

# Frictional Security Governance: Policing the Crime-Terror Nexus in Denmark

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## Abstract

*This article examines policy responses to crime and terror as cases through which to illuminate the transformations of contemporary security governance in Denmark. The policies reveal how particular events have triggered a process of security escalation in which conflated notions of threat have called for new policing measures and organizations. We focus on three critical events linked to ‘foreign fighters’, ‘gangs’, and ‘crossovers’ as cases of escalating threat through which to analyze the expansion and conflation of security domains. Policy responses to the crime-terror nexus, we argue, merge reactive and proactive policing measures and formerly distinct domains of securitization and risk management, highlighting the frictional characteristics of security governance. While the Danish Model—informed by a networked-based and multiagency approach to preventing and countering radicalization and extremism—is often referred to as a model of best practice—we propose that future research needs to explore in greater detail how the expansion and conflation of security domains impact security actors who are mandated to implement the operational response to crime and terror.*

**Keywords:** Crime-terror nexus, Denmark, escalation, friction, policing, security governance

## Introduction

Since the attacks of 9/11, new insider threats have challenged and changed national security constellations around the world. These threats have emerged from a context of increasingly intertwined societal challenges, with overlapping—and often amalgamated—issues of terrorism, organized crime, and immigration. This has changed the scale of public anxiety and the nature of policing practices and policy interventions.[1] Incidents like the train bombings in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005, as well as the shootings in Paris and Copenhagen in 2015, are cases that demonstrate how the entanglement of recurring tropes of crime and violence function as a mechanism of threat escalation.[2] Transgressive, diffuse, and border crossing in nature, these threats have transcended fixed boundaries of categorization, affecting the logic, organization, and practices of national and global security governance. As one of the most acute expressions of this development, the “crime-terror nexus”—characterized by the interplay between transnational organized crime and terrorist organizations—demonstrates that such intersections conjure up a complex field of security interventions.[3]

Research has documented how the hybrid nature of the crime-terror nexus has inspired novel types of expanded forms of policing and led to an increasing entanglement of policy domains.[4] While existing studies have privileged critical perspectives on the impacts on policed populations, little work has been done on how the crime-terror nexus stimulates the crafting of security policies and shapes security governance. Defining security governance as the “management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities” across public and private domains, “structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes,”[5] we ask in this article: What kind of national legislative policies and action plans have become key to current policing strategies targeting the crime-terror nexus, and how do these policies merge previously distinct security logics, organizations, and outcomes of policing?

Significant insights can be gained from existing policy research on organized crime, terrorism, and violent extremism, for instance on the impact of securitization on social policy.[6] Yet, these domains have predominantly been studied separately. Literature on the crime-terror nexus, however, has been concerned with the ‘mutation’ of these domains, the operational and organizational similarities, and how converging threats may affect policy responses,[7] but is lacking insight into actual policy content. This article seeks to fill this knowledge gap by merging policy analysis with the crime-terror nexus as it explores the conflation of

central distinctions in policies on organized crime and violent extremism. It discusses how seemingly different policy interventions engage and coproduce an emerging transformation of Danish security governance. In the following, we analyze how they are brought together in the aftermath of particular ‘critical events’.[8]

We focus on three critical events, which have triggered a process of intense politization of issues relating to the crime-terror nexus: the emergence of Danish foreign fighters in 2012, the gang conflict in 2017, and the 2015 Copenhagen shootings. The selected events provide an opening to study general trends at the heart of security policy development. Furthermore, they constitute an empirical prism through which to explore policy dynamics in an acute and visible way—as a paradigmatic case [9] of how moments of escalating threat have produced immediate policy responses and instituted new forms of action. By exploring the policies in this light, we see how they tap into each other’s domains, and therefore, how they can only be fully understood if they are viewed together.

Critical events differ from regular events in that they have a wide political, economic, and societal impact and can be approached as catalysts to processes of social change.[10] In this article, we combine Veena Das’s notion of critical events (1995) with Sewell’s (1996) work on transformation.[11] Sewell conceptualizes “events” as a sequence of occurrences that result in a transformation of structures and practices. These sequences begin with an initial *rupture*—a “surprising break with routine practice”—after which some events become neutralized and reabsorbed into preexisting structures, while others turn into historical events that “touch[es] off a chain of occurrences that durably transforms previous structures and practices.”[12] We propose that the notion of critical events can be employed as a way to understand the extraordinary nature of such “ruptures” in the security field and how they relate to “sequences of occurrences” that constitute a particular process of intense politization. As Das’s work shows, critical events must be understood in terms of their historical and political trajectories and embeddedness.[13] In this way, we see how gang wars, terrorist incidents, and the issue of foreign fighters unfold at different paces—some over a period of time, some as instant moments—but what concerns us here is how they stimulate particular processes of politization.

