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Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume XII, Issue 4 (August 2018) of Perspectives on Terrorism, available at our new online home: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/PoT. Please note that the journal's old website (http://www.terrorismanalysts.com) will remain online as an archives only site for a while longer, but will eventually be closed down. Readers will want to update bookmarks and reference links accordingly.

Our free and independent scholarly online journal is a publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University's Campus The Hague. Now in its twelfth year, Perspectives on Terrorism has close to 8,000 regular subscribers and many more occasional readers and website visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer reviewed by external referees while its Research and Policy Notes, Special Correspondence and other content are subject to internal editorial quality control.

Here is a brief look at the contents of the current issue:

The first article on 'Fake Terrorism: Examining 'Terrorists' Resort to Hoaxing as a Mode of Attack' is by Dr. Nicole Tishler, the winner of the 5th Annual TRI Award (2017) for the Best Ph.D. Thesis in the Field of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies. She summarises key findings of her extraordinary doctoral dissertation (a link to the entire thesis can be found in the Announcement section of this issue). The second article, by Prof. Seung-Whan Choi Whan, explores whether restrictive immigration policies reduce terrorism, while the third article by J.G. DeLeeuw and W.A. Pridemore uses conjunctive analysis to explore terrorism in the US and the UK.

The Research Notes section includes a quantitative study of terrorist leadership characteristics by Lennart van Leeuwen and Daan Weggemans. It also features a list of 150 Un- and Under-researched Topics and Themes in the Study of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, compiled by the two principal editors of Perspectives on Terrorism.

In the Resources Section readers will find a column of short book reviews by Joshua Sinai, followed by two extensive bibliographies compiled by the journal's Information Resources Editor, Judith Tinnes. This is followed by a list of recent online, open-source publications on terrorism and counter-terrorism, compiled by our web analyst Berto Jongman, and a conference calendar compiled by Assistant Editor Reinier Bergema.

Two Announcements conclude this issue: one about the outcome of the TRI Thesis Award Competition 2017 and the other soliciting contributions for Alex Schmid's Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness.

The current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism was jointly prepared by its Editor-in-Chief, Alex Schmid, and Associate Editor John Morrison, with the assistance from Co-Editor James J.F. Forest and Associate Editor Christine Boelema Robertus.
Fake Terrorism: Examining Terrorist Groups' Resort to Hoaxing as a Mode of Attack

by Nicole A. Tishler

Editor's Note:

The opening article of this issue has been written by invitation of the chairman of the jury of the Terrorism Research Initiative. It summarises some aspects of the doctoral dissertation of Nicole Tishler, “Fake Terrorism: Examining Terrorist Groups' Resort to Hoaxing as a Mode of Attack” (Carleton University) for which she just won the TRI Award for the best Ph.D. thesis in the field of terrorism studies written in 2017. For more information on the Award, see the Announcement at the end of this issue of Perspectives on Terrorism.

Abstract

Little academic attention has been accorded to terrorism hoaxes - i.e. those incidents that are believed to be serious acts of terrorism, but by virtue of involving benign agents or empty threats do not actually involve any direct risk of harm. Hoaxes do, however, impose costs on society. These indirect costs range from wasted emergency response resources to heightened levels of societal fear. This article draws from extensive multi-method research designed to explore the strategic logic(s) underpinning hoax behaviour. It summarizes findings in answer to a preliminary question: what characteristics differentiate groups who incorporate hoaxes into their attack profiles from those who never do? Hypotheses encompass groups' overarching motivation (animal rights, environmentalist, or anti-abortionist; ethno-nationalist; religious), organizational structure (hierarchy and the lack thereof), and campaign context (splinter origins; frequency of real attacks). A robust set of differentiating characteristics is determined using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on two different perpetrator samples: a cross-national sample, drawing on perpetrators identified in the Monterey Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism Database; and a secondary sample based on perpetrators identified in the Canadian Incident Database (CIDB). Although the QCA analysis generates clear predictors of hoax use and non-use, the observational nature of the data is limited in its ability to clarify hoaxers' strategic logics, which are both over-determined and equifinal.

Keywords: terrorism, hoax, strategy, tactics, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), events datasets

Introduction

Terrorism hoaxes are those incidents that are believed to be serious acts of terrorism, but do not actually involve any direct risk of harm. This definition encompasses a range of terrorist activities, including false claims of responsibility,[1] empty threats or lies about past activity,[2] and fake devices.[3] In the post-9/11 world, hoax incidents have most frequently manifested themselves in the form of “anthrax” letter hoaxes – in which a benign white powder is posted in the mail with a threatening note to give the impression of an anthrax attack – and, more recently, as airplane bomb scares, in which a supposed radical falsely claims to have placed a bomb aboard a specified flight. Although media reports indicate that many such hoaxes have proven to be jokes made in bad taste or perpetrated by unorganized individuals who lack the desire and/or means to carry out real attacks, there are several terrorist groups who conduct hoaxes in addition to a broad range of destructive terrorism offences.

Hoaxes do not directly threaten human life or property, but they do impose indirect costs on society.[4] Hoaxed anthrax attacks, for instance, result in building evacuations and investigations by hazardous materials
Hoaxes are an easy, low-cost means of generating potentially drastic outcomes. However, in signalling tactical and operational weakness, and undermining future threats of violence, fake terrorism acts can plausibly impose reputational costs on their perpetrators.[5] Why, then, do otherwise capable and motivated terrorist groups hoax, and why do less-capable groups not hoax more often?

This article summarizes findings from extensive multi-method research leveraging publicly-available terrorism events data.[6] It focuses on the answer to a preliminary question: what are the characteristics that differentiate terrorist groups who incorporate hoaxes into their attack profiles from those who never do? With the descriptors of hoaxers and non-hoaxers defined, the discussion turns to an evaluation of the strategic logic(s) underpinning hoax behaviour.

