

Recognizing Trade-Offs in Indonesian Counterterrorism Strategy

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Abstract

Counterterrorism policies often suffer from a troubling dilemma: Thwarting violence and the development of extremist networks in the near-term may require uncompromising operations that ultimately impact a broader section of society than the intended targets. When whole communities or certain demographics become entangled in sweeping strategies, the suspicion generated can fuel counterproductive grievances and hinder longer-term prevention initiatives. On the other hand, if policies prioritize softer social programs aiming for gradual (re-)conciliation, this approach may provide undue space for violent actors to exploit. Finding the right balance between deterring violence in the short-term and addressing the underlying issues is crucial—but difficult. A pertinent example is playing out in the criminal justice system of Indonesia. Recent updates to the nation's counterterrorism legislation have provided law enforcement with preemptive powers that have generated hundreds of arrests since late 2018. At the same time, new regulations have sought to develop a community policing philosophy for preventing violent extremism. While the two strategies are not mutually exclusive, the atmosphere generated by repressive tactics may inhibit the trust-dependent community-focused approach. Balance will depend on ensuring that community policing remains focused on procedural justice and building relationships, rather than cultivating informants and collecting information.

Keywords: Community Policing; Preventive Detention; Preventing Violent Extremism; Indonesia

Introduction

Indonesia's counterterrorism capacity has increased significantly in the past 20 years. In 2001, Indonesia was one of Southeast Asia's most skeptical and uncommitted countries in dealing with the threat of international terrorism. Not only was the security apparatus more focused on separatists in Aceh and ethnic conflicts in Maluku,[1] but the government also had little to no political will to acknowledge the threat.[2] By 2021, however, Indonesia had established a robust set of counterterrorism measures. The government developed a well-trained counterterrorism police unit, Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88) in 2004, created a vigorous legal anti-terrorism infrastructure through revision of its anti-terrorism law in 2018, and set up a comprehensive national action plan on preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE), known as RAN PE in 2021.[3] The efficacy of these modalities is evident—terrorist attacks in Indonesia today are notably less frequent and less lethal than in the early 2000s.[4]

However, a common dilemma that states face as they strengthen their counterterrorism capacities is the emergence of policy trade-offs—such as between expansive surveillance and respect for individual privacy or between indefinite detention and the right to proper procedural justice. The most common counterterrorism dilemma is the trade-off between operational aggressiveness and the maintenance of public trust. Various case studies have noted that as counterterrorism policies become increasingly focused on arresting terrorist suspects, governments risk alienating and losing support among communities with a similar demographic profile to those of terrorist groups.[5] During France's fight against the Front de Liberation National (FLN) in Algeria, for example, the torture of FLN members to gain intelligence ultimately diminished the support from both Algerians and French citizens—resulting in the exit of France from Algeria.[6] A similar case occurred in Israel, where British colonial forces' torture tactics eventually undercut their authority and increased population support for the paramilitary Irgun organization.[7]

The present article considers this counterterrorism trade-off in the context of Indonesia. Specifically, it analyzes the trade-offs between two of Indonesia's counterterrorism policies: the use of preventive detention and the adoption of a strategy of community policing. While Indonesia's increasingly aggressive use of preventive detention since 2018 has indeed helped to reduce the threat of terrorism, it has also led to increasing

distrust toward the counterterrorism apparatus, particularly from conservative Islamic communities. This erosion of trust is counterproductive as it complicates the implementation of community policing in at-risk populations.

This article will be divided into four main segments. The first segment will summarize the relevant literature on preventive detention and community policing, before outlining how Indonesia has developed and currently implements both policies. A third segment will analyze the practical trade-off between the two policies, while the final section will conclude with discussion of the potential implications.

