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A Blast from the Past: Lessons from a Largely Forgotten Incident of State-Sponsored Terrorism

by Ken Duncan

In the future terrorists may become the ultimate fifth column: a clandestine cost effective force used to wage war covertly against a more powerful rival or subvert neighbouring countries or regimes.

- Bruce Hoffman, St Andrews University, 1992

Abstract

We sometimes believe that state-sponsored terrorism is a modern phenomenon and generally a weapon of rogue regimes. When we do so, however, we are forgetting the lessons of the past; these demonstrate that it had been used almost two centuries ago by what at that time was considered to be a liberal democracy. Examining these now largely forgotten incidents reminds us that state-sponsored terrorism is not an end in itself but a tool that can be used by any state if the circumstances are right. Examining how this threat was met and overcome can be instructive for us today and is in line with some of today’s holistic approaches to counterterrorism.

Introduction

It was three minutes past eight on a cold and misty Christmas Eve and the chief of state was late for a performance of Joseph Haydn’s oratorio ‘The Creation’. In order to make up time, his driver was proceeding at an even more reckless speed than usual and instead of following his usual route down the main road to the opera house, he turned early into a side street. A few seconds after vehicle and escort turned the corner, the air was filled by the roar of an enormous explosion which shattered the vehicle’s windows, as well as those in the surrounding buildings, as a large vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) had been detonated on the main road. [1] Fortunately, the chief of state was not injured by the blast. But as many as twenty-two civilians were reported killed and numerous others injured. [2]

By now the reader may be wondering why I have not been more precise with dates, names, and places. My explanation: I wanted to make it appear as the summary of a recent event. In actual fact it relates to a plot to assassinate the First Consul of the French Republic, Napoleon Bonaparte [3] which took place in Paris on December 24, 1800. In this instance, the VBIED or the ‘infernal machine,’ as it was known then, was a large barrel of gunpowder loaded on a horse-drawn cart. Approximately four hours earlier three men had carefully placed it on the Rue Saint-Nicaise, which leads off Rue de Richelieu on which the opera was located. To ensure that no one moved the cart, the leader engaged a fourteen-year-old girl, a street vendor of bread, to hold the horse. [4] However, the plot ‘misfired’ for several reasons: first, the lookout at the Tuileries failed to signal the departure of Napoleon’s carriage; second, as the mounted escort rode past the
cart one of their horses knocked the bomber, delaying his lighting the fuse by a few seconds; third, the carriage was travelling at high speed and so was further from the blast than expected. Finally, according to some accounts, Napoleon’s carriage turned early in order to take a short cut. The blast shattered the carriage’s windows and injured some of the escort but no one in the carriage or escort was killed. In another stroke of luck, the following carriages containing Napoleon’s wife, Josephine, and other members of the party had been delayed departing the Tuileries. This was because she had been teased about her costume by one of Napoleon’s aides, general Jean Rapp, and had taken the time to change. As a result of this delay, no one in those carriages was injured.

**Terrorism - Then and Now**

This attack was not described as terrorism because the term had a different connotation at the time. Such actions were generally called conspiracies and the participants were conspirators -- terms that are still in use now by police and press when describing terrorist incidents. Perhaps because of this and because it was unsuccessful, the incident has largely disappeared from modern literature on terrorism. Today when introducing terrorism, authors usually begin by citing Josephus Flavius’s account of the Jewish Sicarii, who attacked Romans and Jews in 1st century Palestine, and then proceed through the 12th century Assassins to the 19th century anarchists. Those who include the French Revolution do so only to document the origin of the term terrorism with reference to the ‘Reign of Terror’ and the efforts of France’s revolutionary government to terrorize its own citizens through two committees: the Committee of Public Safety and the Committee of General Security. Use of the term terrorism as a description for violence used by a covert group against society, rather than for a government’s violence against its own people, began with the Anarchist Movement of the second half of 19th century.

Revolutionary France had only recently emerged from the ‘Reign of Terror,’ the name given to the period between 1793 and 1794 when its National Assembly was dominated by radicals of the left known as Jacobins. Jacobin rule ended when their leader Maximilian Robespierre was overthrown and executed in the “Thermidorian” reaction – the name derived from the date of the coup (9 Thermidor Year II) in the Republican calendar. An Executive Directory of five persons, which pursued a more moderate program, next governed France. Then Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the Directory on the 18 Brumaire Year VIII (November 9, 1799) in a coup d’état. Napoleon became First Consul of the French Republic and, although there were two others, essentially he ruled alone. As a result of these upheavals two sets of irreconcilable opponents to his government emerged: on the left Jacobins who were unrepentant about the Terror and who wanted to return to a revolutionary government; and on the right Royalists who sought the restitution of the monarchy and noble privileges. The Royalists also opposed revolutionary taxes, military conscription, and attacks on the Catholic Church as part of the Revolution’s program of de-Christianisation. Both groups used violence to further their ends. The Royalists in western France had risen in open insurrection against the Revolution in 1793, an event known as
the Vendee after one of the departments involved. The insurgents themselves were called Chouans after their signal, the call of the screech owl (chat-huant). [9]

At First a False Scent

In a situation reminiscent of the Spanish government’s response to the 2004 Madrid train bombings, when then Spanish Prime Minister Aznar assumed the Basque terrorist group ETA to be responsible for political reasons (and had some reason to suspect ETA because of its recent activity), Napoleon initially thought that the infernal machine was the work of the Jacobins. He assumed and must have hoped the Jacobins to be responsible because he hoped to use moderate Royalists in constructing his consular government. Napoleon had better reason for suspecting the Jacobins than Aznar did the ETA. Where ETA had avoided mass casualty attacks, the Jacobins had been behind two recent assassination plots, the second of which mirrored the Rue Saint-Nicaise attack. Indeed the official paper’s (Le Moniteur) account of the December 24th infernal machine incident noted that two months before the government had been warned about 30 or so former revolutionaries who had conceived the very same plot. [10] It involved Chevalier, a chemist and former employee of the armaments workshops, together with his accomplice Veyeer, a shoemaker. They had planned to construct a bomb resembling the infernal machine, no doubt through Chevalier’s technical skills with explosives. During the night of October 17-18, Chevalier tested his device to be sure that it would destroy Napoleon’s carriage. Conducted in a warehouse in the centre of Paris, the test attracted the attention of the police who discovered the remains of the experiment and subsequently arrested Chevalier on the night of November 7-8. [11]

He and his accomplice were still under arrest awaiting trial at the time of the Saint-Nicaise bombing. Therefore the attack could be (mis-) interpreted as a means of overthrowing the government in time to effect their release. Acting on his suspicions, Napoleon immediately ordered Joseph Fouche, his infamous head of police, to round up the presumed Jacobin conspirators. Although Fouche suspected that Royalists, not Jacobins, were behind this attack and told Napoleon he would soon be able to prove it, to save his own position he proceeded to round up 130 alleged ‘terrorists’ (i.e. unreformed Jacobins), who were subsequently shipped off to the Seychelle Islands, Cayenne, or the African coast. [12] Fouche was fearful for his own position and suspected the Royalists because he was in secret contact with one of their leaders, a man named Bourmont, who later claimed that he did not know of this particular plot and for this reason had failed to alert Fouche to it. [13] In any event, discovery and arrest of the real culprits did not lead to the recall of the previously arrested Jacobins. It was a case of using one incident to attack two sets of opponents.

What did lead to the real terrorists’ capture was a brilliant piece of 19th century police investigation. According to counsellor of state Real, the police had recovered forensic evidence in the form of a severed leg from the carthorse. They noticed that it had recently been reshod and by checking with all the blacksmiths in Paris found a smith who recognized his work and then the man who had sold both cart and horse to the conspirators. Armed with a description of
their customer, the police began rounding up Royalist agents and soon arrested one of the conspirators – a domestic servant Francois-Joseph Carbon (a.k.a. “little Francois”) who also had served as a Chouan in the Vendee under none other than Bourmont. Under interrogation Carbon gave up the others. From them, Fouche learned they also planned to plant a bomb under the opera house to kill not only Napoleon but also key members of his government. On April 20, 1803 Carbon and fellow co-conspirator Pierre Robinault de Saint-Rejant, a former naval officer, were executed. [14] Another conspirator, Pierre Picot de Limoelan, escaped capture and ultimately moved to the United States. Bourmont, Fouche’s failed informant, also was arrested but escaped prison in 1804. [15]

The Conspiracy

Carbon, Limoelan, and Saint-Rejant were part of a much broader conspiracy, the leader of which was Georges Cadoudal, one of the most dedicated leaders of the Royalist Chouan insurgency. After his arrest in 1804, Cadoudal admitted to French police that he had been won over to the idea of an assassination by Hyde de Neuville. De Neuville was the man selected by the Royalist leader in Great Britain, the Count d’Artois, to go to France and reconstruct the Royalist agency there. Their plan involved preliminary acts designed to stir up agitation and deflect the suspicion of the police and, one suspects, ultimately shift the French public’s odium from the Royalists onto the Jacobins. Once the police had been given a false scent, they would make the actual assassination attempt. Senator Clement de Reis was kidnapped by a Royalist band in Tourraine on September 25, 1800, and former Bishop Audrein of Finistere, who had voted for the death of Louis XVI, was assassinated in Brittany on November 19, 1800. [16] Both of these incidents presumably were in pursuit of this plan, although it is difficult to understand how the killing of a regicide would be viewed as a Jacobin and not a Royalist act. With the failure of the Saint-Nicaise plot, Cadoudal returned to Britain together with de Neuville. Later when he was arrested during another attempt to overthrow the French government (see below), Cadoudal claimed to have had no prior knowledge of the Saint-Nicaise plot and said he had been horrified when he learned of it not because he disapproved of the assassination attempt -- far from it as that was his mission -- but because he thought it premature.[17] According to him, the three conspirators had been sent to Paris only to buy horses for use in an attempt to assassinate Napoleon when he was en route to the Palace of St Cloud.

Cadoudal’s version of events rings hollow for several reasons. First, his version recounts essentially the same plot as that of 1804 and it may be that he accidentally or deliberately confused the two when interrogated by the police. Second, Elizabeth Sparrow in her work on British espionage notes that “In London, Cadoudal had told William Windham in August, the (sic) Bonaparte would be cut off before two months had passed.” [18] The December attack is beyond this timeframe but close enough to fit with it and the preliminary attacks described above. Furthermore, it would have been easier to hide responsibility for an assassination of this nature than for an open assault on Napoleon’s military escort. Lastly his denial of any knowledge of the plot appears to be belied by the evidence presented at the trial of Carbon and Saint-Rejant. When searching Saint-Rejant’s lodgings the police found a letter from Cadoudal
under the bed addressed to ‘Mon cher Soyer,’ (which was the false name Saint-Rejant was using at the time) and so demonstrates that the two were in communication. In it Cadoudal asked for details of the attempt but makes no reference to the alleged mission of purchasing horses, nor does he question his involvement. Written at a time when the Jacobins were widely suspected of being responsible, the letter certainly suggests that this, therefore, was a sanctioned attempt known in advance to Cadoudal. Saint-Rejant’s involvement is clearly indicated in his draft answer to Cadoudal’s letter, also found under his bed, which gave details of the attempt and reasons for its failure that only one of the participants could have known. [19] During the trial, Saint-Rejant consistently denied any involvement in the assassination attempt but neither he nor Charbon made any mention of their being in Paris to purchase horses nor did the police uncover any purchases other than those necessary for the attack.

Great Britain’s Role as a State Sponsor of Terrorism

The question now arises as to what was the extent of Great Britain’s responsibility for these acts. In one of the few good books on the subject of state-sponsored terrorism, Daniel Byman defines it as: “a government’s intentional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, to bolster its political activities, or sustain the organization.” [20] Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash, in their legal analysis of state-sponsored terrorism, add that both indirect and direct assistance by the state includes, inter alia, “groups or persons independent from the State, but in receipt of financial aide or weapons, or only logistic support…” [21] The characteristics of a state’s involvement with terrorists, in ascending order of involvement, can be discussed under the headings of passive support (awareness of terrorists’ activities within your borders without responding or otherwise interfering), political support, provision of haven, financial assistance, logistical (support including the provision of weapons), facilitation, and direction. [22] When considering Britain’s relationship with the Royalists, we should be mindful of Byman’s observation that “many states support terrorist groups as part of a broader effort to bolster an insurgent movement – the support they provide helps a group conduct guerrilla operations and, in so doing, enables it to conduct terrorist attacks.” [23]

Britain’s support for the Royalist counter-revolution followed this pattern and resembled the situation between Palestinian terrorists and their state-sponsors in the 1970-90s. Syria, Iraq, and Libya all sponsored terrorist groups and allowed them to recruit from Palestinian refugee communities and militias. These countries often directed their terrorist protégés’ actions against their enemies, as Syria used Abu Nidal to attack Jordanian airlines offices in order to prevent Jordan negotiating a peace with Israel, or as they used them to challenge Yasser Arafat for leadership of the Palestinian movement. State-sponsors placed restrictions or red-lines on terrorists’ actions because they were concerned about the consequences if the terrorists acted too violently. With early 19th century Britain there was a convergence of aims with the French Royalists and hence no need for red-lines, nor was there any attempt to use the terrorists for other purposes. As will be made clear below, Britain fully supported both the objective -- restoration of the Bourbon monarchy - and the means employed to achieve it -- insurrection and political assassination - of the Royalists it sponsored.
Byman considers the provision of safe haven to be the most important form of assistance a state can provide. [24] Such havens enable a terrorist group to survive and, as Bruce Hoffman notes, “terrorists win by not losing.” [25] In this case, safe haven in Britain was accorded to the leader of the Royalist counter-revolutionary movement, the count d’Artois, brother of the Royalist pretender and the person who would succeed him as King Charles X. He lived in Holyrood House (today the Queen’s official residence in Scotland) and was provided a pension by the British government. Émigré noblemen, Royalist leaders, like Cadoudal, Hyde de Neuville, and Saint-Rejant, and their followers also were able to find refuge in Britain. But this support went far beyond provision of haven to include the more active forms of facilitation. Prime Minister William Pitt and foreign secretary George Grenville believed ‘in the necessary conjunction of military effort with those of the underground, not only in France, but also in Holland and Switzerland.” [26] Just as Syria in part used its Palestinian terrorist organizations to fight a war by proxy with Israel, so Pitt and Grenville viewed support for the Royalist insurgency and ultimately terrorism in France as part of their war effort - employed as an adjunct to military means at first and, when defeated militarily, as the primary means to effect a strategically favourable outcome -- a “fifth column”, in the words of Bruce Hoffman.

