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Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume XIII, Issue 4 (August 2019) of Perspectives on Terrorism. Our free and independent online journal is a publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), Vienna, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University’s Campus The Hague and is available at https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism.

Now in its thirteenth year, Perspectives on Terrorism has 8,500 registered subscribers and many more occasional readers and website visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer reviewed by external referees while its Research and Policy Notes, Special Correspondence, Resources and other content are subject to internal editorial quality control.

The first of the four articles has been written by Dr. Kenneth P. Reidy, winner of the annual TRI award for the Best Ph.D. Thesis on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism (2018). He summarizes some of the findings of his award-winning thesis (see also Announcements). The remaining three articles are based on a selection of papers delivered at a Nordic conference on violent extremism, organised by the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo in November 2018. Sara Jul Jacobsen argues in her article that jihadi-Salafists seek to motivate Muslim women to take part in jihad by strategically addressing issues specific to the intersection of being women and being Muslim in the West today. Maja Touzari Greenwood explores in her article how six Danish former foreign fighters experienced returning to Denmark after having fought with jihadist militias in the Middle East, and how they try to deal with the rejection they are met with in their community and mosques. The next article is written by an international group of scholars (Enjolras et al.) and examines whether generalized trust in society may have a buffering effect on fear in the aftermath of terrorist attacks.

The Articles section is followed by a Research Note from the hand of Paul Stott, discussing a right-wing manifesto from the pre-Internet period. The Resources Section contains a review of Tom Parker's book on the role of human rights in fighting terrorism by Alex Schmid, and one from James Forest on William Allchorn's edited volume ‘Tracking the Rise of the Radical Right Globally’.

Our book reviews editor, Joshua Sinai, presents the tables of contents of sixty books that crossed his desk. Associate Editor Judith Tinnes continues her series of country bibliographies with one on Pakistan, followed by another (her fourth) on Syria. This is followed by the regular listing of new Web-based resources by Associate Editor Berto Jongman and an overview of recent and upcoming conferences by Assistant Editor Reinier Bergema.

The current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism has been prepared by Associate Editor Prof. Tore Bjorgo and the Editor-in-Chief, Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, with the support of co-editor, Prof. James J.F. Forest, and with the help of Editorial Assistant Jodi Moore as well as Associate Editor for IT issues, Christine Boelema Robertus.
Benevolent Radicalization: An Antidote to Terrorism

by Ken Reidy

Note from the Editor: The annual award of the Terrorism Research Initiative for the ‘Best Thesis in the Field of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies (2018)’, was won by Dr. Ken Reidy. We have asked the winner to summarise important parts of his doctoral thesis for the readers of our journal in the article below (for access to the complete thesis, see URL in note 1).

Abstract

Most political activism occurs within social norms and the democratic consensus, but a minority mobilize in a consciously perilous manner. When this is premised upon sacred values, one may be said to be behaviorally radicalized. Within this radicalized fringe, some stay within social norms but take them to an extreme level of self-sacrifice. This may involve risking one’s life to benefit others in an objectively and consistently pro-social manner. This is referred to as aid-in-extremis, a specific form of active bystandership. A recent example includes British Muslims engaged in non-sectarian humanitarian aid for besieged civilians in Daesh controlled territory. In my thesis, these people are categorized as benevolently radicalized; they were Positive Deviants who adhere to a conditioned victim-centric prognosis. Others made a clear break and depart from the norm. This entails violence or tacit support thereof as part of their response - such as those British Muslims who joined Daesh. These people are categorized as malevolently radicalized: their deviance is overall anti-social and they adhere to a conditioned perpetrator-centric prognosis. The paradox is, both cohorts stem from the same domestic sentiment pool and use the same sacred values to undergird their morally opposed behaviors. What seems to determine the prognostic vector is how these sacred values are interpreted and this alludes to the importance of frames. Recognizing that frames are learned and that both groups are in competition for similar people, governments may proactively prevent Jihadist recruitment and sideline their narratives by buttressing the benevolently radicalized, bolstering their numbers and ensuring that their prognostic is perceived as the main moral anchor. This counter-engagement is presented as a relevant and impactful, strengths-based alternative which can constructively channel moral outrage and fulfill needs - yet it is only posited to appeal to particular type of (pre-)Jihadist activists.

Keywords: Aid-In-Extremis (Active Bystandership), counter-engagement, multifinality, pathological altruism, positive deviance, sacred values

Multifinality and Competition

It is widely accepted that there are many pathways to becoming radicalized. This is referred to as equifinality and this is why there is no single “profile”. However, this author’s dissertation research suggests that there may be other outcomes of the radicalization process besides (violent) extremism. [1] This is referred to as multifinality. Recognizing multifinality is important because it provides a partial answer to the central question of radicalization research: “why do some people radicalize to (violent) extremism while similar others, under the same radicalizing conditions, do not?” The argument made in the thesis The Accidental Ambassadors: Implications of Benevolent Radicalization is that similar others, under similar radicalizing conditions, but within a non-violent and non-extremist context, are exposed to different situational variables and that these influence the chemistry of their subsequent socialization. Within particular parameters, [2] this socialization is categorized as radicalization and, within a pro-social context, this radicalization is categorized as benevolent. Therefore, under similar conditions but in a different context, similar others do indeed radicalize, but the form
of radicalization is imperceptible to those whose sole application of radicalization is as a conceptual framework for research on (violent) extremism.

One implication of incorporating multifinality into the radicalization construct is that it opens up a preventative avenue which has not been adequately explored. Rather than solely countering radicalization, governments may also opt to influence the process in order to impact what results from it. For example, many people felt compelled to “do” something about the Syrian civil war; some mobilized as (citizen) journalists, others did so in a medical capacity. Yet others joined competing armed groups. Others still, gave their time and money to raise awareness or to initiate and support humanitarian projects. Therefore, activists diagnosed the situation in Syria and Iraq in much the same way (“something needs to be done”), but differed in their prognostics. As such, there was a wide variety of responses, but this distribution has not been sufficiently reflected in media coverage and this, in turn, gave the impression that (violent) extremism was the main or even the only response. Rather than countering (violent) extremism, the recommendation made in the thesis is to increase the appeal of humanitarian responses and their congruent pro-social narratives in order to cultivate them as the normative prognostic. The goal is to channel the will to “do” something into less damaging outlets, but appealing ones nonetheless.

Therefore, this approach does not target extremism directly. Instead, it aims to make the potential recruitment pool smaller by offering an attractive alternative which is posited to appeal to particular typologies. In doing so, it recognizes grievances, altruistic intentions and willingness to act on a faith-aligned impulse. Instead of dismissing or ignoring that urge, it channels it into a benevolent frame which is championed by constructive and community approved role-models. This offers an alternative approach to prevention which fosters resilience to violence and extremism because its resultant identity and prognostics are resistant to both. This counter-engagement [3] amounts to a competitor to (violent) extremism, not merely a rebuttal.

The Research Participants

Unlike most definitions of radicalization, the parameters of the definition of radicalization proposed for this thesis [2] are politically neutral because they do not stipulate an outcome beyond consciously perilous “direct action” premised upon sacred values. This accurately captures the faith inspired research participants of this in-depth study: six British Muslim aid workers who repeatedly risked their lives by mobilizing to theaters of Jihadist conflict in order to provide humanitarian aid in a non-sectarian manner to local besieged civilians in Daesh-controlled areas within Iraq.

The purpose of this research was to ascertain how some British Muslims mobilized to Jihadist conflict zones in a constructive manner (non-sectarian faith-inspired humanitarian “active bystandership” [4]) while similar others did so in an overall destructive manner ([violent] extremism). To do so, research participants were selected with attributes specific enough to the sphere of violent extremism, yet sensitive enough to warrant the authorities suspicion; a quasi-experimental design which used matching to achieve a theoretical sample with analogous characteristics to European Jihadists. To accomplish this, research participants were matched to European Jihadists along four characteristics: socio-demographics, a desire to act against perceived injustice, previous criminality and previous mobilization to Daesh controlled territory between 2015 and 2018. These were culled from various risk factor instruments and overlapping static and dynamic factors parsed from the literature.

The credibility of this match was confirmed on three counts:

(1) All research participants were interviewed at least once by the British authorities under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, but subsequently categorized as false positives and released without charge.
Others within their social milieu pursued another route and became Jihadists. Therefore, the research participants may be said to be part of the same pool as British Jihadists. This may go some way to explaining the documented overlap between Islamic charities and (violent) Islamic extremist groups.

Had they instead become (violent) extremists, joined Daesh and died in the conflict zone, the psychological autopsies conducted after their demise would be largely consistent with the recurring factors and risk factors associated with (violent) extremism.

Yet unlike European Jihadists, the research participants were neither violent nor extremist and engaged in consistent and objectively defined pro-social behaviors in Jihadist conflict zones; a form of active bystandership referred to as aid-in-extremis. With a credible match and morally opposed behaviors confirmed, the research participants life course trajectories were mapped and juxtaposed to the literature on European Jihadists in order to ascertain which factors differentiated the benevolent one from the malevolent other. These waypoints are presented as a means of offsetting (violent) extremism for particular typologies.

**Radicalization as a Vector**

Based on the outlined parameters these research participants were categorized as radicalized because they mobilized (“direct action”) to Jihadist conflict zones (“consciously perilous”) and this was spurred by a moral logic which is immune to material trade-offs (“sacred values”). This faith-inspired motivation bridges powerful sentiment with morality. Yet operationalizing it is open to interpretation; one may protect (significant) others by engaging the perceived aggressor, or one may ensure (significant) others’ survival by providing for them in a humanitarian capacity. This, perhaps, is why Jihadists and the research participates both describe their actions as “doing the right thing” and why Solzhenitsyn [6] noted that moving “from good to evil is one quaver” - altruism gone awry. This underscores the importance of providing a benevolent frame to define this motivation, offer constructive leadership to direct it and conduct a campaign to promote it. To account for the pro-social form their radicalization assumed, radicalization was conceptualized as a vector; one may radicalize malevolently by engaging in (violent) extremism or benevolently by engaging in aid-in-extremis (“multifinality”). [7]

**Overcoming the Selection Bias through Multifinality**

At first blush, this framing may seem unlikely. After all, how can two morally opposed outcomes stem from the same premise? Nonetheless, emerging perspectives from various branches of psychology suggest that the same adverse conditions which coalesce to foster anti-social behaviors may also align to result in pro-social ones. For example, a consistent finding is that children who endured frequent parental violence were more likely to become destructive adults. This is intuitive and widely confirmed; negative outcomes arise from negative experiences. Yet some victims of abusive parenting respond constructively by becoming caring people who devote their lives to protecting others from the suffering they experienced.

This dynamic has been termed “Altruism Born of Suffering” or, with a slightly different emphasis, “Post-Traumatic Growth”. Responding in this manner is not unique to cruel parenting; it has also been observed with victims of sexual violence and has been found also in situations of mass violence. Counter-intuitively, these adverse conditions were a necessary precursor for subsequent pro-social behaviors. Perhaps this is why Nietzsche noted “distress always permits a variety of interpretations” and why Zimbardo argues that the very situations which inflame the “hostile imagination” in some may also inspire the “heroic imagination” in others.
Such a perspective may also be applied to the process of radicalization; the various adverse factors and mechanisms identified as pivotal to nurturing (violent) extremism may be the same ones which cultivate the morally opposed response of humanitarianism. Therefore, protective factors may not necessarily be the inverse of risk factors. This is not a new suggestion; several scholars of terrorism have already hypothesized that objectively positive outcomes can result from successful radicalization, [20] although much like the psychological research referred to above, constructive outcomes from successful radicalization have seldom been the object of systematic study.

Nonetheless, the ground work for doing so has already been laid; Schmid [21] has noted that the concept of radicalization is “linked too readily to terrorism (broadly defined) as an outcome” and this is underscored by the scholarly consensus on radicalization knowledge that emphasizes the process of radicalization, not its postulated outcomes. [22] However, radicalization is too often conceptually and definitionally tethered to (violent) extremism. Consequently, most definitions of radicalization are embedded with “hypothetical intent”. [23] Therefore, the scholars who apply the construct of radicalization as a conceptual framework are usually those concerned with political violence and this linkage hampered the ability to perceive other outputs of the radicalization process. Despite the academic consensus converging on the process rather than the outcome of radicalization, it is nonetheless necessary to articulate an outcome; failure to do so would render one incapable of distinguishing violent from non-violent radicalization and successful from unsuccessful radicalization. Rather than (violent) extremism, this may be achieved in broader (yet nonetheless explicit) terms by incorporating multifinality.

**Incorporating Multifinality**

Incorporating multifinality into radicalization research is arguably useful for two reasons:

1. **Multifinality provides a more realistic appreciation of human factors:** research has illustrated that not all of those who commit acts of Islamist terrorism are extremists and that not all extremists act upon their beliefs. Thus, (violent) extremism is arguably too specific an outcome for the concept of radicalization to function as an explanatory mechanism. Therefore, it makes sense to draw broader parameters by categorizing successful radicalization as consciously perilous direct action premised on sacred values. How these sacred values are interpreted determines the vector - and this necessarily incorporates multifinality.

2. **Multifinality also serves as a means of overcoming selection bias:** the factors associated with radicalization-to-(violent-)extremism are not unique to (violent) extremism. Therefore, any plausible theory of radicalization-to-(violent-)extremism should also be able to account for the fact that only a minority of people radicalize to (violent) extremism while the majority, subjected to the same radicalizing forces, do not. Horgan [24] labelled this quandary as “the low base rate of terrorism” and Sageman [25] characterized it as “the iron requirement of specificity of any adequate explanation”. Therefore, the litmus test of any credible radicalization-to-terrorism theory would take this conundrum into account and answer “why them and not others?” in a manner which avoids selecting on the dependent variable. As discussed next, this is best achieved with a process-centric approach rather than a problem-based approach to the question at hand.
Evolution of Radicalization Research

Although the term ‘radicalization’ was occasionally used to explain the formation of politically violent and clandestine groups prior to 9/11, [26] radicalization as a formal research avenue was borne of violent extremism, particularly after the Madrid (2004) attacks. [27] Given the impact of the threat and the urgency to counter it, radicalization research focused specifically on (violent) Islamist extremism. This problem-based approach defined the scope of the inquiry, but simultaneously restricted its application to one expression of religious extremism. This inadvertently made the radicalization process synonymous with the process of becoming a fanatical terrorist and/or extremist. Detached from its “radical” root meaning, “radicalization” was construed as a net-negative and this connotation affected how it was used; much like terrorism, it is an exonym not an endonym.

How radicalization was conceptualized had second-order consequences: as radicalization was employed to study mainly Islamist terrorism, its inspiring ideology molded perceptions of who the radicalization process referred to. With no immediately identifiable means of discerning mainstream forms of Islam from the (violent) extremist few, both became heuristically linked resulting in a securitization of Islamic identity. This rendered Western (particularly diaspora) Muslims in many places into a 'suspect community' which, in turn, reinforced extremist narratives and assisted in shrinking the grey zone; thereby achieving a key strategic objective of (violent) extremist groups. On the other hand, this problem-based approach was instrumental to identifying factors and mechanisms which coalesce to result in (violent) extremism. It also illustrated the heterogeneity of people involved and the numerous pathways they pursued (“equifinality”).

Nonetheless, the problem-based focus of radicalization research became unintentionally (but not unforeseeably) politicized and inadvertently contributed to the polarizing objectives of extremist groups; as radicalization is negative and most of the people to radicalize are Muslims (or converts), the focal issue became Islam. Yet, according to the parameters of radicalization in this article, [2] radicalization can also be positive and the socialization process is not unique to Muslims because sacred values are not the sole preserve of Islam. Rather than replacing radicalization with another term, an endeavor which is unlikely to be successful given its currency, the recommendation is to deflect these implicit associations by incorporating multifinality. As discussed next, this is best served by adopting a start-to-finish process approach rather than a finish-to-start outcome approach to research.

Problems with the Problem-Based Approach

Were multifinality to be truth preserving, a logical way to categorize knowledge would be to make “radicalization leading to (violent) extremism” a sub-set of “radicalization” writ large in much the same way that one would categorize “cooking leading to a waffle” a sub-set of “cooking” writ large. Using the latter as a heuristic device, one may argue that the griddle shape of a waffle is what distinguishes it from other (similar) foods. This is correct, but much like contemporary radicalization research, the logic applied is outcome-centric. That is to say, an outcome-centric investigation would commence with the waffle and then shift left in order to document how it was cooked and prepared; a deconstructive approach (finish-to-start) which impedes the recognition of multifinality.

On the other hand, a process-centric approach would commence at the preparation stage and document the various waypoints (and subsequently, trajectories) that batter may pursue without being restricted by the waffle outcome. For radicalization research, this would involve research which commences at the amorphous countercultural recruitment pool level followed by documenting the various trajectories adherents pursued. The purpose would be to ascertain which factors were instrumental in influencing each trajectory; a constructive (start-to-finish) approach which naturally incorporates multifinality. Although most trajectories would not be
considered radicalized, they must be mapped because non-radicalized trajectories may nonetheless serve as functional equivalent alternatives for some.

This different approach to the problem at hand matter because one may come to different conclusions with regards to policy recommendations. For example, consider the counsel an outcome-centric approach to research would provide on prevention compared to a process-centric approach. With a focus on the outcome of violent extremism and a deconstructive approach to understanding its etiology, the former is more likely to recommend measures which directly disrupt the outcome of violent extremism. These may be hard measures such as arrests, soft measures such as counter-narratives or something in between. This amounts to the equivalent of banning the waffle iron because, as noted above, this outcome approach views the griddle shape as its defining characteristic. The concrete problem this approach does not address is: what is an affected and politically awakened Western Muslim to “do” about grievances arising from the crisis in Syria and Iraq? Or, as the British Daesh member Abu Adam al-Britani (2017) asked after describing the situation in Raqqa (25 September 2017): “what are you going to do? … Are you actually going to step up and do something?” [28] The implication here is that the only thing to “do” is (violent) extremism and this feeds off the media coverage alluded to earlier.

With a focus on the receptive sentiment pool and a constructive approach to understanding all trajectories out of it, a process-centric approach is more likely to recommend measures which offset the (violent) extremist trajectory through a viable and relevant alternative. This would involve buttressing an already existent trajectory through a promotional campaign which aims to usurp by dominating the prognostic narrative through community galvanization and social inclusion. This is the equivalent of circumventing waffle consumption by promoting pancakes; another batter-based product. This is a strengths-based approach to prevention; through multifinality, a process-centric approach is able to perceive and “strengthen” alternate trajectories which fulfill the same needs in order to foster a desired outcome at the expense of an undesirable one. As discussed in the concluding sections, this is only posited to function for particular populations and sub-groups. Therefore, given the spectrum of involvement both approaches are necessary.

With the credibility of the research participants made plausible and the benefits of multifinality covered, the following section will discuss the trajectories of the research participants and how these may be used as the foundation for a counter-engagement.

**Trajectory of the Research Participants**

A desire for a change in lifestyle (from petty crime and street gang membership to a socially respected one) led the research participants to mosques where they intended to commence a pious lifestyle and “do the right thing”. There they chanced upon aid workers who subsequently became role-models to emulate. Unbeknownst to the research participants at the time, the aid workers they serendipitously encountered specialized in providing relief to those most in need; civilians living in Jihadist conflict zones. To quickly expand upon their rekindled Islamic identity and prove their commitment, they took up zakat [alms giving] with gusto. As they became involved in charity work, they adopted the tenets of the humanitarian prognostic - which is victim instead of aggressor-centric. Rather than via formal instruction, this occurred in a learning-by-doing manner and this is why the aid group followed in this dissertation research is categorized as a ‘community of practice’. It was through these congruent behaviors that the humanitarian frame was internalized. This was followed by mobilization in order to provide humanitarian relief.

Having first-hand experience of the impact of their actions reinforced the value of that prognostic response and this assisted in them self-categorizing as humanitarians. A second-order consequence of this is that they became resilient to (violent) extremist prognostics. This victim-centric frame and their humanitarian identity were forged by the research participants acting their way into this way of thinking with assistance from
“constructive leaders”. The waypoints along this trajectory included (1) an undefined but faith-inspired altruistic intention to “do the right thing”, (2) chance encounters with constructive role-models who provided (3) a benevolent frame and (4) a congruent behavioral prognostic. The latter three influenced the interpretation of the sacred values and therefore provided the vector.

The proposition emerging from this doctoral thesis is to formalize and expand this sequence because bolstering the number of humanitarians is posited to shrink the number of potential (violent) extremists as both recruit from the same sentiment pool. As stated, this relies to a significant extent on bolstering the number of humanitarians in order to ensure that as many people within the sentiment pool as possible have as many opportunities as possible to encounter and engage with them. The immediate problem with this suggestion is that it is based on a very small sample \( n=6 \) which, in all likelihood, is not representative. Therefore, the question to be answered is: what is the evidence to suggest that the research participants’ trajectories can be extrapolated in order to appeal to a significantly larger audience? To answer this, the research participants are framed as Positive Deviants.

**Positive Deviance**

As most British Muslims are not involved in terrorism or extremism, nor mobilized in Jihadist conflict zones, most British Muslims represent the non-mobilized norm. In terms of a normal distribution of behavior relative to statistical norms, both the benevolently and malevolently radicalized are outliers. As such, both are deviants and given vectorization, the research participants are Positive Deviants; successful outliers who are never representative, at least not until their (radical) strategies are adopted by the majority and become mainstream.

Positive Deviance is a strengths-based approach [31] which is applied to problems requiring behavioral and/or social change. Its basic premise is three-fold: (1) solutions to seemingly intractable problems already exist, (2) they have been discovered by members of the community and these innovators have succeeded even though they share the same constraints and barriers as others. [32] The problem is, they are usually not aware that they have “licked the problem which confounds others” [33] and it therefore takes an outsider to recognize it. Accordingly, research participants neither function nor frame themselves as counter-(violent-)extremists and as such, terrorism scholars do not investigate them. Instead, they simply see themselves as humanitarians and do not immediately recognize the second-order consequences of their beliefs and behaviors: resistance to (violent) extremism through a humanitarian prognostic.

Positive Deviance is generally described as inside-out (it uses insiders, not outsiders), backward (it assumes that the solution to a given problem already exists, but must be ferreted out and implemented) and counter-cultural because outsiders do not bring solutions. Instead, outsiders locate Positive Deviants within a community and assist them in spreading their successful strategies to other members of the community. Positive Deviance also has the lowest perturbation to impact ratio because it turns to solutions already proven within the community (“existent trajectories” as discussed above and “social proof” [34]) rather than importing foreign solutions that may arouse skepticism, reactance or sabotage. [35]

A key component of Positive Deviance is that it is behavior-led rather than based on spreading best practices. This is a central tenet of Positive Deviance: one acts their way into a new way of thinking through behavior. In this sense, there is some overlap with the construal of the research participants’ aid group as a community of practice and their learning-by-doing method. Overall, Positive Deviance provides a fresh alternative when problems are viewed as intractable: it excels over most alternatives when addressing problems that are enmeshed in a complex social system, require social and behavioral change or entail solutions that are rife with unforeseeable or unintended consequences. Finally, the Positive Deviance model provides a viable means of extrapolating an uncommon behavior (deflecting the [violent] extremist prognostic through a humanitarian
prognostic) and with assistance, making it the normative prognostic and moral anchor. The following section addresses whom this prognostic is most likely to appeal to.

**Pathological Altruism**

Various scholars have categorized Jihadists or foreign fighters into different typologies, based on their pathway and/or motivation. However, only some of these typologies would qualify as being receptive to a pro-social prognostic because some may self-select and seek out extremist groups. [36] This is why offering counter-engagements as alternatives is only posited to resonate with particular typologies. How these typologies operationalized their needs, religiosity, emotions and empathy are grouped under the heading of “pathological altruism” because of the warped (but potentially constructive) means that they were met. [37]

1. Khosrokhavar’s “Existential Man”. [38] Pro-social groups may be able to bridge the multiple identity gap these people experience and potentially replace it with a sense of pride which constructively combines their religion with their nationality.

2. McCauley and Moskalenko’s “Caring-Compelled”: [39] these people are affected by suffering and feel personally responsible in reducing it. These people are well-suited to a pro-social prognostic.

3. Nesser’s “Misfits” and “Drifters”. [40] Staub refers to them as “Lost Souls”. [41] These typologies may find a sense of belonging and develop an aligned social identity through involvement with pro-social groups.

4. Neumann’s “Defenders” seem to come closest to describing the research participants as they also (initially at least) mobilized for charitable purposes. [42] The difference is that the “Defenders” did not leave the conflict zone and became radicalized by it whereas the research participants only remain in theatre for a maximum of ten days before returning to the UK. Maher refers to these people as “humanitarian Jihadists” who, due to extended time within the conflict zone, “become hardened and no longer mention the innocents they came to save”. [43] Neumann’s [44] depiction of the “Defenders” shares much with Staub’s [45] categorization of “Idealists” and Khosrokhavar’s [46] model for European radicalization.

5. Venhaus’s “Identity Seeker” and, perhaps, his “Status Seeker”. [47] Similar to Nesser’s [48] “Misfits” and “Drifters” and Staub’s [49] “Lost Souls”, the “Identity Seeker” is primarily attracted by the need for belonging to a group.

While equifinality posits that there are many pathways into (violent) extremism (having the same result), two frequently mentioned factors appeared to be crucial waypoints for the participants in the research for this thesis: (undefined) altruistic intentions [50] and chance encounters. [51] As such, influencing whom one meets and socializes with can impact heavily upon the behaviors one subsequently engages in. Therefore, preventative approaches which intervene at these encounter points may constitute a credible means of prevention. Along with Positive Deviance, these factors give merit to the potential of using the research participants trajectory within a biomimicry model.

**In Conclusion**

The proposed counter-engagement is posited as effective for the above type of people for three reasons:

(i) It can actively compete with the Jihadist call-to-action by offering an alternative, relevant and impactful means to constructively channel moral outrage and fulfill bystander needs to do something. This is premised on other research which suggests that some people become involved with (violent)
extremist groups for misguided altruistic reasons in combination with opportunity factors such as chance encounters.

(ii) Second, internalizing a humanitarian identity and benevolent prognostic makes one resistant to the (violent) extremist identity and to malevolent prognostic(s) because conflict is framed through the suffering of its victims and the devastation of their lives, not the evil aggressors or the self-righteous few on the supply-side of justice.

(iii) Third, recognizing and applauding the positive contributions of Western Muslims assists in expanding the Grey Zone, which Jihadist groups goad the government into eliminating. Therefore, Jihadists identify the Grey Zone as a strategic target and the resulting recommendation is that governments similarly recognize it as such in order to avoid counter-productive counter-terrorism outcomes.

The philosophy behind this functioning as an attractive alternative is accurately summarized by Shahar: “organizations that counter radicalization do not try to dampen the attraction of ‘noble causes’; they know the effort would be futile. Instead they attempt to substitute a different – less violent – version of the same cause”. [52] To adapt an analogy as heuristic, this approach to prevention would assure that Luke Skywalker remains with the Jedi Order and that Lucifer would not fall from grace. By incorporating multifinality and embracing its merits, one may conceive of “radicalization…as the solution, not the problem.” [53]

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Notes


[2] Githens-Mazer defines radicalization as “a collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in direct action”. This definition of radicalization is well-positioned to cater for other outcomes by having “direct action” as its outcome rather than the specific outcomes of terrorism and/or extremism. However, a shortcoming is that radicalization could be applied quite broadly, even beyond the politically violent scope of terrorism research. In order to retain relevance and elevate the threshold with which
this definition would categorize an individual as radicalized, a caveat was added: “direct action” is specified as voluntarily and repeatedly (or of a longer duration) engaging in mobilizations which knowingly carry a significantly heightened risk of death. As these consciously perilous mobilizations are undertaken for a cause, the research participants are conceptualized as “Devoted Actors” whose moral logic is undergirded by “Sacred Values”. However, these values may be widely interpreted. Therefore, this interpretation determines the vector. To account for this, multifinality was incorporated. See: Githens-Mazer, J. (2010), Rethinking the Causal Concept of Islamic Radicalisation. 1st ed. [pdf] Mexico City: International Political Science Association, pp.1-32. Available at URL: http://www.concepts-methods.org/Files/WorkingPaper/PC%2042%20Githens-Mazer.pdf [Accessed 09 November 2017].


