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Advancements in sciences come through painstaking observations. Scientists’ astute observations of the seemingly chaotic world pave the way for what is known as “knowledge creep.” Terrorism research is certainly no exception to this rule. One of David Rapoport’s singular contributions to our advancement of knowledge has been his articulation of the four waves of international terrorism. Rapoport (2006:10) defines waves with three characteristics: a) a cycle of activities characterized by expansion and contraction phases, b) covering multiple nations, and c) “driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups’ characteristics and mutual relationships.” By studying the history of terrorism since the 1880s, Professor Rapoport identifies four distinct waves fueled by common ideological fervor emanating from anarchism, anti-colonialism, socialism, and religious fundamentalism, respectively, with the first three waves lasting roughly 40 years each.

Although the “wave” theory has gained a firm footing in the extant literature on terrorism (Sageman 2008a), to my knowledge, not much effort has gone into the examination of the causes of, and the process by which mega-ideas saturate nearly every corner of the earth. By drawing upon some of the current research in the areas of business, advertisement, and marketing, we can discern some patterns that can shed important light onto why certain ideas seem to “infect” a large number of people across history, culture, and geography. However, before we delve into the question of how, let me address the question of why people follow these mega-trends of ideas.

The Why of the Mega-trends

If the global spread of political ideas seems surprising we should note how other ideas freely flow and inundate our societies. From fashions to toys -- bellbottom pants to cabbage patch dolls -- trends suddenly appear from nowhere. Most young men and women succumb to the craze and, when the fickle fashion ebbs, the photographs of their younger days become a source of infinite amusement to their children a generation later.

In the Western cultural ethos, the idea of individualism is pervasive. In our daily affairs the assumption of self-utility maximizing individuals as islands of rational calculation, independent of community, culture, or creed, becomes self-evident truth. In our unquestioned assumption of fundamental human nature, the picture of the me-centric individual, in the words of the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1970: xi), becomes a “positive consciousness of knowledge,” which he defines as “a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientists and yet is a part of scientific discourse.” Despite this conscious and unconscious acceptance of basic human nature, current advancements in the fields of experimental psychology (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Haider, 2006) evolutionary biology (de Waal, 2006), and cognitive sciences (Damasio, 1994; Pinker, 2002) clearly demonstrate the importance of group behavior in our decision-making processes. Even economists, the primary proponents of the assumption of self-utility maximization, who typically are disdainful of those who might contaminate the concept of human rationality with history, culture or psychology (Becker, 1996; Lerner, 2007), are becoming cognizant of the importance of group psychology and interdependent utility functions (Frank, 1998). This diverse body of research clearly demonstrates that as social beings, we all crave to belong to groups and, when we do, we derive great satisfaction by adhering to their explicit rules and implicit norms. We are happy, being altruistic toward members of our chosen groups and opposing, sometimes violently, the rival groups. In fact, in the Maslovian (Maslow, 1968) hierarchy of needs, the need to belong is second only to the physical needs of keeping our bodies and soul together.

Furthermore, people follow cultural dictates not only because they generate personal utility, but also because through their “doing,” they “become” somebody (Schuessler, 2000). So when we choose to wear a certain fashion, buy a certain toy, or drive a certain car, we not only derive pleasure that the consumed goods generate for us (the instrumental part of our demand), they also help us establish our identity as members of our chosen groups. Similar to these consumers, the participants in a global terrorist movement, beyond satisfying their own personal needs -- varying from power, prestige, monetary gains, salvation, or even the 72 virgins in
heaven -- become the person they want to be as members of the group, in which they claim membership. As a result, when an idea gains momentum, the number of people seeking its affiliation by being part of the community increases.

Therefore, Hoffman (1998) is correct in asserting that when people join dissident organizations and take part in collective violence, which we now commonly define as “terrorism,” they act not so much upon their private motivations, but out of a broad community concern. In other words, in their own minds all political terrorists are altruists. This fundamental difference in motivation distinguishes terrorists from common criminals, who are motivated only by their personal gratification (Gupta 2008). Our natural proclivity to form groups and work for their collective welfare is biologically imprinted in us, which accounts for the human need to join global trends of all sorts, including waves of international terrorism.

Let us now turn our attention to the process by which the ideas spread.

How Do Ideas Spread?

Journalist Malcolm Gladwell, in his bestselling book (2002) asks an important question: How do ideas spread? How do we arrive at the tipping point, after which, a new idea, a fad, a fashion, or an ideology floods the world? Gladwell, studied the success of businesses like the popular footwear, Hush Puppies and children’s shows like Sesame Street. When we examine the process by which a wave of international terrorism spreads throughout the globe, we find that this is the same process by which ideas spread, some ending up being global others remaining localized, some making great impacts, most others disappearing within a very short time. Gladwell’s analysis of the processes by which little things can make a big difference discerns the workings of three broad forces: i) the messenger(s), ii) the message and iii) the context.

The messenger(s):

The social theories of terrorism and political violence argue that gross imbalances within the social structure, such as poverty, income inequality, and asymmetry in power lead to violence. However, when these factors are put to empirical tests they, despite the age-old assertion of their salience, produce only ambiguous results or weak correlations. The reason for these puzzling results rests with the fact that the factors of deprivation – absolute or relative – only serve as the necessary conditions for social unrest. For the sufficient reason, we must look into the role that “political entrepreneurs” play to translate the grievances into concrete actions by framing the issues in a way that clearly identifies the boundaries of the aggrieved community and its offending group (Gupta 2008). The clear identification of the “us” and “them” creates conditions to overcome the natural bias toward free-riding and overcome the collective action problem (Olson, 1968).

Gladwell, for instance, makes a finer distinction within the category of “political entrepreneurs,” whom he calls, the connectors, the mavens, and the salesmen. The connectors are the primary nodes of a communication network. These are the people who know a lot of people and are known by a lot of people by dint of who they are (position, power, money, etc.). The maven is a Yiddish word, meaning the “accumulator of knowledge.” The mavens are the so-called “theoreticians” of a movement, the pundits and gurus, who can provide a cogent explanation of the current crisis based on their knowledge and observations. The salesmen are those, who through their power of persuasion can attract groups of followers. Although there are no specific boundaries separating these three groups of key individuals, any analysis of a global movement will clearly identify people with characteristics of all three.

In this article, I am going to concentrate on only one movement within the fourth wave, al-Qaeda. However, a careful look at all the other previous waves will clearly indicate the same pattern.

The grievances of the Muslim community (Ummah) have been acute for at least a century, since the days when the last Islamic Empire in Istanbul slipped into the pages of history books. After an impressive run that lasted over a thousand years and saw the conquest of almost the two thirds of the “known world,” beginning with the expulsion of the Moors in 1492 by the Spanish monarchy of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Islamic Empires started to experience defeat for the first time. The following half millennium saw a steady decline of the Islamic Empire, which was completed after WWI, with the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, this widespread realization did not immediately create violent rebellion along the lines of religious fundamentalism. The
collective frustration and anger felt in the Muslim world found its expression mostly through nationalistic yearnings, primarily as a result of the second wave of international terrorism. The so-called “jihadi” movement took shape slowly through the writings of the mavens, such as Hassan al-Bannah and Sayyid Qutb. [1] Although they failed to make much political impact outside of Egypt during their lifetimes, their writings inspired the scion of one of the wealthiest Arab families, Osama bin Laden. If we examine bin Laden’s life, we can clearly see why he would be the Great Connector. As a student in the King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah young bin Laden was greatly influenced by his teachers, Abdallah Azzam and Muhammad Qutb, the younger brother of the fiery Islamist. His vast wealth and his connections to the Saudi royal family, gave bin Laden a ready platform, which an ordinary person would not have had. As a result, when the Afghan war started, with his influence and familiarity with the rich and the powerful, he could establish al-Qaeda, “the base,” which served as the bridge between the mujahidin fighting the Soviet army in Afghanistan and their families in the Arab countries. Furthermore, he quickly established linkages with the Pakistani military intelligence service, the Inter service Intelligence Agency (ISI), which served as the conduit for the CIA to deliver money and weapons to the Afghan fighters. Apart from his personal wealth, bin Laden was also able to tap into the vast amount of charity money (zakat), generated within the Arab world, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations. Through his immense connections and seemingly inexhaustible funds, bin Laden was able to attract a large number of lieutenants, including the likes of Ayman al-Zawahiri and many others, who served as the salesmen of his jihadi ideology. Together, the mavens, the connectors, and the salesmen began the foundation of the fourth wave of international terrorism.

