

How Religious Violence Ends

by Mark Juergensmeyer

Abstract

This study of how three religion-related militant movements came to an end—ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Moros in Mindanao in the Philippines, and Khalistan in India’s Punjab—reveals that such movements are most decisively destroyed from within. External military force can limit and weaken a movement and provide the coup de grace that destroys it, but most movements have been dead before they were destroyed. Conversations with former activists in the three movements studied reveal that there are several factors for their implosion: infighting, a loss of faith in the goals and ideology of a movement, and the opportunities for nonviolent alternatives. Authorities resisting a violent movement can hasten the end by providing more options to violent struggle.

Keywords: Terrorism, ISIS, Khalistan, Moros, Infighting, Religion

In my conversation with the former jihadi militant, Muhammad, he seemed even angrier about the failed leadership of the ISIS and al-Qaeda movements than he was about the combined Iraqi, Syrian, Kurdish and United States forces that were united against them. I was able to talk with him in a prison in northern Iraq shortly after the final destruction of the territorial control of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL).[1]

“It was the leadership,” Muhammad grouched, “that let the movement down.” Not only did it discredit the organization, he felt, it disrespected the grand image of the Caliphate and the ISIS struggle for which he thought there was a divine mandate. In his mind the movement was dead before it was demolished.

Some of the same feelings were expressed by former militants in the Khalistan movement, the uprising of young rural Sikhs in India’s Punjab throughout the 1980s that finally came to an end in the early 1990s. Many years later, I was able to talk with both leaders and foot soldiers in the movement about their involvement and how it ended.

Though the leaders of the Khalistan groups with whom I spoke, including Wassan Singh Zaffarwal, Sohan Singh, Simranjit Singh Mann, and Narinder Singh, were hesitant to blame themselves or their fellow leaders, they admitted that internal divisions and loss of vision contributed to the movement’s downfall.[2] Their former followers with whom I spoke, the militants in the movement, were not as hesitant. It was clear to them that the leaders had let them down and the movement had collapsed from within.

In Mindanao, the southern island of the Philippines, I talked with many of the old Muslim militants who were part of the Moro separatist movement that has largely ended after 2018.[3] They also blamed the schisms in the movement for part of their ineffectiveness. They admitted that because there was no single central organization, the infighting and divergent tactics of the rebel groups tore the movement apart. What brought many of these groups together, however, was the promise of a better future beyond the fighting, an awareness of possibilities of success outside the revolutionary strategies that they had previously adopted. This was fulfilled with the signing of the peace agreement with the Philippine government in 2018.

In my recent study of how these three formerly violent political movements related to religion have ended—ISIS, the Khalistan movement, and the Moro movement in the Philippines—there is no single explanation regarding how violent movements such as these come to an end. Nor have any of these completely ended; small factions continue to soldier on. But the main core of militants has resolved itself to the fact that their struggle is not successful, at least for now. What I have tried to do is get inside the worldview of the members of the movements to see how they have perceived their ending, and why.

This approach may complement other studies of how such movements terminate. One of the most comprehensive is Audrey Kurth Cronin’s *How Terrorism Ends*. [4] In this book, Cronin surveys dozens of case studies and

organizes them into six ways in which movements end, through the decapitation of the leaders, negotiation, achieving their objective, imploding, repression, and reorientation to nonviolent activities. Another useful study is Isak Svensson's *Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars*. In his book Svensson probes the religious factor in rebel movements and analyzes the way that it complicates and sometimes helps the process of negotiated settlement.[5]

These and other books provide helpful distinctions, though my approach is somewhat different. I want to understand how the collapse of movements is perceived from the perspective of those who are engaged in them, and to ask how the image of grand warfare that animates them is eventually discarded, or distanced from their current realities.