[4] “In the midst of great violence, some people endanger themselves to help others” (Staub, 2013, pp.4-5) and they do so in a “continuous” manner” (Staub, 2013, p.387). The form of active bystandership discussed in this article is labeled “aid-in-extremis” and this is conceptualized as a benevolent outcome of the radicalization process. See: Staub, E. (2013), Overcoming Evil: Genocide, Violent Conflict and Terrorism, New York: Oxford University Press.


[19] The heroic imagination refers to a process of being aware of how one can help others in need and being willing to take appropriate action regardless of the personal risk involved. When this motivates pro-social behavior, it becomes heroic action. The heroic imagination is related to active bystandership. See: Phillip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect.


[29] Constructive leaders affirm the humanity of all groups (positive collectivism), offer constructive ideologies, help shape institutions and generate concrete actions to fulfill these visions. Constructive leaders consider peaceful alternatives under violence-generating conditions. See: Ervin Staub, *The Psychology of Good and Evil*, p.406.


[31] Strengths-based approaches are means of fulfilling needs by focusing on talents and/or abilities rather than problems and/or deficits. They identify which good(s) (needs) one is pursuing and facilitates socially acceptable means of attaining them.


[33] Pascale et al., *The Power of Positive Deviance*, p.3.


[37] Pathological Altruism refers to any behavior or personal tendency in which either the stated aim or the implied motivation is to promote the welfare of another. But, instead of overall beneficial outcomes, the “altruism” instead has irrational (from the point of view of an outside observer) and substantial negative consequences to the other or even to the self. See: Oakley, B., Knafo, A., Madhavan, G. and Wilson, D. (2012), *Pathological Altruism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Calling on Women: Female-Specific Motivation Narratives in Danish Online Jihad Propaganda

by Sara Jul Jacobsen

Abstract

Based on a monitoring of 16 official social media profiles of three Danish jihadi-Salafi organizations over a five-year period, this article explores how these jihadi-Salafists motivate women to take part in defensive jihad (jihād al-dafʿa). The issue is explored through the analytical lens of discourse, and intersectionality theory as well as the theoretical perspective on affect and the social construction of gender. The article finds that women are motivated to take part in jihad by referencing classical doctrines of defensive jihad and by means of records of charismatic female fighters from the time of the Prophet. However, the female-specific motivation narratives are as contemporary and empowering as they are regressive and founded in classical sources such as the Quran, ahadith and Sīra. The motivation narratives show strong push-back against Western feminism and counter-narrate Western views of Muslim women as oppressed, passive victims of male-dominated ideologies. Instead they (de-)construct 'the Muslim woman' in motivation narratives in which jihadi-Salafism is an important source not only of authenticity but also of strong self-identity and (em)power(ment).

Keywords: Denmark, Jihad, jihadi-Salafism, propaganda, social media, gender, women.

Introduction

Within the last ten years, women's involvement in terrorism has been widening ideologically and logistically, and is expected to increase in future.[1] Accordingly, studies on terrorism have increasingly focused on women. Literature on female terrorism provides important knowledge on issues such as the history of female involvement in terrorism, women's strategic role and impact, and female suicide attacks.[2] Studies that specifically address the issue of women's motives for involvement in terrorist organisations have predominantly done so through milieu approaches and mappings of demographic and socioeconomic backgrounds of women who have left West European countries to join jihadi organizations in Syria or Iraq.[3] They find that women's motives to take part in jihad are complex and without clear patterns.[4] However, the body of literature is still small and what it does not consider in detail, is the female-specific jihad propaganda aimed at West European Muslim women by the jihadi organizations. While social media play an increasingly essential part in jihadists' female-specific recruitment strategy,[5] few studies have been undertaken on the issue of female-specific jihad propaganda on social media.[6] This article therefore aims to examine how three jihadi-Salafi organizations based in Denmark motivate women through their narratives on social media to take part in defensive jihad (jihād al-dafʿa or the violent defense of Islam).[7] The questions explored are: How do the Danish jihadi-Salafi organizations online motivate Muslim women to take part in jihad? What subject positions are constructed and what narratives are offered?

The issue of Jihadism has been on the public agenda in Denmark since the cartoons controversy of 2005–2006, intensifying with the 2015 shootings in Copenhagen. The large number of Danish Muslims who have traveled to Syria and Iraq as foreign fighters further caused the Danish discourse to expand. With nearly 30 citizens leaving for Iraq and Syria per one million inhabitants, Denmark has more so-called foreign fighters per capita than most other EU Member States, only slightly outscored by Belgium. At least 150 individuals have travelled from Denmark to Syria and Iraq, and, according to the latest assessment from the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, the number is now estimated to be even higher. The vast majority of those leaving for Syria and Iraq are young men, but more women have left in recent years. Women now make up every seventh of the total number of Danish jihad travelers.[8] Particularly interesting in the case of Danish jihadi-Salafism is furthermore that while international jihad organizations such as the terrorist organization that calls itself Islamic...
State (ISIS) have until recently excluded women from the battlefield, the Danish jihadi-Salafists have called on women to take part in combat for almost ten years. More specifically, the Danish jihadi-Salafi organizations assign three conceptual subject positions for Muslim women to take within jihad: “mother,” “martyr wife,” and “mujāhida”[9],[10] Thus Muslim women are assigned both non-military and military positions in jihad. The discursive online construction of Muslim women's role as mujāhida, that is female fighter, is the focus of this article.[11] The question is how the jihadi-Salafi organizations appeal to women to participate in combat.

The main argument of the article is that the jihadi-Salafist’s female-specific motivation narratives are as contemporary and empowering as they are regressive and based on classical Islamic sources such as the Quran, ahadith and the schools of Sunni jurisprudence.[12] The motivation narratives show strong push-back against Western feminism and counter-narrate Western views of Muslim women as oppressed, passive victims of male-dominated ideologies. Instead they (de-)construct ‘the Muslim woman’ in motivation narratives in which jihadi-Salafism is an important source not only of authenticity but also of strong self-identity and (em)power(ment).

The article is based on an open-source study of textual and audio uploads posted by three Danish jihadi-Salafi organizations on their sixteen official social media accounts on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube – over 8,000 uploads in total. All textual and audio materials were uploaded by the jihadi-Salafi organizations themselves, not by followers or members. Data include all uploads posted by the organizations from the creation of their social media accounts to the end of 2015. All told, data cover a time period of over five years. This period is particularly interesting in relation to online jihadi narratives because online anti-radicalization initiatives at that time were less developed than they are today. More specifically, Danish anti-radicalization initiatives had not yet begun to force takedowns [13] of online so-called radicalization material from social media in the “fight against online radicalization”. Thus, online censure on social media platforms was almost non-existent and Danish jihadi-Salafists could speak almost freely online. Large parts of the materials collected for this article no longer exist on social media today.

The textual and audio uploads were downloaded, stored, systematized, and analyzed with the help of qualitative software programs. To narrow down the dataset to textual and audio uploads that specifically deal with jihad (-ism), data were coded by data-driven [14] jihad-specific codes (See appendix). for codebook on codes and descriptions). All uploads in which jihad-specific codes appeared were included in their full length which in textual uploads vary from three lines to 20 pages and in audio uploads vary from three minutes to almost four hours. Most uploads were in Danish, a few in English and almost none in Arabic. Variable spellings in Danish, English, and Arabic as well as the nouns in singular and plural were included in the coding process.[15]

Methodologically, the article builds on Jonathan Potter & Margaret Wetherells psychological discourse analysis (1987) and their social constructionist perception of language: that is, that the world is socially constructed through language, both spoken and written, and that language shapes identities, social relations and understandings of the world.[16] Accordingly, social media texts such as the texts and audios uploaded by the jihadi Salafi organizations, construct a version of world situations, rather than merely reflecting or mirroring them.[17] More specifically, the present analysis built on Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe's (1985) theory on how subject positions take place in the social field of meaning-making processes.[18] Simply put, subject positions (i.e., when the subject is placed in a specific position by a certain discourse,) are constructed in their relations: they are defined in relation to what they are and what they are not.[19] Furthermore, the article theoretically builds on Judith Butler's theorization of gender as a social construction.[20] According to Butler (1990; 1997), our gendered identity is created when we are interpolated [21] that is 'called' by someone or something, and given an identity via that call.[22] Thus gender is an effect of repeated speech acts that calls the subject into a gender identity, and thereby constructs a person as a gendered subject. Through continuous repetition and citations, norms about 'right/wrong' or 'natural/unnatural' ways of 'doing gender' become fixed and naturalized.[23] Through the repeated speech acts, gender comes to appear as if it were substantial and essential.[24] This, Butler argues, has consequences for the discursive frames within which subjects can define themselves. Butler uses the metaphor ‘congealing’[25] to indicate what happens. According to Butler, language should thus be understood not only as meaning making, but also as an active praxis with reality-producing
The present article also theoretically builds on feminist accounts of intersectionality. Despite differences and variations, the shared theoretical assertion of feminist accounts of intersectionality is that different social categories such as gender, ethnicity and class intersect. This means that they mutually influence and transform one another as overall social structures, as well as in creating complex identities. On the level of social identities, this means that as an individual you are never just a woman, but always also, ethnically and class-wise, etc. positioned in a way that has consequences for which gender identities become possible, difficult, or impossible. Lastly, the article is using affect theory for an understanding of the online space as social networks constructed around emotion and affectual relationships. As Sara Ahmed stressed (2004), shared anger, shame, hate, or love are inherently politicizing emotions offline and online. In this way, the discursive construction of emotion can be instrumental in creating online communities of feeling.

These theories are encompassed to complement each other in the analysis of how the Danish jihad-Salafists motivate women to take part in combat in their jihad-specific online narratives.

The term jihadi-Salafism (or its equivalent, Salafi jihadism) is used to refer to the Danish organizations as they in various ways position themselves in their textual and audio uploads on social media with a violent fraction within a strand of conservative Islam known as jihadi Salafism. Simply put, the concept of Salafism is derived from the Arabic expression *as-salaf as-Sālih* (the righteous predecessors), which refers to the Prophet and the first generations of the rightly guided Muslims. Salafism as a general approach to the interpretation of Islam is thus embedded in the idea of following in the footsteps of these early generations and deriving religious guidance directly from the sources. The markers by which this is done include explicitly stressing that the organizations follow the way of conservative Salafism or normatively constructing the “right Islam” in a textually rigorous way and rooted in pre-modern time. The organizations furthermore place a strong emphasis on being jihadists by, for example, legitimizing violent defense of Islam, glorifying martyrdom, and paying tribute to specific martyrs.

The three Danish jihadi Salafi organizations included in this study are the Call to Islam (“Kaldet til Islam”), the Muslim Youth Centre (“Muslimsk UngdomsCenter”), and the Islamic Culture Centre (“Islamisk KulturCenter”). To briefly introduce the three organizations, The Call to Islam was until recently one of the most visible and vocal Islamic organizations in Denmark. The Call to Islam has now been dissolved, as several of its members, including its leader, Shiraz Tariq (also known as Abu Musa), have died as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. The Muslim Youth Centre is less visible and less vocal, rarely appearing in the Danish media. The mosque attended by its members, however – the Grimhøj Mosque in Aarhus – has attracted frequent media attention, most recently when its imam was portrayed in a documentary as expressing support for stoning of women as a punishment for adultery. Lastly, the Islamic Culture Centre is also not very visible and vocal. This group is considered rather classic or traditional and follows only one sheikh, Sheikh Abu Ahmad. Some of those implicated in two Danish terror cases – the Glostrup case (also known as “the Sarajevo case”) and the Glasvej case (also known as “Operation Dagger”) – are reported to have participated in Abu Ahmad’s classes. This article is based on these three specific organizations because at the time of data collection they were among the most influential jihadi-Salafi organizations in Denmark, both online and offline. More specifically, these organizations have been among the main establishers of a Danish online jihad narrative. The organizations have been the main base of large clusters of Danish foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join contemporary Islamist organizations such ISIS. All three are termed “organizations” to underline that they all exist or existed online as well as offline (organized with affiliation to mosques etc.), and are not simply online debate forums.

**Pre-modern Motivation Narratives**

Now turning to the questions of how the Danish jihadi-Salafi organizations motivate Muslim women to take part in jihad, the article finds that they encourage women to take the position of a female fighter by referencing classical doctrines of defensive jihad. The jihadi-Salafists thus put forth female-specific classical doctrines on defensive jihad to argue that women are obligated to take part in jihad. Classical jihad doctrines are a theory...
of warfare developed by Muslim jurists long before the emergence of the modern nation state to distinguish between offensive and defensive warfare. Simply put, offensive jihad (jihād al-talab) was war to be waged against other states, while defensive jihad (jihād al-daf’a) addressed the need for all Muslims to fight if their own territories were invaded. Thus, offensive jihad was associated with military conquest and expanding the geographical boundaries of the community and was considered a collective duty (fard kifayya) for mature able-bodied males. On the other hand, defensive jihad was related to the defense of Islamic lands and was considered an individual obligation (fard ‘ayn) upon both men and women. According to the classical doctrine, the individual obligation of defensive jihad applies to those residing in a territory that is under attack or those who are nearby. Modern jihadi-Salafists, including the Danish jihadi-Salafists on which this article is based, drop this distinction, however, as they perceive the “enemy” (i.e. the West, apostate regimes, etc.) as being in charge of Muslim territories and Islam as being under attack, and therefore call on all Muslims to defend themselves. The organizations have thus discursively turned defensive jihad from a territorially oriented doctrine to a contemporary global military program.

Below is an example of a textual upload posted by one of the Danish jihadi-Salafists at the beginning of the Syrian civil war. They explicitly refer to the classical doctrines of defensive jihad to define the individual obligation for women. They refer to the doctrines stressing that “if an enemy attacks a Muslim country, Jihaad becomes an individual duty upon every man and woman”, that “in cases of necessity, such as if the kuffaar attack a Muslim country (…) Jihaad is obligatory for women” and that “Jihaad is, in cases where the enemy has invaded the Muslim country, obligatory for all healthy people, men and women”. They furthermore explicitly reference the Quran (here surah Al-Tawbah) and the Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence (here the Hanafi and Maliki schools of law). In doing so, the Danish Jihadi-Salafists legitimize the position of the female fighter and through continuous repetition and citations, ways of ‘doing gender’ in jihad, thus, become fixed and naturalized. Through online repeated narratives, women’s position in defensive jihad, thus, comes to appear as if it were substantial and essential.

Example I:

When jihaad is fard ‘ayn [individual obligation],[41] which means an individual obligation, there are no excuses, then you must go out and have tawakkul [trust]42 on Allah, that is, to trust in Allah, that He, Azza wa Jall [mighty and majestic],[43] takes care of one’s children (…) Jihaad is, in cases where the enemy has invaded the Muslim country, obligatory for all healthy people, men and women, and a woman can go out without permission of her father or husband (…) Al-Kaasaani al-Hanafi,[44] may Allah have mercy on him, said: “In a time of general mobilization, such as when the enemy is trying to invade a Muslim country, it becomes an individual obligation, fard ‘ayn, on every Muslim who is able to fight, because Allah says (…) ‘March forward, whether you’re light (fast, young and wealthy) or heavy (sick, old and poor)’ (Al-Tawbah 9:41). It was said that this was revealed about mobilization in general: ‘It was not true for the people of Al-Madinah and the Bedouins in the neighborhood to stay behind the Prophet (fighting for Allaah’s cause) and it was not right for them to prefer their own lives over his life.’ (Al-Tawbah 9: 120). Al-Sharh al-Sagheer, one of Maliki’s books (2/274) says something similar, stating that if an enemy attacks a Muslim country, Jihaad becomes an individual duty upon every man and woman (…) Jihaad is not obligatory for women, in principle, except in cases of necessity, such as if the kuffaar attack a Muslim country. In this case, Jihaad is obligatory for women in accordance with their capabilities (…) (text upload by Islamic Culture Centre, June 2013, my translation of the Danish, Arabic as in the original).[45]

As in the text above, the jihadi-Salafists also frequently address the specific ways in which women can leave for jihad. In general, they argue that a woman may only travel in the company of her husband or a mahram (a male relative whom she may not marry). However, the Danish jihadi-Salafists argue that in the extraordinary circumstances of defensive jihad the classical legal stipulation that a woman must not travel without a mahram does not apply. As the text upload above exemplify, they emphasize that in times of defensive warfare, “when the enemy has invaded a Muslim country” (Example I), the classical jurists stipulate that no woman is required...
to seek permission from another to defend herself. And Muslim woman “can go without permission of her father or husband” (Example I). [46]

In their pre-modern motivation narratives, the Danish jihadi-Salafists furthermore motivate women to take part in jihad by posting records of charismatic female fighters from the time of the Prophet. These Salafi women are emphasized as role models for contemporary Muslim women to emulate. In a text upload, one of the organizations encourages women to follow in the lines of the “women from the past,” who “fought and died for their belief” and “gave their blood and tears and sacrificed everything”:

**Example II:**

(…) We never know when death will come, so let this reminder go into your hearts and minds, my honored sisters. Who are we compared to the women of the past? Those who fought for this deen [religion], [47] who died for this deen, who lost family members for this deen, they gave blood and tears; they sacrificed everything, subhan Allah [glory to God]. [48] Everything. So who are we to lay on the lazy side? Thanks to Allah, he has given us many chances this year. Subhan Allah He has ta' a la [may he be exalted ] [49] directed many and subhanAllah [(all) praise be to God] [50] these sisters and brothers who fought side by side with the Prophet have changed much today! They have brought Islam into our hearts, so let’s not miss our chances, In Shaa Allah. [51]

In the text, the Danish jihadi-Salafists through a female voice encourage their “honored sisters” to take this reminder of the female fighters from the past into their heart and not “miss their chances” (Example II). The Danish jihadi-Salafists do not simply refer to women at the time of the Prophet Muhammad in the abstract; they refer to a handful of specific women who at the time of the Prophet participated in defensive jihad. Some of the hadiths referred to even recount women saving the Prophet’s life in situations when he and Islam faced an existential threat. The woman most referred to is Umm ‘Umar, [52] who fought in several battles and sustained numerous injuries to the extent that the Prophet himself is said to have extolled her heroism on the battlefield. [53] In a three-part audio series telling this fighter’s story, it is stated that she defended not only the Prophet but entire Islam: “When she saw that the Prophet was surrounded and that Muhammad was threatened and that all of Islam was threatened, she drew a sword” (Audio upload The Muslim Youth Centre, April 2015, my transcription, my translation from Danish). It is further underlined that “many men wish they were as courageous as she was” and that Umm ‘Umar “had some great characteristics that many men do not have today”. [54]

The audios also refer in particular to Khawlah Bint al-Azwar, a Muslim female fighter, sister to the legendary soldier and Companion of the Prophet Muhammad. According to tradition, she fought alongside her brother in several battles, including the Battle of Yarmouk against Byzantine forces. Khawlah was well known for her leadership in battles of the Muslim conquests in parts of what are today Syria, Jordan, and Palestine, and in particular one battle in which she is said to have led a group of women against the Byzantine army. An example is a video on Khawlah’s life, in which one of the organizations, in glorifying terms, states that she is said to have hunted down and forced men who tried to escape the battle back onto the battlefield. [55] The jihadi-Salafists thus highlight Khawlah Bint al-Azwar as well as Umm ‘Umar for their courageous actions and honorable participation in jihad while at the same time shaming men who have not left for jihad by underlining that modern-day men lack the courage and characteristics of the female warriors who fought for Islam.

The examples above exemplify how the Danish jihadi-Salafi organizations have adapted the rationale of defensive jihad in order to argue that the role of the female jihadi fighter is lawful. In their pre-modern motivation narratives, they create legitimacy and lawfulness in the position as mujāhida by referencing classical sources such as the Qur’an, ahadith, Sīra and schools of orthodox Sunni jurisprudence (Example I). They furthermore call on women to take the position of female fighters by posting stories of charismatic female fighters from the time of Prophet Muhammad (Example II) and thereby offer them authenticity and identity via that call. [56] Put differently, they interpolate [57] the subject is into a gender identity in jihad. Through continuous repetition and citations, ways of ‘doing gender’ in jihad, more specific the position of the female fighter, become congealed. [58]
Contemporary Motivation Narratives

However, the Danish jihadi-Salafi organizations’ motivation narratives are not simply regressive and founded in pre-modern times. They are also contemporary and contextualized in modern-day female-specific identity issues. The motivation narratives merge a focus on classical doctrines of defensive jihad and records of tradition with contemporary narratives which address complex identity issues specific to Muslim women in the West. In particular, they motivate Muslim women to take part in jihad by counter-narrating a (perceived) Western essentialism in which Muslim women (according to them) are seen as passive victims of oppressive male-dominated ideologies (see Example III). An example is the following textual upload in which the jihadi-Salafists counter-narrate a (perceived) hegemonic and stereotyped view of ‘the Muslim woman’ as “reserved, oppressed and weak”. Instead they (de-)construct Muslim women as “strong and self-confident” and emphasize that they are “defined by Islam in the form of the Qur’an and Sunnah”. The Danish jihadi-Salafists refer to female fighters in the Prophet Muhammad’s army “fighting on equal terms with weapon in hand defending Islam against the enemy” (see following example). More specifically, they refer to the heroic actions of the already mentioned Umm ‘Umara (here ‘Nasiba bint Kaab Al Mazini’) and Khawla bint Al Azwar who disprove the “distorted perception of Islam as women’s oppressive and reactionary”. And they ask the rhetorical question: whether contemporary Muslim women have the strength to follow in the footsteps of these brave women. [59]

Example III:

The perception of the Muslim woman as a weak, oppressed and passive is widespread in the West. That women in the western world are forced to be walking sex objects is called ‘freedom’. However, the Muslim woman – as defined by Islam in its writings in the form of the Quran and the Sunnah – is strong and self-confident (…) when the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, was in conflict with the local infidel tribes in the Arabian peninsula, his army of faithful soldiers was joined by many women fighting on equal terms with weapon in hand defending Islam against the enemy. Especially well known is Nasiba Bint Kaab Al Mazini, who was always in the lead. In one battle, she was wounded 13 times, lost one hand, and killed in close combat the man who killed her son Umara (…) Khawla bint Al Azwar saved her brother in a battle by killing his opponents (…) The West rejoices women who can contribute to the distorted perception of Islam as women’s oppressive and reactionary. The West allows the woman to show off her body; to degrade her to a sex object. It allows her the right to do many things, but not to the right to be Muslim. The West will not recognize women who choose Islam. According to the West’s mind, women who choose Islam must be forced to do so by their husbands. In the ideological crusade against Islam, the West uses the Muslim woman as hostage. Women’s oppression is a problem we all must help fight. But the solution – the liberation – is not called free sex (…) it is called Islam. Islam’s historical and brave women have shown the way to it. But are Muslims today strong enough to follow? [60]

The Danish jihadi-Salafists in particular critique the Western lack of tolerance for Islamic women’s insistence on defining themselves within a conservative religious paradigm. They counter-narrate the Western vision of ‘freedom’ and stress that the West “allows” women “to degrade her to a sex object” but not “the right to be Muslim” (Example III). According to Danish jihadi-Salafists, the West does not “recognize women, that choose Islam” but generalize women as male dominated and “forced to do so by their husbands.” The Danish jihadi-Salafists thereby counter-narrate the Western fight against women’s oppression. Instead they construct Islam – more specifically to take part in jihad and follow in the lines of the righteous predecessors (as-salaf as-sālih) – as the source of female strength and liberation.

The Danish jihadi-Salafists more specifically counter position the notion of western feminism as a universal identity platform and global sisterhood (see Example IV). This notion is, according to the Danish Jihadi-Salafists, based on the mistaken idea that women all over the world have identical interests. The West constructs a homogenous, global, feminist ‘we’, and in so doing neglects the differences in interests generated, for example, by a religious self-identity. The idea of the global, feminist ‘we’ is however, according to the Danish jihadi-Salafists, related to an equally unspecified ‘they’. The unspecified ‘they’ is abstractly defined as Muslim women,
who appear to be “oppressed” (see Example IV) and therefore more backwards’ in terms of reaching out for the ‘common’ feminist goals. The Danish jihadi-Salafists instead stress the honor of being “sisters of Islam” and the obligation to “stand up” for their “deen” (i.e. dīn, religion) and “defend it with all their power.” They call on women to stand united and be among those who fight for the religion for which Muhammad fought. They discuss the issue of women’s oppression by saying tradition that Muhammad gave Muslim women their rights 1,400 years ago and pray that “Allah punish those who oppress Muslim sisters”. They call on woman to fight for their “honor”, “deen” (i.e. dīn, religion) and “protection” and ask that women may be among those who rise the “khilafa” (i.e. the caliphate) and die on “la ilaha illa Allah Muhammad rasool Allah” (i.e. the Shahada or the Islamic creed).

Example IV:

Dear sisters, remember, we are sisters of Islam! We are the ones who must bring our nation forward! (…) we are those who will stand up for la ilaha illa Allah! ! [shahada, the Islamic creed][61] Remember Islam is our deen [religion][62] we must defend it with all our power! Remember our beloved Prophet fought for Islam! Even the women did in his time! Islam is what we must fight for! Islam is our honor! Our deen! [religion][63] Our protection! (…) No kuffar can say we are oppressed when Muhammad saws [Peace be upon him] [64] gave women their rights 1400 years ago! Indeed, it’s the kuffar who suppressed! We are well, Alhamdulillah! [praise be to Allah] [65] May Allah use us, may we be among those who fight for our beloved deen that Muhammad fought for, may we be among those who rise the khilafa! [caliphate] [66] So the Muslims can have peace from these kuffar! May we be among those who are God-fearing and die on la ilaha illa Allah Muhammad rasool Allah! [sic, shahada, the Islamic creed] May Allah protect our sisters and brothers all over the world! May Allah punish those who oppress our sisters and brothers of Islam!). [67]

The four textual examples above exemplify how the Danish jihadi-Salafists exhort women to take part in jihad by setting jihad-specific narratives within the context of complex identity issues and emotions specific for the intersection [68] of being woman and Muslim in the West. They also counter-narrate the stereotyped perception of Muslim women as oppressed, passive and male-dominated. The three organizations studied for this article upload narratives that (de-)construct ‘the Muslim woman’ as strong and independent. In so doing, they use contemporary available discourses and situational, contextual language flexibly in a micro-context – that is, their everyday interaction on social media – to motivate Muslim women to take part in jihad.

Conclusion

To motivate women to take part in violent jihad, the Danish jihadi-Salafi organizations repeat female-specific doctrines on defensive jihad from pre-modern, classical Salafi sources. Furthermore, they upload stories of charismatic female fighters from Prophet Muhammad’s time and appeal to modern Muslim women to emulate their example. In so doing, they enable Muslim women to connect their own individual self-perception with the larger notion of tradition and authenticity.

However, the female-specific motivation narratives are just as contemporary and empowering as they are pre-modern and regressive. The gender-based discrimination that Muslim women (feel that they) face in modern-day society is constructed as additional motivation. Therefore, the jihadi-Salafists strategically motivate Muslim women to take part in jihad by addressing issues specific for the intersection of being women and being Muslim in the West today.