The message:

The information age literally bombards us with innumerable pieces of information every single day of our lives. As we see, listen and/or read them, very few get through our conscious understanding. You may, for example, see a billboard while driving, a commercial while watching television or listen to a lecture, yet may recall absolutely nothing about the specific message they contain only a minute later. On the other hand, you may recall something you have heard, seen, or read many years ago. The question is, what causes some messages to stick? The secrets of stickiness have been the focus of research done by psychologists, communications specialists, and scholars from diverse disciplines. Heath and Heath (2002), for instance, identify six factors that cause messages to stick. They argue that a memorable message must be simple, concrete, credible, and have contents that are unexpected, they must appeal to our emotions, and should contain a compelling storyline.

Simplicity is one of the foremost requirements of a “sticky” message. In the area of political communication, where a leader attempts to inspire a large number of people, sticky messages depend on the simplicity of thought. When we look at the messages of bin Laden, we can clearly understand that in his vision: Islam is under threat from the infidel West, the Jews, and their collaborators in the Muslim world. All his communications, long and short, contain this message (Lawrence, 2005).

These messages are not simply a litany of grievances, but are concrete in their action plan: It is the religious duty of every Muslim to join the jihad against those who are putting the followers of the Prophet in peril.

The “unexpected” part of a memorable message comes when to the listeners the leader “connects the dots” and explains clearly the confusing world in which they live. To many in the Arab/Muslim world the message must come as a revelation, where they begin to see how the unbelievers have been undermining their rightful place in history. Through extreme cunning, the infidels not only sapped the energy of the Islamic Empire, but also are plotting to destroy it militarily, politically, financially, and even spiritually. This sudden realization often lies at the core of recruiting of new believers to the cause.

Coming from the son of one of the wealthiest families, living an ascetic life, waging war against injustice, bin Laden cuts a God-like image in the minds of many in the Arab/Muslim world. These images, often carefully chosen by al-Qaeda give his messages an immense and immediate credibility.

As human beings we remember messages that evoke emotions, particularly those that paint the portrait of an impending threat. Fear is most often the primary motivator for collective action. Evolutionary biologists bolster the findings of Prospect Theory offered by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Prospect theory simply states that in the process of evaluating benefits and costs of an action, human beings often place a far greater weight on the fear of a loss than the prospect of a gain. Thus Heidt (2007: 29) points out: “If you were designing a
fish, would you have it respond as strongly to opportunities as to threats? No way. The cost of missing the sign of a nearby predator, however, can be catastrophic. Game over, end of the line of those genes.” Therefore, fear moves us in a profound way. Hence, it should come as little surprise that the messages of bin Laden would be strewn with dire predictions of a destroyed Islamic world, which are sure to pass when the believers fail to act (Olsson, 2008).

Finally, memorable messages come with stories. Experimental studies (Heath and Heath, 2007) show that when two similar messages are presented to an audience, one with supporting statistics and the other with a suitable story, the latter inevitably sticks more than the former. Any good public speaker knows the power of a storyline. Thus when someone evokes the name of the former British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in the negotiating process, we immediately understand the follies of trying to appease an impeccable enemy. Similarly, the mere reference of Vietnam, Watergate, or the Edsel tells a storyline to the listener regarding a complex, yet perhaps a totally unrelated situation. Like all other political communicators, bin Laden’s speeches are chalk full of analogies of stories from Islamic history. Thus, when he calls the Westerners, “the Crusaders,” or George W. Bush, “Hulagu Khan,” their implications leave little doubt in the minds of his intended audience.

Thus, throughout history, the mavens have concocted coherent stories, by borrowing from religion, history, and mythology, with complete set of heroes and villains, good and evil, allies and enemies that have resonance with the masses. The connectors have spread it far and wide, and the salesmen have recruited eager volunteers.

**The Context:**

There may be great messengers, but the sticky-ness of their message depends on their sociopolitical, historical, and cultural context. Rapoport (2006) himself points out three historical and cultural factors for the spread of at least one form of religious wave: Islamic fundamentalism. He argues that the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the beginning of a new Islamic century, and the Afghan War paved the way for it. The success of the Ayatollah Khomeini is bringing about a fundamental change in Iran by driving out the Shah, the closest US ally in the Islamic World, gave a tremendous impetus to many Muslim radicals to choose the path of violent revolution to drive out the infidels and the apostates. Second, a millenarian vision of the arrival of a redeemer coincided with the Iranian Revolution, giving the fundamentalists one more sign of a propitious time to rise up in the name of Allah. Finally, the Afghan War saw a victory for the Mujahideen against the mighty Soviet military. In their victory the religiously inspired totally disregarded the role that the covert US and Pakistani aid played. They simply took it as yet another sign of their inevitable victory.

In contrast to Rapoport’s emphasis on historical and cultural factors, social science analyses of social movements in general, and terrorism, in particular, concentrate on the macro level social, economic, and political variables (Keefer and Loayza, 2008). The presence of a large number of factors of structural imbalances, such as poverty, unemployment, income inequality, and lack of opportunities for political expression provided the youth in the Islamic world and those living in the Western nations the context within which the messages of bin laden could be retained.

Finally, terrorism does not happen in a vacuum. The evolution of a violent movement is the outcome of a dynamic interaction between the target government and the dissident group. Being guided by the same process of over emphasizing the actual threat (Mueller, 2006) time and again governments fall into the trap of overreaction, which only reinforces the movement.

**Inspiration and Opportunity: Looking at the Future**

In my explanation of waves I have included the charismatic connectors, the knowledgeable mavens, and the energetic salesmen. Although they explain the spread of ideas, fashions, or ideologies, there is one significant gap in the puzzle with regard to the spread of radicalism. While ideas spread and many get inspired only a few individuals actually join radical groups. Literature (Horgan, 2005; Sageman, 2008b) shows that regardless how inspired they are few people join violent dissident groups as a result of epiphany; most join slowly over time through friendship and kinship. When people get deeply affected by the sights of suffering of their own people and/or listening to inspiring speeches etc., they seek common friends or relatives through whom they get involved in political activism. O’Duffy (2008), for instance narrates the process of radicalization of Muslim youths in the UK. Yet, one curious phenomenon has generally escaped the notice of most researchers: there is
a significant difference in the rates of actual activism among the various national groups. Thus, while many young men and women from Pakistani background join these movements, few from Bangladeshi or Indian communities do so. On the other hand, young men and women from the Maghreb community, similar to the Pakistanis find ways to become active in such movements. This differential rate may be the outcome of opportunity. Let me explain.

Pakistan was created with a deep scar in its collective mind. Apart from the trauma of horrific mass killings that preceded the partition, it also inherited the persistent problem of Kashmir. Since the inherent logic of the partition based on religion might have dictated that the former Princely state would join Pakistan, history did not go that way. As a result, the Pakistani leaders from the beginning framed the Kashmir issue as an integral part of its national identity. Facing a much stronger enemy, Pakistan turned to the jihadis and, in effect, privatized its war of attrition (Swami, 2007). Since these terrorist training camps were established and administered with the full support of the Pakistani government and its intelligence service, the ISI (Stern 2003) they operated in the open; those who wanted to join them had full knowledge of their location. Similar training camps, built around extreme versions of Islam further flourished in the North West Frontier provinces, with blessings and resources from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States during the Afghan War against the Soviet military became the ready destination of all the “wannabe” jihadis. These camps provided unprecedented opportunities for the inspired all over the world. Apart from the jihadi training camps, radicalism blossomed in Islamic schools, the madrassahs, which were financially supported by Saudi Arabia as a part of their war of religious hegemony (Fair, 2008). By providing opportunity to the inspired, Pakistan quickly became known as the “most dangerous place on earth.”