Napoleon’s successful campaign of 1800 against Austria, which culminated in the battle of Marengo (June 14, 1800), disappointed both Royalists and Republicans alike. Some Jacobins in his government secretly had wished for a disaster to stop the increase in his personal power. [27] When in August Napoleon wrote to the Bourbon pretender stating definitively that he would not play the part of general Monk and restore the monarchy, plotting began anew as both Royalists and Jacobins undertook the assassination attempts described above. The Royalists also turned again to insurrection. Under their plan Britain was to provide supplies to Chouans still in arms in the west of France and would dispatch a new force of Royalists led by d’Artois. The scale of military assistance can be gauged when Napoleon wrote to general Guillaume Brune, the French commander in the area, commenting that Cadoudal, the Chouan’s chief, had been supplied with at least 30,000 British muskets. [28] Even so, by 1801 the French government had prevailed militarily and most leaders of the rebellion had signed a pacification convention ending the revolt. The war itself between Britain and France lasted until March 1802 when, under the terms of the Peace of Amiens, Britain recognized the French Republic. That left few options for French opponents of the regime on either the right or left: coup d’état, terrorism, or both. [29] In the event both were tried. On August 21, following the rupture of the Peace of Amiens (April 1803), Cadoudal returned to France courtesy of captain Wright RN in a British naval vessel. His mission was to assassinate Napoleon as part of a broader insurrection and a coup d’état that was to be led by one of Revolutionary France’s most illustrious generals: Jean Charles Pichegru. Despite his Republican military background, Pichegru held Royalist sentiments and had been exiled to Cayenne in French Guiana in 1797 for his role in an earlier attempted parliamentary coup d’état. He escaped to London and secretly returned to France on January 6, 1804. Once in Paris, he met secretly with Cadoudal and another disgruntled republican general, Jean Victor Moreau, famous for his victory over the Austrians at Hohenlinden. [30] As a further
reinforcement, the duke de Berry, son of d’Artois, was supposed to join them; but storms in the Channel prevented his landing in France. Pichegru was betrayed by a friend, arrested and later found hung in his cell - an apparent suicide. Moreau, who was motivated by opposition to Napoleon rather than support for the Royalists reportedly had refused to join the conspiracy once he knew that Cadoudal was part of it; he was arrested and exiled. Cadoudal’s own luck ran out on March 9, 1804, when the police arrested him. He was executed on June 10, 1804. [31]

In a recent work on this period, David Bell concluded, “neither side went so far as to practice assassination openly.” [32] It is doubtful whether the use of terrorists in place of government officials gave Britain ‘plausible denial’ because even at the time there was no question of what the French government thought about Britain’s role in these conspiracies. An order for the arrest of Cadoudal, issued on December 4, 1800, stated that France had acquired proof that he and his confederates were continuing to maintain contacts with the British government. [33] Following the infernal machine incident, Napoleon wrote to general Jean-Baptiste Jourdan that ‘England had much to do with this.’ [34] The French prefect for the Loire, in a letter to Napoleon, observed: “England well knows that if the republic lost you it would disintegrate into the abyss of revolution. That is England’s veritable system of waging war... It knows not how to vanquish, but it is fully acquainted with the art of assassination.” [35] It was indeed England’s ‘veritable system.’ Grenville, Dundas, Pitt and their colleagues in the British government were fully aware of Napoleon’s military prowess, which, combined with the military resources of France, made military success against him unlikely. They regarded him as a usurper and essentially no different from those before him who had led France into revolution and war. Their conclusion was that peace was possible only with the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty. [36] In pursuit of that aim, undersecretary of state Hammon was in direct contact with the conspirators and the British minister to the Court of Bavaria, Francis Drake, was actively assisting them. [37] In one of his letters, Drake wrote, “all plots against the First Consul must be forwarded; for it is a matter of little consequence by whom the animal is stricken down, provided you are all in the hunt.” [38] Other British agents involved in supporting the conspiracy included Spencer Smith at Stuttgart, Taylor at Cassel, and William Wickham at Berne. [39] Taken as a whole, Britain provided the Royalists with a safe haven, financial support, logistical support, facilitation, and was of course both witting and supportive of the conspirators’ aims and methods. [40]

The French Reaction: An Object Lesson in Counterterrorism Response

Military pacification: Royalist insurrections were a considerable threat to the Republic. In a letter of 14 January, 1800, to general Brune, commander of the Army of the West (which was charged with pacification of the Vendee), Napoleon speaks of his (Brune) having 60,000 troops under his command. [41] The same letter charged Brune with ensuring that the coasts were patrolled to cut off the insurgents from British assistance. He was to threaten or take severe measures to ensure that the large towns protected the small towns and he was to make examples of those towns that had conducted themselves poorly. But he was also to “welcome all those who submitted” and to exercise great tolerance towards priests. This campaign was temporarily successful, but when the insurrection flared up again in late 1800, Napoleon sent in three
columns under the command of general Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte (May 1801), accompanied by Military Tribunals, to render justice on the spot and in doing so the insurrection was ended in a military sense. [42]

**Effective policing:** Beginning in November 1800 Napoleon began undertaking repressive measures to restore security throughout the French countryside, not just in the Vendee. As he saw it, the problem lay with both political Chouans and criminal brigands. As today, often there was, in Napoleon’s time, little difference in the actions (though not the motivations) of the two. Chouans funded themselves in part by attacking government convoys carrying treasury funds and committing other acts of highway robbery. Brigands were omnipresent; in addition to theft they also engaged in smuggling. According to the great French historian of the Revolution, Georges Lefebvre, the problem was not just arresting the brigands -- that had been done in the past -- but of obtaining convictions. [43] Juries and witnesses knew they were liable to sufferer reprisals and thus intimidated often acquitted the accused. The answer was to establish a special criminal court in every department (32 in all) where the problem was severe enough to require one. Consisting of judges and a mixture of military and civilian officials all selected by Napoleon, they were able to pronounce sentences without possibility to appeal. Ultimately (1802) concluded Lefebvre “Bonaparte did away with the jury system in a great many parts of France, and these newly created judicial bodies continued to function until his downfall.” [44] The importance of these actions together with military success in crushing the insurgency lay in more than just drying up a major source of Chouan funding. French peasants always valued their security and a tranquil countryside was essential to the efficient feeding of the nation. By bringing peace to the countryside Napoleon won a considerable victory in what today would be viewed as a hearts-and-mind campaign against both the Royalist insurrection and its terrorist component.

**Hearts-and-minds/disaggregation:** Military defeat of Royalist forces, their isolation from British support, and the restoration of law and order to the countryside were all aspects of this policy. Napoleon knew that he could never win over Royalist ‘ultras’ who would be satisfied with nothing less than the restoration of France’s ancien regime. But he hoped to split the movement by encouraging the defection of more moderate Royalists. As David Kilcullen notes, a key component of classic counterinsurgency is to address the underlying grievances that feed the movement. [45] To do this, Napoleon signalled his intention to reconcile moderate Royalists to the new government. On a symbolic level, he ended observance of the revolutionary holiday (January 21) commemorating the execution of King Louis XVI. On a more practical level, he abolished the law of hostages and went in person to the Temple Prison to free the detainees involved. [46] This law, enacted by the Directory on July 12, 1799 was intended to protect revolutionaries from Royalist assaults by making the group, especially the families of émigré Royalists, responsible for the actions of individuals. As British historian John Holland Rose reminds us, it was to have been a temporary measure intended to crush a revolt, but it came to be seen as permanent anti-terrorist policy. Rose adds, “The blunder of nearly all the revolutionary governments had been in continuing severe laws after the need for them had ceased to be
pressing. Bonaparte...discerned this truth (and) set himself to found his government on the support of the vast neutral mass which was neither royalist nor Jacobin.” [47] This is good advice for framers of counterterrorism legislation today. Laws that are too discriminatory and/or too draconian will not stand the test of time because they further alienate the target population and subvert personal liberties.

Napoleon also addressed another of the prime supports for the counter-revolutionary forces – conscription. In his study of conscription and desertion, Alan Forrest noted that *insoumission* (refusal to be drafted) was a key to the strength of the Royalist bands. Once a conscript had refused to report or deserted from his processing depot he had little choice but to live as a bandit and often drifted into one of the Chouan bands for survival. [48] Napoleon effectively diminished resentment and resistance to conscription by setting conscription quotas at a lower level for the Vendee and the other rebel infested areas than for the rest of France. As Forrest noted, the benefits of this policy of pacification outweighed the principle of equality. [49]

All of these efforts were useful, but Napoleon’s most important initiative was the Concordat. France at the time was undergoing a religious renaissance and Napoleon saw reconciliation with the Catholic Church as a means of winning over moderate Royalists as well as obtaining another support for his new regime. ‘No religion, no government’ he wrote to his brother Lucien in 1801. [50] But the Concordat with Rome was also one of his most daring and controversial actions. Winning over Pope Pius VII was relatively easy compared with overcoming resistance to it on the part of Republicans, particularly in the staunchly anti-clerical French army. Reconciliation with Rome reunited the Catholic Church behind the state and eliminated a major source of royalist resentment. It also had an effect upon Chouan recruitment. There was a strong relationship between the non-juring clergy (those who did not accept the secular Republic and remained faithful to Rome) and the rural counterrevolution for these priests were often leaders of resistance. Under the Concordat they constituted the majority of the newly appointed clergy -- in the department of Bas-Rhin, for example, former refractory priests made up 95% of the new appointments. [51] Now they were salaried employees of the French government appointed by and under the orders of Bishops who themselves were selected by Napoleon and canonically instituted by the Pope. This policy of reconciliation with the Church bore fruit even before the Concordat had been negotiated. Toleration was extended to non-juring priests on the mere promise of allegiance to the new constitution. One of those won over was a cleric named Bernier, one of the Chouan leaders. He not only gave his allegiance to the government but also secretly persuaded other less extreme Chouan leaders to accept the government’s offer of an armistice.

**Decapitation:** In the hope of finally ending the insurrection in the Vendee and with it the terrorist conspiracies against him, Napoleon offered Chouan leaders an amnesty. Several accepted but Cadoudal refused and in hopes of winning him over, Napoleon met with him twice in Paris. At their meetings he told Cadoudal that he needed men ‘full of energy’ like him and offered him the rank of general of division (major general) in the French army or a pension of
100,000 livres on condition that he lived a quiet life. [52] When Cadoudal declined, Napoleon immediately issued an order for his arrest, despite his guarantee of safe conduct. [53]

Counter-intelligence operations and the affair of the duke d’Enghein: Excellent police work had uncovered the true conspirators behind the infernal machine plot of 1800, thwarted several Jacobin conspiracies, and uncovered further Royalist conspiracies one of which, as noted earlier, involved generals Pichegru and Moreau as well as Cadoudal. This last was uncovered by use of a double-agent penetration. Mehee de la Touche was an ex-Jacobin spy during the Reign of Terror and was now used by Napoleon as an agent provocateur. He first contacted Royalists in Britain to propose that they join together with his fictional republican conspirators. He was then dispatched to Munich where he won the confidence of the British envoy, Drake. Drake was so completely taken in that he not only gave him money, a secret code and a recipe for invisible ink, but also confided his own schemes to raise the Rhineland in revolt and to facilitate the entry into Alsace of the duke d’Enghien at the head of a corps of émigrés. [54] At the time Louis Antoine Henri de Conde, duke d’Enghien (last in the line of descent of the Great Conde) was living in Ettenheim, Baden, close to the French border. Drake’s indiscrete revelation to Mehee about his conjectured course of action together with several misinterpreted pieces of intelligence ultimately led to what we today would call a covert rendition. Mehee’s report about Drake’s plans and their subsequent correspondence appeared to fit what the police had learned from the conspirators arrested in Paris.

Cadoudal himself had told the police he had come to Paris to assassinate Napoleon but he had been ordered to wait for the arrival of a prince before acting. [55] Napoleon then jumped to the erroneous conclusion that d’Enghien was this prince; a conclusion supported by the false impression that the duke had been in contact with a notorious traitor, general Dumouriez. [56] Apparently this identification was based upon linguistic confusion of gendarme sergeant Lamothe, who mistook the pronunciation of the marquis de Thumery’s name in German for Dumouriez. [57] Napoleon was convinced by this mistaken information as he noted at the time to Real, “It seems certain that Dumouriez was at Ettenheim.” [58] In fact Dumouriez was never involved and it was the prince de Polignac, not d’Enghien, who was meant to have led the conspiracy.

According to Napoleon, his foreign minister (Talleyrand-Perigord) pointed out the danger of having on France’s border a Bourbon prince who was involved in a political conspiracy in Paris. [59] As a result general Ordener and a party of dragoons were ordered to abduct d’Enghien from Baden on the night of March 14-15, 1804. [60] On March 20 d’Enghien was brought secretly to the Chateau of Vincennes and there tried by military tribunal, found guilty, and executed in the moat that same night. His order for arrest and trial listed his offenses as having borne arms against the Republic, having been and continuing to be in the pay of England, and having been party to plots hatched by England against the internal and external security of the Republic. [61] For Lefebvre, “He was condemned not as a conspirator but as an émigré being paid by a foreign nation to invade France. Had he been arrested on French soil or in enemy territory, the law would have prescribed the death penalty.” [62] But he had been seized on neutral soil and was
not part of the conspiracy. Indeed he told the military court that he regarded assassination as contemptible. His papers, which were seized with him, revealed that at the time he was not in English pay and had not been preparing to lead an invasion of France, although they did contain an offer of his services to the British government during the present war. [63] However he previously had served against France in Conde’s army of émigrés, which had been supported by England. [64] As a result he was condemned by the tribunal under the article 1 of the Decree of October 6, 1792, which punished with death all those ‘who engaged in civil war, armed citizens the one against the other or against the legitimate authority of the state.’ This penalty was repeated in the Decree of March 28, 1793 against émigrés which in section 12, article 74, refers to all those who have taken part in ‘musterings’ against the French Republic or who have served against France. [65] Napoleon was clear about this in his own mind. On St Helena he told general Gourgaud, “I never committed any assassination. The Duc d’Enghien was tried as an émigré holding intelligence with the enemies of France and for conspiracy.” [66]

It was about this affair that Fouche famously said, ‘it was worse than a crime, it was a mistake.’ But was it? One immediate consequence was that the Bourbons now realized Napoleon was capable of paying them back in their own coin – they ceased their assassination attempts. The Jacobins were delighted because by this action Napoleon definitively identified himself with the Republic. There now could be no restoration of the monarchy under him. “I am delighted,” said tribune Curee, “Bonaparte is made of the same stuff as the Convention.” [67] And on April 30, Curee himself proposed that the French Republic be entrusted to an emperor. Furthermore, the title was to be made hereditary in part to frustrate future attempts to overthrow the government by assassination.

**Diplomacy**

In 1801, just prior to beginning peace negotiations, Napoleon instructed his negotiator with the British government, Louis Otto, to protest that while far from suspecting that any former or present minister would be capable of paying for or ordering such a crime as the infernal machine plot, two of the conspirators (Dutheil and Cadoudal) were still in England and in the pay of the English government. [68] With this protest the British Government should have realized the game was up and subjected its continuing support for royalist assassins to what we would today call the ‘Washington Post’ test: if you aren’t comfortable with your actions being broadcast to the world then you shouldn’t undertake them. Needing peace, however, Napoleon made a ‘diplomatic’ disavowal in his demarche by adding that he did not believe the English were capable of such behaviour. Had he said what was honestly thought (and known) in France, then negotiations with a government engaged in assassination attempts would not have been possible. And so Napoleon let the matter ride at the time and proceeded with negotiating the Treaty of Amiens.

Diplomacy was more effective in the aftermath of the d’Enghein affair, when the French went on the diplomatic offensive. When the Russian court showed its displeasure by going into official mourning and protested in the German Diet, it provoked a stinging response from the French
foreign minister who asked Czar Alexander rhetorically if English-paid assassins of his father were known to be residing just outside Russia’s borders, would he have hesitated to have them seized? This was all the more insulting because of rumours of Czar Alexander’s complicity in his father’s murder.

When the foreign secretary, Lord Hawkesbury, protested on behalf of Britain, Napoleon directed Talleyrand to respond directly to Hawkesbury’s protest saying that so long as the British government continued to use its diplomatic agents in neutral courts to further such activities, it would regard them as spies. [69] Napoleon was on solid ground in doing so even by today’s standards for in Bantekas’ and Nash’s opinion when a state lends any form of support to terrorists’ armed activities it violates the *jus cogens* principle of non-intervention and risks retaliation by the targeted state. [70] The French Foreign Ministry, in a precursor to today’s ‘name-and-shame’, tactics also sent a circular note to all of the courts of Europe revealing its evidence against Drake and the extent of British complicity in these affairs. [71] European governments were disgusted by these British actions. Bavaria immediately demanded that the British recall Drake. The duke of Baden expelled all émigrés resident on his lands. The duke of Württemberg sent congratulations to Napoleon on his escape, as did the King of Prussia, who wrote of his desire that “he uproot the horrible, savage, scheme against his person.” And even the Bourbon King of Spain, Charles IV, said, “when one has bad blood, it must be spilled.” [72] So embarrassing were these revelations that, contrary to normal procedure, Drake’s official papers were not published at the close of his mission and Hawkesbury had the official record removed from the government’s files and kept in his personal archives. [73]

**Consequences and Conclusions**

Napoleon would face other attempts on his life but none came so close to success as the plot of the Rue Saint-Nicaise. And while counter-factual history is not history, we can still ponder the outcome for the modern world if this or one of the other attempts on his life had succeeded. No other French leader would have been as successful on the battlefield and none had the same genius for civil affairs as Napoleon. To a large degree he moulded modern France, completing and transforming the work of the Revolution. The Civil Code, for example, was not just his inspiration but bears the imprint of his own considerable (largely conservative) contributions. His military successes aided the spread of French ideas and legal code - known as Code Napoleon – throughout Europe.