Salafists are often perceived as conservative: as founded in the time of the Prophet, and in ideological terms as representing a search to recover the distant past. The Danish jihadi-Salafists also perceive themselves in this way. In some respects, however, this is a distorted view. As shown above, these organizations’ jihad mindset also embodies a contemporary, modern-day jihad narrative. Although they encompass the older notion of Salafi theology, the motivation narratives of the Danish jihadi-Salafists are more complex and more multi-
faceted than the doctrines of the forefathers of the medieval period. In exhaustive ways, they rearticulate the records of tradition and history into emotions and affect specific for contemporary Muslim western women.

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## Appendix: Codebook: Data-Driven Codes and Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jihad, jihadi, jihadist, jihadism</td>
<td>Uploads that concern jihad as a concept, phenomena, position or ideology. Focusing specifically on violent jihad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujāhid, mujāhida, mujāhidin</td>
<td>Uploads that concern the concept, phenomena or position of one engaged in jihad; mujāhid, mujāhida, mujāhidin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martyr; martyrdom, šahīd, šahīda, šuhadā’</td>
<td>Uploads that concern the concept, phenomena or position of a martyr (šahīd, šahīda, šuhadā’) or martyrdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die, death, day of judgment</td>
<td>Uploads that concern death, dying, or day of judgment in relation to jihad (ism), martyrdom (šuhadā’) or being jihadist, martyr, mujāhid or mujāhida.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green birds, lions</td>
<td>Uploads that concern jihad-specific metaphors. Specifically focusing on green birds and lions e.g. martyrs living on in the heart of green birds or mujāhidin as lions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caliphate, Khilafah</td>
<td>Uploads that concern the caliphate as a phenomena or concept. And in relation to the terror organization that call themselves Islamic State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijra</td>
<td>Uploads that concern the notion of emigration (hijra) as a synonym for jihad or narratives of hijra as a part of jihad or the establishment of an Islamic State. [69]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes


[8] See for example the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA): Assessment of the Terror Threat to Denmark (January 2018). More reports in Danish and English are accessible at www.pet.dk.

[9] In this article, the term ‘mujāhida’ is used to conceptualize a female engaged in violent jihad.


[12] See Kecia Ali & Oliver Leaman, 2008: “Four main schools of Sunni jurisprudence have dominated Muslim history, along with one major and several minor schools of Shi’ia jurisprudence. By the early fourth/tenth century, these groups of more or less loosely affiliated scholars were clustered into definable schools of thought. The rise of the schools did not eliminate internal dissent but rather circumscribed its boundaries. The Sunni schools, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’, and Hanbali, are named after, respectively, Abu Hanifa (d. 150/767), Malik ibn Anas (d. 179/796), Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i (d. 204/820), and Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855). Although these men are sometimes referred to as the founders of the schools, they did not actually found them though they did originate many of their distinctive doctrines”.

[13] I.e., the deletion of uploads on social media.

[14] The jihad-specific codes are data-driven i.e., they emerge from readings of the raw data. Data-driven codes involve five steps to inductively create codes for a codebook: (1) reduce raw information; (2) identify subsample themes; (3) compare themes across subsamples; (4) create codes; and (5) determine reliability of codes. See Jessica T. DeCuir-Gunby, Patricia L. Marshall, and Allison W. McCulloch, “Developing and Using a Codebook for the Analysis of Interview Data: An Example from a Professional Development Research Project,” Field Methods, 23, no. 2 (2011): 136–155: DOI: 10.1177/1525822X10388468.

[15] All codes were truncated, which means that all words beginning with the letter composition were included. For example ‘jihār” includes ‘jihād’, ‘jihādi’, ‘jihādismin’, ‘jihād’, ‘jihādī’, ‘jihādism’, etc. For further elaboration on methodology, see this author's forthcoming dissertation (to be completed in 2019).

[17] Idem.


[21] See Althusser, in Judith Butler 1997. According to Althusser, interpellation means that our identity is created when we are ‘called’ by someone or something, and given a name and an identity via that call (Judith Butler, 1997, 25).


[25] Ibid.


[33] Also called "Masjid Quba".

[34] See Manni Crone, "Denmark." World Almanac of Islamism (2011): almanac.afpc.org/Denmark). The Call to Islam's construction of 'the Muslim woman' is still interesting and relevant because this group is among the main actors in the establishment of a Danish online jihad narrative. Their text-uploads and videos are still circulated online within the current Danish jihadi-Salafi milieu.

[35] See Manni Crone 2011; Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen, "The Attractions of Jihadism – An Identity Approach to Three Danish Terrorism Cases and the Gallery of Characters around Them", Ph.D. dissertation (Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 2010). For further elaboration on the three Danish jihadi-Salafi organizations included, see forthcoming dissertation of the author of this
article (to be completed in 2019).


[38] See Nelly Lahoud, 2014; Thomas Hegghammer, 2008; Thomas Hegghammer, 2013.


[42] Idem.

[43] Idem.

[44] A Hanafi jurist, who authored one of the major works in the Hanafi School of Law i.e. one of the four religious Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence (fiqh).

[45] Text upload by Islamic Culture Centre, November 2012, translation from Danish by author of this article; Arabic as in the original.

[46] In three of the over 12,000 uploads the Danish jihadi-Salafi organizations, however, indicates that it is unlawful for a woman to go without a mahram even in situations of defensive jihad while in one upload one of the organizations indicates that violent jihad is for men only. For further elaboration, see forthcoming dissertation by the author of this article (to be completed in 2019).


[48] Idem.

[49] Idem.

[50] Idem.

[51] Text upload by Islamic Culture Centre, February 2013, translation from Danish by author of this article; Arabic as in the original.

[52] Also called Umm Imara on the Muslim Youth Centre's profile and Nasiba Bint Kaab al Mazini on the Islamic Teaching profile.

[53] Audio upload by The Muslim Youth Centre, April 2015.

[54] Audio upload by The Muslim Youth Centre, April 2015, transcription and translation from Danish by author of this article.


[59] And others: for example, Safiya Bint Abdumuttalib who according to tradition was the first Muslim woman to kill an enemy in battle and Asma bint Yazid who according to tradition killed 9 opponents in the battle of Yarmuk and Khawla bint Al Azwar (Text upload by Islamic Culture Centre, October 2012). Also, Hussain’s sister, Zainab, is said to have fought side by side with her brother in battle (audio-upload by Muslim Youth Centre, November 2014).

[60] Text upload by Islamic Culture Centre, October 2012, translation from Danish by author of this article; Arabic as in the original.


[63] Idem.

[64] Idem.

[65] Idem.
[66] Idem.

[67] Text upload by Islamic Culture Centre, November 2012, translation from Danish by author of this article; Arabic as in the original.


[69] Hijrah, or emigration, refers to the relocation of the first Muslims from the urban centre of Mecca, to the oasis town, which eventually became known as Medina. The hijrah looms large in the Muslim imagination because it is through this emigration that the first Muslim community was truly established. The notion of emigration has become an important metaphor for some Muslim thinkers who, adopting for themselves the mantle of authenticity of the first Muslim community, have advocated flight from “un-Islamic” society. See Kecia Ali & Oliver Leaman, 2008.
When Foreign Fighters Come Home: The Story of Six Danish Returnees

by Maja Touzari Greenwood

Abstract

This article explores the question of how six Danish former foreign fighters experienced their return to Denmark after having fought with jihadist militias in the Middle East. Based on an investigation of their struggle to overcome the rejection with which they were met in almost every corner of their social world, the author argues that returning home presented them with an existential crisis. During the crisis of returning, participants actively re-interpret and create meaning not only around their journeys, but also with regard to their standing with their closer and broader relations. In other words, they have to rediscover and redefine their place in the world. The article concludes with some recommendations for rehabilitation efforts.

Keywords: Denmark, Syria, jihadism, foreign fighters, rehabilitation

Introduction

In recent years, thousands of Europeans have left to fight alongside jihadist movements, including approximately 150 individuals from Denmark.[1] Particularly since the Islamic State’s loss of territorial control, Turkey closing its southern borders, and President Bashar al-Assad recapturing control over most of Syria, the flow of foreign fighters has stalled. Consequently, the analytical interest in questions of why individuals were leaving has been replaced by an immediate policy focus on questions that have to do with how to handle those foreign fighters that make their way back home.[2] Europe as well as other regions ‘braced themselves’[3] for the return of ‘floods of foreign fighters’. Of the approx. 150 individuals that left from Denmark, the Danish intelligence service estimates that about one third has returned, while another third is assumed dead, with one third still being in the conflict zone or elsewhere abroad. [5]

The security services’ worries primarily focus on the question whether the returning fighters now possess an enhanced capacity to carry out terrorist attacks because of their battlefield experience, their network connections and a presumed motivation to do so – in short, whether they may ‘bring terrorism with them’. [6] This question has also given rise to academic debates. [7] Returning foreign fighters are deemed by some to be the greatest security threat to Europe, [8] while strategy analysts assess the immediate and long-term threats [9] from what has been termed a ‘terrorist diaspora’. [10]

This debate centres mainly around the question of whether to prosecute and jail or reintegrate and rehabilitate returning foreign fighters. [11] Challenges regarding how to handle returnees have proven to be complex and responses vary across Europe. On the one hand, we see risk assessments and arrests, and, on the other hand, there is a more recent development of models for rehabilitation as well as policies for receiving back children born in, or brought to, IS territory.

The situation is further complicated by the paucity of empirical data in the study field to support the development of research-based initiatives. However, some historical case studies can provide insights from previous conflicts involving foreign fighters. [12] Nevertheless, the current case is unique in its near-global scope, its startling high numbers, and the heterogeneous composition of foreign fighters. As a result, the direct benefits from studying previous experiences appear limited. At the same time, generating data with returnees carries practical difficulties that limit most efforts to interviews with incarcerated individuals, and therefore, represent only one particular type of experience of returnees. [13]
In this article, the question of how six Danish former foreign fighters experienced their return to Denmark is explored after having fought with jihadist militias in the Middle East. It is argued that returning represented a form of existential crisis for the returnees. As they actively re-interpret their situation and create meaning not only around their journeys, but also with regard to their relationship with their closer and broader relations; broadly speaking, they have to figure out their place in the world.

The present analysis is based on an interview process and on fieldwork that took place between 2013 and 2017. The author followed and spent time with a group of individuals who had fought in Libya, Syria, and Iraq with various Sunni and Shia militant movements in conflicts that emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring. All participants have since returned to Denmark. Interviews took place over extended periods of time between and after their journeys. The criteria for participant inclusion were these: each participant had to be born or raised in Denmark and had a) travelled to a foreign conflict, b) had joined a militant movement that justified its fighting with reference to the concept of jihad, c) had eventually returned to Denmark, and d) was willing to be interviewed extensively about the experience. Participants were approached discreetly via personal connections and were informed that participation was voluntary, anonymous and that they could withdraw their cooperation at any point. For this article, names and some details have been anonymised/adapted to lessen the risk of harm for those who agreed to be interviewed. Interviews took place in informal settings and were loosely structured as conversations. The author sought to gain a general impression of their perspectives and did not aim to uncover any facts that could be potentially lead to criminal proceedings against the participants.

The study was guided by ethnographic methods of inductive analysis, allowing theory construction to grow out of the fieldwork process. As themes emerged relating to questions of human existence, as well as issues linked to moral relations with the world, divinity and, ultimately, life and death, the interviewer chose the notion of an existential crisis to make sense of, and communicate, the collected interview and fieldwork material in an empirical way. In the context of this study, an existential crisis is understood as the overwhelming situation an individual may find himself in, when events lead him to question if his life has meaning, purpose, or value, and find it difficult to find ways to make choices for himself or is unable to choose between conflicting paths. It is a moment which may both represent a catalyst for finding new meaning in life, when the individual is able to remerge with an intact psyche from the abyss. As such, the interviews offered a perspective on the crisis of returning, as well as opening opportunities for rehabilitation.

Leaving Jihad

From the moment those interviewed set out on their journeys, placing their all-weather backpacks in the airplane’s overhead compartment or driving their disposable car onto the Scandlines ferry to cross from Gedser to Germany, all participants were already planning to return to their lives in Denmark after having fought in the Middle East. The six individuals interviewed for this study were not belonging to those emigrating jihadists who would post anti-Western video manifestos on the Internet and issue threats on YouTube. Nor did they give bay’ah (an oath of allegiance) to any leader or movement.

For them, the journey was temporary, a moment or an event, but not a life-long emigration project. Although they may have been ready to sacrifice their life in the sense of being prepared to risk dying while fighting for their cause, they did not intend to spend the rest of their lives fighting – their immediate aim was to survive the journey and return to Denmark. Hence, no participant of these interviews put himself on a list of fighters willing to undertake a 'martyrdom mission' (suicide attack). In order to uphold their chances for a smooth return, they largely conducted themselves discreetly on social media while away, waiting to post selfies or information about their activities abroad on social media until their safe homecoming.

While they were active travellers, those participating in the interviews indicated to this author before setting off how long they expected to be away and when they expected to return. Their journeys were sometimes shorter but never longer than they had stated in advance. Having to bear the cost for their arms and stay also limited the length of their stay as they had to return to Denmark for interim periods in order to save again money
to cover the costs for their next stay. They were more likely to have made arrangements to stay in the theatre of conflict for a period of months rather than years. Four out of six participating in the interviews fitted their travel plans into Danish exam schedules or pre-registered a leave of absence with their employer. Some were enrolled in educational or trainee programmes at the time of their leaving Denmark and returned to complete these. The oldest participant had children and promised them to come back alive, while younger participants seemed genuinely keen to meet someone at home with whom to start their own families.

Furthermore, several interview participants expressed a conflicting sense of responsibility towards their mothers, who were urging them to come home. Each had to evaluate whether what he saw as his sacred duty to fight on behalf of the *ummah*, outweighed the consequences the decision would have for himself and his immediate family. Within a hierarchy of religious moral duties, the duty to obey one's parents could, according to one school of Islamic thought, take precedence over the duty to participate in jihad, in which case one is obliged to return if one's parents request it.[19] A participant stated wryly that there exists no stronger force of persuasion than that of an Arab mother ‘guilt tripping’ on you. Those with family ties to the countries in which they fought, were acutely aware of the risks and difficulties their parents had gone through to leave those countries and raise them in Denmark. Reversing that effort seemed disrespectful.

As five of the six participants travelled back to the conflict zone several times, it was not necessarily clear to them when they left the conflict zone whether their departure would be temporary or final. Still, some suspected at a certain point in time that the authorities were unlikely to allow them to return to the Middle East after having returned to Denmark. Security measures around foreign fighters were tightening; measures were implemented to restrict travelling and to broaden the possibilities to prosecute returnees beyond the already existing restrictions of the anti-terrorism laws.[20] Returned foreign fighters who were deemed likely by the police to repeat their travel had been placed under a travel ban and their passports had been confiscated.[21] One person received a nine-month prison sentence for disobeying the travel ban.[22] For participants who had left for Syria, the conflict only escalated in brutality and complexity over time, and they left behind an unresolved conflict with little to show for their personal efforts.

As all six interviewees subscribed to the idea of jihad as a local rather than a global endeavour, it follows that once they went back to Denmark, they would be leaving jihad behind them, shedding their recent identity as *mujahid*.[23] The European jihadists who follow the Islamic State’s interpretation of jihad could follow the advice of the former IS spokesperson, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani: that it could be seen as equally valuable to attack in the West as joining the caliphate where IS held territory.[24] However, the six interview participants had no such view as they only considered themselves active *mujahadeen* while fighting in the Middle East and therefore gave up such a status upon leaving.

On the one hand, they saw themselves as having a role to play in the Middle Eastern conflicts and an obligation to do so, because they saw those conflicts as universally Muslim in nature. If the global Muslim faith community, the *ummah*, is understood as ‘one body’, then all of the world’s Muslims are equally responsible for its wellbeing. Such a pan-Islamic position does not recognise national borders, and if that is the case, one does not fight as a ‘foreigner’, but rather holds direct moral responsibility on a par with the Muslims born in the area.

Yet, the participants considered themselves as acting out of *solidarity with*, rather than *belonging to*, the local population in the conflict zones. Even participants who claimed to be fighting to defend the Muslim *ummah* still talked of doing so *through* fighting for ‘the Syrians’ or ‘the Libyans’, whom they saw as separate from themselves. At no point did a ‘we’ or ‘us’ in their sentences include the local civilian population. Instead, linguistic in-group signifiers most often related to foreign fighters or the militant group; while ‘we’ signified those who fought. Placing themselves once removed from the conflicts in which they fought, helped to support the premise of understanding their own actions as heroic and pious: that fighting was a voluntary choice they had made, based on their own ethics and sense of agency. To the local fighters, defeat meant that a catastrophic violence might be visited upon everyone they loved. In that context, fighting to the death might have seemed less of a choice, whereas the interview participants connected their own choice to fight to an altruistic willingness to self-sacrifice for the *ummah*. They saw themselves as fighting for God, not out of self-interest, but out of choice,
not necessity.

Although it helped them to maintain such an understanding to see themselves as volunteers who would return to Denmark after ending their ‘stationing’, it also highlighted their privileged situation compared to the local population, who had no opportunity to make such a choice. This disparity in terms of consequence meant that when the time came to leave the Middle East and return to Denmark, it was not a straightforward choice for any of the participants. Indeed, for some, leaving was a more complicated decision than to go.

Landing on Familiar Ground

All participants returned home to the same disappointing material reality they had left behind. One returned to find a pile of bills waiting for him, another had lost his job and had to take up temporary work at a warehouse. One participant who had belonged to the criminal gang environment found that he had to work hard to re-establish his authority and earn back trust in his loyalty, which had been compromised by his absence. All struggled to realign with their normal lives back in Denmark – something that stood in stark contrast to the instinctive intensity of the drama in the war zone.

Being relieved to make it through the experience alive has a sadness attached to it that some other fellow fighters did not experience. One participant regretted how ineffective his presence seemed to have been in preventing civilian deaths, lamenting, ‘Children died, and I could not save them.’ There is a connection here to the ideals they and others had given as reasons for going – that they were the brave who were going to protect the innocents. At stake was the duty to the ummah, the imperative to hold intact the religious community as a kind of ‘sacred unity’. To fall short of being able to provide unconditional protection was experienced as a failure to the idea of being faithful. If fighting to protect was a form of worship, then what was failing to protect?

It seemed that some participants forced the pain of such thoughts on themselves as a way of sharing some of the fate of those left behind – a form of self-flagellation or tatbir, as it is known in the Shiite tradition to which some participants belong to – as if their guilty emotions had a redemptive effect. One participant recalled that only the five daily prayers signalled a break from his frustrated state of mind, representing purification. Each time he washed before prayer, he says, he imagined his ego and his sins washing off him.

For this reason, transitioning out of the conflict setting and into the home setting was not a full break. While some of those interviewed worked through complex emotions such as survivors’ guilt or shame about having left the battle zone behind, some others enrolled in charity functions to compensate, packing clothes collected for refugees, raising money for ambulances, or wiring cash to civilian relief organisations connected to the movements with which they had fought.

Some found that their bodies were similarly slow to adapt to home, and continued to be alert and on edge, pumped with adrenalin. One participant described swinging between extremes of craving risk and seeking thrills or collapsing into apathy, drifting about aimlessly. Several participants contrasted the intense and overpowering experience of feeling ‘truly alive’ while fighting with returning to the dull routine of living in Denmark. They struggled with feeling unneeded by Danish society and found themselves excluded and emotionally detached from their old surroundings.

One participant described how everyday occurrences and banalities such as someone jumping the queue in the supermarket or the sense that someone looked at him the ‘wrong’ way easily annoyed him. He claimed, with a sense for drama, that he would rather have died in combat than suffer the routine life of Denmark. Another participant seemed to grow increasingly restless during the interviews after his return; his discourse developed increasingly towards elaborate anti-Western conspiracy theories. He said he easily becomes impatient and resentful when listening to individual people or to public debates complaining about situations and issues that he felt were petty – such as the reluctance to give asylum to refugees.

Those who were accepted back into the criminal environments they originally came from seemed to adjust best to the return situation. Although their loyalty to the gang was questioned and they needed in some way to re-confirm their allegiance to the gang over the ummah, they were eventually received back into a closely
knit social environment of belonging. No participant from the criminal environments appeared to maintain connections to religious environments once returned to Denmark. In some cases, they feel not welcomed in the mosque due to their criminal activities, and in one case, the participant seemed to have lost all interest in spiritual affairs when the exigencies of a turf conflict with a rival gang demanded his full attention upon returning.[25]

Other participants imagined taking on a unique religious status and authority in the Muslim community upon return as veteran mujahedeen, an expectation modelled upon the return of those who fought the Soviet army in Afghanistan in the 1980s. With the exception of few small, closed groups of friends, this expectation of enhanced status and respect stood in stark contrast to the reality the participants encountered once they were back home. Instead, they found themselves being objects of suspicion, not only from the Danish authorities who regarded them as potential or de facto terrorists, but also from their local Muslim communities where scepticism regarding certain modern conceptualisations of jihad run deep. Participants struggled with accepting their chilly reception; one likened it to the traumatising reception that Danish national army soldiers received upon returning from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – wars about which the Danish people had become disillusioned. The only section of society that appeared to show appreciation for the returning foreign fighters were groups of youngsters (shabaab) who shared their attraction to excitement and action. Shabaabs hovered around them, probing for gory war stories, and giggling at the thought of the virgins said to await a mujahid in heaven – hardly the accolade of the mujahedeen they were looking for.

One participant who fought with Shia militias in what was established as an official jihad by Shia religious authorities, described the humiliating and painful experience of being the only person not greeted by one of the elders who came to the local Danish mosque, both blushing with embarrassment and fuming with anger. The elder, who was a much-respected man in the congregation, would most often be welcomed before Friday prayer by fellow worshippers near the shoe rack in the foyer of the mosque, and accompanied into the prayer hall, shaking hands and greeting everyone on his way. Yet, since his travels, the elder would find ways to avoid this participant, either diverting himself or looking straight past him as if he was thin air, extending his hand to the person next to or behind him in such a deliberate way that no one around them could avoid noticing the disrespect.

This interview participant had a particularly bitter reaction, as he saw himself as having acted upon a religious call uttered by the very same authorities that he would assume the elder in the mosque would be loyal to. Though only one participant relayed notions of rebellion against his parents and their Westernised complacency he felt they represented – exemplifying the generational revolt that Olivier Roy suggests underpins the most recent wave of European jihadism – several others also recalled feeling painfully rejected by the older generation. This suggests that rather than having rejected them as sources of authority, as Roy thought, they value their opinion. [26] Several of their parents had fled areas of conflict and violence in order to give their children a life free from such concerns. They therefore tended to view their sons’ involvement in conflict and violence in order to give their children a life free from such concerns. They therefore tended to view their sons’ involvement in conflict as vulgar and flippant.

The fathers and uncles of those interviewed for this study had urged them upon their return to focus on getting an education and finding a good, well-paying, steady job. Their mothers, in turn, instructed them to look after their families and find themselves a nice wife instead of going around ‘acting the hero’ or ‘pretending they are an ‘action man’ on foreign battlefields. Such accusations were particularly painful, because of the implication that the participants’ fighting in the Middle East was unauthentic and disingenuous, i.e., ‘acting’ or ‘pretending’. While such descriptions may reflect a natural way for a parent to reconcile with, or distance themselves from, the violence of their offspring, the six interview participants were frustrated by how this reaction downplays the ‘realness’ and moral weight that they attributed to their actions. In their minds, they had acted in a way that made them not only ‘real men’, but ‘men of honour’. Nevertheless, they were received back by their families as disobedient children. There was an anxiety around whether their families would ‘know’ them – an expression which in the original Danish word holds the same duality as in its English translation: both to be familiar to someone, but also to be acknowledged.[27]
The social stigmatisation also became explicit in the challenge it posed to finding a wife after returning home, as was the ambition of several of those interviewed. Potential spouses and not least their parents, who in religious families are often required to approve the engagement, were looking for settled men with steady jobs who would not suddenly leave their family to go and fight in the Middle East, risking a conviction for terrorism and being sent to prison, or ending up being killed in a far-away conflict. Such men were not in demand on the local marriage market.

When this author asked the interview participants about their experiences abroad, they recounted a reluctance, even amongst their closest friends – fellow gang members and workout buddies – to ask them about their journeys. They felt tainted by the invisible filter of violence they worried their parents, fellow mosque-goers, prospective in-laws, and others from their local community might view them through. Furthermore, the particularity of the violence with which they were associated holds the potential of being condemned as potential or de facto terrorists in the eyes of others.

One participant chose to shave off his beard when he started a new work placement, out of concern that his appearance may inadvertently disclose his new identity as jihadist, or in more vague terms, as an ‘extremist’. He weighed his words carefully, mindful never to come off as aggressive. Yet, he gradually disclosed a nagging resistance to changing his appearance in order to better ‘fit in’ according to logic and values that condemned him and with which he fundamentally disagreed.

He increasingly thought of the Western lifestyle as repulsive – he felt that the ‘realness’ of his experiences in ‘the land of jihad’ allowed him to better realise the vanities of mundane life back home. Initially, he talked about how he had parted alongside his high school classmates although he abstained from alcohol as if to demonstrate to this interviewer his ability to participate in mainstream culture. Eventually, he spoke more of the ambivalence that he felt – that ‘fitting in’ in such ways came at a cost to his integrity. Eventually, he described Danish society as selfish and egocentric, spoiled and immoral. Although he felt conflicted upon his return about the pragmatism with which he sought to divert suspicion, such as shaving his beard, as time wears on, he eventually began to take some form of subversive enjoyment in ‘posing’ as ‘normal’, in knowing something about himself that most others did not know. It made him feel like an ‘insider’ rather than the ‘outsider’, even if he was an insider only to his own reality. He had a mocking tone of voice as he said, ‘Let them see what they want to see’. When asked if he meant that ‘they’ see a terrorist or that ‘they’ do not know that he has fought in Syria he replied, ‘I will never be anything but a terrorist in their eyes’.

Yet in some instances, it was the interview participants who distanced themselves from individuals they had once had positive relationships with, because they themselves acquired new perspectives after returning, rather than the other way around. Several of them described certain people as ‘hypocrites’ if they passed judgement on them for having been a foreign fighter, yet openly supported the cause they fought for (e.g., they condemned President Bashar al-Assad’s air strikes on civilians). Or, those interviewed described them as ‘cowards’, if someone supported the cause and the fighting (i.e., accepted Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani’s call for jihad against Islamic State), but were not willing to join the fight themselves. They felt unjustly positioned as ‘baddies’, as a backdrop against which pious individuals – the ‘beardies’ (referring to the large beards worn particularly by Salafists or religious scholars) – could pose themselves as morally superior. Participants identified a self-serving purpose in how such people would publicly condemn injustices with reference to principles of non-violence in order to legitimise their own cowardice. In the view of those interviewed for this study, the ‘beardies’ sought to reinforce their façade as pious persons, while they were in fact unwilling to risk their lives the way those interviewed had done. The interview participants thus distinguished those who ‘acted’ against the rest, who remained passive and condemned those who acted. Through such ‘holier than thou’ reasoning, the participants were, in their own mind, able to dethrone people held in high regard within their religious and local communities, and who had dared to judge them for fighting. They claimed a more privileged and authentic access to ‘knowing’ about the spiritual ethics of violence from having been the ones who ‘acted’.