Sageman (2008b: 85) finds, from his dataset of terrorist profiles, that most of the violent activists not only are of Pakistani background, but a disproportionate percentage comes from Mirpur district, a small area in Pakistani controlled Kashmir. These findings attest to his earlier (2004) “bunch of guys” hypothesis, where a group of (mostly) men join to create a cell and subsequently stick to their own group norms. These men may come together at a mosque, initially for no reason other than finding halal food or looking for people of their own language and culture. As they get to know one another many of them find a strong bond in a common enemy. Slowly they may form an informal group of like-minded individuals. Soon, in their vociferous vilification of the enemy they establish a bond among themselves. In effect, they create their own “echo chamber,” where only acceptable voices are heard and opinions reinforced. Those who disagree or hold contrary opinions, are quickly discouraged, leaving behind a hard core-group, which increasingly becomes more and more radicalized. They read, listen, or view materials that only buttress their own worldview.

These sorts of groupings are common in all social settings. However, if these radicalized members find a way to act upon their conviction, a terror cell is born. As groups are formed, leaders emerge. In the network process, they act as the nodes by making contact with other groups or the central core of a movement. As ideas spread, inspiration meets opportunity to produce terrorist attacks. This is why the establishment of a strong Taliban-dominated region in Pakistan poses a great security threat to the rest of the world (Hoffman, 2008, McConnel, 2008).

The conclusion that we can draw from this discussion is that the intelligence community needs to pay particular attention as to where groups can form, such as mosques, discussion groups, student unions, etc. Unfortunately, in a rapidly developing world, this task is likely to get harder, which will enable future waves to develop and spread far more quickly, and in turn be more difficult to manage. This is because of the pervasive nature of electronic communication. Today ideas can spread instantly and networks amongst like-minded people are rapidly developing around the world. As Robb (2007) points out, the nodes of communication networks not only become sources of information exchange, they, in effect, become “small worlds” of virtual communities on the web. Through their interactions, they develop social capital, provide ideological and emotional support to their members, raise money, disseminate dangerous information regarding explosives, and keep the fire of hatred burning. Nearly three decades ago, when bin Laden began his jihad, his power to connect was limited by his physical ability to meet with influential people in the disaffected parts of the Arab/Muslim world. The next generation of connectors will increase this capacity infinitely through the rapid advance of communication technologies. More importantly, these new connectors may not even need the large sums of money and family connections that helped bin Laden to establish al-Qaeda. Currently, there is a debate among terrorism experts on how significant al-Qaeda as an organization actually is (Sageman, 2008, McConnel, 2008; Hoffman, 2008). Regardless where the truth lies, however, experts of all stripes clearly warn us that when the next wave comes, or as this wave continues, the “jihadis”, whether completely leaderless or part of a hierarchical organization,
will continue to pose an unprecedented threat to the global security. The essence of human nature will continue to cause us to form groups and fight against other groups. In the open savanna, humanity survived by forming groups. Our future survival will depend on how well we can manage the destructive power of groups.

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NOTES:

[1] The word jihad has a specific religious connotation. Not all Muslims accept the way the radicals have used the term. By accepting the term to label radical Islam, we may actually give it more legitimacy than it deserves. However, since all other alternatives to the expression, such as “Salafis”, “fundamentalists,” “extremists,” or “literalists” carry their own limitations, I will use the term “jihadi” in this article being mindful of its political and religious limitations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:


Interpreting the PKK’s Signals in Europe

By Vera Eccarius-Kelly

Since the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) unexpectedly abducted three German hikers near Mt. Ararat in Turkey on 8 July 2008, and then released them on 20 July, intelligence sources in Europe have intensified their surveillance of PKK operatives among members of the particularly numerous Kurdish Diaspora in Germany.[1] According to German newspaper reports, the PKK demanded that in exchange for the release of the hikers “Berlin stop its hostile politics towards the Kurds and the PKK in Germany”.[2] While the exact purpose of the abduction requires further analysis, it is clear that it was the armed branch of the PKK, known as the People’s Defense Forces (HPG), that kidnapped the German hikers at their Mt. Ararat encampment at 10,500 feet in the evening hours—only to release them unharmed some two weeks later.[3]

Questions Related to an Abduction

Several questions preoccupy security analysts in relation to this abduction. How should this event be interpreted in Europe, and particularly in Germany? What signals did the PKK send? And, most importantly, is the PKK entering a renewed phase of high intensity activism and terrorism in Europe?

This essay aims to provide a brief analysis of the often confusing and contradictory messages sent by European Kurdish circles.[4] Despite convoluted interpretations of Kurdish demands that are linked to a lack of unity among the many Kurdish organizations in Europe, it is possible to disentangle the underlying messages. Part of the difficulty of interpreting signals sent by Kurdish organizations and the PKK relates to contradictory policies enacted by individual European Union member states in relation to the Kurdish question, as well as occasional Turkish meddling and disinformation campaigns. This essay rejects the interpretation that the PKK initiated a new European terror strategy that parallels the growing violence in Turkey.

Mixed Messages: A Dual-Strategy

German intelligence sources have long suggested that the PKK, also known as Kongra-Gel (KGK), pursues a dual strategy to remain relevant in the European context. Since the capture of its leader, Öcalan, in 1999, the terrorist group’s European activities predominantly ranged from acts of civil disobedience, the dissemination of nationalist propaganda, and demonstrations and solidarity marches, to cultural events including festivals and public education campaigns. But the PKK is also a criminal enterprise involved with drug trafficking, human smuggling, and extortion schemes to finance its operations.[5] Throughout the past decade, the aim of the PKK has been to stay in the headlines and reinforce continually a sense of commitment among Diaspora groups to the cause of Kurdish nationalism.

In Turkey, however, the armed branch of the PKK, the HPG, has long engaged in a guerrilla strategy that includes brutal terror campaigns. Their ultimate goal remains the formation of an autonomous region for Kurds in the southeastern provinces of the country. At times it appears that an official Turkish recognition of a separate Kurdish ethnic identity would suffice to advance peace negotiations. But then, positions shift and nothing short of the formation of an independent nation of Kurdistan would seem to appease the group. To grasp fully the many underlying currents that make up the PKK in its entirety remains a daunting challenge for security analysts.

Since the spring of 2006 the predominantly Kurdish provinces of Turkey have experienced growing unrest and heightened levels of violence. The PKK initiated and organized a series of demonstrations in the city of Diyarbakir, the unofficial capital of the Kurdish region. The demonstrations quickly escalated when government forces utilized excessive force to intimidate and disperse the growing number of protesters. A dozen or more Kurds died in street battles with hundreds injured and detained. The violence culminated in a series of bombings that targeted government agencies and its representatives in the region. The so-called Freedom Falcons of Kurdistan (TAK) carried out the bombing campaigns and, according to Turkish intelligence, the group is closely affiliated with the PKK and represents its most militant units.[6]
TAK is accused in the timed urban bombings of 28 July 28 2008, in an Istanbul neighborhood that killed 17 civilians and injured scores. While it is not entirely clear who carried out the bombings, it is possible that ultra-nationalists linked to the secular establishment or Kurdish militants could have carried out the attacks. The PKK has denied any involvement, although the Turkish government stated that it has identified the PKK as the perpetrator of the bombings.[7] If convincing evidence emerges that TAK carried out the bombings without any relationship to the ultra-nationalist terror group Ergenekon, this would have to be interpreted as a strategic intensification of terrorism since a neighborhood was targeted to maximize Turkish civilian casualties.

Symbolic Messaging

When initial information about the hikers’ abduction reached German intelligence circles (BND) and the Federal Criminal Police (BKA), security experts established a communications center to collaborate with Turkish officials in an effort to free the men. The BKA utilized longstanding contacts with PKK operatives in the city of Cologne to initiate negotiations. A combination of factors led to the eventual release of the hikers, namely the direct channel of communication with the PKK in Europe, and the Turkish military’s effective encircling of the militants near the Iranian border. Based on media interviews given by one of the released hikers, Helmut Hainzlmeier, the group of PKK militants shifted in size and tended to march during the night hours to avoid detection by the Turkish military.[8] When the group marched toward the Iranian border region, however, Turkish troops had cut off that escape route, forcing the terrorists to release the hikers. Although several German media interviews with Chancellor Merkel suggested that a payment had been made to the PKK, it is unclear if a ransom payment sped up the release of the three men.[9]

The attempt of the PKK unit to cross into Iran confirms a heightened level of collaboration between the PKK and PJAK, an Iranian-based Kurdish terrorist group that also utilizes northern Iraq for safe haven. The Turkish military has long complained that US forces benefited from militant Kurdish logistical collaboration in northern Iraq, and, that in exchange for information, the US ignored PKK and PJAK units that were deeply ensconced along the Iraqi-Turkish border.[10] The US military rejects the notion that it has ignored or even supported Kurdish militants affiliated with the PKK or PJAK. While regular Turkish incursions, and in particular Turkish air force bombing raids, have weakened the PKK in its northern Iraqi hideouts in the Kandil Mountains, neither of the terror organizations is near military defeat.

