


Journal of Security and Global Affairs

Issue 1 - December 2016



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Special Conference Issue:
Who determines the security (research) agenda?
Institute of Security and Global Affairs

E-ISSN 2452-056X



Journal of Security and Global Affairs

The Journal of Security and Global Affairs (SGA), published in open access by the [Institute of Security and Global Affairs](#) at Leiden University, is a refereed publication, and manuscripts go through a blind review process. The focus of SGA is on a wide array of security topics and issues, providing a platform for the analysis of key issues within security and global affairs. In doing so, SGA aims to generate new ideas and improve the management of safety and security. These include, but are not limited to, items pertaining to the terrorism and counterterrorism, cyber security and cybercrime, political violence, innovative practices, policy development and implementation, evaluative research and the (global) players engaged in these enterprises. Taking a multidisciplinary approach, SGA seeks to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and good practice. SGA publishes original articles that utilize a broad range of methodologies and international perspectives when examining pressing issues in safety and security across the globe.

Journal of Security and Global Affairs (ISSN 2452-0551, E-ISSN 2452-056X)

Special Issue Institute of Security and Global Affairs Conference Leiden University

This Special Issue of the Journal of Security and Global Affairs features the outcome of several workshops and lectures presented during the Institute of Security and Global Affairs Conference ‘Who determines the security (research) agenda?’ which was held on 9-10 November 2016 in The Hague, The Netherlands.

Facing contemporary security and global affairs challenges such as terrorism, cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare requires dialogue and collaboration between various disciplines within academia, as well as between academia and other stakeholders in the public and private sector. Such collaborations raise new questions and dilemmas, for instance about roles and responsibilities of stakeholders. One of the most important questions is what security issues or challenges to focus on and who should take the lead? The Leiden University’s Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) focused on these questions during its opening conference. ISGA welcomed more than 200 actors from the security and global affairs field to discuss the central question ‘Who determines the security (research) agenda?’. More information on the conference and a digital booklet full with pictures can be found [here](#).



Who determines the security (research) agenda?

Prof. dr. Edwin Bakker

Scientific director Institute of Security and Global Affairs Leiden University

The Institute of Security and Global Affairs – ISGA in Dutch, ISGA or ISGA in English – let's stick to ISGA, aims to be a scientific institute engaging in interdisciplinary research and teaching within the broad international scientific field of security studies.

The approach to issues of security is – and I somewhat dislike the term – glocal. That is to say that the local, national, transnational and global impact of security issues are studied and analyzed in conjunction with each other.

This teaching and research takes place in the city of The Hague, the International City of Peace, Justice and Security; the center of government, but also the third largest city in the Netherlands with many security issues and challenges of its own, ranging from dealing with jihadism and managing political demonstrations in this town to increasing the awareness of cyber security among its citizens.

Given the prominent position of The Hague as the largest security cluster in Europe, there is an inspiring interaction between this academic institute and other knowledge institutions and think tanks, national and international governments, the private sector and NGOs. I am happy to see quite a few representatives of these stakeholders here today in the audience and in the various panels, ranging from our friends and colleagues from Cordaid, the Human Security Collective, The Hague Center for Strategic Studies, to representatives from the military, the police, and others that contribute to security, freedom and the democratic rule of law, both at home and abroad.

Allow me to be a bit more specific on the research part of our institute. Though we constitute one body of researchers, we are organized in the following research groups: Diplomacy and Global Affairs, Cyber security, Crisis governance, Terrorism and political violence and a research group in the making: intelligence studies. What we have in common is an interest in – obviously – security and global affairs, but perhaps more importantly a number of research principles that I would like to share with you.

First of all, our research aims to be of the highest academic standard, contributing to the various academic discussions in the wider field of security studies and to be the place of academic debate in the various specific research areas. A good example of this was the tenth annual meeting of the Society for Terrorism Research earlier this week in this very same location where about 200 terrorism experts were present from around the world.

Second, research at ISGA aims to be policy oriented, geared toward the 'practice' of security, global affairs and governance. The emphasis, among others, is on how concepts and

themes central to these areas of research are conceptualized, implemented, evaluated in practice and how they relate to theoretical paradigms.

A third important principle is that we do not want to compare academic discussions with other academic discussions. Of course we start our research based on a proper understanding of the body of literature, but we want to contribute to that same body of literature by focusing on primary sources.

Many of our researchers gather, analyze and use primary sources such as interviews, surveys, archives, and field work. We like to critically engage with our object of study by really knowing and understanding key actors: those that constitute a threat to society: interviewing extremists, or murderers and those that are responsible for our security: policy makers, diplomats, parliamentarians, etc. In many of our research groups this is already a defining characteristic of our research. I hope the use of primary sources in terrorism research and other forms of (political) violence sets ISGA apart from research elsewhere in this particular field.

A fourth principle is to focus on societal phenomena from an interdisciplinary perspective. One of ISGA's strengths is its focus on what is happening 'on the ground', studied from a variety of analytical perspectives and disciplines. We also like to use the term 'lenses'. We believe studying complex phenomena requires a multidisciplinary approach and finding answers to today's global affairs and security challenges often requires an interdisciplinary approach. With its multidisciplinary staff ISGA is well positioned to take on that challenge. We are a group of scholars with a wide variety of academic backgrounds: historians, lawyers, sociologist, political scientists, information technology experts, philosophers, criminologists and economic geographers, to mention just a few.

Finally, our research aims to provide a critical reflection on the various field(s) of study with ISGA. And we hope that you all help us with that reflection, helping us to answer questions such as 'What should research on security, terrorism, global affairs and governance entail?', 'What concepts and theories are currently in vogue?', 'What are the pitfalls in security studies and global affairs?' and 'How can ISGA and the other institutions and centers of the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs help to move these fields forward?'. And, to be very concrete, 'What are the most relevant topics to study today?' and 'Who should determine the security research agenda?', which is the theme of today's conference.

We hope to receive valuable input from all of you to answer these questions. We cannot do it alone; we have to explore, analyze, understand today's challenges with others. The findings of our common efforts to better understand today's very complex global or glocal challenges and security issues will hopefully contribute to a more nuanced debate on these issues and counter those in favor of fact free politics. Especially in the coming months, with elections coming up in our own country, I hope the academic world will speak out on relevant

issues and present the outcome of their research if politicians produce myths and introduce assumptions for which there is no proof.

Many among our researchers have already done so in recent years in the domains of terrorism, radicalization, homicide, crisis management, and cyber security through interviews in the media, op-eds, the Leiden Safety and Security blog or parliamentary hearings or as expert witnesses in courts and members of advisory boards.

In modern university language this is called valorization or impact – which is of course linked to all kinds of targets. Well, we do not need targets to be convinced of the need to translate our research into products that are valuable to society. And we do not need new jargon. We simply use the good old term public debate, which in our eyes, is indeed an important way to contribute to society.

But there is an even more important way in which we aim to contribute to the society that we are part of: in Leiden/The Hague, The Netherlands, Europe, the world – through teaching and training people – research led teaching and training - of young people, great people that follow our courses, our BA minors, our MA programs and executive masters. And after finishing these courses and programs, as our alumni, they can do a lot more than we – as a relatively small team of scholars can do – and that is to use the critical academic attitude, the knowledge and analytical and practical skills we provide them with, to make better products, assessments, measures, programs, or strategies that hopefully make this world a better, safer and a more just place for all of us. It is these students that hopefully one day become your colleagues and that are perhaps Leiden University's biggest contribution to this town, country and world as the new generation that will help to tackle today's and tomorrow's global and local security challenges. Thank you for your attention.



Who determines the cyber security agenda?

Dr. Sergei Boeke

Researcher and lecturer at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs Leiden University

One of the panel discussions at the ISGA Conference focused on cyber security. This panel discussion was led by four renowned cyber security experts, each of them highly experienced in one or more domains: government, academia and the private sector. The moderator of the panel discussion was Gerben Klein Baltink, the director of the Internet Standards Platform 'Internet.nl'. After the short pitches by the panel members, Klein Baltink led the discussion and gave audience members the chance to ask questions. The panel consisted of Brigadier-General Paul Ducheine, Professor for Cyber Operations and Cyber Security at the Netherlands Defence Academy, Dennis Broeders, professor at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and senior researcher at the Council for Government Policy, and Michel van Leeuwen, head of the cyber security policy department of the Ministry of Security and Justice of the Netherlands.

Michel van Leeuwen started his pitch by describing the traditional image of Lady Justice with a blindfold, a balance and a sword. The blindfold is certainly applicable to cyberspace, he claimed, since the attribution of cyber-attacks remains a challenge and the offending actor can often not be identified. The sword is less applicable, as the government has no monopoly on violence in cyberspace, unlike in the physical world. The balance symbolizes how law enforcement in cyber space is only possible when organisations in the Netherlands and abroad work together. To secure ourselves from the vulnerabilities of the Internet of Things (IoT), coordination between actors is of utmost importance, said Van Leeuwen, since limited incentives for producers would lead to suboptimal cyber security. One should also prepare for new cyber crises and system failures. Both can only be dealt with when actors cooperate.

Paul Ducheine described how the shape of a bastion (a military fortress) can also be applied to cyber space. On the one hand it provides protection to all who are living within the bastion, while on the other hand the tip of the spear serves as a weapon which can be used for self-defense. Ducheine illustrated this by referring to the American elections, where Russian actors used stolen information to influence the electoral debate. It is therefore important for states to invest in cyber security, and this requires coordination with Ministries of Defence and other governmental bodies. In the end, there should be a balance between the three elements of rights (and obligations), security and prosperity.

Dennis Broeders organized his pitch around three critical questions. Do we actually know how big the threat in cyberspace is? Many companies do not report incidents or trivialize them to avoid reputational damage. Conversely, security providers have a business

interest in highlighting or possibly overestimating certain threats in their analyses. The lack of a market for cyber security insurance probably originates from an unclear threatscape. Following this, Broeders focused his efforts on Public Private Partnerships, a cornerstone most national cyber security strategies. It is evident that cooperation between private and public actors is essential, but the diverging interests of the parties must be taken into account. To conclude, Broeders argued that the secrecy surrounding cyber security in general must be pushed back, and that government institutions had to resist their tendency to overclassify documents and policies. More transparency would benefit the legitimacy of governmental performance in cyber space, for instance when it comes to bulk interception.

The final discussion between the panel members and the audience covered several subjects. First, the role and position of the Netherlands was discussed. Although the Netherlands has implemented several leading initiatives and policies on cyber security, the role of small countries remains limited and thus joint cooperations must be found abroad. With that in mind, the influence of large IT-companies like Google and Apple and the dominant role they play within the multi-stakeholder scene must be factored into the equation. The subject of hybrid war was also discussed, and one of the audience members, the Dutch ambassador to Ukraine, explained the difficulty of coping with information warfare in practice. At the end of the discussion, the panel members were asked to pitch their conclusion in a few sentences. The results: cyber needs to become more integrated; why not invest 10 percent of our expenditure on cyber security, and are we ready for the next cyber incident?



Promoting and protecting cyber security interests

Prof. dr. Paul Ducheine

Professor of Cyber Security and Cyber Operations University of Amsterdam, Professor Cyber Warfare Netherlands Defence Academy

1. Vital interests

For the Kingdom of the Netherlands six vital or strategic interests are at stake according to its national and international security strategies: territorial integrity, physical, economic and ecological security, social and political stability and a stable and effective international legal order. Due to developments in information and communication technologies, social behaviour, public as well as private, changed dramatically over the last decades. The Internet of things is just one of these examples of evolution in this respect. These changes impact on the Netherlands' vital interests (DESI, 2016). Apart from acknowledging the relevance of cyber security as essential for national security, demonstrated by the promulgation of two thematic National Cyber Security Strategies (I and II), we are actually conceding that cyber security has become the seventh vital interest for the Kingdom.

2. Threats and countermeasures

Threats to cyber security originate from a diversity of actors and, quite obvious, for various motives ascribed to those actors. Those actors, which may involve state and non-state entities - including the persons involved ('hackers') - will be inspired or driven by motives ranging from enhancing security on the one hand, to testing, training, boasting, activism, economic profit, sabotage, propaganda, subversion, theft, terrorism, espionage and (military) conflict on the other (Ducheine, 2015).

These threats require a multidisciplinary response, a comprehensive effort by public as well as private partners. These response are now formulated in Cyber Security Strategies worldwide.¹ The paradigms offer distinguishes framework for public and – were applicable – private organisation to promote and protect cyber security interests. Looking at cyber activities at the state level, a number of distinct paradigms are applicable to describe cyber operations (Klimberg & Mirtl, 2013). These paradigms are demonstrated in national cyber security strategies worldwide (CCD CEO, 2014), as well as through the instrumental use of cyber capabilities in furtherance of states' (other vital) interests.² These paradigms can be depicted as parts of a continuum, a spectrum, or to put it differently, as part of a state's comprehensive efforts in cyberspace (AIV & CAVV, 2011). The paradigms are complementary

² E.g. the use of Stuxnet against Iran.

and overlapping.³ These paradigms represent one (or more) of the institutional frameworks enabling governments (or public authorities) to conduct activities within democratic societies. They thus offer a legal and social framework for (governmental) behaviour, that is, as with all social interaction, subject to adjustments that are initiated or inspired by changes in the security landscape (including ‘new’ threats), public opinion, international, societal and technological trends. As such, these frameworks reflect the *Zeitgeist* regarding topics that have reached the political agenda and require or enable governmental action (Rothman & Brinkel, 2012).

