Benevolent Radicalization: An Antidote to Terrorism

by Ken Reidy

Note from the Editor: *The annual award of the Terrorism Research Initiative for the 'Best Thesis in the Field of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies (2018)', was won by Dr. Ken Reidy. We have asked the winner to summarise important parts of his doctoral thesis for the readers of our journal in the article below (for access to the complete thesis, see URL in note 1).*

Abstract

Most political activism occurs within social norms and the democratic consensus, but a minority mobilize in a consciously perilous manner. When this is premised upon sacred values, one may be said to be behaviorally radicalized. Within this radicalized fringe, some stay within social norms but take them to an extreme level of self-sacrifice. This may involve risking one's life to benefit others in an objectively and consistently pro-social manner. This is referred to as aid-in-extremis, a specific form of active bystandership. A recent example includes British Muslims engaged in non-sectarian humanitarian aid for besieged civilians in Daesh controlled territory. In my thesis, these people are categorized as benevolently radicalized; they were Positive Deviants who adhere to a conditioned victim-centric prognosis. Others made a clear break and depart from the norm. This entails violence or tacit support thereof as part of their response - such as those British Muslims who joined Daesh. These people are categorized as malevolently radicalized: their deviance is overall anti-social and they adhere to a conditioned perpetrator-centric prognosis. The paradox is, both cohorts stem from the same domestic sentiment pool and use the same sacred values to undergird their morally opposed behaviors. What seems to determine the prognostic vector is how these sacred values are interpreted and this alludes to the importance of frames. Recognizing that frames are learned and that both groups are in competition for similar people, governments may proactively prevent Jihadist recruitment and sideline their narratives by buttressing the benevolently radicalized, bolstering their numbers and ensuring that their prognostic is perceived as the main moral anchor. This counter-engagement is presented as a relevant and impactful, strengths-based alternative which can constructively channel moral outrage and fulfill needs - yet it is only posited to appeal to particular type of (pre-)Jihadist activists.

Keywords: Aid-In-Extremis (Active Bystandership), counter-engagement, multifinality, pathological altruism, positive deviance, sacred values

Multifinality and Competition

It is widely accepted that there are many pathways to becoming radicalized. This is referred to as equifinality and this is why there is no single "profile". However, this author's dissertation research suggests that there may be other outcomes of the radicalization process besides (violent) extremism. [1] This is referred to as multifinality. Recognizing multifinality is important because it provides a partial answer to the central question of radicalization research: "why do some people radicalize to (violent) extremism while similar others, under the same radicalizing conditions, do not?" The argument made in the thesis *The Accidental Ambassadors: Implications of Benevolent Radicalization* is that similar others, under similar radicalizing conditions, but within *a non-violent and non-extremist context*, are exposed to different situational variables and that these influence the chemistry of their subsequent socialization. Within particular parameters, [2] this socialization is categorized as radicalization and, within a pro-social context, this radicalization is categorized as benevolent. Therefore, under similar conditions but in a different context, similar others do indeed radicalize, but the form

of radicalization is imperceptible to those whose sole application of radicalization is as a conceptual framework for research on (violent) extremism.

One implication of incorporating multifinality into the radicalization construct is that it opens up a preventative avenue which has not been adequately explored. Rather than solely countering radicalization, governments may also opt to influence the process in order to impact what results from it. For example, many people felt compelled to "do" something about the Syrian civil war; some mobilized as (citizen) journalists, others did so in a medical capacity. Yet others joined competing armed groups. Others still, gave their time and money to raise awareness or to initiate and support humanitarian projects. Therefore, activists diagnosed the situation in Syria and Iraq in much the same way ("something needs to be done"), but differed in their prognostics. As such, there was a wide variety of responses, but this distribution has not been sufficiently reflected in media coverage and this, in turn, gave the impression that (violent) extremism was the main or even the only response. Rather than countering (violent) extremism, the recommendation made in the thesis is to increase the appeal of humanitarian responses and their congruent pro-social narratives in order to cultivate them as the normative prognostic. The goal is to channel the will to "do" something into less damaging outlets, but appealing ones nonetheless.

