# Table of Contents

**Welcome from the Editors**...........................................................................................................................................3

**Articles**

- **The Derna Mujahideen Shura Council: A Revolutionary Islamist Coalition in Libya** by Kevin Truitte...........................................................................................................................................4

- **Theory-Testing Uyghur Terrorism in China** by Andrew Mumford.................................................................18

- **The Strategic Communication Power of Terrorism: The Case of ETA** by César García.........................................................27

- **Migration, Transnational Crime and Terrorism: Exploring the Nexus in Europe and Southeast Asia** by Cameron Sumpter and Joseph Franco........................................................................................................36

**Research Notes**

- **30 Terrorism Databases and Data Sets: A New Inventory** by Neil G. Bowie.............................................................52

**Resources**

- **Terrorism Bookshelf: 30 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects** by Joshua Sinai.................................62

- **Nina Käsehage, The Contemporary Salafist Milieu in Germany: Preachers and Followers** Reviewed by Alex Schmid........................................................................................................................................75

- **Antonio Giustozzi, The Islamic State in Khorasan: Afghanistan, Pakistan and the New Central Asian Jihad** Reviewed by Joshua Sinai........................................................................................................................................76

- **Bibliography: Terrorist Tactics and Strategies** Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes........................................................78

- **Bibliography: Foreign Terrorist Fighters** Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes........................................................121
130 Academic Theses (Ph.D. and MA) On Terrorism and Counterterrorism Issues, Written in English between 1973 and 2018, by Authors with Arab and/or Muslim Backgrounds.................................................................................................................................160
Compiled and selected by Ryan Scrivens

Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects........170
Compiled and selected by Berto Jongman

Announcements
Conference Monitor/Calendar of Events.................................................................200
Compiled and selected by Reinier Bergema

About Perspectives on Terrorism............................................................................209
Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume XII, Issue 5 (October 2018) of Perspectives on Terrorism, available now at: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/PoT. Please note that the journal’s old website (www.terrorismanalysts.com) will remain online as an archives only site for a while longer, but will eventually be closed down. Readers should update bookmarks and reference links accordingly.

Our free and independent online journal is a publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University’s Campus The Hague. Now in its twelfth year, Perspectives on Terrorism has over 8,000 regular e-mail subscribers and many more occasional readers and website visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer reviewed by external referees while its Research and Policy Notes, Special Correspondence and other content are subject to internal editorial quality control.

We are pleased to announce that with this issue of the journal we are joined by a new member of our Editorial Team, Dr. Rashmi Singh, Associate Professor at the Pontifical Catholic University Minas Gerais in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. As an Associate Editor, she will collaborate with one of the two main editors (Alex Schmid and James Forest) on one of the six issues of our journal published in 2019.

Here is a brief look at the contents of the current issue:

The first article by Kevin Truitte describes the rise and fall of the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council – a coalition of Libyan revolutionary Islamic groups – and its relationship with other local and global jihadist entities. Then Andrew Mumford examines the religious and separatist dimensions of Uyghur terrorists in China. César García follows with an analysis of how the Basque terrorist group ETA used strategic communication techniques to create a ‘spiral of silence’ that muted resistance. And in our final article of this issue, Cameron Sumpter and Joseph Franco provide a comparative analysis of the crime-terrorism nexus in Europe and Southeast Asia.

This issue of Perspectives on Terrorism also features a Research Note by Neil Bowie providing a new inventory of terrorism databases and datasets.

In addition, the Resources section includes our regular contributions from Joshua Sinai (book reviews), Judith Tinnes (bibliographies), Ryan Scrivens (theses), Berto Jongman (web resources), and Reinier Bergema (conference calendar).

The current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism was jointly prepared by Co-Editor James J.F. Forest and Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, the Editor-in-Chief of the journal.
The Derna Mujahideen Shura Council: A Revolutionary Islamist Coalition in Libya

by Kevin Truitte

Abstract

The Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC) – later renamed the Derna Protection Force – was a coalition of Libyan revolutionary Islamist groups in the city of Derna in eastern Libya. Founded in a city with a long history of hardline Salafism and ties to the global jihadist movement, the DMSC represented an amalgamation of local conservative Islamism and revolutionary fervor after the 2011 Libyan Revolution. This article examines the group’s significant links to both other Libyan Islamists and to al-Qaeda, but also its ideology and activities to provide local security and advocacy of conservative governance in Derna and across Libya. This article further details how the DMSC warred with the more extremist Islamic State in Derna and with the anti-Islamist Libyan National Army, defeating the former in 2016 but ultimately being defeated by the latter in mid-2018. The DMSC exemplifies the complex local intersection between revolution, Islamist ideology, and jihadism in contemporary Libya.

Keywords: Libya, Derna, Derna Mujahideen Shura Council, al-Qaeda, Islamic State

Introduction

The city of Derna has, for more than three decades, been a center of hardline Islamist jihadist dissent in eastern Libya. During the rule of Libya’s strongman Muammar Qaddafi, the city hosted members of the al-Qaeda-linked Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and subsequently served as their stronghold after reconciliation with the Qaddafi regime. The city sent dozens of jihadists to fight against the United States in Iraq during the 2000s. After the 2011 Libyan Revolution deposed Qaddafi, the city continued to serve as a center of gravity for rigorist Salafists with links to broader jihadist trends, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL). After the formation of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014, a number of local fighters pledged allegiance (bay’a) to IS Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

It would be in Derna’s tradition of hardline Islamism and in the spirit of the 2011 Libyan Revolution that the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC) emerged. The group, a broad coalition of local and regional militias, was founded by locals and former LIFG members to provide security to the city as it became increasingly isolated. It was also meant to support allied Islamist revolutionary-oriented groups – such as the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries (BRSC) – in their fight against the anti-Islamist Libyan National Army (LNA) and its leader, General Khalifa Haftar. The DMSC – later renamed the Derna Protection Force (DPF) – provided security and a semblance of governance against the LNA, as veteran jihadists and jihadist-linked figures found refuge in the city under its protective umbrella. The DMSC was also the first Islamist group in Libya to break with the Islamic State, leading to nearly a year of conflict between the two organizations before IS finally completely withdrew from the city’s environs.

In the wake of the 2011 revolution, Libya has become an increasingly complex fractured polity, dividing along tribal, regional, religious, political, personal, and other dimensions. Existing English language literature on militant Islamist groups in Libya in particular has largely focused either on local branches of IS – such as the group’s now defunct Barqa (Cyrenaica), Tarabulus (Tripoli), and Fezzan provinces – or al-Qaeda (AQIM or ASL), or on the ties between these global jihadist organizations and local actors. This approach often reduces the local actors’ agency and disregards or downplays the local and historical situation in which each group exists, particularly in the complex post-revolution environment.

The DMSC represents these local complexities in Libya, wherein jihadists, non-jihadist Salafists, and even more moderate revolutionaries can operate under a coalition banner against common enemies. Its enemies –
using labels often repeated by Western media – portrayed the DMSC to be a “terrorist” Salafi-Jihadist group with al-Qaeda ties.[1] Alternatively, those who support the organization, either out of ideological affinity or due to common foes, often refer to DMSC fighters as “revolutionaries” who fight in the spirit of the 2011 Libyan Revolution.[2] The Derna-based group does not fit neatly into either category; it is a product both of hardline religious conservatism and historical participation in Salafi-Jihadist activities – in which many of its members participated or shared ties to – along with nationalist objectives that arose from participation in rebellion and revolution within Libya. The DMSC provided both a social, political, and security model that co-opted both the spirit of the 2011 revolution along with the traditional conservative religious identity of Derna and eastern Libya broadly. While the group and its constituent militia groups maintained ties with global and more localized jihadists and even hosted al-Qaeda-linked individuals, it cannot be said to have been a purely Salafi-jihadist organization, nor did it aim to launch terrorist attacks abroad.

The Derna Mujahideen Shura Council/Derna Protection Force was largely driven from the city of Derna in 2018 by an LNA military offensive. In its collapse, a significant number of its leaders were killed or captured, along with jihadist religious and political leaders. The DMSC provides an insight into the complex ties between Libyan revolutionaries, jihadists, and local politics and religion in the chaos of Libya’s fractured political-security landscape.

This article aims to explore the history, composition, ideology, and activities of the DMSC as a hardline Islamist organization focusing on local Derna and Libya-centric issues. It further aims to review the direct ties or indirect links between the DMSC and other local militant Islamist coalitions and foreign terrorist organizations. The group highlights the landscape in which Islamist militias have existed after 2011 in Libya, and how it responded to local challenges as well as to the global contest between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to dominate the narratives of Salafi-Jihadism. While the DMSC's experience is unique due to its situation, it serves as an example of possible organizational and strategic decision-making by a revolutionary Islamist coalition in a local Libyan context.

**Eastern Libya’s Religious Conservatism and the Libyan Jihadists**

Eastern Libya – also known as Cyrenaica – can trace its conservative theological roots to the emergence of the Sanusi order in the 19th century.[3] Al-Sayyid Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi, the founder of the stringent Sufi order, combined political and religious elements in his aim to “purify” Islam of innovations (bida’ā) and return to practices observed during the time of the Prophet Muhammad. This hardline theological interpretation – commonly referred to today as Salafism – rejects more flexible Islamic concepts such as consensus (ijma) and religious analogy (qiyaṣ), found in other schools of Islam more common in other parts of Libya.[4] The 1969 coup d’etat by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi deposed the Sanusi leadership in Libya, and the Qaddafi regime marginalized the eastern Libyan Islamist community for decades.[5]

As elsewhere in the Islamic world, the 1980s Afghan War spurred religious Libyans’ discontent about government repression and lack of economic opportunities at home to travel to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad against the Soviets. After the war, many of these Libyans returned to Libya or joined Osama bin Laden and his emerging jihadist group, al-Qaeda, in Sudan.[6] Libyan veteran jihadists of the Afghanistan war founded the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), with the aim of “purifying Islam” in Libya of “Qaddafi’s apostasy.” Building its numbers and insurgent capabilities during the early 1990s, LIFG officially declared its formation in 1995. Drawing on the historic Sanusi puritanical influences in Cyrenaica as a base of support, the group conducted attacks against security forces in the eastern cities of Benghazi and Derna and attempted several assassinations against Qaddafi.[7]

The Qaddafi regime succeeded in suppressing LIFG domestically by the early 2000s, although some members continued to engage in jihadist activities abroad. Libya sent the second largest number of foreign fighters to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) – after Saudi Arabia – between August 2006 and August 2007, according to documents seized by U.S. forces in 2007.[8] Derna alone provided the largest number of foreign fighters of any city in
the Middle East to AQI, with fifty-two joining the fight against the U.S. in that year alone.[9] In 2007, then-al-Qaeda’s second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri and Libyan al-Qaeda leader Abu Laith al-Libi declared LIFG to be part of al-Qaeda.[10] However, many LIFG leaders in Libya rejected the declaration and in 2009, more than one hundred imprisoned former LIFG members – including those with personal ties to al-Qaeda leadership – published a treatise reconciling with the Qaddafi regime and rejecting al-Qaeda’s ideology and suicide attacks.[11]

Despite the rapprochement with the regime in the 2000s, former LIFG members – including those who later founded the DMSC – played leading roles in the 2011 Libyan Revolution and the overthrow of Qaddafi. Derna in particular served as an important center for pro-jihadist rebels who fought in the revolution. For example, Abdul Hakim Al-Hasadi, an Afghan War veteran and former LIFG leader who fought the United States in 2001-2002 in Afghanistan before being detained and transferred to Libyan custody, led the Derna-based Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade (ASMB) – named after the 1996 massacre of over one thousand prisoners at Abu Salim prison by the Qaddafi regime.[12][13] Al-Hasadi, however, argued that he and the ASMB did not fight against the regime as agents of “Afghanistan” – an indirect reference to al-Qaeda – or to divide Libya, but to support the revolution.[14] Others, including Abu Sufyan bin Qamu, a driver for bin Laden who spent six years as a prisoner in Guantanamo Bay, also settled in Derna and led fighters in the revolution. Bin Qamu went on to form the Derna branch of the al-Qaeda-linked Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) in late 2011.[15]

**Founding and Composition of the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council**

After the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime, the city of Derna became a haven for hardline Islamist militias. By 2014, however, these hardliners and their revolutionary compatriots in other cities in eastern Libya – principally Benghazi and Ajdabiya – found themselves confronted by General Khalifa Haftar and his coalition of militias. This self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) had declared war on “terrorism and extremism” (in other words, on Islamist militias) in Libya.[16] Reacting to this threat, a coalition of anti-Haftar and Islamist factions in Benghazi founded the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC) in July 2014 to combat Haftar and the LNA, which launched a military offensive against the city and the BRSC in October 2014.[17]

In Derna, local Islamist and anti-Haftar leaders similarly founded the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen Derna, the DMSC) in December 2014. Salim Derby, a former LIFG fighter then in command of the ASMB in Derna, announced the group’s foundation in a speech that attacked “the work of the criminal Haftar” and praised the BRSC, stating that the DMSC would stand with the Benghazi Islamist coalition.[18] The DMSC sought to bring together a number of Islamist militias in the city, to provide security to Derna and its surrounding areas from Haftar’s LNA, and to further support BRSC forces in their battle against the LNA in Benghazi. While Darby’s ASMB dominated the composition of the umbrella group, other militias that comprised the DMSC included the Al-Noor Brigade, led by Nasr al-Akr, another prominent LIFG Afghan War veteran also known as Abdullah Saber. He would take on a leadership role in the Shura Council, the bin Qamu’s Derna branch of Ansar al-Sharia, and another group known as the Libyan Islamic Army (Jaysh Libya al-Islami) – although the Libyan Islamic Army appears to have dissolved ties with the DMSC in February 2015.[19][20][21]

Later DMSC would also see allied militia forces from across Cyrenaica join its ranks as it battled the Islamic State and the LNA. In September 2015, the Bayda-based Ali Hassan al-Jaber Brigade under Colonel Mohammed Abu Ghafayar defected from the LNA and aligned itself with the DMSC.[22] In October 2015, revolutionary fighters from the Qataan Tribe in Tobruq, also came to Derna to ally with the ranks of the DMSC.[23] In November 2015, the Asait Tribe in the Green Mountain (Jabal Akhdar) region surrounding Derna also pledged its support to the Shura Council.[24] These alliances were driven not only by ideological affinity, but by an alignment of convenience in opposition to the LNA and in support of the DMSC’s war against the Islamic State’s forces in Derna.
Conflict with the Islamic State

The DMSC, likely by design, excluded a large segment of jihadist militias in Derna from its ranks. These groups – the Battar Brigade and the Shura Council of Islamic Youth – pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) in 2014 and were formally recognized as IS-Wilayat Barqa (Cyrenaica Province). The Islamic State’s influence in Derna generated friction between the pro-DMSC and pro-IS factions. Prior to the formation of the DMSC, in October 2014, the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade had refused to pledge allegiance to any group based outside of Libya – an implicit rejection of calls by IS affiliates in the city to join Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s caliphate project.

In February 2015, IS’ Battar Brigade declared takfir [excommunication] on Haftar, Qaddafi loyalists, supporters of democracy, and called on all militia groups – including DMSC members – to repent and join IS. In April 2015, IS fighters further alienated the population and increased local tensions after a gun battle with a Derna family led to the deaths of ten IS members and six members of the family, whereupon IS publicly crucified three additional family members.

In June 2015, friction between the DMSC and IS reached a boiling point. On June 9, IS fighters attacked and killed DMSC deputy chairman Nasr al-Akr, who had become an outspoken critic of IS both in the city and internationally. In the aftermath of the assassination, the DMSC declared war against the Islamic State and its affiliates, and the ASMB spearheaded the coalition’s attacks against the latter’s checkpoints across the city. While the DMSC managed to take control over large parts of the city in the first few days of fighting, DMSC leader Salim Darbi was killed in early clashes. Atiya Sayyed al-Sha’er, an ASBM commander and DMSC official, replaced Darby as head of the Shura Council until his death in 2018.

Despite Islamic State fighters’ suicide attacks, DMSC forces consolidated control over most of the city in the following months, although fighting in several neighborhoods lasted for the better part of a year. The group launched at least two named offensives, the “Battle of al-Nahrawan” in the summer of 2015 and the “Battle of the Martyrs of al-Quba” in autumn of that year. However, IS continued to maintain a presence on the outskirts in the mountainous Fatayih area, from where the group launched artillery attacks on the city.

Islamic State forces in Derna collapsed completely on April 20, 2016, as remaining fighters from the group fled to the Islamic State-held city of Sirte in central Libya.

The DMSC also combated the Islamic State through information warfare. The group dismissed Syria-based IS spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s Ramadan 2015 audio statement that had denounced the DMSC as cooperating with kufr (Unbelievers) and that had referred to the shura council as sahwat – a pejorative slang word derived from the Awakening Movement in Iraq. The group countered by saying that the Islamic State were takfiris (apostates) and denounced IS’ claim that it alone fought on the path of God, while leaving open the door for future “repentance” and reconciliation. The DMSC regularly referred to the Islamic State as khuwarij, a reference to a puritanical absolutist sect that emerged in the first century of Islam. In August 2015, DMSC praised an ultimately failed uprising by local Salafists against the Islamic State’s rule in Sirte, calling the embattled insurgents their “brothers and family” and encouraging them in their fight against the khuwarij. In October 2015, the group issued another statement clearly aimed at Islamic State fighters. Layered with quotations from the Qur’an, the statement called for IS fighters to surrender in return for promises of forgiveness. The statement further called for IS fighters to fight alongside the DMSC to free the “oppressed” – probably an indirect reference to the conflict with General Haftar and the LNA. While the success of this propaganda ploy is debatable – no reports of mass surrenders of IS fighters surfaced immediately thereafter – nearly six hundred IS fighters reportedly surrendered to DMSC forces in the year-long conflict between the factions.

DMSC’s Ideology and Activities

The DMSC’s ideology was grounded in the traditional conservative Islamism of eastern Libya. The DMSC stressed several times that it would support any Libyan national government based on adherence to sharia law (Islamic law on the basis of the Qur’an and the hadith) as the sole source of legislation. This led the group to
applaud the then-Tripoli based, Islamist-dominated General National Council (GNC) government in February 2016 for its efforts to amend existing Libyan laws to further align with shari‘a law and invalidate all law that was not shari‘a compliant.[43] Building on this, the group also called upon Libyan scholars to amend laws to support Derna’s Shari‘a Court, which had already adopted the enforcement of laws related to alcohol, adultery, and other crimes with penalties in accordance with provisions from the Qur‘an and hadith.[44]

The ideology of the Shura Council further blended these conservative theological interpretations with revolutionary rhetoric. As the DMSC was formed by militia groups that had fought in the 2011 revolution against the Qaddafi regime, it also emphasized in its statements the importance of adherence to the principles of the “17 February Revolution” for the governance of Libya.[45] Both concepts were brought into practice in the 2016 “Derna Mujahideen Shura Council’s Charter: Its Creed and Methodology.” The charter stressed adherence to Islamic law and its provisions as the sole accepted source of legislation, stressing that support for any Libyan government must be agreed upon by the Libyan people. In addition, it rejected efforts to disturb Libya’s unity as well as foreign interference threatening Libya’s stability or territorial integrity, or foreign-backed groups that abuse Muslims or their property. The DMSC charter also recognized the legitimacy of the Tripoli-based Fatwa House (Dar al-Ifta) and its Imam, the controversial Islamist Sheikh Sadeq al-Ghariani who also backed the BRSC, the Ajdabiya Shura Council, and later the Benghazi Defense Brigades.[46]

The DMSC’s 2016 Charter further called for the activation of civil administration and the establishment of a security department in Derna.[47] Since its founding, the Shura Council implemented civil projects in the city, in addition to providing security, particularly after the conflict with the Islamic State erupted. To provide security, law, and order in the city, the Shura Council opened police stations and conducted police patrols, publicized an emergency number for residents, and arrested individuals for crimes such as theft and drug dealing.[48][49][50][51] Both the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade and Ansar al-Sharia’s Derna branch also conducted independent raids and destroyed contraband considered “un-Islamic,” such as illicit liquor.[52] The DMSC also engaged in health and safety standards enforcement, e.g. requiring restaurant owners to display health department certificates and adhere to cleanliness standards.[53][54]

The Derna Mujahideen Shura Council also attempted to develop the city’s infrastructure, despite Derna being under siege by the LNA and, until April 2016, by the Islamic State. Two December 2015 statements emphasized that the group was working with local groups to “accomplish their goals of reconstruction and development” and that it had established a “passport administration” and signed a contract with a company to repair major roads leading into the city.[55][56] The group even attempted to woo international companies to return to Libya with its security guarantees, explicitly identifying a Korean company and a Turkish company to return to complete projects abandoned in 2011 during the revolution.[57]

The DMSC operated a complex media apparatus. Until it was banned, the group managed its media publications through its Derna al-Morasel outlet.[58] Furthermore, the group’s unofficial media affiliate, Al-Ahed Media Foundation, published the group’s statements and photo sets, as well as updates on the security situation in the city.[59] In November 2015, the group reiterated that all official releases would bear the group’s logo, and named the official representatives of the group’s media office as Muhammad Idris Tahir and Hafis Miftah al-Daba’a.[60] Mohammed al-Mansouri served as the DMSC’s official spokesperson.[61] In addition to written statements, the DMSC produced videos of combat and security operations by the group, testimonials of local residents, and propaganda aimed against the LNA and the Islamic State.[62][63][64][65] For example, the group sought to capitalize on internal conflicts in the LNA: a statement released in January 2016 discussed a recent split between former LNA spokesman Mohammed al-Hijazi and General Haftar, describing the event as the beginning of the end of the LNA and stating the group would be willing to accept repentant fighters who wished to defect.[66] The DMSC also published an interview with a former LNA fighter who had defected to the city with the Ali Hassan al-Jaber Brigade that praised the Shura Council.[67]

While the DMSC’s official messaging mainly focused on issues local to Derna, Cyrenaica, or Libya – ensuring a shari‘a compliant legal system, emphasizing its charity and civil works projects in the city, or glorifying the fights against the Islamic State and the Libyan National Army – the group’s media occasionally targeted international
actors or discussed global issues. After BRSC fighters downed a French special forces helicopter in July 2016, the DMSC released a statement criticizing France for its support for Haftar and the LNA in Benghazi.[68] The group also repeated criticized Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi for Egypt's periodic airstrikes against the city and Egypt's support for the LNA.[69] The DMSC released a statement on the Syrian Civil War in support of Islamist rebel groups fighting the Assad government and on the Myanmar government’s ethno-religious persecution of its Muslim Rohingya minority.[70][71] Despite such statements, however, the group’s messaging primarily focused on domestic issues.

**Ties to Libya’s Other Local Militant Islamists**

As stated, during its establishment the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council was created to resist anti-Islamists allied with General Haftar and his LNA and to support other Libyan Islamists. The group’s ties with Sheikh Ghariyani (recognized as their legitimate Imam), the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, and other groups in Libya’s local Islamist militant sphere reiterated their alignment with anti-LNA, Islamist revolutionary factions in the country. The group released several statements in support of BRSC fighters in holdout districts in Benghazi after the LNA took control of large swaths of that city. These included supporting and then eulogizing Derna fighters fighting the LNA in the holdout coastal district of Qanfudah with a video entitled “Last Message from the Champions of Derna, the Victorious of Qanfudah.”[72] In January 2018, the group would memorialize the last Islamist militants in Benghazi as “the Heroes of Akhraybish” after the LNA cleared that final district in the city.[73] In May 2018, DMSC eulogized Wissam bin Hamid, the leader of the BRSC who was killed by LNA forces earlier in the year.[74] Fighters from the defeated BRSC – members of the Free Libya Martyrs Brigade – who had fled Benghazi traveled to Derna to join DMSC forces in late 2017 after the fall of the city.[75]

The DMSC celebrated the foundation of the Benghazi Defense Brigade (BDB), an alliance of soldiers, former police, and Islamist fighters displaced from Benghazi by the LNA and funded by western Libyan Islamists and anti-Haftar figures, including Sheikh Gharyani.[76] It praised the BDB for its “Return to Benghazi” operation and the BDB’s efforts to “combat injustice” and “preserve the principles of the 2011 Revolution”. [77] While the BDB is a broad coalition founded on common grievances against the LNA, the DMSC’s support for the Islamist-dominated group reiterated its alignment to revolutionary Islamism in Libya and its strong anti-LNA stance.

When combined with its public emphasis on sharia-based Islamic government in Derna and nationally, the DMSC’s alliances with Sheikh Ghariyani, the BRSC, the BDB, and other Libyan revolutionary Islamist militias reiterate the group’s position in a collective Islamist pan-Libyan political-religious project. These forces stood in opposition to the anti-Islamists allied to General Khalifa Haftar, whose views they saw as antithetical to the goals of the 2011 uprising and their Islamist values; these were characterized as revolutionary ideals, rather than as pan-Islamist dreams. The DMSC itself was formed as collective opposition of constituent members to the looming threat of the LNA. It offered safe haven to allies from across Cyrenaica, based on common foes, not just identical Islamist goals. While more hardline members within the coalition and amongst its compatriots elsewhere in Libya may have identified with broader jihadist trends, the organization itself did not overtly do so.

