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Interview with Ramadan Shallah, Secretary General, Palestinian Islamic Jihad

(Damascus, Syria, December 15, 2009)

as reported by Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod

Introduction

On December 14-16, 2009, a delegation from the World Federation of Scientists, including the authors, traveled to Damascus to interview senior Syrian and Palestinian leaders from Syria and various Palestinian factions, including the members of the leadership of Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The objective was to gain insight from field interviews into how to further advance scientific understanding of cultural and political conflict in order to create new theoretical and practical frameworks for negotiation and cooperation.[1]

Unexpectedly, the opportunity arose to interview Ramadan Shallah, the Secretary General of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The delegation seized the sudden chance to probe this individual’s mode of thinking about political and religious conflict, decision-making, and notions of sacred values. After the meeting, the authors conducted supplemental background research on the Internet, only to learn that Ramadan Shallah is on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorist list, with a $5,000,000 reward for information leading to his arrest or conviction (cf: www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/tershallah.htm). Accordingly, the contents of this interview were delivered to the FBI and National Security Council. The interview was conducted in English.

Interview

After introductions were made, Ramadan Shallah (RS) went into a detailed explanation of PIJ’s decision to opt out of the peace process.

RS: We did not ever have a peace process. Abbas’s [December 2009] decision not to seek re-election is confirmation of the fact. The Israelis couldn’t possibly find anyone better for them. I understand he’s playing this card to put pressure on the US government, but Clinton’s response was to “let him go.”

Since Madrid and Oslo, 18 and 16 years ago, Palestine has gained nothing. It started with a two-state solution. But if you look at the West Bank today, with the expansion of the settlements and security arrangements, you have Israel in possession of more than 50 percent of the West Bank, which Israel in the end will not give up. That’s 22 percent in the Jordan valley, 10 percent in Jerusalem, 10 percent in border crossings, and 10 percent in settlements.
Netanyahu learned that the most complicated issue for Barak and Arafat was Jerusalem. But Netanyahu has finished with that. So the hope of a two-state solution is gone.

You will not find any political faction in the future that will accept a two-state solution based on Israeli security needs. We see that a sovereign and independent Palestinian state is impossible under such conditions.

I cannot blame the Israelis or the Americans alone. The formula was “peace for land, and land for peace.” I am now convinced Israel will never give a piece of land because the Arab governments have already accepted to live with Israel.

So, we seem to have only two options left: to go for a two-state solution or a one-state solution. In a one-state solution, Palestinians have rights in all of historic Palestine, in a two-state solution they won’t even have rights in 50 percent of the West Bank. But there is little support in the world for a one-state solution, and Israel will never accept this.

The South Africa example won’t work, and it isn’t being discussed. So, I see no end to the struggle until Israel is defeated.

We are living in an age of a clash of civilizations. But how can we escape that if Israel insists on only allowing a Jewish state? What about the Christians? We don’t want a state based on religious identity.

If Israel won’t consider a one-state solution, then the struggle must continue, and support for it will come from other sources. The masses and groups of people will take matters into their own hands, like Hamas in Palestine, Hizbollah in Lebanon, and we’ll see other such grassroots movements everywhere, and the Arab governments will eventually have to join them or you will have the same kind of situation that made [Ayman al-]Zawahiri come out of Egypt to join Bin Laden.

[Senior Hamas leader Ismail] Haniyeh made it clear yesterday that the ultimate struggle is the liberation of all of Palestine, and that is also our goal. We are the indigenous people of the land. I was born in Gaza. My family, brothers and sisters, live in Gaza. But I am not allowed to visit them. But any American or Siberian Jew is allowed to take our land.

There is no possibility today of a two-state solution. That idea is dead.

And there is no real prospect of a one-state solution.
So, we are appealing directly to the people of the region — not to take action against any Arab government — but if the Arab governments don’t face up to their responsibility, then people will take matters into their own hands. There is a “people force” in Lebanon now, and in Gaza.

The Palestinian struggle started with the idea of a one-state solution, then made every concession for a two-state solution. And nothing.

The 2002 Saudi “Arab Initiative” was a post-September 11 gesture of conciliation to the Americans: “Take Palestine, we will bargain away their rights, because we are sorry for September 11.” And Sharon said: “The proposal isn’t even worth the ink on paper.”

We told Arafat that we will do Jihad. The meaning of Jihad is to defend our people.

**Question:** Is there a difference between you and Hamas?

**Ramadan Shallah:** We share the same Islamic identity. From a strategic point of view, there is no difference between us and Hamas, only a tactical difference. For instance, in conflict management, we reject participation in the elections because we believe that the basis of the Palestinian Authority is the Oslo Agreement.

We told Hamas: “Just leave Abbas; Fatah gave Israel every concession and got nothing.” We coordinated our struggle with Fatah, with Hamas. But we don’t believe [in] participating in the PA, which was basically established to liquidate the Palestinian cause. Now the PA is the umbrella for a cheap occupation by Israel.

**Question:** Do you want Palestine as an Islamic state?

**Ramadan Shallah:** I would like to live under Sharia, but I would not impose it. The people must decide. I told brother Khaled Meshaal: I do believe in hijab, my family wears hijab, but you cannot impose a law that all women must wear hijab!

**Question:** How come you speak English so well?

**Ramadan Shallah:** After I got my PhD in 1990, I spent 5 years teaching in the US about the Middle East in a university in south Florida.

**Question:** What was your degree in?

**Ramadan Shallah:** My PhD was on banking systems, working with Islamic banks without interest.
**Question:** Are you on the same wavelength as Iran?

**Ramadan Shallah:** I criticize the Islamic regimes for not having a worldview. You have to develop a worldview. In Iran the situation is complicated. Yes, it is an Islamic state but it’s different than the Sunni worldview, which is mine. I do agree with their foreign policies, but not their internal politics.

If we remain in the political arena, then we, the Arabs and Palestine, must thank the Iranians for their position, and thank God we have Iranian pressure to compensate for the collapse of Arab pressure. But the Sunni view is more open than the Shi’ite view of humanity. Islamic history, its accomplishments, is Sunni history: the Umayyads, Abbasids, even the Ottoman Sunni groups. The Shi’ite groups worked underground. So their view is different.

**Question:** Well, the Taliban had a Sunni state?

**Ramadan Shallah:** Yes, but given their history it was a narrow vision that didn’t consider others who didn’t believe exactly as they do. The Sunni worldview is much more open.

**Question:** Do you see a way forward in a peace process?

**Ramadan Shallah:** I believe that the Middle East problem is not less important than the climate problem, which has drawn 192 countries from all over the world. So if the international community gets together, and can get Israel to really change, then maybe there can be a road to peace. But this will not happen with just the Americans, and I don’t see it happening. I don’t see the international community forcing Israel to accept a genuine and independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, including East Jerusalem. But the Palestinians have great endurance, and will survive.

Even [Israeli historian Martin van] Crevel says Israel should give Palestine all of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem lest Israel be defeated because the Palestinians will outlast Israel.

I live in Damascus, under shelter. I don’t have a passport, even my children don’t have a right to travel or go to a university. The United States is the best place in the world to live in. But, unfortunately, the gang in the White House sees everything through Israel’s eyes, and the government manipulates the people’s vision of what is going on outside the country.
Even the polls, which ask people: “Do you fear the Iranian nuclear program.” Just by posing the question that way, the polls manipulate fear: 85 percent of Israelis fear Iran; 41 percent support attacking Iran; 23 percent of Israelis say they want to leave Israel because they fear Iran.

So I say (laughing): “Let’s work to make 23 percent into 53 percent!” The US and Israel heighten Iranophobia to gain the support of Arab regimes, which fear Iran.

**Question:** Is Iran trying to provoke Israel?

**Ramadan Shallah:** Only if there was a madman acting on the spur of the moment. No one knows how Iran would then develop their nuclear capabilities.

**Question:** What about the concept of a hudna [truce] with Israel?

**Ramadan Shallah:** I don’t agree with Hamas’s idea of a long hudna with Israel, because Israel will only use the time to make things worse. We can agree on a short-term truce for specific purposes, like getting food in to the people. Don’t ask me what the political solution is to be. We aren’t the guilty party to be asked for a solution because we didn’t create the problem. Our sacred duty is to fight, to resist occupation of our sacred land and change the conditions of our people. That is our duty, our sacred duty. Others, like Fatah, have maps and negotiations. We resist.

**Question:** What is the role of women in this resistance?

**Ramadan Shallah:** Our resistance is the resistance of the family. We cannot talk about women as a separate problem. They are our core. They are everything. They are bearing all of the difficulties in our life and society. Therefore, when Hamas imposed the hijab, they did not respect women. We have no right to impose anything on women. More than half the demonstrators for the Hamas anniversary yesterday were women.

**Question:** If the Golan were returned, could Syria make peace with Israel?

**Ramadan Shallah:** I don’t think that Israel is sincere. I don’t think they will give back the Heights in ways the Syrians can live with. But they will dangle the prospect before Syria to buy time, and use it to test to see whether Syria is ready to break off from Iran and join the American camp. Israel can’t repeat the Egypt deal because of the demography of Syria, its close relations with Lebanon [and] Iran. They gave back land to Egypt, but then Egypt was in their pockets. It would take a grand coalition in Israel to make a deal.

**Question:** What will you do if Israel attacks Iran?
Ramadan Shallah: Only a madman would do that. But if Netanyahu is pressured to go back to negotiations, or into some other undesirable thing, then he may attack Iran, but probably go after Hizbollah first. It is possible, but not likely.

Question: What about Egypt’s role in reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas?

Ramadan Shallah: Egypt, unfortunately, is not an honest broker. They are trying to impose Abbas’s view on Hamas. In the past, PIJ tried to mediate reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. But there is a new gang leading Fatah. With the [August 2009] Bayt Lahm conference [of Fatah], it’s even worse today.

Question: Both Israelis and Americans, including their leaders, want to know if there is any possibility that you or Hamas could ever recognize Israel, not necessarily now but in the future, under whatever conditions? And if you could, what would you want for it?

Ramadan Shallah: I cannot speak for Hamas. But I will never, under any conditions, accept the existence of the state of Israel. I have no problem living with the Jewish people. We have lived together in peace for centuries. And if Netanyahu were to ask if we can live together in one state, I would say to him: “If we have exactly the same rights as Jews to come to all of Palestine. If Khaled Meshaal and Ramadan Shallah can come whenever they want, and visit Haifa, and buy a home in Herzliyah if they want, then we can have a new language, and dialogue is possible.”

But until then, I would say to Netanyahu: “I will not accept the existence of Israel. I will never accept the existence of a state of Israel. Never. Ever.” (Smiling) I hope that is clear enough.

After the Cold War, Americans began asking: “Is Israel a liability?” Under the Bush years, it was worse for us with America than even with Israel. Until the Americans see Israel as a liability, nothing is possible.

We have had three Islamic-Israeli wars, including the one with Hizbollah, and we are headed to a religious war between Muslims and Jews — a clash of civilizations.

About the Interviewers: Scott Atran is Research Director in Anthropology at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris, Visiting Professor of Psychology and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, and Presidential Scholar in Sociology at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City. Robert Axelrod is the Walgreen Professor for the Study of Human Understanding at the University of Michigan, with appointments in the Department of Political Science and the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy.
Note

The Impact of Terrorism on Democracy in Northern Ireland

by Axel Schmidt

“Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruits” (Matthew 7 v. 16-17).

Abstract

The terrorist activities by the IRA for a politically united Ireland were one of the most sustained and prolonged campaigns in Northern Ireland, unparalleled in Western Europe since the World War II. Under the pressure of violence, the British government engaged in a process that delivered new constitutional arrangements combined with major legislative reforms, giving terrorist-related politicians access to the governance of Northern Ireland and control over its destiny. This article will discuss the project Mobilizing Opposition Networks to Nationalistic European Terrorism (MONNET), which analyzed the progressive undermining of democracy and human rights by terrorism in Northern Ireland with the view of developing a message to mobilize the European public against terrorism in all its forms. This article will also mention the recommendations made to the European Commission through the MONNET programme.

Introduction

Since the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, the European Union has adopted a counter-terrorism strategy with a commitment to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights. Its aim has been to make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice. The four-fold objectives set out in the EU strategy are: to prevent new recruits to terrorism, to protect potential targets, to pursue and investigate members of existing terrorist networks and to improve the EU’s ability to respond to and manage the consequences of terrorist attacks.

Within the context of this global strategy, project MONNET was implemented through the cooperation of victims’ groups with the support of the European Commission – Directorate Justice, Freedom and Security. The project sought to analyse the impact terrorism had on democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms in Northern Ireland so as to lay down the foundation for preparing a message to mobilise the public against terrorism in all its forms in the United Kingdom and the EU.

Northern Ireland consists of six counties and is part of the UK. The majority of its people, mainly Protestants as well as a significant number of Roman Catholics, wish the Province to remain British. Over the past four decades Northern Ireland has been plagued by a sustained
terrorist campaign by the IRA [1] with the aim of achieving a united Ireland through a transfer of sovereignty over Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom to the Republic of Ireland. The success of IRA violence has been to constrain the British authorities to adopt and enforce a new written constitution for Northern Ireland and to introduce legislative reforms in key areas of Northern Ireland society so as to obtain the means of integrating Northern Ireland into the Republic of Ireland. Terrorists, who used to be ostracised from democratic institutions, have now been given access to the reins of power.

