Ariel Merari’s research team recently asked a series of regular terrorists and organizers of suicide attacks whether they would be willing to carry out “martyrdom operations.” Eleven of twelve regular terrorists said they would not, making statements such as “I am incapable of doing it,” “I simply am not interested,” “I cannot see myself dead,” and “This is no way to die” [13]. Similarly, nine of fourteen organizers said they would not, commenting that “I didn’t want to do it myself,” “I wasn’t ready to do it myself,” “I wouldn’t be willing to carry out a martyrdom operation,” “I didn’t want go on a martyrdom operation…the thought of being a
martyr didn’t cross my mind,” and “I am willing to fight but not to die in a suicide attack” [14]. Even the minority who said that in theory they would consider it also offered numerous excuses for why they would not volunteer [15].

As an aside, it must be noted that there are some attacks which appear to be suicide terrorism but are not, and in these cases, suicidal intent is not required. For instance, in some past attacks, individuals have been tricked into carrying explosives and then were detonated by remote control, against their will [16]. They are not suicide terrorists, they are victims—much like an average civilian would be if a terrorist secretly slipped something explosive into his or her bag. Similarly, donkeys have been used for bombing attacks [17], but they did not have suicidal intent either.

**Access to Weapons**

In the modern era, no one has carried out a suicide attack with his or her bare hands; weapons are always required. Historically, most suicide terrorists have used bombs, and in the vast majority of cases, they received these bombs from others, rather than making the explosive devices themselves [18]. When individuals with suicidal intent do not have access to ready-made bombs, their options are immediately limited. On the one hand, they can try to construct the bombs themselves, which may be tricky for a novice, but is certainly not impossible. As Bruce Hoffman details, “a merely competent technician, rather than the skilled engineer once required, can build a bomb. Explosive material is packed into pockets sewn into a canvas or denim belt or vest and hooked up to a detonator—usually involving a simple hand-operated plunger” [19]. Instructions for bombmaking can be found online (which only helps if the individual has unfiltered internet access), but not everyone is up to the bomb-making task.

The other primary option is to carry out a suicide attack using a gun, assuming that the individual can obtain one. (Some commentators insist that gun-wielding suicide attacks are not suicide terrorism, because the perpetrator’s acts of killing and suicide are sequential, rather than simultaneous. However, this momentary difference is essentially meaningless in cases where the motives and destructive results are identical.) The problem with this method is the uncertainty of death, which may deter those with suicidal intent who want to be sure to perish in their attacks. Unless they are willing to shoot themselves in the head (and most Islamic suicide terrorists are not), suicide attackers with guns are relying on death coming via “suicide by cop.” If the bullets do not strike just right, they may end up wounded and in enemy custody. Examples of this outcome include Major Nidal Hassan, who was shot in the spine and paralyzed, and a series of other attackers who have been shot in the face, groin, leg, and so on—and then lived to face the consequences [20].

Finally, if the individual does not have access to bombs or guns, he or she could attempt a suicide attack by crashing a plane or vehicle into enemies at a high rate of speed (like the 9/11 hijackers), or by spreading a deadly chemical, biological, or radiological weapon. Examples of suicide attacks by these methods are exceedingly rare.

**Access to Enemy Targets**
Naturally, individuals with suicidal intent and weapons still need access to targets for their attacks. Of course, the nature of terrorism dictates that soft targets are virtually everywhere, and it can seem nearly impossible for security officials to guard them all. On the other hand, access is sometimes prevented by geographic barriers, such as oceans, mountains, or thousands of miles, or physical barriers, such as walls and fences. For instance, if an individual in Iran wants to attack the U.S. or Europe, that person will need to travel, and that presents its own set of costs and challenges. On the other hand, if the same individual wants to attack the Iranian government, that may be a hard target, depending upon local security measures. But if the target is simply the Iranian people, access is everywhere.

Beyond simple logic, the best evidence that access to enemy targets is a critical requirement for suicide terrorism comes from Israel, where a fence was built to prevent suicide terrorists from entering the country’s cities [21]. Of course, even fences cannot deny all access, but the result of this countermeasure was a dramatic decrease in attacks. According to the Global Terrorism Database, from 2001-2003, there were 82 suicide attacks on Israeli soil [22]. After the initial portions of the fence were finished in late 2003, there were just 16 suicide attacks over the next three years [23]. After the fence’s path was finalized in 2006, there were just 3 suicide attacks over the next three year span [24]. This security success is almost completely attributable to the fact that suicide terrorists were denied access to enemy targets.

**Additional Facilitators of Suicide Terrorism**

Beyond the minimum requirements, there additional facilitators of suicide terrorism attacks and prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns. These include: (4) homicidal intent, (5) a sponsoring terrorist organization, (6) social approval of suicide terrorism, and (7) social stigma of conventional suicide.

**Homicidal Intent**

Despite widespread assumptions to the contrary, homicidal intent is not a fundamental requirement of suicide terrorism. There have been a number of suicide terrorists who have not demonstrated the desire to kill anyone, although the percentage of these offenders is unknown. In these cases, the perpetrators may have wanted to frame their deaths as heroic acts of martyrdom, rather than as conventional suicide, because they cared so desperately about how they would be perceived. The aforementioned case of Zuheir, who was just looking for a way to die, is one example where homicidal intent was absent [25]. In addition, there have been cases where suicide terrorists directly acted to minimize casualties. For instance, suicide bomber Qari Sami deliberately walked away from a crowd in Kabul before blowing himself up [26]. Furthermore, recent reports from Afghanistan indicate that nearly fifty percent of suicide bombers there only end up killing themselves [27]. This statistic is hard to attribute to mere incompetence; it suggests that at least in some percentage of these cases, the suicide terrorists did not really care to kill.

Of course, when homicidal intent is present and particularly strong, the resulting attacks are likely to be much more deadly, because truly homicidal suicide terrorists are motivated to
maximize enemy casualties. Suicide terrorists’ desire to kill is often rooted in their lust for revenge [28], which is also a common motive for murder-suicide [29]. In various cases, suicide terrorists have attacked to avenge past insults and offenses, personal mistreatment and abuse, or the death of a loved one at the hands of the enemy [30].

**Sponsoring Terrorist Organization**

Sponsoring terrorist organizations are another common facilitator of suicide terrorism. However, organizations are not a requirement for successful attacks, and technological advances have ensured that today’s attackers can do more damage on their own than ever before. For instance, on July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik carried out a bombing attack on government buildings in Oslo, Norway, leaving eight people dead. He then traveled to a Workers’ Youth League summer camp 25 miles away and launched a suicide attack there, fatally shooting 69 people and wounding 66 more [31]. As it turned out, Breivik, who had written at length about martyring himself in his manifesto and had wanted to commit “suicide by cop” during his attack, eventually changed his mind and surrendered when security officials arrived after an hour long delay [32]. Subsequent investigations revealed that although he shared the ideology of some radical groups and had even tried to reach out to them, his attack was solely the product of his own efforts [33].

On the other hand, there are many suicide attacks which would never occur without the sponsorship of terrorist organizations, and others which become far more deadly because of it. In part, this is because the organizations often provide the access to weapons and access to targets [34], without which attacks are essentially impossible. Sponsoring terrorist organizations may also increase suicidal and homicidal intent among future attackers, as well as boost social approval of suicide terrorism through their use of propaganda [35]. In addition, the most sophisticated attacks, such as those of September 11, 2001, generally benefit from the professional expertise, funding, and support operations provided by terrorist organizations and their leaders [36].

**Social Approval of Suicide Terrorism**

Social approval of virtually any activity increases the likelihood that people will engage in it, and suicide terrorism is no exception. A great deal of past research indicates that individuals who believe they will be celebrated and honored for committing acts of suicide terrorism find the prospect significantly more alluring [37]. Because of the social approval in their cultures, subcultures, or peer groups, these people often feel that carrying out suicide attacks will increase their “personal significance” and provide “self-fulfillment...material rewards, status advancement, [and] conspicuous demonstration of bravery” [38].

In the past, social approval of suicide terrorism has often been highest in the regions where Islam is the dominant religion [39]. In addition, Pew Research Center surveys in a number of countries around the world found that individuals who primarily identify themselves as Muslim are more likely to approve of suicide bombings [40]. In part, this may be due to a distortion of the Islamic concept of martyrdom, which in its original sense did not refer to individuals who intentionally killed themselves. By conflating martyrdom and suicide terrorism, radical leaders have
successfully infused the latter with both social and religious legitimacy [41]. However, it must also be noted that some individuals do not care whether their behavior is socially approved of or not, and they may prefer to defy social standards.

**Social Stigma of Conventional Suicide**

Previous research has shown that some people carry out suicide terrorism attacks to escape their overwhelming personal crises, which may include mental illness, financial difficulties, adultery scandals, unwanted pregnancies, substance abuse addiction, or painful health problems [42]. For these individuals, conventional suicide might have appealed as a potential escape, but strong social stigmas and religious prohibitions against the practice got in the way. Virtually all cultures discourage suicide, but some are far more accepting than others of the individual’s right to make that decision [43].

Social approval of suicide terrorism and social stigmas of conventional suicide often work together. When a significant percentage of people in any context believe that suicide terrorism is justified, that opens the door for desperate individuals looking for a way out. And when the same community condemns conventional suicide as a certain path to hell, that closes the alternative escape, furthering the likelihood of a suicide attack. Most societies where Islam is the dominant religion have particularly strong stigmas against conventional suicide, which may help explain why their conventional suicide rates are often below average, while their suicide terrorism rates are often above average [44].

**The Misunderstood Role of Foreign Occupation**

The requirements and facilitators of suicide terrorism help expose the flaws in past assumptions about why attacks occur in some regions more than others. For instance, in his condescendingly-titled article “It’s the Occupation, Stupid,” Robert Pape claims to have proven that “more than 95 percent of all suicide attacks are in response to foreign occupation” [45]. Citing Pape’s research, presidential candidate Ron Paul recently declared that “honest studies show that the real motivation behind the September 11 attacks and the vast majority of other instances of suicide terrorism” is primarily “foreign occupation” [46]. Beyond the apparent agenda—which sounds like blaming the prevalence of suicide terrorism on the presumed bad deeds and bad foreign policy of the United States—this position is also far too simplistic. Complex behaviors are rarely produced by a single cause.

By considering the seven factors reviewed earlier, we can better analyze how foreign occupation affects suicide terrorism rates. For starters, foreign occupation should be expected to increase suicidal intent, due to the psychological consequences of war. For instance, during the first two years of the Iraq war, more than 67,000 civilians were documented as killed or wounded, and many more went missing [47]. Others lost their jobs and homes. Of course, this is not all the fault of the U.S.—in fact, the majority of those killed, wounded, and displaced had local fighters and criminals to blame [48]. But either way, it was almost inevitable that this kind of turmoil would increase the number of people with suicidal intent. In addition, occupation increases access to enemy targets, due to the presence of a large military force. It often increases access to
weapons as well [49]. And finally, foreign occupation should be expected to lead to a rise in both homicidal intent and social approval of suicide terrorism, due to widespread victimization and desires for revenge.

Of course, all policies have costs and benefits, and the decision to occupy a foreign country is no exception. But those who rush to blame foreign occupation for increased suicide terrorism are missing several critical points which should not be overlooked.

First, the relationship between foreign occupation and suicide terrorism rates does not mean that suicide attacks are just politically-motivated. The problem is that foreign occupation often unintentionally increases suicidal and homicidal intent, and then, because of the context and confusion, commentators are quick to attribute political motives to individual attackers.

Second, other types of conflict may produce many of these same effects. For instance, due to their psychological consequences on local inhabitants, sectarian violence and civil war should also be expected to increase suicidal and homicidal intent. And in regions where suicide terrorism has already been established as a combat tactic, these types of conflict will likely boost social approval of suicide terrorism against local enemies as well. This helps explain why many suicide attacks in Iraq have been launched against other Iraqis—not just the foreign occupiers.

Third, anything which provides potential attackers with access to 100,000 new enemy targets is likely to increase attack rates. Whether the American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were there for political purposes or humanitarian ones, their presence alone would increase the number of suicide attacks sponsored by local terrorist organizations who have sworn to strike. There are plenty of would-be suicide terrorists who are willing to attack if their enemies are close by, but not if they have to travel thousands of miles to seek them out. This does not mean that the U.S. military should always run or hide from its enemies.

**Short and Long Term Countermeasures**

By considering the basic requirements and facilitators for suicide terrorism, security officials can begin to craft sound countermeasures. The alternative—throwing strategies against the wall to see what sticks—can be effective on occasion. Sometimes a countermeasure works, even though we may not be sure why. But given the dynamic nature of the threat and the likelihood that challenges will continue to evolve across different countries, cultures, and eras, it is far better to take a research-based approach.

If those in power can prevent (1) suicidal intent, (2) access to weapons, or (3) access to enemy targets, suicide attacks will not occur. If they can prevent (4) homicidal intent, (5) a sponsoring terrorist organization, (6) social approval of suicide terrorism, or (7) social stigma of conventional suicide, the deadliest attacks and most prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns are much less likely.

But some factors are easier to counter than others. For instance, U.S. forces already appear to be doing everything they can to eliminate sponsoring terrorist organizations, so making significant new progress in that area will be difficult. It will also be hard to counter suicide terrorists’ access to weapons and targets. As Hoffman suggests, security officials may be able to “encourage businesses from which terrorists can obtain bomb-making components to alert authorities if they
notice large purchases of, for example, ammonium nitrate fertilizer; pipes, batteries, and wires; or chemicals commonly used to fabricate explosives. Information about customers who simply inquire about any of these materials can also be extremely useful to the police” [50]. However, to a large extent, the weapons may already be accessible, and short of withdrawing U.S. personnel or building fences—as Israel has—suicide terrorists will continue to have access to potential targets for their attacks.

On the other hand, in the short term, much more can be done to identify those with suicidal and homicidal intent—before they strike. Specifically, counterterrorism officials should work to develop more accurate psychological and behavioral profiles of suicide terrorists, based on existing data on others with suicidal and homicidal intent, including previous suicide terrorists and previous perpetrators of murder-suicide. These offender profiles should not only be used to train security personnel on what to ask, listen for, and look for, but also to improve internet monitoring and surveillance, educate community members about dangerous warning signs, and develop “sting” operations whereby future suicide terrorist can be lured and arrested.

In addition, over time, much can be done to combat the social approval of suicide terrorism. Most glaringly, counterterrorism officials should actually strive to capitalize on existing stigmas against conventional suicide to properly stigmatize suicide terrorism. The key is to use public diplomacy—or so-called “truthful” propaganda—to show that some past suicide terrorists have been suicidal, thus discrediting them. By providing compelling anecdotes about these individual suicide terrorists, the personal crises and problems that led them to act, and the true motives behind their attacks, officials could expose such killers as cowardly, unstable, and self-destructive.

Furthermore, true heroes and martyrs—both past and present—should be publicly celebrated and distinguished in both character and deed from those who lust for glory and then kill themselves in suicide attacks. By gradually changing the language, so that every suicide terrorist is not automatically labeled a “martyr,” leaders could begin to reduce the destructive worship of such attackers and restore social approval to genuine acts of heroism.

**Conclusion**

Policymakers and security officials should draw upon the most accurate explanations of suicide terrorism to guide their assessments of where attacks occur—and why. By understanding the basic requirements and facilitators for suicide attacks, they should be able to better predict how prospective policies will alter suicide terrorism rates. In addition, officials should implement research-based countermeasures so that, in the short term, potential suicide terrorists can be identified and arrested and, in the long term, the underlying conditions which facilitate such attacks can eventually be undone.

**About the Author**

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Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance program. His research on terrorism and counterterrorism has been published in a number of peer-reviewed journals and featured by media outlets in Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Notes


[6] Lankford, “Could Suicide Terrorists Actually Be Suicidal?”; David Lester, Bijou Yang, and Mark Lindsay, “Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles Possible?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27 (2004), 283-295; Merari, Driven to Death; Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism.


[12] Lankford, “Could Suicide Terrorists Actually Be Suicidal?”; Merari, Driven to Death.


[22] “Global Terrorism Database.”

[23] “Global Terrorism Database.”

[24] “Global Terrorism Database.”


[28] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*.


[34] Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism.”

[35] Lankford, “Could Suicide Terrorists Actually Be Suicidal?”


[41] Lankford, “Could Suicide Terrorists Actually Be Suicidal?”

[42] Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism; Speckhard and Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr.”


[44] Lankford, “Suicide Terrorism as a Socially Approved Form of Suicide.”


[50] Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism.”


**Abstract**

A random survey of 100 representative mosques in the U.S. was conducted to measure the correlation between Sharia adherence and dogma calling for violence against non-believers. Of the 100 mosques surveyed, 51% had texts on site rated as severely advocating violence; 30% had texts rated as moderately advocating violence; and 19% had no violent texts at all. Mosques that presented as Sharia adherent were more likely to feature violence-positive texts on site than were their non-Sharia-adherent counterparts. In 84.5% of the mosques, the imam recommended studying violence-positive texts. The leadership at Sharia-adherent mosques was more likely to recommend that a worshipper study violence-positive texts than leadership at non-Sharia-adherent mosques. Fifty-eight percent of the mosques invited guest imams known to promote violent jihad. The leadership of mosques that featured violence-positive literature was more likely to invite guest imams who were known to promote violent jihad than was the leadership of mosques that did not feature violence-positive literature on mosque premises.

**Introduction**

The debate over the connection between Islam and its legal doctrine and system known as Sharia on the one hand and terrorism committed in the name of Islam on the other rages on among counter-terrorism professionals, academics, policy experts, theologians, and politicians. Much of this debate centers on the evidence that the perpetrators of violence in the name of Islam source the moral, theological, and legal motivations and justifications for their actions in Sharia. Much of the opposition to this focus on Sharia centers on the argument that Sharia is and has been historically malleable and exploited for good and bad causes.

This study seeks to enter this fray but at a more empirical level. Since we know that mosques are in fact a situs of recruitment and “radicalization” for terrorism committed in the name of Islam, this study seeks to enter into that domain to determine if there is an empirical correlation between actual, manifest Sharia-related behaviors and the presence of violent and jihad-based literature, and further, the promotion of that literature. While the presence of violent and jihad-based literature alone does not necessarily suggest the worshippers at such a mosque adopt the violent literature’s approach to the use of violence, if the imams at such mosques also promote the literature, and if those mosques are more likely to invite guest imams and speakers who are known to promote violent jihad, the presence of these factors together would be strongly suggestive of an environment prone to jihad recruitment. Thus, this study also seeks to determine if the spiritual leadership in these mosques is supportive of this genre of literature.
While scholarly inquiry into the root causes and factors supportive of the political violence known as terrorism has accelerated since the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States; a survey of research in the field reveals a lag in empirical studies that attempt to measure the relationship between specific variables and terrorism phenomena or support for terrorism. Most studies in the field of terrorism research are either based upon anecdotal or retrospective analysis of known data from prior reports of terrorism using multiple regression analysis. [2] Most of these studies disconfirm simplistic causative theories for terrorism, such as socio-economic deprivation. [3]

A 2007 study by Paul Gill noted that prior scholarship had not explored the complex interactions between the individual who becomes a suicide bomber, the terrorist organization that sponsors suicide bombers, and the society that supports the terrorist and terrorist organization. Instead, scholarship had taken a non-integrated approach and previous studies had focused on only one of these three dimensions. [4] The Gill study found, among other things, that the terrorist organization seeks societal support by creating a “culture of martyrdom” and that a theme common to suicide bombers, despite many differences, was that they received support of a community that esteemed the concept of martyrdom. [5] The Gill study advanced scholarship in the area of terrorism research by studying the complex dynamics at work between a terrorist organization, society, and individuals and also proposing that the interplay between those three dimensions enables radicalization and terrorist attacks. [6]

Recent studies, when viewed together, raise the prospect that all three dimensions may be present in highly Sharia-adherent mosques, such as those frequented by Salafists. This is significant because the mosque would be a convenient locus for making observations and gathering data in an attempt to measure the relationship between specific variables and support for terrorism if all three dimensions that enable radicalization and terrorist attacks are present in these highly Sharia-adherent mosques.

A study by Sageman found a connection between highly Sharia-adherent Salafist Islam and violent jihad. This study’s authors emphasize that the connection Sageman noticed between Islam and violent jihad concerns a particular stream of highly Sharia-adherent Islam and not Islam generically. The Sageman study found that 97% of the jihadists studied became increasingly devoted to highly Sharia-adherent Salafist Islam on their path to radicalization despite adhering to various devotional levels during their youths. [7] This noted increase in religious devotion to Sharia-adherent Salafist Islam was measured by outwardly observable behaviors that are objectively linked to Sharia-adherence such as wearing traditional Arabic, Pakistani, or Afghan clothing and growing beards. [8]

The mosque is a societal apparatus that might serve as a support mechanism for the violent jihad. Consistent with the findings of the Sageman study, a study conducted by the New York Police Department noted that, in the mosque context, high levels of Sharia adherence may relate to support for violent jihad. [9] Specifically the NYPD study found that highly Sharia-adherent mosques have played a prominent role in radicalizing several groups who conspired to commit acts of terrorism in the name of Islam, including some groups who were successful in carrying out high-profile attacks. [10] One plausible explanation for why the highly Sharia-adherent mosque is believed to have a connection to the radicalization process is that the global jihad is an
Islamic revivalist movement centered on a common Sharia-driven mission[11] and the mosque serves as a locus for the intensification of religious beliefs. [12]

Further raising the profile of highly Sharia-adherent mosques is the fact that several of these mosques are known to contain brokers to the violent jihad; and in some instances, the broker may even be the mosque’s imam. [13] The broker role may also be filled by ostensibly non-violent groups such as the Tablighi Jamaat, which counts several alumnae as members of the violent jihad. [14] Additionally, these mosques have been the situs where other radicals have met “spiritual sanctioners” who foster an “us-versus-them” perspective and provide moral justification for engaging in violent jihad. [15] The “spiritual sanctioner” presents jihad as a religious duty situated within traditional Sharia and the sanctioner’s commitment to jihad is often the primary determinant of whether a radicalized group will engage in violent jihad. [16]

The presence of an imam or other respected member who serves as a “spiritual sanctioner” or even as a broker[17] to jihad is critical because a respected Islamic scholar who provides justification for violence against “the other” and presents jihad as a religious duty significantly influences the decisions made by one who is seeking a more religiously devout lifestyle. [18] The presence of pro-jihad imams and mosque members, and even ostensibly non-violent Sharia-advocating groups, serve to support a “culture of martyrdom” by providing moral justification for engaging in violent jihad and making available an avenue to participate in violent jihad. The presence of groups like the Tablighi Jamaat, as well as the presence of individual brokers and “spiritual sanctioners” within the highly Sharia-adherent mosques, raises concerns that activities and the atmosphere inside highly Sharia-adherent mosques contribute to the creation or maintenance of a “culture of martyrdom” where violence and jihad are accepted or encouraged.

In addition to the roles played by increased devotion to a highly Sharia-adherent strain of Islam, studies have also noticed a connection between violence-positive Islamic literature and violent jihad. A study by Quintan Wiktorowicz noted that the modern violent jihad, the current avatar of which is Al Qaeda and various groups inspired by Al Qaeda, relies on textual works to legitimize their violent activities. The texts that these jihadist groups rely on date from the medieval period, for example works by Ibn Kathir and Ibn Taymiyya, to the modern period, which includes the works of Abul A’la Maududi and Sayyid Qutb. [19] According to Wiktorowicz, violent Salafists such as Al Qaeda legitimize their violent activities by applying principles set forth in these texts in ways that take a more expansive and permissive view regarding the use of violence than has been allowed by alternative historical interpretations of these texts. [20] However, Wiktorowicz concedes that under certain circumstances these same texts can be used persuasively to garner the support of otherwise non-violent Salafists for the intentional targeting of the American civilian population. [21] Thus, violence-positive texts by Islamic thinkers and exegetes can be exploited not only to sanction engaging in violent jihad, but can also be utilized to gain the support of non-violent Salafists for the intentional killing of civilians.

