Breivik’s Long Shadow? The Impact of the July 22, 2011 Attacks on the Modus Operandi of Extreme-right Lone Actor Terrorists

by Graham Macklin and Tore Bjørgo

Abstract

This article investigates the extent to which Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik has influenced the modus operandi of extreme right lone actor terrorists in the decade since his own attacks on July 22, 2011. The article presents an overview of the principal cases in which Breivik’s name has appeared as either a potential influence or inspiration. It argues that despite his own best efforts, detailed in his manifesto, and the Christchurch shootings on March 15, 2019—for which his inspiration, at first glance, appears to be writ large—Breivik’s actual tactical influence upon the subsequent trajectory of extreme attacks from the extreme right has been limited.

Keywords: Anders Behring Breivik, Christchurch, extreme right terrorism, lone actors, modus operandi, political violence

Introduction

This article examines the extent to which Anders Breivik’s modus operandi has, or has not, influenced subsequent acts of extreme right-wing terrorism in the decade since the July 22, 2011 attacks. It examines what Breivik hoped to achieve through his violence and contrasts this with what has actually transpired. Breivik’s influence on the course of extreme right terrorism is often assumed, not least because of sensationalist headlines pronouncing that a terrorist or would-be terrorist was “obsessed with” or “influenced by” the Norwegian murderer and had planned a “Breivik-style” massacre. Using a case study of the Christchurch attacks that took place in New Zealand on March 15, 2019—in which, superficially at least, Breivik’s influence appears to loom large—the article examines the actual extent of the Norwegian terrorist’s influence upon its planning and commission. It outlines the numerous differences between the two terrorists, which complicate straightforward assertions about Breivik’s influence. Thereafter the article examines the extent to which Breivik has influenced, either directly or indirectly, a range of plots and attacks that have taken place between 2011 and 2021. The article concludes by considering both the nature of Breivik’s legacy for violence from the extreme right and his waning subcultural influence, as new, highly mediatized acts of mass violence have come to eclipse his own massacre.

Since this article seeks to ascertain the extent, or lack thereof, of Breivik’s “influence” upon right-wing terrorism, it is worth establishing what we mean by this term at the outset. Our overarching concern here is to understand and explain the extent to which, through his ideas and actions, Breivik changed the operating method—the modus operandi—of extreme right terrorism. It does not concern itself with the popularity or otherwise of the ideas that he espoused in his manifesto and which he himself considered his primary contribution.[1] The focus of this article is narrower; concerned only with whether or not Breivik has had an impact on the subsequent tactical trajectory of extreme right terrorism. It does not therefore deal with Breivik’s broader appeal within the far right milieu, which is the subject of Berntzen and Ravndal’s contribution to this Special Issue.

This article explores the question of whether or not the July 2011 attacks occasioned innovation in the modus operandi of extreme right terrorism. Martha Crenshaw succinctly defines innovation as the “adoption of new patterns of behavior.”[2] Building upon this, Lubrano defines tactical innovation—the focus of this article—as “substantial shifts that pertain to the material execution of operations and redefine the behavioral patterns of a terrorist organisation. Therefore, it concerns changes that regard target selection, the time and location of the attack, the weapon and/or technology adoption, the composition of the hit squad(s), and so on.”[3]

As Adam Dolnik argues, terrorists are often risk averse and not particularly innovative tactically.[4] It should not be assumed therefore that even if new modes of operating do diffuse within a milieu that they will actually
be adopted and enacted. As Rydgren observes, an idea is not “contagious” in an epidemiological sense; “it only diffuses if actors want it to diffuse.”[5] The same is true of violent strategies and tactics which, while circulating within a radical milieu, do not automatically translate into action simply by virtue of their existence – the concept of “leaderless resistance” being a prime example.[6] Concrete decisions have to be made by individuals to adopt a certain set of tactics. Moreover, for particular tactics to be adopted by an individual or group, they need to be viewed as feasible, legitimate, and effective, otherwise they would have little to recommend them in terms of their applicability to any given situation.[7] Even if a set of tactics fulfil all three of the aforementioned requirements, there are still questions of individual capacity and capability that often serve to frustrate adoption and enactment. Studies of the “contagious” diffusion of terrorism over the course of the last half century have found it to be a “rare” phenomenon but that when it does occur it “very likely” does so according to the “domino effect”.[8]

This article explores the evidential base for claims of Breivik’s influence on the modus operandi of extreme right terrorism. It does so by reviewing some thirty cases in which, according to publicly available information, Breivik has been mentioned by name. Our findings are in one sense pointing in two contradictory directions. While each of these cases show that the perpetrator or would-be perpetrator drew some level of inspiration from Breivik’s atrocity, we simultaneously observe that very few of these attacks or plots actually sought to emulate or build upon the July 2011 attacks either in terms of its scale or tactics. The majority of Breivik’s “influence” appears to be indirect and ideational. There is little evidence that Breivik has exerted a direct tactical influence on extreme right terrorism. Indeed, only in the case of the Christchurch terrorist, Brenton Tarrant—discussed in further detail below—is there a strong evidence base, suggesting Breivik’s influence upon his attack planning. However, even in this seemingly paradigmatic case, there is arguably a rather more complicated pattern of influence at work.

Empirical data for this study was collected from extreme right manifestos, official reports, and author observations of several terrorist trials and court records. The authors also utilised the RTV dataset, their own media monitoring of cases since 2011, and a more systematic interrogation of media databases (i.e., Factiva), using a selection of key words designed to capture any missing data about individuals “influenced” by Breivik. Reports that provided little or no substantiation for asserting that a perpetrator or would-be perpetrator was influenced by Breivik—for instance those that portrayed any plan for mass murder as being a “Breivik-style” massacre simply because they aimed at mass casualties—were excluded from our analysis.

**Background**

On July 22, 2011, Breivik, dressed as a police officer, parked a white transit van outside the main government building in Oslo, then walked to a nearby car he had parked at the scene and drove away. Several minutes later a fertilizer bomb hidden inside the van detonated, killing eight people, seriously injuring a further ten individuals, and badly damaging the surrounding buildings. Breivik then drove to Utøya Island, approximately 40 kilometres away, where the Labour Party’s youth movement was holding its annual summer camp. Having gained entry to the island using the ruse that he was a police officer coming to secure the area following the attack in Oslo, Breivik then proceeded to kill as many of the 564 people present on the island as he could. In the hour and thirteen minutes it took for the police to arrive and arrest him, Breivik stalked the island murdering everyone he could find. He killed sixty-nine people, thirty-three of whom were under eighteen and seriously injured many more.

Breivik made it clear in the police interviews following his arrest, and during his subsequent trial, that his atrocities were merely “the fireworks” to announce the presentation of his manifesto, the distribution of which “was one of the most important motives for the operation.”[9] Breivik claimed to have begun A European Declaration of Independence – 2083, his sprawling 1,521 page compendium of sources culled from the “counter-jihad” milieu, interspersed with his own thoughts on how to plan and prepare an attack, several years before his atrocity. This compendium consists of three “books”. The first two sections, covering history and ideology, was largely cut-and-pasted or otherwise plagiarised from other right-wing authors. He authored the third
“military” book largely by himself. This part of the manifesto offered strategic and operational advice to future “militant nationalists” whom he hoped would follow in his footsteps. Large sections featured detailed descriptions of a broad range of attack preparations. These pages combined his own experiences with materials from other manuals he had found on the Internet and adapted for his own purposes. These guidelines included advice on organisational structures and nitty-gritty details on uniforms, instructions on how to carry out a coup, moral justifications for brutal violence, information on weapons acquisition, target selection, and other issues referring to operational planning and preparations. Breivik was at pains to explain how he was able to overcome obstacles and produce a working explosive device based on fertilizer.

