


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Foreword

Adrianus Koetsenruijter

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It is my pleasure to be invited to provide a short foreword to this collection of analyses on the practice of EU foreign policy in Latin America. EU-Latin America relations build on a broad and common basis of shared history, shared experiences, strong economic ties and social and societal ties. We have strong mutual interests in regional integration and social cohesion. Likewise, EU-Latin America relations are characterized by ever increasing trade and investment flows. Both regions have a strong focus on climate change and how to tackle it. Related to the latter are our mutual interests in sustainable development and in increasing cooperation in renewable energies, ecosystem and water management.

The EU's relations with Latin America have grown and evolved over decades of country-level, sub-regional and bi-regional cooperation. It is axiomatic that no news is good news: EU-Latin America relations may get less attention than other bi-regional relations because they are generally good. Latin American countries have become largely dynamic democracies; this has allowed a strengthening of our mutual ties. EU investments in Brazil are greater than EU investments in Russia and China combined. EU trade with Latin America has doubled in the space of a decade, and we have preferential trade agreements with 26 out of the 33-member Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), including free trade agreements with Chile, Mexico, Colombia and Peru. The EU is also negotiating a trade agreement with the Mercosur grouping of countries that includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Both Europe and Latin America face challenges globally and at home. Conflicts over land and resources have been resurgent in recent years. New types of threats for example to cybersecurity have emerged. Our relationship is not static but continues to evolve in the face of new challenges. As the EU seeks to strengthen capacity in security and defence as mandated by the EU's Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (2016), Latin American countries have already started to participate in high-level reflections on joint security cooperation with the EU. Meeting sustainable development goals (SDGs) under Agenda 2030 are an essential

objective for all of us in addressing health, climate, environment, education and governance issues among others. The SDGs will be an ever-present subject in EU-Latin American relations, providing scope for development cooperation but also more triangular cooperation (joint assistance in development) as more Latin American countries move into the bracket of high-income countries.

I welcome the work of Joren Selleslaghs and his co-contributors in adding to reflections on the workings – including successes and failings - of EU foreign policy in practice, as set out in the following chapters.

About the author(s)

Adrianus Koetsenruijter is a Dutch career diplomat and currently working for the European External Action Service where he is the head of division for MERCOSUR countries. Prior to that, he was the EU ambassador in Tunisia and Libya (2008-2012) and the EU Ambassador in Colombia and Ecuador (2003-2008).



Introduction – Latin America: just another walk in the park for the EU?

Joren Selleslaghs

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Relations between Europe and Latin America have a long and deep-seated history, yet it has always been more on the sideline than at the center stage of most European foreign policies (The Guardian, 2012). Apart from the upswing in the 1980's as a direct consequence of the accession of Spain and Portugal towards the European Community, European Union (EU)-Latin America relations always stayed in the loom and has been referred to as "the other" Transatlantic Relationship. Today, Latin America is not on the top political concern of Europeans with the refugee crisis still unfolding, an increased amount of terrorist threats and an institutionalist/identity crisis as a consequence of the unexpected Brexit. Nor is Europe on the highest political agenda for Latin America as Brazil and Venezuela are going through serious political turmoil, Ecuador is recovering from a heavy earthquake and all Latin American diplomatic efforts are currently focused on the possible implications the US-Cuban rapprochement may have for the rest of the region. Yet, developing a well-endowed strategic relationship with Latin America is of utmost importance for the EU in a longer-term perspective. In fact, there is more EU investment in Latin America than in Russia, India and China combined and in the coming years, Latin America will grow at three times the rate of the EU. Latin America is rising, even if European exporters seem to be fixated almost exclusively on Brazil's and Mexico's impressive economic growth rates. In addition, Latin America is rather stable politically, and some of its countries have gained considerable political clout on the world stage, with Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico being members of the G20. While these factors may lead one to expect a greater focus and more homogeneous policies and levels of policy activity towards Latin America across the EU, this has not been the case. Activity on behalf of the EU and different EU Member States towards the region varies greatly from one country to another, as this edited volume will show.

From an academic Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) perspective, Latin America is also often seen as an odd choice for the purpose of studying EU foreign policy (making), since it is not a region

that is particularly ‘exciting’ in terms of events that might provoke a foreign policy response by EU Member States or the EU as a whole. Indeed, many studies located within an FPA framework focus on special events or particular crises. Think for example about the Arab Spring, the role of the EU in the Middle East Process, the Balkan wars or the Iranian nuclear deal. Latin America, on the other hand, does not exhibit the ‘attractive’ characteristics that such a foreign policy topic has. It is neither outstandingly poor (such as Sub-Saharan Africa) or unstable (such as the Middle East), nor does it match the vertiginous economic rise of parts of Asia. Instead, the region is relatively democratic, with steady but not extravagant economic growth across most of the region during recent years. It is not subject to the same periodic attention as a crisis region has (e.g. sub-saharan Africa) or to the same consistent awareness as the EU’s Neighbourhood, for example. As such, it is often referred to as a ‘fair-weather’ region (Gratius, 2013). The EU’s relatively low-key approach towards Latin America is exactly why foreign relations with the region have overall not received a great deal of scholarly attention, especially in a comparative framework. Even with respect to country-specific studies, the literature is highly disparate, with the majority of studies covering only few European countries approaches: a large number is focused on Spain and Portugal, a moderate amount on Germany’s or France’s policy towards the region, and a more scarce coverage is available for the UK and Italy (Ruano, 2013). Other studies analyze the performance of various European countries within the EU’s policy towards the region¹, but only very little studies critically analyze and contrast the EU’s (own) approach towards the different Latin American countries (Dominguez, 2015). This is an unfortunate state of affairs for several reasons. Firstly, as will become clear from the different country studies below, the different levels of policy activity towards Latin America are surprising given the characteristics of the target region, as one might expect more homogeneous policies towards a strategic partner region of the EU with rather stable economic growth and political – even democratic – stability. Secondly, relations with Latin America cover the entire foreign policy spectrum from economic to cultural relations, making them a fascinating subject of study for their breadth. Thirdly, and last but not least, the EU’s approach towards the region is largely based on tranquil, day-to-day foreign relations, an aspect of foreign policy that constitute an important share of Western democracies’ foreign affairs world-wide.

¹ See for example Freres, Christian and Sanahuja, José Antonio (2006) “*Hacia una Nueva Estrategia en las Relaciones Unión Europea – América Latina*”, Policy Papers nº 01, Complutense University Madrid, 56p.

This investigation therefore sets out to comparatively analyze the EU's foreign policy towards various Latin American countries in order to have a better understanding of how -day-to-day- EU foreign policy towards not less than 33 'fair-weather' countries is conducted. Every country case study will critically analyze the main actors involved, the most salient topics/themes of the relationship and possible limitations for enhanced cooperation. Unfortunately, we were not able to look at all Latin American countries and provide detailed studies for each of them. Instead, we identified five countries (Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) which we believe form a representative set of case studies to be able to draw more general conclusions for the study of EU foreign policy towards Latin America.

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Joren Selleslaghs is a Lecturer and PhD Researcher at Leiden University. His main research interest is on the EU's foreign policy towards Latin America in the areas of security governance, science diplomacy and combatting the consequences of climate change. Joren is also an Individual Expert for the European Commission and a Member of the Board of Directors of the Europe-Central America Chamber of Commerce.



EU-Mexico: tackling global challenges together

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The European Union (EU) foreign policy can be understood as a mutual understanding between Member States that often results in common action (Smith 2004). The idea of mutuality dates to the 1973 Copenhagen Report, in which the concept of mutual consultation between Member States before adopting a final position was introduced in order to strengthen the European identity ("Declaration on European Identity" 1973). In addition, the EU is committed to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, that stresses the need for the EU to become a visible actor in the international sphere and create an effective European foreign policy ("European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Of the European Union" 2016). In the present, EU foreign policy resembles a systematic cooperation between the Member States to address long-standing, as well as new security threats, such as the global issue of terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass-destruction ("EUROPA - Topics of The European Union - Foreign & Security Policy" 2016). In this way, the EU foreign policy is unique in world politics, since it entails a continuum between the intergovernmental cooperation of Member States and supranational integration (Selleslaghs 2016).

Although the EU foreign policy is often considered to be hindered by internal squabbling and lack of capabilities, it has also been labeled as a success in some cases, such as the case of Latin America (Selleslaghs 2016). These disagreements about whether the EU foreign policy works or not stems from its uniqueness in world politics, which makes it difficult to analyze. Therefore, when looking at the EU foreign policy in Latin America, the two actors' relations should be considered in the context of the EU gaining visibility in the region and in the international sphere as an actor promoting humanitarian concerns, security, trade, human rights, climate change and social equality ("European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | EU Relations with Mexico (United Mexican States)" 2016). To illustrate this, the essay analyzes the case of EU-Mexico foreign policy relations by examining the present EU-

Mexican ties and their origin, the current EU-Mexico trade relations and the success of the Global Agreement between the two actors.

Present EU-Mexican ties and their origin

The conduct of international relations with a supranational organization such as the European Union is vastly different from traditional bilateral relations. These decision-making processes and distinct roles for countries have influenced EU-Mexican relations significantly. In this section the current state of ties will first be explored, after which several past and recent examples will be used to highlight parts of the process. The EU attention Mexico receives is a regional exception. As a Latin American country, Mexico is part of a region that does not enjoy much attention from the EU, but on its own receives a considerable share of European foreign policy and trade (Selleslaghs 2016). This not surprising since EU-Mexican trade is exceedingly positive for the EU. As of 2015, EU exports of goods and services to Mexico amounted to €41.6 billion, while Mexican exports to Europe amounted to €23.6 billion; the positive balance of roughly €18 billion forming a direct macroeconomic boost to Europe's GDPs (European Commission 2016). This economic benefit is mutual, with the EU being Mexico's second largest export market and third largest import source (Idem). Currently diplomatic ties between Mexico and the EU exist to a relatively large extent. At the intergovernmental level, international relations are extensive. Per the website of the Mexican ministry of foreign affairs as of May 25, 2016, all EU member-states except for Luxembourg, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria and the Baltic countries maintain permanent embassies to Mexico, whilst Mexico reciprocates all these embassies except for Slovakia's (GOB.MX 2016). There are no cases where the absence of an embassy is a sign of ill relations however, with foreign policy by these states often being conducted instead via consulates or other embassies, while for example Bulgaria shut down its embassy out of financial concerns (Novinite 2016). Additionally, there is a permanent delegation of the EU's External Action Service (EEAS) in Mexico City that represents the EU and actively promotes past agreements and future goals through diplomacy (Delegation of the EU to Mexico 2016).

Another source of mutual benefit can be found in the 2008 Council of the EU adoption of a strategic partnership with Mexico, establishing that the two parties will cooperate in many areas, particularly international crises (Council of the EU 2008). This will be covered in more

detail later. Other examples are the many bilateral human rights dialogues, during which they reaffirm their shared commitment to promoting human rights, with their most recent 2014 summit in part being focused on gender equality, capital punishment and racism (European External Action Service 2014). This is also a good example of the EU as a normative power both towards Mexico and globally (Behrens and Janusch 2012).

Process: How the ties came about

The importance of these decisions is eclipsed by that of the 1999 EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement (EUMFTA), which came into force in October 2000 (European Commission 2016). The EUMFTA is a trade agreement that created a free trade area between the EU and Mexico by eliminating tariffs (de la Peña 2001). The EU wanted to do so as soon as possible, while Mexico sought a more gradual liberalization process. EU tariffs on Mexican goods were fully lifted by 2003, while Mexico did not fully return the favor until 2007, although products that the EU showed a special interest in had their tariffs eliminated by 2003 (Condon 2009). There were also less salient challenges. For instance, negotiations involving a supranational EU, represented then by the European Commission and the 15 member-states, required a different approach to treaty negotiations, especially considering EU foreign policy was still in its pre-Lisbon Treaty state (Idem). Since the negotiation of the EUMFTA the labyrinth of European foreign policy has only thickened further. Whilst the EU has enlarged considerably since then and its institutions have become more elaborate, the member-states continue to cherish their right to conduct foreign policy (Selleslaghs 2016). This makes EU foreign policy distinctly intergovernmental, especially regarding security and national defense (ibid). Today, the EU's foreign policy processes can be classified into 3 categories: the Foreign Affairs Council, the EEAS and the individual member-states

The Foreign Affairs Council is the second most important configuration of the Council of the EU, in which the ministers of foreign affairs of the member-states convene to discuss the EU's foreign relations and are authorized to take direct action through European Security and Defense Policy (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011). This body's main actors are thus the member-states internally, but they conduct policy as one in the international system. The voting system of the Council is such that a 'qualified majority' is required, where both a predetermined voting threshold and a member-state majority must be reached for a decision to pass (European

Commission 2016). In practice, however, striving for high-level consensus is the norm for the Council (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011).