Far from the Turkish, Iraqi, and Iranian territory where PKK guerrilla units operate, the European PKK pursues a strategy that emphasizes strengthening its position by engaging in an aggressive propaganda campaign involving limited violence (i.e. the PKK avoids targeting Europeans and their property). The most obvious area of contestation between Turkish and Kurdish interests in Europe is over the control of media messages to the Kurdish Diaspora. For over a decade, the Turkish state has aimed to curtail the dissemination of ideologically framed interpretations of Kurdish nationhood in the media. For example, the Turkish government requested in the past several years that Denmark’s government withdraw its media license from Roj-TV station—a Kurdish-language station that also broadcasts into Turkey and irritates the Turkish government. In the past, Ankara had successfully pursued the closures of Medya-TV in France in 2004 and Med-TV in the UK in 1999.[11]

But the Danish government rejected Turkey’s attempts to limit the freedom of expression of Kurdish opposition groups in Denmark. When some 56 mayors linked to the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) faced persecution in Turkey for having sent a signed letter to the Danish government, Danish officials reacted with anger. From a Danish perspective, expressing a desire to keep Roj-TV on the air did not represent terrorist activities. Officials in Denmark considered it unacceptable that Turkish state authorities accused the leadership of the DTP of “knowingly and willingly supporting the PKK” by asking that a TV station retain its license.[12]

Media outlets such as Roj-TV, Medya-TV, and Med-TV are inherently controversial and operate as long as they retain a license in Europe. This is also the case for Kurdish web portals on the Internet that circumvent government controls or are listed on security reports such as Firat News Agency in the Netherlands and the now defunct Kurdistan Rundbrief in Germany. Based on statements posted on Kurdish Web sites, the closure of German Roj-TV emerged as the most likely reason for the abduction of the German hikers in Turkey.[13] In May the German government raided the locally registered Roj-TV affiliate Viko Fernseh Produktion (part of the now illegal Mesopotamia Broadcasting Corporation) in the city of Wuppertal (located in North Rhine-Westphalia, the German state with the largest Kurdish communities). Having lost one of its most effective propaganda tools in Germany, the PKK leadership seemed compelled to respond.
The PKK pursued several goals with the abduction and later release of the hikers. It sent the message to the German public as well as Diaspora communities that the organization continues to have the ability to act forcefully, and that it remains relevant in relation to the Kurdish question. The abduction of the hikers, however, should not be perceived as the initial stage of a new and hardened campaign in Europe. The PKK may continue to engage in future abductions of Europeans and in bombing campaigns in Turkey to demonstrate strength. An insecure German public will avoid Turkish vacation locations causing financial harm to popular resort towns and hiking destinations. But the PKK will not endanger its European fundraising and propaganda options by committing abductions of Europeans in Europe. The PKK needs to avoid extensive entanglements with police and security agencies within Europe.

Hydra-Headed Kurdish Organizations

The heightened sense of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey and its politicized offspring in Europe have failed to establish Kurdish ideological unity on a broader scale. Kurds in Europe have not articulated a common political agenda and Kurdish civil society actors appear unable or unwilling to agree on publicly identifiable positions or a representative voice. Interestingly, this development parallels the PKK’s inability to replace Öcalan as its leader after his arrest in 1999. The absence of clear and unifying leadership among Kurdish organizations in Europe appears to have weakened the ability of Kurds to gain support among mainstream political circles. In Germany, only the far left-wing party Die Linke expressed disagreement with the closure of and ban on Roj-TV in Wuppertal.[14]

Several pragmatic reasons explain why a sense of unity within the Kurdish Diaspora may not be a realistic expectation at this time. Essentially, the Kurdish Diaspora operates as an unauthorized challenger community that gains little from seeking authorization by governments in Europe. Kurdish nationalist mobilization is most effective in opposition to state control rather than in collaboration with authorities—even in a de-territorialized setting as in Europe. In addition, many Kurdish civil society organizations continue to exchange information with banned PKK groups in Europe or its affiliated organizations.

This reality forces Kurds to operate in a political space full of friction, often standing accused of collaboration with terrorist groups. The lack of a unified Kurdish position makes the Diaspora appear confused and disjointed to the outside world. Without a doubt, there is ongoing internal discord among Kurdish groups yet this dysfunction also may serve them well. Internal dissension and the lack of a clearly articulated and shared nationalist vision can actually provide a form of protection for the PKK, since this makes it more difficult for European states to assign accountability and take action against various and sometimes transient PKK decision-makers. In addition, the lack of unity within European Kurdish civil society circles prevents the PKK from taking definitive control of all Kurdish organizations in Europe.

Failures in Turkish and European Policy Circles

Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has failed to develop and implement a new path toward resolving the Kurdish question despite its strong showing in the 2007 parliamentary elections. Counter-terrorism efforts rather than dialogue with Kurdish civil society representatives dominate the political agenda. Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) representatives continue to be classified automatically as spokespersons for the PKK to justify the lack of political dialogue in the country. In part, this reflects the intense pressure on the AKP by the secular establishment including the military to close down the AKP for perceived weakening of the foundations of the Turkish Republic. Turkey’s chief prosecutor had filed a case with the constitutional court in March, arguing that the AKP should be disbanded, and that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan be banned along with 70 other party members for at least five years.[15]

While the constitutional court narrowly rejected the AKP ban (6 judges of the required 7 supported a ban) the Kurdish question will be even more difficult to address in the aftermath of ongoing legal wrangling. Turkey’s image in Europe remains tarnished, but many public officials welcomed the court’s decision. Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt reportedly stated that "an attempt to stage a thinly disguised legal coup" against the Turkish government had failed.[16] With the AKP weakened and the intensification of terrorist campaigns in the country, the potential for a Turkish governmental effort to address the Kurdish situation is minimal. There continues
to be speculation, however, that the ultra-nationalist group Ergenekon carried out the timed bombings in Istanbul in July to destroy any chance of public support for addressing the Kurdish question and to undermine the AKP.[17] Recent state investigations into Ergenekon indicate that many assassinations and bombings appear to have been so-called “inside jobs,” i.e. carried out by people affiliated with the ultra-nationalist wing of the military, rather than by Islamist or Kurdish militants as reported in the past.[18] Daily revelations about conspiracies linked to Ergenekon dominate Turkish public discourse.

Europe has also failed to contribute to an effective process that would be necessary to resolve the Kurdish question. An effort to invest in major infrastructure projects such as the controversial South-Eastern Anatolia Dam Project (GAP) will not address either immediate irrigation or energy needs, nor provide badly needed employment for local populations.[19] But most of all, Europe has failed to step up to a leadership position. Hiding behind the EU accession process, the message to the Turkish government has been to improve minority rights. At the same time, Europe sends mixed messages with regard to fighting terrorism. Denmark permits Roj TV and Mesopotamia Broadcasting, but Germany now closed down its affiliates. The European message to the Turkish government and the PKK at this point is not coherent. The Kurdish question and Europe’s response must be clarified so that specific policy steps can be implemented.

Conclusions

The PKK identified years ago that parts of Europe provide useful geographic space where operatives can retreat when the situation in Turkey becomes untenable. Turkey has rightly complained about this. It is a gross exaggeration, however, to suggest that the abduction of the German hikers should be interpreted as an intensification of the PKK’s European campaign. Rather, the PKK leadership felt that it needed to demonstrate relevancy and strength in the face of Germany’s clamp down on Roj-TV in Wuppertal. It will be most telling to observe European-based Kurdish civil society organizations to identify if the PKK gains or loses sympathizers in this effort to assert strength.