Breivik believed that his “courageous actions” would illustrate to “the people” that “the powerful are vulnerable,” hoping that his violence would therefore “inspire admiration and respect.”[10] He claimed inspiration from numerous other figures—“many incarcerated and some have even martyred themselves”—who had been fighting what he described as the “cultural Marxist/multiculturalist alliance”. This nameless roster – “the true heroes of the conservative revolution” – had inspired him in his manifesto. “Hopefully, I will be able to contribute and inspire others,” he stated.[11] In his diary, published as part of the compendium, Breivik was clearly preoccupied with the thought that his terrorism would inspire others. Indeed, his entry for June 11, day 41 of his preparations, recorded that he had prayed: “I explained to God that unless he wanted the Marxist-Islamic alliance and the certain Islamic takeover of Europe” then he had to ensure Breivik “succeed with my mission and as such; contribute to inspire thousands of other revolutionary conservative/nationalists; anti-Communists and anti-Islamists throughout the European world.”[12]

Breivik made every effort to ensure that his violence would inspire others. Superficially, it would appear he has been successful. In the ten years since his atrocity there have been a number of cases in which an extreme right terrorist or would-be terrorist has reportedly been “obsessed with” or “influenced by” him while attempting to commit what press reports invariably refer to as a “Breivik-style” massacre. There is clearly a “cultural script” upon which extreme right-wing terrorists can draw. One New York Times study indicates at least a third of extreme right terrorists since 2011 had been inspired by similar perpetrators, revered them, or studied their tactics and modus operandi.[13]

Breivik’s Impact on the Christchurch Attacks

On March 15, 2019, Brenton Tarrant, an unemployed Australian previously employed as a gym trainer, murdered 51 people during a terrorist attack on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, while wounding many others. He had planned to attack a third mosque but police intercepted and arrested him before he was able to perpetrate further carnage.[14] Prior to the atrocities, Tarrant uploaded to the Internet a manifesto with the title The Great Replacement. Full of extreme right clichés and larded with irony and insider jokes, Tarrant’s manifesto highlighted the inspiration of numerous extreme right killers. He also scrawled their names and those of others on the weapons he used to carry out his own atrocity. In a mock interview with himself that formed the centerpiece of the manifesto, Tarrant asked himself whether he had any ties with other “partisans/freedom fighters/ethno soldiers.” “I have only had brief contact with Knight Justiciar Breivik,” he replied to himself, “receiving a blessing for my mission after contacting his brother knights.” Tarrant followed up this question with another: “Were your beliefs influenced by any other attackers?” He had read the writings of other racist terrorists like Dylann Roof, he stated, “but only really took true inspiration from Knight Justiciar Breivik.”[15]

Tarrant’s claim of “contact” with Breivik occasioned a flurry of media coverage concerning his supposed links to the Norwegian terrorist. Øystein Storrvik, Breivik’s lawyer, informed the press “it seems unlikely” that there was any direct contact between the two men, given the strict controls imposed on Breivik. Indeed, the deputy head of Skien prison, where Breivik is incarcerated, pointed out that the authorities had a “good control” over Breivik’s communications.[16]
Laying a False Trail

Contrary to his own assertions, which were little more than propaganda, Tarrant was never in touch with Breivik. Indeed, Ko tō tātou kāinga tēnei: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Masjidain on 15 March 2019 (2020) later dismissed much of what Tarrant wrote about Breivik in his manifesto as “trolling.” Tarrant confirmed this to them in a subsequent interview.[17] The Royal Commission probed Tarrant’s claim that he received a “blessing” from Breivik “after contacting his brother knights” in the “Knights Templar” organisation – a group Breivik claimed to have co-founded in 2002 to act as a “leaderless network, comprising of self-driven cells,” that would “defeat the cultural Marxist/Multiculturalist Alliance of Europe,” seize political control, and implement “a cultural conservative political agenda.”[18] Though the group was fictitious, Tarrant used the myth of Breivik’s “reborn Knights Templar” as a foil for his own actions, mentioning them when interviewed by New Zealand police in the aftermath of his own atrocity.[19] The most interesting thing about such claims was the lengths to which Tarrant went to perpetuate the charade.

In December 2018, Tarrant had travelled to Poland, telling his mother that he would attend a rally there. Poland’s domestic counter-intelligence agency subsequently identified a “Knighting Ceremony” organised by the Knights Templar Order International/Knights Templar International (KTI) that took place in Wrocław on December 15 as the rally he was referencing.[20] This was not the “reborn” Knights Templar of Breivik’s fantasies, however. This incarnation of the Knights Templar was a far right group that employs militant Christian iconography from the Crusades to bolster its anti-Muslim narratives. Its main preoccupation was “a marketing operation selling Knights Templar-themed products and conferring on those who buy a sufficient amount of products the title ‘Sir Knight’.” Neither Polish nor Australian intelligence agencies found evidence that Tarrant was in contact with KTI or indeed attended its “Knighting Ceremony.”[21] Tarrant subsequently confirmed to the Royal Commission that his Breivik references were a “red herring”, designed to distract police and security services. Remarking on this curious episode, the Royal Commission noted that Tarrant “went out of his way” to create an elaborate false trail of evidence supporting his claim of a link to Breivik in the three months before his attack.[22] In their subsequent report, the Royal Commission described the purpose of this subterfuge as serving to add “credibility” to the claim in his manifesto that he had received external support for his attack. “That he went to such trouble to support what in the end was just an elaborate trolling exercise illustrates the extent of his preparation,” the Royal Commission report concluded.[23]

Operational Guidance and Attack Planning

If Tarrant’s claims of contact with Breivik and his non-existent Knights were palpably untrue, the Norwegian terrorist had nevertheless “significantly influenced”[24] the operational side of his attack planning. Indeed, the Royal Commission found that Breivik’s manifesto and actions offered “considerable guidance” for Tarrant. “To a very large extent, the individual’s preparation was consistent with that guidance,” the Royal Commission recorded:

This was evident in his joining a gym and bulking up with steroids,[25] joining rifle clubs to gain firearms expertise, attempts at operational security generally, cleaning up electronic devices to try to limit what counter-terrorism agencies might discover after a terrorist attack and might detract from the ‘optics’ of the exercise and the preparation of a manifesto to be released at the same time as the attack. In these respects, the guidance offered by the Oslo terrorist was largely operational in nature.[26]

Although the Royal Commission highlighted the “operational” inspiration that Breivik provided, Tarrant’s modus operandi differed in certain key respects. Breivik’s terrorist attack, which combined a bomb attack with a mass shooting, had been an act of “malevolent creativity”[27] in the sense that as an act of terrorism it was tactically innovative in comparison to what had preceded it. While the July 2011 attacks enthused and inspired future terrorists, none of them have repeated Breivik’s combination of a bomb and gun attack. In his manifesto Tarrant boasted that he could have chosen “any weapons or means” including a “TATP-filled rental van” because “I had the will and I had the resources.”[28] Neither statement appears to be true, although he did manufacture
four rudimentary incendiary devices with which to burn down the mosques after his massacre. For whatever reason, he did not do so. The devices which the police recovered from his car were unused.[29] Where Tarrant’s ambitions came closest to rivalling Breivik’s was in his selection of multiple targets. He attacked two mosques and was driving to a third when police rammed his car off the road.