Conceptually we engage in debates about the expansion of the security field, which is discussed in theories of securitization [14] and risk management [15] and in processes such as escalation.[16] Central to these debates is the interplay between potential and realized threats, and the relationship between reactive and proactive measures that is subject to change when the security field expands. According to Højer et al.,[17] “escalation” implies a process of accelerated change, in which “phenomena of growth not only produce more of the same but also produce differences in kind.”[18] This means that accelerating change “may not only imply that a process is speeded up and geographically expanding, but also that the growth—and its conditions—may turn into something entirely different in the process.”[19] While building on this conceptualization of accelerated change in our analysis, we seek to develop it further through the notion of friction as a lens through which to highlight the conflictual engagements between different policy interventions across the crime-terror nexus. Introduced by Tsing to capture “the awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference,”[20] the notion brings attention to the encounter between a range of actors, institutions, and security logics, and helps to capture how the increasing entanglement of proactive and reactive interventions targeting organizing crime and violent extremism serve as a catalyst for changing security governance.

Our intention here is to indicate a set of policy interventions, which exist in a mutually reinforcing relationship because of their hybrid nature. Inspired by recent discussions of the linkages between ‘hybridity’ and ‘friction’ which have shown the fluidity, relativity, and blending of different actors, orders, and forms of authority,[21] we aim to move beyond neat institutionalist accounts of policy intervention, adopting instead a focus on the conflicts, confluences, and coproductions of different domains. When different policy domains intersect, we propose that the intersection itself creates new assemblages of professional groups as well as target groups. The latter, we will show, is indicated by the rise of new policy figures, such as, for instance, the “crossovers”. In the case of the crime-terror nexus, this process has led to a crucial acceleration of interventions and also led to an intersection of changing security logics.

Methodologically, we follow the line of interpretive policy studies, approaching the formulation of policy

problems as a process of discourse and argumentation that is politically produced rather than a preexisting given. We focus on the ways in which the problem is represented and how this shapes policy responses.[22] We therefore employ policy analysis as a methodological tool to generate an understanding of political rationalities, values, interests, and contexts underpinning policy responses.[23] Drawing on insights from the anthropology of policy that approach policies as “an organizing principle of society” and as a “vehicle for change”, [24] we highlight the productive and transformative characteristics of policy, and regard policies as assemblages “in which actors, agents, concepts and technologies interact in different sites, creating or consolidating new rationalities of governance.” [25] In order to do so, we have selected, for Denmark, the most central, national policy documents related to developments within the domains of radicalization, organized crime, and terrorism during the last decade. These are open-source materials consisting of a combination between national action plans, legislative acts, defense agreements, government evaluations, and research-examining initiatives across the policy domains. These materials have been coded and analyzed with a focus on the meaning ascribed to specific (critical) events and how they are rhetorically connected to new trends and approaches. Subsequently, the Danish policy documents have been cross-coded for crime-terror nexus terminology, references, and key concepts, with specific attention to trends and developments in legislative initiatives and emerging approaches and technologies applied in new government initiatives.

The article is structured in three parts. First, we trace the trajectories of expanded policing in Danish security governance back to three critical events, reading them as political moments that are paradigmatic of the linkages between different policy domains. Then we show how such policy responses to radicalization, terrorism, and organized crime are based on a general move that merges distinctions between securitization and risk management, between reactive and proactive policing, and between prevention and punishment. This development, we argue, is not a linear process with one type of intervention replacing another. Rather it should be understood as an intertwining and overlapping process in which diverse interventions and logics oscillate and exist simultaneously—sometimes in frictional ways. In conclusion, we propose that expanded policing, in the form of multiagency collaboration in the Danish Model, needs to be further examined at the level of operational practice to generate a better understanding of how those actors involved in the implementation of such policies navigate the frictional character of contemporary security governance.