These anecdotal studies, when viewed together, suggest that a relationship might be present between high levels of Sharia adherence, violence-positive Islamic literature, and institutional support for violence and violent jihad within the context of the highly Sharia-adherent mosque. The role authoritative, Sharia-centric Islam plays in creating or maintaining a culture that manifests behaviors that demonstrate esteem for political violence against an outgroup deserves
investigation because the various Islamic terrorist groups and individual *jihadists*, for all their geographic, political, and ideological differences, embrace *Sharia* as their doctrinal legal and political authority for the establishment of a political order or state based on Islamic law as their goal.[22]

Moreover, these Islamic terrorist groups and individual *jihadists* cite *Sharia* as their legal and political justification for the political violence they term *jihad* and those who oppose them term terrorism. To date, almost all of the professional and academic work in the area of terrorism carried out in the name of Islam has been anecdotal surveys or case studies tracing backwards the personal history profiles of different Islamic terrorists and the socio-economic, and political environments from whence they came after the fact (either post mortem or post-capture).[23] There are almost no empirical studies attempting to identify specific behavioral variables (such as various indicia of *Sharia*-adherence) which might positively correlate with behaviors associated with a willingness to tolerate, accept, or even engage in terrorism.

One notable exception to this trend was a group of four studies conducted by Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan which sought to measure the association between *religious belief* versus *coalitional commitment* with attitudes directly supportive of terrorism or attitudes suggesting support for terrorism.[24] *Religious belief* was defined and measured by the subject self-reporting his or her frequency of prayer. [25] *Coalitional commitment* was defined and measured by the frequency with which the subject attended communal religious services at a house of worship. [26] The study concluded that a relationship exists between frequency of mosque attendance (coalitional commitment) and the likelihood that a person will support suicide attacks. [27] The study also concluded that there was no empirical evidence to support the religious-belief hypothesis which posits that support for suicide bombings is linked to some measurable index of religious devotion (prayer in this study). [28]

However, the study’s methodology as it relates to gathering prayer frequency data may have been susceptible to weakness that introduced bias and led to a faulty conclusion. The study invited over reporting by relying on Muslims to self report their prayer frequency. A Muslim would be under social and/or psychological pressures to over report his prayer frequency because status as a good or pious Muslim is linked to whether a Muslim fulfills his religious obligation to pray five times daily. [29] Status as a good or pious Muslim is not dependent on attending mosque with a high degree of frequency. A Muslim is permitted to pray outside of a mosque environment when necessary. [30] Hence, the pressure to over report, which exists for self-reporting prayer frequency, is not present when a Muslim reports how frequently he or she attends mosque. Moreover, the measure of mosque attendance frequency is both a measure of coalitional commitment and religious devotion.

In the two Palestinian surveys from the Ginges study, 69.3% of the respondents in the first survey and 85% of the respondents in the second survey reported praying five times per day. [31] The results for mosque attendance were more evenly distributed. [32] Thus, the extremely high percentage of respondents who reported praying five times a day makes it difficult to statistically discern whether a correlation exists between the independent variable (prayer frequency) and the dependent variable (support for suicide bombings). While the Ginges study authors disconfirmed the religious-belief hypothesis, a correlation may be shown to exist between indicia
of religious devotion and behaviors that increase the likelihood that one is sympathetic to
violence once the bias introduced by the self reporting of acts associated with piouness is
removed. Indeed, the confirmed hypothesis for coalitional commitment, insofar as mosque
attendance is also a measure of religious devotion, suggests the Ginges study authors might have
too hastily rejected the religious-belief hypothesis.

A primary purpose of this survey is to pursue the religious-belief hypothesis in the context of
praxis, or the measurable adherence to Sharia’s legal dictates of prayer worship and dress by
Muslim worshippers who are sufficiently devout to pray in mosques. Specifically, this survey
seeks to measure whether a correlation exists between measures of religious devotion as defined
by certain behaviors objectively linked to Sharia adherence, on the one hand, and the presence
of violence-positive materials at the mosque, on the other. This study also seeks to measure
whether a correlation exists between the presence of violence-positive materials at a mosque and
whether the mosque or mosque leadership will promote violence by recommending the study of
violence-positive materials, promoting violent jihad, or inviting guest speakers who are known to
have promoted violent jihad. However, this survey avoids the bias that might be introduced
through self-reporting resulting from pressure on the respondent to demonstrate his or her piety.

*Sharia and the Jurisprudential Consensus Across the Islamic Religio-Legal Schools*

*Sharia Defined and Its Role in Orthodox Islamic Jurisprudence Explained*

Sharia is the Islamic system of law based primarily on two sources held by Muslims to be,
respectively, direct revelation from Allah and divinely inspired: the Quran and the Sunnah
(examples and traditions of Muhammad). Additionally, two other sources, ijma (scholarly
consensus among the accepted Sharia authorities -- ulema) and qiyas (anology), may be utilized
to provide authoritative guidance when the legal rule or solution is not self-evident from the
literal text of the Quran or Sunnah. While Sharia law and rulings based on Sharia are
derived from the same source bodies, Sharia is not a monolithic institution. The Umma—or
Muslim community—is arrayed along several legal, cultural, and nationalistic axes but the
deepest legal fault line is the Sunni-Shia divide. Moreover, there are several distinct schools of
religio-legal thought contained within both the Sunni and Shia sects. The Sunni sect has given
rise to four primary schools of religio-legal thought known as mathhabs (or Arabic pl.:
mathahib): Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanbali, all of which are considered by their
respective adherents to be authoritative for their own followers and indeed all permit a fair
amount of freedom for adherents to migrate between and among rulings from the different
schools. The Salafi sects, such as the Wahhabi groups based mostly in the Arabian
Peninsula, and the Deobandis based mostly in Pakistan and India, are also considered a distinct
and legitimate approach to Sharia by most Sunni legal scholars. Within Shia Islam, there are
three primary mathhabs: Ithna-Ashari, Zayadi, and Ismaili.

The differences among the legal schools are typically understood to exist at one of two levels.
The first is at the level of positive law, or the definitive rulings on any given question typically
answered in a scholar’s ruling called a fatwa. This is typically referred to as the fiqh. The
second distinction among the legal schools is found in the very jurisprudential methodology
purportedly operating as the source for discovering the law. This is typically referred to as *usul al fiqh*, or the science of the law.[40]

In the first instance, diversity of the normative legal rulings of the *fiqh* across the *mathhabs* is illustrated in matters of personal status, for example the varying approaches in the areas of divorce and temporary marriage. Concerning divorce, *Hanafi* interpretation allows a woman to apply for a divorce when her husband is unable to consummate the marriage, but the other Sunni *mathhabs* require that a wife pay a sum before being released from marriage. [41] With regard to the concept of “temporary marriage,” the Shia *Ithna-Ashari* school allows for “temporary marriage” while none of its Sunni counterparts recognize the practice. [42]

While there is room for these differences in the normative rulings of the *fiqh* between the various *mathhabs* in the Sunni world, and between the Sunni and Shia legal rulings, the divergence at the level of positive law is, given the fullness of the *corpus juris* of the *fiqh*, confined to relatively few issues and to ones that operate generally at the margins. Thus, there is unity and agreement across the Sunni-Shia split and across the various Sunni *mathhabs* on the core *Sharia* normative precepts that form the essentials of orthodox Islamic jurisprudence. The introduction to *Reliance of the Traveller* makes prominent note of the fact that the Sunni *mathhabs* are “identical in approximately 75 percent of their legal conclusions” and that differences among the four Sunni *mathhabs* are attributable to differences in methodology—not ideology. [43] This consistency and agreement on core *Sharia* rulings not only extend across the Sunni *mathhabs*, but also bridge the Sunni-Shia divide. Thus, in a 1959 fatwa, the head of the preeminent Sunni university, Al-Azhar in Cairo, Egypt, ruled that the Shia *Ithna-Ashari* mathhab was as religiously valid to follow as any of the recognized Sunni *mathhabs*; and going further, the fatwa stated that transferring from one recognized *mathhab* to another was no crime. [44] More recently, *The Amman Message* echoed the view that all major *mathhabs* are legitimate, that the followers of these major *mathhabs* may not be declared apostate, and that the major schools of Islamic thought express agreement on fundamental Islamic principles. [45] Presumably, if the normative rulings across the Sunni-Shia divide were inapposite on a majority of issues or on core issues, the leading Sunni legal authorities would not have granted Shia *fiqh* this prestigious standing, especially in light of the theological differences which have divided the Sunni and Shia sects historically.

The reason for this generous uniformity within the *corpus* of positive law rulings among the *ulema* of the various legal schools is a question for legal historians and possibly forensic anthropologists. The fact of this broad consensus, however, is indisputable. Interestingly, though, the differences in *usul al fiqh*, or the jurisprudential methodology said to underlie the normative rulings of the *fiqh*, are much greater. While this is true across the Sunni legal schools, it is unmistakably the case across the Sunni-Shia divide. While there are considerable similarities in the *usul al fiqh* of the Sunni and Shia worlds, it is fair to say that the standing of the Imamate in Shia methodology creates a difference operating at the core of methodology. [46]

This leads to an anomaly of sorts. If the methodologies between the Sunni-Shia axis are so starkly distinguishable, how is it that the normative rulings of the *fiqh* remain remarkably aligned? One scholar who has examined this anomaly has suggested that historically the articulated methodologies of the various legal schools represented by *usul al fiqh* in fact followed
the actual development of the fiqh—representing a kind of ex post facto rationalization. Indeed, he suggests that even after the emergence of clearly articulated methodologies of the various legal schools, with clear divergences amongst them, the normative rulings of the fiqh continued within the pre-existent consensus. [47]

**Violent Jihad is an Integral Part of Orthodox Sharia-Centric Islam**

The propriety of violent jihad, expressed as kinetic warfare against non-Muslims, is a matter that finds agreement in orthodox Islamic, Sharia materials and Islamic tradition. This is true even though there is no universally accepted single doctrine of jihad. [48] *Jihad and the Islamic Law of War* notes that there are adherents to Islam of both Sunni and Shia extraction who believe that all non-Muslims, as well as those Muslims who are insufficiently devout, are legitimate targets for violence. [49] Takfiri and jihadist are the terms used to describe this group of militant Islamic fundamentalists. [50]

*Jihad* can be divided into two basic categories—defensive jihad and offensive jihad—each with its own implications for the Islamic community and individual Muslims. [51] Offensive jihad is waged to expand the territory controlled by Islam and is declared by the Caliph. [52] Defensive jihad is waged when lands under Islamic control are attacked by non-Muslim forces. [53] Defensive jihad is an individual obligation (fard 'ayn) incumbent on, at a minimum, every Muslim in the Muslim land under attack, and at a maximum, every Muslim globally to support the jihad by fighting, praying, or making financial contributions to the jihad. [54] In the modern era, with the conspicuous absence of a recognized Caliph, the issue of offensive jihad remains a doctrine with nebulous practical implications. Modern jihads are almost always characterized as defensive jihads, but it is also the case that the line between a defensive jihad and an offensive one is blurry at best given a world in which Muslim countries invariably interact with and often submit to the will of non-Muslim denominated countries and powers as a matter of international law and relations and judicial and diplomatic comity. [55]

The authors of *Jihad and the Islamic Law of War* speak derisively of the Takfiri approach taken by Osama bin Laden, the avatar of the modern jihad movement, accusing him and those like him of ignoring traditional Islamic law and relying selectively on only sources that support the conclusions desired by bin Laden and similar actors. [56] These authors argue that traditional Islamic law and its precedents act as a restraint against the illegal use of force and that traditional Islamic law does not permit non-combatants to be viewed as legitimate targets. [57]

A careful reading, however, of classical, orthodox Islamic exegetical and legal materials reveals that modern jihadists or takfiris have at least a colorable claim under orthodox Sharia sources, and historical precedent, to conduct the jihad they wage; and this includes the intentional targeting and killing of non-combatants. The classic and still highly authoritative Sharia exegetical resource, *Tafsir Ibn Kathir*, exhorts Muslims on several occasions to wage jihad and places few, if any, restrictions on how and when to conduct jihad. [58] The classical works of several respected jurists and scholars from the four Sunni mathhabs dating from the 8th to 14th centuries are all in agreement that violent jihad against non-Muslims is an obligation incumbent on Muslims. [59] Moreover, the respected classical jurist, Al-Shaybani, who was a disciple of the founder of the Sunni Hanafi matthab, advised that it was lawful for a group of Muslims to attack
non-Muslims in areas controlled by non-Muslims even without the approval of the Islamic Caliph. [60] Further, Shaybani advised that it was acceptable to kill non-Muslim prisoners of war and non-combatant civilians. [61]

Indeed, this pedigree for a rather full-throated jihad against the non-Muslim world has been noted by an important scholar in one of the first published works post-9/11 attempting to actually parse the modern doctrine of jihad by noting its roots in classical fiqh. Thus, Mary Habeck’s Knowing the Enemy correctly notes:

The question of offensive jihad is even more complex and controversial. The most widely respected Islamic authorities: the six accepted collections of (Sunni) hadith; the authoritative commentators on, and exegetes of, the hadith and Qur’an; the leading ancient experts on Islamic law; and the four schools of Islamic fiqh all assume that Muslims have a duty to spread the dominion of Islam, through military offensives, until it rules the world. [62]

Directing violence against others on the basis of their status as non-Muslims as a normative, legally-sanctioned behavior is not a concept confined to Islam’s distant history, but is also an accepted feature of modern orthodox, Sharia-centric Islam. Al-Azhar University, in its 1991 certification of an English translation of the classical manual, Reliance of the Traveller, stated that the English translation “conforms to the practice and faith of the orthodox Sunni community.” [63] The translation certified by Al-Azhar University as conforming to orthodox Sunni practice, spends eleven pages discussing jihad as violence directed against non-Muslims.

[64] Providing modern Shiite support for the concept of jihad as violence against non-Muslims, the prominent Shia authority and ruler Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is recorded as saying, Islam says: Kill them [the non-Muslims], put them to the sword and scatter [their armies]. … People cannot be made obedient except with the sword! The sword is the key to Paradise, which can be opened only for the Holy Warriors! There are hundreds of other [Qur’anic] psalms and Hadiths [sayings of the Prophet] urging Muslims to value war and to fight. Does all this mean that Islam is a religion that prevents men from waging war? I spit upon those foolish souls who make such a claim. [65]

Therefore, while Sharia has room for a difference of opinion on some matters, the Islamic religio-legal schools express unity for core Islamic principles, which operates in a de jure and de facto manner as authoritative ijma or consensus. Additionally, as discussed above, violent jihad employed on the basis of the target’s religious identity or practice is a concept that receives support from both Sunni and Shia legal authorities and this support is not confined to medieval literature, but is an idea that has also been advanced by prominent modern Islamic legal scholars and ideological leaders.

Methodology & Data Analysis

Sampling

The survey analyzed data collected from a random sample of 100 mosques. This sample size provided sufficient statistical power to find a modest significant association between the Sharia adherence and violence-positive variables. A sample size of 100 mosques also allowed the survey to extrapolate to all mosques in the United States at a 95% confidence interval with a
margin of error of +/-9.6%. State-by-state estimates of the Muslim population were extracted from the only extant such survey[66] and used to create a listing of all states whose Muslim population represented at least 1% of the estimated total United States Muslim population. The final listing was comprised of eighteen states and the District of Columbia. [67] Fourteen states and the District of Columbia (“15 randomly selected states”) were randomly selected from the final listing to accommodate limits on physical logistics and personnel resources. The study built a comprehensive list of mosques that could be located and surveyed in these 15 randomly selected states. The process is described in greater detail below.

The survey developed a site list of mosques located in each of the 15 randomly selected states after consulting several resources in order to build the most comprehensive list of existing mosques as possible. First, the survey combined the data on the 1,209 mosques listed in “Mosque in America: A National Portrait” [68] with the data on the 1,659 mosques obtained online from Harvard’s Pluralism Project. [69] After the mosque lists from the two sources were combined, a review was conducted to ensure that each mosque address was not listed twice. If it was found, during the review, that a mosque address was listed twice, then one of the two addresses was removed from the mosque listing prior to the random selection process. The survey then identified the cities in each state where the highest concentrations of Muslims lived based on open source information relating Muslim demographics for each of the 15 randomly selected states. Additional mosques were located and added to the list by consulting telephone books, gathering information at existing mosques, and conducting visual field inspections. A Friday telephone call was made to every mosque on the site list in order to confirm the mosque’s existence prior to sending a researcher for an onsite visit. Friday was selected as the day to attempt telephone contact because an employee or representative would most likely be present at mosque on that day. A mosque was excluded from the list if either it did not have a valid telephone number or its telephone remained unanswered after three Friday telephone calls. The final mosque site list for the 15 randomly selected states yielded a total of 1,401 mosques. The first 100 mosques on the site list were selected and arranged by metropolitan area. All remaining mosques were grouped by metropolitan area and then randomized.

The dates and prayer times (noon [Dhuhr]; afternoon ['Asr]; sunset [Maghrib]; and evening ['Isha]) for any given mosque surveyed were randomly selected. The randomly selected dates and times included both weekday and Friday prayers (the Jumu’ah). If the surveyor went to a mosque for a prayer service but found the mosque closed, abandoned, or was unable to locate the mosque at the address provided on the mosque site list, the next mosque that appeared on the randomized list for that city was chosen one after the other until the surveyor located a mosque that was open for the prayer service.

Prepatory Data Collection

The initial mosque visits were conducted between May 18, 2007, and December 4, 2008 (“Survey Period”) by surveyors who visited mosques. Each of the mosques visited during the Survey Period were visited again between May 10, 2009, and May 30, 2010 (“Audit Period”) to audit the findings of the Survey Period. The results of the Audit Period confirmed the findings in the Survey Period in all but nine mosques. Of these nine, four had closed or moved to an
unknown location; the remaining five mosques had additional or different texts available. Of the four closed mosques, the next available mosque for that city on the random list was chosen for the survey. Of the five mosques which presented different texts during the Audit Period, surveyors visited the mosque on a third visit and recorded the findings. Only those texts available on two of the three visits were recorded as present.

Prior to visiting a mosque, a surveyor would obtain as much open source information about the mosque as possible. There were two primary open sources used to obtain mosque information: the Internet and materials from or about the subject mosque that were gathered when surveyors previously visited other mosques. When the dominant language of the subject mosque was determined to be other than English, such as Arabic, Urdu, or Farsi, the surveyor who visited the mosque was fluent in that language.

Survey Procedure

Mosque visits were conducted during the Survey Period and the Audit Period. Each mosque visit included attending and observing a prayer service and surveying materials distributed and texts made available on mosque premises. Additionally, the imam (or senior lay leader if no imam was present) was asked what materials he would recommend for further study. The surveyors recorded their observations on an instrument designed for the survey.

Instrument[70]

The surveyor completed the survey instrument which included noting the location, date, time of visit, type of structure (stand alone, store front, etc.), estimated number of worshipers, whether any of the following texts were present and represented at least 10% of the texts made available: books authored by Abul A'la Maududi or Sayyid Qutb; Sharia legal texts Fiqh-us-Sunnah or Riyad-us-Saliheen, and the Quranic commentary of Tafṣir Ibn Kathir. The surveyor also noted the presence of other materials including texts, pamphlets, handouts, audio and video recordings, titles, and authors (if available). When the materials were provided to the surveyor to retain, the materials were collected and retained for further research. When not, the surveyor noted the substance of the material to the extent possible.

A section of 13 items on strictness of Sharia adherence was completed, which included: segregation of the sexes, prayer line alignment, garb and beard of imam and of worshipers, all of which are objectively linked to Sharia adherence. In addition, a section of 22 items rated materials pertaining to violent jihad, which included the promotion of violent jihad or the encouragement to join a jihad organization, the collection of funds supporting jihad, the promotion of violence in the service of Sharia, the distribution of memorabilia glorifying violent jihad, the presence of materials indicating that imams known to promote violent jihad were invited to speak as guest imams at the mosque, and whether violent jihad materials were distributed for free. Where possible, the surveyor recorded whether the imam recommended such materials. If the imam either recommended or unenthusiastically recommended the study of any violence-positive materials to one who presented as a new worshipper, then the surveyor recorded the imam as having recommended violence-positive materials. If the imam either did
not recommend the study of and violence-positive materials to one who presented as a new worshipper or instructed against the study of violence-positive materials, then the surveyor recorded that the imam did not recommend the study of violence-positive materials.

**Variable Selection**

Behavior Variables [71]

Behavior variables were selected according to those behaviors that doctrinal, traditional *Sharia* adherents contend were exhibited and commanded by Muhammad as recorded in the *Sunna*; and, later discussed and preserved in *Sharia* literature such as *Reliance of the Traveller* and *Fiqh-us-Sunnah*. The behaviors selected enjoy sanction by authoritative Islamic sources such as *Reliance of the Traveller*—which as previously noted conforms to the practice of orthodox Sunni Islam—and as such, the selected behaviors are among the most broadly accepted by legal practitioners of Islam and are not those behaviors practiced only by a rigid sub-group within Islam—*Salafists* for example.

The selected behaviors were observable in the mosque environment; and, therefore, empirically measurable. The behaviors noted as being *Sharia* adherent are outward manifestations of internalized beliefs or commitments as praxes. These *Sharia*-adherent behaviors were selected precisely because they constitute observable and measurable praxes of an orthodox form of Islam; and were not merely internalized, non-observable articles of faith.

Among the mosque behaviors observed and scored as *Sharia* adherent were: (a) women wearing the *hijab*; (b) gender segregation during mosque prayers; and (c) enforcement of prayer lines. As previously mentioned, the behaviors were selected to be scored as *Sharia* adherent because they both enjoy sanction in authoritative *Sharia* literature and are practices that enjoy broad acceptance within Islamic orthodoxy. For example, *Reliance of the Traveller* and *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* express agreement on the obligation of a woman to wear the *hijab*. Excerpts from both authorities outlining the woman’s obligation to wear the *hijab* follow:

There is no such dispute over what constitutes a woman’s 'aurah [private parts/nakedness]. It is stated that her entire body is 'aurah and must be covered, except her hands and face. … Allah does not accept the prayer of an adult woman unless she is wearing a headcovering (*khimar, hijab*).[72]

The nakedness of a woman (O: even if a young girl) consists of the whole body except the face and hands. (N: The nakedness of woman is that which invalidates the prayer if exposed (dis:w23). [73] … It is recommended for a woman to wear a covering over her head (*khimar*), a full length shift, and a heavy slip under it that does not cling to the body. [74]

The *Sharia* literature also expresses similar agreement on the requirement that the genders be separated during prayers. For example, both *Reliance of the Traveller* and *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* express a preference that women should pray at home rather than at the mosque. [75] However, both sources further agree that if women do pray in the mosque, then they should pray in lines separate from the men’s prayer lines.[76] Additionally, authoritative *Sharia* literature agrees that the men’s prayer lines should be straight, that the men should be close together in their prayer lines, and that the imam should enforce alignment of the men’s prayer lines. [77]
The fact that not all Muslims adhere to a completely Sharia-adherent lifestyle and not all mosques conduct their religious services in conformity with normative Sharia dictates allowed surveyors to observe and record variations in Sharia adherence levels among the mosques surveyed and the individuals who attended these mosques. This study borrowed from the analytical framework suggested by *Jihad and the Islamic Law of War*, which describes and categorizes—from extreme secularism to extreme sectarianism—the adherence levels of the world’s Muslims. Muslims who embrace secularism and modernism are referred to as “secular fundamentalists” and “modern secularists.” Muslims who fit into these categories—at a minimum—view Western values and civilization as “the ‘norm’ to which the Islamic world should adjust itself.” The extreme sectarian end of the Islamic adherence spectrum are occupied by Muslims who fit into the categories of “Puritanical literalist,” also referred to as Salafist, and sometimes in the less precise political terms “Islamist” and “Takfiri” or jihadist. Muslims who would be categorized as Puritanical literalists seek to duplicate the state created by Muhammad and rid society of elements that are not consistent with the earliest Muslim community. A Takfiri is a Muslim who views non-Muslims and those who—in his opinion—are insufficiently devout as unbelievers and legitimate targets for violence. Resting in between these two extremes are the Muslims categorized as “Traditionalists” who look to Sharia as a legal and normative structure to inform them how to conduct their affairs—both their inward and outward lives, but who might not adhere to all of its dictates literally.