**DMSC and the Global Jihadist Movement**

The DMSC coalition was founded as a local movement. From the earliest days of the revolution, Derna’s revolutionary leaders and former jihadists who had fought in Afghanistan and elsewhere claimed that their actions were undertaken as a national, rather than as a transnational, movement.[79] The DMSC would make efforts to reject assertions that it was linked to al-Qaeda – a common refrain by its adversaries, given its leaders’ history in Afghanistan and with the LIFG.[79]

The reality, however, is more nuanced. While the DMSC did not actively engage in jihad against Western
countries or interests, the city of Derna under its control served as a haven for elements connected to al-Qaeda, and many constituent members maintained strong ties to al-Qaeda and pro-al-Qaeda factions. Most prominent among these was the Derna branch of Ansar Sharia in Libya, the group believed responsible for the 2012 attacks on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi.[80] Former Guantanamo inmate bin Qamu's group did not have a visible presence in the conflict with the Islamic State in Derna – save a response denying the Islamic State’s claims that it received assistance from the “apostate” Tripoli government and that large numbers of the group had pledged bay’a to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – but instead focused on its conflict with the LNA outside of the city.[81][82] ASL maintained the Sheikh Miloud al-Sadaqa training camp and engaged in da’wa activities (missionary work) in Derna.[83] According to the testimonies of two Tunisian foreign fighters detained near Derna, ASL’s training camps across Libya served to prepare fighters for foreign attacks or for jihad in Syria. [84] Moreover, “Ansar al-Sharia” was the chosen name of al-Qaeda-linked front groups set up after the 2011 Arab Uprisings, part of a “go local” strategy the terrorist group engaged in to capitalize on the post-revolution instability in order to ingratiate itself and its ideology with local communities.[85]

The Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade also has close links to al-Qaeda. The group’s top leaders were linked with al-Qaeda as Afghan War veterans and LIFG members. Furthermore, the bombmaker and U.S.-designated al-Qaeda operative Abdulbasit Azzouz was not only a close associate of the late ASMB/DMSC leader Nasr al-Akr, but he had also served as a member of the ASMB and as deputy commander of al-Akr’s Al-Noor Battalion in 2012. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency described Azzouz as having established a group in 2012 (called Brigades of the Captive Omar Abdul Rahman) to conduct attacks against Western targets, and suggested he could possibly have been al-Qaeda leader Aymann al-Zawahiri’s representative to Libya.[86] Azzouz was arrested in 2014 in Turkey, and his current whereabouts are unknown.[87]

ASL in Derna and the DMSC also received ideological and rhetorical support for their activities from al-Qaeda groups based outside of Libya. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) came to the defense of the ASMB when the Islamic State leveled charges of takfir against the brigade. An official statement released by AQIM on June 26, 2015 refuted the charges while heavily implying that Ansar al-Sharia in Libya was closely connected with AQIM.[88] Further, AQIM released a statement in July 2015 which placed the blame of the ongoing violence between the Islamic State and the DMSC on IS. The July statement further praised the DMSC for its takeover of the city.[89] Another al-Qaeda affiliated individual, former Egyptian Special Forces officer turned jihadist Hisham Ali Ashmawi Masad Ibrahim (also known as Abu Omar al-Muhajir) allegedly found shelter in Derna. The Islamic State issued a wanted poster for him in August 2015, accusing him of waging war against the group in support of the DMSC. Ashmawi is known for his Egyptian pro-al-Qaeda group, al-Mourabitoun, which conducted attacks against Egyptian security forces and officials, and may have been providing training for DMSC fighters as well as planning attacks against Egypt.[90]

The DMSC’s relationships with al-Qaeda or with pro-al-Qaeda groups appear on the surface to be based on personal history, tactical convenience, and similarities in ideology, rather than the Shura Council’s overt aspirations to achieve the broader aims of global jihad. While al-Qaeda branches provided rhetorical support and al-Qaeda-linked individuals may have provided training and material support to the Derna-based coalition, the DMSC did not openly espouse the narrative of global jihad, and only rarely did they publicly address topics beyond the Libyan context. The DMSC’s conflict with the Islamist State in Derna does not appear to have come about as a result of the al-Qaeda-Islamic State split internationally, but is rather due to the Islamic State’s caustic activities in Derna itself. Despite not emphasizing a program of jihad internationally, the DMSC and Derna did
provide a refuge for individuals and groups who did. Continuing the city’s tradition as a haven for jihadists, ASL’s training camps near the city that sent fighters abroad and the presence of al-Qaeda-friendly ideologues reiterate that the DMSC was not wholly opposed to these activities by others. The Islamist group’s shelter for radicals ultimately may have indirectly contributed to terrorist attacks abroad.

**The Fall of Derna**

After years of conflict, mediation and reconciliation efforts between pro-Haftar and pro-DMSC militias failed to alleviate the tensions between the two sides. In May 2018, General Haftar declared peace efforts dead and ordered his forces to conquer the city.[94] In response, the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council and its allied forces declared a “Battle of the Defense of Derna” to repel the advancing LNA.[95] On May 11, Atiya Sayyed al-Sha’eri called for a unification of militia groups in Derna and declared a reorganization of the DMSC under the name “Derna Protection Force” (DPF).[96]

The declaration of the DPF would be the last statement issued by the group. Derna fell to General Haftar and the Libyan National Army by mid-2018. The LNA claimed to seize Ansar al-Sharia’s stronghold in the Temsket district of the city by late May.[97] Despite calls by Sheikh Gharyani for his followers to launch or support jihad against foreign states that allegedly supported the LNA campaign against Derna (e.g., France and the United Arab Emirates) and despite sporadic calls by militants – including a number of fighters in the city of Gharyan in Western Libya – to support the DMSC, no help would be forthcoming.[98] Al-Sha’eri and many other leaders and fighters of the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council were killed, and Abu Sufyan Bin Qamu was detained by LNA forces.[99] On June 28, 2018, General Khalifa Haftar announced the city of Derna liberated from “terrorists.” Despite residual skirmishes in isolated pockets of the city by holdout fighters, the DMSC/DPF, losing fighters, leadership, and control of the city ceased to exist as an organization.[100]

**Conclusion**

The Derna Mujahideen Shura Council was a coalition largely unique in its combination of revolutionary militias and jihadist veterans. This heavily influenced its ideology, which combined the fervor and energy of the 2011 Libyan Revolution with Salafist religious values. The group operated locally in defense of the city of Derna and its conservative traditions, while linked – but not beholden – to jihadists and revolutionary Islamists inside Libya as well as beyond it. It was one of the first Islamist groups in Libya to break with the Islamic State and fought a year-long campaign against the more extreme jihadist group. Under siege from the Libyan National Army, the DMSC eventually fell to its hated enemies, as its allies in Benghazi had before it. The survivors of Derna may yet turn to their more extremist allies and bolster the ranks of groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, but today Derna can no longer provide the stronghold for Islamist revolutionaries and jihadist-leaning ideologues that it once was.

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[17] Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL),” Counter Extremism Project.


[33] “'Aṭīyah Sa'id al-Shārī,” *Jihadology*; URL: https://jihadology.net/category/individuals/leaders/a%E1%B9%ADiyah-said-al-shari/.


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[45] تيويل جالادعيل خشمونوم [45], Twitter Post. December 23, 2015, 4:05PM; URL: https://twitter.com/ala3hed/status/679815072332537856/photo/1


[49] تيويل جالادعيل خشمونوم [49], Twitter Post. September 18, 2015, 4:14PM; URL: https://twitter.com/ala3hed/status/645013147682795522/photo/1

[50] تيويل جالادعيل خشمونوم [50], Twitter Post. October 11, 2015, 10:16AM; URL: https://twitter.com/ala3hed/status/653257838609985536/photo/1

[51] تيويل جالادعيل خشمونوم [51], Twitter Post. October 8, 2015, 12:43PM; URL: https://twitter.com/ala3hed/status/652207752090157060/photo/1 ; تيويل جالادعيل خشمونوم [51], Twitter Post. October 30, 2015, 8:05AM, https://twitter.com/ala3hed/status/66011026988048769.


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[55] تيويل جالادعيل خشمونوم [55], Twitter Post. December 16, 2015, 3:50PM; URL: https://twitter.com/ala3hed/status/677274606902845440/photo/1

[56] تيويل جالادعيل خشمونوم [56], Twitter Post. December 27, 2015, 8:49AM; URL: https://twitter.com/ala3hed/status/6811509560592384


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[100] “لماك لكشب باهر إلا نم ةنرد ريرحت ايمسر نلعي رتفح ةفيلخ ريشملا,” Youtube Video, Libya’s Channel, June 28, 2018; URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M47Fxb1WvJM.
Theory-Testing Uyghur Terrorism in China
by Andrew Mumford

Abstract

Analysis of terrorism perpetrated by Uyghurs inside China and the presence of Uyghur fighters in the warzones from Afghanistan to Syria has been divided as to whether such violence constitutes the alignment of Uyghur groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Turkestan Islamist Party (TIP) with the broader constellation of global jihadi organisations pushing an extremist religious cause, or if it is representative of a more inward-looking push for the secession of Xinjiang province. Testing the causes, conduct and organisational structure of Uyghur terrorism against prevalent theories in the field, this article argues that Uyghur terrorism actually constitutes a hybrid model of modern terrorist group in which religious discourse is used to underline the push for a separatist agenda.

Keywords: China, Uyghur, Xinjiang, Terrorism

Introduction

Uyghur terrorism is not easy to categorise given the predominant paradigms in contemporary terrorism studies. The religious rhetoric used by groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), its successor group the Turkestan Islamist Party (TIP), and the presence of some Uyghurs in contemporary warzones from Afghanistan to Syria has encouraged a portion of analysis to suggest that this constitutes a Chinese contribution to the global jihadist threat. Yet the limited size of the Uyghur presence in jihadist groups outside of China, and indeed the targets of attacks within the country, have prompted counter-arguments that point not to an outward-looking international jihadist agenda but to an inward-looking separatist one that is bent on self-determination for the Uyghur people. This mixed picture has bifurcated the academic literature on terrorism in China (or Chinese terrorism more generally). Having to determine whether Uyghur violence is either separatist or jihadist begs the question of how it can be best theorised in order to help explain the phenomenon.

It is the aim of this paper to better understand terrorism in modern China by theory-testing Uyghur political violence inside and outside the country against prominent theories of modern terrorism, including the instrumental v. psychological debate, David Rapoport’s four waves theory, as well as attempts to contemporise his work by sign-posting to a possible ‘fifth wave’. This article is therefore not just about the state of terrorism in China but an assessment of what the Chinese case tells us about the state of modern terrorism. This subject arguably combines two of the most influential factors shaping twenty-first century international politics: the rise of China as a global superpower and the proliferation of non-state violence.[1]

Surprisingly little of the growing literature on terrorism in China engages with the phenomenon from a theoretical perspective.[2] Much of the literature is concerned with either analysing the repressive nature of Chinese counter-terrorism policies[3] or understanding the nature of Uyghur nationalism.[4] Ultimately this paper argues that a hybrid assessment of Uyghur terrorism is most appropriate because it is too nationalist to be considered part of a ‘fourth wave’ of terrorism, not millenarian or web-savvy enough to be ‘fifth wave’, not organised enough to be instrumentalist, and not accessible enough to withstand credible psychological interpretations. This is the multivariate platform on which theoretical explanations of modern Uyghur violence arguably stand. It is not the purpose of this theory-testing exercise to dismiss the intellectual foundations of the theories themselves – each has its own merits and strong scholarly credentials that have advanced the field in important ways. Instead, this article aims to highlight that the empirical base of our knowledge about terrorism from ethnic Uyghur groups indicates a complex picture that negates singular explanatory frameworks.

This article will firstly offer some background detail on the state of current terrorism inside China, and then engage in turn with leading theories in the field in order to stand the Uyghur case up to their main tenets. It
ends by reasserting the case for a hybrid theoretical assessment of terrorism in China given the absence of a strong fit with any one theoretical model.

**Terrorism in Xinjiang: A Brief History**

Located in the far west of the country, Xinjiang (which is officially called the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, or XUAR for short) is China's biggest province, whose terrain is mainly either desert or mountain range. To trace the historical antecedents of contemporary Uyghur violence would mire the reader in centuries of conflict, repression and reprisal.[5] Its modern manifestation is the by-product of a combustible mix of nationalism, separatism and religion. Only fully integrated into Beijing's political sphere after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Xinjiang's Sunni Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghur population constitute 44% of the province's population today.[6] After the end of the Cold War Beijing simultaneously loosened the ideological grip of communism and moved to strengthen the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In political terms this set loose a new wave of ethnic nationalism among the Han majority, resulting in a backlash of non-Han resentment across the provinces dominated by minorities.[7] The Uyghurs of Xinjiang were foremost among those minority groups to respond through acts of resistance, resenting what they perceived was an attack on their religion, language and ethnicity.[8]

The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was founded in 1989 by Ziyauddin Yusuf with the aim of separating Xinjiang from China which could then be governed by Islamist precepts. Yusuf believed that the Turkic-speaking people of Central Asia should be free from either Soviet or Chinese control. This pan-Turkic ideology, infused with Islamist theology, was spurred by the defeat of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan by the mujahedeen and foreign jihadist fighters. Yet after the collapse of the USSR most Central Asian satellite states such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan achieved their independence. ETIM attempted to wrestle Xinjiang from China by the use of extremist violence to achieve its political aim of an independent state – East Turkestan.

But to the ruling cadre in Beijing the issues of Uyghur separatism and Islamic extremism were, and still are, two sides of the same coin.[9] This interpretation is a deliberate ploy by the CCP to elicit international sympathy for their fight against what they perceive to be networked pan-national Islamist violence. Such a depiction of ETIM activity seemingly justified their domestic crackdown on religious and political activity and simultaneously delegitimised calls for greater Uyghur autonomy.[10] Citing fears of Islamist violence (concerns easily related to by the West) was a Trojan Horse for enhanced repression of Uyghur separatism. As such, in the years after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the Chinese government forwarded three main justifications for its actions against Uyghurs: first, detained Uyghurs were being supported by Islamist groups, notably al-Qaeda; second, Uyghur groups were peddling a violent Islamist ideology that was undermining the Chinese state; and third, that this had international ramifications and that action was in line with the broader aims of the 'Global War on Terror'.[11] This counter-terrorism rhetoric was amplified in the years running up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games when YouTube videos started to emerge in 2006 indicating that ETIM had undergone a transformation and was now branding itself as the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP). These videos by TIP members promised a renewed wave of domestic terrorism, although very little direct evidence exists as to their operational capabilities rendering their claims of responsibility for some acts of violence dubious.[12]

Given the mutual fears of mass catastrophic terrorism at a major sporting event and the shared narrative of global jihadist threats, the authorities in Beijing were given a metaphorical free pass by the West to instigate an internal crackdown on terrorist suspects in Xinjiang. It is only in recent months, nearly two decades after the 9/11 attacks, that Western political and media scrutiny has returned to Chinese counter-terrorism policy and practice. In May 2014, the government of Xi Jinping launched a renewed 'Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism' in Xinjiang (previous 'Strike Hard' campaigns had been instigated in the 1990s), scaling up its military presence in the region and introducing stringent restrictions on freedom of movement and assembly.[13] Since then, the number of people placed under arrest increased three-fold compared to the previous five-year period, with Human Rights Watch accusing the Chinese government in September 2018
of overseeing a system of “mass arbitrary detention, torture, and mistreatment of Turkic Muslims”.[14] Media reports focussed on evidence heard by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in August 2018 of the detention of up to one million Uyghurs in ‘political education camps’ under the auspices of countering terrorism.[15]

This article does not aim to explain this draconian Chinese counter-terrorism response in Xinjiang – this has been done excellently elsewhere.[16] Instead it argues that we must make further headway in trying to understand the phenomenon of Uyghur terrorist violence in the first place. This requires a more vigorous theoretical assessment of what it represents in terms of cause, conduct and consequence. Thus, a systematic exercise in theory-testing is appropriate in order to shed much-needed light on a conflict that is still making headlines globally because of China’s illiberal approach to countering terrorist activity.[17]

**Uyghur Terrorism: Instrumental vs. Psychological Explanations**

The emergence of the field of terrorism studies brought with it two broad schools of thought: the instrumentalist approach and the psychological approach. From an instrumentalist point of view, Martha Crenshaw argued that the recourse to terrorism is a logical strategic choice willingly chosen by groups to further their political agenda. Terrorism thus has, Crenshaw posits, a ‘collective rationality’.[18] Such a strategic choice approach requires the de facto presence of an identifiable organisation and leadership structure capable of fostering rational intra-group discussion. No such coherent structures exist in the Uyghur case given the flimsy coherence of ETIM and the absence of key figures around which the cause revolves when the group evolved into TIP. It is difficult to see how terrorism in Xinjiang can be the product of rational strategic choice when there is no organisational structure to foster the fomentation of such a strategy. Furthermore, there is also a noticeable strategic diversity, possibly even confusion, in the Uyghur case. There is no central, unifying strategic objective. Acts of terror are depicted by the Chinese authorities as an admixture of separatism, jihadism, and Uyghur nationalism.[19] Compounding this is the absence of any effective communications strategy from TIP, beyond sporadic YouTube videos that attempt to claim credit for the perpetration of attacks.[20] Conceptually, strategic choice theory is of limited use explaining Uyghur violence due to the absence of a discernible group structure to hold rational strategic debates and the fragmented nature of strategic objectives inside the community of violent Uyghurs.

Conversely, psychological explanations of terrorism posit, as Jerrold Post has done, that individuals “are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces and that their special psycho-logic is constructed to rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to commit.”[21] Innately using bifurcated rhetoric dividing ‘us and them’, terrorists are, according to Post, united by common personality traits, including a damaged sense of self, often the result of childhood psychological trauma. Such individuals become drawn to terrorist activity precisely to commit acts of violence because it offers a sense of self-significance that bounds the individual's entire identity and self-worth. Yet there are still similar restrictions in making the case for a psychological approach to explain Uyghur violence as there are for an instrumentalist one. The main one is methodological. It is very difficult for terrorist researchers to access detained Uyghurs for interview as a means of asserting their psychological motives, given restrictions placed on the region by the authorities. This does not mean, however, that Beijing may not be guilty of fomenting terrorism in Xinjiang through its own repressive counter-terrorism policies. Terrorists may not be born, but they can be made. The policy consequences of state counter-terrorism will have a psychological effect on individual Uyghurs, but we are not yet at a stage of methodological confidence to make those assertions accurately.

**Terrorism Inside China: Which ‘Wave’?**

David Rapoport’s ‘four waves theory’ of modern terrorism has been a terrorism studies industry standard explanation of the evolution of modern political violence in the years since its publication.[22] To briefly recap,
Rapoport described the modern history of terrorism as having four distinct but overlapping ‘waves’, each with their own defining set of common tactics and motives: the Anarchist wave (1880-1920); the Anti-Colonial wave (1920-1960); the New Left wave (1960s-1979); and the Religious wave (1979-onwards). Rapoport’s theory has heavily influenced post-9/11 studies of terrorism as a global phenomenon and still retains utility as a conceptual benchmark against which to interpret the characteristics of terrorist groups. So how does Uyghur terrorism fit into this theory?

The separatist agenda of groups like ETIM and then TIP, as well as the subsequent crackdown by the central authorities, has ensured that there are overtones of anti-colonialism to the Uyghur struggle. This brings with it echoes of Rapoport’s ‘second wave’. Beijing acknowledged that between 1990 and 2001 there were over 200 incidents of Uyghur violence that killed more than 160 people, injuring 440.[23] Since then the pattern of terrorism inside China has, according to Philip Potter, indicated two broad trends: 1) terrorist attacks are a response to “broader geopolitical circumstances and strategic opportunities (e.g. 9/11 and the Olympics)”); 2) “tensions and grievances can remain dormant for significant periods of time only to flare dramatically.”[24] The 9/11 attacks in America marked a watershed moment in Beijing’s approach to Uyghur violence inside China. Two months after the Twin Towers attack the Foreign Ministry explicitly stated that ETIM was under the control of Osama bin Laden and that Uyghur fighters had received training in Afghanistan.[25] The launching of a global ‘War on Terror’ by President Bush furnished Beijing with an opportunity to change its approach to Uyghur violence by framing such incidents as their own domestic struggle against terrorism. A crackdown on the activities of ETIM ensued, resulting in a dip in violence. Yet one of the ‘dramatic flares’ observed by Potter occurred in 2014. A series of three knife attacks at train stations in Kunming, Urumqi and Guangzho in the spring of that year left 32 people dead, whilst a bomb in Urumqi in May 2014 killed a further 39 persons. This denoted a distinct tactical shift by militants away from hitting government and military targets and towards softer civilian targets, notably at transport hubs that are the mainstay of Beijing’s economic and infrastructural plans for Xinjiang.[26] After these attacks President Xi Jinping vowed that government counter-terrorism policy would be “long-term, complicated and acute.”[27] But it would be churlish to theorise the Uyghur struggle as ‘anti-colonial’. Not only does it fall decades after Rapoport contended that the ‘anti-colonial’ wave had crested, but it would also be reductionist to equate domestic acts of terrorism with a fight against a perceived imperial power. Uyghur terrorist targeting has shifted away from symbols of Beijing’s political and military presence, and there is a notable lack of anti-imperialist language in Uyghur terrorist discourse.[28] Separatism is not de facto anti-colonialism by another name.

**Terrorism Outside China: Uyghurs as ‘Fourth Wave’ Jihadists?**

Assumptions as to the predominant religious motivation of Uyghur violence have held sway within the authorities in Beijing, begging the question of whether Rapoport’s religiously-inspired ‘fourth wave’ of terrorism is a more apt model to apply.

Most Uyghurs practice Hanafi Islam, the jurisprudence of which allows for non-Arabic languages to be used in prayer and is also suffused with other pan-Asian religious influences including Sufism and Buddhism.[29] Yet it is misleading to interpret Uyghur’s Muslim faith as an indication of their belonging to the ‘fourth wave’ of religiously-motivated terrorism. They are not millenarian in their faith (a key tenet of Rapoport’s typology). Their grievances are not motivated by faith outright but by a combination of local governmental restrictions on their worship as well as their wider ethnic and national identity. Indeed, there does not appear to be much homogeneity in the political demands of Uyghurs, with calls ranging from equality with the Han population to demands for complete independence of Xinjiang province.[30]

Assessments as to the quantity and motive of Uyghurs fighting with Islamist groups outside of China vary wildly. Alarmist reports emanated from the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs in June 2014 suggesting that there were up to 1,000 Chinese jihadists receiving training at an paramilitary base in Pakistan, with an additional (but undetermined) number fighting alongside other jihadi groups inside Syria.[31] Clarke and Kan put the number of Uyghur fighters inside Syria and Iraq at somewhere between 100-300, arguing that organisations...
like TIP have become “a noticeable part of the constellation of globally active jihadist terror groups.”[32] Yet despite the acknowledged presence of Uyghurs joining ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front) in Syria this is more likely to be a sign of Middle Eastern jihadist groups fostering recruitment channels from southeast Asia to perpetuate the fight in Syria and Afghanistan rather than a sign of an imminent extension of activity from Uyghur foreign fighters into China itself. TIP has no known independent operational capabilities outside Afghanistan where its small number of members are based.[33] Further evidence pointing to a lack of desire by Uyghur militants to return to China to commit attacks is firstly their willingness to appear in propaganda videos, thus revealing their identity to the Chinese authorities (two Uyghurs appeared in an online ISIS video in March 2017), and secondly the way such foreign fighters have often sold their homes and possessions in Xinjiang in order to finance their travel to Syria and Afghanistan. Many bring their whole families with them.[34]

The presence of a small number of Uyghurs in conflict zones outside China will always stoke concerns as to the regional network being fostered by groups like TIP. For example, in September 2014 four Uyghurs were arrested in Indonesia, with another four arrested five months later, all on suspicion of liaison with the ISIS-affiliated Mujahidi Indonesia Timur in Central Sulawesi.[35] However, a small, yet dispersed, Uyghur presence across the Muslim world falls short of a global network of militant Uyghur jihadists. The sum parts in this case do not add up to a whole. Not only are the actual numbers of foreign fighters unverified, the actual pattern of activity by Uyghurs once encamped in third countries reveals an ethos discernibly more anti-China than pro-jihad. These two motives are distinct and should not be seen as two sides of the same coin. For this reason, Uyghur militancy is not strictly representative of Rapoport’s ‘fourth wave’ of modern terrorism.