Following Breivik’s advice, Tarrant had enquired about gun club membership even before he arrived in New Zealand, which the Royal Commission interpreted as the first sign of his attack planning. Having obtained the necessary permits, Tarrant legally acquired ten guns (four of which he resold prior to the attack) and subsequently he illegally modified some of these weapons.[30] One of these modifications involved mounting a strobe light to one of his semi-automatic weapons, presumably in order to disorientate his victims inside the building. Tarrant decorated his weapons with a range of slogans. Breivik possibly inspired this action too, though this is speculative, since it is unknown whether Tarrant knew that he had carved names on his pistol and rifle in runic script.[31]

The atrocities both men perpetrated aimed at “discriminate mass casualties”,[32] meaning that while the wider symbolic target was deliberately chosen, the actual victims were selected randomly. Breivik’s violence was arguably more “revolutionary” in its intent in the sense that he was attacking both the government and those he regarded as a future generation of “traitors”. Proclaiming in advance that he felt no remorse for the attacks, Tarrant’s attacks targeted those he regarded as “invaders”. [33]

Breivik’s fastidious preparation also held lessons for Tarrant. Breivik claimed he began preparing his attack in earnest in 2006 or 2007, five years before the day when he (and those that followed his advice) would become “immortal”. [34] Writing his manifesto took him three years alone, he claimed, though this assertion in his manifesto should be treated with caution.[35] In comparison, Tarrant’s attack required “roughly two years” of preparation, according to his manifesto.[36] This time differential likely reflects the difference in the complexity of their attack plans. Both men also proved adaptive to circumstances. Their plans changed over time. Breivik, who initially drew up a list of 65 potential targets, gradually whittled these down to two, though some of his decision-making was dictated by external circumstances which forced these changes upon him. [37] Tarrant, insofar as we can glean from publicly available information, selected his targets rather later in the attack preparation process, only three months beforehand, according to the manifesto, but stuck with them. He elected to bring forward the date of his attack only when he realised he was running out of funds.

There were several other stylistic similarities in their attacks. To execute them, both men dressed up. This element of “cosplay” (i.e. wearing a specific costume to embody a particular character) highlights the centrality of ideological performativity for both terrorists.[38] However, in each case this served a different function. Breivik dressed as a policeman as part of his deception to gain entry to Utøya, whereas Tarrant donned military fatigues reflecting his belief that his assault on the Christchurch mosques was part of a supposedly eternal “war” against Islam. Breivik had offered detailed advice on how to organise a terrorist attack, counselling readers to prepare their own information package for media management since the police often released “retarded looking” photos of a perpetrator in the aftermath of an attack.[39] Tarrant’s marketing strategy was slightly different. He posted multiple photographs not of himself but of his weaponry and clothing, though the effect was similar in many ways since the media publicised these, thereby helping to spread his message further.

Both men acquired their guns legally and joined local rifle clubs in order to train in sharp shooting and obtain a gun license, but ultimately to prepare themselves for their attacks. Breivik was also able to gain a Storm Ruger rifle (Mini-14) and a trigger to make rapid firing easier, together with laser sights, a large quantity of ammunition and—once his attempts to buy a silencer had failed—a bayonet. A “good alternative” to joining a rifle club was playing Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, Breivik had written in his manifesto. He regarded the game as “probably the best military simulator out there” and “more as a part of my training-simulation than anything else” since “You can more or less completely simulate actual operations.”[40] Tarrant was also an avid gamer, though there is no evidence to date that he was mimicking Breivik in this regard, as opposed to simply enjoying such a pastime on its own merits.
Technological Differences

Breivik had fantasised about forcing the former Norwegian prime minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, to read a prepared text about her “betrayal” of Norway and making her beg for her life before beheading her. He imagined filming this deed and uploading the footage to YouTube.[41] The idea was a non-starter. He arrived at Utøya too late to catch her, but he had also failed to acquire an iPhone on which to film his deed in the first place.[42] Echoes of Breivik’s sinister idea could be found in Tarrant’s attack. Tarrant livestreamed his atrocity using a helmet-mounted GoPro digital camera, popular with extreme sports fans, and linked it to Facebook from whence footage of the massacre went viral. Here technological advances since 2011 played to Tarrant’s advantage. Facebook Live—launched to a restricted audience in 2015, before becoming available to all in 2016—had been unavailable to Breivik. Three years later, Tarrant became the first lone actor to livestream a terrorist attack, although several jihadist terrorists had previously incorporated some element of livestream or film into their attacks. One of the early adaptors was Larossi Abballa who murdered two police officers in their home in June 2016 and then livestreamed the aftermath of the killings.[43]

There were also differences in how technology was integrated into preparations for their respective attacks. While Breivik physically studied the island of Utøya from the other side of the shore,[44] Tarrant used a drone to conduct surveillance of his first target, the Al Noor mosque, ten weeks before his attack.[45] There were also similarities and differences in how both men disseminated their respective manifestos. The mass distribution of a manifesto was new in the sense that it utilised technology to reach a much wider audience than previously available for terrorists. One can point to Ted Kaczynski (the “Unabomber”) as someone whose manifesto had also been widely distributed as a result of its publication in two national newspapers, though in his case this led to his identification and life imprisonment, marking the end of his terrorism rather than announcing new acts of violence.

Breivik attempted to disseminate his manifesto to 8,109 people whose email addresses he had been “farming” meticulously since November 2009.[46] The majority of these emails were rejected, however, because Breivik’s spam filter only allowed him to send 1,000 emails a day from a single account, something he only learned in retrospect. Tarrant experienced none of the technical problems that bedevilled Breivik. Moments before he commenced his attack, Tarrant emailed his manifesto to a more limited list of thirty-four recipients, twenty-eight of which were media organisations, the remainder being the Prime Minister’s Office and others in the New Zealand parliament.[47] Tarrant had previously uploaded his manifesto to Mediafire, a file hosting website, and Zippyshare, a free cloud-based file hosting service. He also provided links to both in his announcement on 8chan the next morning that he was about to commit his atrocity.[48]

That Tarrant announced his attack on 8chan, an Internet image board founded in 2013, was instructive of the possibilities that digital culture affords a new generation of extreme right terrorists who emerged after Breivik was imprisoned.[49] Tarrant was also socialised and acculturated into the visual culture of the 4chan image board – from which 8chan had emerged – which he had begun using when he was fourteen years old.[50] Indeed, one of the reasons he announced his Livestream and links to his manifesto on this forum was because he knew that its users could be relied upon to continue propagandising on his behalf after the atrocity. “I have provided links to my writings below”, he announced on 8chan moments before his attack commenced, “please do your part spreading my message, making memes and shitposting as you usually do.”[51] He made a similar point in his manifesto, urging readers: “Create memes, and spread memes. Memes have done more for the ethno-nationalist movement than any manifesto.”[52]

Manifestos

As well as providing an insight into his self-image and the strategic rationale he constructed for his attacks,[53] Breivik in his manifesto wanted to provide other would-be terrorists with “the tools required to win the ongoing Western European cultural war.”[54] Åsne Seierstad, author of the book One of Us, writing about the massacre, observed that the compendium was a “declaration of war” designed “to inspire fighting spirit, to fire up the reader.”[55] Rather than looking to compare and contrast the ideological content of Breivik’s
manifesto with those of other subsequent terrorists,[56] this article instead examines what his manifesto meant to Breivik and how subsequent treatises, such as that penned by Tarrant, have differed in certain key aspects. For Breivik, his manifesto was absolutely fundamental for his entire attack.[57] He framed his atrocity as a “marketing operation” to aid the “distribution of this book.”[58] Breivik also created a short film to “market the compendium” which he would upload to YouTube shortly before his killing spree. However, that was the extent of his digital innovation.[59]

If Breivik framed his attack as a “marketing operation”, what was he selling? In short, “ideology” was the “product” Breivik wanted to “sell to the European peoples.”[60] Describing his massacre as a “book launch” reflected his own understanding that no one would otherwise be interested in his ideas.[61] It is not the purpose of this article to detail the ideological similarities and dissimilarities between Breivik and Tarrant’s manifestos. Suffice to say that racial and racist fears about Europe’s changing demography were central to both. For each man the overriding concern was immigration in general and Muslim immigration in particular. Breivik argued that Muslim immigration was a form of “demographic warfare” aimed at replacing “the indigenous peoples of Western Europe and our cultures” in what amounted to “a merciless and bloody genocide.”[62] An identical belief saturated The Great Replacement. “It’s the birthrates. It’s the birthrates. It’s the birthrates,” Tarrant wrote. “If there is one thing I want you to remember from these writings, its [sic] that the birthrates must change.”[63] Both men framed their violence as “pre-emptive” and “defensive” as a result. Both texts also presented a moral justification for their killings which they intuitively knew would be repugnant to many. To obviate this, they framed their mass murders as a burden nobly born so that future generations would not have to bloody their hands.[64]