Surveyors observed the conduct of mosque services and the behavioral choices of worshippers at a given mosque, and then scored the observed behaviors as Sharia adherent if the behaviors were objectively linked to normative Sharia behaviors, as recorded in the Quran or Haddith and confirmed as such by extant and authoritative Sharia literature, or were behaviors that are understood as being preferred behaviors among a consensus of Sharia scholars. Given that *Jihad and the Islamic Law of War* divided the Muslim world into two basic camps—(a) those who believe the West should conform to traditional Islamic or Sharia norms and who embrace and practice Sharia in their personal lives and (b) those who largely or entirely reject traditional Islamic or Sharia norms and do not practice Sharia in their personal lives—the surveyors scored the observed behaviors and conduct of mosque services as being either Sharia adherent or not Sharia adherent. The mosques where the highest degrees of Sharia adherence were observed were the Salafi-Wahabi and Deobandi mosques. The levels of Sharia adherence decreased until there were minimally observed or no indicia of what could be thought of as “traditional” or “orthodox” Sharia adherence.

**Texts Selected**

Texts were selected for scoring based on the fact that they either called for violent jihad against non-Muslims or because the texts called for hatred of “the other.” For example, *Reliance of the Traveller* is a selected text because it makes explicit demands for jihad against non-Muslims. A sampling of quotes on jihad and the non-Muslim from *Reliance of the Traveller*:

The caliph (o25) makes war upon Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians (N: provided he has first invited them to enter Islam in faith and practice, and if they will not, then invited them to enter the social order of Islam by paying the non-Muslim poll tax (*jizya*, def: o11.4)… [85]
The caliph fights all other peoples until they become Muslim (O: because they are not a people with a Book, nor honored as such, and are not permitted to settle with paying the poll tax (jizya)). [86]

The *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* and *Tafsir Ibn Kathir* were among the other books which were selected for scoring based on their promotion of violence against and hatred of “the other.” A sample quote from both *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* and *Tafsir Ibn Kathir* follows:

Ibn 'Abbas reported that the Prophet, upon whom be peace, said, ‘The ties of Islam and the principles of the religion are three, and whoever leaves one of them becomes an unbeliever, and his blood becomes lawful: testifying that there is no god except Allah, the obligatory prayers, and the fast of Ramadan.’ (Related by Abu Ya’la with a hassan chain.) Another narration states, ‘If anyone leaves one of [the three principles], by Allah he becomes an unbeliever and no voluntary deeds or recompense will be accepted from him, and his blood and wealth become lawful.’ This is a clear indication that such a person is to be killed. [87]

Perform *jihad* against the disbelievers with the sword and be harsh with the hypocrites with words, and this is the *jihad* performed against them. [88]

Texts authored by Maududi and Qutb and similar materials, such as pamphlets and texts published and disseminated by the Muslim Brotherhood, were selected in part because these materials strongly advocate the use of violence as a means to establish an Islamic state. Maududi espoused that it was legitimate to direct violent *jihad* against “infidel colonizers” in order to gain independence and spread *Sharia*-centric Islam. [89] In the below excerpt from *Jihad in Islam*, Maududi explained the Islamic duty to employ force in pursuit of a *Sharia*-based order:

These [Muslim] men who propagate religion are not mere preachers or missionaries, but the functionaries of God, (so that they may be witnesses for the people), and it is their duty to wipe out oppression, mischief, strife, immorality, high handedness and unlawful exploitation from the world by force of arms. [90]

The ideas in Qutb’s *Milestones* serve as the political and ideological backbone of the current global *jihad* movement. [91] In the quote below from *Milestones*, Qutb explains that violence must be employed against those who stand in the way of Islam’s expansion:

If someone does this [prevents others from accepting Islam], then it is the duty of Islam to fight him until either he is killed or until he declares his submission. [92]

While works by Maududi and Qutb, as well as similar materials, were selected because of their strong endorsements of violence, these works were also selected because they help to contemporize the view that violent *jihad* is a legitimate vehicle for Islamic expansionism. This is especially true of Qutb whose ideas profoundly influenced the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda, the latter through its co-founder, Ayman Al-Zawahiri. [93]

These severe-rated violence-positive materials by Maududi, Qutb, and others distinguish themselves from the moderate-rated violence-positive materials because they are not Islamic legal texts per se, but rather polemical works seeking to advance a politicized Islam through violence, if necessary. Further, the authors of these severe-rated materials were not recognized *Sharia* scholars. Works such as *Tafsir Ibn Kathir*, *Reliance of the Traveller*, and *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* are Islamic legal and exegetical resources written by respected *Sharia* scholars. *Tafsir Ibn*
Kathir, Reliance of the Traveller, Fiqh-us-Sunnah and similar works contain passages exhorting readers to commit violence against non-Muslims as a means to further an expansionist view of Islam. However, they also contain detailed instructions regarding how a Muslim should order his or her daily routine in order to demonstrate his or her piety to the Muslim community and to Islam’s god.

This is especially true of the Fiqh-us-Sunnah which focused primarily on the internal Muslim community, family and individual believer, and did not frame jihad as an open-ended, divinely ordained imperative. Relatively speaking, the Fiqh-us-Sunnah expressed a very restrained view of violent jihad in comparison to the other rated materials. The text does not explicitly call for violent jihad against the West even though the text understands Western influence of Islamic governments as a force that is destructive to Islam itself. [94] The moderate-rated exegetical and legal materials were written by respected Sharia scholars—and although they express positive views toward the use of violence against “the other”—there may be legitimate, non-violent religious purposes to support their presence on mosque premises. By contrast, the severe-rated materials by Maududi, Qutb, and others were not primarily concerned with instructing Muslims on the mundane aspects of daily living, but rather on imparting a global view of Islam through polemical works extolling violent jihad.

Data Analysis

The first round of analysis was descriptive to allow presenting a profile of the mosques. The second round of analysis examined the association between Sharia adherence and key mosque, imam, and worshiper characteristics. The third round of analysis examined the association of texts recommended by the imam for study and the same key characteristics. To facilitate conducting the above analyses, a three-point scale of strictness of adherence of texts to Sharia and advocating the use of violence in the pursuit of a Sharia-based political order, including praising the use of violent jihad against the West and the use of violence to implement Sharia, was created. Based on an empirical analysis of texts (available upon request from authors), from most severe to least severe texts: (1) texts authored by Abul A’la Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, or other similar texts, and the Sharia legal text Riyad-us-Saliheen; (2) Quranic commentary of Tafsir Ibn Kathir and the Sharia legal text Fiqh-us-Sunnah; and (3) having no such texts. The association of the scale and Sharia adherence items were then examined using crosstabs with chi-square and a test of linearity for ordinal variables and analysis of variance for continuous variables. Similarly, we examined the association of key characteristics and whether or not the imam or lay leader recommended such materials that advocate the use of violence in the pursuit of a Sharia-based political order.

Results[95]

Violence-positive materials were found in a very large majority (81%) of the 100 mosques surveyed. Violence-positive materials were more likely to be found in mosques whose communal prayer practices, imams, and adult male worshipers exhibited greater indicia of Sharia-adherent behaviors than were their less Sharia-adherent counterparts. Moreover, the
mosques that contained violence-positive materials were many times more likely than mosques that did not contain violence-positive materials to engage in several behaviors that promoted violence and violent jihad.

*Association of Sharia Observance in Mosque Prayer Observance and Imam Appearance to the Presence of Violence-Positive Materials and Whether the Imam Recommended the Study of Violence-Positive Materials*

Mosques that conducted their communal prayers in accordance with *Sharia* advocated norms were more likely to contain violence-positive materials, both moderate and severe, than those mosques whose communal prayer practices did not conform to *Sharia* norms.

Almost all of the mosques that engaged in gender segregation during prayer service, as advocated by *Sharia*, contained violence-positive texts on their premises. Sixty percent (60%) of the mosques that engaged in gender segregation contained severe materials; 35% contained moderate materials; and 5% contained no violence-positive materials. Mosques that did not segregate women from men during communal prayer were more likely than mosques that segregated men from women to contain no materials (26%); and were less likely to contain moderate materials (27%) or severe materials (47%).

In addition to containing violence-positive materials, mosques that engaged in gender segregation during communal prayer services were more likely to be led by imams who recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials than were mosques that did not engage in gender segregation during communal prayer. Ninety-four percent (94%) of the imams at mosques that engaged in gender segregation recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials; while only 6% did not recommend that worshipers study violence-positive materials. Imams who led mosques that did not engage in gender segregation were less likely than the imams of mosques that segregated men from women during prayers to recommend that worshipers study violence-positive materials. Eighty percent (80%) of the imams who led congregations that did not engage in gender segregation during prayers recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials; and 20% of these imams did not recommend that worshipers study such materials.
Mosques that had either a layperson or an imam enforce alignment of the men’s prayer lines were more likely to contain violence-positive materials than were mosques that did not enforce the alignment of men’s prayer lines. Of the mosques that enforced alignment of men’s prayer lines, 59% contained severe materials; 37% contained moderate materials; and 4% contained no violence-positive materials. Forty-two percent (42%) of the mosques that paid little attention to men’s prayer line alignment contained severe materials; 22% contained moderate materials; and 36% contained no materials.

Mosques that enforced alignment of men’s prayer lines were more likely to be led by an imam who recommended that worshipers study violence positive materials than were mosques that did not enforce men’s prayer line alignment. Imams of 96% of the mosques that enforced men’s prayer line alignment recommended the study of violence-positive materials and only 4% did not recommend the study of such materials. Imams at 72% of the mosques that did not enforce alignment of men’s prayer lines recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials while 28% of the imams at these mosques did not recommend that worshipers study violence-positive materials.
Similar to gender segregation during prayer service and enforcement of men’s prayer lines, the imams’ choice of beard was also related to the presence of violence-positive materials on mosque property and whether the imam would recommend the study of violence-positive materials. Sixty-one percent (61%) of mosques led by an imam who wore a Sunna beard contained severe materials; 33% contained moderate materials; and 7% contained no violence-positive materials. Mosques led by an imam who did not wear a Sunna beard were less likely to contain severe materials and more likely to contain no violence-positive materials than the mosques led by imams who wore a Sunna beard. Forty-six percent (46%) of mosques led by an imam who did not wear a Sunna beard contained severe materials; 28% contained moderate materials; and 26% contained no violence-positive materials. Imams who wore a Sunna beard were more likely to recommend that worshipers study violence-positive materials than were imams who did not wear a Sunna beard. Of the imams who wore a Sunna beard, 93% recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials and 7% did not recommend worshipers study violence-positive materials. Seventy-eight percent (78%) of imams who did not wear a Sunna beard recommended...
that worshipers study violence-positive materials; and 22% did not recommend worshipers study violence-positive materials.

Other measures of the imams’ Sharia adherence—whether the imam wore a head covering; whether the imam wore traditional, or non-Western garb; and whether an imam wore his watch on his right wrist—were also indicative of whether a mosque would be more likely to contain violence-positive materials than mosques where the imam did not practice these Sharia-adherent behaviors. However, the relationship between these behaviors and the presence of violence-positive materials was not statistically significant.

Mosques led by imams who wore a religious head covering were more likely to contain violence-positive materials than mosques that were led by imams who did not wear a religious head covering. Of the mosques led by imams who wore a religious head covering, 60% contained severe materials; 26% contained moderate materials; and 14% contained no violence-positive materials. Of the mosques led by imams who did not wear a religious head covering, 46% contained severe materials; 35% contained moderate materials; and 20% contained no violence-positive materials.
Mosques led by imams who wore traditional Islamic clothing were more likely to contain violence-positive materials than were mosques led by imams who wore Western clothing. Of mosques led by imams who wore traditional Islamic clothing, 62% contained severe materials; 29% contained moderate materials; and 10% contained no violence-positive materials. Of mosques led by imams who wore Western clothing, 43% contained severe materials; 32% contained moderate materials; and 25% no violence-positive materials.

Mosques led by imams who wore a watch on their right wrist were more likely to contain violence-positive materials than mosques led by imams who did not wear a watch on their right wrist. Of the mosques led by imams who wore a watch on their right wrist, 42% contained severe materials; 50% contained moderate materials; and 8% contained no violence-positive materials. Of the mosques led by imams who did not wear a watch on their right wrist, 54% contained severe materials; 28% contained moderate materials; and 18% contained no violence-positive materials.

These same measures of Sharia adherence by a mosque’s imam were also indicative of whether the imam would recommend that a worshiper study violence-positive materials. Of the three behaviors, the relationship between an imam wearing traditional Islamic garb and whether an imam would recommend the study of violence-positive materials was the only statistically significant relationship. The relationship between both (a) an imam wearing a head covering and (b) an imam wearing a watch on his right hand and whether an imam would recommend the study of violence-positive materials was not statistically significant.

Imams who wore head coverings were more likely to recommend that a worshiper study violence-positive materials than were imams who did not wear head coverings. Ninety percent (90%) of imams who wore head coverings recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials. Eighty percent (80%) of imams who did not wear head coverings recommended the study of violence-positive materials.

Imams who wore traditional Islamic clothing were more likely to recommend the study of violence-positive materials than were imams who wore Western garb. Of the imams who wore traditional Islamic dress, 92% recommended the study of violence-positive materials. Seventy-seven percent (77%) of the imams who wore Western garb recommended worshipers study violence-positive materials.

Association of Worshipers Sharia-Based Appearance Characteristics to the Presence of Violence-Positive Materials and Whether the Imam Recommended the Study of Violence-Positive Materials

The severity of violence-positive materials present on mosque premises increased as the percentage of adult male worshipers who exhibited Sharia-adherent appearance characteristics increased. In mosques where no violence-positive material was found, an average of 14% of the men wore beards. An average of 36% of the men wore beards at mosques where only moderate materials were found; and an average of 48% of the men wore beards at mosques that contained severe materials.
In mosques where no violence-positive materials were found, an average of 16% of the men wore religious hats. An average of 34% of the men wore religious hats at mosques where only moderate materials were found; and an average of 47% of the men wore religious hats at mosques that contained severe materials.

A negative relationship was shown to exist between adult male worshipers exhibiting a Western or assimilative appearance the presence of violence-positive materials on mosque premises. In mosques where no violence-positive materials were found, an average of 73% of the men wore Western garb. An average of 35% of the men wore Western garb at mosques that contained only moderate materials; and an average of 34% of the men wore Western garb at those mosques that contained severe materials.

The mosques where imams recommended the study of violence-positive materials were marked by higher percentages of adult male worshipers who exhibited Sharia-adherent appearance characteristics and lower percentages of adult males who wore Western, assimilative clothing than those mosques where the imam did not recommend the study of violence-positive materials. In mosques led by an imam who recommended the study of violence-positive materials, 44% of the adult male worshipers wore beards; 42% wore religious hats; and 34% wore Western clothing. In mosques led by an imam who did not recommend the study of violence-positive materials, 13% of the adult males worshipers wore beards; 15% wore religious hats; and 87% wore Western garb.
Measures of *Sharia* adherence by non-adult male worshipers that failed to show either a relationship or a statistically significant relationship between the behavior and the presence of violence-positive materials on premises were: (a) the percentage of women with the modern hijab (as opposed to the traditional hijab or the niqab); (b) the percentage of girls with the hijab; and (b) the percentage of boys with a head covering. In mosques with no violence-positive materials, 57% of the women wore the modern hijab. Thirty-eight percent (38%) of the women wore the modern hijab in mosques that contained moderate materials; and 42% of the women wore the modern hijab in mosques that contained severe materials.

Twenty-nine percent (29%) of the girls in attendance at mosques that contained no violence-positive materials wore the hijab. Fourteen percent (14%) of the girls at mosques that contained moderate materials wore the hijab; and 36% of the girls who attended mosques that contained severe materials wore the hijab.

Of the boys in attendance at mosques that contained no violence-positive materials, 14% wore a head covering. Twenty-four percent (24%) of the boys who attended the mosques that contained moderate materials wore a head covering; and 32% of the boys who attended the mosques that contained severe materials wore a head covering.

The percentage of women in attendance at mosque who wore a modern hijab (as opposed to the traditional hijab or the niqab) showed a statistically significant negative relationship to whether the imam would recommend the study of violence positive literature. At mosques led by imams who did not recommend the study of violence-positive materials, 70% of the women wore the non-*Sharia*-adherent modern hijab; while 41% of the women wore the modern hijab at mosques led by imams who recommended worshipers study violence-positive materials.

Both the percentage of girls who wore the hijab and the percentage of boys who wore head coverings demonstrated a statistically significant relationship with whether an imam would recommend the study of violence-positive materials. However, neither of these relationships
were statistically significant. Twenty percent (20%) of the girls wore a hijab at mosques that were led by an imam who did not recommend the study of violence-positive materials; and 29% of the girls wore a hijab at mosques led by an imam who recommended the study of violence-positive materials. Zero percent (0%) of the boys wore a head covering at mosques that were led by an imam who did not recommend the study of violence-positive materials; and 30% of the boys wore a head covering at mosques that were led by imams who recommended the study of violence-positive materials.

Association of Presence and Strictness of Materials Found on Mosque Premises to the Promotion of Violence and Violent Jihad

The presence of violence-positive materials on mosque premises was correlated to several indicia of whether the mosque would promote violence and violent jihad. Of the mosques that contained severe materials, 100% were led by an imam who recommended that worshipers study violent materials; 100% promoted violent jihad; 98% promoted the financial support of terror; 98% promoted the establishment of the Caliphate in the United States; 100% praised terror against the West; and 76% invited guest speakers known to have promoted violent jihad.

The observed incidences of the promotion of violence and violent jihad were not substantially different for the mosques that contained only moderate materials. Of the mosques that contained only moderate materials, 97% were led by an imam who recommended the study of violent materials; 97% promoted violent jihad; 97% promoted the financial support of terror; 97% promoted the establishment of the Caliphate in the United States; 97% praised terror against the West; and 60% invited guest speakers known to have promoted violent jihad.

Mosques that contained no violence-positive materials on their premises were substantially less likely to engage in several measures of violence- and violent-jihad-promoting behaviors than were mosques that contained such materials. Of the mosques that contained no violence-positive materials, 18% were led by an imam who recommended the study of violent materials; 5% promoted violent jihad; 5% promoted the financial support of terror; 5% promoted the establishment of the Caliphate in the United States; 5% praised terror against the West; and 5% invited guest speakers known to have promoted violent jihad.
Either no relationship existed or no statistically significant relationship existed between the presence of materials found on mosque premises and whether mosques: (a) promoted joining a terrorist organization; (b) collected money openly for a known terrorist organization; and (c) distributed memorabilia that featured jihadists or terrorist organizations. Of the mosques that contained severe materials, 10% promoted joining a terrorist organization; 8% collected money openly for known terrorist organizations; and 12% distributed memorabilia that featured jihadists or terrorist organizations.

Of the mosques that contained moderate materials, 7% promoted joining a terrorist organization; 3% collected money openly for known terrorist organizations; and 7% distributed memorabilia that featured jihadists or terrorist organizations.

Of the mosques that contained no violence-positive materials, 5% promoted joining a terrorist organization; 5% collected money openly for known terrorist organizations; and 5% distributed memorabilia that featured jihadists or terrorist organizations.

Validity of Variable Selection
While violence-positive literature was found at both mosques that manifested the more strict, orthodox Sharia-adherent behaviors and their non-Sharia-adherent counterparts, violence-positive literature was more likely to be found in those mosques whose behaviors conformed to orthodox, Sharia-adherent Islam. The survey results report a modest statistically significant
correlation between the presence of violence-positive literature in mosques and the presence of a greater percentage of adult male worshippers who exhibit Sharia-adherent behavioral characteristics.

In addition to this modest correlation between Sharia adherence and the presence of violence-positive literature, the presence of violence-positive literature was also related to whether mosque leadership would engage in certain behaviors that are promotive of violence and violent jihad. Imams of mosques that contained violence-positive literature were more likely to recommend that worshippers study violence-promoting texts than were imams of mosques where no violence-positive literature was found. Additionally, mosques where violence-positive literature was present were more likely to invite guest speakers who are known to have promoted violent jihad than were the mosques where no violent literature was present. The fact that the imams in the Sharia-adherent mosques, as measured by the behavior of the worshippers, were more likely to recommend the violence-positive literature and the fact that these mosques were more likely to have invited guest speakers known to have promoted violent jihad further confirms the variable selection.

The authors of this survey are not asserting that there is no legitimate reason for mosques to have the surveyed texts available on mosque premises. However, the results are noteworthy precisely because this correlation with violence-positive literature combined with its promotion at Sharia-adherent mosques was almost non-existent in mosques typified by more assimilative behaviors.

The Role of the Sharia-Centric Mosque in Supporting the Violent Jihad

This survey serves as empirical support for anecdotal studies that have noted a connection between highly Sharia-adherent mosques and the recruitment of those among their respective worshippers who commit political violence in the name of Islam. [96] The mosque leadership of some highly Sharia-adherent mosques with known terrorist connections have praised suicide bombers and the mosques have sold literature that advocated violence against disfavored groups. [97]

This survey’s results help to provide insight into the role that Sharia-adherent behaviors possibly play in defining group identities, creating an us-versus-them outlook, and projecting violence against outgroups such as the West and non-Muslims, which is mirrored by the Sharia literature found in the mosques prone to violent literature. [98] The mosques where greater indicia of Sharia-adherent behaviors were observed were more likely to contain materials that conveyed a positive attitude toward employing violent jihad against the West and non-Muslims than were mosques where more Western, assimilative behaviors were observed. These materials may be instrumental in drawing a fault line between the ingroup of devout, Sharia-adherent Muslims and the outgroup comprised of non-Muslims and those Muslims who embrace Western values.

The fact that “spiritual sanctioners” who help individuals become progressively more radicalized are known to be connected to highly Sharia-adherent mosques [99] is another concern in addition to the presence of violence-positive texts at these mosques. The imams at Sharia-adherent mosques are far more likely to recommend that their worshippers study materials that promote violence. A recommendation from a respected religious leader that a worshipper study
violence-promoting legal and normative literature may legitimatize the material’s message that it is acceptable to use violence against outgroup members. Additionally, receiving permission from a religious leader to immerse oneself in materials that promote violence against outgroup members may serve as tacit permission to employ violence against an outgroup.

Mosques where greater indicia of Sharia-adherent behaviors are observed also manifest behaviors that are at least sympathetic to violent jihad and those who commit violent jihad. Mosques where the greatest indicia of Sharia-adherent behaviors were observed were the mosques most likely to contain materials holding positive views of violent jihad. In almost every instance, the imams at these mosques where violence-positive materials were available recommended that worshippers at their mosques study texts that promote violence. These same highly Sharia-adherent mosques where violence-positive materials were present—almost without exception—engaged in activities that promoted violent jihad and were several times more likely to invite guest preachers who were known to have supported violent jihad than were mosques in which violence-positive materials were not available.

**Non-Sharia-Centricism and “Reform” Islam**

The authors recognize—and the survey demonstrates—that there are mosques and mosque-going Muslims who are interested in a non-Sharia-centric Islam where tolerance of the other, rather than hatred of the other, at least as evidenced by the absence of violence-positive and jihad-promoting literature is the norm. The survey helps to confirm previous anecdotal [100] and less rigorous empirical efforts [101] that have observed that a majority of the mosques in the U.S. have been inundated with Salafist violent literature and Saudi-trained imams and that only a minority of mosques eschew all forms of violent literature and dogma. These exceptional mosques where violence-positive literature were not recommended exhibited significantly fewer indicia of orthodox, Sharia-adherent behaviors than those mosques where such literature was recommended for study and were also significantly less likely to promote violent jihad or invite speakers known to have promoted violent jihad than mosques that were typified by Sharia-adherent behaviors.

