

Crime and Punishment: Jihadist Financing and Criminal Accountability in Finland

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Abstract

This article provides the first-ever empirical overview of patterns of jihadist financing in Finland. As jihadism has evolved in the country, particularly during the 2010s, financing-related activities have become increasingly present, also developing in quality and variance. While there are no upheld convictions on terrorist financing in Finland to date, the authors have identified at least three distinct types of jihadist financing present in the country. First, assets have been raised and moved to armed jihadist groups operating in conflict zones abroad. Second, foreign fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq, predominantly to join IS, have self-financed their travel and equipment purchases, partly through illicit means, and, in at least one case, also moved assets for the benefit of the group they joined. Lastly, there have been assets raised in Finland and moved to individuals engaging in jihadist activities abroad. However, Finland faces notable challenges in investigating and prosecuting these offenses, hampering its efforts to promote criminal accountability for terrorist offenses.

Keywords: Finland, jihadism, jihadist financing, terrorist financing, Al-Shabaab, Ansar al-Islam, Islamic State (IS), Syria, Iraq, foreign fighters

Introduction

Finland has long been a peripheral country in the broader European jihadist milieu, far removed and isolated from its key nodes in the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium. Before the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, it rarely had an issue with members of its Muslim population taking part in Islamist militancy, domestically or abroad. Indeed, Finland's first national counter-terrorism strategy from 2010 stated that there had been "no visible signs of wide-scale radicalization leading to violence" among the country's Muslim population.[1]

The lack of wide-scale radicalization and jihadist violence aside, a nascent jihadist milieu did in fact emerge in Finland in the 2000s. Initially, the phenomenon existed primarily in three contexts: within the Somali and Kurdish diasporas, and among converts. Early pioneers appear to have focused primarily on nonviolent activism, including recruitment and financing, although a small number of extremists also traveled abroad for terrorist training and foreign fighting.[2]

Reflecting broader trends in Western Europe in the 2010s, Finland's jihadist milieu has developed significantly. In a nutshell, an increasing number of individuals have become engaged in jihadist activities, predominantly through participation in the conflict in Syria and Iraq.[3] Further, extremist networks—with improved capacity for activism and outreach—have emerged, promoting the jihadist ideology, recruiting new members, and engaging in various types of activism.[4]

Consequently, jihadist activism in Finland has increased in quantity and developed in quality. Indeed, by the late 2010s the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (Suojelupoliisi, Supo) stated it had observed significant terrorism-related activities in Finland, including dissemination of ideology and financing.[5] This is also reflected in Supo's terrorist threat assessments. Between June 2014 and June 2017, the organization elevated its threat assessment on three separate occasions. In August 2017, Finland experienced its first-ever jihadist attack when an Islamic State (IS)–inspired attack took place in the city of Turku.[6]

Yet, these trends stand in stark contrast to the limited number of pretrial investigations and prosecutions of terrorist offenses, particularly in the context of financing terrorism. To date, there has been only one upheld

conviction in Finland on terrorist offenses, and no upheld convictions on terrorist financing.

To better understand the evolution of jihadism and efforts to counter it in Finland, and to supplement knowledge generated by preexisting literature,[7] this article explores financing activities—including suspected and attempted activities—connected to jihadism in Finland between 2001 and 2020. Further, it examines the Finnish authorities' efforts to investigate and prosecute these activities, offering preliminary thoughts on why such activities have resulted in only few pretrial investigations, prosecutions, and zero upheld convictions.

In the context of this article, jihadist financing refers to actions that—directly or indirectly—raise, store, move, or use [8] assets of any kind in support of jihadist actors or activities.[9] It introduces a preliminary typology of jihadist financing that captures its variations and evolution in Finland over time. When applied to the gathered data, three distinct types of financing can be identified: raising and moving assets for armed jihadist groups abroad; raising assets for traveling to, and engaging in, jihadist activities in conflict zones abroad; and raising and moving assets for other individuals engaging in jihadist activities abroad.

This article is divided into five parts. After the introduction, it outlines its data sources and limitations. The third part introduces the preliminary typology by examining the three types of jihadist financing identified above. The fourth part examines Finland's efforts to investigate and prosecute financing activities connected to jihadism. It also offers a preliminary argument as to why Finnish authorities have struggled with investigating and prosecuting these activities. The fifth and final part summarizes the article's key findings and reflects on their broader implications for Finland's counter-terrorism efforts.

Data and Limitations

This article is based on primary and secondary data gathered from a variety of sources. First, the authors conducted 16 semi-structured interviews with law enforcement and intelligence officials, prosecution authority, journalists, governmental authorities, and professionals working on countering terrorist financing. Unfortunately, the organizations represented in the interviews alone were not able to provide a full and detailed panoramic view of jihadist financing and countering it in Finland. For instance, the authors contacted representatives of four instant loan providers and one money service provider, but each declined to be interviewed.[10]

Second, the authors collected data from relevant official documents which are not openly accessible. The authors were granted access to initial and pretrial investigation documents on suspected cases of terrorist financing connected to jihadism. Ongoing investigations, however, were excluded. The authors were also given access to suspicious activity reports and suspicious transaction reports submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) between 2012 and 2019; these have been the basis of analysis conducted by the Unit.[11] Furthermore, the authors were also given access to the National Prosecution Authority's documents on all prosecution decisions made on suspected cases of terrorist financing between 2001 and 2019.

Third, the authors were given access to two reports published by the FIU on terrorist financing; these have since been made partially accessible to the public. The first report examined the characteristics of terrorist financing in Finland between 2017 and the first half of 2019, and the second looked at European convictions on terrorist financing between 2015 and 2020.

And lastly, the authors collected data from various openly accessible sources, including reports by international agencies, news articles, and the preexisting literature.

There are several limitations in this study. The most significant limitation was the lack of access to a key data source, intelligence gathered by Supo. Indeed, the organization has in recent years consistently stated that financing activities are one of the main manifestations of jihadism in Finland, and that there are "significant" financing-related activities in Finland.[12] Without access to such data, it is exceedingly difficult to provide

a comprehensive picture of the phenomenon and its evolution in the 2010s. Lack of access to Supo's archives also leaves a regrettable gap in terms of suspected jihadist financing activities before 2008 as there were no relevant pretrial investigations launched earlier, while only sporadic attention has been paid to jihadist activities in Finland in the 2000s in other data sources.

