

Anti-Government Extremism: A New Threat?

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(Special Issue Editors)

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Introduction

In recent years, intelligence and security agencies have identified “anti-government extremism” (AGE) as an emerging threat to democracy, political processes, institutions, and elected politicians.[1] However, this term is used to refer to a rather wide range of phenomena, movements, ideas and actions, and it is not always clear what exactly makes such manifestations extremist rather than being considered legitimate expressions of political dissent. We hope that this Special Issue of *Perspectives on Terrorism* will contribute to open a scholarly discussion on these issues and give us a better grasp on this slippery AGE concept and phenomenon.

Anti-government extremism finds different expressions in terms of organizational formations, conspiracy theories, collective action, and violence and threats against politicians and government representatives. These different expressions are loosely connected or combined in the sense that specific AGE movements tend to adhere to some conspiracy theories to justify certain forms of action, whether that be collective demonstrations or individual violence. In some cases, the conspiracy theory (e.g., QAnon) is the driver behind the formation of a social movement that takes a variety of action routes, such as mass demonstrations or violent attacks by individual persons.

One form of AGE is *movements, networks and individuals that reject the legitimacy of the government* as a matter of principle and refuse to obey or submit to any authorities and regulations (see Jackson’s contribution in this issue). The earliest modern manifestation started on the far left with the Anarchist movement that emerged during the second half of the 19th century and in the early 20th century, rejecting the legitimacy of state authority. In recent decades, the most influential anti-government movements have been affiliated with the far right rather than with the far left. Thus, anti-government extremism is nothing new, and it may have very different ideological roots. In David Rapoport’s theory of the four waves of terrorism, [2] the first three waves were anti-government in different ways: the anarchist wave (1879–2020s), the anti-colonialist wave (1919–1960s), and the New Left wave (1960s–1990s). AGE movements vary considerably: some reject all forms of state authority, while others oppose specific governments or policies. The argument that all terrorism is anti-government is incorrect—many terrorist groups direct most of their violent attacks against non-state targets, such as ethnic and religious minorities, media institutions, businesses, or the public. Other terrorist movements make a point of only (or mainly) attacking targets representing the state, governmental institutions or politicians.

The first wave of modern revolutionary terrorism began around 1880 with anarchist movements like Narodnaya Volya (The People’s Will) in Russia. Their strategy of “propaganda by the deed” selectively targeted individuals they considered to be embodiments of the autocratic, oppressive state, aiming to assassinate the czar, senior government officials and other prominent representatives of state power.[3] The broad anarchist movements contained a variety of anti-authoritarian socialist groups and ideas, some rejecting all forms of state power and ready-to-use violence, while others were pacifist and even libertarian.[4] Although many anarchists were opposed to violence, a string of anarchist militant groups and lone actors were behind the first wave of modern terrorism, lasting from the late 1870s until around 1920. During this period, anarchists were behind assassinations of a Russian czar (1881), the Empress of Austria-Hungary (1898), the president of Italy (1900), the American president (1901), two prime ministers of Spain (1897 and 1912) and other representatives of state authority, as well as conducting a number of less-selective bombing attacks. The anarchist terrorist campaign peaked during the 1890s, often fed by sensationalist news media and brutal overreactions by governments. The terrorist campaign faded gradually after the turn of the century. As a significant political movement, anarchism

was in most respects crushed at the end of the Spanish civil war in 1939. In the post-WWII era, anarchism survived in limited circles and saw a resurgence with the student rebellion of 1968 and beyond.

The wave of anti-colonialist terrorism from the end of WWI until the 1960s was opposed to Western colonialist governments but was not directed against government as such; the militant movements tried (often successfully) to build new independent states.