Understanding Preventive Detention

Preemptive arrest, also commonly referred to as preventive detention, is the act of detaining an individual who is expected to commit a crime, based on less evidence than ordinary criminal law would generally allow. [8] In the context of counterterrorism, national governments have implemented various practices referred to as preventive detention, ranging from pre-charge detention of a potential terrorist suspect, or detainment during an immigration process, to indefinite detention without trial under an executive order.[9] However, a commonality between them is their deviation from the standard arrest procedure in administering justice. For many state authorities, this deviation in the context of counterterrorism is vital as it overcomes various challenges associated with investigating terrorist activities, such as limited time frames, the difficulty of obtaining evidence, and the need to withhold sensitive intelligence information. Proponents believe the strategy is proportional to preventing the risk of mass-casualty terrorist attacks.[10]

The use of preventive detention is not new nor exclusive to modern-day counterterrorism policing.[11] The United Kingdom employed the practice between 1970 and 1989 to detain citizens suspected of supporting the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland.[12] The United States used it in World War II to detain people of Japanese descent in internment camps out of prejudiced fear for their support of the Axis powers.[13] Other countries also adopt the preventive approach of indefinitely detaining “habitual criminals”—such as violent recidivists or repeat sexual offenders.[14] The use of preventive detention is not limited to any specific nation or region. The United States, for example, legalizes indefinite detention of suspected terrorists in Guantanamo Bay; Trinidad and Tobago allow its executive to “make provision for the detention of persons” in national emergencies; and the Colombian government provides no explicit limit for the length of pretrial detention in criminal cases.[15]

However, not all preventive detention practices are the same. On the spectrum of least to most right-stripping, practices can be clustered into three frameworks. The first is the pretrial detention framework. Countries such as Germany and Spain only detain individuals without charge in advance of a trial that is set to occur. This practice is the least extreme framework as it involves the constant presence of judicial oversight. Second is the immigration detention framework. Nations such as Canada and New Zealand delegate authority to detain suspected terrorists to administrative officers during immigration processes.[16] While there is a lack of judicial oversight during the initial detainment in such cases, decisions are made accountable to judicial review—ensuring some level of rights protection for the suspects. The third is the national security framework. Countries with this framework, such as Malaysia and the United States, derive detention authority from the powers their constitutions and special regulations delegate to the executive. To that end, this is the most extreme detention framework as there is little to no judicial oversight over the executive branch’s decisions to detain.[17]

Understanding Community Policing

Another judicial approach that has been associated with effective counterterrorism strategy is community policing, which developed following research showing the benefits of closer interactions between citizens and the police.[18] During the 1980s, several countries began establishing neighborhood police posts, while foot patrols were increasingly seen on urban and suburban streets as officers attempted to build better relationships with community members. The idea was to be less reactive and focus more on preventing

problems through close collaboration with residents, who were no longer seen as the referent object of law enforcement but as “co-producers of public safety.”[19] Police would seek information on criminality from community members but also provide updates on police activities, listen to community concerns, and offer appropriate support.

The reciprocity of these relationships is a crucial feature and requires a high degree of trust in the institution of law enforcement and its personnel. An effective way of building this trust is by ensuring what is known as procedural justice, which links satisfaction of a conflict resolution outcome with the perceived fairness of the process. If people believe police officers act with integrity, they are more likely to cooperate. There are four key aspects of procedural justice: (1) people have opportunities to express their problems to the police; (2) they believe police operate with transparency and neutrality; (3) they think the police are trying to do what’s best for the community; and (4) police treat everyone with respect and dignity.[20] One study from EU nations found that the “quality of relations” between residents and the police was even more important than police competence when it came to their perceived legitimacy.[21]

Procedural justice is particularly important if community policing is framed as a way of preventing violent extremism. Human intelligence often plays a central role in thwarting terrorist attacks and dismantling networks, but residents cannot be compelled or coerced into cooperation; information must come from genuine collaboration. This has been a problem in some Western nations, where Muslim communities have been expected to cooperate with the police but were also made to feel like suspects themselves.[22] Ideally, a properly implemented and observed community policing approach would avoid this dynamic while more broadly respecting human rights and addressing the underlying grievances associated with violent extremism. Of course, this is not straightforward in practice, particularly where police culture is playing catch-up with public opinion.

