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## Introduction by the Guest Editors of the Special Issue

### The Long-Term Impacts of Attacks: The Case of the July 22, 2011 Attacks in Norway

by Tore Bjørgo and Andres Ravik Jupskås

#### **Abstract**

This special issue explores the long-term impacts of the July 22 attacks in Norway in 2011, carried out by an extreme right terrorist lone actor. The Introduction article will first describe the car bomb attack on the Government District in Oslo and the subsequent mass shooting of young participants at the Labour Party's youth organisation at the Utøya Island. Next, it will discuss dimensions of impact at three levels: the individual, the national/societal, and the global levels. Finally, the article asks why some terrorist attacks have stronger and more lasting impacts than others, comparing the July 22 attacks with some other large-scale terrorist atrocities (like the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks in the US and UK) but also some small-scale but nevertheless significant attacks. Three factors stand out: Severity (in terms of casualties and other harm), innovation (the terrorists did something different that became extra shocking and newsworthy), and responses (from governments, the public or potential supporters).

**Keywords:** Breivik, lone actor, right-wing extremism, Norway, Oslo, Utøya

#### **Introduction**

One of the defining criteria of terrorism is that the violence is intended by the perpetrators to have effects beyond the immediate targets of physical violence. The Global Terrorism Database (University of Maryland) has recorded more than 190,000 terrorist attacks worldwide since 1970, killing more than 140,000 people. Beyond the pain, grief and tragedy suffered by those directly affected, most of these attacks had limited or no lasting consequences at a higher societal or global level. However, some of these terrorist attacks did have long-lasting impacts, nationally and even globally, although many of the lasting consequences were not quite what the perpetrators had intended.[1]

In this Special Issue we focus on the long-term impacts of the July 22, 2011 attacks in Norway. First, we provide a chronological summary of the attacks, as well as the subsequent trial of the perpetrator. Second, we assess the long-term impacts of the attacks, distinguishing between individual, national and global dimensions. In this part, we mainly draw upon the contributions to this Special Issue, but we also refer to other publications on the July 22 attacks, and compare the attacks to other large-scale terrorist attacks, most notably 9/11. Third, and finally, we briefly discuss why some terrorist attacks are more likely to have a long-term impact.

#### **Background: The July 22 Attacks in Oslo and Utøya**

Shortly after 3 p.m. (CET) on July 22, 2011, a Friday afternoon, a white van was driven up in front of the main government building in Oslo, housing the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of Justice.[2] A man, dressed as a police officer, left the van and walked away. A few minutes later, a 950 kilo (approximately 2,000 lbs.) fertiliser-based bomb exploded, causing massive material damage and immediately killing eight individuals, while another ten persons suffered serious injuries. More than 300 people received minor injuries or were so close to the explosion that their lives were endangered.[3]

In the midst of the chaos following the explosion, the perpetrator, Anders Behring Breivik (32), drove his rented car out of Oslo, some 40 kilometres towards his next target, Utøya Island, where the Labour Party's

youth movement Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking (AUF), had its annual summer camp. That afternoon, 564 people were present on the island. Dressed in his fake police uniform and armed with a semi-automatic rifle (Ruger Mini-14), a Glock pistol, and loads of ammunition and other equipment, he tricked the ferry crew into taking him over to the island, claiming that he was sent by the Police Security Service to make a security check of the camp in the aftermath of the attack in Oslo. On the island, he was received by the female camp administrator and an off-duty police officer in charge of security. As the unarmed police officer started to become suspicious, Breivik shot and killed the two before proceeding to massacre young camp participants. Hunting down youths who fled from the shooting, he shot everyone he came across.[4] The massacre took the lives of 69 people (among them 33 below the age of 18), seriously injuring another 33, while causing immense mental harm to many of the survivors. During the police investigation and the trial, it became clear that Breivik had intended to kill everyone on the island, either by shooting them or by chasing them out in the cold water to make them drown, using water as “a weapon of mass destruction”.[5] He had also intended to capture and kill the former Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, who gave a talk to the camp participants earlier that day. He had planned to film her “execution” but dropped the plan due to technical challenges.[6] However, she had already left the island when Breivik arrived several hours later than originally planned.[7] Breivik did not stop the killing spree until the first team of the police anti-terrorist Delta Force arrived and confronted him, one hour and 13 minutes after the shooting had started. They were delayed, too, due to a combination of communication failures, coordination breakdown at the systemic level, and mishaps.[8]