At the more supranational level, the EEAS conducts foreign policy as the diplomatic corps of the EU under the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Idem). The EEAS thus maintains diplomatic missions and delegations to states across the world, including Mexico (Delegation of the EU to Mexico 2016). The European Commission also conducts some foreign policy, particularly when it falls within the portfolio of a relevant commissioner (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011). In these two bodies the main actors are the commissioners and bureaucrats, who act as one supranational EU. A very recent example of these bodies at work can be found in the May 24-25 visit of High Representative Federica Mogherini to Mexico, where she announced that the EU and Mexico will initiate negotiations to modernize the existing legal framework surrounding the EUMFTA (Delegation of the EU to Mexico 2016). However, the decision to initiate said negotiations was made by the Mexican foreign ministry and the Foreign Affairs Council; the EEAS' role remains symbolic (Idem).

Finally, the individual member-states of course pursue their own foreign policy. However, constraints come from the treaties of the EU, a violation of which might result in state prosecution in the European Court of Justice (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011). A recent minor example of bilateral relations is an agreement between Spain and Mexico to collaborate on renewable energy, which is especially appropriate since a Mexican diplomat is to be appointed head of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN News Centre 2016). An interesting observation on the member-states' foreign policy is that there has been a convergence, 'Europeanization' or perhaps even a Constructivist socialization of national foreign policies within the EU, in particular towards Latin America (Ruano 2013).

Present EU-Mexico trade relations

Latin America has been referred to as an ideal partner for the EU since the impressive economic growth rates in Mexico and Brazil, as well as in the region (Dominguez 2015). This section will analyze the present EU-Mexico trade relations, as well as why the EU is interested in fostering a trading partnership with Mexico and the implications of this partnership.

Dimensions of the EU-Mexico trade relations

Being the second largest economy in Latin America, Mexico is shifting into a modern, competitive state that upholds democratic principles and the rule of law ("European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | EU Relations with Mexico (United Mexican States)" 2016). The transformation of the state can also be seen from its entry in the Pacific Alliance, an economic partnership that combines some of the most financially developed states of the South American Pacific coast: Chile, Peru and Colombia ("What the EU Could Learn From The Pacific Alliance - Latam Investor" 2016). The Pacific Alliance is considered Latin America's most successful trading partnership, managing to increase free trade, exports and foreign direct investment (ibid). Consequently, the partnership is seen by the Latin American countries as a more effective means of boosting trade than an alliance with the EU, since there is no supranational organization to hinder or slow down the trading process and no subsidy system to misallocate resources (ibid). However, there still exist several obstacles to the success of the Pacific Alliance (such as the *Mercado Integrado Latinoamericano* project launched in 2011, which seeks to integrate the financial markets of the four states, but which has not lived up to its potential yet), which means that the EU can still be an advantageous trading partner to Mexico from several perspectives (ibid). As the EU sees itself as an actor that protects human rights and encourages the creation of a stable economic environment, the economic growth of Mexico presents an opportunity for the EU to establish a relation between the two actors involving three dimensions: a political one, encompassing multilevel political dialogues fostering bilateral and international cooperation, an economic one, promoting trade and investment in the area and a development dimension, comprised of social policies and actions (Gardini and Ayuso 2015). The EU rhetoric focused on its cooperation with the Latin American region as well as Mexico in particular, because of the common interests between the two (trade, liberal policies, human rights, climate change) and the historical, cultural and social ties they share ("European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | The European Union – Mexico Political Relations" 2016). In this context, the EU sought to cooperate with Latin America in order to increase its visibility in the region and world, as well as to insure its security of trade and investment supplies (Selleslaghs 2016). In the case of Mexico, the issue of trade is particularly active on the EU agenda, since Mexico's main interest lies in deepening the process of trade liberalization and improving the conditions for Mexican exporters' access to

the European market ("European Commission/ Trade/ Mexico" 2016). Currently, the EU is Mexico's second biggest export market and Mexico's third largest source of imports, including machinery, electric equipment and transport equipment (Idem). An important success of the trade relations between the two actors was the creation of a EU-Mexico free trade area, which led to a major advancement in bilateral trade and investment partnership ("European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | The European Union – Mexico Political Relations" 2016). Because of this, bilateral trade between the two actors grew by approximately 140% (Idem). Moreover, since 1999, trade between Mexico and the EU has grown by 236%, with the Netherlands topping the list of Foreign Direct investment (FDI) with a total of \$50599.9 million (Konrad 2015). Therefore, it can be stated that Mexico has become one of the most important economic partners for the EU in Latin America. However, even though the Global Agreement has generated a boost in trade, there are still structural limits to the growth of Mexican exports to the EU, such as poor infrastructure (the EU has been proposing the implementation of infrastructure projects that have been rejected by the indigenous population of Mexico, as well as by the civil society organizations; it has been mentioned repeatedly that these parties have not been consulted or allowed to participate in the discussion regarding the creation of new infrastructure promoting exports and that these projects do not promote sustainable development, instead harming the environment and serving the interests of large corporations) and the intricacy of the European trade regulations (these include various anti-competitive practices which lead to the profit of large corporations, instead of indigenous small businesses in Mexico) (Gardini and Ayuso 2015).

A difference in Approach: The EU and China

Latin America has become of strategic importance due to competition in trade that the EU has been experiencing from the United States and China (Selleslaghs 2016). The manner the EU presents itself in can hence be understood as an attempt at differentiating itself from other global actors, by actively contributing to peace, democracy, and bilateral (trade) relations. This all-encompassing approach the EU takes finds its converse in the approach China takes. This approach is directed purely at bilateral trade relations, and is exemplified by the free trade agreements it signed with Costa Rica and Chile (entered force in 2010 and 2011 respectively) (China FTA Network 2016). The challenge the EU is faced with is to boost trade with its other

transatlantic partners than the United States (US) to maintain its' competitive position (Selleslaghs 2016). It distinguishes itself from other actors such as China by raising issues that stretch beyond mere trade partnership. The geopolitical dimension of EU – Latin American relations stretches further than a mere struggle for influence or highest trade capacity, as it entails a mutual approach to regional and global challenges. Both regions are subject to drugs-related organized crime – including smuggle – and a combined approach may enhance security for both sides. Mexico in specific suffers intensely from drugs-related crime, and the EU can be of support in combatting this locally (see paragraph on declaratory policies). On a global level, the Latin American continent can help solve challenges such as climate change, terrorism, resource scarcity, and food security (Idem.).

The Global Agreement

The bilateral relations between the EU and Mexico are governed by the Economic Partnership, Political Cooperation and Cooperation Agreement (hereinafter to be called Global Agreement) signed in Brussels on 8 December 1997. This section will analyze the origins of the agreement, as well as its positive and negative impacts on the EU-Mexico foreign policy.

The origins of the Global Agreement and limitations

Mexico was the very first Latin American country to sign this agreement, and it entered into force on 1st of October 2000. With a focus on trade, political dialogue, and cooperation, the Global Agreement underscores democratic principles and respect for human rights, which are an “essential element” that “underpins the domestic and external policies of both parties.” (EEAS - "European Union – Mexico Political Relations") European External Action Service (EEAS). One of the biggest achievements in EU-Mexico relations is that an EU-Mexico free-trade area has been established, with a major boost to bilateral trade and investment (Idem.). Besides the successful FDI, Mexico and the EU indeed “share positions and values in the international arena” (Global Agreement between the European Community [...] and the United Mexican States 2000), and have continued to declare a ‘Strategic Partnership’ (2009), which reflects the will to “strengthen coordination on matters of global importance and further intensify the political, economic and cooperation links.” ("Mexico – European Union Strategic Partnership Joint Executive 2010). This intensification of bilateral ties and dialogue

areas is an essential part of the declarative policies that the two partners have jointly expressed, but the Global Agreement also has its' flaws. An example of this is the necessity of inclusion of a multitude of different actors, but the Global Agreement seems to focus less on civil society than it perhaps should. "The systematic and institutional participation of civil society was not originally contemplated in the Global Agreement between the EU and Mexico, but two articles make specific references to civil society." These articles are Article 36, and Article 39 which respectively focus on cooperation on social affairs and poverty, and the topic of human rights and democracy. Article 39 specifically states that "cooperation shall focus mainly on: (a) the development of civil society by means of education, training and public awareness programmes." (The Modernization of the EU-Mexico 'Global Agreement 2015). Whilst both these articles explicitly refer to cooperation activities including civil society, and periodic consultations, it seems that the Global Agreement envisages a rather passive cooperative role for civil society, rather than an active actor in this relationship.

It therefore seems that the Global Agreement must grow along with the context the EU-Mexico relations find themselves in, and that a modernization of the Global Agreement is worthwhile. Whilst negotiations on the terms of such modernization are ongoing, one can deduce several imperatives for modernized cooperation from the old Global Agreement. The modernization should reinforce successful current practices of cooperation, and work on flaws such as the inclusion of civil society more. Not only should a renewed agreement do that, but it should provide more of a synergy between cooperation, political dialogue, and economic partnership.

The Benefits of the Global Agreement

However, In the field of research cooperation, the EU is slowly starting to implement operational policies directed at enhanced cooperation. This year in October, the first coordinated call between the EU and Mexico on geothermal energy was published as part of the Horizon 2020 work programme for 2016-2017, with a total budget of €20 million with each side contributing an equal amount (Moffre, Luis Samaniego 2015). This figure is indeed positive, but only the first coordinated call between the EU and Mexico on such an important renewable energy since the conclusion of the Global Agreement in 2000. Besides, the figure of €10 million investment is relatively small compared to the total budget in current prices

being nearly €80 billion ("Horizon 2020 Budget 2013). This somewhat disappointing proportion of The Horizon 2020 budget reveals diverging priorities: The EU is interested in Latin America, but lacks resources to back up the talk, and takes very long to set up actual research cooperation with Latin American countries such as Mexico. Besides, the question remains how 'European' the EU-Mexican partnership really is. A total amount of \$63 billion has been invested in Mexico as by EU-28 in between 1999 and the end of 2013, but when looking at FDI, only the Netherlands and Spain have made investments of any significance (Konrad 2015). Even though the EU may invest such a substantive amount in Mexico, the FDI data gives the impression that there are only certain countries within the EU that have any benefit from this, and hence there is a strong divergence in interest and spending. Besides the Horizon 2020 project, the EU and Mexico have also created a platform for Dialogue between Civil Society and Institutions of the Mexican Government and the European Union. (5th Forum of Dialogue between Civil Society and Institutions of the Mexican Government and the European Union 2012). This Forum allows for civil society organizations to engage in dialogue, and to "present constructive contributions and recommendations to enhance the EU-Mexico relations." (Idem.) Since the conclusion of the Global Agreement, this Forum has become an "invaluable opportunity to discuss and convey the ideas of civil society, to better adapt the implementation of the Global Agreement and Strategic Partnership between Mexico and the European Union to the needs of their respective societies." (Idem.) From this stems the idea that bringing together civil society organizations to contribute to EU – Mexico relations can indeed be more effective, and indirectly influence FDI, but that the EU itself seems to remain somewhat sluggish in implementing actual operational policies.

Conclusion and Implications of the EU-Mexico Cooperation

Latin America has been referred to as an ideal partner for the EU since the impressive economic growth rates in Mexico and Brazil, as well as in the region (Dominguez 2015). Being the second largest economy in Latin America, Mexico is shifting into a modern, competitive state that upholds democratic principles and the rule of law ("European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | EU Relations with Mexico (United Mexican States)" 2016). Therefore, the role of the EU as an actor who promotes democratic principles, the respect for human rights, social equality and sustainable development deems the EU as an

ideal candidate in forming closer ties with Mexico. The EU's foreign policy is aimed at exerting its influence as a soft power that seeks to become a model in the international sphere and that has adapted to the challenges of globalization, becoming capable to address security, as well as political, humanitarian and economic threats (Maihold 2007). In this context, the EU has strengthened its role in Latin America by forming ties with Mexico, where it can exert its mission of spreading the norms of social equality, sustainability and humanitarian concern by creating joint operations aimed at abolishing organized crime in Mexico, contributing to the development of democracy and promoting civil participation in the political dialogue in the region. However, the EU has also made sure that its more concrete interests in the region are met, such as investing in trade and maintaining the security of the investment supplies. Consequently, EU-Mexico relations are considered successful because the EU was effective in promoting its normative role in the international sphere while maintaining its concrete interests in the region.