Developing Indonesia’s Preventive Detention and Community Policing Practice

Indonesia’s Preventive Detention in Practice

The authority of Indonesia’s current preventive detention for counterterrorism originates from the 2018 legislative amendments (Law No. 5/2018 on Anti-Terrorism) which, aside from having expanded the definition of terrorism,[23] has also specifically expanded Densus 88’s ability to conduct preventive detention against terrorist suspects in two ways. First, the regulation extended the pre-charge and pretrial detention periods for suspected terrorists. In the original anti-terrorism regulation, Law No. 15/2003 on Anti-Terrorism, police were allowed to detain a suspected terrorist for seven days before charging the individual and 120 days before trial.[24] This alone was already expansive in comparison to provisions for other crimes, which only allow for one day of pre-charge detention and a maximum of 60 days of pretrial detention.[25] In the amended anti-terrorism regulation, however, this detention authority is further extended to allow the detention of suspected terrorists for 21 days prior to charging and 200 days prior to trial.[26]

Second, the regulation has extended the scope of prosecutable activities under terrorism clauses to include nonviolent activities not directly connected to terrorist operations. The original 2003 anti-terrorism regulation only authorized security forces to arrest suspects who either conduct, attempt to conduct, or directly support the conduct of terrorist attacks. These included activities such as *knowingly* procuring firearms for terrorist attacks (Article 9), contributing funds toward an attack (Article 11), or directing individuals to conduct attacks (Article 14).[27] In the amended anti-terrorism regulation, security forces can criminalize individuals even if they do not contribute to, or participate in, such attacks. It now assumes that while these nonviolent actions may not directly contribute to any attack, they generally still facilitate the terrorist organization’s or network’s activities. These include arresting members affiliated with designated terrorist organizations (Article 12A), individuals who create, collect, or distribute training materials (Article 12B), and individuals who distribute terrorist propaganda material (Article 13A).[28]

These two de facto expansions of detention powers provide security forces with a larger window of opportu-

nity to find actionable evidence post-arrest, reducing the possibility of the trial being waived or the suspect walking free due to a lack of evidence. In turn, this enables security forces to conduct preemptive detention more confidently without needing a full set of evidence before the arrest. Additionally, the increased scope of prosecutable offenses allows security forces to target individuals deemed vital to the survival of a terrorist organization (e.g., funders, trainers, and ideologues) despite their not conducting or directly supporting acts of violence. As National Police Chief Gen. Tito Karnavian stated in 2018, for security forces, “prosecuting early action is better so that police can prevent or launch pre-emptive strikes. [It is better] than waiting until we have evidence.”[29]

The expanded use of preventive detention as authorized in the 2018 anti-terrorism law has greatly increased the number of arrested terrorist suspects over the past four years. In 2018 alone, Densus 88 arrested over 396 terrorist suspects—marking a 117% increase on the previous year.[30] Although arrests in 2019 and 2020 were reduced to 275 and 228 cases, this number increased again in 2021. Between January and December last year, Indonesian security forces arrested and killed more than 384 terrorist suspects.[31] Most of these suspects were alleged members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (42.5%), Indonesia’s notorious pro-Al Qaeda group that has, however, not conducted any successful attacks since 2011; Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) (31%), Indonesia’s largest pro-Islamic State group; and the West Papua National Army-Free Papua Organization (TNPB-OPM) (13.5%), a separatist group that the Indonesian government labeled as a terrorist organization in early 2021.[32]

The expanded use of preventive detention has also increased the diversity in the roles of those arrested. Out of the 113 suspects arrested in 2021 whose organizational role was publicized in police reports, only 28.3% were militaristic/operational (e.g., planning and preparing for attacks). Many of these suspects’ roles were instead aimed at supporting the terrorist organization rather than involving any specific plan of attack. These roles include logistical distribution (30.9%), fundraising roles (23.8%), and ideological indoctrination and propaganda roles (12.3%). One key example of this was the arrest of four suspected terrorists in the southern Sumatra province of Lampung, whose main role was to operate the Abdurahman Bin Rauf foundation, a charity organization that has raised money for JI by distributing more than 6,000 charity boxes across the province. Notably, these individuals do not necessarily focus on conducting attacks but are vital to the organization’s survival.[33]