When Breivik was arrested, he immediately claimed that what he had done was not the main operation but “only the fireworks for something to come,” and that there were two other “Knights Templar” cells ready to strike – unless the Norwegian government gave in to his demands: to give him absolute power and reinstitute torture and the death penalty. The threat that there might be more attacks to come was taken seriously, although the police investigation eventually found this to be a bluff and that the alleged “Knights Templar” organisation did not exist. Breivik never admitted that the Knights Templar was a phantom group, though he conceded in court that his description of it was a bit “pompous”.[9] However, he realised early on that his demands were unrealistic. His purpose was to provoke the Norwegian authorities to torture him and break their own principles, as this would give him an ideological victory.[10] This part of his strategy clearly failed: the police investigation and interviews with the perpetrator and the ensuing court process went by the book and upheld all the principles of the rule of law.[11]

The police investigation and the court process showed that Breivik had spent at least two years preparing for the attacks and putting together a 1,500-page compendium [12] which he tried to distribute just before the attack to 8,109 e-mail addresses he had collected (only 958 e-mails actually got through).[13] More than half of this volume consisted of cut-and-paste texts from various anti-Islamist writers who had inspired his idiosyncratic variety of an extreme right ideology that was meant to justify his violent plans. The last part of the compendium described his (phantom) organisation “Knights Templar” and his ideas for the war against the “invasion” of Islam into Europe and the alleged “traitors” who had facilitated this. He described various categories of traitors and the punishments (including the death sentence) that awaited them. The final part of the compendium devoted a large section to various operational details, including how he was able to construct a functional fertiliser-based bomb, even though based on fertiliser that was modified to make an explosion more difficult. It was stated that the purpose of describing this in such detail was to help other like-minded militants to make their own explosive devices and prepare their operations. The compendium was meant to inspire and assist other anti-Islam activists to emulate him and carry out their own terrorist attacks.

After his arrest, Breivik was put in high-security custody but until his trial and formal conviction a year later he had some opportunities to communicate with his supporters by mail (see Berntzen & Ravndal’s article in this Special Issue). During this period in custody his mental health was evaluated by two separate psychiatric teams to assess whether he was sane and could be held criminally responsible for his violence. The report by the first forensic psychiatric team concluded that he was psychotic at the time of the criminal actions as well as during their observation after his arrest, suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and delusions. The Attorney General

accepted this report and decided to go for an insanity plea so that he would be convicted to compulsory mental health care – which would also mean that he could not be held legally accountable or punished for his acts. However, this psychiatric report was heavily criticised by other forensic psychiatrists and psychologist as well as by experts on terrorism and right-wing extremism for its very narrow perspective – a perspective that did not take into consideration that Breivik might actually be an ideology-driven terrorist, acting rationally within the framework of a right-wing extremist worldview.[14] The court therefore decided to appoint a second psychiatric team which eventually came to a different conclusion: this team found Breivik to have a “dissocial personality disorder” as well as a “narcissistic personality disorder”, which meant that he could be held legally responsible for his acts. Which of these two psychiatric assessments should prevail became one of the core issues during the trial, which lasted two months – from mid-April to mid-June 2012.[15] In August 2012, the verdict held Breivik guilty and legally responsible for the July 22 attacks. He received the maximum sentence possible at that time, 21 years in prison and preventive detention, a conviction which can be prolonged for as long as Breivik would be considered a danger to society. He serves his sentence in a high-security wing of the prison, isolated from other inmates, and with very limited opportunities to communicate with supporters outside.


### ***Dimensions of “Impact”***

What does “impact” mean in the context of terrorist attacks? Obviously, there are several dimensions of the concept of impact. For our purpose, we will focus on the long-term impacts on the individual level, the national (or societal) level, and the global level.

At the *individual level*, the consequences are obviously total and permanent for the direct victims killed in the terrorist attack. For the victims’ families and persons close to them, the grief and loss are also extremely severe and long-lasting. For the survivors of the attack, the suffering varies according to the degree of physical and mental injuries, as well as the length of time they continue to be affected. One of the studies in this Special Issue (by Glad, Stensland & Dyb) addresses the long-term impact on the mental and physical health of the survivors of the Utøya attack. The authors found that the attack had a wide range of negative repercussions for the survivors’ mental and somatic health for years post-attack, including symptoms of post-traumatic stress, anxiety, depression, complicated grief, headache, and other symptoms. Moreover, exposure to the attack also led to long-term functional impairment for many, particularly in relation to the survivors’ academic performance and well-being at school. Furthermore, it had negative health consequences for people close to the survivors, such as their caregivers.