Therefore, this approach does not target extremism directly. Instead, it aims to make the potential recruitment pool smaller by offering an attractive alternative which is posited to appeal to particular typologies. In doing so, it recognizes grievances, altruistic intentions and willingness to act on a faith-aligned impulse. Instead of dismissing or ignoring that urge, it channels it into a benevolent frame which is championed by constructive and community approved role-models. This offers an alternative approach to prevention which fosters resilience to violence and extremism because its resultant identity and prognostics are resistant to both. This counter-engagement [3] amounts to a competitor to (violent) extremism, not merely a rebuttal.

The Research Participants

Unlike most definitions of radicalization, the parameters of the definition of radicalization proposed for this thesis [2] are politically neutral because they do not stipulate an outcome beyond consciously perilous "direct action" premised upon sacred values. This accurately captures the faith inspired research participants of this in-depth study: six British Muslim aid workers who repeatedly risked their lives by mobilizing to theaters of Jihadist conflict in order to provide humanitarian aid in a non-sectarian manner to local besieged civilians in Daesh-controlled areas within Iraq.

The purpose of this research was to ascertain how some British Muslims mobilized to Jihadist conflict zones in a constructive manner (non-sectarian faith-inspired humanitarian "active bystandership" [4]) while similar others did so in an overall destructive manner ([violent] extremism). To do so, research participants were selected with attributes specific enough to the sphere of violent extremism, yet sensitive enough to warrant the authorities suspicion; a quasi-experimental design which used matching to achieve a theoretical sample with analogous characteristics to European Jihadists. To accomplish this, research participants were matched to European Jihadists along four characteristics: socio-demographics, a desire to act against perceived injustice, previous criminality and previous mobilization to Daesh controlled territory between 2015 and 2018. These were culled from various risk factor instruments and overlapping static and dynamic factors parsed from the literature.

The credibility of this match was confirmed on three counts:

(1) All research participants were interviewed at least once by the British authorities under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, but subsequently categorized as false positives and released without charge.

(2) Others within their social milieu pursued another route and became Jihadists. Therefore, the research participants may be said to be part of the same pool as British Jihadists. This may go some way to explaining the documented overlap between Islamic charities and (violent) Islamic extremist groups.

(3) Had they instead become (violent) extremists, joined Daesh and died in the conflict zone, the psychological autopsies conducted after their demise would be largely consistent with the recurring factors and risk factors associated with (violent) extremism.

Yet unlike European Jihadists, the research participants were neither violent nor extremist and engaged in consistent and objectively defined pro-social behaviors in Jihadist conflict zones; a form of active bystandership referred to as aid-in-extremis. [4] With a credible match and morally opposed behaviors confirmed, the research participants life course trajectories were mapped and juxtaposed to the literature on European Jihadists in order to ascertain which factors differentiated the benevolent one from the malevolent other. These waypoints are presented as a means of offsetting (violent) extremism for particular typologies.

Radicalization as a Vector

Based on the outlined parameters [2] these research participants were categorized as radicalized because they mobilized ("direct action") to Jihadist conflict zones ("consciously perilous") and this was spurred by a moral logic which is immune to material trade-offs ("sacred values"). This faith-inspired motivation bridges powerful sentiment with morality. Yet operationalizing it is open to interpretation; one may protect (significant) others by engaging the perceived aggressor, or one may ensure (significant) others' survival by providing for them in a humanitarian capacity. This, perhaps, is why Jihadists and the research participates both describe their actions as "doing the right thing" [5] and why Solzhenitsyn [6] noted that moving "from good to evil is one quaver" - altruism gone awry. This underscores the importance of providing a benevolent frame to define this motivation, offer constructive leadership to direct it and conduct a campaign to promote it. To account for the pro-social form their radicalization assumed, radicalization was conceptualized as a vector; one may radicalize malevolently by engaging in (violent) extremism or benevolently by engaging in aid-in-extremis ("multifinality"). [7]