It has been said that countries appear to learn more from defeat than they do from victory. If this is so then from 1800 to 1809 Napoleon gave Europe a graduate-level tutorial. To be able to meet France militarily, the other powers were forced to transform their military establishments and this inevitably affected their societies. Regarding Prussia, the most extreme example, Robert Asprey notes that “Scharnhorst called for military reforms that would … bring the army and nation into a more intimate union…. ” [74] According to Gordon Craig, reforms “as the opening of the officer corps to the middle classes and the revision of military justice, which were animated by the same philosophy as Stein’s reforms of the civil government, were received with favour by the general
Thus the Prussian army and state were roused from their post-Frederickian torpor. The Napoleonic Wars also shaped the course of European history in other ways. They accelerated the decline of Austria and the end of the Holy Roman Empire, and transformed many of the lesser European states. Indeed, the history of 19th century Europe would have been quite different had those terrorists been just a little luckier in the execution of their attack on that cold December’s evening in the Rue St-Nicaise.

Bruce Hoffman’s observation about the future of state-sponsored terrorism quoted above can also be seen as appropriate for its past uses. This episode validates observations about the importance of state-sponsors as enablers of terrorists and the interconnection between insurgency and terrorism. Terrorism, however, is not synonymous with insurgency. Insurgency is governed by the laws of war, which limits attacks to legitimate combatants. Terrorism, on the other hand, is the deliberate attacking of civilians to coerce changes in political behaviour in response to political or ideological motivations. When a group, including an insurgent group, takes the decision to use this tactic, its actions rightfully can be called terrorism and those states that knowingly support such actions rightfully can be called state-sponsors of terrorism.

Conservative, and for the time, democratic Britain’s role as a state-sponsor in fostering both Royalist insurgents and terrorists in France reminds us once again that terrorism is a tactic, a means and not an end in itself. It further demonstrates that terrorism is not the sole prerogative of rightist, leftist, nationalist, separatist, or religious organizations and suggests that it has and will continue to be used by organizations and states according to their perception of its utility. Great Britain had tried war and lost; sponsored insurgency and then turned to supporting terrorism as a means of achieving its national aims. Terrorism was seen then as now as a low-cost, low-risk alternative to war. For Britain the embarrassment it suffered from Napoleon’s dissemination of incriminating documents was far less than the damage it would have suffered - and was about to suffer - as part of the third coalition from another disastrous military campaign.

When he learned of the proclamation of empire shortly before his execution, Georges Cadoudal reportedly quipped, “We wanted to make a king, but we made an emperor.” In this respect Cadoudal was a better political analyst than he was a terrorist. Certainly the plots were real and although almost all were detected by the French police, to paraphrase the IRA ‘the terrorists only had to get lucky once, the authorities had to be lucky all the time.’ These plots were used by Napoleon to push his own agenda of centralization and authoritarian repression. There is a tendency still present today for the state to become more repressive as it tries to meet the terrorist challenge. A state can always defeat terrorism by out-terrorizing the insurgent terrorists - but only at great cost to itself as the example of Argentina’s struggle “el Proceso” (the process) demonstrates when from 1976 to 1979 the Argentinean government in its ‘dirty war’ against terrorism was responsible for the death or disappearance of between 10,000 and 30,000 people. Napoleon, to his credit, never reached these limits, though he did try every means available in his day to overcome the terrorists, which brings us to counterterrorism.

Lessons learned
Napoleon gives us an object lesson in how to defeat an insurgency and its associated terrorism. The essence of his counterinsurgency/counterterrorism strategy was to address both the manifestation of the insurgency and terrorism and their underlying causes. As Bruce Hoffman advised the US government, Al-Qaeda and its allies cannot be defeated by military means alone; you must also break their recruitment cycle. To do this, in the words of Michael Clarke, director of RUSI, “the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government has to displace the appeal or the fear of the insurgents.” Napoleon knew and followed this strategy. He used military operations against the Chouans to defeat the insurgency in the field and to reassert government control over the afflicted departments. This created a secure environment for the next phase, which was to reconcile the population to his government and the changes made by the Revolution. He allowed exiled émigrés to return and reintegrate into French society. Indeed, many of them served him well in both civil and military capacities. He addressed the problem of banditry in the countryside through special courts, ending a major grievance of the peasants. He also restored relations with the Catholic Church - another major grievance - and turned the clergy into supporters rather than opponents of his regime. In addition, he reduced the level of conscription for certain departments, lessening this grievance. This may seem commonplace today - but the lesson has yet to be learned in Afghanistan where the US was seriously considering substituting a strategy of search and destroy against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The lessons of history suggest this would not have been successful. As for Napoleon and his government, there would always be irreconcilable opponents - the Vendee did rise again in 1815. However, it truly can be said that it took a united Europe to overthrow the Napoleonic Empire - insurgency and terrorism had both failed.

Final Reflections: Was This “Terrorism”? 

Any discussion of Great Britain’s role as a state-sponsor must establish that the activities of Cadoudal and his confederates actually amounted to “terrorism”. Assassination as a terrorist tool is first mentioned by Morozov in ‘The Terrorist Struggle’ where he describes it as “a terrible weapon in the hands of such a group of people.” However not all commentators agree. One of the first to draw a distinction is David Rapoport, who described terrorism as the “offspring” of assassination but believes there are profound differences. Assassination for him is “an incident, a passing deed, an event: terrorism is a process, a way of life, a dedication.” More recently, Michael Walzer posited three distinct divisions of political violence: guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political assassination. He argues that political leaders are a special class of civilians because they self-select for their positions and, therefore, cannot be included in the general classification of ordinary private citizens, who have nothing to fear from political assassins. Similarly V.I. Muntiyan argues that terrorism “represents an antithesis of political murder. Unlike the selectivity typical of political assassination, it shows indifference in relation to victims.” Many scholars also accept the idea that terrorism, in Hoffman’s words: (is) “designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target…” Modern France’s definition of terrorism incorporates this idea: (the) “purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” [86] As does the British
definition: “the use or threat of action …designed to influence the government or to intimidate
the public or a section of the public; and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a
political, religious, or ideological cause.” [87] But this is not a majority opinion. In his survey of
definitional elements, Alex Schmid found that fear figured in 51% of responses, the
psychological dimension in 41.5%, and victim-target differentiation in only 37.5%. [88]

However, I would argue that in certain cases political assassination could be considered as a form
of terrorism even when taking into account these distinctions. Assassination can be a weapon of
terrorists as Rapoport himself notes when he observes that the Assassins were a “prototype of
pure terrorism.” [89] Here assassination is not a distinct form if it is a component of a terrorist
campaign. Certainly the Royalists made several attempts on Napoleon’s life so one could say
that their actions in the Infernal Machine conspiracy were part of a terrorist campaign. Self-
selection itself should not be a definitive issue either. Workers for non-governmental
organizations, such as the Red Cross, are also self-selecting but attacks on them are rightly
considered to be terrorism. Killing political figures is not always the ultimate objective of
assassinations but instead a means of effecting political change. In this respect, there is
considerable difference between the assassination of Czar Paul in an 1801 palace coup that
placed his son Alexander on the Russian throne, an act that is not terrorism, and the assassination
of four major politicians (including two Prime Ministers) by dissident army officers in Japan in
the 1930s. These officers did not intend to seize power themselves; their intention was “to
induce self-reflection and change on the part of the established authorities.” [90] This certainly
appears to be psychological pressure (intimidation) intended to advance a political cause. More
recently, the Tamil Tigers did not expect assassination of the Prime Ministers of India and Sri
Lanka to achieve their aims in and of itself. With such assassinations there is an audience to be
coerced or intimidated - the government and, beyond it, the general population - for assassination
is a powerful statement of a group’s capabilities. The killing of Benazir Bhutto is another recent
example of how a terrorist group can attempt to intimidate a political party or subvert a political
process through assassination. Likewise, in the calculation of both the Royalist conspirators and
their British supporters, the assassination of Napoleon potentially would have led to ‘self-
reflection’ on the part of the French ruling elite, thereby forwarding the ultimate aim of restoring
the monarchy.

Finally, attempts to assassinate a head of state are considered acts of terrorism by the United
Nations under the 1973 ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents,’ which is one of 16 conventions
and protocols pertaining to the subject of international terrorism. [91] As the standard for
inclusion in the US State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism is any “premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents, usually to influence an audience,” [92] the incident of the infernal machine
would have been included in the 1801 edition of Patterns, had one existed at the time, and Great
Britain for its support of these terrorists would have been described as a state-sponsor.
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Notes

[1] According to general Rapp, the police had warned Napoleon that attempts would be made on his life. Louis Antoine Fauvelete de Bourrienne, Memoires of Napoleon Bonaparte, (New York: Scribners, 1891), vol. 2, p. 44. A contemporary account can be found in the judgment of the Criminal Tribunal for this incident contained in G. Lenotre, “L’Attentat de la Rue Saint-Nicaise,” Le Droit Criminel (2002); available on line at: http://ledroitcriminel.free.fr.

[2] Georges Lefebvre, Napoleon: From 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, (New York: Columbia University, 1969), p. 125. The numbers for those killed and injured vary considerably. The Process Verbal of the Criminal Tribunal mentions only that four persons were killed instantly and that others died subsequently of their wounds. - see also G. Lenotre (above).

[3] Napoleon was known as Citizen Bonaparte, General Bonaparte, or First Consul Bonaparte at the time. But in 1802, following his election as First Consul for Life, he began to sign documents with his first name following royal tradition. Rather than changing his naming convention midway though this article, I have elected to use the name by which he is known to history.

[4] G. Lenotre, op. cit.. In the record of the trial the girl’s mother identifies her daughter as Pensol. Saint-Rejant always denied that he had ever used a young girl for this purpose. His denials would have been more credible if they were not made in the context of denying any knowledge of, or involvement in, the incident. See also Peter de Polnay, Napoleon’s Police, (London: Allen, 1970), p. 75.

[5] G. Lenotre, op. cit. - According to de Polnay (above), the coachman Cesar was usually drunk and this being Christmas Eve he was more drunk than usual. General Bessieres, who was accompanying Napoleon, claimed that Cesar was so drunk that he thought the explosion was a salute fired in honor of the First Consul. R.M. Johnson, Napoleon Bonaparte: A Diary, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1910/1994), p. 78.

[6] This absence of the plot in the literature of terrorism is paralleled by an absence in works on political assassination. For example see Franklin L. Ford, Political Murder, (Cambridge, Harvard U, 1985) and David C. Rapoport, Assassination and Terrorism, (Toronto, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1971) do not mention it. Wikipedia, however, has an entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plot_of_the_Rue_Saint-Nicaise.


[14] Woloch, op. cit., p.71. A total of 9 persons were executed and another 5 sent into exile. Other conspirators escaped.


[19] Interrogation of Saint-Rejant by the President of the Court; in Lonotre, op. cit., p. 25.


According to the US House International Relations and Senate Foreign Relations Committee language (1989), the criteria include provision of: sanctuary from extradition or prosecution; arms, explosives and other lethal substances; logistical support; safe haven; training and/or planning; direct or indirect financial assistance; and diplomatic facilities. - See Michael Kraft, “Could Hamas Make Palestine the Next Terrorist Designated State?” (http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/01/could_hamas_make_palestine_the.php)

D. Byman, op. cit., p. 23.


Harvey Mitchell, The Underground War Against Revolutionary France, (Oxford: Oxford U, 1965), 228. William Windham would have preferred Britain to concentrate her efforts entirely in France.

Georges Lefebvre, op. cit., p. 123. According to Lefebvre, Fouche was one.

Napoleon to general Brune, 8 February 1800, (available on line at: http://www.histoire-empire.org/correspondance_de_napoleon/correspondence_de_napoleon.html). (Hereafter cited as www.histoire-empire.org/correspondance.)

J. Godechot, op. cit., p.367.


For more on this conspiracy see H. Mitchell and J. Godechot, op. cit.

David A. Bell, The First Total War, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), p. 3.

www.histoire-empire.org/correspondance.

First Consul to general Jourdan, Minister Plenipotentiary at Turin 13 January 1801, www.histoire-empire.org/correspondance.

P. de Polnay, op. cit., p. 74.


For further details on the activities of these agents, see Mitchell and Sparrow. E. Sparrow (p. 155) describes an earlier assassination plot against one of the members of the French Directory undertaken through Talbot in Switzerland. This plot was known to Grenville but not to Canning.

There was one notable exception, British foreign minister Charles Fox warned Napoleon of an assassination attempt in 1806. – cf. G. Lefebvre, op. cit., p. 252.


G. Lefebvre, op. cit., p. 127.

G. Lefebvre, op. cit., p. 128.

G. Lefebvre, op. cit., p. 129.

D. Kilcullen, op. cit., p. 611.


A. Forrest, op. cit., 193.

G. Lefebvre, op. cit., 135.

G. Lefebvre, op. cit., 156.

P. de Polnay, op. cit., p.64. Ironically, Cadoudal was to work with Moreau in his next conspiracy against Bonaparte.


G. Lefebvre, op. cit., p. 181.  - See Bonaparte’s minute to Minister of Justice Regnier, 1 November 1803, in which he says it is important to have someone with Drake who has his confidence. www.histoire-empire.org/correspondance.


A. Castelot, op. cit., p. 212.

J.H. Rose, op. cit. p. 422.


[67] G. Gourgeaud, op. cit., p. 182. Fouche and Talleyrand both pushed for action against d’Enghien because they believed that it would create a final breach with the Royalists. – A. Chastelot, op. cit., p. 213.


[75] Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army*, (New York: Oxford U, 1964), p. 50. Both Craig and Peter Paret [*York and the Era of Prussian Reform 1807 – 1815*, (Princeton: Princeton U, 1966)] are careful to emphasize, in Paret’s words (p. 244) that “just as the adoption of revolutionary methods of warfare did not lead to a revolution, so the increasing number of officers with bourgeoisie antecedents in the army did not coalesce into a force for political liberation…dilution of the nobility in the long run was less a process of democratization than one of upward social mobility.”

[76] This definition is derived from the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) Article 2 (1)(b), which states: “any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”


[91] Article 1, as an international agreement relating to international terrorism, specifically refers to head of state ‘whenever such person is in a foreign country.’
[92] 22 USC Sec 2656f(d).
Internet Websites and Links for (Counter-)Terrorism Research

by Berto Jongman

Abstract

Since 9/11 the field of (Counter-) Terrorism Studies has expanded exponentially. With the simultaneous expansion of Internet-based resources, it has become almost impossible to maintain an overview of the field – the more so as a variety of sub-fields have emerged, dealing with specific aspects of the phenomenon of terrorism. Any researcher dealing with (counter-) terrorism issues on a regular basis would be aided by a guide of web links directing him or her to areas relevant for particular research needs. However, since the knowledge requirements of researchers differ, there can be no universal list that satisfies all. The following short list is admittedly subjective, serving my individual research needs. I have grouped them in 15 fairly general categories; much more specialised categories could be selected. By visiting these sites and exploring what is available on each of them, the reader might get further ideas as to where to look to satisfy his or her specific needs. Most of these websites have their own list of additional web resources which can also be very useful. In the following, I will introduce each category with some explanatory notes.

General Sites

If you do not know yet where to look for, you should start with general search engines and general sites. I list only half a dozen here. AboutCom provides general information about the history and causes of terrorism, types of terrorism, groups & tactics, US counter-terrorism policy, the global war on terrorism (GWOT - now replaced with the less pretentious term fight against violent extremism), homeland security, human and civil rights and emergency preparedness. There is also a section on books, TV and movies, plus sections called ‘must reads’ and ‘most popular’.