However, although the horrible killings and the suffering of the victims made a strong impression on the Norwegian society and the international community when it happened in 2011, it can be argued that the shock and the feelings of empathy and solidarity with the victims subsided after a while, becoming overshadowed by other terrible events on the world scene. At least, several surveys suggest that the share of Norwegians thinking about July 22 on a weekly basis has dropped from 13 per cent in 2013 to a mere 1 per cent in 2020, while the share that seldom or never thinks about July 22 has increased from 55 to 80 per cent during the same period (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1:** How often Norwegians Think about the July 22 Attacks, 2013-2020



Source: Surveys from two different projects of the Institute for Social Research.

At the *national or societal level*, there can be a variety of short-term and long-term impacts in different sectors of society. Large-scale terrorist attacks can have consequences for public health, the economy, public administration, security measures, legislation, political processes, culture, and other sectors.

The task of following up with survivors and the bereaved in the aftermath of such terrorist attacks is largely a responsibility of health services but also other public agencies (e.g., schools and social services) and civil society (e.g., churches, mosques, aid organisations, and volunteers) became involved.

The 564 persons that were present at Utøya during the attack – mostly youths in their teens and early 20s – came from local communities all over the country. Many Norwegians knew someone – killed, wounded, survivor or family member – who had been directly or indirectly a victim of the terrorist attack. This closeness to the atrocity made most people in Norway feel that they were affected in one way or another. A survey conducted a few weeks after the attack showed that one out of four Norwegian knew someone victimised by the attacks. [16] For those most directly affected, survivors and bereaved established a joint self-help group that continues its activities, ten years later.[17]

Large-scale terrorist attacks can also have considerable economic consequences. The physical destruction caused by the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC was devastating, as was the car bomb attack on the Government district of Oslo. Several government buildings were so damaged that many ministries and the Prime Minister’s office had to be relocated to other parts of the city. The Government district had to be totally reconstructed, a process that will not be completed until at least 15 years after the attack, with an estimated cost of at least NOK 36.5 billion Crowns (3.5 billion Euro).[18]

Failures to prevent or handle major attacks can also lead to changes in public administration. In the United States, the security and coordination failures led to the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security with more than 240,000 employees, and a new Office of the Director of National Intelligence. In Norway, the police

response to the attacks was severely criticised in the media and in the report of the July 22 Commission,[19] pointing out a number of blunders and deficiencies, implying that many lives could have been saved if the police had been better prepared and had performed better. This critique led to a thorough reorganisation of the Norwegian police, with mixed results. The number of police districts was reduced from 27 to 12 in order to make the units more robust and better able to handle major events like a terrorist attack. The number of local units was reduced as well, although at some loss of local know-how and community networks.[20]

One of the goals of terrorist actors is often to provoke political authorities to respond in ways that will undermine the legitimacy of the government or cause chain reactions that might further the goals of the terrorists.[21] If governments display a lack of capacity or will to respond adequately, this may indeed serve such goals. Overreactions are more common, with governmental displays of force such as taking military action or engaging in excessive repression, causing radicalisation among segments of the population affected by such overreactions, while also undermining the legitimacy of the governments. It can be argued that the “Global War on Terror” in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, involving large-scale and long-lasting military invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and a broad range of repressive measures at home and abroad, was an overreaction that caused unforeseen negative consequences.[22] Anders Behring Breivik was quite explicit in stating that provoking overreactions and repression was one of his goals.[23] He generally failed to achieve this. Trust in the government remained high in the population after the attack.[24] The immediate political response by the Prime Minister and by other leading politicians as well as by the Norwegian population was widely admired abroad.[25] Moreover, the government administration and the political system was back in operation surprisingly fast after the attack. The response by the health services was also highly effective.[26]

A common response to major terrorist attacks is a dramatic increase in security measures. Typically, this includes more resources and authorisation for methods to security services as well as a broad range of protective measures. The July 22 attacks exposed how naïve Norwegian society had been in terms of general threat perception, and its lack of sufficient protective security measures against terrorist attacks. During the following months and years, a wide range of security measures were implemented in and around public buildings, and the Police Security Service and several operational police units and functions were strengthened.

Frequently, a long-term national level impact of high-casualty terrorist attacks involves changes in terrorism legislation. Norwegian terrorism legislation in force at the time of the attack in 2011 criminalised conspiracies (*inngå forbund*) to prepare terrorist attacks, based on the (often mistaken) assumption that terrorism is necessarily a group activity. This meant that if Breivik’s July 22 terrorist plot had been detected some weeks before his attack, his evident preparations to carry out terrorist attacks would not have been punishable because he did it alone. The new Penal code, in force from 2015, removed this loophole for preparations by lone actor terrorists.[27]