3. Imperfections and conflict of interests

For public bodies operating under the rule of law, legislation authorising and tasking these bodies is required as soon as governmental action impact upon citizens’ rights and privileges. Inevitably, legislation in each of the paradigms may be incomplete and lagging behind social behaviour and technological opportunities. The legislator, enabling the executive branch by providing tasks and powers, is the pinnacle of the balance of conflicts between three interrelated perspectives. Firstly, security demands or ambitions require tasking accompanied by powers. Secondly, security comes at a price: either financially through taxation or through infringements on other rights or privileges (i.a. privacy), as these security providing bodies require manpower, funds and powers. Thirdly, security offers benefits, as economy, society and social behaviour gain from security. Economic prosperity and individual or collective wellbeing may be the result of a secure place to do live and to do business.

4. In the discussion (Q&A): Cyber warfare

It is evident that cyber warfare proper should be reserved for the paradigm of military conflict.⁴ Cyber warfare involves ‘warfare proper’ and ‘operations other than war’, including peace support (and enforcement) operations related to conflict (Gill & Fleck, 2015). Thus ‘cyber warfare’ can be defined as “employment of cyber capabilities with the primary purpose of achieving [military] objectives in or by the use of cyberspace” (Schmitt, 2013).

In response to cyber threats, cyber warfare is the *ultimum remedium*, and highly unlikely, as the other paradigms will prevail. However, as of now, most, if not all military operations abroad will be supplemented with cyber capabilities of some kind.

³ Klimberg and Mirtl p 15, referring to these paradigms as ‘mandates’.

References

- AIV & CAVV (2011). *Cyber Warfare* (report no. 77/22, 2011), viewed 31 December 2012, www.aiv-advice.nl
- CCD CEO (2014). 'National Strategies & Policies', *NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence*, viewed <https://www.ccdcoe.org/328.html>
- Desi (2016). EU's Digital Economy & Society Index (DESI), viewed <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/desi>
- Ducheine, P.A.L. (2015). 'The Notion of Cyber Operations in International Law', in: Nicholas Tsagourias & Russell Buchan (eds), *The Research Handbook on the International Law and Cyberspace*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing
- Gill, T.D. & Fleck, D. (2015). *The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Klimberg, A. & Mirtl, P. (2013). 'Cyberspace and Governance—A Primer', *Austrian Institute for International Affairs*, viewed 11 November 2013, http://www.oiiip.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Publikationen/Cyberspace_and_Governance_Working_Paper_65_2.pdf
- Rothman, M. & Brinkel, T. (2012). 'Of snoops and pirates: Competing discourses of cybersecurity' in Paul A.L. Ducheine, Frans Osinga and J. Soeters (eds), *Cyber Warfare: Critical Perspectives*. The Hague: TMC Asser Press.
- Schmitt, M. N. (2013). *Tallinn manual on the international law applicable to cyber warfare*: prepared by the International Group of Experts at the invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



The Political Economy of UN Security Council Reform

Prof. dr. Erik Voeten

Professor and Peter F. Krogh Associate Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice, Director of Graduate Studies, Georgetown University

The Security Council is not representative of the geopolitical realities of the modern world. This is (or was) true too of the Bretton Woods institutions and other global institutions designed during the Cold War. How can we understand why some institutions have adapted while others have not?

I argue that we must look beyond the formal rules of institutions to understand this. Powerful states can threaten to act outside or even exit an institution to force reform. Moreover, some institutions are more sensitive to outside competition than others. Stakeholders will be more likely to agree to give up their privileged positions when an institution faces the prospect of irrelevance in the absence of reform. (This argument builds on my own work as well as that of Philip Lipsky and Randall Stone).

Consider the World Bank. States can lend unilaterally. There are about two dozen regional multilateral development banks. The latest iteration is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Thus, countries can go outside the institution to satisfy their political development objectives and/or use the threat to go outside to reform the World Bank. If the World Bank doesn't adapt it will become irrelevant.

By contrast, the IMF does not face similar outside competition and has not adapted to changing power distributions in the same way. Indeed, the U.S. has become more powerful in the institution, especially if we include informal power.

The Security Council's situation is more complex. Some of its institutional activities are and others are not subject to outside competition. There is no competitor that can bestow legitimacy on operations in the same way (although regional organizations have a limited capacity to do this). Yet, the UNSC's ability to confer legitimacy depends on the continued support from key non-permanent members. Threats to act without UNSC authorization are often key to acquiring the UNSC's blessing. Successful peacekeeping greatly depends on voluntary contributions from states and regional organizations. Japan and Germany are still the 2nd and 3rd largest contributors to the UN budget. So, non-permanent members do have leverage that they could use to demand formal institutional reform.

Paradoxically, the only country that has regularly used its outside power explicitly to demand reform is the United States, which has stopped paying its bills on several occasions

and demanded reform. This has sometimes been successful but has also come at great cost to both the U.S. and the UN. We can expect more of this from the Trump Administration.

Why don't other countries do this more frequently? Perhaps this is just a difference of style and I am by no means suggesting that the world would be a better place if more countries adopted US style strategies. But I think there is something else going on.

For most states getting a UN seat is not that important for their core national security interests. This is about status. Playing unilateral hardball would defeat the purpose for Germany, Japan, India, Brazil and others. The inside option of pointing to the indignity of no reform may also be valuable. Indeed, there may even be downsides to actually having that seat. One former president of an aspiring member once told me that he really didn't need any more opportunities to get into trouble with the US.

Moreover, there have been more informal reforms that do take into account changing power dynamics. Informal practices within the Council to solicit and take seriously views of non-permanent members in a region or otherwise interested parties. Also, a shift where some security issues are now discussed outside the Council, including the G20, six party talks, and other informal multilateral institutions. The fact that Japan is not a permanent member doesn't mean it's excluded from multilateral talks on North Korea or the security issues in which it has an interest. These informal reforms help keep the non-permanent members on board even though they are an imperfect substitute for better formal institutional rules.



Decision-making Rules and Processes in International Organisations: The Case of the UN Security Council

Prof. dr. Jan Wouters

Jean Monnet Chair holder European Union and Global Governance, Professor of International Law and International Organisations, founding director of the Institute for International Law and the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies

I would like to focus on three points: (i) the EU's role in the UN Security Council (UNSC), (ii) the UNSC as a substitute world legislature, and (iii) the need for judicial checks and balances vis-à-vis the UNSC.

1. The EU role in the UN Security Council

As is known, the EU is strongly committed to the United Nations (UN). The UN is mentioned at least 15 times in the EU Treaties, and the EU has expressed its commitment to go for “multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations” (Art. 21 TEU). In her recent address to the Security Council in June 2016, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms. Federica Mogherini, concluded by saying: “Our European Union will always come back to the United Nations, to the core of the international multilateral system, to the stubborn idea of a cooperative world order.”

But the EU is actually a rather invisible actor in the UNSC, and one cannot say that there is a great amount of strategic thinking about its own role in the UNSC. The newly adopted Global Strategy mentions the UNSC only at one instance: “A commitment to global governance must translate in the determination to reform the UN, including the Security Council, and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs).” It is remarkable that the Strategy does not speak about strengthening the EU's voice in the Security Council. If one looks at the way in which this voice is organized in the EU Treaty, the conclusion is that it is deliberately kept weak: EU Member States that sit on the UNSC do not have to coordinate their positions with the full EU membership: they just have to keep them and the High Representative “fully informed” and must concert among each other. Moreover, they can deviate from EU positions if this is needed in light of “their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter” (Art. 34 TEU).

The honest situation is that (most of) EU Member States, when sitting on the UNSC, behave as great powers in their own right and not as “agents” for the EU – which is however their legal obligation under the principle of sincere cooperation and the case-law of the European Court of Justice. It would be very positive if Italy and the Netherlands in the period 2017-2018 would break with that unfortunate tradition and operate truly as agents for the EU. In fact, there is some good hope in that regard: on Wednesday 21 September 2016, the Dutch and Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Bert Koenders and Paolo Gentiloni, signed a joint declaration on cooperation in the UNSC in 2017-2018. According to the press statement of the Dutch Foreign Ministry of the day after, “[b]oth during that period and in the run-up to it, they will work as closely as possible with one another and with other European Union member states on the Council.”

There is an *a fortiori* case for a stronger EU voice in the UNSC now that one of our MS which happens to be a permanent member has indicated that it is on its way out from the EU. If Brexit is consumed, France will be the only remaining permanent member from the EU. The case for a permanent seat for the EU, or for another EU Member State (e.g. Germany), may pop up again, and it is important for the EU to have a strategic reflection about this. The Global Strategy is totally silent about this.

2. The Security Council as a “substitute world legislature” and the problems this poses

An interesting but at the same time problematic feature of the activism of the UNSC since the end of the Cold War, and in particular since the turn of the millennium, has been the UNSC’s action as a “substitute world legislature”. This requires some explanation. The Council was set up as “the world’s fire brigade” (to use the expression of President Roosevelt) in order to act decisively in the face of “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression”. But it was not set up to produce generally applicable norms. Interestingly, over the past two decades, especially since the attacks of 9/11, the UNSC has been adopting quite a few “Chapter VII” resolutions with a general scope of application: e.g. UNSC Res 1373, UNSC Res 1544, UNSC 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters.

A diplomat who had worked for a time in the UNSC context once told me: “You do not want to ask how sausages are produced”: the remarkable manner in which UNSC resolutions are being prepared is definitely one of the mysteries of global governance. But when the UNSC adopts generally applicable norms, which by the force of Chapter VII are binding upon the whole international community and have to be implemented by all States (including EU Member States and the EU) into domestic legislation, one could and should expect more guarantees in terms of the respect of proper legislative process, rule of law, respect for human rights and so forth.

3. The need for judicial checks and balances vis-à-vis the UNSC in order to hold it accountable for problematic resolutions, including resolutions that run against human rights, the rule of law and/or international law

We know the international legal system is very imperfect and does not display similar features with regard to democratic checks and balances and rule of law safeguards as we know (albeit often imperfectly as well) in our domestic legal systems. But it has happened that the UNSC, especially decisions by its sanctions committees, has gone against human rights of individuals. Think of the *Kadi* case, which has been fought out before the EU courts in Luxembourg, because there was simply no judicial mechanism available at the international level. If individual rights of persons can be violated by UNSC decisions, there need to be rule of law-based mechanisms at the international level. The recent system of an ombudsperson is a step in the good direction, but requires further deepening and systematization and may not fully satisfy the test of judicial review.

At the very least, I would submit that the International Court of Justice could rule on the validity, under international law, of UNSC resolutions that are problematic from the human rights / rule of law perspective upon request of the UN General Assembly. The ICJ has always been reluctant to accept that power, but it is submitted that the recent wave of law-making activism and focus on the legal position of natural persons by the UNSC merits a reconsideration of this point of view.



The United Nations Security Council: The Difficulty of Reform

Prof. dr. Madeleine Hosli

Professor of International Relations, Institute of Security and Global Affairs Leiden University

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in its current composition, is not based on global power positions and a majority of UN states seems to favor (formal) change. Obstacles to reform, however, are situated in the institutional provisions for UN Charter reform, specifying a high hurdle for UN Charter amendment and granting veto power to the P-5 as well as – in the current constellation of UN membership – to two of the largest UN regional groupings. Accordingly, not only the divergent preferences of UN members prevent a decision on UNSC reform, but the decision-making procedure for UN Charter amendment poses a major obstacle to change.

Hence, institutional thresholds have been ‘locked in’ in the provisions for UNSC reform as incorporated in the UN Charter. Path-dependency theory can illustrate how the original design now prevents reform. Simultaneously, social choice theory helps demonstrate how these locked-in decision rules affect chances for reform, given expanded UN membership over time. The two-thirds majority requirement in the UNGA, coupled with the requirement of P-5 inclusion, constitutes a major institutional hurdle for change, given the current number of UN member states. Accordingly, changing the composition of the UNSC is a task not only made difficult by diverging UN member state preferences on this politically sensitive issue, but by decision rules that constitute a – probably underestimated – extent of *status quo* bias. So far the UN member states have not been able to consolidate their diverging preferences in favor of a compromise solution that would overcome the many obstacles for reform. By comparison, adaptation of the Council’s working methods and increased transparency has already been achieved. For many UN member states, however, this adaptation does not suffice to ensure that the UNSC operates in satisfactory ways.

Although some rising powers are deprived of an equal representation in the UNSC and their efforts to increase their formal representation have been unsuccessful so far, actors have been able to adapt to the situation and increase their representation and influence in more informal ways. Overall, both the potential candidates for permanent seats as well as their regional counterparts show a high level of commitment to collective security within the UNSC, either through their election as non-permanent members, contributions to peacekeeping missions or within the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).

The states that strive for a more permanent representation achieve a comparably high share of representation in the UNSC as non-permanent members and thus already have a

quasi non-permanent seat. For example, Japan has served in this function about 35 per cent of the time since it became member to the UN, whereas Brazil served almost 30 per cent, Germany 25 per cent, Argentina 24 per cent, Pakistan 21 per cent, and Italy, India and Colombia each 21 per cent. Of the African members, Nigeria has been represented about 15 per cent of its time eligible, but South Africa has only served twice in recent years although it was member of the UN since 1945. However, another 68 UN member states have never served on the UNSC. Notably, while members of the G4 and their regional counterparts have divisive interests in the formal reform proposals, they seem to be able to balance their interests when it comes to distributing non-permanent seats.

The powers that seek a different UNSC setup provide a substantial share of troops to UN peacekeeping operations and take the major share of the overall contributions. Over the last five years, India, Pakistan as well as Nigeria have continuously been under the top five troop contributing countries (TCC) making up a large share of contingents under UN command. South Africa and Brazil are also engaging substantially with contributions ranking around the top 15 with 1.000 to 2.000 troops per year. China in recent years provides a significant share around 2.000 peacekeepers. In addition, since 1994, the TCCs have direct access to the UNSC as it has institutionalized regular briefings with the TCCs.