The Great Replacement was seemingly less central to Tarrant’s enterprise than Breivik’s manifesto had been to him. While undoubtedly important for understanding his motivations, or at least his presentation of them, Tarrant feigned a certain disinterest in his manifesto. He claimed to have written a much longer document but said he had deleted it—a statement that the Royal Commission considered fictitious. For Tarrant, livestream video was the more important communicative component of his terrorism. It was not a medium for his message. It was the message. The central point of the attack, Jason Burke highlights, was not just to kill Muslims, “but to make a video of someone killing Muslims.”[65] Tarrant’s manifesto was also written both for a different audience and indeed a different generation than Breivik’s. Unlike Tarrant’s manifesto, Breivik’s longer, more ponderous tome, was devoid of mordant humour or other such rhetorical devices. Tarrant’s manifesto was also considerably shorter, and therefore far more digestible, than Breivik’s bloated compendium. This facilitated its rapid translation into several non-English languages. The same can not be said for 2083.

It is difficult to assess the extent to which Breivik’s manifesto inspired Tarrant in comparison to other factors. He was clearly familiar with it. New Zealand police recovered a copy of it from the SD card of Tarrant’s drone while a subsequent investigation of his IP address highlighted that he had accessed a number of “suspicious files”, including Breivik’s manifesto, between August 24, 2017 and September 4, 2017. During his interview with the Royal Commission, Tarrant told them that “he did not download the Oslo terrorist’s manifesto until mid-2018,”[66] long after he had begun planning his own terrorist attacks. This indicates perhaps that much of Breivik’s “guidance” was applied selectively as Tarrant went along with his preparations, or appeared post facto rather than providing the “true inspiration” for the Christchurch attacks, as he had boasted in his own trolling manifesto.

In terms of providing a template for subsequent acts of extreme right violence, Tarrant’s manifesto has, ironically, become more important than Breivik’s in the sense that it inspired a trend among extreme right terrorists to produce their own manifestos and to post them online to message boards as a way of announcing the carnage they were about to unleash. Those copying Tarrant may, or may not, have been aware that he was structuring his own manifesto along the same lines that Breivik had and, in penning their own manifestos, they too were following in his footsteps. The “nucleus”[67] of the Norwegian terrorist’s manifesto was a sixty-four page interview in which Breivik posed himself a series of questions. This self-interview format was copied by Tarrant as well. While Breivik pioneered this narcissistic format,[68] it was derived in essence from celebrity profiles which Breivik had read.[69]
The Trial as Stage

There was a marked difference in how both men approached their respective trials. For Breivik, whose trial ran from April 16 to June 22, 2012, his arrest and prosecution was not an unhappy end to his “operation” but the beginning of the eagerly anticipated “propaganda” phase that would provide him with the opportunity—so he believed—to explain his ideas to the world. Perceiving that his trial offered “a stage to the world,” Breivik believed he would be free to use it to court the world’s media. He went so far as to include an example of his own intended opening and closing court statements in his manifesto. Tarrant made no such preparations, though he joked with himself that he would eventually be awarded the Nobel Peace prize like Nelson Mandela.

Breivik’s strategy was derailed, however. The trial was handled in such a way that he was unable to use it as a platform for his views. Breivik did not manage to follow his own instructions for turning his trial into a propaganda platform either. Rather than finding a lawyer who supported his extreme right ideology, he selected a lawyer who was an active member of the Labour party, whose youth movement he had attacked at Utøya. Breivik had prepared a lengthy speech for the trial but, unlike other parts of the trial which were broadcast, this self-serving statement was not transmitted beyond those present in court, something which severely curtailed his audience. To defend himself against the psychiatric assessment that he suffered from grandiose delusions, Breivik also had to downplay his previous claim that he was a “Justiciar Knights Commander of the European Knight Templar”, admitting that it was a “pompous” way of describing “four sweaty guys in a cellar”. However, as we have already seen, this did not deter Tarrant from aligning himself with such claims. Breivik also lost much time and energy fighting the psychiatrists’ insanity charges. This stood in the way of pursuing his real aim: to present himself as a right-wing vanguard in “the battle against Islamism and its defenders.”

Envisioning his future trial in his manifesto, Breivik appears to have believed that he would become a “living martyr”. As his advice to readers revealed, he naively thought that, despite incarceration, he could continue to contribute to the consolidation of the “cause” from within prison, either through building a pan-European political organisation or at least a prison group. In 2013 it was reported that he wanted to register a “one-man party” entitled “Den norske fascistparti og den nordiske liga” for the “democratic fascist takeover of Norway.” Predictably enough, this idea also came to naught.

Breivik had failed to reckon with the tight controls that would be imposed upon him in prison. “Everything is 100 percent monitored,” his lawyer confirmed. By 2017 an estimated 4,000 letters—to and from Breivik—had passed through the prison’s censorship department. The authorities censored 600 of them, mostly from Breivik. Such conditions brought Breivik’s fantasy of becoming a political leader from behind bars to an abrupt end. He was unable to communicate with would-be acolytes, build networks, or spread his influence directly through personal contact. He was largely prevented from fraternising with other inmates and has had few visitors aside from a paid “friend” (a priest), a handful of academic researchers, and his mother, before she died.

Prison did not diminish his beliefs, however. Frederik Sejersted, Norway’s Attorney General, stated in 2017 “He still wants to inspire others. He still wants a fascist revolution.” He has completed the active phase, and now he is working on his project as an ideologist and a writer to create networks,” Sejersted argued. One of the methods he considered was to use dating ads to spread his ideology, though again he appears to have been singularly unsuccessful in this endeavor as well.

Despite such setbacks Breivik, who assumed his conviction had rendered him a figure of political substance, still believed he had wisdom to impart to others. In November 2012 he sought to write to another terrorist defendant, Beate Zschäpe, of the National Socialist Underground (NSU), who was then standing trial in Munich for her involvement in ten murders (nine racist killings and the murder of a female police officer), membership of a terrorist group, and arson. The NSU, which had perpetrated a bomb attack in Cologne in 2004, injuring twenty-two people, had also carried out at least fourteen bank robberies to finance its activities between 2000 and 2007. Breivik advised Zschäpe to use her trial to spread her ideals and to emphasise that she was a “militant nationalist” so that she would be seen as a “courageous heroine of national resistance who has done and sacrificed everything to stop multiculturalism and the Islamification of Germany.” While he
applauded the NSU killings, Breivik patronised Zschäpe by claiming that his own attack on the “political elite” had been more effective. Zschäpe never received the letter. The German authorities had confiscated it.[83] She was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2018.