One would expect that such a devastating attack on the governing Labour Party and its youth organisation – perpetrated by an individual who some years earlier had been an active member of the right-wing populist Progress Party – would change the political landscape. And to some extent it did. The electoral support for the Labour party increased, while support for the Progress Party decreased – both in the polls and in the local elections, which took place only about two months after the July 22 attack. The Progress Party lost ownership to the immigration issue and fewer voters believed immigration was an important political issue.[28] Furthermore, as in the case of 9/11 and the Madrid bombing of 2004, there was a noticeable increase in electoral turnout among young voters.[29] Moreover, many youth wings, particularly the Labour youth but also those on the right, experienced a substantial influx of new members.[30] However, some of these effects turned out to be short-lived. Just one year later, the electoral strength of major parties was similar to what it had been prior to the terrorist attacks[31]. Furthermore, in 2013 the Labour Party-led government lost power and had to make room for a coalition by the Conservative Party and the Progress Party. The Labour Party was highly sensitive to potential accusations of playing “the July 22 card” and avoided holding the Progress Party responsible for fomenting some of the anti-Islam/immigration views that the July 22 terrorist took to the extreme. Many members of the AUF were critical of this reluctance by the mother party to address this sensitive issue properly. These are some of the issues discussed in the articles by Anna Grøndal-Larsen and by Anders Ravik Jupskås

and Øyvind Solheim. These controversies are also addressed in the article by Jone Salomonsen. The news media and the culture industry (television, movies, theatre, art) also played important roles in shaping the narratives in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. Although an emotionally sensitive topic, the July 22 attacks were eventually addressed in several movies, television series and theatre productions.[32]

A related dimension at the national/societal level concerns how society commemorates the tragic event, and how narratives are shaped. In the aftermath of large-scale terrorist attacks, conflicts regarding the establishment of memorial sites are a recurring feature. Since such terrorist attacks tend to take place in localities where people will continue living their day-to-day lives – some of whom have been directly or indirectly affected by the attack – such memorials tend to function as reminders of these horrible events, triggering traumatic feelings and disrupting a return to normality. Such controversies around the location and design of memorials were prominent in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in New York as well as after the Bali bombings in 2002, to mention a few examples. In Norway, some neighbours to the planned memorial next to Utøya were fiercely opposing these plans – an issue also covered in the article by Jone Salomonsen in this issue.


**Global impacts of terrorist attacks** are less common but some attacks have repercussions of transnational dimensions, including security politics, global economy, travelling, international law, human rights, and research agendas. The emergence of international live television news, the Internet and a variety of social media channels increases the potential global impact of terrorist attacks and the capacity of terrorists to communicate their messages to international audiences through graphic images and verbal manifestos.[33] Among terrorist attacks taking place during the last 50 years that had a kind of ‘global turning point’ impact, a few stand out, such as:

- The hostage taking of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympics in Munich. The failed rescue operation by untrained and ill-prepared police forces, resulting in the death of all the hostages, exposed the fact that German authorities (as well as those in most other countries) were ill-prepared to deal professionally with such terrorist hostage situations. This led to the establishment of highly trained special police and military forces in most countries, soon making hostage attacks far more risky and less profitable to terrorists. Security became a major concern in relation to large sports events.
- The 9/11 plane attacks on New York and Washington D.C. in 2001, organised by Al-Qaida, had truly global and geopolitical impacts. The spectacular live images of the planes crashing into the twin towers in New York were televised globally, causing powerful reactions worldwide, ranging from shock and horror among those who identified with the victims to celebrations among those who identified with the terrorists’ cause. Whereas 2,977 people were killed directly by the 9/11 attacks, the War on Terror campaign resulted in invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and other wars, leading to the death of at least 800,000 people, according to one conservative assessment.[34] The repercussions of the 9/11 attacks and the resulting War on Terror are still influencing world politics on several dimensions.[35] One of the outcomes was that this event reinforced and normalised the idea that there is a “clash of civilizations” between the Western world and the Islamic world – a perception which increased hostility and fear on both sides. The 9/11 attack led to increasing Islamophobia in the West, whereas the “War on Terror” response was perceived as a war against Islam among many Muslims, feeding popular support for al-Qaida and similar extremist and terrorist movements.
- The London bombings in 2005 (preceded by the Madrid train attacks and the murder of the film maker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004) led to a significant shift in threat images and counterterrorism. Whereas the 9/11 attacks led to military responses against what was perceived as an external enemy, the London bombing shifted the focus towards homegrown terrorists and fear of radicalisation among local Muslims – “them” – living among “us”, giving Islamophobia a new twist.[36] Furthermore, with a perceived threat from within society, policies to counter violent extremism (CVE) began to put far

stronger emphasis on non-military means of prevention. This led to a flurry of policies, action plans and interventions at local, national, and international levels to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism.