By depicting fighting as a claim to moral authenticity and visceral authority, the participants challenged traditional sources of authority within Islam. They did so by placing emphasis on the embodied experience of
war over intellectual or theological musings, as well as over merely ‘eye-witnessing’ the conflict from a distance via news or social media. They appeared to see themselves as what Yuval Harari has called ‘flesh-witnesses’: ‘They are neither thinkers nor mere eyewitnesses. Rather, they are men who have learned their wisdom with their flesh.’[28] Emphasising experiential authority simultaneously served the dual purpose of undermining the scepticism that they were experiencing and valuing their agency. In other words, the interview participants were the ones who acted when others were passive or ‘merely’ contributed to charity efforts. Claiming to be a ‘flesh-witness’ became a way for those with little or no status within the religious community to challenge the established religious leaders and claim moral authority by virtue of their martial experiences. In their view, only they had the privileged authority to speak about, and pass judgement on, what they witnessed as jihad.[29]

Claiming Visceral Authority

However, the participants’ embodied knowledge was not only a private matter but a public security concern. Participants worried about being put under surveillance by the security services; they were afraid of imprisonment and of having a terrorism conviction ruin their future life prospects. They had a more strained relationship with their local communities. They also had grounds to fear that their activities could have serious repercussions for their families and lessen or at least complicate their chances to get married. They were dealing with feelings of rejection, abandonment, and hopelessness about the future, feeling angry, nervous, and disillusioned. Their own meaning formation, therefore, became something of a struggle between societal attitudes towards them, and their defiance and insistence that their fighting jihad represented a righteous and pious activity. Because their activities were controversial to the extent that these had to be hidden from society, such meanings were largely kept isolated at the individual level. In the case of the interview participants, it may be that one replaced the other, so that when societal recognition seems unattainable, a defiance is emphasised in response. ‘How am I the bad guy?!’ one participant asked rhetorically.

‘There is no knowing how great it is unless you were a part of it’, another participant offered. ‘If just one child was saved, then it is all worth it, because the people called for us, and we rallied’. Yet another participant recounted the thrilling experience when he as part of the militia rode into town and how they were praised by the crowds running alongside their vehicles. This sense of real appreciation made him feel needed in a more profound way than anything else in his life. They found a sense of purpose in the communal struggle, in the lives of lost civilians and fellow fighters, they found a cause that filled their spiritual void. And they all insisted that, in principle, they would not hesitate to do it again.

Jarrett Zigon’s description of narratives as ‘articulations of the embodied struggle to morally be with oneself and others in the social world’ points to the tension of feeling condemned exactly for having followed ones’ own ethical principles.[30] Feeling bitter and feeling proud intersect, as one cements the other when confronted with rejection. Before this chance to join the jihad arose, there was no redemption. Giving themselves up to serve a greater cause offered them an opportunity to view themselves as dignified. The conflicts in the Middle East presented them with the opportunity to no longer see themselves as sinners but as heroes – by defending the ummah they became ‘glorified mujahedeen’. However, upon return to Denmark they were on their own when it came to upholding this self-image.

The rejection those interviewed faced upon return meant that the meanings they ascribed to fighting remains fragile and ‘up in the air’. Stabilising meanings around their journeys into the jihad is therefore an ongoing effort in which they run the risk that returning home, in contrast to the intensity of the moral drama of jihad, would simply be an experience devoid of purpose and meaning, leading to feelings of not being needed, being excluded, and being emotionally detached. Cheryl Mattingly argues that in an existential crisis when it is ‘uncertain what kind of self one ought to become’, the construction of moral selves does not arise from available fixed positions but rather from an exploration of open-ended potentialities.[31] In the case of foreign fighters, the ‘dignified self’ of a mujahid represented one such a potentiality. However, as this ‘process of becoming’ took place in a highly charged atmosphere upon return, being labelled a ‘potential terrorist’ is another attribute that
might be assigned to each of them.

The interview participants remained defiantly attached to the meanings they had ascribed to their journeys upon return. To repent their actions and throw those meanings, as it were, into the fire would escalate an existential crisis. One interview participant was cautious when I asked him whether he felt like a hero, and answered that he does not feel fundamentally changed, but adding that he had gained for himself a point of pride which he could use to distance himself from the more negative projections of his self, a kind of buffer between the fault lines in his self-perception.

By means of fighting jihad, those six men interviewed for this study sought to rise above their previous lives and thereby render that part of their past irrelevant – in other words, to overwrite their previous script. Fighting a cause that connected notions of being rebellious, radical, and non-conformist with notions of being honourable and ethical appears to be particularly conducive to such an effect. This is what Eric Hoffer described as particularly attractive ‘not to those intent on bolstering and advancing a cherished self, but to those who crave to be rid of an unwanted self’.[31]

Yet these men did not necessarily seek to do so by breaking with their former violent practices, but rather by situating that violence in a new context that resonates with their ethics. As such, radical and violent sentiments may resonate with certain subjectivities exactly because they speak directly to the dissonant feeling with which they move in mainstream society. These men negotiated their identities in a context that demanded allegiance to, and alignment with, ‘Danish values’ while simultaneously being constructed as a suspect population and as a potential ‘enemy within’.

The interactive nature of resonance is illustrated in the work of Zehra F. K. Arat and Abdullah Hasan, who argue that not only have Western media and political discourse cast Muslim men as terrorists, but various jihadist groups have further sought to cement this stereotype.[33] These stereotypes do not exist in parallel but rather in dialogue, as they both draw on each other to emphasise the violence inherent in the masculine myth. Yet in the jihadist form, violence was claimed as an empowerment of Muslim masculinity – one that promised to resolve its problematisation as suspect. Hence it relies on the emasculating experience of normative marginalisation that makes its emancipatory narrative resonate. When participants talked of a need to ‘straighten their back’, they did so from a position of being bent.

The compelling idea of ‘a sudden political and social revolution whereby the humiliated and excluded of today are to become the omnipotent rulers of tomorrow’, as Manni Crone puts it, ‘proposes a form of empowerment, whereby social and political impotence can be exchanged for a position of action and power’.[34] This is exactly what Islamic State promised when it came to recruiting foreign fighters, and this is also the reason why it has been so hard to counter.

This notion also helps to unlock the question of why so many foreign fighters as well as European sympathisers of al-Qaeda or Islamic State seemed to live outwardly secular and in some cases in fact delinquent lifestyles immediately before leaving for the Middle East (or before committing a terrorist attack in the West). From the perspective of ‘cross over’ between criminal and jihadist environments, it is exactly the nature of the criminal and secular lives that the participants have led that makes it credible that a jihad narrative of redemption resonates with them – precisely because of, rather than in spite of, the contrast. To become foreign fighters and leave for the Middle East offered them a way to do ‘good’ in a concrete and realised form through a practice that was previously the cause of their condemnation. There is undeniably more at stake by joining jihadist movements than being part of criminal environments, such as the promise of an otherwise unlikely spiritual absolution. Religion provides an opportunity for salvation more relevant to the sinner than to the saint, and such relevance is connected to moral emotions: ‘The more poignant the sense of sin, the more urgent the desire to escape it’.[35] The desire for salvation is reliant on the pre-existence of sin, but also on the intervention of a search for a moral modality of being.

Those interviewed were proud of having been foreign fighters; several of them considered it the most honourable thing they had ever done. For some it was perhaps the only dignifying act they could claim. The controversial
nature of the path they chose, in some cases only worked to strengthen their resolve. It facilitated a narrative of perseverance in the face of obstacles through which they proved their faith and gave them a ground to stand on. Fighting may represent a transgression, but the radicalism of their activities was not merely an incidental by-product of their activities, but rather speaks to the specific configurations of their becoming. Challenging societal norms around violence seeks to challenge the authority society claims over them. By standing up in outright defiance of the boundaries of what is perceived as permissible violence, their transgression apparently also served to transcend such norms and place them beyond the reach of such norms.

Conclusions

Few central insights from these six foreign fighters’ experiences of returning to Denmark after having fought alongside jihadist militant groups in the Middle East, that relate to European policy initiatives will be highlighted here.

Because their activities were (and are) controversial and necessitated a degree of secrecy, all six participants struggled to align their own understanding of their journeys as foreign fighters with the rejection and negative judgement coming from their surroundings. Consequently, some meanings became isolated and entrenched at the individual level. The six interview participants remain defiantly attached to those meanings they ascribed to their journeys. In some cases, these meanings were their only claim to a sense of moral dignity. To repent their actions would be to throw the meanings they attach to them as it were into the dustbin and thereby deepen an existential crisis. This explains why some European prospective returnees have refused to offer public repentance for what they did – even when it may cost them their chance to return. In relation to rehabilitation initiatives, this defiance often represents an obstacle to engaging in programs that presuppose and demand ideological disengagement and repentance prior to joining and benefitting from such a program. It may therefore be fruitful not to make such demands for rehabilitation initiatives.

One observed effect of the entrenchment of meaning, was how some interview participants reacted to social rejection. They did so by a reinterpretation of the spiritual authority located in the embodied experience of jihad. In relation to rehabilitation initiatives, this is worth noting when involving religious authorities into such initiatives. Returnees do not necessarily relate in a dogmatic way to matters of theology and religious authorities, but actively interpret religious creeds in relation to their own situations and select authorities that support those interpretations. As the interview participants placed emphasis on masculine ideals of embodiment and action, a theological discussion with them may miss the target.

Several participants noted how feeling disconnected from their local environments was the most difficult experience upon returning. This points to the sensitivity with which such relations should be drawn into the workings of state programmes, as the trust between returnees and their surroundings is crucial for successful reintegration – although it remains fragile.

While away, participants were doused with enormous amounts of adrenaline and praise, two things that one can thrive on. But both experiences – excitement and recognition – were denied them upon return as they felt isolated from the broader society. Not only did they miss the intensity and drama of their wartime experiences, they also missed the profound sense of purpose, meaning, and worthiness that they had felt abroad. In relation to rehabilitation initiatives, but also with regard to prevention programs, it could be helpful to better understand the potential invigorating effects of these experiences on the individuals. It also explains why the idea of ‘a normal good life’ does not necessarily sound attractive to the returnee nor to the potential jihadist traveller. This may well be the reason why initiatives that focus on the level of ideology struggle to resonate in a way that presents credible and attractive alternatives to ‘the glamor, energy, and sheer badassery’ of jihad as an ideal. Rehabilitation initiatives may need to accept that for some the most disillusioning and traumatising thing about fighting, may have been giving it up.
Finally, policy questions along the lines of ‘how can we help these people adapt back into society’ miss their target, if these returnees see nothing comforting in European societies. Consequently, it would be helpful to move on from the perspective of radicalisation as an event that changes a person, and instead focus on how people choose extremist projects that, however limited and potentially problematic, may pose a ‘solution’ to their frustrations, and offer them a strategy for generating vindication and (self-)esteem. The Middle Eastern conflicts represented not just a unique opportunity to ‘become’ somebody radically different from the subjectivities available to the participants in the West, but also an easily attainable one. The belief that violence redeems morality may be so appealing simply because it is so achievable. This contrasts with the search for societal recognition and grounding that the participants find unattainable. For this reason, questions around rehabilitation may in fact relate closely to those of prevention. If we do not take seriously the reasons why young men like those interviewed for this study left in the first place, we may wrongly assume they wish to return to that very situation. If their position within society was exactly what they sought to escape by becoming foreign fighters, then rehabilitation promises of readjusting back into it will not sound particularly attractive.

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Notes


[14] A jihadist group is here taken to mean a militant group justifying its use of violence with reference to the concept of jihad.


[17] There exists little indication to the effect that the idea of a life-long commitment and emigration was common among Danish foreign fighters until after the Islamic State established the idea of the caliphate in June 2014. Until then, fighting was generally conceived of as a temporary endeavor. When it did become the case that most foreign fighters were leaving with the deliberate intent of emigrating to the caliphate permanently, the numbers seemed to drop rather than increase – in part due to frustrations over the internal strife between Islamic State and other jihadist groups (only approximately 25 people left Denmark in 2015-2016, while 110 had left before end of 2014 according to CTA Threat Analyses of 2014 and 2016. – CTA, (2016), Threat Assessment; URL: https://www.pet.dk/Publikationer/~media/CTA/20141212VTDendeligs.pdf.ashx. It may therefore well be that many of the other Danish foreign fighters, like the six interview participants, left with the intent to return.

There is a key theological difference between whether jihad is regarded as a collective duty of the entire ummah to supply enough men to fight so that as long as there is a sufficient number fighting, it is not a duty for each individual to join the fight (fard al-kifayah), or whether it is an individual duty for all able-bodied Muslims, so that one's personal salvation depends upon carrying out this duty (fard al-ayn). The fact that the six interview participants predominantly interpret jihad as a collective duty does not necessarily mean that they disavow the idea that jihad could ever be an individual duty; they just did not see the present circumstances as living up to the criteria for such jihad. 


Crucial as to whether or not foreign fighters are viewed as potential threats by the security services when returning home is how these foreign fighters conceptualise the conflicts in the Middle East in a global context. What is particularly important to know is whether they regard Western countries as legitimate targets for attack. In recent years, rebel troops have moved across country lines: veterans from the civil war in Libya have moved to Syria to continue the fight there, while fighters have moved across the border between Syria and Iraq. Some consider these fights to be local offshoots of a cosmic war. Such interpretations are not always stable but may be flexible, according to an individual fighter's experiences. One interview participant who fought against Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi's regime, began, in an interview, to describe a local engagement that had as much to do with his own family history as it did with religious ideals about future Islamic rule in Libya. In an interview he observed that had he been a couple of years younger and had he been coming of age after Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi’s fall and when the Syrian civil war broke out, it would have been entirely possible that he would have joined that conflict instead.

While the interview participants in this study did not maintain connections with religious environments upon return, some other research points to the fact that belonging to criminal and jihadist environments may in some instances coexist comfortably. Cf. [25] While the interview participants in this study did not maintain connections with religious environments upon return, some have been entirely possible that he would have joined that conflict instead.

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[27] Originally in Danish: at kende/at kendes ved’.


[29] This term also covers the theological implications of ‘witnessing’. According to some interpretations, the act of fighting, being injured, or dying for a religious cause constitutes a way of ‘bearing witness’ (shuhada) to one’s faith (aligned with pronouncing the declaration of faith, the shahada) that makes the person a shahid (witness, but it also means martyr), granting him spiritual immortality. Cf. Asad, Talal (2007), On Suicide Bombing. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 48.


Does Trust Prevent Fear in the Aftermath of Terrorist Attacks?

by Bernard Enjolras, Kari Steen-Johnsen, Francisco Herreros, Øyvind Bugge Solheim, Marte Slagsvold Winsvold, Shana Kushner Gadarian, and Atte Oksanen

Abstract

This article examines the potentially buffering effect of generalized social trust on fear in the aftermath of terrorist attacks and in situations of terrorist threat. It draws on comparative, longitudinal survey data, examining the cases of the 2011 Utøya terrorist attack in Norway, the 2016 Nice attack in France and the 2017 Barcelona attack in Spain; it also draws on a comparative news story experiment that examined the bolstering effect of social trust in relation to terrorist threat. The results show that high levels of generalized social trust before exposure to terrorism are linked to lower levels of fear after the event. This relationship holds for the longitudinal survey data and the news story experiment, and across national contexts. This result indicates a general bolstering effect of social trust. However, the size of effects vary between national contexts and incidents of terrorism. This indicates that the effect of trust is dependent on the social and cultural structures of trust in the different countries and on specific factors related to the attacks.

Keywords: Trust, terrorism, fear, public opinion, resilience, Utøya, Barcelona, Nice.

Introduction

The threat of terrorism has become a permanent feature of public and political debates in the past few decades, and the question of how this threat affects citizens’ political preferences and attitudes is of great interest. [1] Research on the political psychology of terrorism has increasingly emphasized the impact of emotions on people’s political responses, and in particular, the role of fear.[2] Previous scholarship argued that fear reduces tolerance for outgroups,[3] increases support for hawkish foreign policies[4] and decreases political participation.[5] Given these potentially negative effects of fear, studying the preconditions for the development of fear among citizens in the context of terrorist attacks is important. This study delves into the relationship between generalized social trust before an attack and the fear of new attacks experienced in the aftermath. “Generalized social trust” is defined as “trust in people we do not know, and who are likely to be different from us.”[6] We take as our point of departure existing evidence that generalized social trust may buffer fear in the wake of a terrorist attack. In the aftermath of the right-wing extremist terrorist attack in Norway on July 22, 2011, preexisting high levels of trust were shown to have a prophylactic effect on fear; that is, trust bolstered against the development of fear among individual citizens.[7]

We study three countries that have recently experienced terrorist attacks (Norway, France and Spain), using longitudinal and experimental survey data. Specifically, we examine the effect of generalized trust on fear after the terrorist attacks that occurred at Utøya in 2011, in Nice in 2016 and in Barcelona in 2017. By looking at three different national contexts, with different background histories and situations concerning terrorist attacks, we can gauge whether the buffering effect of trust found in Norway in 2011 reflects a general mechanism, or whether the effect is linked to this specific case or to features of Norwegian society. The article also examines the relationship between generalized trust and fear under the condition of terrorist threat, using a news story survey experiment conducted in these three countries in 2017.

Although the relationship between trust and fear may be general, and thus, valid across national and social contexts, the study of three countries and three different cases of terrorism also enables a discussion of whether characteristics of the context, such as aggregate levels of trust and fear, as well as previous and current experiences with terrorism, play a role in this relationship. In line with Barber,[8] we conceive of trust as a property not only of individuals but also of society, meaning that existing institutional, relational and cultural structures in a given society may, to a varying degree, be conducive to citizens’ probability of trusting others, and influence the relationship between trust and fear.
The article contributes to the existing literature on the societal effects of terrorism, by examining generalized social trust as a factor that may serve to buffer the development of fear, not only in the Norwegian case but also more generally. The article also contributes to the use of unique longitudinal, experimental and comparative data that enable analyses of how factors preceding an attack impact reactions among the population.

**Trust and the Regulation of Emotions: A Theoretical Perspective**

Terrorist attacks and threats of future terrorism present citizens with complex stimuli, and emotional reactions may depend on a set of appraisals concerning the gravity of the attack, the danger of repetition and authorities' capacity to protect citizens in the future. Generalized social trust, in particular, might regulate emotions of fear in relation to terrorist attacks through processes of cognitive reappraisal. Defining generalized social trust as an individual characteristic, and as dependent on the social structure, we present the theoretical argument that individuals with high levels of are less fearful than other citizens in the context of terrorist attacks. The effect of trust is assumed to be dependent on characteristics of the social structure and the particular situation.

Social scientists have increasingly emphasized the role of emotions in political life, and investigated the influence of emotions in a wide array of political processes and outcomes, including information processing, trust and attitudes.[9] A growing literature also seeks to examine the interaction among emotions, norms and cognition in explaining outcomes in terms of political attitudes.[10] Although the role of emotions in cognitive attitudes is increasingly studied, the role of cognitive attitudes in emotions has not been investigated to the same degree. Studies of cognitive emotion regulation form a notable exception.[11]

Emotion regulation is defined as “the set of processes whereby people seek to redirect the spontaneous flow of their emotions.”[12] Emotion regulation can be deliberate, involving an effort to override spontaneous emotional responses, or can be automatic and effortless. Among diverse emotion regulation strategies,[13] a particularly relevant regulation strategy for this study is “cognitive reappraisal,” which involves rethinking the meaning of affectively charged stimuli or events in terms that alter their emotional impact. During cognitive reappraisal, people reduce the emotional impact of an event by changing their subjective evaluations of this event. From this viewpoint, as pointed out by Ochsner and Gross,[14] cognition and emotion are seen as interacting subsystems that are involved in emotional responses, entailing that individuals exert varying degrees and types of regulatory control over their emotions. Theories of emotion[15] underscore the role played by the interpretation or appraisal of an event in our emotional response. Cognitive emotion regulation alters the emotional response through the manipulation of the appraisal of the event. Reappraisal has been shown to be effective at reducing negative effects of emotion.[16]

Starting from this cognitive reappraisal perspective, we expect that trust influences reappraisal processes when individuals are confronted with threatening events. Trustful individuals can be expected to reappraise threatening events in a less threatening manner than less trustful individuals do, because trustful individuals have more positive expectations for other social actors. Following Castelfranchi and Falcone,[17] we consider trust a “layered relational construct,” involving psychological and social dimensions. The psychological dimension of trust is a mental and affective disposition toward others involving two basic types of beliefs: evaluations and expectations. Whereas such dispositions are relatively stable and formed through socialization, evaluations and expectations are partly socially shaped by the prevalent cultures of trust or distrust in a given context, and are partly dependent on the trustee.

Castelfranchi and Falcone's perspective on individual-level trust could be fruitfully combined with Barber's[18] perspective on trust as a social structure. Barber argued that specific institutional, relational and embodied (habitus) social structures influence expectations about the trustworthiness of unknown (generalized) others and institutions. According to Barber, three types of expectations are involved in trust: “The most general is the expectation of the persistence and fulfilment of the natural and moral social order. Second is the expectation of the technically competent role performance from those involved with us in social relationships and systems. Third is the expectation that partners in an interaction will carry out their fiduciary obligations...
and responsibilities; that is, their duties in certain situations to place others’ interests before their own.”[19] In this perspective, trust reflects the efficiency of society’s normativity and morality, which enables a discussion of how different societies at different points in time may be conducive to finding others trustworthy and to trusting behavior.

Taking Barber’s insights as a point of departure, when the three expectations about trustworthiness are fulfilled (i.e., when citizens get a strong sense of being within a moral social order, where individuals and institutions are expected to be willing to, and capable of, fulfilling their obligations), this should work as a strong impetus to reduce fear through cognitive reappraisal. Consequently, the buffering effect of trust could be assumed to be stronger in high-trust societies, such as Norway, than in low-trust societies, such as France and Spain. However, several caveats about this assumption should be mentioned in the context of terrorism. First, acts of terrorism may pose severe challenges to social trust in any country,[20] which means that generalized social trust might be just as disrupted in Norway under the condition of terrorism as in the two other countries. Second, factors pertaining to the attacks and the fear that these evoke, such as the danger of repetition, may also play a role in determining the role of trust in relation to fear. The strength of the present study is that we examine multiple cases of terrorism across time: in Norway, a right-wing attack with little chance of repetition; in France and Spain, Islamist attacks in a situation of continuous risk. Thus, this design may enable a discussion of the role of such context-specific factors.

The Context

This study is based on a three-country comparison of Spain, France and Norway, and is, at the same time, a study of three different cases of terrorism. Along with citizens in the other Nordic countries, Norwegian citizens typically express the highest levels of generalized social trust in international comparison,[21] as well as high levels of trust in politics and fair institutions.[22] France and Spain display substantially lower levels of social trust, as France is ranked among the low-trust societies, below Spain, which is in the middle group. [23] When it comes to institutional trust, France is situated in the middle, ranking lower than the Nordic countries, but a bit higher than countries such as Spain and Portugal.[24] Although the object of study in this article is generalized social trust, it is still of some contextual interest to present this information about levels of institutional trust as well, because levels of institutional trust may confer something about how citizens see the willingness and capability of their institutions to uphold the moral and social order. Moreover, a strong relationship is often found between levels of social trust and institutional trust in a society.[25]

The three terrorist attacks are distinct in terms of the ideology, scope and modus operandi of the terrorist or terrorist groups. The July 22 attacks in Norway (2011) were perpetrated by a lone-actor terrorist with a right-wing extremist ideology, and were directed against government buildings and a summer youth camp of the Labor Party at Utøya, using a homemade bomb and semiautomatic weapons. Altogether, 77 people died in the attacks, and more than 250 people were wounded. The Nice attack in 2016 was inspired by Islamic ideology, and was also carried out by a single terrorist, who drove a truck into a crowd during the July 14th national festivities, resulting in the deaths of 86 people and injury to 458. The Barcelona attacks in August 2017 were committed by an Islamic group, and involved van attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils, leaving 16 dead and more than 130 wounded. The explosion of a set of homemade bombs in a house in a nearby village the day before the attack was linked to the terrorist cell responsible for the attack.

All three attacks were likely to generate high levels of fear given that they were directed against civilians and involved the use of extreme violence. One main difference might be the danger of repetition. The Norwegian attacks were conceived mainly as an isolated incident of right-wing extremist violence, while the Nice and Barcelona attacks came as part of a wave of Islamist terrorist attacks in Western Europe. The Global Terrorism Database [26] reported 18 jihadist terrorist events in France in 2015 and 2016 (before Nice). Although there was just one reported incident in Spain in 2016 and 2017 (before Barcelona), we assume that the Barcelona attacks in Spain may have been conceived by citizens as part of a broader European wave. This might, in turn, have led to higher levels of fear of new attacks in France and Spain in 2016/2017 than was the case in Norway.
in 2011.

**This Study**

To investigate the prophylactic role of generalized trust in fear generated by a terrorist threat, we combine *comparative, longitudinal* and *experimental* approaches. The longitudinal and experimental approaches allow for two different tests of the effect of generalized trust on fear, while the comparison among Norway, France, and Spain events enables control for potential contextual factors. The data do not allow us to test the psychological mechanism by which trust might regulate emotions, but allow us to inquire into whether the level of fear is lower for high-trusting individuals, and whether this effect is lower in high-trust societies in the aftermath of terrorist events and after exposure to a terrorist threat.

Generalized social trust is expected to have a prophylactic effect on anxiety in the analysis; that is, trustful individuals display lower levels of anxiety than less trustful individuals, when exposed to terrorist attacks or terrorist threats. We expect that this prophylactic effect may vary, depending on whether a society has a higher or lower level of generalized social trust, and according to the characteristics of the attacks in question. Thus, we present a hierarchical argument; that is, individuals who rank high or low in generalized social trust are nested within societies that have norms pertaining to trusting others.

Expectations about variations between national contexts may follow two different lines of thought. Trust may be more effective in societies where it is plentiful. High-trusting individuals may reap larger rewards when there are other trusting individuals, and a society with strong trust structures may also provide a stronger sense of security and cognitive reasons not to fear. Following this, the prophylactic effect of generalized trust should be stronger in Norway than in Spain and France, given that the former is a country with higher levels of social and institutional trust.

However, it may be that “a rising tide lifts all boats”; that is, individual-level trust matters less in high-trust societies, as everyone benefits from the high levels of trust (and social capital). Scholars have argued that individual trust seems to matter more in situations where there is less social capital,[27] because it becomes a distinctive individual resource in such contexts, and accordingly, more valuable. If this is true, then the effect of generalized trust on fear of terrorism should be stronger in Spain and France than in Norway. Adding to this argument is that Norwegian citizens may have been less reliant on trust in order not to experience fear in 2011. The Utøya attacker was quickly captured, and was not seen as linked to a larger network that could repeat the attacks, which meant that there was less immediate reason to fear new attacks in this context than what was presumably the case after the Nice and Barcelona attacks.

We examine the effect of generalized social trust on fear using two methods: a set of longitudinal surveys in France, Spain and Norway with pre- and post-measures linked to the Nice, Barcelona and Utøya attacks, respectively, and a news experiment embedded in a separate survey from 2017.[28] In the analysis, we ask three research questions (RQs) to answer with the use of these data:

- **RQ1:** Does generalized social trust have a prophylactic effect on fear in the case of concrete terrorist attacks? (longitudinal data)
- **RQ2:** Does generalized social trust have a prophylactic effect on fear in the case of exposure to a terrorist threat? (survey experiment data)
- **RQ3:** Does the effect of trust on fear vary by national context? (longitudinal and survey experiment data)
Data and Method

Longitudinal Study

The longitudinal data are drawn from two separate surveys: the Social Media in the Public Sphere (SMIPS) survey from Norway (2011) and the Disruptive Events Survey (DES), collected as part of the comparative project Disruption, Social Capital and Resilience (RCN-SAMRISK II grant 238118), which covers Norway, France, and Spain (2015–2017). The SMIPS survey was fielded in 2011, and contains two waves of data: one collected before the Utøya attacks (in April 2011) and one collected three weeks after the event. For France and Spain, we make use of the DES, with pre-measures collected in December 2015 and post-measures after the terrorist attacks in Nice for France, and after the Barcelona attacks for Spain. The longitudinal analysis assesses respondents’ generalized trust levels before the attacks (measured in April 2011 for Norway, in December 2015 for France and in January 2017 for Spain) on levels of fear measured after the terrorist attacks (August 2011 for Norway, July 2016 for France, and September 2017 for Spain). These data have a panel structure, which allows us to study within-individual variation over time, and allow us to investigate the differences characterizing the relationship between levels of generalized trust and levels of anxiety within these three countries. The panel data include 2,299 respondents for Norway, 393 respondents for France, and 674 respondents for Spain.