Overcoming the Selection Bias through Multifinality

At first blush, this framing may seem unlikely. After all, how can two morally opposed outcomes stem from the same premise? Nonetheless, emerging perspectives from various branches of psychology suggest that the same adverse conditions which coalesce to foster anti-social behaviors may also align to result in pro-social ones. [8] For example, a consistent finding is that children who endured frequent parental violence were more likely to become destructive adults. [9] This is intuitive and widely confirmed; negative outcomes arise from negative experiences. [10] Yet some victims of abusive parenting respond constructively by becoming caring people who devote their lives to protecting others from the suffering they experienced. [11]

This dynamic has been termed "Altruism Born of Suffering" [12] or, with a slightly different emphasis, "Post-Traumatic Growth". [13] Responding in this manner is not unique to cruel parenting; it has also been observed with victims of sexual violence [14] and has been found also in situations of mass violence. [15] Counter-intuitively, these adverse conditions were a necessary precursor for subsequent pro-social behaviors. Perhaps this is why Nietzsche [16] noted that "distress always permits a variety of interpretations" and why Zimbardo [17] argues that the very situations which inflame the "hostile imagination" [18] in some may also inspire the "heroic imagination" in others. [19]

Such a perspective may also be applied to the process of radicalization; the various adverse factors and mechanisms identified as pivotal to nurturing (violent) extremism may be the same ones which cultivate the morally opposed response of humanitarianism. Therefore, protective factors may not necessarily be the inverse of risk factors. This is not a new suggestion; several scholars of terrorism have already hypothesized that objectively positive outcomes can result from successful radicalization, [20] although much like the psychological research referred to above, constructive outcomes from successful radicalization have seldom been the object of systematic study.

Nonetheless, the ground work for doing so has already been laid; Schmid [21] has noted that the concept of radicalization is "linked too readily to terrorism (broadly defined) as an outcome" and this is underscored by the scholarly consensus on radicalization knowledge that emphasizes the *process* of radicalization, not its postulated outcomes. [22] However, radicalization is too often conceptually and definitionally tethered to (violent) extremism. Consequently, most definitions of radicalization are embedded with "hypothetical intent". [23] Therefore, the scholars who apply the construct of radicalization as a conceptual framework are usually those concerned with political violence and this linkage hampered the ability to perceive other outputs of the radicalization process. Despite the academic consensus converging on the process rather than the outcome of radicalization, it is nonetheless necessary to articulate an outcome; failure to do so would render one incapable of distinguishing violent from non-violent radicalization and successful from unsuccessful radicalization. Rather than (violent) extremism, this may be achieved in broader (yet nonetheless explicit) terms by incorporating multifinality.

Incorporating Multifinality

Incorporating multifinality into radicalization research is arguably useful for two reasons:

(1)   Multifinality provides a more realistic appreciation of human factors: research has illustrated that not all of those who commit acts of Islamist terrorism are extremists and that not all extremists act upon their beliefs. Thus, (violent) extremism is arguably too specific an outcome for the concept of radicalization to function as an explanatory mechanism. Therefore, it makes sense to draw broader parameters by categorizing successful radicalization as consciously perilous direct action premised on sacred values. How these sacred values are interpreted determines the vector - and this necessarily incorporates multifinality.

(2)   Multifinality also serves as a means of overcoming selection bias: the factors associated with radicalization-to-(violent-)extremism are not unique to (violent) extremism. Therefore, any plausible theory of radicalization-to-(violent-)extremism should also be able to account for the fact that only a minority of people radicalize to (violent) extremism while the majority, subjected to the same radicalizing forces, do not. Horgan [24] labelled this quandary as "the low base rate of terrorism" and Sageman [25] characterized it as "the iron requirement of specificity of any adequate explanation". Therefore, the litmus test of any credible radicalization-to-terrorism theory would take this conundrum into account and answer "why them and not others?" in a manner which avoids selecting on the dependent variable. As discussed next, this is best achieved with a process-centric approach rather than a problem-based approach to the question at hand.