### ***Expanded Policing in Danish Security Governance: Three Critical Events***

During the last decades, Danish security governance has evolved around a number of policy interventions and institutional arrangements that respond to emerging developments within the fields of organized crime, radicalization, and violent extremism. These interventions must be understood in the context of global security transformations and the transnational exchange of models and technologies aimed at combatting a variety of threats and vulnerabilities. Yet at the same time, these interventions and arrangements have indeed been developed and implemented in response to critical *local* events that have captured public and political attention. Below, we shed light on three such events linked to foreign fighters, gangs, and crossovers, considering them as cases through which to examine the process of security escalation and how, and with what consequences, this escalation merges previously distinct security logics, organizations, and outcomes of policing. To examine the transformation of security governance, we take our empirical point of departure in national policy making between 2009 when the government issued its first action plan against radicalization and extremism and its first package of anti-gang initiatives and 2019 when a ‘safety-package’ addressing violence in public spaces was introduced.

### **Foreign Fighters: Policies Targeting Radicalization and Violent Extremism**

*The first Danish foreign fighter: in early spring 2012, young Victor Kristensen decided to leave Denmark to take up arms and fight with the Islamic State in the pre-civil war battles in Syria and Iraq. On 13 March 2013, he wrote a letter to his family, explaining that he had not been forcibly recruited, but had voluntarily decided to leave Denmark having chosen the path of Islam. Following his arrival in Syria, he joined the Islamic State and subsequently became involved in the planning of an attack on Iraqi government forces.*

*On 26 November 2013, Victor died in combat north of Baghdad, wearing a suicide jacket.[26] An ethnic Danish convert from Denmark's second-largest city, Aarhus, Victor was the first of over one hundred Danish citizens to travel to Syria to fight the Assad regime or promote revivalist religious organizations in the Middle East. Some of these foreign fighters were well-known to the authorities because of their alleged links to local criminal groups or because they were well-established in the local urban criminal milieu. [27] When they left Denmark, most of these people left friends and relatives behind, but leaving them with no information about their relations or whereabouts in Syria, causing a number of families and citizens to call the Danish authorities worried about the survival of their children, spouses, siblings, or friends. New relationships and alliances were established between police officers and civilians in the social milieus affected. Collaboration between the police and local community organizations was intensified to prevent further travels to the conflict zone.[28]*

The emergence of Danish foreign fighters presented a turning point in the development of national government policy in the 2010s. While the 2000s introduced “soft” welfare approaches—such as education—to counter violent extremism, the 2010s proved to be a decade of changing security paradigms that moved the crime preventive scheme from education and welfare to penalties and criminalization. The government adopted its first counter-terrorist legislation in 2002, in the aftermath of 9/11, and introduced several legislative regulations in 2006 as a consequence of the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). One central outcome of these events was a new focus on insider threats and homegrown terrorism, connecting foreign and domestic counter-terrorist policies, as well as domestic issues of immigration, integration, crime prevention, and welfare provisions. In 2009, the government issued its first national action plan against radicalization and extremism, called “A Common and Safe Future”. The scope was widespread, with no less than 22 preventive initiatives being added to existing intervention efforts in “vulnerable residential areas”.[29]

The 2009 action plan was inspired by the municipal social services and police forces in Aarhus and Copenhagen, as these were in the process of designing and preparing counter-radicalization measures. The action plan emphasized that radicalization was a threat posed by forces who challenged social cohesion and fundamental values, such as democratic freedom and equal opportunities.[30] It suggested that new fundamentalist Muslim organizations raised anti-democratic voices which could sever the links between the young generation and the future of the nation. In this way, it pointed to the young migrant generation's sense of belonging to Danish society as a primary means of prevention. The preventive efforts included democracy teaching, dialogue-based interventions in targeted communities, capacity building in associational settings, the training of prison staff in risk-behavior detection coupled with other special prison initiatives, as well as multiagency collaboration and partnerships between the police, municipalities, and the Muslim diaspora.[31]