Overall, rising powers have not disengaged, but rather developed adaptation strategies to overcome the 'structural constraints' of the UNSC setup, also by increasingly engaging in informal groups of states, which provide a way to enhance efficiency of security governance outside the UNSC, while sometimes relying on the Council legitimacy, thereby forming diplomatic initiatives that range from competing to complementing UNSC security governance. In cases where the UNSC is blocked, states can act outside and later engage the UNSC in providing ex-post legitimacy. In a way, this option is easier to achieve, since rising powers are significantly constrained in changing the formal setup of the organization. Lastly, non-represented countries have lobbied continuously for more inclusive and transparent working methods and have achieved at least gradual change towards a more integrative and transparent UNSC.

Several reform proposals have been presented to make the UNSC an institution better representing the distribution of influence of states in the current global order. Much applied diplomacy, global negotiations and skills in finding compromise solutions will be needed for this institution to be adapted, but reform may benefit the Council's ability to operate as an institution seen to be legitimate, and effective, to maintain global peace and security. Adaptation of the institutional structure is a challenge that seems to affect many international organizations (including, for example, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), but the case of the UNSC very clear illustrates path dependency and how high

decision-thresholds for change may prevent an institution from adapting to current challenges and circumstances.

References

- Dörfler, T. & Hosli, M. (2013). "Reforming the United Nations Security Council: Proposals, Strategies and Preferences", in Bob Reinalda, ed., Routledge Handbook of International Organization, Milton Park: Routledge, 377–90
- Dörfler, T. & Hosli, M. (2015). "The United Nations Security Council: The Challenge of Reform", in Dries Lesage and Thijs van de Graaf, eds., Rising Powers and Multilateral Institutions, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 135–52.



Agenda setting in the metropolitan security field

Dr. Elke Devroe

Lecturer and researcher Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University

Dr. Adam Edwards

Reader at Cardiff University

It can be argued that Metropolises, or ‘city-regions’, are becoming the most important global centres of governance both for advocates and critics of the greater freedom of movement of capital, labour, goods and services across national borders. This freedom of movement has implications for the movement of illicit as well as licit traffic across borders and through a world urban system of city regions. The workshop considered the impact of the rise of city-regions as objects of policing through reference to the “Policing European Metropolises Project” (PEMP). This international research project considers the evolving ‘governmental arrangements’ and ‘governmental dispositions’ for metropolitan policing and their implications for understanding strategic policy-making aimed at anticipating and reducing threats to the security of European city-regions. Strategic policy-making implies a concern with the dilemmas and contradictions of metropolitan policing agendas that draw upon a broad repertoire of enforcement and preventative measures. Drawing upon comparative research findings from PEMP, the workshop also questions whether metropolitan policing agendas are converging towards a ‘control model’ of policing and considers what other scenarios can be anticipated. A core aim of the workshop was to equip policy-makers, private partners and scholars with an understanding of the dilemmas confronting strategic policy-makers concerned with the security of city-regions.

Dr. Elke Devroe commenced the workshop by providing an overview of the aims and objectives of the first two phases of the PEMP. The first phase of the project analyses ‘governmental arrangements’ for metropolitan policing, including the relationship between police, policing and various social integration strategies (variously translated as community safety, integral security and urban security) in five cities (Barcelona, Berlin, London, Paris and Sofia). The second phase of the project expands the analysis of governing arrangements to include a comparison of cities within, as well as between, 9 countries (Belgium, Britain, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia). It also diagnoses the dispositions of metropolitan policing agendas in terms of their privileging of criminal justice, restorative justice, social justice and risk management goals given their *orientation* (around offenders, victims and/or environments), their targeting of primary, secondary and tertiary *populations* (the entire populous; groups ‘at risk’ of offending and victimisation; and offenders and victims known to public authorities) and their *objectives* (in reducing certain crimes,

maintaining public order and/or providing a social service). This comparison delimits the objects of analysis to public (not commercial, voluntary or informal) policing, policy formulation (not implementation or outcomes) that is strategic and concerned with medium-term planning and agenda-setting (not operational policing). The aim of this comparison is to establish convergence or divergence in metropolitan policing regimes to better understand the conditions that are conducive to maintaining, developing, reforming or transforming criminal justice agendas as city-regions seek to adapt to transnational security challenges.

Adam Edwards then discussed how the predicates of this comparative analysis, the circuits of causal, dispositional and facilitative power that constitute metropolitan policing, can be used to build explanations of convergence and divergence in the politics of security in city-regions. One proposition is that these circuits promote convergence through ‘mimetic institutional isomorphism’ or the risk averse tendency of policy actors to copy ‘best practice’ rather than risk major policy change and innovation that could fail. A rival proposition is that these circuits enable divergence when policy actors seek to distinguish themselves from established governmental arrangements, as in independence and devolutionary movements seeking to legitimate their secession from established nation states, or when the legitimacy of these arrangements is eroded through various ‘exogenous shocks’ to the policy environment, such as crises of finance, migration and warfare or innovations in discipline and production including the impact of emergent, disruptive, digital technologies. As such, the comparative analysis promoted through PEMP seeks to challenge teleological thinking about inevitable and inexorable processes of policing change and to recognise the importance of political agency in constituting policing agendas but without recourse to voluntaristic arguments that obscure the ‘standing conditions’ in which this agency is exercised. It is to pose and begin to answer the question of what discretion metropolitan authorities have in setting their own policing agendas and what, if any, significant variegations in the exercise of this discretion can be identified through multiple case studies of metropolitan policing in Europe. In so far as significant divergence, even amongst ‘outliers’ from any central tendency in metropolitan policing, can be identified this is both analytically and politically important in recognising that security agendas needn’t be as they are and can be otherwise.

In a stimulating response, the workshop discussant, Dr. Bob Hoogenboom (Nyenrode Business University), challenged the very premise of PEMP, arguing that an understanding of security in city-regions, particularly in Western European metropolises such as Rotterdam, cannot be restricted to a focus on the public sphere but must acknowledge the increasing influence and significance of commercial actors such as financial and insurance companies and the broader assemblage of actors in civil society who effectively do security. It can be argued that it is even more important to recognise the role of these actors as statutory

authorities withdraw under the pressures of austerity and as private companies, along with private citizens, are exhorted to fill the vacuum left by an increasingly degraded public sector.

In response, it was argued that hitherto PEMP has not claimed to be providing an account of the whole apparatus of security 'in action' but to focus, specifically, on public policy-making given that in liberal societies this is the focus of democratic accountability and citizenship rather than private government and contractual relationships. A problem with dissolving the analytical and normative specificity of public policing into nebulous assemblages or 'nodes' of public-private security is that this colludes in the degradation of the public sphere and the primacy, in a liberal democracy, of accountable public policy-making.

References

Devroe, E. & Edwards, A. (2017). *Policing European metropolises: The politics of security in city-regions*. London: Routledge.



International Relations, Security, And Power

Prof. dr. David Baldwin

Senior Political Scientist in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and Wallach Professor of Political Science Emeritus at Columbia University

There are seven basic questions to ask about “security.” Although the answers to these questions change as situations change, the questions are the same for all situations.

1. **Security for whom?** There is no single “right” answer to this question. One may want to focus on the security of a single individual, a country, or the whole planet.
2. **Security for which values?** In international relations the traditional answer to this question has been security for the political independence and territorial integrity of the nation-state, but other possible answers include security for economic welfare, for a sustainable ecosphere, etc.
3. **How much security?** Although some have insisted that security is not a matter of degree, one can and should conceive it as a matter of degree. There are large and small security threats, and it is important to keep them in perspective in order not to overreact.
4. **Security from which threats?** In international relations, other actors—state or non-state—have usually been regarded as the source of security threats. But some have suggested the inclusion of natural disasters—floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc.—as security threats. One might even add what might be called threats from “not-so-natural” disasters—e.g., damage to the atmosphere caused by humans.
5. **By what means?** The traditional means for pursuing security in international relations has been described as the “threat, use, and control of military force.” Indeed, the field of security studies is frequently defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military force. This is unfortunate, since there are an infinite variety of means available for the pursuit of security.
6. **At what costs?** Although this question is often overlooked, it is one of the most important. The costs of security are not all measureable in monetary terms. There are also moral and political costs. This is a particular problem for liberal democracies, since threats to civil liberties can undermine the very foundation of liberal democracy. The important thing is not to maximize security, but rather to optimize security.
7. **In what time period?** Security threats can be immediate or long-term. One of the problems with climate change is that it has a rather long time horizon. Thus, even though President Obama has described climate change as a security threat, the topic never came up in the American presidential debates.

International relations scholars describe something called the “security dilemma.” This refers to the tendency of one country’s pursuit of security to be perceived as a threat by other countries. This can set off a spiral effect with everyone winding up less secure than they were before. Is the security dilemma applicable to non-state actors such as ISIS? I think so. Some things said or done in the pursuit of security from terrorists may actually increase the numbers and/or determination of terrorists. For example, treating all Muslims as potential (or actual) terrorists is likely to swell the ranks of radical jihadists.



Treatment, transition management and re-integration of high-risk offenders in Europe – results of a comparative project

Prof. em. Dr. Frieder Dünkel

Professor and chair of Criminology, University of Greifswald

1. Introductory remarks

Treatment, transition management and re-integration into society are the task of prison and probation administrations. In certain cases, the police are also involved in the supervision of released offenders, in particular if they are subject to electronic monitoring. The paper deals with the results of an EU-funded comparative European project on identifying good practices of transition management and re-integration of high-risk offenders in Germany, Estonia, Finland and Ireland.

The re-integration of high-risk offenders is one of the major challenges for the criminal justice system. All criminal justice systems in Europe provide mechanisms for the re-integration of so-called dangerous or high-risk offenders as an important if not priority objective of punishment. The present paper is based on an internationally comparative project on the treatment and transition management of high-risk offenders in Europe. The project was funded by the Criminal Justice Programme of the European Commission (JUST/2011/JPEN/AG2943) during the period 2012-2015 (see *Dünkel et al.* 2016; 2016a).

Since the early-1990s discussions about increasing rates of sexual and violent crimes took place. The *Dutroux*-case in Belgium was a landmark for the “punitive turn” in crime policy and sentencing practices in the following years. Germany expanded the so-called preventive detention (*Sicherungsverwaltung*), an indeterminate imprisonment for dangerous offenders after they have served their determinate prison sentence. But the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) outlawed some of the law reforms with the result that so-called dangerous offenders had to be released. The motivation for coordinating the project by the Ministry of Justice of the Federal State of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania was to find models for the treatment and transition management including after-care supervision of high-risk offenders.

The definition of high-risk offenders is not always clear in national legislation. For the present project the partners came to the following conclusion: “A high-risk offender is someone who presents a high probability to commit crimes which may cause very serious personal, physical or psychological harm”. Therefore, the project focused on (recidivist) violent and sex offenders.

2. General results

The results of the project were presented under 4 aspects. The first issue was the question of legislation covering all aspects of treatment in prisons or institutions, the transitional phase of preparation for release, the decision making for early release and the aftercare support and supervision. So, special emphasis was given to best practices concerning the treatment inside prisons (sentence plan and treatment programs), the transition management (preparation for release, early release schemes, through care) and on aftercare services and supervision of high-risk offenders (probation service in a multi-agency approach, community guarantee, see 2.1).

The project partners further discussed “good practice” experiences in the area of high-risk offenders, which are summarised under “case studies” below (2.2).

2.1 Legislation and practice concerning the treatment and transition management of high-risk offenders

Why and under what perspective is legislation so important? The Findings of the project state as regards legislation: “It is agreed upon that the following results alongside the phase of execution of the sentence should be laid down by substantive law. Only an appropriate quality of juridical rules can reach the necessary commitment.”

As to *treatment inside prisons* it was agreed that *socio-therapy* for high-risk offenders is a promising model of preventing re-offending. There is empirical evidence that socio-therapy “works” (see in particular the chapters of *Pruin* and *Feelgood* in *Dünkel et al.* 2016; 2016a).

Socio-therapy is an integral part of a prison system based on the goal of rehabilitation (“resocialisation”). Sentence planning, risk assessment, socio-therapy, preparation of release, early (conditional) release, continuity of care are core elements of such an approach, which should be laid down by substantive prison law. Socio-therapy is executed in special units and comprises a range of rehabilitative measures. Other principles of punishment such as incapacitation and deterrence also for high-risk offenders are no acceptable solution as sentences such as “life without parole” would constitute a violation of human rights principles (according to the German FCC and also the ECtHR in the case of *Vinter et al. vs UK*, judgement of 9 July 2013).

High-risk offenders should be subject to a specific prison regime with a therapeutic approach. In this, their specific risk of re-offending, criminogenic needs and responsivity to certain treatment modalities (see the RNR-model) should be considered and an increased effort towards rehabilitation (“resocialisation”) through (preferably) cognitive-behavioural therapy in a milieu-therapeutic environment should take place. This includes provisions for a gradual return of the prisoner to life in the free society by prison leaves, work release, open

facilities and other temporary release schemes and the orientation at early/conditional release with an intensive aftercare.

As to the *preparation for release* (prison leaves, relaxations of the prison regime) it was agreed that an intensive preparation for release for high-risk offenders is a promising model of preventing re-offending and improving social reintegration. There is empirical evidence that a gradual transition scheme of preparation for release combined with early release (see below) and aftercare “works”.