Building Blocks for a Theory of Hoax Behaviour

This study assumes a rationalist model of terrorist group activity: groups will use hoaxes when they contribute to the achievement of their overarching organizational goals, and when hoaxes confer a higher utility than alternate modes of attack.

A wide range of non-exclusive strategic logics may plausibly explain groups’ hoax use. First, terrorists may use hoaxes to exploit their low costs, relative to more serious activities[7] – a logic that could be applied to particularly great effect in contexts where groups are seeking a low-cost means of exploiting intergroup dynamics.[8] Second, hoaxes may be used as a complement to destructive activity. Such hoaxes may be incorporated as a component of groups’ mixed strategies,[9] designed to waste counterterrorism resources; as dry-runs or intelligence-gathering facilitators, to increase future attacks’ chances of success; or as “noise” to drown out simultaneous destructive activities, and thereby decrease the likelihood of appropriate counterterrorist intervention. Third, hoaxes may be used by actors who prefer less-severe alternatives to destructive activity, whether as an outlet for incomplete radicalization to violence, or as an intentional signal of restraint guided by normative imperatives and concern for audience costs. In each case, hoaxes may result from deliberate group strategy – as defined by some central executive – or from principal-agent breakdowns and associated actions of individual group members. Although irrationality is a plausible explanation for non-conforming cases, so too may be flaws inherent to observational data: incidents may be wrongly-attributed, and badly bungled attempts at real attacks may be wrongly documented as intentional hoaxes.

It is expected that different actors will hoax for different reasons. Even within individual groups’ campaigns, multiple strategic logics may be simultaneously at play. Equifinality (i.e. that many different pathways can lead to a given outcome) and complex causality are thus likely features of any empirically-substantiated explanation for hoax behaviour.

Existing Literature and Hypothesis Formation

Existing literature commenting on terrorism hoax activity is sporadic, incomplete, and incoherent – largely on account of narrow conceptualizations of “hoax,” and empirical conflations with related event types like false alarms, pranks, threats, and foiled or failed attacks. One point of consensus is that hoaxes are a particular tactic or method of terrorism,[10] alternative to “serious” terrorism. However, it is more instructive to treat hoaxes as a mode of terrorism – indicating the fake way in which the act is carried out – than as an alternative tactic. A terrorist bomb hoax must be treated as a real terrorist bombing until its hoaxed character is uncovered;[11] divorcing a hoax from the tactic it imitates ignores important context for analyses of emergency response.
and perpetrator signalling. Furthermore, focusing on hoaxes’ conceptual parallels with their insinuated tactics can better situate the study of hoaxes within established literatures from which theoretical frameworks and empirical foundations may be meaningfully extrapolated.

The literature on factors affecting terrorists’ tactical decision-making and lethal capacity is particularly instructive. In the sub-sections that follow, theories and findings from this literature are applied as the basis for hypothesis development regarding terrorist groups’ hoax use (and non-use).

**Group Motivation**

Groups’ overarching motivations for terrorism affect the quality and nature of the violence they carry out [12] by determining the range of perceived “legitimate” targets and means. [13] Accordingly, certain motivations should correspond with the use of lower-severity forms of violence like hoaxes, whereas others might predict a preference for severely lethal alternatives. Animal rights and environmentalist ideologies typically involve strong norms of non-violence, manifested in groups’ explicit calls to protect human life. [14] This orientation would logically extend to anti-abortionist groups. For groups espousing these motivations, hoaxes may serve as a morally-consistent means of publicizing their cause, spreading fear, and draining responder resources. In the same vein, casualty-averse groups may use practice runs to increase the likelihood of their violent activities being carried out as planned (i.e. with no or limited casualties). Existing research has shown lone actors motivated by single issues to be the most likely to engage in dry runs of their activities. [15] This finding may plausibly extend to group-based perpetrators with the same motivations.

For ease of reference, anti-abortionist, animal rights, and environmentalist motives are collectively referred to herein as the “single issues.” This label is not intended in this study to encompass all single-issue or “special interest” terrorist activity.

**H1:** If a terrorist group is motivated by anti-abortionist, animal rights, or environmentalist sentiments, it is likely to use hoaxes at some point in its campaign.

Even if groups lack ideologically-rooted norms opposing violence against humans, they may still prefer to avoid causalities. Ethno-nationalist groups are particularly concerned with presenting themselves as legitimate political alternatives to existing powers. [16] Accordingly, ethno-nationalist groups should be inclined to privilege less-severe forms of violence that do not impose high costs on their constituents. Hoaxes would offer a low-cost means of publicizing such groups’ cause without accruing high audience costs (in terms of lost legitimacy), since they disrupt infrastructure, rather than destroy it. [17]

**H2:** If a terrorist group is motivated by ethno-nationalism, it is likely to use hoaxes at some point in its campaign.

On the other hand, religious groups have been assessed as being particularly lethal when they decide to engage in terrorism. [18] Religiously-motivated terrorists are unconcerned with (earthly) constituents, [19] and their transcendental, absolutist worldviews free them from moral constraints against the use of severe violence. [20] If extreme violence is theologically justified, [21] these actors are unlikely to view hoaxes’ inability to cause death or bodily harm as an advantage worth pursuing. Additionally, religious groups maintain a select and reliable membership base that improves their ability to carry out complex and lethal attacks. [22] For these groups, hoaxes’ ease of perpetration does not confer a relative advantage over more serious alternatives.