**Discussion of the Broader Policy Implications**

**Prior Surveys and the Search for Predictive Variables**

Recent polling surveys of several predominantly Muslim countries present a picture of a global Muslim community that is in conflict about support for employing violence against civilians and the groups who commit violence against civilians. On the one hand, an April 2007 survey by WorldPublicOpinion.org revealed that majorities in Morocco (57%), Egypt (77%), Pakistan (81%), and Indonesia (84%) believe that attacks on civilians designed to achieve political goals are never justified. [102] Strong majorities in these countries, except for Pakistan, believe groups that employ violence against civilians do so in contradiction to Islamic tenets. Strikingly, in Pakistan, only 30% of the respondents agree with the proposition that groups violate Islamic principles when they employ violence against civilians. However, 66% of Moroccans agreed with the proposition; as did 88% of Egyptians; and 65% of Indonesians. [103] It is noteworthy
that the survey questionnaire did not make it clear whether the target civilians were Muslims or non-Muslims.

While support for political violence in the survey was a mixed bag, the survey did find that majorities in each country favored (a) strict application of Sharia law in every Islamic country and (b) keeping Western values out of Islamic counties. Both of these attitudes are consistent with the goals of Al Qaeda and were understood as aligned with Al Qaeda by the respondents:

These survey results appear to be supported by a more recent 2010 Pew Survey, which surveyed Muslims in Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria, Jordan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Turkey. The Pew Survey found that very large majorities in each of these countries (except Turkey) support a dominant role for Islam in politics. Even more significantly, large segments of the populations in these countries favor Sharia criminal punishments, including capital punishment for those who choose to leave Islam (i.e., apostasy):
A recent study by Andrew F. March in the field of political theory pursued an inquiry into whether Islamic doctrine would allow Muslims to cooperate socially with non-Muslims and sincerely affirm liberal citizenship, as that term is understood in its Western democratic sense. March found grounds for an overlapping consensus based on a study of the Quran as well as works by some contemporary Muslim jurists and exegetes, but he also noted that there exists contemporary and prominent Sharia scholars who cite to authoritative texts holding that Muslims are either at war with non-Muslims or, at best, are in a state devoid of any obligation to socially cooperate with non-Muslims. [107] Additionally, March noted that the underpinnings of his theoretical overlapping consensus might in fact be negated by empirical evidence showing that a large percentage of Muslims were unaware of [or reject] the theological or philosophical arguments that militate toward a moral affirmation of liberal citizenship. [108]

The results of both the World Public Opinion Survey and the Pew 2010 Survey suggest that there are large segments of the Muslim world, representing demographics which rival the West, that reject quite emphatically the notion of liberal citizenship, freedom of worship, and other political mores taken for granted in the West. These surveys, however, report the attitudes of residents in non-Western countries which enforce Sharia to varying degrees. We might expect Muslims in the West—who are immersed in Western culture, values, and representative government—to express different attitudes than their counterparts in the Middle East, Far East, and North Africa. Unfortunately, the results of this survey suggests that Islam—at least as it is generally practiced in mosques across the United States—continues to manifest a resistance to a sufficiently tolerant religio-legal framework that would allow its followers to make a sincere affirmation of Western citizenship. This survey provides empirical support for the view that mosques across the U.S., as institutional and social settings for mosque-going Muslims, provide a milieu resistant to the

### Views of Harsh Punishments

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<tr>
<td>Stone people who commit adultery</td>
<td>16%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Whippings/cutting off of hands for theft and robbery</td>
<td>13%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion</td>
<td>5%</td>
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*Asked of Muslims only. PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q108b-d.*
legal, theological, or political arguments that make political, civic, and social cooperation within a secular constitutional political order ideal.

**This Survey’s Limitations**

This survey only examined the presence of Sharia-adherent behaviors, the presence of violence-positive materials in mosques, whether an imam would promote the study of violence-positive materials, and whether an imam would use his mosque as forum to promote violent jihad. The authors note that most of the content of the texts used to rank strictness of dogma and violence in the moderate category of violence in the cause of Sharia includes material that does not relate to these topics and incorporates a host of other theological matters. This survey sampling of mosques also has several limitations. Since there is no central body to which all mosques belong, it was difficult to be certain that our sampling universe list was complete. Additionally, despite our preparatory efforts, many mosques were no longer at their address of record. This may have introduced bias into our sampling, although we found no evidence of any systemic distortions.

Further, the results of this survey do not tell us the percentage of American Muslims that actually attend mosques with any regularity, or at all, nor does it tell us what relative percentage of all American Muslims present as Sharia-adherent and non-Sharia-adherent. Moreover, although this study captured whether imams at highly Sharia-adherent mosques would recommend studying violence-positive materials and would utilize their mosques for behaviors supportive of violent jihad, the survey did not capture the individual mosque attendees’ attitudes toward violence and violent jihad. It is reasonable to conclude, the authors believe, that the worshippers at the more Sharia-adherent mosques, where the imam is more likely to promote the violent literature and jihad generally, are more inclined to be sympathetic to the message conveyed in the violent and jihad literature than their counterparts who attend the lesser Sharia-adherent mosques where the material is either not present or the imam does not promote it. A follow-up survey of individual mosque attendees would provide better insight regarding the relationship, if any, between Sharia-adherence on the individual or mosque level and an individual’s attitude toward violence and violent jihad.

**About the authors:**

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The authors and the editors of Perspectives on Terrorism wish to acknowledge and express gratitude to the Middle East Quarterly, which originally published the results of this study in its Summer 2011 edition (available online at http://www.meforum.org/2931/american-mosques) for granting permission to republish the results of this study in a more expansive online format.

Notes:

[1] These survey results were first published in "Shari'a and Violence in American Mosques," Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2011, pp. 59-72, available at http://www.meforum.org/2931/american-mosques. The authors would like to acknowledge the Center for Security Policy for its funding the largest portion of the survey costs. The authors would also like to acknowledge Professor Jonathan Rabinowitz, of Bar-Ilan University’s Louis and Gabi Weisfeld School of Social Work, for his assistance in data and statistical analysis, and Pete Rowe, Esq., for his invaluable and dedicated contribution in finalizing this article for publication.


[5] Id. at 157.

[6] See Id. at 142-159.


[8] Id.


[10] See Id.


[12] Id. at 115.

[13] Id. at 143-44.


[16] Id. at 10, 38.


[18] Silber and Bhatt, supra note 8, at 38.


[20] Id. at 76-77.

[21] Id. at 90.


[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Id. at 230.

[28] Id.


[32] Id.


Sheyk al-Akbar Mahmud Shaltut, Head of the al-Azhar University, Fatwa Announced July 6, 1959

Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror

Mary Habeck, at 1-2. Id.

Ihsan Bagby et al., The Mosque in America: A National Portrait (2001), and avail. at http://sun.cair.com/Portals/0/pdf/Muslim_population. The District of Columbia was added because of the sizable Muslim populations in Maryland and Virginia that work in the

See id.

Hafiz Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir. See e.g Tafsir Ibn Kathir

Sageman, supra note 1, at 2. Supra

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See Appendix A for a complete explanation of the behaviors that were scored as Sharia adherent, the materials that were scored as violence positive, and the behaviors that were scored as promoting violence or violent jihad.

Id.

Id. 1-2.

Mary Habec, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror, 116 (Yale Univ. Press 2006).

Al Azhar University, Certification of Reliance of the Traveller (1991), and avail. at http://www.exmuslim.org/Certificate%20Aal-Azhar

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[91] Sageman, supra note 1, at 9.
[93] Sageman, supra note 1, at 9.
[95] See Appendix B to view the tables containing the data referenced in both the Results discussion and the graphs embedded within the Results discussion.
[97] Id. at 33.
[98] See Appendix A for excerpts from the Sharia literature found in those mosques that made available materials supportive of violence.
[99] Silber and Bhatt, supra note 8, at 35 and Sacks, supra note 16 (discussing Anwar Al Awalki’s connections to several 9/11 hijackers and accused Fort Hood terrorist, Nidal Malik Hassan).
[103] Id., p. 10.
[104] Id. at 15, 21-22.
[107] March, supra note 52, at 266.
[108] Id. at 274.
## Appendix A: Excerpts from violent materials made available in mosques

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Source Document</th>
<th>Page Number/ Location</th>
<th>Subject Matter</th>
<th>Excerpt*</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fiqh-us-Sunnah</td>
<td>Vol. 1, Page 77b</td>
<td>Apostates</td>
<td>Ibn 'Abbas reported that the Prophet, upon whom be peace, said, &quot;The ties of Islam and the principles of the religion are three, and whoever leaves one of them becomes an unbeliever, and his blood becomes lawful: testifying that there is no god except Allah, the obligatory prayers, and the fast of Ramadan.&quot; (Related by Abu Ya'la with a hasan chain.) Another narration states, &quot;If anyone leaves one of them, by Allah he becomes an unbeliever and no voluntary deeds or recompense will be accepted from him, and his blood and wealth become lawful.&quot; This is a clear indication that such a person is to be killed.</td>
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<td>Fiqh-us-Sunnah</td>
<td>Vol. 1, Page 77b</td>
<td>Non-muslims</td>
<td>Ibn 'Umar related that the Messenger of Allah, upon whom be peace, said, &quot;I have been ordered to kill the people until they testify that there is no god except Allah, and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, and they establish prayer and pay the zakah. If they do that, their blood and wealth are protected from me save by the rights of Islam. Their reckoning will be with Allah.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiqh-us-Sunnah</td>
<td>Vol. 1, Page 77b</td>
<td>Apostates</td>
<td>Says ash-Shaukani, “The truth of the matter is that he becomes an unbeliever who is to be killed for his unbelief. The hadith authenticates that Islamic law calls one who does not pray an unbeliever. It has also put the performance as the barrier between a believer and an unbeliever. Abandoning prayer means he may be called an unbeliever.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiqh-us-Sunnah</td>
<td>Vol 1, Page 80</td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Although it is not obligatory for a child to pray, it is a must that his guardian order him to do so when he is seven, and he should beat him if he does not pray after he reaches the age of ten. A minor should practice praying until he reaches puberty. 'Amr ibn Shu'aib related from his father on the authority of his grandfather that the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, &quot;Order your children to pray when they reach the age of seven. Beat them (if they don't pray) when they reach the age of ten. And have them sleep separately.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiqh-us-Sunnah</td>
<td>Vol. 1, Page 113</td>
<td>Women/Hijab</td>
<td>There is no such dispute over what constitutes a woman's 'aurah [private parts/nakedness]. It is stated that her entire body is 'aurah and must be covered, except her hands and face. Says Allah in the Qur'an, &quot;And to display of their adornment only that which is apparent (do not expose any adornment or beauty save the hands and face).&quot; It has been authentically related from Ibn 'Abbas, Ibn 'Umar and 'Aishah that the Prophet said, &quot;Allah does not accept the prayer of an adult woman unless she is wearing a headcovering (khimar, hijab).&quot; This is related by &quot;the five,&quot; except for an-Nasa'i, and by Ibn Khuzaimah and al-Hakim. At-Tirmizhi grades it as hasan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiqh-us-Sunnah</td>
<td>Vol.2, Page 50 &amp; 56</td>
<td>Women/Prayer</td>
<td>As stated earlier, it is better for women to pray in their houses. Ahmad and at-Tabarani record that Umm Humaid as-Sa’diyah came to the Messenger of Allah and said: &quot;O Messenger of Allah, I love to pray with you.&quot; The Prophet said: &quot;I am aware of that, but your salah in your residence is better for you than your salah in your people's mosque. And your salah in your people's mosque is better than your salah in the [larger] congregational Mosque.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiqh-us-Sunnah</td>
<td>Vol.2, Page 62b</td>
<td>Women/Prayer</td>
<td>If a woman is present with the group, then she is to stand in a row by herself behind the men and she is not to join them in their rows. If she did not stand in a separate row, her salah will still be valid according to the opinion of majority. Anas said: &quot;An orphan and I prayed behind the Messenger of Allah in our house and my mother prayed behind us.&quot; In another version it is stated: &quot;He put me and the orphan in a row behind him and the woman behind us.&quot; This is related by al-Bukhari and Muslim.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiqh-us-Sunnah</td>
<td>Vol.2, Page 64a</td>
<td>Prayer Lines</td>
<td>&quot;It is preferred for the imam to order the followers to straighten the rows and fill in any gaps before he starts the salah. Anas relates: &quot;&quot;The Prophet would turn his face to us before he began the salah and he would say: 'Be close together and straighten your rows.'&quot; This is related by al-Bukhari and Muslim. He also reported that the Prophet would say: &quot;&quot;Make your rows straight for the straightening of the rows is part of the completion of the salah.&quot;&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiqh-us-Sunnah</td>
<td>Vol.3, Page 7</td>
<td>Apostates</td>
<td>Abu Hurairah is reported to have said: &quot;When Allah's Messenger, upon whom be peace, died and Abu Bakr succeeded him as caliph, some Arabs apostasized, causing Abu Bakr to declare war upon them. 'Umar said to him: 'Why must you fight these men?', especially when there is a ruling of the Prophet, upon whom be peace: 'I have been called to fight men until they say that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah, and whoever said it has saved his life and property from me except when a right is due in them, and his account will be with Allah.' Abu Bakr replied: 'By Allah! I will fight those who differentiate between salah and zakah because zakah is the due on property. By Allah! If they withheld even a young she-goat ('anaq) that they used to pay at the time of Allah's Messenger, upon whom be peace, I would fight them.' Then 'Umar said: 'By Allah! It was He who gave Abu Bakr the true knowledge to fight, and later I came to know that he was right.'&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiqh-us-Sunnah</td>
<td>Vol. 3, Page 65</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>The Hanafiyyah say that the share [monies paid] of such people [non-Muslims] are cancelled when Islam is strong. For instance, 'Uyainah ibn Hisn, al-Aqra' ibn Habis, and al-'Abbas ibn Mirdas came to Abu Bakr and requested their share. He wrote them a letter, which they took to 'Umar. He tore the letter and said: &quot;This is something that the Prophet, upon whom be peace, used to give you to reconcile you to Islam. Now, Allah has fortified Islam and it is no longer in need of you. Unless you stay with Islam, the sword will be between you and us. Say: 'It is the truth from the Lord of you [all]. Then whoever will, let him believe, and whoever will, let him disbelieve' [al Kahf 29].&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiqh-us-Sunnah</td>
<td>Vol. 5, Page 19</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Fear Allah concerning women! Verily you have taken them on the security of Allah, and intercourse with them has been made lawful unto you by word of Allah. You too have rights over them, in that they should not allow anyone to sit on your bed whom you do not like. But if they do that, you can chastise them but not severely.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reliance of the Traveller</td>
<td>fl.2</td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>When a child with discrimination (O: meaning he can eat, drink, and clean himself after using the toilet unassisted) is seven years of age, he is ordered to perform the prayer, and when ten, is beaten for neglecting it (N: not severely, but so as to discipline the child, and not more than three blows).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reliance of the Traveller</td>
<td>fl.3</td>
<td>Apostates</td>
<td>“Someone raised among Muslims who denies the obligatoriness of the prayer, zakat, fasting Ramadan, the pilgrimage, or the unlawfulness of wine and adultery, or denies something else upon which there is scholarly consensus (ijma’, def:b7) and which is necessarily known as being of the religion (N: necessarily known meaning things that any Muslim would know about if asked) thereby becomes an unbeliever (kafir) and is executed for his unbelief (O: if he does not admit he is mistaken and acknowledge the Obligatoriness or unlawfulness of that which there is scholarly consensus upon. As for if he denies the obligatoriness of something there is not consensus upon, then he is not adjudged an unbeliever).”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reliance of the Traveller</td>
<td>fl.4</td>
<td>Negligent Muslims</td>
<td>A Muslim who holds the prayer to be obligatory but through lack of concern neglects to perform it until its proper time is over has not committed unbelief (dis: w18.2). Rather, he is executed, washed, prayed over, and buried in the Muslim's cemetery (O: as he is one of them. It is recommended, but not obligatory, that he be asked to repent (N: and if he does, he is not executed)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance of the Traveller</td>
<td>f.5.3</td>
<td>Women/Hijab</td>
<td>The nakedness of a woman (O: even if a young girl) consists of the whole body except the face and hands. (N: The nakedness of woman is that which invalidates the prayer if exposed (dis:w23)).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reliance of the Traveller</td>
<td>f.5.6</td>
<td>Women/Hijab</td>
<td>It is recommended for a woman to wear a covering over her head (khimar), a full length shift, and a heavy slip under it that does not cling to the body.</td>
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| Reliance of the Traveller | f8.2                | Prayer Lines   | *It is recommended:  
(1) to stand for the prayer after the end of the call to commence (iqama);  
(2) to be in the first row;  
(3) to make the rows straight, especially if one is the imam (O: when one should order the group to do so);  
(4) and to fill up the first row first, then the second, and so on (O: meaning there should not be a second row when the first one is not full (A: as to pray in such a second row is the same as not praying with a group, and is rewarded as if one had prayed alone), nor gaps within one row, nor a distance in excess of a meter and a half between rows). It is superior to stand on the imam's right (A: though the sunna is for the imam to be in the middle) (N: and if one arrives at a group prayer in which the row extends to the right, one's rewards is greater for standing on the left, since one is performing the sunna).* |
| Reliance of the Traveller | m10.11              | Women          | *If the wife does not fulfill one of the above-mentioned obligations, she is termed 'rebellious' (nashiz), and the husband takes the following steps to correct matters:  
(a) admonition and advice, by explaining the unlawfulness of rebellion, its harmful effect on married life, and by listening to her viewpoint on the matter;  
(b) if admonition is ineffectual, he keeps from her by not sleeping in bed with her, by which both learn the degree to which they need each other;  
(c) if keeping from her is ineffectual, it is permissible for him to hit her [if] he believes that hitting her will bring her back to the right path, though if he does not think so, it is not permissible. His hitting her may not be in a way that injures her, and is his last recourse to save the family;  
(d) if the disagreement does not end after all this, each partner chooses an arbitrator to solve the dispute by settlement, or divorce.)* |
<p>| Reliance of the Traveller | o1.2                | Non-muslims    | The following are not subject to retaliation: ... (2) a Muslim for killing a non-Muslim; |
| Reliance of the Traveller | o1.2                | Apostates      | The following are not subject to retaliation: ... (3) a Jewish or Christian subject of the Islamic state for killing an apostate from Islam (O: because a subject of the state is under its protection, while killing an apostate from Islam is without consequences); |
| Reliance of the Traveller | o8.1                | Apostates      | When a person who has reached puberty and is sane voluntarily apostatizes from Islam, he deserves to be killed. |
| Reliance of the Traveller | o8.2                | Apostates      | In such a case, it is obligatory for the caliph (A: or his representative) to ask him to repent and return to Islam. If he does, it is accepted from him, but if he refuses, he is immediately killed. |</p>
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<tr>
<td>Reliance of the Traveller</td>
<td>09.8</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>The caliph (o25) makes war upon Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians (N: provided he has first invited them to enter Islam in faith and practice, and if they will not, then invited them to enter the social order of Islam by paying the non-Muslim poll tax (jizya, def: o11.4)-which is the significance of their paying it, not the money itself-while remaining in their ancestral religions) (O: and the war continues) until they become Muslim or else pay the non-Muslim poll tax (O: in accordance with the word of Allah Most High, &quot;Fight those who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day and who forbid not what Allah and His messenger have forbidden-who do not practice the religion of truth, being of those who have been given the Book-until they pay the poll tax out of hand and are humbled&quot; (Koran 9:29))</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reliance of the Traveller</td>
<td>09.9</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>The caliph fights all other peoples until they become Muslim (O: because they are not a people with a Book, nor honored as such, and are not permitted to settle with paying the poll tax (jizya))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance of the Traveller</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>A free male Muslim who has reached puberty and is sane is entitled to the spoils of battle when he has participated in a battle to the end of it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance of the Traveller</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>As for personal booty, anyone who, despite resistance, kills one of the enemy or effectively incapacitates him, risking his own life thereby, is entitled to whatever he can take from the enemy, meaning as much as he can take away with him in the battle, such as a mount, clothes, weaponry, money, or other.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reliance of the Traveller</td>
<td>p42.2</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Allah Most High says: &quot;Men are the guardians of women, since Allah has been more generous to one than the other, and because of what they (men) spend from their wealth. so righteous women will be obedient, and in absence watchful, for Allah is watchful. And if you fear their intractability, warn them, send them from bed, or hit them. But if they obey you, seek no way to blame them&quot; (Koran 4:34).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>The third kind [of non-Muslim] were those with whom there was neither a treaty nor were they fighting against the Prophet-peace be on him-, or those with whom no term of expiration was stated. Concerning these, it was commanded that they be given four months' notice of expiration, at the end of which they should be considered open enemies and fought with.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>If someone does this [prevents others from accepting Islam], then it is the duty of Islam to fight him until either he is killed or until he declares his submission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>Fight against those among the People of the Book who do not believe in God and the Last Day, who do not forbid what God and His messenger have forbidden, and who do not consider the true religion as their way of life, until they are subdued and pay Jiziyah.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>&quot;It was also explained that war should be declared against those from among the People of the Book [16 Christians and Jews] who declare open enmity, until they agree to pay Jiziyah or accept Islam.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>Concerning the polytheists and the hypocrites, it was commanded in this chapter that Jihad be declared against them and that they be treated harshly. The Prophet-peace be on him-carried on Jihad against the polytheists by fighting and against the hypocrites by preaching and argument.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>Thus, after the revelation of the chapter Bara'ah, the unbelievers were of three kinds: adversaries in war, people with treaties, and Dhimmies [second-class citizens within the Islamic state]. The people with treaties eventually became Muslims, so there were only two kinds left: people at war and Dhimmies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>&quot;This group of thinkers, who are a product of the sorry state of the present Muslim generation, have nothing but the label of Islam and have laid down their spiritual and rational arms in defeat. They say, &quot;&quot;Islam has prescribed only defensive war&quot;&quot;...&quot;&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>&quot;When writers with defeatist and apologetic mentalities write about &quot;&quot;Jihad in Islam,&quot;&quot; trying to remove this 'blot' from Islam, then they are mixing up two things: first, that this religion forbids the imposition of its belief by force, as is clear from the verse, &quot;&quot;There is no compulsion in religion&quot;&quot;(2:256), while on the other hand it tries to annihilate all those political and material powers which stand between people and Islam, which force one people to bow before another people and prevent them from accepting the sovereignty of God. These two principles have no relation to one another nor is there room to mix them. In spite of this, these defeatist-type people try to mix the two aspects and want to confine Jihad to what today is called 'defensive war'.&quot;&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>&quot;Anyone who understands this particular character of this religion will also understand the place of Jihad bi al-sayf (striving through fighting), which is to clear the way for striving through preaching in the application of the Islamic movement. He will understand that Islam is not a defensive movement in the narrow sense which today is technically called a defensive war. This narrow meaning is ascribed to it by those who are under the pressure of circumstances and are defeated by the wily attacks of the orientalists, who distort the concept of Islamic Jihad. It was a movement to wipe out tyranny and to introduce true freedom to mankind, using resources according to the actual human situation, and it had definite stages, for each of which it utilized new methods.&quot;</td>
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**Perspectives on Terrorism**