The following principles should be laid down by law: The planning for (early) release must be organised in due time and give also for high-risk offenders a concrete perspective for the time of release and for the period of aftercare supervision. Prison leaves and other forms of temporary release are an essential part of a gradual return of the prisoner to life in free society. The criteria for granting such releases should be less restrictive the longer the stay in prison lasts. Particularly in the last phase of the sentence the prisoner should have the right to be granted temporary releases, except if he/she presents a serious danger of committing very serious crimes against other persons. These principles should apply also to high-risk offenders. The criteria and legal conditions should be regulated by substantive prison law. The competence of decision-making should be given to prison governors or prison authorities in general (with the requirement to consider the expertise of psychologists or psychiatrists). There must also be a right to immediate judicial review if such necessary forms of preparation for release are denied.

It was further agreed that *early release* for high-risk offenders is a promising model of preventing re-offending. There is empirical evidence that a systematic preparation for release combined with early release schemes, support, and control by aftercare services “works”. This is in particular the case if there is social re-integrative support provided by probation and aftercare services (in many countries this support is linked to conditional early release, while fully serving the prison sentence would result in a lack of such support; electronic monitoring then is also no solution, as it is restricted to pure control ideas and not social re-integration). Legislation should also define the criteria for “good prognoses”, preferably in a way that gives priority to an early release in the situation of uncertain prognoses (“*in dubio pro libertate*”). A “good practice” model of legislation is a regular early release scheme as provided in Austria as it allows the supervision and control after release through directives including – if necessary – electronic monitoring etc. The Finnish legislation and practice can also be seen as a model of “good practice”. Offenders can be “tested” in a six-month period before the early release date by granting them a temporary long-term stay outside prison (living in half-way houses or other accommodation facilities with intensive care and supervision).

It is agreed that *post release supervision* for high-risk offenders is necessary and that there are promising models of preventing re-offending and improving the social integration.

Legal provisions should allow for the supervision of high-risk offenders after release. Post-release supervision has to be based primarily on the support of the probation and/or aftercare services. These provisions should clearly determine the range of supervision, the competent authorities for its execution as well as possible directives and obligations to be imposed on the supervised person. The intensity of supervision should decrease in the course of time. Life-long supervision should be excluded!

Furthermore, legal provisions should regulate the dissemination and exchange of information regarding the supervision as well as clearly define obligations of the person under supervision to submit information to the competent authority for this purpose. When acting upon this information, authorities should be legally obliged to consider the effects on the rehabilitation of the supervised person and the protection of potential or former victims. All obligations and directives imposed on the offender under supervision must have the primary aim of rehabilitation and pure control measures should be excluded. Electronic monitoring is only advisable as an exceptional measure and only if it is combined with intensive support and care by the probation and aftercare services.

Police supervision should never be a stand-alone measure of control. It must be combined or as far as possible replaced by forms of support and control by the probation and aftercare services. Police supervision must be based on substantive criminal or procedural law (not police-law). The aim of rehabilitation and possible negative effects by stigmatising ex-prisoners demand a very sensitive use of police control.

As to the organisation of *post-release services* it was agreed that the delivering of these services concerning accommodation, employment, social welfare aid, etc. for high-risk offenders is necessary and promising for preventing re-offending and improving social integration. Such aftercare services can “work”, particularly if they are structured by a network of intensive co-operation (multi-agency approach). All competent authorities on the local level (state and municipal institutions) should be obliged by law to provide the necessary services to released prisoners according to their needs, which was discussed under the headline of “*community guarantee*”. Legislation shall also define the necessary measures, the competent authorities and the right of the released person to demand these services right in advance, i. e. already during the custodial phase. Legislation should set out such guarantees in the laws regulating communal/local competences and duties and also in laws regulating the obligations of after-care services (e. g. probation services) as well as of local agencies involved in the reintegration of released prisoners (job centres, accommodation services, health care services etc.). Good practice models can be found in Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands.

2.2 Case studies on Estonia, Finland, Germany and Ireland

It was difficult to identify really “good practices” in *Estonia* that has been criticised by the so-called Torture Committee (CPT) for its excessive use of isolation cells for disciplinary reasons. In particular, high-risk offenders are suffering from the conditions of a very strict prison regime. However, one positive aspect was that the preparation for release is provided by special case managers. Risk assessments take place also in the aftercare situation (for those conditionally released). Conditional release can be granted earlier if the offender agrees with electronic monitoring. Major problems were the poor prison conditions and that there is a lack of systematic through care. The probation service is in a developing stage, police supervision after release is still of importance.

In contrast *Finland* provides a system of gradual transition and increased liberties in the course of the execution of sentences, which are seen as a normal part of the sentence enforcement also for high-risk offenders. Sentence and release plans in cooperation with the aftercare services have been implemented (multi-agency approach). 40-44% of prisoners are transferred to and released from open prisons. Electronic monitoring is used to control prisoners when being on prison leaves (“supervised probationary freedom” or “temporary release”). Early release is granted almost automatically (99%), a phase of temporary release (up to 6 months, before early release after one half or two thirds of the prison sentence) serves for the preparation of release and re-integration into daily life outside prison; it can be electronically monitored.

In *Germany* socio-therapeutic treatment units in prisons have been established, which – according to several evaluation studies – have contributed to a reduction of re-offending rates and to a better re-integration into society. They can be judged as a “good practice” as well as models of transition management (e. g. InStar Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania), where the probation services are included into the preparation of release work latest 12 months before release. The sentence plan at the beginning of the execution of a prison sentence is further developed to a re-integration plan 12 months before release. Prison leaves are an integrated part of the preparation for release (with very good results with prisoners’ compliance). Conditional early release with probationary support and through care are further corner stones of this model.

Those inmates fully serving the sentence will get a supervision of conduct order, i. e. social work support and control, in rare cases electronic monitoring. Only about 60 cases out of 35,000 supervision of conduct cases are under electronic surveillance. In these cases, police are also involved in the control mechanisms of EM.

Ireland had a problematic practice of isolating high-risk offenders (up to 23 h per day in their cells), which was criticised by the CPT. The numbers of such isolated prisoners have

been reduced by 80% and also the number of prisoners with reduced times of joint activities with others.

A good practice is the “integrated case management” in co-operation with the probation service (12 months before release). 9 months before release a “Community Integration Plan” has to be developed. The Probation Service works in cooperation with local services (multi-agency approach). The Police are only involved in sex offenders’ release and aftercare management (SORAM), but no electronic monitoring is provided.

3. Conclusion

According to a European basic philosophy and constitutional requirements (in Germany the principle of resocialisation, rehabilitation as a human right) high-risk offenders must be prepared for a life after release from prison. All principles of effective offender treatment (RNR) apply also to high-risk offenders. Further promising approaches are the “Good-lives”-model and efforts to strengthen the capabilities of offenders (focus on the formulation of positive goals, see *Feelgood* in *Dünkel et al.* 2016; 2016a).

As to the institutional setting inside prisons or other institutions (psychiatric institutions, preventive detention etc.), high-risk offenders should as far as possible be integrated in “normal” prison regimes with as much of contacts and meaningful activities as possible (also with the outside community). Isolation and segregation are acceptable only temporarily and for the shortest time period as possible.

Guidelines should be the standards as formulated by the Council of Europe for long-term and “dangerous” offenders (Rec (2003)23 and Rec (2014)3). The principles of normalisation, of dynamic security and of intensive support and supervision in the transitional and post-custodial phase are essential elements for a successful re-integration of high-risk offenders. The role of the police and of technical forms of social control should be of minor importance. Electronic monitoring should never be a stand-alone sanction or form of supervision.

References

- Dünkel, F., Jesse, J., Pruin, I., von der Wense, M. (2016) (Eds.): *European Treatment, Transition Management, and Re-Integration of High-Risk Offenders. Results of the Final Conference at Rostock-Warnemünde, 3-5 September 2014, and Final Evaluation Report of the Justice-Cooperation-Network (JCN)-Project “European treatment and transition management of high-risk offenders.”* Mönchengladbach: Forum Verlag Godesberg.
- Dünkel, F., Jesse, J., Pruin, I., von der Wense, M. (2016a) (Eds.): *Die Wiedereingliederung von Hochrisikotätern in Europa – Behandlungskonzepte, Entlassungsvorbereitung und Übergangmanagement.* Mönchengladbach: Forum Verlag Godesberg.



Re-entry of politically sensitive offenders

Jan Maarten Elbers

Assistant-researcher Institute of Security and Global Affairs Leiden University

When societally sensitive ex-detainees re-enter society, a myriad of questions rise: What happens with these individuals when they are released? What role does possible considerable public attention play during their re-entry? Are they capable of “reintegrating”? How do professionals who stand by them cope with the experience of social pressure concerning these (ex-) detainees? Such questions, but also societal sentiments that often accompany their re-entry, are very well understandable from a moral perspective. Until now, however, empirical knowledge to properly weigh these sentiments is lacking.

The role of public attention after ex-detainees are released from prison has often been neglected in previous scientific research. This formed the vantage point of this exploratory study. Using a select number of interviews – with ten societally sensitive ex-detainees and seventeen professionals – we have tried to map multiple aspects of the problems this group of ex-detainees is confronted with.

Since reintegration policy is continuously evolving and the number of participants in this study is limited, this study does not provide an evaluation of current policy. On the contrary, it gives a voice to an underexposed group of ex-detainees and analyzes their experiences, as well as those of professionals. The ultimate goal is to pinpoint a number of factors in multiple areas of life, which may important for successfully reintegrating societally sensitive ex-detainees. The interviews provide the following insights:

Detainees as Security Risks

In prison, societally sensitive detainees already experience that they are approached differently, based on perceived security risks. Either out of their free will or not, they are separated from regular detainees because they are perceived as a risk to public safety, threaten peace and order among detainees at regular departments and / or because they themselves are at risk of ill-treatment by fellow prisoners.

Unprepared into society

According to ex-detainees, this ‘risk-management’ can result in limited attention for their life after prison, during incarceration. They experience that the special units where these ‘high-risk detainees’ often end up, offer very few activities aimed at reintegration. Formal reintegration policy appears to underscore these experiences. Moreover, ex-detainees in some cases are said to be not eligible to participate in reintegration activities that are offered, based

on their sentence length or criminal history. These societally sensitive ex-detainees clearly express a need for more activities aimed at their reintegration, during their years of captivity.

Re-entry in spotlights

Post-prison, these ex-detainees more than once are public figures. As a result of public attention, they experience a double stigma: that of 'Ex-detainee' and 'Security Risk'. On one hand, they feel approached with prejudice by their (old) environment, on the other hand by parties involved in their re-entry. They are seeking for the most suitable way to cope with their stigmas, in every new situation.

The present risk of social unrest also results in tension with involved parties: none of them is very welcoming of negative publicity and possible harm to their reputation. The risk-based approach that some parties take, can be deployed at the expense of engaging in activities aimed at reintegration. Fearing the emergence of social unrest, leaves can be refused and a wide range of restrictive special conditions may be imposed by these parties. A strict protocol for facilitating the re-entry of these ex-detainees is absent. On paper, this provides space for "customization". In the experiences of societally sensitive ex-detainees, however, these parties are more than once focused on managing risks, instead of offering individualized, adequate support. They experience slow cooperation between a plurality of parties, which decide over them instead of with them about their re-entry. Part of the interviewed professionals recognizes this risk-based approach among involved parties. They indicate that, when the re-entry of an ex-detainee is accompanied by social unrest, his or her guidance demands more of their time and effort, and cooperation between parties is more than once made more difficult.

Risk-management versus Rehabilitation

Societally sensitive ex-detainees are primarily responsible for their own smooth transition to society. This means that they will have to put in effort in order to successfully reintegrate. Generally, they can be supported by involved parties, like the Dutch Probation Services (Reclassering Nederland). It should be noted that not every ex-detainee is equally motivated to make efforts and to accept every possible assistance. The continued provision of customized assistance, might know a dead end in these cases. From a security perspective, at least supervision of these ex-detainees can pragmatically be organized. Both motivated and non-motivated socially sensitive ex-detainees may encounter many external obstacles during their reintegration, which involved parties may be able to influence.

Once released, 'regular' ex-detainees already experience difficulties obtaining housing, employment, and building a meaningful life. As a consequence of public attention and subsequent stigmatization, this proves even more difficult for societally sensitive ex-detainees. Both during and after imprisonment, they experience limited support from involved parties.

Nearly half of the ex-detainees in our study indicates having obtained housing post-release at their own initiative. Those who were dependent of external parties, criticized the slowness with which housing was realized. They accredit this slowness to excessive risk-management by involved parties.

Regarding (timely) finding suitable accommodation, according to professionals, the attitudes of mayors is decisive. The extent to which they contribute to a smooth reintegration, varies per case and mayor.

Professionals emphasize that societally sensitive ex-detainees usually have no chance on the labor market, unless they are actively supported by external parties. Ex-detainees indicate to miss out on that support. Most of the ex-detainees we spoke to, were dependent of social security benefits. Next to having economic consequences, lack of employment may also have cognitive and social psychological consequences. It can also mean a lack of a meaningful daily activities, as becomes apparent in this study. Some ex-detainees regain some meaning in volunteering, which they often engage out of their own initiative.

Additionally, the social network of societally sensitive ex-detainees has more than once disappeared after their release from prison. Engaging in new social relations is further complicated by the stigma they carry. For example, they fear being recognized publicly and judged. Many ex-detainees lack support in the social domain. Some are supported by volunteers. In addition to these perceived shortcomings, ex-detainees often evaluate the existing support as controlling and hardly as supportive. Parties involved in their re-entry often seem to prioritize managing risks. This approach possibly degrades the goal of rehabilitating ex-detainees. Paradoxically, an excessive emphasis on risk-management hypothetically increases the risk of recidivism. Due to a prevailing risk-orientated approach, one of the goals of detention and re-entry, rehabilitation, is often neglected.