The findings of MONNET are a result of the analysis of the consequences of the terrorist campaign in relation to (1) the process that delivered the new constitutional arrangements, (2) the unstable new constitutional arrangements resulting from the Belfast Agreement and subsequently the St Andrews and Hillsborough agreements, (3) the new legislation to assuage IRA/Sinn Fein demands, (4) the use of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to undermine the British state; prompting (5) the recommendations that were made to the European Commission.

New Constitutional Arrangements

The process leading to new constitutional arrangements for Northern Ireland has been characterized by progressive surrender to IRA terrorism, the enemy of democracy. The gradual undermining and perverting of democracy by terrorism has taken place over a period of time extending from the mid-1980s to the present day.

The first major concession to the demands of IRA terrorists was the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 which was proposed and approved by the British and Irish governments without consulting the people of Northern Ireland. By means of this agreement the government of the Republic gained a consultative role in Northern Ireland affairs through an inter-governmental conference. Although the aim of this agreement was to improve security through greater cooperation with the Republic, it had the opposite effect of increasing IRA violence in order to gain further and decisive concessions from the British authorities.

On December 15, 1993, the Downing Street Declaration was issued. The British and Irish governments declared that they were working in view of achieving “peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement among all the people who inhabit the island” with the aim of bringing an end to violence. The British government again made concessions to the IRA which declared a ‘cease-fire’ at the end of August 1994. It was followed by the Frameworks document issued on February 22, 1995, which proposed a three-strand approach to the Northern Ireland problem, taking into account the functioning of an accountable government in Northern Ireland, the North/South institutions between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, and the East-West Structures. The suggested arrangements contained neither a sound basis of fundamental principles nor any safeguards against the infiltration of the democratic system by
terrorist-related politicians. They were meant to pave the way for new constitutional arrangements that would make it possible for the IRA, through its political wing Sinn Fein, to achieve their political aim of a united Ireland slowly and gradually.

The multi-party negotiations that resulted in the Belfast Agreement in 1998 put in place a three-strand approach adopted in the Frameworks document. Strand One dealt with the ‘Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland’ and the establishment of an Assembly and an Executive Authority. Despite the pledge of Office and the Code of Conduct there were no proper safeguards against terrorist-related politicians gaining access to any of these institutions, which would provide them with the means of pursuing their political aims. Strand Two dealt with the ‘North/South Ministerial Council’ (NSMC) with executive responsibility to develop cooperation and action in multiple areas within the island of Ireland through the implementation of an all-island cross-border body. The NSMC was to operate in conjunction with the Assembly. Again there were no safeguards to prevent terrorist-related politicians from taking part in the Council, giving them a direct opportunity to advance their political aims towards a united Ireland. Strand Three proposed the creation of the ‘British-Irish Council’ to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. The Agreement was a compromise between terrorist-related politicians and politicians abiding by the rule of democracy at the instigation and under the pressure of both, the British and Irish governments, with the support of the United States and the EU. Under the threat of a renewed terrorist campaign by the IRA, and with a false promise of a final settlement, the majority of the people of Northern Ireland voted for the Agreement on May 22, 1998.

Since the Belfast Agreement, two other agreements have come into existence, the St Andrews Agreement in 2006 [2] and recently the Hillsborough Agreement on February 5, 2010. [3] Both agreements fulfil the implementation of the Belfast Agreement without making any substantial modifications to it. The St Andrews Agreement merely introduced practical changes to the working of the institutions and paved the way for the devolution of powers from Westminster to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive. The Hillsborough Agreement completed the process of devolution by ensuring that policing and justice powers would be transferred on April 12, 2010 to the Northern Ireland Executive, which is under the influence of terrorist-related politicians.

**The Unstable New Constitutional Arrangements and the Insecure Foundations for the Institutions**

The Belfast Agreement was meant to provide Northern Ireland with new constitutional arrangements legislated in the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Unfortunately, (a) the insecure
foundations for the institutions may be underpinned by (b) a future Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (see chart in Annex).

Under the d’Hondt system [4], terrorist-related politicians were given free access to the Assembly and to the Executive of Northern Ireland and subsequently to the North/South Ministerial Council. They were given the means of intensifying cooperation between North and South to create an ever closer union between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

The first and predominant characteristic of the constitutional system created as a result of the Belfast Agreement is a compulsory partnership between democrats and terrorist-related politicians at all levels of the institutions, both in the Assembly and in the Executive, and consequently in the international NSMC. Moreover, once Ministers are appointed to the Executive, they operate independently as the head of their own department. The First Minister and deputy First Minister [5], who both have equal powers, cannot give specific directions to another Minister. The second prominent characteristic is that the Executive as a whole is not collectively responsible to the Assembly which has no powers to request and obtain the removal of the Executive by way of a motion of no-confidence as is possible in authentic democratic parliamentary systems. The principle of separation of power between the Executive and the Legislative is not implemented, and as a result there is no proper system of checks and balances. The third characteristic is the international NSMC, a body made up of Ministers from the Executive in Northern Ireland and the Irish government. Its purpose is to ensure cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on as many issues as possible affecting the economy of both. It is meant to progressively merge the two economies and move towards a closer union, with the aim of finally reaching the political union that terrorist-related politicians have been pursuing for the past 40 years.

The Northern Ireland Act 1998, amended by the Northern Ireland Act 2006 and the Northern Ireland Act 2009, favours the enemies of democracy and as such is in breach of the fundamental principles on which a democratic constitution and institutions ought to be based. The principle of consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland is inoperative, since the minority is determining the destiny of the process of integration between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The principle of the territorial integrity of Northern Ireland is undermined by the compulsory collaboration with the Republic of Ireland. The principle of the solidarity of government does not apply since each Minister can make his/her own decisions despite the opposition of other members of the Executive. The principle of democracy being enforced through genuinely democratic institutions has been seriously compromised, since a vote by the majority of the people of Northern Ireland can never remove from office a terrorist-related politician who is by right a member of the Executive as a result of the d’Hondt system. The same principle is further undermined by the system of mandatory coalition, which excludes voluntary coalition and prevents the existence of an opposition. It appears that the majority principle, which applies in all democracies in the EU, has been made inapplicable in Northern Ireland since
the mechanism in place in the Assembly and the Executive give equal say to the minority, which
can veto any decision made by the majority.

The breaches of these fundamental principles, which guarantee the proper functioning of
democratic institutions, are the result of concessions made to IRA/Sinn Fein. The constitutional
arrangements gave terrorist-related politicians what they required so as to manage and monitor
the process of integration of Northern Ireland into the Republic of Ireland. The victims of IRA
terrorism and their relatives, of whom many have never seen justice done, now experience the
daily trauma of living under the authority of unrepentant terrorists, who openly and unashamedly
pride themselves in the IRA.

The Future Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland

The Belfast Agreement prescribed the setting up of the Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission (NIHRC). It gave a mandate to the NIHRC and required it to

consult and to advise on the scope for defining, in Westminster legislation, rights
supplementary to those in the European Convention on Human Rights, to reflect the
particular circumstances of Northern Ireland ... These additional rights ... - taken
together with the ECHR - to constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.[6]

It should have been expected that the Bill of Rights would be based on reliable principles which
would promote democracy and human rights against terrorism. Regrettably, the NIHRC sought
to use its mandate with a threefold purpose; first to underpin the Belfast Agreement, particularly
the inclusion of terrorist-related politicians in both the Assembly and the Executive of Northern
Ireland, second to advance the elaboration of an all-Ireland Charter of Rights in view of
eventually unifying fundamental rights in both jurisdictions to encourage people of Northern
Ireland to join a united Ireland, and third to facilitate a future constitutional change when
Northern Ireland is incorporated into the Republic of Ireland following a transfer of sovereignty.

The NIHRC proposals for a Bill of Rights outline principles which are inefficient to safeguard
democracy and human rights against terrorism. Over the past nine years it has systematically
failed to recognise that the main circumstance of Northern Ireland was and remains terrorism.
This is the issue that had to be considered in order to enshrine new human rights and protect law-
abiding people from terrorism, and to devise appropriate safeguards to ensure the protection of
human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy against terrorism. Having failed in both
these requirements, new rights suggested by the NIHRC in its final advice were submitted to the
Secretary of State on December 10, 2008. [7] Some of these rights have the potential to
undermine democracy and human rights in Northern Ireland since they can be used to the benefit
of terrorist-related politicians and terrorists in the future.[8]
The compromise between terrorism and democracy has granted terrorist-related politicians the unfettered right to be in control of the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly. As a result, the very foundation of democracy and human rights in Northern Ireland has been corrupted, mainly to the prejudice of victims of terrorism. The proper function of a Bill of Rights should have been to set out democratic principles in order to remedy this situation rather than support it.

**The New Legislation to Assuage IRA/Sinn Fein Demands**

Since the Belfast Agreement was approved, there have been a number of legislative reforms introduced to satisfy IRA/Sinn Fein concerning equality, public processions, the criminal justice system, victims, policing, etc. We will only consider here (a) the discriminatory 50/50 legislation that applies to the recruitment into the police and (b) the definition of victims that equates innocent victims of terrorism and the perpetrators of terrorist acts.

*The Enforcement of Discrimination through 50:50 Recruitment Legislation into Police*

The temporary provisions of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 that relate to 50/50 recruitment were adopted following the recommendations of the Patten Report which stated that: “The Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland was set up as part of the Belfast Agreement of April 1998”.[9] This reform is the bitter fruit of the Belfast Agreement introduced through the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 to satisfy terrorist-related politicians.

The provisions for 50:50 recruitment would have been in breach of the European Council directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation that was being prepared and was eventually agreed to by the Council on October 17, 2000.[10] The directive originated with the European Commission and there was no mention made of Northern Ireland. However, when it was referred to the Council for final agreement, in a matter of five days between October 12 and 17, 2000, the British government requested the insertion of provisions that would permit differences in treatment regarding the recruitment into the Police Service of Northern Ireland on the grounds that it was necessary to tackle the under-representation of one of the major religious communities. As a result, particular provisions for Northern Ireland were introduced in Article 15 of the Directive.[11]

With the exemption granted by the Council, the British government could enforce legislation that creates a new recruitment process and which openly discriminates against certain applicants to the Police Service of Northern Ireland on the grounds of their religion. All candidates who wish to join the police service and serve as regular officers, and who reach a specified standard of merit in the selection procedure, are placed in a pool from which an equal number of Roman Catholics and non-Roman Catholics are then drawn for appointment. One half must be Roman...
Catholic and the other half “Protestant or undetermined”. The purpose of this legislation is to increase the number of Roman Catholics within the police service of Northern Ireland, but in practice it has already discriminated against hundreds of Protestants who reached the specified standards and should have been able to join the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).

The failure of this legislation has been that it does not address the real cause of under-representation of Roman Catholics in the Police Service of Northern Ireland, which stems from IRA terrorist threats being exercised in the past on the Roman Catholic population to prevent young people from joining the police force.[12] It also reduces the number of recruits that should be enrolled, since there are not enough Roman Catholics applying and yet this cannot be compensated by applicants from other religious backgrounds because of the limited number imposed by the 50:50 recruitment policy. This has contributed to undermining the capacity of and confidence in the PSNI to achieve its policing objectives.[13]

The Definition of Victim that Equates Innocent Victims of Terrorism and Perpetrators

The Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 defines a victim as “someone who is or has been physically or psychologically injured as a result of or in consequence of a conflict-related incident” as well as “someone who has been bereaved as a result of or in consequence of a conflict-related incident”. [14] A conflict-related incident, according to the Order means, “a violent incident occurring in or after 1968 in connection with the affairs of Northern Ireland”. [15] The key element of this definition is of course ‘conflict-related incident’. It supposes that there has been a violent ‘conflict’ or a kind of ‘war’ in Northern Ireland and that all those affected by it should systematically be classified as victims.

The definition of victim is yet another bitter fruit of the compromise between terrorism and democracy. It leaves aside any reference to the terrorist campaign of the past 40 years and to the continual violation of criminal law and human rights law by terrorist organisations dedicated to re-writing the past to suit their political aims. The actual terrorist campaign against the state and the law-abiding people of Northern Ireland has been renamed ‘conflict’, a term that terrorists have used in order to be treated equally with members of the security forces and to eliminate the distinction between right and wrong.

The definition of victim provided in Northern Ireland legislation has raised serious concerns, even outrage, and rightly so, on the part of innocent victims of terrorism. Several measures have been taken or suggested on the basis of this definition, which demonstrates that perpetrators of acts of terrorism and innocent victims are put on an equal footing and proves its adverse impact. On the day Mrs McBride, the sister of an IRA terrorist, lawfully killed by the security forces, was appointed by the Office of First Minister and deputy First Minister (OFM/DFM) as one of the four Victims’ Commissioners for Northern Ireland, it was published on the First Minister’s
website that “her brother had been killed in active service”.[16] In the same vein, the Consultative Group on the Past proposed that a “recognition payment” of £12,000 should be made to all the nearest relatives of people who died during the terrorist campaign, whether civilians, police officers, soldiers or terrorists.[17]

This definition has given terrorists and their families the same status and rights as innocent victims of terrorism. Such an amalgam should never have been tolerated and requires that the compatibility between the definition of victim given in Northern Ireland legislation and that to be found in international legal instruments be analysed so that the elements of a proper definition of victim of terrorism can be established.

