The Internal Brakes on Violent Escalation within the British Extreme Right in the 1990s

by Graham Macklin

Abstract

It is perhaps counter-intuitive to ponder why the extreme right milieu, which regularly espouses violent apocalyptic jeremiads regarding the impending threat to race and nation, has not generated as much violence as it would appear capable of. This article explores this question, using a case study of the British extreme right in the 1990s, a period in which there was violent street conflict with anti-fascist activists. It focusses in particular upon the British National Party, as that organisation sought to become a legitimate political party whilst simultaneously being entangled in violent street confrontations with anti-fascists, on the one hand, and conflict with militants on its own “radical flank” who baulked at the party’s new direction, on the other. Specifically, this article explores the role internal rather than external “brakes” might have played in limiting violent escalation in a “scene” in which a certain level of violence was endemic. Utilising the typology of “internal brakes” developed by Busher, Macklin and Holbrook, which highlights five distinct, though often overlapping, “logics” that work to restrain violent escalation, the article discusses the processes that worked to restrain rather than escalate violence. It does so in order to demonstrate how this typology can be used as an analytical tool for conceptualising how the internal restraints on violence might function within other political milieu as well.

Keywords: Internal brakes, violent escalation, non-violence, extreme right, group dynamics

Introduction

Extreme right-wing groups rarely do as much violence as their rhetoric would suggest that they might.[1] Such a statement might seem counter-intuitive upon first reading. After all one can easily cite countless examples of politically motivated violence and terrorism perpetrated by such groups and individuals that would appear to confound rather than confirm this assertion. Relatively speaking, however, very few groups, extreme right or otherwise, have recourse to lethal force as the tool of first resort.[2] Even organisations and networks whose stock in trade is terrorism still seek to manage and regulate their violence, albeit often for a variety of quite different reasons.[3] Whilst there is wealth of research regarding how terrorism “declines” or “ends” and how violent groups deescalate their violence,[4] there is rather less research on why and moreover how some groups restrain violence in the first place, or at least seek to ensure that it does not escalate beyond a certain point.[5]

Rather than focussing on the myriad instances of violent escalation by extreme right actors that preoccupy counter-terrorism officials and policy makers across Europe and the United States at present, this article focusses instead on a different question. What are the intragroup mechanisms and processes through which extreme right organisations actually exercise restraint upon violent escalation? Through a historical case study of the British extreme right in the 1990s, a period characterised by violent factionalism within the milieu and intense street conflict with anti-fascist activists outside it, this article highlights five “internal brakes” that might have served to restrain or repress greater forms of violence from emerging within the milieu. “Internal brakes” are herein defined as practices, “through which actors who are recognised as group members seek either: a) to inhibit directly the adoption or diffusion of more violent tactics by other group members; or b) foment strategic decisions and (sub)cultural practices the logical consequences of which are to inhibit the adoption or diffusion of more violent tactics.”[6]

Each of the brakes outlined in this article conformed to a different though often overlapping “logic” that could be observed within the case study as working to limit greater violence, or at least presented non-escalation as a viable option to activists. These brakes, around which this article is structured, are as follows:

• Brake One – The identification of more- or less violent strategies of action as being as or more effective
that more violent alternatives. (Strategic logic);

• **Brake Two** – Construction of moral norms and evaluations that inhibit certain forms of violence and the emotional impulses towards violence (e.g. revenge) (Moral logic);

• **Brake Three** – Self-identification as a group that is either non-violent or uses only limited forms of violence (Ego maintenance);

• **Brake Four** – Boundary softening in relation to putative out-groups (Out-group definition);

• **Brake Five** – Organisational developments that either a) alter the moral and strategic equations in favour of non- or limited violence, b) institutionalise less violent collective identities and/or processes of boundary softening, and/or c) reduce the likelihood of unplanned violence (Organisational logic).

**Methodology and Case Selection**

This categorisation derives from a collaborative CREST-funded project entitled *The Internal Brakes on Violent Escalation: A Descriptive Typology*, co-authored with Joel Busher and Donald Holbrook in 2019. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* subsequently published a refined version of this typology later that same year. Space prohibits a more detailed explanation of either the project or the typology and so interested readers are enjoined to consult both those publications for further information.[7]

The current article demonstrates how this typology can be applied to an ideological/historical case study to understand more about how internal brakes functioned within the extreme right. It does not represent an uncritical application of the typology to a case study, however. Instead, it provides an example of how a historical case study can inform theory building. The original typology derived in part from three case studies – one on the animal rights movement, another on international jihadism and a third one on the British extreme right, the research for which informs the current article. Methodologically, the relationship between the historical case studies and the development of the theoretical framework was an iterative one. The first step, once case studies were selected (based upon a “most-different case comparative strategy”[8]) was to conduct a thorough review of the relevant theoretical and analytical literature. This ranged across several disciplines, including social movement studies, terrorism studies, peace studies, and the sociological and psychological literatures on processes of violence. Collectively, the research team interrogated these literatures for insight into the processes and mechanisms that might illuminate how groups and individuals inhibited rather than facilitated violence. We had been mindful of this in selecting our case studies too, choosing three sets of ideological actors that engaged in very different levels of violence. The underlying intention was to address, or at least mitigate concerns, that “theories, derived largely from examples of groups that turned to violence, may tend to over-predict violence.”[9]

From our literature review, we developed a general coding framework. We used the framework to code our case studies and in turn used the case studies to hone the typology by “coding-up” i.e. identifying those practices within our case studies that could be said to be exerting a “brake” on violence – or at least the escalation of a certain form of violence. As we began to identify the practices that seemed to inhibit violence across our case studies, we used these to interrogate our initial framework and to add new codes to it as and when these emerged. These were further refined through an ongoing engagement with the theoretical literature. The typology went through fifteen different iterations as a result of this process, leaving us with the five categories that informed both the typology and this article.[10]