To assess respondents’ degree of generalized social trust, they were asked to answer the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” This question was measured on a 10-point scale for Norway in 2011 and on a 7-point scale for France in 2015 and for Spain in 2017.[29] To capture the emotional reaction to terrorism, respondents answered a question about egotropic worry: “How worried are you about someone in your family or personally being a victim of a terrorist attack?” The question was measured on a 4-point scale ranging from “not at all worried” to “very worried.”

Experimental Study

The experimental approach, based on identical survey experiments conducted in the Norwegian, French, and Spanish parts of the DES survey in 2017, allows us to test the existence of a mechanism linking generalized trust and anxiety in different national contexts. The experiments used news stories that presented an imminent terrorist threat. In the story, homeland security has disclosed a terrorist hideout, including concrete plans for a terrorist attack, and the terrorists are still on the loose (see the Appendix for a full description of the experiments).

The data consist of quantitative, representative web surveys in Norway, Spain and France. In the experiment conducted in the three countries, respondents were randomly assigned to four different groups. Three of the groups received identical news stories, describing the disclosure by the national security police of plans for a major terrorist attack in the country's capital city. The three stories were distinguished only by the type of perpetrator involved: an Islamist group of individuals who were born and raised in the country, an Islamist group of foreigners who had recently arrived in the country, and a right-wing extremist group in Norway and France or a Basque extremist group in Spain. The fourth group was a control group that received a neutral story about the finding of a mysterious stone slab with inscriptions. The news stories were modeled on real news stories describing a terrorist threat, and were designed to trigger a feeling of imminent threat. The questionnaire and the news stories were presented in Norwegian, Spanish and French, and country experts who were part of the project team ensured consistency across countries.

In the analysis, the three groups were collapsed and compared to the control group. The rationale for this analytical strategy was that the aim of the study was to examine the general effect of social trust on fear, the type of threat notwithstanding.[30]
To measure respondents’ emotional responses to the news stories, we used the emotional response battery developed by Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen,[31] in which fear is measured with three items. After reading the story, respondents were asked: “How does what you have just read make you feel?” Respondents were then asked to indicate their responses using a slider format and a 7-point scale. The three fear items—feeling anxious, feeling scared, and fearing fearful—were combined into an additive index for the analysis.

The independent variable, generalized trust, was measured with the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” Respondents were then asked to indicate their responses using a slider scale, ranging from 1 (“You can't be too careful in dealing with people”) to 7 (“Most people can be trusted”). The measure is identical to the one used in the longitudinal study.

**Results**

Based on our theoretical discussion, we expect that people who show higher levels of trust experience lower levels of fear as a result of a terrorist threat. The longitudinal analysis consisted of assessing the effect of generalized trust on the level of fear after the terrorist attacks, whereas the analysis of the experiment assessed whether individuals who have higher levels of generalized trust before exposure to a threatening news story display lower levels of fear after exposure.

**Longitudinal Analysis**

Table 1 shows the mean levels of generalized social trust and egotropic fear before and after the respective attacks in each country. Although we see an increase in social trust in Norway, there is stability in France, and seemingly a decline in Spain. Mean fear levels remain stable in France, and increase somewhat in Spain. In Norway, fear is at a lower level (the mean lies close to “somewhat worried”). We do not have a pre-measure for fear.

Table 1: Mean Trust and Personal Fear Before and After Terror Attacks (SMIPS and DES Data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before</td>
<td>After</td>
<td>Before</td>
<td>After</td>
<td>Before</td>
<td>After</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized Social Trust</td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td>6.86***</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.07***</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.04†††</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.050)</td>
<td>(.052)</td>
<td>(.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egotropic Fear</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>2.85***</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.89***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.29)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5711</td>
<td>3150</td>
<td>2328</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two-sample t test with equal variances: *** prob diff < 0=0.000, ††† prob diff > 0=0.000

Table 2 presents the results of the longitudinal analysis (linear regressions), measuring the effect of generalized trust before the three terrorist attacks under study, on the levels of egotropic fear experienced by the respondents in the aftermath of the attacks, controlling for individual background characteristics (age, gender, income and education).
Table 2: Cross-Lagged Panel Linear Regression: Effect of Generalized Trust before Terrorist Attacks (T1) on Personal Fear after Terrorist Attacks (T2). Linear Regression (Standardized and Non-Standardized Coefficients and Standard Error)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-standardized Coefficients</td>
<td>Standardized Coefficients</td>
<td>Non-standardized Coefficients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.001 (.0008)</td>
<td>.023 (.0003)</td>
<td>.000 (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.003 (.008)</td>
<td>.008 (.000)</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male = 0)</td>
<td>.322*** (.026)</td>
<td>.248*** (.095)</td>
<td>.061 (.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.061*** (.011)</td>
<td>-.019*** (.022)</td>
<td>-.042 (.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized trust (T1)</td>
<td>-.039*** (.005)</td>
<td>-.141*** (.026)</td>
<td>-.101*** (.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.940*** (.073)</td>
<td>.000*** (9.353)</td>
<td>20.311*** (5.387)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2299</td>
<td>2299</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < .001; ** p < .05; * p < .10

Table 2 shows that higher levels of generalized trust before the attacks are associated with lower levels of egotropic fear after the attacks in the three countries studied. This result indicates a prophylactic effect of generalized trust, which matches our expectations. Figure 1 further displays the predicted marginal effects of generalized trust on the fear of personally being harmed by future terrorism. The figure shows the predictions from the models (concerning levels of fear in the different countries at T2) while manipulating the values of a covariate (levels of generalized trust at T1). Consequently, the figure displays the effect of a discrete change in generalized trust at T1 on levels of fear at T2.

Figure 1: Predicted Marginal Effect of Generalized Trust before the Attacks on Personal Fear after the Attacks

The average effects are similar in the three countries, but are still somewhat stronger in France and Norway than in Spain. The difference in levels of fear when the lowest level of generalized trust and the highest level of generalized trust is compared is 0.8 on the fear scale for France, 0.5 points for Spain and 0.4 points for Norway,
and , respectively. Personal fear of being harmed by new attacks is lower in Norway than in the two other countries, but the slope is steeper in France than in the two other countries.

To come closer to the effect of generalized trust on the concrete response to the terrorist attack, we ran a linear regression on the effect of generalized trust controlling for fear at T1 for France and Spain. In the Norwegian study, there was no pre-measure for fear; thus, this analysis could be conducted only for the latter two countries. Results are in the expected direction, and significant, as displayed in Table 3.

Table 3: Effect of Generalized Trust before Terrorist Attacks (T1) on Personal Fear after Terrorist Attacks in Spain and France, with Control for Fear at T1. Linear Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th></th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-standardized</td>
<td>Standardized</td>
<td>Non-standardized</td>
<td>Standardized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.002 (.003)</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.003 (.002)</td>
<td>-.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.028 (.016)</td>
<td>.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Man = 0)</td>
<td>0.003 (.083)</td>
<td>0.002 (.057)</td>
<td>-.082 (.021)</td>
<td>-.047 (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized trust (T1)</td>
<td>-.049** (.025)</td>
<td>-.092** (.021)</td>
<td>-.043** (.033)</td>
<td>-.065** (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear (T1)</td>
<td>0.496*** (.049)</td>
<td>0.492*** (.033)</td>
<td>0.535*** (.033)</td>
<td>0.530*** (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>14.160* (2.11)</td>
<td>0.000* (4.591)</td>
<td>-5.027 (1.211)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < .001; ** p < .05; * p < .10

Based on these analyses, then, we can conclude only that there was a prophylactic effect of trust in the case of Spain and France. For Norway, the results are limited to showing that those who had higher levels of generalized social trust before the attacks expressed lower levels of fear after the attacks, as shown in Table 2.

Experimental Analysis

The experiments were designed to manipulate the presence of a terrorist threat, by presenting a constructed news story to respondents. The stories had an impact on the respondents. In the three countries, individuals who were exposed to the news stories reporting displayed, on average, a much higher level of anxiety than individuals exposed to a neutral story (the control group), as shown in Table 4. The treated and control groups displayed the same levels of generalized social trust before exposure to the experiment.

Table 4: Mean Social Trust and Anxiety Index for Control and Treated Groups

(Additive Index Scaled from 1 to 21)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Trust</td>
<td>4.99 (.058)</td>
<td>4.99 (.033)</td>
<td>3.44 (.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Anxiety</td>
<td>5.16 (.146)</td>
<td>12.23*** (.094)</td>
<td>8.06 (.190)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To examine the relationship between trust and reported fear within the context of the experiment, we ran a linear regression as shown in Table 5.

**Table 5: Effect of Treatment and Generalized Trust on the Anxiety Index (Linear Regression)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-standardized Coefficients</td>
<td>Standardized Coefficients</td>
<td>Non-standardized Coefficients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>6.128***</td>
<td>.589***</td>
<td>6.999***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.709)</td>
<td>(.486)</td>
<td>(.486)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized trust</td>
<td>-.578***</td>
<td>-.149***</td>
<td>.224**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.118)</td>
<td>(.112)</td>
<td>(.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment × Generalized Trust (Interaction)</td>
<td>.314**</td>
<td>.166***</td>
<td>-.502***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.156)</td>
<td>(.130)</td>
<td>(.130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.056***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.256***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.610)</td>
<td>(.422)</td>
<td>(.422)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < .001; ** p < .05; * p < .10

Table 5 shows that generalized social trust reduces fear in Norway, and increases fear in France. The effect is not significant in Spain. Specific predictions for the control group compared to the treatment group (i.e., the interaction of generalized trust and the treatment for each level of trust) are shown in Figure 2.

**Figure 2: Predicted Marginal Effect of Generalized Trust on Treated (Exposed to News Story about Terrorist Threats) and Control Groups**

Figure 2 shows the predictions of the levels of fear for the treatment group and the control group in the three countries, while the levels of generalized trust are manipulated. The figure displays the effect of a discrete change in generalized trust levels of fear for both groups. It shows a negative relationship between generalized social trust and fear within the group that was exposed to the terrorist threat scenario, and the group that was exposed to the control story, in all three countries. The levels of fear are higher for the treatment groups than for the control groups in all three countries.

In order to take into account the heterogeneity of the effects of trust on fear, we have to look at the interaction term. The interaction term is significant for Norway and France, but not for Spain. The interaction effect is negative for France, whereas it is positive in Norway. This indicates that, in Norway, trustful individuals are generally less anxious, but get more anxious when exposed to terrorist threats. The overall combined effect of
being trustful and exposed to terrorist threat is to reduce anxiety (as illustrated in Figure 2). Conversely, in France, trustful individuals are, at the outset, more anxious than distrustful individuals. The combined effect of being trustful and exposed to terrorist threat is to reduce anxiety.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this article, we examined the potential prophylactic effect of generalized social trust on fear in the context of terrorism. The results from the longitudinal (RQ1) and experimental study (RQ2) provide partial evidence that trustful individuals are more likely to experience lower levels of anxiety than less trustful individuals, in situations where the individuals are exposed to concrete acts of terrorism or a terrorist threat.

This longitudinal study used data that measured trust before exposure to a real or experimental event and levels of fear after such exposure. The results showed, first, that citizens with higher levels of generalized trust before the terrorist attacks had lower levels of fear after the attacks, in all three countries. When controlling for fear at T1 in Spain and France, effects were in the expected direction and statistically significant. However, the analyses presented here cannot fully determine whether generalized trust impacts the reaction to terrorism in the form of fear, since we were not able to do the same analysis for Norway. Instead, the results demonstrate the stability of generalized social trust are linked to lower levels of fear, even under threatening conditions.

Since we did a pre- and a post-test, generalized trust can be interpreted as influencing levels of fear, not vice versa. The finding that this relationship holds under conditions of terrorism indicates that trust may play an important role in bolstering against adverse reactions when societies are faced with disruptive events.

The results from the experimental study also show a statistically significant relationship between generalized social trust before news story exposure and expressed fear after the experiment in France and Norway - but not in Spain. The effects in France and Norway are distinct in the sense that in France there is a positive average effect of generalized social trust on fear, but a negative interaction effect. In Norway, we find the opposite; a negative average effect of social trust, and a positive interaction effect. This is indicative that, at least in an experimental situation, generalized social trust and fear may interact in different ways. Even though evidence is partial, the results from the experimental study still bolster findings from the longitudinal study, and indicate that the buffering effect of generalized social trust on fear may extend beyond the case of terrorism.

RQ3 raised the question whether the effects of trust vary by national context. The results support the theoretical assumption that the buffering effect of trust is general, and not exclusively linked to high-trust country contexts. An indication of this is found in the relatively strong consistency of the relationship between trust and fear across the three countries and in relation to threat and actual terrorist attacks. At the same time, the differences in effect sizes among countries indicate that social and normative trust contexts matter.[32] Although the differences are small, we found in the longitudinal study that the negative relationship between trust and fear was stronger in France than in Spain and Norway in relation to terrorist attacks. These findings do, however, not give unequivocal support to the argument that in conditions of lower aggregate trust, having trust is more important at the individual level, nor do the findings support the argument that generalized social trust has a stronger effect in high-trust contexts.[33] Still, it is interesting to note that within the high-trust and low-fear context of Norway, the act of trusting generalized others seems to have played a less distinctive role for regulation of emotions at the individual level than in the two other cases, especially compared to the French case. The low levels of fear in Norway may also have had specifically to do with the fact that the perpetrator was seen as an exception, and not as a representative of a continuous violent threat. Reacting without fear could then have been less reliant on social trust. Within the context of the massive Paris attacks that came as part of wave of terrorist attacks in France, generalized social trust may have had a more distinctive role to play.

The results of the experimental study tell a complementary story about the role of national context. In the Norwegian high trust/low fear context, it would appear that social trust provides a general protection against fear, but serves, to a lesser degree, as a distinctive resource when citizens are confronted with a terrorist threat. In France, which could be described as a high fear context at the time of the study, after a series of terrorist attacks in 2016-2017, generalized trusters are on average more fearful than others, but in the context of a
concrete terrorist threat generalized trust still serves as a buffer. These results, as well as the non-significant results in Spain, are indicative that the potential buffering effect of generalized social trust is context- and situation dependent.

It should be noted that many different factors may play a role in the reappraisal of emotions in a given context, and that we have not been able to include these in this analysis. Researchers have recently indicated that the interplay among norms, cognitions and attitudes may be very complex.[34] One such factor might be the “motivation to control prejudice,”[35] which might have led Norwegian high-trust responders to report lower fear than others. Research has also demonstrated the importance of cultural worldviews in regulating fear. [36] In the context of Norway, a strong cultural value structure linking trust, rationality, peacefulness and fearfulness post-2011 has been described.[37] Such historically forged value structures may differ between countries, and play a role when citizens are confronted with new threats of terrorism.

This study has several limitations. Given that we combined data from two different studies, there was a difference in the scales used to measure generalized social trust. The SMIPS survey used a 10-point scale, but the DES used a 7-point scale, which means that there is more variation in the Norwegian trust measure than in the measures for France and Spain. We also lacked a pre-measure for fear in the longitudinal Norwegian study, which means that we could test only the interaction between generalized trust and fear in the Spanish and French cases. Based on the available variables, we are not able to examine in detail the mechanisms through which cognitive appraisal takes place; analyses were limited to looking at the relationship between trust and fear at two points in time, under the condition of terrorism or terrorist threat. Future research should model the relationship among cognition, norms and emotions, using an expanded set of variables. It is also difficult to fully account for specific factors pertaining to the three terrorist attacks we investigated. This may have impacted the development of fear - for example, in terms of the modus operandi and ideology of the attackers, whether the act was committed by insiders or outsiders, and the danger of repetition. There is a need for additional comparative research that could include the comparison of a wider set of cases to assess the potential universality of the prophylactic effect of generalized social trust.

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Øyvind Bugge Solheim is a political scientist. He studies the consequences of terrorism focusing on the effects on attitudes towards minorities and out-groups, and on the mediating role of the media and politicians after terrorist attacks. His work includes the article Right-wing Terrorism and Out-group Trust: The Anatomy of a Terrorist Backlash.
in Terrorism and Political Violence and his thesis Terrorism and Attitudes Toward Out-groups: A Political Perspective.

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Atte Oksanen is professor of social psychology at the University Tampere in Finland. Oksanen's research focuses on emerging technologies and social interaction. He has led major research projects funded by the Academy of Finland, the Kone Foundation, Finnish Cultural Foundation, Finnish Work Environment Fund and the Aaltonen Foundation. Oksanen has published over 80 peer-reviewed international journal articles and he has over 220 publications to his name. Publications include flagship journals such as Criminology, Addiction and Pediatrics and monographs published by Routledge and Springer.
Appendix

Description of Data Sets

Table A.1: Longitudinal Study, SMIPS, 2011 and DES, Wave 1 (December 2015), Nice Wave (August 2016, France) and Barcelona (September, 2017, Spain)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of survey</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before event</td>
<td>SMIPS survey,</td>
<td>DES survey, wave 1, December 2015</td>
<td>DES survey, wave 1, December 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 2011</td>
<td>1, December 2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After event</td>
<td>SMIPS survey,</td>
<td>DES survey, Nice wave, August 2016</td>
<td>DES survey, Barcelona wave, September 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August 2011 (3</td>
<td>1, December 2015 (4 weeks after attacks)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>weeks after Utøya attack)</td>
<td>230x644</td>
<td>324x598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response rate T1/T2</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Panel N</td>
<td>N = 2299</td>
<td>N = 393</td>
<td>N = 674</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.2: Survey Experiment Study, DES, Wave 2, January 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Random assignment to 1 of 4 conditions)</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism manipulation</td>
<td>Terrorist threat</td>
<td>Terrorist threat</td>
<td>Terrorist threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Islamic terror, native-born suspect</td>
<td>1. Islamic terror, native-born suspect</td>
<td>1. Islamic terror, native-born suspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Islamic terror, foreign-born suspect</td>
<td>2. Islamic terror, foreign-born suspect</td>
<td>2. Islamic terror, foreign-born suspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Right-wing terror, native-born suspect</td>
<td>3. ETA terrorism, Basque suspect</td>
<td>3. Right-wing terror, native-born suspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 1541)</td>
<td>(n = 1508)</td>
<td>(n = 1462)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control story</td>
<td>Mysterious stone slab (n = 521)</td>
<td>Mysterious stone slab (n = 494)</td>
<td>Mysterious stone slab (n = 538)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>2062</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**News Story Experiment**

Respondents were exposed to a news story about either an Islamist terrorist threat, or to a news story about a right-wing extremist threat (in Norway, France, or the Basque country in Spain) or to a control news story about a mysterious stone slab found in Mexico. For the news story about the Islamist terrorist threat, there were two versions, one describing homegrown terrorists and one describing terrorists coming from abroad; otherwise, the new stories were identical. All news stories were adapted with national versions of the names of cities and people.

Below, we display first the terrorist news story, with a slash [/] showing the variation between the homegrown scenario and the external scenario, and second, the control story. For the terrorist Islamic and right-wing news stories, we use the Norwegian version. We used the Basque version only in Spain.

**Treatment: Terrorist threat [homegrown, external, right-wing extremist, Basque]**

The two experiment groups received the same story, with the exception of information about the place of origin of the Islamist terrorists (see the brackets in the text).

We’re interested in how people understand what they read in the news. Please read this recent article from a national newspaper and we’ll ask you some questions about it afterwards

**The Department of Homeland Security called for a press conference:**

October 22, 2016

**Fear of terror attacks in Oslo**

The Department of Homeland security urges local law enforcement to increase surveillance after the discovery of suspicious documents in an Oslo apartment.

The documents purportedly plan a large-scale 9/11 style attack against a variety of public targets, including government building, schools, and athletic stadiums in Norway, said a spokesperson of the Department of Homeland Security when they today, on short notice, called a press conference.

**Connections to [Islamist extremist/right wing extremist groups/ETA]**

The apartment where the documents were found was rented to two young men [who grew up in [Kongsvinger, the sons of immigrants from Iraq/who recently arrived from Iraq/from Hedmark/from San Sebastian]. According to sources we have spoken to, the two men are supposed to have ties with the [Islamist State terrorist group/Right-Wing Extremist groups in Eastern Norway/the ETA]. Documents found on their laptops are said to contain concrete plans for a major terrorist attack in Oslo in the coming weeks.

“We have reason to believe that the men could be working with [Islamist State/right-wing extremist cells] in other cities to attack civilians in one large event like the [bombings in Paris in November 2015 or in smaller, coordinated events like the attacks in recent months in New York and New Jersey or in Brussels/Oklahoma City bombing or the Utøya attacks in Norway, or in smaller attacks in recent months such as the shooting at McDonald’s in Munich], said the representative of the Department of Homeland Security.

**Difficult to Prevent**

There are a growing number of warnings from top security officials about the threat of a terror attack in Norway in the coming months. Officials fear a recent call to arms by [the Islamist State/right wing terrorist/the ETA] terror group may inspire a “lone wolf” attack. Lone wolf attacks are particularly hard for law enforcement to prevent and they can cause a great deal of destruction, says a representative of the PST to the newspaper.
The Department of Homeland Security is urging local law enforcement to increase surveillance and take precautions during large public gatherings. Military bases are on high alert and being fortified as well. Major cities like Oslo are increasingly utilizing nuclear detection devices to identify potential dirty bombs, says the representative.

The Department of Homeland Security is asking citizens to be aware of their surroundings and immediately report suspicious individuals or packages to law enforcement when out in public.

The findings are of such a serious character that the authorities have chosen to inform the public, despite the danger of creating fear in the public.

The story will be updated as new information becomes available.

**Control Group: Aztec Slab Stone**

_We’re interested in how people understand what they read in the news. Please read this recent article from a national newspaper and we’ll ask you some questions about it afterwards_

**Mysterious stone slab bears ancient writing**

An ancient slab of green stone inscribed with insects, ears of corn, fish and other symbols is indecipherable so far, but one message is clear: It is the earliest known writing in the Western Hemisphere.

The ancient Olmec civilization probably produced the faintly etched symbols around 900 B.C., or roughly three centuries before what previously had been proposed as the earliest examples of writing in the Americas.

“We are dealing with the first, clear evidence of writing in the New World,” said Stephen Houston, a Brown University anthropologist. Houston and his U.S. and Mexican colleagues detail the tablet’s discovery and analysis in a study appearing this week in the journal Science.

The text contains 28 distinct symbols, some of which are repeated three and four times. The writing system does not appear to be linked to any known later scripts and may represent a dead end, according to the study.

“That’s full-blown, legitimate text-written symbols taking the place of spoken words,” said William Saturno, a University of New Hampshire anthropologist and expert in Mesoamerican writing.

Villagers in the Mexican state of Veracruz discovered the tablet sometime before 1999, while quarrying an ancient Olmec mound for road-building material. News of the discovery slowly trickled out, and the study’s authors traveled to the site this year to examine and photograph the block.

“This is centuries before anything we’ve had. People have debated whether the Olmecs had any writing. This clears it up. This nails it for me,” David Stuart, a University of Texas at Austin expert in Mesoamerican writing, said of the new find.

The find bolsters the early importance of the Olmecs, who flourished between about 1200 B.C. and 400 B.C., before other great Central American civilizations such as the Maya and Aztec.

“To me, this find really does bring us back to this idea that at least writing and a lot of the things we associate with Mesoamerican culture really did have their origin in this region,” Stuart said.
Notes


[26] URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/


[28] See Appendix Tables A.1. and A.2. for an overview of the longitudinal and experimental data.

[29] The shifting in scales was due to a need to ensure coherence of the scales within the DES study.

[30] Separate analyses for the three treated groups showed similar effects across the types of threat. These analyses are not shown in this article.


[32] Barber, op. cit.

[33] Uslaner, op. cit., Ch. 5.

[34] Redlawsk et al., op. cit. Vasilopoulos, et al., op. cit. Vasilopoulos & Wagner, op. cit.


The White Wolves: The Terrorist Manifesto That Wasn’t?

by Paul Stott

Abstract

In 2019, both the Christchurch and Poway Synagogue terrorist attacks saw the alleged gunman produce a pre-attack manifesto, posted online, detailing immediate motivations and broader political strategy. This development is far from unique – the 2011 bombing and shootings by Anders Behring Breivik were presaged by a 1,500-page statement outlining his world view. Far right manifestos of this type seek to influence and direct opinion and have come to form part of the contested aftermath of terrorist attacks. Some of the dangers posed by such declarations can be seen in a much earlier document entitled ‘The White Wolves’.

The White Wolves circulated in the United Kingdom in the 1990s, and gained notoriety during a series of nail bombings in London, for which David Copeland, a member of a small far-right group called the National Socialist Movement (NSM) was eventually convicted. It seems unlikely Copeland was the author of the White Wolves; to this day it is unclear who is. The first contribution of this Research Note is to point to the risks inherent in assessing extremist materials where authorship has not been fully established. Dissemination of the White Wolves on the far-right, and media speculation about it, heightened ultimately inaccurate fears a violent separatist group had been established that was about to start a terrorist campaign. The White Wolves sense of urgency and desire for blood however, are recurring themes in both fascist and terrorist declarations, and this text also serves as a contribution to the study of terrorist tropes.

Keywords: United Kingdom, terrorism, fascism, Nazism, manifestos, racial separatism.

Introduction

The White Wolves document was a 14-page statement calling for a campaign of racial attacks which the authors hoped would lead to an ethnically segregated Britain in the style of the divided communities in Northern Ireland. From there, it was expected the authorities would begin a programme of repatriation, thus ensuring the goal of an ethnically homogenous Britain. It was circulated anonymously on the British far-right, along with an accompanying two-page leaflet, even more vituperative in its tone. Judging by its contents, the White Wolves was written in 1993 and the anonymous authors claimed to be “all long standing members of Nationalist groups.” [1]

Methodologically, this Research Note relies upon a detailed analysis of the original statement, and an accompanying leaflet and communiques bearing the name White Wolves which appeared either in 1993-94, or immediately prior to and during the 1999 nail bomb attacks in London. As will be seen in subsequent sections, some of the themes and techniques therein are persistent. These include the need for imminent action, of being at the eleventh hour, and what the authors see as the power of the Jews. It is breaking this alleged Jewish domination that is all important - anti-Semitism is the central aspect of their worldview, and the problems facing white Britons flow from the actions of the Jews. The White Wolves sense of urgency, and call to sacrifice, have considerable similarities to contemporary justifications of violence and serve as a reminder that recurring themes can echo within terrorist literature. However, the type of attacks suggested – small squads of racist attackers targeting ethnic minorities in order to provoke tit-for-tat violence - proved to be very different from how far-right terrorism has evolved in Britain since the 1990s.

Although the White Wolves has been largely forgotten in an era of readily accessible online activism, this Research Note argues that the pre-Internet White Wolves document is important. Firstly, for what it tells us about the far-right, and additionally for the questions it raises about terrorist manifestos. It contributes to debates about the ideological nature of far-right terrorism, by pointing to the importance given in this historical material, not to anti-Muslim attitudes, but to racial homogeneity and to anti-Semitism. Indeed, anti-Semitism
forms the structural base from which the White Wolves broader positions evolve. A second feature is to provide a new perspective to the debate concerning the response of liberal democratic societies to terrorist manifestos. Instead of discussing the case for or against proscription of such literature, a warning is given here about the risk of material which emerges at the time of terrorist attacks, when there may be a heightened atmosphere of fear and agitation. Although the White Wolves document was popularly linked to a series of terrorist attacks, ultimately that connection, more than twenty years later, remains unproven.