*Use of ECHR to Undermine the British State*

While there is no record of any successful application lodged by innocent victims of terrorism or their relatives before the European Court of Human Rights, the IRA terrorists and their relatives have effectively used the ECHR against the United Kingdom. It has become a power tool in order to undermine the respectability of the British security forces and breathe life into terrorist anti-state propaganda.

Terrorists engaging in the most heinous crimes with total disregard for the human rights of their victims have applied to the ECHR, alleging that they were victims of the state. In several cases the European Court was asked to consider issues that were submitted on the grounds of the right to life (protected by Article 2 of the Convention), such as: the shoot-to-kill policy against IRA terrorist suspects both in Northern Ireland and abroad; the investigating procedures in relation to the deprivation of life following a number of cases involving terrorist suspects being killed by security forces; and the use of lethal force by security forces against terrorists.

Unfortunately, some judgements rendered by the Court have served the purpose of terrorists against the state. In the case of McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, [18] the Court reviewed the operation that led to the shooting by the British Special Air Service (SAS), of well-known terrorists who were about to detonate a deadly bomb in the centre of Gibraltar in March 1988. By 10 votes to nine the Court decided that the authorities could have controlled and organised the operation differently to prevent the use of lethal force and that as a result Article 2 had been violated. However, the nine dissenting judges came to the logical and well-balanced decision that the use of force by the authorities against the suspects for the purpose of defending innocent persons from unlawful violence was absolutely necessary and proportionate given the circumstances.

Decisions such as the one mentioned above create confusion as to what the state should do to protect its citizens from terrorist suspects and attacks. It also generates distrust on behalf of genuine victims of terrorism in relation to human rights legislation that is perceived as a means
for terrorists to justify and/or cover up their actions, while intensifying the propaganda to undermine the state authorities.

**Recommendations made to the European Commission**

An analysis of what has occurred in Northern Ireland over the past 40 years has highlighted the extent to which democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms have been undermined and destroyed by terrorism throughout Northern Ireland.

It appears that serious crimes that could be classified as crimes against humanity have never been investigated or prosecuted. The constitution of Northern Ireland has been replaced with new arrangements that allow terrorist-related politicians to take part in and even control the working of the Assembly and the Executive, the proposed Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland is designed to underpin the political agreement and strengthens the position of terrorist-related politicians within the institutions of Northern Ireland, while further restricting the capacity of the security forces to combat terrorism. The devolution of policing and justice will complete the process of handing over de facto control of the institutions to IRA/Sinn Fein, enabling them to achieve their political aim of a united Ireland. The legislation that applies to policing, the education system, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and other issues concerning victims, favours terrorists to the detriment of law-abiding citizens and the innocent victims of terrorism.

Meaningful measures to prevent the progress of terrorist policies and interests that jeopardise the future of democracy in Northern Ireland and the rest of Europe have not yet been taken by the British authorities, the EU or the Council of Europe. Unfortunately, ECHR case law sometimes delivers a confusing message that requires clarification and is often used by terrorists as a means of furthering their propaganda against the British state.

In view of the above, the following recommendations have been respectfully submitted to the European Commission:

1. The findings of project MONNET could be compared and contrasted in association with the European Network of Victims of Terrorism (ENVT) with other areas affected by terrorism within (and outside) the EU.

2. Groups of victims of terrorism should be encouraged to promote human rights and democracy within the EU and raise awareness against terrorism.

3. The Northern Ireland experience should be used to help provide a more precise definition of terrorism at European level.
4. The Northern Ireland experience should be used to provide a definition of victim of terrorism at European level.

5. A principled basis upon which the European Network of Victims of Terrorism could advance in carrying out its functions needs to be determined.

6. Measures should be taken to oppose any indirect support or encouragement to terrorism and to promote human rights and democracy throughout the EU.

7. The present support for the new arrangements in Northern Ireland should be reconsidered, suspended and replaced by measures that effectively promote democracy and human rights throughout the EU.

8. Any indirect financing of terrorism by the EU should be reconsidered and redirected towards the needs of genuine victims of terrorism.

9. The Council of Europe should be encouraged to strengthen its stand against terrorism.

10. The ECHR case law should be carefully analysed and the information resulting from it disseminated to the general public.

11. Support and funding should be provided for further test cases to be submitted to the ECHR in order to develop case law that protects and supports innocent victims of terrorism.

12. Encouragement should be given to the European Court of Justice to refer to and apply the ECHR case law in its decisions.

**Conclusion**

Although the EU has outlined the objectives to be achieved, it appears that the strategy to combat terrorism needs to be more efficiently implemented within the member states at local level in order to be successful. This is an issue that needs to be addressed urgently so that the fight against terrorism does not remain the task only of national authorities, but may be intelligently supported by the European population at large.
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**Notes**

[1] Out of 3,365 people who were killed between 1966 and 2001, the IRA was responsible for 1,778 victims; the IRA caused the greatest number of victims and the most damage to property and businesses (David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney and Chris Thornton. Lost Lives. Edinburgh, Mainstream Publ. Company, 1999, pp. 1497 and 1504).

[2] Agreement reached at St Andrews (Scotland) after three days of negotiations between October 11 and 13, 2006; accepted by all Northern Ireland political parties on November 10, 2006.
After ten days of negotiations between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, an agreement was reached at Hillsborough Castle (Northern Ireland) on February 5, 2010.

The d’Hondt system is a proportional system of representation that is used for allocating seats in party-list elections.

It must be noted that both First Minister and deputy First Minister have absolutely equal powers, which explains why ‘deputy’ is always written with a small ‘d’ in legislation.


A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, Advice to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland’, December 10, 2008.

The proposed rights would, for example, imply that terrorists would benefit from the clauses on equal treatment and non-discrimination, according to which they should not be discriminated against on the grounds of their criminal convictions.


Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006, Section 3(1).

Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006, Section 2 (2).


European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Judgment McCann and others v. the United Kingdom, September 5, 1995 (A324).
Irish Republicanism and the Internet: support for New Wave Dissidents

by Lorraine Bowman-Grieve

Abstract

This article considers the use of the Internet by Irish Republicans and does so by applying thematic content analysis to a sample of websites that support the Irish Republican movement. Particular attention is paid to the Irish Republican virtual community which, through regular user interaction, creates and sustains an online discourse of support for their cause and the currently active dissident movements. Further analysis focuses on the function of a virtual community and the interactions facilitated by this online social space in relation to the potential for increased commitment to, and involvement in, support-related activities both on and off line.

Introduction

Despite the fact that Irish Republican paramilitary organisations such as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) / Irish Republican Socialist Movement (IRSM) have recently denounced the use of terrorism to achieve their goal of a United Ireland there has been an apparent resurgence in paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland [1]. In March 2009, members of the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) and the Continuity IRA (CIRA) were responsible for the murders of two British soldiers at Massereene Barracks in Antrim and the killing of a policeman in Armagh. According to a recent story in the UK’s Telegraph, MI5 are “convinced dissident groups have managed to recruit former IRA bomb makers”. This conviction finds further support following the recent diffusion of a 600lb bomb in south Armagh in September 2009. The bomb, considered by security sources as one of the most sophisticated to have been assembled by any of the dissident terror groups in recent years, is thought to be the work of Oglaigh na hÉireann (Gaelic for Youth/Soldiers of Ireland) [2].

The recent spate of violent activity in Northern Ireland indicates a regeneration of dissident movements that appear to have been dormant in recent years. The RIRA, CIRA and also Oglaigh na hÉireann have crept back into the media with their involvement in violent activities that are being used to promote their position, or rather their opposition to the peace process in Northern Ireland. While these groups may have appeared extinct in recent years they have apparently managed to maintain some level of support within Northern Ireland and the Republic. The extent of this support remains unknown; however Internet activity in support of these movements over the past few years indicates that there is a body of ‘online supporters’ who have been waiting for the return of these movements.
The purpose of this article is to introduce the reader to the uses of the Internet by dissident Republican movements and their supporters. In particular we will focus on the website of Republican Sinn Fein (RSF), the political wing associated with the Continuity IRA, and the website of the youth movement “Na Fianna Éireann” which in turn links directly to the “Irish Republican Bulletin Board”, a virtual community in support of Irish Republicanism.

**Terrorist use of the Internet and Virtual Communities of Support**

Websites in support of terrorist movements are not difficult to find; in fact it is often simply a matter of using the right keywords in search engines and following internet links to find websites that are sources of information both for the supporter and the merely curious. The more sophisticated of websites provide access to a wealth of information relating to the terrorist movement - including news items, archived news and, in some cases, the option of an email news bulletin. It is not unusual for websites of this nature to include also detailed information relating to the movement, such as communiqués from leaders and details of ‘successful’ activities, both violent and merely political. Sophisticated websites often include pictures and images of ‘enemy’ attacks and civilian casualties. Such information and imagery is important to the propaganda campaign of the movement as they serve to “justify” retaliation and promote support. Supporters are also often afforded the opportunity of contributing towards the funding of the organisation via donations made payable online or through the purchase of merchandise offered for sale on the website.

Of course websites, no matter how sophisticated, remain one-way providers of information; they do not allow visitors of the site to interact with those running the site or link up with each other. Virtual Communities, however, are a very different entity. The role of a virtual community is to provide a ‘public’ space (albeit often hidden) for interaction between those who support, sympathize with, or are merely interested in a terrorist movement. Virtual Communities appear to have become an increasingly popular means for supporters of terrorist and extremist movements to communicate with each other. Although distinct numbers are almost impossible to gauge, their popularity can be deducted from the many communities that are directly linked to websites of interest. With web forums in support of Islamic Fundamentalism (e.g. Al Hesbah & Al Boraq), White Supremacism (e.g. Stormfront & Combat 18), Israeli Extremism (e.g. Kahane) and Irish Republicanism (e.g. the Irish Republican Bulletin Board) it has become apparent that virtual communities are becoming an expected feature to the online presence of terrorist movements or their front organizations.

Virtual Communities in support of terrorist movements might best be understood within the framework of ‘Communities of Practice’ [3]. Communities of practice are informal social learning environments that can contribute to the increasing commitment of group members to
particular movements and ideologies. Virtual Communities of Practice require that a body of members actively use a created virtual space to effectively interact in a meaningful, community-driven way. Regular community members will pride themselves on their communities and the activities they pursue, i.e. of communicating with others, of disseminating their ‘truth’, of creating a place where others can come to learn, contribute and find validation for their beliefs and opinions. These social spaces provide a forum for the discussion and dissemination of information and material considered relevant to the movement.

Through the creation of specific discourses they promote the formation of the individual political identity of participants. Over time these communities develop their own set of norms with the potential to contribute to the creation of joint values, rules of acceptable behaviour and even some sort of moral standards. With the formation of inter-personal bonds strong ties and links between online community members can be forged. Such links should not be under-estimated in terms of their potential to create very real social networks and communities of supporters who are willing to work together in the future to achieve some common goals in the name of a terrorist movement (such as one of the factions of the Irish Republican Army) or ideological position (such as a United Ireland). In so doing both the group discipline and the ideology of the group can potentially exert increasing levels of control on the participating individual, which, in turn, may affect subsequent decision-making and behaviour.

Irish Republicanism Online: Republican Sinn Féin and Saoirse

Republican Sinn Féin considers itself the ‘real’ Sinn Féin and thus claims it was formed in 1905 (when Sinn Féin came into existence). However, Republican Sinn Féin (RSF) as a distinct movement began only in 1986 when the main Sinn Féin party (the political wing of the Irish Republican Army – IRA) decided to end its traditional abstention policy from the Irish parliament. Those who opposed the move walked out to form RSF. The group was lead by Ruairí Ó Braídaigh, former President of Sinn Féin, and Daithí Ó Conaill, former Chief of Staff of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). At the 1988 RSF annual convention the party reaffirmed its support for the ‘armed struggle’. RSF remain opposed to the current peace process, and the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), an active terrorist group, is widely believed to be the military wing of the movement.

Site Services and Functions

The Republican Sinn Féin website consists of text and images which are designed to represent an Irish Republican viewpoint and, more specifically, to represent the views and opinions of the Republican Sinn Féin party which continues to encourage action in the pursuit of the organisations objectives, which include the following (as stated on the official website: http://www.rsf.ie/):
The overthrow of British rule in Ireland, and the establishment of a Federal Democratic Socialist Republic based on the Proclamation of 1916. To establish a reign of social justice based on Irish Republican socialist principles in accordance with the Proclamation of the Republic of 1916 and by a just distribution of the nation’s wealth and resources. To establish the Irish language as the primary means of communication in the Republic.

The website is used to provide information on the history and organisational structure of the group according to which (R) SF was formed in 1905 making it the oldest political organisation in the country. It was organised throughout the 32 Counties and has continuously rejected the “failed political entities of the Six and 26 Counties in existence since the British partitioned our country”. The group is organised throughout Ireland with “cumainn (branches) in England and Scotland and supporters in North America and Australia.”