**H3:** If a terrorist group is motivated by religion, it is unlikely to ever use hoaxes.
Organizational Structure

The more hierarchical groups are in their structure, the greater their lethal capacity.[23] As groups become increasingly decentralized, severed lines of communication reduce their ability to carry out large-scale and sophisticated attacks.[24] For groups lacking hierarchy, then, hoaxes’ relative simplicity and low costs may be seen as a major benefit over difficult-to-execute sophisticated attacks. Furthermore, groups lacking command and control structures are more vulnerable to principal-agent problems.[25] When groups are wholly decentralized, a wide range of loosely-connected individuals carry out activities in the group’s name. In the case of leaderless resistance, for instance, individuals who have not fully radicalized to violence might hoax in an attempt to signal allegiance to a group’s cause. In these cases, hoaxes may result when individual actors pursue hoaxes’ low costs and risks at the expense of the group’s broader strategy.

\[ H_{4a}: \text{If a terrorist group displays no hierarchy, it is likely to use hoaxes at some point in its campaign.} \]

\[ H_{4b}: \text{If a terrorist group displays hierarchy, it is unlikely to ever use hoaxes.} \]

Campaign Context

Organizational splits are a positive predictor of violence,[26] and escalating tactical intensity may be a contributing factor in the incidence of group schism to begin with.[27] Splinter groups are thus likely to be particularly extreme in their use of violence, and – in desiring to remain distinct from their “parent” group – unwilling to accept the audience costs of reduced credibility. Such groups are unlikely to engage in low-severity activity, since signalling restraint would be counterproductive to their aims.

\[ H_5: \text{If a terrorist group emerged as a radical splinter or offshoot of a less violent group or movement, it is unlikely to ever use hoaxes.} \]

Hoaxes are unlikely to achieve the strategic aim of imposing costs on society if the perpetrator lacks sufficient reputational capital to have the hoax believed. Such capital is most effectively acquired by a serious attack track record (i.e. excluding hoaxes and foiled or failed plots). If terrorists play mixed strategies – that is, sequencing hoaxes and violent events in order to keep the counter-terrorists guessing – they can leverage their violent reputations to project power without increasing costs.[28] In this sense, perpetrating a minimum number of serious events serves as a permissive condition for hoax use; where only a few serious events have been carried out, hoaxes are unlikely to confer any strategic value.

\[ H_6: \text{If a terrorist group perpetrates only a few serious events, it is unlikely to ever use hoaxes.} \]

Data and Explanatory Factors

This study’s unit of analysis is the terrorist group, with a binary dependent variable distinguishing groups who never use hoaxes from groups who have used hoaxes at least once within their broader campaigns. Whether the group ever hoaxes is determined based on events captured in the Monterey Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism Database (herein “the WMDD”; until recently, the world’s most comprehensive open-source data set on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN] terrorism events),[29] International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE; one of the most frequently-cited datasets on transnational terrorist activities),[30] and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).[31] The WMDD and ITERATE are the only publicly-available events databases which explicitly capture hoax activity as possible event types; in the GTD, hoax activity – although excluded as a possible event type – can be subjectively evaluated via the “fake weapons” weapon type and associated event summaries.
The study’s sample is a cross-section of all perpetrator groups identified in the WMDDB who were responsible for at least one realized violent event – or credible threat thereof – in either the WMDDDB, ITERATE, or GTD. This sample was selected for its manageable size (n = 81, after culling perpetrators that do not meet the study’s standards for established terrorist entities, as compared with over 1,200 discrete perpetrators in ITERATE), but also because groups committing CBRN offenses represent a hard case for hoaxing: in having crossed or attempted to cross the unconventional weapons threshold, terrorists with an interest in CBRN weaponry are the most extreme in their tactical preferences. Their use of hoaxes, at the complete opposite end of the severity spectrum, is particularly puzzling.

A second sample (n = 42) comprising all terrorist group perpetrators named in the Canadian Incident Database (CIDB) contributes comprehensive data within a single country context.[32] This CIDB-based sample controls for bias resulting from the limited scope of events captured in the WMDDDB (no conventional weapons incidents), ITERATE (no domestic incidents), and the GTD (inconsistent hoax coverage); as well as bias resulting from the primary sample’s requirement that groups display an interest in CBRN.

Explanatory factors (defined in Table 1) were coded independently by the author, based on open-source data. In addition to the datasets’ event descriptions, primary sources of data were group descriptions from Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs)[33] and Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism.[34] Where this information was insufficient, secondary sources were consulted, privileging in the following order: government reports, peer-reviewed academic resources, and news archives. For consistency with extant scholarship, coding decisions (where samples overlap) were checked against those assigned in existing perpetrator databases.[35]

Table 1. Definitions of Explanatory Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR NAME (SHORT-HAND)</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOTIVE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-Issue</td>
<td>1 = anti-abortionist, animal-rights, or environmentalist motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SINGLEISSUE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left or Right</td>
<td>1 = broadly left- or right-wing motivation, including single issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LEFTRIGHT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purely Ethno-Nationalist</td>
<td>1 = exclusively ethno-nationalist motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PUREETHNO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contains Ethno-Nationalism</td>
<td>1 = motivation contains an ethno-nationalist component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CONTAINETHNO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purely Religious</td>
<td>1 = exclusively religious motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PURERELIG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contains Religion</td>
<td>1 = motivation contains a religious component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CONTAINRELIG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRUCTURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>1 = 1 group displays some degree of hierarchy (i.e. leadership or command and control are present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(HIERARCHY)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMPAIGN CONTEXT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Splinter</td>
<td>1 = group originated as a radical splinter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SPLINTER)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than a few serious events</td>
<td>1 = group committed more than 3 serious events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SERIOUS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The “more than a few serious events” variable’s three-event threshold was empirically-derived, based on tests for bivariate consistency. Above this threshold, there is a substantial degree of unimportant variation: there is no difference in hoax behaviour between a group perpetrating four serious events or 2,494 (the maximum value in the sample), but groups perpetrating four or more serious events are qualitatively different from those perpetrating three or fewer. Fuzzy scoring alternatives do not improve this factor’s performance.