While there was a considerable wealth of data available on the few cases that have been investigated—and in two cases, prosecuted—by the authorities, it is unclear how representative these cases are. The access given to the authors by the authorities was exhaustive, but an additional hurdle is that currently terrorism-related pretrial investigation documents are archived in a problematic way and cannot be systematically searched in law enforcement databases. In the context of this study, the authors have strived to identify and access documents from all relevant investigations, but there are no guarantees that the list is exhaustive.

Additionally, as Finland is a peripheral country in the broader European jihadist milieu, much of the financing-related activity is international.[13] In many cases, assets raised in Finland were either transferred to armed groups or other jihadist actors abroad—predominantly in conflict zones—often via neighboring countries, or collected in Finland by individuals who later engaged in jihadist activities abroad.[14] Local authorities in these destination countries rarely had the capacity or inclination to aid in ongoing initial or pretrial investigations in Finland.[15] This constitutes a significant obstacle to investigating and prosecuting terrorist offenses, including financing. Furthermore, in the context of our study, criminal investigations opened abroad with connections to Finland—and investigated in cooperation with the Finnish authorities—were regrettably excluded from the material provided to the authors.

Lastly, a key deficiency from a methodological perspective is that the data were predominantly gathered from law enforcement and other official sources. The analysis on jihadist financing and its evolution in Finland would likely have been more detailed and nuanced had it been possible to conduct interviews with individuals who had participated in such activities in the past. However, the authors have tried to address this deficiency in part by including information collected from interviews of some of these individuals published by Finnish media.

A Preliminary Typology of Jihadist Financing in Finland

The limitations identified above notwithstanding, the gathered data clearly demonstrate that jihadist financing does occur in Finland, and that it has been increasing in quantity, quality, and variance throughout the 2010s.

Financing Armed Groups Abroad

Traditionally, financing armed groups abroad has been perceived by the authorities as one of the main forms of jihadist activism in Finland. In the early 2010s, it was highlighted as a key manifestation of the phenomenon in the country.[16] In this type of activity, individuals engaging in jihadist financing in Finland raise funds and move them abroad to persons directly connected with armed groups with the intention of supporting the group in question.

During the 2000s, Finnish law enforcement has on several occasions suspected that funds are being raised in Finland and moved to various armed groups operating in conflict zones abroad.[17] According to a Supo official who commented on jihadist financing in an interview in 2019, this type of financing in Finland has typically consisted of raising small sums of money—both from individuals aware and unaware of the funds' intended purpose or destination—and then bundling them together for transfer abroad, which often occurred through Hawala networks.[18] Both legitimate businesses and nonprofit organizations have been used in fundraising, and some of those raising funds may have pressed or even forced others to donate funds in some cases.[19]

One of the earliest public allegations of jihadist financing in Finland connects to Ansar al-Islam, an armed

group founded in Iraq in the early 2000s. The group had support networks in various countries in Western Europe—including Finland—during the decade, and these diaspora communities reportedly represented an important revenue source.[20] The existence and activities of Ansar al-Islam’s supporters in Finland were made public when a local media reported—and Supo confirmed—in 2004 that approximately 30 Kurds residing in Finland had connections to the group. Some allegedly had received money from the network’s leader, Mullah Krekar.[21] Several of the individuals connected to the group have been alleged to have raised funds for the group through donations and restaurant businesses.[22] To the knowledge of the authors, however, no investigations on the network’s alleged activities were launched in Finland in the 2000s.[23]

The first formal pretrial investigation into suspected terrorist financing began in 2011, and it was connected to the Somalia-based al-Shabaab. According to the prosecution, four Somalis—three men and one woman—constituted a cell that sought to raise and transfer funds to al-Shabaab between 2008 and 2011.[24] The alleged cell members were suspected of several terrorist offenses, including financing of terrorism. The defendants had raised and moved funds—reportedly approximately 2,000–3,000 euros in total, partly through charitable donations—via a Hawala network to Somalia and Kenya. According to the prosecution, the funds were sent to al-Shabaab.

The main defendant—who reportedly maintained contacts with “radical preachers”, was an ardent al-Shabaab supporter, and had gigabytes of jihadist content on his computer [25]—sent money to two al-Shabaab members. In addition to terrorist financing, he was charged with recruitment for the commission of a terrorist offense, and preparation of an offense to be committed with terrorist intent. These charges connected to his suspected plan to forcibly recruit his underage nephews—aged 15 and 17 at the time—to join al-Shabaab. The plan included luring his nephews to Kenya under false pretenses, and then drugging and smuggling them to an al-Shabaab training camp in Somalia. While the District Court of Helsinki found there was enough evidence to find the defendants guilty of all charges in 2014, the conviction was overturned in March 2016. Ironically, the main defendant was acquitted in absentia as he had already relocated to Syria—together with his family—and joined not al-Shabaab but IS.[26]

While there were no related pretrial investigations or court cases in the 2010s in Finland, law enforcement and intelligence officials have recurrently identified—including those interviewed by the authors—raising and transferring funds to armed groups abroad as the most significant form of jihadist financing in the country.

Self-Financing

In the 2010s, self-financing had become a notable form of jihadist financing in the context of the foreign fighter mobilization from Finland to Syria and Iraq. In this form of financing, foreign fighters raise funds in Finland to cover their travel, equipment purchases, and other related expenses before departing to a conflict zone. There are also reports that some Finnish citizens residing in the conflict zone have continued to fund their living expenses through social welfare payments.[27]

To date, more than 80 adults—approximately a quarter of whom are women—and 30 underage individuals from Finland have traveled to Syria and Iraq, the majority of them to join and live under IS.[28] The conflict in Syria and Iraq is not the first to attract foreign fighters from Finland in the context of jihadism. During the 2000s, foreign fighters from Finland have traveled to Somalia and possibly also to Iraq.[29] Further, a group of Finnish men—mostly converts—connected to the Salafi milieu formed around Roihuvuori mosque in eastern Helsinki showed interest in participating in the conflict in Chechnya in the mid-2000s, and a few allegedly went as far as arranging their travel to the Caucasus region.[30] One individual also attempted to enter the conflict zone, albeit unsuccessfully.[31] Regrettably, there is no data available to examine the financial dimension of these activities.