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EU-Chile: Moving beyond the logic of economics

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The European Union (EU) has directed part of its foreign policy towards Latin-America. Even though this aspect of foreign policy is not prioritized by the EU, its importance and opportunities should not be underestimated (Selleslaghs ²⁰¹⁶). By directing its foreign policy towards Latin-America, the EU becomes visible in the region and in the world, which reinforces its status as an international actor. However, there are also other reasons that make Latin-America attractive to the EU. Chile in particular offers the EU a stable and promising country to invest in and to direct its foreign policy towards. The EU's interest in Chile is mostly caused by Chile's beneficial economic climate, though the EU also has a general interest in the development of Chile. This essay aims to understand what the EU's foreign policy towards Chile exactly entails, and whether or not it is successful. The first section of this essay will explain why Chile is of interest to the EU. Section II will outline the relevant actors behind the EU's foreign policy. This is followed by Section III which will address the EU's declaratory policy and determine what the EU's position is on Chile. Section IV discusses the operational policy of the EU and demonstrates what actions the EU is taking in Chile. The final section will assess the successfulness of the EU's foreign policy towards Chile.

SECTION I – Why Chile?

Chile differs from many other Latin-American countries because it offers very favorable conditions for foreign investors (Garcia 2004). This is due to the legacy of the Pinochet regime that implemented a liberal free-market economy (Ibid.). Moreover, when Chile started to democratize in the 1990s, it created a well-functioning legal system with coherent legislation and lowered tariffs (Ibid.). Chile's attractiveness was further enhanced by other endogenous and exogenous factors in the 1990s (Ibid.). Many European multinational corporations, especially Spanish corporations, went to Latin-America in the 1990s to expand and to seize the opportunities Latin-America offered that Europe did not. (Ibid.)

Additionally, during this time many Latin-American economies were privatizing their businesses, which were perfect for European corporations to acquire (Ibid.). Chile enhanced

its attractiveness by changing its image from a small distant market to a centrally located distribution center (Ibid.) It did so by establishing preferential trade agreements with different parts of the world, e.g. Asia and the Americas (Table 1) (Ibid.). This meant that new European businesses would also have access to these parts of the world when establishing themselves in Chile.

Table 1: Trade Agreements (TAs) of Chile

Trade Partner	Type Agreement	Date Signature	Date Entry into Force
Trans Pacific Partnership	FTA	04-02-2016	-----
Uruguay	FTA	04-10-2016	-----
Pacific Alliance	FTA	10 -02-2014	01-05-2016
Thailand	FTA	04-10-2013	05-11-2015
Hong Kong	FTA	07-09-2012	29-11-2014
Vietnam	FTA	12-11-2011	04-02-2014
Malaysia	FTA	13-11-2010	18-04-2012
Turkey	FTA	14-07-2009	01-03-2011
Australia	FTA	30-07-2008	06-03-2009
Japan	FTA	27-03-2007	03-09-2007
Colombia	FTA	27-11-2006	08-05-2009
Peru	FTA	22-08-2006	01-03-2009
Panama	FTA	27-06-2006	07-03-2008
China	FTA	18-11-2005	01-10-2006
New-Zealand, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam (P4)	FTA	18-07-2005	08-11-2006
European Free Trade Association	FTA	26-06-2003	01-12-2004
United States of America	FTA	06-06-2003	01-01-2004
Republic of Korea	FTA	15-02-2003	01-04-2004
European Union	FTA	18-11-2002	01-02-2003
Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua)	FTA	18-10-1999	15-02-2002 (Costa Rica), 03-06-200 (El Salvador), 23-03-2010 (Guatemala), 18-07-2008 (Honduras), 19-10-2012 (Nicaragua)
Mexico (ACE 41)	FTA	17-04-1998	01-08-1999
Canada	FTA	05-12-1996	05-07-1997
MERCOSUR (ACE 35)	FTA	25-06-1996	01-10-1996
WTO Members	Multilateral TA	01-01-1995	01-01-1995
Ecuador	Preferential TA	10-03-2008	05-01-2010
India	Preferential TA	08-03-2006	17-08-2007
Bolivia	Preferential TA	06-04-1993	06-04-1993
Venezuela	Preferential TA	02-04-1993	02-04-1993
Argentina	Preferential TA	02-08-1991	02-08-1991

Source: Organization of American States Foreign Trade Information System, 2016

Moreover, because of Chile's ties to MERCOSUR, Chile is especially interesting for the EU as the EU has been trying to establish a comprehensive trade agreement with MERCOSUR for many years (European Union External Action 2016a). A strong relation with Chile would thus mean that the EU would be one step closer to a comprehensive trade agreement with MERCOSUR.

It should, however, be mentioned that even though the EU has been interested in Chile and vice versa, there are presently other developments playing a role. This is because of the Pacific Alliance that was formed in 2011 (Organization of American States Foreign Trade Information System 2016b). The Alliance is made up of Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico and aims to form an area of deep integration to enhance growth, development and competitiveness of the economies of these countries (Ibid.). It does so by gradually seeking the free movement of goods, services, capital and people (Ibid.) Additionally, the Alliance aims to become a platform for economic and trade integration with a projection towards the Asia-Pacific region (Ibid.). From the Alliance's very beginning it had set its eyes on the Asia-Pacific Region and is now aiming to move beyond commodity reliance and toward integration into the supply chains that generated the rapid growth and development in Asia's Pacific Rim (Marczak, George 2016). It is for this reason that Alliance's member states engaged into a series of trade agreements with East Asian countries (Ibid.). This could mean that Chile is perhaps more interested in the opportunities that the 'East' is offering than the EU. After all, the Asia-Pacific region has been growing rapidly and is a bigger region than the EU. Consequently, Chile might focus more on the 'East' in the future, which may lead to limited economic relations with the EU.

Section II – Actors

Before analyzing what the EU's foreign policy towards Chile entails and whether or not it is successful, it is important to know who the actors are behind this policy. It is not surprising that the European Commission (EC) is one of these actors, as some of its core duties are to represent the EU outside of Europe and to manage and implement EU policies. The European Parliament (EP) also plays a role, as it holds regular meetings with Chile through the EU-Chile Joint Parliamentary Committee (European Parliament 2016a). The EP also has several standing committees in different areas, e.g. human rights, to maintain relations with non-EU countries,

such as Chile (Dominguez 2015). In addition, the individual member states also have an active role to play in the EU-Chile partnership. The United Kingdom and Spain are the main European investors in Chile (Garcia 2011). Moreover, since the 1990s Spain in particular has been pushing for a good relation with Chile on behalf of Spanish companies and the Spanish employer association that yearned for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Chile (Dür 2007). When in the 1990s the Spanish Manuel Marín was appointed as the commissioner for Economic Cooperation with the Mediterranean, Latin America and Asia, he pushed for a FTA (Garcia 2011). Marín was therefore vital to the establishment of the first agreement between the EU and Chile, namely the Association Agreement (AA) of 2002 which encompassed a FTA. Also in the 1990s, Germany and France stressed the importance of negotiations with Chile as they feared the loss of market access in Latin America in light of the U.S.' Free Trade Area of the Americas (Dür 2007). In 2002 the EC organized a conference on the EU-MERCOSUR and EU-Chile negotiations which was attended by approximately 70 business associations and companies, such as Renault (Dür 2007). Even though there were many actors in favor of a strong relationship with Chile, it should be noted that European farmer organizations had their reservations (Dür 2007). This was because Chile would cause increased competition with respect to the agricultural sector (Dür 2007).

Section III – EU's Declaratory Policy

As the previous section demonstrated, it would seem that the EU's interest in Chile mainly relates to its economic opportunities. Especially in terms of trade, Chile has very favorable conditions for foreign investors and the low tariffs make the import and export of products attractive. It is therefore not surprising that trade is one of the EU's priorities in Chile (Garcia 2011). The declaratory policy of the EU towards Chile can be found in the EC's Country Strategy Paper for Chile (ECCSPC) 2002-2006, which listed its strategic priorities "to reduce poverty, to consolidate democracy and to enhance economic development" (European Commission 2002). The EU's strategy slightly changed in the ECCSPC 2007-2013 as Chile became more democratic and economically developed during the previous period. The strategic priorities for 2007-2013 were to deepen the EU-Chile AA of 2002 through cooperation and policy dialogue in the fields of innovation and competitiveness, social cohesion and education, and social development (European Commission 2007). The letters of intent signed by the EC in 2011 also demonstrate the EU's declaratory policy. These expressed to develop cooperation

in six new fields: tourism; small and medium-sized enterprises policy; industrial cooperation; cooperation on standardization; raw materials; and ground navigation by satellite and Earth observation (European Union External Action 2016b). Moreover, in the same year the EC and the Chilean National Emergency Office expressed their wish to expand their knowledge of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery from disasters, and to agree to establish dialogue in the field of disaster risk reduction (European Commission 2011).

These documents demonstrate that the EU's foreign policy is not solely focused on trade and economic opportunities. In fact, it demonstrates that the EU aims to assist Chile in its development as a whole. This is because the EU has been involved in many different areas of development, such as sustainability, social development, crisis response, education, and poverty reduction.

However, it should be stressed that the EU stated Chile to be a 'graduated' country due to its strong economic performance, hence Chile was no longer eligible for bilateral cooperation with the EU under the 2014-2020 financial exercise (European Commission 2016a). Chile is, from 2013 onwards, only eligible to participate in the EU's regional and thematic programmes, such as EUROSOCIAL and workshops on solar energy (Cest+I 2015; European Commission 2016a).

Nevertheless, the EU seeks to redefine new forms of the EU-Chile cooperation and to modernize the AA (European Commission 2016a; European Commission 2016d). The objectives of the EU as of 2013 are to generate new economic opportunities, to create jobs and growth, and to promote the EU's model of social and environmental protection (European Commission 2016d). However, as mentioned earlier, it can be questioned how important the EU presently is for Chile. As Chile is not eligible anymore for bilateral cooperation with the EU under the financial exercise of 2014-2020, this may have further caused Chile to focus on the 'East' and seek economic opportunities elsewhere.

Section IV – EU's Operational Policy

This section outlines the EU's actions in Chile. As Section III demonstrated, the EU aims to assist Chile in many different areas other than economic growth. Due to word constraints not

all areas can be addressed, hence this section is structured along the lines of trade, development, humanitarian aid, and political relations.

Trade

As mentioned above, the 2002 AA encompassed a FTA, which included a reference to animal welfare in the annex (Cabanne 2013). The EU included animal welfare because it aimed to develop certain standards in Chile, especially because Chile is a large meat exporter (Ibid.). The EU has strict standards with respect to which products qualify to be imported. Therefore, Chile needed to improve its standards on animal welfare for its meat to be qualified for EU export. After Chile had institutionalized animal welfare standards new economic opportunities emerged for Chilean meat producers, leading to a growth in exports to the EU (Food and Agricultural Organization 2013). Later in April 2016, the EU and Chile conducted a successful negotiation with respect to organic trade (European Commission 2016f). The agreement relates to all EU organic products, and will allow for products produced and controlled according to EU rules to be directly placed on the Chilean market and vice versa (Ibid.). It will also aim to protect organic logos and provide a system of updates of the product's coverage, with increased co-operation, information exchange and dispute settlement in organic trade (Ibid.). The EU also made Chile eligible to the Generalised System of Preferences, which is a tool for economic development by providing developing countries with preferential access to the EU's market (Jean et al. 2014).

Development

Chile participates in many of the EU's regional programs, such as EUROSOCIAL, which aims to contribute to "the design, reform and implementation of public policies in Latin America which have an impact on social cohesion" (European Commission 2016e). Chile also participates in a similar social cohesion and development program called the AI-INVEST IV program (ALINVEST n.d.). This program aims to strengthen executing institutions and their workings, together with local companies and institutions, to increase competitiveness, innovation and internationalisation (Ibid.). Moreover, agreements have also been signed with respect to chemical precursors, science and technology cooperation, air transport, regular human rights dialogues, employment, social policies and regional policy (European Commission 2010). Furthermore, an Association for Development and Innovation was signed in 2009 in addition

to the 2002 AA aiming to project this agreement to the future (European Union External Action 2009; European Commission 2010).

Aside from the development programs above, Chile also participates in programs to counter drug trafficking, as Chile ranks fourth place in Latin-America with cocaine consumption and first in marijuana consumption (European Commission 2010). Since the 1980s, drug trafficking has become a growing issue in Chile, especially because of its shared borders with Peru and Bolivia, which are world leading coca producers (Ibid.). Additionally, because of Chile's economic stability, the open market economy and its bank-secrecy laws, Chile is attractive for money laundering (Ibid.). Chile has therefore implemented the EU Drugs Strategy 2005-12, which aimed to finance or plan interventions under regional or thematic programmes to tackle issues caused by illicit drugs (Ibid.). Chile also participated in the EU-LAC Drug Treatment City Partnerships program, which tried to bring "cities together in the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean to improve policies and city-level decisions on the quality and coverage of drug treatment and rehabilitation" (Universalia Management Group, 2011).