Should the AKP government manage to unveil disturbing facts and details regarding Ergenekon’s operations in Turkey over the coming months, new opportunities could emerge for an effective approach to address the Kurdish question. But it is far too early to develop reliable predictions at this point. If past efforts to undermine criminal and terrorist networks are any indication of what is to come, then the situation will remain bleak. The Turkish track record does not inspire confidence.

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NOTES:

[1]The total number of Kurds residing in Europe is estimated to be around 1 million; nearly 85% of the Kurdish Diaspora in continental Europe comes from Turkey, while Kurds from Iraq form a large part of Kurdish communities in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The numbers of Iraqi Kurds in Europe has increased since 2003 because of the ongoing war. Also hidden in general figures related to Kurds is the fact that as many as two-thirds of all Turkish-origin Kurds in Europe live in Germany, and estimates range from 500,000 to 700,000 Kurds in the country. Birgit Ammann, Kurden in Europa, Ethnizität und Diaspora (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2001), 138.
[3] For an interview with one of the abducted hikers, see Stern Magazin on line in German at http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/Ex-PKK-Geisel-Hainzlmeier-Den-Ararat/631858.html
[4]The author utilizes a range of open sources to develop theories related to the PKK’s intentions which include conversations with German and Turkish academics, researchers in Europe, PKK affiliated websites, German media reports, and publicly available security reports.
[7]The head of Germany’s intelligence service or Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) expressed public doubt that the bombing campaign in Istanbul was carried out by the PKK. See http://www.zeit.de/news/artikel/2008/08/03/2585499.xml
See also German newspaper commentaries at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3481190,00.html?maca=en-AI-2414-html-box
[14] http://www.dielinke-nrw.de/1103.html?&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=7249&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1103
http://www.szon.de/news/politik/aktuell/2008071009983.html?_from=rss
http://www.derwesten.de/nachrichten/nachrichten/2008/7/9/news-61367346/detail.html
[16] For EU related comments on the Turkish constitutional case, see Elitsa Vucheva’s article at http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2008/gb20080801_421263.htm?campaign_id=rss_eu
[17] Turkish Daily News reported on August 4 that the PKK was responsible for the attack, yet also makes mention of Ergenekon and speculations related to the bombings. See details at http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=111549
[18] In Today’s Zaman the terrorist group Ergenekon is described as a “deep state” paramilitary organization that has manipulated Turkish policies and public opinion for a long time. For full details, see http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=132507
[19] Taspinar, Omer (2005), Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey (New Yor
Review Essay:
Top 50 Books on Terrorism and Counterterrorism

By Joshua Sinai

Terrorist rebellions, in all their configurations, constitute the primary warfare threats facing the international community. This was especially the case following September 2001, when al-Qaeda demonstrated that it had world class ambitions to inflict catastrophic damages on its adversaries. In other conflicts, such as the Palestinian-Israeli arena, terrorist targeting is primarily localized, although as demonstrated by Hizballah’s rocket and guerrilla warfare against Israel in summer 2006, even localized conflicts have regional and international repercussions. Because of the worldwide reach of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, including what are referred to as al-Qaeda-inspired “self-starter” home-grown cells in Western Europe, North America, and elsewhere, many nations have been upgrading their homeland security defenses, and calling on their academic communities to provide analytical understanding of the origins, nature and magnitude of the terrorist threats around the world and how to counteract and resolve them. In response, academic courses and research institutes have been proliferating at colleges and universities worldwide, with graduate certificates and degrees offered in terrorism studies. To meet the great demand for academic and public policy resources on this subject, the publishing industry has been releasing a plethora of books on terrorism in general, the groups that engage in terrorist warfare, the radical religious movements that drive individuals to join terrorist groups and employ terrorist tactics on their behalf, the conflict zones where such warfare is being waged, and the types of counteraction that governments are employing in response.

Despite the great attention being expensed on terrorism and counterterrorism studies, however, the general state of the discipline is uneven. One problem is that terrorism is first and foremost a covert activity, with governments’ intelligence services, but not academic analysts (with few exceptions), possessing primary data about terrorist groups and their activities, causing terrorism studies to be less scientifically valid than the natural sciences. This is especially the case in compiling data on terrorist incidents, whether aborted, thwarted, or “successful,” or the size and leadership trees of terrorist organizations, since such data is largely unavailable in open sources. In some flagrant cases, certain writers on terrorism have been found to fabricate their data. Fortunately, there still are plenty of excellent books on this subject to merit recommending them to general and academic readers.

The books reviewed in this essay are divided into nine sections, which are not intended to be mutually exclusive: textbooks on terrorism, using the social sciences to study terrorism, terrorism and the Internet, radical Islam, suicide terrorism, 9/11 and its aftermath, Palestinian terrorism, terrorism in the United States, and counterterrorism.

This list of 50 books is not intended to be final, but will be continuously expanded with additional titles. Readers are encouraged to nominate additional books for inclusion in future lists.

Textbooks on Terrorism

Despite its relative brevity (133 pages of text), Leonard Weinberg’s Global Terrorism: A Beginner’s Guide [Second Edition] (Oneworld Publications, 2008; $14.95) succeeds in explaining the history of terrorism, how to define terrorism, what is new about al-Qaeda’s type of terrorism, the conditions that give rise to terrorism, the types of individuals that become terrorists, the nature of governments’ responses, and how terrorism ends. The author is a veteran academic specialist on terrorism and readers will greatly benefit from the accumulated wisdom that is sprinkled throughout this wonderfully written book.

Gus Martin’s Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues [Second Edition] (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006; 696 pages; $63.95) is one of the finest stand-alone, comprehensive textbooks for university courses. Its 696 pages cover the spectrum of all issues involved in studying terrorism, ranging from the early history of terrorism, how terrorism is defined, causes of terrorism, the “morality” of terrorist violence, the objectives, tactics and targets of terrorists, the role of the media, the phenomenon of religious terrorism, the role of women in terrorism, the nexus between terrorism and organized crime, terrorism in
the United States and internationally, the components of counterterrorism, and future terrorism trends. Each chapter is organized pedagogically, with opposing viewpoints and issues for classroom discussion.

Since its original publication in 1998, Bruce Hoffman’s Inside Terrorism [Second Edition] (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006; 456 pages; $24.95) has become one of the most widely read books on terrorism. This revised and expanded edition incorporates new developments and trends in terrorism, particularly since 9/11’s catastrophic attacks by al-Qaeda. The book’s chapters discuss how to define terrorism, the origins of contemporary terrorism, the internationalization of terrorism, the role of radical religions in driving terrorism, suicide terrorism, the exploitation by terrorist groups of old (e.g., print) and new (e.g., internet) media, terrorists’ objectives, “tradecraft,” technological innovations in their use of weapons, targeting, and future trends in terrorist warfare. The author may be faulted for adopting the thesis that a strategic logic drives suicide terrorism (when, in fact, it is hugely self-destructive to their group’s cause), but otherwise the book’s comprehensiveness will generate much interest from general readers.

Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives [Three Volumes] (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007; 2016 pages; $400.00), edited by James J.F. Forest, brings together chapters by dozens of experts (including this reviewer) to discuss terrorist threats around the world and how to defeat them. Volume I covers “Strategic and Tactical Considerations”, Volume II examines “Sources and Facilitators”, and Volume III discusses “Lessons Learned from Combating Terrorism and Insurgency”. Dr. Forest is Director of Terrorism Studies at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center.


Using the Social Sciences to Study Terrorism

Despite the limitations in data acquisition due to the covert nature of terrorist activities, the academic study of terrorism has greatly benefited from concepts and methodologies produced by the social sciences. As a result, academic analysts are able to draw on social science disciplines to investigate characteristics of terrorism such as the underlying causes driving terrorist rebellions, the psychological nature of terrorist operatives, and the factors driving individuals to become radicalized and join terrorist groups.

Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction, edited by Magnus Ranstorp (New York: Routledge, 2007; 352 pages; $37.95), is an attempt to take inventory of the strengths and weaknesses in terrorism research in order to identify a set of priorities for future research. Fourteen academic experts (including this reviewer) contributed chapters on new trends in terrorism studies, the impact of 9/11 on terrorism research, responding to the roots of terror, the socio-psychological component of terrorist motivation, al-Qaeda’s warfare, recruitment of Islamist terrorists in Europe, the landscape of intelligence analysis and counterterrorism, terrorism in cyberspace, and the components of terrorism and counterterrorism studies.

Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward (New York: Routledge, 2005; 288 pages; $47.95), edited by Tore Bjorgo, is the product of an experts workshop (in which this reviewer participated) that was held in Oslo, Norway, in June 2003. This was the first time that an academic meeting had ever been held to explore, in a systematic manner, concepts and methodologies to conduct analysis on root causes of terrorism.

John Horgan’s The Psychology of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005; 224 pages; $41.95) is one of the best applications of a social science discipline, in this case, psychology, to explain the drivers that motivate individuals to become terrorists, function as terrorists, and, in ideal cases, disengage from terrorism. Also noteworthy is the author’s discussion on how to define terrorism and conduct academic research on terrorism.

Ely Karmon’s Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists and Islamists (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005; 426 pages; $176.00) is an important and innovative study of how terrorist organizations form cooperative coalitions and how they function within the changing international system. Dr. Karmon focuses on the cooperation between European left-wing terrorist organizations from 1984 to 1988 and cooperation between European and Palestinian terrorist organizations during the period of 1968 to 1990, in order to use these findings to develop a broader theory concerning cooperative coalitions between organizations.
involved in international terrorism in the 1990s and early 21st century. In a masterful 70-page chapter on the Islamist terrorist networks, the hypotheses generated by the previous case studies are tested to determine whether the new terrorist actors who emerged in the 1990s, such as al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups around the world, who are driven by religious motivation, act in a similar fashion as their ideological and nationalist predecessors in forming cooperative coalitions.

In Forecasting Terrorism: Indicators and Proven Analytical Techniques (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2004; 103 pages; $40.00), Sundri Khalsa identifies 68 indicators of terrorist activity, based on terrorist capability and intention. These indicators, when applied to actual terrorist group activity, are intended to be used in a warning framework to anticipate terrorist activity that requires early warning. A CD-ROM is included to graphically display the forecasting system and explain the author’s methodology.

The actual and potential resort by terrorist groups to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) warfare is an issue of great concern to governments that might be targeted by such intentions. One of the best treatments of this subject is The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002; 336 pages; $29.95) by Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole.

Terrorist organizations and criminal enterprises, especially narco-traffickers, share a number of characteristics, especially adaptability to changes in governmental law enforcement responses. In From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007; 312 pages; $24.95), Michael Kenney examines how narcotics traffickers and terrorists “learn” to adapt to new countermeasures against them and the lessons from such “learning” experiences that can be used for more effective governmental responses.

Terrorism and the Internet

As today's generations of terrorists are hunted by counterterrorist organizations, they possess a distinct advantage that their older predecessors lacked: access to computers, the worldwide Internet and cyberspace's myriad technological benefits in conducting communications and warfare. According to Gabriel Weimann’s Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006; 320 pages; $20.00), which is the first comprehensive study of this issue, terrorists have established a sophisticated and dynamic presence on the Net, which has completely transformed the way they communicate, obtain information, conduct propaganda and issue threats. They use it to radicalize and recruit new members, raise funds and train, organize and carry out warfare, and then broadcast such incidents on their own websites.

The Internet has become the "seductive hypermedia" for radical Islamic terrorists, with official and unofficial Web sites, forums and chat-rooms that appeal to supporters worldwide. Most Web sites are intended to advance a group's propaganda to increase their supporting audience, while some have operational intentions. How can we defeat such terrorism in cyberspace? Hypermedia Seduction for Terrorist Recruiting, edited by Boaz Ganor, Katharina Von Knop and Carlos Duarte (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2007; 300 pages; $150.00) is an important collection of papers by an eclectic group of international experts (in which this reviewer participated) in terrorist use of the Internet, advertising and graphic design specialists, who had been convened to formulate a comprehensive response campaign. The volume's chapters examine radical Islamist websites, the use of symbolism in Islamic fundamentalism and Jihad, mining the Jihadist network in cyberspace, the use of the Internet as a "seductive" recruitment technology, and practical ways to counter the "seductive" terrorist web.

Militant Islam

Militant Islam has not emerged in a vacuum, but is the product of the confluence of historical and contemporary religious drivers and "real world" factors. To understand the narrative that is central to Muslim belief, it is essential for those engaged in countering religiously-inspired radicalization and terrorism to first read the Quran. The following five books provide an excellent overview of the revival of militant Islam, within the context of the larger Muslim world, which is largely mainstream.

Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004; 320 pages; $19.95) by Olivier Roy, discusses the driving forces behind the revival of militant Islam in Western Europe.
Mr. Roy, a leading French academic expert on political Islam, explains how many Muslims in Western Europe have turned to radical Islamic ideologies as a way of coping with political and psychological crises in their own lives and what they perceive to be threats against their Muslim brethren around the world.

In *Fundamentalism: The Search for Meaning* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005; 254 pages; $16.95), Malise Ruthven provides a penetrating analysis of the nature of fundamentalism around the world, including Islam. Fundamentalism in other religions, such as Christianity and Judaism, are discussed, as well. Mr. Ruthven is a British writer who has taught at several universities.

Bassam Tibi’s *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus Global Jihad* (New York: Routledge, 2007; 328 pages; $41.95), assesses the impact and manifestations of political Islam, particularly in Europe, which faces a growing conflict between radical segments within its large Muslim minority and the continent’s democratic and pluralist institutions and values. Dr. Tibi, one of the world’s foremost experts on political Islam and Arab nationalism, is Professor of International Relations at the University of Goettingen, in Germany and a visiting professor at Cornell University.

In *Bad Faith: The Danger of Religious Extremism* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007; 327 pages; $26.00), Neil J. Kressel, a professor of psychology at William Paterson University, incisively explains the nature of religious extremism. To Dr. Kressel, religious extremists are "those persons who — for reasons they themselves deem religious — commit, promote or support purposely hurtful, violent, or destructive acts toward those who don't practice their faith."

It is not only Islam that fosters religious extremism, Dr. Kressel points out. Christianity and Judaism have their share of anti-secularists who elevate sacred religious texts, such as the Bible or Koran, to a position of supreme authority in a state. While Dr. Kressel is critical of religious extremism, this is emphatically not an anti-religion treatise. He recommends that once a religiously extremist minority within a religion begins to act violently, then mainstream leaders must immediately identify and "self-police" such outbreaks. In this way, constructive elements have the best chance of overtaking destructive ones. All those in the counterterrorism community who wish to understand and respond to the characteristics of religious extremism that lead to terrorism will greatly benefit from reading Dr. Kressel's important book.

Unmodern Men in the Modern World: Radical Islam, Terrorism, and the War on Modernity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007; 304 pages; $19.99) by Michael Mazarr, is one of the best diagnoses of the resentment by Islamist forces toward modernity, which has led them to utilize terrorism to retaliate against the effects of modernity on traditional life in their respective societies. In one of his many insightful passages, Dr. Mazarr, a professor at the National War College, writes that modernization challenges the religious and spiritual element of tradition by threatening to secularize society "in order to replace a religious view of the world with a scientific, rationalist one... modernization and modernity place faith under stress, call it into greater question, threaten to trade it out in favor of rationalist humanism. And one result, unsurprisingly, is a flight back to religion, so that the actual effect of modernization in many contexts is an upwelling of devotion."

### Suicide Terrorism

One of the manifestations of radical Islamic terrorism is suicide martyrdom bombings, in which the goal of the perpetrator is to kill himself (or herself) together with the intended victims. *Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs* (London: Pluto Press, 2005; 288 pages; $27.95) by Farhad Khosrokhavar, a French social scientist, discusses the concept of martyrdom in Islam, how it expresses itself in Iran, Palestine (vis-à-vis Israel), and Lebanon, and al-Qaeda’s use of martyrdom operations in its worldwide operations.