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<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
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<td>Jihad</td>
<td>If we insist on calling Islamic Jihad a defensive movement, then we must change the meaning of the word 'defense' and mean by it 'the defense of man' against all those elements which limit his freedom. These elements take the form of beliefs and concepts, as well as of political systems, based on economic, racial or class distinctions. When Islam first came into existence, the world was full of such systems, and the present-day Jahiliyyah also has various kinds of such systems.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>Since the objective of the message of Islam is a decisive declaration of man's freedom, not merely on the philosophical plane but also in the actual conditions of life, it must employ Jihad. It is immaterial whether the homeland of Islam - in the true Islamic sense, Dar al-Islam - is in a condition of peace or whether it is threatened by its neighbors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>&quot;With these verses from the Qur'an and with many Traditions of the Prophet -peace be on him - in praise of Jihad, and with the entire history of Islam, which is full of Jihad, the heart of every Muslim rejects that explanation of Jihad invented by those people whose minds have accepted defeat under unfavorable conditions and under the attacks on Islamic Jihad by the shrewd orientalists.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>What kind of a man is it who, after listening to the commandment of God and the Traditions of the Prophet - peace be on him-and after reading about the events which occurred during the Islamic Jihad, still thinks that it is a temporary injunction related to transient conditions and that it is concerned only with the defense of the borders?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>&quot;Thus, this struggle is not a temporary phase but an eternal state - an eternal state, as truth and falsehood cannot co-exist on this earth. Whenever Islam stood up with the universal declaration that God's Lordship should be established over the entire earth and that men should become free from servitude to other men, the usurpers of God's authority on earth have struck out against it fiercely and have never tolerated it. It became incumbent upon Islam to strike back and release man throughout the earth from the grip of these usurpers. The eternal struggle for the freedom of man will continue until the religion is purified for God.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>&quot;The Jihad of Islam is to secure complete freedom for every man throughout the world by releasing him from servitude to other human beings so that he may serve his God, Who IS One and Who has no associates. This is in itself a sufficient reason for Jihad. These were the only reasons in the hearts of Muslim warriors. If they had been asked the question &quot;&quot;Why are you fighting?&quot;&quot; none would have answered, &quot;&quot;My country is in danger; I am fighting for its defense&quot;&quot; or &quot;&quot;The Persians and the Romans have come upon us&quot;&quot;, or, &quot;&quot;We want to extend our dominion and want more spoils.&quot;</td>
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<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>&quot;Those who say that Islamic Jihad was merely for the defense of the 'homeland of Islam' diminish the greatness of the Islamic way of life and consider it less important than their 'homeland'.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>&quot;We ought not to be deceived or embarrassed by the attacks of the orientalists on the origin of Jihad, nor lose self-confidence under the pressure of present conditions and the weight of the great powers of the world to such an extent that we try to find reasons for Islamic Jihad outside the nature of this religion, and try to show that it was a defensive measure under temporary conditions. The need for Jihad remains, and will continue to remain, whether these conditions exist or not!&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>Jihad in Islam is simply a name for striving to make this system of life [Islam] dominant in the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 7</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>&quot;But the movement which is a natural outgrowth of the Islamic belief and which is the essence of the Islamic society does not let any individual hide himself. Every individual of this society must move! There should be a movement in his belief, a movement in his blood, a movement in his community, and in the structure of this organic society, and as the Jahiliyyah is all around him, and its residual influences in his mind and in the minds of those around him, the struggle goes on and the Jihad continues until the Day of Resurrection.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 9</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>But any place where the Islamic Shari'ah is not enforced and where Islam is not dominant becomes the home of Hostility (Dar-ul-Harb) for both the Muslim and the Dhimmi. A Muslim will remain prepared to fight against it, whether it be his birthplace or a place where his relatives reside or where his property or any other material interests are located.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qutb's Milestones</td>
<td>Chapter 9</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>There is only one place on earth which can be called the home of Islam (Dar-ul-Islam), and it is that place where the Islamic state is established and the Shari'ah is the authority and God's limits are observed, and where all the Muslims administer the affairs of the state with mutual consultation. The rest of the world is the home of hostility (Dar-ul-Harb). A Muslim can have only two possible relations with Dar-ul-Harb: peace with a contractual agreement, or war.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 1, P. 596; Sura 2:126--Al Baqarah</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>In this Ayah, Allah made it obligatory for the Muslims to fight in Jihad against the evil of the enemy who transgress against Islam.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 2, P. 445-446; Sura 4:34--An Nisa</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Allah's statement, (beat them [wives]) means, if advice and ignoring her in bed do not produce the desired results, you are allowed to discipline them, without severe beating. …you are allowed to discipline them lightly.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 2, P. 516; Sura 4:76--An Nisa</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>Therefore, the believers fight in obedience to Allah and to gain His pleasure, while the disbelievers fight in obedience to Shaytan [Satan]. Allah then encourages the believers to fight His enemies. (So, fight against the friends of Shaytan; even feeble indeed is the plot of Shaytan).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 2, P. 519; Sura 4:77--An Nisa</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>Rather, you will earn your full rewards for them [your good deeds]. This promise directs the focus of believers [Muslims] away from this life and makes them eager for the Hereafter, all the while encouraging them to fight in Jihad.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 3, P. 170; Sura 5:35--Al Ma'idah</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>…He [Allah] commanded them [Muslims] to fight against their enemies, the disbelievers and idolators who have deviated from the straight path and abandoned the correct religion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 4, P. 315; Sura 8:39--Al-Anfal</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>I [Muhammad] was commanded to fight against the people until they proclaim, &quot;There is no deity worthy of worship except Allah.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 4, P. 376; Sura 9:5--At-Tawbah</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>Upon the end of the four months during which We prohibited you from fighting the idolators, and which is the grace period We gave them, then fight and kill the idolators wherever you may find them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 4, P. 376; Sura 9:5--At-Tawbah</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>…[D]o not wait until you find them [idolators]. Rather, seek and besiege them in their areas and forts, gather intelligence about them in the various roads and fairways so that what is made wide looks ever smaller to them. This way, they will have no choice, but to die or embrace Islam[.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 4, P. 408; Sura 9:30-31--At-Tawbah</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>Allah the Exalted encourages the believers [Muslims] to fight against the polytheists, disbelieving Jews and Christians, who uttered this terrible statement and utter lies against Allah, the Exalted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 4, P. 475; Sura 9:73--At-Tawbah</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>Allah commanded the Prophet to fight the disbelievers with the sword, to strive against the hypocrites with the tongue and annulled lenient treatment of them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 4, P. 475; Sura 9:73--At-Tawbah</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>Perform Jihad against the disbelievers with the sword and be harsh with the hypocrites with words, and this is the Jihad performed against them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 4, P. 546; Sura 9:123--At-Tawbah</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>Allah commands the believers [Muslims] to fight the disbelievers, the closest in area to the Islamic state, then the farthest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 4, P. 548; Sura 9:123--At-Tawbah</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>…fight the disbelievers and trust in Allah knowing that Allah is with you if you fear and obey Him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 9, P. 23-24; Sura 45:14--At-Jathiyyah</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>In the beginning of Islam, Muslims were ordered to observe patience in the face of oppression of the idolators and the People of the Scriptures so that their hearts may incline towards Islam. However, when the disbelievers persisted in stubbornness, Allah legislated for the believers to fight in Jihad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 9, P. 87; Sura 47:4--Muhammad</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>(So, when you meet those who disbelieve (in battle), smite their necks) which means, 'when you fight against them [disbelievers], cut them down totally with your swords.' (Until you have fully defeated them,) meaning, 'you have killed and utterly destroyed them.'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 9, P. 89; Sura 47:4--Muhammad</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>He [Allah] has ordered Jihad and fighting against the enemies in order to try you and test your affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</td>
<td>Vol. 10, P. 72; Sura 66:9--At-Tarhim</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>Allah the Exalted orders His Messenger to perform Jihad against the disbelievers and hypocrites, the former with weapons and armaments and the later by establishing Allah's legislated penal code[.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyad-us-Saliheen</td>
<td>Chapter 34:274</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Although Islam has permitted man, in inevitable circumstances, to rebuke his wife, it has also suggested a very wise course for it. It has suggested that first of all he should advise and preach [to] her, and if she does not mend her ways by these means, then he should stop sleeping with her, which is a great warning for the sensible wife. If she does not improve even by this method, then he may take recourse to slight beating, but in that he must avoid her head and face. He should take recourse to beating if he thinks that it would work, otherwise it is better to avoid it. But surprisingly enough some start the process of reformation with beating and that too with great ruthlessness which has not been permitted by Islam in any case. It is this aspect which the Prophet (PBUH) has highlighted in this Hadith. He has contended that when the wife is indispensable for man and it is very difficult for him to pass night without her then why should he beat her like a slave or bondmaid? He should try to understand that she, too, has feelings and her position is like one of the two wheels of the cart of life. If at all it comes to beating her then he must keep her true status in view before taking recourse to it. He should never lose sight of her importance in conjugal life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyad-us-Saliheen</td>
<td>Chapter 34:276</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>'Amr bin Al-Ahwas Al-Jushami (May Allah be pleased with him) reported that he had heard the Prophet (PBUH) saying on his Farewell Pilgrimage, after praising and glorifying Allah and admonishing people, &quot;Treat women kindly, they are like captives in your hands; you do not owe anything else from them. In case they are guilty of open indecency, then do not share their beds and beat them lightly but if they return to obedience, do not have recourse to anything else against them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyad-us-Saliheen</td>
<td>Chapter 234:1287-1288</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>The Hadith points out the superiority of fighting in the way of Allah. The moment one fights for Allah's sake, be it in the early morning or the evening, is better than the world and all that is in it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyad-us-Saliheen</td>
<td>Chapter 234:1289</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>It [Haddith] brings into focus the excellence of fighting Jihad with one's wealth and life for the sake of Allah.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riyad-us-Saliheen</td>
<td>Chapter 234:1290</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>This Hadith highlights the excellence of observing Ribat [guarding the Islamic frontier for the sake of Allah] and fighting in the way of Allah. It also highlights the insignificance of this world and the great reward in the Hereafter which can be attained through Jihad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyad-us-Saliheen</td>
<td>Chapter 234:1298</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>The example cited here [in this Hadith] means that so long a Mujahid is engaged in Jihad, he is like a person who keeps himself occupied in Salat [prayer] at night and observes Saum [fasting] in the day time. The action of such a person can be equal in reward to the conduct of a Mujahid. Thus, in special situations Jihad is the most meritorious act. A worshipper cannot attain that reward for his worship which a Mujahid achieves in Jihad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyad-us-Saliheen</td>
<td>Chapter 234:1308</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>This Hadith also stresses the fact that if a person is unable to take part in Jihad due to illness, for example, he should then provide such material to a Mujahid which is helpful for him in Jihad. If he does so, he will be eligible to the same reward which is due on Jihad. This would also be a source of increase and growth in his possessions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyad-us-Saliheen</td>
<td>Chapter 234:1319</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>Jannat-ul-Firdaus is the highest portion of Jannah[Paradise]. The allocation of this portion [of Paradise] to the martyrs is a proof that Jihad is very much liked by Allah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyad-us-Saliheen</td>
<td>Chapter 234:1345</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>What this Hadith really means is that when the situation calls for Jihad then the foremost priority of a Muslim should be Jihad. In such an event his passion for touring the world should yield to the spirit of Jihad against the infidels and then he must with his full force fight against the enemy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyad-us-Saliheen</td>
<td>Chapter 234:1348</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>This Hadith means that one who neither takes part in Jihad nor provides arms to a Mujahid nor looks after the families of the Mujahidun during their absence, is guilty of crimes for which he is punished in this world by Allah. It is, therefore, the duty of the Muslim Ummah [community] that it should in no way neglect the obligation of Jihad and all its requirements; otherwise it will suffer punishment in this world and in the next.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyad-us-Saliheen</td>
<td>Chapter 234:1349</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>This Hadith mentions three categories of Jihad, namely Jihad with wealth, Jihad with one's life and Jihad by speech. One should make Jihad as is warranted by the situation one is confronted with. That is, where a Muslim is required to sacrifice his life, he must sacrifice his life; where he is required to sacrifice his wealth, he should spend wealth; and where he is required to make Jihad by means of his speech, he should do it by speech. One should not hesitate to spend for the sake of Allah what is required by the situation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riyad-us-Saliheen</td>
<td>Chapter 234:1352</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>The Ahadith mentioned in this chapter make the importance of Jihad and the reason for so much stress on it abundantly clear. These also show how great a crime it is to ignore it. It is very unfortunate indeed that present-day Muslims are guilty of renouncing Jihad in every part of the world. May Allah help us to overcome this negligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maududi's Jihad in Islam</td>
<td>P. 18</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>These [Muslim] men who propagate religion are not mere preachers or missionaries, but the functionaries of God, (so that they may be witnesses for the people), and it is their duty to wipe out oppression, mischief, strife, immorality, high handedness and unlawful exploitation from the world by force of arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maududi's Jihad in Islam</td>
<td>P. 20</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>If these people [Muslims] evade their duty of actively striving for this end [imposing an Islamic government], it clearly implies that they are hypocrites and liars in their faith.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maududi's Jihad in Islam</td>
<td>P. 20</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>In these words, the Qur’an has given a clear and definite decree that the acid test of the true devotion of a party to its convictions is whether or not it expends all its resources of wealth and life in the struggle for installing its faith as the ruling power in the State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Meaning of the Quran</td>
<td>Sura 2--Al-Baqarah</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>Salat, Fast, Zakat, Haj and Jihad have been prescribed for the moral training of the Ummat [Muslim community].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Meaning of the Quran</td>
<td>Sura 4--An-Nisa</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>If the wife is defiant and does [n]ot obey her husband or does not guard his rights, three measures have been mentioned, but it does not mean that all the three are to be taken at one and the same time. Though these have been permitted, they are to be administered with a sense of proportion according to the nature and extent of the offense. If a mere light admonition proves effective, there is no need to resort to a severer step. As to a beating, the Holy Prophet allowed it very reluctantly and even then did not like it. But the fact is that there are certain women who do not mend their ways without a beating. In such a case, the Holy Prophet has instructed that she would not be beaten on the face, or cruelly, or with anything which might leave a mark on the body.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Meaning of the Quran</td>
<td>Sura 4--An-Nisa</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>In the sight of Allah, there are two distinct parties of fighters. One party is that of the Believers who fight for the cause of Allah in order to establish his way on His earth, and every sincere Believer is bound to perform this duty.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Meaning of the Quran</td>
<td>Surah 5--Al-Ma-idah</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>Thus, this verse exhorts the Believer to fight his enemies on all fronts. On one side, he confronts Satan and a host of his followers, and on the second, his own self and its alluring temptations. On the third side, he has to fight many people who have swerved from the way of God, and with whom he is bound by close social, cultural and economic relations. On the fourth side, he is required to oppose all those religious, cultural and political systems that are founded on rebellion against God and force people to submit to falsehood instead of the Truth. Though these enemies employ different weapons, they all have one and the same object in view, that is, to subdue their victims and bring them under their own subjection. It is obvious that true success can only be achieved if one becomes wholly and solely a servant of God and obeys Him openly and also secretly, to the exclusion of obedience to all others. Thus there is bound to be a conflict with all the four enemies: Therefore the Believer cannot achieve his object unless he engages himself with all these hostile and opposing forces at one and the same time and at all events, and removing all these hindrances marches onwards on the way of Allah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Meaning of the Quran</td>
<td>Sura 8--Al-Anfal</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>This aim [of Islamic warfare] has two aspects-- the negative and the positive. On the negative side, the aim of war is to abolish (fitnah), and on the positive, it is to establish Allah's Way completely and in its entirety. This is the only objective for which it is lawful, nay, obligatory for the believers to fight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Meaning of the Quran</td>
<td>Sura 9--At-Taubah</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>In this portion [verses 13-37] the Muslims have been urged to fight in the Way of Allah with the mushrik [polytheistic] Arabs, the Jews and the Christians, who were duly warned of the consequences of their mischievous and inimical behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Meaning of the Quran</td>
<td>Sura 9--At-Taubah</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>&quot;The second reason why Jihad should be waged against them is [th]at they did not adopt the Law sent down by Allah through His Messenger. [Humiliation/reduction in status] is the aim of Jihad with the Jews and the Christians and it is not to force them to become Muslims and adopt the 'Islamic Way of Life.' They should be forced to pay Jizyah [poll tax] in order to put an end to their independence and supremacy so that they should not remain rulers and sovereigns in the land. These powers should be wrested from them by the followers of the true Faith, who should assume the sovereignty and lead others towards the Right Way, while they [Jews and Christians] should become their subjects and pay jizyah.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Meaning of the Quran</td>
<td>Sura 9--At-Taubah</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>This Command [to fight the unbelievers and hypocrites] enunciated the change of policy towards the hypocrites. Up to this time, leniency was being shown to them for two reasons. First, the Muslims had not as yet become so powerful as to take the risk of an internal conflict in addition to the one with the external enemies. The other reason was to give trough (sic) respite to those people who were involved in doubts and suspicions so that they could get sufficient time for attaining to faith and belief. But now the time had come f[or] a change of policy. The whole of Arabia had been subdued and a bitter conflict with the external enemies was about to start; therefore it was required that these internal enemies should be crushed down so that they should not be able to conspire with the external enemies to stir up any internal danger to the Muslims. And now it had become possible to crush them. As regards [the second reason], these hypocrites had been given respite for a period of nine years to observe, to consider and test the Right Way, and they could have availed of it, if they had any good in them. So there was no reason why any more leniency should be shown to them. Therefore, Allah enjoined the Muslims to treat the hypocrites on one and the same level with the disbelievers and start Jihad against them, and to give up the policy of leniency [they had adopted towards them] and adopt a fine and stern policy instead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Meaning of the Quran</td>
<td>Sura 9--At-Taubah</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>From the apparent wording of this verse, it may be inferred that only those Muslims have at first been held responsible to fight with those enemies of Islam who live near their territory. But if we read this verse along with the succeeding passage, it becomes clear that here &quot;disbelievers who are near you refers to those hypocrites who were doing great harm to the Islamic Society by mixing up with the sincere Muslims. This very thing was stated in v. 73 at the beginning of this discourse. The Command has been repeated at its end in order to impress on the Muslims the importance of the matter and to urge them to do Jihad and crush these internal enemies, without paying the least regard to the racial, family and social relations that had been proving a binding force with them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Meaning of the Quran</td>
<td>Sura 66--At-Tahrim</td>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>The commentary referred the reader to the author's previous comment from Sura 9--At-Taubah located in cell &quot;D-272.&quot;</td>
</tr>
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## Appendix B - Shari‘a-Adherent Behaviors: [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Observation: Yes/No or Count</th>
<th>Subject to Secondary Review</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender Segregation During Prayer Service</td>
<td>Shari‘a-adherent communal prayer occurs when men and women are segregated during prayer service. The segregation could occur by virtue of men and women praying in different buildings or different rooms. The segregation could also occur when men and women were in the same room, but were separated either with or without the use of a physical divider. Non-Shari‘a-adherent communal prayer occurs when men and women are not segregated during the prayer service and the genders mix.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment of Men’s Prayer Lines</td>
<td>Shari‘a-adherent alignment of men’s prayer lines occurs when either the imam, lay leader, or the worshipers inspect and enforce the straightness of the men’s prayer lines. Non-Shari‘a-adherent alignment of men’s prayer lines occurs when there is no observable attention paid to strict alignment of the men’s prayer lines.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam’s or Lay Leader’s Beard [3]</td>
<td>An imam’s or lay leader’s beard is a Sunna-style (i.e., full) beard, whether trimmed or not and either with or without henna dye coloring the beard. A non-Sunna style beard is either limited to a chin-beard or if the imam or lay leader wears no beard at all.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Observation: Yes/No or Count</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imam or Lay Leader Wore Head Covering</td>
<td>Shari’a-adherent behavior is that the imam or lay leader wore a religious head covering. Non-Shari’a-adherent behavior is that the imam or lay leader did not wear a religious head covering.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam’s or Lay Leader’s Clothing</td>
<td>Shari’a-adherent garb is any of the following: (a) short thoub; (b) pants rolled up above the ankles; or (c) ankle-length thoub. Non-Shari’a-adherent garb is Western-style clothing such as modern-style dress or casual pants and shirt.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam or Lay Leader Wore Watch on His Right Wrist [4]</td>
<td>Certain Salafists wear the watch on the right wrist. Wearing the watch on the left wrist or not wearing a watch at all.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Men with Beards</td>
<td>Shari’a-adherent behavior is for an adult male worshiper to have a beard (full or not). Non-Shari’a-adherent behavior is for an adult male worshiper to not have a beard.</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Male Worshipers’ Clothing</td>
<td>Shari’a-adherent behavior is to wear either: (a) short thoub; (b) pants rolled up above the ankles; or (c) ankle-length thoub or similar Muslim attire. Non-Shari’a-adherent behavior is to wear Western-style clothing such as pants not rolled up above the ankles.</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Adult Female Worshipers’ Clothing</td>
<td>Shari’a-adherent behavior is to wear either the traditional hijab (covering the hair) or the niqab (covering the entire female body except the eyes). Non-Shari’a-adherent behavior is to wear the modern hijab (a scarf that does not completely cover the hair) or to not wear any hair covering.</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls (age 5-12) Wear Hijab</td>
<td>Shari’a-adherent behavior is to wear the traditional hijab. Non-Shari’a-adherent behavior is to not wear the hijab.</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys (age 5-12) Wear Head Covering</td>
<td>Shari’a-adherent behavior is to wear a religious head covering. Non-Shari’a-adherent behavior is to not wear a religious head covering.</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Violence-Positive Shari’a Legal and Religious Texts or Presence of Violence-Positive Islamic Political Literature</td>
<td>If the surveyor found the <em>Fiqh us Sunnah</em> or <em>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</em>, but not more extreme materials, then the mosque was categorized as containing moderate-rated material. If the surveyor found the <em>Riyadh us Salaheen</em>, works by Qutb or Mawdudi, or similar materials, then the mosque was categorized as containing severe-rated materials. If the surveyor found no violence-positive materials or if the violence-positive materials constituted less than 10% of all available materials, then the mosque was categorized as containing no materials.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>No, unless the surveyor found materials promoting <em>Fiqh us Sunnah</em>, <em>Tafsir Ibn Kathir</em>, <em>Riyadh us Salaheen</em>, or works by Qutb or Mawdudi. Other materials were subject to a secondary review.</td>
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<td>List</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imam Recommended Studying Texts Promoting Violence</td>
<td>Following the prayer service, the surveyor asked the following question: “Do you recommend the study of: (a) only the Quran and/or Sunna; (b) Tafsir Ibn Kathir; (c) Fiqh Us Sunna; (e) Reliance of the Traveller; or (f) the works of Qutb, such as Milestones, and Maududi, such as The Meaning of the Quran?” If the Imam or lay leader recommended studying any of the above-mentioned materials except for the Quran and/or Sunna, then the Imam or lay leader was recorded as having recommended the study of texts promoting the rated material.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoted Joining a Terrorist Organization [5]</td>
<td>If materials available on mosque premises promoted joining a known terrorist organization, such as “mujahideen” engaged in jihad abroad, then the mosque was recorded as having promoted joining a terrorist organization.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoted Financial Support of Terror</td>
<td>If materials available on mosque premises promoted the financial support of terrorism, jihadists, or terrorist organizations, then the mosque was recorded as having promoted the financial support of terror. Examples include materials that made explicit calls to support mujahideen abroad or families of Palestinian suicide bombers.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Observation: Yes/No or Count</td>
<td>Subject to Secondary Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openly Collected Money at the Mosque for a Known Terrorist Organization</td>
<td>If materials available on mosque premises indicated that speakers came to the mosque to raise money for specific terrorist organizations, then the mosque was recorded as having openly collected money at the mosque for a known terrorist organization.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoted Establishment of the Islamic Caliphate in the U.S.</td>
<td>If materials available on mosque premises promoted establishing the Islamic Caliphate in the United States, then the mosque was recorded as having promoted the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate in the U.S.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praised Terror Against the West</td>
<td>If materials available on mosque premises praised engaging in acts of violence against the West or praised acts of terrorism previously committed against the West, then the mosque was recorded as having praised terror against the West.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque Invited Guest Imams or Preachers Known to Have Promoted Violent Jihad</td>
<td>If materials available at the mosque indicated that the mosque had invited a guest imam or other guest speaker who is known to have promoted violent jihad, then the mosque was recorded as having invited guest imams or preachers known to have promoted violent jihad. Examples of such imams include Siraj Wahhaj, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Anwar al-Awlaki.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List | Description | Observation: Yes/No or Count | Subject to Secondary Review
--- | --- | --- | ---
Promoted Violent Jihad | If any of the materials featured on mosque property promoted engaging in terrorist activity; promoted the financial support of terrorism or jihadists; promoted the use of force, terror, war, and violence to implement Shari’a; promoted the idea that oppression and subversion of Islam should be changed by deed first, then by speech, then by faith; praised acts of terrorism against the West; or praised suicide bombers against Israelis, then the mosque was recorded as having promoted violent jihad. | Yes/No | Yes

Notes

[1] According to Islamic jurisprudence, Shari’a-adherence can be measured across several normative axes, such as obligatory-prohibited, recommended-discouraged, and simply permissible. In theory, every act of a Shari’a-adherent Muslim falls within one of the normative categories—that is, there is no behavior outside of Shari’a. For purposes of this survey, the authors have chosen, except where indicated by notation, the obligatory-prohibited and the recommended-discouraged or recommended-permissible axes, which we have demarcated Shari’a adherent/non-Shari’a adherent, respectively.