The topic of climate change has also not been left untouched by the EU, as EURO-CLIMA strives for sustainable development. This is because EURO-CLIMA is helping Chilean NGOs to bridge the climate finance gap and to implement local adaptation plans in Chile (EURO-CLIMA, 2016). It also fosters general strategic partnerships with the Chilean civil society with respect to climate change (Ibid.). Aside from these regional programs, Chile has also been participating in several bilateral development projects with the EU, which are listed in Table 2 (European Commission 2016b).

Table 2: Bilateral Projects between EU-Chile

Bilateral Project	Goal	Timeframe	Total Costs
Fortalecimiento de organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil que promueven la igualdad de género en Chile	Promoting Chilean women's' rights. Focused on: gender based violence, economic empowerment, and leadership and political participation.	15-09-2013 /14-09-2015	€ 520.000.00
Cooperación Regional por la Calidad de la Educación en América Latina	Improve quality and equity of education through strengthening the civil society's efforts.	5-12-2013 /4-12-2016	€ 303.203.18
Aumentar la empleabilidad y sustentabilidad económica de los trabajadores(as) en el sector artístico-cultural en Chile	Increase employability and economic sustainability of workers in the artistic and cultural sector.	1-03-2014 /28-02-2017	€ 12.363.05.96

Table 2 Bilateral Projects between EU-Chile (continued)

Bilateral Project	Goal	Timeframe	Total Costs
Mecanismos innovadores de sustentabilidad para garantizar la actoría social y política de las OSC en el desarrollo del país	To generate proposals and specific modalities of mechanisms of sustainability for strengthening the capabilities and practices of social and political impact of CSOs.	1-03-2013 /30-06-2015	€ 444 426.00
Agua que has de beber: fortalecimiento y cohesión de múltiples actores sociales para incidir en la implementación de políticas públicas que prioricen el uso humano del agua	To strengthen and work towards the cohesion of multiple social actors to influence the implementation of public policies that prioritize water use.	1-03-2013 /31-08-2015	€ 45.1600.00
Plataformas Territoriales por los Derechos Económicos y Sociales: Educación, Salud, Trabajo y Previsión	To strengthen local social leaders and promote a network of organizations that defend the rights to Education, Health, Labor and Welfare, building joint agendas and advocacy strategies.	1-03-2013 /28-02-2015	€ 388.675.00
Acceso a la justicia para grupos en situación de vulnerabilidad de sus derechos en Chile: mujeres y privados/as de libertad	Increase access to justice for vulnerable groups, in particular women and prisoners.	5-03-2012 /4-09-2013	€ 130.141.00
Apoyo a la difusión del enfoque de Derechos Humanos en un marco de Responsabilidad Social Empresarial en Chile	To conduct workshops with the business of the city of Valdivia, linking corporate responsibility with a human rights perspective and that translated into a national plan of action	12-12-2014 /11-05-2015	€ 19.200.00

Source: European Commission 2016b

Humanitarian Aid

As Chile's capacity to respond to disasters is relatively well established, it tried to share its knowledge with countries in the region. The EC funded such a program called the *Apoyo a la Prevención de Desastres en la Comunidad Andina* (European Commission 2010). The EU is also funding Viña del Mar Segura, which aims to develop this region with a risk management approach (European Commission 2016b). The goal is to reduce the vulnerability of the local communities of Viña del Mar to risks of natural disasters (Ibid.). Another program, which ended in 2015, was aimed at the construction of a community model integrated risk management with the participation of the civil society in Talcahuano (Ibid.) The program intended to help prevent, mitigate, prepare and recover from natural disasters and manmade events (Ibid.).

Political Relations

One of the main platforms of political relations between the EU and Chile is the EU - Latin America and the Caribbean Foundation where the regions' heads of state come together (EU-LAC) (EU-LAC 2016). This platform's mission is: to connect both regions' intergovernmental processes, e.g. businesses and civil society; to develop a joint forward-looking global vision with shared strategies in the regions; to invigorate bi-regional partnership hence encouraging and advocating the formulation and implementation of policies and agendas; and to circulate knowledge (Ibid.). Aside from EU-LAC Chile and the EU also meet on a bilateral basis. The AA provides for regular political dialogue meetings since 2003 (European Union External Action 2016b). Additionally, there are bi-annual meetings of a ministerial Association Council and annual meetings of the EU-Chile Association Committee at the level of senior officials (Ibid.). There is also an annual conference in London called 'Chile Day' (Ministry of Foreign affairs of Chile 2016). This is a public-private collaboration supported by the Chilean Ministry of Finance and the British Embassy in Santiago (Ibid.). It aims to reinforce the relations between Chilean market representatives and their global partners (Ibid.).

The EP also holds regular meetings with Chile in the form of delegations to the EU-Chile Joint Parliamentary Committee (European Parliament 2016a). This is a platform where bilateral relations and programs are discussed as well as Chile's involvement in the EU's regional programs (European Parliament 2016b; European Parliament 2016c). Lastly, Chile is one of the five non-EU member states that has been participating in the EU's operation ALTHEA in Bosnia & Herzegovina (Mani, Amigo 2016). This is a peacekeeping operation that provides deterrence and continued compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement (European Defence Information 2016). Presently, Chile is deliberating to deepen its association with the EU to involve Chilean peacekeepers in other EU-led missions (Mani, Amigo 2016).

Section V – EU Foreign Policy: Successful?

In order to assess if the EU's foreign policy is successful, it is important to know what 'successful' entails. This research paper defines successful as a beneficial outcome for both the EU and Chile. To start, the EU calls Chile a graduated country and stated that Chile was not eligible for the 2014-2020 financial exercise, which indicates that Chile's economy has grown. However, the question is whether or not the EU's foreign policy played a role in this. Figure 1

demonstrates that even after the 2007-2013 financial exercise the EU and Chile have been importing and exporting billions worth of goods and services. More broadly, the numbers of trade between the EU and Chile indicate that trade increased, as the 2003 bilateral trade accounted for approximately \$7.7 billion and in 2015 accounted for \$16.6 billion (European Commission 2016c). Presently, the EU is Chile's third largest trade partner after the U.S and China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 2016). Though the EU has been Chile's main investment partner for the past five years as it accounted for approximately 25% of total investment (Ibid.).

Figure 1: EU-Chile Trade Statistics (in billion €)

Trade in goods	2014	2015	2016
EU imports	8.6	8.2	7.4
EU exports	7.4	8.3	8.6
Balance	-1.2	0.1	1.2
Trade in services	2013	2014	2015
EU imports	1.6	1.7	2.0
EU exports	3.1	3.4	3.8
Balance	1.5	1.6	1.8

Source: European Commission, 2016c

The agreement on animal welfare brought about improved standards in Chile. Chile created and implemented legislation after this agreement and institutionalised it (Cabanne 2013). This also improved the quality of Chilean products and it helps to meet the standards of other countries, which is favourable for future Chilean trade relations. Moreover, the agreement on organic products with the EU opened up a new market for Chile. There is thus quite some trade between the EU and Chile that could have contributed to the economic growth of Chile. Though it should not be forgotten that Chile is trading more with the U.S and China, hence Chile's growth could also be attributed to these countries and possibly the Pacific Alliance. As the Pacific Alliance is focused on the 'East' and China already being a larger trade partner than the EU, it could well be that in the future Chile may turn increasingly to the East, which may limit relations with the EU.

Even so, quite some scholars argue that Chile's economic growth is caused by other factors than trade. Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (2006) argued that structural policies and policy reforms since the Pinochet regime played a crucial role in Chile's economic growth. Corbo et al. (2005)

mentioned the increased quality of institutions in Chile and stated that voice and accountability, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of corruption can explain half of the difference in development in Chile in contrast with other Latin American countries. Calderon and Fuentes (2005) estimate that more than 20% of the economic growth increase between 1981-1985 and 1996-2000 was due to better institutions. Schmidt-Hebbel (2006) also mentioned Chile's macroeconomic stabilization since the 1990s, which significantly and persistently influenced Chile's economic growth. Additionally, Loayza et al. (2004) estimated that stabilization policies contributed to approximately 40% of Chile's growth acceleration. However, according to Chumacero et al. (2004) both the FTAs with the EU and the U.S. have caused an estimated steady gain of 1% for the GDP level in Chile. In light of the above, one could argue that trade with the EU is a large source of income, yet not the sole reason for Chile's economic growth. One could also argue that the EU has contributed to the foundation of a stable economy. This is because the EU's foreign policy has aimed to improve and institutionalize the factors that Corbo et al. (2004) mentioned during the EU's financial exercises, such as regulatory quality and political stability. Moreover, the EU has been investing in Chile for many years, which is beneficial for Chile. The EU's foreign policy has thus been successful in terms of trade and improving Chile's economy. Furthermore, trade between the EU and Chile also means that Chile has diversified its export and import market, which makes its economy less dependent. The EU also benefits from the bilateral trade with Chile, as it now trades with a large meat exporter that also offers other agricultural goods, such as wines, and meets its quality standards.

In terms of development, it is difficult to assess how successful the EU has been exactly. One might argue that the EU has contributed to the social cohesion in Chile as the EU's programs do not only target the Chilean government, but also non-state actors. The EU also launched multiple programs to increase competitiveness and innovation, which were some of its main objectives in the period of 2007-2013. Moreover, absolute poverty has been reduced tremendously since the 1990s, and thus one of the 2002-2006 objectives of the EU's foreign policy is met. The EU has also been supportive in tackling issues relating to drugs consumption and drugs trafficking in Chile. However, according to the United Nations' World Drug Report there is an increase in drugs use in Chile (UNODC 2015). Moreover, according to the OECD (2016) Chile is below average with respect to "civic engagement, health status, jobs and

earnings, social connections, work-life balance, housing, income and wealth, personal security, education and skills, and environmental quality” and faces great inequality. This would imply that even though the EU funds programs and supports Chilean efforts to develop further, the situation in Chile is still far from optimal.

Therefore, with respect to development it is debatable if the EU’s foreign policy is successful. One could, however, argue that its foreign policy builds a foundation and contributes to the first stages of change in Chile. While change does not happen easily or fast, Chile now has a foundation to continue improvements in these areas. With respect to humanitarian aid, the EU has funded several programs aiming to help, mitigate or improve readiness for natural and man-made disasters. This was also one of the EU’s objectives, hence this objective has been met. Chile also benefits from the EU’s humanitarian aid and training programs as it has contributed to improved response to disasters.

Conclusion

The EU does not simply direct its foreign policy towards Chile to be the sole beneficiary. Both Chile and the EU benefit from the EU-Chile partnership. Chile’s economic position has improved quite drastically and it now has a truly diversified market to maintain its strong economic position. Though the EU’s main interest is Chile’s economic opportunities, it also contributed to Chile’s development as a whole. As Chile adopted and created laws, regulations, and institutions to meet the standards of the EU and to implement policies that come forth of the EU-Chile partnership, it built a foundation for future development. Additionally, the EU contributes to social cohesion, engagement and social development by not only funding and helping the Chilean government, but also non-state actors. The EU also benefits from this partnership as it can now trade with a stable Latin-American country that meets its standards. The EU also became an important international actor in Chile, which reinforces its position in Latin-America and the world. It can therefore be stated that the EU’s foreign policy towards Chile is successful as both the EU and Chile benefit from it. Though in the future Chile may turn increasingly to the ‘East’, which may limit Chile-EU relations.

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The EU in Argentina: from Common Interests to Tangible Convergence

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Europe and Argentina have a long shared history; 97% of Argentina's population is of European origin, due to large-scale Spanish, Italian, French and German immigration in the 19th century (CIA, 2016). Formal ties between the two polities date back to 1971 when Argentina became the first Latin American country to conclude a trade agreement with the EEC (European Commission, 2015). Through the consolidation of the EU's policy areas over time, the relationship has evolved beyond trade: the EU is currently the largest foreign investor in the Republic (EEAS 2016a), and the formalisation of the *Framework Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement* in 1990 paved the way for further development cooperation in other areas, such as science, infrastructure and tourism (EEC, 1990). Argentina also plays an important role in multilateral negotiations as a member of the MERCOSUR, with which the EU is negotiating an inter-regional Association Agreement (TRADE, 2016c). In the following essay I seek to provide an analysis of the EU's means of conduct vis-à-vis the Argentine Republic, both bilaterally and multilaterally. The essay is divided into six sections: the institutional framework of EU Foreign Policy, the objectives and interests of the EU, the declaratory policy of EU-Argentina relations, the EU's operational policy, the outlook and possible future challenges and the conclusion, in which the mutually beneficial nature of cooperation is considered.