### Uyghurs and the ‘Fifth Wave’ of Modern Terrorism

Scholarly attempts to build upon Rapoport’s four waves have become a cottage industry in recent years. As the ‘War on Terror’ attempted to eliminate the threat of jihadist groups globally, academics have sought to make sense of the evolution of terrorism. In between the fall of al-Qaeda as a centrally-controlled organisation based in Afghanistan and the rise of the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed caliphate across Syria and Iraq three broad contending themes have emerged that purport to show how the religious wave identified by Rapoport has ended.

Firstly, Jeffrey Kaplan has argued that a fifth wave of modern terrorism has crested and it is “particularistic, localistic, and centered on the purification of the nation through perfection of a race or tribal group.”[36] Labelling this wave ‘new tribalism’, Kaplan aimed to highlight the local, as opposed to global, dynamics that led to terrorism with a particular emphasis on ‘racial or tribal mysticism’ as a motive.[37] Yet Kaplan’s ‘new tribalism’ fifth wave theory is not fully substantiated in the Chinese case. Kaplan outlines 17 ideal-type characteristics of this new form of terrorism, of which the Uyghur example barely complies with half (for example, Uighur groups do not use rape as a weapon, do not claim to establish some form of new calendar, do not believe in human perfectibility, do not place faith in the logic of genocide, and have not embarked on a campaign of apocalyptic violence).

Secondly, Jerrold Post et al have intimated that a fifth wave (a possible ‘tsunami’ even) will be social media-inspired acts of lone actor terrorism.[38] The internet has facilitated what has been labelled a ‘virtual community of hatred’, allowing for online radicalisation to inspire the next generation of political violence. This fifth wave hypothesis is also not really applicable in the China case mainly because of strong central government control over internet access inside the country. The online ‘community of hatred’ that Post holds as key to facilitating this wave is largely off-limits to Uyghurs because of nationwide web censorship.

Thirdly, Honig and Yahel argue that Rapoport’s fourth religious wave has been superseded by a fifth wave constitutive of what they label ‘terrorist semi-states’. These entities “control portions of a weak state’s territory… but still launch terrorist attacks against third party victim states.”[39] They point to groups like ISIS, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Hezbollah and Hamas as examples of these territorially established groups that embrace a mix
of conventional and unconventional tactics. Yet this too is not fully applicable for the Uyghurs as their cause is nominally secessionist within the context of exceptionally strong central political control over the territory and governance structures of Xinjiang province. There is little chance of a ‘state within a state’ emerging. Honig and Yahel’s model only really applies to instances where there is initial weak governmental control over the contested space. China has over the decades ensured a strong political, economic and military presence in Xinjiang, fostered by a programme of government-sponsored migration of ethnic Han into the province.[40]

Conclusion: The Case for a Hybrid Theory

The Chinese government has asserted that Uyghur groups are guilty of promulgating what it labels the ‘three evils’: terrorism, separatism and religious extremism.[41] This veritable shopping list of perceived crimes against the state reveals that even Beijing has a hybrid interpretation of what Uyghur violence represents – at turns jihadist, anti-communist, and nationalist. Terrorism perpetrated by Uyghurs is thus not easily categorisable, rendering any theoretical explanation somewhat of a hydra. It is too diffuse organisationally to be fully explainable from an instrumentalist perspective. Crenshaw’s emphasis on strategic rationale is dampened in the Uyghur case by the scant evidence offered by either TIP members themselves or the Chinese security forces to back up claims of responsibility for attacks. TIPs claims via internet videos to be behind attacks, including an explosion at a factory in Guangzhou and bus bombs in Shanghai and Kunming in 2008 were largely uncorroborated, even by the security forces.[42] Research on Uyghur terrorism is too unsubstantiated methodologically to belong fully to the realm of a psychological explanation as advocated by the likes of Post. Restrictions imposed by the Chinese authorities on academic freedom of movement make access to interviewees very difficult, and ensures that much face-to-face interaction with Uyghurs (including those suspected of terrorism) is done predominantly with exiles who have fled China.[43] Furthermore, Uyghur terrorism lacks a comfortable fit within any of the identified ‘waves’ of modern terrorism identified by Rapoport and others due to its fusion of ethno-nationalist ideology and Islamic theology, not to mention the absence of genocidal violence and the online orchestration of terror acts.

Uyghur groups are of course not the only terrorist movement in recent history to combine a number of ideological motives. Hybrid is not a synonym for unique. What some might term ‘old’ terrorist groups exuded a mix of political catalysts. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), for example, was simultaneously socialist, separatist and Basque nationalist in its outlook. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or the Tamil Tigers) imbued a similar concoction of revolutionary socialism and ethnic nationalism in the name of separatism. Even what some would label ‘new’ terrorist groups, including the recent iteration of the self-proclaimed caliphate of Islamic State, are hybrid entities in as much as they combine a profound religious agenda with a rejection of the Westphalian state system of sovereign borders. Yet what makes the Uyghur case stand out is, firstly, how the religious beliefs of the perpetrators have been seized on by the counter-terrorist state to manipulate global opinion to create a permissive environment for repressive responses, and secondly, how the political, media and academic assessment of political violence by Uyghurs oscillates between religious and secular motives. If the ‘old’ groups like ETA and LTTE were firmly secular groups, and ‘new’ groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS are undeniably religious in their motive, then Uyghur groups like ETIM/TIP fall between two stools analytically.

Understanding the violence occurring inside China, and Beijing’s response to it, are of increasing international importance given President Xi Jinping’s recent declaration that China had entered a ‘new era’ when it would “take centre stage in the world.”[44] The abrogation of leadership on global issues and in international institutions by the United States under the Trump administration stands in stark contrast to China’s willingness to shoulder more international responsibilities abandoned by the US. China’s global strength is being pushed through the construction of the Belt and Road Initiative, the enhancement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Consequently, it is essential to investigate how terrorism is framed in China as the experiences the Chinese government has gained are likely to be transplanted into its global security agenda. There is a growing literature on terrorism in China. However, theoretical perspectives are still largely missing from this pool. Explaining the nature of acts of terrorism perpetrated by Uyghurs is an
important endeavour. This article is just a first step towards initiating a bigger conversation in the field.

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Notes


[27] Quoted in Ben Blanchard, “China says three killed in attack at Xinjiang train station,” Reuters, 30 April 2014; URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-blast/china-says-three-killed-in-attack-at-xinjiang-train-station-idUSBREA3T0HX20140430

[28] Holdstock, China’s Forgotten People, p.76.

[29] Ibid., p.12

[30] Ibid., p.76.


[37] Ibid., p.72.


[42] See Roberts, “Imaginary Terrorism?”

[43] For example, the September 2018 Human Rights Watch report ‘Eradicating Human Viruses’ is based on 58 interviews with Uyghur exiles.

The Strategic Communication Power of Terrorism: The Case of ETA

by César García

Abstract

This conceptual article analyzes the use of strategic communication by the terrorist group ETA, whose goal (for a period of 60 years) was to gain independence for the Basque region from Spain. It argues that the use of strategic communication management techniques, including assassinations and kidnappings, was successful in generating fear and led to political change. It created a spiral of silence whereby people who opposed not only terrorism but Basque nationalist ideology were less willing to express their ideas even under a democratic regime. This case study shows ETA's social and political fabric supported the fear strategy almost as much as its criminal activity.

Keywords: ETA, strategic communication, Spain, Basque, terrorism

"None of his companions made a gesture to defend him. Nobody made a commentary, expressed a reproach, responded to the insult. The group was disaggregating. It used to happen."

(Fernando Aramburu, Patria)

Introduction

The Basque Country is considered part of a group of regions that some have called “imagined communities,”[1] while others have called them “stateless nations.”[2] Catalonia, Quebec, and Scotland are other examples of these. Each has a very strong sense of identity which has influenced efforts to become independent nation-states and a resulting tension between nationalist and non-nationalist communities.[3]

ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, translated as “Basque Homeland and Freedom”) is a terrorist group that demanded an independent Basque nation-state in Northern Spain and Southern France. Founded in 1958, it is currently inactive after the announcement of a ceasefire in 2011. During its existence, this terrorist group killed more than 800 people and used street violence and intimidation on a daily basis to scare those opposed to Basque nationalism. Both the European Union and the United States listed ETA as a terrorist organization on their watch lists.[4]

Although finally defeated by the Spanish police and now almost extinct, ETA has been able to project internally (within the Basque territory and in Spanish society as a whole) as well as globally, the perception of a problem in the Basque region thanks to the communicative nature of terrorism.[5] For decades, the continuous and extensive presence in the media of the violence of ETA and its satellite organizations proved effective in generating the public perception that there was a conflict between Basques and the rest of Spaniards that needed to be solved by political means.

Llera and Leonisio (2017) argue that fear is a strategic tool of asymmetric war used by terrorist groups to influence opinions, attitudes and social behaviors of the society terrorists want to divide. This asymmetric war is also a fight for the control of the public space that intensifies in the case of regions or territories involved in nation-building processes, such as the Basque region, where identification with the nationalist community constitutes an ethnic division.[6] Abrahms suggests that terrorism's effectiveness in generating terror translates into the surge of a spiral of silence.[7] This public opinion phenomenon can be described as the fear of individuals to express their opinions in a group or social context when they feel in the minority, afraid of being stigmatized, isolated or repressed by the hegemonic majority.[8] Spencer and Croucher argue that due to ETA killings of non-nationalist politicians, non-nationalist segments of Basque society saw their freedom of expression as well as their subjective identity restrained out of fear of being identified as “bad Basques.”[9]
Unlike several modern terrorist groups, the communicative nature of ETA and its capacity to generate fear was not restricted to killings, kidnappings or extortion, or even to a sophisticated creation of media productions or use of the internet (most of ETA’s life span took place pre-internet). Instead, ETA’s strategic communication apparatus was articulated through a social support apparatus (called by many the Basque National Liberation Movement) comprising a number of organizations with a strong presence in the public sphere. Dominguez points out that ETA appendices such as the youth branches, the newspaper (called Egin first, Gara later), a trade union (LAB), anti-nuclear power plant movements, feminist platforms and other “civil organizations” all served as potential sources of terror.[10] This ancillary aspect of public relations or propaganda used for terrorist purposes has been relatively ignored by the strategic communication academic literature which - particularly after September 11 - has been focused mostly on the use of digital communication by international terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State.[11] However, although some attention has been paid to the activities of the IRA (Irish Republican Army) [12], collaterally ETA itself [13] and social-revolutionary groups such as the Red Army Faction [14], ‘old-fashioned’ European-style pre-digital era terrorism style in general has received little academic attention in the strategic communications literature.

**Theoretical Framework**

Terrorism has been defined in a number of ways. Schmid and de Graff consider it a combination of violence and persuasion.[15] Amis describes it as “political communication by other means.”[16] Nacos calls it “political violence against non-combatants/innocents that is committed with the intention to publicize the deed, to gain publicity and thereby public and government attention.”[17] Matusitz describes the role of mass media as a key facilitator of “essentially a message.”[18] However, Gerrits notes that the spread of terrorists’ information goes beyond mass media, including gatherings, pamphlets or brochures.[19] Although no definition of terrorism gets full international approval, all of them show similarities when it comes to its symbolic nature, its communicative dimensions, the creation of a climate of fear in order to influence audiences, and its asymmetric character, among other factors.[20]

Likewise, it is not always clear whether terrorism is a form of propaganda, public relations, or both. Terrorists attempt to influence the public agenda and change the course of public opinion. They also try to build relationships with their own constituencies, although this is more a primary focus of terrorism than public relations or propaganda. Fawkes notes the challenges of establishing borders between public relations and propaganda.[21] Rothenberg accepts that terrorism is “propaganda of the deed,” meaning that although terrorism often fails in a military sense it is still successful in terms of media coverage.[22] Other authors, such as Nacos and Schmid, make clear that the existence of violence (or the lack thereof) constitutes the dividing line between what can be considered terrorism or mere communication.[23]

So far, ETA has not received much attention for its communication strategy. There are a number of analyses about ETA, but mostly focusing on its organizational aspects, its political doctrine and their social consequences.[24] Spencer and Croucher studied the spiral of silence generated by terrorist violence in the Basque Country.[25] García analyzed the role of ETA in a study about the use of strategic communication to build the Basque nation, but only as a part of a larger nationalist conglomerate.[26] There are more recent documents on certain aspects such as the impact of ETA’s terrorist activity on Basque public opinion and the interpretive framework and story-telling propagated by ETA after the cease-fire.[27] It did not help their dissemination that these studies are not focused specifically on the topic of propaganda and that they have not been published in English.

The topic of terrorism in the field of communication has, however, attracted in recent years the attention of a growing number of scholars in the field of communication. There are several articles particularly about the growth of ISIS and its postclassical terrorism model, based on the ‘propaganda of the deed’ paradigm and the sophisticated use of internet and global media infrastructures to project ISIS as a global threat.[28] By comparison, terrorist organizations such as IRA or ETA - claiming territorial issues, recruiting terrorists in their region and operating locally – have seemed less appealing as an object of study, perhaps even a thing of the past. However, the fact that a terrorist group can be considered dormant does not mean the political
ends of the organization are not well alive. Indeed, in the case of ETA, a number of supporters and/or satellite organizations continue to generate fear through the occupation of the public sphere or by exerting different forms of low intensity violence in the Basque country.[29] An added element that has not been emphasized enough in the academic literature on communication and terrorism is that often terrorism can be presented in softer versions. This is the case of ETA, whose social and political fabric is almost as important as its criminal activity. This article has as an objective to fill the academic void about ETA from a communication perspective.

**Methodology**

The following can be considered a case study that uses a historical-critical method to investigate how, over the course of more than five decades, a terrorist organization was able to generate fear, and therefore change political attitudes among its audiences through the use of a variety of propaganda actions and communication strategies. The approach is holistic and considers that killings, kidnappings, extortions and other types of physical violence are part of the communication function as well as demonstrations of operational capabilities across a variety of civil organizations occupying the public sphere.

The case of ETA, and the Basque case as a whole, is difficult to compare within the context of regions that, with a high degree of autonomy, have spent long periods in a nation-building process, such as Catalonia or Flanders. The Spanish Basque region is the only place among Western democracies with a terrorist group supported by a significant part of the population (around 15 per cent of Basques still vote on average for what used to be ETA's political arm). This circumstance makes the Basque case very unique as a region with a combination of democracy, economic development, ethnic cleavage and violence. If anything, the ethnic and violent components of ETA make it comparable to cases of other, less developed territories.

**Analysis of ETA’s Creation of a Spiral of Silence**

**Strategy**

During the Franco era, and at the beginning of Spain's transition towards democracy, ETA followed the “revolutionary war” model based on a spiral of action-reaction-action: 1) ETA (or the 'masses' managed by ETA) implement a provocative action against the system; 2) The repressive apparatus of the Spanish state comes down hard on the masses; 3) The masses react in two opposing and complementary forms: with fear and by rebelling. Then the moment is ripe for ETA to act, reduce fear and increase rebellion.[30]

Taking into account these premises, for ETA it was a strategy of 'the worse the better'.[31] ETA's violence had as its main purpose to provoke the Franco dictatorship. ETA, through its killings, wanted to generate as much police repression as possible – not among ETA militants but among the Basque citizens in general, so they would join ETA's “revolutionary war.” There were two conditions *sine qua non* to accomplish this goal: ETA's organization structure would be able to withstand the police response, and the Basque population as a whole would support the revolutionary war.

The approval of the Spanish Constitution in 1978 made things even more difficult for ETA. It meant the devolution of the self-government that the Basque Country had enjoyed before the Spanish Civil War and before the enactment of the Statute of Guernica in 1979. Indeed, it helped *de facto* the integration of moderate nationalism into the constitutional consensus.[32] Gurr notes that gaining autonomy tends to erode the cohesion of communal groups and reduce their fighting capacity.[33] This is what happened in the Basque Country following the transition to democracy, where only 15 percent of the electorate supported ETA, with the most radical sector being outside the Constitutional consensus.[34] In this situation, ETA saw violence as the only way to activate the action-reaction-action spiral, break the social consensus about self-government and gain popular support.

The void left by the BNP (Basque Nationalist Party) in civil society after accepting the Spanish legal framework
was filled by ETA.[35] The generator of propaganda would thus not only be the group perpetrating killings (ETA), but also its social support apparatus (MLNV, Basque National Liberation Movement). MLNV includes the social and political movements of a number of Basque nationalist organizations pursuing the creation of a Basque nation-state, Euskal Herria, based on the abertzale (patriot) and socialist left. All of these organizations share the practice of revolutionary methods and even violence with ETA.[36]

It is important to emphasize the role of BNP at least as an indirect ETA propagandist. The use of public communication techniques were an essential part of the BNP communication management while in power for more than three decades. Through the control of the public media apparatus, the BNP framed issues, manufactured stories, and built slogans to achieve general Basque nationalist goals. The highly ethnocentric and nationalistic discourse used by the Basque public media has been strongly propagandistic.[37] Arregui, a former Counselor for Culture and the spokesman for the regional Basque government, held the BNP responsible for terrorism due to (among other factors) its sharing of the political aims of ETA, and due to its discrediting and undermining the Spanish laws.[38]

**Structure of ETA**

ETA's apparatus of propaganda was based on the existence of numerous satellite organizations that operate in the public sphere in a number of areas: political (HB), union (LAB), youth (Jarrai), feminist (Egizan), ecologist (Eguzki), student (Ikasle Abertzaleak), internationalist (Askapena), media and culture (Egin and Egin Irratia), human rights (Senideak, Gestoras Pro Amnistia) and recreational (Herriko Tabernas), as well as a number of organizations committed to the protection of the Basque language and culture. Its purpose is the creation of a counter society that contradicts the larger, official and legal society.

**Media Use**

We can differentiate between ETA's own media and sympathetic media. ETA owned its own communication apparatus. For internal purposes, ETA had Zutabe (a Basque word meaning pillar or column), an internal bulletin where ETA communicated its strategies, threats and political demands to its militants and supporters. It also served as a threat instrument since it was used to attack those considered to be enemies of the Basque cause, including entrepreneurs, athletes and journalists, who for various reasons, did not share ETA's goals.[39]

The main media service is (still) Gara, first called Egin before that outlet was closed by a judicial order in 1998, together with the radio station Egin Irratia in 1998. Egin and then Gara supported the views of ETA and Herri Batasuna (ETA's political arm). ETA sent press releases to Gara immediately after their killings which the rest of the Spanish media echoed later. ETA also announced ceasefires through its own newspaper. As with Zutabe, Egin stories served to identify the enemies of ETA.

**Other Techniques: Socialization of Pain and Occupation of the Streets**

Jowett and O'Donnell argue that “propaganda is too complex to limit its techniques to a short list.”[40] Indeed, most scholars do not disagree with Goebbels' conception of propaganda as the use of any available resource to conquer the masses. Among them, there are two methods that, beyond perpetrating killings to achieve media resonance, allowed ETA to generate fear in all layers of Basque society, thereby affecting the political, economic and social life as well as the ordinary behavior of individuals and groups. These two methods are, in ETA's own terminology, the socialization of pain and the 'occupation of the public space'.

During 1998-99, the nationalist front strategy was accompanied more and more by street violence (kale borroka). According to ETA's strategy, the street violence socialized the pain suffered by the imprisoned Basque fighters among the Basque population.[41] This trickle-down violence, whereby an urban bus or a cash machine could be set on fire, was effective in making all sectors of Basque society feel ETA's presence. Until 1998, ETA generated a high level of street violence and killed a broader set of targets - mainly police, military and politicians, as well as others. After 1998, the growing emphasis on street violence was not simply the result of a shift in strategy. It was also a reflection of the logistical weakness of ETA due to effective counter-terrorism actions by the Spanish government and the active collaboration of French authorities, which began during the 1980s that forced the
organization to opt for less risky operations.[42] In other words, and also for tactical purposes, ETA tried to
dress up as a strategic decision what was in reality a result of its organizational limitations.

ETA’s socialization of pain was not restricted to traditional public disorder but also consisted of extortion and intimation of broader targets. For example, in 2001, ETA members organized mass mailings in which 18,000 letters were sent to private persons who were asked to contribute voluntarily to the association for families of ETA prisoners.[43] Other techniques of intimidation had as their main purpose the occupation of the public sphere, for example forcing shopkeepers to display posters in their windows or proprietors of newspaper stands to give prominent placement to ETA-linked newspapers, booklets and pamphlets.[44] Trying to gain popularity among the working-class to become a sort of armed arm of the working-class, ETA also made use of violence related to other social conflicts, such as killing alleged drug traffickers, or attacking the construction of nuclear power plants or roads in natural preserve areas.

Because of its symbolic power, the main propaganda technique of ETA, besides its crimes, has been its supporters’ occupation of the streets. Bennett, Segerberg and Walker note that local physical occupations and protest activities, in which core participants show unity for a cause, still attract significant media attention and generate adherents through the dissemination of images, videos, websites and other media artifacts.[45] Marches have been one of the key street manifestations of the ETA terrorist and separatist movement. These marches highlighted the opposition of radical Basque nationalism to Spain’s political transition: “Self-determination, amnesty and expulsion of Spanish police forces regarding objectives; blood, votes and street protests regarding means. These principles never changed.”[46]

Perhaps the most memorable ETA demonstration was the dubbed “Freedom March” (Marcha de la libertad) of 1977. It was inspired by Mahatma Ghandi’s Salt March for India’s independence (1930) and the Washington DC march for work and freedom led by Martin Luther King, Jr. (1963). The event lasted more than 45 days and traversed more than 1,870 km in the Basque Region and in Navarre. Casquete describes the symbolic power and the communicative capacity of ETA conglomerate marches and street protests:

> “…the demonstration embodied the Basque people in movement, which made the nation not something imaginary, but a tangible, visible, strong mass of comrades. It was a nation when walking, turning to express in the street its own claims and to stifle those of the enemies, was a relevant mission that the circumstances demanded of each combative abertzale [Basque patriot]. The constant repetition of the manifestations, together with the pressure against those of the political rivals, got at times, outwardly, to evidence its strength in the public space.”[47]

Fernández Soldevilla and López Romo noted that the “ETA marches became a part of the public space”, limiting the manifestation of a Spanish-Basque identity to anonymous voters and the visualization of this segment of society to the presence of Spanish police forces.[48] A number of public servants decided to step down from elected positions in the face of these public manifestations. Furthermore, the mass presence reflected in this type of street protests served as a mechanism of control for ETA supporters who had been permanently on call or to justify their absences.[49]

**Effects and Evaluation**

There is evidence that ETA’s terrorism generated a spiral of silence effect in Basque society. Llera and Leonisio describe how fear became part of everyday reality, “fear of physical (sometimes irreversible) damage or destruction of property, but also social marginalization or emptiness, including stigmatization as Spanish.”[50] A number of scholars argue that non-nationalist Basques saw their freedom of expression limited because of the violence.[51]

Some data confirm the effect that the social climate of violence and the linguistic imposition may have had on the presumably non-nationalist portion of the Basque population. The first has to do with demographics
over the past 25 years. A 2007 survey showed that since 1992 more than 200,000 people – about 10 percent of the total population – had moved away from the Basque Country, though this is the region with the second highest income per capita in Spain.[52] A second survey from 2010 indicated that some 16 percent of the Basque population said they would be willing to leave the Basque Country if they were offered the same living standards elsewhere.[53]

As tables 1 and 2 suggest, the impact of ETA has been profound in terms of public opinion. During the 1985-2010 period, ETA's terrorism was the main concern of Basque citizens, fluctuating between 72 percent and 45 percent.[54] ETA's attacks pressured a significant percentage of Basques towards a position in favour of entering into political negotiations with the terrorists under any circumstance, although the majority position was to negotiate with them only in the case of ETA giving up the armed struggle.

**Table 1:** Opinion about Negotiation with ETA, 1996-2014 (%)

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<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>If ETA ceases violence</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>No response</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
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Source: Euskobarómetro, temporary series.

**Table 2:** Evolution of the felt freedom regarding talking about politics in the Basque Country, 1997-2014 (%)

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<tr>
<td>With everybody</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>With some people</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With almost nobody</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>With nobody</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Euskobarómetro, temporary series.