In *The Martyr's Oath: The Apprenticeship of a Homegrown Terrorist* (John Wiley & Sons Canada, 2005; 288 pages; $36.95) Stewart Bell, a Canadian journalist, chronicles the story of Mohammed Jabarah, a young Canadian Muslim who became radicalized and recruited by al-Qaeda for a bombing mission in Singapore in 2001. By investigating why an intelligent young person who grew up in a comfortable middle class family in Canada (although originally from Kuwait) would end up as an operative in a terrorist organization in East Asia, Mr. Bell searches for answers on how best to counter the proliferation of similar types of recruits in North America and Europe into radical Islamic terrorism.
9/11 and its Aftermath

According to Evan F. Kohlmann’s extensively researched Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network (New York: Berg, 2004; 256 pages; $19.95), the Hamburg cell that had carried out the 9/11 attacks across the continent was an outgrowth of the infiltration of Europe by al-Qaeda’s operatives and allies beginning in the early 1990s. As a fragile state with a Muslim majority, Bosnia afforded Osama bin Laden’s Saudi, Egyptian and Yemeni lieutenants, and their North African “Jihad foot soldiers” with a safe haven to establish the infrastructural seeds for the European and Canadian “sleeper cells” that would threaten Western European states and America in the succeeding years.

Once al-Qaeda started its devastating bombing campaign against America in East Africa in 1998, the world’s attention began to focus on the group and its leader, Osama bin Laden. One of the best of the first crop of books on this topic was Peter Bergen’s Holy War: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2002; 320 pages; $14.95), which was based on first-hand investigative reporting and interviews with bin Laden, his associates, and counterterrorism officials. In 2006, Mr. Bergen published The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s Leader (New York: Free Press, 2006; 528 pages; $15.00), which updates his account by drawing on primary documents and interviews with more than fifty people who knew bin Laden personally.

Terry McDermott’s Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008; 368 pages; $14.95) is an excellent account of the personal histories of al Qaida’s 9/11 hijackers and the beliefs and motivations that drove them to commit such horrendous acts. McDermott, a Los Angeles Times correspondent, traveled to some 20 countries to conduct research for the book.

Although primarily focusing on the al-Qaeda-led Global Salafi Jihad, Marc Sageman’s Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004; 232 pages; $29.95) is considered one of the most original and innovative social science studies conducted on how individuals are driven to join terrorist organizations. Utilizing his background as a forensic psychiatrist, political sociologist and former CIA case officer in Pakistan, Dr. Sageman’s study is based on his knowledge of radical Islamic ideologies and compilation of dozens of biographies of terrorist operatives which enable him to generate a myriad of findings on trends in recruitment and operational warfare by today’s Jihadi operatives.

Dr. Sageman’s Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008; 208 pages; $24.95), updates and expands his earlier work on what drives radical elements of a society to terrorism. According to Dr. Sageman, the pre-9/11 al-Qaeda has become morphed into a social movement consisting of several thousand members. This makes al-Qaeda even more dangerous because as a social movement it has dramatically grown beyond its organizational origins.

How do al-Qaeda’s supporters become radicalized? Dr. Sageman formulates a four phase process that depends on an individual’s sense of moral outrage in response to perceived suffering by fellow Muslims around the world; how he might interpret such moral outrage within the context of a larger war against Islam; whether or not the sense of "moral outrage" resonates with one’s own experience, for example, discrimination or difficulty in making it in Western society and, finally, being mobilized by networks that take one to the next level of violent radicalization in the form of terrorist cells.

To counter the social movement inspired by al-Qaeda, Dr. Sageman proposes a strategy to "take the glory and thrill out of terrorism.” Military operations against them should be conducted swiftly and precisely, with such terrorists considered "common criminals." The sense of "moral outrage" by young Muslims can be diminished by helping to resolve local conflicts that al-Qaeda’s propaganda highlights as injustices against the Muslim world. The young jihadists want to become heroes, so they need to be provided with alternative role models, such as Muslim soccer stars and other successful community leaders.

Dr. Sageman's incisive observations based on carefully examined evidence, astute insights and scholarship make "Leaderless Jihad" the gold standard in al-Qaeda studies.

To understand how terrorist groups operate, it is crucial to uncover how they go about recruiting new operatives to maintain themselves as viable organizational networks and, if possible, expand their activities. Such insight is provided in The Lesser Jihad: Recruits and the Al-Qaida Network (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little-
field Publishers, Inc., 2007; 174 pages; $24.95), by Elena Mastors and Alyssa Deffenbaugh. Focusing primarily on the al-Qaeda network, the authors examine “why, how, and where individuals” become involved in that network, which they define as “financial backers and fund-raisers, operators, logisticians, recruiters, trainers, and leaders.” It is important to uncover such recruitment patterns to enable counterterrorism agencies to derive potential strategies for dealing with the “entry” points into their networks. By focusing on the al-Qaeda network’s recruitment processes, The Lesser Jihad is an important contribution to our understanding of the measures required to counter and defeat such a terrorist network.

Brynjar Lia’s Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008; 256 pages; $28.95), is a biography of an important al Qaida theoretician. In addition to writing an influential 1,600 page book, al-Suri had trained a generation of young jihadists in the Afghan training camps and helped establish the organization’s European networks. Syrian-born Al-Suri was captured in Pakistan in late 2005. Lia is a research professor at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).

Palestinian Terrorism

While the threats posed by al Qaida and its worldwide affiliates occupy the attention of most books, other terrorist conflicts also merit close attention. For example, in a stunning upset, in January 2006 Hamas’s political arm won the Palestinian parliamentary elections. Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007; 336 pages; $17.00) by Matthew Levitt explains how Hamas was able to blend terrorism, political activism, and social welfare services to become the dominant force in the Palestinian territories. The book is meticulously documented.

Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg explore the underpinnings of the cult of martyrdom among the Palestinians in The Road to Martyr's Square: A Journey Into the World of the Suicide Bomber (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006; 304 pages; $19.95). Their book is based on their extensive field research in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which enabled them to see first hand and collect documentation and video materials to which most outsiders are not privy. According to the authors, suicide bombings have become so deeply ingrained in Palestinian society as a 'cult of martyrdom' that "lengthy indoctrination and training sessions for suicide bombers were no longer deemed necessary. Indeed, the script was so well known that someone who wanted to become a bomber, it was said, was simply given a bomb; he decided the coordinates for himself." This beautifully written yet disturbing book offers a unique perspective on the intifada and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, written by authors who demonstrate great understanding of the Palestinians' internal and external struggles.

Anat Berko's The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and Their Dispatchers (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007; 216 pages; $49.95) is an insightful examination of Palestinian suicide bombers and the men who dispatch them on their missions. While concrete grievances against Israel and its occupation policy — primarily in the West Bank (since Israel has withdrawn from the Gaza Strip) — drive most Palestinian suicide bombers to attack Israelis, the cult of death through martyrdom is reinforced daily through indoctrination and hate propaganda in Palestinian mosques, schools, media and popular music. How can suicide bombings be stopped? The key, Dr. Berko believes, rests with Muslim religious leaders, who "have the moral responsibility to forcefully condemn suicide bombing attacks and to issue unequivocal fatwas [religious rulings] against them." They must emphatically state that those who carry out such attacks "not only do not automatically go to paradise, but that they automatically go to hell." The book contains a wealth of information about Palestinian society, such as the impact of polygamous families and arranged marriages on the sons and daughters who decide to become suicide martyrs.

Bernard Rougier’s Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007; 333 pages; $28.95) is based on the author’s intensive field work in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain al-Hilweh, the country’s largest concentration of Palestinians. Mr. Rougier is a Middle East scholar affiliated with Sciences-Po in Paris. Although he is chiefly concerned with how militant pan-Islamism took hold in Ain al-Hilweh, he offers extensive evidence of similar developments in Nahr al-Bared and other refugee camps. He shows how a growing number of disaffected Palestinian refugees now view themselves as part of the global geography of radical Islam, pointing out that this is a position that has led them to identify with the rhetoric of al-Qaeda. Mr. Rougier concludes that militant Islamism among the Palestinians can be mitigated by re-invigorating the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and offering the Palestinians a viable state.
Terrorism in the United States

In *Holy War on the Home Front: The Secret Islamic Terror Network in the United States* (New York: Sentinel, 2006; 256 pages; $21.00) Harvey Kushner (with Bart Davis) assert that for more than two decades a secret network of Islamic extremists belonging to al-Qaeda and Hamas has been entrenching itself in American society, where some of them function as leaders of local and national Islamic organizations and charities, religious preachers, soldiers, drug smugglers, and prison chaplains. Mr. Kushner is chairman of the department of criminal justice at Long Island University and a well-respected terrorism expert.