Institutional framework of EU Foreign Policy

Firstly, a brief review of the general legal and institutional basis of the EU's Foreign Policy is in order. According to the post-Lisbon *Treaty on European Union*, external action should be guided by the principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights, equality and solidarity and the UN Charter as well as international law (European Union, 2012: Art.21 Par.1). Of particular interest to this case study is the encouragement of "progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade" (Ibid.: Par.2e) and the promotion of "stronger multilateral cooperation"

(Ibid.: Par.2h). In terms of competencies, the European Council is the key institution determining the broad external “interests and objectives of the Union” (Ibid.: Art.22 Par.1), deciding by recommendation of the Council of the European Union (specifically the Foreign Affairs Council and the Political and Security Committee). The declaratory policy of the Council, in turn, is influenced by proposals made by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) (Ibid.: Art.22 Par.2). In summary, the main agents of EU Foreign Policy are the Council of the EU and the High Representative shaping, where the HR represents and enacts the policy input of the Council and the Commission through the EEAS. Through this, the Union’s foreign policy aims to be a point of convergence for supranational and inter-governmental institutions. However, various limitations apply to this structure, as for example the FAC is chaired by the Council President, not HR, when issues of commercial policy are discussed (EEAS, 2016c). Similarly, different standing committees and EP delegations exist for particular regions. Additionally, Member States can pursue bilateral cooperation outside of the EU framework if the Council is notified (European Union, 2012: Art.28 Par.3). In order to make sense of this entanglement, the highly visible and representative role of HR Federica Mogherini provides a useful point of orientation to begin an Argentina-specific analysis of the Union’s external action.

Objectives & interests

During her recent visit to Argentina, Mogherini stressed the importance of trade liberalisation and economic reforms of the Macri government, reversing the protectionist Peronist governance (Mogherini, 2016). Beyond that, the European Investment Bank plans to aid the socio-economic development of Argentina by focusing on “small and medium enterprises, job creation, [...] and renewable energy” (Ibid.). Lastly, Mogherini sees the former role of the Argentine Foreign Minister as Chef de Cabinet at the UN (UN, 2014) as conducive to the advancement of further multilateralism which, according to her, makes Argentina “an excellent partner for foreign policy for the European Union” (Mogherini, 2016). In summary, the four main objectives laid out by the HR are: lifting restrictions on international trade, investing in small-scale enterprises and renewables and advancing multilateralism and regional integration (particularly through negotiations of a MERCOSUR Association Agreement, in which Argentina is an important ally).

To contextualise Mogherini's press statement, the EU's interests in greater cooperation with Argentina should be considered. Firstly, there are a few broad interests that the EU has in expanding international cooperation in general. These are mainly securing trade exports and imports as well as investment opportunities for its Member States abroad. In this regard, Argentina is an important commercial partner, with a total trade value of €17.2 billion in 2015 (€944 million EU export surplus) and €35.2 billion EU foreign direct investment in 2014 (TRADE, 2016a). This makes the Union Argentina's biggest foreign investor and its second largest trade partner (EEAS, 2016a). Closer cooperation with the country therefore is in the interest of the EU on a purely materialistic basis, particularly in the light of growing Chinese investments and trade in the region (Maihold, 2007: 12). Nevertheless, Latin America is also important to the EU from a political perspective. Firstly, there is a general bi-regional convergence in UN voting patterns, particularly regarding climate change and human development goals (Selleslaghs, 2016a: 1). Precisely because of their united political weight as a voting bloc, accounting for more than one-third of UN members, close relations are paramount to the EU if they want to push for their agenda in the international realm (Ibid.). Secondly, Latin America, and specifically Argentina, presents itself as most receptive to an "inter-regional strategy" seeking further regional integration (Maihold, 2007: 1). The EU can aid these regionalisation dynamics, which is in line with their set objectives in Article 21(2) of the TEU and their Argentina-specific declaratory policy described below. To what extent these regionalisation dynamics are successful beyond the state level and take effect within civil society remains to be seen, and may require further scrutiny and active engagement by the EU.

These three regional characteristics lead to EU-wide consensus about the importance of maintaining good relations with the region (Selleslaghs, 2016b); a political atmosphere that is crucial to coordinating a common foreign policy. Economic interdependence, political convergence and EU-internal consensus thus provide fertile ground for cooperation through which the EU can promote its principles of democracy, rule of law and allegiance to the UN Charter and international law as well as multilateralism. Argentina's political crises in the 1970's has created popular demand for these exact principles, rendering the country particularly receptive to the EU's normative power (Maihold, 2007: 12) as shown by the second declaration below. All these factors have let scholars to label Latin American countries

as “natural partners” (Maihold, 2007) and “fair weather” (Selleslaghs, 2016a) states for the Union. In light of this, the EU has established a long-term institutional framework with Argentina, guided by the interests and principles assessed above.

Declaratory policy of EU – Argentina relations

Although a trade agreement was signed by the EEC and the Argentine Republic in 1971, the 1990 *Framework Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement* is of greater contemporary importance as it still governs the relations between the two polities today. Five core declaratory themes emerge from this agreement; “the traditional links of friendship” between the two regions, the Argentine wish to strengthen its democratic and socio-economic progress, Argentina’s engagement in regional integration and the desire to let the cooperation be guided by the principles of “equality, non-discrimination, mutual advantage and reciprocity” (EEC, 1990: 67). Lastly, there is the wish to further elaborate cooperation beyond the 1990 framework at a later stage (Ibid.). The second and fourth declarations are directly in line with the general declaration of the principles of EU foreign policy outlined in Article 21 of the TEU as described earlier, while the third point hints towards one of the main interests of the EU behind greater cooperation with Argentina: promoting regional integration in Latin America to pave the way to more effective multilateral diplomacy. The framework also established a *Joint Cooperation Committee*, meeting annually and providing a bilateral forum in which representatives of both parties can evaluate and discuss the status of the Agreement as well as put forward recommendations to improve cooperation between the two countries (Ibid., Art.7). The areas of collaboration that the *Joint Cooperation Committee* covers are agriculture, mining, fishing, infrastructure, transport, communications, health, education, training, tourism, energy and the environment (Ibid.: Art.4 Par.2). Although the 2000 *Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation* set up a more specific *Cooperation Steering Committee* to facilitate academic dialogue in research, technology and demonstration (EEC, 2000: Art.6), the areas of collaboration outlined in the agreements are purposefully extensive to facilitate more specific cooperation strategies in the future. As Article 4(1) states: “[t]he Contracting Parties [...] shall foster economic cooperation in all fields deemed suitable by them, with no field excluded from the outset.” It thus of greater interest

to look at the *Country Strategy Paper* to understand the EU's operational policy, and thus areas of actual collaboration, towards Argentina.

Operational policy towards Argentina

Three priorities were identified by the Commission in the *Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*: support for education and traineeships to combat poverty, investment in small and medium-size enterprises (SME) to boost Argentina's economic competitiveness, and the strengthening of bilateral relations through improved policy dialogue and intensified academic exchange (DEVCO, 2007a: 3-4). This declaratory policy has been operationalised through a variety of programmes listed below.

Figure 1: Main areas of funding by the EU between 2007-2013 (in Million €)

Sector	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011-2013	Total
1. Education	21.40				-	21.40
Educational Inclusion and Work-related Skills	21.40				-	
2. Economic Competitiveness		3.2	3.3	3.3	13	22.8
Support to SMEs		3.2	3.3	3.3	13	
3. Strengthening of bilateral relations and mutual understanding between the EC and Argentina	2.0	2.8	2.8	2.8	10.40	20.80
Higher Education Programme		2.1	2.2	2.2	7.8	
Support to the Policy Dialogues	2.0	0.7	0.6	0.6	2.6	
TOTAL	23.40	6.0	6.1	6.1	23.4	65

Source: DEVCO (Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development). 2007a.

In terms of funding, Argentina has received around €108 million between 1990 and 2007 through EC cooperation programmes (Ibid.). For the period of 2007 to 2013, a total of €65 million was allocated to implementing cooperation programmes, of which €21.40 million went into the education sector, €22.8 million were distributed to the SME sector, €14.3 million were invested into Higher Education Programmes, while the remaining €6.5 million are funding policy dialogue processes (EEAS, 2010). Additionally, the Union co-funded 15 further programmes in Argentina, mostly under the framework of "Non-State Actors & Local Authorities" (NSA-LA) and "Support to Democracy and Human Rights" (EIDHR). Other minor

contributions were made in the field of Environment (€258,381) and the Human Development/Investing In People (IIP) sector where the EU gave a grant of €464,372 to combat regional child trafficking. Total EU contribution in these schemes was around €15 million (Ibid.).

Most of this bilateral development assistance was provided through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) up until 2013 and 2014 respectively, after which Argentina was deemed a 'graduated' country "not eligible for bilateral cooperation under the EU financial exercise 2014-2020" due to its economic performance (TRADE, 2016b; EEAS, 2016a; DEVCO, 2016). This alludes to EU's greater emphasis on multilateral, bi-regional diplomacy of cooperation vis à vis Argentina in the future.

Outlook & possible challenges

The future means of cooperation between the Union and Argentina are likely guided by bi-regional cooperation schemes because Argentina is no longer eligible for bilateral cooperation and both parties have a clear interest in strengthening regionalisation processes. Argentina is a co-founding member of the Organisation of Ibero-American States (OEI), the Community of Latin American States (CELAC), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and most importantly, part of Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) (DEVCO, 2007a; 2007b). Among all of them, MERCOSUR has enjoyed most attention by the EU, and negotiations concerning an inter-regional Association Agreement (AA), with temporary suspension, are underway since 2000 (EEAS, 2016b). In 2008, a joint declaration emerged from the EU-MERCOSUR Summit of Lima to facilitate further political dialog and expanding "bi-regional cooperation to the fields of infrastructure, renewable energy sources, and science and technology" (Council of EU, 2008). This led to the relaunch of AA talks at the 2010 EU-LAC Summit of Madrid, where the parties discussed cooperation beyond the realm of industry and agriculture, such as intellectual property rights and government procurement (EEAS, 2016b). Between 2007 and 2013, the EU invested €50 million in MERCOSUR to increase civil society participation in regionalisation, to strengthen its institutional framework and to aid the organisation in "preparing the implementation" of the AA (Ibid.).

While the focus on inter-regional cooperation is in line with the general interests of both Argentina and the EU by putting their desire for greater multilateralism into practice, there are a few drawbacks. Firstly, bi-regional diplomacy involves many summits, the practicality of which has been questioned by scholars such as Günther Maihold. He identifies a clear divergence between rhetoric and actual agreement implementation, likely due to the lack of executive structures at these summits (Maihold, 2007: 11). EU-MERCOSUR relations are also constrained by the same factors as EU-Argentina relations. Firstly, China's growing influence in the region presents a threat to EU trade dominance, partly because cooperation with China is not attached to conditions regarding democracy, human rights and all the other aspects that make EU a 'normative' power (Ibid.: 3). Secondly, there is the ongoing dispute regarding the European Common Agricultural Policy: the protectionist measures of the EU are harming Argentina as its most important export is agricultural produce (Azpíroz, 2014: 12), making agricultural trade harmonisation unlikely in the short-term mainly due to entrenched French interests. This is particularly interesting given Mogherini's emphasis on the necessity of the abolition of Argentina's protectionist policies. Thirdly, the ongoing dispute between the UK and Argentina regarding the Falkland Islands is likely to hinder greater policy convergence. Although Macri has called for a "new kind of relationship" with the UK regarding the islands (Watts, 2016), the long term goal remains to claim undisputed sovereignty over the territory. To what extent this geopolitical issue can be factored out of the EU's Foreign Policy based on the UK's recent referendum on leaving the EU (BBC, 2016) remains to be seen in the future. Besides that, the restrictive import policies advanced by the Kirchner government have led to tensions between the parties in the past (European Commission, 2012). Although the market has been liberalised by the Macri government, calls for protectionism remain popular within Argentina and the Union and could seriously threaten further policy convergence.