A section entitled “Éire Nua, d’Aois Nua” Gaelic for “A New Ireland, a New Age” features an in depth analysis of RSF’s proposal for a New Ireland which incorporates the goals, objectives and principles outlined throughout the website. The website is also used to encourage active involvement in the organisation and an online membership application form is available. RSF describes itself as an active organisation and makes clear that joining requires a commitment of a considerable portion of time to the work of the organisation. The RSF website also includes a section devoted to Republican news and links directly to the Republican Newspaper, Saoirse (http://saoirse.rr.nu):

Saoirse – Irish Freedom is the voice of the Irish Republican Movement. The monthly newspaper of Republican Sinn Féin, it takes its name from Irish Freedom – Saoirse, a Fenian paper which first appeared in November 1910 and continued as a monthly publication until December 1914 when it was suppressed by the British authorities. (http://www.rsf.ie/saoirse.htm)

Saoirse re-emerged in 1987 and has been available online since 1996; additionally the site provides information on past publications and currently claims an email list of 500 subscribers for RSF News. Saoirse is arguably most important in relation to its propaganda role, providing a means of communicating and disseminating. Information considered important to RSF members and supporters.

In a recent edition of Saoirse (dated October 2009), the headline of an article claiming “British Repression provokes resistance” read, “The leopard does not change its spots and neither does the nature of British rule in Ireland.”, illustrating the general position of this source as a provider of information that is supportive of Republicanism with a clear desire to promote the end of British Rule in Northern Ireland.
With news items ranging from the aftermath of recent violent events in Northern Ireland to history-based news stories and current news such as that the present leader Ruari O Bradaigh will not be standing for the presidential position of RSF at the forthcoming Ard Fheis (Annual Party Conference), Saoirse provides a wide range of information to the interested Republican, including those associated with the youth movement Na Fianna Éireann.

Na Fianna Éireann

Na Fianna Éireann (FE) (Gaelic for ‘The Warriors of Ireland’), is a Republican youth movement traditionally used to support the activities of the IRA. FE were historically a band of warriors, who defended Ireland against invasion. According to their website (http://fiannaeireann.com/):

Na Fianna Éireann is the only true Republican youth movement, which still holds the same principles as when it was founded in 1909 by Countess Markievicz. Those principles include the educating of young boys and girls towards a united Ireland, and to assist all branches of the Republican Movement.

The FE website is directly linked to the Republican Sinn Féin (RSF) website, the website for Saoirse, and the Irish Freedom Committee website, a U.S. based Republican organisation which adheres to the same principles as RSF. The FE website provides the latest news updates and a news archive via the Irish Republican Bulletin Board to which it directly links; it also provides a news delivery service to personal email accounts which facilitates a faster and more efficient flow of information to Republican supporters. The site also includes detailed information on the goals and objectives of the organisation, how to become a member (membership only available in Ireland) and what being a member of Na Fianna Éireann means.

To be a member of Na Fianna means that you have devoted yourself to the service of Ireland. It means that you will become trained in mind and body to render that service. It means that the service of Ireland will be your first object in life and that you will strive with all your mind and strength and energy to carry out the promise you made when you became a member.

Membership of Na Fianna Éireann is open to boys and girls of eight years and upwards, of good character, irrespective of class or creed, who accept the objects of the organisation.

This website provides a vast amount of information either directly or via links to other websites. Included on the site are links to RSF statements, the “Fianna Code”, emblems and mottos, a roll of honour (dedicated to ‘martyred’ freedom fighters) and contact information (Street and email address). The FE Code is an interesting section in that it sets out a blueprint defining and describing how a true and committed FE member must behave. This is not to say that this section
of the board is overtly sinister. In fact, at first glance it is surprisingly banal with references to how a good FE member must be patriotic, reliable, diligent and kind; however the FE member must also be obedient and brave

“
He renders strict obedience to his superiors. He learns to obey before he commands; he learns to discipline and control himself before he aspires to teach discipline to others”(…)

“He faces danger, knows no fear, and stands for right on all occasions”.

The ‘statement’ section of this site is also of particular interest. It includes not only Ard Fhéis (Annual Conference) statements and Easter messages (Significant as it marks the occasion of the 1916 rising which lead to the Independence of Ireland) issued by Na Fianna Éireann but also articles of interest to young Republicans, including two statements from Na Fianna Éireann warning Republican youths to “Beware of Imitations” and urging that ‘fake groups’ be ignored. More specifically they call for groups which recognise the legitimacy of the existing Irish parliament be ignored because these groups do not represent “true” Republicanism.

Another statement of interest is concerned with police raids on FE members in their homes in Dublin in May 2003; this particular statement speaks of unwarranted harsh treatment by Free State Forces (An Garda Siochána). The statement alleges that members of the Garda entered members’ homes without warrants where they stole or damaged property with the supposed intention of intimidation. The statement ends with a clear declaration that intimidation will not prevail

The members involved are unbroken and unbowed to this intimidation against our members and have vowed, not to bend to oppression by any state that partitions our Island. It has also shown the states willingness to harass Republicans, while people openly take drugs in the street unhindered. It has shown where their efforts are based, in regards intimidation. We will not bend nor beg to this and will continue, as we have since 1909, to strive to bring about a 32 county socialist republic on this Island.

A multimedia section provides access to a picture and video gallery made up primarily of pictures and videos depicting Marches, which took place as recently as March 2003. It also includes a video of a Bobby Sands Commemoration (the IRA hunger striker) in March 2001, where a British flag burning was filmed. This multimedia part of the site also provides leaflets which can be downloaded and printed by individual supporters. The website service is interesting since it allows online supporters and members to become more actively involved in support of the movement, providing them access to materials which could be printed out and distributed for propaganda purposes.
The FE website also provides access to its own magazine, Young Republican, which is available, both by subscription or for download online. The magazine is dedicated to Republicanism and supports RSF. It provides a forum for these particular political viewpoints to be openly expressed, outlining issues of importance to this particular community. For example from the contents of the first issue it is apparent that Prisoner of War Status for Republican Prisoners is of importance. This is also reflected in the picketing and distribution of approximately 5,000 leaflets in support of PoW status, which took place at Croke Park in August 2003. This magazine also includes interviews with Republican figures, historical analyses of Republican events and also news items from the FE website, e.g. an article relating to alleged raids by Garda Siochána on supporters. As with Saoirse magazine mentioned previously, Young Republican is used to make the Republican viewpoint more accessible to a wider audience. In so doing it aspires to influence public perceptions of Republicanism and the activities of this movement.

While the various websites in support of Irish Republicanism - and here I named just a few - are important, what is central to the function of the internet as a tool for the dissemination of information and propaganda important to the Republican movement are virtual communities. Communities of this nature have the potential to facilitate the creation and maintenance of discourses that further support Republicanism as an ideology - in particular those specific organisations that remain in pursuit of the Republican ideal of a united Ireland.

Irish Republican Bulletin Board (http://admin2.7.forumer.com/)

The following discussion relates to data (in the form of posts) downloaded from the Irish Republican Bulletin Board (IRBB) over a six month period during 2004, with an updated review of material and posts from 2009. Over 300 posts covering a variety of topics and discussion interests for this particular group of users were downloaded and analysed, using content analysis. The examples used in this study come primarily from regular board users who avail of this facility to discuss and debate Republican issues.

This review of IRBB is part of a larger study that examines the use of the Internet by various types of terrorist and extremist movements (see Bowman-Grieve, 2006). As such the posts were analysed with a view to create a framework for understanding how and why terrorist moments and their supporters use the internet to communicate at various levels (i.e. with each other, with other movements etc.) about a range of topics relevant to them. The topics identified in this study include the creation of a specific political discourse with statements of justification for Irish Republicanism that are interwoven with the history and culture of Irish Republicanism and which, in turn, relate to distinct processes of increasing involvement in the form of shared stories of past experiences and the promotion of ways to become involved.
The Creation of a Political Discourse

‘Political Discourse’ refers here to the engagement of community members with political matters of perceived importance concerning Northern Ireland. Often this discourse is critical, not only in relation to the Republican Movement but also more generally in terms of the political process. The political discourse on the IRBB relates primarily to the political parties involved in the Northern Ireland conflict, both legitimate and illegitimate, that is, both recognised political parties and paramilitary organisations. For example, it is not unusual to find discourses concerned with the discussion, critique and support of organisations such as Republican Sinn Fein, Na Fianna Eireann and the Continuity IRA. Support for political parties and paramilitary organisations are exemplified in the following posts:

And everybody knows the CIRA are THE republican movement. The Irps and cokes are just ‘wayward elements’. But don’t worry, uncle Rauri will bring them back....

...don’t tell us socialist republicans what republicanism is all about, we know because we’re sticking to the path of republicanism. If progress is joining the RUC and Stormont well then I don’t want progress because that’s the path of the sell out.

The political discourse created within the community, although often critical in nature, is also concerned with making suggestions as to how the Republican Movement might move forward in the future. Consider the following excerpt reflecting an extreme opinion:

Time to reorganise, re-train and prepare for the next phase of the struggle – and that day will certainly come sooner or later. It would be inaccurate to say we have been “ineffective in defeating” the occupation army. The struggle is ongoing. As long as the British army occupies the Six Counties there will always be men and women in Ireland to oppose (sic) them. Ireland unfree (sic) shall never be at peace – as the Brits have learned.

On the other hand, a more tempered opinion is exemplified in the statement: “The RM must be flexible and meet the Unionists half way.” Such statements illustrate in some part the diversity of viewpoints within this community. Although most regular users of this board state their support for Republicanism or at the very least their support for continued political activity towards achieving the goal of a United Ireland, they do not all share the same opinions or ideas in relation to how this goal will be best achieved. In this sense, this forum for the communication of ideas, opinions and thoughts provides an insight into these different views and how they are maintained or changed through the ongoing discourse between members.

Finally in relation to this political discourse, the British government and Loyalist factions are constructed and perceived as the enemy - often described as ‘occupiers’ or ‘oppressors’. The ‘enemy’ is consistently blamed for standing in the way of Republican goals, “The Orange
backlash has always been a flaw in Republican plans to re-unite this island”, as one voice put it, contributing to the discourse created around the justifications for Republicanism.

**Statements of Justification for Irish Republicanism**

Statements of justification generally focus on two related issues. Firstly, there are those statements made by individuals regarding their personal justifications for supporting the Republican Movement and specific Republican parties and/or paramilitary organisations and their activities. Secondly, there are those statements that reflect the discourses of justification for the use of terrorism and political violence to achieve the stated aims of the Republican movement.

In relation to this first category, there appears to be a general level of support for RSF (and CIRA, but less vocally) within this group of regular users, which is reflected both within their discourses and by the amount of time they invest in and involve themselves in this bulletin board and, in some cases, the proliferation of other websites, online magazines etc. Republican discourses are often intertwined with personal ideologies and beliefs to produce justifications for support and involvement that are embedded in the history of the Republican Movement. These are often ‘romanticised’, rather then based in the reality of the conflict. There is also a feeling of what can be best described as ‘eternal hope’ - board members believing the movement will continue and will eventually be successful (albeit not in the foreseeable future). An example:

*As all of you know, the political legitimacy for the I.R.A. has not changed yet. That legitimacy has not changed since ’69, or ’98, or in 850 years for that matter! Though after almost 3,500 deaths during ‘The Troubles’, I worry about what a continuation of war will really solve. I do think the political situation will inevitably bring people back into Republicanism; back to Ireland’s cause, sooner or later.*

An important feature of Republican discourses relates to those who are considered Republican Heroes and who are subsequently ‘mythologized’. Unsurprisingly, ‘fallen comrades’, past volunteers and historical figures fall into this category. Their names are often called upon to boost morale:

*For a just and lasting peace there must be an Ireland united and free. There will always be those such as the Continuity IRA (Óglaigh na hÉireann/IRA) who bravely fight on for the full freedom of Ireland. It would be an insult to those many dead Volunteers for the leaders today to accept the status quo and give up the cause for which they died.*

A much loved and favourite Republican figure is Bobby Sands. Sands died while on hunger strike in prison. He was elected to Parliament less than a month before his death and remains...
revered as a ‘true republican’. He is ‘martyred’, ‘mythologized’ and made legendary within some of the discourse on this board. One of the regular board users for example, posts excerpts from Bobby Sands Diary and the link to the site from which the excerpts were taken, a site dedicated to the memory of Bobby Sands. A famous quote from Bobby Sands "Everyone, Republican or otherwise has their own particular part to play. No part is too great or too small, no one is too old or too young to do something” can often be found on this board, particularly in the form of a sign off quote.