Even in the case of mobilization from Finland to Syria and Iraq, which occurred primarily from 2012–2016, there are only limited data available. Since there have not been terrorism-related charges brought

against any foreign fighters or other individuals engaging in jihadist activities in the conflict zone, it is challenging to obtain information on their self-financing activities. To the knowledge of the authors, only few initial investigations focusing on the 30–40 returnees to Finland have been opened, and to date, no pretrial investigations have been opened nor have charges been filed regarding terrorist financing offenses.

Two general observations, however, can be made concerning Finnish foreign fighters' self-financing activities. First, the travel to, and activities in, the conflict zone appear to have been financed in various ways, reflecting broader patterns in Europe.[32] Funds appear to have predominantly originated from legal sources, including personal savings, salaries, and income generated by legitimate businesses, as well as social welfare benefits.[33] For instance, in one case two IS foreign fighters used a credit card and funds of their place of employment—a restaurant in Helsinki—to cover their travel expenses.

Second, some foreign fighters have sought to generate funds for their activities through criminal means. Indeed, several foreign fighters from Finland appear to have resorted to criminal activities to fund their travel arrangements to, as well as equipment for, the conflict zone. One such individual is the main defendant in the Al-Shabaab trial, who traveled to Syria with his family at some point after spring 2015. He appears to have financed his—and his family's—travel arrangements to the conflict zone in part by credit fraud while also committing credit fraud to purchase equipment relevant to foreign fighting at a local sporting goods store.[34] While there is evidence of illicit financial activities in only a relatively small number of cases, it is highly likely that Finnish foreign fighters in general have resorted to similar self-financing methods as foreign fighters from other Nordic and Western countries.[35] These methods include credit card and consumer loan frauds, petty theft, VAT and other business fraud, lease/loans of vehicles,[36] social benefit fraud, and possibly also raising money through social media.[37]

Some of the jihadist groups active in Syria and Iraq, particularly IS, have actively sought to encourage and advise foreign fighters to raise funds and material and contribute these to their group's causes upon joining them.[38] Since there is a lack of evidence regarding multiple large-scale financing operations, it is relatively safe to assume criminal self-financing activities have largely been small-scale, individual-level schemes, with one notable exception: a group of young men connected to the aforementioned extremist Salafi milieu and the Roihuvuori mosque.

The core of the group consisted of at least five male congregants, several of whom were converts. According to the pretrial investigation documents, members of the group intended to travel to Syria in the summer of 2013 and join Kataib al-Muhajirin (KaM). Between the time the men reportedly decided to travel (around late 2012 and early 2013) and departed (June 2013), the head of KaM's "European foreign fighters' group" was Abu Salamah al-Finlandi. Abu Salamah was a Finnish-Namibian convert who had traveled to Syria together with his convert wife in the latter half of 2012. He was also a friend to at least two members of the group, and he likely played the role of a recruiter or at least a facilitator.[39] While not all of the group actually made it to Syria, most of the group's members participated in the activities of KaM, IS, and Katibat ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a.

Before the group departed to Syria, several men committed VAT frauds and other financial crimes.[40] Collectively, the amount of raised assets—in money and materiel—exceeded 120,000 euros. While fighting for IS in Syria, one of the group's members described—in a private email to a family member—his financial crimes as war loot (*ghanima*), which has caused damage to the infidel nation of Finland.[41] According to pretrial investigation documents, similar sentiments were shared by others within the group. For instance, one individual—who later admitted in a media interview that he did not regret his financial crimes [42]—described the group's members in an internal chat as "Islamic Robin Hoods" stealing from the infidels (*kuffar*). Further, another member depicted their activities as bringing "macaroni for terrorists". One member of the group in particular had previous experience in committing VAT frauds. He utilized this knowledge and expertise by providing the rest of the group a blueprint—referred to as the Action Plan—for committing similar frauds. At least two members of the group also formed a charitable organization, Northern Relief, which they used to gather additional resources.

The group's returnees were ultimately arrested in Finland in late 2014 and eventually prosecuted. They faced 12 charges, encompassing financial offenses including VAT frauds and accounting offenses, charges of preparation of an offense to be committed with terrorist intent, provision of training for the commission of a terrorist offense, and recruitment for the commission of a terrorist offense. The prosecution offered a wide collection of evidence, including pictures of two of the group's members in Syria, carrying weapons and standing in formation with other fighters in a KaM meeting.

In January 2018, the District Court of Helsinki found the men not guilty of terrorist offenses. At the time of the alleged terrorist offenses, the relevant legislation in Finland was limited. General financing of a terrorist group was criminalized only in 2015 and traveling abroad for the commission of a terrorist offense in 2016, so they could not be deployed in this case. The defendants were, however, convicted of the financial crimes they were charged for. The usage of the proceeds of their financial offenses was not investigated or prosecuted as terrorist financing. The only criminalized financing-related terrorist offense—according to existing Finnish legislation at the time—was financing of a specific terrorist act. As the prosecution was not able to connect the defendants' financing activities to specific terrorist acts, they chose to technically incorporate the funds raised through VAT frauds into the preparation of terrorist offenses charges.

Financing Individuals Engaging in Jihadist Activities Abroad

As an increasing number of individuals from Finland—and from Western Europe more broadly—have been actively engaging in jihadist activities abroad, it has opened opportunities for domestic extremists—and others—to raise and transfer funds to them. As Finland-originated individuals have predominantly joined or lived under IS in the 2010s, the destination of funds has been Syria and Iraq—with transfers mostly routed through Turkey.[43] Four cases are worth outlining in greater detail. The first case involves the Rawti Shax organization, which Brynjar Lia and Petter Nesser describe as a reconstitution of part of Ansar al-Islam's support networks in Europe during the 2000s.[44] Rawti Shax has been active in various parts of Europe, with local and national cells communicating and operating online. A key part of its modus operandi has been recruiting foreign fighters for jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq, predominantly for IS, and providing financial support for them.[45] The network has also been active in Finland during the past decade, and one of its key leaders lived in the country between 2013 and 2014.[46] A former leader of Rawti Shax's Finnish "cell", Abu Muhajir al-Kurdi, reportedly partly financed a Kosovar-Albanian Rawti Shax member's travel to Syria and Iraq via Turkey in late 2013.[47] Al-Kurdi himself traveled to the conflict zone and joined IS in March 2014.[48]