**Conclusion**

The case of ETA demonstrates that terrorism can be a powerful communication tool. Indeed, its activity provoked many Basques to be afraid of taking part in politics. Only after ETA's dissolution in 2011 or during the truces did this feeling reach lower levels on a par with the rest of Spaniards. A second characteristic is that the communicative impact of terrorism in divided societies - like the Basque society, where there are ethnic cleavages - tends to be asymmetric. Not all of the society's members feel intimidated in the same way. Those who share the goals but maybe not the means of the terrorists (such as BNP supporters) barely felt coerced in their freedom to participate in politics, while those who oppose Basque nationalism as a whole and who felt Spain was their community of reference, indicated a high level of fear towards getting involved in politics. For example, 63 percent of those who voted for the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and 79 percent of those who voted for the Spanish Popular Party (PP) expressed fear in voicing their opinions, while only 37 percent of BNP voters or 28 percent of those who voted for ETA's political branches expressed such a fear.[55] Likewise, there was more fear to express political thoughts among those who reported feeling ‘Spanish’ or ‘more Spanish than Basque’ than among those who felt ‘more Basque than Spanish’ or only ‘Basque’. The proportion went from 56 percent in the first case to 36 percent in the second case.[56]

In sum, freedom to participate in politics was seriously affected in the Basque Country, creating a disadvantage
for non-Basque nationalist parties in elections in the Basque region. This freedom was not affected exclusively by ETA’s crimes, extortion and kidnappings but also by the rest of the social, cultural and political conglomerate of Basque radical nationalism. The ecosystem created by civil activism and other satellite organizations mobilized by terrorism (and which agreed to its methods) supported the strategy of fear almost as much as ETA. Indeed, although ETA has been defeated by the Spanish government, the terrorist group is still alive thanks to storytelling that is constantly recreated by activist politicians who shared ETA’s original goals. The same goes for a number of civil and satellite organizations who still have an active presence in the Basque public sphere. The case of ETA raises the question of how long the communicative power of terrorism can linger after the actual violence has come to an end and the terrorist organization has been disarmed and officially defeated.

About the Author: César García is a Professor at Central Washington University. He specializes in teaching and research on strategic communication. He has published a number of articles on the use of strategic communication for nation building.

Notes


[56] Ibid.
Migration, Transnational Crime and Terrorism: Exploring the Nexus in Europe and Southeast Asia

by Cameron Sumpter and Joseph Franco

Abstract

Theories of a crime-terror nexus are well established in the literature. Often conceptualised along a continuum, relationships between organisations range from contracting services and the appropriation of tactics, to complete mergers or even role changes. Recent irregular migrant movements have added to the nexus, providing financial opportunities to criminal enterprises and creating grievances and heated debate that has fuelled the anger of ideological groups. In Europe, terrorist organisations have worked with and sometimes emulated organised crime syndicates through involvement in the trafficking of drugs, people, weapons and antiquities. In Southeast Asia, conflict areas provide the backdrop for cross-border drug trafficking and kidnap-for-ransom activities, while extremist groups both commit crimes for profit and target criminals for recruitment.

Keywords: Crime-Terror nexus, organised crime, terrorism, migration, Europe, Southeast Asia

Introduction

Links between criminality and violent ideological groups have existed for decades. Hezbollah has been active in Latin America since the 1980s, when it began working with drug cartels to raise funds for operations and the purchase of arms. The organised-crime-plagued Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este near the border with Brazil and Argentina has long played host to Islamist groups such as the Egyptian al-Jama'at al-Islamiyya, Hamas and al-Qaeda, which have colluded with gangs to smuggle contraband, drugs and weapons, launder money and forge documents. According to Brazilian intelligence, Osama bin Laden himself visited the notorious South American crime hub in 1995. The so-called ‘Golden Triangle’ straddling the borders of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand is considered the second-largest opium producing area in world, sustaining insurgency groups fighting the Myanmar government. In maritime Southeast Asia, the Mindanao-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) gained notoriety through its kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) activities, receiving multi-million dollar payoffs. Extremist organisations are continuing this crime-terror trend, both in terms of connections with the criminal underworld and independent illicit activities to raise capital for their own operations.

An added dynamic is the increased movement of migrants in recent years, particularly into Europe. The perilous journeys undertaken by refugees fleeing war zones and asylum seekers escaping repressive regimes have largely been dominated by criminal groups, which exploit human desperation for financial profit. When hundreds of thousands of people began pouring into Europe from the Middle East and North Africa in 2014, observers speculated that terrorist organisations may be working with human traffickers to smuggle operatives into the West. Commentators on the political right have embraced such claims yet a clear link remains unfounded. In Southeast Asia, motivations for movement are distinct. The tendency is for undocumented migrants to move from their poorly-governed places of origin to other poorly-governed spaces. This article will explore contemporary relationships between terrorist organisations, criminality and migration flows in Europe and Southeast Asia.

These diverse regions were selected for case studies as each has experienced a resurgence in violent extremism in recent years. Southeast Asia and Europe have both long struggled with organised transnational crime, which terrorist networks appear to be exploiting. Both regions have also experienced the strains of irregular migration, as asylum seekers escape conflict and political oppression.
Crime-Terror Nexus

In his seminal 1998 book, Inside Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman stated that it was “useful to distinguish terrorists from ordinary criminals”, who are driven purely by selfish motivation, usually seek material gain, and never intend to provoke a psychological reaction, send a political message, or influence public opinion through the criminal act.[6] In contrast, Phil Williams points out that terrorists have fundamentally religious or ideological goals, aiming to disrupt the status quo, manipulate political decision making, or overhaul existing governance structures.[7] Brian Phillips has also noted a “great chasm” between terrorists and criminals generally, owing to divergent motivations, though he identifies a fluidity which may blur conceptual lines with certain examples. [8] Bovenkerk and Abou Chakra stress that differences may also extend to the profiles of each: Criminals are generally from poorer socio-economic backgrounds, whereas those perpetrating political violence come from a variety of social classes, including wealthy, well-educated families.[9]

While a distinction may appear clear on the individual or micro level of analysis, macro (structural) and meso (group) perspectives suggest greater similarities and potential ground for confluence. One of the earliest and most cited works investigating relational dynamics between criminal and terrorist groups was from Tamara Makarenko, who conceptualised organisational links as a continuum.[10] Makarenko noted that the end of the Cold War resulted in a downturn in state sponsorship for terrorism, coinciding with the rise of transnational crime in the 1990s, which emerged as a means to fill the subsequent resource shortfall among a number of underground ideological groups.[11]

The Crime-Terror Continuum places organised crime on the left extreme with terrorism on the opposite. Moving towards the centre from either end there are strategic alliances between each type of group. An ideological group shifting further along the continuum will begin to employ criminal activities for operational purposes, such as bank robbery and kidnap for ransom in order to fund its activities. Conversely, an organised crime group may begin to converge by using terrorism for operational purposes; for example, the Italian Mafia has employed terror tactics in order to coerce the government into reducing pressure on its activities.[12] Criminal groups also tend to prosper in chaotic environments and stand to gain from political violence and the subsequent strains on a state's security apparatus.[13] Though the opposite can also be true, as criminal organisations may seek to uphold the status quo rather than subverting political institutions if the existing climate is conducive to their activities.[14] At the centre of the continuum is complete convergence, involving either the evolution of a criminal group to prioritising political motivations, or that of an ideological organisation to deploy its political rhetoric simply as a front for criminal enterprise.[15]

In 2005, Louise Shelley and John Picarelli envisaged the relationship as a terror-crime interaction spectrum, which includes five phases:

1. Activity appropriation: Terror and criminal groups may imitate each other’s methods;
2. Nexus: Seeking efficiency, each group begins to outsource services such as forgery or bomb making, leading to business relationships;
3. Symbiotic Relationship: As a “natural progression” the groups then start collaborating more regularly and sharing goals and methods;
4. Hybrid Group: Next the two groups’ activities converge to the point where terrorism and organised crime reach equal footing and both become central to a group's existence;
5. Transformation: In rare cases, a group may become so focused on the activities of the other that it drops its initial motivations completely and evolves into purely criminal or political. [16]

Shelley and Picarelli stress that this process is dynamic and many groups may not advance to a close relationship, much less to the hybrid or transformation stages. That said, in parts of the world where governance and rule of law is weak or non-existent, both may flourish and it can become “often difficult, not to say meaningless, to draw a distinction between” criminal groups and terrorist organisations.[17] Indeed, Chris Dishman asserts
that transformation through an evolution of interest is even more likely than sustained cooperation, given the essentially differing motivations.[18]

Despite Bruce Hoffman’s differentiation between the intrinsic individual motivations of terrorists and criminals, there may be more similarities on the micro level when considering social and emotional drivers. Common themes in theories of radicalisation are the personal search for belonging, status, power and adventure among youth trying to find their way in life.[19] Young people becoming associated with gangs and organised criminal organisations are often driven by similar needs, seeking a robust identity and the physical and emotional sanctuary of in-group membership.[20] A further point of convergence between criminals and terrorists is the common adversaries of law enforcement and a state’s intelligence community.[21]

The media, on the other hand, are considered differently by the two types of organisation. While criminals may seek to silence reporters through violence, terrorist organisations often view journalists as important conduits for relaying their messages and intentions to as wide an audience as possible.[22] Another variation regarding a third party is the way a state may respond to threats. Following a campaign of violence, a government may conceivably begin negotiations with a rebel insurgency that employs terrorist tactics, yet it is unlikely any such deals are pursued with a criminal organisation, at least openly in a democratic country.[23]

On a macro level, corruption is said to play a significant role in fomenting the success of both terrorist and criminal organisations, and the utility they perceive in working together.[24] Organised crime syndicates rely on corrupt officials to maintain business interests such as prostitution, drug trafficking and the cross-border smuggling of contraband and weapons. And in corrupt nations the world over judicial systems are undermined by the bribing of judges and prosecutors which provides various levels of impunity to well-resourced criminals. [25] This falls within the larger phenomenon of ‘negative synergy’ where illicit events and personnel produce a larger impact than they would if they acted separately.[26] What acts as the enabler for negative synergy between criminals and terrorists is money.[27]

The benefits of operating in corrupt states for terrorist organisations are two-fold. Militant Islamist groups highlight government corruption to seize the moral high ground in recruitment drives, portraying themselves as purer and more just than the ‘taghut’[false idol] state establishment. Yet at the same time, such organisations often profit from the smuggling routes and opportunities for monetary gain that backhanded transactions with venal authorities provide.[28] It may be no coincidence that Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Somalia – all countries which have endured sustained campaigns of terrorism in recent years – comprise five of the eight most corrupt nations in the world, according to Transparency International.[29]

The structural resemblance between current terrorist organisations and organised crime syndicates is “striking”, according to Bovenkerk and Abou Chakra.[30] Traditionally stable hierarchical arrangements have now given way to more fluid group dynamics, which operate in small, loosely connected, autonomous units or cells.[31] Chris Dishman argues this evolution has provided opportunities for cooperation between criminal and terrorist organisations, and even long-term alliances.[32] Louise Shelley describes this evolution as emerging in the post-Cold War world, when nation-state power ceded a degree of authority to multinational corporations and multi-lateral international organisations.[33] Modern day criminal and terrorist networks “mirror the contemporary organizational structures of the licit world” according to Shelley, who contrasts the innovation and malleability of today’s large tech companies with “old-fashioned corporations” of yesteryear, such as General Motors.[34] Developments in communication technologies have facilitated this strategic disintegration of formal structures, and provide opportunities for both terrorist and criminal organisations to advance their activities internationally while evading state security agencies, which are often hindered by jurisdictional boundaries.[35]
Crime-Terror Nexus in Europe

Events in Europe over the past few years have added weight to the assertion that various connections now exist between organised crime and terrorist networks. In a 2014 qualitative analysis of the crime-terror nexus in Europe, Makarenko and Mesquita found evidence of linkages in the European Union (EU) to consist largely of operational alliances and the appropriation of tactics.[36] They argue, however, that the nexus is at its most pronounced and collaborative in post-conflict regions of the world where state governance is weak and groups have merged or altered focus, such as the FARC’s evolution into a drug cartel in Colombia. In stable Western democracies relationships are more opaque, but the gradual development of ties has increased the efficacy of both types of organisations.[37]

The most frequent linkage in the EU is the formation of alliances, either in the short-term as a “marriage of convenience” or for more sustained periods.[38] The 2004 Madrid train bombings which killed almost 200 people were largely funded by a “small, yet effective drug trafficking network” which imported hashish from Morocco and ecstasy from the Netherlands to be sold in Spain.[39] Drugs reportedly fund terror groups in other parts of the continent as well. Italy’s counter-terrorism and organised crime Head Franco Roberti said in 2016 that IS and the Italian Mafia were working together to smuggle Moroccan-origin hashish from the Libyan coast into Southern Europe.[40] Contraband has also travelled in the opposite direction: in May 2017, an Italian couple with alleged ties to the infamous Camorra crime clan in Naples were arrested and charged with attempting to traffic Soviet-era weapons, including anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles to the Islamic State in Libya, as well as arms from a large arms cache to Iran.[41]

Links have been established for the trafficking of antiquities from the Middle East and North Africa into Europe. An investigation by the Turin-based newspaper La Stampa in 2016 found the Italian Mafia had been purchasing weapons from Moldova and the Ukraine, with help from the Russian Mafia, and transporting these from the southern Italian city of Calabria to the then IS-controlled Libyan city of Sirte.[42] In exchange for the weapons, IS would allegedly ship back artefacts seized from historic sites and tombs in Libya. The undercover journalist researching the story was offered to buy a Roman-era marble bust for €60,000.[43] Citing an unnamed French security official, the Wall Street Journal reported in August 2017 that IS makes roughly $100 million per year from selling artefacts pilfered from Iraq and Syria.[44]

The second predominant crossover between terrorist groups and organised crime in Europe is the appropriation of tactics, which Makarenko & Mesquita consider to be an evolution of the alliance stage.[45] Whether to avoid differences in strategy and the possibility of betrayal by criminal groups or simply to secure more of the profits, terrorist organisations have increasingly been directing criminal operations themselves. According to the British newspaper The Mirror, IS was running an extensive series of lucrative cannabis farms in southern Albania in early 2016, which the group had commandeered after authorities pushed the local Mafia from the area in 2014. The jihadi outfit then began recruiting in the area – often from the ranks of organised crime as these men come equipped with desirable skill-sets.[46]

A recently intercepted operation suggests the Islamic State may also profit both from the commercial value of drugs and their stimulant effects. In November 2017, Italian police seized a large shipment of a synthetic opiate known as Tramadol in the port of Gioia Tauro, which would have commanded a street value of nearly €50 million.[47] Italian authorities stated the 24 million tablets, which had reportedly originated in India, were on their way to Libya where the Islamic State planned to sell them to its militants for €2 a pill, then use the profits to fund terrorist attacks.[48] Tramadol has come to be known as the “fighter’s drug” and is widely used by militants in Libya and Egypt for recreation; it numbs the effects of physical exertion in battle.[49] Boko Haram fighters in the greater Lake Chad Basin region purportedly also favour this opioid-like painkiller.[50] Another drug popular among militant extremists is an amphetamine-based substance known as Captagon, which Islamic State defectors have claimed is given to IS fighters to keep them awake and alert.[51]

The increasing involvement and recruitment of individuals with criminal histories has been a notable dynamic of militant jihadism in Europe since the rise of IS in 2014. An October 2017 report from Rajan Basra and Peter Neumann noted that two-thirds of German foreign fighters who ended up in Syria and Iraq had criminal
records, with similar percentages from the Netherlands and Norway, while almost half of French jihadis were known to police.[52] IS has been highly successful in attracting petty criminals and hoodlums, either by offering them a “redemption narrative” where they can start fresh while joining a revolution, or through the erroneous framework that jihadism legitimises crime, as it is considered acceptable (even obligatory) to steal from non-believers.[53]

This was summed up well in 2016 by a senior Belgian counterterrorism official, who said: “Young Muslim men with a history of social and criminal delinquency are joining up with the Islamic State as part of a sort of ’super-gang’, which provides the romanticism of a perceived noble uprising and/or the allure of a well-armed, powerful criminal group.[54] A broader study conducted by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) found that many of the European jihadis interviewed continued to drink alcohol, take drugs and commit crimes even after committing themselves to the Islamic State.[55] Reportedly, Paris attacker Salah Abdeslam used to sit in his Molenbeek café watching ISIS videos “with a joint in one hand, and a beer in the other.”[56]

Migration-Crime-Terror Nexus in Europe

Organised criminal networks have long assisted with, and profited from, irregular and illegal migration into Europe. However, in recent years, the number of people escaping brutal conflict, repressive regimes and/or environmental degradation has surged, which has increased the profits of criminals, resulted in countless deaths, and polarised societies in receiving European nations.

According to a 2016 report jointly authored by Interpol and Europol, over 90% of migrants entering the EU are assisted by criminal organisations, however loosely constituted, and the migrant smuggling ‘industry’ into Europe was estimated to be worth $5-6 billion in 2015.[57] A telling example is one outfit in Turkey which was charging $1,200 per person for a perilous 25-kilometre journey from the Turkish city of Bodrum to the Greek Island of Kos in an inflatable dinghy crammed with 40 passengers. Each boat would net $48,000, regardless of whether the voyagers survived.[58]

Given the fluctuating nature of irregular migrant flows, the criminal groups that facilitate travel are often small and adaptive, entering partnerships of mutual benefit with others in the illicit industry.[59] Sometimes alliances are based on family networks or more traditional cooperative operations. According to Libyan coastguard Col. Rida Benissa, Italian fishing boats lurked near the Libyan shore in 2015 to assist people smugglers heading north, and were facilitated by relationships between the Mafia and Libyan criminal groups based on the long-established trade of petroleum for whiskey.[60]

Terrorist organisations are also said to have profited from the movement of people. In May 2015, IS was reported to have made up to $320 million through the exploitation of migrant movements from the Middle East and North Africa into Europe.[61] Within its so-called caliphate, the organisation was intent on keeping people from leaving either by force or through subtle strategies such as highlighting the dangers of refugee routes and the uncertainty of potential destinations.[62] [63] Yet outside the territory it directly controlled, fleeing refugees have been seen as a source of revenue. IS has reportedly exacerbated migrant flows by conducting attacks on civilians and refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt's Sinai peninsula, which force people to escape and allow the terrorist organisation to profit from taxing the passage of vehicles or facilitating logistics.[64] Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has similarly prospered on the plight of the desperate, demanding levies on migrant flows through North Africa.[65]

The connection between terrorist organisations and migration receiving the most attention, however, is the possibility that militant extremists have infiltrated refugee routes to smuggle themselves (back) into Europe. In late 2014, a widely cited BuzzFeed report quoted a Turkish people smuggler who claimed to have sent at least ten Islamic State fighters to Greece over the preceding few months.[66] Fears grew when two of the suicide bombers in the November 2015 Paris attack were found to have traveled into Europe among refugees through
Greece, and one was carrying a stolen Syrian passport when he died.[67] Former head of French intelligence Bernard Squarcini said at the time: “It is obvious now, amongst the migrants there are some terrorists.”[68] Six months later, INTERPOL and Europol warned of “an increased risk that foreign terrorist fighters may use the migratory flows to (re-)enter the EU.”[69]

Possibly the clearest link between migration, organised crime and terrorism can be found in the forged document industry, which the Islamic State appears to have both sought as a service and possibly emulated. A few weeks before the Paris attacks in late 2015, police in Brussels raided an inner-city apartment, uncovering a large-scale forgery operation which produced ID cards “of excellent quality” according to the arrest warrant. It was later revealed that at least three of the Paris attackers had used forgeries from this illegal outfit to evade authorities when crossing European borders.[70] The Algerian national at the heart of the illicit business was believed to be solely motivated by profit and was not charged with terrorism. However, French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve claimed in early 2016 that the Islamic State had established its own “real fake document industry”, and around the same time former FBI Director James Comey revealed there was concern in the US intelligence community that the Islamic State had its own “capability to manufacture fraudulent passports”.[71]

Two-and-a-half years have now passed since the Paris attack and there is not significant evidence that terrorists have been smuggling themselves in large numbers into Europe to conduct attacks. In July 2016, a 21-year-old Syrian refugee killed a pregnant woman in Germany with a machete, though police described the man as “completely out of his mind” and found no apparent links to terrorist organisations.[72] In the same month, a 17-year-old asylum seeker from Afghanistan badly injured five people with an axe and a knife on a train in Germany before being shot dead by police. The Islamic State’s Amaq news agency claimed the assailant was one of its ‘soldiers’ and a Bavarian interior ministry spokesperson said it was “quite probable that this was an Islamist attack.”[73] Just over a year later, a teenaged Iraqi refugee (who had been living in the UK for two years) was charged with planting an explosive device on an underground train in London which injured 30 people.[74] These unsophisticated attacks perpetrated by asylum seekers hardly offer proof that trained jihadi militants have systematically infiltrated refugee routes into Europe, though the possibility cannot be ruled out.

The most dangerous outcome of the assertion that refugees pose a security risk to Western nations may be the polarising effect the issue has on democratic societies. Right wing media has seized upon any connection between migrants and violence, sometimes from dubious sources,[75] while left-leaning commentators often downplay potential threats.[76] In the United States, Donald Trump ran his election campaign on a platform of anxiety toward outsiders; in late 2017 the president eventually managed to implement a travel ban on people from several (mainly Muslim majority) countries.[77] Comparable xenophobia was present in the campaign leading up to the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom.[78] And in Europe the influx of over one million refugees in 2016 alone energised far-right movements and increased popularity among nationalist political parties, such as Marie la Penn’s Front National in France, and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party, which in October 2017 won seats in parliament, resulting in anti-fascist protesters flooding the streets of Berlin.[79]

In December 2017, thousands of white supremacists and far-right nationalists from different countries marched in Warsaw, Poland, with acerbic anti-immigration signs and hurling abuse directed at Muslims and Europe’s far left.[80] Groups at the extremes of the immigration debate in Europe, and the likelihood of each side further radicalising one another, potentially poses a greater threat to the continent’s stability than the dangers allegedly lurking within the refugee movements themselves.

**Crime-Terror Nexus in Southeast Asia**

Southeast Asia is no stranger to the crime-terrorism nexus. Violent extremist organisations have taken advantage of various poorly-governed spaces. In maritime Southeast Asia, the distinct geography presented by the shared borders of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines has provided groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) with a conducive environment to launch attacks.[81] The five-month long Battle for the town of Marawi was a recent
demonstration of how terrorist organisations such as the IS-linked Maute Group (MG) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) were able to sustain themselves in the face of a major military offensive by assembling an illicit stockpile of weapons and other materiel. Similar to European examples of the crime-terrorism nexus, the relationship between the two phenomena can flow in either direction. Criminals also possess agency to employ terrorist behaviour to better achieve their goals. Both terrorists and criminals conduct their activities through pre-existing real world networks pre-dating the widespread proliferation of information and communications technologies (ICT).

Any discussion of the linkages between violent extremist organisations and criminal organisations often includes the ‘Golden Triangle’. According to a recent UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) survey, the lawless area surrounding the borders of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand constitute the world’s second largest opium-producing region.[82] Specifically, 90 percent of opium produced in the Triangle comes from territory controlled by the Shan State Army – an insurgent group ostensibly waging a war to secure rights for the Shan minority from the Burmese majority.[83] The inflow of cash resulting from the opiate trade has led to the protraction of the conflict. But it is not only insurgents fighting the state who profit from the illicit opium trade. Since the late 1980s, Myanmar’s military government has used the drug trade to acquire resources and raise counterinsurgent militia units.[84]

Unfortunately, the unfettered opium trade has also coincided with the industrial scale production of synthetic narcotics in Southeast Asia. Methamphetamine is reportedly being produced in 6 out of 10 ASEAN countries. [85] In the Philippines, it was apparent that ready availability of methamphetamines was not diminished by the anti-drug crusade promoted by President Rodrigo Duterte. Drug-related political violence in Mindanao increased six-fold in areas known to be hotbeds of jihadist activity.[86] Duterte’s administration was quick to link the Battle for Marawi as a backlash against the reinvigorated anti-drug campaign, stating that the MG fuelled primarily by the drug trade.[87] But beyond Duterte’s bombastic declarations, his government has failed to make the case that the MG had the sole distinction of being the only terrorist group linked to the drug trade.[88]

Rather than being the cause, the Maute’s involvement in the drug trade was symptomatic of how terrorist groups would latch into any illicit fundraising activity to advance their cause. The ASG is an example of how a terrorist organisation could oscillate between ideologically-driven violence and profit-driven organised crime. Founded by Abdurajak Janjalani with seed funding from al-Qaeda, the ASG sought to replicate the tactics utilised by anti-Soviet mujahidin fighters.[89] The killing of Janjalani in 1995, led to the splintering of the ASG before its members built a coherent line of succession and developed a robust ideological stand. The ASG would achieve notoriety with the 2000 Sipadan Island kidnappings, receiving millions of dollars in exchange for the freedom of several Western European hostages. In the decade that followed, the ASG would degenerate into a criminal gang with only superficial references to the mujahidin discourse of Janjalani.[90]

Groups like the ASG do not exist in a vacuum. Un- and ill-governed spaces that act as the proving ground for both terrorist and criminal tactics are the result of distinct historical and socioeconomic circumstances. In maritime Southeast Asia, pre-colonial trade and the resultant emergence of piracy on the high seas were the precursors of the ASG’s cross-border kidnapping sorties.[91] In the Golden Triangle, shared ethnicities act as the bridge for various factions involved in the drug trade.[92] Parallels between various ungoverned spaces in Southeast Asia see not only the convergence of extremist groups’ motivations. Terrorist tactics disperse across disparate violent groups. In Southern Thailand, the various factions tied to the Malay Muslim insurgency aim for soft targets such as civil servants and teachers.[93] It is the same targeting mindset employed by the ASG in the remote provinces of Sulu and Basilan, to keep deployed military forces off balance.[94]

The appropriation of tactics is a natural progression from shared targeting preferences. The MG started as an extortion gang by Farhana Maute, a known political kingmaker in central Mindanao. After figuring in a political dispute, Farhana mobilised her armed kinsmen including her sons into the MG.[95] When the group first emerged, its use of IS imagery was an attempt to differentiate themselves from other private armed groups in central Mindanao.[96] In hindsight, it would appear that initial forays into jihadist propaganda and
discourse would mutate into actual linkages with IS. However, it is too simplistic to ascribe the tactics used by the MG in the Battle for Marawi simply as a result of influence from the IS core. The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Mindanao stretch back to decades prior to the emergence of the MG. The earliest attacks of the ASG were based on fuel oil and fertiliser-based explosives, diverted from legitimate commercial and agricultural stockpiles. The same IED components and designs can be seen in communist insurgent-held areas in Eastern Mindanao. It was the availability of possible explosive precursor materials that drove IED development. As expected, the know-how available for extremist groups moved to the criminal underworld. As early as 2008, reports have warned of a pool of mercenary “bombers-for-hire”, who have no qualms transferring their skills to any ideological group willing to pay.