The large numbers and diversity of arrests have significantly helped to reduce the threat of terrorist organizations in Indonesia. Notably, over the past two decades, terrorist attacks in Indonesia have become less frequent and lethal. Whereas the 2002 Bali Bombing by JI resulted in over 502 casualties, the 2018 Surabaya bombing attack by JAD resulted in 13 deaths and 41 injured.[34] The most recent attack by the JAD, the 2021 Makassar Bombing on Easter Sunday, only resulted in two deaths and 20 injured—the deaths being the two suicide bombers.[35] Additionally, arrests have significantly disrupted organizations’ attempts to regroup and rebuild by arresting individuals who have fulfilled vital roles in supporting the organization. For example, by arresting key JAD leaders and ideologues in 2018, their once robust and centralized organizational structures are now de facto nonfunctional.[36] Similarly, by arresting senior JI officials, such as Abu Rusydan and Siswanto, whose role focused more on giving JI leaders strategic guidance and not on orchestrating attacks, counterterrorism operations have greatly disrupted JI’s leadership selection process.[37]

However, preventive detention is not without its unintended problems. The exponential increase of arrested terrorist suspects in the past four years has added significant strain on Indonesia’s already-overcrowded prison system. In 2020, for example, Indonesian prisons were at 109% overcapacity, with prisons in key areas such as Jakarta reaching 160% overcapacity.[38] Coupled with the fact that these prisons are mostly understaffed,[39] large additional numbers of terrorist inmates due to preventive detention have made close monitoring of these inmates increasingly difficult. If prison reform is not adequately and quickly implemented, these conditions could create ripe environments for the further radicalization of suspects who were initially arrested for low-risk activities, potentially leading them toward participation in more decisive operational roles once they leave prison. Abdul Rauf, for example, an inmate arrested for his involvement in fundraising for the 2002 Bali Bombing, was further radicalized in prison, and ultimately left to fight for ISIS in Iraq after

he was released.[40]

Indonesia's Community Policing in Practice

In Indonesia, community policing occupies a point of focus in the nation's emerging national action plan to prevent violent extremism (known by its Indonesian acronym, RAN PE). The ambitious plan was instituted by presidential regulation in January 2021 and aims to facilitate stakeholder coordination, improve data collection methods, and build the capacity to conduct prevention programs.[41] Pillar one of the three-pillar plan includes an article on building resilience among vulnerable groups, which involves the "optimization of community policing in preventing violent extremism." [42] When the regulation was issued, media commentary seized on this point, as both human rights activists and representatives of Islamic organizations expressed concern that the strategy would generate mutual suspicion and division if people were encouraged to spy on one another.[43]

This apprehension is well-founded. During the authoritarian Suharto regime, which spanned the last 30 years of the 20th Century, the army stationed noncommissioned officers throughout the archipelago, where they coordinated with neighborhood and village leaders to collect information on perceived subversive activity. Then from the early 1980s onward, police developed a system of organizing informal neighborhood-watch-type community patrols, which became a form of central state surveillance.[44] These practices were largely phased out through democratic reforms in the late 1990s. However, more recently, the government has urged neighborhood associations (known as *rukun tetangga/rukun warga*) to report on certain community behaviors, which has generated some persecution of LGBT and minority religious groups.[45] To be sure, such co-opted neighborhood surveillance is not the same as community policing, which requires building trust rather than stripping it away through suspicion and discrimination.