The government launched a revised action plan in 2014, when the traffic of foreign fighters to the Syrian civil war was peaking and the public hotline to the police was increasingly busy as families and frontline social workers voiced their concerns about ongoing radicalization.[32] The 2014 national action plan brought several important changes. First, it emphasizes that the government takes a hard line against extremism, with the implementation of stricter measures to stop recruitment for participation in armed conflicts abroad.[33] The notion of the *foreign fighter* appears as a key policy subject, described as an urgent threat to national security, requiring deterrence, punishment, and consequence-based action. Hence, the revision of the 2014 action plan refers directly to the foreign fighter situation going back to the first incidents in 2012 and the increased travel of Danish citizens to foreign war zones. Importantly, the action plan postulated a link to criminal groups. A subsection of the action plan points out that it has become a trend among criminals and gang members to have close links with extremist circles.[34] Against this background, the new policy aimed to target both criminal and extremist social milieus by means of exceptional legislative changes of the Passport Act, Aliens Act, and Criminal Code.[35] Concrete suggestions are made to allow the police to issue travel bans and to revoke the passport of any individual who is suspected of planning to join an armed conflict abroad. Legal consequences are introduced for aliens residing in Denmark who join an armed conflict abroad. Furthermore, changes were made in the Criminal Code in order to provide sufficient scope for discouraging recruitment to, and participation in, armed conflicts like those in Syria and Iraq.

A new suggestion was to propose the introduction of new offenses to discourage potential recruits.[36] Simultaneously, we see a persistent urge to introduce welfare governance. Here, an elaborate list of outreach initiatives is presented with the aim of mobilizing civil society and expanding the existing early-warning system by enrolling parents' networks, local associations, and professionals in positions of trust for surveillance, reporting, and preventive efforts. This is a crucial turning point in Danish preventive policy as welfare and education initiatives are run in parallel with increasing penalties, surveillance, and criminalization.[37]

In June 2016, a new law came into effect. It banned Danes from supporting warring forces abroad and criminalized journeys to conflict zones where terrorist organizations were known to operate.[38] This move was a major step toward stricter security governance. Since the new law paved the way for the immediate arrest of foreign fighters upon their return to Denmark—with up to five years of prison or expulsion of non-Danish citizens from the country awaiting them—it seemed rather counter-productive to the police's efforts to convince foreign fighters to return to Denmark in order to engage in a de-radicalization program. Instead, the action plan introduced a stronger partnership between police forces and prison services, and called for stricter measures to prevent radicalization in prisons and in criminal milieus outside prison.[39] These initiatives were backed by an expansion of prevention measures aimed at the population as a whole, for instance, by extending democracy teaching to children down to 1–2 years of age in day-care centers and by extending de-radicalization programs to include adults over 18 years of age, as well as specific groups in vulnerable residential areas.

### **Gangs: Policies Targeting Organized Crime**

*The 2017 gang conflict: mobilization of police patrols, zones of visitation, buzzing of surveillance helicopters. The effects of a conflict between two rival gangs, Loyal to Familia and Brothas, left a clear and visible mark, resulting in increased measures of law enforcement in Copenhagen during the summer of 2017. The conflict had been lurking since the release of a prominent gang leader from prison in early spring. During the summer, the conflict escalated into a struggle for power and domination over the expansion of territory, recruits, and criminal markets, initially manifested in the capital before spreading to other parts of the country. The dispute triggered an unprecedented number of shootings and violent clashes in the streets. Not only did gang members target and kill each other; police officers and police cars were targeted, and stray bullets hit and wounded civilians and random passersby. To a much greater extent than in previous conflicts, the almost-daily episodes of shootings were characterized as both highly unpredictable in their nature and as assaults with the intention to kill.[40]*

Since 2009, five national policies have been indicative of the direction of governance related to organized crime, consisting of three extensive anti-gang packages passed in 2009, 2014, and 2017,[41] and two safety packages passed in 2017 and 2019.[42] Consistent in these policies is that they are responding to periods of gang conflicts,[43] significant disturbances, and incidents of excessive violence [44] including bomb explosions. [45] Concerns about public safety were therefore highlighted as critical in the preventive initiatives taken at the time. Episodes in the streets, where “law-abiding citizens [are] at risk of getting in the line of fire,”[46] “endangering the lives of ordinary Danes,”[47] were seen as particularly problematic and “totally unacceptable”. [48] The policies further underline the link between the behavior of gangs and individual gang members and the insecurity this produces in the everyday lives of ordinary citizens.[49] Yet, as we shall see, the focus on public safety is closely linked to issues of national security, for instance when bomb explosions originating from organized crime milieus were becoming an object of national anti-terrorist legislation.