**Historical Material**

Whoever wrote the White Wolves had a clear interest in history, and a detailed knowledge of the British far-right. It opens and ends with an old Norse poem, the Havamal, reminding the reader that the coward shall know no peace, whilst the glory of the great dead shall never die. It also quotes Rudyard Kipling, that most English of writers, and to the modern ear, perhaps one of the more problematic. Kipling's ‘The Beginnings’ (1917), with its lines about 'when the English began to hate' [2] lead into a historical case study of what the manifesto considers to be violence working as a political tool. This is the little known riots of 1919 when racial violence broke out between early non-white migrants and the majority community in nine towns and cities in England and Wales – mostly those with docks where labourers and seaman contested for jobs. “The government was forced to act and to order the repatriation of thousands of Blacks who hadn't already fled for their lives”. [3]

Where the far-right subsequently took part in racial violence, for example in the Notting Hill riots in the 1950s, the failure to sustain and broaden this conflict to other towns and cities is portrayed as a decisive failing. [4] The White Wolves quote disapprovingly from a 1973 Spearhead article where the National Front (NF) condemned racist fire bombings in the London Borough of Wandsworth. Instead of continuing such actions, activists were neutralised by the dull political routines of electoralism, where it is argued the NF could never win in a system rigged against it. [5] Spearhead was a privately owned magazine published by John Tyndall, then leader of the NF, and later leader of the British National Party (BNP). Such a reference does place the White Wolves authors either within the far-right milieu for some years, or with a very good working knowledge of it. Few in the pre-internet era would readily have knowledge of, or be able to access, Spearhead from twenty years earlier and be able to incorporate it into arguments against right-wing political reformism.

**Theoretical Basis**

The White Wolves were coy about declaring their ideological adherences. This is a call to arms, but it is one rooted in an examination of the failure of what it refers to as ‘nationalist’ groups in the UK. [6] Here we see a strong degree of euphemism, indeed caution, being deployed. Even in a document dedicated to Robert Jay Matthews, a neo-Nazi who established the American terrorist group ‘The Order’ and was killed in 1984 after committing a series of attacks, the authors stop short of referring to themselves as fascists or neo-Nazis. [7] Such euphemisms are a reminder of the difficulty of openly organising as National Socialists in the United Kingdom, where patriotic sentiments frequently pivot on Britain’s historical role in fighting, not for Nazism or fascism, but against it.

Despite these contradictions, the White Wolves possesses an overtly racist message, which has much in common with classical Nazism. There’s is an approach characterised by anti-Semitism, and the need for violence in order to bring about an all-white Britain. The Jews are seen as holding power in society [8] and there is a liberal/Jewish conspiracy to destroy the white population. [9] Under this conspiratorial framework, Jews regard the white race as their only opposition, [10] and an element of defeatism leads to a position where political change will come only through violence: “The race war is not about to happen, so we must start it ourselves” [11] and, similarly, “We do not believe that we alone can win the Race War, but we can start it” [12]. As well as ambition, a sense of urgency and finality is present “This really is our last chance,” [13] and “Only a blood sacrifice can now save our nation.” [14] The White Wolves is a narrative of demographic Armageddon.
Some of these are familiar far-right and indeed terrorist tropes. John Tyndall titled his main political statement “The Eleventh Hour: A Call for British Rebirth” [15] - the concept of living in a defining era where there is a duty upon individuals to act is not unusual among the politically dissatisfied. There is also an overlap with concepts expressed by jihadist actors. The idea of the need for blood is to be found in Mohammed Siddique Khan’s suicide video, which emerged shortly after the 7/7 bombings “Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood”. [16] Whilst far-right and Islamist terrorists differ dramatically in the type of world they seek to create, there appear to be certain interesting parallels in the expressions they deploy to explain violence.

**Aims and Tactics**

Stripped of any adherence to electoral politics or democratic engagement, the White Wolves aim is initially to invoke physical conflict. Attacks by active cells such as the random stabbing of British residents of Pakistani origin are expected to provoke minorities into indiscriminate violence, so as to force white ‘native’ communities ‘off the fence’. A recurring theme is the need for a “tit for tat war which is the only thing which can force ordinary Whites to stand up and fight.” [17] The majority community has proved immune to the far-rights political arguments, and must be shocked from its stupor. Once serious divisions have been stoked, segregation, in the style of the deeply divided communities in Northern Ireland, is the next aim. [18] From there, they hope to force the establishment’s hand and to see repatriation of all non-whites to their perceived countries of origin.

In order to facilitate conflict, the use of simple, everyday weapons such as bricks, catapults, petrol bombs and knives is stressed [19]. A rudimentary bomb making guide, with several diagrams, is also included [20]. There are parallels here with some of the Al-Qaeda and Islamic State English language publications we have seen in recent years, such as the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) magazine *Inspire*, and *Dabiq* from Islamic State, which stress the importance of simplicity in selecting weapons. [21] Some very distinct organisational tactics are also declared in the White Wolves. These centre on a recruitment process rooted in gradually escalating actions involving no more than five people [22] These should be independent cells and individuals should not leave existing far-right groups that they are members of, as to do so would attract attention.

**Events**

The White Wolves manifesto ensured that in 1994 and again in 1995 it received substantive media coverage after it was posted to both regional and national newspapers. [23] Attention to the White Wolves re-surfaced in 1999, following a nail bomb attack in Brixton, an area associated with London’s black community on 17 April 1999, and another on Brick Lane, where many people of Bangladeshi origin lived, on 24 April. These incidents, on successive Saturday afternoons, led to considerable fear of a sustained far-right terrorist campaign. Amidst high-profile policing of migrant communities, the next attack, on Friday 30 April was aimed at a gay bar in Soho, killing three customers. Three days before the Brixton bomb, a stencilled White Wolves communiqué had been posted in central London, one of five such statements to appear. [24] From the Command Council of the White Wolves, this called on all Jews and non-whites to leave Britain by the end of the year as “when the clock strikes midnight on 31/12/99 the White Wolves will begin to howl, & when the wolves begin to howl, the wolves begin to hunt.” [25] There were also claims of responsibility to emerge after Brixton from ‘The White Wolves’, and a separate claim in the name of Combat 18, a neo-Nazi group who openly deployed terrorist rhetoric. [26]

**The White Wolves: Assessment**

This section seeks to assess to what extent the White Wolves publication influenced subsequent far-right terrorist attacks in Britain, examine what such tactics tell us about the far-right generally, and also to consider the author of these materials.
Notable, when viewed through the prism of 2019 and contemporary far-right agitation, is what is absent, and the extent to which British far-right terrorism eventually developed in a different direction to that signposted by the *White Wolves*. The document serves as a reminder that anti-Muslim attitudes have not always been predominant on the British far-right – across 14 pages, Islam and Muslims are not mentioned in the main text at all (and only once, in passing, in the accompanying leaflet). The *White Wolves* document certainly presages an era where a small number of those on the far-right, politically isolated and unable to effect change by other methods, turn to violence. Yet its tactical suggestions - of small groups of no more than five racist attackers, conducting direct actions in order to provoke an extreme response - is different to what we have seen in practice from far-right terrorists in Britain. The 2017 terrorist attack at Finsbury Park mosque, [27] the 2016 killing of the Member of Parliament Jo Cox, [28] and the murder and bombings conducted by Ukrainian fascist Pavlo Lapshyn in the West Midlands in 2013, [29] were all carried out by ostensibly lone actors. Two of the three attacks were specifically targeted at Muslims.

The term lone actor is selected above, ahead of lone wolf, as those convicted appear to have acted alone at the time of their attack, but arguably have come through a process of radicalisation where they have then acted upon their political positions. David Copeland, who carried out three nail bombings at the time the *White Wolves* communes and manifesto were circulating, was himself convicted as a lone attacker, but trial evidence showed he had been through two fascist organisations – the British National Party, and then the National Socialist Movement, a small splinter from the better known *Combat 18*. The NSM disbanded on 4 May 1999, within days of his arrest. [30] This trend, of single actor rather than group based violence, has arguably continued. In 2016 Britain proscribed the neo-Nazi group National Action under counter-terrorism legislation. [31] In a subsequent trial one of its members, Jack Renshaw, was convicted of plotting to kill the Labour MP Rosie Cooper; however the organisation’s leader, Chris Lythgoe, was cleared of encouraging Renshaw. [32]

There is no conclusive evidence the *White Wolves*, as an organisation, ever existed. Nor was authorship of the text, or any of the communes, established. What evidence we have concerning the *White Wolves* is inconclusive and sporadic – a document written in 1993, circulated by persons unknown in 1994. In 1999, when Copeland was conducting his bombings, *Command Council of the White Wolves* communes appeared. When in custody, Copeland claimed to be a member of the *White Wolves*. Yet his modus operandi differed from the template proscribed – he seemingly acted on his own, rather than in a band of up to five, and his schedule of weekly attacks was of an intensity they specifically cautioned against, warning it would swiftly lead to discovery and arrest. [33]

The date of writing, plus the range and scope of the *White Wolves* document, mitigate against Copeland being the author. Aged just 17 when it was written, and 22 during the nail bomb campaign, he hardly fits the authors self-description of a collaborative effort penned by world weary veterans of British ‘nationalism’. Nor is he likely to have developed a take on debates within the pages of *Spearhead* in 1973 – three years before he was born. Whilst names such as long-term fascist Dave Myatt have been put forward as potential authors, [34] to this day the writer or writers of the text remain(s) publicly unknown. This takes us to a position where the *White Wolves* document and communiques should serve as a reminder to approach with caution statements and reports which appear after, or shortly before, terrorist attacks. They could come from literally anyone and may, or may not, be the definitive words of the perpetrators.

Far from signposting radical political change or a route to power for the far-right, in many ways the *White Wolves* is an admission of failure. For all the media attention it briefly gained, it is today largely forgotten. Internet searches for it draw little response, even on far-right websites such as Stormfront or Blood and Honour. It is eclipsed by older calls to arms such as The *Turner Diaries* or *Hunter*, [35] and, in the internet era, by manifestos such as Breivik’s or that in Christchurch, which possess the added gravitas of being closely connected to contemporary outrages. The *White Wolves* document could also fade into obscurity far more easily, being pre-internet, than recent statements uploaded to file sharing sites as pdfs, and examined within short periods of time by sympathisers, ideological foes and law enforcement agencies alike.
In terms of political impact, it is worth stressing the *White Wolves* authors appear marginal figures, responding to decades of political failure by a far-right repeatedly rejected at the ballot box. Here we reach perhaps the ultimate irony. Unknown to its writers, by the time the *White Wolves* manifesto achieved concerted media attention in 1999, the British far-right was about to enter into its greatest period of electoral success, as Nick Griffin took over from John Tyndall, modernising the BNP and attempting to inch it towards the mainstream. In obtaining approximately 50 local authority councillors, representation in the Greater London Assembly and two members of the European Parliament, Griffin’s BNP was to give the British far-right its high water mark, albeit from a comparatively low base. [36]

**Conclusion**

The *White Wolves* document serves as a reminder of a section of the far-right which rejects democratic engagement and seeks instead to achieve political objectives through violence. Within the *White Wolves*, a deeply anti-Semitic worldview is evident while the contemporary opposition to Islam is broadly absent. In its rejection of the political process it foreshadows more recent trends, even though it appears to have had no direct influence upon the far-right terrorist attacks to occur in Britain this century. Its ideological base, in racial separatism and anti-Semitism, is one that brooks little compromise and is politically limiting, although it was not necessarily anti-intellectual. Yet in approaching the failures of British fascism via a historiographical critique, the authors of the *White Wolves* unintentionally remind readers of their own weaknesses and the British far-rights inability to make substantive political progress. In proposing a strategy of violence that would pressure the British state towards beginning a programme of repatriation, the *White Wolves* position themselves, not as seeking to take control of the levers of power in society, but as permanent outsiders, hoping to shock both the inert masses and those in office, into change.

Some of the similarities between the rhetoric in the *White Wolves* manifesto and that of later, jihadist actors are a subject worthy of further research. Comparisons can certainly be made in terms of their shared sense of duty and their attitudes to shedding blood. That very different terrorist currents have more in common than they may care to admit may not be a surprise to terrorism researchers, but is a potential tool for those involved in countering radicalisation. More importantly, the incomplete lineage and lack of clarity as to the authorship of the *White Wolves* should strike a note of caution for those rushing to comment on material emerging in the wake of contemporary terrorist attacks.

**About the Author:** Dr Paul Stott is a Research Fellow in the Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism at the Henry Jackson Society, and a Tutor in the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at SOAS University of London. His research interests focus on terrorism, Islamism, the political fringe and their impact on liberal democracies. Email: paul.stott@henryjacksonsociety.org

**Notes**

[1]. The *White Wolves* is neither dated nor paginated. However, a stop press addition on the final page refers to both a BNP election victory, their first, which occurred on 17 September 1993, and praises a racist attack in London the same year. There is no event in the text which can be dated later than 1993. All page references are taken on the basis of counting the pages from the front cover onwards, giving 14 pages. The quote here is thus from p.2, and all quotes are from a copy in the authors possession.

[2] The full poem can be read at [http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poems_beginnings.htm](http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poems_beginnings.htm)


Chapter 10 of Peter Fryer’s *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain* (London: Pluto Press, 1984) gives a more sober account of these events, but one that also stresses the racial nature of the violence. By September 1919, at least 600 black men had been repatriated from Cardiff alone.
[6] The opening paragraph, on p. 2 of The White Wolves, refers to ‘Nationalist groups,’ ‘Nationalism’ and ‘Nationalists’ – all in the space of just five lines.
[21] As examples, consider The AQ Chef, “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom”, Inspire, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 33 – 40; or Islamic State's reminder to wage jihad, even by yourself, with all resources such as knives and guns, in Dabiq, Issue 14, 2016 “Kill the Imams of Kufr in the West” p. 17.


[35] Both books were written under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald by the late American Nazi William Pierce (1933 – 2002).


Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid

Terrorism is ‘hard’ and human rights are ‘soft’ in the perception of many people. The subtitle of Tom Parker’s book, implying that the soft power of acting within the confines of a human rights framework can defeat terrorism is therefore intriguing. Who is the author of this book who tries to convince us to put human rights at the heart of counter-terrorism? An idealist with his head in the clouds and far removed from the realities on the ground in places like Iraq? Nothing could be further from the truth. Tom Parker has an intelligence background and has worked for both the British MI5 and for the US section of Amnesty International. As an advisor, he has worked in more than half a dozen war zones as well as in New York where he co-authored the UN Secretary-General’s “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.” Parker has academic credentials too, from the London School of Economics and from Leiden University, but has also survived two bomb attacks in London and Baghdad. This book, which has been in the making for many years, reflects the author’s rich personal experience which lends weight to his arguments. In more than 800 pages, the author explains why holding the moral high ground in the fight against terrorism is not a luxury few governments under siege can afford but actually something that makes eminent sense.

One of Parker’s central contentions is “that terrorism is an essentially contingent political tactic – any success depends in large part on the manner in which the target state chooses to respond to terrorist activity’ (p.28). Under President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney the US government embraced after 9/11 what the Vice President termed ‘the dark side’ which led, among other human rights violations, to the torture practices in Abu Ghraib in Iraq. Seeking to provoke an over-reaction is, according to Tom Parker’s reading of terrorist strategy papers, one of the six core concepts underlying the use of violence by terrorist groups – the other five being asymmetrical warfare, waging a war of attrition, propaganda by deed, charismatic leadership (the construction of revolutionary prototypes and martyrs), and building legitimacy (p.28 and 203).

Part I (pp. 33-205) of the book looks at terrorism from the perspectives of its practitioners, exploring the strategies and tactics behind the ‘philosophy of the bomb’. Having extracted the essence from studying the terrorist playbooks, one of Parker’s conclusions is – and it applies especially to democracies - that ‘The genius of terrorism is that it turns us into our own worst enemies’ (p.142). Part II (pp 206-458) looks at what the social sciences have found out about violent extremism. Like in the first part, where he combed out the strategic thinking of terrorists and their intellectual godfathers, Parker scans the by now very large academic literature on terrorism, summarising what he finds useful to make his case. He finds that indiscriminate state repression e.g. in the form of police brutality, tends to inflame feelings of rage and calls for revenge, thereby greatly facilitating terrorist recruitment. One of the most solid findings from big-data quantitative studies on terrorism that Parker surveyed is that “while poverty did not correlate in absolute terms to an increase in terrorism, human rights abuses and the suppression of civil liberties did” (p.451). Heavy-handed coercive actions by state actors are, however, not the only radicalizing factor Parker found in the academic literature. Other push factors that can radicalise people and turn some of them into terrorists are “selective empathy for those suffering, the quest for self-actualization, supportive like-minded social networks, grievances with at least some social legitimacy [and] a sense of social or political exclusion” (p.456).

In Part III (pp.459-768) the author explores the ineffectual ways many governments have reacted to the challenge of non-state terrorism. He shows that again and again democratic governments have fallen into the terrorist trap as if they had learned nothing from the past. “States would be wise to respect human rights precisely because terrorist groups want states to abuse them”, Parker concludes (p.761), after citing statements of terrorist insiders pointing in this direction. The author’s survey of what went wrong in past counter-terrorist campaigns and his practical experience gained in present ones combine to make this an powerful book. After reading it, even a sceptical reader might be more inclined to support his conclusion that “Placing human rights at the..."
center of the state’s counter-terrorist response is not only the right thing to do, it is the smart thing to do as well” (p.767).

Coming from a CT practitioner who is also a scholar, Tom Parker’s volume carries an authority that few other works in the field of (counter-) terrorism studies possess. Its length should not deter readers for the book is well written, with fascinating historical and contemporary details spicing his account.

About the Reviewer: Alex P. Schmid is Editor-in-Chief of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.

Reviewed by James J.F. Forest

Few would contest the observation that the radical right has seen a dramatic rise in extremist activity and membership in recent years. Researchers have taken notice of this threat, evidenced by the flurry of recent books, journal articles, reports and conferences on right-wing extremism. The December 2018 issue of this journal is a case in point, with 11 research articles on terrorism from the extreme right that had originally been presented as papers at a workshop in February of that year at the Centre for Research on Extremism at the University of Oslo.

Thus the title of the book under review captures immediate attention: how does one track such a complex global phenomenon as the radical right with academic rigor, breadth and depth? Initial thoughts and imaginations included the idea that perhaps opinion surveys were conducted worldwide of governments, community leaders, law enforcement organizations, and so forth. Perhaps a major philanthropic foundation had sponsored such a massive undertaking, with the research team providing in this book their extensive analysis—both qualitative and quantitative—addressing research questions about where, how and why this phenomenon has come to be. These were just some initial thoughts before receiving this book for review.

However, this is not that kind of book. It does indeed offer a unique value to the researcher, the policy maker, and the casual observer of recent events—really, for anyone with an inkling of interest in this topic. But instead of a massive study laden with data, charts, graphs and analysis, the volume contains a wealth of relatively brief observations from around the world that collectively provide a robust, and rather disturbing, portrait of the radical right worldwide.

In April 2018, the Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR) was launched in the United Kingdom. [1] Led by a group of university-based researchers, CARR facilitates analysis on the radical right through a rapidly expanding collection of blog posts, reports, a doctoral forum, several research bibliographies and audio/visual resources (for example, the first CARR podcast featured an interview with Professor Cas Mudde, a US-based Dutch expert on right-wing populism and violence). Within the first year, several hundred brief essays and commentary had been posted to its blog forums by researchers associated with CARR and its partners. The volume under review contains 80 of these essays, most of them in the range of 4-8 pages in length, which makes for quick reading. Of course, as is the case with many edited volumes, the quality of writing varies considerably across these essays: fairly understandable, as they were initially blog posts. But each contribution in its own right provides some unique color to the complex, pixelated landscape of research on the radical right worldwide.

The essays are thematically arranged into seven sections of the volume. The first section, as editor (and CARR Associate Director) William Allchorn notes in his preface, reviews the “ideological currents present within the radical right.” Authors address such topics as right-wing nationalism, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.

The essays in the next section examine historical manifestations of the radical right. Case studies include the impact of false genetic supremacy theory, transnational white nativism, post-war Britain, and conspiracy theories. Highlights of this section include Henry Mead’s 2-part review essay on anti-democratic political ideologies, and Leonard Weinberg’s analysis of the historical record for comparing Trump and Mussolini. Essays in the third section of the book focus exclusively on the radical right in several Western European countries, while the fourth section of essays looks exclusively at the United States. The fifth section contains essays on the radical right in an eclectic variety of countries, including Brazil, Romania, Russia, Hungary, Poland and India. Through the culmination of these many essays (pp. 109-289) examining social movements, political parties, and prominent government leaders, some readers will be startled to realize just how global in scale the radical right has truly become.
The sixth section of essays in the volume takes specific aim at the violent manifestations of the radical right, which will be of particular interest to students and scholars of terrorism studies. The essay by Yannick Veilleux-LePage on how the radical right has legitimated vehicle ramming attacks is particularly striking. And the last section of essays - on social media and the radical right - includes case studies of groups (e.g., “Britain First” and DFLA) and online influence campaigns (e.g., #IAmSoldierX). One highlight in particular is the essay by Matthew Feldman, the Director of CARR, on how members of the so-called “alt-right” use humor in their online communications. Finally, the essays are followed by an extensive bibliography (69 pages, compiled by Archie Henderson) of books and articles published on the radical right during the previous calendar year.[2]

To sum up, this book offers a global snapshot of a complex phenomenon. As with any picture, it is merely a reflection of a moment in time, framed by what the camera lens could capture at that moment. Intuitively, we know there is much more out there beyond this snapshot. That, in the end, is a troubling thought indeed.

**About the Reviewer:** James J.F. Forest is a professor at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University, and Co-Editor of *Perspectives on Terrorism*.

**Notes**

[1] For more information about the Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR), please see their website at: [http://www.radicalrightanalysis.com](http://www.radicalrightanalysis.com).

[2] A digital copy of this extensive bibliography, containing conference papers, reports, book reviews, blog posts and other materials (as well as links to full texts and abstracts where available online) is available at: [http://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/bibliography/bibliography-2018](http://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/bibliography/bibliography-2018)
Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 60 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects

Selected by Joshua Sinai

So many books are published on terrorism and counterterrorism-related subjects that it is difficult to catch up on a large backlog of monographs and edited volumes received for review. In order to deal with this backlog, this column consists of capsule Tables of Contents of 60 books, including also several books published less recently, but still meriting attention. Some of the newly-published books will be reviewed in future issues of 'Perspectives on Terrorism' as stand-alone reviews.

The following capsule overviews are arranged topically under the headings “Terrorism – General,” “Proxy Wars,” “Radicalization,” “Counterterrorism – Legal,” “Maritime Terrorism,” “Terrorism and Religion,” “Global Jihad,” and “Country Studies) – Afghanistan, China, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, and United States.

Terrorism – General


Table of Contents: Preface; Introduction; (1) The Emergence of Disaster-Oriented PPPs; (2) Assessing Disaster-Oriented PPPs; (3) The Federal Reserve, a Strategic Alliance; (4) The War Industries Board, a Responsive Alliance; (5) Comparing the Frameworks and the Identity Crisis of Disaster-Oriented PPPs; Conclusion; Appendix: Interview Participants.


Table of Contents: An Explanation; (1) The Reason Why; (2) Middle East and North Africa: Connected by Islam; (3) Africa: Rich in Resources, Poor in Governance; (4) The UK and Europe: Bloodied Past, Complacent Present, Uncertain Future; (5) The Americans: Faith, Drugs and Revolution; (6) The United States: Both Superpower and Vulnerable Goliath; (7) Asia: People and Potential – For Both Peace and War; (8) War Without End?; Appendices.

Boyle, Michael J., Non-Western Responses to Terrorism (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2019), 504 pages, US $ 120.00 [Hardcover], US $ 34.48 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-5261-0582-0.

Table of Contents: Foreword by Alex P. Schmid; Introduction; Part I: Russia and Central Asia: (1) Russia: Response to terrorism in the twenty-first century; Part II: Asia: (2) China: Xi Jinping, China’s legal reform and counterterrorism; (3) Japan: Terrorism and counterterrorism in Japan; (4) Malaysia: Adapting to the dynamic changes of terrorist threats; (5) Indonesia: Political violence and counterterrorism: Disputed boundaries of a postcolonial state; Part III: South Asia: (6) India: Counterterrorism in India: An ad hoc response to an enduring and variable threat; (7) Pakistan: Countering terrorism in Pakistan: Challenges, conundrum and resolution; Part IV: Latin and South America: (8) Brazil: When the shoe doesn’t fit: Brazilian approaches to terrorism and counterterrorism in the post-9/11 era; (9) Colombia: The changing meaning of ‘terrorism’ in Colombia: A matter of discourse; Part V: Middle East and North Africa: (10) Algeria: Algeria's response to violent extremism; (11) Egypt: Extremism in moderation: Understanding state response to terrorism in Egypt; (12) Lebanon: Contending notions of terrorism in Lebanon: Politico-legal manoeuvres and political Islam; (13) Saudi Arabia: Islam and Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism strategy; (14) Iran: State and terrorism in Iran; Part VI: Africa: (15) Kenya: Counterterrorism in Kenya: Security aid,


*Table of Contents:* (1) Planetary Terror; (2) Terror, Revolution, Sovereignty; (3) Jihadism and Modernity; (4) The New Phobocracy.


*Table of Contents:* Introduction; (1) The Study of Terrorism: Achievements and Challenges Ahead; Part One: Concepts and Typologies: (2) The Landscape of Political Violence; (3) Defining Terrorism: A Conceptual Minefield; (4) The Evolution of Terrorism Event Databases; (5) The Moral Dimensions of Terrorism; Part Two: The History of Terrorist Violence: (6) The Pre-History of Terrorism; (7) European Political Violence During the Long 19th Century; (8) The Long 20th Century; Part Three: Approaches and Methods: (9) Organizational and Institutional Approaches: Social Movement Studies Perspectives on Political Violence; (10) Formal Approaches to the Study of Terrorism; (11) Sociological and Criminological Explanations of Terrorism; (12) Anthropological and Cultural Approaches to the Study of Terrorism; (13) Historical Approaches to Terrorism; (14) Psychological Approaches to the Study of Terrorism; (15) Critical Approaches to the Study of Terrorism; Part Four: Causes and Motivations: (17) The Causes of Terrorism; (18) Nationalism and Terrorism; (19) Religion and Terrorism, (20) Ideology and Terrorism; (21) Single-Issue Terrorism; Part Five: Terrorism, Political Violence, and Collective Action: (22) State Terrorism; (23) Terrorism, Civil War, and Insurgency; (24) The Crime-Terror Nexus and its Fallacies; Part Six: Actors, Strategies, and Modus Operandi: (25) Terrorist Organizational Dynamics; (26) Terrorist Technological Innovation; (27) Women and Terrorism; (28) Suicide Terrorism; (29) The Strategic Model of Terrorism Revisited; Part Seven: Issues and Pedagogical Challenges: (30) The Rise and Fall of Terrorism; (31) Financing Terrorism; (32) Terrorism and State Sponsorship in World Politics; (33) Teaching about Terrorism: Methodology and Ethics; (34) New Techniques in Teaching Terrorism; Part Eight: The Geographical Context of Terrorism: (35) Terrorism in Western Europe: A Homegrown Trademark; (36) Terrorism in Latin America; (37) Terrorism in the Middle East; (38) Terrorism in Asia; (39) Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Recapitulation of Causes and Consequences; Part Nine: Academic and Policy Perspectives on Countering Terrorism: (40) Counterterrorism Strategies; (41) Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Policy Perspective; (42) Counterterrorism and International Law; (43) Torture and the War on Terrorism; (44) Academic Research and the Intelligence Community: Some Reflections; Part Ten: Autobiographic Reflections on the Evolution of a Field: (45) Constructing the Field of Terrorism; (46) Institutionalizing the Field of Terrorism; (47) Revising the Field of Terrorism.