While the P/CVE plan calls for further development, Indonesia's experience with community policing dates back to the democratic transitional period of the early 2000s. A collaboration between UNDP, the World Bank, Asia Development Bank, and the Indonesian government called the *Partnership for Governance Reform* was the first to introduce the community approach in 2001.[46] Subsequent projects from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Asia Foundation conducted specific capacity-building programs, including cultural competency training for officers working in the outer regions of Maluku and Papua.[47] Additional pilot projects involved dozens of community task forces in four provinces, which reportedly improved trust and opened lines of communication for community members to share their concerns.[48]

Projects on the ground have been backed by evolving government regulations over the years since the beginning of democratic reform. A police chief regulation (*Peraturan Kepala Kepolisian*) in 2005 established what became known as Police and Community Partnership Forums (FKPM) in over 5,000 police precincts across the country.[49] Three years later, a more detailed regulation aimed to become a guideline manual for implementation, which was updated again in 2015, following a restructuring of the national police.[50] Regulation No. 3/2015 described how the concept of community policing was to be understood, emphasizing accountability, transparency, "intensive two-way communication" between officers and residents, mutual respect, and collective problem-solving.[51] Regarding implementation, the regulation sought to: (1) empower social institutions; (2) enhance capability and instill community policing values throughout the institution; and (3) draw on strategies developed in Japan, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand to establish models that fit the Indonesian context.[52]

In early 2021, a further policy update defined the particular strategy deemed most suitable for Indonesia and outlined the roles, responsibilities, and oversight of dedicated community policing officers. The new police regulation 1/2021 settled on two versions: the *wilayah* (regional) model in residential areas such as neighborhoods, villages, and hamlets; and the *kawasan* (area) model in commercial and industrial quarters. [53] The *wilayah* approach is based on each community's "will, awareness, and interest" to get involved in local security and order issues. In the *Kawasan* model, business owners and commercial tenants can form an

FKPM, based on “mutual agreement” among each other and with police.[54] However, there is also a broader and important distinction between internalizing community policing values at the institutional level and implementing relevant activities on the ground.

Discussion: The Trade-Off

The Challenge in Community Policing: Building Public Trust

Establishing trust between communities and counterterrorism agencies plays a significant role in ensuring that counterterrorism strategies succeed. First and foremost, this trust is important strategically—consistently high public trust in counterterrorism agencies is necessary for parliamentary bodies to justify their support for new initiatives and programs.[55] This support is particularly vital when terrorist attacks are few and far between, as these are the times when the public begins doubting the gravity of the terrorist threat, while terrorist organizations can focus on rebuilding their ranks. Secondly, public trust is also important for operational purposes. Notably, successful CVE depends on the cooperation of various service providers.[56] These service providers range from teachers and local imams whose credibility makes them key actors in countering radical narratives to youth organizations and neighborhood leaders whose embeddedness in society makes them important actors in facilitating the reintegration of ex-terrorist inmates—individuals who would not cooperate if trust was not present.[57]

The significance of trust is particularly important in the practice of community policing. As mentioned above, the strategy of community policing requires the public to perceive themselves as “co-producers of public safety” vis-à-vis the police—partners that would voluntarily provide human intelligence on close neighbors or locally reputable imams to the police for suspected terrorist activities.[58] Without trust between communities and counterterrorism agencies, this voluntary cooperation would easily be perceived as coerced surveillance. In the United States, for example, Muslim communities’ distrust of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and certain municipal police agencies has led them to perceive the FBI’s community policing efforts to be merely a pretext to “entrap young Muslims” and “coerce people to spy on their Muslim-American friends.”[59] A study among Danish communities also found that a lack of trust between Muslim communities and counterterrorism agencies has prevented cooperation out of fear that counterterrorism units will “keep tabs” on individuals and register them as potential terrorists.[60]

The importance of public trust in community policing is also true in Indonesia’s case. Various clauses in Indonesia’s community policing regulations reflect this. For example, one regulation states that community policing officers (known as *Petugas Polmas*) are generally noncommissioned officers who have served for at least five years and must reside in the assigned community.[61] The operational principles mentioned in the 2005 police chief regulation provide these officers with long-term or even permanent postings to allow rapport to develop organically between them and their surrounding community.[62] The regulation No. 3/2015 update also mentions public trust as both community policing’s main goals and criterion for success evaluation.[63] *Petugas Polmas* are expected to develop this trust through various means, ranging from establishing partnerships with local stakeholders, conducting foot patrols, visiting households, solving local disputes, and communicating effectively with residents.