A wave of the “New Left” terrorist movements during the 1970s and 1980s was strongly anti-government but it varied among groups and participants in terms of the extent to which they were influenced by anarchist ideas. Although anarchist ideology was quite pronounced among some groups like Action Directe in France and several others, major groups like the German Red Army Faction (RAF), the Red Brigades (BR) in Italy, or the Japanese Red Army were more inspired by Marxist–Leninist ideology and communism, opposing western imperialism in general and the US war in Vietnam in particular. Although they claimed that the Soviet Union and its European satellite states had become traitors to the communist cause, several of these groups were secretly sponsored by the Soviet Union and Eastern Germany. These movements were fiercely anti-*Western* governments but admired communist governments like the one in North Vietnam and its Vietcong movement and regimes like Mao’s China and Castro’s Cuba.[5]

This left-wing terrorist wave had faded in most Western countries by the early 1990s. What emerged instead was an anarchist subculture of militant “autonomous” groups, mostly youths that opposed the police and all other forms of governmental authorities, but also fascists and neo-Nazis. They increasingly branded themselves as anti-fascists using the acronym Antifa. They were often violent, sometimes seeking out their enemies to beat them up, or seeking confrontations with the police. They damaged property, including by arson, and they were frequently involved in fierce street fights, yet they rarely took recourse to lethal or terrorist violence.[6]

In recent decades, anti-government extremism has increasingly taken a turn towards the far right. Whereas the main historical traditions of the extreme right in Europe have promoted strong centralized states with powerful dictators like Hitler, Mussolini and Franco, the dominant stream of the far right in the U.S. has opposed a strong federal government, a sentiment that has also been influential in the Republican party. A predecessor to the modern American militia movements was the conspiratorial, anti-government Posse Comitatus movement, starting from the late 1960s, and before it, the Ku Klux Klan movement from the 1870s onwards.[7] A variety of anti-government militias and patriot movements crystallized in the wake of the FBI’s shootout with Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge in 1992, and the heavy-handed Waco siege in 1993 - events that in the eyes of many were proof that the federal state was a tyrannical government, allegedly infiltrated by evil leftist and globalist forces, the “New World Order”.[8] The militias are heavily armed with military-style guns and gear, and oppose any attempt by the government to restrict their access to guns, claiming a right to opposing the federal government with armed force. Adherents of the militia movements have been involved in a number of violent clashes and even terrorist attacks, including the Oklahoma City bombing of a federal government building in 1995. The militia movements got another boost with the election of the first black American President, Barack Obama. Paradoxically, when Donald Trump was elected in 2016, many of these previously anti-government groups suddenly became strong supporters of the new president, feeling that they finally had one of their own in the White House (e.g., see Arie Weil’s article in this issue). After Trump’s defeat in the next presidential election, members of several militia groups (including Oath Keepers, Proud Boys, and Three Percenters), were at the forefront of the storming of the Capitol on January 5, 2021, to “stop the steal”—i.e., to disrupt Congress from certifying President Joe Biden’s 2020 electoral victory.[9]

Another strand of American anti-government extremism is the Sovereign Citizens movement that originated in the 1970s. They fundamentally rejected the legitimacy of a central government[10], much like the leftist anarchist movement that originated a century earlier. The American Sovereign Citizens movement has inspired like-minded movements like the Freemen on the Land in Canada, UK, Australia and several other countries, and the Reichsbürger movement in Germany. Although supporters of these movements and ideas are mostly not violent, their refusal to pay taxes, adhere to traffic rules and other governmental regulations have frequently led to clashes with the police and other governmental agencies, resulting in some cases in fatal violence (see

the contributions by Rathje and Fiebig & Koehler in this issue).

Whereas these anti-government movements were until recently relatively marginal, such sentiments and conspiracy theories have increasingly become quite mainstream on the right side of the polarized US political landscape. A considerable proportion of American voters believe that the storming of the Capitol on January 6, 2021 was justified[11], and that the presidential election was “stolen” from Donald Trump, or they believe in the QAnon conspiracy theory that “a group of Satan-worshipping elites who run a child sex ring are trying to control our politics and media.”[12]

Thus, the far right in the U.S. has a long tradition of being opposed to the federal government (going back all the way to the events leading up to the American Civil War and its aftermath in the 1860s). A number of armed militia organizations are based on this anti-government doctrine. In contrast to the American far-right scene, the main historical extreme right traditions in Europe, Fascism and Nazism, promoted a strong central state with a dictator as leader.

Several of the articles in this special issue analyze anti-governmental movements and groups that in various ways reject state authority. In his contribution to this special issue on anti-government extremism, Sam Jackson makes a conceptual distinction between ideological AGE and issue-driven AGE. The latter objects to a government’s actions or stated priorities, such as policies to handle the current pandemic or lax immigration control. Issue-driven AGE may end if the government changes its policy so as to be in line with the opposition, at least on this specific issue. Ideological AGE rejects the legitimacy of any governments, at least above the local level (for example, some American AGE movements will only accept the county sheriff as the highest level of legitimate authority).