Evolution of Radicalization Research

Although the term 'radicalization' was occasionally used to explain the formation of politically violent and clandestine groups prior to 9/11, [26] radicalization as a formal research avenue was borne of violent extremism, particularly after the Madrid (2004) attacks. [27] Given the impact of the threat and the urgency to counter it, radicalization research focused specifically on (violent) Islamist extremism. This problem-based approach defined the scope of the inquiry, but simultaneously restricted its application to one expression of religious extremism. This inadvertently made the radicalization process synonymous with the process of becoming a fanatical terrorist and/or extremist. Detached from its "radical" root meaning, "radicalization" was construed as a net-negative and this connotation affected how it was used; much like terrorism, it is an exonym not an endonym.

How radicalization was conceptualized had second-order consequences: as radicalization was employed to study mainly Islamist terrorism, its inspiring ideology molded perceptions of who the radicalization process referred to. With no immediately identifiable means of discerning mainstream forms of Islam from the (violent) extremist few, both became heuristically linked resulting in a securitization of Islamic identity. This rendered Western (particularly diaspora) Muslims in many places into a 'suspect community' which, in turn, reinforced extremist narratives and assisted in shrinking the grey zone; thereby achieving a key strategic objective of (violent) extremist groups. On the other hand, this problem-based approach was instrumental to identifying factors and mechanisms which coalesce to result in (violent) extremism. It also illustrated the heterogeneity of people involved and the numerous pathways they pursued ("equifinality").

Nonetheless, the problem-based focus of radicalization research became unintentionally (but not unforeseeably) politicized and inadvertently contributed to the polarizing objectives of extremist groups; as radicalization is negative and most of the people to radicalize are Muslims (or converts), the focal issue became Islam. Yet, according to the parameters of radicalization in this article, [2] radicalization can also be positive and the socialization process is not unique to Muslims because sacred values are not the sole preserve of Islam. Rather than replacing radicalization with another term, an endeavor which is unlikely to be successful given its currency, the recommendation is to deflect these implicit associations by incorporating multifinality. As discussed next, this is best served by adopting a start-to-finish process approach rather than a finish-to-start outcome approach to research.

Problems with the Problem-Based Approach

Were multifinality to be truth preserving, a logical way to categorize knowledge would be to make "radicalization leading to (violent) extremism" a sub-set of "radicalization" writ large in much the same way that one would categorize "cooking leading to a waffle" a sub-set of "cooking" writ large. Using the latter as a heuristic device, one may argue that the griddle shape of a waffle is what distinguishes it from other (similar) foods. This is correct, but much like contemporary radicalization research, the logic applied is outcome-centric. That is to say, an outcome-centric investigation would commence with the waffle and then shift left in order to document how it was cooked and prepared; a deconstructive approach (finish-to-start) which impedes the recognition of multifinality.

On the other hand, a process-centric approach would commence at the preparation stage and document the various waypoints (and subsequently, trajectories) that batter may pursue without being restricted by the waffle outcome. For radicalization research, this would involve research which commences at the amorphous counter-cultural recruitment pool level followed by documenting the various trajectories adherents pursued. The purpose would be to ascertain which factors were instrumental in influencing each trajectory; a constructive (start-to-finish) approach which naturally incorporates multifinality. Although most trajectories would not be

considered radicalized, they must be mapped because non-radicalized trajectories may nonetheless serve as functional equivalent alternatives for some.

This different approach to the problem at hand matter because one may come to different conclusions with regards to policy recommendations. For example, consider the counsel an outcome-centric approach to research would provide on prevention compared to a process-centric approach. With a focus on the outcome of violent extremism and a deconstructive approach to understanding its etiology, the former is more likely to recommend measures which directly disrupt the outcome of violent extremism. These may be hard measures such as arrests, soft measures such as counter-narratives or something in between. This amounts to the equivalent of banning the waffle iron because, as noted above, this outcome approach views the griddle shape as its defining characteristic. The concrete problem this approach does not address is: what is an affected and politically awakened Western Muslim to "do" about grievances arising from the crisis in Syria and Iraq? Or, as the British Daesh member Abu Adam al-Britani (2017) asked after describing the situation in Raqqa (25 September 2017): "what are you going to do? … Are you actually going to step up and do something?" [28] The implication here is that the only thing to "do" is (violent) extremism and this feeds off the media coverage alluded to earlier.