However, several challenges remain. First, while their activities and engagements with communities are potentially constructive in terms of building trust, community policing officers on the street also rely on broader community perceptions of law enforcement, which repressive or heavy-handed practices can erode. In the past, police in Indonesia have been seen as acting with a degree of superiority toward the public, being quick to use their firearms, and seeking ‘pocket money’ during inspections and interactions with local business owners.[64] A 2009 review commissioned by the National Police (Polri) on community policing found that “it is difficult to change the officers from behaving with superiority to becoming the partner or even servants of the community.”[65] The review also noted that most police recruits actually join the force to seek this “superior” status. More recent research finds that such rent-seeking remains a problematic practice, which represents a significant obstacle to building trust and reaping the benefits of this community-based

approach.[66]

A second challenge, particularly when it comes to counterterrorism, is that certain provisions in recent regulations appear to require a more covert form of community policing. Reminiscent of the nation's late 20th-century authoritarian era, noncommissioned community policing officers stationed in neighborhoods once again have a designated intelligence function. Articles in the January 2021 regulation obligate community officers to "identify and document community data and activities related to security and public order" and then submit associated reports to their superiors.[67] A subsequent regulation issued in August 2021 built on these designations of duty and included specific provisions for preventing violent extremism. According to police chief regulation 7/2021, community officers should encourage residents to identify new neighborhood arrivals and the presence of "suspected" extremists, and officers should supervise, monitor, and record certain "traditional teachings/beliefs," which is vague and unhelpfully open to interpretation.[68] There is a fine line between collaborating with community members and using them as a source of information to be sent up the chain of command.

The Complication of Preventive Detention: Eroding Public Trust

Indonesia's use of preventive detention has further complicated security forces' efforts to build the public trust necessary for community policing to be effective. This is most recently evidenced by the increased public outcry against Densus 88 and Indonesia's National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) from conservative Muslim communities for their heavy-handed treatment of terrorist suspects. However, it is important to note that the reduction of public trust due to right-stripping counterterrorism practices such as preventive detention is not exclusive to Indonesia. Studies in the United Kingdom and the United States have found similar dynamics—when communities have an increased perception that police are deviating from the standard procedure of administering justice when dealing with terrorist suspects with a similar identity to them; or an increased perception that counterterrorism agencies are unfairly targeting certain communities based on their identity, cooperation and trust between such communities and the police erode.

In the case of Indonesia, this has been evident in the public outcry against Densus 88 and the BNPT following the arrest of suspected terrorists who held prominent positions in notable Islamic organizations. For example, after the arrest of Ahmad Zain an-Najah, a member of the Fatwa Committee of the Indonesia Ulama Council (MUI), and Farid Okbah, head of the Indonesian People's Da'wah Party (PDRI), in November 2021 for being suspected JI members, hundreds of protesters demonstrated in Solo, Central Java calling for the disbandment of Densus 88.[69] Protesters claimed that Densus was unprofessional and Islamophobic in conducting the arrest. More specifically, the police were accused of unfairly targeting *ulamas* who have not yet been proven to have engaged in any terrorist activities. One protester claimed a double standard: "As to the extent of [Okbah and an-Najah's] involvement, what kind of terror was committed? He is a preacher who is considered righteous ... [while] in Papua it is clear that there are acts of terror carried out [there]. Why are our ulama the ones being arrested?"[70]

Such criticism continued in 2022. After the arrest of three suspected terrorists in Bengkulu in early February, two of whom were administrators of MUI's Bengkulu branch, the deputy chairman of the MUI, Anwar Abbas, also made strong criticisms against Densus 88 and BNPT. In his interview with Tempo Magazine, Abbas noted that the current counterterrorism strategy was "too extreme" and that suspects such as Farid Okbah and Zain an Najah, people whom he knew to be kind and polite, should not be arrested immediately but given the opportunity for dialogue. Abbas added that "the definition of terrorists are people who create fear in the community. Try sitting near Farid Okbah and Zain an Najah. There will be no fear with them... [The arrest] confused me too. How can such a person be considered a terrorist?"[71] To that end, he believed arrests and preventive detention should only be used as a last resort after civil dialogue fails to deradicalize them.[72]