Ari Weil analyses what happened when U.S. anti-government militias faced the situation that someone they supported – Donald Trump – took power at president of the United States. Through the period of 2015 to 2021, the Oath Keepers changed their rhetoric from staunch opposition to federal power to embracing mass federal action (including the use of military power and martial law) to keep Trump in office – in stark conflict with the group’s founding ideology.

Verena Fiebig and Daniel Koehler’s article analyzes one important ideological AGE movement, the Sovereign Citizens. On the basis of a systematic literature review, they collected and compared data on what is known about the demographics, radicalization drivers, mental health status, and violent and criminal behaviors of sovereign citizen activists. Sovereign citizens are commonly described as “individuals and loose networks who hold strong anti-government beliefs that lead to the rejection of local, federal, or state authority and the legal system.” Based on their literature review, Fiebig and Koehler find that sovereign citizens are typically middle-aged or older males with financial difficulties, who are also often socially isolated. They tend to radicalize at a relatively old age after biographical breaks (such as losing a job or undergoing a divorce) and the loss of protective factors. Their experiences of powerlessness are often explained by conspiracy theories. If they use violence, they justify it as self-defense in the face of governmental encroachment. The reactive nature of their violence is typically manifested in violent attacks on police officers when they try to enforce governmental authority, such as executing eviction orders, arrest warrants or following traffic stops.

This reactive pattern of violence also comes out clearly in Jan Rathje’s article on the justification of violence among ‘Reichsbürger’ and other conspiracy-ideological sovereignists in Germany. The two cases studied involved middle-aged men who were in conflict with governmental authorities related to an eviction order due to unpaid debts, and the police trying to collect illegal weapons, respectively. Both claimed that their homes were sovereign states, independent of the German state, which they did not recognize as legitimate, asserting their right to self-defense by armed force. They both justified their violence by framing their cause along the lines of extreme right conspiracy theories (see below).

As editors of this special issue, we tried to find articles to cover a broad variety of anti-government extremism movements, not just those leaning towards the extreme right. Unfortunately, despite proactive invitations, we have not been able to obtain contributions of sufficient quality to address left-wing forms of anti-government

extremism. For comparative reasons as well as for ideological balance, we really deplore the lack of articles on historical anarchist movements as well as on modern varieties of left-wing anti-government militancy (such as Antifa) in this Special Issue.

A second form of AGE refers to the spreading of *conspiracy theories that undermine the legitimacy of governments, institutions, policies, and political opponents*. A highly influential conspiracy theory was the notorious “Protocols of the Elders of Zion”, a fabricated text originally distributed in Russia in 1903 claiming to describe how the Jews were plotting to achieve global domination.[13] It was used to incite anti-Jewish pogroms as well as justifying the Nazi persecution and extermination of Jews in the death camps.

A more recent twist of this anti-Semitic conspiracy theory was the notion of a Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG), claiming that Jews are already in control of the political establishment, the police, the media, academia, and the cultural elites, and are used by Jews as instruments to destroy the Aryan race through immigration and the promotion of homosexuality etc. This was a very popular conspiracy theory among neo-Nazis and white supremacists, especially from the late 1980s onwards, but still exists as a fringe phenomenon.[14]

The “Eurabia” theory [15]—the claim that EU leaders had made a secret agreement with Muslim leaders to Islamize and Arabize Europe through immigration of Muslims—gained a broader reception among far-right and anti-immigration movements and among some populist parties from the early 2000s onwards. This conspiracy theory also inspired extreme-right terrorists like Anders Behring Breivik, whose attacks against government ministries and youth party members in Norway in 2011 killed 77 people.

Whereas the Eurabia theory focuses on the cultural threat of Islamization, the “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory claims that there is a secret plot to dilute and destroy the ethnic character of the European population by replacing it through immigration of non-white people, reinforced by a drop in birth rates among native Europeans. This conspiracy theory, originally developed by the French author Renaud Camus, was promoted by the Identitarian movement in Europe and continues to have a considerable impact on populist parties and movements. In the U.S., the Great Replacement theory linked up well with the notion of the “white genocide” theory which is popularized by the neo-Nazi David Lane. It was also strongly promoted by Fox News host Tucker Carlson as well as by parts of the Alt Right movement and the New Zealand terrorist Brenton Tarrant.