The July 22 attacks in Norway had less long-lasting impacts than these three events, but it did have some global impacts as well. First and foremost, the magnitude of the victimization in Utøya and property destruction in Oslo led to increased concerns among security services, police, and policymakers in many countries about the potential threats from lone actor terrorists and their potential for causing massive harm. In addition, terrorism from the extreme right also became perceived as a more serious threat than before – although this concern did not really take hold until the series of (attempted) mass shootings by extreme right terrorists in 2019. The July 22 attacks were at the time (rightly) considered an outlier – both when compared with other lone actor attacks,[37] and in the history of right-wing terrorism. The two previous main cases of high-casualty attacks considered (rightly or wrongly) as carried out by lone actors were the so-called Oktoberfest bombing in Munich in 1980 (13 killed, including the perpetrator) and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 (168 killed, including 19 children). In both cases, it is questionable whether the perpetrators were lone actors in a strict sense.[38]

**Figure 2:** Number of Extreme Right Fatal Attacks and Fatalities per Year in Western Europe (1990-2020)



Source: RTV Trend Report 2021


**Figure 3:** Number of Fatalities per Fatal Extreme Right Attack, Ranging from 1 per Attack to 5 or More. (1990-2020)



Source: RTV Trend Report 2021

The July 22 attacks also had a significant impact on the research agenda in terrorism studies. Although Jihadi terrorists had also increasingly turned to lone actor attacks during this period, the July 22 attacks in 2011 demonstrated the destructive potential of a lone actor. In the aftermath, there was a huge increase in academic articles, books and reports on “lone wolf terrorists” and “lone actor terrorists”.

**Figure 4:** Use of the term “Lone Wolf (N = 15 243) and “Lone Actor” (N= 1 856) as Terms in Full Text Scientific Publications. Absolute Numbers, period 2000-2020



Source: Google Scholar. Compiled by Lars Erik Berntzen, University of Bergen. See Research Note by Berntzen and Bjørge in this Special Issue.

The fact that the huge increase in publications on the “lone wolf/lone actor” occurred in 2013 and 2014, two-three years after the July 22 attack, reflects the research and publication cycle – but also that “lone wolves” suddenly became a hot topic for researchers, resulting in a flurry of academic output [39] of mixed quality. These patterns will be discussed more thoroughly in a Research Note by Lars Erik Berntzen and Tore Bjørge in this Special Issue.

It should be mentioned that the establishment of the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) is also a direct outcome of the July 22 attack, as this exposed an urgent need for updated research on right-wing extremism and violence, leading to a government decision to finance a research center to focus specifically on right-wing extremism. C-REX was established at the University of Oslo in February 2016 (after a competition with other two other consortiums), with funding for ten years.

### ***What Makes Some Terrorist Attacks Have Lasting Impacts?***

There are, in our view, three factors that account for a lasting impact of some terrorist attacks: severity, response and innovation.

*Severity:* One obvious reason is that terrorist attacks with large-scale destruction and with a high number of casualties will make for a greater and more lasting impact than small-scale attacks. This was clearly the case with the July 22, 2011 attacks in Norway as well as with the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the London bombings of 2005, the Barcelona attacks of 2017 and the Christchurch attacks of 2019, to mention a few. It is obvious that the high-casualty attack in Christchurch, with 51 fatalities and 40 more wounded, made a far stronger impact than the attacks in Poway (California, 2019), Bærum (Norway, 2019) and Halle (Germany, 2019), with only one or two persons killed. However, some small-scale hate crimes may also have major impacts for other reasons. In Oslo in February 2001, the racist knife murder of a young black boy, Benjamin Hermansen, by a group of Nazis skinheads, the Boot Boys, caused a huge shock in Norwegian society, bringing tens of thousands out in the streets to protest against racism. The shock and the powerful public response caused the end of the Nazi skinhead movement in Norway, leading to widespread defections, stopping recruitment, and making it unacceptable to display support for Nazism in public.[40] The brutal violence and open racism against an innocent victim were sufficiently shocking to bring racism high up on the public and political agenda. A similar racist knife murder of the black boy Stephen Lawrence in London in 1993 had a great and lasting impact as well. Widespread outrage over faulty police investigation and the reluctance of the police to consider the racist dimension of the attack led to a public enquiry (the MacPherson Report), concluding that London’s Metropolitan police was marred by institutional racism.[41] The issue is still haunting the English police and its relations with minorities. Thus, severity in terms of destruction and the number of casualties is not alone sufficient to make a lasting impact. Many large-scale terrorist attacks are soon forgotten by those not directly affected, whereas smaller attacks can gain lasting significance.