Gangsters or ‘preman’ have also been a feature of Indonesia’s jihadi movement for decades. In the late 1970s, a gang leader named Musa Warman with links to Islamist extremists led a series of robberies to support terrorist activities in the archipelago. The use of fa’i (robbery of ‘non-Muslims’ to raise money for militancy) has continued sporadically ever since, contributing to operations such as the Bali bombing in 2002 which killed over 200 people and sustaining some of the small, semi-autonomous cells that became the norm in Indonesia after an effective police campaign to dismantle extremist networks during the 2000s. In June 2018, police arrested five members of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (the Indonesian umbrella organisation of IS supporters) who were allegedly planning to rob banks in the city of Blitar.

Similar to recent recruitment drives in Europe, Jemaah Islamiyah leaders in Indonesia drew upon a ‘redemption narrative’ to attract new members since the late 1990s. Bali bomber Ali Ghufron (aka Muchlas) wrote in a treatise that jihad provided a way for delinquents and transgressors to repent, which opened up new channels for enlistment. Significant numbers of preman committed violence under jihadi leadership during sectarian conflict in Central Sulawesi, which erupted following the fall of President Suharto in 1998. Prisons are also productive recruitment sites. Over 1,000 convicted terrorists have ended up in Indonesian penitentiaries over the past 15 years and ordinary criminals such as drug dealers have become vulnerable targets for radicalisation in prisons. According to the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), at least 18 Indonesians with criminal histories were involved in terrorism cases between 2010 and 2016, most of whom were radicalised in prison. Jihadis in Indonesian prisons have often become potent gangs, with access to better food, services and conditions through outside support and the intimidation of guards. Such benefits, along with potential feelings of atonement, belonging and protection offer attractive incentives for regular criminal inmates to develop extremist convictions.

The symbiotic interaction between criminality and terrorism creates opportunities for illicit actors to straddle both communities. In mainland Southeast Asia, drug production and distribution are under the almost complete control of insurgent groups who occupy opium fields. In such scenarios, affiliation between terrorist and criminal groups does not merely overlap but constitutes an inseparable relationship. In maritime Southeast Asia, kidnapping as exemplified by the ASG is a “cottage industry” that employs entire communities. One only needs to look at how the MG were able to amass fighters for the protracted Marawi siege as proof of how terrorism and crime are linked – both money and firearms were promised to youths willing to fight in Marawi.

Polarisation and violence between migrant and native communities, as seen in European ghettoes, follow a different dynamic in Southeast Asia. There is less emphasis on how state actors purportedly neglect minorities. In Southeast Asia, the crime-terrorism nexus foments a pervasive sense of lawlessness and insecurity. This leads to a vicious cycle that in turn further allows the entrenchment of criminal and terrorist activity.

Migration-Crime-Terror Nexus in Southeast Asia

Migration and its relationship to the crime-terrorism nexus is markedly different in Southeast Asia compared to the flows observed in Europe. The United Nations differentiates between four types of illicit flows: labour trafficking; human trafficking for sexual exploitation; the smuggling of migrants in the region to wealthy
countries in the West; and the smuggling of migrants from war-torn countries in South and Southeast Asia. [108] There is little evidence to suggest that human trafficking for sexual exploitation and the smuggling of Southeast Asians to the West is of consequence for the crime-terrorism nexus in the region.

Contestation over the status of Rohingya Muslims is the single greatest migration-related issue that could impact the trajectory of IS influence in Southeast Asia. Muslims from Rakhine State in western Myanmar have long faced discrimination and disenfranchisement from the Burmese majority. In 2012, latent communal tensions erupted into open conflict when the killing of a Buddhist woman sparked a series of riots in Rakhine. Southeast Asian nations, linked collectively through the ASEAN, have opted to ignore the issue.[109] The status quo was maintained up until 2015, when a surge in illegal migration composed of Bangladeshis and Rohingya ended up on the shores of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and even Australia.[110]

The displacement and forced migration of the Rohingya caught the attention of both IS and AQ. The IS publication Dabiq has repeatedly expressed its intent to establish a base in Bangladesh from which to attack Myanmar government forces.[111] While IS may have limited operational capabilities in Bangladesh or Rakhine state, using the Rohingya issue is already a boon for its propaganda campaign in the face of dwindling content emanating from Syria and Iraq.

It was only a matter of time before the Rohingya situation would break from acting merely as propaganda fodder into actual violence. On 9 October 2016, Border Guard Police bases in Rakhine state were attacked by the Harakah al-Yaqin (HaY). It marked an escalation of the conflict and ushered in a renewed insurgent movement in Rakhine. What was distinct about the HaY is its Saudi-based Rohingya émigré leadership which commands trained Rohingya guerrilla fighters.[112] It is unclear whether the HaY, now known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), has actual links to IS. Its leadership has repeatedly denied any connections to other jihadist or transnational terror organisations.[113] With further violence and displacement stemming from a Myanmar massive and disproportional military crackdown which started in August 2017, it remains unlikely that the raison d'être for ARSA’s existence will disappear.

A further connection between migration and terrorism in Southeast Asia involves Uighurs from Western China. In 2009, following inter-ethnic riots in the Xinjiang city of Urumqi, relatively limited numbers of Uighurs began seeking asylum in Southeast Asia.[114] A very small minority of these appear to have radicalised; some sought to travel to Syria, while a few individuals ended up in Indonesia.[115] In 2014, the head of the Indonesian jihadi forum Jihad al-Busyro, Arif Tuban, established WhatsApp communications with Salim Mubarak Attamimi, aka Abu Jandal, an Indonesian IS recruiter in Syria. On behalf of the beleaguered Santoso [Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) leader], Arif asked Abu Jandal for funding and manpower, which resulted in a small group of Uighurs being sent from Kuala Lumpur to Poso, four of whom were arrested en route.[116] It is not clear how many made the trip, but at least one allegedly traveled through Singapore and was subsequently sheltered by men on the Indonesian island of Batam, who were later implicated in the supposed ‘rocket attack’ plan on Marina Bay Sands.[117] An Indonesian police chief said in early 2016 that six Uighurs had made it to Central Sulawesi.[118] All are now thought to have been killed in the joint military-police operation Tinombala, which has all but obliterated Santoso’s MIT. The Uighurs in Indonesia drew much attention and speculation, given concerns over the further internationalisation of regional terrorist organisations. However, it appears likely the men were not initially seeking war in the archipelago, but were diverted by handlers in Malaysia as they attempted to travel for hijrah or jihad to Syria. There have been no reports since of Uighur militants linking up with terror networks in Indonesia.

Conclusion

The Crime-Terrorism Nexus preceded the emergence of global jihadist groups such as IS. Any emerging violent extremist organisation would have to contend with the challenge of amassing illicit resources to sustain its operations. Converging motivations between terrorists and criminals should be expected. The greatest challenge for law enforcement and security services is keeping up with the technical means that illicit actors
and groups can use. Exponential growth in digital transactions and the emergence of non-traditional financial mechanisms such as cryptocurrencies will complicate measures to prevent the transfer of illicit resources. Encryption and the proliferation of non-public, peer-to-peer communication apps via the internet also make surveillance by security services more difficult.

Current irregular migration flows confound the picture. Facilitated by transnational criminal groups, asylum seekers entering Europe are branded security threats by increasingly significant populist politicians of the societies accepting them. Potentially dangerous social movements and far-right political parties have prospered. While there is little evidence of radicalism among the new arrivals, Islamophobic sentiment in host nations may well form grievances that initiate pathways to extremism. Southeast Asia has not experienced such frictions, but the plight of Muslim refugees – whether they be fleeing Myanmar or moving towards Europe – has provided effective propaganda material for those organisations intent on stoking anger and inspiring violence.

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Notes


[12] Ibid., pp. 131,134.


[27] Convergence, p. xvii.


[33] Louise Shelley, op.cit., p. 98.

[34] Ibid., p. 99.


[37] Ibid., p. 261-262.


[43] Ibid.


[78] Tobias Buck, “Immigration resonates on the streets of Brexit campaign”, *Financial Times* (8/6/17); URL: [https://www.ft.com/content/e7bfc9b4-2bcb-11e6-bf8d-26294ad519fc](https://www.ft.com/content/e7bfc9b4-2bcb-11e6-bf8d-26294ad519fc) (accessed 5/12/17).


[87] Nyshka Chandran and Martin Soong, "Battle in southern Philippines is related to Duterte's drug war, says finance chief" *CNBC* (18/6/17); URL: https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/18/marawi-siege-is-related-to-dutertes-drug-war-says-finance-chief.html (accessed 15/12/17).


[98] Interviews with Mindanao-based Philippine Army infantry officers, explosives and ordnance disposal experts, and intelligence operatives.


[101] "Indonesia Backgrounder: How The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates", *ICG Asia Report No. 43* (11/12/02); URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/indonesia-backgrounder-how-jemaah-islamiyah-terrorist-
network-operates (accessed 20/12/17).


Research Note

30 Terrorism Databases and Data Sets: a New Inventory
by Neil G. Bowie

Introduction


While the previous inventory covered 60 databases and data sets, this one describes 30 in the same three categories:

(i) Academic, Think Tank and Independent Databases (n =21)
(ii) Commercial Databases (n = 5) and
(iii) Governmental Databases (n =4).

Most of these data refer to terrorism, yet a few are broader, covering other forms of political violence as well as armed conflicts.

The present inventory, as well as the previous one, reflects the increasing availability of quantitative terrorism related data. The format for some of these databases and data sets has changed considerably over the years. The simple chronological design and linear nature of early terrorism events data sets from the late 1960’s has been transformed by technology into an array of 21st century relational database systems, with sophisticated front-end web-based interfaces. However, the integrity of terrorism data must be the cardinal principal before the application of smart user interfaces. In other words, one should not confuse attractive visual databases on terrorism data with greater accuracy and authority. Classic simple data sets built on sound methodological design (e.g. items 6, 10 and 15 below) can have as much quantitative and qualitative value when compared with more modern web-based counterparts.

Thorough and rigorous design methodology and validity checks produce data that researchers can have confidence in. When researchers can combine the trinity of rigour, database functionality and sophisticated web-based design, the results can be an authoritative and powerful database system (e.g. item 17).

The terrorism databases and data sets outlined below present an eclectic mix of generalised terrorism events data and more niche subject areas of terrorism and political violence. Many are generated from open source data (e.g. items 1, 9 and 14). Increasingly, some commercially based organisations are providing subscription-based services that charges clients for terrorism related information and data (e.g. items 22, 25 and 26). These commercially based services often provide clients with bespoke terrorism intelligence and data required by companies operating or setting up businesses within terrorism and conflict affected regions of the world. The paucity of local terrorism and intelligence data gatherers in these regions provide an opportunity for specialist companies such as Control Risks (item 22) to fill a vacuum that generalised terrorism databases and data sets do not cover.

Development of new terrorism database systems is not the sole domain of universities, think-tanks and commercial providers. American and European governments have a long-established tradition in developing their own terrorism database systems. However, the recent creation by the Government of Pakistan of its own National Counter Terrorism Database (item 28) indicates a move by some governments outside the northern hemisphere to generate their own ‘home-grown’ database systems. Consequently, country co-operation between national counter-terrorism database systems in conjunction with trusted reciprocating partners, can provide intelligence and law enforcement agencies with richer intelligence data.
The entries below offer a representative cross-section of terrorism databases and terrorism data sets that should be of use to researchers in terrorism studies. The list is not definitive. Additional terrorism databases and data sets will be listed in a future Research Note in this journal by the same compiler. Hopefully, by then there should be also some databases on counter-terrorist operations available – currently one of the lacunae in the field.

In most cases, the entries are clickable links to the data storage sites. All website links have been validated as of 7 October 2018.

**Keywords:** terrorism, counter-terrorism, databases, datasets, chronologies, political violence, armed conflict

### I. Academic, Think-Tank and Independent Databases

1. **Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) Reports on Political Violence (Bangladesh)**

   **Host Institution:** Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), Dhaka, Bangladesh.

   **Scope:** Political violence incidents in Bangladesh between political parties, within political parties and clashes with law enforcement agencies.

   **Access:** Free.


   **Summary:** Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), a legal aid and human rights organisation based in Dhaka, produces a series of monthly political violence incidents occurring within Bangladesh. The political violence incident reports provide data on intra and inter political party violence as well as law enforcement clashes with political parties. They are compiled by the ASK Documentation Unit. Variables include number of incidents, number of injuries and individuals killed.

2. **The BFRS Political Violence in Pakistan Data Set**

   **Host Institution:** The Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC), Princeton University, New Jersey (NJ), United States.

   **Scope:** Incidents of political violence in Pakistan (1988-2011).

   **Access:** Free.

   **Website:** [https://esoc.princeton.edu/files/bfrs-political-violence-pakistan-dataset](https://esoc.princeton.edu/files/bfrs-political-violence-pakistan-dataset)

   **Summary:** The BFRS Political Violence in Pakistan Data Set codes incidents of political violence in Pakistan for the period 1988-2011. Key incident variables include: location, type of violence, perpetrator (if known), consequences and cause.


   **Host Institution:** Democracy Resource Center, Nepal (DRC-N) Kumaripati, Lalitpur, Nepal.

   **Scope:** Electoral Political Violence Monitoring, Nepal.

   **Access:** Free.

   **Website:** [http://democracyresource.org/political-violence-monitoring/](http://democracyresource.org/political-violence-monitoring/)
Summary: The Democracy Resource Center, Nepal (DRC-N) is a non-profit, non-political organisation focussed on promoting democracy in Nepal. The DRC-N also produces a series of analysis update reports on electoral political violence within Nepal. These factsheet updates contain a mixture of qualitative analysis and quantitative data, with accompanying graphics.

4. Esri Story Maps – Terrorist Attacks

Host Institution: Esri Story Maps and Peace Tech Lab, United States.

Scope: Terrorist attacks worldwide (2016 – present day).

Access: Free.

Website: https://storymaps.esri.com/stories/terrorist-attacks/

E-Mail: https://www.esri.com/en-us/contact#c=gb&t=0

Summary: The Esri Story Maps provide an interactive chronological map of terrorist attacks worldwide from 2016 until the present day. The project is a joint initiative between Esri Story Maps and Peace Tech Lab. Data used to populate the maps is crowd-sourced from the web site Wikipedia. The web site acknowledges the subjective nature of the definition of terrorism.

5. Global Conflict Tracker

Host Institution: Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., United States

Scope: Global conflicts, including transnational terrorism

Access: Free.

Website: https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/global-conflict-tracker

E-Mail: communications@cfr.org

Summary: The Council on Foreign Relations Global Conflict Tracker allows users to track key global conflicts. This ranges, for example, from Transnational Terrorism in the Middle East to Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. In addition, a broad range of other conflict information is provided, accompanied by commentary and data. Filtering permits users to query the tracker by impact on U.S. interests, region, conflict status and type of conflict.


Host Institution: Center for Systemic Peace, Vienna, Austria.

Scope: High Casualty Terrorist Bombings n ≥ 15, 1989-2017

Access: Free.

Website: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html

E-Mail: contact@systemicpeace.org

Summary: The High Casualty Terrorist Bombings, 1989-2017 (HCTB) data set records bomb attacks directed at civilian and political non-combatant targets instigated by non-state actors. The minimum level entry to the data set is 15 deaths or more. The data set, listed in a spreadsheet, contains 1,272 incidents.
7. Jihadist Foreign Fighters Monitor (JihFFMON)

**Host Institution:** The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands.

**Scope:** Dutch and Swiss jihadists who have travelled and remain(ed) in Syria and Iraq.

**Access:** Free.

**Website:** [https://dwh.hcss.nl/apps/ftf_monitor/](https://dwh.hcss.nl/apps/ftf_monitor/)

**E-Mail:** reinierbergema@hcss.nl

**Summary:** The Jihadist Foreign Fighters Monitor (JihFFMON) is an interactive tool allowing users to analyse Dutch and Swiss jihadist foreign fighters who have travelled to Syria and Iraq. The JihFFMON monitor provides graphical data, filtering functions and statistical data as well as hyperlinks to related documents on travelling jihadi foreign fighters and returnees.

8. The Kivu Security Tracker (KST)

**Host Institution:** Congo Research Group, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, New York City (NYC), United States and Human Rights Watch.

**Scope:** Violence by state security forces and armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

**Access:** Free.

**Website:** [https://kivusecurity.org/map](https://kivusecurity.org/map)

**E-Mail:** info@kivusecurity.org

**Summary:** The Kivu Security Tracker is an interactive website that maps violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo by state security forces and armed groups. A series of interactive maps (with narrative), graphs and reports provide researchers with both quantitative and qualitative data. The data sets can be used for trend analysis and causal analysis of violations covered by international human rights and humanitarian law. Key incident variables include: violent death, mass rape, political repression and kidnapping (for ransom).

9. LADB – Latin American Digest Beat

**Host Institution:** Latin American Digest Beat, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico (NM), United States.

**Scope:** Social, political and economic issues in South America, including terrorism and political violence incidents.

**Access:** Log-in required.

**Website:** [http://ladb.unm.edu/](http://ladb.unm.edu/)

**E-Mail:** ladb@unm.edu

**Summary:** LADB – the Latin American Digest Beat, provides a database of over 28,000 articles drawn from a wide array of journals and news media sources on material relating to South America. Key searches on ‘Political Violence’ and ‘Terrorism’ within the archive provides hundreds of entries on political violence and terrorism incidents in South America.


**Host Institution:** Center for Systemic Peace, Vienna, Austria.

Access: Free.

Website: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html

E-Mail: contact@systemicpeace.org

Summary: The Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) data sets records major armed conflict for the period 1946-2017. A major episode of political violence is defined as a minimum of 500 'directly related' deaths as a result of systematic, intense and sustained political violence. Episodes of political violence in the MEPV can include, for example inter-state, intra-state or communal events.

11. Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and al Qaeda

Host Institution: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland (MD), United States.

Scope: Muslim public opinion in the larger society on U.S. policy, attacks on civilians and on al Qaeda since 9/11.

Access: Free.

Website: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl%3A1902.1/16069

E-Mail: infostart@start.umd.edu

Summary: This series of survey data sets, undertaken by WorldPublicOpinion in Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan and Indonesia, attempts to assess Muslim public opinion on Islamic groups, including al Qaeda in the post-9/11 era. Among the broad range of key research questions this study assesses, are the views of the larger Muslim societies, their prevailing narratives and their understanding of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The research is undertaken by WorldPublicOpinion.org with the principle support from academic staff at the University of Maryland's START consortium.

12. The Nigeria Security Tracker (NST)


Scope: Political violence within Nigeria.

Access: Free.

Website: https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483

E-Mail: communications@cfr.org

Summary: The Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), hosted by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), records acts of political violence in Nigeria. Source data are derived from weekly surveys of both local Nigerian media reports and international news sources. The NST began monitoring in May 2011. The data and information are mapped onto a graphical interface. This includes an interactive map of Nigeria accompanied by commentary, statistical data and graphs. Much of the NST’s data is linked to underlying political, economic and social problems within Nigeria. For example, the weekly tracker includes the activities of militant Islamist groups such as Boko Haram, ethnic group violence and state violence against groups and individuals.

13. Nuclear Facilities Attack Database (NuFAD)

Host Institution: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland, (MD), United States.
**Scope:** Global coverage of assaults, sabotages and unarmed breaches of nuclear facilities.

**Access:** Free.

**Website:** [http://www.start.umd.edu/nuclear-facilities-attack-database-nufad](http://www.start.umd.edu/nuclear-facilities-attack-database-nufad)

**E-Mail:** infostart@start.umd.edu

**Summary:** Developed and operated by START, the Nuclear Facilities Attack Database (NuFAD) is an interactive open source database covering the years 1961-2014. This interactive database recorded 80 incidents of sabotage, assaults and unarmed breaches relating to radiological threats and threats to nuclear facilities. An interactive map, timeline and filtering systems provides users with a series of criteria while an accompanying narrative describes each incident.

14. **Odhikar Statistical Data Sets on Political Violence (Bangladesh)**

**Host Institution:** Odhikar, Bangladesh.

**Scope:** Statistics on Political Violence 2001 – May 2018.

**Access:** Free.


**E-Mail:** [http://odhikar.org/contact-us/](http://odhikar.org/contact-us/)

**Summary:** Odhikar, a human rights organisation based in Bangladesh, produces a series of data sets on human rights issues, including incidents of political violence in Bangladesh from 2001-2018. The data sets present data on individuals killed in acts of political violence in Bangladesh as well as data on intra-party clashes between the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL).


**Host Institution:** The Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC), Princeton University, New Jersey (NJ), United States.

**Scope:** Incidents of terrorism in Pakistan (civilian and non-combatant) 2004-2009.

**Access:** Free.


**E-Mail:** [https://esoc.princeton.edu/contact](https://esoc.princeton.edu/contact)

**Summary:** The Pakistan Geo-Referenced WITS data set contains geo-referenced incidents of terrorism recorded in what was formerly the United States Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) database. The incidents covering the period 2004-2009 record acts of violence in Pakistan involving non-combatants and civilians.

16. **Pew Research Center - Data Surveys on Terrorism**

**Host Institution:** Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. United States

**Scope:** Broad ranging public surveys on terrorism related themes.

**Access:** Free.

**Website:** [http://www.pewresearch.org/topics/terrorism/](http://www.pewresearch.org/topics/terrorism/)

**E-Mail:** info@pewresearch.org
Summary: The Pew Research Center is a non-partisan organisation, headquartered in Washington D.C. It is a 'fact tank' covering a wide array of topics, including social, political, scientific and religious issues. Its key work focuses on public opinion polls and trends research as well as empirical analysis and demography. The Pew Research Center also collates data on terrorism issues related to the United States, e.g., American citizens' concern on ISIS, American attitudes in the post 9/11 period and American Muslims views on groups such as al Qaeda. The reports include narrative commentary, statistical data and graphic information.

17. Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS)

Host Institution: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland (MD), United States.

Scope: Identified individuals involved in violent and non-violent extremist incidents within the United States (1948-2016).

Access: Free. Requires legal terms and conditions agreement to be completed.

Website: http://www.start.umd.edu/data-tools/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-pirus

E-Mail: pirus@start.umd.edu

Summary: The Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) data set contains open source data on 1,800 violent and non-violent extremists with far left, far right and Islamist ideologies, as well as single-issue perpetrators. The data presents information on individuals, their attributes, backgrounds and the processes by which they were radicalised. In addition to the core PIRUS data set, users can access a highly sophisticated data visualization tool.

18. Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the United States (PPT-US)

Host Institution: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland (MD), United States.


Access: Free.

Website: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl%3A1902.1/17702

E-Mail: infostart@start.umd.edu

Summary: The PPT-US data set records incidents of terrorist activity by organisations, targeting the United States homeland for the period 1970-2016. An extensive array of variables is included in the PPT-US, including: terrorist incident, perpetrators (organisations) goals, ideology, alliances, networks and financial resources.

19. SPLC Southern Poverty Law Center Extremist Files Database

Host Institution: SPLC Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, Alabama (AL), United States.

Scope: Profiles of key radical-right individuals in the United States.

Access: Free.