The sources for this case study derive from a survey of the secondary academic literature on the British extreme right as well as memoirs written by former or still active activists, contemporary media reports, television documentaries, as well as archival research into the principal publications produced by the groups discussed herein. One obvious limitation in the study is the lack of interview data with activists themselves, which would quite possibly reveal more about how brakes on violent escalation might work when activists are moments away from violence or indeed in the midst of it. Activist autobiographies, distorted though they might be by issues of memory, self-censorship, or the fact that many of the authors of such memoirs are now actively working against
the groups they were once part of, can still provide a level of insight into how internal brakes on violence functioned at an individual level, however. Whilst these testimonies require critical reading, many of them give quite candid accounts of their violence that do not necessarily reflect well on their former selves. They have thus been included here to highlight some of the sorts of visceral emotional responses that participating in violence could have for the perpetrator and the way in which such events could serve to decelerate involvement in violence rather than accelerate it – though such accounts are often limited to discussing personal choices rather than group dynamics.

**Street Violence between the British Extreme Right and Anti-Fascists during the 1990s.**

The implosion of the National Front (NF) following the 1979 general election caused the extreme right to fragment. The most important of the many factions to emerge from this tumult was the British National Party (BNP), founded in 1982 by the former NF chairman, John Tyndall. Although for the majority of its early life the BNP was less a legitimate political party than a “street gang”; by the late 1980s it had come to fill the void left by the ongoing atrophy of the NF as a mass political organisation.[11] The demise of the NF saw anti-fascist groups demobilise too. The Anti-Nazi League (ANL), founded in 1977 to combat the NF, was wound down whilst the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), which had stood behind the group, also decommissioned its “squad”s – groups of activists who would physically defend ANL activities from attack.[12] Surplus to requirements, the SWP later expelled many of these activists. Physical opposition to the extreme right did not cease, however. Many activists re-united under the banner of Red Action (RA) in 1981, which engaged in sporadic street clashes with the extreme right. It was only after an attack upon an open-air concert staged by Labour-controlled Greater London Council in 1984, however, that RA formed its own “mobile combat unit”[13] to undertake offensive violence against the extreme right. The following year RA became a core component of Anti-Fascist Action (AFA), a coalition of anti-fascist groups formed on 28 July 1985 to physically and ideologically oppose a rise in extreme right activity.[14]

From 1985 onwards there were numerous violent encounters, the most notable being an AFA attack on skinheads gathering at the re-direction point for a Blood & Honour concert in Hyde Park in 1989 and the “Battle of Waterloo” in 1992, when a running battle was fought on and around the concourse of Waterloo Station in London. Whilst the street violence, even when weapons such as iron bars, bats and CS gas were used, remained relatively stable insofar as the overarching repertoire was concerned, there were instances of escalation including the firebombing of activists homes and attacks against property.

In the midst of this ongoing street violence, the BNP launched its “Rights for Whites” campaign in London’s East End, hoping to reposition it as “the legitimate defender of local white residents.”[15] The campaign, which began in 1990 amidst a wider “white backlash” against “multiculturalism,”[16] culminated with the party gaining a council seat on the Isle of Dogs in 1993.[17] The BNP’s political progress led AFA to retrain its focus upon the party as the principal threat emanating from the extreme right. Other groups also entered the fray. The SWP re-launched the ANL whilst the Anti-Racist Alliance was also launched. AFA perceived the latter as “protest” groups who would do little to “stop” the extreme right. Copsey argues that, as part of a broader intra-movement contest, AFA sought “to differentiate itself from this competition by further emphasising its physical mettle.”[18]

In 1992, in response to anti-fascist direct action against party activities, the BNP formed a “Stewards Group.” This soon become known as Combat 18 (C18), its numerology signifying its ideological allegiance: 1 = A; 8 = H; AH = Adolf Hitler. The relationship between the BNP and its progeny soon soured, however. As early as the spring of 1993 C18 berated the BNP leadership for following the “failed tactics of the 1970s” [19] whilst advocating a revolutionary path itself. The BNP victory on the Isle of Dogs failed to mollify C18 who derided the party’s electoral strategy as a “complete and utter failure.”[20] By the end of the year Tyndall proscribed C18 as a “hostile organisation”. [21]
This failed to stem the challenge to Tyndall’s leadership, however. His personal authority and the efficacy of the electoral strategy he advocated came under increasing pressure as numerous activists, their hopes dashed by electoral defeat (the BNP lost their council seat the following year), found C18’s claims to be a revolutionary vanguard preparing for “race war” increasingly alluring. Tyndall’s loss of control over C18, whose militants physically attacked his own organisers on several occasions, and the ongoing violent clashes with anti-fascists, would appear to indicate that the internal brakes on violent escalation were beginning to erode or in some instances fail altogether during the period in question. Indeed, C18 became notorious in 1997 after attempting, with the help of Danish colleagues, to perpetrate a letter bomb campaign against political opponents and celebrities in mixed-race relationships. Two years later David Copeland, active in the National Socialist Movement, a group that evolved from C18, detonated three nail bombs in London in April 1999, his devices exploding, without warning or demand, in areas historically associated with London’s Afro-Caribbean, Bengali and LGBTQ communities. In his final attack Copeland murdered three people, including a pregnant woman and her unborn child, and injured 79 people four of whom lost limbs.

However, if one takes a broader view of the milieu, the groups within it, and the political goals they were trying to achieve, it becomes possible to see more clearly that the five “internal brakes” on violence were all present during this period as the BNP in particular continued its efforts to move away from street violence. This was a transition aided by the subsequent dissolution of AFA and RA. Indeed, even in the paradigmatic case of the London bombings where any such restraints on lethal violence surely failed at an individual level, in the aftermath of the attack leading actors quickly restated these restraints within the milieu, though their words and actions rarely related to moral qualms about violence. It is to a more detailed exploration of how these brakes manifested themselves that this article now turns.