**Models and Methods**

While probit regression models on this data yielded fairly robust results,[36] the correlational logic that underpins probit is a mismatch for the question at hand. Although infrequently applied in terrorism studies, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) offers a better fit for evaluating hoax use. QCA is an exploratory technique that searches for factors that – in isolation or in combination – are sufficient to produce a given outcome. It thus accounts for equifinality, elucidating factors that are important in some cases and under certain conditions, if not for the entire sample on average. QCA is built on the logic of sets. In set theory, the inverse of what explains an outcome does not necessarily explain the outcome’s negation: causality is asymmetric.

Since this study’s hypotheses are not mutually exclusive nor are their associated strategic logics expected to apply equally across all cases, QCA’s ability to capture asymmetric causality and equifinality confers important advantages over more traditional approaches. The study’s motivational hypotheses illustrate this point. Basic cross-tabulations indicate that, while single-issue motivations may be sufficient for explaining hoax use, lacking a single-issue motivation has no bearing on the hoax outcome (see Table 2); despite embodying a perfect set relation, the variables for hoaxing and single-issue motivation have only a 40.73% correlation. The disjoint between the strong set relation and weak correlation occurs because the set of non-single-issue groups encompasses many kinds of groups: some whose motivations predict hoax use (ethno-nationalist); some whose motivations predict non-hoaxing (religious); and some whose hoax (non-) use is determined by non-motivational factors altogether.

**Table 2. Cross-tabulation of Single-issue Motivation as a Sufficient Condition for Hoaxing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>single-issue</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hoaxer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following section presents and discusses results from two QCA models, each testing for the hoaxter and non-hoaxter outcome. The two models differ in the measures used to capture group motivation, with Model A’s variables indicating mutually-exclusive motivations, and Model B allowing for combined motives and a broadened definition of the animal rights, environmentalist, and anti-abortionist motive to also include the right- and left-wing economic motivations they are traditionally grouped with. This combined broadly left- and right-wing variable is used to probe whether single-issue motivations generate an independent effect, or whether their role is driven by non-hierarchical structure: a necessary test, given that all of the sample’s single-issue groups also lack hierarchy. In all cases, I apply a consistency threshold of 0.8 (i.e. at least 80% of groups displaying the same combinations of factors must agree on the outcome) and a frequency threshold of two (i.e. at least two observed cases must exhibit the same combinations of factors to be considered in the solution).

Results are presented (Table 3) using the following notation: “ ~ ” indicates the negation of a factor or the outcome; “ * ” indicates the logical AND; and “ + ” indicates the logical OR.
Results and Discussion

The solution coverage measures indicate that the models are better at identifying groups that never use hoaxes (accounting for 67.2 – 75.9% of non-hoaxers) than they are at identifying groups that sometimes do hoax (accounting for 30.4% of hoaxers). This discrepancy in coverage indicates that hoaxing groups tend to follow more idiosyncratic pathways to hoaxing; they are not captured by the two case minimum frequency threshold applied here.

In Model A, the single-issue motivations appear as an independent, sufficient condition for hoaxing, accounting for 21.7% of hoaxing groups. However, since all observed single-issue groups also lack hierarchy, this solution rests on the simplifying assumption that single-issue groups displaying hierarchy would also hoax if they were to exist. Given the consistent presence of non-hierarchy in solutions for hoaxing, and of hierarchy in solutions for non-hoaxing, this counterfactual is implausible.

Table 3. QCA Models and their Minimized Solutions (WMDB-based Sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODEL A</th>
<th>HOAXER = f(SINGLEISSUE, PUREETHNO, PURERELIG, HIERARCHY, SPLINTER, SERIOUS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SINGLEISSUE + (PUREETHNO * ~HIERARCHY) → HOAXER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solution coverage: 0.304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solution consistency: 0.875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~HOAXER = f(SINGLEISSUE, PUREETHNO, PURERELIG, HIERARCHY, SPLINTER, SERIOUS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~PURERELIG * (HIERARCHY * ~PUREETHNO + ~SERIOUS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ PURERELIG * SPLINTER            → ~HOAXER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solution coverage: 0.759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solution consistency: 0.917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODEL B</th>
<th>HOAXER = f(LEFTRIGHT, CONTAINETHNO, CONTAINRELIG, HIERARCHY, SPLINTER, SERIOUS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~CONTAINRELIG * ~HIERARCHY * SERIOUS → HOAXER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solution coverage: 0.304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solution consistency: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~HOAXER = f(LEFTRIGHT, CONTAINETHNO, CONTAINRELIG, HIERARCHY, SPLINTER, SERIOUS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONTAINRELIG * (CONTAINETHNO + SPLINTER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ LEFTRIGHT * HIERARCHY            → ~HOAXER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solution coverage: 0.672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solution consistency: 0.929</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the non-exclusive motivation variables are used, the solution has the same degree of coverage, but indicates more generally that any motivation – as long as it lacks any religious component – combines with non-hierarchy and the perpetration of at least three serious events to produce the hoax outcome. However, this sufficient combination disappears when the single-issue groups are removed from the sample, meaning that economically-oriented groups who are non-hierarchical and carry out more than three real attacks do not hoax with adequate consistency to generate a sufficient condition on their own. Accordingly, the effect of single-issue motivations on hoaxing is overdetermined, but their normative orientation likely still plays a role.

Not only does a lack of hierarchy contribute to hoax use, but the presence of hierarchy is also associated with hoax non-use. Still, group structure is never sufficient on its own for predicting whether or not a group will hoax. Non-hierarchy must combine with any non-religious ideology and the minimum serious event threshold to generate the hoax outcome. The range of possible motives in this solution points to principal-agent problems as an underlying driver of hoax use.