Anti-terrorisme is a Dutch site that brings together web resources in different categories, including terrorism in the Netherlands, foreign intelligence services, Europe and counterterrorism, NATO, weapons of mass destruction, maritime security, cyber terrorism and narco-terrorism. One can expand searches to more general topics like criminology, prisons, newspapers, foreign media, police and private security. There are many similar sites in other languages that categorise resources in such a way.

A good way to start are also major libraries which sometimes offer customer-tailored services. The US Library of Congress maintains so-called Portals to the World, which are electronic resources selected by subject experts. At the time of this writing the terrorism portal is temporarily taken down for a review of its content. The world’s largest library also has a section called Research Guides and Databases. It includes country studies and a global legal information
network that provides contextual background information if one is interested in counter-terrorism legislation for specific countries.

The Terrorism Starting Page brings together web resources related to the topic of aggression. Resources are categorised in groups like research institutes (domestic/foreign), specialists (domestic/foreign), electronic books, special files, an online encyclopaedia on terrorism and scientific journals (domestic/foreign).

- AboutCom: terrorism issues
  http://terrorism.about.com/
- Anti-terrorisme
  http://anti-terrorisme.beginthier.nl
- Library of Congress: Portals to the world- terrorism
  http://www.loc.gov/rr/international/hispanic/terrorism/terrorism.html
- Terrorism Starting Page
  http://agressie-infobronnen.startpagina.nl/
- WWW Virtual Library: International Resources
  http://www2.etown.edu/vl/
- Wikipeadia: terrorism
  http://en.wikipeadia.org/wiki/terrorism

News Portals

For those concentrating on current developments, news portals can be very useful. I selected just seven but there are many more sites that bring together selections of newspapers, magazines and journal articles. On the World News page one can select a topic or a country and will find related newspaper articles. For terrorism-related issues one generally has to search under “military and” or “politics”. The Global Security site is a very useful site on security issues broadly defined, including terrorism. One can find there many official documents related to on-going armed conflicts. The focus is on situation reports, military issues, weapons of mass destruction, intelligence and homeland security. For each topic, there is a selection of web resources in the categories: NGOs, news, US government sites, other government sites. Most of the terrorism-related links can be found under Homeland Security; these are grouped in the following categories: policy shops, counterterrorism, transportation security, immigration and borders, bioterrorism, emerging response, civil liberties, extremist groups. Under the topic ‘Intelligence’ there is a whole section on private intelligence.
For current developments on terrorism, I find the British News Now site very helpful. One can narrow the news selection down to current affairs and terrorism. Under the heading “terrorism” one can select topics like AQ [Al-Qaeda], Bin Laden, counter-terrorism, Guantanamo, renditions, suicide bombers and terrorism trials. By clicking on one of these topics, the reader will find a variety of news items from sources in different world regions that have been published in the last 24 hours. One can also select news items on a specific date. The war & terrorism section includes topics like military news (US/UK), British forces, intelligence, terrorism, wars, war crimes, arms trade, cluster bomb ban, private security contractors, torture, world conflicts. This site is very useful to get a quick overview of terrorism-related incidents.

The Silobreaker site features news on global issues (including politics, conflicts & crime, environment and health), technology, science, business, energy and countries. A subscription permits researchers to use software that allows one to scan the content volume on specific topics, to use automatic network analysis on persons and entities as well as to identify hot spots. It also includes a Tweet section, a section on blogs, an audio/video section and a press release section.

Many websites are country-specific. Two examples: if you want Dutch news sources you should access the Villa Media site which contains links to most media sources (newspapers, magazines, journals, radio, TV) in the Netherlands. The Where-to-do-research site has a focus on the United States; it has links to the top 100 US daily newspapers. One can chose specific topics, some of which are terrorism related, e.g. terrorism and counter-terrorism, think tanks, reference & research, politics and history. Each topic has a selection of web resources. More media sources can be found on Arno Reuser’s Repertorium for Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and the Toddington website with search tools and research resources for on line investigators. The US diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks are currently very much in the news. Cablesearch is an attempt to construct and maintain a user-friendly search engine of already published documents from Wikileaks.

-Alternative News Resources
http://rinf.com/pages/resources.html

-Cablesearch
http://cablesearch.org

-European Union

-Global security.org
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/?co=C005905

-[ British] News Now-terrorism
http://www.newsnow.co.uk/h/Current+Affairs/War+&+Terrorism/Terrorism

- Arno Reuser’s Open Source Intelligence Resource Discovery Toolkit
http://rr.reuser.biz/ShortVersion.html
Terrorism Databases

Terrorist databases can be very useful if one is interested in a specific group, a country or a specific terrorist tactic or target category.[2] There are several sites that plot news items on a world map. An example is the Global Incident Map. It lists incidents related to hazmat [hazardous materials] situations, forest fires, H1N1 pandemic, gang activity, border security issues, presidential threats, terrorism events predictions, drug interdictions, non-terrorist aviation incidents, earth quakes and the Iranian conflict. By clicking on a symbol on the map, one is directed to the original news item. In the free version there is, however, a 24-48 hour time delay while paying subscribers receive breaking news about incidents. There are features to filter the news by incident type, country, city and date.

The Worldwide Incidents Tracking Systems (WITS) of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is the US government’s authoritative database on terrorist attacks. Users of the WITS database can filter and sort attack data by a broad range of characteristics, browse attack records, and derive statistics on terrorism by country, region or global. The website offers also information on foreign terrorist organisations, terrorism definitions, terrorist exclusion list designees and bomb threat call procedures. It further offers profiles of terrorist organisations and information on terrorists captured and killed. In addition, it presents several indicator lists (radiological incidents, suspicious financial activities, terrorist documents and chemical incidents).

The website of the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP) keeps track of news in the following categories: global security, aviation security, corporate security, cyber security, homeland security, maritime security, law enforcement & intelligence. For each section, news sources are listed. Incidents can also be plotted on a counterterrorism news map. The IACSP website also has a Counterterrorism Solutions Center with a few useful features and produces the magazine CounterTerrorism.
The RAND Corporation has maintained a database on terrorist incidents since 1972. Its Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) database contains information on over 36,000 incidents. Since the MIPT –RAND database was discontinued in March 2008, it has been revised and updated but is not yet fully available to the public. The subscription-based database of the Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center (JTIC) is probably the only one that is up-to-date and not lagging behind months or even years as some other databases in the public domain do. Incidents can be filtered by country, group, event, fatality number, target, tactic and date. By viewing at current news item a researcher can immediate click on group and country profiles to obtain more contextual information. The website also provides case studies on high profile attacks and offers country briefings. Jane’s website has an extensive section on web resources on countries (e.g. Australia, UK, US, New Zealand and Canada) and organisations (e.g. ASEAN, EU, NATO, UN, INTERPOL, OAS and OSCE). It also offers links on groups’ designations as terrorist organisations, government reports and anti-terrorism legislation. Janes’s produces a number of products that are very useful for professional researchers, including the Terrorism & Security Monitor, Terrorism Watch report, World Insurgency and Terrorism, Airport review, Country Risk Daily Report, Intelligence Review and the Islamic Affairs Analyst. However, this information comes at a price that goes beyond the budget of most academic researchers.

The South Asia Terrorism Portal is maintained by K.P.S. Gill in New Delhi and collects and analyses information on Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. For each country one can find assessment, bibliographies, data sheets, documents, timelines and information on terrorist groups. The datasheets are based on local news sources and are much more detailed and specific than international news sources. India and Pakistan are countries in the top 10 of international terrorism. This website provides very rich and detailed research materials, also offering statistics on fatalities among civilians, security forces and terrorists.

One of the largest databases on terrorism is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by START of the University of Maryland. It has data on incidents that go back to 1970, now covering over 87,000 discrete incidents, both domestic and international. This publicly available website allows researchers to filter and search the data with the help of several analytical tools. The GTD Data Rivers tool, for instance, allows users to visualize trends in terrorism spanning almost four decades. START plans to continue to expand and enhance GTD in the coming years to ensure that these data remain relevant for trend analyses.

As suicide terrorism has become a characteristic tactic of jihadi terrorism since the early 1980s researchers of the University of Chicago around Robert Pape have developed a publicly available database on suicide attacks for the 1980-2009 period. The Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST) database allows researchers to filter information on suicide attacks by year, location, group, campaign, target type, weapon and gender.

The most-widely used profiles on terrorist organisations are the ones produced by the US State Department. These are published annually in the Country Reports on Terrorism. Many links on
the internet lead to these profiles. These government data are freely available but not as extensive and current as those produced for its subscribers by *Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center*.

- Global Incident Map  
  [http://globalincidentmap.com](http://globalincidentmap.com)
- Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre  
- The Long War Journal  
  [http://www.longwarjournal.org](http://www.longwarjournal.org)
- National Counter Terrorism Center: World Wide Incidents Tracking System (WITS)  
  [http://www.nctc.gov/site/other/wits.html](http://www.nctc.gov/site/other/wits.html)
- Planet Data: The security news network: news map  
- RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents  
- South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)  
  [http://www.satp.org](http://www.satp.org)
- START: Global Terrorism Database  
  [http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/](http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)
- Total Intelligence Solutions: Intel Watch Map  
  [http://www.totalintel.com/content/intel-watch-map](http://www.totalintel.com/content/intel-watch-map)
- University of Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST): Suicide Terrorism Database  
  [http://cpost.uchicago.edu/search.php](http://cpost.uchicago.edu/search.php)

Terrorism Archives

As the materials on specific terrorist incidents, campaigns, groups and tactics accumulate, archives, both private and public are created to house all the information. I mention only two here:

- National Security Archive, September 11th-George Washington University  
  [http://www.gwu.edu/~archive/NSAEBB/#911](http://www.gwu.edu/~archive/NSAEBB/#911)
- The Avalon project of Yale’s Law School  
  [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/21st.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/21st.asp)

Terrorist Group Profiles
The monitoring of terrorist groups is a time-consuming and demanding activity. What is available in the public domain is usually incomplete, already dated and often unreliable. While there are several thousands of terrorist groups [3], only a few hundred are well-described. Three websites in this area are:

- Dudley Knox Naval Postgraduate School Library-Terrorist Group Profiles
- IACPC: group profiles
  http://www.planetdata.net/ct/terrorgroups.php
- US Department of State: Counterterrorism
  http://www.state.gov/s/ct/index.htm

**Terrorism Journals/Magazines**

In this section I listed only two quality digital magazines that are available for free. They cover current topics and articles and are written by very knowledgeable experts. There are many more journals and magazines. Researchers may consult the websites of academic publishers like Sage, Wiley, Taylor & Francis or Elseviers – they all provide searchable lists of journals/magazines. The downside is that very often substantial costs (e.g. $ 25.- per article) are involved for downloading single articles from scholarly journals.

- Combating Terrorism Center at West Point: Sentinel
  http://ctc.usma.edu/
- Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor
  http://www.jamestown.org

**Terrorism Research Institutes/Centres**

In the section on research institutes I have limited myself as a recent issue of *Perspectives on Terrorism* (Vol. IV, No. 5) published a list of one hundred institutes/centres and programs. In addition to more academic institutes, there are many more policy-oriented think tanks, governmental in-house research centres, commercial security firms and NGOs with a research arm; these all engage in terrorism and counter-terrorism research of one sort or another. By visiting just a few institutes and consulting their web links to other sites and resources one can, however, easily feel overwhelmed. It very much depends on one’s research question which institute in which country can help you further. Here I list only two dozens of them.

- Brookings Institution-Project on Terrorism and American Foreign Policy
  http://www.brookings.org/terrorism/
Center for Biodefense, Law and Public Policy  
http://www.ttu.edu/biodefense.

-Center for Defense and International Security Studies (UK)-Terrorism program  
http://www.cdiss.org/terror.htm

-Center for Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Leiden University - Campus The Hague  
http://www.campusdenhaag.leiden.edu/research/

-Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (UK)  
http://www.st-and.ac.uk/academic/intel/research/cstpv

-Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare  

-Center for Terrorism Preparedness  
http://seem.findlay.edu/PubInfoPages/default.asp

-Council on Foreign Relations  
http://www.cfr.org/issue/135/

-Federation of American Scientists (FAS)  
http://www.fas.org/terrorism/index.html

Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI)  
[Norwegian Defence Research Establishment]  
http://www.ffi.no

-Foundation for Defense of Democracies  
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/

-The International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals  
http://www.iacsp.com

-The International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS)  
http://www.potomacinstitute.org/academic/icts.cfm

-International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative  
http://ihl.ihlresearch.org/

-The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, ICD, Herzliya  
http://www.ict.org.il

-International Peace Institute (IPI), New York (UN-focused)  
www.ipinst.org/terrorism
Developments related to the Salafist jihadist campaign with its global aspirations to conduct a holy war against alleged infidels and heretics are covered by many websites. I list here only a handful. The *Hudson Institute* specializes in detailed research on specific aspects of global jihad. The Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group of the *ICT* and *SITE* monitor jihadi websites; they are just two well-known organisations that re-publish selections of jihadist propaganda and ideological statements in English translations, accompanied by comments to put these into perspective. There are several good blogs that bring together Islam experts who offer religiously informed comments and perspectives. AIVD, the Dutch domestic intelligence agency and the Netherlands’ National Coordinator on Counterterrorism (NCTb) (see CT-section) produce, on a regular basis, assessments on developments regarding the global jihad. Most of these reports are translated into English and available for free on the respective websites.
Terrorist Financing

The idea that following the money trail will lead from the recipients of donations to the sources that finance terrorism has lead to institutions that focus on hawala and other forms of terrorist financing. Two sites can serve as starters:

- Financial Action Task Force
  http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1,00.html

- Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
  http://www.fincen.gov/

Terrorism Experts

This section on terrorism experts contains a handful of sites that bring together terrorism experts. The Counterterrorismblog is a good site of up-to-date information; its archives are very useful. The NEFA Foundation, linked to the events of Nine Eleven 2001, specialises in current
developments and produces research reports on jihadi organisations and terrorist plots in the US and Western Europe. The website has links to legal files on terrorist suspects which makes it a very valuable resource for researchers. Websites of networks of experts often contain useful information on on-going research and conferences. However, often they are not in the public domain. Publicly available are, inter alia:

- Counterterrorism Blog
  http://counterterrorismblog.org/
- NEFA Foundation
  http://www.nefafoundation.org
- Network of European Experts on Terrorism
  http://reet-neet.eu
- Network of Terrorism Research [in German]
  www.netzwerk-terrorismusforschung.de
- World Security Network
  www.worldsecuritynetwork.com

*Early Warning*

While forecasting in the field of terrorism is, due to the small size of terrorist groups and their clandestine modus operandi, notoriously difficult without specific human intelligence, general trends in the field of terrorism often reflect those of armed conflicts or political crisis situations. Helpful in this regard are the reports of the *International Crisis Group* which provide early warnings on likely conflict escalations. *Nightwatch* provides a nightly newsletter that tracks current news and assesses international security developments. An academic project at Kansas University tracks developments in several dozen countries where there is, in their estimate, a likelihood of civil unrest in the coming five years. The model successfully predicted civil unrest in Peru, Ireland, Ecuador, Italy and most recently Tunisia.

Domestic Political Violence Forecasting Model
http://radicalism.milcord.com.blog

International Crisis Group
http://www.crisisgroup.org/

Nightwatch
http://www.kforcegov.com/Services/IS/Nightwatch.aspx
Armed Conflict & Conflict Resolution

Terrorism is often linked to wider armed conflicts at home or abroad. Here are a few websites which offer information on armed conflicts and conflict resolution. The CIRI Human Rights Data Project monitors 15 separate human rights, including the life integrity rights (extra-judicial killings, torture and political imprisonment). The annual indexes for 195 countries produced by CIRI covering the period since 1981 can be used in correlation analysis.