Examining policy interventions, two main aspects stand out: tighter legislation and increased punishment on the one hand, and enhanced investigation tools and surveillance technologies on the other. The focus on increased punishment is strongly emphasized as the principal method of intervention in the three legislative anti-gang packages. This is manifested in anti-gang package I from 2009, which established a gang provision, § 81 a in the Criminal Code, providing legal authority to sentence double penalty for offenses related to organized crime during an ongoing conflict.[50] In the following two anti-gang packages in 2014 and 2017, this was expanded and made easier to apply by including crimes in emerging conflicts and crimes qualified to trigger

conflicts.[51] Increased punishment also includes possession of illegal firearms,[52] significant restrictions on parole,[53] the banning of gang members from entering and residing in specific areas upon their release from prison,[54] and deportation of gang members without Danish citizenship, to name a few measures initiated.

The agenda for preventing organized crime, aligned with action plans against radicalization and extremism, linked security concerns with issues of integration and targeted vulnerable residential areas through rules of exception and increased police visibility. As each policy built on and addressed new forms of restrictions, punitive measures likewise became harsher. While the policies consist of a combination of preventive and punitive measures, they should primarily be understood as a form of deterrence and not as “early prevention”. The 2017 gang conflict provides a turning point in this development as subsequent policies more clearly linked public safety with national security. As the conflict drained police resources and personnel, the 2017 safety package responded directly to the conflict by outsourcing police tasks to the armed forces [55], as we will elaborate on below. Notably, the 2019 safety package underlined that bomb explosions in public places related to organized crime are to be regarded as an attack on the state, and that conviction would therefore be in accordance with the so-called ‘terror paragraph’ in Denmark’s criminal code.[56] In this way, the terrorist threat was introduced in policy responses to organized crime in the aftermath of the 2017 gang conflict.

The other significant aspect in the evolving policies is the strengthening of investigation tools and surveillance measures to assist the police in preventing and solving cases of organized crime. Investigation tools include initiatives relating to collaboration between the police and the Danish Tax Agency,[57] increased authorization to exchange information relating to suspects,[58] and increased operational capacity for specialized analysis. [59] Particularly in the 2017 and 2019 safety packages, surveillance was prioritized through the increased use of cameras and drones and through granting greater authority to engage in wiretapping.[60] The prioritization of increased investigation capacity and new technology for the police is—on a smaller scale—mirroring the investments made to improve the intelligence services’ responses to new threats.

Looking at policy responses to organized crime, it becomes clear that the 2017 gang conflict was a turning point. While there had been a handful of very serious gang wars between biker gangs and streets gangs in Denmark since the late 1970s, the policy response to organized crime intensified significantly after the gang conflict in 2017. This is not solely manifested in the far-reaching initiatives focusing on punitive measures and investigations that build on existing legislation. Organizationally, the police are expanding and training more personnel to counter the new threats. As a new development, the policies targeting organized crime are now directly linking public safety with issues of national security.

### **‘Crossovers’: Policies at the Intersection between Violent Extremism and Organized Crime**

*The Copenhagen shootings: In the afternoon on 14 February 2015, Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein attempted to enter the back entrance of ‘Krudttønden’—a cultural center in Copenhagen where the event ‘Art, Blasphemy and Freedom of Expression’ was taking place. As the door was locked, he made his way further toward the main entrance, armed with an M95 assault rifle. In the minutes that followed, Omar fired 27 rounds through the front of the building, injuring two officers, while one shot killed film director Finn Nørgaard. The event was organized by the Lars Vilks Committee and featured a panel discussion about the limitations of artistic expression and freedom of speech in the wake of the 7 January massacre at the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris. The following night, on 15 February, patrol officers noticed a man walking around in the inner city. They thought he was drunk, and he continued on foot toward the Great Synagogue on Krystalgade, where he passed two other police officers who were responsible for guarding the synagogue. The man—later identified as Omar—then headed directly toward the main entrance, where he shot and killed Dan Utzon, a civilian guard. The two police officers approached him, but were both hit by shots and fell to the ground. In the early morning of 15 February, Omar was observed on CCTV and subsequently located near an apartment building in Copenhagen’s Nørrebro district. In an exchange of gunfire, Omar was shot and killed by the police.[61]*

The Copenhagen shootings led to one of the most extensive policing efforts in recent times—an effort that is

still ongoing, expanding existing security partnerships in novel ways. The terror incidents also led to a critical internal evaluation of the effects of existing preventive measures and to the introduction of a number of new policy measures, action plans, and laws aimed at strengthening Denmark's response to terrorism and the preservation of public safety and security. One principal characteristic of these measures is the increasing governmental focus on the crime-terror nexus, and the growing policy concern relating to the emerging threat of 'crossovers' to national security and societal values.