Religious and ethno-nationalist ideologies also affect groups’ hoax use. Although QCA is unable to reject the null hypothesis with respect to ethno-nationalism’s individual effect on hoaxing, the results support a new hypothesis: that religious ethno-nationalists are particularly unlikely to ever use hoaxes. Religious ideology also exerts an effect on groups’ hoax behaviour, independent of ethno-nationalism: religious ideology combines with radical splinter histories to explain why some groups never hoax. Unlike for the other motives, the presence of
religion never requires the co-presence or co-absence of hierarchy. This finding suggests that the positive effect of religious ethno-nationalists and/or religious splinters on non-hoaxing is sufficiently strong to override any moderating role that a lack of hierarchy might otherwise play.

Although it is never a sufficient condition on its own, where the number of events perpetrated figures into solutions, it confirms a symmetrical relationship: having committed more than three serious events is sometimes associated with groups’ use of hoaxes; and having committed three or fewer serious events is sometimes associated with non-hoaxing. It appears that the three-event minimum threshold accords perpetrators sufficient reputational capital to force counterterrorist response and hoax without otherwise signalling weakness and undermining their credibility for future attacks.

A QCA analysis of the CIDB-based sample generally corroborates these findings. The only substantial difference in results across the two samples pertains to the effect of a group’s splinter origins on hoax behaviour. For the WMDDDB-based sample, splinter origins combined with religious motivation to explain non-hoaxing. For the CIDB-based sample, splinter origins contribute to both the hoax and non-hoax outcome, magnifying the expected effect of the corresponding motivational (religion or ethno-nationalism) or structural (hierarchy or non-hierarchy) feature – in either direction. The hypothesized mechanisms may still hold: if ethno-nationalist groups prefer to stay within the realm of legitimate politics, low-severity hoaxes may be an attractive middle ground when group schism would otherwise encourage more violent forms of action.

While it is difficult to derive conclusions regarding groups’ intent based on purely observational data, these findings suggest that groups’ use of hoaxes may result most substantially from principal-agent problems and individual members’ cost-benefit analyses, rather than an overarching strategic logic for the group. If groups are hoaxing strategically, their logic is not clearly indicated by broad-based organizational characteristics, but by particularities of the group and its circumstances. These same organizational characteristics, however, are sufficient in most cases for precluding groups’ incorporation of hoaxes into their campaign activities.

Conclusions and Future Hoax Research

This study used QCA to identify a range of characteristics (and combinations of characteristics) that differentiate terrorist groups who never use hoaxes from those who sometimes do. Consistency across two distinct samples speaks to the explanatory factors’ robustness, and to the ability of existing cross-national databases that code for hoaxes to provide insight into group behavior. They may lack nuance and coverage at the event-level, but when transformed to the group-level, these datasets provide a fairly accurate picture.

Unfortunately, group-level cross-sectional analyses of terrorism hoax behaviour have only limited counterterrorism applications. Although the motivational, organizational, and campaign contextual factors identified above can distinguish between hoaxers and non-hoaxers, they cannot identify which events are real or hoaxed. Fortunately, the QCA solutions describing which groups never hoax have substantial coverage and consistency. Activities of groups displaying these characteristics should always be taken very seriously. The QCA solutions will wrongly identify a hoaxing group as a non-hoaxing one about 9% of the time, but it is a safer bet to rely on a framework that wrongly treats hoaxes as real than the other way around.

This study framed the discussion of group-based characteristics differentiating hoaxers from non-hoaxers in the context of perpetrators’ underlying strategic logics. While the explanatory factors used can indirectly corroborate the presence of certain logics, they do not purport to represent direct tests thereof. It is impossible to disentangle – based on observational events and perpetrator characteristics alone – which logics are truly driving hoax activity. Events-based analyses with temporal and qualitative components can be used to move research on hoaxes forward and probe the question of strategic logic more appropriately.

Events-based research, however, remains vulnerable to the flaws and limitations of terrorism events datasets, many of which are accentuated when dealing with hoaxes. A comparison of the datasets consulted in the present study reveals that the frequently-used GTD, ITERATE, and WMDDDB substantially underestimate the
incidence of terrorism, especially hoaxes. With time periods held constant, the CIDB captures over ten times more terrorism incidents in Canada than the cross-national datasets, and between 2.5 and 12.9 times more hoax incidents. The cross-national databases, although they yielded valuable group-level insights here, are thus inappropriate for events-level analysis of hoax activity. A feasible alternative is to focus new collection efforts on individual groups’ campaigns. In providing profiles of likely hoaxers and non-hoaxers, the present study’s findings can be leveraged as an empirically-informed launchpad to identify such groups and campaigns for meaningful comparison.

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Disclaimer: The author’s views are her own and do not reflect endorsement by the Government of Canada.

Notes


Terrorism,” 428–29.


[31] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database (College Park: START, 2016).

[32] Canadian Incident Database (Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society, 2016); URL: www.extremism.ca.

[33] Developed by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism's Terrorism Knowledge Base.

[34] Developed by IHS Markit.


Does Restrictive Immigration Policy Reduce Terrorism in Western Democracies?

by Seung-Whan Choi

Abstract

Given that immigration policy and terrorism are two hotly debated issues, this study empirically examines the effects of twelve different restrictive policies that Western democratic states use to screen immigrants for terrorism prevention. This study finds mixed effects of restrictive policy alternatives. On the one hand, terrorism is likely to decrease when states impose immigration restrictions based on skill or wealth, or when states offer immigrants limited legal rights that permit only restricted residence and designated employers. On the other hand, terrorism is expected to increase when states allow no special visas or procedures to recruit immigrants, or when states give workers citizenship only when they are born to a native parent. These mixed findings suggest that to deter future terrorist incidents, states should be selective in initiating and implementing new immigration reforms.