*Table of Contents:* Preface; Part One: History and Theory: (1) Human Rights in Global Politics: Historical Perspective; (2) Theories of Human Rights; (3) The Relative Universality of Human Rights; (4) The Unity of Human Rights; Part Two: Multilateral, Bilateral, and Transnational Action: (5) Global Multilateral Mechanisms; (6) Regional Human Rights Regimes; (7) Human Rights and Foreign Policy; (8) Human Rights in American Foreign Policy; (9) Transnational Human Rights Advocacy; Part Three: Contemporary Issues: (10) Humanitarian Intervention; (11) Globalization, the State, and Human Rights; (12) (Anti)Terrorism and Human Rights.

**Table of Contents:** Preface; Introduction: Freedom and Security in the New Interdependence; (1) Politics in an Age of Interdependence; (2) Domestic Security and Privacy in the Transatlantic Space; (3) Competing Atlantic Alliances and the Fight Over Airline Passenger Data Sharing; (4) Cross-National Layering and the Regulation of Terrorist Financial Tracking; (5) Insulation and the Transformation of Commercial Privacy Disputes; Conclusion: Information, Power, and World Politics.


**Table of Contents:** (1) Introduction; Part I: Theory and Principles: (2) Justice, Oppression, and the Right to Resist; (3) Rights Worth Killing For; (4) The Codes of Resistance; (5) Rights Worth Dying For: Distributing the Costs of Resistance; Part II: Wars of Liberation: Fighting Within the Standard JIB: (6) Non-State Groups and the Authority to Wage War; (7) Guerrilla War, Discrimination, and the Problem of Lawful Irregulars; Part III: Fighting Beyond the Law of War: (8) The Partisan Jus in Bellow: Resistance Beyond the Laws of War; (9) Terrorist War; (10) Back to the Start: The Ethics of Beginning; Conclusions.


**Table of Contents:** Populists and Autocrats: the Dual Threat to Global Democracy; Introduction; Country Reports; Related and Disputed Territory Reports; Survey Methodology; Tables and Ratings: Table of Independent Countries, Table of Territories, Combined Average Ratings: Independent Countries, Combined Average Ratings: Territories, Electoral Democracies.


**Table of Contents:** Preface; (1) Introduction: A Day of Infamy; (2) A Clash of Civilizations?; (3) Blowback; (4) Diversion; (5) Spoiler Violence; (6) Breakdown; (7) Revenge and Spill-Over; (8) A Logic of Escalation?; (9) Counter-Terrorism; (10) Peace Processes and Terrorism; (11) Injustice and Inequality; (12) Conclusion: Terrorism and Global Disorder.


**Table of Contents:** (1) Introduction; (1.1) Counterterrorism Cooperation and International Bureaucracies: Research Questions and Objectives; (2) Analyzing International Bureaucracies: A Theoretical Framework; (3) Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and International Cooperation: Surveying an Ambivalent Field; (4) The United Nations and the European Union in the Fight against Terrorism; (5) Case Study 1: The United Nations Secretariat; (6) Case Study 2: The UN Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate; (7) Case Study 3: The European Commission; (8) Case Study 4: The EU Counterterrorism Coordinator; (9) Conclusion; Annex: List of Interviews.


**Table of Contents:** (1) Introduction; (2) Theorizing Norm Change; (3) The Atom Bomb: Constructing a Nuclear Order; (4) Atoms for Peace? New Nuclear Technology Export Controls; (5) Satellites and Sovereignty: Humanitarian Intervention and the “Responsibility to Protect”; (6) Armed UAVs and the Norm Against


Table of Contents: Introduction: Achieving Objective, Policy-Relevant Intelligence; (1) Soviet Leaders, Soviet Intelligence, and Changing Views of the United States, 1965-1991; (2) The Stasi's Reporting on the Federal Republic of Germany; (3) “We May Not Always Be Right, but We're Never Wrong”: US Intelligence Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1972-1991; (4) East Germany in the Sights of the West German Federal Intelligence Service: Four Examples from as many Decades; (5) British Intelligence, PIRA, and the Early Years of the Northern Ireland Crisis: Remembering, Forgetting, and Mythologizing; (6) Israeli Intelligence Threat Perceptions of Palestinian Terrorist Organizations, 1948-2008; (7) Pakistani Intelligence and India; (8) American Intelligence Assessments of the Jihadists, 1989-2011; Conclusion: Intelligence and Policy.


Table of Contents: Preface and Acknowledgments; Introduction; (1) Theorizing the Trafficking-Terrorism Nexus; (2) Mapping How Trafficking and Terrorism Intersect; (3) Convergence and Coexistence: Divergent Paths of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; (4) Emerging Relationships Within the Nexus: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; Conclusion; Appendix 1. Socioeconomic Predictors of the Trafficking-Terrorism Nexus; Appendix 2. The Impact of Drug Trafficking on Terrorism.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) The Battle Against Terrorism Reshapes the NATO Organization; (2) Partners for Peace After the Cold War; (3) From Partnership to Membership in 1999; (4) The Class of 2004 and the Post-9/11 World; (5) Further Class Membership and the Traps of Southeast Asia; (6) Bosnia in the Lengthened Shadow of the Cold War; (7) Kosovo in the Shadow of Bosnia's Lessons; (8) NATO Applies its Capabilities in Afghanistan; (9) The War in Iraq Shakes NATO Capabilities; (10) European Security, East and West; (11) The Coasts of NATO, North and South; (12) NATO Missions Reshape the Battle Against Terrorism


Table of Contents: Introduction: Constructions of Terrorism; (1) Can Terrorism Be Defined?; (2) Misoverestimating Terrorism; (3) Terrorism as Tactic; (4) The Construction of State Terrorism; (5) Killing Before an Audience: Terrorism as Performance Violence; (6) Constructing Terrorism: From Fear and Coercion to Anger and Jujitsu Politics; (7) Framing Terrorism: The Communicative Constitution of the Terrorist Actor; (8) Some Thoughts on Constructions of Terrorism and the Framing of the Terrorist Threat in the United Kingdom; (9) Contradictions in the Terrorist Discourse and Constraints on the Political Imagination of Violence; (10) Legal Constructions of Terrorism; (11) Do Different Definitions of Terrorism Alter Its Causal Story?; (12) Analyzing Pathways of Lone-Actor Radicalization: A Relational Approach; (13) Constructing Cultures of Martyrdom Across Religions, Time, and Space; (14) Introducing the Government Actions in Terror Environments (Gate) Data Set; (15) The World Versus Daesh: Constructing a Contemporary Terrorist Threat; Conclusion: Understanding How Terrorism Is Constructed.


Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) Expeditionary Police Advising: A Brief History; (2) Paramilitary Police Auxiliaries and Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Failure of the Direct Approach in the Nazi East, 1941-1944; (3) A Hidden Dimension of Britain’s ‘Informal Empire’: British Police and Security Advisors and Anti-Communist Measures in the Middle East, 1949-1958; (4) ‘A Theoretical Middle Course’: The Militarization of


Table of Contents: Preface; Part I: Introduction: (1) Individual and Community Responses to Disasters; Part II: Foundations of Disaster Psychiatry; (2) Epidemiology of Disaster Mental Health: The Foundation for Disaster Mental Health Response; (3) Disaster Ecology; (4) Neurobiology of Disaster Exposure: Fear, Anxiety, Trauma, and Resilience; (5) Trajectories of Health, Resilience, and Illness; Part III: Clinical Care and Interventions: (6) Early Interventions for Trauma-Related Problems; (7) Acute Stress Disorder and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder; (8) Psychiatric Aspects of Medical-Surgical Disaster Care; (9) Collaborative Care Interventions for Acutely Injured Survivors of Individual and Mass Trauma; Part IV: Special Topics: (10) International Disaster
Response; (11) Risk Communication in Disasters: Promoting Resilience; (12) The Unintended Consequences of Disaster-Related Media Coverage; (13) Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction; (14) Children and Families Responding to Disaster and Bereavement; (15) Disaster Workers: Exposure to Mass and Traumatic Death; (16) Health Care Planning for Community Disaster Care; (17) Workplace and Organizational Disasters: Response and Planning; (18) Pandemics: Health Care Emergencies; (19) Leadership in Disasters; (20) Nuclear Disaster Response; (21) Ethical Issues in Disaster Psychiatry; Part V: Public Health and Disaster Psychiatry: (22) Public Health and Disaster Mental Health: Preparing, Responding, and Recovering.


*Table of Contents:* Preface; Introduction; (1) Conceptual Building Blocks; (2) “Humanitarian” Interventions: Thumbnail Sketches; (3) New Wars and New Humanitarianisms; (4) New Thinking: The Responsibility to Protect; (5) So What? Moving From Rhetoric to Reality.

**Proxy Wars**


*Table of Contents:* Introduction; (2) Sharpening the Definitions of Indirect Intervention and Proxy War; (3) The Evolution of Proxy War Since 1945; (4) A Theory of Proxy War; (5) America’s Proxy War in Laos; (6) South Africa’s Proxy War in Angola; (7) India’s Proxy War in Sri Lanka; (8) Conclusion.

**Radicalization**


**Table of Contents:** Part I: The Known Knowns: (1) What is Radicalization?; (2) Who is Radical?; (3) How Do Radical Movements Organize; (4) When and Where Does Radicalism Occur?; Part II: The Known Unknowns: (5) IS Radicalism About Ideas and Ideology?; (6) IS There a Life Cycle of Radicalism?; (7) How and Why Does Radicalism Diffuse in Waves?; (8) What is the Past and Future of Radicalism?

Susan C. Cloninger and Steven A. Leibo (Eds.) [with the assistance of Mohammad Amjad], *Understanding Angry Groups: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Their Motivations and Effects on Society* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2017), 434 pp., US $73.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4408-3350-2.


**Table of Contents:** (1) The Politics of Protest; (2) The Activist; (3) The Organization; (4) The Target; (5) The Message; (6) The Tactic; (7) The Response; (8) The Aftermath; (9) The Future.


**Table of Contents:** Introduction; (1) Trying on Extremism: Material Culture and Far Right Youth; (2) Branding Identity: Coded Symbols and Game Playing; (3) Historical Fantasies, Fantastical Myths: Sacred Origin Narratives; (4) Dying for a Cause, Causing Death: The Threat of Violence; (5) Global Symbols, Local Bans: Transnational Nationalist Symbols; (6) Soldier, Sailor, Rebel, Rule Breaker: Embodying Extremism; Conclusion: Mainstreaming the Extreme; Methodological Appendix: Narrative Account of Research Methods.


**Table of Contents:** Foreword; Introduction; (1) Role Models; (2) New Arrivals; (3) Crisis of Distrust; (4) Capacity to Aspire; (5) Competing for the Future: Part I; (6) Competing for the Future: Part II; (7) Social (Im) mobility; (8) Reentry; (9) Diversity: Part I; (10) Diversity: Part II; (11) To Brussels; (12) Faithless Radicals; (13) Fake News; (14) Youth Workers Fight Back; (15) Jobs; (16) Isolating Extremists; (17) Broken Democracy; (18) My Brother’s Keeper; Epilogue: What Went Unsaid.

Table of Contents: (1) Rethinking Radicalization; (2) Distant Suffering; (3) DIY Religion: Hidden Worlds, From Fear to Bliss; (4) Mediating Violence: Filming the Self; (5) From Drug Dealer to Jihadist; (6) The Gamification of Jihad: The Cyber Caliphate; (7) My Concern is Me; (8) Radicalization: Experience, Embodiment and Imagination.


Table of Contents: Preface; (1) Conceptualization and Debates; (2) Civil Resistance in Theory and Practice; (3) Proliferation and Expanding Forms of Civil Resistance; (4) How Resistance Happens; (5) The State and Civil Resisters; (6) Transnational Relations and Intervention; (7) Processes, Dynamics, and Outcomes; (8) Conclusion.

**Maritime Terrorism**


Table of Contents: Preface; Prologue; (1) Rules of Engagement; (2) Finally, Terry Meets the Pirates; (3) Piracy 101; (4) Best Management Practices; (5) Should Merchant Ships Be Armed?; (6) Crime Without Punishment; (7) to Pay or Not to Pay; (8) Attack on the *Maersk Alabama*; (9) Hostage in the Lifeboat; (10) the Rescue of Captain Phillips; (11) Chopstick Diplomacy on the High Seas; (12) Strategy and Tactics; (13) A Course to Steer.

**Terrorism and Religion**


Table of Contents: Preface; Introduction: The Object of this History; (1) The American Way of War through the Premodern Looking Glass; (2) Christian Exegesis and Violence; (3) Madness, Martyrdom, and Terror; (4) Martyrdom in the West: Vengeance, Purge, Salvation, and History; (5) Twins: National Holy War and Sectarian Terror; (6) Liberty and Coercion; (7) The Subject of History and the Making of History; Postface. No Future to That Past?


Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) Does Religion Cause Terrorism?; (2) Religion, Violence, Nonsense, and Power; (3) Discounting Religion in the Explanation of Homegrown Terrorism: A Critique; (4) Religion, Radicalization and the Causes of Terrorism; (5) the Role of the Devoted Actor in War, Revolution, and Terrorism; (6) Girard on Apocalypse and Terrorism; (7) Rational Choice and Religious Terrorism: Its Bases of Applications, and
Future Directions; (8) Terror as Sacrificial Ritual? A Discussion of (Neo-)Durkheimian Approaches to Suicide; (9) Initiations of Terror: Applying a Retro Style of Analysis to the Religion-Terrorism Nexus; (10) The LTTE: A Nonreligious, Political, Martial Movement for Establishing the Right of Self-Determination of Ilattamils; (11) The Role of Religion in al-Qaeda’s Violence; (12) Meanings of Savagery: Terror, Religion and the Islamic State; (13) Where’s Charlie? The Discourse of Religious Violence in France Post-7/1/2015; (14) Understanding the Threat of the Islamic State in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan; (15) Terror and the Screen: Keeping the Relationship of Good and Bad Virtual; (16) Understanding Falun Gong’s Martyrdom Strategy as Spiritual Terrorism.

Counterterrorism – Legal


Table of Contents: Part I. Background: (1) Introduction; (2) History of POW Treatment in the United States: From the Revolutionary War to the Korean War; (3) Modern POW Treatment in the United States: The Vietnam War, the Geneva Conventions, and the Pre-9/11 Era; Part II. Evolution of Norms Around POW Treatment: (4) POW Treatment and Lawyers; (5) POW Treatment and Policy Makers; (6) POW Treatment and Interrogators; Part III. Conclusion: (7) Implications and Recommendations; Appendix A: Who’s Who; Appendix B: Timeline of Major Events; Appendix C: Acronyms.


Table of Contents: Introduction; Part I. International and EU Law: (1) Liability for Terrorism-Related Risks Under International Law; (2) Liability for Terrorism-Related Risk Under EU Law; (3) Civil Liability Systems of Seven EU Member States; (4) Case Studies (England and Wales, France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden); (5) Comparative Analysis; (6) Insurance of Terrorism-Related Risks; (7) Contracting for Liability Limitation; (8) Alternative Systems for Redressing Terrorism-Related Risks; (9) Is Liability for Terrorism-Related Enterprise-Threatening?; (10) Economic Analysis of Current Liability for Terrorism-Related Risk and Alternatives; (11) Is there a Role for the European Union?; Conclusion.


to Rights Protection or Appeasement of National Authorities?; (14) Accountability for Counter-Terrorism: Challenges and Potential in the Role of the Courts.

**Global Jihad**


*Table of Contents:* Introduction; (1) American Jihad, Muslim Americans, and the General Public; (2) America’s Homegrown Jihadists and Foreign Fighting; (3) Democracy, Civil Liberties, and Terrorism; (4) Theory of Terrorist Outbidding and Its Empirical Evidence; (5) The Effect of Economic Growth on Terrorism; (6) New Findings on the Causes and Effects of Human Rights Violations; (7) Demystifying the Impact of Naming and Shaming; (8) Preferential Trade Agreements and Human Rights Abusers; (9) Leaders’ Education, Democracy, and Use of Torture; (10) Civil War and Rule of Law; (11) Civil War, Volunteer Soldiers, and the Military; Conclusion.


*Table of Contents:* Introduction; (1) The Long Road to the Caliphate; (2) The Inner Workings of the Islamic State; (3) The Coming Terrorist Diaspora; (4) From “Remain and Expand” to Survive and Persist; (5) After the Caliphate: Preventing the Islamic State’s Return.


*Table of Contents:* Translator’s Introduction; From Tunis to Sana’a; From Kissinger to Obama; From Sectarianism to Chaos; Targeting Sunnis: Introduction: Sunnis Confront the World; (1) Targeting Sunnis; (2) Challenges and Confrontations; (3) Which Country Leads Arab Muslims: Saudi Arabia or Iran?; (4) The Impact of the “Arab Spring” on Lebanon; (5) A Major Strategic Project for two Contenders in the Middle East: Iran and Sa’udi Arabia; (6) Concluding Remarks; Appendices.


*Table of Contents:* Introduction; Part One. Glorious Memories and Agonizing Awakening: (1) the Social, Economic, and Cultural Bases of Islam; (2) Muhammad the Messenger and His Message; (3) The Caliphate and the Conquests; (4) The Great Days of the Caliphate and the Evolution of Islam; (5) the North Moves
South; Part. The Responses of Traditional Muslim Societies: (6) Sultan Selim III, Napoleon, and Mehmet Ali; (7) French Invasion and Algerian Resistance; (8) The British Conquest of India and the Sepoy Revolt; (9) Chechen Imam Shamil Resists Russian Imperialism; (10) Bankers on Horseback; (11) Sudanese Mahdiyah and the British Conquest; (12) Sanusiyyah Imam Umar al-Mukhtar against Italian Genocide; (13) The Riff War and Abd al-Karim in Morocco; (14) The Aceh War and Dutch Imperialism; (15) Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the Muslim Awakening; Part Three. The Shift to Secular Nationalism; (16) The Struggle to Define Identity; (17) The First Iranian Revolution; (18) The First World War; (19) The Postwar Middle East; (20) Palestine, the Much Promised land; (21) Turkey and Ataturk; (22) Reza Shah of Iran; (23) Islam in India and the Formation of Pakistan; (24) Kashmir, the Palestine of Central Asia; (25) Islam in Southeast Asia; (26) Afghanistan’s Centuries of Resistance; (27) The Silk Road; (28) The Algerian Revolution; (29) Nasser and Arabiyah; (30) Saddam Husain and Iraq; Part Four. The Reassertion of Islam: (31) Iran, the Revolutionery Shiah Muslim State; (32) The Muslim Brotherhood; (33) the Philosopher of the Muslim Revolt, Sayyid Qutb; (34) Palestine: Wars, Diaspora, and Failed State; (35) Hizbullah, Stateless Nation; (36) Gaza and Hamas; (37) The Uyghurs and Chinese Islam; Part Five. Militant Islam: (38) The Moro “Rebellion” in the Philippines; (39) Somalia, the “Failed State”; (40) Boko Haram and Nigeria; (41) Usama bin Laden and al-Qaida; (42) The Islamic State; Part Six. Afterward: The Parable of the Blind Brahmins: (43) Trunks and Tails; (44) What the North did to the South; (45) What the South did to Itself; (46) Where We Are Now and Where We Can Go?


**Table of Contents:** Foreword; Introduction: Is Southeast Asia a “Terrorist Haven”?; Part I. The Religion/Ideology Factor; (1) Bali and Southeast Asian Islam: Debunking the Myths; (2) Deconstructing Jihad: Southeast Asian Contexts; Part II. The Al Qaeda Factor: (3) the Question of “Links” Between Al Qaeda and Southeast Asia; (4) The Indigenous Roots of Conflict in Southeast Asia: The Case of Mindanao; (5) Understanding Al Qaeda and Its Network in Southeast Asia; (6) Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Exploring the Linkages; Part III. The Media Factor: (7) The Globalized Media and Southeast Asia: Boon or Bane?; (8) Evaluating Western Media Perceptions of Thailand After the Bali Bombing; Part IV. The ASEAN Factor: (9) ASEAN Counter-Terror Strategies and Cooperation: How Effective?; (10) Enhancing State Capacity and Legitimacy in the Counter-Terror War; (11) Counter-Terror Cooperation in a Complex Security Environment; Part V. The US Factor: (12) An Enemy of Their Making? US Security Discourse on the September 11 Terror Problematique; (13) Power, Leadership and Legitimacy in the War on Terror: Meshing “Soft” and “Hard” Power in US Foreign and Security Policies; (14) US Strategy in Southeast Asia: Counter-Terrorist or Counter-Terrorism; Part VI. The Indonesia Factor: (15) Indonesia and the Challenge of Radical Islam After October 12; (16) The Indonesian Dilemma: How to Participate in the War on Terror Without Becoming a National Security State; (17) Assessing Indonesia’s Vulnerability in the Wake of the American-led Attack on Iraq.


**Table of Contents:** Preface; Introduction: The Call to Jihad; (1) Philosophical Foundations; (2) Strategic Vision; (3) Organizational Dynamics; (4) Recruitment and Training; (5) Operations and Tactics; (6) Future Directions; (7) The Challenge of Credible Intelligence; Conclusion: Forging a Winning Strategy to Counter the Global Jihad.


**Table of Contents:** (1) Introduction: Joining the War on Terror; (2) Middle Eastern State Responses to the War on Terror; Part I. Reshaping Islam: (3) Moroccan Islam in the Twenty-First Century; (4) Anatomy of
a Religious Bureaucracy; Part II. Reshaping the State: (5) Gendered Reforms in “Moderate” Morocco; (6) Deploying Religious Policy Through Public Education; (7) Controlling Credentials in Higher Islamic Education; (8) Exporting Moroccan Islam: A Religious Foreign Policy; Conclusion: Morocco, the United States, and the Problem of Terrorism.

Country Studies

Afghanistan


China


*Table of Contents:* Introduction: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in China; (1) China’s 'War on Terrorism': Confronting the Dilemmas of the 'Internal-External' Security Nexus; (2) 'Fighting the Enemy With Fists and Daggers': the Chinese Communist Party's Counter-Terrorism Policy in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR); (3) 'Fighting Terrorism According to Law': China's Legal Efforts against Terrorism; (4) The Narrative of Uyghur Terrorism and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Uyghur Militancy; (5) China and Counter-Terrorism: Beyond Pakistan?; (6) China's Counter-Terrorism Policy in the Middle East; (7) Uyghur Terrorism in a Fractured Middle East; (8) Uyghur Cross-Border Movement Into South East Asia: Between Resistance and Survival.

Israel


Abbas,


Lebanon


*Table of Contents:* Introduction; (1) North Lebanon in Bilad al-Sham; (2) Defending an Imagined Umma: The Path to Terrorism; (3) The Anti-Syrian Movement: Rebuilding a Political Scene; (4) The Syrian Regime Reacts: Building Up a Jihadi Network; (5) Jihad and Resistance in North Lebanon: The History of Fatah al-Islam; (6) The Failure to Create a Lasting Support Base for the Syrian Insurrection; Epilogue; Conclusion.

**Saudi Arabia**


*Table of Contents:* Foreword; Introduction; (1) A Religious Diplomacy Inscribed in the Saudi Regime's DNA; (2) The Establishment of the System: From Pan-Islamism to the Fight Against Nasserist Pan-Arabism Until the 1979 Crisis; (3) Wahhabism and Salafism: The Same Battle; (4) Religious Diplomacy Transformed: Anti-Shiism and Anti-Communism; (5) When Submunitions Explode; Conclusion; Annexes.

**United Kingdom**


*Table of Contents:* Preface; (1) Terror Crime Prevention with Communities: Trust, Community and Counter-Terrorism: An Introduction; (2) Credibility in Counter-Terrorism Practice; (3) Community Policing within a Counter-Terrorism Context: Understanding Police and Community Engagement; (4) Citizenship, Responsibilisation and Trust in Counter-Terrorism; (5) Police and Community Engagement and Partnership for Counter-Terrorism; (6) Understanding Emotions in Counter-Terrorism Practice; (7) Governing Terror: ‘Top-down’ and ‘Bottom-up’ Approaches to Counter-Terrorism; Conclusion: Engaging Communities for Twenty-First-Century Security.


*Table of Contents:* Introduction; (1) Perspectives on Security Threat Politics; (2) The 2012 Study 'Public Perceptions of Threat in Britain'; (3) The Scope of Security Threats and Their Causes; (4) Security Threats and Their Consequences; (5) Government, Perceptions and Experiences of Security Threats, and Citizen Involvement in the Risk Management Cycle; Conclusion.
United States


*Table of Contents:* Introduction: The Strength of our Intelligence Community; Part I. The History and Process of Intelligence: (1) A History of U.S. Intelligence; (2) A Brief Look at the Intelligence Community; (3) Intelligence Fundamentals; (4) Intelligence Analysis: A 9/11 Case Study; (5) Five-Eyes – Foreign Intelligence Services; Part II. Post-9/11 Evolution: (6) Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the New IC; (7) U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence; (8) Cyber Security and Intelligence; (9) The Role of Fusion Centers in Homeland Security; (10) U.S. Border Security and Intelligence; (11) Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Through Bi-Directional Intelligence Information Sharing with the Private Sector; Part III: Considerations for the Next Decade: (12) Congressional Oversight, the Intelligence Community, and 21st-Century Challenges; (13) Domestic Intelligence Revisited: Assessing the Domestic Intelligence Model and Process; (14) Disrupting Armed Groups: Human Intelligence Strategies; (15) The Lone Wolf and Radicalization; (16) Whistleblower or Traitor?; The National Intelligence University: Integrating the Intelligence Community; Epilogue.


*Table of Contents:* Preface; (1) Introduction; (2) Electronic Surveillance and National Security; (3) Interrogation and Torture; (4) Military Tribunals; (5) Drones and Targeted Killing; (6) Making Policy for the Long War.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.
Bibliography: Terrorism by Country – Pakistan

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on terrorism affecting Pakistan. It covers both terrorist activity within the country's borders (regardless of the perpetrators' nationality) and terrorist activity by Pakistani nationals abroad. While focusing on recent literature, the bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to July 2019. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to broaden the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, terrorism, Pakistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, TTP, Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Islamic State, FATA, Kashmir

NB: All websites were last visited on 20.07.2019. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

Bibliographies and other Resources


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**Books and Edited Volumes**


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Khan, Alam; Estrada, Mario Arturo Ruiz; Yusof, Zarina (2016, March): How Terrorism Affects the Economic Performance? The Case of Pakistan. *Quality & Quantity*, 50(2), 867-883. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-015-0179-z


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**Note**

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories, on professional networking sites, or author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of preprints); it might therefore not have passed...
through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after obtaining permission by the author(s).

**About the Compiler:** Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., is a Professional Information Specialist. Since 2011, she works for the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). Additionally, she serves as Information Resources Editor to ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. In her editorial role, she regularly compiles bibliographies and other resources for Terrorism Research. She wrote her doctoral thesis on Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents (focus: media-oriented hostage takings). E-mail: j.tinnes@gmx.de
Bibliography: Conflict in Syria (Part 4)
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Abstract
This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the Syrian conflict. To keep up with the rapid changing political events, more recent publications have been prioritized during the selection process. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to broaden the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, Syria, conflict, uprising, civil war, Assad regime, rebels, opposition, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS, Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF, Russia, Iran, United States

NB: All websites were last visited on 20.07.2019. This subject bibliography is conceptualized as a multi-part series (for earlier bibliographies, see: Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3). To avoid duplication, this compilation only includes literature not contained in the previous parts. However, meta-resources, such as bibliographies, were also included in the sequels. Literature focusing specifically on the “Islamic State” (a.k.a. ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) has been excluded as it is covered in a separate multi-part bibliography. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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Karaca, Ece (2018): Interactive Data Visualization: Applications Used to Illuminate the Environmental Effects of the Syrian War. (Master's Thesis, Ohio State University, Columbus, United States). URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1524096815846145


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Kostyuk, Nadiya; Zhukov, Yuri M. (2019, February): Invisible Digital Front: Can Cyber Attacks Shape Battlefield

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Policy Failure. Middle East Policy, 25(2), 136-162. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12347


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society-upended


**Note**

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories, on professional networking sites, or author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after obtaining permission by the author(s).