My approach has been to read the writings of the movements and engage in conversations with their supporters. It is an effort that Mona Kanwal Sheikh and I have called "epistemic worldview analysis," which is described more fully in the book *Entering Religious Minds: The Social Study of Worldviews*, which we have jointly edited in and in which we have essays explaining this approach.[6]

What I have found with regard to the ending of the three movements that are the subject of my recent study is that there are a multiplicity of factors both internal and external to the movements. Often, however, the internal dynamics of a movement has made the critical difference. In the three cases observed in this article, the attempts to destroy the movements solely with military means often backfired when the movements were strong and the leaders saw the attempts to suppress them as a challenge, or as an acceptance of their imagined notion of a grand and divinely ordained cosmic war. But when the movements were internally depressed, weakened, or susceptible to changing their tactics, the fight was often terminated from within, and efforts at military repression from outside could provide only a coup de grace. From the examples I have just mentioned, we can identify three factors in a movement turning away from violence: a loss of faith in the movement's vision, fractures in the communal consensus of the organization, and the awareness of alternative opportunities that provide new hope.[7]

Loss of Faith

In a refugee camp in northern Iraq, I talked with a wife of a former ISIS militant who openly displayed her disdain toward the movement and what it had done to her husband.[8] She claimed that it had ruined her family's life. She did not know where her husband was, whether he was dead or alive, and—if alive—whether he was awaiting trial or even execution. It was all a maddening mystery to her. She said she had once believed in the Caliphate, but now it seemed like an empty hoax.

Though I found that not all former fighters and their supporters felt this way, I noticed that many did. But when did their faith in the Caliphate and its notion of a grand war begin to erode? I put this question to the wife of the former militant and, at first, she did not give an answer. When pressed, she muttered, "when things fell apart."

This answer was consistent with other accounts that I heard from former ISIS supporters, and from reports from other scholars and journalists who have interviewed them. When things were going well, when the Caliphate was expanding and the stolen resources from the region were sufficient to provide for the necessities in life, it was easy to believe in the prophetic future of a golden era that would be ushered in after this period of turmoil. But later, as there was turmoil within the movement and when it seemed to be falling apart, it all seemed like a cruel joke.

In the Khalistan movement in India, several of the ex-militants with whom I spoke said that the movement began to collapse when it no longer had a clear purpose.[9] There was a moment, they said, when their organizations were fighting for Khalistan and for the dignity of Sikhs as a community. But later they saw the movement degenerate into infighting and thuggery. Though research by three social scientists at Guru Nanak Dev University in Amritsar cast doubt on how much the ordinary youths in the moment were ever motivated by the high ideals that the leaders espoused, there is no question that some at least gave lip service to that higher vision.[10] For them the excitement of being part of a thrilling battle was enhanced by the sense that they were

in a war for their faith, fighting for all that was right and sacred, a war propelled by divine forces. As the movement slid into drug dealing and petty theft, it was hard to maintain that lofty image.

In the Philippines, the evolution of Abu Sayyaf is further testimony to the dissolution of a movement's ideals. One of the founders of the movement, Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, had been a teacher of Islamic theology and had been involved in the mujahidin militia in Afghanistan.[11] One of the reasons that he broke from the Moro National Liberation Front was the issue of religion. He thought that the MNLF had abandoned its lofty religious ideals and was pandering to political expediency in negotiations with the Philippine government. He wanted his movement to be purer in its intentions, and to engage in jihad with a spiritual as well as political purpose. Over time, however, Abu Sayyaf became identified with drug dealing and taking hostages for profit. In proclaiming itself affiliated with the Islamic State it attempted to regain its religious credibility, though other Muslim activists with whom I talked in Mindanao regarded it as window dressing for what had essentially become a criminal gang.

In each of these cases the character of the movement changed when the vision was abandoned. Even though the fighting continued, as it did in the case of Khalistan and Abu Sayyaf's branch of the Moro movement, there was a change in the way that the movement was seen by its members. One of the foot soldiers in the Khalistan movement told me that after a while he did not know why they were fighting, except to sustain themselves through stolen resources.[12] He indicated that he would have left the militant Sikh movement earlier than he did, but he did not know how to do so. He was afraid that the police would not trust him and he would be finished off in a "police encounter," the term often used for extrajudicial police killings. Or, if he showed weakness and an eagerness to leave, he feared that members of the movement would turn on him and kill him in an effort to prevent any information about the movement's location and activities from leaking out. Despite these fears, many supporters at the margins of the movement were able to simply fade into the background as it declined. Weary of terror and war, fringe members began to drop off.

Fractures in Communal Consensus

At the same time that they lost faith in the purpose of the movement, many militants were disillusioned by infighting within their organization. Muhammad told me about a disagreement that he had with a fellow jihadi over strategy, a fight that turned violent.[13] Muhammad pulled up his shirt to show me the scar where he had been stabbed in that encounter. Increasingly, it had appeared to him that they were fighting as much among themselves as they were against their perceived enemies.