*Response:* The nature of the response or responses to terrorist attacks is also decisive. Terrorists usually want to provoke certain types of responses (such as over-reactions or inability to act) that can undermine the legitimacy of the government or the enemy.[42] However, terrorist attacks do also frequently backfire, as responses serve to bolster opposition to the terrorist cause and increase support for the authorities. Some terrorist attacks overstep the limits of acceptable violence and lead to a backlash among the constituency of (potential) supporters. One example was the Omagh bombing in 1998, which killed 29 people and was carried out by the Real IRA in an effort to undermine the Northern Ireland peace process. This carnage led to strong local, regional and international outcry against ‘dissident’ republicans and increased support for the Northern Ireland peace process.[43]

*Innovation:* Terrorists generally try to make news. However, if terrorist attacks become repetitious, such attacks may over time lose their newsworthiness and impact. One way that terrorists try to avoid this trap is by innovation – doing something that has not been done by terrorists before, even if only a few people are killed.[44] The poison gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo group is one example, suicide

attacks with hijacked airplanes on buildings in New York and Washington, is another. The innovation may be in terms of attack methods but also in terms of targeting: attacking sports events (the Munich Olympics), school children (the Beslan school siege) or political youth camps (Utøya) illustrate the shock effects of such unprecedented attacks.

There are many important aspects of long-term impacts of terrorist attacks that are not covered (or merely touched upon superficially) in this Special Issue. We have tried to address some of the main consequences related to the July 22, 2011 attacks specifically, sometimes with an eye toward other major attacks as well. Other academic studies [45] covering major events like the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington and the 7/7 bombings in London have had multiple long-term impacts, including increased discrimination of ethnic and religious minorities, infringements on personal liberties, increased surveillance, and major changes in the security sector as well as changes in legislation, public opinion, the economy, travel patterns, and more. There is an obvious need for more comparative studies of the long-term impacts of major terrorist attacks. There is a need to explore how and why some of these consequences became severe and lasting whereas other consequences were only temporal and more manageable.

### About the Authors

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**Anders Ravik Jupskås** is a senior researcher and deputy director at the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), University of Oslo. His work covers right-wing extremism, populism and party politics. He has published articles in *Scandinavian Political Studies*, *Swiss Political Science Review* and *Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift*, as well as chapters on far-right politics in recently published edited volumes on ECPR Press, Palgrave and Routledge. He is the author of *Ekstreme Europa* (Cappelen Damm, 2012/2017).

### Notes

- [1] Richard English (2016). *Does Terrorism Work? A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Diego Muro (2018). *When Does Terrorism Work?* London and New York: Routledge; Max Abrams (2006). "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security*, Vol. 31, pp. 42-78.
- [2] Description of the attacks is based on *Rapport fra 22. juli-kommisjonen*. Oslo: NOU 2012:14. URL: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/nou-2012-14/id697260/>. English summary: [https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/bb3dc76229c64735b4f6eb4dbfcdbfe8/en-gb/pdfs/nou2012\\_14\\_eng.pdf](https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/bb3dc76229c64735b4f6eb4dbfcdbfe8/en-gb/pdfs/nou2012_14_eng.pdf); and Cato Hemmingby and Tore Bjørgo (2016). *The Dynamics of a Terrorist targeting Process: Anders B. Breivik and the July 22 Attacks in Norway*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Pivot.
- [3] Breivik had actually planned to carry out three car bomb attacks but due to a combination of several constraints (time, work capacity and financing) he had to settle for only one bomb attack. On the day of the attack, he was also several hours delayed. This saved many lives as most of those working in the building had already left for the weekend. See Hemmingby & Bjørgo (2016), op.cit.
- [4] He spared only two: a nine-year-old boy and a "conservative looking young man" he considered to be out of place, looking a bit like himself. See Hemmingby & Bjørgo (2016), p. 69.
- [5] According to statement by ABB in court (NTB court transcripts 20.04.2012).
- [6] According to Breivik's statements in court, 19 April 2012 (NTB court transcripts).
- [7] Hemmingby & Bjørgo (2016), op.c cit., p. 60-61.