The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia Movement and the Radical Right (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2002; 416 pages; $27.95) by Daniel Levitas cautions us that far-right extremist groups in America have always posed a terrorist threat, as exemplified by Neo-Nazi groups such as the Aryan Nations and individuals such as Timothy McVeigh. Extensively researched and documented, this is the most definitive account ever written on America’s far-right militia movements.

U.S. Counterterrorism

The political and intelligence failures by the Clinton and Bush administrations to prevent 9/11 have resulted in the publication of numerous books, of which nine are briefly reviewed here. The first was *Breakdown: How America’s Intelligence Failures Led to September 11* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2002; 256 pages; $19.95) by Washington Times’ investigative reporter Bill Gertz, which places the blame on the lack of political will by successive administrations and Congress to vigorously counter al-Qaeda’s growing threat.

In *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003; 285 pages; $36.95 hardcover; $20.95 paper), Paul Pillar provides a framework for understanding the history and current posture of U.S. counterterrorism policy. The concluding chapter provides recommendations for improving America’s counterterrorism capability. Dr. Pillar is a former deputy chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, and currently a visiting professor at Georgetown University.

With the benefit of time and a full complement of staff to conduct its research and call on expert witnesses, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004; 568 pages; $10.00) provides the most comprehensive critique of the events and policies that led to 9/11 (although since its publication questions have arisen over its glossing of evidence that more may have been known than what was included in its report by U.S. intelligence units about al-Qaeda’s pre-9/11’s preparatory activities).

Daniel Benjamin’s and Steven Simon’s *The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right* (New York: Times Books, 2005; 352 pages; $16.00), believe that America is losing the war on terrorism. Due to the Bush administration's post-September 11 policies, they write, America’s strategic position is weakening; increasing numbers of Muslims are joining the radical Islamists in terrorist violence. Jihadist ideology has become the bloody banner for grievances around the world, “merging into a pervasive hatred of the United States, its allies, and the international order they uphold.” This hatred has loosened Muslim religious and social inhibitions on violence that it nowjustifies an attack on "infidels" such as the United States using weapons of mass destruction. As a consequence of what Messrs. Benjamin and Simon (but not necessarily others) consider to be the Bush administration's failure to understand that radical Islam is a transnational problem and the intervention in Iraq, which has turned that country into the "central theater of the jihadist struggle," they argue that "Unwittingly, we are clearing the way for the next attack — and those that will come after."

One of the most sweeping and extensively researched narrative of the events leading to al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks is provided by Lawrence Wright’s *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Knopf, 2006; 480 pages; $27.95). It also examines al-Qaeda’s activities from the perspectives of American counterterrorism agencies that had tried, but ultimately failed, to stop them.

In *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006; 384 pages; $27.00) veteran journalist Ron Suskind argues that the failure to anticipate 9/11 led the Bush Administration to adopt a new preemptive counterterrorism doctrine in which even the possibility of a one percent likelihood of a nuclear detonation.
The Terrorist Watch: Inside the Desperate Race to Stop the Next Attack (New York: Crown Forum, 2007; 272 pages; $26.95) by Ron Kessler is an insightful and revealing look at how U.S. counterterrorism agencies and their top players conducted America's attacks on al-Qaeda and its affiliates prior to and following September 11. Kessler is a veteran Washington-based investigative journalist on national security and the author of 16 books. His unparalleled access to top players in America's counterterrorism campaign allowed him a rare glimpse into their tradecraft, making The Terrorist Watch a riveting account.

Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy [Three Volumes], edited by Yonah Alexander and Michael B. Kraft (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007; 1456 pages; $299.00), is a comprehensive collection of key documents, statements, and testimony on U.S. government counterterrorism policies, laws and programs as they evolved prior to and following 9/11. One of the co-authors, Mr. Kraft, is a former high level State Department official, so the volume greatly benefits from his extensive knowledge of these issues.

Michael A. Sheehan’s Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism Without Defeating Ourselves (Random House, 2008; 320 pages; $24.95), recommends using “offensive operational intelligence” to identify and defeat terrorist cells, some of which are loosely affiliated “wannabes”. Mr. Sheehan is a former Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism in the New York City Police Department and Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism at the State Department.

Counterterrorism - General

In The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005; 334 pages; $39.95) Boaz Ganor, one of Israel’s top counterterrorism academic experts, identifies terrorist threats and delineates ways in which governments can most successfully counteract them. The "puzzle" of the book's title hints at the myriad ways a response to a terrorist threat can take shape in the form of policy making, intelligence collection and analysis, deterrence, and offensive and defensive countermeasures (and how to avoid the "boomerang effect").

Emanuel Gross’s The Struggle of Democracy Against Terrorism: Lessons from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2006; 320 pages; $35.00) is one of the best studies on the legal challenges and moral dilemmas faced by democracies in balancing security against civil liberties, human rights and the rule of law in countering the threats posed by terrorists. Mr. Gross covers the spectrum of relevant topics including defining terrorism, the laws of war in countering terrorism, interrogating terrorists, the powers of military commanders in administering areas where terrorists operate (such as in Iraq or the West Bank), administrative detention, the right to privacy by citizens during emergency periods, the use of civilians by terrorists or armies as human shields, and thwarting terrorist acts through targeted killings of terrorist leaders and operatives.

Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, by the National Research Council of the National Academies (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2002; 440 pages; $41.36), is considered one of the “classic” studies in homeland security. Comprehensive in scope and authoritative in its technical expertise, the volume’s chapters discuss scientific and technical approaches to mitigate vulnerabilities in key infrastructural sectors, such as transportation, information and telecommunications systems, health systems, the electric power grid, food and water supplies, and others that may be susceptible to terrorist attacks. It also discusses nuclear and radiological threats, bioterrorism, toxic chemicals and explosive materials, cyberterrorism, and potential threats to energy systems, such as the electrical power grid and oil and gas. For each of the critical infrastructure sectors discussed, the volume provides recommendations on how to apply knowledge and technology to make the nation safer, as well as the research and development programs that are required to produce innovations to protect the nation against future threats.

Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to Understanding, Preventing, and Surviving Terrorism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005; 556 pages; $75.00) by Mark A. Sauter and James Jay Carafano is a theoretical and practical treatment of terrorism, counter-terrorism and homeland security. The book is divided into three sections: the emergence of homeland security as a modern concern, how to understand terrorism and an overview of America's homeland-security system. Although primarily written as a textbook for the academic market—with each chapter beginning with an overview and learning objectives and ending with a chapter summary, discussion topics, notes on sources and even a quiz—"Homeland Security" is much more than a textbook. It is an indispensable reference resource for those seeking to understand how terrorists operate and the structures and
mechanisms that have been developed to respond to the magnitude of the terrorist threats confronting us.

*Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network* (New York: Routledge, 2006; 300 pages; $45.95), edited by Peter Katona, Michael D. Intriligator and John P. Sullivan, brings together experts from a range of disciplines to discuss the components necessary for comprehensive counter-terrorism. What sets this book apart from other initiatives are the authors’ specializations in clinical medicine, public health, economics, political science and public policy, law enforcement, military and intelligence.

Daniel Byman’s *The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad* (Wiley, 2007; 320 pages; $25.95) proposes a comprehensive approach to countering terrorism, involving the use of intelligence, law enforcement, a counter narrative to al-Qaeda’s ideology, reforms in the targeted countries, and strong alliances among governments. Dr. Byman directs Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and the Center for Peace and Security Studies.

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About Perspectives on Terrorism

- Perspectives on Terrorism (PT) seeks to provide a unique platform for established and emerging scholars to present their perspectives on the developing field of terrorism research and scholarship; to present original research and analysis; and to provide a forum for discourse and commentary on related issues. The journal could be characterized as 'non-traditional' in that it dispenses with traditional rigidities in order to allow its authors a high degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of article while at the same time maintaining professional scholarly standards.

About the Terrorism Research Initiative:

- PT is a journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), an initiative that seeks to support the international community of terrorism researchers and scholars especially through the facilitation of collaborative and cooperative efforts. TRI was formed by scholars in order to provide the global community with centralized tools from which to better actualize the full potential of its labours. TRI is working to build a truly inclusive international community and empower it through the provision of collaborative projects to extend the impact of participants' research activities.

- The Journal can be accessed at the following website URL:

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