**Brake One: Strategic Logic**

Strategic logic impelled many of the decisions taken, particularly at an organisational level, not to engage in greater violence. Indeed, that the BNP leadership identified “non-violent” strategies as being the more likely means of attaining their political goals shaped how they perceived the political utility of other forms of violence. For party leaders, who had convictions for quasi-paramilitary activity in the 1960s, or, more recently, convictions for explosives offences, the political efficacy of non-violence was an insight perhaps gained only from previous exposure to the legal perils of “revolutionary” activity. This strategic logic was reinforced by a growing awareness that, defiant rhetoric aside, the party could not “out violence” its anti-fascist opponents during the street conflict that dogged its every activity.

During the 1990s, the extreme right had neither the “fastidious attention to detail” nor the “practised caution” of their anti-fascist opponents when it came to planning and executing street violence.[22] Nor could they compete when it came to intelligence gathering. High alcohol usage within the milieu appears to have played its part in diminishing the capacity of groups like C18 to organise violence or gather “anti-anti-fascist” intelligence with quite the same efficiency as its opponents.[23] Whilst numerous studies have highlighted that alcohol and substance abuse increase the risk of casual violence, they have also acted as a barrier (at least in an American context) for activists transitioning from acts of spontaneous street violence to premeditated mass casualty terrorism.[24] Or to put it another way, activist cultures and lifestyles can inadvertently strengthen restraint at one level of violence whilst simultaneously acting as a solvent upon such brakes at another level. This points to the importance of understanding how processes of internal restraint are shaped and often complicated by group cultures and practices.

From a strategic perspective, extreme right activists also understood that escalating their responses to their anti-fascist opponents risked increasing State repression of their own activities. During the course of the decade and beyond, new technologies led activists to understand the personal costs of engaging in political violence differently: the growing ubiquity of CCTV and mobile phone cameras increased risk of identification, apprehension and prosecution, whilst increased legal penalties served as a further deterrent for others. Fear of arrest caused some C18 activists to self-censor their worst rhetorical excesses. Whilst preparing the third
issue of *Combat 18*, an 88-page racist tirade replete with bomb making instructions, leading C18 activist Will Browning had written “kill ‘em all” next to a list of the names of left-wing activists. “The original draft had included the names and addresses of 300 MPs, something [C18 leader] Charlie Sargent had removed in a fit of panic.”[25] Not everyone shared such concerns, however, as the subsequent arrests of those who produced *The Stormer*, highlighted.[26]

Similar articulations of risk were evident in the aftermath of C18’s failed letter bomb campaign in 1997. Despite mounting pressure on the group, Browning allegedly sought to plan another campaign the following year, travelling to Germany to discuss the idea with German counterparts. One of those present voiced disquiet about the prospects of their getting away with such a venture, forcing Browning to abandon the idea.[27] Indeed even some of the “theoreticians” within the “radical flank” understood that insofar as the fantasy of armed insurrection was concerned, “the time was not yet right for such plans: we needed the people first, properly motivated, in their thousands, and we had dozens.”[28]

Conspiratorial racial anti-Semitism, the ideological prism through which many extreme right activists interpret the world, can have a radicalising effect that leads towards violence but there is also evidence that the paranoia it is capable of inducing at the individual level could also exert a paralysing effect on violence escalation. There were occasions in which militant action was considered against an anti-fascist magazine but quickly abandoned because the would-be perpetrators convinced themselves that “Mossad” would wreak revenge upon them if they did stage an attack.[29]

Strategically, there was also an awareness that undue violent escalation might induce a potential backlash from supporters and the public that was counter-productive to their goals. For much of the 1980s, extreme right activists had argued that “party time is over.”[30] The electoral hegemony of the Conservative Party had assured that, for the remainder of the decade, there was no electoral road to success. Thus violent stratagems such as “leaderless resistance” [31] quickly became popular within the milieu though, as research highlights, just because such violent ideas are widely disseminated does not mean that they will be automatically adopted as the basis of political action.[32] Though BNP leader John Tyndall agreed with those in the radical flank of the wider “movement” that there was no electoral route out of the political ghetto, he rejected violent militancy as a panacea, preferring to dig in and await a more favourable political climate. Importantly, he sought to entrench a particular set of political practices and repertoires of action within the BNP early on in its life cycle that would prove hard to shift once they had become embedded.[33] This created a certain path dependency for the BNP, meaning that whilst its activists often engaged in violence as part of their activism, the level and type of violence they employed was deemed “sufficient” not to warrant further escalation.

The BNP “Rights for Whites” campaign, which culminated in the election of the party’s first local councillor in 1993, occasioned a great deal of violence, but this street violence never morphed into terrorism against their anti-fascist opponents. Indeed the Isle of Dogs election result further entrenched the shift away from violence as party “modernisers” pivoted to defend their gain, as much from their own activists as anything else. *Spearhead* and *British Nationalist*, the BNP’s two publications, were at pains to highlight the political opportunity this moment offered the party if it played its cards right. As the BNP refocussed upon electioneering, party cadres also began to internalise the need to move away from violence, which ultimately forced their anti-fascist opponents to do likewise, causing a cumulative de-escalation in violence as the arena of combat shifted from the street corner to the ballot box. The dissolution of “direct action” groups like AFA further facilitated this cumulative de-escalation.[34]