With a focus on the receptive sentiment pool and a constructive approach to understanding all trajectories out of it, a process-centric approach is more likely to recommend measures which offset the (violent) extremist trajectory through a viable and relevant alternative. This would involve buttressing an already existent trajectory through a promotional campaign which aims to usurp by dominating the prognostic narrative through community galvanization and social inclusion. This is the equivalent of circumventing waffle consumption by promoting pancakes; another batter-based product. This is a strengths-based approach to prevention; through multifinality, a process-centric approach is able to perceive and "strengthen" alternate trajectories which fulfill the same needs in order to foster a desired outcome at the expense of an undesirable one. As discussed in the concluding sections, this is only posited to function for particular populations and sub-groups. Therefore, given the spectrum of involvement both approaches are necessary.

With the credibility of the research participants made plausible and the benefits of multifinality covered, the following section will discuss the trajectories of the research participants and how these may be used as the foundation for a counter-engagement.

Trajectory of the Research Participants

A desire for a change in lifestyle (from petty crime and street gang membership to a socially respected one) led the research participants to mosques where they intended to commence a pious lifestyle and "do the right thing". There they chanced upon aid workers who subsequently became role-models to emulate. Unbeknownst to the research participants at the time, the aid workers they serendipitously encountered specialized in providing relief to those most in need; civilians living in Jihadist conflict zones. To quickly expand upon their rekindled Islamic identity and prove their commitment, they took up *zakat* [alms giving] with gusto. As they became involved in charity work, they adopted the tenets of the humanitarian prognostic - which is victim instead of aggressor-centric. Rather than via formal instruction, this occurred in a learning-by-doing manner and this is why the aid group followed in this dissertation research is categorized as a 'community of practice'. It was through these congruent behaviors that the humanitarian frame was internalized. This was followed by mobilization in order to provide humanitarian relief.

Having first-hand experience of the impact of their actions reinforced the value of that prognostic response and this assisted in them self-categorizing as humanitarians. A second-order consequence of this is that they became resilient to (violent) extremist prognostics. This victim-centric frame and their humanitarian identity were forged by the research participants acting their way into this way of thinking with assistance from

"constructive leaders".[29] The waypoints along this trajectory included (1) an undefined but faith-inspired altruistic intention to "do the right thing", (2) chance encounters with constructive role-models who provided (3) a benevolent frame and (4) a congruent behavioral prognostic. The latter three influenced the interpretation of the sacred values and therefore provided the vector.

The proposition emerging from this doctoral thesis is to formalize and expand this sequence because bolstering the number of humanitarians is posited to shrink the number of potential (violent) extremists as both recruit from the same sentiment pool. As stated, this relies to a significant extent on bolstering the number of humanitarians in order to ensure that as many people within the sentiment pool as possible have as many opportunities as possible to encounter and engage with them. The immediate problem with this suggestion is that it is based on a very small sample ($n=6$) which, in all likelihood, is not representative. Therefore, the question to be answered is: what is the evidence to suggest that the research participants' trajectories can be extrapolated in order to appeal to a significantly larger audience? To answer this, the research participants are framed as Positive Deviants.