The ISIS movement remained intact even though there was fighting within the ranks. In the case of the Khalistan and Moro movements, however, the infighting led to multiplying schisms. When I interviewed the old Khalistan leader, Wassan Singh Zaffarwal, he expressed frustration that his attempt to unite all of the different rebel movements under the umbrella of a single organization was not successful.[14] Even Zaffarwal's own group, the Khalistan Commando Force, broke into several quarreling camps.

Sometimes the disputes between these splinter movements could turn deadly. In the Khalistan movement, the numbers of Sikhs killed by Sikh militants increased dramatically during those years that the movement was most active.[15] Infighting may have led indirectly to the military invasion that resulted in the death of one of the spiritual leaders of the Sikh uprising, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. A former member of the inner circle of the movement was bribed by a rival faction to kill Bhindranwale, or failing that, to do in his right-hand man, Surinder Singh Sodhi, a young admirer of Bhindranwale whom the leader called "my brother." [16] The killers gunned down Sodhi in a tea stall, after which Bhindranwale lashed out at his rivals for what he described as "chopping my right hand." [17] In revenge for the killing his henchmen murdered several key personnel in the rival movement, thus prompting the Indian army to step up its plans to invade the Golden Temple, which took place soon after. This momentous invasion, Operation Blue Star, led to a litany of violence: the death of Bhindranwale, the subsequent assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the killing of thousands of Sikhs in reprisal, and a new lease on life for the Sikh uprising following those attacks.

In the Moro movement, the emergence of a splinter group, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, was aimed in part at discrediting the negotiating tactics of the main movement in central Mindanao, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Butch Malang, the commander of the MILF forces, told me that although some of his own fighters had joined the breakaway movement, the lives of the MILF fighters were put in jeopardy by the splinter group's actions.[18] Many of Malang's group felt that their lives were threatened as much by BIFF as by the Philippine government forces.

Part of the reason for the divisions within the Moro movement was that there was never a centralized command, nor a single leader. In the case of the Khalistan movement, the figure of Bhindranwale provided something of a unifying image of leadership for the movement, despite the rival organizations that emerged in the Sikh resistance. However, after Bhindranwale was killed in Operation Blue Star in 1984, the movement failed to find another charismatic figure to unite it. Later in the 1980s, many of the organizations in the movement, including the Khalistan Commando Force and the Sikh Students Federation, broke up into splinter organizations that vied with each other for attention and support. In the case of ISIS, the figure of the Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, provided the central leadership that largely united the movement. But the organizational structure was generally decentralized, and on the local level there were the fierce struggles for leadership and strident infighting which Muhammad found so disheartening.

Though Muhammad clung to the idea of a Caliph as a righteous ruler worth fighting for, he seemed uncertain about whether al-Baghdadi was a sufficiently strong leader to deserve that title. According to the Islamic studies scholar Ebrahim Moosa, a Caliph can lose his divine mandate when he is regarded as not performing as a Caliph should.[19] It is not clear whether this is the way that many of the ISIS fighters viewed al-Baghdadi, especially during the last days the movement exercised territorial control, but Muhammad was clear in his blame of the movement's leadership without specifying whom he had in mind.

Faith in a movement can erode when its leader is seen as losing legitimacy. It could be through demonstrations of their incompetence, greed, or inconsistencies. In the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, it is likely that the leader Muhammed Omar lost support from some of his followers when it was revealed that he was living in relative luxury in palatial quarters funded in part by Osama bin Laden. Posthumous respect for bin Laden was likely to have diminished when it was revealed that a stash of pornographic videotapes was found in his quarters when the hideout was invaded by American soldiers in the attack that led to bin Laden's death.