Breivik also penned letters to three imprisoned members of the Aryan Brotherhood in the United States, but these never left Skien prison either. Similarly, Breivik never received a letter written to him by Nikolai Korolev, a former FSB officer who was serving a life sentence for his part in the 2006 bombing attack on the Cherkizovsky Market in Moscow, an attack which left thirteen people dead. Korolev’s group Spas (The Saviour), an extreme nationalist Russian group, had carried out the attack and seven of its other members were also jailed.[84]

Breivik’s failure to use the court and the prison system to amplify his message was writ large during the subsequent case he brought against the Norwegian government for breaching a ban on “inhuman and degrading treatment” under the European Convention on Human Rights in January 2017, a case he lost. Compared to his original trial there was little interest in him from wider Norwegian society. Most of the ten seats in the Oslo court that were available to the public were empty throughout the hearing. “He’s being forgotten, step by step…. People are kind of done with him,” observed author Åsne Seierstad. Even she was surprised by the lack of public interest.[85]

Tarrant had also claimed in his manifesto that, if he survived the attack, he intended to go to trial and plead not guilty because his attack was a “partisan action against an occupying force, and I am a lawful, uniformed combatant.”[86] Initially, it appeared Tarrant would follow in Breivik’s footsteps. He pleaded “not guilty” to all 51 counts of murder and—like Breivik, who defiantly made a clenched fist salute in court on the opening day of his trial—he signalled his own ideological defiance by flashing a white power symbol during his arraignment. [87] However, for reasons that remain unclear, after a year on remand awaiting trial, Tarrant unexpectedly changed his plea to guilty. This voided the necessity of a trial, which had been scheduled for June 2020, and alleviated fears that he would use the opportunity as a platform to peddle his views and cause further distress to his victims’ families.[88] Tarrant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, having never uttered a word of justification. Indeed, as Mr Justice Mander highlighted in his sentencing remarks, Tarrant had “taken no steps in the course of this hearing to advance the ideology that motivated you.” Unlike Breivik, Tarrant appears to have conceded that “nothing good” came from his crimes and accepted that his actions were “abhorrent and irrational” though, as the judge recorded, “it is not apparent, despite your claims, that you are genuinely remorseful beyond being regretful of the situation that now faces you.”[89]

**What Impact has Breivik had upon the Broader Trajectory of Extreme Right Terrorism?**

Even in the seemingly paradigmatic case of the Christchurch attacks, the difficulties of ascribing “influence” are substantial. It becomes even harder in relation to several other less well known cases for which the extant publicly available documentation is far weaker. This investigation of Breivik’s influence on the *modus operandi* of extreme right-wing terrorists in the past decade is, of course, selecting on the dependent variable. Looking to ascertain what level of influence Breivik might have exerted upon the attackers or would-be attackers that followed him, leads one to find cases in which an influence is ascribed to him. This approach does not, of course, account for the many cases of extreme right violence and terrorism upon which Breivik has had no discernible influence whatsoever. Gauging Breivik’s lack of impact upon wider trends of extreme right terrorism can be addressed in part by using data from the Center for Research on Extremism’s (C-REX) RTV dataset, with the caveat that this database only covers Western Europe while several of the cases “inspired” by Breivik hail from Eastern Europe, North America, and, in Tarrant’s case, Australasia.

While the violence in Norway might seem to have ushered in a new era of extreme right lone actor attacks, in fact—as the RTV dataset highlights—the proportion of fatal events perpetrated by lone actors in Western Europe between 1990 and 2019 (the area and period currently covered by the RTV dataset) has not risen dramatically, but has instead remained relatively stable. However, although the first half of the last decade saw a drop in the number of fatal lone actor attacks in Western Europe, there was an increase in such attacks in the
second half of the decade. If such attacks appear as the dominant *modus operandi* today it is also because other forms of fatal extreme right violence—such as those committed by organisations, gangs, or autonomous cells—have diminished across the same period (Figure 1). The Extremism Crime Database (ECDB), which covers fatal right-wing attacks in the United States, highlights a similar stability of lone actor perpetrators across the same time frame.[90]

**Figure 1**: Fatal Right-wing Attacks in Western Europe by Perpetrator Type, 1990–2019

There are key differences in other respects too. Mass casualty attacks, such as those Breivik perpetrated, remain an outlier when compared with more general patterns of extreme right violence. Indeed, the majority of fatal attacks committed between 1990 and 2019 in Western Europe only had one single victim (see the introduction to this Special Issue).

Breivik’s target selection of government officials, state institutions and political opponents he considered “traitors” is also at odds with wider attack trends, since the majority of attacks target ethnic and religious minorities (Figure 2), though the number of attacks against “state institutions” has also been growing.
It is also notable that, tactically speaking, no extreme right terrorists since 2011 have successfully combined bombs and firearms within the same attack or deliberately attacked multiple targets during the course of the same attack (the Christchurch attack, which is not covered by the RTV, is an exception in this regard). Here again the Breivik case falls outside the general trend. Indeed, the majority of extreme right attackers do not choose guns or bombs as weapons but have employed instead knives, fists and boots.

**Breivik's Influence – Direct, Indirect, or Entirely Negligible?**

The following section explores the extent to which Breivik has had a direct, indirect or entirely negligible impact upon the *modus operandi* of those extreme right terrorists who have claimed some form of inspiration from him or his actions. Publicly available information for the majority of these cases is weak in comparison to the volume of material available regarding the Christchurch shootings. Nevertheless, in line with the wider literature, press reports indicate that psychological disorders, often unspecified or based upon anecdotal remarks rather than clinical diagnosis, feature in several cases.[91] This can, however, not be regarded as a causal explanation for their offences or as a means of explaining Breivik's appeal to them, not least because the empirical base with regards to most of these cases is so low.

For reasons that are not entirely clear, in the immediate aftermath of July 2011, Breivik appealed to several individuals in Eastern Europe.[92] The first case occurred on August 10, 2012 and involved a twenty-nine-year-old man from Ostrava in the Czech Republic who used the name “Breivik” on the Internet. He was accused of making preparations for a similar attack as the Norwegian terrorist. Police recovered explosives, hundreds of rounds of ammunition, helmets, police uniforms and a police ID from his apartment. However, his intended target, if any, was unclear. Neighbours stated that he had “mental problems” rather than being an “extremist”.[93] The second case involved Brunon Kwiecień, a doctor of chemistry formerly employed by the University of Agriculture in Kraków, Poland, who was arrested on November 20, 2012. He was subsequently found guilty of preparing a terrorist attack on the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish Parliament, which he
reportedly planned to destroy with the help of four tonnes of explosives. The attack was to have taken place during a budgetary session that would have been attended by the president, the prime minister, and numerous other leading politicians. Kwiecień was jailed for thirteen years in 2015, a sentence lowered to nine years in 2017, though he died in prison two years later.[94] A third East European terrorist allegedly “obsessed” with Breivik was a Ukrainian student, Pavlo Lapshyn, who murdered an elderly Muslim man and detonated a series of bombs outside mosques in the West Midlands within days of arriving in Britain in 2013, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. However, little concrete evidence has emerged as to how this apparent obsession manifested itself in relation to his modus operandi or ideological views.[95] He selected different targets, killed his victim with a knife, and manufactured a series of rudimentary nail bombs which were a good deal less sophisticated than Breivik’s device. No mention was made of Breivik’s supposed influence in court either, further diminishing the claim that the Norwegian terrorist provided any direct influence.[96]

The types of actor for whom Breivik appealed during this period were varied, as can be concluded from three cases in Belgium, Latvia, and the United Kingdom, though evidence of actual attack preparation was low in each instance. The first “plot,” which Belgian police foiled in Sint-Niklaas involved a twenty-three-year-old man (dubbed the “Dutch Breivik”) arrested in a café as he tried to recruit others to help him perpetrate an attack. The man had apparently penned a manifesto describing his desire to overthrow the Belgian state and had planned attacks against Flemish state broadcaster VRT and other undisclosed political targets. The extent of his preparations, which was likely very low, has not yet emerged.[97] He was subsequently detained in a psychiatric ward.[98] A potentially comparable case, in which mental health issues also appear to have been a factor, occurred in 2018 when Latvian police arrested a man who reportedly was “completely obsessed” with Breivik and had planned to attack a minority school and several commercial premises on his hero’s birthday. [99] Another case, which occurred in the United Kingdom, appears to have been driven by personal grievance as much as by politics, highlighting the blurred boundaries between extreme right lone actors and a wider pool of grievance-motivated violence.[100] Arrested in June 2014, a thirty-seven-year-old man claimed he was “inspired by Breivik and McVeigh”, having become angry at being constantly ridiculed for his ginger hair. He had obtained the ingredients to manufacture cyanide to kill “non-Aryans” and (following a retrial) was found guilty of preparing terrorist acts, though the jury rejected aspects of the allegation that he had intended to use the chemicals as part of a terror plot. In a notebook the man had written: “I don’t want to be a serial killer. I’m more of an Anders Breivik. I have left potential targets open. I was waiting for an opportunity to kill one of them. Let it be Prince Charles which would be good.”[101]