Positive Deviance

As most British Muslims are not involved in terrorism or extremism, nor mobilized in Jihadist conflict zones, most British Muslims represent the non-mobilized norm. In terms of a normal distribution of behavior relative to statistical norms, both the benevolently and malevolently radicalized are outliers. As such, both are deviants and given vectorization, the research participants are Positive Deviants; successful outliers who are never representative, at least not until their (radical) strategies are adopted by the majority and become mainstream. [30]

Positive Deviance is a strengths-based approach [31] which is applied to problems requiring behavioral and/or social change. Its basic premise is three-fold: (1) solutions to seemingly intractable problems already exist, (2) they have been discovered by members of the community and these innovators have succeeded even though they share the same constraints and barriers as others. [32] The problem is, they are usually not aware that they have "licked the problem which confounds others" [33] and it therefore takes an outsider to recognize it. Accordingly, research participants neither function nor frame themselves as counter-(violent-)extremists and as such, terrorism scholars do not investigate them. Instead, they simply see themselves as humanitarians and do not immediately recognize the second-order consequences of their beliefs and behaviors: resistance to (violent) extremism through a humanitarian prognostic.

Positive Deviance is generally described as inside-out (it uses insiders, not outsiders), backward (it assumes that the solution to a given problem already exists, but must be ferreted out and implemented) and counter-cultural because outsiders do not bring solutions. Instead, outsiders locate Positive Deviants within a community and assist them in spreading their successful strategies to other members of the community. Positive Deviance also has the lowest perturbation to impact ratio because it turns to solutions already proven within the community ("existent trajectories" as discussed above and "social proof" [34]) rather than importing foreign solutions that may arouse skepticism, reactance or sabotage. [35]

A key component of Positive Deviance is that it is behavior-led rather than based on spreading best practices. This is a central tenant of Positive Deviance: one acts their way into a new way of thinking through behavior. In this sense, there is some overlap with the construal of the research participants' aid group as a community of practice and their learning-by-doing method. Overall, Positive Deviance provides a fresh alternative when problems are viewed as intractable: it excels over most alternatives when addressing problems that are enmeshed in a complex social system, require social and behavioral change or entail solutions that are rife with unforeseeable or unintended consequences. Finally, the Positive Deviance model provides a viable means of extrapolating an uncommon behavior (deflecting the [violent] extremist prognostic through a humanitarian

prognostic) and with assistance, making it the normative prognostic and moral anchor. The following section addresses whom this prognostic is most likely to appeal to.

Pathological Altruism

Various scholars have categorized Jihadists or foreign fighters into different typologies, based on their pathway and/or motivation. However, only some of these typologies would qualify as being receptive to a pro-social prognostic because some may self-select and seek out extremist groups. [36] This is why offering counter-engagements as alternatives is only posited to resonate with particular typologies. How these typologies operationalized their needs, religiosity, emotions and empathy are grouped under the heading of "pathological altruism" because of the warped (but potentially constructive) means that they were met. [37]

1. Khosrokhavar's "Existential Man". [38] Pro-social groups may be able to bridge the multiple identity gap these people experience and potentially replace it with a sense of pride which constructively combines their religion with their nationality.

2. McCauley and Moskalenko's "Caring-Compelled": [39] these people are affected by suffering and feel personally responsible in reducing it. These people are well-suited to a pro-social prognostic.

3. Nesser's "Misfits" and "Drifters". [40] Staub refers to them as "Lost Souls". [41] These typologies may find a sense of belonging and develop an aligned social identity through involvement with pro-social groups.

4. Neumann's "Defenders" seem to come closest to describing the research participants as they also (initially at least) mobilized for charitable purposes. [42] The difference is that the "Defenders" did not leave the conflict zone and became radicalized by it whereas the research participants only remain in theatre for a maximum of ten days before returning to the UK. Maher refers to these people as "humanitarian Jihadists" who, due to extended time within the conflict zone, "become hardened and no longer mention the innocents they came to save". [43] Neumann's [44] depiction of the "Defenders" shares much with Staub's [45] categorization of "Idealists" and Khosrokhavar's [46] model for European radicalization.

5. Venhaus's "Identity Seeker" and, perhaps, his "Status Seeker". [47] Similar to Nesser's [48] "Misfits" and "Drifters" and Staub's [49] "Lost Souls", the "Identity Seeker" is primarily attracted by the need for belonging to a group.