- Center for Systemic Peace
  http://www.systemicpeace.org

CIRI Human Rights Data Project
http://ciri.binghamton.edu

-Human Security Institute
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com

-Institute for War & Peace Reporting
http://iwpr.net/caucasus_index1.html

NATO
http://natolibguides.info
http://www.nato.int/libraries

-SIPRI
http://www.sipri.org/

-Threats Watch
http://threatswatch.org/

-United States Institute of Peace
http://www.usip.org/

CBRN Terrorism

Despite the fact that most terrorist groups are, in their modus operandi, quite conservative, using time-tested tactics, there is apprehension that some of them might, with or without the support of rogue regimes, be able to access chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents and materials. There are many websites on CBRN issues, including these:

Arms Control Association
http://www.armscontrol.org
Cyber Terrorism

While there is plenty of cyber crime, cyber hacking, cyber espionage and cyber fraud, cyber terrorism in the narrow sense of the word has so far been almost non-existent. However, the term cyber-terrorism’ is often used very loosely and attention to this field, partly because terrorist propaganda and recruitment make use of computer networks, has been rapidly growing.
Counter-Terrorism

There are hundreds of websites focusing on countering terrorism. The following is but a brief selection. Most of these have features that refer researchers to more specialized sites.

- International Association for Counter Terrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP)
  http://www.antiterrorism.org/main.html
- Counter-Terrorism-Terrorism and Security Information
  http://www.disastercenter.com/terror.htm
- Counterterrorism: Training & Resources for Law Enforcement
  http://www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/
- Dutch Coordinator for Counterterrorism
  http://english.nctb.nl/
- Dutch Ministry of Interior: Counterterrorism
  http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/terrorismebestrijding
- European Union: fight against organised crime
- FEMA-Responder Knowledge Base
  https://www.rkb.us/
- Homeland Security
  http://www.dhs.gov/files/counterterrorism.shtm
- International Security Resources
  http://www.internationalsecurityresources.com/
- International Society of Explosives Engineers
  http://www.isee.org/
- International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security
  http://english.safe-democracy.org/keynotes/
- Military Education Research Library Network
  http://merln.ndu.edu/
- National Counterterrorism Center
About the Author: Albert J. Jongman is a senior analyst with the Ministry of Defense, the Netherlands. Prior to this, he was data manager for PIOOM, a human rights monitoring programme at the University of Leiden. He has been responsible for various data collections, including several World Directories of Terrorist Groups and the PIOOM’s World Conflict and Human Rights Maps for which he received the Golden Candle Award from OSS.NET. He has published on armed conflict and political violence, incl. the edited volume Contemporary Genocides (1996).

Notes

Reactions to the War on Terrorism: Origin-Group Differences in the 2007 Pew Poll of U.S. Muslims

by Clark McCauley and Sarah Scheckter

Abstract

This study explored opinions relating to the war on terrorism for seven groups of participants in the 2007 Pew poll of U.S. Muslims: African-American Muslims and Muslims born in Iran, Pakistan, other South Asian countries, Arab countries, European countries, and sub-Saharan African countries. For all seven groups, half or more of respondents did not believe the US war on terrorism is sincere. Yet less than ten percent had favorable opinions of Al-Qaeda or justified suicide bombing in defense of Islam. Within these general similarities two groups stood out. Iran-born Muslims were on average less religious than other groups, had higher education and income, and reported least support for suicide bombing. African-American Muslims reported lower education and income than other groups and were most negative about the war on terrorism. These results indicate that US Muslims are not a homogenous community; understanding Muslim views of the war on terrorism will require study of origin-based subcultures.

Introduction

In the United States, different immigrant groups have brought with them different subcultures. Irish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants to New York City famously created neighborhoods and communities of their own; other US cities saw similar ethnic neighborhoods develop. Muslim immigrants to the US have done the same, including Iranians in Los Angeles, Somalis in Minneapolis, and Lebanese in Detroit. These immigrant communities reproduce to some extent their homeland traditions in language, religion, and politics as well as food and music preferences.

There is reason to believe that different Muslim communities in the US may also have different views of political issues. Such differences might arise initially from the political contexts that moved different groups to emigrate from their home lands. Many Iranians came to the US, for instance, when the Shah was toppled. Somalis came to the US when famine and violence made their homeland a dangerous place. But the experience of diasporas in their new homes must also play a role in determining immigrants’ political and social attitudes. For example, some believe that the European experience of jihadist terrorism has been worse than the US experience because Europe is less accepting of immigrants. [1].

Recognizing that immigrant groups can differ markedly in their cultures and their political viewpoints suggests caution about general characterizations of “Muslims” in any Western country. In the US, Muslims from Arab countries, Iran, or South Asia are likely to differ in many important ways, possibly including their political opinions. In this article, we explore opinions
of different groups of US Muslims about issues relating to the war on terrorism. Using data from the 2007 Pew poll of US Muslims, we compare groups of US Muslims defined by country of birth, with special attention to converts to Islam.

**Muslims in the US: Comparison by Origins**

If “Muslims” in the US are in fact a congeries of distinct communities, how can we learn about their differences? The obvious approach is opinion polling but in practice it is difficult to get polling data that can adequately represent tiny fractions of a population. Muslims in the US constitute less than one percent of the population and different ethnic and diaspora groups of Muslims are correspondingly smaller percentages. Standard polling methods, such as random-digit dialing or address sampling, are impractical when the target group will comprise less than one percent of those sampled.

Nevertheless, there have been polls of US Muslims, using one or both of two approaches to getting the sample. The first approach is to accumulate Muslim respondents who turn up in national polls using standard probability sampling techniques. Over many national polls, many Muslims are identified and then these individuals can be contacted all at once in a poll targeting only Muslims. The second approach is to sample only from neighborhoods known to have a relatively high proportion of Muslim residents. The odds of calling a Muslim can thereby be raised, although Muslims living outside ‘Muslim neighborhoods’ will be undersampled in this approach.

Polls of US Muslims have typically used a combination of the two approaches, but the samples thus obtained have usually consisted of 500 or fewer individuals – too few to permit fractionating the sample to compare subgroups defined by homeland or ethnic origins. The 2007 Pew survey of US Muslims is an exception, with a sample size of 1050. Our study takes advantage of this larger sample to compare groups of US Muslims based on country of birth.

**African-American Muslims**

It is believed that there has been an African-American Muslim presence in the United States since the eighteenth century slave trade, though the bulk of population growth for African-American Muslims has occurred during the 20th and 21st centuries. Estimates of the African-American Muslim population have varied widely: Turner has estimated that 42% of Muslims in the United States (4-6 million, by his estimate) are African-American.[2] Pew, on the other hand, estimated that 2.35 million Americans are Muslim, and estimated that 20% of that number are African-American (suggesting approximately 470,000 African-American Muslims).[3] Pew further estimates that about half of all Muslims who were born in the United States are African-American, many of them converts.

African-American Muslims are typically members of one of several (typically Sunni) groups, including the American Society of Muslims (the descendent of the original Nation of Islam), the new Nation of Islam (now led by Louis Farrakhan), the Five Percenters, the Dar ul-Islam, the Islamic Mission of America, and other smaller organizations. We will refer to African-American
Muslims throughout this article. Though some use the term “Black Muslims,” historically this
term has had specific connotations in relation to one group, the Nation of Islam, and thus may
not take into account all of the groups of African-Americans practicing Islam in the United
States.[4]

The longer history of African-American Muslims in the US suggests that they may be culturally
and politically different from US Muslims with relatively recent origins in Muslim countries.
Thus, rather than looking at all 273 Pew respondents born in the US, our analysis focused on the
135 native-born respondents who identified themselves as “Black” and reported that both parents
were also born in the US. These 135 represent what we believe is the more culturally
homogenous group of African-American Muslims; they are, as Pew estimated in 2007, about half
(135/273) of all respondents born in the US.

Converts

Concerns have been raised that converts to Islam represent a particular security threat in Western
countries. Converts to Islam have been singled out for special attention by security forces in
Russia [5], Switzerland [6], Germany [7], and the US [8]. The concerns expressed usually do
not specify whether converts are particularly susceptible to radicalization or only difficult to
guard against because their appearance and cultural background allows them to blend into their
native country better than immigrants might.

It is possible that converts are more susceptible to radicalization because they are more zealous
and fervent in their new religion than those born into that religion. This popular idea was tested
in the US Religious Landscape Survey conducted by the Pew Forum in 2007. Reporting on the
results of this survey, Pond and Smith show that converts to a religion are more fervent, but the
differences between converts and born members are small.[9] For instance, 69% of converts and
62% of nonconverts say religion is very important to them; 52% of converts and 44% of
nonconverts attend worship once a week. Such small differences in zeal are unlikely to be
associated with big differences in political opinions. But these comparisons are averaged across
Christian religions; Muslim converts and nonconverts were not compared. It is possible
therefore that Muslim converts are much more zealous than born Muslims.

Of course being more zealous in a new religion, or being open to further life change after a
religious life change, need not mean that converts are more likely to have radical political
opinions. More zealous Muslims may know more about their religion and be less susceptible to
the eccentric version of Islam that Al-Qaeda forwards. Also, being more open to life change may
focus a convert on personal rather than political change. Given the uncertainties associated with
the idea that Muslim converts are more susceptible to radical opinions, we use the Pew Survey of
US Muslims to explore the political opinions of convert and nonconvert Muslims.

Overview of the study

We analyzed the 2007 Pew Survey of US Muslims to explore two questions. First, are there
important differences in the political views of US Muslims as a function of what country they
were born in? Second, do converts to Islam have more radical political views than nonconverts?

We focus particularly on opinions relating to the war on terrorism. As discussed in Leuprecht et al., Al-Qaeda frames its appeal as follows: the West is conducting a war on Islam, Al-Qaeda is leading the Muslim resistance to the war on Islam, and suicide bombing and other attacks on civilians are legitimate because these are the only means open to Muslims against the power of the West.[10] Our analysis focuses therefore on three opinions relating to Al-Qaeda’s frame: belief that the war on terrorism is not sincere, favorable opinion of Al-Qaeda, and justification for suicide bombing in defense of Islam.

**Methods**

*2007 Pew Poll of US Muslims*

Our study examined the 1017 respondents who were coded by Pew for country or region of origin: 28 respondents’ data were missing place of birth information and 15 were born in countries coded by Pew as *other.*[11] Of the 273 respondents reporting they were born in the US, 135 were identified as African-American Muslims; the remaining 138 respondents do not appear in this report. Thus the total of respondents represented in this report is 869 (=1050-28-15-138).

*Groups defined by birthplace*

Seven origin groups were identified. Two countries had large enough numbers of emigrants for separate analysis: Pakistan (137) and Iran (87). South Asian countries excluding Pakistan (Bangladesh, India, Afghanistan) had 151 emigrants, Arab countries combined had 103 emigrants, European countries (including Bosnia and Herzegovina) had 59 emigrants, and sub-Saharan African countries excluding Egypt (Sudan, Somalia, Africa - unspecified) had 107 emigrants. In addition, we identified African-American Muslims as respondents who self-identified as Black and who reported being born in the United States with both father and mother born in the United States.

*Missing data*

Some items had non-negligible percentages of missing responses (*don’t know* or *refused*) for some origin groups. In addition to ignorance and ambivalence, missing rates can reflect caution about responding to sensitive items, and items relating to the war on terrorism may be sensitive in this sense. In our tabled results, percentages are calculated without missing responses in the denominator, but we note percent missing in or after each table.

*Results*

Given the relatively small sample sizes for comparisons by origin (*ns* of seven origin groups ranging from 57 to 151), and the many possible comparisons across seven groups, reliance on statistical testing would likely inflate the number of significant results obtained. Rather than statistical significance, we use a criterion of substantive significance in which percentage
differences less than 15 percentage points are not interpreted. In addition, if one category of respondent is consistently different from others, we note this pattern for discussion.

**Demographics**

Table 1 shows the range of demographic reports across our seven origin groups. In general, demographics were similar for our seven groups except that African-American and Iran-born stood out from other groups.

African-Americans reported lower socio-economic status than the six immigrant groups: lowest education (22% reporting college degree or more vs. 44-74% for immigrant groups), lowest financial condition (38% reporting *excellent* or *good* vs. 42-71%), and lower family income (tied with Africa-born at 24% reporting $75k or more vs. 35-64%). African-Americans were also less often married (37% vs. 63-82%) and much more often converts to Islam (72% vs. 0-9%).

Iran-born respondents reported highest education (74% college degree or more) and income (64% family income $75k or more)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AfAm</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>S.Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent female</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent college degree or more</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent family income $75k or more</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent employed full time</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent financial condition <em>excellent</em> or <em>good</em></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent married</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent convert to Islam</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Religiosity**

Table 2 shows the range of religiosity reports across our seven origin groups. African-American Muslims spent more time at the mosque than other Muslims: 56% reported that they take part in social or religious activities at the mosque beyond *salah* and *Jum‘ah* prayer (Pakistan-born Muslims next highest at 38%). Seventy-nine percent of African-American Muslims endorsed the
idea that mosques should express their views on social/political questions (Muslims born in Arab countries next highest at 50%). Taken together, results on these two items indicate that African-American Muslims have more of their social and political life centered in the mosque than other US Muslims. This does not mean exceptional religiosity: African-American Muslims are not substantially different from other Muslims in attending mosque for prayer or in belief in the Koran.

Iran-born and Europe-born Muslims were lower than other groups in attending mosque for prayer (6% and 17% vs. 39-57%), importance of religion (very important 28% and 41% vs. 64-84%), seeing the Koran as the word of God (57% and 67% vs. 90-96%), and wearing the hijab in public (11% and 8% vs. 25-61% for others). In general these two groups, especially Iran-born Muslims, showed less religiosity than other US Muslims.

Table 2: Religiosity: Percent italicized responses by origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AfAm</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>S.Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On average, how often do you attend the mosque or Islamic Center for salah and Jum‘ah Prayer? once a week or more</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And outside of salah and Jum‘ah prayer, do you take part in any other social or religious activities at the mosque or Islamic Center? yes</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How important is religion in your life? very important</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koran is the word of God (vs. written by men)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your opinion, should mosques keep out of political matters – or should they express their views on day-to-day social and political questions? should express views</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think of yourself first as an American or first as a Muslim? Muslim</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When you are out in public, how often do you wear the headcover or hijab? [females only] all the time</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Do you think there is a natural conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society, or don’t you think so? yes, there is a conflict 37 18 21 21 25 33 17

Note. Across seven origin groups and eight religion items, missing ranged from 0-10%, except “Muslim first” item with 18% percent missing for Iran-born and 15% missing for Europe-born.

Perceived discrimination

Table 3 shows that substantial minorities (17-39%) of every origin group reported being victims of discrimination as Muslims; over half of every group saw discrimination against Muslims in security surveillance (58-78%) and in press coverage of Islam and Muslims (55-74%).

African-American Muslims reported at a higher rate (42% vs. 10-24%) that others in the last month acted suspiciously towards them because of their faith. Also, African-Americans were most likely (39% vs. 17-24%) to report being victims of discrimination in the US.

Table 3: Perception of discrimination: Percent italicized responses by origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AfAm</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>S.Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are you very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, or not at all worried about not being hired for a job or promoted because of your religion? very or somewhat worried</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the past twelve months, have people acted as if they are suspicious of you because you are a Muslim, or not? yes</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… have you been called offensive names because you are a Muslim, or not? yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…have you been physically threatened or attacked because you are a Muslim, or not? yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And thinking more generally, not just in the past twelve months, have you ever been the victim of discrimination as a Muslim living in the United States? yes</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think that the government’s anti-terrorism policies single out Muslims in the US for increased surveillance and monitoring, or don’t you think so? singles out Muslims</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Do you think that coverage of Islam and Muslims by American news organizations is generally fair or unfair? unfair

Note. Across seven origin groups and five personal discrimination items (the first five items in Table 3), missing ranged from 0-5%. The two group discrimination items had larger missing rates: 3-22% missing for the item asking about government surveillance of Muslims, and 3-14% missing for the item asking whether news coverage of Muslims is unfair. African-American respondents showed lowest missing rates: 3% missing on both items.

Government policies

Table 4 indicates that half or more of each origin group expressed dissatisfaction with “the way things are going” in the US (47-87%), with President George W. Bush (72-93%), and with use of military force in Iraq (81-90%). For every group, there was less disapproval of the use of military force in Afghanistan than military force in Iraq; nevertheless a substantial fraction of every origin group disapproved of using force in Afghanistan (32-77%).