- [8] For details on Breivik's surrender to the Delta Force, see Hemmingby & Bjørgo (2016), op.cit., p. 70-75. The delayed police operation was heavily criticised by the July 22 Commission's report. For a critical assessment of this report, see Helge Renå (2019), *Police Coordination in Crises. Who knew what, when, where and why in managing the terrorist attacks in Oslo and Utøya in 2011?* (PhD thesis, University of Bergen).
- [9] The police investigation showed that he was alone to develop and carry out his terrorist plot although he belonged to a larger anti-Islamist and extreme right universe on the Internet [Hemmingby & Bjørgo (2016)].
- [10] Statement by Breivik in the first police interview with him immediately after he was arrested at Utøya. See note [23] for details. In connection with a research project on Breivik's target selection and decision-making process, we were given access to all the police investigative interviews with Breivik, including 1.200 pages of transcripts and DVD recordings. See Hemmingby & Bjørgo (2016) [note 2], and a shortened version in Hemmingby & Bjørgo (2018), "Terrorist Target Selection: The Case of Anders Behring Breivik". *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. XII, Issue 6 (Special issue on "Terrorism from the Extreme Right", edited by Jacob Aasland Ravndal and Tore Bjørgo).
- [11] There was general agreement among legal experts in Norway that the criminal justice process passed the test but there was more disagreement among experts on whether his prison conditions deviated from the standard. URL: <https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/jPrpz/vi-maa-nettopp-motstaa-den-fristelsen-det-er-aa-gjoere-ham-spesiell>
- [12] Berwick, Andrew, aka Anders Behring Breivik (2011): *2083 – A European Declaration of Independence* (retrieved from Internet, 23.07.2011).
- [13] Hemmingby & Bjørgo (2016), op.cit., p. 62.
- [14] One of the editors/authors of this article (Bjørgo) was one of these critics, also serving as an expert witness during the trial. URL: <https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk/i/XgkXr/med-monopol-paa-vrangforestillinger>
- [15] See Hemmingby & Bjørgo (2016), op. cit., pp. 78-82; Tore Bjørgo, Beatrice de Graaf, Liesbeth van der Heide, Cato Hemmingby and Daan Weggemans(2016), "Performing Justice, Coping with Trauma: The Trial of Anders Breivik, 2012. In: Beatrice de Graaf & Alex P. Schmid (Eds.). *Terrorists on Trial: A Performative Perspective*. Leiden: Leiden University Press (pp. 457-502).
- [16] *Klassekampen*, 19 august 2011
- [17] The Norwegian support group after the 22nd July terror attacks. URL: <https://22juli.info/english/>
- [18] URL: <https://www.aftenposten.no/oslo/i/Ln6mz1/i-dag-starter-et-av-de-stoerste-byggeprosjektene-i-norge-noensinne>
- [19] See note 2.
- [20] Vanja Lundgren Sørli and Paul Larsson (Eds., 2018). *Politireformer – Idealer, realiteter, retorikk og praksis*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk.
- [21] Richard English (2016). *Does Terrorism Work? A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Tore Bjørgo (2013). *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 76-79).
- [22] Mark Mazzetti. "Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat," *The New York Times*, Sept. 24, 2006. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/world/middleeast/24terror.html> ; Richard English (2016) [note 1].
- [23] During the initial police interviews with Breivik after he was arrested at Utøya, one of his demands was that the Norwegian government should reinstate torture and the death penalty. This would make the government break its principles, which would give him an ideological victory – although he conceded that this was not a very realistic demand. During the trial, he also claimed that one of his goals was to "launch a provocation leading to persecution of the moderate cultural conservatives, in turn boosting their motivation for resistance." Cit. Hemmingby & Bjørgo 2016, p. 35.
- [24] Bernard Enjolras, Kari Steen-Johnsen, Francisco Herreros, Øyvind Bugge Solheim, Marte Winsvold, Shana Gadarian & Atte Oksanen (2019). "Does trust prevent fear in the aftermath of terrorist attacks?" *Perspectives on Terrorism*. 13(4), pp. 39-55. The paper by Jupskås and Solheim in this special issue discussed diverging views on the question whether voices critical of the current immigration policy had been repressed or not.
- [25] Uri Friedman (2011). "Comparing How Norway and the U.S. Respond to Terror: Norwegians appear to have largely bypassed bloodlust and vengeance." *The Atlantic*, July 27, 2011. URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/comparing-how-norway-and-us-respond-terror/353336/>
- [26] *Rapport fra 22. Juli-kommisjonen*, chapters 9 and 10. [note 2]
- [27] URL: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/sub/radikalisering/radikaliseringskonferanse/id663873/>
- [28] Tor Bjørklund and Johannes Bergh (2013). «Lokalvalget i skyggen av 22. juli». In: Johannes Bergh & Dag Arne Christensen (Eds.) *Et robust lokaldemokrati : Lokalvalget i skyggen av 22. juli 2011*. Abstrakt forlag (pp. 21–44).
- [29] Johannes Bergh and Guro Ødegård (2013). «Ungdomsvalget 2011». *Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift*. 29(1), pp. 30- 50