While equifinality posits that there are many pathways into (violent) extremism (having the same result), two frequently mentioned factors appeared to be crucial waypoints for the participants in the research for this thesis; (undefined) altruistic intentions [50] and chance encounters. [51] As such, influencing whom one meets and socializes with can impact heavily upon the behaviors one subsequently engages in. Therefore, preventative approaches which intervene at these encounter points may constitute a credible means of prevention. Along with Positive Deviance, these factors give merit to the potential of using the research participants trajectory within a biomimicry model.

In Conclusion

The proposed counter-engagement is posited as effective for the above type of people for three reasons:

(i) It can actively compete with the Jihadist call-to-action by offering an alternative, relevant and impactful means to constructively channel moral outrage and fulfill bystander needs to do something. This is premised on other research which suggests that some people become involved with (violent)

extremist groups for misguided altruistic reasons in combination with opportunity factors such as chance encounters.

(ii) Second, internalizing a humanitarian identity and benevolent prognostic makes one resistant to the (violent) extremist identity and to malevolent prognostic(s) because conflict is framed through the suffering of its victims and the devastation of their lives, not the evil aggressors or the self-righteous few on the supply-side of justice.

(iii) Third, recognizing and applauding the positive contributions of Western Muslims assists in expanding the Grey Zone, which Jihadist groups goad the government into eliminating. Therefore, Jihadists identify the Grey Zone as a strategic target and the resulting recommendation is that governments similarly recognize it as such in order to avoid counter-productive counter-terrorism outcomes.

The philosophy behind this functioning as an attractive alternative is accurately summarized by Shahar: "organizations that counter radicalization do not try to dampen the attraction of 'noble causes'; they know the effort would be futile. Instead they attempt to substitute a different – less violent – version of the same cause". [52] To adapt an analogy as heuristic, this approach to prevention would assure that Luke Skywalker remains with the Jedi Order and that Lucifer would not fall from grace. By incorporating multifinality and embracing its merits, one may conceive of "radicalization…as the solution, not the problem." [53]

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Notes

[1] Reidy, K. P. (2018), *The Accidental Ambassadors: Implications of Benevolent Radicalization.* Ph.D. Thesis. Northumbria University. Available at URL: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/39788/

[2] Githens-Mazer defines radicalization as "a collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in direct action". This definition of radicalization is well-positioned to cater for other outcomes by having "direct action" as its outcome rather than the specific outcomes of terrorism and/or extremism. However, a shortcoming is that radicalization could be applied quite broadly, even beyond the politically violent scope of terrorism research. In order to retain relevance and elevate the threshold with which

this definition would categorize an individual as radicalized, a caveat was added: "direct action" is specified as voluntarily and repeatedly (or of a longer duration) engaging in mobilizations which knowingly carry a significantly heightened risk of death. As these consciously perilous mobilizations are undertaken for a cause, the research participants are conceptualized as "Devoted Actors" whose moral logic is undergirded by "Sacred Values". However, these values may be widely interpreted. Therefore, this interpretation determines the vector. To account for this, multifinality was incorporated. See: Githens-Mazer, J. (2010), *Rethinking the Causal Concept of Islamic Radicalisation*. 1st ed. [pdf] Mexico City: International Political Science Association, pp.1-32. Available at URL: http://www.concepts-methods.org/Files/WorkingPaper/PC%2042%20Githens-Mazer.pdf [Accessed 09 November 2017].

[3] A counter-engagement couples an alternative narrative with an offline behavior as an attractive alternative. See: Hamid, N. (2018), Don't Just Counter-Message; Counter-Engage. *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism*. [online] Available at URL: https://icct.nl/publication/dont-just-counter-message-counter-engage/ [Accessed 30 November 2018].

[4] "In the midst of great violence, some people endanger themselves to help others" (Staub, 2013, pp.4-5) and they do so in a "continuous" manner (Staub, 2013, p.387). The form of active bystandership discussed in this article is labeled "aid-in-extremis" and this is conceptualized as a benevolent outcome of the radicalization process. See: Staub, E. (2013), *Overcoming Evil: Genocide, Violent Conflict and Terrorism,* New York: Oxford University Press.

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