African-American respondents were notably more negative than other groups on two items. They were more dissatisfied than other groups with how things are going in the US (87% dissatisfied versus next highest 58% for Europe-born and Africa-born). They were also more opposed to military force in Afghanistan (77 % versus next highest 56% for Arab-born).

Table 4 also shows that, across seven origin groups and four government items, missing responses ranged from 2 to 22 percent. It seems likely that items about US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq would be more threatening for respondents than the item about President Bush, but perhaps surprisingly - missing rates are at least as high for the latter as for the former. We infer from this pattern that most of the missing responses reflect uncertainty or ambivalence in response to the question asked.

Table 4: Government policies: Percent italicized responses (percent missing) by origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AfAm</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>S.Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>135</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country today? satisfied

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AfAm</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>S.Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>satisfied</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*disapprove* (4) (18) (16) (19) (13) (10) (22)

Do you think the US made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force in Afghanistan? *wrong decision*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right Decision</th>
<th>Wrong Decision</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(7) (7) (5) (20) (12) (20) (18)

Do you think the US made the right decision in using military force against Iraq? *wrong decision*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right Decision</th>
<th>Wrong Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>82</td>
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<td>90</td>
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</table>

(2) (12) (8) (17) (9) (14) (16)

*Opinions relating to the war on terrorism*

Table 5 indicates that about half of US Muslims (42-73%) do not believe that the war on terrorism is a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism, and that no more than ten percent of US Muslims justify suicide bombing in defense of Islam (2-10%) or have a positive view of Al-Qaeda (0-9%).

Again African-American Muslims stand out from the immigrant groups. Seventy-three percent of African-American Muslims reported that they did not consider the US war on terrorism to be a “sincere effort” to reduce terrorism. This is 17 percentage points higher than the next-highest group, Iran-born Muslims (56%). Iran-born Muslims are lowest in justifying suicide bombing (2% vs. 5-10% for other origin-groups.

Table 5 also shows that percentages of missing responses for the three terrorism-related items are 10-20 percent missing for the WOT item, 14-27 percent missing for the AQ item, and 3-11 percent missing for the Suicide Bombing item. These rates are only slightly higher than missing rates for the four government policy items in Table 4. One might suppose that the most threatening item in Table 5 is the item about justifying suicide bombing in defense of Islam. This item, however, has lower missing rates (2-11 percent) than the WOT item (10-20 percent missing) or the AQ item (14-27 percent missing). Thus, we are inclined to believe that the opinion percentages in Table 5 are only slightly conservative estimates of Muslim respondents’ acceptance of the jihadist framing of the war on terrorism.
Table 5: Opinions relating to the war on terrorism: Percent italicized responses (percent missing) by origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>AfAm</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>S.Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>135</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>107</td>
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</table>

Do you think the US led war on terrorism is a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism or don’t you believe that?  *don’t believe that*

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Al-Qaeda?  *very or somewhat favorable*

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
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<td>(23)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified, rarely justified, or never justified?  *often or sometimes*

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlates of opinions about WOT, AQ, and suicide bombing

We also looked for demographic characteristics and opinions that are correlated with the three terrorism-related items.[12] In particular we looked for relationships that can shed light on why some respondents see the war on terrorism (WOT) as insincere, or have a favorable opinion of Al-Qaeda (AQ), or justify violence against civilians in defense of Islam (Violence).

**Intercorrelation of terrorism-related items.** Across the seven categories of respondents, correlations of the WOT item with the AQ item and the Suicide Bombing item ranged from -.10 to .17 and correlations of the AQ item with the Suicide Bombing item ranged from .19 to .36. These correlations indicate that responses to the WOT item are not related to responses to the AQ or Violence items, which are consistently but only moderately related.

**Converts.** Are converts more extreme? Our three terrorism-related items, considered separately for each of six origin groups (no converts among Pakistan-born), produced 18 correlation coefficients (not tabled) linking conversion status with a terrorism-related item. Of the 18 “convert correlations,” only two are substantial. For Iran-born respondents, converts are more likely to justify violence in defense of Islam ($r=.29$). For Europe-born respondents, converts are less likely to see the war on terrorism as insincere ($r=-.26$). These two correlations offer little support for the idea that converts are generally more likely than born Muslims to hold extreme opinions about the war on terrorism.
Converts were also compared with nonconverts for each of the eight religiosity items in Table 2. Across six origin groups (no converts among Pakistan-born) and eight items, only four of 48 correlations were substantial. The four were scattered: Iran-born converts were more likely than nonconverts to wear the *hijab* (.47), Europe-born converts were more likely to say that mosques should express social and political opinions (.27), Africa-born converts were more likely to rate religion as important (.44) but, surprisingly, also less likely to say that the Koran is the word of God (-.28). It appears that converts are not generally more religious than nonconverts.

**Correlates of terrorism-related items.** For each origin-group, we correlated each of the three terrorism-related items appearing in Table 5 with each of the items in Tables 1-4 (six demographic items not including convert status, eight religiosity items, seven experience of discrimination items, and four items relating to government policies). Here we summarize briefly the pattern of correlations; full report of these correlations is available in an extended version of this report available at [http://www.brynmawr.edu/psychology/McCauley1.html](http://www.brynmawr.edu/psychology/McCauley1.html)

For most origin groups, seeing the WOT as insincere was substantially correlated (.25 or greater) with two discrimination items (Muslims singled out, media unfair to Muslims) and with four national policy items (dissatisfied how things are going in the country, disapprove the president, wrong decision in Afghanistan, wrong decision in Iraq). African-American opinions of the WOT were not predicted by these items.

Again for most origin groups, favorable evaluation of Al-Qaeda was substantially correlated with two demographic items (lower education, lower family income), two religiosity items (thinking of self first as Muslim, often wear *hijab*), and one national policy item (wrong decision in Afghanistan). Again opinions of African-American respondents are not predicted by these items. Instead, for African-Americans, the highest correlate with favorable opinion of Al-Qaeda was worry about not being hired or promoted because of being Muslim ($r=.29$).

Surprisingly, justifying suicide bombing was not substantially correlated with any other item tested, for any origin group, except that Iran-born women are much more likely to justify suicide bombing if they often wear the *hijab* ($r=.61$).

In sum, the correlates of seeing WOT as insincere are perceptions of discrimination against Muslims and dissatisfaction with US leadership and US policies, whereas the correlates of sympathy for Al-Qaeda are lower socioeconomic status, higher commitment to Muslim identity, and greater opposition to US forces in Afghanistan. The only substantial correlate of justification of suicide bombing was wearing the *hijab*, and this only for Iran-born female respondents.

**Discussion**

In the Introduction we raised the general question of whether political opinions, in particular opinions related to the war on terrorism, might differ for different subcultures of Muslim Americans. To explore this question, we divided respondents to the 2007 Pew poll of US Muslims into seven groups based on origins: African-American (135), Pakistan (137) Iran (87),...
Arab countries (193), S. Asia not including Pakistan (151), and African countries not including predominantly Arab countries (107). African-Americans were respondents self identifying as “Black” and reporting they were born in the US of parents who were also both born in the US.

Then we identified three Pew questions in which opinions could be identified as running against the war on terrorism: seeing the war on terrorism as insincere, favorable opinion of Al-Qaeda, and justifying suicide bombing in defense of Islam. In addition, we identified nineteen Pew questions about issues that may be related to negative feelings about the war on terrorism: eight items about religiosity, seven items about perception of discrimination against Muslims, and four items evaluating satisfaction with government and government actions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In broad terms, we compared opinions on these twenty-two items, as well as standard demographics, for each of the seven origin-groups. Then we looked for correlations of demographic items, religion items, discrimination items, and policy items with each of the three terrorism-related items for each of the seven groups.

Three opinions about terrorism

Perhaps our most surprising result is that the three terrorism-related items in the Pew poll are not strongly related. The correlation between positive opinion of Al-Qaeda and justifying suicide bombing is consistently positive, but across the seven origin-groups the correlations range from .19 to .36. This level of correlation suggests that opinions about Al-Qaeda and opinions about suicide bombing have importantly different origins, and success in changing one of these opinions may have little effect on the other.

Even more disconnected, seeing the war on terrorism as insincere is not at all related to opinions of Al-Qaeda or suicide bombing. Across the seven origin groups, the correlations range from .10 to .17 – consistently close to zero. Not surprisingly, seeing the war on terrorism as insincere has different correlates than favoring Al-Qaeda or justifying suicide bombing. Seeing the war on terrorism as insincere is correlated most with perceptions of discrimination against Muslims and disagreement with US policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, whereas positive evaluation of Al-Qaeda is correlated most with lower education, lower family income, thinking of self first as a Muslim, wearing the hijab, and opposing US forces in Afghanistan.

In sum, we began with what we thought were three items tapping opinions about the war on terrorism. Our results indicate that these three are largely separate opinions rather than three aspects of one general opinion about the war on terrorism.

General patterns of opinion among US Muslims

Across all seven Muslim origin-groups, there are some broad consistencies. Religiosity, as indexed by attending mosque frequently, high ratings of the importance of religion, and seeing the Koran as the word of God, is high - except for Iran-born and Europe-born. Between a quarter and a half of each origin-group sees itself as Muslim first and American second. About a quarter of each origin group reports having been a victim of discrimination against Muslims. More than half of each origin-group believes that Muslims in the US are singled out for increased
surveillance, and that coverage of Islam and Muslims by American news organizations is generally unfair. Half or more of each origin-group are dissatisfied with the way things are going in the US, disapprove of then-President George W. Bush, and believe that the US made the wrong decision in using military force in Iraq. About half of each origin-group does not believe that the war on terrorism is a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism (73 percent for African-Americans).

These results from the most comprehensive available poll of US Muslims add up to a 2007 snapshot of political dissatisfaction in which most US Muslims oppose US policies relating to the war on terrorism and see Muslims as victims of discrimination. Given this level of dissatisfaction, it is perhaps surprising to find that favorable opinion of Al-Qaeda is rare: across origin-groups, zero to four percent of respondents are favorable toward Al-Qaeda (except 9 percent for African-Americans). Also rare is the opinion that suicide bombing against civilian targets is justified in defense of Islam: across origin groups, two percent to ten percent justify this kind of violence.

It is possible that these low percentages are conservative estimates, depressed by immigrant fears of expressing anti-American opinions. We believe, however, that such depression must be small to the extent that missing rates (don’t know and refused) are only slightly higher for the Al-Qaeda item than for the item tapping disapproval of President George W. Bush. We assume that few would fear the consequences of expressing a negative view of the President.

_African-American Muslims_

Across both demographics and opinion items, African-Americans stand out. Compared with other origin-groups, African-Americans report lower education and income, are less often married, and are predominantly (72%) converts. They are more likely to report social or religious activities other than prayer at the mosque or Islamic Center and they are more likely to think that mosques should express opinions on day-to-day social and political questions. They are more likely to report that people have acted suspicious of them because they are Muslim, and more likely to report having been a victim of discrimination as a Muslim living in the US. They are more dissatisfied with the way things are going in the country and more likely to believe that the US made the wrong decision in using military force in Afghanistan. They are less likely to believe that the US war on terror is a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism and tend to have a more favorable opinion of Al-Qaeda. These are highlights where the difference between African-American Muslims and other origin-groups is particularly large, but on many other items African-Americans are consistently among the most concerned about discrimination in the US and about US government policies.

One might suppose that the elements of African-American concerns at the level of group comparisons would be correlated at the individual level. For instance, given that African-American Muslims are most likely to believe that the war on terrorism is not sincere and most likely to believe that the US made the wrong decision in using military force in Afghanistan, one might suppose that it is African-American respondents who are against military force in...
Afghanistan who are most likely to believe that the war on terrorism is not sincere. But the correlation between opinion about Afghanistan and opinion about the war on terrorism is in fact near zero (.03).

For most origin-groups, seeing the war on terrorism as insincere is associated with perceptions of discrimination, dissatisfaction with government, and opposition to US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. But for African-American respondents, these same items show no substantial correlations with opinion about the war on terrorism.

Similarly, more favorable evaluation of Al-Qaeda is generally associated with lower education and income, thinking of self first as Muslim, wearing the hijab, and opposition to US action in Afghanistan. But for African-American respondents these same items are unrelated to opinion of Al-Qaeda.

The challenge then is to explain how African-American Muslims report the most negative or among the most negative opinions about the war on terrorism, but their negative opinions are not predicted by their perceptions of discrimination, the US government, or government actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here we can offer only the most tentative suggestion.

We note that, for African-American respondents, the highest correlates of seeing the war on terrorism as insincere are items tapping general political dissatisfaction: with the way things are going in the country ($r=.20$) and with President George W. Bush ($r=.24$). For African-American respondents (but for no other origin-group) the highest correlate of a favorable view of Al-Qaeda is worry about not being hired or not being promoted because of being a Muslim ($r=.29$).

This pattern suggests that for African-Americans, opinions about the war on terrorism and about Al-Qaeda are derived from opinions about domestic issues, including distrust of government and problems getting a job. In their views of terrorism, African-Americans appear to pay less attention than other origin-groups to US foreign policy, including military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In brief, it may be that African-American opinions about the war on terrorism have little to do with the war on terrorism and more to do with dissatisfaction with politics and employment in the US. However, this suggestion cannot be evaluated without additional research.

**Iran-born Muslims**

Iran-born Muslims report more education and higher family income than any other origin-group. They are also lowest in religiosity, with lowest mosque attendance (6% attending weekly or more), lowest mosque activities (10% once a week or more), fewest rating religion very important in their lives (28%), fewest seeing the Koran as the word of God (57%), and fewest seeing themselves as Muslim first rather than American first (27%). Iran-born respondents were lowest in justifying suicide terrorism (2%), although the difference from other origin groups (5-10% justifying) was not great.

Correlational results also show something unusual about Iran-born Muslims: wearing the hijab is correlated .61 with justifying suicide bombing. Although this correlation represents only the
female respondents in the Iran-born group, it is large in relation to other groups for the same item (next highest correlation between wearing the hijab and justifying suicide terrorism is .26 for females in the Africa-born group).

What might explain the ways in which Iran-born Muslims stand out from other origin-groups? One possibility is a difference in religious sect. Ninety percent of Iran-born Muslims report themselves as Shi’a, whereas the other six origin-groups report themselves mostly Sunni with percentages of Shi’a ranging from 4 to 17 percent. Outside the US, however, there is no evidence we are aware of that suggests that Shi’a are less religious than Sunni.

We are left with a conundrum. Sect, religiosity, socioeconomic status, and wearing the hijab as predictor of justifying suicide bombing—all point to something different about Iran-born US Muslims, but we have so far little help in explaining how these differences may be related.

Converts vs. nonconverts

Are converts more religious and more politically extreme? Perhaps the most direct test of the idea that converts are more religious are the correlations of convert status with rated importance of religion in the respondent’s life. Comparison of converts with non-converts for six origin-groups (Pakistan-born included no converts) found no differences for five of these groups; only for Africa-born Muslims did converts rate the importance of religion higher than born Muslims. Given that converts are not generally more religious, it is no surprise that converts are not more extreme. Across three terrorism-related items and six origin-groups (no converts among Pakistan-born), converts differed substantially from non-converts on only four items spread across three origin-groups. These scattered differences do not support the idea that Muslim converts are generally more politically extreme than born Muslims.

Our findings with regard to converts are subject to two limitations. Converts were rare (0-9 percent) in all origin-groups except African-Americans (72 percent). Comparisons of converts and nonconverts thus depend on data from only 2-5 converts in each origin group, except for African-Americans. Thus it is only for African-American Muslims that we can be confident in saying that converts do not differ from nonconverts in response to the three terrorism-related items or the eight religion items. For African-American Muslims our results should count strongly against the idea that converts to Islam are more religious or more politically extreme.