- [30] Guro Ødegård (2014), «Sma partier – store endringer Medlemskap i ungdomspartiene i Norge 1998–2011». *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning*, 14(1), pp. 135-148.
- [31] See e.g., Anders Ravik Jupskås and Tore Wig (2012). “One year after terrorism struck Norway: taking stock”. *OpenDemocracy*, July 24, 2012. URL: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/one-year-after-terrorism-struck-norway-taking-stock/>
- [32] For a discussion on media productions about the July 22 attacks, see Anne Gjelsvik (Ed., 2021) *Bearbeidelser: 22. juli i ord og bilder*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- [33] Brigitte Nacos (2016). *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: Mainstream and Digital Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism* (3rd ed.). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- [34] According to “The Costs of War” project at Brown University. URL: <https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/>
- [35] See, for example, Michael Cox (2002). “Paradigm Shifts and 9/11: International Relations After the Twin Towers,” *Security Dialogue* 33(2).
- [36] Mike Hardy (2015) Home-grown terror and clashes within civilisations: Reflections ten years on from the July 7th 2005 terror attacks in London. In: Serena Hussain, Mike Hardy and Fiyaz Mughal (Eds., 2015). *7th July London Bombings: A Decade of Reflection*. Open Society Foundation. URL: <https://pureportal.coventry.ac.uk/en/publications/77-reflections-7th-july-london-bombings-a-decade-of-reflections>
- [37] Ramon Spaaij (2012). *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism* (London: Springer); Hemmingby & Bjørge (2016), op.cit., chapt. 8.
- [38] The Oktoberfest bomber, who was killed when his device exploded prematurely, had been involved with a banned neo-Nazi militia group (*Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann*), and there were suspicions that other persons had been involved in the preparations of the attack, but this could neither be proved nor disproved. The Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh had a partner (Terry Nichols) and two other helpers and should not be considered a lone actor terrorist.
- [39] Even pop idol Michael Jackson dedicated his album “Invincible” to the Norwegian victim of racist violence, Benjamin Hermansen. URL: <https://www.vg.no/rampelys/i/wEP3OP/hedrer-benjamin>
- [40] This was confirmed by former leading figures in the local Nazi scene at the time. See Tore Bjørge (Ed., 2018). *Høyreekstremisme i Norge: Utviklingstrekk, konspirasjonsteorier og forebyggingsstrategier*. PHS Forskning 2018:4. Oslo: PolitiHøgskolen, pp. 48-49, 59-60. URL: <https://phs.brage.unit.no/phs-xmlui/handle/11250/2568904>
- [41] URL: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stephen-lawrence-inquiry>
- [42] The fumbling investigation of the decade-long series of murders of immigrants and other crimes in Germany by what eventually turned out to be a cell known as the National Socialist Underground (NSU) led to a crisis in confidence in the police and security agencies due to their reluctance to share relevant information and explore properly the possibility that this might be an extreme-right terrorist campaign. Daniel Koehler (2018). *Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century: The ‘National Socialist Underground’ and the History of Terror from the Far-Right in Germany*. London & New York: Routledge.
- [43] John Morrison (2020). “Reality Check: The Real IRA’s Tactical Adaptation and Restraint in the Aftermath of the Omagh Bombing,” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol 14, Issue 6. URL: <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2020/issue-6/morrison.pdf>
- [44] Adam Dolnik (2007). *Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends*. London: Routledge.
- [45] See e.g., Rachel E. Utley (ed., 2012). *9/11 Ten Years After: Perspectives and Problems*. London & New York: Routledge; Robert M. Brackbill & W. Allen Robison (Eds. 2019), Long-Term Health Effects of the 9/11 Disaster. Special issue of *Environmental Research and Public Health* (Nov. 2019). URL: <https://doi.org/10.3390/books978-3-03921-813-4>; Arabinda Acharya (2015). *Ten Years After 9/11 - Rethinking the Jihadist Threat*. London & New York: Routledge. Lars Erslev Andersen, Mani Crone, Peter Hansen, Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen, Ulla Holm, Søren Hove and Leila Stockmarr (2011). *Ti år efter: 11. september 2++1 – Tilbageblik, Status og aktuelle tendenser*. Copenhagen: DIIS - Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier; Serena Hussain, Mike Hardy and Fiyaz Mughal (Eds., 2015). *7/7 Reflections - 7th July London Bombings: A Decade of Reflection*. Coventry University. URL: <https://www.faith-matters.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/A-Decade-of-Reflections-Final.pdf>; Mike Hardy (2015). *Home-grown terror and clashes within civilisations: Reflections ten years on from the July 7th 2005 terror attacks in London*. In: Hussain, Hardy and Mughal (Eds., 2015).