The death of a leader does not necessarily lead to a loss of regard for his authority. In the case of the Palestinian resistance in Israel, the Israeli missile attack that destroyed Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was not the occasion for his image to lose credibility or the movement to erode. Just the opposite. He was immediately proclaimed a martyr, and pictures of the fallen leader were plastered throughout the region. The elections following his death led to overwhelming support for Hamas and the establishment of Hamas' control in Gaza. In the case of ISIS, the death of al-Baghdadi in 2019 during an American military raid on his quarters in the Idlib region of Syria did not signal the end of the Caliphate, or a lack of respect for the fallen leader's image. For one thing, he committed suicide as enemy troops encircled him, thereby dying through self-martyrdom—an appropriate end for a jihadi leader. Moreover, his successor was quickly named, and the ideas of a Caliphate and an Islamic State endured. As in the case of Hamas, movements can sometimes become stronger after a charismatic leader is killed and the fallen leader is treated as a martyr. Although Bhindranwale's movement splintered organizationally, the number of young people who volunteered to join the movement increased after his death in 1984. They were in part inspired by his legendary martyrdom.

When a movement is already weak and its authority is challenged, the killing of a leader can help to hasten a movement's demise. This may be what has happened with Abu Sayyaf and the Maute brothers' gang after their leaders were killed in the Marawi siege in Mindanao in 2017. However, in this case their groups were already weakened and the leaders' authority questioned as the prospects for the groups' success diminished in the fighting.

In all three of the cases mentioned, the infighting and loss of esprit de corps within the movement was a major factor for their undoing. When an activist movement splits and turns on itself, the paranoia of the movement

turns inward. The demonization applied to external enemies is turned inward toward perceived heretics, those suspected of treason within their own ranks. The group would be literally killing itself. Thus, as one old militant said to me, such movements were already “walking dead.”

New Hope

There is another powerful internal factor contributing to the transformation of a formerly violent movement: hope. The movement for an autonomous Muslim Mindanao provides an interesting case in this regard. When I asked Naguib Sinarimbo, an ex-Moro militant, to trace the trajectory of his rise within the movement, his full embrace of the image of cosmic war animated by religion and aimed at an intractable enemy, and later his engagement in negotiations for peace with the very enemy that he would earlier have willingly killed, I wanted to know what happened. What was the critical moment in which his views changed?

He said that it was when he met a Philippine general, Victor Corpus, who listened to him. The general had himself been a militant at one time, a soldier in the Communist insurrection, who had surrendered and later joined the Philippine army, rising to a high military rank. Therefore he understood what it was like to have been part of an insurrection and then feel the pain of abandoning it. He seemed genuinely concerned about the plight of the Moro people, Naguib told me, and he wanted to help them find a way out that would give them the dignity which they sought and the peace that the government demanded. That moment came to Naguib as an epiphany, he said. Before that he did not know that it was possible to see the enemy in such human terms.[20]

It was not just this attitude of respect, he said, it was the larger program that the general and his staff outlined for the Moro people. Naguib was convinced that the agreement that they negotiated really did fulfill the demands that the Moro movement was making, and provided the region with a modicum of independence, economic support, and respect.

Naguib was expressing a vital part of the peace process that leads to an end of conflict. This is when combatants can see beyond war and imagine opportunities for themselves after the fighting is over. Fighting no longer appears desirable or necessary. In the Palestinian movement, the suicide bombings attributed to the Hamas movement declined during times when negotiated peace settlements seemed possible and economic conditions in Gaza and the West Bank improved. They also declined when Hamas was given a political role and its followers perceived that they had a voice in public life. When they felt that their voice was not being listened to, however, either their own followers or a schismatic group would turn to violence again, and the cycle of war would return. In the case of Khalistan, it is noteworthy that some of the old Khalistan leaders, including Wasan Singh Zaffarwal, Jagjit Singh Chohan, and Simranjit Singh Mann, turned to electoral politics in the years after the demise of the movement. They were able to see a future for themselves in public life.

In Mindanao, leaders like Naguib Sinarimbo were also planning to play roles in electoral politics. They were getting ready for the next stage of the movement, the implementation of Bangsamoro as a political entity. This meant that the leaders and fighters in an armed struggle that had lasted many years had to learn to adjust to peace. They had to treat the government like an ally rather than a foe, and learn the arts of compromise and negotiation that all democratic politicians have to adopt.

This was not an easy task. As Naguib told me, many of his colleagues were skeptical. Some left the movement in dismay over what they regarded as capitulation. Many who were wavering needed reassurances and support. One of the reasons why the transition was so difficult was that it required longtime militants to adopt a radically new view of the world. They were being asked to abandon the vision of cosmic war—the existential struggle between good and evil—that had animated much of their fighting, and that made mortal enemies out of those with whom they differed, including the government and other branches of the wider movement. Butch Malang admitted that was a daunting assignment. It took him a year, he said, to adjust to the new reality, and he did so eventually only with grave misgivings.