Among recent conspiracy theories, few have gained a more rapid and widespread following than the highly bizarre QAnon conspiracy, launched in 2017. It claims the existence of a cabal ring of satanistic, cannibalistic child abusers, allegedly linked to Democratic politicians like Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and a broad range of liberals. They allegedly operated a global child sex trafficking ring that conspired against former U.S. President Donald Trump. After Trump lost the presidential election, QAnon supporters were at the forefront of the storming of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Several high-level Republican politicians have expressed support for the QAnon conspiracy, and a quarter of the party’s electorate believes there is some truth to it.[16] Although QAnon is tightly linked to U.S. politics, it has rapidly found a large base of supporters in Europe.

An article on QAnon in this Special Issue, by Julia Ebner, Christopher Kavanagh and Harvey Whitehouse, applies linguistic methodology and fusion-based theory to assess the risk of violence that might arise from adherents of the QAnon conspiracy theory. They explore a hypothesis that a high level of identity fusion—a visceral feeling of oneness with the group—in combination with a strong perception of an existential threat may predict an enhanced risk of violence. They find support for this fusion-plus-threat model in their data but do not claim that they possess a predictive model at this stage. Neither do they claim that their approach can be used to reliably identify individuals who will commit acts of violence. However, their study does support the thesis that the QAnon movement poses a risk to national security, particularly in English-speaking countries. The three authors conclude that the “high prevalence of identity fusion indicators along with external threat narratives, violence-condoning group norms as well as demonizing, dehumanizing and derogatory vocabulary in several QAnon groups are a particularly concerning warning sign that points to an increased proneness of group members to commit acts of political violence.”

Jan Rathje’s paper in this issue also addresses how conspiracy theories serve to justify violence among ‘Reichs-

bürger' and other conspiracy-ideological sovereignists in contemporary Germany. Drawing from two case studies, Rathje demonstrates how violent anti-government actors make use of various conspiracy theories (such as "New World Order", "the Great Replacement") to justify their use of firearms against the police.

A third expression of anti-government activism is *issue-oriented demonstrations and opposition to specific policies*. Most of these demonstrations were legitimate expressions of opposition and criticism of government authorities and policies, and the large majority among the participants were non-violent. However, some of these demonstrations crossed the boundary into violent extremism, and violence was clearly planned by some of the activists. The most flagrant example was the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, where thousands of demonstrators—incited by the outgoing president Donald Trump—tried to stop the certification process of the results of the presidential election. The mob, consisting of members of right-wing extremist organizations, such as the Oath Keepers, the Proud Boys, and the Three Percenters, as well as adherents of the QAnon conspiracy theory and ordinary Trump supporters, used violent means to break through the barricades and into the Capitol building, assaulting the Capitol Police and chasing lawmakers who feared for their lives. At least five people died during and after the event, directly or indirectly as a consequence of the attack.

A similar—but less dramatic event—took place on 29 August 2020, when several hundred protesters attempted to break into the German Reichstag (the federal parliament building in Berlin) as part of a vast protest against the country's coronavirus restrictions. Far-right Reichsbürger and neo-Nazi activists led the attackers, although many of the protesters did not have such connections.

Similar demonstrations took place in many European countries during the pandemic, usually breaking restrictions on masks and social distancing but also sometimes turning violent. Typically, the crowd consisted of an unusual mixture of far-right activists, conspiracy theorists, new-age adherents, left-wingers, anti-vaccine activists and people who had never before participated in political demonstrations. They shared their anger against governmental COVID-19 restrictions, policies, or in some cases, election results. What is more, they also tended to share the same slogans and conspiracy theories. Far-right extremist activists and organizations often took the lead in initiating these demonstrations, and sometimes also initiated violent attacks on the police or attempts to break into buildings.

In a forthcoming issue of *Perspectives on Terrorism*, several articles will address how pandemic policies and restrictions became the rallying point for mass demonstrations and violent mobilization against governmental institutions, politicians and health workers. These are examples of issue-driven anti-government extremism in contrast to ideological AGE, as discussed by Sam Jackson in his article in the current issue.