[2] If a mosque, on the basis of materials observed by the surveyor, was recorded as having: (a) promoted violent jihad; (b) promoted joining a terrorist organization; (c) promoted financial support of terror; (d) collected money openly at the mosque for a known terrorist organization; (e) promoted establishing the Caliphate in the U.S.; (f) praised terror against the West; (g) distributed memorabilia featuring jihadists or terrorist organizations; or (h) invited imams or preachers who are known to have promoted violent jihad, then the materials that the surveyor relied on to record the presence of this material were subject to a secondary review by a committee of three subject-matter experts. This secondary review was collected and reviewed by the experts evaluating the materials independently of one another. A consensus view of two of the three experts was required to confirm the surveyor’s observation. In 63% of the cases, the materials were so explicit in their promotion, praise, or support for the above behaviors that the committee’s decision was unanimous. In no instance was there not a consensus and agreement with the surveyor’s observation.

[3] The different legal schools vary on whether a beard is obligatory or preferable; they also differ on whether the beard for purposes of fiqh is only the chin hairs or also the lateral hairs of the sideburns and cheeks; and they differ on the minimum required length before trimming is permitted. The majority view, taking into account all schools and the Salafist opinions, is that a full beard is Sunna (following the behavior of Muhammad) and if not obligatory, preferable. For purposes of this survey, the full beard, trimmed or not, was considered Shari’a adherent and a chin beard or no beard, was considered as non-Sunna, and in the survey’s lexicon, non-adherent.

[4] While wearing a watch on the right hand is not strictly speaking a Shari’a requirement, during the preparation of the methodology of this survey, the authors identified literature at several mosques attended by Salafists advocating the wearing of a watch on the right hand for two...
reasons: not to wear jewelry on the left hand to follow the mode of dress of Muhammad, who, based upon certain Sunna, did not wear jewelry on his left hand; and to avoid dressing in the way of non-Muslims. The authors decided to add this observation to determine whether this behavior translated into observance by the more fundamentalist Salafists. They also observed that the 12 imams who wore the watch on the right hand were right handed.

[5] All of the materials characterized from this point to the end of the survey was dated or produced prior to September 11, 2001; but was still available at or sold by the mosque in prominent fashion.
## Appendix C - Data Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Association of strictness of violence-positive materials available at mosque and key aspects of sharia-based mosque prayer service and sharia-based imam characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No material (n=19)</th>
<th>Moderate [1] (n=30)</th>
<th>Severe (n=51) [2]</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Chi-square (all df=2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prayer service [3]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segregation in prayer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>16 (26%)</td>
<td>17 (27%)</td>
<td>29 (47%)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>6.48, p=.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>13 (35%)</td>
<td>22 (60%)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment of prayer lines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.86, p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>16 (36%)</td>
<td>10 (22%)</td>
<td>19 (42%)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
<td>20 (37%)</td>
<td>32 (59%)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of imam or lay leader [4]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam or lay leader has Sunnah beard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No [5]</td>
<td>13 (26%)</td>
<td>14 (28%)</td>
<td>23 (46%)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6.62, p=.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes [6]</td>
<td>3 (7%)</td>
<td>15 (33%)</td>
<td>28 (61%)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam wore head covering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>9 (20%)</td>
<td>16 (35%)</td>
<td>21 (46%)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1.98, p=.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7 (14%)</td>
<td>13 (26%)</td>
<td>30 (60%)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam wore traditional (non-Western garb)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.97, p=.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>11 (25%)</td>
<td>14 (32%)</td>
<td>19 (43%)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5 (10%)</td>
<td>15 (29%)</td>
<td>32 (62%)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam wore watch on right wrist [7]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15 (18%)</td>
<td>23 (28%)</td>
<td>45 (54%)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>2.61, p=.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>6 (50%)</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] Has only Tafsir Ibn Kathir commentary on the Qur'an and/or Fiqh-us-Sunnah (n=20).
[2] Has Riyadh-us-Salaheen (n=7) or more extreme fiqh material.
[3] In 1 mosque there was no prayer and surveyor could not determine the usual practice.
[4] 4 mosques did not have a leader.
[5] 3 with no beard included in this category.
[6] 3 had traditional beards with henna; and all were in the severe group. They were combined with this group for ease of reporting.
[7] In 1 case it was not determined.
Table 3: Association of strictness of violence-positive materials available at mosque and mosque attendance and key sharia-based worshiper characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of worshipers [10]</th>
<th>No material (n=19)</th>
<th>Moderate [8] (n=30)</th>
<th>Severe [9] (n=51)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>F test (unless otherwise noted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Kruskal-Wallis, p&lt;.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of men with beards (SD) [11]</td>
<td>14% (26.3) (n=17)</td>
<td>36% (25.4) (n=30)</td>
<td>48% (32.4) (n=51)</td>
<td>39% (31.7) (n=98)</td>
<td>F=8.61, df=2, 95 p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of men with hats</td>
<td>16% (25.8) (n=17)</td>
<td>34% (26.2) (n=29)</td>
<td>47% (32.6) (n=51)</td>
<td>38% (31.3) (n=97)</td>
<td>F=6.54, df=2, 94 p=.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of men with Western garb</td>
<td>73% (39.9) (n=16)</td>
<td>35% (30.7) (n=30)</td>
<td>34% (33.1) (n=51)</td>
<td>41% (36.2) (n=97)</td>
<td>F=8.79, df=2, 94 p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of women with modern hijab (vs. traditional hijab/niqab) [12]</td>
<td>57% (45.0) (n=7)</td>
<td>38% (37.5) (n=21)</td>
<td>42% (27.3) (n=37)</td>
<td>33% (32.9) (n=65)</td>
<td>F=0.92, df=2, 62, p=.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of girls with hijab</td>
<td>29% (48.8) (n=7)</td>
<td>14% (32.2) (n=21)</td>
<td>36% (40.4) (n=37)</td>
<td>28% (43.8) (n=65)</td>
<td>F=1.87, df=2,62 p=.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of boys with head covering [13]</td>
<td>14% (37.8) (n=7)</td>
<td>24% (37.6) (n=20)</td>
<td>32% (40) (n=36)</td>
<td>27% (38.8) (n=63)</td>
<td>F=0.72, df=2, 60, p=.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[8] Has only Tafsir Ibn Kathir commentary on the Qur'an and/or Fiqh-us-Sunnah (n=20).
[9] Has Riyadh-us-Salaheen (n=7) or more extreme fiqh material.
[10] In 2 mosques only the imam was present.
[12] Women were present in 65 mosques.
[13] Boys were present in 63 mosques.
Table 4: Association of key sharia-based aspects of mosque prayer service and sharia-based imam characteristics and imam recommending violence-positive material

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prayer service</th>
<th>Did not recommend [14] (n=15, 15%)</th>
<th>Recommended (n=82, 85%)</th>
<th>Total (n=97)[15]</th>
<th>Chi-square (all df=1) p=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Segregation in prayer</td>
<td>No 12 (20%) 48 (80%)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3.77, p=.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes 2 (6%) 34 (94%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment of prayer lines</td>
<td>No 12 (28%) 31 (72%)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>11.10, p=.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes 2 (4%) 51 (96%)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of imam or lay leader</td>
<td>No 11 (22%) 39 (78%)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.61, p=.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beard of imam or lay leader</td>
<td>Yes 3 (7%) 43 (93%)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam wore head covering</td>
<td>No 9 (20%) 37 (80%)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1.76, p=.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes 5 (10%) 45 (90%)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam wore traditional garb</td>
<td>No 10 (23%) 34 (77%)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4.32, p=.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes 4 (8%) 48 (92%)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam wore watch on right wrist</td>
<td>No 14 (17%) 69 (83%)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>2.37, p=.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[16]</td>
<td>Yes 0 (0%) 12 (100%)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[14] Ten imams did not recommend that a worshiper study any violence-positive materials and 4 imams instructed against the study of violence-positive materials. All 14 observations were included in the “do not recommend” category.

[15] In 4 mosques, neither an imam nor a lay leader was present. However, in 1 of these 4 cases the imam had made clear recommendations on the mosque’s webpage.

[16] In 1 case it was not determined.
Table 5: Association of mosque attendance and key sharia-based worshiper characteristics and imam recommending violence-positive material

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Did not recommend [17]</th>
<th>Recommended</th>
<th>F test for significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n=15, 15%)</td>
<td>(n=82, 85%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of worshipers</td>
<td>Median=4, Total=250</td>
<td>Median=39, Total=7864</td>
<td>Mann-Whitney U p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of men with</td>
<td>13% (27.6) (n=15)</td>
<td>44% (30.3) (n=82)</td>
<td>F=11.99, df=1, 93, p=.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beards (SD) [18]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of men with</td>
<td>15% (27.2) (n=15)</td>
<td>42% (30.4) (n=81)</td>
<td>F=9.07, df=1, 92, p=.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of men with</td>
<td>87% (19.1) (n=12)</td>
<td>34% (32.6) (n=82)</td>
<td>F=30.17, df=1, 91, p&lt;.0001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western garb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of women with</td>
<td>70% (44.7) (n=5)</td>
<td>41% (30.9) (n=59)</td>
<td>F=3.85, df=1, 62, p=.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modern hijab (vs. traditional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hijab/niqab) [19]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of girls with</td>
<td>20% (44.7) (n=5)</td>
<td>29% (41.6) (n=60)</td>
<td>F=.21, df=1, 63, p=.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hijab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of boys with</td>
<td>0% (n=5)</td>
<td>30% (39.6) (n=58)</td>
<td>F=2.77, df=1, 91, p&lt;.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>head coverings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[17] Ten imams did not recommend the study of any materials and 4 imams instructed against the study of violence-positive materials. All 14 observations were included in the “do not recommend” category.
[18] Data in parentheses that follow percentage figures denote the standard deviation.
[19] Women were present in 65 mosques. Data collected on percent women with niqab (rare), hijab, and modern hijab.
Table 6: Association of strictness of violence-positive materials available at mosque and promotion of violent jihad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No material (n=19)</th>
<th>Moderate [20] (n=30)</th>
<th>Severe [21] (n=51)</th>
<th>Total (n=100)</th>
<th>Chi-square (all df=2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imam recommended studying texts promoting violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70.7, p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>14 (82%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3 (18%) [22]</td>
<td>28 (97%)</td>
<td>51 (100%)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoted violent jihad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>87.6, p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>18 (95%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>29 (97%)</td>
<td>51 (100%)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoted joining terrorist organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.49, p=.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>18 (95%)</td>
<td>28 (93%)</td>
<td>46 (90%)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>5 (10%)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoted financial support of terrorist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>81.9, p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>18 (95%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>29 (97%)</td>
<td>50 (98%)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collected money openly at mosque for known terrorist organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.70, p=.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>18 (95%)</td>
<td>29 (97%)</td>
<td>47 (92%)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>4 (8%)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotes Caliphate in US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>81.9, p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>18 (95%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>29 (97%)</td>
<td>50 (98%)</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Praising terror against West</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>87.6, p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<td>0 (0%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>29 (97%)</td>
<td>51 (100%)</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distributed memorabilia featuring jihadists or terrorist organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.99, p=.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<td>28 (93%)</td>
<td>45 (88%)</td>
<td>91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>6 (12%)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque invited imams or preachers who are known to have promoted violent jihad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.9, p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>18 (95%)</td>
<td>12 (40%)</td>
<td>12 (24%)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>18 (60%)</td>
<td>39 (76%)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[20] Has only Tafsir Ibn Kathir commentary on the Qur'an and/or Fiqh-us-Sunnah (n=20).
[21] Has Riyadh-us-Salaheen (n=7) or more extreme fiqh material.
[22] Denominator is 17, 2 in this column had no imam or leader.
Abstract
Throughout its history, the oil and gas industry has been a subject of environmental protests, labour disputes, tensions with local communities, and it has also been a target of various violent activities ranging from vandalism to political violence, which have impinged on the security of oil industry workers and interfered with operational activities of oil companies on numerous occasions. Although a considerable number of attacks on oil and gas infrastructure occurred over the course of the industry’s existence, most of those attacks were directed against onshore petroleum targets. Compared to onshore petroleum infrastructure, attacks on offshore oil and gas installations are relatively rare. The following chronology provides details of attacks, unlawful interferences, and security incidents involving offshore oil and gas installations that happened between 1975 and 2010.

Introduction
This chronology [1] lists some 60 events. [2] The chronology was compiled from publically available data on past attacks against maritime and petroleum infrastructure collected from various sources including databases, policy documents and reports of national and international government and non-government organisations, scholarly commentaries, journal articles, books, and previous studies done by academics and security analysts, as well as media reports, newspapers, and online news. [3] It should be noted that sometimes different sources report different details of offshore attacks and incidents. In some cases, inconsistent and conflicting facts are reported. Where possible, all reasonable effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of information contained in this chronology.

It is recognised that this chronology probably does not list all incidents that happened during that period and it does not reflect the frequency at which they are happening. Therefore, it does not necessarily provide a reliable base for quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, some interesting observations can be made.

General Observations
It is apparent that attacks on, and interferences with, offshore petroleum installations have generally increased in recent years. The majority of attacks/interferences have occurred since the beginning of 2004. In particular, 41 of 60 incidents (almost 70 percent) have occurred since 1 January 2004. Prior to the beginning of this chronology, we found only one security incident/attack, namely the 1899 ‘Montecito Mob’ incident which is also listed. However, there must have
been more in the intervening 75 years. The majority of security incidents involved violence (whether actual use of violence or threat of violence), but 15 of 60 incidents (25 per cent) were non-violent.

The types of installations that had been victims of attacks/interferences include fixed offshore production platforms, mobile offshore drilling rigs, floating production storage and offloading units (FPSOs), floating storage and offloading units (FSOs), offshore oil export terminals, and other types of offshore installations such as oil derricks, wellhead platforms, and flow stations. In some cases, the type of facilities attacked was not specified, but incidents involving offshore drilling rigs are the most common. [4]

Attacks and security incidents involving offshore oil and gas installations have taken place in practically all regions of the world. [5] The analysis of offshore security incidents by location shows that most of the incidents occurred in economically and politically unstable countries [6] and some occurred in stable countries, but the incidents listed in this chronology are limited to the following countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Angola, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Guyana/Suriname, Iraq, Yemen, Indonesia/Malaysia (Malacca Strait), India, Malaysia, Denmark (Greenland), Cameroon, and Mexico. The majority of offshore incidents (more than 60 percent) took place in Nigeria.

The attacks/interferences have been committed by various types of adversaries including terrorists, insurgents, pirates, hostile nation States, environmental activists, anti-oil activists and other protesters, and sometimes unknown perpetrators. The analysis indicates that insurgent groups are responsible for at least one-third of all incidents. [7] There are five bomb threats and threats of attack (rather than the actual attacks) among the incidents recorded in this chronology. Other incident scenarios include abduction of workers, armed intrusion, hostage-taking, bombing and use of explosives, military strikes, and unauthorised boarding. The most common scenario is armed intrusion and abduction of offshore workers. [8]

In at least 13 of 60 incidents there was some kind of damage caused to platforms and 8 of 60 attacks resulted in human casualties. Almost all incidents caused interruption or shutdown of platform operations. The means of transport that assailants use to reach offshore platforms is often not reported, but in most cases perpetrators used motorboats. In some cases, small fishing vessels and vessels that look similar to offshore supply vessels were used.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Details of Attack/Incident</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Aug 1899</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>When an oil company began to construct an oil derrick off the shores of Montecito, a highly affluent suburb of Santa Barbara in the State of California, a local mob took direct action. They attacked the rig and demolished it. [9] The next day these activists were described approvingly on the front page of the local newspaper as ‘a party of the best known society men of Santa Barbara armed to meet any resistance’. [10] The local ‘society men’ responsible for the attack did not suffer any noteworthy legal repercussions for their actions, despite having been so well known. [11] The incident had become known as ‘Montecito Mob’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Aug 1975</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Philips Petroleum Company in Yarmouth, England, received three anonymous telephone calls with callers announcing that underwater charges with delayed-action fuses had been attached to the legs of offshore production platforms in the Hewett field, some 20 miles to the east off Norfolk coast. Three platforms were evacuated immediately. [12] A Royal Navy vessel, helicopters, and an expert diving team were dispatched. Two days later, it was concluded that the threat was a hoax, and normal production operations were resumed. The incident cost to the British taxpayers about USD $500,000. [13]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May 1977</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>An African guerrilla movement, the Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front (CELF), said that it plans to blow up the offshore drilling complex of the Gulf Oil Company (GOC) in the Cabinda enclave of Angola and warned the company to evacuate its 200 British and American employees within three days. A spokesman for the guerrilla group said the warning must be taken seriously because the movement had acquired ground-to-ground missiles in exchange for coffee and uncut diamonds. [14] The guerrilla spokesman said the guerrillas were opposed to GOC because it was giving the ruling pro-Marxist Angolan Popular Liberation Movement $2 million a day in oil royalties. [15]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jul 1981</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Greenpeace activists attempted to board an oil rig operated by Shell 177 miles off the coast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, to express their opposition to drilling during a Shell news conference on the rig. Shell denied the group access to the drilling rig. Greenpeace officials sought to explain their fear that the drilling (which had been delayed for six years) would result in oil spills endangering the nearby Georges Bank, home for much of the world’s supply of cod, haddock and food fish. [16] Shell denied the group access to the drilling rig and Shell spokesman said Georges Bank is a relatively low-risk geological formation for oil spills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1981</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>An anonymous caller said that a bomb had been placed on one of several attending vessels at Habitat Texaco platform located 9 miles offshore, southeast of Santa Barbara, California. No bomb was found after platform and vessel searches. [17]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Details of Attack/Incident</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 1983</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Iraqi planes attacked the Iranian offshore platform at the Nowruz oil field; the damaged platform collapsed, and the oil slick caught fire. [18] The platform burned and spilled oil at an initial rate of approximately 5,000 barrels per day (bpd). The rate slowed to about 1,500 bpd in the two years before the well was capped in May 1985. Overall, approximately 1.9 million barrels of oil spilled into the sea as a result of this incident. [19]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Oct 1987</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>The US Navy attacked Iranian R-7 and R-4 oil platforms in Reshadat (also known as Rostam) offshore complex blaming Iran for a missile strike on the US-flagged Kuwaiti oil tanker Sea Isle City near Kuwait Harbour three days earlier. [20] The Navy destroyers opened fire on R-7 platform and subsequently detonated explosives on it, completely destroying it; and R-4 platform was attacked in a similar fashion and severely damaged. [21] As a result of the attack, one platform was almost completely destroyed and another was severely damaged and, according to Iran, production from the Reshadat and Resalat offshore complexes was interrupted for several years. [22] The attacks caused damage to the nearby Resalat offshore complex, connected by underwater pipelines to Reshadat. [23]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1988</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>In response to the US attack on the Iranian Joshan missile boat, Iranian patrol boats attacked the neighbouring United Arab Emirates’s Mubarak oil field. The Iranian boats sprayed several ships and a mobile drilling rig with machine-gun fire and grenades but caused no casualties. [24]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM**