In an immediate response to the Copenhagen shootings, and informed by the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, the Danish government presented a plan for 12 new anti-terrorism initiatives on 19 February 2015—a plan funded with approximately EUR 130 million (DKK 970 million) over four years.[62] The plan notes that the terrorist threat in Denmark has recently changed character, firstly as a consequence of the return of foreign fighters from Syria, and, secondly, due to increasingly aggressive extremist social media propaganda inspiring people to commit solo attacks with the help of easily accessible weapons.[63]

According to the government, terrorist actions carried out by solo terrorists present a number of distinctive challenges, as planning preparations leave little or no trace, making them increasingly difficult for intelligence services to detect. Furthermore, the use of new communication and encryption technology poses a growing challenge to prevention.[64] Against the background of this assessment, the government sought to expand Denmark's protection against terrorism through a number of new initiatives. To a large extent, the focus of these initiatives is increasing the capacity of the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET) to monitor criminal individuals and milieus and to analyze and process the intelligence obtained. Resources are allocated for an advanced IT system enabling the sharing and processing of large amounts of data. At the same time, the government aims to strengthen the response of the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) to the threat of foreign fighters through legislative amendments, enabling the DDIS to trace and monitor Danes traveling from Denmark to Syria or Iraq to participate in combat operations of the Islamic State, and to strengthen initiatives aimed at preventing radicalization in Danish prisons.

The new focus on expanding surveillance measures ought to be understood against the background of the evaluation and critique of the ways in which the police and intelligence services responded to the Copenhagen shooting, and in particular in relation to the failure to prevent this incident. Omar, a 22-year-old man who grew up in Denmark, was not only known to the police due to his affiliation with the gang known as Brothas, but had also been arrested on several occasions, sentenced for violence, possession of drugs, and possession of an illegal weapon. Most recently, he had been arrested in January 2014 and imprisoned for a knife attack. Even though the prison authorities had reported their concerns about Omar's signs of radicalization, he was released on 30 January 2015—just two weeks before the Copenhagen shootings. In an internal evaluation conducted by the National Police, the need to strengthen interagency collaboration and coordinate intelligence and police efforts at the intersection of gang crime and terrorism was highlighted.[65] According to the police, the Copenhagen shootings demonstrated that crossover environments between gangs and militant Islamist groups were becoming a new breeding ground for radicalized extremism, and that individuals who were simultaneously influenced by militant Islamist propaganda, as well as extremely violent milieus, are a growing security concern.[66]

The emerging threat of this crossover phenomenon was also highlighted in the 2016 national action plan for preventing and countering extremism and radicalization. The aim of this action plan was to further enhance preventive efforts with a range of new initiatives, ranging from “a hard line against foreign fighters,” over “stricter measures against radicalization in prisons,” to “targeted intervention in criminal groups.”[67] As part of these targeted interventions, a more consistent intervention against “regular crimes committed in radicalized groups” was to be envisaged, for instance through closer collaboration between PET and the police.[68] The action plan also held that overlaps between criminal and extremist milieus require swift interventions when prisoners show signs of radicalization.[69]

As part of these anti-radicalization efforts, collaboration has been strengthened even further between the Prison and Probation Service, PET, the prosecution service, and the municipalities, and new institutions and units

have been introduced. One of these institutions is the armed forces. Instead of being tasked mainly with the provision of external security as part of international missions, the armed forces are increasingly being engaged in providing internal security and safety in Denmark. Against the background of the 2017 gang conflict in Copenhagen, combined with growing concerns about terrorist threats, the government asked the Chief of Police and the Chief of Defense how the armed forces could provide additional support and resources for the police. On September 2017, based on their recommendations, the Ministry of Justice presented the decision that the military should release police resources for local safety measures by guarding selected locations and performing border-control activities. Under the direction of the police, soldiers should be deployed in the streets. Instead of providing only ad hoc support, the armed forces now have a visible, permanent presence at the border and in the streets, where they are tasked with providing internal security by guarding and patrolling key sites, including the Great Synagogue and other potential terrorist targets.