With regard to the second category, members have involved themselves in numerous discussions on the uses of terrorism and violence. Their views are generally split. A number of regular users, although supportive of the Republicanism, argue that the continued or future use of terrorism is futile; they hold that to date it has not achieved the goals of the Republican movement and so it should not be used in the future where alternative courses of legitimate political activity have a greater chance of success, particularly given the current international climate and the “war on terrorism”. An example:

_There is no legitimacy for further war until a change is incurred in the opinion of Ireland’s people, or if the British/Unionists go back on their word._

However, a small number of board members do not believe the ballot box will bring a solution; they support the future use of violence, albeit within limitations. The community discourse indicates that violence is supported as part of a larger campaign but is only seen as justifiable when civilians are not deliberately targeted, indicating that for at least some members of this board there is an acceptable level of political violence. Regarding the future use of terrorism by the Republican Movement, support is not unanimous; with many board users expressing support for the peace process with the hope of some sort of arrangement being successful in the future should the Good Friday Agreement fail:

_You will always have the extremist on both the nationalist and unionist sides who will never be happy with any deal that does not give their side total control. Let’s hope they don’t run the show._

The war analogy is also often used to justify the use of violence - past and present - by the Republican movement. Board members see past paramilitaries and terrorists as ‘freedom fighters’ or ‘patriots’ and believe that training and recruitment is not only necessary but will continue, as will the Republican Movement as long as the six counties remain part of Northern Ireland and the UK. Take, for example, the following posts:

_When you waged a war for 30 years and killed innocent men women and children as is the case in armed conflict…(...)It isn’t about treating us better and we’ll stop fighting_
you, our demands is what ALL our patriot dead died for and that’s get out before we send you home...in body bags! Long live the IRA!
I do think the political situation will inevitably bring people back into Republicanism; back to Ireland’s cause, sooner or later.

Processes of Increasing Involvement

Processes of increasing involvement relates to the idea that supporting the Republican Movement and self-identification as a Republican supporter reflects engagement in a broader process. In the context of this online community this reflects, at least, a desire to increase one’s knowledge of, and participation in, the Republican Movement. In considering involvement from this perspective, what constitutes ‘engagement’ in the supportive process becomes increasingly blurred as far as any online-offline distinctions are concerned. In this sense active support can come in many forms including the following:

• The support of ‘Prisoners of War’ (PoWs) or Irish Republicans who have been imprisoned due to their involvement in Republican and terrorist activities. Support of PoWs is actively encouraged on the IRBB. Members are asked and encouraged to show their support and demonstrate their commitment to the Republican Movement and this online community by writing letters to these imprisoned individuals and signing petitions seeking recognition of their status as PoWs etc.

• Similarly there is encouragement that where possible individuals take part in marches supporting the Republican Movement. The times and locations of such marches are often posted on the board. For example, a recent march organised by Na Fianna Éireann which took place in Limerick received significant media attention because young supporters of Na Fianna marched in army/combat outfits. The headline from one newspaper read “Sick spectacle of kids on parade”. The press coverage was subsequently discussed on the bulletin board with newspaper stories and photographs scanned and posted for the community to consider.

• Also encouraged is the establishment of other websites and online magazines. Such activities are recognised as being a positive way of supporting the community and Republican Movement. The websites and magazines set up online facilitate further dissemination of Republican information and are a means of demonstrating support and becoming further involved in this online community.

• Additionally, members of the IRBB are encouraged to join Na Fianna Éireann and other organisations sympathetic to Irish Republicanism:

Republicans no(sic) this and it is up to us all now more than ever to get out there...let our voice be herd (sic)……And to those who want to help.....Join the Republican Movement join
its support groups…..It is now time that we show the people that there is only ONE! Republican Movement and we will continue until freedom is achieved. TIOCF/AIDH AR LA

Conclusion

The Internet facilitates the dissemination of information and propaganda related to the Republican movement, including their justifications or stated goals and tactics used. However and perhaps more notably, the Internet also has the potential to act as a recruitment tool by facilitating a number of ways to increase online and offline engagement.

It can be argued that virtual community members exist in a pre- or semi-radicalized state. In this state they are aware of the ‘conflict’ and the ideology and goals of a particular movement. However, they have also positioned themselves through a process of political negotiation facilitated by online interaction regarding acceptance or rejection of the terrorist organisation and their use of violence. The individual may have become involved in on- and offline support activities. Thus the discourses created within, and interactions facilitated by, the virtual community have the potential to contribute to the de-legitimisation of the enemy and other perceived out-groups. Through processes of increasing involvement on the part of supporters and the formation of group ties online, activity by supporters has the potential to contribute to processes of radicalisation (see, for example, della Porta, 1988, & Sageman, 2004, on the importance of inter-personal bonds for involvement [4]).

This case study, considering the function of three websites and a bulletin board dedicated to the support of Irish Republicanism, indicates that the notion of a virtual terrorist support community is a valid one. There is evidence to suggest the existence of a discrete process of engaging in and sustaining support for terrorism. One implication of increased attention to such processes is the acknowledgement that a variety of roles and functions exist within terrorist movements and that those roles that help to sustain the terrorist group can be recognised as existing along a continuum, ranging from the online supporter through to the active member/terrorist. The use of the Internet by both terrorist organisations and their supporters should not be underestimated; the Internet is a powerful tool which has the capacity to play an important role in the proliferation of terrorist movements. The implications of this in terms of current counter-terrorism policy have yet to be considered in full.

About the Author: Lorraine Bowman-Grieve is a PhD graduate in Applied Psychology from University College Cork in Ireland. Her doctoral research, which was awarded an IRCHSS scholarship, focused on the use of the Internet by terrorist movements and their supporters. With an MSc in Forensic Psychology from the University of Kent at Canterbury, Lorraine Bowman-Grieve currently works as a lecturer in Forensic Psychology at Leeds Trinity and All Saints.
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Notes

Through the Lenses of Hollywood: depictions of Terrorism in American Movies

by Thomas Riegler

Abstract

This article argues that Hollywood cinema has shaped, and sometimes distorted, the perception of terrorism since the late 1960s. It does so by discussing emblematic movies in a comparative way. The main thesis is that Hollywood never seriously tried to offer an accurate assessment of terrorism. Instead, it offered a mediated version that transcends reality and is firmly rooted in a pop culture framework. Nonetheless, since movies are, according to cinema theorist Siegfried Kracauer, a “mirror of the prevailing society”, they too reveal something about the historical evolution of terrorism and modifications in its understanding. Another issue briefly addressed is the question whether “real” terrorists tend to re-enact or copy (cinema)”reel” violence – given the fact that terrorists too are subject to the influence of cinematic images and metaphors.

Introduction

Italian novelist Umberto Eco once claimed that 70 percent of our knowledge derives from watching Hollywood movies. Could this also be true for our perception of terrorism? It can be argued that for a large part of its audience, American cinema, besides television (the substantial role of TV is not explored in this article), is one of the primary sources of information.[1] The perception of what terrorism means, how it can be understood, is shaped by cinematic images. This is also of importance on a political front as mass cultural representations of terrorism tend to be often stereotypical and ideologically biased. Cinema generally affirms the political and cultural status quo from which it originates: movies reproduce, charge, and disseminate interpretations, ideologies, and world views in contemporary society by constructing and filling an imaginary space, where the hegemonic constants of the public discourse come to life. Terrorism, often described as the “scourge of our times”, is one of them and a reoccurring theme of American movies since the 1970s.

The 1970s: hijackers and “lone wolves”

When reviewing Hollywood’s output on terrorism, it is obvious that it correlates with the waves and historical development of political violence: previously sporadic encounters with terrorism in Hollywood cinema, like Alfred Hitchcock’s Saboteur (1942), became more frequent in the 1970s, at a time when international terrorism and especially hijackings of jetliners orchestrated by Palestinian groups made headlines and featured in newsreels. Thus, the Arab gunman, who
threatens innocent passengers and strikes at Western installations, became a typical Hollywood
villain: John Frankenheimer’s *Black Sunday* (1976) depicted seductive terrorist Dahlia Iyad
(Marthe Keller) of German-Palestinian background enlisting an alienated Vietnam veteran
Michael Lander (Bruce Dern). Together they plan an attack on the Super Bowl finale in Miami: a
Goodyear blimp loaded with scrap metal is launched as a cluster bomb attack aimed to kill
thousands of sport fans, including President Jimmy Carter.[2]

During the 1970s major acts of terrorism had not yet struck the US homeland. Therefore the
entertainment industry mainly looked abroad for inspiration and major foreign events were
dramatised for the silver screen: William A. Graham staged the Munich hostage massacre of
1972 four years later in *21 hours at Munich*. Only five months after the real event Marvin J.
Chomsky re-enacted the spectacular Entebbe rescue mission in the studio, featuring a big star
cast, including Burt Lancaster as defence minister Shimon Peres, Anthony Hopkins as Yitzhak
Rabin, and Liz Taylor as a relative of a hostage (*Victory at Entebbe*, 1976). The story was also
adapted for TV in *Raid on Entebbe* (1977), starring Charles Bronson. The formula for these
movies is basically the same: high-ranking politicians in crisis centres make daring decisions,
while elite commandos first train meticulously for their mission and then free the hostages in a
climactic shoot-out sequence. It is a triumphant celebration of the commando’s capacity to dare
and win – a myth to which Israel contributed by commissioning its own cinematic version of the
events in *Operation Thunderball* (1979).[3]

Home-grown terrorism is almost exclusively the work of lunatics and psychotic types with little
political background: in *Airport* (1970) a self-made bomb explodes on board of a Boeing 707
bound for Rome. Responsibility rests with demolition expert D. O. Guerrero (Van Heflin), a
desperate man with a long history of mental illness who wants his wife to benefit from a life-
insurance he just purchased. The damage caused by the mid-air explosion in the hull of the plane
results in Guerrero being sucked out of the jetliner, which the pilots manage to landed safely. In
*Skyjacked* (1972) it is the suicidal Vietnam veteran Jerome K. Weber (James Brolin), who takes
command of a domestic flight and directs it via Anchorage to Moscow, where the plane is
surrounded by aggressive Soviet troops. The would-be defector is finally challenged by the
heroic Captain Henry O’Hara (Charlton Heston) and shot by the soldiers.

*The Taking of Pelham 1-2-3* (1974) is one of the first examples outlining a scenario of urban
terrorism that is financially motivated: a gang led by a British mercenary kidnaps a New York
subway train in order to extort a one million dollar ransom. This storyline of a threatened public
is repeated in the thrillers *Two Minute Warning* (1976) and *Rollercoaster* (1977), where
anonymous blackmailers target popular American institutions – a football stadium and an
amusement park, respectively – in horrific schemes with a potential for mass casualties.[4]
Political motives, no matter how twisted, appear to be reserved for traumatized war veterans
only: in *Twilight’s Last Gleaming* (1977) an Air Force General, who was court-martialled for his
anti-war stance, takes control over a Titan rocket silo and threatens to start World War III unless
the US government releases all the real facts about the background of the Vietnam War. This
demand is met by declassifying a top secret memo, which defines the war in South East-Asia as a
means to enhance American credibility vis-a-vis the Soviet Union's.[5]

Since the US experienced sporadic acts of domestic terrorism by left-wing radicals from the
Weather Underground or the Symbionese Liberation Army during the 1970s, the urban guerrilla
is featured as a potential danger lurking at home. As a consequence, Clint Eastwood's vigilante
cop Dirty Harry has to eliminate a fictitious “People Revolutionary Strike Force” (The Enforcer,
1976). The kidnapping of big money heiress Patty Hearst in 1975 – the most visible act of 70s
left-wing terrorism – was adopted for the screen in all kind of ways: ranging from the infamous
exploitation pieces Patty (1976) and Tanya: Sex Queen of the SLA (1976) - where “SLA” stood
for “Sexual Liberation Army” - to a classic true crime”” story made for TV (The Ordeal of Patty
Hearst, 1979). In 1988 Paul Schrader revisited the case in Patty Hearst (1988); however his
presentation of the events (terrorist victim apparently becomes perpetrator) in a deliberately
detached style received only limited release.[6]

The 1980s: enter religious fanatics and red infiltrators

This more or less distanced perspective on terrorism changed abruptly once the US was directly
confronted with major acts of terrorism abroad: the 444 days long Iranian hostage crisis (1979),
the American involvement in the Lebanese civil war (1983), and the resulting confrontation with
Shi’ite extremism. Terrorism rapidly acquired an extraordinary salience in American public
opinion.[7]

In Nighthawks (1981) – one of the first films to address the media fixation of modern terrorism –
the international terrorist mastermind Wulfgar (Rutger Hauer) brags: “There is no security”. His
network of Palestinian, German, and Irish activists spreads terror in New York until policeman
DaSilva (Sylvester Stallone) is finally prepared to absorb the lessons of his British
counterterrorism mentor: terrorism has to be fought outside of the law. This is the logic of “lesser
evil“: in order to keep a fragile democratic system safe from its enemies one has to forget
democratic niceties and the rule of law. Such emphasis on extra-legal counter-terrorism became a
key motif in many movies to come: it is as if the agonising ineffectivity of the US in Ronald
Reagan’s actual poor handling of terrorism had to be compensated in the sphere of imagination.
One of the most intriguing examples is Delta Force (1986). The film sets off with a portrayal of
the 1985 skyjacking of TWA 847 by the Shiite Islamic Jihad. While this hostage scenario was
ended following secret negotiations, Delta Force gives free rein to a military solution inspired by
Israeli Entebbe strategy to achieve “victories over terrorism”. [8] In the film the counter-terrorist
elite force is dispatched to liberate the hostages, who in the meantime have been taken from the
airliner to the urban jungle of Beirut where they are dispersed in underground dungeons. The
rescuers blast their way through the city, kill scores of enemy fighters, and lead the American hostages back to safety.[9] The numerous enemies are portrayed as Shiite Muslims with a clear connection to the Iranian regime. When the terrorists are first introduced, they are shown in an extreme low angle shot, which further distorts their already shabby appearance with their loosened ties, unkempt hair, and maniacal stare. Their savage “otherness” is a mixture of ethnicity and psychosis – most evident in the manic outbursts of their leader Abdul (Robert Foster) towards the hostages.[10]