The second case is a suspected money transfer to the Finland-originated IS fighter Abu Ismail al-Bengali by a Bangladeshi Imam residing in Finland. According to investigative reporter Tasneem Khalil, al-Bengali "was active in the Finnish jihadi/Islamist scene until 2013/2014 before migrating to Syria".[49] Before traveling, he briefly lived in Helsinki and worked in a Halal butcher shop with a fellow compatriot whom he had befriended (and who later also joined IS). Al-Bengali reportedly joined the group in July 2014 after traveling to Syria.[50] According to pretrial investigation documents, it was suspected that the imam—whose daughter al-Bengali had married—sent a money transfer of several thousand euros to al-Bengali after he had traveled to the conflict zone.

The third case connects to a Sweden-based activist, whose financing activities link directly to Finland. According to researcher Magnus Ranstorp, an influential Salafi preacher used his Finland-based company as a part of his illicit fundraising scheme in Sweden—a VAT fraud worth approximately 590,000 euros—in 2013. He purchased mobile phones from the UK and shipped these to his company in Finland before reselling the shipment to a Swedish foreign fighter and his Swedish-based company.[51]

The final case revolves around a cluster of suspected money transfers from Finland to the al-Hol internment camp in Syria. At least 11 women who had either traveled to the conflict zone from Finland or have Finnish citizenship—as well as 33 minors, most born in the conflict zone—have reportedly been detained in the camp. [52] Internment camps, such as al-Hol, present without a doubt a dire humanitarian situation, particularly

for the minors, but the issue what to do with the adult detainees who have participated in the activities and atrocities of IS residing in the camp presents a complex question with distinct legal, moral, political, security, and financial dimensions. From the perspective of terrorist financing and countering it, funds injected to the camp also present an acute issue. The more funds are injected to the camp, the more armed groups and their resident members, organized crime groups, corrupt officials, and security personnel benefit from them. Some of these beneficiaries may later deploy these funds to exacerbate instability in the camps, in the region, and beyond.[53]

Based on documents made available to the researchers, funds have been collected by at least some of the detainees' relatives and friends. Some of these fundraising activities have been organized, ultimately collecting significant sums: tens of thousands of euros, if not more. While the funds appear to have been wired to Turkey through various official mechanisms, it is unclear how the funds have been forwarded from there to the final recipients in al-Hol.

To date, reportedly two-thirds of the Finland-originated individuals—both women and minors—detained in al-Hol have returned to Finland. At least four women have escaped from the camp with their children, and three women with their children have been repatriated by the Finnish government.[54] It is highly likely that at least some of the identified money transfers reached their intended recipients and were subsequently used to fund their escapes. It is also highly likely that there have been more transfers from Finland than are known to the authors or authorities as escapes from al-Hol are known to be both common and expensive. According to Vera Mironova, the cost of an escape from al-Hol was at least 15,000 USD per family by mid-2020, with significant variance depending on nationality and number of children.[55] There are not many data available on the escapes of Finnish women or how they were funded, but at least one such case has been mentioned in the Finnish media. In a police interview, a Finnish woman of Central Asian origin reportedly claimed she had paid almost 25,000 dollars—which she allegedly received from her mother—for her escape from al-Hol to Istanbul.[56] While the details of her story cannot be corroborated, the sum appears plausible.

What makes the cluster of the suspected money transfers to al-Hol relevant from the perspective of jihadist financing is that at least in one specific case, a key individual involved in fundraising had explicitly articulated their awareness that the funds being collected and transferred could in part go to IS. Further, at least one intended recipient was still espousing pro-IS views at the time of the attempted transfer. These transfers could fit the legal definition of financing a terrorist group or an individual terrorist. While investigations of suspected offenses committed in Syria and Iraq are still ongoing, to date no returnees from al-Hol or those suspected of having sent money there have been prosecuted with regard to terrorist financing.

This coincides with a broader pattern. To date, none of Finland's approximately 30 adult returnees have been found guilty of terrorist offenses committed in the conflict zone, and only a few have been prosecuted, making Finland one of the few Western countries with a zero-percent conviction rate. The country has similarly struggled with investigating and prosecuting suspected terrorist offenses of domestically active extremists—with the exception of the Turku attacker. In the context of jihadist financing, it is both demonstrably clear that this sort of activism has both occurred and become more common and serious in the past decade. Why, then, is this trend not reflected in the numbers of pretrial investigations, prosecutions, and convictions?

Explaining the Lack of Pre-trial Investigations and Prosecutions

As this article has demonstrated, activities regarding jihadist financing have evolved and become more common in the 2010s. In addition to the more traditional money transfers to armed groups abroad, recent developments include assets sent to, or taken by, foreign fighters to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq. Additionally, assets have been raised and transferred to individuals participating in jihadist activities abroad.

Yet in the context of terrorist financing, and despite numerous initial investigations, only three pretrial investigations have taken place, and only one launched after 2015.[57] To date, there are no upheld convictions on terrorist financing, despite Finnish authorities stating that there are significant terrorist

financing operations occurring in Finland.[58]

Investigating, prosecuting, and eventually convicting offenders who take part in jihadist financing—and jihadism more broadly—are prerequisites of a functioning legal system and counter-terrorism policy. Furthermore, pretrial investigations in particular help law enforcement to form and maintain a more thorough understanding of the local jihadi milieu, connections of various local actors both to each other and to comrades abroad, and to gain insight into their *modus operandi*. This will likely enhance the Finnish authorities' capacity to prosecute terrorist offenses in the future. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine reasons behind the scarceness of pretrial investigations, prosecutions, and convictions in Finland.

There is no one simple explanation; rather there are several contributing factors. First, jihadist financing activities in Finland appear not to be a significant phenomenon, recent developments notwithstanding. This applies to both the quantity of cases as well as to the quality. In most cases, the funds involved are low (measured usually only in hundreds or low thousands of euros).[59] Therefore, a low number of investigations, prosecutions, and convictions can be somewhat expected.