Whilst party modernisers sought to protect the party from itself, they also sought to alter public perceptions, which, ultimately, became something of a self-fulfilling prophecy since the more the BNP distanced itself from violent conflict the more it could claim not to be a violent group. This was particularly necessary for the party’s political development since BNP strategists understood that, whilst many voters were receptive to the party’s anti-immigration platform, its reputation for violence and thuggery repelled many more.
The BNP sought to address this question by strategically re-orientating itself. This saw the party going so far as to reject its “march and grow” strategy, the mainstay of the extreme right action repertoire for decades. In its place, the party instituted a new “hearts and minds” approach based upon local community organising. As the BNP's national organiser highlighted at a conference on 29 January 1994, because the BNP was now “enjoying much higher levels of support, it was important to behave in a responsible and restrained manner, to prove that the BNP was a serious party worthy of electoral support.”[35] Three months later, the party staged a press conference to announce that there would be “no more marches, meetings, punch-ups.” Whilst this reflected the ongoing impact of anti-fascist “direct action” against the BNP, party organisers also articulated its wider strategic imperative: street violence “hindered our political progress” whilst simultaneously being “the only thing holding our extreme opponents together.”[36]

A tactical rather than moral decision, for Tyndall it was also contextual. Armed insurgency simply would not work in Britain, he told another national socialist activist three months later (as he knew from his conviction for quasi-paramilitary activity in 1962). That did not mean that he rejected such tactics, only that they were not applicable in a British national context. Indeed, having debated violent strategies with William Pierce, leader of the National Alliance and author of *The Turner Diaries*, Tyndall conceded that, “were I in Dr. Pierce's shoes I may well favour doing exactly what he is doing.”[37]

Despite this strategic orientation away from violence, in the short term violence actually intensified, in part because AFA sought to “clear fascists out of working class areas” in the wake of the Isle of Dogs victory.[38] During the course of 1994 persons unknown sent a parcel bomb to the BNP headquarters which injured the official who opened it. In another incident that month, a BNP activist, canvassing in Newnham, lost an eye during a confrontation with anti-fascists. The following month a group of men attacked the BNP press officer in his home, whilst during the summer of 1995 the party's head of administration also had his home raided by a gang of assailants who made off with three computers.[39]

The strategy of non-confrontation took some time to embed on the extreme right too. In December 1994, extreme right activists sent a letter bomb to *Searchlight*, an anti-fascist magazine. C18 also firebombed the home of an ANL activist in Gravesend, Kent. Police raids on the homes of several C18 militants during 1995 led to the seizure of bomb-making manuals, instruction books for snipers, and documents highlighting the group's surveillance of targets including journalists who had worked on a *World in Action* exposé of its activities. It is impossible to know how serious the intentions of this group were before police raids ended their possibility for action. In contrast, the BNP, rather than investing in capabilities for perpetrating violence, continued on its trajectory away from violence; training its representatives on the doorstep to explain how the group abjured from racism and violence in order to build connections with the public and to distance themselves from sub-revolutionary violence. However, as the subsequent history of C18 highlighted, despite the best efforts of the BNP to “modernise” the fact that a “radical flank” existed meant that violence was never within the purview of one party or person to control or manage. Processes of escalation and de-escalation were never uniform across the milieu, for once violence became contrary to the strategic interests of one party, those who remained wedded to its use as a means to an end simply joined new groups more amenable to their personal peccadillos; thereby displacing violent militancy from one part of the “scene” to another.

**Brake Two: Moral Logic**

Moral norms and principles problematize certain forms of violence or require its use to be justified. Emotional barriers to violence, including confrontational tension and fear also help to forestall activists from entering into the “tunnel of violence” and, as Randall Collins argues, can cause violence to be “aborted” before it materialises. [40] Despite being willing to employ brutal violence in street fights, many activists adhered to a broader set of moral “norms” and “codes” that dictated their targets, choice of weapons, and the level of violence that was deemed justifiable to themselves and fellow activists in any given situation. In their research on the United States, Simi and Windisch [41] highlight that the general norms governing extreme right violence are similar to those governing bar room brawling or the football terrace.[42] This is born out in the narratives of taking
part in violence that can be found in memoirs of both extreme right and anti-fascist activists germane to this case study.

Political violence usually took place within certain expected and recognised parameters. Breaching these, often in the heat of the moment, could offend these internalised sets of norms. Recalling his involvement in football violence, one extreme right activist stated: “At one point, I was fighting two Millwall blokes when one of our mob stuck a screwdriver into the cheek of one of them. Fuck that; I didn’t mind having a punch-up, but this was over the top.”[43] It is important to emphasise, however, that context is everything and can have a wide-ranging impact on perceptions of what is and is not morally justified. The self-same activist who recoiled in horror from the use of a screwdriver in a street brawl was later jailed for gun-running to Loyalist paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland.[44]

Moral injunctions against violent escalation or at least the method by which violence is escalated were also observable in the aftermath of David Copeland’s nail bomb campaign in London in April 1999.[45] Copeland had been a member of the National Socialist Movement (NSM). Following the atrocity, the group’s leader immediately dissolved the organisation denouncing Copeland’s terrorism as “un-Aryan” – signalling that at one level the group believed that it adhered to a certain mode of behaviour that Copeland’s indiscriminate terrorism had violated.[46] This serves to highlight that even when internal brakes on violence fail activists are often quick to reassert them, though in this instance self-preservation was also likely a factor.

Whilst there were certainly those who applauded Copeland’s violence, others found it hard to justify when the victims included a (white) pregnant woman and her unborn child. This highlights that “who” a group identifies as a legitimate or illegitimate target for violence matters. Such a definition can help reinforce or reassert moral norms within a group that lead away from particular forms of violence. The “wanton barbarity” of Copeland’s bombing campaign was condemned by Colin Jordan, considered by many as a leading theoretician of National Socialist terrorism, because Copeland had targeted “innocent” people – the general public who had no culpability for the problems Jordan perceived were afflicting race and nation. Had Copeland attacked instead the “prime culprits” reasoned Jordan, then his terrorism would have been morally justifiable since these individuals would have been “fairly and properly punished.” As it was, Copeland’s “misdirected mayhem” left those Jordan deemed legitimate targets “unscathed” whilst the strategically counterproductive nature of his violence meant that “we have been damaged along with Copeland’s victims. Altogether a bad business”.[47]