Keywords: restrictive immigration policy, terrorism, empirical analysis, Western democracies

Introduction

A recent Pew Research Center survey of ten countries in the European Union indicates that a median of 59 percent of the population consider refugee inflows to be a terrorism risk factor in their country.[1] Responding to this growing concern, many European politicians have called for increasingly restrictive immigration policies to counter emerging terrorist challenges. For example, Marine Le Pen, a French far-right politician, suggested that the 2017 London terrorist attack “underlined the importance of countries being able to protect their borders and stepping up general security measures.”[2] Believing immigrants to be a danger to national security, some American leaders have also employed a right-wing populist agenda.[3] For example, on January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump issued an executive order, temporarily blocking entry by citizens of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The President asserted that “it is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from foreign nationals who intend to commit terrorist attacks in the United States; and to prevent the admission of foreign nationals who intend to exploit United States immigration laws for malevolent purposes.”[4]

Does such a restrictive immigration policy actually reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks? This study addresses this question empirically. While existing studies do not use a quantitative approach, they provide qualitative insights on the potential connection between immigration policy and terrorism.[5] For example, Nowrasteh's terrorism risk analysis of individual visa categories finds that a moratorium on all immigration or tourism is not warranted given that foreign-born terrorist suspects who enter the United States, either as immigrants or tourists, do not necessarily become high security risks.[6] Yet, Krikorian's study advocates an introduction of sustained, across-the-board immigration law enforcement as a way to keep out potential terrorists from American soil.[7] Although these studies have contributed to immigration policy debates in both a constructive and positive way, they are limited in two ways: (1) their scope is limited to largely a single immigration policy restriction, and (2) their method is limited as it uses predominately qualitative approach of inquiry. This study attempts to provide a remedy for these two limitations, given the fact that states are likely to use multiple policy tools to regulate the inflow of immigrants for terrorism prevention and a quantitative inquiry is another instrumental venue to make systematic comparisons of different immigration policies across countries and over years.

Drawing on recently compiled data collected by Peters and Shin, who assess the content of immigration laws and immigrant rights in twelve policy areas in Western, industrialized, and democratic states,[8] this study performs a cross-national, time-series data analysis during the period 1970 to 2007. This study puts forward
evidence that the effects of restrictive immigration policies are mixed. In other words, the risk of terrorism is likely to diminish when states impose reduced immigration based on skill or wealth, or when immigrants are given very limited legal rights (e.g., designated employers and restricted residence). Conversely, the risk of terrorism is likely to increase when states offer no special visas or procedures to recruit laborers or settlers, or when immigrants are given citizenship only through being born to a native father or mother.

Restrictive Immigration Policies and Terrorism

This section discusses how restrictive immigration policies can exert dampening effects on terrorism. States employ numerous policy options to control inflows of immigrants. While some immigration policies are introduced as general security measures, others are devised more specifically in response to terrorist activity. It should be noted that immigration policies that are not designed with terrorism in mind may have potentially unintended consequences as terrorists often exploit them for their own advantages. For analytical purposes, this study categorizes immigration policies into three areas that are further divided into twelve policy alternatives, as shown in Table 1: border regulations (i.e., who gains entry to the state), immigrant rights (i.e., what rights immigrants receive), and enforcement (i.e., how the border is enforced). Border regulations consist of eight subcategories based on nationality, skill, quotas, recruitment, work prohibitions, family reunification, refugee policy, and asylum policy; immigrant rights are classified into citizenship and other rights; and enforcement restrictions includes deportation and other enforcement.[9]

States establish border regulations to decide who to permit inside their territory. All things considered, border regulations may function as the most effective tool to fend off potential terrorists who try to take advantage of immigration loopholes. By imposing strict border regulations (e.g. suspension of visa issuance for countries with a high risk of terrorism, an imposition of a waiting period for background checks on visa issuance, etc.) states may be better able to keep out known, suspected, or potential terrorists from their countries. A traditional way by which states regulate entry is to screen immigrants based on their national origin; in such cases, specific nationalities are not permitted to enter under the pretext of national security.[10]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Brief Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border regulations</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Nationality is used as a basis for immigration restrictions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skill</td>
<td>Restrictions are based on skill or wealth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quotas</td>
<td>The number of immigrants are limited each year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recruitment</td>
<td>States regulate entry by controlling access to their labor markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work prohibitions</td>
<td>States impose restrictions on industries or positions held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family reunification</td>
<td>States allow varying levels of family reunification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refuge policy</td>
<td>Entrance policies are set for refugees outside the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asylum policy</td>
<td>Entrance policies are set for those claiming refugee status at the border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Rights</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>States decide who can be a member of the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other rights</td>
<td>States outline other rights for immigrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>Deportation</td>
<td>States regulate who and how can be deported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other enforcement</td>
<td>States impose other enforcement measures in place.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

President Donald Trump's idea of the travel ban from seven Muslim-majority countries belongs to the category of nationality restrictions. Another way of controlling immigration is to select foreign nationals based on their skills or wealth. By permitting only highly skilled or wealthy foreigners such as top executives and high-level intra-company transfers to their territory, states may be able to curtail the number of potential
terrorists. The rationale for this immigration measure is consistent with the findings of some previous studies: terrorism is rooted in poor socio-economic conditions.[11] Another alternative restriction is through the use of recruitment measures. At times, states may ban recruitment of immigrant workers by invoking a national security exigency; at other times they may allow private companies to recruit workers or they may hire workers for themselves. States may also regulate entry by controlling access to their labor markets, thus limiting the availability of positions in certain industries. Other options include changing levels of family reunification or to use numerical quotas. States can also impose restrictive border regulations by allowing only a small number of refugees and asylum seekers who come from populations suspected of engaging in terrorist activities.[12]