Second, Finnish law enforcement has struggled to adequately investigate terrorist financing cases connected to jihadism—as demonstrated above. This was also noted by the Financial Action Task Force in its evaluation of Finland in 2019.[60] This may in part derive from difficulties, which law enforcement officials—particularly in small countries with limited exposure to violent extremism—face in identifying and investigating cases, where funds have been either transferred or used abroad—particularly in conflict zones. Indeed, identifying the recipient of the transferred funds, let alone establishing for what activities the money has been or was intended to be used, is exceedingly challenging for law-enforcement organizations with limited exposure to the phenomenon. Further, the finite amount of funds connected to individual investigations likely raises the threshold for launching potentially lengthy and expensive pretrial investigations into jihadist financing in a situation where other investigations—e.g., into organized crime—may have to be prioritized due to limited resources.

Third, Finnish legislation on terrorist offenses was introduced in 2002, based on international commitments and may be regarded as reactive.[61] Indeed, as violent extremism and political violence have been rare phenomena in Finland after 1945, the country has had limited reasons to develop a robust counter-terrorism legislation—or policy more broadly—before the 2000s. Even during 2000s and 2010s, there are grounds to argue that Finland has had its own reasons for a cautious approach to terrorist crimes, since it has one of the lowest terrorism threat levels in Western Europe. However, it is also possible to argue that in the last two decades, there have been several cases, which likely would have resulted in prosecutions and convictions elsewhere in Europe.

On countering terrorist financing in particular, the international community has noticed Finland's lackluster approach. The country has received several notices from international actors regarding insufficiencies in terrorist-offense-related legislation.[62] Particularly in the context of funding armed groups abroad, the adopted legislation or its interpretation has historically been problematic from a pretrial investigation perspective, leaving law enforcement few tools to successfully investigate terrorist financing cases with an international element.[63] These insufficiencies were exposed in the al-Shabaab trial, where the defendants were acquitted despite sending funds to two of the group's members.[64] At the time of the alleged crimes the so-called general funding of terrorist actors had not yet been criminalized—a deficiency in the Finnish Criminal Code which has since been corrected. Indeed, at the time, one could only be found guilty of terrorist financing either if the offender was aware that money was to be used for a terrorist offence, or if the intention of the sender was to financially support an offense with terrorist intent—which are exceedingly difficult to prove.

While Finland has updated its counter-terrorism legislation in the 2010s—criminalizing general financing of a terrorist group, and training and recruitment for the commission of a terrorist offense in 2015; traveling abroad for the commission of a terrorist offense in 2016; and financing of an individual terrorist in April 2021—these had not led to any charges by late 2021.

While the financing of an individual terrorist was criminalized only in 2021, the question of whether to investigate and prosecute funds transferred in 2019–2020 by relatives and friends to al-Hol detainees—with some of the latter still supporting IS and engaging in activities promoting it at the time of the transfers—is still relevant. The transfers present a complex legal puzzle for Finnish—and European—authorities, as the criteria for financing a terrorist group or a specific terrorist act could materialize in certain circumstances, should the sender either have the intention or foreknowledge that part of the funds could be redirected to IS, or that its recipients would continue to engage in criminalized forms of jihadist activities after receiving funds. It appears that even within the Finnish National Bureau of Investigation there are different views on whether the cases in Finland ought to be investigated in terms of terrorist financing. However, similar activities have led to prosecutions and convictions elsewhere in the region.

The fourth contributing factor is that it is challenging for Finnish law enforcement to investigate terrorist financing offenses and gather sufficient evidence for prosecution due to the fact that although intelligence agencies both in Finland and abroad possess and share intelligence with law enforcement regarding terrorist activities, the data are often classified and may not be utilized—at least in full—to open pretrial investigations. Also, as most suspected terrorist financing offenses are international, and assets are either moved or used abroad, gathering evidence is extremely demanding and dependent on cooperation from local authorities—which may not have the willingness or capacity to help. However, these features are not typical for Finland alone—quite the contrary, the same challenges are characteristic for terrorist offenses’ investigation and prosecution globally. Nevertheless, other EU member states have been more active and effective in investigating and prosecuting terrorist financing offenses.[65]

Fifth, the threshold of initiating pretrial investigations of terrorist financing—as well as terrorist offenses in general— seems to be set relatively high, a fact which has also led to public debates. The National Prosecution Authority (NPA) decides whether suspected terrorist crimes will be investigated in cases where the suspected offenses have occurred abroad and consults law enforcement on launching investigations on suspected domestic terrorist offenses. The NPA appears to have adopted an approach which favors a person’s right not to be placed as a suspect of a crime without sufficient cause over the interest of solving a crime. [66] Yet, according to Finnish legislation, an investigation must be initiated when “there is reason to suspect that an offense has been committed”.[67] If the officer in charge of an investigation has taken all reasonable preparatory actions to determine whether to initiate an investigation, but is still uncertain, he ought to initiate an investigation rather than not.[68] This is especially relevant in serious offenses which threaten the life, well-being, and security of people, such as terrorist offenses. Hence, the NPA’s approach has led to public discussions [69] and criticism—including in several interviews conducted by the authors.

The notable challenges in investigating and prosecuting offenses relating to terrorist financing notwithstanding, the question does arise whether the Finnish criminal process regarding terrorist offenses and financing in particular has been sufficiently balanced and effective. Furthermore, from a policy perspective, it should be questioned whether the present situation corresponds with the aims and ambitions stated in the Finnish counter-terrorism strategy. And lastly, it should be asked whether Finnish authorities deem their contribution in combating terrorism—and terrorist financing—sufficient in the global fronts of countering terrorism as a responsible member of the UN, EU, and FATF.

Conclusion

While Finland is still a peripheral country in the broader European jihadi milieu, jihadism in Finland has developed significantly in the 2010s. This is largely due to the extraordinary appeal of the IS and the conflict in Syria and Iraq. As a part of this development, Finland has experienced an increase in the quality, quantity, and spectrum of jihadist activism, mainly in the context of the foreign fighter mobilization to Syria and Iraq—predominantly to the ranks of IS. This increase is poorly reflected in the number of initial and pretrial investigations looking into terrorist offenses in Finland, let alone trials and convictions.