This bifurcation of deserving and undeserving victims could be seen within the extreme right not just with regards to the victims of terrorism but also during more everyday incidences of political violence. The impact of such moral categorisations on braking processes was evident in an account of an aborted arson attack upon a property believed to be connected with Irish Republicanism, which ceased when the activists involved realised that a family was living upstairs, something they had not previously contemplated. “If you were going to go to jail for murder or manslaughter,” reasoned this activist, “you might as well make the targets worthwhile ones.”[48] Such moral categorisations insofar as they are observable in autobiographies are not straightforward. Another activist remembered baulking at an “unprovoked” attack upon a mixed-race couple by fellow activists but was largely unrepentant in recalling attacks against left-wing activists.[49] For others the focus was narrower still. Street fights with AFA activists were felt to be legitimate but violent attacks upon left-wing newspaper sellers less so – such violence “went too far” because these activists, unlike hardened AFA activists, were unable to defend themselves.[50]

In other instances, acts of violence against illegitimate targets conflicted with preconceived notions of manhood and masculinity that activists believed themselves to adhere to. Recalling an extreme right attack upon a community meeting at Welling Library in 1989 that hospitalised seventeen people, the majority of whom were women, one participant recalled how his participation in such violence alongside Terry Blackham, the National Front organiser, had affected them both. “Afterwards I agreed with Blackham that we would never mentioned what happened in Welling Library that night. It physically shook him, which with hindsight, I find hard to believe. At the time, however, I thought we were both going to be sick immediately after we left the
Again, this was not a question of too much violence (Blackham was subsequently jailed for gun-running to Loyalist paramilitaries), it was a reflection of the fact that the violence was against a target that upset their own self-image and the moral codes they had believed they adhered to.

Being engaged in violence against targets that are perceived as illegitimate in some way created a complex emotional feedback loop for the other activist involved in the violence, Matthew Collins. Participation in the assault caused a deep sense of shame and guilt that conflicted with his self-identity (see brake 3). “I began to realise that this was what race wars were about, “ he later recalled, “the innocent attacked and their dignity destroyed.”[52] Guilt would ultimately propel Collins to collaborate with anti-fascists and he subsequently worked as a “mole” against his former colleagues. The change of heart was not immediate, according to his autobiography:

Sure I had days where I was wracked with guilt and self-pity, but this is what I did and this is what I was part of. I know it was wrong, but there really didn’t seem to be anything else and my head was buzzing with the thrill of being a pimply politician for one half of my day and part of a vicious gang of thugs the next.[53]

This latter comment highlights that violence, even if morally repugnant to one's sense of self, can still prove too exciting to give up, at least in the short term. Violence against unexpected targets could also induce a “moral shock” that would lead others to leave the movement. When C18 fell into fratricidal strife in 1997, in which one of its leaders murdered another prominent activist, several key activists drifted out of the group, feeling deeply disillusioned that petty personal rivalry had led to killing.

**Brake Three: Logic of Ego-Maintenance**

Many activists within extreme right groups do not necessarily perceive themselves to be full-blown racist revolutionaries. As one former NF activist recalled:

We had a lot of tough talkers, lunatics and hard nuts but we hardly ran large scale terrorist operations. We took, on the whole, a voyeuristic and occasionally helpful interest in our colleague's violent terrorism and occasionally the odd idiot got himself caught playing with a gun in his bedroom or back garden, but we were responsible for little more state subversion than perhaps a gang of third division football hooligans. We were criminally inclined pub brawlers and occasional drunken racist attackers…. Politically, we were little more than a poorly organised pressure valve built around obsessive personality cults.[54]

Not identifying with a certain form of violence or perceiving oneself as a certain type of group served to limit efforts to develop such capabilities in the first place. Tyndall's narrative about BNP violence always emphasised that it was “defensive” or, *in extremis*, when confronted with incontrovertible proof, dismissed evidence of violence instigated by his own activists as “very rare.” Several leading party figures had serious criminal convictions that the BNP always sought to minimise or mitigate when questioned in public. Tyndall dismissed a conviction of one of his lieutenants under the Explosives Act in 1985 as “foolish” whilst the conviction of his National Activities Organiser for a racist attack in 1993 he explained away as a “frame up” of which the man was completely “innocent.”[55]

Such denials were of course politically expedient but such leadership statements and others like them also served to reaffirm to party activists themselves that their own sense of serving a nobler purpose remained intact. More broadly, at a political and cultural level, the BNP self-identified as the political voice of a forgotten and disenfranchised “white working class” rather than as a group waging armed insurgency in support of “white revolution”. Its arguments in this respect also softened though its commitment to an all-white Britain did not. Such political campaigns took place within the context of the milieu's evolving narrative arc that was shifting away from claims of “white power” towards arguments for “ethno-plurality” and a self-definition of themselves as a “civil rights” movement simply seeking “Rights for Whites”.

In line with the strategic logic of Brake 1, this self-identification saw the BNP begin to distance itself from groups like C18 whose actions damaged its efforts to “modernise” itself. Indeed BNP party manuals and rules of
conduct officially urged BNP activists to keep those who spoke the “language of violence” at “arm’s length.”[56] Internally, the BNP also circulated the message that C18 was an MI5 “honey trap” designed to ensnare unwitting activists. This was part of a broader effort by BNP leaders to counter the appeal of “revolutionary” violence as espoused by C18 amongst some of its own membership. Such a message also served to locate the responsibility for acts of violence to outside the milieu, projecting it onto the “State.” Such conspiratorial theorising was evident in the wake of the Copeland bombings, serving as a means of cleansing the extreme right’s self-image of the stigma of violence, at least to its own satisfaction. Indeed, the BNP claim that such acts of extreme right terrorism were, in reality, perpetrated by a “state-sponsored ‘pseudo-gang,’”[57] also highlights how conspiracy theories can work to buttress the logic of ego maintenance by seeking to dissuade colleagues from participation in the activities of more extreme groups.