Most films of this genre in the 1980s did not address actual events like *Delta Force*, but drew ever more alarming pictures of the terrorist threat, especially in the B-movie genre (*Hostage*, 1986; *Death before Dishonor*, 1987; *Terror in Beverly Hills*, 1988). Corresponding with the aggressive stance first taken by the Reagan administration towards the Soviet Union, the spectre of Red Terror was particularly prominent in *Invasion U.S.A.* (1985). It depicted a mixed force of Cubans, East Germans, and Russians, led by the maniac psychopath Major Rostov (Richard Lynch), whose team secretly lands on a peaceful Florida beach to spread chaos and violence.[11] Since ordinary law enforcement is helpless against this onslaught, the government re-activates retired CIA-counterterrorism specialist Matt Hunter (Chuck Norris). He understands the mindset of the terrorists and devises a trap in which the enemy is consequently tricked into.[12]

**The 1990s: action films and new threats**


With regard to their background, the featured villains mirror the climate of political correctness in the first post-Cold War period: a decadent British aristocrat (*Passenger 57*), a group of “homeless” Stasi agents (*Die Hard III*), or corrupt Russian military figures in alliance with resentful Bosnian Serbs (*The Peacemaker*, 1997). But most of them are “home grown”: disgruntled former employees of law enforcement agencies (*Speed*) or renegade soldiers (*Die Hard II*, *Operation Broken Arrow*, *The Rock*). What unites most of them is the simple fact that
they kill and maim mainly for money. They are depicted as ordinary criminals hiding behind a political ideology. For instance in *Die Hard I*, the “Volksfrei”-movement, a West German left-wing terrorist group, attacks a party at the headquarters of a Japanese cooperation in Los Angeles and takes the guests hostage. Their declared aim is to force the liberation of “revolutionary brothers and sisters” from prison. However, this turns out to be only a diversion; the group real aim is to rob 640 million dollars from a safe. Another telling example is the disgruntled ex-policeman Howard Payne in *Speed*. He informs his opponent via mobile phone about the sole motivation of his blackmail scheme: “Well, I want money, Jack. I wish that I had some loftier purpose, but I’m afraid in the end, it’s all about the money“.[13]

Yet there is also a new threat emerging in 1990s cinema that has nothing to do with those apolitical gangsters – in response to renewed public interest sparked by the (largely unsuccessful) bombing of New York’s World Trade Center in 1993, the radical Islamist terrorist was introduced on the movie screen with *True Lies* (1994), *Executive Decision* (1996), and *The Siege* (1999). These three films depict jihadists as backward lunatics and potential mass murderers whose onslaught had to be fought by all means necessary.

In *True Lies*, a group called “Crimson Jihad” has smuggled nuclear weapons out of the former Soviet republic Kazakhstan and attempts to blackmail the US government. To demonstrate their seriousness they detonate the first bomb on an uninhabited island of the Florida Keys. The “pillar of holy fire” that rises at this place threatens a nuclear holocaust.[14] Spymaster Trilby (Charlton Heston) urges his troops to locate ringleader Aziz (Art Malik) and his men before “somebody parks a car in front of the White House with a nuclear bomb in the trunk.” This job is effectively done by Harry Tasker (Arnold Schwarzenegger), agent of the “Omega Sector”, a clandestine unit specialising in counter-proliferation.[15] *Executive Decision* features Arabs hijacking a Boeing 747 with the intention of blowing up the plane, and smuggle enough nerve gas on board to wipe out the entire East Coast of the US. When a US senator, who happens to be on board, wants to negotiate to advance his own career interests, he receives a “punishing” bullet in the head. Instead *Executive Decision* aims straight for a climatic shoot-out at the very last moment a Special Forces team that had slipped into the belly of the plane in mid-flight via a “decompression tunnel” intervenes and shoots all hijackers.

The enemy within and the reaction of the American public in the face of terrorist violence are the main concern in *The Siege*. To force the US government to release a terrorist leader - he had been kidnapped by American forces - several terrorist cells undertake suicide missions in New York. When the crisis reaches its peak, the president declares martial law and all able-bodied Muslims who do not cooperate, are detained behind barbed wire. Libeal FBI investigator Frank Hubbard (Denzel Washington), who managed the investigation before the army was called in, is the exact opposite of commanding General William Deveraux (Bruce Willis). While the latter uses his troops like a “broadsword”, Hubbard “plays by the book” and upholds constitutional rights. In
the end he arrests not only Deveraux for murdering a prisoner, but disposes of the last attacker, who exclaims both defiant and threatening: “There will never be a last cell!”[16]

After 9/11: the changing face of terrorism

In the immediate period after 9/11, Hollywood indeed shunned away from the subject of terrorism, focusing instead on fantastical escapism, Science Fiction and family entertainment. Tellingly, the Twin Towers were edited out of most movies in the production line that showed the New York skyline.

One of the first movies to address terrorism after 9/11, The Sum of all Fears (2002), featured the destruction of Baltimore by an atomic bomb. Overall the film was considered as out of touch with the post 9/11 reality since the story focuses on the ensuing escalating tensions between the US and Russia. With terrorism more or less out of the picture, threats were depicted as extra-terrestrial (War of the Worlds, 2005), in the form of disease (I am Legend, 2007) or as a result of rapid climate change (The Day after Tomorrow, 2005). Besides commercial considerations with regard to a weary public, both domestic and international, but also because previous scenarios considered fantastic and purely entertaining had been so “brutally realized” on 11 September 2001, the subject of terrorism was not addressed in a major way for some years in Hollywood’s production studios.

The War Within (2005) was one of the earliest examples of movies addressing the situation in post 9/11 America: it focuses on Hassan (Ayad Akhtar), a Pakistani engineer, who was wrongly suspected of terrorist activities and tortured in prison. The violent experience transforms Hassan into a radical who seeks revenge for the injustice done to him. He connects with a terrorist cell that is in the middle of planning an attack on the Grand Central Station in New York. But his logic is put under severe pressure by contradictions and conflicting emotions: the war, in which he sees himself, is fought “within” – in his own psyche.[17] The search for answers also motivates Syriana, a 2005 movie that is partly based on the memoirs of Ex-CIA agent Robert Baer. It explores the political, economic, legal, and social effects of the oil business, and how its mechanisms breed terrorism. The main character, elderly CIA agent Bob Barnes (George Clooney), is embedded in a network of power relations connecting mighty Washingtonian law firms, Texan oil business, the US government, and the corrupt elites of a Middle Eastern sheikdom. In the script, this “system” uses all means necessary to advance its political-economic interests and produces terrorism as a form of blowback. A sub-plot illustrates this on the basis of the radicalisation of two Pakistani oil workers, who simply want to improve their lives and are prevented from doing so. [18] Stephen Spielberg addressed the conflict via historical analogy in Munich (2005). His adaptation of a novel on the Israeli revenge for the massacre of its athletes during the 1972 Olympics was also a critical exploration of the cycle of violence engulfing the Middle East and, indirectly, a “prayer for peace”.

PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

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It took more than five years for the entertainment industry to tackle 9/11 directly. In *United 93* (2006), Paul Greengrass retold the story of the hijacked flight that did not reach its intended target on September 11th. Instead it crashed into a field in Pennsylvania, supposedly because the passengers revolted against the hijackers. The director offers only a distanced portrait of the hijackers – although the first scene in the movie, a prayer ritual in the morning hours of September 11th, 2001, depicts them as devout Muslims on a mission. But since *United 93* is all about the heroic actions of the passengers and their sacrifice, the motivation and personal background of the terrorists remain rather obscure to the moviegoer. Oliver Stone’s *World Trade Center* (2006) did not even show the planes hitting the towers. Instead, Stone concentrated on a human interest story based on the miraculous rescue of two survivors from Ground Zero.

With growing distance, movie makers began to focus on the War on Terror, its progress and implications, both domestic and international. In *Body of Lies* (2008), CIA agent Roger Ferris (Leonardo Di Caprio) sets up a fictitious terror group, equips it with fake bank accounts, and plants messages in fundamentalist chat rooms. A staged attack on a US Army base in Turkey aims to flush out a jealous Al Qaeda mastermind - the Syrian born, American educated Al-Sameen (Alon Aboutboul). The plan works although the situation becomes desperate for the agent. He has to endure torture when caught by Al-Sameen and is about to be executed on video when Jordanian intelligence agents burst into the room and kill all terrorists. It turns out that Ferris's principal ally, the deceptive spymaster Hani Salaam (Mark Strong), is a far more effective manipulator than previously assumed, making the most of a partnership of convenience. [19]

Finally, *The Kingdom* (2007) can be read as an alternative scenario to the real life War on Terror in its depiction of successful counterterrorism as the result of cooperation between Western and Middle Eastern police forces. A team of FBI investigators works closely with the Saudi police Colonel Al Ghazi (Ashraf Barhom) to hunt down Abu Hamza, a mid-level al-Qaeda operative, who is responsible for a bombing attack on an American compound in Saudi-Arabia.[20] Overall the film offers a “utopian spectacle of wounded Americans heading home, mission accomplished,” as Jim Hoberman remarked.[21]

**Comparing depictions of terrorism: 1970s – 2000s**

In order to clarify the relationship between context and cultural output, the four ten year periods are put in comparison with each other. This analysis highlights how the differing depiction of terrorism indicates shifts in the public’s understanding – in line with the specific political and social “Zeitgeist” of the decade, or in reference to hegemonic ideas about the interpretation of terrorism in the public discourse.
In 1970s cinema terrorism was escapist entertainment with little basis in reality. Nevertheless it featured many characteristics like air piracy, attacks on vital city infrastructures and mass gatherings. Fitting the Cold War framework the enemy “other” consisted of left-wingers, Third World guerrillas, as well as “home-grown” radicals and “lone wolfs”. Where Middle Eastern terrorists appeared, their background was primarily secular, national liberation on their agenda. What unites this diverse lot is the more or less subjective motivation: the real driving forces for the perpetrators are not political, but hatred of society, psychosis, or simply greed.

This mode of representation changed during the 1980s – greatly influenced by the engagement of the US in the Middle East and the experience of devastating attacks like those in Beirut in 1983. The terrorist”” was finally established as a sworn public enemy of everything America stands for: - be he a Communist infiltrator or a Shiite extremist. Against this threat the whole arsenal of military might is mobilised’. To fight fire with fire is depicted by many movies as the most effective way to deal with terrorism (Nighthawks, Invasion U.S.A, Delta Force). Terrorism is now no longer the brainchild of twisted minds, but a form of proxy warfare – organised, equipped, and paid for in secret by rogue states like the Soviet Union or Iran. The message is that terrorism can not claim any “true” political underpinning or legitimate causes – it’s either the product of “loony” fanaticism or of a criminal enterprise orchestrated by its secret paymasters.

The 1990s were both a time of easing and one of heightening awareness of new threats: since the ideological struggle of the Cold War had ended, the former stereotypical villains lost much of their symbolic value. They kept appearing, like the East-Germans in Die Hard, but had morphed into a criminal syndicate. At the same time 90s cinema envisioned a crumbling world order with failing state power, the emergence of asymmetric threats, and new players in the form of transnational networks. In doing so, the movies captured the phenomenon of decentralised local initiatives replacing the old-fashioned state sponsored terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s quite accurately. Films like The Siege or Executive Decision made it clear that the mode of operation had changed as well. The first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Embassy bombings of 1998 in East Africa had demonstrated that the “new Jackals” aimed to achieve spectacular violence against highly symbolic targets while also inflicting mass casualties. Prior to that, terrorist groups had observed some limits of violence since it would have weakened their base of popular support. The terrorist cells in The Siege and in Executive Decision act according to this modus operandi: they orchestrate suicide bombings, rely on the media to broadcast their message, and intend to set off a chain reaction of escalating violence.

More recent movies deliberately aim to capture the phenomenon even more realistically. To utilize politically agenda-free terrorist figures as opponents would not fit the post 9/11 environment. Yet while terrorism is the prime subject of several popular TV series – e.g. 24, The Unit, or Sleeper Cell - it was picked up only reluctantly by the Hollywood movie industry after
2001. The commercial failure of *Body of Lies* or *The Kingdom* had apparently put a lid – at least temporarily – on terrorism-related movies.