Perhaps the issue that is most threatening to greater EU-Argentina cooperation are the claims of human rights abuses and the alleged partial suspension of the rule of law by the Macri government (Andermann, 2016a: 8; 2016b). If Macri's supposed contradictory declaratory and operational policy remains unaddressed by the EU, the reports of police violence, imprisonment of political opponents and bypassing of parliament through emergency presidential decrees (Watts, 2016) could seriously undermine EU's normative integrity and legitimacy as a normative power on the world stage. Through personal correspondence,

however, an EU official assured that the EU remains in constant dialog with NGOs in Argentina regarding domestic human rights abuses. In general, the received reports from local NGOs suggest an improvement of the rule of law with the change of government in terms of an independent judiciary, freedom of expression and political opposition.

Benefits and conclusion

Despite these potential difficulties, the EU Foreign Policy towards Argentina can generally be considered a success, as the relationship is mutually beneficial. Argentina benefits from the EU's experience regarding regional integration. Additionally, the EU's soft power in terms of promoting democratic principles is favoured by Argentinians over US influence (Braghiroli & Salini, 2014: 13), perhaps based on its history of military dictatorship, but also likely associated with the cultural ties linking both regions together. For the EU, Argentina is beneficial because the country counters many of the 'centrifugal forces' present in Latin America (Maihold, 2007: 3). Firstly, there is the growing apathy regarding regional integration in Latin America, where Argentina constitutes an important counterweight to this trend. Secondly, there is the "de-facto suspension" of the Washington Consensus in many Latin American countries (Ibid.), while Argentina's new government is clearly set on a path to reconsolidate its international standing economically and financially. Lastly, while China does present a threat to the EU's geo-political and economic position in the region, close ties to Argentina and its receptiveness of the 'soft' conditions attached to EU cooperation perhaps bestows the Union with the *added value* crucial to remain competitive in Argentina, providing the EU with a 'point of entry' to Latin American politics and trade. While this essay could only briefly touch upon the many facets of EU-Argentina relations, the analysis did demonstrate that both parties are keen to deepen their ties, although the extent of real operational policies have been limited thus far. The abolition of "bilateral cooperation under the EU financial exercise 2014-2020" (DEVCO, 2016) could present an opportunity to engage in future cooperation based on an equal footing, where a true partnership, not a donor-recipient dynamic, guides EU-Argentina relations.

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EU-Brazil Relations: On a Road to a Mutually Beneficial Future?

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What are the mutual goals of the two global actors: The European Union and the Federative Republic of Brazil? To what extent have been these goals met and by which means are the two international actors working towards their achievement? In order to sufficiently respond to these questions, the paper will look at EU's foreign policy towards this Latin American giant. But why should we focus specifically on Brazil instead of examining European neighborhood countries such as Ukraine or Syria that tend to always be a priority and play a key role in EU's foreign policy? In reality, Brazil is much more important for the EU than it is often known or acknowledged. Not only is Brazil the largest economy in the region, but it also accounts for more than 33% of the EU's total trade with Latin America (The European Commission, "Brazil - Trade - European Commission"). Moreover, it has been observed that Brazil aims to show its emergence as an economic power by actively participating in the region. When it comes to the international level, Brazil focuses mainly on her establishment of better relations within the EU as well as on her participation in UN operations. Since Brazil is the biggest geopolitical actor in the Latin American region, the establishment of good and prosperous relations with the EU should benefit not only the two actors in question, but also the EU-Latin American relations in. Thanks to her active participation in international trade, as well as, her involvement in both politics and military on the international level, Brazil could establish a status quo as an international superpower. And yet, despite her significance, Brazil has been often forgotten when it comes to deciding new priorities of the EU. That being said, in order to show the enormous impact Latin America's biggest country has on the EU, EU's foreign policy towards Brazil will be examined. Firstly, a brief overview of the two actors (the EU and Brazil) will be provided. Moreover, the paper will offer a brief history of the relations and describe not only the areas of collaboration among them, but also the mechanisms through, which these relations are achieved. The paper will also explore the nature of policies while

identifying the challenges and constraints the EU and Brazil have been facing. Lastly, what shall be clear is that a significant part of the discussion includes the South American political and economic bloc named Mercosur. The essay will identify that even though negotiations with Brazil mainly take into account economic benefits for the two international actors, some joint action plans and operational policies also aim to achieve further integration and deal with security issues. Finally, the paper will conclude that the EU-Brazil relations are closer than ever, but there are important issues due to which the two actors fail to reach a consensus.

Actors

1. Brazil

The Federative Republic of Brazil is not only the largest country in Latin America, which makes her the world's fifth largest country, but also an important global player, which "emerged as a key interlocutor for the EU" (The European Commission). The fact that this strategic partner is strongly engaged in an exploitation of natural resources and a pursuit of both industrial and agricultural growth makes her a significant economic actor that functions as a leader of the Latin America. And yet, despite Brazil's development and participation in the United Nations (UN) as well as the World Trade Organization (WTO), this strong ally still faces some serious domestic problems such as high-income inequality, corruption and rising unemployment (*The World Factbook*, p. 1). The first EU-Brazil Summit, which significantly changed the future of their relations took place during the Portuguese Presidency at the Council of the EU in 2007. The main Brazilian actor of this Summit was President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (The Council of The European Union, EU-Brazil Summit 2007, p. 1).

2. The European Union (The EU)

The EU, whose predecessor was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) proposed by Schuman on the 9th May 1950 now functions as one of the most significant global actors as well as a 'soft superpower' (Lelieveldt and Princen, p. 3). What started as a regional economic agreement between six European countries gradually developed into a union with a political system, which comprises of 28 member states (27 after Brexit) (Lelieveldt and Princen, p. 3-4). This both intergovernmental and supranational body has its common foreign and security policy, which the EU uses when dealing with other external actors (Lelieveldt and Princen, p. 3-4). Moreover, there was one European country that made a great improvement in EU-Brazil

relations – Portugal. Specifically, it was the Prime Minister of Portugal, Jose Socrates, together with other important prime ministers from European countries France, Spain, Slovenia and Italy, who significantly contributed to the establishment of closer relations between the two actors (The Council of The European Union, EU-Brazil Summit 2007, p. 1).

Historical Background and the Areas of Collaboration

Brazil has retained a heritage of good relations with the European countries since the end of the colonial period (Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on EU-Brazil relations, 2009). The first initiative to formalize these close links can be traced back to the European Community (the EC) period, when Brazil and the EC agreed upon the Framework Agreement for Cooperation in 1995. This first agreement focuses on the cooperation on almost every level, which includes, but it is not limited to, the strengthening of democratic values, economic cooperation, enhancing cooperation, development of trade, industrial cooperation, as well as the cooperation in the field of science, technology, energy and transport. (Framework for Cooperation, 1995). This agreement was further enhanced by the Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation in 2004 and together these agreements govern the EU-Brazil cooperation (European External Action Service, 2015). The most important aspect of this cooperation, however, is to be found in 2007, when a Strategic Partnership between the two actors was established (Council of the European Union, 1st EU-Brazil Summit, 2007). The main topics of this partnership are the following: economic growth, cooperation on foreign policy issues, acknowledgment of global challenges such as climate change, humane rights and sustainability and lastly, the fight against poverty. It is necessary to emphasize the positive impact the Strategic Partnership had on EU-Brazil relations. The Strategic Partnership allowed Brazil to enhance her image of a both global and regional leader. In the meantime, it also provided the EU with an opportunity to engage in a more open and substantial dialogue with her major investment hub in Latin America – Brazil (Council of the European Union, 1st EU-Brazil Summit, 2007). Furthermore, trade is another important subject of this dialogue since Brazil remains to be the most important market for the EU in the Latin American region. At the same time, the EU has been Brazil's first trading partner (Communication from the Commission, 2007). More specifically, the EU currently accounts for 19,5% of Brazil's total trade whereas Brazil accounts for 2% of the EU's trade.

Table 1: EU-Brazil Trade in 2014

<i>EU-Brazil 2014 (€ Billions)</i>	EU imports	EU exports	Balance
Trade in goods	31.2	36.9	5.7
Trade in services	7.5	15.0	7.5

Source: The European Commission, (2015)

According to the EU Commission, these figures “show the strength of our bilateral trade relationship” (The European Commission, 2015). In other words, Brazil is the single biggest exporter of agricultural goods to the EU, as 48% of what the EU imports from Brazil accounts for solely agricultural products. (The European Commission, 2015). The EU is also the biggest foreign investor in Brazil since about 50% of the FDI flows received by Brazil between 2008 and 2012 came from the EU (European Commission, 2015).

Table 2: EU – Brazil: Foreign direct investment in 2014

<i>Brazil 2014 (€ Billions)</i>	Inward stocks	Outward stocks	Balance
Foreign Direct Investment	113.6	343.6	230.0

Source: The European Commission, (2015)

While these figures represent a high activity in terms of trade, the Brazilian market is highly protected with applied customs averaging tariff of 13.5%. This is the main reason why, as we shall see, the EU is trying to create an overarching FTA with Mercosur. However, due to objections of the EU member states, an establishment of this agreement has not been very successful yet as it will be shown further in the paper.

Table 3: Brazil-EU Relations: 10 Areas of Collaboration

1.	Strengthening multilateralism
2.	Raising human rights standards, fostering democracy and governance
3.	Achieving the Millennium Development Goals and promoting regional and social development
4.	Protecting environment
5.	Strengthening energy cooperation
6.	Enhancing Latin America’s stability and prosperity
7.	Advancing the Mercosur
8.	Reinforcing trade and economic relations
9.	Promoting justice, freedom and security
10.	Bringing people together

Source: The European Commission (2007)

As it has been shown, the two parties have been collaborating in almost every possible area of collaboration, which suggests that both Brazil and the EU have been interested and put lots of effort into strengthening their relations. It should be also noted that after the first EU-Brazil Summit in 2007, similar summits have been held on an annual basis in order to further develop and strengthen their relations. As we shall see further in the paper, the policies that govern these relationships include “Declaratory Policies” and “Operational Policies”.

Declaratory Policy

One of the examples of declaratory policy in regards to EU-Brazil relations can be traced back to 1999 when the Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement came into force (The European External Action Service). The key function of this document was to provide a political dialogue, which focuses on a trade of agricultural and industrial goods between the EU and Mercosur; a sub-regional group including the following countries: Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and lastly Venezuela (The European External Action Service). Prior to the EU-Brazil ‘Strategic Partnership’, the European Commission presented a document called the ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – towards an EU-Brazil strategic partnership’, in which this institution proposed strengthening of cooperation due to Brazil’s new ‘global leader’ image (The European Commission).

There are also several examples of EU foreign declaratory policy towards Brazil after the establishment of this ‘Strategic Partnership’ in 2007. For instance, in the field of fusion energy research, the EU negotiated an ‘Agreement for Cooperation between the European Atomic Energy Community and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil’ in November 2009 (Agreement for Cooperation). The main objective of this ‘Agreement’ was to develop technological capabilities that would, by improving cooperation between the Parties, underlie fusion energy (Agreement for Cooperation). This was followed by the ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Statistical Cooperation between the Statistical Offices of the EU and Brazil’, which was signed in Luxembourg in 2010. The purpose of the ‘Memorandum’ was to share knowledge gathered in statistical fields and thus, promote both coordination and cooperation on statistics-related matters. During the same year another valuable ‘Agreement’ between the two global actors in regards to the short-stay visa waiver for holders of diplomatic, service or official passports was made (Agreement between the EU and Brazil on Short-Stay Visa

Waiver). This 'Agreement' implied that the citizens of both the EU and Brazil, who met certain criteria were allowed to "enter, transit through and stay without a visa in the territory of the other Contracting Party for a maximum period of three months" during half a year. (Agreement between the EU and Brazil on Short-Stay Visa Waiver).

Operational Policy

Even though declaratory policy is a necessary component of any successful foreign policy, it cannot simply work on its own. In other words, in order to reach full effectiveness and truly strengthen the bilateral relations, a country or an international institution such as the EU has to engage in operational policy as well. One of the most significant operational policy initiatives regarding the EU-Brazil relations was the very first summit that took place in Lisbon in July 4, 2007 and changed the nature of the relations between the two actors (Ferreira-Pereira, p. 5). It was this Summit of 2007 that led to a more serious political dialogue regarding a range of issues from security to sports (Ferreira-Pereira, p. 5). In the second EU-Brazil Summit, which was held in Rio de Janeiro in 2008, the partners accomplished to adopt the 2008 Joint Action Plan built on five fundamental pillars (Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, p. 5). Joint action plans such as this are also operational in nature as they enhance future cooperation and most importantly call for 'action'. Another type of operational policy is funding. Specifically, in 2005, Brazil decided to invest €5.2 billion into the EU due to her interests in sectors such as trade, mining and construction (The European Commission). This also shows that Brazil plays a role of a very important investor in the EU. The EU is involved in funding to support EU-Brazil relations as well. For example, in 2007 the EU allocated over €233 million to Haiti for the period of 2008-2013, where Brazil was engaged in the UN peacekeeping missions (The European Commission).