Website: https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files

E-mail: https://www.splcenter.org/contact-us/general

Summary: The SPLC Southern Poverty Law Center is a legal advocacy organisation (non-profit) based in Montgomery, Alabama (AL), US. The SPLC maintains the Extremist Files Database detailing profiles of prominent radical right individuals and organisations. The profiles include detailed narratives on the
backgrounds of named individuals. In addition, the database also provides search functions on extremist groups and ideologies within the United States.

20. Terrorism Against Israel (1920-Present)

**Host Institution:** Jewish Virtual Library a project of AICE (The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise), Maryland (MD), United States.

**Scope:** Terrorism incidents against Israel since 1920.

**Access:** Free.

**Website:** [https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/terrorism-against-israel](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/terrorism-against-israel)

**E-Mail:** [https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/contact-us](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/contact-us)

**Summary:** The Jewish Virtual Library (JVL) is a project of The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise (AICE). The JVL publishes an extensive set of data on terrorism incidents against Israel, covering also the period before the country came into existence. The figures dating back to 1920, include data and statistics on fatal attacks, trends in anti-Israeli terrorism, major attacks worldwide (against Israel) and counter-terrorism.

21. Terrorist and Extremist Organisations (TEO) Database

**Host Institution:** National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland (MD), United States.

**Scope:** Terrorist and extremist organisations.

**Access:** Contact START.


**E-Mail:** [infostart@start.umd.edu](mailto:infostart@start.umd.edu)

**Summary:** The Terrorist Extremists Organisations (TEO) Database project attempts to gain better insights into the process of individuals forming into groups and organisations to pursue common objectives using terrorism and violence as a tactical method. The project analysed the formation of organisations, the bonds that keep them together, their tactical use of terror and violence, how they survive and how organisations wither away and cease.

**II. Commercial Databases**

22. Control Risks Risk Maps

**Host Institution:** Control Risks, London, United Kingdom

**Scope:** Global series of forecast maps on political and security risks

**Access:** Free.


**E-Mail:** [https://www.controlrisks.com/contact-us](https://www.controlrisks.com/contact-us)

**Summary:** The Control Risks RiskMap series provides a set of forecasts on worldwide political and security risk in high resolution map format. The nine maps cover a wide array of political and security themes. These include, for example, political and security risk, terrorism and militancy, kidnap, travel risk and maritime piracy. Each map contains accompanying keys, rating security and political risk and theme related keys.
23. The United States Sanctions Tracker

**Host Institution:** Enigma Public, United States.

**Scope:** United States Government sanctions, 1994 - Present.

**Access:** Free.

**Website:** [https://labs.enigma.com/sanctions-tracker/](https://labs.enigma.com/sanctions-tracker/)

**E-Mail:** [https://www.enigma.com/contact](https://www.enigma.com/contact)

**Summary:** The United States Sanctions Tracker is an interactive website providing narratives, data and graphics on U.S. sanctions against countries, companies, Specially Designated Individuals (SDN's), organisations and industries, dating back to 1994. The tracker provides a list of thematic sanctions issues, including terrorism. Terrorism data for the tracker is sourced, among others, from the Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT) and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (SDGT). An interactive timeline map provides information on key sanctions-related topics: terrorism, narcotics trafficking, Iran, Ukraine/Russia and North Korea. The tracker allows users to identify the U.S. Presidential administrations (from Clinton to Trump) that have invoked specific sanctions. The tracker does not include embargoes, nor does it cover all U.S. sanctions.

24. Gallup Polls on Terrorism-related Topics

**Host Institution:** Gallup, Washington, D.C., United States.

**Scope:** Survey polls on terrorism-related topics.

**Access:** Free.

**Website:** [https://news.gallup.com/topic/terrorism.aspx](https://news.gallup.com/topic/terrorism.aspx)

**E-Mail:** [https://news.gallup.com/contact.aspx](https://news.gallup.com/contact.aspx)

**Summary:** The Gallup survey polls provide a comprehensive selection of surveys on topical issues related to terrorism. For example, the public's worries about terror attacks on the United States, about visa controls and about the relationship between religion and terrorism are covered. Narrative comments, statistical data and graphs as well as information on the methodology used for each survey is also provided.

25. Maplecroft Terrorism Dashboard (MTD)

**Host Institution:** Verisk Maplecroft, Bath, United Kingdom.

**Scope:** Terrorism Incidents Worldwide.

**Access:** Contact Verisk Maplecroft.

**Website:** [https://www.maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2013/08/06/maplecroft-terrorism-dashboard-maps-over-12000-terror-attacks-over-last-20-months/](https://www.maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2013/08/06/maplecroft-terrorism-dashboard-maps-over-12000-terror-attacks-over-last-20-months/)

**E-Mail:** [info@maplecroft.com](mailto:info@maplecroft.com)

**Summary:** The Maplecroft Terrorism Dashboard (MTD) was a proprietary geo-coded dashboard of incidents of terrorism worldwide. Developed in 2012, the dashboard provided interactive mapping to facilitate geographic trend analysis of terrorism incidents. In addition to the 12,000 incidents coded on the MTD, the company planned to incorporate retrospectively all incidents from the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), developed and built by the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The current operating status of the MTD is unknown.
26. Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC) Database

Host Institution: Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC), United States.

Scope: Database of terrorism group profiles and related terrorism intelligence.

Access: Subscription based.

Website: https://www.trackingterrorism.org/

E-Mail: https://www.trackingterrorism.org/contact-us

Summary: The Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC) is a subscription-based service offering use of its database and related terrorism resources. The TRAC database provides information on terrorist group profiles, ideologies, operations, maps as well as terrorist groups. The TRAC database also encompasses 'chatter categories', videos and research publications. The database operates in real-time.

III. Government Databases

27. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Terrorism Most Wanted Lists

Host Institution: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington, D.C., United States.

Scope: FBI Most Wanted – Terrorism.

Access: Free.

Website: https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorism

E-Mail: https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/

Summary: The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) produces a series of interactive lists on 'Most Wanted Terrorists', 'Domestic Terrorism' and 'Seeking Information – Terrorism'. Users can filter by category and search information covering the period 2010-2018. Detailed profile information pertaining to named individuals is provided, including, for example, alleged terrorist group connection, alleged terrorism incident(s) indictments, photographs and warnings to the public.

28. National Counter Terrorism Database (NCTD), Pakistan [under development]

Host Institution: National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Scope: Database to counter terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.

Access: Restricted.

Website: https://nacta.gov.pk/national-counter-terrorism-database/

E-Mail: https://nacta.gov.pk/ [Contact form]

Summary: The National Counter Terrorism Database (NCTD) is currently being developed by the Pakistan National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). The NCTD will log: incidents of terrorism, individuals detained, proscribed and wanted persons, as well as under-trial prisoners. Further parts of the real-time NCTD will hold information on Madaris (Muslim schools with emphasis on Islamic studies), Masajid (Mosques), terror-alerts and profiles of convicted terrorists and extremists.

29. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Sanctions List Search Tool

Scope: U.S. Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) and Consolidated Sanctions List.

Access: Free.

Website: https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/

E-Mail: https://home.treasury.gov/utility/contact

Summary: The Sanctions List Search Tool, is operated by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) within the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The tool allows users to search Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) and the Consolidated Sanctions List against a range of subject areas including identified terrorists and drug traffickers. It includes the names of countries, such as Iran, Sudan and Cuba that OFAC has applied economic sanctions against. The Sanctions List Search Tool includes information on groups of individuals, including designated terrorists.

30. Terrorism in Great Britain: the Statistics. [June 2018]


Access: Free.

Website: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7613/CBP-7613.pdf

E-Mail: papers@parliament.uk

Summary: Terrorism in Great Britain: the Statistics, is a briefing paper produced by the UK House of Commons’ research service for Members of Parliament (MP’s) and their support staff. The briefing publishes statistics on terrorism in Great Britain issued by the U.K. Home Office as well as other sources, including the START Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the University of Maryland. Key statistical data include: deaths due to terrorism, terrorism arrests, prosecutions and convictions for acts of terrorism and number of foreign fighters present in Syria.

About the Compiler: Neil G. Bowie is an independent scholar, specialising in the analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorism. He holds a Ph.D. from the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. Neil Bowie also holds degrees from the universities of Aberdeen, Strathclyde and from Edinburgh's Napier University. He can be reached at: neil.bowie1@btinternet.com
Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 30 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

The books reviewed in this column are arranged according to the following topics: “Terrorism – General,” “Suicide Terrorism,” “Boko Haram,” “Islamic State,” “Northern Ireland,” and “Pakistan and Taliban.”

Terrorism – General


This is a well-informed account of the impact of Europe’s refugee crisis that was generated by the post-Arab Spring conflicts’ population displacements affecting the continent’s changing political climate, economic situation, and levels of crime and terrorism. In terms of terrorism, the author points out that several significant terrorist attacks involved operatives who had entered European countries illegally, such as some members of the cells that had carried out the attacks in Paris (November 2015) and Brussels (March 2016). With regard to future terrorism trends, the author cites Phillip Ingram, a former British intelligence officer, who observed that “Conservative estimates suggest thousands of extremists have managed to slip in through the refugee crisis. And a significant number of them have experience in fighting and in planning not only simple operations, but the kind of complex ones seen in Paris and Brussels” (p. 87). The migration crisis is also affecting Europe’s politics, the author concludes, with “the fault lines of increasingly polarized left- and right-wing partisan ideologies… resulting in earthquakes of various sizes, in Europe and around the world” (p. 214). The author is an American journalist and analyst who runs the “Balkan.com” website and lives in Skopje, Macedonia.


This conceptually important account is based on the author’s extensive field research in Indonesia, where she interviewed fifty-five jihadis from seven Islamist groups in order to examine their disengagement from terrorism. The author’s thesis is that “disengagement is driven by a combination of psychological, emotional, relational, and strategic factors” (p. 8). Specifically, four factors are identified in the disengagement process: “(1) disillusionment with the group’s tactics and leaders; (2) rational assessment, where one comes to analyze the extent to which the context has changed or whether the costs of continued actions outweigh potential benefits; (3) the establishment of an alternative social network of friends, mentors, and sympathetic family members; and (4) a shift in priorities toward gainful employment and family life” (p. 8). Following a discussion of general theories of disengagement, the author explains how the Indonesian case offers “rich opportunities for those seeking to understand why Indonesian jihadists are disengaging from violence” (p. 15). To analyze these issues, the book’s chapters cover topics such as the status of Jemaah Islamiyah, the country’s primary jihadist terrorist group, and five chapters with each one presenting a case study of jihadists who disengaged from terrorism (all of whom are given pseudonyms). The next chapter, “The Role of the State and Civil Society in Disengagement Initiatives,” analyzes the effectiveness of programs by the state and civil society to facilitate disengagement and de-radicalization of Indonesian jihadists. One of the author’s findings is that these programs “lack needs assessments or outcomes assessment” despite the availability of such data, and that it “would also be advisable to prioritize disengagement, reintegration, and aftercare as an end in itself” (p. 166). The author concludes that “to disengage and reintegrate, one must have a counterbalancing support structure of friends, family, and mentors that constitute an alternative set of loyalties” (p. 184). This book is an important contribution to the theoretical literature as well as to country case studies on the factors involved in de-radicalization and disengagement from terrorism. The author is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Goucher College, in Towson, Maryland.

This edited volume is an account of regime change – generally defined as a radical replacement or overthrow of a government by another, usually by means of military force, whether internal or external, or resulting from a popular uprising. The volume's aim is to present an overriding conceptual framework that is examined through a series of country case studies to generate findings. As the editors explain, “to identify patterns, commonalities and disjunctures in contemporary transitions that occur after civil war, secessionist conflict, popular revolution or military rule (p. 3). The case studies are arranged in five clusters of analysis: transitions after civil war (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, and Nepal); transitions after popular revolutions (German Democratic Republic, Iran, and Tunisia); transitions after violent secession (Kosovo, South Sudan, and Northern Cyprus); transitions after military rule (Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Ghana, and Myanmar); and transition after foreign intervention (Afghanistan). The concluding chapter discusses the factors that influence the success of regime change, such as those that are endogenous (e.g., the perceived legitimacy of a new regime in its “ability to provide goods and services to the population ‘under its command’) (p. 326) and exogenous (e.g., impact of international humanitarian aid). Hans-Joachim Giessmann is Executive Director of the Berghof Foundation, Germany, and Roger Mac Ginty is in the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, and the Department of Politics at the University of Manchester, UK.


This is an insightful and comprehensive account of the latest trends in global terrorism by Walter Laqueur, one of the top veteran experts on terrorism (who, sadly, passed away following the book's publication at the age of 97 on September 30, 2018), and his co-author Christopher Wall, an instructor on counterterrorism for the United States Navy. Following an introductory overview of terrorism, including a discussion of the changes introduced by the fourth wave of terrorism (based on David Rapoport's notion of the four waves of modern terrorism), the book is divided into three sections. The first section, “History and the Invention of Terrorism,” is a history of the evolution of terrorism, beginning with the French Revolution, anarchism in Russia (and the notion of terrorism as 'propaganda by the deed’), through the end of the Second World War, including the use of terrorism by Indian nationalists. The second section, “Contemporary Terrorism,” covers modern terrorism, focusing primarily on the emergence and prevalence of al Qaida as one of the world’s major terrorist groups, as well as the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS), and its rivalry with al Qaida. It recounts the proliferation of Islamist jihadi terrorism in Europe, North America, and in major terrorist battlegrounds such as Afghanistan, Libya, and Yemen. The final section, “Reflections on Terrorism,” presents the authors’ findings on the study of terrorism, such as the psychology of terrorism, economic explanations of terrorism, the impact of religious extremism on terrorism, and weaknesses in the arguments presented by what is known as the school of ‘critical terrorism studies’. The section’s final chapter presents the authors’ findings on future trends in terrorism. An Epilogue discusses the impact of Donald Trump’s presidency on terrorism. The book's numerous important insights include the observation that a group’s strategy of conquering territory “in the shortest amount of time possible” is also one of its significant vulnerabilities because the “‘liberation’ of territories created obvious targets for counterterrorist forces that had not existed before” (p. 13), mainly because “holding territory also means that terrorists must operate out in the open, making them easy targets for the modern air forces of most developed countries” (p. 14). One of the few points on which the authors can, in the view of this reviewer, be criticized is when they refer to Menachem Begin's (who later became Israel's Prime Minister) dissident right-wing terrorist group's July 1946 bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem as helping to “establish the modern state of Israel” (p. 130). In fact, it was the mainstream Mapai-led diplomacy and the paramilitary Haganah’s armed force that brought about Israeli statehood in May 1948. The authors insightfully conclude that “terrorism is not an existential threat because of the inferior military capability terrorists normally possess short of their acquiring weapons of mass destruction.” They further observe that a state's overreaction to terrorism “can pose
an existential threat to itself,” for instance, in imposing “punitive and draconian” anti-terrorism programs that impinge on a democratic society’s civil liberties (p. 244).


The contributors to this volume apply a multi-disciplinary approach to examine the important issue of how terrorists are portrayed in the media and in popular culture, particularly as stereotypical masculine images of terrorists are employed to threaten their targeted societies in many ways. However, with women becoming increasingly active in terrorist operations, including as suicide bombers, using their bodies as weapons, such attacks, the editors explain, are subverting the accepted “cultural construction of masculinity and femininity” resulting in repercussions for the gendering of the profile of terrorists. To examine these issues, the volume’s chapters discuss topics such as the “sartorial code” of Anders Behring Breivik, and how “adversarial masculinities” were portrayed in two works of fiction (Jean Larteguy’s 1960 novel *The Centurions* and Fox’s television counter-terrorism series *24*), and how insurgents were portrayed in some of Britain’s colonial wars. Sue Malvern is Senior Lecturer in History of Art, University of Reading, and Gabriel Koureas is Lecturer in Visual and material Culture at Birbeck, University of London.


This is a conceptually innovative examination of why civil wars occur in some countries but not others. The case studies of Peru (1980-1995), where civil war broke out, and Bolivia (2000-2008), where it did not, provide the study’s empirical data. An overarching research question is examined for both countries: what were the high-intensity and low intensity “conflict-fueling and conflict-inhibiting factors that determined violence escalation intensity” (p. 9). Quantitative and qualitative data and interviews with experts and secondary literature are used to answer this question. In the concluding chapter, the author finds that the major difference between the potential onset of violent civil war in Peru and Bolivia was the organizational strength of the Sendero Luminoso (SL – ‘Shining Path’), which was “fostered by the failed policies” of the Peruvian state. The author concludes that an “irregular armed rebel group could not emerge in Bolivia because of the lack of underlying conditions and powerful actors making use of these factors” (p. 181). Strategic mistakes by SL, on the other hand, contributed to the group’s defeat and the de-escalation of the conflict. This was due to three major failures: “the alienation of rural peasantry because of indiscriminate SL violence; a failed urban warfare strategy; and the overconcentration on Guzman as charismatic leader” (p. 185). A final section provides a valuable discussion of future directions in peace and conflict studies. The author is Research Fellow, Heinrich-Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany.


This book provides concisely written, authoritative and insightful overviews of significant topics in the study of terrorism and counterterrorism in a question-and-answer format. It is divided into seven sections: (1) “A Primer on Terrorism” (e.g., defining terrorism, the history and evolution of terrorism, the distinction between transnational terrorism and domestic terrorism, the rationality of terrorism, and metrics to assess the effectiveness of terrorism; (2) “Causes of Terrorism” (e.g., globalization, poverty, religion, foreign policy, and failed states, as well as whether the causes differ for domestic and transnational terrorism); (3) “Role of Terrorist Groups” (e.g., what is a terrorist group, how do terrorist groups recruit members, how are terrorist groups organized, how do leaders exercise control, why do some groups choose to conduct suicide attacks while others do not, how do terrorist groups end, and what is the nature of state sponsorship of terrorist groups; (4) “Effectiveness of Counterterrorism” (what are the measures employed in counterterrorism, what is the nature of proactive and defensive measures in counterterrorism, how effective is retaliation, should concessions be made to resolve terrorist kidnappings, and how effective is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security); (5) “Asymmetries and Terrorism” (e.g., what is the nature of the asymmetric competition between terrorist groups
and their stronger government adversaries, and why do certain terrorist groups cooperate with each other; (6) “Economic Consequences of Terrorism” (e.g., why do terrorist groups aim to cause economic damages to their government adversaries, and what is the impact of targeting certain economic sectors, such as transportation and tourism); and (7) “The Future of Terrorism” (e.g., can future trends in terrorist warfare be forecasted, the role of intelligence in anticipating terrorist warfare, what new types of terrorist warfare are likely, ranging from cyberterrorism to weapons of mass destruction, and what are likely future “hotspots” for terrorist outbreaks). Written by a veteran academic expert on terrorism and counterterrorism, the book provides numerous insights. These include the observation that success in terrorist groups’ warfare can be defined as the “ability to inflict damage and gain visibility for their cause. Alternatively, success can hinge on the groups’ ability to secure some or all of their demands” (p. 22). The author also expects low-tech attacks to “remain the most prevalent kind of terrorist attack” because they “can kill at relatively low cost,” they “can be performed by loosely knit cells” and lone actors, and the casualty impacts “are sufficiently large to attract the world-wide attention” that terrorists seek (pp. 141-142). The author is the Vibhooti Shukla Professor of Economics and Political Economy at the University of Texas at Dallas, Texas.


This is a carefully analyzed examination of the interaction between terrorists’ use of the Internet’s social media and privacy law, freedom of expression, data protection and governments’ surveillance legislation. To examine these issues, the book’s chapters cover topics such as defining terrorism, including its legal definition and the distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare; terrorists’ use of social media; counter-measures by governments, such as requests to social media companies to take down extremists’ sites; assessing the effectiveness of counter-narratives against extremists’ messages; and the impact of extremists’ use of social media on journalism. The author concludes that “in order for an appropriate balance to be struck, those operating at the intersection of these interests and rights must ensure that they remain attuned not only to the complex laws that govern this area, but also to the constantly evolving social and media environment” (p. 192). The author is a privacy and data protection solicitor in London, England, UK.


This is an examination of the historical and cultural factors in the Middle East and how they can contribute to a better understanding of current extremist narratives in the Middle East. The author applies a critical discourse analysis within the framework of Hayden White’s views on narratives as well as Johan Galtung’s theories on structural and cultural violence, combined with elements of auto-ethnography. A number of the author’s conclusions can be questioned, including the following assertion: “Their modern-day avatars, Kurds, Bedouin, Palestinians, militant settlers, Hutus and Berbers, have already created their own collective grand narrative that Western powers have denigrated as terrorist” (p. 199). Throughout the text, the author appears to disregard the difference between legitimate armed insurgent and resistance movements adhering by and large to international and humanitarian law principles in their efforts to overthrow illegitimate regimes and terrorist groups that primarily target civilian populations and do not respect the immunity of non-combatants. The book is jargon-filled and full of statements that make no sense to this reviewer, e.g., “If modern Western history can be characterized as ironically structured and satirically emplotted, we may be seeing a harbinger of what traditional historians liked to characterize as ‘decline’ or collapse” (p. 201). The author is Adjunct Associate Professor of Archaeology and Anthropology at Catholic University, in Washington, DC.


This comprehensive volume is the sixth in a series of the Small Wars Journal-El Centro anthologies that examine the subject of criminal and state interactions in Mexico as well as Central and South America, including its spill-over into other countries such as the United States. As the editors explain in their introductory overview,
while the previous volumes examined the violent competition for power and profit between criminal cartels and states within a framework of ‘criminal insurgency’ where cartels and criminals exploit weaknesses in states to control the turf in which criminal enterprises operate, the contributors to the present volume examine how some state actors also succeed in penetrating, dominating, and co-opting criminal groups and networks as they transform their countries into narco/mafia states for their own illicit financial gains. These topics are discussed in the volume’s 54 chapters, foreword, introductory overview, postscript, afterword, and appendices. The volume’s chapters cover topics such as “Review of Gangster Warlords: Drug Dollars, Killing Fields, and the New Politics of Latin America,” “America’s Unacknowledged Insurgency: Addressing Street Gangs as Threats to National Security,” “Bullets for Ballots: A History of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration in Colombia,” “Coke Zero: FARC’s End and the Future of Colombian Cocaine,” “Developing Military Forces to Counter Hybrid Threats: Mexico’s Marines,” “Criminal Networks: A Gateway for Terrorists,” “Gangs in El Salvador: A New Type of Insurgency?,” “Crime, Drugs, Terror and Money: Time for Hybrids,” and “The Shining Path of Peru: An Analysis of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Tactics.” John P. Sullivan served as a Lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department and is a Senior Fellow with Small Wars Journal--El Centro. Robert J. Bunker is an Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA and a Senior Fellow with Small Wars Journal--El Centro.

**Suicide Terrorism**


This is a conceptually innovative examination of suicide terrorism in general, and Palestinian suicide terrorism in Israel during the second Intifada, which lasted from September 2000 to February 2005, in particular. One of the book’s unique contributions is its analysis of suicide terrorism from an anthropological-sociological perspective, based on the author’s extensive field research in Israel and the West Bank focusing “on the site of the act of suicide terrorism in real time” (pp. xxiv-xxv). This field research included the author’s role as participant-observer in suicide terrorism scenes by being embedded with the ultra-Orthodox ZAKA volunteers who arrive in the immediate aftermath of suicide terrorist incidents to deal with the bodies of victims, and who also work with emergency medical responders in treating the wounded. Such direct involvement in managing the incidents’ aftermaths leads the author to contend that “suicide terrorism is exceptional in that it breaks down the fundamental distinction between aggressor and victims” (p. xxv) and to understand “the human bomb and those who dispatched him before the explosion” (p. xxxi). Following an introductory overview, the book’s conceptual framework is applied to examine topics such as the complexity of profiling Palestinian suicide bombers, including how potential candidates are recruited; the anatomy of a suicide bombing operations, including several case studies; the preparatory phases prior to an attack; the religiously-based views of martyrdom sacrifice involved in targeting the oppressor victimizer; the research methodology involved in investigating suicide terrorism; and concluding findings. With the decline in the incidents of Palestinian suicide bombing attacks in the current period due to a spectrum of factors, including upgraded Israeli defensive measures, the book would have benefited from a discussion of the transformation in terrorist tactics, for instance, the increasing use of rockets and mortars, shootings and stabbings, but it is still an important contribution to the literature on suicide bombing attacks. The author is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.