Recommendations

- Facilitate reintegration possibilities on special units in prison.
- Enhance support of societally sensitive ex-detainees in obtaining housing and employment post-release.
- Experiment with social support of societally sensitive ex-detainees without a history of sex offences.
- Prioritize improving rehabilitation of societally sensitive ex-detainees over risk-management.



Public Private Partnership to create a Transdisciplinary Vision

Case Study: Designing a MSc program Cyber Security within the Cyber Security Academy

Jan van den Berg

Cyber Security chair: Delft University of Technology, Faculties TPM & EEMCS, Cyber Security chair: Leiden University, Faculty GGA, Scientific director at Cyber Security Academy The Hague

Jacqueline van Zoggel

Senior Consultant at Cyber Security Academy The Hague

How it all started

The relatively recent established fifth domain of cyberspace (next to the four physical domains of land, water, air and space) offers, next too many opportunities, a huge global security challenge named cybersecurity. In many cyber sub-domains, people are struggling in finding their way when dealing with this new challenge. Due to the fast and dynamic development of cyberspace, the number of cybersecurity specialists is largely laying behind the practical needs. Based on this observation done in September 2012, it was decided in the community of the so-called The Hague Security Delta (HSD) of the Netherlands to start an initiative for developing an executive MSc program Cyber Security. By the intense public-private cooperation between representatives of both knowledge institutes, private and public partners within a new foundation called the Cyber Security Academy The Hague (CSA), a full MSc program for professionals was developed that received full accreditation right from its start. The first group of students began their studies in January 2015, the majority of which is now finalizing them by writing the concluding MSc thesis.



Figure 1: A sketch of partners working together in the Cyber Security Academy The Hague.

Need for a common vision

Creating a new MSc program, in very limited time, in a largely new scientific field is no sinecure. The usual research-driven way of designing and implementing a MSc-level program could not be applied here. In order to become successful, we understood that it would be of crucial importance to first create a vision in co-creation with all relevant stakeholders. Based on scientific insights and a variety of experiences within public and private organizations and quite some discussions, we decided to adopt two fundamental ideas, namely, (i) a new conceptualization of cyberspace consisting of three layers, and (ii) the starting point that cyber security is actually a risk management problem. We visualized this in the two figures shown below:




Figure 2: Conceptualization of cyberspace in 3 layers (rings) and (cyber) sub-domains.




Figure 3. Cyber Risk Management using the 'bowtie' model.

The important key insight around the new definition of cyberspace concerns the 'socio-technical' layer in the middle of the figure on the left, which is the layer of cyber activities: cyber activities are the things we do using IT, in all kinds of cyber sub-domains. The governance layer at the outside is added to emphasize that both the (complex) world of cyberspace (middle layer) and its enabling ICT (inner layer) need a lot of governance. (For more background information on the chosen conceptualization and related figures, we refer to [1].)

Towards a transdisciplinary methodology for cyber security education

Next to choosing a new conceptualization of cyberspace we became aware that, basically, cybersecurity concerns a risk management challenge, which entails much more than securing the enabling IT. What matters in the very first place is the security of the cyber activities (in the socio-technical layer), which by definition includes human behavior. Managing these socio-technical cyber risks - in line with the underlying IT-risks - concerns a complex

management challenge that - due its manifold complexity - requires a multidisciplinary methodology on the intersection of various disciplines.

To develop and apply such a methodology, a broad range of scientific knowledge and insights from research institutions on the intersection of disciplines like engineering, law, management, psychology, and economics should be combined with the current practices of public and private organizations in the field of digital security. As a consequence of this thinking, we looked for a diverse team of enthusiastic representatives of knowledge institutes, private and public organizations willing to take up this challenge with an open mind. The first deliverable has been a new executive MSc program cyber security program rooted in the vision sketched above and provided below in figure 4.



Figure 4: Description of the Executive MSc program being executed at the CSA The Hague.

In the implementation phase we asked members of the development team to contribute to the education, in the role of core lecturer (by representatives from knowledge institutes) or in the role of guest lecturer (by representatives of public and private organizations).

Looking at the general set-up of the program, you can easily discover a set of scientific disciplines underlying the program including risk management, law (rules & regulations), IT, governance, management, economics. So the aim is to familiarize students with different scientific perspectives on the general cyber security problem, at different levels (like global level, state level, organization level, up to personal level).

In addition (although not so explicitly shown in the figure), case studies in all kinds of cyber sub-domains are provided to illustrate these perspectives, where the risk management perspective can be considered as the overarching approach. A final remark on the program

concerns the MSc thesis at the end. Here students are challenged to apply the several perspectives, often on a concrete research problem in the cyber security field they are working.

Transfer to research

The creation of a new approach and development and execution of this executive master program became the source for innovative research proposals and the development of a new research group Security and Cyberspace within the new Institute of Security and Global Affairs of Leiden University.

Reflection

Reflecting on how far we have reached we might say having being successful in providing students of this executive MSc program cyber security with a set of scientific approaches, complemented with a variety of 'best practices' used in industry and public organizations. We have been able to do so through excellent public-private cooperation by a group of enthusiastic people with all kinds of backgrounds, based on a common vision, and contributed to new approaches of life-long learning concepts. Actually, this way of cooperating in the design of a new MSc program cyber security created a lot of new, innovative insights for all contributors. It looks like a new way of designing higher education programs complementary to the traditional, research-based design of such programs. The new way of working is thought to be applicable in other cases as well, especially when the domain of study is highly dynamic, complex and still rather uncultivated (in terms of underlying research-based knowledge).

A critical comment should be made here as well. Although the program contains quite a number of different scientific methodological perspectives, we have not been able to integrate these explicitly a set of into truly inter- and transdisciplinary (sometimes called holistic) approaches contributing to new solutions for cyber security problems. Although some commencements might be visible in certain case studies used, the challenge of selecting the right set of methodologies for a given (cyber security) problem is mostly done at an ad-hoc basis now. We need to execute additional research complemented with practical case studies to find more systematic ways of applying transdisciplinary methodologies

Conclusions

Looking back now (four years after the start of the initiative for creating cyber security education for professionals) - while taking into account the development of a vision on both the fundamental challenge of cybersecurity and the methodological aspects of dealing with cybersecurity - we observe having been successful in establishing a multi-disciplinary MSc program cyber security and the creation of a learning community of high potential

professionals in the field of cyber security. This success is largely due to the effective collaboration of quite a number of enthusiastic representatives from knowledge institutes, public and private partners, all willing to contribute with an open mind. This concerns a way of working quite different from the traditional research-based development of higher education programs.

The challenge of providing students with truly transdisciplinary methodologies in the field of cyber security is still in its infancy: we need additional research and practical validation in order to make this a reality.

References

Berg, van der J, Zoggel, van J., Snels, M., Leeuwen, van M., Boeke, S., Koppen, van de L., Lubbe, van der J., Berg, van den B. & Bos, de T. (2014). "On (the Emergence of) Cyber Security Science and its Challenges for Cyber Security Education", winner of the best paper award at the NATO STO/IST-122 symposium in Tallinn.



Regional and Interregional Integrative Dynamics in relation to Cross-border Crises

Naila Maier-Knapp

Research associate at the Human Protection Hub Griffith University and PhD candidate in European Studies at the University of Canterbury

Following the end of the Cold War, both the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been advancing regional and inter-regional integration significantly. While the regional and inter-regional integrative dynamics in connection to these two regional organisations has generally followed institutionalized policy plans and regular procedures, there have been a range of cross-border crises which have had an irregular stimulus and additional impact on regional integration, and to a lesser extent inter-regional integration, of the EU and ASEAN. Because these crises have been commonly of cross-border and cross-sectoral nature, they have raised the urgency for governments to enhance cooperation across national borders as well as consider new sites for coordination, policy-making, and incorporation of new actors and institutions in helping to manage these crisis situations. In spite of this overall opportunity for regional cooperation and hence, regional institutional integration associated with cross-border crises, it is important to note that there are ambiguities and complexities that come with this opportunity.

Recognising especially the more recent impact of cross-border crises in Western Europe, crises – whether subject to construction or not – have raised concerns about state-centrism and nationalist connotations attached to certain issue areas, limiting the extent of regional institutional integration from the outset. In keeping with the cross-sectoral, cross-regional, and crisis-centred research methodology put forward in my previous research, I draw upon two contemporary examples of crisis from Western Europe and Southeast Asia which are related to the themes of organized crime and drug trafficking of the workshop. These are, the homicide in Munich in July 2016 and the case of irregular migration of the stateless Rohingya boatpeople in May 2015. These instances of crisis fall within the broader theme of organized crime and drug trafficking and exemplify how state capacity and statehood have been tested. By drawing upon these more controversial and securitized examples of crisis – yet of similar relevance and sensitivity to the issue of state capacity in the overall context of organized crime and drug trafficking – this presentation emphasizes contemporary dynamics of state-centrism that complicate regional and hence, inter-regional integration. In the evening of the 22 July 2016, one week after the terrorist attack in Nice, a shooting took place

In the evening of the 22 July 2016, one week after the terrorist attack in Nice, a shooting took place
Maier-Knapp, N. (2016) Regional and Interregional Integrative Dynamics in relation to Cross-border Crises38-40

confirmed that this was a lone-wolf homicide, populist sentiments were reignited chiming with a climate of fear in Europe. Concomitantly, this incident triggered a security-oriented discourse in the immediate aftermath, which focused on strengthening police capacity, constitutional change to allow employment of Bundeswehr in the event of a terrorist attack in Germany, capacity-building against cybercrime, and trafficking in small arms. This public discourse concentrated on homeland security and underlined the central role of the state, suggesting the rhetorical nature of Merkel's commitment to greater bilateral cooperation with France and the continued support of EU efforts. Indeed, it was previous terrorist attacks in Paris the year before which had primary effect on regional policy-making in the EU. At meetings at the inter-regional level, there was continued commitment to cooperation with international partners on a variety of concerns regarding terrorism and transnational crime, however, reference to this particular homicide was not made explicitly.

In Southeast Asia, the case of the Rohingya boat people in 2015 is a good case-in-point of this paradox concerning continued state centrality in connection to issues of transboundary nature and effect. Human rights organisations and international media outlets have reported extensively on a boat of stateless Rohingya people left adrift in the Andaman Sea in April and May 2015. Significant international pressure was exerted on the Thai military junta compelling it to act. On the one hand, Thailand and fellow ASEAN member states attempted to appease the international community by relegating this issue to the ASEAN level. On the other, they ensured political unity of ASEAN by underlining that this case was a domestic problem of Myanmar and framed the internationalization of this issue along the lines of the non-interference discourse. Following meetings of ASEAN and partners on the Rohingya boat people, this problem was subsumed under the broader discussion of trafficking in persons within the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime. Mired in a crisis of irregular migration itself, the EU has not pushed for the migration and human trafficking agenda in the inter-regional dialogue with ASEAN. Nevertheless, the European Commission and its delegations in Southeast Asia continue to support research and seminars on this matter by nongovernmental actors to complement the primary official path of resolve between Myanmar and relevant UN institutions.

Through the discussion of the security discourse in the aftermath of the selected crises, it was attempted to demonstrate that certain issue areas of transboundary nature falling within wider understandings of transnational crime may be directed and more favorable to state capacity than regional capacity. Hence, they limit the thematic and institutional depth of regional and interregional integration from the outset and discard generalizations of the causal relationship between regional integration and cross-border crises and challenges. Even though these examples may have neither revealed the utility of the selected crises as a trigger for enhanced policy-making at the regional level nor acted as a stimulant for the inter-regional

EU-ASEAN dialogue, public awareness was raised and has been conducive to incremental institutionalization in the areas of organized crime and drug trafficking. While broaching organized crime and drug trafficking thematically for regional policy-making can circumvent a nationalist backlash associated with other areas, including the aforementioned case of irregular migration, and promote the idea of a common good gradually, these issue areas are still highly sensitive areas to national sovereignty and call for caution.



Critical assessment of EU-Latin American interregional cooperation in fighting drugs and related organized crime

Joren Selleslaghs

PhD candidate at Leiden University, EU Innovation and Funding Consultant at PNO Consultants, member of the Board of Directors of the Europe-Central America Chamber of Commerce (EURACEN)

Nowadays many countries from Latin America are at a turning point in their approach to drugs-related problems. Some of them are questioning the impact of the drug control policies pursued over the last decades, which were mainly focused on law enforcement and reduction of drug supply. As a consequence of these policies, many lives were lost due to drug trafficking, and social problems increased, linked to the fight between cartels for the control of production areas as well as to smuggling. Rather than favoring the so-called “war against drugs”, many Latin Americans now call for a new approach, focusing more on drug demand reduction (i.e. prevention, treatment, risk and harm reduction, social reintegration and rehabilitation – increasingly necessary in the region due to the rising rates of drug consumption).

This has increased the interest of Latin American countries in new, holistic perspectives and strategies such as EU Drugs Strategy and EU’s COPOLAD programme. It can furthermore provide a good opportunity for the EU to reassert itself in the region and try collaboration and cooperation in a geographical region and thematic area traditionally headed by the United States. Nonetheless, if the EU really wants to achieve a considerable impact in supporting Latin America in facing the drug problem and go beyond merely achieving own pre-set goals, it should considerably re-focus most of its programmes and projects so that it matches this ambition. In fact, the EU’s declaratory and operational approach seem to be biased towards combatting the production and trafficking of (illicit) drugs (i.e. ‘supply side’), instead of tackling the issue at its roots in a holistic approach. A critical impact assessment has also shown that the EU has only achieved little real impact on the ground and that it uses different indicators than its Latin-American counterparts to measure possible successes achieved.