**The relationship between real and (movie) reel terrorism**

Since the public’s understanding of terrorism is clearly affected by the latter’s mass cultural representation, the question remains if this can also be applied to terrorists themselves? There is indeed some evidence that terrorists picked ideas from movie scenarios or imitated what they saw on the screen. Gillo Pontecorvo’s *The Battle of Algiers* (1965), a dramatization of the real life conflict between Algerian FLN rebels and the French army, inspired many left-wing revolutionary groups as well as terrorists: it is said that the IRA, the Tamil Tigers, and the Black Panthers screened it to their members for training purposes since *The Battle of Algiers* quite authentically depicts the inner workings and dynamics of an insurgent struggle and the alleged effectiveness of urban terrorism.[22] In Western Germany, the leader of the Red Army Faction (RAF), Andreas Baader, was an keen student of Pontecorvo’s pseudo-documentary. According to his biographers Klaus Stern and Jörg Herrmann, Baader modelled the “Dreierschlag” of 1970 – the simultaneous robbing of three banks in West Berlin – after a key scene in his favourite movie.[23] A more recent example was used as evidence in a British trial of an Al Qaeda sympathiser in 2006. When investigators played a video he owned – *Die Hard with a Vengeance* (1995) – the tape abruptly ended after 60 minutes and instead began to show pictures of New York landmarks, while a voice in the background imitated explosion sounds.[24]

In regard to 9/11, several commentators like Tom Engelhardt even assumed that the terrorists had modelled their plot after a Hollywood scenario: “What if those pre-existing frameworks hadn’t been quite so well primed to emerge in no time at all? What if we (and our enemies as well) hadn’t been at the movies all those years?, they asked”[25] To claim that terrorism is simply a form of copy cat crime is of course far-fetched – even in the case of *The Battle of Algiers* it is very difficult to determine if there was any direct nexus between viewing it and the practical application of insurrectionary tactics depicted therein. What is certain is that the movie’s inspirational force roused passions, made people identify with the cause of anti-colonialism and international struggles that were in full swing at that time. What can be assumed is that violent extremists tend to get inspiration and ideas from popular culture like everyone else, but for different reasons and motives.

**Conclusion**

For Hollywood movies terrorism was first of all a thrilling piece of entertainment: the plots are all but spectacular, the villains mostly represent archetypes of “evil”, and ultimately the threat is averted by righteous forces. Although as exaggerated and deformed Hollywood’s interpretation of terrorism may be, the movies can be “read” in an insightful way: as a sort of "snapshot" of the
cultural context from which they originate, the cinematic texts tell us about prevailing mass fears, fantasies, and projections about terrorism. They represent the status quo of the public discourse at that time, reproducing hegemonic ideas promoted by many politicians, the media, or think tank experts. Thus, both the meaning of terrorism and what is projected into it can not be understood, without paying close attention to what is happening on the cinema screen. This “mirror(ed) image” of terrorism is revealing because ultimately it expresses certain dimensions we prepare to confront in real life: the spectre of unspeakable atrocities, the notion of extra-legal violence to be employed against terrorists, or the establishment of a “state of siege” ending all civil liberties.

Of course there are also risks associated with this: the review of relevant movies demonstrates that the mass culture representation of terrorism is problematic due to the highly suggestive effect of imaginary combined with ideological subtext. In Hollywood movies terrorism is essentialised – that is, often presented as de-politicised and merely pathological or criminal. Its cinematic representation generates a high degree of assurance in the effectiveness of simple, quick solutions to highly complex problems. It also legitimises extra-legal and military approaches while denouncing compromise and negotiations as appeasement. In short, it tends to reduce reality’s complexity to a simple dichotomy of good and evil. The result is a kind of false conscience that hampers a better understanding of terrorism and political violence in regard to its causes, intentions, and the spectrum of possibilities for counteraction. There can be little doubt that cinema and popular culture in general can provide valuable insight into shifting political and ideological trends, re-arrangements of frameworks beyond the obvious public fascination with the subject of terrorism.[26]

About the author: **Dr. Thomas Riegler** studied history and politics at Vienna and Edinburgh Universities. He now works as a journalist and historian in Vienna. He has published on a wide range of topics, including terrorism, film studies, and contemporary history. His most recent book is: Terrorism. Actors, Structures, Trends (2009, in German).

Notes

Officially Blacklisted Extremist/Terrorist (Support) Organizations: a Comparison of Lists from six Countries and two International Organizations

by Benjamin Freedman

Abstract

Since 9/11, international cooperation against international terrorism has improved. However, the global community is still far from a situation in which one country’s terrorist group is all countries’ public enemy. This comparative list enumerates 120 extremist/terrorist groups blacklisted by six countries and two international organizations. The listings highlight the security interests, priorities, and outlook of particular countries and international organizations. Each individual list reflects regional or, in some instances, global, security concerns of the designating country/body and, therefore, there is less overlap than anticipated.

Introduction

Currently, the United States has officially designated 45 foreign organizations as “terrorist” (FTO). Another 60 organizations and support groups/entities are on its Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL). Other countries have developed such lists as well. The United Kingdom, for instance, has one of the most extensive lists, blacklisting 55 organizations. Canada blacklists 41 organizations, India 34, Australia 18, and Russia 16. International organizations also hold such lists: the European Union has blacklisted 29 organizations while the list of the United Nations contains 24 entities.[1]

It is instructive to compare these lists. In the following, we look at 120 extremist/terrorist groups blacklisted by six major countries (AUS, CAN, IND, RU, UK, & US) and two major international organizations (EU, UN). Surprisingly, there is far less overlap than one would expect. Most notably, al-Qaeda is blacklisted by all six of the countries included, as well as by the United Nations. Strangely, however, it is not featured on the European Union’s list.

To a large degree, these lists of officially designated extremist/terrorist organizations and suspected support groups highlight the security interests, priorities, and outlook of the particular countries and international organizations. Each individual list reflects regional or, in some instances, global, security concerns of the designating country/body. Several of the groups included on the Indian designation list, for instance, are Pakistani and operate within the immediate South Asian region. The United States' designation list, on the other hand, approaches the terrorist threat from a global, rather than regional, perspective. As such, the American list
includes organizations deemed threatening to American security or personnel abroad, regardless of geographic location. [2]

Table: 120 Officially Designated Extremist/Terrorist Organizations and Suspected Support Groups: a Comparison of UN, EU, US, UK, Russian, Canadian, Australian and Indian Lists.[3]

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<th>Group name</th>
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<td>4. Akhil Bharat Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES)</td>
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<td>Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>87.</td>
<td>Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>88.</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army (PLA)</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>89.</td>
<td>People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>90.</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>91.</td>
<td>PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>92.</td>
<td>Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM)</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>93.</td>
<td>Real IRA</td>
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<td>94.</td>
<td>Red Hand Commando</td>
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<td>95.</td>
<td>Red Hand Defenders</td>
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<td>95.</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)</td>
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<td>97.</td>
<td>Revolutionary Organization 17 November</td>
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<td>98.</td>
<td>Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF) in Manipur</td>
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<td>99.</td>
<td>Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)</td>
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<td>100.</td>
<td>Revolutionary Struggle</td>
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<td>101.</td>
<td>Saor Eire</td>
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<td>Saved Sect / Saviour Sect</td>
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<td>103.</td>
<td>Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)</td>
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<td>104.</td>
<td>Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)</td>
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<td>105.</td>
<td>Students Islamic Movement of India</td>
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<td>106.</td>
<td>Supreme Military Majlis ul-Shura of the United Mujahideen Forces of the Caucasus</td>
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<td>107.</td>
<td>Taliban</td>
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<td>108.</td>
<td>Tamil Nadu Liberation Army (TNLA)</td>
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<td>109.</td>
<td>Tamil National Retrieval Troops (TNRT)</td>
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<td>110.</td>
<td>Tehrik Nefaz-e Shari’at Muhammadi (TNSM)</td>
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<td>111.</td>
<td>Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK)</td>
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<td>112.</td>
<td>Tunisian Combatant Group</td>
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<td>113.</td>
<td>Ulster Defence Association (UDA)</td>
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<td>114.</td>
<td>Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)</td>
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<td>115.</td>
<td>Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)</td>
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<td>116.</td>
<td>United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)</td>
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</table>
117. United National Liberation Front (UNLF)  
118. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)  
119. Vanguards of Conquest (VOC)  
120. World Tamil Movement

About the Author: Benjamin Freedman is Editorial Assistant of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism.’ He served as a Research Intern for the Stein Program on Counter-terrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and as a Consular Intern for the US Department of State in Marseille, France. He has done research on terrorist and extremist “drop-outs,” al-Qaida/terrorist financing as well as narco-terrorism. He graduated magna cum laude from Bowdoin College, with a degree in government and legal studies, focusing on comparative and Middle East politics.

Notes

[1] The full UN Al-Qaeda/Taliban Monitoring Group's consolidated list has some 300 names and includes "individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with [Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban]". For the purposes of this comparative list, however, UN-designated charities, banks, and generally non-violent support groups have been excluded. Only non-state armed groups are included, as this provides a clearer comparison with those terrorist organizations designated by individual states. The Indian list is about to be expanded by mainly al-Qaeda-linked groups, almost tripling the number of currently proscribed groups.

[2] The United States List considered here includes only the Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), not those on the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL).

[3] A note on spelling/transliteration and translation: The spellings, transliterations, and translations used come from official governmental and intergovernmental lists, except for organizations from the Russian designation list which were translated into English independently. Organizations are listed in absolute alphabetical order (e.g. al-Qaeda figures under “A” rather than “Q”) and every attempt has been made to list organizations by their most commonly known name, regardless of language. Where notable discrepancies in spelling and/or translation exist between lists, an effort has been made to include such variants alongside the organization's most-commonly known name. These lists can be found on the following websites:

Australia: http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/95FB057CA3DECF30CA256FAB001F7FBD?
OpenDocument
%3DPDF&ei=63Z4S9XPO5WG_Aa51L52Cg&usg=AFQjCNGBPgbJiidRcEcHpy9akBJzI2waxQkajj2-cPMV9HYYf_1a66ciOQHSQ
India: http://www.mha.gov.in/uniquepage.asp?id_PK=292
Russia: http://nak.fsb.ru/nac/ter_org.htm
UN: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolidatedlist.htm#
US: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
Mark Perry’s recent book *How to Lose the War on Terror* provides a concise and nuanced look on the complicated events that unfolded in the Middle East after September 11, 2001. Perry, the director of *Conflicts Forum*, is not the armchair post-9/11 pundit on terrorism or Islamic extremism that we too often see; he has been talking to terrorists and Islamists having traveled and lived in the Middle East for over twenty years.

The first half of Perry’s volume is dedicated to the events that evolved in Iraq after the American invasion in 2003. He highlights and criticizes the decisions made by Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, to rid the Iraqi government of former Bathists and to dismantle the Iraqi military, which created the Iraqi insurgency that bogged down the U.S. military and contributed significantly to Iraq’s insecurity. Perry’s book reads like a suspense novel, providing the reader with a first-hand narrative of the talks that took place between the American military personnel and the Iraqi tribal and business leaders who had close ties to the Sunni insurgency in the al-Anbar province. This portion of the book takes the reader from the streets of al-Anbar and the meeting rooms in Amman, Jordan, to the halls of the Pentagon, outlining how America eventually decided that negotiating an end to the cycle of violence was in the mutual interest of both the U.S. military and Iraq’s Sunni insurgency; mainly because both had a common enemy – foreign fighters associated with al-Qaeda in Iraq. Perry rightly and convincingly argues that the U.S. had to engage its enemies to settle the security impasse. He correctly concludes that it was important for the U.S. to separate the Iraqi nationalist insurgents, whose main motivations were ending the American occupation and getting its piece of the political pie in a Shia dominated government, from the foreign fighters associated with al-Qaeda who were largely focused on leading an Islamic revolution by using indiscriminate violence against whoever disagreed with them.

The second half of Perry’s book is dedicated to the meetings that he and several other American and Europeans had with the leaders of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Muslims Brotherhood in 2005. His major argument is that the U.S. must recognize that so-called ‘corrigeble terrorists’ groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah are fundamentally different organizations than al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Again, with an abundance of first-hand evidence, Perry presents a narrative straight from the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah, outlining their rationales as both political parties and armed resistance movements. He argues that both Hamas and Hezbollah are more legitimate resistant movements by virtue of having significant popular support from their local constituencies and due to their willingness to work within existing political processes. The chapter on Hezbollah is probably the most interesting. To be sure, Hezbollah is not just another
terrorist organization to be taken lightly. Its mass following as a fully functioning political organization that is willing to work within the Lebanese political system, its ability to provide important social services in southern Lebanon, and its capacity to maintain its status as a heavily armed terrorist organization point to the fact that Hezbollah is a crucial player in the region and one that the U.S. must address. Perry’s analysis of the complicated and highly contentious political landscape that developed after the assassination of Lebanese president Rafiq al-Harriri is probably one of the most even-handed descriptions available.

Yet what does this book tell us about why America should talk to terrorists or risk losing the war on terror? Perry’s main argument which runs throughout the book is that America successfully engaged its enemies to settle the violent conflict in Iraq, and, presumably, this tactic of engagement could be replicated to end the conflicts between the U.S. and other more corrigeable terrorist antagonists like Hamas and Hezbollah. Additionally, as Perry argues, the U.S. should stop aggregating terrorist groups and classifying them all as “evildoers”; rather, it should view them as credible movements with rational political objectives. But Perry’s overarching argument does suffer from a few analytical pitfalls. The negotiations that took place between the Iraqi insurgency and Americans were ad hoc agreements reached between the American military and the Sunni tribal leaders of al-Anbar during a wartime situation. And this dialogue occurred in the early stages of a broader counterinsurgency campaign being developed and implemented by the American military, bypassing the U.S. Department of State, the agency that would lead any future political negotiations with Hamas or Hezbollah. But why should the U.S. divert from its long-standing “no concessions” counterterrorism policy and engage in political negotiations with Hamas and Hezbollah? Again, it is difficult to find convincing arguments. Of course Hamas and Hezbollah represent fundamentally different threats and have more justifiable ideologies and goals than an incorrigible terrorist group like al-Qaeda. But, as many terrorism scholars have continually pointed out, terrorist groups are not defined based on the legitimacy of their socio-political goals, but rather because of the tactics they use (deliberately targeting non-combatants with the intention to spread fear to a wider audience) to pursue them. The question then becomes, since Hamas and Hezbollah have legitimate political followings and have shown a willingness to work within more or less democratic political systems, why don’t they renounce terrorism, take steps towards disarmament, and engage fully in their respective political systems? If rational political goals are truly their credos and America is simply too ignorant to understand that then they should consider renouncing terrorism and leaving armed resistance behind. A major concern for the U.S. would, with respect to engagement, be this: if it chooses to divert from its “no concessions” counterterrorism policy and negotiates with terrorists today, then what new groups or splinter groups with justifiable goals will it be negotiating with tomorrow?