Personal disillusionment and de-identification with violent groups was another way in which the restraints on violence were applied within the milieu. Following the failed C18 letter bomb campaign in 1997, one leading C18 activist recalled realising that, after his clique began discussing plans for a follow up, “my heart wasn’t in it anymore.” Thereafter, he began to take stock and realised the “futility” of what he was engaged in, which ultimately led him to leave the group.[58]

For the BNP, self-identification as a group that was ostensibly “non-violent” meant that, on paper at least, there were mechanisms for sanctioning activists who advocated or undertook more extreme acts of violence than the party’s established action repertoire allowed for. However, the application of this particular set of brakes was heavily reliant upon the wider political context and party leaders had to weigh disciplinary decisions against a range of factors.

Eschewing violence for strategic and political reasons had to be weighed in the balance with its appeal to, and use by, party activists. Numerically small in number, party activists were thus a scarce resource. Successfully managing political violence, even if it transgressed political priorities, was thus a complex balancing act for leaders since they were ever mindful that an unpopular decision might precipitate a haemorrhaging of members to a rival group if they acted too harshly. Thus, BNP leader John Tyndall, whilst tolerant of a certain level of “defensive” violence anyway, often sought accommodation with party militants rather than confrontation. This was particularly evident during the mid-1990s as he sought to staunch the flow of BNP activists to C18. Though he had proscribed C18 and denounced the group’s leadership – though pointedly not its members – Tyndall was much less willing to sanction his own activists who were also involved in its activities at a grassroots level, for fear of alienating the self-same people that he relied upon to carry out BNP activities. If he acted too harshly against those ignoring his proscription, Tyndall risked tipping the balance of power in C18’s favour, thereby diminishing his own political authority within the milieu. In some instances he had no real ability to manage such violence anyway, since many activists had a malleable sense of party identification: group acronyms often simply served as a badge of convenience, activists identifying as “BNP” or “C18” depending on the activity it best suited.[59]

Within the milieu, respect and prestige accrued to activists who possessed a record of established militancy rather than the reverse. Criminal convictions often lent legitimacy and credibility to an activists’ personal standing within the milieu. Indeed rather than being a cause for sanction, association with violence often enhanced an individual’s reputation. It certainly proved no bar to promotion in the party structure. However, a track-record of proven militancy also meant that these activists did not need to “prove” themselves through further violence, since their ability on this score was not in question. Having established such a reputation, and acquired the “respect” that flowed from it, the physical authority of an activist could also serve as a brake for violence or indeed as an accelerator, depending on the context of a violent clash. Many such figures served as “stewards” at party activities because they could be relied upon to control violence, but also mete it out if the occasion required.[60]

A key aspect pertaining to the ability of such activists to control and modulate street violence was an expectation that the violence itself would conform to a certain well-worn type. As one former activist noted, street
violence was “endemic” to extreme right activism and activists became habituated to it.[61] Activists knew what to expect and, equally importantly, what not to expect. Prior experience of street violence conditioned expectations of what to expect during future clashes. There were, a former anti-fascist activist recognised, unwritten “rules of engagement,” which activists on both sides broadly adhered to, though there were some notable breaches.[62] Violence therefore remained within these recognisable parameters, meaning that, though activists often went to confrontations armed with hammers, bats, knives and other tools, limited expectations of greater violence meant there was no desire to upscale their tactical repertoire by using firearms during such encounters. However, this type of internal restraint might equally reflect the difficulties of obtaining a firearm due to Britain’s stringent firearms legislation.

When tactical escalation did occur, for instance with the formation of C18 in 1992, the activists involved, initially at least, remained bound by the same collective notion of street violence as the BNP. Indeed, on the few occasions that they brawl with AFA, C18 hoped for a “tear-up” but did not expect anyone to be killed. [63] However, within the radical flank, brakes on violence quickly waned as the group began producing “hit lists” and exhorting their followers to kill political opponents, their publications providing them with the technical wherewithal to do so by printing bomb-making instructions. Their unimpeded rhetorical excesses aside, in real life the group frequently failed to professionalise its activities: its efforts to firebomb a political opponents’ home displayed a distinct amateurishness for a group that styled itself as a “terror” cell.[64] Even C18’s most infamous act of political violence, the 1997 letter bomb campaign, required the group to outsource the construction of the devices to Danish activists, reflecting a mixture of security consciousness but also a failure by the group to invest in such lethal capabilities itself.

**Brake Four: Logic of Out-Group Definition**

The inability to dehumanise political opponents or racial enemies completely can serve as a powerful brake on violence for some individuals. Recent studies have highlighted that even “violent talk” that de-humanises individuals can have a “therapeutic” and cathartic effect insofar as the “performative” nature of such narratives enable the speaker and their audience to let off steam. That said, whilst “violent talk” might have a moderating impact in some instances, clearly there will always be those for whom “talk is cheap”. [65] There is some anecdotal evidence that violent talk in the aftermath of a terrorist atrocity can, however, lead other activists to question their involvement. To take one recent example, an activist in National Action (NA), a group banned for being concerned with terrorism in December 2016, recalled that it was his proximity to murder that first gave him pause to consider the nature of the group he was involved in. After an extreme right activist murdered Jo Cox MP earlier that year, NA had glorified her killer in a series of tweets that would later lead to its proscription. “I thought, I’m connected to this person who’s tweeting it and celebrating it,” noted the NA activist.[66]

A similar, though more dramatic example of where the logic of outgroup definition played a pivotal role in preventing a terrorist attack can be found in the autobiography of Kerry Noble, previously of the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord. Noble was on the verge of bombing a “gay church” in 1984 when he simply dallied too long whilst priming his device and began to re-humanise those around him. This left him unable to carry out his planned atrocity.[67]