By tying in more closely to what the different Latin-American counterparts exactly would like to achieve through EU cooperation mechanisms, as well as bringing social and health indicators more central, the EU’s interregional approach could be considerably strengthened in the area of non-traditional security governance. It seems that the EU and Latin America (still) have different perceptions of the drugs problem and how to deal with it,

which became clearly visible in the run-up for the UNGASS 2016 session were the EU and Latin America's initial position papers/strategies were notably different . In addition, the inexistence of "one" Latin American single voice and a common strategy also further complicates an effective EU region-to-region approach.

By providing a critical assessment of EU-Latin America interregional cooperation in the field of non-traditional security governance and more specifically the EU's interregional approach in supporting Latin America in its fight against illicit drugs, drugs trafficking and organized crime, this presentation aimed at filling a notable academic (and policy-making) gap in the field of EU-driven interregionalism, EU Foreign Policy (analysis) and regionalism/regional security governance studies.

References

- Chanona, A. (2015). "The European Union and Latin America: Facing the Drug-trafficking Challenge", in J. Roy (eds.) *A New Atlantic Community: The European Union, the US and Latin America*, University of Miami, pp. 159-175.
- UNASUR (2015). "Regional Vision of the South American Council on the World Drug problem for UNGASS 2016", *Montevideo, European Union (2016) Common Position on UNGASS 2016*, Brussels.



The Politics of Crisis Management

Dr. Sanneke Kuipers

Associate professor Crisis Governance Research Group Institute of Security and Global Affairs
Leiden University, senior researcher and consultant at Crisisplan BV

Crises are the ultimate test for strategic leadership. But what can we reasonably expect from crisis managers when they need to make critical decisions in the heat of the moment, under conditions of extreme pressure and uncertainty? The book *The Politics of Crisis Management* (see figure 1), by Arjen Boin, Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius, focuses on leadership tasks in crisis management from a political-strategic perspective.

During the ISGA conference, one of its authors—Arjen Boin, professor of Public Institutions and Governance in Leiden—engages in a discussion with a panel of benign critics from practice: Stavros

Zouridis is professor of Public Administration at

Tilburg University and former Director of Strategy at the Ministry of Justice; Peter Bos is Director of the Utrecht Safety Region and former Dutch Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) commander and Ivar Nijhuis is Director of Communications at the Ministry of Security and Justice. This article summarizes three leadership tasks from the book and the reflections by the panel members based on their discussion of cases from practice.

Sense making pertains to assessing what is going on, when the first signals arise. Very often, these signals can only be properly understood as ‘signal’ with hindsight knowledge, as they are just fragmented bits of ambiguous information and noise that policy makers face on a daily basis. Organizations are prone to create blind spots that allow issues to remain unnoticed for long until they suddenly lead to inevitable and unpleasant surprises. Sense making requires proactive detection and assessment of situations but also risk awareness and responsiveness.




Figure 1 Cover second edition book ‘The Politics of Crisis Management’

Zouridis discusses the Schiedammerpark murder case. He claims that the anticipation of accountability influences sense making within and between organizations, which leads to compartmentalization of issues. Additionally, a large gap exists between the perception of incidents—such as a sex offender escaping from prison—as ‘routine’ on the ground (among law and order front line officers) and the political perception of incidents as highly ‘inflammable’ by elected officials.

Decision making and coordination during crises usually needs to be performed under time pressure, based on a lack of reliable information and an incomplete picture of the situation. These conditions are far from ideal for high quality decision making, yet decisions in crises are critical and their consequences are far-reaching. Crises necessitate the ad hoc prioritization and coordination of resources. Both vertical and horizontal coordination are necessary because organizations usually operate in a networked setting where no one has the authority to enforce their decisions or priorities over others.

Bos illustrates this from his experience with coordination issues between different country teams during the USAR mission in response to the Nepal earthquake in 2015. In spite of the urgency to rescue as many people as possible in the first ‘golden’ hours and days after an earthquake, valuable time goes lost due to coordination problems. The authorities in the affected area are determined but often incapable to act decisively. The other countries hesitate who could or should coordinate because of their own political interest in the area or their delicate relation with each other or with the affected authorities. Studies on decision making and coordination should pay more attention to the negotiation dimensions of the coordination task.

Meaning making is a crucial task for strategic leaders because crises lead to profound uncertainty among those directly affected and society at large. It requires that leaders communicate to their own organization and to the outside world how this upsetting situation could best be seen. Leaders can provide reassurance and channel emotions by defining a situation. Their definition must match their actions and decisions in the crisis response in order to be perceived as authentic and consistent. Meaning making brings together all other leadership tasks in crisis: sense making of the situation at hand, crisis communication, decision making on the way forward, learning from previous mistakes. Through meaning making, leaders connect an undesirable situation to a desired future.

Nijhuis recognizes the importance of consistency in rhetoric and action from his experience with the response to the MH-17 crash. He also points out that the proactive positioning and information needs of Parliament put a strong emphasis on accountability from the very start of this crisis.

In short, research on crisis management is nowhere near completion, as there are many challenges ahead. *The Politics of Crisis Management*, just released in a revised second edition

by Cambridge University Press, offers both theoretical inspiration for the practice of crisis response as well as inspiration for practical requests for more future research.



The position of the Islamic State on the security agenda: the end is near?

Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn

PhD candidate and lecturer at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University

In the last few years the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) has gained worldwide attention due to several atrocities and bloody attacks. Time and again this terrorist organisation, that prefers to call itself a state, has been successful in reaching a wide audience. The year 2014 could even be called the ‘Year of IS’ with the proclamation of the Caliphate in June as its ultimate highlight. Within a short amount of time, large areas of Syria and Iraq were controlled by the organisation. During that same period IS began to focus its attacks on the West by beheading Western aid workers and journalists. With the development of an advanced social media strategy, IS quickly formed an online army of supporters. Ultimately, this made the organisation to be seen as one of the largest security threats in the world.

Lately, the group seemed to have lost its momentum, as it is under immense military pressure in parts of Syria and Iraq and has witnessed several strategic losses. The question remains what these military losses, meaning losing territorial control over the Caliphate, will mean for the position of IS on the security agenda. During the ISGA Conference, Alex Schmid (ISGA, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism ICCT), J.M. Berger (George Washington University, ICCT) and Michael Kowalski (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism - NCTV, ISGA) discussed this urgent question during a panel moderated by Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn (ISGA, ICCT).

First of all, the panel stated that it remains difficult to come up with a fruitful answer as much of the outcome is determined by the specific scenario that will arise. Will the organisation be able to hold some of its territory, will the combatants of IS go underground or will they retreat to another battleground, like Libya? Schmid presented six scenarios, in which IS would still exist in five of the scenarios. Berger added another new dimension: the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States of America. According to Berger, his election could have immense consequences for an “US-Russia”-axis. This could also reinforce groups like Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. Although these Al Qaeda-aligned groups may have received little attention in the last couple of years, they have certainly not disappeared. Berger said Al Qaeda could be seen as more political than extremist, while IS should be seen as the opposite. When looking at the current social media usage of IS, Berger states that their online army has already been decimated.

The utopian and apocalyptic narrative of the organisation is also under pressure. Strikingly, the city of Dabiq which plays a central role in this narrative has been abandoned without much bloodshed. According to Berger, the cynical character of the apocalyptic narrative is reflected in the fact that IS only employs it when it is convenient. Kowalski set out some consequences based on several dimensions. When we for example analyse IS from an operational level, we will witness more fighters who will return, who possibly also suffer from psychological problems. Kowalski also stressed the instability in Europe, a theme which Schmid too mentioned in his discussion about migration, and highlighted several societal developments concerning polarization and non-jihadist related terrorist threats.

The discussion with the audience showed that although IS as an organisation could be under pressure, this does not necessarily affect the strength and attractiveness of jihadism. It could for example function as an ideal moment for other jihadist groups to step forward. Other attendees pointed out that military means should not be regarded the solution to the conflict and to address the breeding grounds of terrorism. In the end, the problem is political, and that is where a solution needs to be found. Although IS is losing its dominant position, a situation in which another reincarnation of jihadism in the Middle East will arise in the years to come remains a rather unfortunate but realistic possibility.



Islamic State and the security agenda: the end is near?

J.M. Berger

Researcher, analyst and consultant on extremism, fellow International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) The Hague, affiliate of SAFE Lab Columbia University

Berger discussed the outcome of the U.S. election and some of its likely ramifications on global terrorism. It is not clear whether the new administration will implement policies uniformly in line with rhetoric voiced during and after the campaign, but at least some of the following outcomes are now squarely within the realm of possibility. This includes possibility the United States will affirmatively align in favor of Bashar al Assad's prosecution of the Syrian Civil War, rhetorically or substantively. Such an alignment could revitalize the migration of foreign fighters to the conflict, as well as increasing the risk of terrorist attacks outside of Syria and Iraq.

The United States seems poised to resume a more robust program of support for autocratic regimes in the Middle East. For al Qaeda, this is a return to its foundational talking points, which may enhance perceptions of its relevance within jihadi and radicalized communities relative to the Islamic State. However, the centrality of U.S. support in maintaining the cohesion of the coalition against ISIS raises the prospect that a reduced role for American diplomacy could cause the coalition to function less effectively, or dissolve completely.

Increased incidents of hostility toward Muslims in the West, which are already taking place, may create an environment in which typical ISIS recruitment targets may be more prone to mobilize as individual actors. Finally, the new administration is not likely to continue the current administration's focus on countering violent extremism (CVE) and outreach to Muslim communities, either domestically or abroad. It is well within the realm of possibility that all U.S. efforts and funding currently under the CVE umbrella will be discontinued.

Finally, the last two presidential administrations have made extraordinary efforts to emphasize that the United States is not at war with Islam. This is a crucial message for many reasons, including but not limited to radicalization risks, the credibility of CVE efforts, diplomacy with Muslim nations, and the cohesion of military coalitions. Messaging that undercuts or reverses this longstanding position may have cascading negative consequences for efforts to fight terrorism.



What is the future of ISIS and what is its status on the security agenda?

Prof. dr. Alex P. Schmid

Visiting Research Fellow International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, director of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and associate professor at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs of Leiden University

Let me begin by noting that the second part of the title of this panel, ‘...the end is near’ is ambiguous: is it the end of a military campaign against the Islamic State’s Caliphate or is it the ‘End of Times’ as featured in the Apocalypse – that final battle between Good and Evil which is supposed to bring history to an end as the Day of Judgment has come when Allah will save only those who are worthy to be saved which, first of all, supposedly includes the jihadists who fought for his cause. Al Baghdadi has called for ‘total war’, which reminds one of the last days of the Third Reich (with Josef Goebbels call “Wollt ihr den totalen Krieg?”) – a Nazi empire which was supposed to last a thousand years but the nightmare of National Socialism ended after twelve.

The Islamic State in Iraq is only ten years old and the Caliphate it proclaimed little more than two years. According to one Hadith the apocalyptic battle was supposed to take place in Dabiq close to the Syrian-Turkish border but since the village of that name was given up in October 2016 without a fight by Daesh, the question arises whether the fight for Mosul will be more apocalyptic. One apocalyptic scenario could be that the fragile Mosul Dam will be dynamited or hit by rockets and the house-high waves of the waters coming down will flood and wash away the Mosul with its one and a half million people. Fortunately, the Mosul Dam is in the hands of the Peshmerga so Mosul will not be washed away by a flood. Given the fact that IS fighters are building underground tunnels to defend the Mosul, they would have been among the first to drown – so this worst case scenario is an *impossible scenario*.

While we cannot know the future, we can make scenarios of *possible* and more or less *probable* futures. I offer you five, beginning with the most positive scenario.

1. *Happy end scenario with victory over ISIS and creation of two federal states in Iraq and Syria*

Mosul will fall and before the end of the year Raqqa will also fall – like before Palmyra, Tikrit and Fallujah have fallen. These blows will deprive the Caliphate of its territorial state character and damage the ISIS brand so much that those foreign IS provinces from Nigeria to the Sinai to Afghanistan and all the way to Uzbekistan and Philippines will before long also crumble. As the full extent of ISIS’ crimes against humanity become known when people from the liberated conflict zones are able to tell their stories and documentary evidence of the crimes of

ISIS are made public, the very idea of jihad is losing much of its attraction among Muslims and converts to Islam. At the same time both Iraq and Syria are divided into ethnically and religiously separate political units which together will form a decentralised federal state, where Sunnis, Kurds, Shi'ites, Assyrians, Turkmen, Yazidis and other minorities have their own territorial base, as recently proposed by Russia for Syria. That happy scenario based on religious and ethnic separation of those locked in combat has one drawback - it is improbable.

2. *The second scenario is one of protracted urban warfare in Iraq and Syria*

Neither Mosul nor Raqqa will fall within the next half year as Abu Bakr al Baghdadi called for taking a stand with honour rather than withdraw. A model of what could happen in Mosul and - to a lesser extent - in Raqqa is Sirte in Libya - a town of 80,000 people where Col. Gaddafi came from. Militias linked to one of the two governments in Libya have attacked the city of Sirte with ground forces for half a year while the United States provided heavy air support. This has been going on since May 2016 but parts of Sirte are still in the hands of a few hundred fighters from the Islamic State. At the same time, heavy US aerial attacks turned much of Sirte into ruins. During the Vietnam war one US general was quoted as saying: 'in order to liberate the town we had to destroy it'. If Mosul with its more than one million mainly Sunni civilians who are trapped there and used as human shields suffers the same fate as Sirte and looks like the rebel-held parts of Aleppo in the end, a backlash in public opinion might ensue in the Arab and Muslim world and the victory might be pyrrhic. The resistance of ISIS with its 3,000 - 4,500 fighters in Mosul would then be seen as heroic and lone actors all over the world might intensify attacks in intervening countries to take revenge and to take the pressure from Mosul and Raqqa. This is a probable scenario.