Volume 5, Issues 5-6

December 2011
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Details of Attack/Incident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 Apr 1988</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>The US military attacked and destroyed Iranian offshore oil complexes, <em>Salman</em> (aka <em>Sassan</em>) and <em>Nasr</em> (aka <em>Sirri</em>), shortly after the US frigate, <em>Samuel B Roberts</em> was damaged by a mine, allegedly belonging to Iran, in international waters near Bahrain. [25] According to Iran, the attacks caused severe damage to the production facilities of the platforms and the activities of the <em>Salman</em> complex were totally interrupted for four years, its regular production being resumed only in September 1992, and reached a normal level in 1993; and activities in the whole <em>Nasr</em> complex were interrupted and did not resume until nearly four years later. [26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr 1995</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Greenpeace activists occupied <em>Brent Spar</em> facility in the North Sea for more than three weeks thereby interfering with Shell’s decommissioning operations. [27] Shell subsequently obtained legal permission to evict the protesters from the platform and the protesters were removed from <em>Brent Spar</em> on 23 June 1995. [28]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Dec 1997</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Employees and villagers kidnapped one US citizen, one Australian, and two British oil workers, and at least nine Nigerian staff members of Western Geophysical, a US-owned oil exploration company off the coast of Nigeria. The victims were released in stages on 17 and 18 December 1997. [29]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>Details of Attack/Incident</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 May 1998</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Over 100 unarmed and peaceful Ilaje protestors went to the Chevron’s Parabe oil production platform about nine miles offshore. Nigerian Navy and Mobile Police stationed at the platform, who were armed, allowed the protestors aboard. [30] The protestors occupied the platform to protest environmental and distribution issues, and to demand monetary compensation for environmental and economic grievances and jobs. [31] After two days of negotiations, Chevron used its contracted helicopters to fly Nigerian security forces to the platform. Security forces opened fire at the protesters which resulted in the death of two protesters and several others were wounded. [32]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jun 1999</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Armed youth militants (local anti-oil industry activists) stormed a Shell oil platform in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. The attackers caused damage to the platform and kidnapped three foreign platform workers, including an Australian. [33] The attackers then hijacked a helicopter and forced the hostages to fly them to a village near Warri. [34] The hostages were released unharmed on or about 16 July 1999 for an undisclosed ransom. A group calling itself Enough is Enough in the Niger River (EENR) claimed responsibility. [35]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jul 1999</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Armed men stormed a Royal Dutch Shell operated oil rig in Osoko and held seven British nationals and 57 Nigerians hostage. On 22 July 1999, the youths released the hostages unharmed. [36]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug 1999</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Three British nationals were kidnapped by armed youths from a US operated oil platform in the Niger Delta region. [37] No one was injured, and no one claimed responsibility. On 11 August the youths released the hostages unharmed. [38]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Details of Attack/Incident</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Jun 2000</td>
<td>Guyana/ Suriname</td>
<td>The gunboats of the Suriname Navy approached an American owned and operated offshore oil drilling rig, CE Thornton, retained by the Canadian corporation CGX Energy. [39] The Canadian company had received a license from the Guyanese government to conduct exploratory drilling in a disputed area of the continental shelf claimed by both Guyana and Suriname. [40] The Surinamese Navy advised that the rig was in Surinamese waters and ordered it to stop unauthorised drilling immediately and clear the area within 12 hours. Fearing that the Surinamese Navy would use force against it, the oil rig decided to follow the orders to withdraw. [41]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 2000</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>About thirty-five armed young men from a village in Bayela State used a rowboat to reach two oil platforms off the coast. They boarded the rig and took 165 oil workers hostage, including 20 foreigners. They demanded that Shell employ more Nigerian nationals and that it pay a fee to the local community for exploiting its petroleum resources. Shell made a deal with the hostage-takers and the employees were released four days later. [42]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug 2001</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>The local community group of anti-oil activists boarded a Shell’s production platform and the nearby Trident VIII jackup drilling rig. The rig’s crew was safely evacuated to Port Harcourt and the activists had withdrawn. [43]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2003</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>About 100 oil workers were held hostage aboard offshore installations off the coast of Nigeria by striking Nigerian workers complaining about redundancies and unfair dismissal of Nigerian employees. The hostages included over twenty Americans and over thirty British nationals. [44]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Apr 2004</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Terrorists carried out a suicide boat attack on offshore Al-Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT) in the Persian Gulf. [45] Two zodiac type speedboats piloted by suicide bombers approached the terminal at high speed. The lead boat aimed at the platform and was fired upon, after which it detonated before it could hit the platform. The second boat was also fired upon, killing attackers but the boat still rammed MV Takasuzu oil tanker, yet it failed to detonate/explode. [46] The Al-Basra terminal, capable of exporting up to 900,000 bpd, was shut down for two days, which (combined with a closure of KAAOT) cost nearly $28 million in lost revenues due to oil not being exported during that time. [47] This consequently led to the spike in oil prices on the world markets which resulted in a further loss of approximately US$6 billion to the global economy. [48] The attack was allegedly carried out by Zarqawi network based in Iraq. In addition, the initial security zone of 2 nautical miles around ABOT was supplemented with a 3000 metre warning zone and a 2000 metre exclusion zone. [49]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>24 Apr 2004</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Terrorists carried out a suicide boat attack against offshore Khawr Al-Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT) in the Persian Gulf using a dhow. [50] The dhow was intercepted by a coalition forces vessel as it approached the exclusion zone around the platform. Soon after it was boarded by Navy personnel, the boat exploded. Two US Navy sailors and one member of the US Coastguard were killed in the attack, and four others were injured. [51] No damage was reported, but the terminal was immediately shut down by the authorities. [52] KAAOT, which exports about 700,000 bpd, reopened the next day following the attacks. [53] The attack was allegedly carried out by Zarqawi network based in Iraq. The initial security zone of 2 nautical miles around KAAOT was supplemented with a 3000 metre warning zone and a 2000 metre exclusion zone. [54]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2004</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Yemeni insurgents abducted several Western nationals based on offshore oil facilities off the coast of the Red Sea. After several hours, the workers were released. Yemeni authorities have increased security at all sea ports and oil terminals in response to the attacks and information ‘about the intention of a foreign terrorist group to carry out sabotage acts on vital oil facilities on Yemeni shores’. The security effort included the deployment of helicopters around two oil terminals on the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea. [55]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Nov 2004</td>
<td>Malacca Strait</td>
<td>In the Malacca Strait, outside Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s territorial seas, several lookalike fishing boats followed a tug towing the oil rig <em>Ocean Sovereign</em>, while underway. [56] The duty officer alerted Master who came to the bridge and observed a boat heading for tug. Crew mustered and as the pirates came within 250 metres of tug, they started shooting, causing extensive damage to navigation equipment, bridge windows and the superstructure. Crew switched on lights, activated fire hoses and fired rocket flares but the pirates continued to shoot with automatic weapons. When they were within 50 metres, the crew took evasive manoeuvres and the pirate boat moved away. The crew suffered no physical injuries but was shaken after the incident. [57]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jun 2005</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>A group of armed men boarded FPSO <em>Jamestown</em> in Warri Region and took hostage all 45 crew members. After lengthy negotiations, the gunmen released all hostages unharmed three days later. [58]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Sep 2005</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>More than 100 armed militants stormed a Chevron-operated <em>Idama</em> oil production platform in the southern Niger Delta in response to the arrest of an ethnic militia leader on treason charges and forced it to shut down operations. [59] Armed with assault rifles, militants attacked the platform using about eight boats, each carrying 15 gunmen, and occupied the <em>Idama</em> flow station. Six government security forces had their weapons taken from them. Production of 8,000 bpd shut down. [60]</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>10 Jan 2006 / 11 Jan 2006 [61]</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) rebels attacked Shell’s EA offshore oil platform located about 15 km offshore and kidnapped four foreign oil workers from a support vessel anchored at the platform. [62] The company shut down 115,000 bpd EA platform. MEND demanded the immediate and unconditional release of Dokubo-Asari and Governor D.S.P. Alamieyeseigha. [63] Insurgents also blew up crude oil pipelines, cutting supplies to Forcados offshore export terminal by 100,000 bpd. [64] Some sources claim that EA platform was not attacked, but a support vessel in the vicinity of the platform was attacked. [65] Hostages were released on or about 30 January 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan 2006</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>MEND insurgents, travelling in speedboats, attacked Shell’s Benisede flow station. They burned down staff accommodation and damaged the processing facilities, [66] killing at least 16 people in the process, including fourteen soldiers and two civilians. [67] Shell’s operations were reduced by about 106,000 bpd as a result of the attack and the company was forced to consider evacuating. [68]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Feb 2006</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>MEND insurgents in speedboats bombed the Forcados offshore oil loading terminal and abducted nine workers from the nearby offshore barge at the Escravos coast, [69] and they also damaged oil platform equipment. [70] Six workers were released on 1 March and the remaining three on 27 March. [71]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Jun 2006</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>About 30 armed militants boarded a semi-submersible rig, the <em>Bulford Dolphin</em>, about 65 km offshore and abducted eight offshore workers. [72] Hostages were released a couple of days later. [73] About 20 non-essential personnel were evacuated to shore and the rest of the rig crew was safe, but operations were temporarily halted. The attack also contributed to the rise of oil prices by about $1 to $71.50 per barrel. [74]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Aug 2006</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Iranian Navy attacked and seized control of <em>Orizont</em> offshore drilling rig, owned by the Romanian oil company Grup Servicii Petroliere (GSP), in the Salman field. There were 26 Romanian offshore workers on board the platform at the time of the incident. Iranian troops had seized and occupied the rig after firing on it with machine guns from a ship. The rig was operated under a deal signed between Petrom, GSP and Dubai-based Oriental Oil Co, and the shooting reportedly happened as the rig was being taken outside Iranian waters for a mandatory overhaul. Iranian armed forces kept the crew on the rig’s heliport for several hours without food and water, but later they allowed the crew to return to their quarters after cutting off all communications between the workers and the company. The incident arose due to a commercial dispute. [75]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Nov 2006</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>FPSO <em>Mystras</em> was attacked by armed men while anchored off Port Harcourt. Ten gunmen boarded the facility and kidnapped seven workers. Their boat was intercepted by the authorities and engaged in a shoot-out during which one worker was killed, one injured, and five others were rescued. [76]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Details of Attack/Incident</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Mar 2007</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Mobile offshore drilling unit <em>Aban VII</em> (jack-up rig) was attacked by pirates in speedboats near the southwest coast of India, outside India’s territorial sea. [77] The rig was boarded by three pirates while under tow. Pirates were noticed as they were preparing to transfer some equipment from the rig to their speedboats and the alarm was raised. Pirates jumped overboard and escaped in their speedboats. [78]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 2007</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td><em>Bulford Dolphin</em> mobile offshore drilling rig was attacked again by gunmen about 65 km off the coast of Nigeria. One British expatriate worker was abducted and taken ashore from the platform. The attackers, believed to be pirates, boarded the rig via an offshore support vessel, which was secured alongside the platform at the time of the incident. [80] Hostage was released on 4 April 2007. [81]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Apr 2007</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>An offshore security vessel that was supporting <em>Trident VIII</em> drilling rig, was attacked and three Nigerian sailors were abducted and another six were injured. The gunmen also seized weapons and equipment. <em>Trident VIII</em> rig was later shut down as a result of this incident and the staff of <em>Don Walker</em> oil rig, which was within a 10 minute boat ride from the incident, had requested security reinforcements from the nearest naval base. [82]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>Details of Attack/Incident</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 May 2007</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td><em>Chevron’s Oloibiri</em> floating storage and offloading (FSO) unit was reportedly attacked by MEND at offshore Pennington field off southern Bayelsa state. One Nigerian sailor was killed during the attack and six other foreign oil workers were abducted, but later released on 2 June 2007.* [83] The FSO was moored near <em>Funiwa</em> platform. The production at the 15,000 bpd Funiwa field and other fields supported by this vessel was shut down to avoid any additional security or safety incidents. [84]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May 2007</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td><em>FPSO Mystras</em> was attacked by gunmen believed to be pirates they boarded via the anchor chain. The intruders kidnapped eight foreign workers, including an Australian, from FPSO and an offshore support vessel. The workers were released the following day. [85] <em>FPSO was moored about 55 km off Port Harcourt (however, some sources report that it was 55 miles offshore). Force majeure was declared at a field capable of producing 50,000 bpd, and the production was shut down for several days.</em> [86] <em>Some sources report that this attack was carried out by MEND, not pirates; and that six foreign workers were kidnapped, not eight.</em> [87]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May 2007</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td><em>Trident VIII</em> offshore drilling rig was attacked and boarded by gunmen, believed to be pirates, near Brass oil export terminal. One crew member was kidnapped. [88] The attack triggered a security lockdown of the Brass crude oil export terminal. [89]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jun 2007</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>In the early hours three gunmen armed with AK-47s boarded the 159,000-dwt Cape Brindisi moored at Pennington Oil Terminal (also known as FSO Oloibiri) and proceeded to shoot up the vessel. No injuries to the crew were reported as they succeeded in going into lock-down mode, after which the gunmen left the ship. The militants reportedly took control of the FSO Oloibiri, where the Cape Brindisi had been loading. [90]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Oct 2007</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Seven workers were kidnapped at the EA field (possibly from FPSO Sea Eagle) about 15 km off the coast of Bayelsa state by gunmen in speedboats including four Nigerians, a Russian, a British, and a Croatian. All workers were released two days later. [91]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Oct 2007</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Gunmen in speedboats attacked FPSO Mystras about 85 km offshore at an oil production facility operated by Saipem, taking hostage six oil workers. MEND had claimed responsibility for the attack. [92]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Feb 2008</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Safe Scandinavia oil rig in the North Sea issued a security alert which resulted in one of the biggest evacuations in the history of the North Sea offshore industry. It was reported that a catering worker on the rig screamed ‘Bomb!’ in her sleep and apparently was ‘convinced that her nightmare was about to come true’. The authorities sent helicopters to evacuate more than 500 workers, but it turned out that it was just a dream. [93] The company reported that 161 workers evacuated to the neighbouring Alba and Armada platforms before the operation was called off. [94]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>Details of Attack/Incident</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jun 2008</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>In the early morning, near Port Harcourt, Rivers, Nigeria, armed assailants in speedboats fired upon an oil facility, killing nine naval officers and wounding four civilians. No group claimed responsibility. [95]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jun 2008</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell’s <em>Bonga</em> floating production storage and offloading vessel (FPSO) was attacked by armed militants about 120 km offshore. It was reported that at about 1:00 am around two dozen armed men in speedboats stormed the floating facility and after failing to get access inside they started shooting at FPSO and those on board. Some people were wounded, but no lives were lost. The attack lasted for almost four hours, during which the militants also encountered and hijacked an offshore support vessel and kidnapped its US captain, but released him later that day. [96] The responsibility for the attack was claimed by MEND, the most high-profile militant group in the region. The facility was damaged in the attack, which forced the company to shut down the entire production at its main offshore oil field in Nigeria, interrupting production of approximately 200,000 bpd and 150 million standard cubic feet of gas. [97]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Sep 2008</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Shooting was reported near Chevron-operated <em>Idama</em> offshore production platform, causing Chevron to evacuate offshore workers as a precaution. [98]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Dec 2008</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Six armed robbers boarded the mobile offshore drilling rig <em>Allied Centurion</em> in Malaysia’s territorial sea and stole stores and property from the facility. One crew member suffered head injuries, but remained in stable condition. Authorities were informed and later boarded for investigation. [99]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>21 Jun 2009</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>In Rivers state assailants detonated explosives damaging two oil pipelines at Adamakiri and in Kula respectively as well as an offshore facility at the Afremo oil fields operated by Shell, but causing no fatalities or injuries. MEND claimed responsibility. [100]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jun 2009</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>MEND militants rejected the government’s amnesty offer, arguing it did not address the fundamentals of the crisis in the region. MEND claims to have blown up the second remaining well head platform Jacket B of the Shell Afremo offshore oil fields in Delta state. [101]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jun 2009</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>MEND claims that at least 20 soldiers were killed in one of its attacks on Shell’s Forcados offshore terminal in Delta state. Chevron evacuated hundreds of workers from the Niger Delta after the attacks. [102] At least six high-profile attacks by MEND on oil well heads, offshore platforms, major pipelines and oil pumping stations were reported. [103]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Jun 2009</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>MEND attacked Shell’s Forcados offshore terminal facility in Delta state using explosives. [104] Cluster 11 and 30 caught on fire after a massive explosion. A confrontation with a military gunboat patrol that stumbled upon heavily armed fighters resulted in the sinking of the gunboat with about 20-25 soldiers on board. [105]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>5 Jul 2009</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>MEND attacked Shell’s <strong>Well Head 20</strong> platform located at Cawthorn Channel 1. The facility connects to the Bonny loading terminal in Rivers state. On the same day MEND militants attacked and blew up the strategic Okan manifold which controlled about 80 per cent of Chevron Nigeria Limited offshore crude oil to its BOP Crude Loading Platform in Delta state. [106]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jul 2009</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>MEND conducted a raid on an oil offloading facility in Lagos. This was the group’s first attack outside Niger Delta in several months. Five people were killed in the attack. [107]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jan 2010</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>A group of pirates attacked FSO <strong>Westaf</strong>, off Lagos, Nigeria. Seven crew members were taken to hospital due to the attack including the master who was wounded in the stomach. The attackers stole cash, crew belongings and expensive ship equipment. [108]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 2010</td>
<td>Greenland</td>
<td>Greenpeace activists ‘boarded’ the drilling rig <strong>Stena Don</strong> operating in Arctic waters offshore Greenland and were suspended 15 meters above the water in tents to protest against drilling operations. The activists had to outrun Danish Navy commandos before climbing up the inside of the rig and hanging from it in tents suspended from ropes. They remained on their position for two days forcing the company to suspend drilling. [109] The drillship <strong>Stena Forth</strong>, which is located about 20 miles away, also had to be shut down during the <strong>Stena Don</strong> occupation. [110]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Sep 2010</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>In the waters off the Shetland Islands in the UK, Greenpeace activists climbed the anchor chain of Chevron-operated drill ship <em>Stena Carron</em> and were hanging suspended from the chain in a capsule-tent several days, effectively delaying the company’s drilling operations in the Atlantic Frontier. [111]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Sep 2010</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Armed men (believed to be pirates) attacked and attempted to take control of an offshore oil rig at an oil field operated by Addax Petroleum. [112] The assailants became locked in a sustained gunfire with Nigerian Navy patrol boat after it intervened; later it kidnapped three French employees from an offshore supply vessel while retreating. [113] A Thai employee may also have been taken hostage during the attack. The pirates nearly reached the platform by using a vessel which looked like the ships that routinely provide supplies to offshore rig workers.  [114]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Nov 2010</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>A group of MEND insurgents attacked the <em>High Island VII</em> offshore drilling jack-up rig at the Okoro offshore field located about 12 km offshore and kidnapped 19 crew members including 12 Nigerians, two Americans, two Frenchmen, two Indonesians and one Canadian. Hostages were freed ten days later. [115]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Nov 2010</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Gunmen attacked an offshore rig operated by Afren PLC, which was engaged in exploratory/survey work at the Okoro oil field about 11 km off the coast of Nigeria. Seven foreigner workers were kidnapped from an oil rig and the company reported that two workers were wounded in the attack and have been flown out by helicopter to receive medical treatment.' [116]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Nov 2010</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Armed men boarded ExxonMobil’s Oso offshore platform on the Nigeria’s southeast coast and abducted eight offshore workers. At the time of the attack there were 74 people aboard the platform. The company suspended 75,000 bpd production from the facility. [117] The gunmen allegedly came in five speedboats; they beat up some crew members and cut electricity to the offshore facility. [118] A previously unknown group, which identified itself as the Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF), claimed responsibility for the attack and threatened to target oil installations in fresh attacks. [119]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Nov 2010</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>The Africa Marine Commando (AMC) rebel group carried out a deadly assault on an offshore oil platform at the offshore Moudi oil terminal (consisting of production platform, FSO Moudi and a single buoy mooring) located in the Gulf of Guinea about 50 km off Cameroon’s disputed Bakassi peninsula. [120] Six people were killed in the attack, including three members of Cameroon’s Rapid Intervention Battalion (a national defence force) involved in the security of offshore oil and gas installations, two Cameroonian civilians and one of the attackers. [121] Cameroonian security service said that the group had threatened further attacks unless they receive money. [122]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Nov 2010</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Four Greenpeace activists took protesting action by climbing 39 metres over the water at the deepwater oil rig Centenario, off the coast of the State of Veracruz, in Mexico. The activists boarded the rig and put up a large banner stating ‘Go Beyond Oil’ to call for an end to deepwater drilling. [123]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About the Compiler: Mikhail Kashubsky is a Principal Consultant at the Centre for Customs and Excise Studies (CCES), University of Canberra, Australia and a PhD Candidate at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, Australia (Email: mikhail.kashubsky@canberra.edu.au). This chronology is based on part of the author’s PhD thesis research.

Notes

[1] Attacks on offshore underwater pipelines and oil tankers are not included.
[2] It is arguably the most comprehensive chronology of attacks on offshore petroleum installations that has ever been produced and published.
[3] The sources include the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships annual and quarterly reports; International Maritime Organisation Maritime Safety Committee (IMO MSC) circulars titled Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; reports such as Country Reports on Terrorism and Patterns of Global Terrorism which are produced annually by the US Department of State; Worldwide Threat to Shipping Reports produced by the US Office of Naval Intelligence; Anti-Shipping Activity Messages published by the Federation of American Scientists; A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other Criminal Actions Against Maritime Targets published by RAND Corporation in 1983; reports based on the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) database; NCTC Reports on Terrorism published by the US National Counterterrorism Center; the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) database maintained by the US National Counterterrorism Center; the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, as well as several studies undertaken by academics and security analysts such as a 2005 study of the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (IIIP) titled Trends for Oil and Gas Terrorist Attacks and a study by Brynjar Lia and Ashild Kjok entitled Energy Supply as Terrorist Targets? Patterns of “Petroleum Terrorism”, 1968-99.
[4] Distribution of incidents by ‘type of facility’: offshore drilling rigs – 18 of 60; fixed offshore production platforms – 7 of 60; FPSOs – 5 of 60; FSOs and other storage facilities – 4 of 60; offshore oil export terminals – 5 of 60; other types of facilities (such as oil derricks, wellhead platforms, flow stations) – 4 of 60; and unspecified types of facilities – 14 of 60.
[5] These include: 39 in Africa, 8 in the Middle East, 3 in Asia, 5 in Europe (including Greenland), and 5 in the Americas.
[6] These include: Angola, Iran, Nigeria, Guyana/Suriname, Iraq, Yemen, Indonesia/Malaysia (Malacca Strait), India, Malaysia, Cameroon, and Mexico.
[7] Distribution of incidents by ‘type of perpetrators’: insurgents – 20 of 60; terrorists – 2 of 60; pirates – between 1-7 of 60; environmental activists – 5 of 60; anti-oil activists and other protesters – 6 of 60; hostile States – 6 of 60; unidentified/unknown perpetrators – 12 of 60.
[8] Distribution of incidents by ‘tactic/scenario’: abduction of offshore workers – 17 of 60; armed intrusion – 17 of 60; bomb threat or threat of attack – 5 of 60; hostage-taking 4 of 60; bombings and use of explosives – 5 of 60; unauthorised boarding – 8 of 60; military strikes – 6 of 60.


[51] Peter Lehr, ‘Maritime Terrorism: Locations, Actors, and Capabilities’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds.) Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (Taylor & Francis Group, 2009), 55, 61.


[61] Some sources report that the incident took place on 10 January 2006; others report that it took place on 11 January 2006.


[79] Some sources report that the incident took place on 31 March 2007; others report that it took place on 1 April 2007.


Literature on Right-wing and Vigilante Terrorism
by Eric Price

Monographs, Edited Volumes, Non-conventional Literature and Prime Articles published since 1968

NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterix [*] only have a clickable table of contents.

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*RightWing News* [http://rightwingnews.com](http://rightwingnews.com)

*Right Wing Watch* [http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/right-wing-organizations](http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/right-wing-organizations)

**About the Compiler: Eric Price** is a Professional Information Specialist and Editorial Assistant of Perspectives on Terrorism. He was, for many years, Librarian of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and supported also the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime with his open source data expertise.
Book Reviews


Reviewed by Richard Phelps

Veteran investigative reporter Peter Taylor is a familiar author and documentary maker to students of the conflict in Ulster. His trilogy *Brits*, *Loyalists*, and *Provos* has long entered the canon of authoritative and informative books on the subject. His documentaries have a Louis Theroux-like quality in allowing his interview subjects to open up and speak for themselves about the conflict and violence they are involved in. In recent years though, the BBC journalist has turned his attention to a more fashionable source of violence: Islamist militants. Having made a number of remarkable investigative documentaries on the subject, his transition from the confines of Northern Ireland to the landscapes of the global jihad is the subject of his latest book *Talking to Terrorists: A Personal Journey form the IRA to Al Qaeda*.

*Talking to Terrorists* reflects the methodology of the reporter in producing this book – he interviewed suspected terrorists and their families – more than an argument he makes with any force within it. In the book, Taylor’s treatment of the conflict in Northern Ireland is an extended discussion of one particular case study, and the author is clearly supportive of the approach, highlighting the fruits that it can bring. “Northern Ireland offers a possible template for the resolution of other conflicts” he writes, “[b]ut what about Al Qaeda?” Taylor never answers his question. Indeed, he avoids the swirling debate over whether governments or their intermediaries should or should not engage in dialogue or negotiations with Islamists who perform violence against civilians for political ends, though he seems to be broadly supportive of the potential that it may offer. Instead, what Taylor offers are snapshots and case studies of Islamist terrorism around the world: he meets with suspects and their families, offering narratives and reflections on their experiences.

Heavy on description, light on analysis, the case studies that Taylor offers represent glimpses of various themes and issues in the “war on terror”. They offer in book form what Taylor earlier presented in an accompanying documentary series. However, whilst such cursory treatment of the issues proved highly effective in his documentaries, in written form it strikes the reader as being a superficial investigation - even though this is not the case. Frustratingly, little in *Talking to Terrorists* appears new, although those who have watched the documentaries will know that much of it is new. As such, the account he gives of a British Muslim fighting in Pakistan surviving the experience of the house in which he was sleeping collapse after being hit by a drone missile, appears alongside tired accounts of the Madrid, Bali, and 9/11 attacks. Aimed more as a taster for a generalist readership, Taylor offers an introductory picture. However, the lack of precisions will irk readers who are more informed: “200,000” died in the Algerian civil war, “significantly, he [the British jihadist] had no beard”, the Taliban and Al Qaeda share “basically the same ideology”, Mullah Omar is an “eminent Islamic scholar”, are examples of this. Taylor’s experience and journalistic skill should have given this book the potential to offer far more.
The author’s journey “from the IRA to Al Qaeda” is precisely that: rather than offering a spectrum of experiences involving the range of everything in the continuum of non-state militancy from the IRA – at one end – to Al Qaeda – at the other – what Taylor offers instead is a jump from the former to the latter. The jump however, is far from seamless. In the first 50 pages he talks about the IRA and Northern Ireland; in the remainder of the book he talks about the Islamist militancy. The resulting disconnect may perhaps accurately reflect the progression of Taylor’s career as a journalist, but when presented in book form the product feels rather disjointed. He states that there is wisdom to be harvested from experiences-past, but he does little to elaborate what he thinks history’s lessons are. As a result, the Northern Irish section of Talking to Terrorists reads more like an appendix to an earlier work than an integral section to the present book. Northern Ireland aside, the reader is left with a patchwork of dispatches without real conclusions.