Such cases are perhaps indicative of the type of actors that Breivik was influencing in the immediate years after the 2011 attacks. His name was also frequently mentioned in relation to right-wing activists arrested for illegally possessing explosives, but here again, there was little evidence of any actual attack plan. Two Swedish cases are illustrative. In January 2015, police—acting on a tip off from his mother and girlfriend—arrested a forty-year old man in Jönköping with Nazi sympathies who apparently idolised Breivik. Reportedly suffering from mental health issues, the man was arrested in possession of 10kg of black powder explosives.[102] Later that year, in July, Swedish police arrested two men in Falkenberg, finding large quantities of explosives. A well-known neo-Nazi had bought 50 kilos of explosives from a dynamiter on sick leave, who had 500 kilos of dynamite illegally stored in his home. During the trial, a witness explained that the neo-Nazi claimed that he “would be greater than Breivik”. The man was sentenced to two and a half years in prison.[103]

While many of the foregoing cases involved individuals whose attack planning was at an early stage, the same could not be said for two fatal attacks that occurred during the summer of 2016. On June 16, Thomas Mair murdered the British Labour MP Jo Cox. He remained silent as to the inspiration or motive for his attack beyond shouting “Britain First” during his frenzied attack and then giving his name as “death to traitors” in court. While focus upon the ideological materials recovered from his home highlighted the influence of North American and South African extreme right propaganda, Mair was also allegedly “fascinated” by Breivik. Police recovered “newspaper clippings” Mair had kept relating to Breivik’s terrorist attacks among items of Nazi paraphernalia he had also collected.[104] This does not prove Breivik exerted a significant influence upon Mair, not least because his modus operandi differed significantly (though his targeting of a political figure
was similar). Yet it at least suggests that the Norwegian terrorist featured somewhere and at some level in his ideological imaginings.

Breivik’s influence is easier to discern in a second fatal terrorist attack that occurred the following month. On July 22, 2016, the fifth anniversary of Breivik’s attacks, a German-Iranian teenager, David Sonboly, went on a rampage in Munich, using the same type of pistol as Breivik, indiscriminately killing nine people, seven of whom were also teenagers. He appears to have targeted those he perceived as foreigners. Sonboly subsequently took his own life. It later emerged that he had “concerned himself extensively” with Breivik while conversing with a friend. Although the Bavarian police did not find a copy of Breivik’s manifesto amongst his personal belongings, a classmate informed one newspaper that Sonboly used a picture of the Norwegian terrorist as his WhatsApp profile picture. Sonboly, who was fascinated by spree killers, had previously been admitted to a psychiatric unit, causing some alarm there by allegedly drawing swastikas on his drawing pad and giving the Nazi salute to another patient. His extreme right proclivities were discussed in relation to his treatment.[105]

Initially, Sonboly’s attack was not perceived as a “politically motivated crime” but as being spurred by personal revenge; he had been bullied in school by youths of Turkish and Albanian heritage. In October 2019, however, the Bavarian police reclassified the crime to recognise that “the radical right-wing and racist views of the perpetrator should not be ignored.”[106] The Bavarian Ministry of the Interior highlighted that Breivik “had been a type of role model” for Sonboly, though whether this had any impact upon his murderous actions or political attitudes with respect to right-wing extremism “remains open.” With regards to the timing of his atrocity, the Ministry asserted “We can only assume, that David S. purposefully selected the date,” though their own investigations “did not deliver any concrete evidence of this.”[107] Subsequent investigations revealed that Sonboly held xenophobic and far-right views and considered himself part of the Aryan race—but also that he was obsessed with school shootings and rampage killers.[108] Probably due to its ambiguous motivation, this particular mass shooting does not seem to have inspired other far-right terrorists.

While Sonboly’s was the deadliest of attacks influenced by Breivik (until Christchurch), the Norwegian terrorist’s name continued to appear intermittently after 2011. In France, there were three such cases during the course of 2017, one of which stands out because it involved a group rather than lone actors. In the first case, a “group” calling itself **Commando de défense du peuple et de la patrie française** (Defence Command of the French People and the Motherland) attacked women wearing the veil and other members of ethnic minority groups in Chalon-sur-Saône and Dijon. In a sound recording sent to a newspaper, the group claimed to be “directly inspired” by Breivik, but there was little else beyond anti-Muslim animus to suggest any tactical learning from him. This “Commando” it transpired was a single teenager who subsequently surrendered to police. [109]

In October 2017, French police dismantled a larger “criminal terrorist conspiracy” intending attacks on politicians and mosques. Eight men and three minors were charged. The group, founded in November of the previous year, called themselves the “OAS” (Secret Army Organisation—a reference to the 1960s terrorist group that had fought against Algerian independence). It was led by a twenty-one-year-old who had become frustrated with the inaction of the extreme right groups he had been associated with, leading him to form his own clique. He had previously been arrested in Vitrolles in June after posting online that he had planned to attack ethnic minorities, jihadists, migrants and “scum.” He had come to the police’s attention as the administrator of a Facebook page that openly glorified Breivik. When these OAS members were arrested, they only had “vague” plans to commit violent actions, according to Parisian prosecutors. However, these plans included (according to one report) plots to kill the then Interior Minister Christophe Castaner and a radical left MP, Jean-Luc Mélenchon. “The organisation was planning purchases of weapons and paramilitary training. Some were already trained in shooting.”[110]

The third case, which involved an individual known as Guillaume M. whom police arrested on June 28, 2017 in Argenteuil. This case bore similarities to other cases involving lone actors who found inspiration in Breivik. Guillaume M. had only recently been released from prison for inciting racial hatred and for glorifying Breivik’s acts of mass murder. He also had a prior conviction for possessing explosives. Regarding Breivik as a “hero,” he was also fascinated by the Columbine killers, indicating that the Norwegian terrorist was but one source
of inspiration. Described in press reports as “unstable” and manifesting “personality disorders,” the central charge against him related to his “plot” to kill French president Emmanuel Macron, whom he had mused about murdering during the traditional July 14 parade on the Champs-Elysées. Guillaume M. had also expressed more inchoate ideas about attacking the police or committing a “mass killing”, stating on an online forum (which led to his detection) that “I am looking for a weapon, semi-auto compulsory” because “I want to kill people” and to “do as much damage as possible.” His vague list of targets included “several people from each minority, Muslims, Jews, Blacks, homosexuals, Freemasons.” When police arrested him, they seized several knives he had purchased only minutes earlier. Researching his digital footprint, police learned that Guillaume M. had conducted online research on Macron and on the manufacture of explosives; they also unearthed several YouTube videos posted by “Guillaume Breivik” in which a hooded individual could be seen handling petrol bombs.[111]

Another significant case involved Christopher Hasson, a U.S. Coast Guard Lieutenant from Maryland, who had pleaded guilty to four federal weapons and drug charges in October 2019.[112] He was given a prison sentence of more than thirteen years.[113] In addition to conducting online searches and making “thousands” of visits for “pro-Russian, neo-fascist, and neo-Nazi literature,” from 2017 onwards, Hasson had “routinely perused” the portions of Breivik’s manifesto instructing a would-be terrorist to amass firearms, food, disguises and survival supplies. “Consistent with the Breivik manifesto, the defendant performed thousands of visits to websites selling firearms and tactical gear,” court documents highlighted. Hasson collected an arsenal of fifteen firearms and, according to a “conservative” estimate, over 1,000 rounds of ammunition. He had been researching gun clubs and firing ranges, as well as stockpiling illegal drugs, including steroids and over thirty bottles of human growth hormone. He also compiled a list of targets, predominantly Democrat politicians and journalists, whom—in accordance with the relevant section of Breivik’s manifesto—he had designated as “traitors.” A review of his online activity from January 2017 onwards “revealed targeting indicators consistent with Breivik’s instructions,” prosecutors argued.[114] While his plot was only in a preliminary stage, Hasson had “intended to exact retribution on minorities and those he considered traitors,” prosecutors told the court.[115] He was inspired by other extreme right figures as well, but “Breivik appears to be the guiding force that shaped his specific plans.”[116]