Similar dynamics can be observed in the evolution of jihadist financing. In the 2010s, jihadist financing in

Finland has become more common and varied. However, only three investigations into terrorist financing have been launched in Finland during the decade, and only one since 2015.[70] Several factors have contributed to this, including the difficulty of investigating suspected crimes; limitations in the content and interpretation of relevant legislation; and somewhat lackluster and reactive efforts to update relevant legislation to effectively combat the phenomenon. While beyond the scope of this article, a comparative study on the modus operandi of jihadist financing as well as prosecution and conviction rates in the wider European or Nordic context would be beneficial to provide a more nuanced picture on the limitations of Finland's efforts to counter terrorist financing and terrorism more broadly. Differences in legislations are not significant enough to explain why Finland is the only country in the Nordic region where not a single returnee from Syria or Iraq has been convicted of terrorist offenses committed in the conflict zone.

Indeed, a more robust approach into investigating jihadist activities—including financing—within, or connected to Finland would better promote criminal accountability—the relative lack of which has been criticized by members of the international community. Opening new investigations when sufficient suspicions arise serves also as an opportunity to gain more knowledge on the phenomenon and its manifestations in Finland and to become more experienced in investigating and eventually prosecuting terrorist offenses—a key objective of any functioning counter-terrorism policy. In a situation where the Finnish jihadi milieu has grown, become more active, and to a greater degree transnationally connected than ever before, addressing such deficiencies should undoubtedly be a priority for Finnish policy makers and authorities. Failure to do so could embolden Finland-based extremists to act more openly and brazenly in the future.

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Notes

[1] Ministry of the Interior, *National counter-terrorism strategy, 2010*; URL: https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/80497/sm_242010.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, p. 5.

[2] Leena Malkki and Juha Saarinen, *Evolution of Jihadism in Finland*. The Hague: ICCT Research Paper, 2021; URL: <https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/05/evolution-of-jihadism-in-finland.pdf>, pp. 3–7. For a more detailed analysis, see Leena Malkki and Juha Saarinen, *Jihadism in Finland*, Helsinki: Publications of the Ministry of the Interior, 2019:14; URL: <http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-324-302-6>, pp. 63–78.

[3] On Finnish foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, see Leena Malkki and Juha Saarinen, 2021, pp. 14–20.

[4] Supo, Year Book 2016; URL: https://supo.fi/documents/38197657/40760242/2016_EN_Supo_yearbook.pdf/a17d7df6-68b3-95a2-7a5a-eeec9673d52c3/2016_EN_Supo_yearbook.pdf?t=1602666282005, p. 21.

[5] Supo, National Security Overview 2020; URL: https://supo.fi/documents/38197657/39761269/Supo_national-security-overview-2020.pdf/6234d8c5-9eec-c801-0eec-2529ed5be701/Supo_national-security-overview-2020.pdf?t=1603884700679.

[6] On the attack, see “Turku Stabbings on 18 August 2017,” Safety Investigation Authority Investigation Report 7/2018, URL: https://turvallisuustutkinta.fi/material/attachments/otkes/tutkintaselostukset/en/muutonnettomuudet/2017/oNRjHqmf/P2017-01_Turku_EN.pdf.

[7] See, for example, Leena Malkki and Juha Saarinen, 2021; Leena Malkki and Juha Saarinen 2019; Leena Malkki and Matti

Pohjonen, *Jihadist online communication and Finland*, Helsinki: Publications of the Ministry of the Interior, 2019:29, URL: <http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-324-300-2>.

[8] This mechanism framework is adopted e.g. in the FATF's Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment guidance; URL: <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-Risk-Assessment-Guidance.pdf>, p. 7–8.

[9] It is important to highlight that this article does not approach jihadist financing from a legal perspective, and thus its definition of jihadist financing is not identical to the definitions of terrorist offenses in Chapter 34a of the Criminal Code of Finland (19.12.1889/39). Therefore, some of the cases described in this article have not necessarily been criminalized, particularly at the time of alleged offenses, or led to convictions or even criminal charges.

[10] This is unfortunate, since it has been reported that instant loans have been widely used by Western foreign fighters and mentioned as a significant risk factor also by Finnish authorities. See e.g. Essi Isoaho and Ida-Ellen Kaski, *National risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing*, Helsinki: Publications of the Ministry of Finance 2021:17; URL: https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/163051/VM_2021_17.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, p. 92.

[11] It should be noted, however, that most of the data were unusable for the purpose of this article, as several reports were ambiguous and brief and often connected to other cases, the documents of which were not accessible to the authors.

[12] Supo, Year Book 2019; URL: https://supo.fi/documents/38197657/40760242/2019_EN_Supo_yearbook.pdf/9be682cf-bfb6-50d6-d7b7-cc903d8e5802/2019_EN_Supo_yearbook.pdf?t=1602666410607, p. 12; and Supo, Year Book 2020; URL: <https://vuosikirja.supo.fi/documents/62399122/66519032/Supo+Year+Book+2020.pdf/65663bab-fcf6-5d86-9e15-9a12ab37c3a5/Supo+Year+Book+2020.pdf?t=1616408481574>, p. 10.

[13] National Bureau of Investigation/Financial Intelligence Unit, *Report on characteristics of terrorist financing in Finland, 2020, public version*; URL: <https://poliisi.fi/documents/25235045/67733116/KRP-Tiivistelm%C3%A4-Selvitys-terrorismin-rahoittamisen-ominaispiirteist%C3%A4-26.4.2021.pdf/841c8d78-ab02-56fe-695f-1da75962b7ff/KRP-Tiivistelm%C3%A4-Selvitys-terrorismin-rahoittamisen-ominaispiirteist%C3%A4-26.4.2021.pdf?t=1620827032585>, p. 2.

[14] According to a recent National Risk Assessment, the most common country receiving assets connected to suspected terrorist financing is Turkey. Ibid.

[15] See e.g. Lasse Kerkelä, "Väitetty avustustoiminta Syyriaan toi useita syytteitä lelusalakuljettaja Rami Adhamille—epäillään nostaneen yhdistyksen tililtä satojatuhansia euroja," *Helsingin Sanomat*, 12.2.2018.