How immigrants are treated may also be crucial in explaining the likelihood of terrorist activities. States may become victims of terrorism if they offer limited politico-legal rights to their immigrants who may have grievances, motivating them to lash out due to their unstable social status as foreign-born residents. One of the important immigrant measures that states can use to restrict the political behavior of immigrants is withholding citizenship, the granting of which would allow the immigrant the same rights as citizens. When immigrants have settled for a long period of time in a host state, it is reasonable for them to expect to become part of the social milieu. Denying an appropriate path to citizenship to long-time residents with no criminal records may increase terrorism because some foreign residents find that their contribution to the host country is not recognized and their socio-legal benefits are almost non-existent. Krueger's study illustrates this phenomenon.[13] After having compared the demographic backgrounds of 63 homegrown terrorists with a sample of approximately 1,000 Muslim Americans, he concludes that non-U.S. citizens are at greater risk of becoming America's homegrown terrorists. Other immigrant rights include the right to own land or run a business, the right to access the welfare system, and even, occasionally, the right to vote. In this regard, Piazza offers useful insights on the behavior of potential terrorists:[14] states may face increased terrorism if they discriminate against ethnic minorities that collectively suffer from disadvantages in income, housing, employment and face unequal access to government social services. Put differently, when immigrants have no access to those rights, they may feel disenchanted, which may increase susceptibility to radicalization and terrorist recruitment. Thus these individuals have a greater risk of turning to terrorist violence against the host government.

Enforcement policy is another means of restricting immigration. Camarota's study examines how 48 foreign-born Al-Qaeda operatives entered and remained in the United States during the period from 1993 to 2001.[15] His study notes that one-fourth of the terrorists were illegal aliens and another fourth had pending asylum applications. The Al-Qaeda operatives knew how to enter the state by exploiting weaknesses in American immigration laws and regulations. Accordingly, precise enforcement mechanisms are necessary given that they can serve as an essential tool to fend off potential terrorists from American soil.[16] The U.S. government, for example, created the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in 2003 within the Department of Homeland Security. ICE is tasked with enforcing the nation's immigration laws in an appropriate, legal and fair manner and it is responsible for apprehending and removing aliens who pose a threat to American national security.[17] When some detainees seek asylum, they can be moved to an alternative detention program and provided access to appropriate resources and advocacy groups.[18]

Lack of effective policy enforcement provides openings that terrorists are able to exploit. Accordingly, it is crucial to enforce existing policies, even harsh ones, in order to deter future terrorist attacks. The enforcement of restrictive immigration policies is applicable only to immigrant terrorists. This means that jihadist terrorists who were born in Western countries and/or radicalized within those countries are likely to escape from the immigration enforcement measures. Deportation may serve as the ultimate tool to enforce immigration laws. Accordingly, states should make clear that terrorist suspects will be deported as quickly as a transparent deportation process allows.[19] Other enforcement measures include employer and carrier sanctions, fences, border patrols, and amnesties for those remaining in the country illegally.

A state's immigration policy purports to regulate and control a certain number of immigrants some of whom may transform into terrorist operatives in the future. Unfortunately, academic and policy circles are in the dark as to how those different restrictions affect the flow of immigrants and the consequent likelihood of terrorism. It is reasonable to speculate that not all restriction policies are equal in their ability to reduce or deter terrorism.
The relative effectiveness of restrictive immigration policies needs to be investigated in order to find the best counterterrorism option.

**Research Design**

To empirically examine the connection between immigration policy and terrorism, this study collects a cross-national, time-series dataset on ten Western industrialized democracies that are attractive destinations for low-skilled workers during the period 1970 to 2007. The focus of the immigration policy toward low-skilled workers is important for this empirical investigation because the game theoretical approach by Bandyopadhyay and Sandler predicts that immigration-receiving states “can curtail its terrorism at home by limiting unskilled labor quotas.”[20] In addition, given that previous studies show that many terrorists came from low-class backgrounds,[21] the focus on low-skilled workers is defensible. This study builds a statistical model of terrorism as follows:

\[
\text{Terrorism}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Restrictive Immigration Policy}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \text{Democracy}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \text{Economic Development}_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 \text{Population}_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 \text{Muslim}_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \text{Post-Cold War}_i + \varepsilon_{it}
\]

where subscript \( i = 1, \ldots, N \) indicates the state and subscript \( t = 1, \ldots, T \) indexes the year. \( \text{Terrorism}_i \) is the outcome variable; \( \beta_0 \) is an intercept; \( \beta_1 \) through \( \beta_6 \) are coefficients for explanatory variables; and \( \varepsilon_{it} \) is an error term. All the explanatory variables except for Post-Cold War on the right-hand side are lagged by one year to ensure that the events of the explanatory variable occurred before the outcome variable.

The outcome variable – Terrorism – comes from Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev who systematically subdivided La Free and Dugan’s Global Terrorism Database into domestic and transnational terrorist incidents.[22] Because immigration-receiving countries can be subjects of either domestic or transnational terrorism, this study operationalizes terrorism in three different ways: (1) the total number of terrorist incidents, including both domestic and transnational attacks, (2) the total number of domestic terrorist incidents, and (3) the total number of transnational terrorist incidents. When the perpetrators and victims are from the same country, an act of violence is defined as domestic terrorism (e.g., the nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995). Transnational terrorism is an act of violence that involves at least two different nationals (e.g., the destruction of the Khobar Towers that housed US airmen in June 1996 near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia). Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev’s data compilation spans from 1970 to 2007, so the statistical analysis of this study is confined to that period.