Chatty and reflective, the book is neither the personal journey expected of a memoir, nor is it particularly authoritative or informative. Yet nor does he attempt that – for Taylor states explicitly that he has not set out to write a global study of terrorism or an academic analysis. Nevertheless, the snapshots that he presents leave the reader to search for conclusions, since Taylor does not draw many. The technique he applied to great effect in filmmaking often falls flat in written form: “I asked him if he was a terrorist […] Boukhari’s reply was, ‘I’m not a terrorist. I think people see me as a terrorist, but I’m not. I’m a mujahid’. Talking to Terrorists accompanies a powerful documentary series. Yet the written word without the images in his book at times appears cliché and tired, failing to produce the same impact as his documentaries.

About the Reviewer: Richard Phelps is an Adjunct Fellow at the Quilliam Foundation (London). He focuses on the history and development of Islamist dissent in the Arabic world.

Reviewed by Joost Augusteijn

This book is to be welcomed for many reasons, but primarily for providing a new focus in terrorism studies. It is one of the first works dealing explicitly with the responses of the societal surround of militant groups to their actions and ideas, which in a recent issue of this journal (vol. V, no.1) was placed first on a list of fifty un- and under-researched topics. Studies that incorporate support relations between terrorists and the population have so far focused exclusively on the way the terrorists or the state dealt with the small circle of people directly around the terrorists who provide recruits and practical assistance. Malthaner widens the scope of existing research by focusing on dynamics of interaction and patterns of development in relationships between terrorists and their constituency. His definition of ‘constituency’ is based on reference group theory: ‘real social groups whom the militants address and to whom they refer, with whom they are actually involved in some form of relationship, and who – at least to a certain degree – actually sympathise with and support the militant groups’ (p. 29).

For his analysis, Dr. Malthaner looks at three Islamist organisations in the Middle East: (i) the Lebanese Hizbullah, (ii) al-Jamaa al-Islamiya and (iii) al-Jihad – both of them Egyptian. In the process, he successfully challenges the idea that religious terrorists execute their acts for no audience but themselves and therefore, unlike other terrorists, allegedly feel no constraints. He makes clear that even suicide bombings were for the perpetrators not primarily a direct way to paradise but a tactical weapon in a struggle with a political objective. Malthaner thus convincingly shows that religion-based terrorists also have a social context and a political objective (e.g. liberate people from oppression) and that their interactions with their constituency had a direct effect on the goals and orientation of these militant groups. Consequently, he concludes that theoretical insights and concepts developed in the study of nationalist and socio-revolutionary movements are also applicable to religious terrorists; in other words: there is no Islamist exceptionalism.

As can be expected from a doctoral study supervised by Peter Waldmann, the book has a very strong and impressive theoretical and methodological introduction; it covers almost half of the volume. In the other half, the type of support relations are analysed and then traced from the beginning of violent conflict in the 1980s to a stabilisation at the end of the last century, first for the Egyptian cases and then for Hizbullah. This balance between theory and fundamental research, however, also highlights a number of the few weaknesses of this study. While the fact Malthaner actually went to Egypt and Lebanon to do primary research is admirable, his use of local sources is limited and somewhat uncritical. For the opinions of the constituency he relies on secondary literature and some newspaper headlines, supplemented by personal observations and interviews he conducted himself. Remarkably, there is no use of material produced by the constituency itself. The only instances where their actual opinion is represented, consists of quotations from interviews, in which the statement of one person is uncritically presented as reflecting the feeling of villages with 10,000 or neighbourhoods with 750,000 inhabitants! The
names of the interviewees are also not disclosed nor are the interviews themselves in the public domain. This makes their status as evidence even more problematic. The fact that there are some opinion polls and election results available in the Lebanese case makes his representation of public opinion somewhat more convincing for the case of Hizbullah.

Since Malthaner deals with developments over a long period in a small number of pages, this means that we learn very little about the reaction of the constituency to specific events or the substance of their reactions. The inclusion of a study of al-Jihad - although on a theoretical level understandable as an example of an organisation which turns away from its constituency once it encounters opposition - is in practise odd as there is virtually no further attention paid to this group. The book is essentially a comparison between al-Jawaa and Hizbullah. Malthaner’s desire to see support relations between the population and the organisations under investigation occasionally also leads to inconsistencies. For instance, when he argues that the Islamists received support from shopkeepers and traders after showing how a conflict between them led the Islamists to burning down their shops for selling items the Islamists disapproved of. Or his claim that the Islamists relied on family support and the social standing of their families rings odd as he also writes that they were instructing new recruits to sever the ties with these same families.

Despite these criticisms, Malthaner is convincing when showing the importance of the relationship with the constituency for the understanding of the behaviour and success of terrorist movements. He does provide the first systematic analysis of the structure and development of support relationships, indicating the constraints under which a successful movement has to act to obtain and maintain public support. As long as a militant movement provides economic support and social services, maintains order through policing services as well as mediation, it can be expected to be widely accepted. If, on the other hand, the movement actively starts to enforce its own moral code of conduct on the population, acceptance becomes much more problematic. He also shows that repression by the security forces after a support relationship has been established is dangerous - unless it is done with overwhelming force. However, in the case of repression by a foreign government as in the case of the Israelis in south Lebanon, even extreme force appears to have been counter-productive.

The question whether the results of Malthaner’s research apply to terrorist movements in the Western world remains unanswered in this book. Many of the support relations such as those based on traditional loyalties or utilitarian exchanges are less relevant in most Western countries. The similarities in support relations between these religiously inspired movements and the nationalist IRA nevertheless raises the question whether the absence of such relations accounts for the lack of success of socio-revolutionary organisations in the 1970s. Fortunately, the author is aware of the limitations of his study and its ability to sustain definitive conclusions. While one cannot generalise on basis of this study, it does provide informed suggestions on patterns of interaction and basic forms of support relationships. All this put together makes this the most illuminating work on terrorism this reviewer has read in a long time.

About the Reviewer: Joost Augusteijn is Lecturer at the Department of History of Leiden University, The Netherlands, and member of the Editorial Board of Perspectives on Terrorism
In the introduction to *Armed for Life*, the author outlines the challenges of studying the *Army of God*, a loosely organized, amorphous anti-abortion terrorist group in the United States, by comparing the task to holding “a moonbeam in your hand” (p. xi). Indeed, the *Army of God* is difficult to grasp because it is a distinctly amorphous organization, held together by a single idea: abortion is murder and therefore it must be countered by any means necessary. Paying scholarly attention to the *Army* is important for two reasons. First, the organization has proven to be extremely harmful: it has taken numerous lives, destroyed health care facilities, and threatened the safety and freedom of both those accessing and those providing reproductive healthcare. Second, the loose structure characterizing the *Army* reflects a burgeoning trend in terrorism – ‘leaderless resistance’.

The first chapter of *Armed for Life* provides a brief historical overview of the practice of, and attitudes to, abortion - ranging from ancient Greece to present-day United States. The second chapter describes the Army’s split from the mainstream pro-life movement and, with it, its turn towards violence. The third chapter, focuses on some of the rationales and justifications professed by members of the *Army of God* for engaging in murder. In the fourth chapter, Jefferis examines the structure (or rather: lack thereof) of the *Army*. The fifth and final chapter discusses political and legal responses to the *Army* and its tactics.

Until the 1970s, abortion was illegal in the United States. However, in the seminal 1973 court *Roe v. Wade* case, abortion was legalized under certain conditions. The decision was highly controversial; within a year it provoked the rise of a sizeable pro-life movement across the country. Yet soon this movement struggled with its limited repertoire to achieve some form of success. Discouraged by their slow progress, some members of the pro-life movement began adopting more extreme measures, engaging in vandalism, property destruction and even the bombing of clinics. With time, such actions escalated, culminating in the murder of doctors and clinics’ staff who were held responsible for conducting abortions.

One of the main questions posed in the book is how a pro-life group legitimizes the use of violence to achieve its goals. According to Jefferis, the most common rationalizations offered are biblical/religious, moral, legal (i.e. self-defense), utilitarian and finally, what the author calls, ‘personal justification’. Membership in the *Army* is mainly based on support for certain beliefs about abortion and the willingness to use violence, rather than on any form of official registration or training and indoctrination. Unlike more traditional terrorist organizations, the *Army* has no cells, hierarchies or collaboration in planning attacks; the only chain of command is between individual “soldiers” and the group’s “general” (God). However, that is not to say it is completely without any form of organization; members share loose personal ties, tap into a vast body of online literature and technical advice, and organize an annual banquet to honor those who are serving prison time for anti-abortion violence. The author posits that the group’s unique organizational characteristics challenge governments to constantly re-consider counterterrorist tactics. Despite important progress in policies condemning anti-abortion violence, tensions...
remains between free speech and the right to be protected from intimidation. In addition, given the lack of clear institutional standards, governmental policies are often dictated by political party affiliation and ideology.

Though Jefferis is thorough in accounting for variations in responses to the Army’s actions, her analysis lacks a more detailed discussion of the role of culture and cultural bias. She fails to examine how the ethnic, racial and religious profile of a group such as the Army of God influences its likelihood of being considered a terrorist organization. Would the Army receive such lax and inconsistent prosecution if its members identified with Islam instead of Christianity? By ignoring the impact of cultural bias in (not) prosecuting certain members of the Army of God, Jefferis overlooks an important obstacle to the dismantling of the Army and to bringing an end to its violence.

In her conclusion, Jennifer Jefferis acknowledges that until we can “pin down” the Army it will “keep coming back” (p. 144). However, she argues that a better understanding of how it came into being and how it functions will also contribute to a better understanding of other single issue groups. Indeed, although the book does not offer concrete solutions, Armed for Life provides the reader with an engaging, detailed and rich understanding of this controversial organization. It is especially helpful for those who wish to understand the ideology, historical background and political context under which the Army of God was formed.

About the reviewer: Aylish Cotter is an undergraduate student at McGill University in Montreal, Quebec. Her areas of concentration are deviance, social conflict, and violence.
Networking

Expanding the TRI Network for Doctoral Researchers in the Fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Armed Conflict to the United States of America and Russia

by Alex P. Schmid, Gordon Clubb, Jason Rineheart and Yulia Netesova

In September 2011, the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) announced the creation of a post-graduate terrorism research network in the United Kingdom. The idea was to compile a list of post-graduates conducting research in the UK in the overlapping fields of terrorism, political violence, and armed conflict. While much research is conducted in these three overlapping fields, those involved in research are often unsure what is going on outside their own university department. They also wonder how their own work relates to current research developments elsewhere. To address these concerns, TRI has been inviting UK researchers to complete a profile form.

The response was impressive and clearly demonstrated a need for such a network. The interest was so high that the TRI UK network decided to include also academics who already had a PhD and other qualified researchers interested in collaborating with researchers in the UK. While focused on fostering a postgraduate research community, the network aims to create links with the wider terrorism research community in the UK and abroad.

The UK network, managed by Gordon Clubb, is planning to publish a UK Terrorism Research Review in one of the next issues of Perspectives on Terrorism. It will contain the updated profiles of researchers, details of events organised by members of the network and information on conferences, scholarships etc. TRI hopes this will be a useful tool for researchers to build a vibrant research community and promote multidisciplinary research.

In the present edition of Perspectives on Terrorism, TRI is seeking to expand this initiative to two more countries - the United States and Russia. This will allow doctoral researchers there to exchange information and ideas and check who is working on a topic similar or related to their own. Like in the case of the UK project, the ultimate goal is to maintain an updated list of, on the one hand, American terrorism researchers and, on the other hand, Russian researchers so that interested individuals can correspond with each other and create a collegial environment for potential collaboration in their own country and, hopefully, also beyond it. As the nature of terrorism research is increasingly global and multi-disciplinary, TRI-facilitated networks can provide a way for doctoral researchers as well as post-doctoral scholars to keep themselves updated about research trends in the field and also make each other aware of upcoming conferences and job opportunities at home or abroad.

Russian and US-based doctoral researchers are invited to complete the form below. The information received will be grouped and listed by TRI Research Assistants Yulia Netesova (for
Russia) and Jason Rineheart (for the USA) and made available in appropriate form to all bona fide participants in their respective countries.

(i) Name:
(ii) University:
(iii) Department/Discipline:
(iv) (PhD Thesis) research topic:
(vi) Expected completion of project:
(vii) Email address:
(viii) Country:

If you are from or in the United States, please send this information (i – viii) to Jason Rineheart at jrineheart@gmail.com, and, if you are from or in Russia, to Yulia Netesova at julianetesova@gmail.com. Yulia and Jason are themselves postgraduates preparing their PhD theses. If you want to join the UK network or provide input for the UK Terrorism Research Review, please contact Gordon Clubb at G.Clubb@leeds.ac.uk.

NB: TRI is planning to create more country-based networks and is looking for volunteers to assist us in setting them up and running them. If interested, please contact Alex P. Schmid at: info@terrorismanalysts.com
About Perspectives on Terrorism

PT seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the field of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. It invites them to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) could be characterized as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than fee-based subscription journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles - but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal is peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT is not supporting any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles we expect contributors to adhere to.

**Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism:**

Alex P. Schmid, Editor;
Joseph J Easson, Associate Editor;
Tim Pippard, Assistant Editor;
Eric Price, Editorial Assistant

**Members of the Editorial Board**

The Editorial Board currently consists of 15 experienced researchers. They are (in no particular order):

M.J. Gohel (CEO, Asia-Pacific Foundation, London),
Jarret Brachman (North Dakota State University, USA),
Members of the Editorial Board act as peer-reviewers for articles submitted to *Perspectives on Terrorism*. Currently there are five vacancies on the Editorial Board. Readers of *Perspective on Terrorism* are invited to submit names of possible candidates. Selection will take place on the basis of the publication record of those nominated, taking also into account their contribution to a better gender and geographical balance of the Editorial Board.

**About the Terrorism Research Initiative:**

PT is the journal of the *Terrorism Research Initiative* - an initiative that seeks to support the international community of terrorism researchers and analysts by facilitating coordination and cooperative initiatives. TRI was formed in 2007 by a broad association of individual scholars and representatives of institutions in order to provide the academic community as well as counter-terrorism analysts and practitioners with scientific tools to contribute to the enhancement of human security by collaborative research – thereby allowing them to better actualize the full potential of their efforts. TRI is working to build a truly inclusive international research community and seeks to empower it by creating synergies that can extend the impact of each participant’s research endeavours.

The Journal can be accessed at the following website URL:

[www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com)
Legal Note: Perspectives on Terrorism (PT) hosts articles that reflect a diversity of opinions. The views expressed therein, and the empirical evidence cited in their support, remain the sole responsibility of the contributing authors; they do not necessarily reflect positions and views of the journal’s Editorial Team and Editorial Board or PT’s parent organization, the Terrorism Research Initiative.
Greetings and Welcome to 'Perspectives on Terrorism'

It is a pleasure to welcome you to one of the newer publications in the field of Terrorism Studies. We would like to take this opportunity to introduce you to our journal and explain, in a few words, the underlying impetus that motivates us as well as the intended direction of this online publication and the underlying Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI).

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) seeks to provide a unique platform for established and emerging scholars to present their perspectives on the developing field of Terrorism Studies, based on scholarship focusing on political violence and armed conflict; to present original research and analysis and to provide a forum for discourse and commentary on related issues.

The journal could be characterized as 'non-traditional' in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities of academic journals in order to allow its editors and authors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles while at the same time maintaining professional scholarly standards, guarded by peer-review. Although PT differs from other publications in the field, it is intended to be complementary and non-competitive. Indeed, the establishment of this journal was brought about in consultation with leaders in the field of terrorism and political violence studies; several of them have also editorial responsibilities for various other scholarly journals.

One of the objectives of *Perspectives on Terrorism* is to allow authors to write on subjects or present thoughts that might precipitate further debates and commentary from the wider community of scholars studying violence and conflict and how to prevent and counter such threats to human security. Since PT is using an electronic platform, it is possible to engage in discourse more promptly than in paper-based publications.

PT is a journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), an initiative that seeks to support the international community of terrorism researchers and scholars through the facilitation of collaborative projects and cooperative initiatives. TRI was established in 2007 by scholars from several disciplines in order to provide the global research community with a common tool than can empower them and extend the impact of each participant's research activities. By including promising young scholars working on their PhD theses as Research Assistants in its network, the Terrorism Research Initiative also seeks to create opportunities for them to enter the circle of more established scholars and analysts. To enhance the quality of academic research in the field, TRI has facilitated the publication of the *Handbook of Terrorism Research* [London: Routledge, 2011; 736 pp. ISBN: 13: 978-0-415-41157-8 (hbk)], by Prof. Alex P. Schmid, Editor of *Perspectives on Terrorism* [see: <http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415411578/>].
TRI Openings (December 2011)

1. Editorial Assistant (PT)
2. Research Assistants (TRI)
3. Technical (IT) Assistants (PT)

TRI is currently accepting applications for Research Assistants, Editorial Assistants as well as Technical Assistants for Information Technology. Responsibilities for these part-time, non-paid positions will include assisting the Editor of Perspectives on Terrorism and the Director of TRI with developing collaborative projects, conducting in-depth topical research, and assisting him with the daily activities of the Initiative.

The Editorial Assistant position will support the production of TRI's Perspectives on Terrorism journal. The Technical Assistant position will serve to make better use of IT developments for running the journal.

Responsibilities of Research Assistants (RA) will include assisting the Editor of Perspectives on Terrorism and the Director of TRI with monitoring terrorist organizations and developments, developing collaborative projects, conducting in-depth topical research as well as offering assistance with the daily activities of the Initiative.

Interested candidates should send a letter (e-mail) outlining their motivation to apply for a TRI position. In addition, they should attach a CV/Resume to the letter (and, if available, a publication list) as well as the names of two references who are familiar with their work and educational achievements and send this information to info@terrorismanalysts.com.

Applicants with an interest in integrating emerging web-based technologies and techniques into scholarly activities are especially encouraged to apply.

The workload of TRI positions is flexible and negotiable but averages 5-10 hours per week. RA, EA and TA positions run for six months (renewable) whereby the first month is a trial month.
International Advisory Board of the Terrorism Research Initiative

Adam Dolnik is Professor of Counterterrorism at the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies in Germany. Before his appointment in 2011 he was Director of Research Programs and Professor at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP) at the University of Wollongong, Australia.

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Gary LaFree is a Professor of Criminology at the University of Maryland and the Director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

David Rapoport is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at UCLA, a Mellon Foundation Emeritus Fellow, Founding and Co-Editor of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence.

Marc Sageman is a Consultant on transnational terrorism with various governmental agencies and foreign governments and the author of Understanding Terror Networks and Leaderless Jihad.

Michael Scheuer is currently a Senior Fellow with The Jamestown Foundation, prior to which he served in the CIA for 22 years where he was the Chief of the bin Laden Unit at the Counterterrorist Center from 1996 to 1999.

Yoram Schweitzer is a Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and Lecturer at Tel Aviv University.

Michael Stohl is Professor of Communication at the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB).

Jeff Victoroff is an Associate Professor of Clinical Neurology and Psychiatry at the Keck School of Medicine, University of Southern California.

Peter Waldmann is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Augsburg, Germany, and a long time member of the Advisory Board of the German Ministry of Development.

Leonard Weinberg is Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada.
Participating Institutions of the Terrorism Research Initiative


Center on Terrorism, John Jay College, USA.


Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP), University of Wollongong, Australia.


Defense & Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTRc), Monash University, Australia.

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore.

International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Pennsylvania State University, USA.

Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University, USA. http://insect.syr.edu/ .

The Institute of International and European Affairs, (II EA), Dublin, Ireland, with a branch in Brussels.

Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), Athens, Greece. www.rieas.gr .

Research Unit, Political Violence, Terrorism and Radicalization,

Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Denmark.

University of the Pacific, School of International Studies, USA.

University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh Institute for the Study of Religion, Violence and Memory, USA.
Individual Participants of the Terrorism Research Initiative

Mahan Abedin is a former editor of the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor and currently the Director of Research at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism (a London-based organisation studying Islamism, democratization and extremism in the Muslim world). He is editor of *Islamism Digest* - a monthly academic journal specialising on the in-depth study of Islamic movements.

Gary Ackerman is Research Director at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

Shaheen Afroze is Research Director and Head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Division at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS).

Abdullah Alaskar is Professor of History at King Saud University, columnist, Riyadh daily newspaper.

Mustafa Alani is a Senior Advisor and Program Director in Security and Terrorism Studies at the Gulf Research Center, UAE.

Rogelio Alonso is Professor in Politics and Terrorism at Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid, where he holds the position of Ramón y Cajal Fellow in Political Sciences. He coordinates the Unit for Documentation and Analysis on Terrorism.

Ramiro Anzit Guerrero is a Senior Advisor in the Argentine National Congress and Professor at the University del Salvador and University del Museo Social Argentino.

Victor Asal joined the faculty of the Political Science Department at the University at Albany in Fall 2003 and is also the Director of the Public Security Certificate at Rockefeller College, SUNY, Albany.

Omar Ashour is Director, Middle East Studies, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies University of Exeter.

Scott Atran is Presidential Scholar at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City, Visiting Professor of Psychology and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, and Research Director in Anthropology at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris.

Edwin Bakker is Professor of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism at the Campus The Hague of Leiden University and Director of its Center for Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism.

Daniel Baracskay is a full-time faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Valdosta State University, where he also teaches public administration courses.

Michael Barkun is professor of Political Science in the Maxwell School at Syracuse University.

Shazadi Beg is a Barrister in the United Kingdom and an acknowledged expert on Pakistan. Currently, she is involved in working on disengagement from violent extremism in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province.

Gabriel Ben-Dor is Director of the School of Political Sciences and Head of the National Security Graduate Studies Program at the University of Haifa, where he teaches and conducts research in the fields of political violence, civil-military relations and national security.
Jamal Eddine Benhayoun is a Professor of Cultural Studies and Director of the Research Group on Culture and Globalisation, Abdelmalek Essaadi University, Tetuan, Morocco.

Andrew Black is the Managing Director of Black Watch Global, an intelligence and risk management consultancy headquartered in Washington, DC.

Mia Bloom is Associate Professor of International and Women Studies at Penn State University and a Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Penn State.

Randy Borum is a Professor at the University of South Florida and a behavioral science researcher/consultant on National Security issues.

Anneli Botha is a senior researcher on terrorism at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, South Africa.

Amel Boubekeur is a Research Fellow and the leader of the Islam and Europe programme at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, focusing on Political Islam in Europe and North Africa.

Christopher Boucek is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Princeton University and a Lecturer at the Woodrow Wilson School.

Jarret Brachman is a member of the faculty of North Dakota State University and an independent Al-Qaeda analyst. He runs a jihadist monitoring blog at http://www.jarretbrachman.net.

Jean-Charles Brisard is an international consultant and expert on terrorism and terrorism financing.

Francesco Cavatorta is a lecturer in International Relations and Middle East politics at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland.

David Charters is a military historian and senior fellow at the Gregg Center, University of New Brunswick, Canada.

Erica Chenoweth is Assistant Professor of Government at Wesleyan University and a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley.

David Cook is an Associate Professor of religious studies (Islam) at Rice University, specializing in apocalyptic literature and movements, radical Islamic thought and West African Islam.

Victor D. Comras is an attorney and consultant on terrorism, terrorism-financing, sanctions and international law. He led the State Department’s sanctions and export control programs for nearly a decade and served as one of five International Monitors appointed by the Security Council to oversee the implementation of measures imposed against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated terrorist groups.

Maura Conway is the MA Programme Director at the School of Law & Government, Dublin City University.

Steven R. Corman is the Director of the Consortium for Strategic Communication at Arizona State University.
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Luis de la Corte is a Professor of social psychology at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, and an investigator at Athena Intelligence.

James Dingley is a sociologist and former lecturer on terrorism and political violence at the University of Ulster. He is now running his own consultancy on terrorism (Cybernos Associates) and chairs the Northern Ireland think tank Northern Light Review.

Vera Eccarius-Kelly is an Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics at Siena College in Albany, NY, specialized in Latin American and Middle East politics, and, in particular, on revolutionary and social movements in Central America and Muslim Minority activism in Europe.

Rodney Faraon is Director of Intelligence and Threat Analysis for the Walt Disney Company's Global Security Division.

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