[16] See e.g. Ministry of the Interior, *Report on Violent Extremism in Finland, 2013*; URL: <https://intermin.fi/documents/1410869/3723676/Vakivaltainen-ekstremismi-Suomessa-tilannekatsaus-1-2013.pdf/c153bd87-b4ff-4cb0-8843-0e0352be052c/Vakivaltainen-ekstremismi-Suomessa-tilannekatsaus-1-2013.pdf>, p. 6.

[17] See, for example, Katja Kaartinen, "Krp tutkii terrorismin rahoitusta Suomessa – kaksi henkilöä pidätettynä," *Turun Sanomat*, 17.9.2011; URL: <https://www.ts.fi/uutiset/kotimaa/257978/Krp+tutkii+terrorismin+rahoitusta+++Suomessa++kaksi+henkiloa+pidatettyna>.

[18] Kati Pehkonen, "Starttirahaa pyhään sotaan: käsikirjoitus," *Yle*, 1.4.2019; URL: <https://yle.fi/aihe/artikkeli/2019/04/01/starttirahaa-pyhaan-sotaan-kasikirjoitus>.

[19] Supo, *Statement for the National risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing, 2021*; Kati Pehkonen, 2019.

[20] See e.g., Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations. Ansar al-Islam, 2018*; URL: <https://stanford.app.box.com/s/bjk3nu47vci4023mudxkw3kqdr1vcy5k>, p. 4.

[21] Most of the network's alleged members were refugees resettled from Iraq in the 1990s, and resided in the city of Turku. *Yle*, "Suomesta yhteyksiä terroriepäilyyn?". 15.10.2004; URL: <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-5193337>. On Mullah Krekar, see e.g. Brynjar Lia and Petter Nesser, "Jihadism in Norway: A Typology of Militant Networks in a Peripheral European Country," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Volume 10, Issue 6, (2016).

[22] Supo, Annual Report 2004, p. 6; Toby Archer & Ann-Nina Finne, "Pizzaa islamisteille," *Ulkopolitiikka* 4/2005.

[23] In the Finnish context, their activism has continued under the Rawti Shax organization in the 2010s.

[24] Stina Brännare, "Syyttäjä: terrorismista epäilty valmisteli lasten kaappaamista huumaamalla," *Yle*, 18.9.2014; URL: <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-7476191>.

[25] Sara Rigatelli, "Somalimiehen hätkähdyttävä tarina: Vapautui Suomessa terrorismituomiosta, oli jo Isisissä," *Yle*, 4.3.2017; URL: <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9460874>.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Vera Mironova, "Impunity for Repatriated Islamic State Members," *Lawfare* blog, 3.8.2021; URL: <https://www.lawfareblog.com>.

[com/impunity-repatriated-islamic-state-members.](http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CTC-SENTINEL.pdf)

[28] Ministry of the Interior, *Violent extremism in Finland - situation overview 2020*; URL: <http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-324-621-8>, p. 24.

[29] Leena Malkki and Juha Saarinen, 2019, pp. 69, 72.

[30] Leena Malkki and Juha Saarinen, 2021, p. 6.

[31] Mika Parkkonen, "Suomalainen muslimi halusi auttaa sodan piinaamia veljiään," *Helsingin Sanomat*, 15.9.2006; URL: <https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000004425363.html>.

[32] See e.g. Magnus Ranstorp, "Microfinancing the Caliphate: How the Islamic State is Unlocking the Assets of European Recruits?" *CTC Sentinel*, 9 (5) (2016); URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CTC-SENTINEL>, pp. 13–14.

[33] Essi Isoaho and Ida-Ellen Kaski, 2021, p. 17.

[34] Kati Pehkonen, 2019.

[35] On Sweden e.g. see Magnus Normark and Magnus Ranstorp, and Filip Ahlin, *Financial activities linked to persons from Sweden and Denmark who joined terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq during the period 2013-2016*, Swedish Defence University, 2017; URL: <http://fhs.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1119564/FULLTEXT01.pdf>.

[36] Exclusively by those few foreign fighters, who traveled to the conflict zone from Finland in these vehicles.

[37] Magnus Ranstorp, 2016, pp. 13–14.

[38] Ibid, p. 11.

[39] On Abu Salamah, see Nuno Tiago Pinto, "Inside the Foreign Fighter Pipeline to Syria: A Case Study of a Portuguese Islamic State Network," 13 (8) (2020); URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/inside-the-foreign-fighter-pipeline-to-syria-a-case-study-of-a-portuguese-islamic-state-network/>, note X.

[40] Helsinki District Court, judgment number 18/103187, 24 January 2018.

[41] Miika Viljakainen, "Espoolainen lähihoitaja Antti tuli uskoon vuonna 2012, kaksi vuotta myöhemmin hän oli Isis-taistelija—tässä koko uskomaton tarina," *Ilta-Sanomat*, 18.1.2020; URL: <https://www.is.fi/kotimaa/art-2000007684174.html>

[42] Kati Pehkonen, 2019.

[43] Amira El-Bash-Hilden, *Viranomaisnäkökulma terrorismin rahoittamisen riskiin Suomessa*, Laurea University of Applied Sciences, 2020, p. 27.

[44] Brynjar Lia and Petter Nesser, 2016, p. 123.

[45] "Press Release: Joint action against radical Islamist terrorist group coordinated at Eurojust (Operation JWEB)." *Eurojust*, 12.11.2015.

[46] Leena Malkki and Juha Saarinen, 2019, p. 68.

[47] See, for example, Kjell Persen: "Slik knytter italiensk politi Krekar til IS." *TV2*, 19.11.2015; "Speciale terrorismo / Ecco nomi, piani, organizzazioni e azioni dei terroristi arrestati oggi dal ros dei carabinieri." *Il Nord Quotidiano*, 12.11.2015.

[48] He reportedly died fighting in the ranks of IS in Syria in late 2014. Sara Rigatelli, "Isisin vuodetulla jäsenlistalla on ainakin viisi suomalaistaistelijaa," *Yle*, 23.3.2016; URL: <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-8759501>.

[49] "Latest Bangladeshi IS fighter killed in Iraq is Taz Rahman," *Dhaka Tribune*, 12.5.2017; URL: <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/05/12/latest-bangladeshi-fighter-killed-iraq-taz-rahman>.