Insofar as this case study is concerned, the strategic impediments to needing or indeed wanting to adopt greater violence in the first place (Brake 1) also led to softening of boundaries that would eventually embed across the BNP and not just at an individual level. As the party began to “modernise” to gain public support, it also began phasing out activities that might associate it with violence and undermine these electoral ambitions, though this process took over a decade to complete. BNP publications contained none of the racist and anti-Semitic invective that saturated C18 newsletters and magazines. That said, although C18 publications dehumanised their racial enemies, individual activists retaining a grudging respect for their anti-fascist opponents, based largely on their physical bravery during violent confrontations.[68] However, the extent to which this shaped wider attitudes to violence is unknown.
Both extreme right and anti-fascist activists were engaged in a battle for what they perceived to be the hearts and minds of the working class, whether racialized for the cause of race and nation or as potential agents in the broader class struggle against capitalism. This had important ramifications with regards the potential for escalating conflict. Carter’s study of cumulative extremism in Northern Ireland highlights that Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries were able to escalate the conflict through attacks upon their opponents support base i.e. indiscriminately targeting Catholics and Protestants to provoke further conflict.[69] There was no similar dynamic at play in this case study, since targeting an opponent’s wider constituency of support would, in effect, have entailed waging war one on oneself.

Compared with C18, or at least its core activist group, the BNP was an outward facing political group. Whilst it might deride the general public as “sheeple” for not flocking to their standard, they remained committed to engaging with the British electorate, not rejecting them; to win their electoral support through doorstep campaigning and community action. This meant that there was no internal pressure from the party to isolate itself from the wider society or indeed to “burn bridges” socially with those outside the movement. In comparison C18, which was contemptuous of the wider public, was ideologically inspired by utopian dreams of a white “homeland” to be established in Essex, though in reality this scheme to withdraw from society went nowhere.

Another internal restraint related to out-group definition was a reluctance on the part of the BNP to demonise the police as the enemy, even if party leaders remained contemptuous of its “political” leadership, which, they argued, was part of a wider “establishment” plot to subvert the nation. Such respect was almost non-existent in the case of C18 whose publications regularly denigrated the police as “scum” working for “ZOG” (“Zionist Occupation Government”) and the despised “system” that they wanted to overthrow. Even here, however, dehumanisation could be tempered by personal experience. Following his arrest in 1998, David Myatt, one of the most ardent advocates for racial revolution, was impressed by the “professional attitude” of the police and the “courteous” manner in which he was treated which “made me revise my attitude toward the Police.”[70]

**Brake Five: Organisational Logic**

Whilst the establishment of C18 represented an effort by the BNP to invest in developing a capability for greater violence, conversely, as this relationship quickly soured, the internal restraints on violence were reapplied because it made sense to do so from an organisational standpoint. As the BNP committed itself to electoralism, not only did C18 become surplus to requirements, but even some of its own activities, including public meetings and marches became “somewhat counterproductive,” since they attracted opposition. Tyndall’s proscription of C18 was another reflection of the BNP’s effort to de-invest from violence, though as already noted above, this was often more honoured in the breach than in the observance.

C18 also seems to have undergone its own organisational shift away from certain forms of violence. Initially the group had tried to cultivate links to Northern Ireland and Loyalist para-militarism which might have begat greater violence. Yet its break with the BNP coincided with the group re-focussing its energies upon football hooliganism which, whilst violent, was also a form of violence that remained within recognisable parameters. It was when these parameters changed, for instance, “when small groups of fascists and anti-fascists chanced upon each other in back-streets, well away from the police,”[71] that the most violent encounters often took place; a form of what Randall Collins [72] calls the “forward panic” pathway to violence, as the two groups fought tooth and nail with one another to re-establish their “emotional dominance” of the situation.

As noted above, the style and form of street violence could largely be anticipated and therefore “managed” by participants at set-piece events. Both the extreme right and anti-fascists employing a system of “Stewards” to marshal marches and to defend them from violence. These “security” arrangements were not evenly spread across the BNP, however, as some branches were notably more adept than others. Whilst the “stewards” also ensured a “defensive” capacity, such a corpus of activists, usually chosen through self-selection, could also contain the kernel for “offensive” violence, as was the case when the BNP “Stewards’ Group” morphed into C18.
Decisions about how to fulfil their goals also affected internal restraints on violence. The BNP, for instance, foregrounded its more modest intermediate objective of contesting local elections whilst de-prioritising its longer term “revolutionary” goal of replacing Britain’s liberal democracy with a white ethno-state whereas – rhetorically at least – C18 did not. This is not to argue that BNP renounced its revolutionary goals, merely to assert that the path it chose to achieve it was incremental rather than “revolutionary”.

What perhaps also helped limit violence was a certain level of ideological heterodoxy within BNP publications. Whilst Tyndall personally controlled magazines such as *Spearhead*, they also functioned as a comparatively open forum for ideological discussion. The BNP leader also tolerated dissenting publications like *The Patriot* (though the extent to which he was aware, initially at least, of its overarching agenda is unclear). An important question in this regard hinges upon whether or not such forums succeeded in exerting a brake on more militantly-inclined activists by acculturating them to any of the five logics discussed here. It is not possible to answer this question with the available data, however. It is notable though that Tyndall’s tighter control over the political structure of the BNP, which he ran as his personal fiefdom, did cause some tensions, particularly for newer activists with different strategic views, some of whom felt that their concerns and ideas were crowded out by Tyndall’s clique. Those with tactical differences were forced to operate outside the BNP once the breach with C18 became irreparable, highlighting that restraint in one part of the movement can simply displace violence to another part.