The Danish Defense Agreement 2018–2023 added further substance to this change, stating that the armed forces will play an increasing role in contributing to the internal security of the Danish population. The armed forces' ability to support the police will be strengthened considerably in a number of areas, including guard duties, a permanent helicopter response in support of the police's counter-terrorist preparedness, units on high readiness to assist the police in case of terrorist attacks, and additional conscripts and special-forces patrols to provide the police with special assistance when required.[70] The ability of the armed forces to contribute to national security, with a particular emphasis on a counter-terrorism response, was formally codified into legislation in 2018.[71]

### ***Governing the Crime-Terror Nexus***

The study of the last decades of policy development aimed at the crime-terror nexus reveals that certain critical events have led to the formation of new partnerships that blur the boundaries between internal/national and external/international security, as well as between public and private safety and security. Under the Danish approach, policy interventions aimed at countering and preventing violent extremism are structured by comprehensive multiagency collaboration and coordination. While the Danish approach builds on, and is incorporated into, existing crime preventive structures and agencies,[72] policy responses to waves of gang wars have led to the incorporation of additional actors and stakeholders. Most recently, and in particular as a response to the increased focus on the threat of crossover environments, the intelligence agencies and armed forces have gained a prominent role in these partnerships.

As shown by the policy interventions described above, the governance of the crime-terror nexus is characterized by the involvement and interaction of multiple agencies. It is composed of different modalities, rationalities, and technologies of governance, such as welfare governance and security governance. In this way, formerly distinct domains of securitization and risk management are becoming increasingly entangled. Whereas securitization is based on a modality of governance, calling for exceptional measures to counter a concrete threat, risk management is aimed at intervening before the threat has fully emerged.[73] However, the logics of securitization and risk management are not mutually exclusive.[74] In this way, it can be argued that neat conceptualizations such as 'the comprehensive approach' can capture the merging of these security logics. Yet, rather than representing opposite ends of the same continuum that tie neatly together, they "rub against each other,"[75] producing friction that pulls in different directions and creates new messy and hybrid arrangements. It is these messy and ambiguous interventionist processes that have transformed the field of Danish security governance.

### ***Between Preventive and Punitive Measures***

The first form of friction within and between the three policy fields is the relationship between preventive and punitive measures. In this area, there has been a general move toward stricter and more punitive legislation, described by some researchers as a paradigm shift.[76] This development culminated in a series of legislative changes in the third anti-gang package in 2017 and in the revision of the action plan against violent extremism

the year before. We see this development as a frictional move between two kinds of responses to societal challenges, one of which is a traditional Nordic welfare response involving education and social reform, while the other represents a turn to punishment.

The frictional coexistence of preventive and punitive measures has transformed Danish security governance in two significant ways. First of all, the welfare state—with its municipal organizations and institutions—has become a security agency in itself, with employment centers, social services, and the public child and youth sector as key stakeholders in crime prevention. Social workers work alongside police officers as providers of public safety, and the early-prevention approach has increasingly included childcare institutions and schools in this collaboration and monitoring facility. This development resembles what Randi Gressgård (2019) has defined as the normalization of exceptional politics in the Swedish case,[77] and a welfarization of security on a general level. Secondly, there has been a weakening of the welfare state and its presence in the new strategies to counter gangs and terrorism. Instead, the turn to punitive measures and harsher legislation has extended preventive interventions and policing activities into national defense activities. These are carried out by a range of new security stakeholders such as the Prison and Probation Service, PET, police units, and the armed forces. In these partnerships, the welfare state can be used in an outreach function by the police; and the responsibility for method development, knowledge enhancement, policy development, and partly also the allocation of resources, has been centralized within PET, the Danish national police, and the Ministry of Immigration and Integration.

### ***Between Proactive and Reactive Interventions***

Another form of friction within and between the three policy fields is that between proactive and reactive interventions. The material presented above shows a trajectory of reactive policymaking which responds to critical events by combining security strategies. Each revision of action plans has been carried out by different government administrations. These have responded to critical events in an increasingly defensive mode, pointing to the crime-terror nexus as a primary reason for the escalation of insider threats. In other words, the policies are a response not only to critical events within their own scope of intervention, but also to events within each other's political realms.