“Some of our fighters know only how to fight,” he said, somewhat sadly.[18] In his case, however, the old commander eventually took on a new role of facilitator in one of the major elements of the peace process, the

cessation of hostilities. New circumstances—the hope of a settlement—can make veterans look differently at a struggle, and even allow them to imagine the possibilities of reconciliation and peace. Moreover, it helps when the government gives roles to their old adversaries and actively promotes a rehabilitation program for former militants—programs that provide networks of social support and training for new jobs outside the (para-) military arena. These are attempts to return combatants to ordinary society, to allow them to see a role for themselves beyond the armed struggle.

Religion has played a role in the transition from conflict to peace, and in Mindanao it was once a destructive one, buttressing the bellicose jihadi worldview. But religion has also been employed in positive ways in recent years. Since the MILF movement influences all of the mosques in the area, Sinarimbo told me, it has given the imams in each district instructions on what to include in their sermons about the peace process. The imams have encouraged the faithful to embrace the plan and not reject it as the BIFF and Abu Sayyaf urged them to do. Hence the most profound change within the movement has been a shift in attitude away from the divisions of the past and toward a different role within society—one that no longer requires militancy to achieve social change.

In the Punjab, an old Khalistan activist, Gurtej Singh, told me “all we wanted was respect.”[21] Gurtej Singh had been a confidant of the martyred leader Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, and insisted that Bhindranwale was never in favor of Khalistan, a politically separate state for Sikhs. All he wanted for the Sikh community, Gurtej Singh said, was the honor that they were due as the majority community in the Punjab linguistic region, the post-1966 Punjab State in India. He said that the Sikh insurgents were never a terrorist organization, but a movement for Sikh pride. He added that it was a response to the humiliation they felt when Sikhs—particularly those in the dominant rural caste, the Jats—were treated as second-class citizens in their own territory, robbed of their water rights and mistreated by the police.

Whether or not Gurtej Singh’s analysis was correct, in the period since the cessation of hostilities in the Punjab, the Indian government has tried to more visibly show respect to the Sikh community and to give them greater cultural recognition. Sikh shrines have been improved and recently an enormous government grant provided for a new freeway access point and multilevel parking structure adjacent to the Golden Temple. An elegant marble plaza with fountains and statuary was constructed in the approach to the Sikhs’ most sacred shrine. In towns across the Punjab, statues have been erected in memorial of historical Sikh figures, such as Bhagat Singh, who was an early nationalist leader in the struggle against the British. Some of the more recent martyrs—the young men killed in the Khalistan uprising—have been memorialized with tacit governmental approval in such villages as Sultanwind, where one of the most prominent young men in the village became the leader of the Khalistan Commando Force and swallowed a cyanide tablet to kill himself when he was captured by the police. Today, a school library has been named in his honor.

In Iraq and Syria, it remains to be seen how Sunni Arab culture and leadership will be revered in a post-ISIS society. Many of the former supporters of ISIS with whom I talked in refugee camps told me that in Iraq the Shi’a treat Sunni “like dirt”.[23] One of the former jihadi militants with whom I spoke in prison said that he did not welcome the violence of al-Qaeda and ISIS but that it was necessary. Since the Shi’a government is violent, he said, they had to respond in kind. In his mind, the respect that he craved was not yet forthcoming from the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government.

In this case, military liberation from ISIS occupation was only part of the process of reintegration of the Arab Sunni population into the political life of those countries, and it was an incomplete one at that. The military destruction of ISIS territorial control was likely the final coup de grace for an organization that had essentially imploded from within. What followed was not so much peace as largely the absence of killing, although sporadic attacks have continued for years afterward. Peace, in the sense of economic renewal and full acceptance of Sunni Arabs into the political process of Iraq and Syria, is yet to come. Failing that, the spirit of war will continue and the conditions will be ripe for a revival of militant encounters in the future.

This article has focused on only three cases, but these suggest that often military and police suppression can go only so far in terminating a rebellion and that heavy-handed tactics alone can sometimes make matters worse.