3. *Scenario number three would consist of a withdrawal into the desert*

and hiding among Sunni tribes to continue guerrilla warfare from the underground. This scenario resembles the one of the Taliban in Afghanistan after the post-9/11 American attacks when they were driven from Kabul and Kandahar, fled to Pakistan and went underground - only to resurface later. It also resembles what happened after the Anbar 'surge' of General Petraeus in Iraq after 2007. The Islamic State in Iraq went underground and reorganised itself with the help of former Baathist party-, military- and intelligence officials whom the Salafi jihadists had met in Camp Bucca.

Many Sunnis of Iraq, squeezed between the Kurds in the North and revengeful Shi'ites in the South might yet team up with ISIS and provide the backdrop of a comeback of ISIS later on, secretly supported by some of the Gulf States. If in the past ISIS had been more modest and concentrated on consolidating support among the Sunnis rather than expand into Syria

and create provinces abroad, they might have had a greater chance to establish a permanent state but now the chances of it are smaller. Much will depend on how the Shi'a dominated government in Baghdad treats the people of Mosul and Niniveh and Sunni's in general. If the present Abadi government is not doing much better to give the Shia a fairer share of political power than they had under Maliki, and revenge attacks against Sunni civilians escalate, ISIS is bound to profit from such short-sighted intransigence. This is not an improbably scenario.

4. *Shift of Caliphate 's seat to other country*

The fourth scenario would be one where ISIS declares one of its eight recognized provinces (wilayat) abroad to be the new centre of the Caliphate, given its need to have a territorial base. Here the question is which of its provinces abroad would lend itself as new seat of the Caliphate. None of them are doing particularly well – whether you look at Nigeria, Somalia, the Sinai, Afghanistan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Libya, the North Caucasus, Uzbekistan or the Philippines. These local ISIS chapters are partly mainly virtual and partly contested, with one local faction of an existing insurgent group favouring independence and the other accepting submission to ISIS (as in Nigeria). While Al-Qaeda has been able to forge alliances with other militant groups in the countries where it operates, ISIS has always aimed at total submission of partners – something which generally does not go down well with local militants. This is an unlikely scenario. A survival of ISIS' Caliphate in the virtual online world alone might not be long-lasting even though the current Caliph has already named a successor should he die in Mosul.

5. *The fifth scenario would be one where the fight is transported by returning foreign fighters back into the heartland of the intervening countries*

especially European ones. Returning foreign fighters would recruit and train the next generation of jihadists and also conduct operations in Western countries, focusing on spectacular operations that would suggest strength so as to persuade young Muslims in diaspora situations to join them. The increased repression by counter-terrorism forces and the further rise of xenophobic populism in Western Europe would create growing polarisation between host societies and Muslim diaspora members and reduce the so-called Grey Zone, with more mainstream Muslims feeling discriminated, marginalised and, as a consequence, ready to support the jihadists. This is probably the most likely scenario.

6. *The sixth scenario would be one where ISIS is trying to increase the number of displaced people and asylum seekers and use migrants as a weapon*

Already in 2014 ISIS threatened to flood Europe with half a million refugees from Libya and also claimed to have inserted 4,000 terrorists among the refugees and migrants, ready to

attack. If Western Europe could indeed be saddled with more than one million asylum seekers year after year and if the integration of these migrants leaves much to be desired, the European Union might face a crisis of solidarity. Unable to accommodate all the incoming migrants, some of the asylum seekers might get disappointed and might allow themselves to be recruited or end up in organized crime. Former ISIS terrorist themselves, having returned to their home countries, might use their skills acquired in the caliphate, to bring organised crime in Europe – based on people smuggling, arms smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, bank robberies and drugs trafficking to a new level – similar to Mexico.

In five of these scenarios ISIS does not disappear as Al –Qaeda in the past has not been disappeared after the expulsion from Afghanistan or killing of Bin Laden ten years later. In the end Al –Qaeda and ISIS are both manifestations of a broader jihadist movement – one that has been around since at least 1928 when the Muslim Brotherhood was founded and which existed already in the 19th century. ISIS and Al-Qaeda might yet converge again once the personality clashes between Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi have come to an end.

Security and Society Research Agenda

This brings me to the Security and Security Research Agenda. There are four things that require priority attention:

- (i) We have to broaden our approach and not just study terrorist attacks but see such incidents as part of broader terrorist campaigns – these should be the unit of analysis.
- (ii) We also have to see such campaigns in terms of action-reaction patterns and study counter-terrorism – including counter-productive counter-terrorism – with the same vigour as terrorism.
- (iii) We have to overcome our short-sighted focus on individual terrorist groups and start to study the dynamics of the broader social or religious movements of which they are part. Movements, rather than groups ought to be the unit of analysis.
- (iv) We also have to move away from mere prevention and control of terrorism to the prevention and resolution of conflicts. Unresolved conflicts that drag on for years and decades create bitterness and resentment and that, in turn, leads to terrorism as a nihilistic response to a lack of perspective.

There are about 100,000 jihadist terrorists in the world. However, what frightened me, when I recently studied public opinion surveys among Muslims in Muslim-majority countries as well as in Western diasporas, is the degree of sympathy and support these jihadists enjoy among

young people. While it is true that most dissatisfied young people – those who feel discriminated, marginalised without a decent job and career prospects – do not join a terrorist group, it is a frightening phenomenon that up to 200 million Muslims have in various opinion surveys expressed varying degrees of sympathy and support not only for some of the goals of jihadists, but for some of their methods, including suicide terrorism against civilians when it is done in defense of Islam.

Jihadism is the revolutionary paradigm of our age. Communism tried and succeeded to mobilize people on the basis of *class*, Nazism did the same on the basis of *race* and Islamist jihadists now do it on the basis of *faith*. Islamism is a movement like the Communist movement or the Fascist movement and it will not go away anytime soon. The Salafist Jihadists exploit dozens of real local conflicts and unless we address these local conflicts which might in some cases be ethnic rather than sectarian. we cannot contain and ultimately defeat the jihadist.



Multidimensional conflict management and the complex nature of peacemaking

Dr. Paul Meerts

Senior Research Associate and former Deputy Director of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” in The Hague; Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges; and Member of the Steering Committee of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program

The word negotiation comes from “nec otium,” Latin for not being idle. The word might be compared with Hannah Arendt’s (Arendt, 1958) distinction between “work” and “labor.” While labor is what the slaves do, the same thing over and over again, work is what the merchant does: add value by trading with the products of the slave’s labor. Through exchange, they add value and that is exactly what we hope for in negotiation, the so-called integrative or win–win mode. Sometimes they will not represent themselves, but might be an agent for somebody else, such as rulers or councils, and can prove that they are legitimate by showing their opponent a paper, or “diploma.”

Before Roman times, negotiators in the Middle East already concluded treaties, the contents of which have been found on clay tablets. The rulers, however, struggled with the problems of confidence and trust. Could they rely on the word of their opponent, as treason and poisoning were normal features in negotiations in their palaces and across the borders? More importantly, why should sovereigns trust each other, if they each sought the “raison d’état,” the interest of the state? Trust was not of much help; forcing, instead, the other party to live up to the agreement was a much more effective instrument. One way to secure the treaty was indeed to threaten a new war, in cases where the other party did not implement the treaty.

Another way could be to exchange hostages as a guarantee for compliance, which was exactly what the Pharaoh of Egypt and the King of the Hittites did when they concluded a treaty after a ferocious war that ended with a mutual hurting stalemate. Intermarrying was another tool for creating some kind of security. The Emperor of Byzantium married the daughter of his adversary, the Khagan of the Khazars, and thereby turned him into an ally. But these solutions could be volatile: your ally of today can be your enemy of tomorrow, and vice versa. Therefore, it is better to let your enemy live when he is not a threat anymore, at least not in the near future; respect your opponent; and have empathy in order to understand his motives. However, empathy is not the same as sympathy.

Diplomatic conferences were essentially bilateral meetings between two absolute rulers or the councils of city states, which sometimes negotiated directly, but normally sent their

envoys to bargain with the other party. In Renaissance times, the Italian city-states not only used special representatives, but also established more or less permanent diplomatic posts in each other's towns. Diplomacy thus gained some stability, and stability is, as we have already seen, beneficial for effective negotiation. Machiavelli, for example, saw the importance of this and advised for regulating diplomatic relations in one way or another. Bilateral diplomacy thus slowly but surely became more complex, as more adversaries had to deal with more conflicts between them. Yet bilateral negotiation was not always enough to settle disputes, so mediators were asked to help the opponents to solve their mutual problems.

The next step was conferences in which more than two parties participated. The most famous of the early conferences were those held in Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in the Holy Roman Empire of German nations as well as the Eighty Years War between the Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of the United Netherlands. Westphalia changed the meaning of sovereignty.

The Peace of Westphalia, which was concluded in 1648 through a series of bilateral negotiations in the cities of Münster and Osnabrück, declared that all countries were equal, although some remained more equal than others. This conference is widely seen as the mother of all diplomatic conferences and the beginning of the era of regimes, as it was helpful in creating more effective negotiation processes as an alternative to warfare (Holsti, 1991). Essentially, the conference was an assembly of conferences. The parties came together in official ceremonial meetings, in which precedence played a major role, as is still the case nowadays, although precedence was regulated in the Vienna Convention in 1961, whereby it became much less of a hindrance than in the past. These formal meetings were not important, but acted like focal points, as some conferences do in modern times. The real bargaining took place elsewhere, and most of the time in secret. In the case of Westphalia, the countries negotiated in each other's dormitories, often indirectly through Italian mediators – from the Pope and Venice – who studied their letters and often pressed for changes to make the demands more negotiable. Interestingly, a first attempt was made to keep the peace through legitimate intervention by France and Sweden in Germany. It was understood that sanctions were necessary in the case of non-implementation.

The next milestone was the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, which put an end to the first – kind of – world war, with whose outcomes Europe is still struggling (Gibraltar, for example). The colonies were taken into the final settlement, and for a few years the peace could more or less be kept. The negotiations were still bilateral, albeit in the context of one conference.

One hundred years later, the Vienna conference of 1814–1815 became the first plurilateral negotiation. Not yet multilateral, as the number of real negotiating parties was kept at five, which seems to be a convenient setting as today's UN Security Council has five parties as the most influential, permanent decision-makers. The five of Vienna were Russia,

Austria, Prussia, Great Britain and – as a latecomer – France. Interestingly, the rulers realized that they should not exclude a major power like France, even if France had lost the war. Excluded, however, were the other interested countries and parties – such as the German Jews, for example – whose representatives were kept busy by operas, ballets, balls, excursions, and all kinds of other festivities. The inner circle of negotiating parties decided for them, although they did give some influence to middle powers such as Bavaria, as go-between. A renewed attempt was made to force the parties to live up to their agreements through the creation of the Holy Alliance in 1815.

In the late eighteenth century, more and more diplomatic conferences were held to avoid war, such as the Berlin conferences in 1878, 1884 and 1885. These plurilateral negotiations came to blossom in the twentieth century, with the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, ending the First World War, as another major event in the history of diplomacy. Like in Vienna, representatives of hundreds of sovereignties presented their credentials in Paris, but only five were included in the inner circle: the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan. Moreover, the negotiation was de facto trilateral, as Japan did not really participate and the role of Italy was comparatively weak. Other countries did have a more important role to play in Paris than in Vienna, and in separate meetings they could voice their concerns. In that sense a multilateral process surrounded the “exclusive zone.” Some “outsiders” were particularly successful, including Romania and Poland. Others, such as Germany and the fledgling Soviet Union as major powers, were kept outside the process of negotiation. As we know, this exclusion had grave consequences for the future. Inclusion creates an effective negotiation process, but exclusion is the source of ineffective implementation.

The Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907 were multilateral meetings in which all of the parties negotiated on an equal footing, and as a consequence they ended without a substantial outcome, apart from the decision to create a Permanent Court of Arbitration. The League of Nations (1919-1946) could be regarded as the first full-fledged multilateral negotiation process, but like the Hague Peace Conferences it was highly ineffective. Until the middle of the twentieth century, bilateral, trilateral and plurilateral negotiations dominated the political and diplomatic scene, like those in Munich in 1938 with Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France, and during and after the Second World War with the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. It was only with the San Francisco Conference in 1945 – which created the United Nations – that a reasonably effective multilateral diplomatic conference came into existence, be it with a strong plurilateral nucleus: the United Nations Security Council.

Of course, in all the other conferences afterwards, some major powers continued to dominate the smaller powers. Yet through the institutionalization of rules and regulations, these conferences became true regimes with their own roles to play and their own interests to

defend, but all the while protecting and channeling negotiation processes to their conclusion, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of conference diplomacy and the processes of international negotiation, while also securing and sanctioning their implementation.