The contributors to this edited volume examine the historical role of martyrdom and terrorism in relation to the traditions of Christianity in Europe and Islam in the Middle East. The book is divided into three parts. The chapters in Part One, “Pre- and Early Modern Violence and Martyrdom,” examine the writings on martyrdom in early Christianity and Islam, including how Protestants and Catholics viewed the role of Church and State in
early modern England. The Second Part, “The French Revolution and the Invention of Terrorism,” examines the rhetoric of martyrdom-type sacrifice by leading figures in the French Revolution. The third part, “Martyrdom, Terrorism, and the Modern West,” explores how patterns of religious thinking have influenced contemporary expressions of martyrdom sacrifice and terrorism. These more recent manifestations include the martyrdom-terrorism nexus in Ireland prior to independence; terrorism and martyrdom in contemporary Britain in the form of al Qaida-linked Islamist terrorism by the July 7, 2005 terrorist cell that carried out the attacks against London’s transportation system and others; martyrdom and hostage executions by Islamist extremist terrorists in the Iraq War; and how the “screen media” has “cast individuals as terrorists or martyrs” (p. 20). Dominic Janes is Reader in Cultural History and Visual Studies at Birbeck, University of London, and Alex Houen is Senior University Lecturer in Modern Literature in the Faculty of English, University of Cambridge, and Fellow of Pembroke College.


The contributors to this volume apply multi-disciplinary approaches to examine suicide terrorism in all its dimensions. Following the editors’ introductory overview, the volume is divided into two sections. Section I, “Suicide Terrorism: A Phenomenon,” applies psychosocial, evolutionary psychological, and military disciplines to examine suicide terrorism. This section is accompanied by an analysis of the terrorist operatives who had carried out the November 2008 Mumbai attacks in India. Section II, “Suicide Terrorism: A Process,” continues the discussion of the psychology of suicide terrorism, including whether such actors are indeed ‘suicidal,’ the militant jihadi ideology that motivates such actors, the “use and abuse” of children and youth in terrorism and suicide bombing attacks, and the measures required to deter suicide terrorism. What makes this edited volume especially important is the collaboration of American, Israeli, Dutch, and Indian experts on suicide terrorism.


This is a conceptually innovative and highly-informed account of the appeal of violent extremism to the tiny minority of Muslim women who leave their homes, especially in Western countries, to join foreign terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State (IS). What makes this account especially important is the author’s personal background as a Pakistani Muslim immigrant to America, her extensive experience as a government expert at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and her field research, which included interviewing female Muslim extremists. To explain this phenomenon, the author formulates an analytic framework based on the ‘Three Cs’: culture (e.g., the strongly held religious beliefs and religious rights and wrongs promulgated by violent Islamist extremists, including the appeal of entering paradise by conducting martyrdom operations), context (e.g., the “push and pull” factors for radicalization, such as their perceived sense of injustice done to the Muslim community in overseas conflicts affecting their brethren that need to be avenged), and capability (e.g., their competence in attaining the ability to become violent extremists, such as traveling to join a jihadist struggle in a conflict zone such as Syria for training in firearms to carry out their attacks). This framework is applied to examining several cases of Muslim female extremists who had decided to embark on violent trajectories into terrorism, such as Tashfeen Malik, who had carried out a terrorist attack with her husband, Syed Farook, in San Bernardino on December 2, 2015; Shannon Maureen Conley, a convert to Islam from Arvada, Colorado, who was arrested at Denver International Airport during her attempt to travel to Syria to join the IS on July 2, 2014; and others, including several extremist British females who had joined IS in Syria where they married jihadi fighters who later died in battle. What can be done to defeat such violent extremism? The burden, the author concludes, primarily lies with the Muslim world “to eradicate the conditions that lead to radical recruitment,” including teaching a more moderate and tolerant form of Islam and promoting “active female participation, rebuilding civil society, legislating educational reform, accounting for human rights abuses, and abetting Muslim women’s organizations” (p. 161). The author is a gender expert instructor at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, and a Research Fellow at the Center for Global Policy.
**Boko Haram**


This is a comprehensive collection of primary source documents, audio and video transcripts of pronouncements by Boko Haram preachers and other officials that were translated by the volume's editors. Following an insightful introductory overview on the history and nature of Boko Haram by David Cook, the volume is divided into five parts: Part One, “Nigerian Preachers (2006-2008)”; Part Two, “Reaching a Verdict (2008-2009)”; Part Three, “Making Nigeria Ungovernable (2009-2012)”; Part Four, “Boko Haram State (2013-2015)”; and Part Five, “West African Islamic State (2015-2016).” Each part is introduced by a short overview from the hand of one of the editors. Abdulbasit Kassim is a Ph.D student at Rice University, Houston, Texas, where David Cook is Associate Professor of Religion. Michael Nwankpa has a Ph.D in Sociology from the University of Roehampton, London, England, UK.

**Islamic State**


As explained by the editors’ introductory overview, this book attempts to “fill a niche” by focusing on “the lessons learned and pitfalls to be avoided in the future” in dealing with the Islamic State (ISIS) “as a strategic issue going forward, from the perspectives of the regional powers as well as the United States and its engagement in the region” (p. 4). To examine these issues, the book is divided into five parts. Part I, “Ideology and Externalities,” provides the editors’ introductory overview and a chapter on ISIS’s “revolutionary revanchism.” Part II, “Intelligence Failures,” discusses the American intelligence community's failure to anticipate the rise of ISIS and theoretical observations about how such intelligence failure came about. Part III, “Local Actors,” examines ISIS and other groups in Syria and Iraq, including the emergence of the Islamic State – Khorasan in the Afghanistan/Central Asia region. Part IV, “Joint Action: U.S. and Regional Powers,” discusses international and regional responses against ISIS. Part V, “U.S. Interests,” presents a chapter on the risk of ISIS’s attacks in the United States. It also offer suggestions on how to defeat ISIS as a state, as a transnational insurgency, and a revolutionary movement. This book, which is informed by its contributors’ veteran expertise in national security, is an important contribution to understanding the components involved in countering the threats posed by the Islamic State.


This is a well-informed account of the conditions that produced the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS, and its Arabic acronym, Da’esh), and what it portends for the Middle East’s future. The book’s chapters cover topics such as ISIS’s world view; its origins (from its founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to its current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi); the impact of Iraq’s “broken politics” and Iraqi Ba’athists (especially their former military officers) in fueling ISIS’s revival; the role of the Syrian civil war in empowering ISIS’s control of geographical territory; the rivalry between al Qaida and ISIS (which the author describes as an extension of al Qaida in Iraq) over redefining Salafi Jihadism; the factors underpinning ISIS’s appeal to Western Muslim youth (such as its social media postings that promise “a higher cause to fight for and a more promising life under the self-proclaimed caliphate” – p. 229); and the future of ISIS. The author views ISIS as having: “a totalitarian, millenarian worldview that eschews political pluralism, competition, and diversity of thought. Baghdadi and his associates criminalize and excommunicate adherents of freedom of thought, and the idea of an ‘other’ who deserves respect is alien to their messianic ideology. Any Muslim or co-jihadist who does not accept ISIS’s
interpretation of the Islamic doctrine is an apostate who deserves death” (p. 27). With regard to ISIS’s future, the author highlights its vulnerabilities, which include “the absence of a positive blueprint for governance and a debilitating vacuum of ideas” (p. 279). Another vulnerability, in comparative historical terms, is that it is “more like the Taliban in Afghanistan than the great revolutionary movements such as the Bolshevik Revolution and the Chinese Communist Revolution” (p. 288). Regarding ISIS’s future, one of the author’s conclusions is that “ISIS is a product of an organic crisis in Arab politics. Therefore, the decline and demise of the group will depend on the reconstruction of fragile state institutions and genuine political reconciliation among warring ethnic and religious communities, a complex and difficult process that will take years to materialize” (p. 290). It is such insights that make this book an important contribution to the literature on ISIS. The author teaches international relations and is professor in Contemporary Middle East Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science, England, UK.

Northern Ireland

Lorenzo Bosi and Gianluca De Fazio (Eds.), The Troubles in Northern Ireland and Theories of Social Movements (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press, 2017), 244 pp., Euro 95.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-9-0896-4959-1.

The contributors to this conceptually innovative volume examine various aspects of “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland through the lenses of social movement theory. As explained by the volume’s editors, several related questions are examined which apply to the conflict in Northern Ireland as well as other divided societies: “How does non-violent mobilization emerge and persist in deeply divided societies? What are the trajectories of participation in violent groups in these societies? What is the relationship between overt mobilization, clandestine operations, and protests among political prisoners? What is the role of media coverage and identity politics? Can there be non-sectarian collective mobilization in deeply divided societies?” (p. 12). The book’s chapters are divided into four sections: the relationship between the civil rights movement (CRM) and the larger political and media context, including the transition from protest to violence; social mobilization by the Protestant community, including Ulster loyalist accounts of mobilization, demobilization and decommissioning; social mobilization by the Irish Republican movement, including the mobilization movement outside prisons, using the H-Block hunger strike as a case study; and social movements in Northern Ireland that do not align with the traditional ethnonational divisions by operating from a non-sectarian platform. Lorenzo Bosi is an Assistant Professor at the Scuola Normale Superiore and Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Movement Studies (COSMOS), Florence, Italy. Gianluca De Fazio is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Justice Studies at James Madison University, Harrisonburg, Virginia.


This is an interesting conceptual as well as empirically-based account of the behaviors and motivations of British soldiers during the early period of their deployment in the Northern Ireland conflict from 1971 to 1972. As the author explains, his conceptual framework applies a ‘bottom up’ approach to study the conduct of such small groups of soldiers over a brief period of time “to capture and examine these soldiers’ orientations, loyalties, rationale, confusion, motivation and fears during a period of profound tactical confusion regarding aims and the conduct of operations” (p. 5). This framework is applied to examine the activities of the British Army’s Scots Guards and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders units in Northern Ireland during the period of 1971 to 1972. The author is Assistant Professor in International Relations at the University of Nottingham, England, UK.
The contributors to this volume examine the factors causing violent activity by mostly republican and some loyalist dissidents in Northern Ireland and the methods required to mitigate such threats. A series of questions were posed to the volume's contributors, which is the product of an experts workshop held by the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews, such as who are the dissident republicans and what distinguishes them from the rest of society, what are their political objectives, why are they committed to engage in physical violence, how are they radicalized into violent extremism, and how can disengagement from violence be promoted? (p. 7). Among the volume’s important insights is the chapter by John Nalton, Gilbert Ramsey, and Max Taylor on “Radicalization and Internet Propaganda by Dissident Republican Groups in Northern Ireland since 2008.” It cites an article by P. Brantingham and F.A. Faust (1976) in identifying three types of crime prevention initiatives, which apply to countering terrorism: primary prevention, which focuses on stopping a crime prior to its occurrence; secondary prevention, which focuses on “known offenders” (p. 136). It also presents a highly useful typology of radicalizing Internet sites as “international – high profile,” “international – low profile,” “local – known,” and “local – unknown,” with appropriate countering extremism activities directed at each category. (p. 138) In the concluding chapter, co-editor P.M. Currie’s findings include the observation that countering violent dissident republicanism requires “a more effective counter-narrative to point up the criminality, cruelty and hypocrisy of dissident communications and activity, to undermine the appeal of fictionalized accounts of violent attacks and to promote understanding of the significant achievements of the peace process and the injustices and suffering that went before” (p. 173). This volume is an important contribution to the literature on the challenges presented by dissident terrorist groups that emerge in the aftermath of peace agreements and the measures required to mitigate such threats. The authors were, at the time of publication, both associated with the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.


The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was established in June 1922, following the secession of the Irish Free State from the United Kingdom. This new police force incorporated the organizational culture, uniform and badges of its predecessor, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). The RUC served as Northern Ireland’s primary police force over the next eighty years, and, following the peace agreement that brought an end to the province’s protracted conflict, it was subsumed into the Police Service of Northern Ireland in November 2001. This book is an extensively researched, comprehensive, and authoritative history of the RUC, especially in the years following the intensification of the conflict in Northern Ireland in 1969. How effective was the RUC? The author observes that as a policing force the RUC “discharged its responsibilities well, providing an effective deterrent against crime and having an excellent detection rate, so much so that even in the worst years of the ‘troubles’ the crime clearance rate in Northern Ireland was higher than that of many forces in Great Britain” (p. 266). Attempting to manage the Province’s ‘troubles’ by the Republican and Loyalist terrorists who attacked police officers was more troublesome, however, and “placed an enormous strain” on RUC officers, while “the risk of injury or death was the highest in any European police force and one of the highest in the world. In the eighty of years of the force’s history, 314 officers lost their lives to those who believed in using violence for political ends; all but twelve died between 1969 and 1998” (p. 271). Richard Doherty is one of Ireland’s leading military history authors with more than a dozen monographs to his credit.


This is the author’s dramatic personal account as a Catholic from Cork, Ireland, who, rather than joining the IRA in 1995, became a member of the British Armed Forces. In 2001, as explained in the book’s back cover,
the author returned to Ireland as a member of the Army’s covert counter-terrorist unit in Northern Ireland, Joint Communications Unit Northern Ireland aka JCU-NI, the FRU, 14 Intelligence Company (known as “The Det”). For the next three years, the author was involved in numerous high-profile operations, including the arrest of IRA bomber John Paul Hannan, who was wanted by British authorities for engaging in a bombing campaign in London and Birmingham in 2001, and in the prevention of an assassination attempt on loyalist leader Johnny Adare. In 2004, the author decided to leave the British Army, with one of the cited reasons his suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and move back to South Africa.


This is a comprehensive and extensively detailed history of the background and aftermath of the dispute that led to the hunger strikes by the IRA prisoners in the H-Blocks of Long Kesh (later known as HM Prison Maze) in 1980-81. The prisoners’ demand was to overturn the British government's policy of criminalizing terrorist prisoners (with the IRAs operatives viewing themselves as “paramilitaries”) by granting them ‘special category status’ and distinguishing them from other prisoners who were sentenced for non-political criminal offenses. To examine these issues the author utilizes a wide array of newly released archival material to address topics such as the role of prisons in the conflict from 1972 to 1979, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy, the conditions that gave rise to the two hunger strikes and the attempts to negotiate a deal, the “war of attrition” between the IRA and the British security forces, and the end to the conflict with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement of April 10, 1998. The author is Professor of Modern British and Irish History at Canterbury Christ Church University, Kent, England, UK.


This is an interesting account of Britain’s intelligence and counterinsurgency campaign in Ireland from 1919 to 1921, which is known as the Anglo-Irish War. Although the book’s central figure is Michael Collins, the charismatic Irish revolutionary who was a leading figure in the Irish struggle for independence and had served as Chairman of the Provisional Government of the Irish Free State from January 1922 until his assassination in August 1922, the author's primary focus is to use the 1919 to 1921 period “as a case study of intelligence management under conditions of low-intensity conflict” (p. xiii). In the conclusion, the author finds that in responding to the Irish insurgency, British intelligence failed due to strategic, operational, tactical, and administrative mistakes, which were taken advantage of by Collins, whom the author describes as “a natural intelligence officer and political genius” (p. 228). The author finds that Collins “was a desperate physical-force nationalist and determined warrior who exploited a weak British security policy to wage a ruthless and bloody intelligence contest and guerrilla war. Collins’s greatest achievement, therefore, was to maneuver the British into this hopeless political dilemma, not in eliminating British forces” (p. 228). The author is a retired veteran of U.S. intelligence, including serving as a case officer in the National Clandestine Service.


During the Northern Ireland civil war from 1968 to 1998, known as “The Troubles,” a spectrum of adversarial Roman Catholic “Republican” and Protestant “Loyalist” terrorist groups operated in the province. This book focuses on the British government's counterterrorism's response measures, discussing how its military, police and intelligence special units were formed, their mandates, how their operatives were recruited, how they operated and their most significant operations. To examine these issues, Mr. Lesley-Dixon's book - with numerous photographs that illustrate the text - is divided into three parts. The first part, “Nationalist Paramilitary Organizations,” focuses primarily on the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). It operated from 1970 to 1998 with Sinn Fein, its non-violent political front contesting the U.K.'s parliamentary elections. The PIRA, the author explains, committed the largest number of terrorist attacks, which aimed “to foster urban
insurgency, civil disorder [to] seriously exercise and strain routine policing and thus create a threat to national security and advance their desire for a one-Ireland island” (p. 26). It also aimed to disrupt the province’s civil order by bombing local businesses “to deter inward investment and job creation in the province” (p. 27). Some of its major terrorist operations involved a bombing assassination of Lord Louis Mountbatten on Aug. 27, 1979 while he was on vacation in Mullaghmore, County Sligo, and bombing the Grand Hotel in Brighton on Oct. 12, 1984, where politicians, including Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, were staying for the Conservative Party’s annual conference. While Thatcher was not hurt, five people were killed, and 34 others were wounded. “Loyalist Paramilitary Organizations,” the second part, examines the origins and operations of groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). Their operations were “intent on championing Unionism, protecting Protestant communities and ruthlessly retaliating against Republican violence” (p. 45). As a continuous “dirty war,” the British security forces had to deal with contentious and challenging rules of engagement issues, with one of the most controversial the shoot-to-kill policy when faced with threatening insurgents. This was the case in March 1988 when British intelligence uncovered information of a PIRA plot to attack a parade of British military bands in Gibraltar. When confronted by this terrorist cell, the responding Special Air Service (SAS) team killed its three members. This became highly controversial, as the author writes that “Despite initial praise for averting mass murder, controversy was not far behind when it was realized that none of the three IRA members had been armed and no remote bomb trigger was to be found” (p. 91).

The operations of other British security forces covered in dramatic detail include the Military Reaction Force (MRF), the Special Reconnaissance Unit (also known as the 14 Field Security and Intelligence Company - “The Det”), as well as MI5, Special Branch, and the Joint Support Group (JSG). This highly informative account would have benefited from an additional concluding chapter that updated the status of these terrorist and government security forces in the aftermath of the peace process, especially the demobilization of the Republican and Loyalist forces and the integration of their personnel into civilian society.

[This is a condensed version of the book review editor’s longer review, which appeared in The Washington Times. Reprinted by permission.]


This is a well-researched account of the activities of insurgent organizations such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) in Britain during the period of the outbreak of the war of independence in 1919 to the end of the civil war in 1923. As the author notes, these organizations’ operatives were “nurtured by the culture of Irish immigrants who settled in England, Scotland and Wales in the nineteenth century” whose population reached an estimated 524,000 at the height of republican activity in Britain in 1921. (p. 1). Believing that “only violence could achieve Irish independence” (p. 1), their insurgent activities involved fundraising, gunrunning and smuggling of ammunitions into Ireland, arson bombings of property, and assassinations. This book’s importance also lies in placing IRA (and PIRA) terrorism, which during this period involved relatively low-level violence, within its later historical contexts of heightened violence in Britain in 1939-40 and 1972-2001, when the violent campaigns were “a means of forcing the British to withdraw from Northern Ireland” (p. 323). The importance of focusing on these terrorism-related activities in Britain during this period, the author concludes, is that “The war of independence and the civil war were ultimately won and lost by the actions of actors in Ireland, but republicans in Britain played a noteworthy role in the drama” (p. 328). This book is based on the author’s Ph.D dissertation which earned him a doctorate in history from Trinity College Dublin, Ireland.


This is an insider’s account of the history of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the Northern
Ireland Policing Board, focusing on the accountability of a police force to the community it serves in a democracy. The PSNI was the successor to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) which was reformed and renamed in 2001 as a result of the Belfast Agreement, which was part of the Northern Ireland peace process. To examine the effectiveness of the reformed police force, the book’s chapters discuss topics such as the September 1999 Report of The Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland; the Policing Board’s membership, modus operandi and accountability; policing at the district and community levels; civil unrest and public order policing (including policing during polarizing community parades); as well as issues involved in dealing with contentious past issues. Sir Desmond Rea is former Chairman of the Northern Ireland Policing Board, 2001-2009, and former Chairman of the Northern Ireland Labour Relations Agency, 1996-2002. Robin Masefield, CBE, is former Director General of the Northern Ireland Prison Service, 2004-2010.


In this book, the author, who became General Officer Commanding (GOC) and Director of Operations in Northern Ireland in 1990, eventually retiring from the British Army as a General in 1996, presents an insider’s account of the experiences of ten Britons who were prominently involved in the Northern Ireland ‘troubles’ between 1969 and 2000. As the author explains, these accounts are not intended to provide a history of the ‘troubles’, but to “give an illustrative flavor of the lives and experiences of some British soldiers, policemen, officials and civilians, with whom I worked, over those difficult years in a beautiful but troubled place” (p. xi). The tales by these Britons, with each chapter introduced by the author’s well-informed overview, include Simon Hoggart, a veteran journalist at *The Guardian* newspaper who had covered the Province for many years; Graham Crossland who had joined the British Army’s Green Howards regiment in August 1965, which was deployed in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s; Peter Jones, who had served in military intelligence; Tom King, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland at the time of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, who was the target of an IRA assassination attempt; Sir John Blelloch, a top civil servant, who was involved in managing the 1981 Hunger Strike; Chris Albiston, a former Metropolitan Police officer who had joined the Royal Ulster Constabulary, eventually becoming Chief Constable; and John Deverell, Director and Coordinator of Intelligence at Stormont, who was responsible for managing intelligence operations in Northern Ireland. In a Postscript, the author concludes that the Britons profiled in the book represent the overall British effort in which “the military, in conjunction with their colleagues in the police and security services, created the opportunity for peace to take hold. They confronted the violence; they underpinned law and order; and they sustained the community; giving politicians and civil servants the time to develop the processes and understanding necessary for progress” (p. 177).

Pakistan and Taliban


This is an excellent and up-to-date account of the latest developments in Pakistan, focusing in particular on the impact of religiously extremist terrorism presented by groups such as al Qaida, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Taliban on the country’s political trajectory. To examine these issues, the book’s chapters discuss the internal and external origins of extremism in Pakistan; Pakistan during the Musharraf years, 1999-2002; the role of the ungovernable tribal region on the proliferation of terrorism; the “Talibanization” of Pakistan; and future trends of extremism in Pakistan. The final chapter, which also discusses the arrival of the Islamic State in Pakistan, insightfully concludes that “If Pakistan can embrace diversity and gear the educational system and grass-roots civil society in positive directions, the terrorism problem can become manageable, at the very least. Until change occurs, the country will remain a troubled land” (p. 200). The author is chair of the Department of Social Science at Pulaski Academy in Little Rock, Arkansas.

This is an important and comprehensive collection of primary sources, including newspaper and websites with published statements that are translated into English by those associated with the Afghanistan- and Pakistan-based Taliban movement. Following the editors’ introductory overview, the volume is divided into three parts: Part 1, “Mujahedeen and Topakiyaan (1979-1994)”; Part 2, “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1994-2001)”; and Part 3: “Insurgency (2001 - ).” A useful glossary and bibliography are also included. Both editors are veteran academic experts on the Taliban, with Alex Strick Van Linschoten being based in Amman, Jordan, and Felix Kuehn based in Berlin, Germany.

*About the Reviewer: Joshua Sinai, Ph. D., is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.*

Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid

This German-language doctoral dissertation by Nina Käsehage, from Göttingen University (2017), is the product of more than five years of field research into a fast-growing new Islamist religious movement in Germany (now counting more than 10,000 members). The thesis is partly based on participatory observation (involving more than one hundred interviews with Salafists), as well as the analysis of many of the messages and videos circulating among them on the Internet.

The author found that while the role of the Internet is significant in linking young German Salafists to militant Islamists abroad, the local centres of radicalisation are specific charismatic Salafist preachers. From her thesis, it appears that the Salafist milieu in Germany is, on the one hand, a closed parallel world, yet, on the other hand, it is internally quite heterogeneous.

The access the author managed to obtain to this community of ‘true Muslims’ (as they call themselves) resulted in a book that provides the reader with a unique window into the closed world of ‘true believers’ (as they also call themselves) in an open German society. The book is full of revealing quotes to illustrate the worldview of, on the one hand, the purist, political or jihadist preachers and, on the other hand, those followers attracted to each of these three streams of Salafism. The followers are mainly between 15 and 35 years old individuals in search of an identity and a new community to belong to. These Salafist preachers offer them religious solutions for their psychological and social problems, ranging from exorcism to suggestions of how to engage as foreign fighters in jihad.

While those following the purist preachers clearly tend to be violence averse, the line between the political Salafists and the jihadist Salafists is, when it comes to the approval of violence, more fuzzy. Indeed, hundreds of German Salafists have travelled to Syria in recent years, pulled by the establishment of a Caliphate; only a few have come back so far. As to push factors: many of those interviewed, especially women, had themselves experienced (sexual) violence in the families they grew up in Germany. Most females and males interviewed had experienced discrimination and humiliation in the outside world (e.g. on the job market) - something unfortunately further reinforced once they decided to wear characteristic Muslim clothes (jellaba/niqab).

This dissertation is an excellent example of ‘German thoroughness’: all observations are meticulously documented in 3,234 footnotes, often containing additional information beyond mere references – making this an outstanding academic exploration that is both critical and empathetic towards its subjects of observation. The volume, despite its highly nuanced theoretical assessments, concludes with twenty pages of very concrete and practical policy recommendations – such as involving some purist Salafist preachers and some disenchanted returnees from Syria in efforts to halt a further trajectory towards violence. Some of the author’s recommendations have already found their way into German programs to prevent (further) radicalisation. Dr. Käsehage is a historian and scholar of religion at the University of Rostock, Germany.