Just as effective is a measure of hope: providing possibilities for new beginnings for a movement's followers where grievances are addressed and new paths for individuals and groups are opened. For war to end, old militants must be able to see a world after war and a life beyond the struggle.

About the Author: Mark Juergensmeyer is distinguished professor emeritus of sociology and global studies and interim director of the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, and William F. Podlich distinguished fellow and professor of religious studies at Claremont McKenna College. He is author or editor of more than 30 books, including the award-winning 'Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence' (2000) and 'When God Stops Fighting: How Religious Violence Ends' (2022).

Notes

[1] Conversation with Muhammad (a pseudonym), jihadi fighter in prison in northern Iraq, March 13, 2019. ISIS is the acronym for "the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria," although the Arabic word for Syria that is used, *sham*, refers not only to Syria but to the Arab Sunni Muslim-dominated regions that include Syria, Western Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and pre-1948 Israel, the region that the French called "the Levant," hence the alternative acronym, ISIL. These informal conversations were not formal interviews, and I use pseudonyms to mask the identities of most of those with whom I spoke. My research was supported in part by the Resolving Jihadist Conflicts Project at Uppsala University, for which I am very grateful.

[2] Author's conversation with Wassan Singh Zaffarwal, Dhariwal, January 19, 2017; Sohan Singh, Mohali, August 4, 1996; Simranjit Singh Mann, Chandigarh, August 3, 1996; Narinder Singh, Chandigarh, August 4, 1996; and others. I have used the real names of public figures, who have approved my use of their comments for publication.

[3] Author's conversation with Naguib Sinarimbo, Cotabato City, Mindanao, Philippines, May 2, 2018; Butch Malang, Cotabato City, August 24, 2016, and others.

[4] Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

[5] Isak Svensson, *Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars*. Brisbane Australia: University of Queensland Press, 2013.

[6] Mona Kanwal Sheikh and Mark Juergensmeyer (Eds.), *Entering Religious Minds: The Social Study of Worldviews*. London: Routledge, 2019.

[7] The following analysis is based on a section of my book, *When God Stops Fighting: How Religious Violence Ends*. Oakland: University of California Press, 2022, chap 5. The choice of the three case studies and the way that the conversations were held are discussed in that book.

[8] Conversation with Hadiya (a pseudonym) Hasan Sham Refugee Camp, Kurdistan, Iraq. February 12, 2017.

[9] Zaffarwal, Sohan Singh, Mann, Narinder Singh, op. cit.

[10] Harish K. Puri, Paramjit Singh Judge, and Jagrup Singh Sekhon. *Terrorism in Punjab: Understanding Grassroots Reality*. Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1999.

[11] See Bob East, *The Neo Abu Sayyaf: Criminality in the Sulu Archipelago of the Republic of the Philippines*. London: Nielsen UK, 2016.

[12] Conversation with Surjit Singh (a pseudonym), Sultanwind, August 18, 2017. Arrangements and translation assistance by Prof. Jagrup Singh Sekhon.

[13] Muhammad, op. cit. I have no way of certifying the veracity of this story or the truthfulness of these statements, but they do show a disaffection with the ISIS organization and leadership. As I mention in my book, *When God Stops Fighting*, the warden told me he had isolated Muhammad from other prisoners since he was seen as hostile to the ISIS organization.

[14] Zaffarwal, op. cit.

[15] According to figures supplied by the Home Ministry of the Government of India, initially the number of Sikhs killed by Sikh militants in the early 1980s was in the dozens. By 1988, it had swelled to over a thousand. Data reported in the *Times of India*, February 8, 1992, p. 15.

[16] Quoted in Shekhar Gupta, "Temple Intrigue," *India Today*, May 15, 1984, p. 56.

[17] Gupta, "Temple Intrigue," p. 57.

[18] Malang, op. cit.

[19] Ebrahim Moosa, "Overlapping Political Theologies: ISIS and Versions of Sunni Orthodoxy." Paper presented at the working group of the project on "Resolving Jihadist Conflicts," Uppsala, Sweden, September 7, 2016.

[20] Sinarimbo, op. cit.

[21] Malang, op. cit.

[22] Conversation with Gurtej Singh, Chandigarh, January 17, 2017.

[23] Conversation with Ahmad (a pseudonym), Hasan Sham Refugee Camp, Kurdistan, Iraq, March 10, 2019.