Another successful aspect of the operational policy is Brazil's image of the "most successful Latin American country participating in the Erasmus Mundus programme", which functions as a valuable tool for bringing future students of higher education from both Brazil and the EU together (The European Commission). It is, thus, important to realize that 'bringing people together' by using exchanges such as the Erasmus Mundus is on the priority list of both parties as well. Finally, when it comes to the sustainable development, both Brazil and the EU have increased their commitment to work under High-Level Political Forum, which illustrates

another way of using operational policy for improving bilateral relations (The European Commission). The main objective of this forum is to promote a balanced approach of the economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainable development (The Council of the European Union, p. 9).

Challenges and Constraints

During the international conference on EU-Brazil relations, which was held in Brussels on the 7-8th May 2012, the Brazilian Ambassador to the European Union, H.E. Ricardo Neiva Tavares, gave a speech, in which he confidently stated that, “When one examines the present state of relations between Brazil and the European Union, the conclusion is that they have never been as close as they are today” (Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, p. 4). Despite the true value of his statement, we should not think of the EU-Brazil relations as being flawless. Just because they have ‘never been as close as they are today’, does not mean that they have not faced any challenges. For example, one of the topics of the ‘global economic area’ Brazil and the EU could not agree upon was the reform of the International Monetary Form (IMF). While Brazil, as an emerging economy, was strongly advocating for the inclusion of other less-developed and slowly economically emerging countries, the EU being aware of the global economic crisis’ consequences considered this proposal to be too risky (Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, p. 9). Another challenge could be linked to the area of ‘sustainable development’. In order to develop itself, Brazil has been putting lot of time into biofuel cultivation (Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, p. 12). However, some of EU’s observers have been questioning the extent to which Brazil’s biofuel industry was truly ecological and sustainable (Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, p. 12). This was due to a fact that there was a link between biofuel cultivation and deforestation, which seemed highly suspicious (Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, p. 12-13). This, therefore, shows that even though EU-Brazil relations significantly strengthened over the past years, there are still certain topics on which the two global actors have rather opposing views.

Additionally, the EU and Brazil have indeed succeeded in building strong relations with prospects for development. However, there is another actor that governs this relationship, Mercosur. Even though the most logical way for developing the relations between the EU and Brazil even further would be to establish a free trade area, without tariffs on goods and

services, this idea seems very unlikely at the moment. In fact, it looks like the EU wants to achieve such an agreement with the whole Mercosur and not just Brazil. This was slightly unexpected since it was Brazil that accounted for 70% of the bloc's GDP (Haskel, 2016). As Alejandro Perotti, a former legal adviser to the Montevideo-based Mercosur Secretariat indicated, "Europe is interested in selling its products to Mercosur, not separately to Brazil" (Haskel, 2016). The first efforts to create a free trade area between Mercosur and the EU took place in 2004, but both sides "judged the other's offer to be insufficiently ambitious" and therefore the negotiations failed (The Economist, 2016). The initiative was brought up again in 2016, but negotiations in May seemed to have encountered obstacles again (The Economist, 2016). The problem is mainly due to lack of agreement among the EU member states. More specifically, 13 member states led by France, are posing difficulties in achieving a deal in the negotiations, as they are afraid of losing support from the farmers in their respective countries (The Economist, 2016). The farmers in these countries seem to be "scared of Mercosur, the world's most competitive producer of grains and meat" (The Economist, 2016). In an effort to battle these domestic disagreements with farmers, the European Union Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development, Phil Hogan, announced that beef will not be part of the Mercosur deal negotiations (MercoPress, "Uruguay", 2016). However, Uruguay's foreign minister Rodolfo Nin Novoa, expressed that both beef and ethanol are indeed included in the deal but with no volumes or time span. This led to further concerns about the validity of each of these statements (MercoPress, "Uruguay", 2016). In other words, the farmers from these EU member states are afraid that their products will not be able to compete with the ones imported from Mercosur and will have to drop their prices in order to stay in business (MercoPress, "Brussels", 2016). The dissatisfaction of such an outcome can be traced within the EU, where in Dublin for example, the farmers marched to protest against the deals. (MercoPress, "Brussels", 2016). As Santiago Deluca, a former secretary of Mercosur's Permanent Review Tribunal explained: "I do not think there will be an accord. There is a lot at stake. Mercosur has a lot to lose on the services field, but Europe has a lot more to lose on the agricultural field. Let's just recall that a ton of soybeans from (Argentina's) Santa Fe province costs the same as an iPod" (Haskel, 2016). While other member states have a positive view on the achievement of this deal, what can be observed is a lack of consensus among EU member states. Moreover, even though Brazil's minister of trade and industry, Armando Monteiro, has expressed his willingness to achieve trade deals with the EU, some of the other

member states of Mercosur, particularly Argentina, has been rather concerned about the controversial protectionist policies (Leahy, 2015).

Conclusion

The relations between Brazil and the EU seem to be indeed successful. Their relationship seems to have also undergone a huge progress and development since 1996. That being said, by providing a brief shared history of the EU-Brazil relations, a description of their mutual interests and areas of collaboration as well as a few specific examples of both declaratory and operational policies and obstacles they have been facing, the research paper provided a concise analysis of the EU Foreign Policy towards Latin America's largest country, Brazil. The paper highlighted the different areas of EU's cooperation with Brazil, having established the areas under which the two actors collaborate as well as the policies and initiatives that govern their relations. And yet, the paper also highlighted that even though EU-Brazil relations have never been so close, there are also issues such as the reform of the IMF and a possible inclusion of emerging economies, on which the two actors cannot reach a consensus. Taking this into account, one suggestion for even greater improvement of EU-Brazil relations is to find a solution for their domestic problems first. While the EU is often criticized for the democratic deficit, Brazil has been facing some serious problems regarding corruption, a relatively high crime rate as well as the high unemployment. Moreover, what the recent failure to establish a free trade area has shown is that even though the European Commission and the European Council handle the negotiations, there is a lack of consensus among the EU member states.

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Integrating money and minds- relations between the EU and Uruguay

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Uruguay, despite being a relatively small country in terms of GDP and population size, over the past decades has proven to be at the forefront of development in the region of Latin America. Although the region's economy has endured several crises from 1999 to 2002, and as well during the global financial crisis in 2008, Uruguay has continued to be a democratic, stable country with respect for human rights, the rule of law and the environment. The European Union's relations with Uruguay have historically been very warm, of which the result can be seen today in their shared norms and foreign policy objectives. An example of this, is that both the EU and Uruguay are striving for an association agreement of the EU with Mercosur. This is the regional (economic) cooperation framework, of which Brazil, Venezuela, Paraguay and Argentina are also members (EEAS 2016a). As the EU is Uruguay's third trade partner with a trade volume of about €3 billion (EEAS 2016b), continuing these warm relations and trade negotiations are important for both parties. Uruguay has recently implemented some policies and regulations that can be called progressive and liberal, such as the possibility of same-sex marriage and the regulation and legalisation of marihuana, which makes it is an interesting time to look at how the seemingly shared norms of this small South-American country with the EU might influence their relationships or policies. This paper will overview the relations between the European Union and Uruguay, analysing the past and future of these relationships and critically engaging with the EU's foreign policy towards Uruguay. First, a short background of Uruguay, especially regarding its politics and its relative position in the region will be provided. Then, the actors that are involved in the relations, as well as the ways in which these relations are carried out, will be analysed. Furthermore, the areas of collaboration between the EU and Uruguay will be critically reviewed. This paper will conclude with naming some possible opportunities and constraints in the future relationships between the EU and Uruguay.

Uruguay, gaining its independence in 1828 (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union Directorate B 2009, 5), has historically been a relatively stable country with a long and strong democratic tradition in the region, as the only time its government functioned as a military dictatorship was from 1973-1985 (Ibid. 5-6). Since then, Uruguayans have shown to have faith in their democracy and the rule of law, with social development being fairly high (European Commission 2007, 4). Currently, the President's Office of Uruguay is again held by Mr. Vázquez, who was in office from 2005-2010 before, and just as former President Mujica part of the Frente Amplio–Encuentro Progresista, which is described as a collective of socialist, left-wing parties (European Commission 2001, 7–8). Other parties that have been governing before are the Colorado Party and the Blanco Party, being more liberal and conservative parties respectively (Ibid.). Over the past few years Uruguay has become an increasingly liberal, progressive country. Under the rule of President Mujica, abortion rights were secured, marihuana was regulated and legalized and same-sex marriage was made possible (Mander 2014). If these regionally and globally progressive regulations will continue to exist under the rule of Vázquez is still unsure. Uruguay currently is seen by the European Union as an high-income country, as they are no longer entitled to the EU's development program Generalised Scheme of Preferences (European Commission 2016). It is a relatively developed country, with low illiteracy rates, a good healthcare system, civil service and social welfare systems (European Commission 2007; Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union Directorate B 2009). However, the country suffers from economic swings in the region, being a small country with only 3.5 million inhabitants, relative to the total of 240 million inhabitants of Mercosur (EEAS 2011, 6, 24). During the financial problems in Argentina between 1999-2002 and the global financial crisis in 2008, Uruguay suffered from a severe GDP loss and a high percentage of unemployment (European Commission 2007, 8; Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union Directorate B 2009, 13–16). In the aftermath of these crises, Uruguay has climbed up the ladder and can currently be seen as one of the most well-developed countries in the region, with a growing GDP and lowering poverty rates (Ibid.). This might be due to their stable domestic politics and low levels of corruption in comparison to other nations in the region, which makes the implementation of policies to counter such crises more effective. Regarding domestic economics, Uruguay's main export products are found in the fields of agricultural products (Delegation of the European Union to Uruguay 2016b). It also has quite a strong financial sector in Montevideo, alongside being the administrative

heart of Mercosur (European Commission 2007). Although Uruguayan GDP is growing and trade with the EU becomes easier, currently the most important issue in domestic politics and development is the divide between the urban people – almost a third of all inhabitants live in the capital Montevideo – and the rural areas of the country, where development tends to stagnate and urban levels of prosperity are far from reached (Ibid. 10-12). Relations between the EU and Uruguay are mainly acted out by the government of Uruguay and the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Commission and the European Parliament, both on a bilateral basis and multilaterally via (most importantly) Mercosur. Additionally, EU member states also uphold bilateral relationships with Uruguay, historically this has especially been the case with Spain, now actively mediating in a smaller conflict regarding two potentially polluting factories on the border of Uruguay with Argentina (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union Directorate B 2009, 10). Furthermore, there are negotiations on further open trade agreements via the World Trade Organization and EU members (European Commission 2014).

Historically, it is interesting to see that Uruguay has actively engaged and continues to do so in negotiations over free trade agreements. One of the biggest World Trade Organization (WTO) trade agreements was even started in Uruguay in 1986, and was named the “Uruguay Round” (World Trade Organization 2016). Most of the EU cooperation schemes and projects have been aimed at further integrating the Uruguayan market with the European market, as well as providing development aid in specific sectors. The Uruguayan-EU relationship was formally mainly shaped by the Framework Agreement for Cooperation in 1991 (Council of the European Communities and Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay 1991) and the Interregional Framework Cooperation for Mercosur and the EU in 1995 (Council of the European Union 1995). These two formal documents were the start of further integrating the Uruguayan market with the European Market, as well as establishing (aid) relationships in multiple areas. Currently, the European Commission conducts its relationships with Uruguay based on Country Strategy Papers, that provide a broad strategy and focus for the relationship between the nation and the EU for 6 years. This strategy is reviewed after the first 3 years of it being in place. From 2001-2013, two Country Strategy Papers (CSP’s) have been written on Uruguay, the first being more focused on the economic development of Uruguay after a severe crisis (European Commission 2001), the second focusing more on the inclusion of all

people of Uruguay in its economic and social development as well as aiming at investing more in science and research (European Commission 2007). Over the years, one can see a significant shift in thinking about Uruguay from the CSP's and Midterm Reviews. First, Uruguay was seen as a rather developing country, needing aid to reform and diversify its economy. Now, EU aid is more focused on the social issue of including people from more rural areas in Uruguay's growing prosperity, and making the economy ready for further technical innovation through investing in scientific research. Bilaterally speaking, negotiations between the EU and Uruguay for the most part take place during the EU-Uruguay Joint Committee, which is held every few years. Clearly, one can see from the 8th and last summit, there is a joint focus on enhancing free trade between Uruguay and the region and the EU (European Community and Uruguay 2012). The same can be seen from different member state-Uruguay meetings, as for example the British Group Inter-Parliamentary Union meetings with Uruguayan MP's. They were also mainly focusing on trade issues, whilst also naming the strong cultural ties and shared norms of the UK and the EU more broadly with Uruguay (British Group Inter-parliamentary Union 2014).