Another brake that limited violent escalation, one that might be particularly pertinent to the extreme right given its long history of fissiparous fragmentation, is the concentration of a group’s energy upon internal movement rivals. This arguably reduced its capacity to prosecute violence against external enemies. This is evident in the case of C18. Having failed to usurp Tyndall’s leadership of the BNP, C18 extended its control over the financially lucrative Blood & Honour nazi music “scene.” This served to magnify internal tensions over money, personal prestige and reputation amongst the group’s core activists. The result was a factional feud that culminated in murder in 1997 and the group’s dissolution. The impact of this fratricidal struggle drained C18 of its capacity for “revolutionary” violence. Charlie Sargent’s killing of Chris Castle, a close friend of rival leader Will Browning, led his more revolutionary-inclined faction to focus solely on obtaining “retribution” at the expense of wider movement goals. This took its toll. Several leading activists walked away, sensing that Browning was “bad news” to be around. “I know it sounds awful,” one former C18 activist stated, “but really Chris dying probably saved lives because that put an end to any plans for race war.”

**Conclusion**

This case study of the internal restraints on violent escalation within the British extreme right in the 1990s has highlighted five observable internal brakes that have played a role at one time or another to limit violence within the milieu. Not all of these brakes are evident in every instance. Some appear in isolation and, at other times, several of them appear to overlap. Nor has every activist adhered to all of these brakes all of the time and nor, in all likelihood, have they had the same level of meaning for them. It is also likely that, as this case study suggested, certain brakes are more salient at certain times in constraining violence. Indeed, in this instance Brake one (the identification of less violent strategies of action as being as or more effective than violent alternatives) was the one that framed the overarching political trajectory of the BNP as it wrestled with its own radical flank and the ongoing assault on its activities by anti-fascist activists. It is worth noting too that this is a historical case study of the processes at play within these groups at a particular point in time. The 1990s were not a vacuum and violent contestation between extreme right and anti-fascist groups has occurred before and indeed since.

If this case study represents a historical snapshot of how internal brakes on violence might have functioned at a particular point in time within a specific cluster of groups, it is worth restating that the typology around which its findings are structured is more dynamic. As previously mentioned in the methodology section, this typology was derived iteratively from three very different ideological case studies with very different propensities towards violence. The underlying intention of using such diverse case studies was not to create a “checklist” (since what
Brakes mean, why, and when, still requires interpretation and analysis to understand their importance) but simply to widen the typology’s broader applicability so that its insights would extend beyond those of a single case study or a theoretical literature review. Further comparison across different actor types operating under different external conditions would undoubtedly prove a fruitful avenue for further enquiry since it could help us better understand how different external pressures have shaped the implementation of internal restraints on violence, or caused them to weaken or fail. Such research, which this Special Issue of *Perspectives on Terrorism* helps to facilitate, might also potentially illuminate how different configurations of such brakes function together at different times and in different situations to limit violence or, indeed, how certain combinations might be more or less robust. It might also illuminate whether certain types of group, whether defined by organisational form or ideology, might be more or less prone to its mechanisms of restraint weakening or collapsing than others.

What would be equally profitable would be more in-group comparisons across the same ideological movement. The “far right” for example is not a homogeneous entity ideologically, organisationally, strategically, or tactically. A wider survey of how internal brakes function across the “movement” as a whole – either within one country or across a more comparative axis – might help researchers better conceptualise which groups within a given political milieu have the weakest internal restraints on violence and are thus more problematic from the perspective of countering violent extremism. One might also enquire as to how the logics and limits of violence differ within the numerous anti-fascist groups ranged against them. Whilst this is beyond the scope of this article, those interested in how “antifa” groups in the United States exercise restraint can consult Copsey’s contribution to this Special Issue.

Another area into which this nascent research agenda on the internal brakes on violence could expand relates to the interplay between these five logics. How do they condition and shape one another, for example? Further research might elaborate how these internal restraints function as violent escalation becomes an imminent possibility for activists. This is where our knowledge is at its most opaque. Interview data or ethnographic research might help to elucidate how and why these brakes have functioned (or failed) in the past as activists have gotten closer to planning or initiating acts of violence. At present, beyond a smattering of anecdotes contained within activist autobiographies, we know little about how brakes on violence function in greater proximity to the moment of violence: in other words how they are supported, sublimated or suborned at the point of no return. Indeed, researchers and analysts need a greater understanding and awareness of the conditions under which such brakes on violence are weakened or can be made to fail by those within the group seeking tactical escalation. Brakes might fail because of activities by activists within the milieu, who favour radical repertoires, but equally they might be made to fail because of external pressures brought to bear on a group, whether intentionally or through their misapplication, by police or government agencies. External actors might pay greater heed to where their actions can bolster rather than undermine those mechanisms and processes that can serve to limit violent escalation from within.

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Notes

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[27] Nick Lowles, op cit., p. 305.


[34] Nigel Copsey, “From Direct Action to Community Action”, op cit., pp. 123-141.


[38] Mark Hayes, op cit., 229-246.


[41] Simi and Windisch, op cit.


[44] “Men found with guns for UDA are jailed,” The Independent, 10 February 1994. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/men-found-with-guns-for-uda-are-jailed-1393082.html


[50] Nick Lowles, op cit., p. 69.


[52] Ibid, p. 55.

[53] Ibid, pp. 175-176.

[54] Ibid, p. 237; Dave Hann and Steve Tilzey, No Retreat: The Secret War between Britain’s Anti-fascists and the Far Right (Lytham: Milo Books, 2003), p. 178 highlights the belief amongst some anti-fascists that their opponents were insufficiently committed to politics.


[63] Nick Lowles, op cit., p. 18.

[64] Nick Lowles, op cit., pp. 142-3.


[68] Lowles, op cit., p. 18. Portinari, op cit., p. 37 notes: “It would be too easy for me to claim that Red Action was just an irritant, but in all fairness they gave the right wing a torrid time. A few of us had a begrudging respect for them, though.”


[70] David Myatt, op cit.

[71] Dave Hann and Steve Tilzey, op cit. p. 223.


[73] "Why I turned my back on C18", op cit.