[50] "MOT: Oulu Imam's son-in-law and business partner died in ISIS ranks" (2019).

[51] Magnus Ranstorp, 2016, p. 13.

[52] Petri Burtsov, "Sisäministeri Mykkänen Isis-leirin kymmenistä suomalaisista: 'Aikuisia emme halua Suomeen, lapset Suomen viranomaisten haltuun,'" *YLE*, 24.5.2019; URL: <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10799617>.

[53] Audrey Alexander, "Cash Camps – Financing Detainee Activities in al-Hol and Roj Capms," *Combating Terrorism Center*, September 2021; URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Cash-Camps.pdf>, p. III.

[54] Sara Rigatelli, "Al-Holista palasi jälleen äiti lapsineen Suomeen – UM myönsi matkustusasiakirjat mutta ei auttanut perhettä paossa," *Yle*, 1.8.2020; URL: <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-11475665>; Mikko Haapanen, Sara Rigatelli and Riikka Kajander, "Al-Holista kotiutettiin nyt myös aikuisia – paljonko paluut ovat maksaneet, mitä leireillä vielä oleville tapahtuu," *Yle*, 20.12.2020; URL: <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-11707111>; Katriina Töyrylä and Tom Kankkonen, "Syriasta luovutettiin Suomeen al-Holissa ollut nainen ja hänen kaksi lastaan," *Yle*, 16.7.2021; URL: <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-12021553>; Maria Manner, "Al-Holin opettaja,"

Helsingin Sanomat, 26.9.2021; URL: <https://www.hs.fi/sunnuntai/art-2000008244808.html>.

[55] Vera Mironova, "Crowdfunding the Women of the Islamic State," *Lawfare*, 29.10.2020; URL: <https://www.lawfareblog.com/crowdfunding-women-islamic-state>; Vera Mironova, "Life inside Syria's al-Hol camp," *Mei@75*, 9.7.2020; URL: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/life-inside-syrias-al-hol-camp>.

[56] "Suomalaisnainen väittää maksaneensa 25 000 dollaria pois pääsystä al-Holin leiriltä – 'Aishan' uskomaton matka Isis-alueelle ja takaisin," *MTV Uutiset*, 12.9.2021; URL: [https://www.mtvuutiset.fi/artikkeli/suomalaisnainen-vaittaa-maksaneensa-25-000-dollar-25-000-dollar-poispaasysta-al-holin-leirilta-aishan-uskomaton-matka-isis-alueelle-ja-takaisin/8231496](https://www.mtvuutiset.fi/artikkeli/suomalaisnainen-vaittaa-maksaneensa-25-000-dollar-25-000-dollar-25-000-dollar-poispaasysta-al-holin-leirilta-aishan-uskomaton-matka-isis-alueelle-ja-takaisin/8231496).

[57] Essi Isoaho and Ida-Ellen Kaski, 2021, p. 17.

[58] Supo, Year Book 2019; URL: https://supo.fi/documents/38197657/40760242/2019_EN_Supo_yearbook.pdf/9be682cf-bfb6-50d6-d7b7-cc903d8e5802/2019_EN_Supo_yearbook.pdf?t=1602666410607, p. 12; Supo, Year Book 2020; URL: <https://vuosikirja.supo.fi/documents/62399122/66519032/Supo+Year+Book+2020.pdf/65663bab-fcf6-5d86-9e15-9a12ab37c3a5/Supo+Year+Book+2020.pdf?t=1616408481574>, p. 10.

[59] Amira El-Bash-Hilden, 2020, p. 56.

[60] FATF Mutual Evaluation Report of Finland, April 2019; URL: <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-Finland-2019.pdf>, p. 5.

[61] Leena Malkki, "International Pressure to Perform: Counterterrorism Policy Development in Finland," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 39 (4) (2016); URL: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1117332>.

[62] For example, the European Commission, the FATF, and the UN's Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.

[63] "KRP: Poliisilla ei työkaluja puuttua epäiltyyn terrorismin rahoittamiseen—"Käynnissä ei ole yhtään esitutkintaa," *STT, Ilta-Sanomat*, 28.9.2017; URL: <https://www.is.fi/kotimaa/art-2000005387154.html>.

[64] The initial guilty verdict was overturned as the Helsinki Court of Appeals argued that there had not been sufficient evidence presented that the defendants' intention was to send the money to be used for offenses with terrorist intent, not even if the receivers were members of al-Shabaab. Judgment number 16/111925, 23 March 2016. Prior judgment in the District Court of Helsinki, number 155462, 19 December 2014.

[65] Legal traditions and legislation differ in EU member states, but since they are bound by the same international agreements and directives, some comparisons are possible. For example, between 2015 and 2020 there were 94 jihadist- terrorism-related court proceedings in EU member states. More than 90% of the prosecutions resulted in convictions and concerned foreign terrorist fighters. (National Bureau of Investigation/Financial Intelligence Unit, Report on European judgments relating to terrorist financing 2015–2020, 2021).

[66] The National Prosecution Authority has commented on the matter in, for example: Maria Manner and Paavo Teittinen, "Mistä terrorismitutkintojen vähäisyys Suomessa johtuu?" *Helsingin Sanomat* (16.1.2021); URL: <https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000007743536.html>.

[67] Criminal Investigation Act (805/2011), Chapter 3, Section 3.

[68] Helesvirta Jussi, "Esitutinnan aloittaminen—Syytä epäillä -kynnys ja siihen liittyvä harkinta," *Edilex* 2020/24, p. 27.

[69] See, for example, Paavo Teittinen, "Terrorismitutkinta kiristää viranomaisten välejä: valtakunnansyyttäjän mukaan suojelupoliisi ei anna tarpeeksi tietoa, Supo kiistää väitteen" *Helsingin Sanomat* (27.12.2019); URL: <https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000006355005.html>, and Rebekka Härkönen, "Poliisi on estänyt neljä terrori-iskua Suomessa- krp:llä ollut selvittelyssä lähes 130 terrorismijuttua," *Aamulehti* (6.4.2019); URL: <https://www.aamulehti.fi/rikos/art-2000007556976.html>.

[70] Essi Isoaho and Ida-Ellen Kaski, 2021, p. 17.