A fourth form of anti-government extremism is *violent attacks, plots, threats, and harassment against politicians and governmental representatives*. Political assassinations have a long history—in modern times from the anarchist murders of Russian czar Alexander II (1881) and the American president William McKinley (1901) to the murders of British MP Jo Cox (2016) and German regional governor Walter Lübcke (2019) by right-wing extremists. More recently the plot to kidnap Michigan governor Gretchen Whitmer and the attempt to attack and mutilate Democrat House Speaker Nancy Pelosi stand out. During the period between 1975 and 2011, at least 132 (mainly local) politicians have been killed in Italy by left-wing and right-wing extremists as well as by organized crime.[17] Far more common than physical attacks is the stream of harassment and threats towards elected politicians and civil servants at all levels, increasingly communicated via social media. Although rarely resulting in actual violence, it is well documented that such harassment and threats have a strong negative impact on the democratic process, causing many politicians to become less outspoken on controversial issues, and consider quitting politics due to the heavy personal cost. Terrorism is not only physical violence but may also involve threats of violence to achieve psychological repercussions beyond the immediate target.[18]

In this Special Issue, two articles specifically address violent attacks, threats, and harassment against politicians. In her article, Agata Kałabunowska examines politically motivated extreme-right attacks on elected representatives in contemporary Germany. After reviewing police and security service statistics documenting a widespread and increasing frequency of violent crimes against officials and elected officials, she analyzes in detail three recent cases of serious violent attacks against prominent regional and local politicians, including the 2019

murder of the head of the regional council of Kassel, Walther Lübcke; the 2015 near-fatal knife attack on the mayoral candidate in Cologne, Henriette Rieker; and the 2017 attempted knifing of another mayor, Andreas Hollstein in Altena. A related phenomenon was the series of death threats towards politicians circulating under the name NSU 2.0, referring to the terror campaign of the terrorist group National Socialist Underground.[19] Kałabunowska's study shows that the perpetrators selected their targets based on the victims' views on the German liberal immigration policy. She also notes that most of the attacks were directed against local politicians, which gives valid reason to assume that this might be the most vulnerable group of elected political figures. Politicians from the left, center and right of the political spectrum were targeted. The perpetrators were generally lone actors, not members of organized far-right groups, but they were holding far-right views.

The other article addressing this topic—by Tore Bjørgo, Anders Ravik Jupskås, Gunnar Thomassen and Jon Strype—analyzes patterns and consequences of threats towards politicians in Norway, based on surveys of national and local politicians. Although Norway experienced two extremely lethal attacks on government institutions and youth party politicians in 2011, actual attacks on politicians are nevertheless rare. However, many politicians have experienced serious threats (mainly through social media) against themselves or their families, as well as other forms of harassment. These verbal threats may have severe consequences: a majority of the exposed politicians reported some levels of fear, and many avoided speaking publicly on certain policy issues or even said they considered quitting politics. Thus, violent threats and incitement may not even have to lead to actual violence to have a terrorizing impact: politicians at national as well as local levels restrain themselves from engaging in or speaking out on certain issues or consider quitting politics due to fear and stress caused such verbal threats, in turn harming democratic institutions and processes.

Final Thoughts

The purpose of this Special Issue has been to open up a scholarly debate on the slippery concept and phenomenon of anti-government extremism. There are several topics and questions that have not yet been properly addressed in the present contributions. For example, is anti-government extremism a useful descriptive or analytical concept at all? How can we distinguish legitimate expressions of political dissent from extremism? Under which conditions may legitimate dissent transform into extremism? Under which circumstances does AGE wax and wane as a threat to society? And what is the connection between militant, issue-oriented AGE and ideological AGE that rejects all forms of government authority?

As noted earlier, an issue of *Perspectives on Terrorism* in 2023 will include several articles that address AGE-related issues, specifically involving opposition to anti-pandemic policies. In addition, it will include some articles that did not pass the review process in time for inclusion in the current issue of this journal.