Creating New Conflicts through Peacebuilding: The Case of Religious Violent Extremism in Kosovo through Life Stories⁵

Dr. Arlinda Rrustemi

Researcher and lecturer Institute of Security and Global Affairs Leiden University

Interferences by the international community in fragile zones are frequent. The nature of interventions ranges across political, military and economic aspects. Some academics argue that they create a gap between the international and local communities (Lemay-Hébert 2011; Richmond 2014). The liberal policies of the international community emphasize the institutional approaches, such as rebuilding basic state functions: security, justice and administration. The establishment of a democratic state regime is believed to more likely through this approach. This in turn facilitates democratic peace theory that calls to promote democratic regimes since the likelihood of the world to become more peaceful rises.

The “local turn” scholars have criticized the liberal peace approach. Richmond argues that the liberal peace theory is hegemonous as it undermines liberal social contract and treats locals colonially (Richmond, 2009a). It prioritizes ‘elites and institutions over societies and everyday life’ (Richmond, 2009a, p. 586). Furthermore ‘material power matters more than everyday life’ (Richmond, 2010, pp. 666–669). Most importantly, social justice is neglected despite that various aspects of it play an important role in peace and state building processes (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, 780). It also ‘fails to develop engagement with everyday life, local culture, identity, and the emotional and psychological issues arising in post-conflict situations’ (Richmond, 2009a, p. 569). Therefore ‘unintended consequences’ arise in post war zones (Lemay-Hébert 2011; Richmond 2014). Hence this article sheds light on how the international attempts of peacebuilding in post conflict zones unintentionally create new conflicts, such as the rise of religious violent extremism among local population in Kosovo.

Beni’s life story, a male from a Kosovo village, provides more light to the ongoing discussions on the negative side effects from the international community’s involvement in Kosovo. More specifically, it uncovers the unintended consequences of creating new forms of violence, such as religious violent extremism. Beni, a religious, highly educated and a married man, comes from a middle class family. He has been educated abroad and has fought in all wars in former Yugoslavia. After the war, he decided to return in Kosovo to assist the post war reconstruction process. He focused on defending the cultural values, meaning Islam.

He decided to establish an Islamic movement “Mother” to re-establish respect towards Islam and deter the threat posed by international and local community. He aims to fight various economic and cultural injustices that became more visible during the post conflict reconstruction phase. He aspires to ‘undoubtedly’ achieve religious tolerance, meaning to practice and wear headscarves and hijabs. Economically, he aims to shift from materialism and corruption to a shared economy by delivering services to people in need. He aims to deter the perceived economic inequality between the poor and rich in Kosovo where some citizens are billionaires while others lack basic needs, such as housing and food. Sharing is understood as the rich citizens providing for the poor citizens if they have excessive economic resources. He targets youth since he believes that they can achieve their social and economic ambitions within the movement. He plans also to expand not only in Balkans but also in Europe through diaspora. The latter he believes are treated as ‘second class’ citizens in Europe.

Resistance to the movement by the local and international authorities is expressed mostly through regular interrogations of the movement members and office searches. Beni argues that the movement is confronted with a constant pressure from Kosovo’s Police and European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo [EULEX]. Both authorities interrogated the movement members about their activities and interests, but also about whether Kosovo is “a secular state” or “Europe”, alleging of being members of “radicalism” and of being “fundamentalists” and “Taliban”. Furthermore, in his private conversations with KFOR international officials, he faced similar offenses. This in turn strengthened his motivation to continue with his work at the movement.

Beni drew lessons from experiencing the wars in former Yugoslavia, claiming that “knowing the human horrors, suffering and injustice which I, as a soldier, learned, experienced in wars, the humanitarian aspect is above everything else”. He participated in an action to free a Muslim city where several workers died. After his unexpected survival, he started working for the “Mother” movement. While he wants to be “in the service of Islam and in protection of the rights of Muslims”, he expects “only challenges and punishment” and no “privileges or benefits”. He expects his vision to start materializing only after twenty years, but is certain that “[it] will triumph”.⁶ His readiness to sacrifice his life for other Muslim brothers illustrates his devotion to Islam and that injustices conducted towards Muslims worldwide need to be countered. For him, the Islamic dimension provides the movement with legitimacy as it corresponds to the local needs that have emerged after the war: “It is based on fair judgment, social and economic equality, justice for everyone without taking into account the [political] functions [and economic status]”. He rejects human rights, democracy and other exported ideas from the West, such homosexuality and cohabitation.

⁶ Beni, p.27

Currently, he is being persecuted on terrorism grounds by the local authorities of the Republic of Kosovo. The judicial proceedings are ongoing. It is important to understand the motivations that led him to attempt to sacrifice his own life to assist other Muslim brothers, the abovementioned religious and economic grievances, and the pressure faced by the international and local authorities. Despite that whether he is guilty is unknown, the international community, the local authorities and the liberal and post liberal scholars need to be take into account his grievances in order to create a sustainable and inclusive state and peace building process in Kosovo.

References

- This article is based on the PhD thesis 'Statebuilding through Life Stories: Incorporating Local Perspectives' by Dr. Arlinda Rustemi LLM, 29 September 2016 and <http://www.leidensafetyandsecurityblog.nl/articles/how-international-actors-unintentionally-contribute-to-kosovos-extremism-a>
- Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas. 2011. "The Bifurcation of the Two Worlds: Assessing the Gap between Internationals and Locals in State-Building Processes." *JOUR. Third World Quarterly* 32 (10). Taylor & Francis: 1823–41.
- Mac Ginty, Roger, and Oliver Richmond. 2013. "The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace." *JOUR. Third World Quarterly* 34 (5). Taylor & Francis: 763–83.
- Richmond, Oliver. 2009. "A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday." *JOUR. Review of International Studies* 35 (3). Cambridge Univ Press: 557–80. 2010. "Resistance and the Post Liberal Peace." *JOUR. Millennium-Journal of International Studies*. Sage Publications. 2014. "The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace: Negative or Positive?" *JOUR. Cooperation and Conflict*. SAGE Publications, 10836714537053.



Multidimensional conflict management and the complex nature of peacemaking

Prof. dr. Isabelle Duyvesteyn

Professor of International Studies / Global History at the Leiden University Institute for History and Special Chair in Strategic Studies at the Leiden University Institute of Political Science

The contribution by Prof. Duyvesteyn to the ISGA Conference focused on the challenges, both practical and scientific, related to the desire to manage conflict and to make peace. Currently there is no over-arching theory on how external parties can help others build a state and/or a viable and legitimate political order. Based on state-building theory, which has been largely informed by the experiences in early Modern Europe, these processes tended to take place bottom-up. Current practices, however, operate on the belief that state-building can be stimulated from the top-down by focusing on institutions, introducing democracy and tackling all state domains at the same time. There is no scientific proof, however, that indeed state-building works this way. A legitimate political order emerges when the state actors are able and capable to provide a social contract initially based on the provision of security. It is exactly in this domain where the interveners take over, potentially robbing the state of its most powerful instrument to legitimate itself.



Human Right tickle the security (research) agenda

Dr. Doutje Lettinga

Senior policy advisor Amnesty International The Netherlands

In her presentation, Dr. Doutje Lettinga presented work on Amnesty International The Netherlands security and human rights. After giving a short introduction about Amnesty, Doutje discussed in more detail the sections' work on communications surveillance and counterterrorism. Amnesty recognizes that states need to provide security to their citizens, including their human right to life, and that they should be able to take effective and targeted security measures, but always within the limits of the law, including international human rights law. Hence, measures should be necessary, specific, proportionate and adequately supervised. Doutje made a case that security and human rights are integral, complementary and mutually reinforcing. In other words, that respecting human rights and the rule of law is essential to maintaining security, in the same way as one cannot enjoy human rights without a decent level of security.



Watch Out 4 the Label Terrorist!: The Dutch Local Person Specific Approach to Countering Terrorism and (Violent) Extremism Reviewed

Josien Roodnat

Researcher, Senze

Mr. dr. Quirine Eijkman

Lector (professor) Access2Justice, Centre for Social Innovation (KSI) Utrecht University of Applied Sciences / Senior-Researcher Security & the Rule of Law, Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) Leiden University

For over a decade the Dutch authorities have developed their so-called ‘comprehensive or broad approach’ to counter terrorism and violent extremism. This entails that, on the one hand, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization measures focus on identifying, monitoring and de-radicalising potential violent extremist (the hard or repressive approach) and, on the other hand, on anticipating to the risk of radicalisation and terrorism, fighting discrimination and polarisation, fostering social cohesion and stimulating the socio-economic integration of (religious) minorities (the soft - or preventive approach).

A key local preventive measure is the person-specific intervention including mental health care or temporarily revoking someone’s passport. These measures are mostly executed by the Minister of Security and Justice or otherwise the local executive (the Mayor). The person specific approach has no explicit legal basis in Dutch law but is a policy based on administrative or criminal law and predates the 2014 Comprehensive Action Plan to Combat Jihadism. At the municipal level these measures are implemented on a ‘case-based analysis’ on the basis of information as provided by the Counter-Terrorism Information box (CT-Infobox) to local stakeholders, including the Mayor, the police, public prosecutor’s office, social professionals.

In the context of the person-specific intervention the locally integrated approach appears to be important. Even though recent evaluative research concludes that the effect of the local person-specific intervention is not clear, it continues to be a key policy area.[1] Simultaneously, concerns in relation to access to justice for those affected by anticipatory administrative measures exist. The administrative bills and acts that legalize the intervention against people do not have a clear link to established legal principles. For example, there are vague definitions such as the criterion of ‘grounded presumption’ in the Bill the ‘Temporary Administrative Powers Counter-Terrorism Act’, which entails that a person can be connected to terrorist activities or the support of such activities based on the behavior of that person. This is fairly broad and has no basis in Dutch (criminal) law.

This preliminary study presentation focuses on the basis of exploratory research methods, 10 semi-structured interviews with local professionals in three municipalities and document analysis, on the question whether or not local stakeholders feel that there a person-specific intervention in the

Netherlands sorts effect. Furthermore, it reflects on their perspective on the need for access to justice. It concludes that local professionals find it plausible that the personal approach to deal with (religious) extremism sorts (some) effect. One condition is, according to them, that it consists of context specific involvement with a realistic goal. An intervention strategy must therefore be context dependent. Also, they need to be deployed and always be balanced relative to each other. Nonetheless, it remains a learning approach. Depending on the degree to which a person is radicalized one is able to monitor the person concerned, or to achieve disengagement of radical behavior. Important for the individualized approach are a solid network of partners and key figures. Additionally, as far as possible, an expert in interpretation of indications and proper exchange of information between the various (local) professionals. Also, the exchange of information between local - and national partners plays an important role. However, in practice this is sometimes an issue and therefore has implications for the local implementation of person specific approach. It appears to be easier to achieve in so-called prioritized municipalities, which receive extra funding, than in (smaller) not prioritized municipalities. Last but not least, this report recommends to explore more in-depth the possibilities of securing the local integrated approach to counter (violent) extremism and terrorism within regular processes of both non - as well prioritized municipalities and cooperation with regard to disclosure of the (national) government.

Regarding access to justice local professionals see especially a great responsibility in the identification of individuals and groups at 'risk'. At the same time, there is little regard for the legal protection of subject of administrative measures, which have not been taken by the professionals themselves. The local professionals appear to want to prevent people from wrongly get a terrorist, extremist or radical stamp. This is because the risk-label can have far-reaching social consequences for the person concerned. Local professionals make considerable efforts to interpret the risk posed by individuals or groups adequately, the "daring to cross off of names of local lists'. Also they are concerned about the privacy of those involved. According to local professionals, more exchange of information is required; where there should always be a balance between the security of society and the privacy of the individual. The question, however, remains, whether this deliberation should be considered in this particular way? And, whether or not the balance between security of the majority versus a violation of a right of a specific person is not a form of anticipatory justice. Partly as a result of this outcome, it is advisable to do follow-up research that focuses not only on the effect of the Dutch local integrated approach, but also on the need for (material) legal protection with regard to particular administrative measures from the perspective of all concerned stakeholders.

Editorial policy

The Journal of Security and Global Affairs (SGA), published in open access by the [Institute of Security and Global Affairs](#) at Leiden University, is a refereed publication, and manuscripts go through a blind review process. The focus of SGA is on a wide array of security topics and issues, providing a platform for the analysis of key issues within security and global affairs. In doing so, SGA aims to generate new ideas and improve the management of safety and security. These include, but are not limited to, items pertaining to the terrorism and counterterrorism, cybersecurity and cybercrime, political violence, innovative practices, policy development and implementation, evaluative research and the (global) players engaged in these enterprises. Taking a multidisciplinary approach, SGA seeks to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and good practice. SGA publishes original articles that utilize a broad range of methodologies and international perspectives when examining pressing issues in safety and security across the globe.

Guidelines

Contributions should not exceed 5000 words including references, figures and tables. Contributions should begin with a brief abstract of about 100 words. Submissions should be typewritten, double-spaced, with footnotes, references, tables, and charts on separate pages. All manuscripts should follow the format specified in the Chicago Manual of Style (author-date).

Manuscripts will be sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, so the author's name, affiliation, and contact information should be included on separate cover page. In addition, any references should be removed that may identify the author such as unpublished work by the author or other work closely associated with the author. If included, authors should anonymize these references by citing the work as "Identifying reference" and listing these sources as part of the cover letter to the Editor. These references should not be included in the Reference section.


Submission of the manuscript for consideration by Security and Global Affairs implies that it has not been previously published and is not under consideration elsewhere.

Stay in touch

-  www.universiteitleiden.nl/en
-  leidensafetyandsecurityblog.nl
-  [Twitter.com/ISGA_Hague](https://twitter.com/ISGA_Hague)
-  [Facebook.com/faculteitfgga](https://facebook.com/faculteitfgga)

Contact information

E: isga@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
T: +31 (0) 70 80 09 506



**Universiteit
Leiden**
The Netherlands