This backlash toward Densus 88 has also led to increasing distrust regarding the legitimacy of BNPT's counter-radicalization initiatives. For example, as part of their counter-radicalization initiative, the BNPT, in early

March, released a list of five characteristics of radical ulama. This list included preaching pro-caliphate sermons, labeling other religions as *kaffir* (infidels), using sermons to sow distrust and criticism toward the government, being intolerant toward diversity, and adopting anti-traditional culture stances.[73] Shortly after, the head of the MUI, Amirsyah Tambunan, released a statement rejecting the criteria. He argued that contrary to BNPT's belief, ulama who carry these characteristics are not necessarily bad and that "some beliefs which deviate from the Islamic faith, such as the Ahmadiyya followers, should be categorized as heretical because they believe in another prophet after Muhammad." Amirsyah concluded, "BNPT should not interfere in matters of religion as it is not their domain." [74]

Such public outcries are detrimental to community policing for two reasons. First, while the majority of the Indonesian public does not share these outcries and distrust, they are commonly shared among conservative Islamic groups. These groups include members from organizations such as the *Aksi Bela Islam* alumni and Dewan Syariah Kota Surakarta (DSKS), which called for Densus 88's dissolution in November 2021. This is particularly concerning as this demographic would likely be an area of focus for a CVE community policing strategy, given their strong antipathy to democracy, belief in the supremacy of sharia law, and (in the case of DSKS) actual connections to terrorist organizations.[75] Second, these outcries are significant as they involve not only grassroots organizations but also the MUI—which is a state-sponsored religious organization with one of the highest authorities to issue fatwa in Indonesia.[76] They were asked by then-President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to "formulate policies regarding Islam," and in 2017, issued a fatwa that became the catalyst for nationwide demonstrations against a Jakarta governor who was perceived to have insulted Islam. [77] Having the MUI discredit the counterterrorism agency's authority would be detrimental to engendering buy-in and trust from the population.

Conclusion

Counterterrorism strategies tend to either emphasize short-term gains or longer-term benefits. When responses require immediate results, such as during the wave of attacks associated with pro-ISIS extremists in the mid- to late-2010s, the interests of public safety may demand aggressive counterterrorism practices that will inevitably have residual effects, such as false accusations and perceptions of persecution. Such adverse impact should clearly be avoided, but there will always be trade-offs when the critical priority is preventing the death of innocent civilians. The importance of recognizing such trade-offs, however, is finding the right balance between keeping people safe in the near term and avoiding the exacerbation of grievances that may lead to discord down the road. In Indonesia, this trade-off is most evident between two of its counterterrorism policies: preventive detention and community policing.

Indonesia's intention to institutionalize a community-oriented approach to policing violent extremism is a much-needed step to improve prevention. To make community policing effective, high public trust is needed. However, some of the specific provisions in recent regulations suggest that the version of community policing being developed to prevent violent extremism could actually exacerbate problems associated with trust. For example, encouraging residents to discuss the presence of ideological study groups their children or siblings may be attending would be prudent if the process is transparent and solutions to any perceived dangers are developed collectively. But if descriptions of activities are treated as data to be eventually passed on to a counter-terrorism police unit through periodic reports, this would undermine the intention and values of a community policing model. Neighborhood officers should not have a prescribed intelligence function involving the documentation of local activities. The idea is to listen to community concerns, not to query people on particular threats.

This already challenging circumstance is currently made worse by some unintended consequences of preventive detention. Notably, while the use of preventive detention since 2018 has helped reduce the terrorist threats Indonesia faces, it has also led to a reduction in communities' trust in the intentions and practices of counterterrorism agencies. Similar to the experiences of other countries, Indonesia's deviation from the standard procedure when administering justice toward terrorist suspects belonging to a specific community has eroded trust between such communities and the state's counterterrorism agencies—leading to vari-

ous protests and vocal opposition toward the government. While these public outcries have yet to become widespread, the fact that conservative Islamic groups and MUI continue to voice them indicates that such distrust is a cause of concern.

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