About the Authors

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Notes

- [1] E.g., the U.S. National Security Council (2021). URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/National-Strategy-for-Countering-Domestic-Terrorism.pdf>; The Norwegian Police Security Service (2022). URL: <https://pst.no/globalassets/ntv/2022/nasional-trusselvurdering-2022-pa-engelsk.pdf>; Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat & Bundeskriminalamt (2020). Politisch motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2019. Bundesweite Fallzahlen, URL: <https://www.bmi.bund.de/Shared-Docs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/2020/pmk-2019.pdf?blob=publicationFile&v=6>.
- [2] Rapoport, David (2022). *Waves of Global Terrorism: From 1879 to the Present*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- [3] For background on Anarchist terrorism, see Bruce Hoffman (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press; W. Laqueur (1987). *The Age of Terrorism*. Boston: Little, Brown; Jensen, R. (2004). Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16:1, pp. 116–153; Jones, T. (2015). Anarchist Terrorism in the United States; in: R. D. Law (2015, Ed.). *The Routledge History of Terrorism*. London and New York: Routledge; A. P. Schmid & J. de Graaf (1982). *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*. London: Sage.
- [4] Anarchists were not necessarily opposed to all forms of governance; rather they wanted non-hierarchical forms of direct democracy.
- [5] Alexander, Yonah and Dennis Pluchinsky (1992). *Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organisations*. London: Frank Cass.
- [6] For an analysis, see Nigel Copsey and Samuel Merrill (2020). Violence and Restraint within Antifa: A View from the United States. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 19, Issue 6: 122–138.
- [7] Blee, Kathleen and Mehr Latif (2019) Ku Klux Klan: Vigilantism against Blacks, Immigrants and other Minorities. In: Tore Bjørgo and Miroslav Mareš (Eds.) (2019). *Vigilantism against Migrants and Minorities*. Oxon: Routledge.
- [8] Pitcavage, Mark (2001). Camouflage and Conspiracy. The Militia Movement from Ruby Ridge to Y2K. *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 44, No. 6, pp. 957–981.
- [9] URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-63013702>.
- [10] Smith, John L. (2021). *Saints, Sinners, and Sovereign Citizens: The Endless War over the West's Public Lands*. Lincoln: University of Nevada Press; Christine M. Sarteschi (2020). *Sovereign Citizens: A Psychological and Criminological Analysis*. Cham: Springer.
- [11] According to one opinion poll, 11% of Americans believed the siege of the Capitol was completely or somewhat justified. URL: <https://www.businessinsider.com/insider-poll-capitol-siege-ten-percent-justified-2021-1?r=US&IR=T>
- [12] URL: <https://www.npr.org/2020/12/30/951095644/even-if-its-bonkers-poll-finds-many-believe-qanon-and-other-conspiracy-theories>. See also the articles by Ebner, Kavenagh and Whitehouse in this special issue.
- [13] Segel, Benjamin (1995). *A Lie and a Libel: The History of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press; Norman Cohn (1967). *Warrant for Genocide*. Pelican Books.
- [14] Barkun, Michael (1998). Conspiracy Theories as Stigmatized Knowledge: The Basis for a New Age Racism? In: Jeffrey Kaplan and Tore Bjørgo (Eds.) (1998). *Nation and Race: The Developing Euro-American Racist Subculture*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- [15] Originally formulated by Bat Ye'or (2005). *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis*, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
- [16] URL: <https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2022-02-24/a-quarter-of-republicans-believe-central-views-of-qanon-conspiracy-movement>.
- [17] Lo Moro D., Gualdani M., Zizza V., Cirinnà M. (2015). Commissione Parlamentare d'inchiesta sul fenomeno delle intimidazioni nei confronti degli amministratori locali. Senato della Repubblica Italiana; cited in: Gianmarco D. (2015). Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians' ability. *Working Papers* 2015/37. Instituto d'Economia de Barcelona. See note [31] in Kałabunowska's article in this issue.
- [18] Hoffman, Bruce (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press (p. 40).
- [19] The National Socialist Underground, NSU, operated between 2006–2011, murdering nine immigrants and one policewoman, while also being responsible for a series of bank robberies, bombings and other crimes. Although the core group consisted of only two men and one woman, they were receiving logistical and other support from an outer circle of more than 100 people. For details, see Daniel Koehler (2017). *Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century: The "National Socialist Underground" and the History of Terror from the Far-Right in Germany*. London: Routledge.