Conclusion

We analyzed the 2007 Pew Survey of US Muslims to explore whether opinions relating to the war on terrorism differ for groups defined by the country or region in which respondents were born. Briefly our answer is that differences across origin groups are relatively small, except for two groups. African-Americans generally reported more discrimination and less support for US military action in Afghanistan. Iran-born Muslims are highest in education and income, lowest in religiosity, and lowest in justifying suicide bombing in defense of Islam. We also raised the question of whether converts to Islam might be more religious and perhaps more politically extreme. Our answer is that they are neither more religious nor more politically extreme,
although this answer can be asserted with confidence only for African-Americans because other origin-groups included few converts.

Most generally, our results indicate that US Muslims are not a homogenous group. African-American Muslims and Iran-born Muslims appear to be different in important ways from other origin groups, despite the fact that differences are not easy to establish in groups as small as we examine here (origin-group size ranging from 59 to 193). We have only the most tentative suggestions for understanding the pattern of results for African-American and Iran-born Muslims, but this should not be surprising. The 2007 Pew poll of US Muslims aimed to represent the population of US Muslims but the items in the poll were not designed to learn about group differences among US Muslims. In this sense we have pushed the Pew poll beyond its design limitations and our results must be seen as only the first step in learning about group differences among US Muslims. Nevertheless we believe that the pattern of results that distinguishes African-American and Iran-born Muslims is clear enough to make a general point. Research to learn more about the sociology and politics of different communities will be more useful than attempts to generalize about “US Muslims.”

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Notes


[11] According to the 2007 Pew report, Muslim Americans: Middle class and mostly mainstream, nearly 60,000 respondents were interviewed to find a representative sample of Muslims. Interviews were conducted by telephone between January 24 and April 30, 2007, by the research firm of Schulman, Ronca & Bucuvalas, Inc. (SRBI).

[12] Correlational analyses relating to these three items were carried out after recoding missing responses (DK or refused) as neutral values. We used a criterion of substantive significance rather than statistical significance. Statistical tests would make the same size correlation significant or not depending on sample size (here ranging from 59 Europe-born respondents to 194 Arab-born respondents). For our smallest sample, European origin respondents, correlations of about .25 are significant at p<.05 two tailed, and correlations less than this value are unlikely to have practical significance. Thus we attend only to correlations of magnitude .25 or larger.
Situational Awareness in Terrorism and Crime Prevention

by Glenn P. McGovern

Abstract
When governments raise the terrorist threat level and advise their citizens to be more alert to their surroundings: what precisely does that mean for the average citizen? When the warnings encompass vast regions, such as the United States or the European Union and lacks any definitive information on what exactly to be alert to: how is the average citizen supposed to prepare? This article explores the nature of these warnings and provides a set of guiding concepts, often used by professional law enforcement and other government agents, in order to provide a basic tool to the average citizen to reduce his or her chances of becoming a victim.

Introduction
As the tenth anniversary of the deadly September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks approaches, security perceptions in many countries have changed immensely. During those ten years the United Kingdom, Spain, Indonesia, India and a number of other countries have suffered their own large-scale terrorist attacks resulting in hundreds of lost lives. Two wars have been fought and continue on to this day, largely in the name of combating terrorism. Osama Bin Laden still enjoys his freedom, to a degree, while spewing out his messages of hate, serving to influence numerous other extremists. In response to these attacks and in view of the continuing threat of terrorist atrocities, many governments have developed security alert mechanisms, either color-coded or numerically-based in order to warn their citizens.

Many societies have been moving from situations of basic mutual trust to control measures and, as a consequence, conveniences taken for granted since World War II have been encroached upon, especially in the last decades. This has been most notable when traveling; passengers are requested to remove shoes, belts, jackets and metal items before boarding an aircraft and are subjected to special body scans and/or physical pat downs. We are no longer allowed to bring bottled water through airport security and most recently printer ink has been banned too. Some travel trajectories now require more in the way of documentation than previously needed. As a consequence, billions upon billions of dollars are being spent in the name of fighting terrorism.

For the vast majority of the citizens of this Earth, these are inconveniences that are taken in stride as we recognize the reasoning behind it, even though they can be frustrating. Most of us go about their days working, providing for their families, and pursuing their goals oblivious to the terrorist threat. However, with each threatened, failed, foiled or completed new attack, the Western governments issue their warnings in their ongoing effort to protect their people. More
often than not, these warnings are followed by the inevitable statement advising each of us to be more alert to our surroundings.

While a logical statement, what exactly is meant by it? While it may be common sense to some, it has been said that common sense can be a most uncommon trait. In law enforcement and intelligence circles, being alert to one's surroundings is more commonly referred to as “situational awareness”. Simply stated it means “being aware of what is occurring in your immediate area and recognizing a potential threat at an early enough stage to allow counter measures to be taken to avoid it.” It has been accurately described as the basic building block for those in law enforcement, military, intelligence professions. Based on it, advanced skills of surveillance detection, counter surveillance, operational security as well as behavioral profiling have been developed.

A person might be the best-trained, most experienced special operations warrior on the planet, but if he (or she) does not practice solid situational awareness, he might be as good as dead. The vast majority of the population will never have the hand-to-hand skills of a professional mixed martial arts fighter, or the weapons handling skills of a Delta Force or Special Air Service trooper. However, with a little practice, everyone can achieve basic situational awareness skills approaching those of a trained operator. Ironically, while it is one of the easiest skills to learn and implement, like common sense, it is the easiest to discard. Situational awareness essentially requires only practice to develop the habit of implementing it into one’s everyday life.

One of the key aspects one has to understand about situational awareness is that it is not about bravery or cowardice; rather it is about detection and avoidance. This becomes all the more critical when in the company of loved ones; they often represent an additional liability to you, a handicap if you will. While in a one-on-one situation, you may be able to handle the problem either by confrontation or by retreat, if there is more than one adversary and they are willing to target your family, you can find yourself in a very serious predicament.

**Threat Levels**

On March 11, 2002, the United States Government created the five level color-coded Threat Chart in order to provide its citizens with an easy to comprehend terrorist threat measurement. In recent years, this chart has fluctuated primarily between yellow (“Significant Risk of Terrorist Attacks”) and orange (“High Risk of Terrorist Attacks”). Only once has it hit red (“Severe Risk of Terrorist Attacks”). As of this writing the threat level stays at yellow, unless one is flying either domestically or internationally, whereupon the threat level is orange.

On August 1, 2006 the British Government established its own terrorist threat level indication system, also consisting of five levels, but not color-coded. In the last four years, it has fluctuated between level four (Severe - “Attack Highly Likely”) and level five (Critical - “Attack Expected Imminently”). As of this writing, the level has been set at Severe, especially in certain parts of the European Union. Interestingly, the Israeli Government has placed its country at a
state of emergency since the state of Israel came into existence in May 1948. However, when a possible terrorist event is believed to be imminent, or is in progress, Israel only raises the alert level in the city or region that is directly affected. Once the threat has either materialized or has passed away, the alert level is reduced for the area affected. This is important as it prevents the onset of complacency of the citizenry that comes with long periods of an enhanced alert status.

As recently as the autumn of 2010, Western Europe, the United States and Japan issued warnings of possible Al-Qaeda inspired terrorist attacks with the recommendation to be alert, i.e. to practice situational awareness. Short of having code word protected access to top secret intelligence information, the vast majority of citizens, including many in law enforcement, will not know the exact nature of the threat. When a government raises the warning level, there is almost never any direct information offered as to where, when and what type of attack is threatening to take place.

There are many reasons for this lack of specificity - from protection of sources, to prevention of general panic that could result from more specific information, to the details on the attack (place, time) simply not being available. If history is any guide, the attacks can take a multitude of forms. A suicide bomber on foot in a hotel lobby or on a subway station, a Mumbai-style running raid attack or a hostage taking scenario, a car bomb (vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) parked outside a restaurant.

For violent events, there are primarily two main categories. The first is the targeted attack where a specific individual or location is the focus of attack by a hostile person or organization. The second category is less specific: these are basically situations where victims happen to occur because they were at the proverbial “wrong place at the wrong time.” Situational awareness is most helpful in preventing or mitigating, to the extent possible, becoming a victim in those types of attacks.

Two concrete examples of situational awareness and the lack thereof: First, the recent killing of Hollywood publicist Ronni Chasen. On her way home from a movie’s first night followed by the after party, she was stopped at a traffic intersection in Beverly Hills, waiting to make a left turn. A lone man on a bike apparently attempted to rob her while she was in the car and only succeeded in shooting her five times. This was not a terrorist attack, or a government-sponsored assassination, this was a random event where two people from different walks of life crossed paths.[1]

Second example with an entirely different outcome: On January 27, 2011, in Lahore, Pakistan, CIA Contractor Raymond Davis while driving in his vehicle was attacked by two men on a motorcycle and at least one of them was armed with a firearm. Now, unlike the case with Ms. Chasen, Davis has since been identified as a former U.S. Army Special Forces soldier. With his high skills in the combat arts, he went on the offensive and killed the two hostiles.[2] However, sitting in a vehicle stuck in traffic and approached by a possible motorcycle-borne hit team is an extremely deadly situation for any individual regardless of training and experience. The point in
this case was that had Mr. Davis not be practicing situational awareness, he most likely would not have recognized a potential threat until it was too late for an effective response.

Situational Awareness for the Average Citizen

Consider that in the United States, the government is stating that there is a significant risk of a terrorist attack. This for a country that is 9.83 million square kilometers (3.79 square miles) in area (for the European Union it would mean an area that is 4.3 million square kilometers in size). What exactly does that mean for the couple enjoying a leisurely walk down the Champs-Élysées? What does it mean to the family visiting the Tower of London, or the millions of people of traveling each day to and from work in Madrid or Washington D.C.?

For all intents and purposes, it does not mean a thing to the citizens at large. They are more likely to fall victim to a vehicle collision or to street mugging than a terrorist event. However, what it does provide is the initial platform for assessing one’s situational awareness. One of the greatest benefits of situational awareness is that it is a tool that can - and should - be used daily against a range of potential threats. Perhaps the best simple analogy for it was coined by Scott Stewart in his article A Primer on Situational Awareness, wherein he referred to it as driving a vehicle and being alert to the other traffic. [3]

Those who commit hostile acts generally do so only after some careful planning. This is especially true for terrorist groups and criminal organizations. This well-documented process generally provides only two or three opportunities for detection. For the average citizen moving about the day, unless they are the unfortunate individual being targeted, most will not be in an area long enough and/or frequently enough to have the opportunity to detect something unusual during these initial stages of planning. For those happening to be unfortunate enough to be in an area about to be attacked, if a threat is detected, the amount of time available for a reaction would be severely limited as the most likely attack is underway.

Situational awareness is by its nature, a subtle art. It is practiced primarily with one’s eyes, scanning as one moves through the day the surroundings and the brain analyzing the visual input. It does not mean one should become paranoid of an attack at every street corner, behind every tree or building. At the same time it does not mean unusual events are dismissed outright. Situational awareness can and should be applied to all manner of threats, as we can never know when we will be attacked. It provides you, the citizen, with the opportunity to detect abnormal behavior or unusual activity that does not fit within the familiar environment.

The first concept to building situational awareness is accepting the fact that the world is a dangerous place. In some locations, depending on the political or socio-economic environment, it may be more dangerous than in others. You have to ask yourself, do I need to be at this particular location at this specific time? At times this is an easy decision to reach, especially when you are selecting whether or not to visit an area for business, study or vacation. The revolutionary turmoil currently being witnessed in Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen are examples.
The second concept is to recognize that as the average citizen, you are not prepared to deal adequately with, or respond to, a terrorist attack. You lack the training, the armor, the weapons, the back-up and more to take effective action. Even for those in the military, intelligence and in law enforcement, when off-duty, even if armed, during an attack they are not armored, have no immediate means of communication beyond a cell phone, an quite possibly are unknown to the officially-designated first responders. Worst, and most importantly, police and security forces arriving at the scene may not know whether you are friend or foe.

Situational awareness is a mindset that a person must consciously employ every time they leave a location of relative safety, primarily one’s residence and one’s office. Individuals should move in a state of what is termed “relaxed awareness.” In this state you are alert to potential threats, but still able to engage in conversation, drive a vehicle, etc. - but without tuning out the world moving about in the immediate vicinity. The human body can support this level of alertness without suffering any mental and/or physical degradation.

While in a state of relaxed awareness, if an anomaly is detected, the individual then moves into what can be termed “focused awareness.” In this stage, the individual focuses on the abnormal behavior that first attracted his or her attention. This behavior can cover a broad spectrum, from a group of teenagers hanging around a street corner and up to no good, to a man wearing heavy clothing on a warm sunny day. The benefit of focusing on behavior rather than race or ethnicity is that it often allows one effectively to negate the issue of cultural differences; it lets one focus on the “what is wrong with the picture.”

Through this focused awareness, the individual has time to make a decision as to the potential threat being faced. If the anomaly is determined not to be threat, then the individual falls back into a state of relaxed awareness. However, should it be perceived to be a threat (regardless of whether it ultimately is found to be correct or not), the body falls into high alert and steps need to be taken to mitigate the threat to you and/or the family. This can be as simple as crossing the street, stepping into a store, to immediately driving away, contacting law enforcement, etc.. The principal concern for the average citizen should be to move away from the threat.

An important aspect of situational awareness is the understanding that in many terrorist attacks, you may not be in a position to see the threat prior to it being perpetrated. Traveling on mass transit, dining in restaurants, and staying in a hotel, all possible places of terrorist targeting, largely prevent a person of identifying a threat early enough to take action. Therefore, it is important to determine what steps can be taken to avoid being caught up in the “collateral damage.”

This can be a more difficult determination especially in areas that are not experiencing ongoing hostilities, but can and could be targeted in the future. If traveling on a train or subway system, where would a terrorist be most apt to strike? Analyzing the bombings that occurred in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2007, the explosive devices were positioned primarily toward the middle cars. Therefore, traveling in the front or tail car could reduce your chances of falling victim, at least to the extent of blast wave, fragmentation and shrapnel injuries.
When staying at a hotel, the ideal location to obtain a room is between the second and seventh floors, with the second and fourth being optimal. By being above the first floor, the likelihood of having your room burglarized and or your being assaulted are significantly lessened due to the difficulty in breaching second story and above windows and patios. By staying below the seventh floor (or sixth depending upon how they are numbered) the room is still within reach of a fire departments ladders, in the event of a fire.

The second through fourth floors are the prime, as they provide the previous highlighted benefits, while adding two others. First of all, at between twenty and sixty feet off the ground, they provide a degree of buffer in the case of a vehicle borne explosive attack, and the resulting blast wave. The height is also close enough to the ground that an escape can be made, such as during an attack like that which occurred in Mumbai, India. Now ideally, in such a case, it is better to lockdown in place and await the arrival of responding police, but should it become necessary, escape is possible.

Here is where you need to think outside the box. From the third or fourth floor, the goal is to reduce the total amount of vertical distance that needs to be covered by freefall. Use of the below placed balconies is one avenue that can either be climbed directly, or reached through the use of bed linens and/or window curtains/drapes. Regardless, if a drop needs to be made from the fourth or fifth floor, it can be survivable. This is not to say a four-story fall will not hurt or cause injuries, but it can be done when all other options of safely escaping an area under attack have either failed or are not feasible.

An understanding of the nature of violent attacks, combined with a commitment of not going through one’s life oblivious of the events occurring around us, adds to ones’ overall confidence. This increased confidence level has been documented in and of itself as a factor of coping with and even preventing attacks. In 1981, a study titled *Attracting Assault – Victims’ Nonverbal Clues* was published.[4] It detailed the results of a study conducted by Betty Grayson and Morris Stein into how criminal predators (those involved in rape, murder, robbery and the like) selected their victims. The researchers videotaped busy pedestrian walkways in New York City, and then later showed the footage individually to the participating violent offenders. Within seconds these men started identifying potential victims. The researchers videotaped busy pedestrian walkways in New York City, and then later showed the footage individually to the participating violent offenders. Within seconds these men started identifying potential victims. Interestingly, the individuals (i.e. potential victims) identified were largely consistent across the range of predator. The results revealed that when people move confidently, they can reduce their likelihood of being targeted and attacked substantially.