During the course of 2019, seventy-eight men, women, and children were murdered in five separate extreme right attacks, in four countries, on three continents. Following the attacks in Christchurch, this particular form of extreme right terrorism gained a cumulative momentum as subsequent attacks, inspired by Tarrant, sought to emulate his violence and, apparently, to exceed it. During the following months, lone actors committed attacks in Poway, California (April); El Paso, Texas (August); Bærum, Norway (August); and Halle, Germany (October). What is notable about this “wave” of violence, in the current context, is that the attackers were all influenced, to a greater or lesser degree, by the Christchurch terrorist rather than by Breivik.[117] The attack perpetrated by Phillip Manshaus—who murdered his adopted sister before attacking a mosque in Bærum, just outside Oslo—stands out because even here, in his native Norway, Breivik played second fiddle to Tarrant, whom Manshaus described himself as a “disciple” of. Manshaus watched the video shortly after the Christchurch attack but first it did not make much of an impression. It was only when he read Tarrant’s manifesto on August 2, 2019 that he felt compelled to act. He carried out his attack just eight days later.[118] Copying his idol, Manshaus also tried to livestream his attack (using a helmet-mounted GoPro camera) but failed to get online. Instead, he recorded his botched mosque attack, which was screened as evidence against him during the trial. This is not to argue that Breivik has no discernible trace in this attack. Manshaus conducted Internet searches on Breivik, [119] and posted three photos to his Instagram page – two of himself and another of Breivik when the latter was giving the Nazi salute in court.[120] However, during the trial it was striking how insignificant Breivik appeared to be as a source of inspiration in comparison with Tarrant. In the final verdict, Tarrant’s name is mentioned thirteen times, Breivik not even once. Manshaus was jailed for 21 years.[121]

There were also several plots to commit violence in which Breivik appears to have had more of an influence on the *modus operandi* of the would-be attackers. However, because the police intervened early on to intercept the plots, it remains difficult to gauge the precise nature of this influence. On November 13, 2019, Polish police
arrested two men in Warsaw, the day before the annual Independence Day march in the city, for plotting attacks on Muslims. Breivik and Tarrant were both mentioned as having helped to inspire the plot, according to press reports, which was to have targeted mosques to prevent the “Islamisation of Poland”. The men had written a manifesto to accompany their atrocity, with one of them making public calls to “exterminate” Muslims. The two men – one of whom appears to have come to the attention of Polish intelligence as a result of their investigations into Brunon Kwiecień – had also allegedly planned to use both firearms and explosives in their attacks, echoing Breivik’s *modus operandi*. A third man was also arrested, for illegal possession of explosive precursors.

Nearly a decade later, while the evidence for Breivik’s direct influence upon the *modus operandi* of extreme right terrorism is not particularly strong, especially when his actions are measured against wider trends in right-wing political violence, his indirect influence upon would-be attackers continues to be felt. However, this appears to be growing weaker as the milieu generates new “heroes” and “martyrs”. In December 2019, Scottish police arrested another would-be assailant, a man who was accused of planning an attack on an Islamic Centre in Fife. The BBC reported that he made social media posts “glorifying terrorist acts” committed by others, including Breivik. Insofar as we know anything of the attack plans in this case, we can judge that Tarrant was probably the prevailing influence, since the man faces accusations “that he made online statements that he ‘intended to stream live footage of an incident’ and that he was going to ‘carry out an attack on the Fife Islamic Centre’ in Glenrothes.” Police also charged him with possessing both Tarrant’s and Breivik’s manifestos.

**Breivik’s Influence on Other Violent Actors**

While the preceding discussion has focused upon Breivik’s direct and indirect impact on extreme right terrorism, it is important to note that the influence of the Norwegian attacks has been felt beyond these parameters. The literature on lone actors highlights numerous socio-demographic similarities with other types of violent offenders, particularly school shooters—although, according to one study, their behaviors differed “significantly,” with regard to the degree to which they interact with co-conspirators, their antecedent event behaviors, and the degree to which they leak information beforehand. Breivik had himself been inspired by the “cultural script” provided by several previous school shooters and his own attacks have since played a role in inspiring other such perpetrators and would-be attackers. We discuss a (non-exhaustive) list of such cases here as a means of demonstrating the breadth of Breivik’s appeal beyond the right-wing extremist milieu. Shortly after his own attack, Breivik’s name appeared in relation to one of the highest profile school shootings in recent U.S. history.

On December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza murdered his mother before killing a further twenty-six people, including twenty children aged between six and seven years old, at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. Reports soon emerged that he was “obsessed with” or “inspired by” Breivik. Police had indeed found several news articles about Breivik at the family home, though the Norwegian terrorist was in fact one of several mass murderers Lanza had researched online. Others have since stated that Breivik was the “most influential” of the mass killers Lanza researched. “We believe Adam studied him closely and may have tried to imitate some of his techniques,” an official familiar with the investigation stated. “They both used the same video games to train and prepare and they were both obsessed with other mass killers.” CBS News also reported that Lanza saw himself “as being in competition” with Breivik and had chosen Sandy Hook Elementary because it was the “easiest target” to help him achieve his goal of exceeding Breivik’s death toll, though police have dismissed such statements about Lanza’s motive as “mere speculation”.

Since Sandy Hook there have been several other reports of Breivik’s influence in relation to similar acts of violence. One such case was William Atchison, who idolised school shooters, and subsequently murdered two Hispanic students at Aztec High School in New Mexico on December 7, 2017, before taking his own life. Atchison’s online activity indicated “all the hallmarks of the ‘alt-right,’” according to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC). He reportedly used numerous names online while gaming (including “Future Mass Shooter”) as well as adopting those of other school shooters and terrorists, including Adam Lanza, the “incel” mass
murderer Elliot Rodger and Anders Breivik. What marks Atchison’s case as unusual is that he was also in direct contact with, and talked to, David Sonboly, who had killed himself the previous year after murdering nine people in Munich on the fifth anniversary of Breivik’s massacre.

Two other notable cases occurred in the United Kingdom. A teenager who was jailed for life in 2015 had stockpiled five pipe bombs, two home-made explosive devices, a Glock semi-automatic pistol, and 94 jacketed hollow point expanding bullets, as well as CS gas. He had planned to use these arms to perpetrate a massacre at Newcastle College, a large educational institution with 12,000 students, where he had briefly studied. His plot was considered to be in an advanced stage. He had posted comments online, praising U.S. high school shooters and Breivik. He had also expressed a desire to kill someone during Skype conversations with a girl in Iceland that referenced both Breivik and Jaylen Fryberg, a fifteen year old freshman student who murdered four fellow students at a Seattle high school in 2014, indicating, however, that the Norwegian terrorist was not his only point of reference.

The fascination Breivik exerted for would-be school shooters with mixed ideologies was also evident in another British case four years later. It involved a British teenager who was arrested in June 2018 in Gloucester, after trying to purchase a Glock 17 and ammunition with which he planned to perpetrate a massacre. Police stated that they had foiled his plot at what the would-be terrorist had termed “phase one” and that he had yet to identify a target. He had ordered his gun from the United States but the parcel, addressed to him, was intercepted by Homeland Security, who passed on the details to their British counterparts. The teenager, who had a “deep and persistent” interest in mass shootings, was said to have regarded Breivik and the Columbine high school killers as “poster boys”, according to the prosecution. In his home, police discovered a shopping list of other items he intended to buy, including petrol, a gas mask and body armour. He had also drawn 77 stickmen to represent the victims of the July 2011 terrorist attack. On his laptop police discovered, among other items, a document entitled “The Breivik Timeline”.