Regarding Mercosur specifically, the EU aims at signing a far-reaching Association Agreement with Mercosur. The negotiations over this Agreement already started with the signing of the Interregional Framework Cooperation in 1995 (Council of the European Union 1995), and were re-launched after a decade of economic crises in 2010. Since then, Uruguay has been at the forefront in promoting this integration of both the markets within Mercosur and the Mercosur markets with the EU. Even more so, it has actively acted in the negotiations when Uruguay held the Office of Presidency of Mercosur in 2016 (MercoPress 2016b). When Venezuela came into Office in May 2016, it was decided that Uruguay would continue to lead the negotiations on the Association Agreement, as Venezuela currently faces serious political turmoil (MercoPress 2016a). Judging from the Regional Strategy Paper on Mercosur, the European Commission aims at strengthening Mercosur's institutions (later changed to strengthening biotechnological developments), increasing regional integration and fostering negotiations for the Association Agreement (European Commission 2007; EEAS 2011). For the last part, the EU even reserved a budget of €15 million for the period of 2011-2013, which is about half of the six-year budget for Uruguay as a whole (European Commission 2007, 20). Most relations between Latin-America and Mercosur with the EU have been done through

multiple (high-political) summits and negotiation rounds, although also a significant amount of money is used to promote and enhance civil knowledge on the regional integration process (€10 million) (European Commission 2007, 5). As can be judged from previous analysis, key to the relationship of the EU with Uruguay is free trade and economic integration. However, there is quite a few specific areas in which more specific collaboration has been sought, or on which the EU and Uruguay tend to share policies. Examples of these areas include scientific and technological development, inclusion of rural areas in policies, reforming of the penal system, trade and agriculture but also environmental protection and UN peace-keeping operations.

Specific areas on which Uruguay and the EU collaborate, are of course the areas the EU focuses on in terms of aid. In the past, this mainly has been economic reform and strengthening of institutions, however currently Uruguay gets more specific help in a few areas, as it is not eligible for bilateral aid regarding poverty reduction anymore (EEAS 2016b). This is most prominently due to the economic rise of Uruguay after a decade of crises and the subsequent falling unemployment rates. Main challenges for Uruguay are now to include all Uruguayan regions in the growing welfare of the country (European Commission 2007), as well as creating a regional momentum to negotiate and establish an Association Agreement between the EU and Mercosur. Interestingly, there is no focus on democratic reforms – re-establishing the status of Uruguay as a stable, functioning, liberal democracy – other than is the case with many other countries in the region. However, there has been help from the EU to Uruguay to pursue some tax reforms and reform the penal system, as to strengthen these institutions that have to play their part in a country with respect for rule of law, human rights and democracy (Delegation of the European Union to Uruguay 2016a). These measures have however not yet been evaluated on their impact.

Regarding trade, a large part of the EU imports from Uruguay are meat (beef), leather and soy beans, whilst exporting transport equipment and other manufactured goods (Delegation of the European Union to Uruguay 2016b; European Commission 2016). Alongside with the region's enormous potential for agricultural production, the (region's) trade relationship based on the export of agricultural products might (and has) posed challenges regarding the Association Agreement between Mercosur and the EU. Especially Argentina and Brazil have a strong will to secure their own agricultural exports, and thus not to open up those

markets to the EU, whereas Uruguay would possibly benefit more from these free trade agreements. In order to strengthen the Uruguayan economy, the EU in the past has invested in diversifying the Uruguayan economy, now focusing on technological innovation and investing in (especially biotechnological) research. This, on the longer term, will help to change the trade relationship that is now in place between the EU and Uruguay – as now the types of goods traded, raw materials versus manufactured goods for the EU, make Uruguay more dependent on the global market. The EU investment in these areas will help stabilize the Uruguayan economy and thereby create a possible win-win situation, when the Association Agreement between Mercosur and the EU can be signed under negotiations leadership of Uruguay.

Besides the official focus of the European Commission on some institutional reforms and trade agreements, other areas in which the EU and Uruguay collaborate can also be seen. From the very first agreement in 1991 onwards, environmental protection has been high on the agenda of the EU-Uruguay relationship (Council of the European Communities and Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay 1991). Currently, Uruguay is a global leading nation regarding the use of sustainable energy, as now 95% of all its energy comes from hydroelectricity (Watts 2015). This progressive behaviour regarding sustainability is a joint aim for both Uruguay and the EU, and there is room for mutual learning and sharing of ideas and technologies. Furthermore, Uruguay has continuously taken a leading role regarding UN peacekeeping operations. As a small country, Uruguay still is the world's 3rd contributor to the UN peacekeeping forces in terms of troops (Gonnet and Hernández 2008). When accounting for population size, Uruguay is the 1st global contributor, for which the nation received compliments by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in 2011 (United Nations News Service 2011). This area, focused on global peace, stability, respect for human rights and the rule of law can be more focused on regarding the EU's role in this respect, as Uruguay and the EU seem to share similar norms regarding the necessity of providing the means for these peacekeeping forces.

Finally, it is interesting to see how the increasing amount of very liberal and progressive policies and laws in Uruguay could possibly change the relationship with the EU. This is especially so, for Uruguay holds a very specific stance regarding the legalization and the regulation of the use of marihuana. There policies are both progressive in a global sense, as

well as in a region that is often seen in relation to many drugs-related violent (domestic) conflicts (Mander 2014). The progressive policies put in place can be seen as an increasing integration of Uruguay with the norms that are shared amongst most EU member-states, sometimes even having more progressive policies. For example, the legalization of same-sex marriage is still not in place in Italy and Germany. However, the results and continuation of these new policies are still unsure, as well as the role that they might play in the further process of integration of Uruguay with the EU. There is yet very little information available on this matter, as most EU-Uruguayan relationships these days are more focused on signing an Association Agreement via Mercosur, than on the bilateral relationships based on shared norms and values. However, one can imagine that the emergence of Uruguay as a democratic, social, progressive country on a relatively conservative continent will not have harmed the position of Uruguay as the chair of the negotiations on this matter.

To conclude with, there are few constraints and challenges to the Uruguay-EU relation, including the possible problems regarding Argentina and Brazil on the Association Agreement that Uruguay favours. Additionally, there is the issue of political instability of some of the bigger regional economies, including Venezuela and Brazil. Furthermore, some social issues within Uruguay might cause economic problems, as the ageing population (European Commission 2007, 4) and the growing amount of high-educated people leaving Uruguay (Altman 2014). Therefore, investment especially in scientific research and technology becomes very important in the changing relationship between the EU and Uruguay, as to strengthen its domestic economy and making it less dependent on regional or global market changes. Additionally, the possibilities of further integrating knowledge regarding sustainable energy and environmental protection, as well as collaborating in UN peacekeeping missions, could strengthen the EU-Uruguay relationship and might also work in favor of the establishment of an Association Agreement. In the larger picture of EU-Latin America relationships, the relationship with Uruguay can be regarded as an unique one, as Uruguay is a full-grown democracy with no need for high poverty reduction development aid, other than many other nations in the region. Therefore, the relationship the EU currently has with Uruguay may become an exemplary relationship for the region, where other nations may develop in a similar way as Uruguay did – although Uruguay is, after all, only a very small nation which has less impact on the global market than countries such as Brazil. Uruguay and

the EU now stand at the forefront of inventing a new way of a semi-aid relationships, where poverty reduction aid is no longer needed. The EU now helps by investing to further diversify the Uruguayan economy, whilst Uruguay implements liberal, perhaps “Western” policies and remains a stable democracy. All in all, the EU and Uruguay are in the process of integrating both their markets and their shared norms, which for both actors could result in a very fruitful relationship.

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Conclusion – Pathways for an enhanced strategic partnership across the Atlantic

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Despite being more on the sideline than at the center stage of EU foreign policy, cooperation across the Atlantic has been rich in variety covering the entire foreign policy spectrum from economic to cultural relations. For example, the relationship with Mexico and Chile is largely dominated by a steady increase in trade volumes in both directions across the Atlantic, while the relationship with Uruguay, and arguably Argentina, is more of a socio-political nature and include considerable amount of citizen (notably student) exchanges from one side to the other. Yet, as the five country case studies have shown, the EU's approach towards Latin America is also diffuse and rather uncoordinated: whereas the EU is increasingly forging shared positions and stances on global affairs with some Latin American countries (Mexico, Uruguay and Chile) it is on the opposite side of the spectrum with others such as Brazil (IMF reform) and Argentina (Falkland Islands). In addition, the Latin American geo-political landscape is rapidly changing and pushing the EU more and more to the background of Latin American (international) affairs. Various regional integration schemes are being developed with whom the EU has more of a troublesome relationship than a mutual beneficial one: i.e. the Pacific Alliance's turn to the "East" and EU-MERCOSUR 17 years' deadlock on a possible Free Trade Agreement.

For these reasons, the EU has been unable to fully exploit the potential of this "other Transatlantic Relationship", which is substantial from both an economic and political point of view. From an economic point of view, Latin America is expected to grow at three times the rate of the EU and the amount of European FDI in the region surpasses that of any other region by far (The Guardian, 2012). In addition, most Latin American countries are characterized by robust democratic systems and similar positions in global affairs and three Latin American countries form part of the G20. Between the two of them – 33 states of Latin America and the Caribbean with 600 million inhabitants; and 28 states of the EU with 550 million inhabitants – they comprise most of the Western world and jointly constitute over one-third of United

Nations (UN) members, making a further convergence of views on important transnational issues of great interest if the EU wants to achieve its pro-claimed aim of being a highly reliable international actor for global peace and prosperity.

In addition, by enhancing its political/diplomatic clout in the region, the EU could assist Latin America better in its efforts of making the region a safer and more secure part of the world which is of geo-political interest to Europe as well. Jointly countering transnational and drugs-related organized crime, supporting legal arbitration and a diplomacy of peace in (local) border and territorial waters disputes on the Latin American continent will help make the 21st century a peaceful and progressive era. In addition, the EU should also step up its efforts in garnering further Latin American contributions to solving global challenges that are also of high importance to the EU such as climate change, terrorism, resource scarcity and food security (Selleslaghs, 2016).

Traditionally, the EU's added value to the region has been more than anything in the area of economics. Yet, with China becoming a very influential investor and economic player in Latin America and the renewed strategic economic role of the US as a consequence of the recent US-Cuba rapprochement, the geo-economic narrative is rapidly changing as well². Having already signed free trade agreements with Chile and Costa Rica, China has continued to gain ground in the region, most notably by becoming Brazil's largest export market and primary foreign investor. As a result, the EU is currently faced with the prospect of losing its status as Latin America's second trading partner after the US. Therefore, if the old continent wishes to consolidate its economic dominance in the region, it will have to find ways to boost trade and investment in Latin America (again).

The way forward: creating a comprehensive strategy for Latin American relations

None of the above goals will be reached, however, if Europeans fail to pool the means and tools of diplomacy and security. The creation of the EEAS and a vast network of EU delegations across the globe (more than 20 in Latin America already) has been a good step in that direction. Yet a truly comprehensive diplomacy involves linking foreign, trade, aid, investment and security policies which is more difficult to achieve in 'fair weather countries', as most Latin

² For full details, see Friends of Europe (2015) "EU-Latin America Relations, charting a course for the future", Brussels, 44p.

American partners tend to be (Gratius, 2013). But it certainly applies to other political regimes that are externally assertive or reactively defensive, such as Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela. It is no accident that there is a degree of coordination among Member States and the EU in countries such as Brazil (being a major geopolitical player in the region) and Columbia (to support a long-lasting regional peace-process) or in Central America, where pooling information and sharing modest diplomatic resources is a recognized need. Elsewhere, Member States have less incentive to coordinate their diplomacy, and the EU delegations may focus only on providing technical assistance and (development) aid, instead of developing a joint (EU-Member States) long term strategy and action plan which includes shared economic and political goals. With the recently launched 'Global Strategy' prepared by the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, the EU missed a serious opportunity to spell out its overarching ambitions and objectives to re-invigorate the 'Other Transatlantic Partnership'. In fact, by devoting only one –little inspirational- paragraph to the region, Latin Americans' perception of Europe's low priority for the region was (re-)affirmed. The only way out of this is to formulate well-articulated action points which are shared by both parties and which will receive a stringent follow-up at the highest level during implementation phase (other than the EU-CELAC joint declarations). Only then shared aspirations and mutual opportunities will be exploited and the strategic partnership enhanced.

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