About the Reviewer: Alex P. Schmid is Editor-in-Chief of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.

Reviewed By Joshua Sinai

On July 29, 2018, five terrorists in Tajikistan rammed their car into a group of seven Western touring cyclists and then shot and stabbed the remaining survivors. Four of the killed cyclists included a couple from Washington, D.C., who were on a worldwide cycling adventure. The other fatalities were males from Switzerland and the Netherlands, and three others were wounded. Four of the terrorist suspects were killed and one was arrested. The Islamic State (also known as ISIS or Daesh) claimed responsibility for the attack, releasing a video showing the attackers pledging allegiance to the group. This was the first terrorist assault by local ISIS adherents, who were part of the terrorist group's regional branch, which is known as IS-Khorasan (IS-K), against Western tourists in Tajikistan.

As explained by Antonio Giustozzi, a Visiting Professor at King's College, London, in this important and very detailed account, the IS-K envisions Khorasan as the Islamic State's regional caliphate, encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, Iran, parts of India and Russia. Even China is not immune, as the author cites an IS-K suicide bomber's vehicular attack against the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on Aug. 30, 2016, which was also intended to attract Chinese Uyghur jihadists to join its ranks (p. 64). As the author explains, the IS-K first emerged in Afghanistan in 2014 as part of the Islamic State’s ambition to overtake al Qaida as the world's pre-eminent jihadi terrorist group, particularly in its ambition to be the first jihadi group to establish an operating Caliphate. The IS-K’s core membership began as a small group of ISIS organizers and fighters who were dispatched to Afghanistan but soon attracted a larger flow of disaffected fighters from the Taliban and other jihadi groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with other defections coming from other Central Asian groups, such as Uzbekistan's Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). These disaffected jihadists, the author adds, regarded the IS-K’s ultra-extremist jihadist ideology as “more aligned with their uncompromising views,” (p. 122) for offering “higher salaries and better conditions and equipment,” and, above all, at least during its early years, for being part of the Islamic State’s successful control of territory in Iraq and Syria, which led to thousands of foreign fighters, with many of them from Western and Central Asian countries, as well as Chinese Uyghurs, to join ISIS’ ranks. (p. 125)

What makes the IS-K so dangerous today is that several thousand ISIS fighters who have recently been pushed out of Iraq and Syria, where ISIS has lost much of the territory previously under its control, have joined it in Afghanistan, hoping that its remote rural areas make it easier for them to re-establish themselves to create a new safe haven. Like ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the IS-K is ruthlessly brutal in its violent attacks, especially in targeting Afghanistan's and Pakistan's Shi'ite communities. They hope such massacres and Shi'ite retaliations would polarization the majority Sunni populations' hatred toward the Shia minorities and ignite large-scale sectarian warfare. This would also further increase the IS-K's popularity vis-a-vis the Taliban and al Qaida, which generally attempt to avoid attacking Shi’ites, preferring to attack moderate Sunni adversaries within their own communities, including government forces, educational institutions and humanitarian assistance organizations - which the IS-K also attacks.

To the chagrin of the Taliban and al Qaida, the IS-K has succeeded in exploiting Sunni-Shi’ite rivalry to gain some Sunni Arab states' support, with governments and wealthy citizens in countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, favoring it over the Taliban, which is backed by their Shi’ite Iranian rival. It also exploits the antipathy toward the pro-Shi’ite Syrian government, which is backed by Iran and Russia. As cited by the author’s IS-K source, the Qatars pushed the group to “open a new front in Central Asia,” with the rationale “a form of retaliation against Russia's intervention in Syria, and an effort to force Russia to split its dwindling resource among several fronts. The assumption of the Qatars is clearly that the Central Asian states, if threatened, would request Russia’s assistance” (p. 40). Another factor in the IS-K’s success, the author points out, lies in its organizational structure. With an estimated several thousand fighters (exact figures are not known), it divides the territory where it operates in “Khorasan” into provinces, which are led by amirs (princes) who are meant
to be responsible for administering its coercive version of religious laws, finance, logistics, recruitment and propaganda, and military operations.

With the IS-K’s attempt to clone IS-Central in its ultra-extremist Salafism, its centralized control over operations, and its brutal violence against its adversaries, the author concludes that its insurgency is flawed. It has failed “to forge the disparate groups that merged into it into a coherent whole,” (p. 211) it has continued to be dependent on external funding, which is drying up with the defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and it has failed to effectively “compete with the Taliban” in its insurgent warfare to replace it, thus becoming “a sideshow” (p. 214). Nevertheless, the IS-K’s rigid ideological extremism makes it a spoiler in preventing the Taliban from negotiating (however halfheartedly) with the Afghanistan government to reach some form of accommodation, and it will continue to pose a threat in the “Khorasan” countries in which its terrorist operatives are present and able to attract local recruits to its cause. Such insights, based on the author’s extensive first-hand regional-based research, make The Islamic State in Khorasan an important guide for understanding the nature and magnitude of the threat, as well as the vulnerabilities posed by the IS-K in these highly volatile regions.

This is a revised and enlarged version of a review which originally appeared in The Washington Times. Reprinted by permission.

About the Reviewer: Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.
Bibliography: Terrorist Tactics and Strategies
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Abstract
This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on terrorist tactics and strategies (such as the planning of attacks, targeting, decision making, and successful or failed plots). Though focusing on recent literature, the bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to September 2018. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to broaden the search.

Keywords: bibliography; resources; literature; terrorism; tactics, strategies, planning, plots, attacks, targeting, decision making

NB: All websites were last visited on 16.09.2018. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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Note

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after obtaining permission by the author(s).
About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., is a Professional Information Specialist. Since 2011, she works for the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). Additionally, she serves as Information Resources Editor to ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. In her editorial role, she regularly compiles bibliographies and other resources for Terrorism Research. She wrote her doctoral thesis on Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents (focus: media-oriented hostage takings). E-mail: j.tinnes@gmx.de
Bibliography: Foreign Terrorist Fighters
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Abstract
This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on foreign fighters of terrorist organizations. Though focusing on recent literature, the bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to September 2018. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to broaden the search.

Keywords: bibliography; resources; literature; foreign fighters; foreign terrorist fighters; FTFs; returnees

NB: All websites were last visited on 18.09.2018. A previous bibliography on Foreign Fighters of Terrorism has been published by Eric Price in Issue 9(1) of Perspectives on Terrorism. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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Volume 12, Issue 5

October 2018

121
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and-ancestry-of-belgian-foreign-fighters


**Note**

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that
the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

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130 Academic Theses (Ph.D. and MA) on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Related Issues, Written in English between 1973 and 2018, by Authors with Arab and/or Muslim Backgrounds

Compiled and selected by Ryan Scrivens

Abstract

This bibliography contains doctoral dissertations (Ph.D.) and Master (MA) Theses on issues relating to terrorism and counter-terrorism. Titles were retrieved manually by browsing the Open Access Theses and Dissertations (OATD) database using the search terms 'terrorism' and 'jihad'. More than 4,800 entries were evaluated, of which 130 were ultimately selected for this list. All theses are open source. The entries are 'clickable', allowing access to full texts. However, readers should observe possible copyright restrictions.

Bibliographic entries are divided into seven sub-sections:

1. Terrorism Actors, Groups, Incidents, Campaigns, and Consequences
2. Counter-Terrorism Strategies, Tactics, and Operations
3. Counter-Terrorism Policy, Legislation, Law, and Prosecution
4. Terrorism and the Media, Representations, and Public Opinion
5. State Repression and Civil War at Home
6. Terrorism and the Internet
7. Terrorism and Gender

1. Terrorism Actors, Groups, Incidents, Campaigns, and Consequences


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2. Counter-Terrorism Strategies, Tactics, and Operations


Alshammari, Mansour Salim H. Takfīr and Terrorism: Historical Roots, Contemporary Challenges and Dynamic Solutions, with Special Reference to al-Qaida and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ph.D. Thesis, April 2013, University of Leeds. URL: http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/5340/


Erbay, Tayfun. The Role of the Military in Counterterrorism: Unintended Consequences. MA Thesis, December
3. Counter-Terrorism Policy, Legislation, Law, and Prosecution


4. Terrorism and the Media, Representations, and Public Opinion

Abdullah, Saeed Ali N. *A Study of Reporting About Terrorism on Two Pan-Arab Television News Channels*. Ph.D. Thesis, August 2014, University of Leicester. URL: [https://lra.le.ac.uk/handle/2381/37235](https://lra.le.ac.uk/handle/2381/37235)


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5. State Repression and Civil War at Home


Nasrazadani, Ariana. Iranian State Strength and Domestic Terrorism: How Iran Came to be the Cool Spot in a Hotbed of Terrorism. MA Thesis, May 2017, University of Kansas. URL: https://kus Scholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/25821/Nasrazadani_ku_0099M_15334_DATA_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y


6. Terrorism and the Internet


7. Terrorism and Gender


About the Compiler: Ryan Scrivens is Associate Theses Research Editor of Perspectives on Terrorism and Coordinator of the Canadian Network of Ph.D. Thesis Writers of the Terrorism Research Initiative. He is also a Visiting Researcher at the VOX-Pol Network of Excellence and a Research Associate at the International CyberCrime Research Centre. Ryan recently completed a Ph.D. in Criminology at Simon Fraser University, and has since been awarded a Horizon Postdoctoral Fellowship at Concordia University, working with Project SOMEONE to develop...
ways to build resilience against radicalization leading to violent extremism and hatred.
Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects

Compiled and selected by Berto Jongman

Most of the items included below became available online in May and June 2018. They are categorised under these headings:

1. Non-Religious Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns
2. Religious (mainly Jihadi) Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns
3. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics
4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism
5. Counter-Terrorism – General
6. Counter-Terrorist Strategies, Tactics and Operations
7. State Repression and Civil War at Home and Clandestine & Open Warfare Abroad
8. Prevention and Preparedness Studies
   (including Countering Violent Extremism, De-Radicalization, Counter-Narratives)
9. Intelligence
10. Cyber Operations and Information Warfare
11. Risk & Threat Assessments, Forecasts, Analytical Studies
12. Also Worth Reading

1. Non-Religious Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns


Out of control: Ukraine's rogue militias. Vice, YouTube, May 25, 2018. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wMMXuKB0BoY


The bloody peace in Colombia. *Deutsche Welle, YouTube*, May 25, 2018. URL: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hXzI7yTUF-k](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hXzI7yTUF-k)


2.a. Al-Qaeda and Affiliates


A. Deen. P. Cruickshank, T. Lister. Nine lives: my time as MI6’s top spy inside al-Qaeda. 2018. URL: [https://intelnews.org/2018/05/25/01-2328/](https://intelnews.org/2018/05/25/01-2328/)


Hassan Hassan. Idlib is now in Ankara’s crosshairs as it tries to secure its borders. *The National*, May 2, 2018. URL: https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/idlib-is-now-in-ankara-s-crosshairs-as-it-tries-to-secure-its-borders-1.726612

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A. Jawad al-Tamimi. The internal structure of the Islamic State’s hisba apparatus. *Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis*, June 1, 2018. URL: https://www.mideastcenter.org/islamic-state-hisba-apparatus


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2.c. Other


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M. Savage. In Belfast fear is growing that the hated barriers will go up again. The Guardian, May 6, 2018. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/global/2018/may/06/no-one-wants-border-ireland-belfast-barriers-stay-up


3. Terrorism Strategies and Tactics

Analysis of jihadi encryption and steganography too MuslimCrypt – Part II: effectiveness of transmitting secret messages on twitter, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Telegram, Tutanota, and ProtonMail. MEMRI, Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor, May 31, 2018. URL: https://www.memri.org/jttm/analysis-jihadi-encryp-
tion-and-steganography-tool-muslimcrypt---part-ii-effectiveness


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4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism


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C. Maza. Does Russia’s Putin have a private slush fund to kill opponents? Suspect in Ukraine’s murder plot says he does. Newsweek, June 1, 2018. URL: http://www.newsweek.com/does-russias-putin-have-private-slush-fund-kill-opponents-suspect-ukraines-953175


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8. Prevention and Preparedness Studies (including Countering Violent Extremism, De-Radicalization, Counter-Narratives)


9. Intelligence


H. Haqqani. From key Pakistani general to ISIS terrorist ‘killed’ in jihad, the chilling saga of Shahid Aziz. *The Print*, May 27, 2018. URL: https://theprint.in/opinion/from-key-pakistani-general-to-isis-terrorist-killed-in-jihad-the-chilling-saga-of-shahid-aziz/63221/


10. Cyber Operations and Information Warfare


Charlie Winter's address at the United Nations’ open meeting on countering terrorist narratives. ICSR, June 1, 2018. URL: http://icsr.info/2018/06/charlie-winters-address-united-nations-open-meeting-countering-terrorist-narratives/


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### 11. Risk & Threat Assessments, Forecasts, Analytical Studies


12. Also Worth Reading


Prof. Thomas Piketty. Full address and Q&A. Oxford Union, YouTube, May 14, 2018. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Li5x_MrTuYs


Prof. Thomas Pikkety. Full address and Q&A. Oxford Union, YouTube, May 14, 2018. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1i5x_MrTuYs


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Conference Monitor/Calendar of Events

Compiled and selected by Reinier Bergema

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), in its mission to provide a platform for academics and practitioners in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism, compiles an online calendar, listing recent and upcoming academic and professional conferences, symposia and similar events that are directly or indirectly relevant to the readers of Perspectives on Terrorism. The calendar includes academic and (inter-)governmental conferences, professional expert meetings, civil society events and educational programs. The listed events are organised by a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental institutions, including several key (counter) terrorism research centres and institutes.

We encourage readers to contact the journal’s Assistant Editor for Conference Monitoring, Reinier Bergema, and provide him with relevant information, preferably in the same format as the items listed below. He can be reached at <reinierbergema@hcss.nl> or via Twitter: @reinierbergema.

October 2018

**Jihadi Audiovisualities**
*Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz*
4-5 October, Mainz, Germany
Website: visit | Twitter: @uni_mainz

**Congressional Brief: Preventing Terrorism in the U.S., Successes, Failures, and Recommendations**
*George Washington University Program on Extremism*
9 October, Washington, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @gwupoe

**ICSR Report Launch – The Kurds After the ‘Caliphate’: How the Decline of ISIS Has Impacted the Kurds of Iraq and Syria**
*International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR)*
9 October, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICSR_Centre

**The Arc of Crisis in the MENA Region**
*Atlantic Council*
9 October, Washington DC, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @AtlanticCouncil

**Congres Radicalisering en Extremisme [in Dutch]**
*Studiecentrum voor Bedrijf en Overheid (SBO)*
9-10 October, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @SBO_nl

**High-Level International Conference on Preventing and Countering Terrorism in the Digital Age**
*OSCE*
9-10 October, Minsk, Belarus
Website: visit | Twitter: @OSCE
Does Terrorism Work? The Case of the Provisional IRA  
*University of Nottingham*  
10 October, Nottingham, United Kingdom  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@UniofNottingham](#)

SEECAT (Special Equipment Exhibition & Conference for Anti-Terrorism) ’18  
*SEECAT*  
10-12 October, Tokyo, Japan  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: *n/a*

Globalized and Agonized?: The Arguments for and against the Role of Cultural Exchange in Response to the Radicalization Risk of Young Adults  
*National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)*  
11 October, College Park, United States  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@START_umd](#)

High Level Conference  
*Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)*  
11 October, Luxemburg, Luxemburg  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](#)

TARTIS Seminar Series on Political Violence: Joby Warrick  
*John Jay College of Criminal Justice*  
12 October, New York, United States  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@JohnJayCollege](#)

The Role of Russia in The Middle East And North Africa Region. Strategy or Opportunism?  
*Italian Institute for International Political Studies*  
12 October, Milan, Italy  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ispionline](#)

Violence Prevention, Safety Promotion and the Sustainable Development Goals  
*Safety and Violence Initiative (SaVI), University of Cape Town*  
15-16 October, Cape Town, South Africa  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@UCTSaVI](#)

Terrorism Experts Conference  
*Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism*  
16-17 October, Ankara, Turkey  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: *n/a*

Film, Public Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Historical and International Perspectives  
*University of Southern California*  
16-18 October, Los Angeles, United States  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@usc](#)

Safeguarding Medical Care and Humanitarian Action in the UN Counterterrorism Framework  
*International Peace Institute*  
17 October, New York, United States  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ipinst](#)
Research Seminar
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)
17 October, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

The Future of Terrorism
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)
17 October, College Park, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @START_umd

Preventing Violent Extremism Forum
The MPOWER Project; Counter Extremism Project (CEP); and the Permanent Missions of Norway and Jordan
17 October, New York, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @FightExtremism

Free Speech and National Security
Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
17 October, Washington DC, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @csis

The Rise of a Transnational Radical Right in Europe
Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo
18 October, Oslo, Norway
Website: visit | Twitter: @CrexUiO

National Security and Shifting Geopolitics: Challenges at Home and Abroad
NYU School of Law: Center on Law and Security
22 October, New York, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @nyulaw

13th Homeland Security Week
Homeland Security Week
22-24 October, Hyattsville, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @DefenseInsights

Terrorism and Media Course
Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism
22-26 October, tba
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Monitoring and Responding to Political Violence in South Africa
Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
23 October, Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, South Africa
Website: visit | Twitter: @issafrica

RAN Expert Meeting: Right-Wing Extremism and Schools
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) EDU
23-24 October, Berlin, Germany
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope
2018 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference
Blekinge Institute of Technology
23-25 October, Karlskrona, Sweden
Website: visit | Twitter: @BTHInformation

Warsaw Security Forum
Warsaw Security Forum
24-25 October, Warsaw, Poland
Website: visit | Twitter: @WarsawForum

RAN Study Visit ‘Learning From Adjacent Fields:
Exploring the Relation Between Hooliganism and Extremism’
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)
25-26 October, Poland
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

RAN Expert Meeting: Prisoner Society
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) P&P
25-26 October, Milan, Italy
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Book Talk: “Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict”
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)
29 October, College Park, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @START_umd

RAN Expert Meeting: Multi-Problem Target Group: The Influence of Mental Health Disorders and Substance Abuse on Exit Work
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) P&P
30-31 October, Zagreb, Croatia
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

The Threats From Hybrid Warfare - Challenges and Countermeasures in Liberal Democracies
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
31 October, Oslo, Norway
Website: visit | Twitter: @nupinytt

Forum on Returning Foreign Fighters: Policies and Actions to Address the Threat and Protect Vulnerable Communities
The Soufan Center, Georgetown University, Qatar University & Qatar International Academy for Security Studies
30-31 October, Doha, Qatar
Website: visit | Twitter: @TheSoufanGroup

November 2018

Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict
Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation
1 November, Stanford, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @StanfordCISAC
Towards a Post-Ottoman Dialogue: Origins and Solutions for Violent Extremism in the Middle East, Balkans, and Northern Africa
Leiden University
1 November, Leiden, the Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @UniLeiden

Surviving The Era of Disasters
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
1 November, Barton, Australia
Website: visit | Twitter: @ASPI_org

Border Security, Refugees and CT Course
Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism
5-9 November, tba
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Fighting Terrorism and its Financing
CEPOL
5-9 November, Budapest, Hungary
Website: visit | Twitter: @EU_CEPOL

International Policing and Security Pre-Conference Workshops
Charles Sturt University
5-6 November, Sydney, Australia
Website: visit | Twitter: @charlessturtuni

Leaving Terrorism Behind
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) EXIT & RVT
6 November, Vienna, Austria
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

International Victims Conference: Remembering Innocent Victims of Terrorism
Raymond McCord
7 November, Belfast, Ireland
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Political Science Lunch Research Seminar: Radical Right and Radical Left Populism, and the Political Economy of Anti-Globalization Backlash
Leiden University
7 November, Leiden, the Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @UniLeiden

International Policing and Security Conference 2018
Charles Sturt University
7-8 November, Sydney, Australia
Website: visit | Twitter: @charlessturtuni

RAN LOCAL Academy: What is the Role of Local Coordinators in the Prevention of Radicalisation?
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) LOCAL
7-8 November, Paris, France
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope
A Multi-Problem Target Group: The Influence of Mental Health Disorders and Substance Abuse on EXIT Work
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) EXIT & H&C
7-8 November, Vienna, Austria
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Istanbul Security 2018: Security of the Future
Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies
7-9 November, Istanbul, Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Do We Know It When We See It? (Re)-Conceptualizing Rebel-to-Party Transition
Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation
1 November, Stanford, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @StanfordCISAC

Conference PV&E´18
GCOCP-Institute for Applied Prevention Research
8-9 November, Eschborn, Germany
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

TARTIS Seminar Series on Political Violence: Steve Coll
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
9 November, New York, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @JohnJayCollege

Secession in the Post-Truth, Post-Order World
Charles University
9 November, Prague, Czech Republic
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

International Cyber Security and Intelligence Conference & Exhibition
ICSIC Canada
14-15 November, Vaughan, Canada
Website: visit | Twitter: @icsic_2017

Primary Education, Young Children and Extremist Influences
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) EDU
15-16 November, Lisbon, Portugal
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Bundeskriminalamt Autumn Conference
Bundeskriminalamt
20-21 November, Wiesbaden, Germany
Website: visit | Twitter: @bka

Nationalism and International Order
Leiden University
21-23 November, Leiden, the Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @UniLeiden
Optimising Triple P (Police – Prison – Probation)
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) POL & P&P
22 November, Paris, France
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

International Conference on Terrorism and Political Violence (ICTPV-18)
ITAR
22 November, Singapore, Singapore
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Communications to Drive Offline Interventions
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) C&N
22-23 November, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Berlin Security Conference
Behörden Spiegel
27-28 November, Berlin, Germany
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Terrorism: National, Regional and International Perspectives
Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights
28-30 November, Vienna, Austria
Website: visit | Twitter: @BIM_Vienna

ARPC Terrorism Risk Insurance Seminar
Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation
29 November, Sydney, Australia
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Reconstructing Neighborhoods of War: Beirut, Warsaw, Dresden, Aleppo et al.
Orient-Institut Beirut
29 November – 1 December, Beirut, Lebanon
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Inspiring Terror: The Internet, Social Media, and the Lone Wolf
Princeton Committee of Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
29 November, Princeton, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @fpri

Countering Terrorism in the EU: Annual Conference 2018
ERA Academy of European Law
29-30 November, Trier, Germany
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Nordic Conference on Research on Violent Extremism: Theory and Practice
Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo
29-30 November, Oslo, Norway
Website: visit | Twitter: @CrexUiO
Working With Men in Prevention and Disengagement from Violent Extremism
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) YF&C
29-30 November, Manchester, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Review of RAN Collection Practices
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) YOUNG
29-30 November, Helsinki, Finland
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

International Political Science Conference (POLITSCI ’18)
BILSAS
30 November, Istanbul, Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

December 2018

International Congress on Big Data, Deep Learning and Fighting Cyber Terrorism
Gazi University and ICT Authority of Turkey (BTK)
3-4 December, Ankara, Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: @Gazi_University

America and the Middle East since 9/11
Chatham House
4 December, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @ChathamHouse

Counter Terror Asia Expo 2018
Counter-Terror Asia Conference (CTAC)
4-5 December, Singapore, Singapore
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Europe and its Neighbourhood: Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management in the 21st Century
International Crisis Group
6 December, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @CrisisGroup

Methods for Evidence-Based Approaches to Prevention Activities and Countering Violent Extremism within the Social and Health Domain
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) H&SC
6-7 December, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

TARTIS Seminar Series on Political Violence: Stephen Tankel
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
7 December, New York, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @JohnJayCollege
Preventing Revictimisation
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) RVT
10-11 December, Manchester, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

January 2019
Terrorism Analyst Training Course 2019
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
21 January – 1 February, Singapore, Singapore
Website: visit | Twitter: @RSIS_NTU

12th Annual International Conference
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
27-29 January, tbc
Website: visit | Twitter: @inssisrael

About the Compiler: Reinier Bergema is a Strategic Analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and an Assistant Editor at Perspectives on Terrorism. His research interests include, inter alia, radicalisation and Dutch (jihadist) foreign fighters. He is project leader of HCSS’ Jihadist Foreign Fighter Monitor (#JihFFMON).
About Perspectives on Terrorism

Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University, Campus The Hague. PoT is published six times per year as a free, independent, scholarly peer-reviewed online journal available in both HTML and PDF versions at http://www.terrorismanalysts.com and in PDF version (only) at https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism.

PoT seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism-, Political Violence- and Conflict Studies.

The editors invite researchers and readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

Perspectives on Terrorism has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s Research Notes, Special Correspondence, Op-Eds and other content are reviewed by members of the Editorial Team, while its Articles are peer-reviewed by outside academic experts and professionals. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and waging conflicts. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to. They are responsible for the content of their contributions and retain the copyright of their publication.

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