To conclude: Perry’s book provides a brilliant first-hand narrative of the very complex political situations in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and Iraq; it is accessible to both the practitioner
and the academic researcher. Yet, in the view of this reviewer, it is lacking persuasive arguments on why the U.S. would lose the ‘war on terror’ if it does not talk to terrorists.

About the Reviewer: Jason Rinehart is a postgraduate student in the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews and a Research Assistant with the Terrorist Research Initiative.
Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism


Terrorism in the Maghreb receives comparatively little scholarly and media attention, which makes this book by Anneli Botha, a senior researcher on terrorism at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa, particularly welcome. After a brief executive summary and introduction, Botha offers chapters on terrorism in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. She then provides two wider assessments, studying the region in terms of transnational terrorist networks and counterterrorism strategies, before closing her book with a conclusion. With this monograph, Botha has rendered an important service to researchers. She consulted numerous reports on her subject and presents them in a succinct narrative, punctuated by useful maps, tables, and figures.

The book makes two overarching claims. The first concerns transnationalization, as the book’s subtitle indicates. Botha bills her work as an effort to assess “the threat and implication of the name change announcement of the Salafist Group for Combat and Preaching (GSPC) to al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)” in 2007. She contends that the “name change in itself implied that the original domestic group had transnational ambitions” (p. viii). The second claim concerns history. Botha warns that while it is “a mistake to assess the threat of terrorism in any country in historic isolation[,]” this holds “particularly true when one tries to assess and understand the ‘renewed’ threat of terrorism in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia” (p. viii).

Botha links transnationalization to regime strength, pointing out that AQIM targets foreign and regional interests even though it can no longer threaten the Algerian government (p. 83). She also asserts that Tunisian radicals join international terrorist outfits because their local efforts have failed (p. 123). Describing terrorism’s spread beyond the Maghreb is something of a challenge for Botha, however. Trans-national (rather than international, global, etc.) is the precise term for her approach, as she tends to focus mainly on individual countries even when addressing phenomena ‘across nations.’ The chapter on transnational terrorist networks, for instance, is unexpectedly structured primarily as a series of nation-by-nation accounts, with full sections dedicated to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, which inevitably leads to repetitions from the three national chapters (e.g., pp. 107–8 and 166–168).

Botha’s national focus does, however, reinforce her argument for historical context; she manages to push her story into the past – back to the early 1990s for the regional assessments, to the period of independence in the 1960s and 1950s for the national chapters. Yet Botha builds her book primarily from recent media sources (well over half the work’s citations come from press agencies; see pp. 209–236) while setting the stage for her descriptions of Islamist ideological challenges to Maghreb regimes by citing Muslim thinkers and movements from the Near East.
(pp. 11–17). The feeble sense of Maghreb history that results is punctuated by minor errors regarding the specifics of individual Maghreb nations, such as muddling the Arabic transliteration of the Moroccan monarch’s title Commander of the Faithful (“amir amoumine” on p. 88), abbreviating his name insufficiently as simply “King Mohammed” (p. 89), or describing “Liberation” as his country’s “leading newspaper” (p. 67), and so on. Focusing intensely and separately on the three nations of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia does yield one surprising benefit. Botha’s book fortuitously, if inadvertently, reveals the relative arbitrariness of the Maghreb as a unit of analysis, at least in terms of contemporary terrorism. Among the three countries that comprise what was once called ‘French North Africa,’ Algeria is of incomparable bigger importance and clearly merits Botha’s first and most extensive chapter, which is much longer than the chapters dedicated to Morocco and Tunisia combined. Algeria’s long-standing significance in transnational terrorism is also featured in Botha’s historical passages on the potent threat posed by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), an organization already present in the United States (p. 159) and conducting attacks in France (pp. 37–38) during the 1990s. Botha highlights Algeria’s uniqueness explicitly near the book’s end and does implicitly so also at the book’s opening, through her focus on AQIM. This group remains prominent across the volume, as when Botha dedicates full sections of her chapters on Morocco and Tunisia to their citizens’ involvement in this new spawn of Algeria’s GSPC (pp. 103–107, 119–123). But AQIM is hardly a Maghreb phenomenon. In fact, chapters addressing, say, Mauretania and Mali (rather than Morocco and Tunisia) might have offered more insight into AQIM, given the group’s significant development in the Sahel.

However, the monograph finishes on a strong note, leaving the reader wishing the author had stepped back from the details of her mainly news-based narrative more regularly throughout the work. Botha mentions only briefly her conversation with a security expert in Tunis (p. 184) and her interviews with Polisario Front members in Tindouf (p. 196), and she leaves underdeveloped some important thoughts – for example, that the end of the war in Iraq may unleash on the Maghreb another wave of radicalized and experienced fighters akin to the Afghan Arabs (p. 200), or that the current concern with interdicting funds to terrorists overlooks the prevalence of self-sufficient, small cells (see pp. 202–203). Nonetheless, her work, despite some shortcomings, will serve as a useful resource for future attempts to address these and other issues related to terrorism in the Maghreb.

*About the Reviewer: Dr. Benjamin P. Nickels is a Faculty Researcher with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland at College Park.*
Selected Literature on Radicalization and De-radicalization from Terrorism: Monographs, Edited Volumes, Grey Literature and Prime Articles published since 1970

compiled by Eric Price & Alex P. Schmid


*Grey Literature*


AIVD. (2010). *Disengagement en deradicalisering van jihadisten in Nederland*. The Hague, AIVD.


Fighel, J. (2009). The Saudi Double Game; The Internet “Counter-radicalization” Campaign. Tel Aviv, The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. [http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/s_a_001.pdf]


Horgan, J. & Braddock, K. (2009). Assessing the Effectiveness of Current De-
Radicalization Initiatives and Identifying Implications for the Development of US-Based Initiatives in Multiple Settings. Maryland, MD.: University of Maryland, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. [http://www.icst.psu.edu/docs/STARTderad.pdf]


**Prime Journal Articles**


Lauwers, G. (2003).' Discussing Autonomy and Independence for Corsica'. Contextualizing Secession (July), pp. 49-71


Ould Bah, A. S. (2010). 'Reflexions on Forms and Dimensions of Radicalization(s).' *Freedom from Fear* (23, March) [http://www.freedomfromfearmagazine.org]


Weine, (et al.,) (2009) 'Community and family approaches to combating the radicalization and recruitment of Somali-American youth and young adults: A psychosocial perspective.' *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways Toward Terrorism and Genocide.* 2 (3), pp. 81–200


*About the Compilers: Eric Price is a Professional Information Specialist; Alex P. Schmid is Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'.*
About ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’

The Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism consists of

Alex P. Schmid (Editor) and Director of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI). He is a former Editor of Terrorism and Political Violence. Until 2009, he was Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) and held a chair in International Relations at the University of St. Andrews. Between 1999 and 2005 he was Officer-in-Charge of the UN Terrorism Prevention Branch. He is Member of the European Terrorism Expert Networks EEnET and NEET.

Shazad Ali (Assistant Editor) is a journalist who writes on international affairs with a focus on counter-terrorism, Asia and Europe. He has a Masters in International Relations and is pursuing an MPhil leading to a PhD in European Studies at the University of Karachi. His research is related to European concerns on rising religious extremism and terrorism, focusing on Pakistan.

Tim Pippard (Assistant Editor) is a Consultant with the Security and Intelligence Practice of IHS Jane’s Strategic Advisory Services (JSAS). From December 2006 to June 2008, Mr. Pippard was managing editor of Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC), an online terrorism threat assessment service.

Joseph J. Easson (Assistant Editor for IT) has been the Data Manager of CSTPV since September 2006. After completing an MA General (Hons) in Classics and History from the University of Edinburgh he obtained a Postgraduate Diploma in Information Systems at Napier University. Since then he has worked on the development and implementation of IT systems for both commercial and educational institutions.

Brad McAllister (Assistant Editor) is lecturer at the University of Georgia’s School of Public and International Affairs. Until 2009 he was a Research Fellow with CSTPV at the University of St. Andrews, where he specialized in the study of the internal organizing dynamics of terrorist networks. He has also worked for Georgia University’s Center for International Trade and Security as a Research Fellow, investigating terrorism and proliferation issues.

Benjamin Freedman (Editorial Assistant) graduated from Bowdoin College (magna cum laude) with a degree in Government and Legal Studies. He served as a Research Intern for the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. In addition, Benjamin Freedman interned for the U.S. Department of State in Marseille, France.
Perspectives on Terrorism (PT) seeks to provide a unique platform for established and emerging scholars to present their perspectives on the developing field of terrorism research and scholarship; to present original research and analysis; and to provide a forum for discourse and commentary on related issues. The journal could be characterized as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with traditional rigidities in order to allow its authors a high degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of article while at the same time maintaining professional scholarly standards.

**About the Terrorism Research Initiative:**

PT is a journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), an initiative that seeks to support the international community of terrorism researchers and scholars especially through the facilitation of collaborative and cooperative efforts. TRI was formed by scholars in order to provide the global community with centralized tools from which to better actualize the full potential of its labours. TRI is working to build a truly inclusive international community and empower it through the provision of collaborative projects to extend the impact of participants’ research activities.

The Journal can be accessed at the following website URL:

[www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com)

**Legal Note:** Perspectives on Terrorism hosts articles that express a diversity of opinions. The views expressed therein and the empirical evidence cited in their support remain the sole responsibility of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect positions and views of the Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism or the Terrorism Research Initiative.
Style and Formatting Guide for ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’

Purpose: The criteria and standards outlined in this document are meant to serve as guidance for editors and editorial assistants of Perspectives on Terrorism when styling and formatting manuscripts for publication.

I. Basic Manuscript Formatting

All text in manuscripts for publication should be submitted in Word and be single spaced and formatted in 12-point Times New Roman font. All text of pre-production draft manuscripts should be align-left until final production (Web site administrators will adjust manuscripts before uploading content onto the PT Web page, and manuscripts to be published in the print edition will be adjusted before final production).

Manuscripts should also include no paragraph indentation (flush with the left margin throughout the manuscript). A single line break should separate each paragraph from the proceeding or succeeding paragraph. A 3-line drop cap should be used for the first letter of the opening paragraph. Page margins should be 1 inch on each side.

If you wish to include images, tables or diagrams in your article then please provide these as image files in JPEG or PNG format.

A short biography of the author(s) should be included at the end of the manuscript with a line between the last sentence of the concluding paragraph and the biography. The name of the author(s) should be bolded and biography information should be italicized.

II. Titles and Headings

The main title of the manuscript should be bolded and in 16-point Times New Roman font. Names of authors should immediately follow the title on the next line and should be bolded in 12-point Times New Roman Font. Section headings/titles should also be bolded and in 12-point Times New Roman font. Subheadings within section headings/titles should be 12-point Times New Roman font, not bolded, and italicized.

In main titles, section titles/headings, and subheadings always 1) capitalize the first and the last word; 2) all nouns, pronouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs, and subordinate conjunctions (“as”, “because”, “although”); and 3) lowercase all articles, coordinate conjunctions (“and”, “or”, “nor”), and prepositions regardless of length, when they are other than the first or last word.

Example:

Terrorism Today and Tomorrow (main title)

John Doe and Jane Smith (authors’ names)

Introduction (section heading)

This is the introduction text
Relevant Data
Statistics and data for paper

What Does It Mean? (section subheading)
Interpreting the data

The Next Attack
Explaining the data’s predication

III. Citations
In the text of manuscripts citations should be in the form of bracketed endnotes, as in the following example:

According to General Custer, “I will win the battle against the Indians at Little Big Horn with ease.” [1]

Endnotes should appear at the end of the article in 8-point Time New Roman font, as in the below example:


Citations and/or quotations longer than one sentence, or three lines of text in the manuscript, should be indented ½ inch on a new line in block form with no quotation marks as in the following example:

According to Robert Pape, criteria based on research data were proposed to study why suicide terrorism has become such a proficient form of asymmetrical warfare independent of Islamic fundamentalism. He describes the initial psychological considerations as follows:

Islamic fundamentalism is not as closely associated with suicide terrorism as many people think. The world leader in suicide terrorism is a group that you may not be familiar with: the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.

This is a Marxist group, a completely secular group that draws from the Hindu families of the Tamil regions of the country. They invented the famous suicide vest for their suicide assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. The Palestinians got the idea of the suicide vest from the Tamil Tigers. (July 18, 2005, The American Conservative)

Using Pape’s research and interpretation, it is apparent that… etc.