On February 14, 2006, Michael Chertoff, then Secretary of Homeland Security made the following statement: “In a free and open society, we simply cannot protect every person against every risk at every moment in every place. There is no perfect security...in order to protect our country and defend our freedoms; we must continue to focus our resources on the areas that pose the greatest risk.” Democratic governments, regardless of their political ideology, will generally take steps to protect their citizens. However, the law enforcement/security forces simply cannot
be everywhere at every moment. Terrorists and criminals know this and continued to use it their advantage.

Terrorists will carry out their attacks at locations that offer the best likelihood of success. Of late, these have increasingly been soft targets such as restaurants, hotels and public transportation systems. Hence, each and every person has a responsibility to provide to a degree, for their own protection and that of their loved ones. Situational awareness, while no panacea, can make the difference between becoming a victim or being a survivor. To some extent at least, the choice is yours.

**About the author:** Glenn P. McGovern has over two decades of law enforcement experience at the local, state and federal levels. He has thirteen years of experience in SWAT and special operations and was, for three years, assigned to international terrorism investigations. He is the author of Targeted Violence (CRC Press 2010) and Protective Operations (CRC Press 2011).

**Notes:**


Book Review


Books and articles about Al-Qaeda and its figurehead Osama Bin Laden are published in great quantities. Yet the qualifications for the task of analysis among the authors are often meager. This is not the case for Michael Scheuer who previously published, while still working for the Bush administration, as “Anonymous” *Imperial Hybris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terrorism*. Between 1996 and 1999 Scheuer was the chief of the CIA’s bin Laden unit; he continued to work for the American government as counterterrorism analyst until 2004. Few people are more qualified to write on Osama Bin Laden than he is. This raises high expectations to which the book, however, does not always live up to. Spoiled by recent Wikileaks, one expects revelations, e.g. from the period when transcripts of Bin Laden’s intercepted satellite phone conversations ended on Scheuer’s desk. The reader who looks for such materials will be disappointed. It might be that Scheuer did not or could not share some such information. However, more disquieting is the thought that he and his colleagues of the counter-terrorist intelligence community did not know that much about him and Al-Qaeda. The book Scheuer wrote could have been written without access to classified materials. It is based largely on Osama Bin Laden’s own writings and speeches (159 documents totaling 791 pages (p.10)) and the commentaries and reminiscences of those closest to him (p.249). Scheuer has documented his sources well: there are no fewer than 688 notes and almost 15 pages of small-print bibliography.

The analysis of these documents forms the bulk of the book and is illuminating. Based on these materials, he constructs a portrait of the leader of Al-Qaeda that is at odds with much that others have tried to tell us. Before his construction of Bin Laden, Scheuer first de-constructs the dominant portrait of OBL as pushed by the Saudi propaganda machine - “good Saudi-boy-led-astray-by-evil-Egyptians”(p.91) - and propagated more or less unwittingly by those in the West who, in Scheuer’s view, fell for it (e.g. Lawrence Wright and Steve Coll - p. 13). The Bin Laden Scheuer reconstructs is not, as often portrayed a person “swaggering, boastful, threatening, disrespectful toward both scholars and princes” (p.83) but a “kind, humble man who lived a modest life”(p.87), “courageous”, consistent”(p. 25), a “workaholic”(p. 35), “Spartan”(p.37), “tolerant for religious diversity”(p.41), “like a businessman”(p.69), a Salafi, not a Wahhabi (p. 174)“comfortable with command, able to make hard decisions, hold an organization together”(p. 87), a “modern Saladin”(p.181), “fearless on the battlefield”(p.212) , “a master of media”(p.238) a man who “makes brilliant use of the intimacy of Muslims with Islamic history”(p.214). Scheuer’s Bin Laden is “ a pious, generous, and personally brave man, who behaves with integrity and speaks with an eloquence that can alternately comfort and inspire his listeners”(p. 167). Scheuer admits that “my view of bin Laden is far out of the mainstream” (pp. 185-6). His claim that “Bin Laden and al-Qaeda demonstrably attract the Muslim world’s most devout, who
also are often its best and brightest” (p. 195) can be questioned as can many other of Scheuer’s assessments. Those who fight Bin Laden on the American side, the US soldiers in Afghanistan, are, in Scheuer’s view, “lions led by jackasses” (p. 187). He has a special grudge against John Brennan, “the very former CIA officer who stopped plans to capture bin Laden in 1998-1999 [who] is now President Obama’s senior adviser on ‘extremism’, a word whose substitution for more accurate Islamic terms is emblematic of both ignorance and an eagerness to deceive”. (p. 186). Clearly, the author has some axes to grind but he also comes up with some uncomfortable (though debatable) insights such as that Bin Laden rhetoric and actions do not put him outside Islam (p. 247) and that he is “seen as, a legitimate and good Muslims by his coreligionists” (p. 176).

While this book will be the standard biography for some time to come, one is left behind with an uncomfortable feeling that its author has been too close to his subject, writing almost a hagiography rather than a biography. Some of Scheuer’s judgments are, in this reviewer’s view, amazingly far off the mark: are we living, as he claims, in the “bin Laden era” (p. 163)? Is it fair to say, as Scheuer does, “that he has had a greater impact on how Americans view their society, government, and security than any other individual in the past fifty years”? (p. 163). Are we really, as Scheuer believes, “fighting a war for survival” (p. 182) with Al-Qaeda? Is the Bin Laden who claimed, in 2000, that “there would be a holy war in every street of the United States” (p. 227) not devoid of any sense of reality and, with his claim that he has religious authorization to kill up to ten million Americans (p. 215), out of his mind?.” Scheuer reprints a dialogue between OBL and his son Omar: “America and Israel are one bicycle with two wheels. The wooden wheel represents the United States. The steel wheel represents Israel. Omar, Israel is the stronger power of the two.(…) The Americans are weak. It is best to attack the weakest point first. Once we take out the weak wooden wheel, the steel wheel will automatically fail” (pp. 111-112). If Bin Laden is, as Scheuer claims “a man who has grasped the timeless truth that wars are only won by killing” (p. ix), he obviously does not understand that his camp will never be able to “overkill” either Israel nor the United States. Scheuer takes Bin Laden seriously. Paradoxically, that is both the strength and the weakness of his book.

Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid
Selected Literature on Terrorism and Religion

Monographs, Edited Volumes, Non-conventional Literature and Prime Articles published since 2001,

selected by Eric Price

(Professional Information Specialist; Editorial Assistant PT)

NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterix [*] only have a clickable table of contents.


[http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0730/2002013335-d.html].


[http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0711/2002004848.html].


[http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip075/2006038688.html].


Gabriel, B. (2008) *They must be stopped: why we must defeat radical Islam and how we can do it* New York: St. Martin's Press [*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0835/2008018642-b.html*].


[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip058/2005005282.html*].


[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0727/2007037960.html*].


[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0610/2006009341.html*].


[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip077/2007000021.html*].


[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0723/2007030824.html*].


[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0710/2007005571.html*].


Non-conventional Literature


[http://www.unaoc.org/repository/Armstrong_Religion_Conflict.pdf].


[*http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/religion/9780195335972/toc.html].


*Prime Journal Articles*


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50 Un- and Under-researched Topics in the Field of (Counter-) Terrorism Studies

by Alex P. Schmid

Introduction

The Terrorism Research Initiative seeks to stimulate individual and collaborative research on terrorism and other forms of political violence that threatening human security. While some topics are “fashionable” and obtain an extraordinary amount of attention (e.g. CBRN threats, radicalization, suicide terrorism, jihadist terrorism) other (sub-) topics are un- or under-researched.

In order to stimulate research, TRI presents this list of 50 un- and under-researched topics. Any individual or research group wishing to tackle one or another of these topics, is encouraged to register that with the research data bank of the Center for Terrorism and Counterterrorism of Leiden University’s The Hague Campus where an online inventory of ongoing and completed research is maintained. Check the website: http://www.terrorismdata.leiden.edu/

1. Terrorist audiences and their responses: cross-national and longitudinal comparisons of public opinion surveys regarding support of, and opposition to, terrorism;

2. Measuring and evaluating counter-terrorism policies: methodologies and techniques;

3. Unwanted and unexpected side- and boomerang (blowback) effects of counter-terrorism: ways to recognize and minimize them;

4. Is there a disconnect between academic research on terrorism and the counter-terrorist intelligence community’s knowledge (and knowledge requirements) regarding terrorism?;

5. Review of national terrorism prevention programs and policies in a comparative perspective;

6. De-mobilisation of guerrilla and terrorist groups: best practices and lessons learned;

7. Non-violent popular revolt and Salafist Jihadism: competing paradigms for political change in the Islamic world;

8. Conspiracy theories related to (counter-) terrorism: is there a need for countering them?

9. Warning the public: responsible crisis communications prior, during and after terrorist attacks - lessons learned and best practices;

10. Strengthening public resilience against terrorism: policies of individual states (e.g. Israel, Colombia, USA);

11. New strategies for identifying and countering extremist ideologies on the Internet;

12. Countering terrorism: is it possible to limit the role of government and strengthen the role of civil society;
13. Civil society and (counter-) terrorism: the role of NGOs in terrorism and counter-terrorism;
14. Immigration, diasporas and terrorism: misperceptions, alleged and proven links;
15. The responses of human rights organizations to human rights violations by terrorist groups.
16. Counter-terrorism within the frameworks of human rights and humanitarian law requirements: upholding or updating international law standards?
17. The UN CT strategy [GA Res. 60/288 (2006)]: where does the international community stand with its implementation?
18. Terrorism and the Media, Terrorism and the Internet: cross-impacts and what can be done about them while upholding freedom of speech and expression?
19. Freedom of speech vs. incitement to terrorism: the response of the courts;
20. Prevention of terrorism by intelligence and security services vs. prosecution and punishment of terrorists by law enforcement: dilemmas and solutions;
21. The prosecution of terrorists in international comparison: national arrest, trial and conviction records compared;
22. The grievances of terrorists: should they be taken seriously or are they just pretexts and justifications for violence?
23. The terrorism - organized crime nexus: new insights and developments
24. The delayed impact of the 2008 economic crisis on terrorism, political violence, armed conflict and non-violent protests;
25. The rehabilitation of terrorists vs. the rehabilitation of common criminals in prison: recidivism records compared;
26. Prisons: new ways of preventing and countering radicalization of prisoners and advancing rehabilitation of convicted offenders;
27. Countering radicalisation and violent extremism in schools and religious institutions: evaluating existing programs;
28. The shrinking space of citizen privacy: thinking about safeguards to prevent the development of surveillance societies in the name of counter-terrorism;
29. Islamophobia and Antisemitism compared: between rhetorical weapons and legitimate grievances;
30. Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Jews, and Buddhists under attack for their faith: a quantitative comparison in the post-Cold War period – claims vs. facts;
31. Differentiating between terrorism, other forms of political violence and human rights
violations: towards a more balanced approach to assessing armed conflict and repression;
32. Analyzing terrorist statements and internal writings: looking for cues regarding the expected utility of terrorism in terrorist thinking;
33. Measuring the actual effectiveness of terrorism: findings from empirical research on the tactical and strategic outcomes of uses of terrorism;
34. State human rights violations in response to terrorism – how widespread, how serious?;
35. Kidnapping for ransom: the consequences of paying ransom and of refusals to pay.
36. The messaging policies of Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and media jihadists:
   analyzing communiques and threat statements systematically
37. Careers of ex-terrorists and their role in countering terrorism;
38. Terrorists released from prison: subsequent careers;
39. The targeting logic of terrorist attacks;
40. The trajectory of terrorist campaigns in comparative perspective;
41. The role of victim associations in court cases against terrorists;
42. Websites associated with terrorist groups: an overview;
43. Failed, foiled and completed attacks by Al-Qaeda, AQ affiliates and individual (would-be) associates: a consolidated overview;
44. New legislation on terrorism: inventory, comparison and impact;
45. The lethality of terrorism in comparison with criminal homicides, victimization by natural disasters, specific diseases, etc.: towards a realistic ranking of human risks;
46. Pakistan: regional and global implications of potential state failure/collapse;
47. Afghanistan: endgame scenarios and their regional and global implications;
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Edited by Alex P. Schmid, Terrorism Research Initiative, Vienna, Austria

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About Perspectives on Terrorism

PT seeks to provide a unique platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the field of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. It invites them to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) could be characterized as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than fee-based subscription journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles - but without compromising professional scholarly standards. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT is not supporting any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles we expect contributors to adhere to.

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Tim Pippard, Assistant Editor  
Shazad Ali, Assistant Editor  
Brad McAllister, Assistant Editor  
Eric Price, Editorial Assistant  
David Mazzuca, Editorial Assistant

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About the Terrorism Research Initiative:

PT is the journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative - an initiative that seeks to support the international community of terrorism researchers and analysts by facilitating coordination and cooperative initiatives. TRI was formed in 2007 by a broad association of individual scholars and representatives of institutions in order to provide the academic community as
well as counter-terrorism analysts and practitioners with scientific tools to contribute to the enhancement of human security by collaborative research – thereby allowing them to better actualize the full potential of their efforts. TRI is working to build a truly inclusive international research community and seeks to empower it by creating synergies that can extend the impact of each participant’s research endeavours.

The Journal can be accessed at the following website URL:

www.terrorismanalysts.com

**Legal Note:** *Perspectives on Terrorism* hosts articles that reflect a diversity of opinions. The views expressed therein, and the empirical evidence cited in their support, remain the sole responsibility of the contributing authors; they do not necessarily reflect positions and views of the journal’s Editorial Team or its parent organization, the *Terrorism Research Initiative*. 
Word of Welcome from the Editor

It is a pleasure to welcome you to one of the newer publications in the field of Terrorism Studies. I would like to take this opportunity to introduce you to our journal and explain, in a few words, the underlying impetus that motivates us and the intended direction of this online publication and the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) of which it is part.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) seeks to provide a practical platform for established and emerging scholars to present their perspectives, based on scholarship focusing on terrorism as well as other, related forms of political violence and armed conflict; it seeks to present original research and analyses and wishes to provide a forum for discourse and commentary on related issues. The journal could be characterized as 'non-traditional': it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities of academic journals in order to allow its editors and authors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles - while at the same time maintaining professional scholarly standards. Although PT differs from other publications in the field, it is intended to be complementary and non-competitive. Indeed, the establishment of this journal was brought about in consultation with leaders in the field of terrorism and political violence studies; several of whom have also editorial responsibilities for various other scholarly journals.

One of the objectives of *Perspectives on Terrorism* is to allow authors to write on subjects or present thoughts that might precipitate further debates and commentary from the wider community of scholars studying violent conflict. Our aim is to contribute to the prevention and control of such violent threats to human security. Since PT is using an electronic platform, it is possible to engage in discourse more promptly than in paper-based publications.

PT is a journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), an initiative that seeks to support the international community of terrorism researchers and scholars through the facilitation of collaborative projects and cooperative initiatives. TRI was formed in 2007 by scholars from various disciplines in order to provide the global research community with a common tool than can empower them by extending the impact of each participant's research activities. By including promising young scholars working on their PhD theses as Research and Editorial Assistants in its network, the Terrorism Research Initiative and its journal also seeks to create opportunities for them to enter the circle of more established scholars and analysts.

To enhance the quality of academic research in the field, TRI has also facilitated the publication of the *Handbook of Terrorism Research* [London: Routledge, 2011; 718 pp.; ISBN: 978-0-415-41157-8 (hbk)].
Participating Institutions of the Terrorism Research Initiative

Athena Intelligence, Spain. http://www.athenaintelligence.org/

Center on Terrorism, John Jay College, USA.

Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC) at Campus The Hague of Leiden University, Netherlands. http://www.campusdenhaag.nl/ctc

Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St. Andrews, Scotland .http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/

Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP), University of Wollongong , Australia.

Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, USA. http://www.comops.org/

Defense & Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan

Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTrEc), Monash University, Australia.

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore.

International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Pennsylvania State University, USA.

Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University, USA. http://insect.syr.edu/

The Institute of International and European Affairs, (IIeA),Dublin, Ireland, with a branch in Brussels.

Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies, Tufts University, USA. http://fletcher.tufts.edu/jebsencenter/default.shtml

Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

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