Breivik’s Legacy and his Ongoing Struggle for Influence

While Breivik believed his manifesto had outlined a feasible, legitimate, and effective recipe for activists to follow in his footsteps, the majority of far-right militants, both at the time and since, have disagreed, understanding that his attacks have been detrimental to their political cause. Even those who glorify his actions have rarely been moved to emulate these themselves. Breivik has had little direct impact upon the modus operandi on the trajectory of extreme right-wing terrorism. However, his use of a manifesto to announce violence rather than to claim responsibility only in its aftermath, and his stated desire to video-record his atrocity which, while unsuccessful, were used to much greater effect by the Australian mass murderer Brenton Tarrant eight years later. While Tarrant turned to Breivik’s manifesto for “operational guidance”, neither he nor other subsequent extreme right terrorists have sought to emulate the Norwegian terrorist’s combination of a bomb attack and mass shooting, which was a key component of his modus operandi.

Mass casualty killers remain a tiny minority. As evidence from the RTV dataset highlights, Breivik continues to be an outlier insofar as more general trends of extreme right political violence are concerned. That Breivik’s tactical model has failed to diffuse more widely is partly due to his target selection but also due to the comparatively complicated nature of his attacks which have been hard to replicate, though the Christchurch attacks are a partial exception in this regard.

If Breivik has failed to have a discernible tactical influence—either directly or indirectly—in the broader field of political violence, he has clearly been influential for a small handful of lone actors even if, due to a lack of publicly available documentation, it is often hard to discern the precise extent of this “influence”. Early police intervention in the majority of these cases has also meant that these instances have been thwarted plots, which makes it difficult to draw any hard and fast conclusions as to how they might have developed or how Breivik might have influenced that development.

However, just because Breivik’s modus operandi has not widely diffused in the last decade does not mean that
others will not try and emulate him in the future. The 2019 shooting attacks in Christchurch indicate that influence and diffusion do not necessarily occur at a particularly rapid pace. Furthermore, as Berntzen and Ravndal highlight as part of their article in this Special Issue, there remains a subculture of “dark fandom” [138] surrounding Breivik, perpetuated on Chan forums and through Telegram channels. This online eco-system seeks to keep Breivik’s name and those of other extreme right terrorists alive so that others might come to be inspired by his deeds—even though, in comparison to extreme right terrorists of a more recent vintage, his digital presence is far less pronounced.[139]

Indeed, Breivik no longer appears to be a preeminent influence ideologically or tactically for a younger generation of terrorists, regardless of whether or not they glorify him online as a “hero”. His wider struggle for cultural and political influence within the milieu can be detected in the declining number of blogs set up to venerate him in the aftermath of the atrocity. Berntzen and Ravndal (in this Special Issue) highlight that number of blogs dedicated to Breivik which were set up in 2011 had largely disappeared by 2014 though those that had “an ideological and ‘romantic’ focus endured for longest.”[140] The last post on “The Commander Breivik Report” blog was made in January 2015. “Cut off from their hero, Breivik’s fans began discussing other nationalist issues. Some shut down their blogs. Some sites were left without any updates,” noted Åsne Seierstad. [141]

As the sudden wave of attacks engendered by the Christchurch massacres in 2019 highlights, the most likely reason that Breivik’s visibility has declined is because he has been replaced by others who have succeeded in staging highly mediatised murderous attacks against more direct racial and religious enemies like Muslims or Jews. Indeed, Tarrant’s livestreamed killings of Muslims had a far greater appeal to those immersed in such online spaces where footage of the murders freely circulate, than Breivik’s killing of predominantly (though by no means exclusively) white Norwegian children.[142] There is likely a generational effect at work here as well. Many of those “inspired” by Tarrant are very young men. They were children when Breivik acted, even though there was only eight years between the two attacks. For this reason, the events in Norway, one might speculate, likely had much less resonance for them. If the past decade is a reliable indicator of future trends terrorism from the extreme right, then Breivik’s influence – such as it is – might continue to fade. However, it is equally likely, given the cases discussed in this article, that the echo of his deeds will continue to linger on within violence-prone extreme right subcultures for years to come.

About the Authors:

Graham Macklin, Ph.D. is Assistant Professor/Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo, Norway. He has published extensively on far right politics, transnational networks, violence and terrorism in the United Kingdom and the United States including, most recently, ‘Failed Führers: A History of Britain’s Extreme Right’ (2020) and, as co-editor, ‘Researching the Far Right: Theory, Method & Practice (2020). He is the co-editor of ‘Patterns of Prejudice’ and ‘Fascism’. He also co-edits the ‘Routledge Studies in Fascism and the Far Right’ book series.

Tore Bjørgo, Ph.D., is director of the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), Professor at the University of Oslo, and Adjunct Professor of Police Science at the Norwegian Police University College. He is also Associate Editor of Perspectives on Terrorism. His main fields of research have been political extremism and terrorism, racist and right-wing violence, disengagement from violent groups, crime prevention and policing.

Notes


[28] Tarrant, op cit., p. 11


[30] Royal Commission of Inquiry, op cit., pp. 201 and 204 itemises Tarrant’s firearms and how he modified them.


[33] Tarrant, op cit., pp. 11-12.


[40] Breivik, 2083, p. 1420.

[41] Åsne Seierstad, op cit., p. 269.

[42] Breivik in court; transcript by NTB, 19 April 2012.


[46] Åsne Seierstad, op cit., p. 163. In his manifesto (op. cit., p. 1269), Breivik urged readers to further distribute his compendium.


[49] Blyth Crawford, Florence Keen and Guillermo Suarez de-Tangil, Memetic Irony and the Promotion of Violence within Chan Cultures (2021); URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/memetic-irony-and-the-promotion-of-violence-within-chan-cultures/


[52] Tarrant, op cit., p. 47.


[54] Breivik, 2083, p. 5.


[57] Åsne Seierstad, op cit., p. 164.


[63] Tarrant, op cit., p. 3.
[64] Breivik, 2083, p. 1365 and Tarrant, op cit., p. 53.
[68] Ibid.
[70] Cato Hemmingby and Tore Bjørgo, op cit., p. 77.
[71] Breivik, 2083, p. 941.
[73] Tarrant, op cit., p. 18.
[75] Bjørgo et al., op cit.
[76] Breivik, 2083, p. 941.
[82] Ibid.
[84] Åsne Seierstad, “Does mass murderer Anders Breivik”.


[95] Adrian Shaw, “Pavlo Lapshyn: Murdering bomber wanted to start race war on the streets of the UK,” Mirror, 21 October 2013; URL: https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/pavlo-lapshyn-murdering-bomber-wanted-2477954


[106] “Germany: 2016 Munich attack had ‘radical right-wing’ motives, say police,” Deutsche Welle, 25 October 2019; URL: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-2016-munich-attack-had-radical-right-wing-motives-say-police/a-50991641 In January 2021 the Bavarian state criminal police stated that Sonboly was likely motivated by a range of factors; URL: https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/pavlo-lapshyn-murdering-bomber-wanted-2477954


[110] “France charges eight over plot targeting politicians," Agence France-Press, 22 October 2017; URL: https://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/france-charges-eight-over-plot-targeting-politicians-1.669251; and Elise Vincent, “"L’OAS” de Logan N. ou la dérive imprévisible d’une cellule d’ultradroite," Le Monde, 17 April 2018; URL: https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2018/04/17/la-derive-imprevitable-de-la-galaxie-de-logan-n_5286497_1653578.html; see also “Qui est Logan Alexandre Nisin, de l’ultra-droite au projet d’attentat terroriste?" Sud-Ouest, 18 October 2017; URL: https://www.sudouest.fr/2017/10/18/


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[140] Ibid.

[141] Åsne Seierstad, “Does mass murderer Anders Breivik”.