**About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., is a Professional Information Specialist. Since 2011, she works for the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). Additionally, she serves as Information Resources Editor to 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. In her editorial role, she regularly compiles bibliographies and other resources for Terrorism Research. She wrote her doctoral thesis on Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents (focus: media-oriented hostage takings). E-mail: j.tinnes@gmx.de**
Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects

Compiled and selected by Berto Jongman

Most of the items included below became available online in July and August 2019. They are categorised under the following headings (some of these also have sub-headings, not listed here):

1. Non-Religious Terrorism
2. Religious Terrorism
3. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics
4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism
5. Extremism, Radicalization
6. Counterterrorism Strategies, Tactics and Operations
7. Prevention, Preparedness, and Resilience Studies
8. Cyber Issues
9. Analytical Studies
10. Terrorism Databases
11. Specific, and National, Threat Assessments, Warnings

1. Non-Religious Terrorism

1.a. General

Jailed PKK leader claims Turkish government-PKK conflict can end ‘within a week.’ Kurdistan24, August 9, 2019. URL: https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/ac5b0a8b-e4c8-4874-9db3-925f29f50b2e


Peter Neumann discusses the state of domestic terrorism in the US. ICSR, YouTube, August 8, 2019. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bH0nqzaIPRI&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR1huam5_T_08D0byHwMTQyRMhpfg4bIIWCzGsuxaS_3b2AL3GxlcVzFnA


Why domestic terrorism is an underestimated national threat. PBS, August 5, 2019. URL: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/why-domestic-terrorism-is-an-underestimated-national-threat


Turkey to stand against moves at UN legitimizing YPG/PKK terrorists. Daily Sabah, August 3, 2019. URL: https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2019/08/03/turkey-to-stand-against-moves-at-un-legitimizing-ypgpkk-terrorists


J. Parkin Daniels. Peace is war as armed groups roil Colombia's lawless border region. The Guardian, July 20, 2019. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/20/colombia-guerrillas-peace-war-catatumbo


1.b. Explosions/Remote Violence


Rail chaos in Florence after suspected arson attack on high-speed line. The Local, July 22, 2019. URL: https://www.thelocal.it/20190722/rail-chaos-in-florence-after-suspected-arson-attack-on-high-speed-line


1.c. Violence against Civilians


Oslo mosque shooting: Norwegian terror suspect remanded in custody. The Local, August 12, 2019. URL: https://www.thelocal.no/20190812/oslo-mosque-shooting-norwegian-suspect-rejects-allegations


Moskéskyting I Bærum. C-Rex – Senter for ekstremismeforskning, August 11, 2019. URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/aktuelt/aktuelle-saker/2019/moskeskyting-i-berum.html?fbclid=IwAR2jdzvL6K6OrF1E4nzba0m3nPK552xTBYUOpof1rreS06X0-aCPGUaLivo


L. Dearden. Man who stormed mosque ‘armed with shotguns’ was inspired by Christchurch and El Paso attackers, massaging board post suggests. The Independent, August 12, 2019. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/norway-mosque-shooting-attack-suspect-philip-manshaus-christchurch-el-paso-4chan-a9052106.html?fbclid=IwAR1vgcx9YmQR9MDvZ_iZA-5X-zZOiOjf72xnWMAONx-vBpFyjYLWNZlOlf0


### 2. Religious Terrorism

#### 2.1. AQ and Affiliates

##### 2.1.a. General


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2.1.b. Explosions/Remote Violence

D. Hussain. Al Qaeda suicide bomber who killed Somali politician was a blind woman who worked for her target. Daily Mail Online, August 9, 2019. URL: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7341227/Somalia-says-blind-female-suicide-bomber-killed-Mogadishu-mayor.html


2.1.c. Violence against Civilians


Boko Haram leaves millions displaced 10 years on. Deutsche Welle, YouTube, July 29, 2019. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IB5Le3KHbbo


Somalia security forces end militant attack on hotel that killed 13 – police officer. Reuters, July 13, 2019. URL: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-somalia-security/somalia-security-forces-end-militant-attack-on-hotel-that-killed-13-police-officer-idUKKCN1U803V


2.2. Daesh and Affiliates

2.2.a. General


Over 40 ISIS members now part of Turkish-backed forces in Afrin. ANF News, August 9, 2019. URL: https://anfenglish.com/features/over-40-isis-members-now-part-of-turkish-backed-forces-in-afrin-36804


M. Meyers. ISIS has been rebuilding as US troops withdraw from Syria. Military Times, August 7, 2019. URL: https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/08/06/report-isis-has-been-rebuilding-as-us-troops-withdraw-from-syria/


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ISIS threat hovers over Syria camp, rattling authorities. Asharq al Awsat, July 29, 2019. URL: https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1834891/isis-threat-hovers-over-syria-camp-rattling-authorities?fbclid=IwAR0pF_lSSD793n3z7CCBZhey3dFUaneNZOAX7RcNHz1PTbs9EX6jy4PKcmE

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Conference Monitor/Calendar of Events

Compiled by Reinier Bergema

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), in its mission to provide a platform for academics and practitioners in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism, compiles an online calendar, listing recent and upcoming academic and professional conferences, symposia and similar events that are directly or indirectly relevant to the readers of Perspectives on Terrorism. The calendar includes academic and (inter-) governmental conferences, professional expert meetings, civil society events and educational programs. The listed events are organised by a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental institutions, including several key (counter) terrorism research centres and institutes.

We encourage readers to contact the journal's Assistant Editor for Conference Monitoring, Reinier Bergema, and provide him with relevant information, preferably in the same format as the items listed below. Reinier Bergema can be reached at <r.bergema@icct.nl> or via Twitter: @reinierbergema.

**August 2019**

**State of the Region 2019 Masterclass**
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
14 August, Canberra, Australia
Website: visit | Twitter: @aspi_org

**Yemen: The War and the Way Out**
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
20 August, Beirut, Lebanon
Website: visit | Twitter: @CarnegieEndow

**Advanced Summer Programme: Preventing, Detecting and Responding to the Violent Extremist Threat**
Leiden University & International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague
19-23 August, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @UniLeiden; @ICCT_TheHague

**Advanced Summer Programme: Terrorism, Countering Terrorism and the Rule of Law**
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague & TMC Asser Institute
26-30 August
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICCT_TheHague; @TMCAsser

**Bellingcat OSINT Workshop**
Bellingcat
26-30 August, Zurich, Switzerland
Website: visit | Twitter: @bellingcat

**Seminar for Judges and Prosecutors on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing in Kazakhstan**
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
27-28 August, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan
Website: visit | Twitter: @osce
Terrorism Risk Insurance Seminar  
*Australian Reinsurance Pool Cooperation*  
29 August, Sydney, Australia  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: n/a

Out of the Shadows: Shining a Light on Irregular Migration  
*Center for Strategic & International Studies*  
29 August, Washington DC, United States  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@csis](#)

Breakfast Seminar: The EU in the Sahel – From Good Intentions to Europe First?  
*Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*  
29 August, Oslo, Norway  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@nupinytt](#)

**September 2019**

Tunisia and the Risks Facing the Region  
*Clingendael Institute*  
2 September, The Hague, The Netherlands  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@clingendaelorg](#)

3rd Cross-Sectoral and Cross-Pillar Meeting on Developing the Draft Work Plan to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism 2018-2025  
*ASEAN*  
2 September, Thailand  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ASEAN2019TH](#)

2019 OSCE Asian Conference  
*Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)*  
2-3 September, Tokyo, Japan  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@osce](#)

European Symposium on Societal Challenges in Computational Social Science  
*ETH Zürich*  
2-4 September, Zürich, Switzerland  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@eth_en](#)

Countering Terrorism Through Innovative Approaches and the Use of New and Emerging Technologies  
*United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism*  
3-4 September, Minsk, Belarus  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@un](#)

14th BISA US Foreign Policy Working Group: Annual Conference  
*The BISA US Foreign Policy Working Group*  
4-5 September, Dublin, Ireland  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@USFPgroup](#)
Institute for Security, Defense and Peace
4-6 September, Ohrid, Macedonia
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

2019 General Conference
European Consortium for Political Research
4-7 September, Wroclaw, Poland
Website: visit | Twitter: @ecpr

4th Postgraduate Conference: Current Themes in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence
The Society for Terrorism Research
6 September, Coventry, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @SocTerRes

Post-ISIS Era: Regional and Global Implications
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
6-8 September, Washington DC, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @NATO

Building a Multipolar World Order: The Role of BRICS in Large-Scale Armed Conflict
International Institute for Strategic Studies
6 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @IISS_org

Why People Radicalize? The Anatomy of Violent Extremism
Henry Jackson Society
9 September, Westminster, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @HJS_Org

“Changing Times, Changing Treason?” A Lecture by the New Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
9 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org

ICT World Summit 2019: Terrorism 2020: Understand the Present, Prepare for the Future
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism
9-12 September, Herzliya, Israel
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICT_org

Course: Counter Terrorism / Attack the Network (AtN)
NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)
9-13 September, Ankara, Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

‘Chaos States’ and Local Order: Rethinking State-Building in Iraq and Yemen
Chatham House
10 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @ChathamHouse
RAN YOUNG Academy Session 3 - Challenges & Progress  
*Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) YOUNG*  
10-11 September, Barcelona, Spain  
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Anti-Money Laundering: Are We Where We Want To Be?  
*Brookings Institute*  
11 September, Washington DC, United States  
Website: visit | Twitter: @BrookingsInst

18 Jahre 9/11 – Ist ein Ende des Kampfes gegen den Terror in Sicht?  
*Online Propagandaforschung*  
11 September, Mainz, Germany  
Website: visit | Twitter: @OnPropFor

Breakfast Briefing - How People Radicalise: The Anatomy of Violent Extremism  
*Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)*  
11 September, London, United Kingdom  
Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org

Jihadismus Online – Ideologische Hintergründe und Neue Erscheinungsformen [German]  
*Online Propagandaforschung*  
11-12 September, Mainz, Germany  
Website: visit | Twitter: @OnPropFor

Expert Workshop for University Lecturers on Counter-Terrorism and Trafficking in Firearms  
*United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*  
11-12 September, Almaty, Kazakhstan  
Website: visit | Twitter: @UNODC

Disciples of the State? Religion and State-Building in the Former Ottoman World  
*Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center*  
12 September, Cambridge, United States  
Website: visit | Twitter: @BelferCenter

The Red Queen Problem: Technology Start-ups and National Security  
*Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)*  
12 September, London, United Kingdom  
Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org

RAN Study Visit: Restorative Justice  
*Radicalisation Awareness Network*  
12-13 September, Zagreb, Croatia  
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

The Italian Political Science Conference (SISP 2019)  
*Società Italiana di Scienza Politica*  
12-14 September, Lecce, Italy  
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a
Transforming Security and Defence: A 21st Century Model
*The Institute of International & European Affairs*
13 September, Dublin, Ireland
Website: visit | Twitter: @iiea

Mediating Ceasefires in Civil Wars
*International Institute for Strategic Studies*
13 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @IISS_org

ICT’s Off-Site Training Weekend
*International Institute for Counter-Terrorism*
13-15 September, Herzliya, Israel
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICT_org

Always the Same...Or Always Changing? Britain’s Counter-Terrorism Prevent Strategy Under Review.
*A VERT Research Network*
16 September, Melbourne, Australia
Website: visit | Twitter: @AvertResNet

Understanding the Threat of ISIS in Central Asia
*Chatham House*
17 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @ChathamHouse

The Challenges of Providing Humanitarian Aid in Fragile States and Conflict Zones
*International Institute for Strategic Studies*
17 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @IISS_org

Finland’s Presidency of the Council of the EU’s “Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism: Looking into the Future”
*Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) P&P; Finnish EU Presidency*
17-18 September, Helsinki, Finland
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Building Military Capability, Developing New Partnerships and Protecting National Interests in an Uncertain World Order
*The United Service Institution of India*
18 September, Delhi, India
Website: visit | Twitter: @USI_1870

RESOLVE 2019 Global Forum: Resetting Priorities to Address Violent Extremist Threats
*RESOLVE*
18 September, Washington DC, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @resolvenet

Conference Panel at the European Society of Criminology - Transforming Higher Education for the Future Through Strengthened Cooperation Between Academia and the United Nations
*United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*
18-21 September, Ghent, Belgium
Website: visit | Twitter: @UNODC
Extremists Being Released from Prison: Community and Family Acceptance  
*Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) P&I*  
19 September, Helsinki, Finland  
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Radicalisation in België en Nederland. Kritische Perspectieven op Veiligheid en Geweld  
[Radicalisation in Belgium and the Netherlands: Critical Perspectives on Security and Violence, in Dutch]  
*Egmont Institute*  
19 September, Brussels, Belgium  
Website: visit | Twitter: @Egmontinstitute

Paradise Lost? Policing in the Age of Data Protection  
*Academy of European Law*  
19-20 September, Copenhagen, Denmark  
Website: visit | Twitter: @ERATrier

6th International Conference on Social Sciences (ICOSS 2019)  
*International Institute of Knowledge Management*  
19-20 September, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia  
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Investigating Web 2.0: Collection, Analysis and Presentation of e-Evidence in Court  
*Academy of European Law*  
23-24 September, Madrid, Spain  
Website: visit | Twitter: @ERATrier

Youth Activist Forum: Engaging the OSCE to Address Racism and Xenophobia  
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)  
23-25 September, Warsaw, Poland  
Website: visit | Twitter: @osce

SAFE 2019: 8th International Conference on Safety and Security Engineering  
*Wessex Institute*  
23-25 September, Ancona, Italy  
Website: visit | Twitter: @wessexinstitute

Steering Committee Meeting  
*Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)*  
24 September, Brussels Belgium  
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Webinar: The Foreign Fighter Phenomenon – Lessons From Trinidad and Tobago  
*Chatham House*  
24 September, online  
Website: visit | Twitter: @ChathamHouse

Book Talk: They Will Have to Die Now: Mosul and the Fall of the Caliphate  
*Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center*  
25 September, Cambridge, United States  
Website: visit | Twitter: @BelferCenter

The Protection of Children in Armed Conflict  
*Chatham House*  
25 September, London, United Kingdom  
Website: visit | Twitter: @ChathamHouse
Preparation Remembrance Day 2020
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)
25 September, Brussels Belgium
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

4th CDCT Bureau meeting
Council of Europe Committee on Counter-Terrorism (CECT)
26 September
Website: visit | Twitter: @COE_HRightsRLaw

Book Talk: Preventing Palestine: A Political History from Camp David to Oslo
Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center
26 September, Cambridge, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @BelferCenter

Delivering Aid in Fragile Settings: Challenges to Help the Most Vulnerable
Chatham House
26 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @ChathamHouse

Member States’ Workshop on Far-Right Extremism
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)
26-27 September, Brussels Belgium
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Coroners Society National Conference 2019: The Challenge of Terrorism
Coroners Society of England and Wales
27 September, Essex, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Evaluating Outcomes in Fragile Contexts: Improving Research and Impact Assessment Approaches
Chatham House
27 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @ChathamHouse

Course: Terrorist Use of WMD
NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)
30 September – 4 October, Ankara, Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) & TMC Asser Institute
30 September – 4 October, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @opcw; @TMCAsser

October 2019

Communications After an Attack and the Role of the Media
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) C&N
1-2 October, Lisbon, Portugal
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope
Troubled Refugee Children in the Classroom
*Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) EDU-He-SC*
3-4 October, Zagreb, Croatia
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

International Conference on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Crisis Situations
Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation
7-8 October, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @MinBZ

*Congres Aanpak Radicalisering en Terrorismebestrijding*
[Congress on Dealing with Radicalisation and the Fight against Terrorism, in Dutch]
*Studiecentrum voor Bedrijf en Overheid*
8 October, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Breakfast Briefing: Policing the UK in an Evolving Threat Landscape
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
9 October, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org

*7th Europol-INTERPOL Cybercrime Conference*
*EUROPOL*
9-11 October, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @EUROPOL

“The ISIS Files” with Rukmini Callimachi and Lorenzo Vidino
*International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT)*
& *George Washington University Program on Extremism (GWUPOE)*
10 October, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICCT_TheHague; @gwupoe

*Leergang Terrorisme, Recht en Veiligheid*
[Course on Terrorism, Law and Security, in Dutch]
*Leiden University*
10-11 October; 31 October-1 November; 14-15 November; 28-29 November,
The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @UniLeiden

Annual Conference on Countering Terrorism in the EU 2019
Academy for European Law
10-11 October, Trier, Germany
Website: visit | Twitter: @ERATrier

Conference: Terrorism Experts Conference (TEC)
*NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)*
15-16 October, Ankara, Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a
Course: Terrorism and Media  
_NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)_  
15-16 October, Ankara, Turkey  
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Illicit Financial Flows 2019: Accurately Mapping the Problem and Designing an Effective Response  
_Chatham House_  
17 October, London, United Kingdom  
Website: visit | Twitter: @ChathamHouse

Inaugural NASIH Conference  
_North American Society for Intelligence History_  
20-21 October, Washington DC, United States  
Website: visit | Twitter: 

RAN Young Academy Session 4: How to Professionalise your Initiative  
_Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) YOUNG_  
21-22 October, Berlin, Germany  
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

International Symposium on Radicalization & Extremism  
_Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM)_  
21-23 October, Ankara, Turkey  
Website: visit | Twitter: @orsamtr

Cranfield University’s Symposium on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)  
_Cranfield University_  
22-23 October, Swindon, United Kingdom  
Website: visit | Twitter: @CranfieldUni

RAN EXIT: Gender Issues in Exit Strategies  
_Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) EXit_  
22-23 October, Rome, Italy  
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Megan Butler on Turning Technology Against Financial Crime  
_Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)_  
23 October, London, United Kingdom  
Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org

Alienation vs. Integration  
_Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) H&SC_  
23-24 October, Helsinki, Finland  
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Dying too Young: Children and Small Arms  
_Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for Interational Studies_  
24 October, Stanford, United States  
Website: visit | Twitter: @FSISStanford
Member States’ Workshop on Islamist Extremism
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) H&SC
24-25 October, Berlin, Germany
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Bellingcat OSINT Workshop
Bellingcat
28 October – 1 November, Copenhagen, Denmark
Website: visit | Twitter: @bellingcat

November 2019

RAN High Level Conference
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)
4 November, Brussels, Belgium
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Policy & Practice Event: Evaluating Impact of Disengagement, Deradicalisation and Resocialisation Efforts
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)
7 November, Madrid, Spain
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Prevention of Radicalization to Terrorism: Regional Policy Responses and Risk Mitigation
United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism
7-8 November, Budapest, Hungary
Website: visit | Twitter: @un

The Figure of the Terrorist in Literature, Film and Media
University of Zurich
8-9 November, Zurich, Switzerland
Website: visit | Twitter: @uzh_en

Arms Control Conference and Experts Forum
Institute for National Security Studies & Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
11-12 November, Tel Aviv, Israel
Website: visit | Twitter: @inssisrael; @kasonline

RAN LOCAL: When and How to Intervene – Specific Case Management
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) LOCAL
13-14 November, Milan, Italy
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

RAN C&N: How to Make an Effective Campaign that is Reaching the Target Audience and Selling the Message
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) C&N
14-15 November, Budapest, Hungary
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

RAN EDU: Challenges in Islamist Extremist Ideology in Schools
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) EDU
14-15 November, Antwerp, Belgium
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope
Water 2019: The New Oil?
*Chatham House*
18 November, London, United Kingdom
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ChathamHouse](#)

Course: Border Security, Refugees and CT
*NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)*
18-22 November, Ankara, Turkey
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: n/a

European Academic Conference on Humanities and Social Sciences (WEI-HSS-Rome 2019)
*West East Institute*
19-21 November, Rome, Italy
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: n/a

VIII International Congress for the Victims of Terrorism
*Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)*
20-21 November, Nice, France
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](#)

14th Homeland Security Week
*Institute for Defense and Government Advancement*
20-22 November, Washington DC, United States
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@DefenseInsights](#)

NISA Conference 2019: Old Wine, New Bottles?
The Transforming Discipline of Intelligence Collection
*Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association*
21 November, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@NISAssociation](#)

Verdiepingsleergang Terrorisme, Recht en Veiligheid
[Advanced Course Terrorism, Law and Security, in Dutch]
*Leiden University*
21-22 November, 12-13 December, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@UniLeiden](#)

RAN P&P: What Can we Learn from Experiences with Different Prison Regimes for Radicalised/ Terrorist Offenders so far?
*Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) P&P*
21-22 November, Lisbon, Portugal
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](#)

IISS Manama Dialogue 2019
*International Institute for Strategic Studies*
22-24 November, Bahrain
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@IISS_org](#)

Seminar: Defence Against Terrorism (Executive Level) Seminar
*NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)*
25-26 November, Ankara, Turkey
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: n/a
European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference (EISIC) 2019
University of Oulu
26-27 November, Oulu, Finland
Website: visit | Twitter: @unioulu

Need to Know IX: Intelligence and Major Political Change
International Centre for Defence and Security
28-29 November, Talinn, Estonia
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

RAN YF&C: Academy on ‘Youth (work) online’
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) YF&C
28-29 November, Copenhagen, Denmark
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

RAN POL: Information Sharing
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) POL
28-29 November, to be confirmed
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Acknowledgement

Special thanks go to Berto Jongman, Alex Schmid and Agnes Venema for their suggestions and contributions to this conference calendar.

About the Compiler: Reinier Bergema is a Research Fellow and Project Manager at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) and an Assistant Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. His research interests include, inter alia, radicalisation and Dutch (jihadist) foreign fighters.
Announcement of the TRI Thesis Award 2018

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) seeks to enhance the quality of research in the field of terrorism studies. For this purpose, TRI established in 2014 an annual award for the ‘Best Doctoral Thesis in the Field of Terrorism- and Counter-Terrorism Studies’. The jury consists of Prof. Edwin Bakker (Leiden University), Prof. James J.F. Forest (University of Massachusetts at Lowell), Prof. Clark McCauley (Bryn Mawr College) and the undersigned. Among the submitted Ph.D. theses received by the jury at the end of March of this year, the jury identified three finalists and from these a winner. The winner receives an award of US $ 1,000, while the other two finalists receive a Certificate of Achievement.

The jury has just awarded the prize for the best thesis submitted or defended in 2018 to

**Dr. Kenneth Patrick Reidy** for his thesis *‘The Accidental Ambassadors: Implications of Benevolent Radicalization’* (University of Northumbria, Newcastle upon Tyne).

The other two finalists are:

**Dr. Caitlin E. Ambrozik**, author of *‘Countering Violent Extremism Locally’* (Cornell University, N.Y.) and

**Dr. Simone M. Friis**, author of *‘Virtual Violence: Militant Imagery, Online Communication and the Islamic State’* (University of Copenhagen).

The author of this year’s winning thesis has summarised some of his findings in the opening article of the current issue of *Perspectives on Terrorism*. The Abstracts of the theses of the other two finalists can be found below in an Appendix.

The jury was impressed by the quality of the work of all three finalists. Dr. Ambrozik’s thesis impressed the jury by its careful empirical analysis of the difficulties in implementing programmes to counter violent extremism. Dr. Friis broke new methodological ground by creating a sophisticated framework for the analysis of the visual propaganda of the Islamic State.

In the end, the jury decided to grant the award to Dr. Ken Reidy for the originality of his thesis. He conceptualised—and empirically tested—radicalisation as a vector which can go in a malevolent as well as a benevolent direction, the first ending in extremism and/or terrorism while the second manifesting itself, for instance, as ‘aid-in-extremis’, risking one’s own life to save others as in the case of Muslim humanitarian aid workers in jihadist conflict theatres. As one member of the jury pointed out: ‘This thesis can make a big contribution to preventing terrorism and perhaps also to de-radicalisation. It is not easy to prevent radicalisation to violence using moral and practical arguments; maybe it is easier to prevent radicalisation to violence by pointing to living examples of benevolent self-sacrifice for the victims militants claim to represent.’ The jury was also impressed by Dr. Reidy’s encyclopedic knowledge of the literature on radicalisation and jihadist terrorism.

On behalf of all members of the jury, the chairman congratulates the winner Dr. Reidy, and the two other finalists, Dr. Ambrozik and Dr. Friis for their achievement.

*About the Author: Alex P. Schmid is Chairman of the TRI Award Jury.*

*Appendix*


In 2011, the Obama administration announced a national countering violent extremism (CVE) strategy, which tasked local communities to work together to design and implement their own CVE programs to help prevent
the threat of violent extremism. Seven years later, the majority of Americans do not know what “CVE” is and few programs exist at the local level. This project examines the U.S. approach to CVE and the challenges local stakeholders faced while attempting to design and implement “community-led” CVE programming. In examining these challenges, I explore why only some communities have responded to the federal government’s call for action to design and implement CVE programming and created what I term CVE governance networks. I find that three factors - community stakeholder interest in CVE, capacity to mobilize and facilitation - explain the variation in mobilization at the local level in the United States. However, the creation of a CVE governance network does not necessarily mean that the network will develop and implement CVE programs. Local community stakeholders face numerous challenges throughout the policymaking process, which ultimately hinders implementation efforts. Often, governance networks succumb to internal political conflicts that are fuelled by stakeholder disagreements over how CVE programming should be implemented within their communities. Given this, I find that networks with a local leader who is able to both facilitate coordination and make final implementation decisions tend to be more successful in implementing collaborative programming. Evidence from interviews and surveys of stakeholders involved in the CVE policymaking process lends support for my theory of local level collaborative policymaking and reveals the intricacies of the CVE policymaking process.


This dissertation concerns the Islamic State's use of militant imagery and online communication. Militant groups have produced visual communication displaying and promoting violent methods as part of their political struggles for decades, if not centuries. Yet, in recent years, the transformation of the communication and information environment has introduced significant changes in how militant imagery functions on the global stage. Today, modern multiple media and digital technology provide militant groups with new opportunities for shaping their public image and reaching audiences across the globe through dynamic online networks. The Islamic State has exploited and accelerated the communicative possibilities of the Web 2.0 era as part of its violent political struggle. In many ways, the political significance of the Islamic State lies not only in the group's territorial conquests, but also in its communicative and symbolic power and its ability to shape public imaginaries and reach a global audience through spectacular and violent imagery. Hence, the Islamic State provides a critical case for exploring the transforming security landscape in an increasingly interconnected, digital, and image-saturated world. To examine the Islamic State's use of militant imagery and online communication, the dissertation conducts a problem-driven, multi-level analysis consisting of four sub-studies, which build on a mixed set of methods and data collection techniques. The first sub-study conducts a mapping of the overall characteristics of the Islamic State's media campaign and online network, focusing on strategy, structure, output, and circulation style. The second sub-study examines the Islamic State's use of public displays of violence, focusing on the group's execution videos. The third sub-study addresses the debate on online radicalisation by exploring the Islamic State's online mobilizing techniques aimed at European citizens. Finally, the fourth sub-study examines the measures aimed at countering the Islamic State's online activities and discusses the strategic and democratic challenges of the fight against militant imagery in the digital age. Through these studies, the dissertation contributes to contemporary academic debates and policy issues on the role of imagery in contemporary security politics, the propaganda strategies of jihadist groups, the virtual dimension of mobilization to violence, and the role of online communication in contemporary warfare.

N.B. The deadline for the next round of submissions (Ph.D. theses submitted or defended in 2019) for the annual TRI Thesis Award is 31 March 2020.
About Perspectives on Terrorism

Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University, Campus The Hague. PoT is published six times per year as a free, independent, scholarly peer-reviewed online journal available at https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism.

PoT seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism-, Political Violence- and Conflict Studies.

The editors invite researchers and readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

Perspectives on Terrorism has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s Research Notes, Special Correspondence, Op-Eds and other content are reviewed by members of the Editorial Team, while its Articles are peer-reviewed by outside academic experts and professionals. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and waging conflicts. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to. They are responsible for the content of their contributions and retain the copyright of their publication.

The Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism consists of:

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