Positioning the Danish state and society in a defensive role against amalgamated insider threats, government policies have highlighted an image of the Other (foreign fighters, gangs, and crossovers) as a fundamental threat to the Danish way of life,[78] as well as a safety threat to public everyday life. While this kind of policy construction is inherently reactive, so are a number of interventions within each policy document cited above. Existing reactive tactics, such as routine patrols in vulnerable residential areas, are strengthened by extralegal measures and rules of exception. In this way, some of the policy objectives have been steered toward reactive, law-enforcing policing activities with various tasks and objectives. The reactive approach, however, does not replace, but works in conjunction with community policing activities, strengthened prevention, and proactive interventions aimed at preempting crime and violence. The proactive approach surfaces in several ways in the policies, one of which is the explicit urge to detect and avert attacks and conflicts before they happen by making major investments in surveillance and intelligence. This strategy resulted in the Danish intelligence services gaining a more prominent role in the prevention of extremism.

This development shows the current coexistence of processes of securitization and risk management in security governance, in which proactive strategies such as early prevention extend into sectors of the municipality, while strategic police investigations extend into the intelligence services. Furthermore, the unpredictable nature of the new insider threats has led to an increase in lateral surveillance techniques, engaging citizens and civil communities in proactive risk management. Police-civilian partnerships are also constitutive of proactive tactics against drug dealing, organized crime, and gang conflicts without the existence of any immediate victim to mobilize the police, and with the police relying on informants, covert surveillance, and undercover investigations rather than waiting on calls for police assistance.

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## ***Conclusion***

The authors of this article argue that intersecting policy fields targeting the crime-terror nexus offer a privileged empirical prism through which to analyze the escalation and transformation of security governance in Denmark. Examining the last two decades of policy development by focusing on foreign fighters, gangs, and crossovers, we have sought to demonstrate that Danish counter-extremism, counter-terrorism, and gang crime prevention exist in a mutually reinforcing relationship that conjures up a dynamic field of escalating interventions. When analyzing the three policy fields together, it becomes clear that policy revisions have resulted in a frictional form of security governance, in which interventions oscillate between different logics and approaches.

The coexistence of, and oscillation between, proactive and reactive governance measures is one of several examples of how a mix of intervention styles and logics emerges from the intersection of policies targeting the crime-terror nexus. This development, we argue, cannot be understood as a linear movement from one modality of governance to another over time, or as a momentary paradigm shift. Instead, it ought to be approached as an unstable set of relations between reactive and proactive interventions, preventive and punitive measures, shaped by changing discourses of safety and security. Frictional security governance, thus, defines an ongoing process of accelerated change around the escalation of threat and expansion of corresponding interventions. The authors of this article hold that it is in the intersections—where we find the conflicts, confluences, and coproductions between different policy domains—that one can discover the deeper processes of change in security logics, practices, and constellations. This development is not unique to the Danish case. The same structures and logics are in particular underpinning security governance in other Nordic countries ranging from multiagency approaches, threat perceptions, and the understanding of what it means to provide security. [79] While responses to the changing threat environment are tailored to national contexts, the expanded and conflated security field is a general trend, which is, for instance, evident in the increasing domestic role of the armed forces in Europe and beyond.[80]

We have tried to show that this development has significant implications for the way in which policing is cross-institutionally organized and for the different rationales and logics that underpin new policing tasks and measures. Collaborations with municipalities, civic communities, and local institutions on the one hand, and armed forces, prison services, intelligence services, tax services, and immigration services on the other hand, show the scope of current partnership policing and point to novel demands on the police to manage a variety of security challenges. The Danish Model, with its multiagency approach, is widely described as a model of ‘best practice’,[81] based on the argument that to counter the complexity of international threat networks, we must employ an equally powerful response network.[82] However, little attention has been paid to the way in which security agents manage these rapidly changing conditions and how the expanding security network impacts those actors who are given the operational responsibilities to deal with crime and terrorism.[83] The authors believe that this is a significant knowledge gap that deserves further scholarly attention.

This article proposes to focus on certain problem fields in future explorations of policy implications on practice, such as how security actors seek to balance frictional interplays between preventive and punitive measures, reactive and proactive interventions, and securitization and risk management. Research focusing on how policing actors navigate the prevention of the crime-terror nexus at the operational level is crucial to identify the pitfalls of frictional security governance, but also to gain a better understanding of how the constitutive interrelationship between different policy domains might hold the potential for more flexible and timely policing efforts.

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