The main explanatory variable – restrictive immigration policy – is taken from Peters who measured the variation of immigration policy based upon reading actual immigration laws, regulations, and the executive’s policy discretionary action,[23] and Shin who updated and expanded Peters’ data collection.[24] Given that the recent debates on the connection between immigration and terrorism have revolved around the U.S. and Europe, this study chooses to include ten industrialized states in the sample: the U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland.[25]

Table 2 shows the average immigration policy composite scores for each state along with the average total terrorist incidents. The United States appears to have the most restrictive immigration policy among the ten industrialized states, though it did not experience the highest number of terrorist incidents. Germany has the second most restrictive immigration policy, followed by France and Canada. Because New Zealand scores the least on immigration policy and terrorist incidents, it may seem to be an outlier among the ten sample countries. However, the main findings that are discussed in the next section do not change even after New Zealand is excluded from the Western democracies.
Each of the twelve alternative measures of immigration policy that are compiled by Peters and Shin has values, ranging from 1 (most restrictive) to 5 (most liberal). Using principal component analysis, Peters and Shin construct a composite measure that combines all twelve immigration restriction policies. Higher values of the composite measure mean a more open policy. Because the focus of this study is the restrictiveness rather than openness of national immigration policy, this study re-records those measures for ease of interpretation, with higher values signaling a more restrictive policy.

To account for omitted variable bias, this study includes five confounding factors that have been regarded as significant factors of terrorism in previous studies: democracy, economic development, population, Muslim, and post-Cold War. Other variables such as involvement in conflict and foreign intervention are not included in the model because previous studies already document them well and also because too many controls tend to complicate the estimation results. Even when these controls are included in the model, the main findings that are discussed in the Empirical Results section do not alter. Their estimated results are not reported to economize space.

Democracies are expected to experience more terrorist attacks than autocracies on the grounds that they allow more freedom of expression and movement. The democracy variable is collected from the Polity dataset; it is a composite index on a scale of -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy).

Since more industrialized economies tend to create fewer economic grievances, they should face a smaller risk of terrorism. However, it should be noted that the role of economic grievances in terrorism is far from clear, as previous studies showed mixed and inconclusive findings. For the purposes of this study, economic development is operationalized with the log of GDP per capita, gathered from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 2017.

Empirical studies by Choi and Eyerman demonstrate that highly populated countries have greater trouble providing adequate security for their large populations; therefore they are likely to run a greater risk of terrorism. Data for total population are garnered from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 2017. This study takes a logarithm of the population variable to make positively skewed distribution more normal, which better satisfies the assumption that the variable should be normally distributed in a statistical sense.

Several previous studies deem a sizable Muslim population to be a significant factor for the occurrence of terrorism. Muslim is measured by the percentage of Muslims in the country's population. The data is obtained from the Religious Characteristics of States dataset.

The end of the Soviet funding of left-wing groups led to a decrease of terrorist attacks in the post-Cold War era. To account for the systemic decrease in terrorist activity since the end of the Cold War, a post-Cold War
variable is created. The post-Cold War variable is recoded as 1 since 1991 and 0 otherwise.

Because the outcome variable – Terrorism – is a count measure, this study decides to run a negative binomial regression with Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by country. Although this study also considers Poisson regression as the baseline model, it does not fit the data well, as noted by the Pearson goodness-of-fit chi-squared test that is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 8169.509, p < 0.00001$). The negative binomial maximum-likelihood regression performs much better for the terrorism data in which the variance, 968.91, is much larger than its mean, 16.48, indicating the problem of overdispersion. Negative binomial regression adds a dispersion parameter to model the unobserved heterogeneity among observations; this allows the variance to exceed the mean, thus correcting for the overdispersion found in Poisson regression models.[35]

**Empirical Results**

In this section, this study first presents the overall effect of the twelve restrictive immigration policies on terrorism and then moves onto an individual effect of each policy alternative.

Table 3 shows estimated results of negative binomial regression in which a composite indicator for the twelve policy restriction options is tested against terrorism. In Models 1 through 3, the coefficients on Restrictive Immigration Policy are not significantly different from zero. This implies that regardless of the measures of the political violence, restrictive immigration policy has little to do with terrorism one way or another. When states try to prevent future terrorist attacks by introducing more restrictive immigration policies, their effectiveness appears to be dubious. Among the five control variables, the indicator for Population emerges as a significant, positive predictor of terrorism across the table. As hypothesized, states with a large number of populations are disposed to experience a greater risk of terrorism. This result may sound counterintuitive when one looks at the single case of the United States that has far fewer foreign fighters than the United Kingdom, despite vastly greater population size. However, when one interprets the estimated coefficient as representing the average role of the population size among the ten sample countries, its positive effect should make sense. The other control variables such as Democracy, Economic Development, Muslim, and Post-Cold War are shown to be inconsistent factors in predicting terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Incidents</th>
<th>Domestic Incidents</th>
<th>Transnational Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted Immigration Policy</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.479)</td>
<td>(0.528)</td>
<td>(0.557)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>-1.520</td>
<td>-1.667</td>
<td>-1.635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.936)</td>
<td>(0.995)</td>
<td>(0.974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.670***</td>
<td>0.776***</td>
<td>0.477*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
<td>(0.232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.126**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>-0.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.495)</td>
<td>(0.579)</td>
<td>(0.381)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>10.933</td>
<td>10.934</td>
<td>12.696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.655)</td>
<td>(8.502)</td>
<td>(8.149)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo $R^2$                      | 0.07            | 0.08               | 0.07                    |
Dispersion = 1                    | 29.32           | 30.71              | 8.42                    |
Observations                      | 367             | 367                | 367                     |

Note: Robust standard errors, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, two-tailed tests.
One may assert that much of the terrorism that occurred in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s had little to do with immigration. This assertion begs the question: What would happen to the significance of the Restricted Immigration Policy variable if the data for the 1970s and 1980s are not used for the estimation? And also, what would happen if the model takes into account some measures of immigration in each country besides the policy variable? Table 4 directly deals with these two questions. The estimates are produced after the study period is limited to the years since 1990, which causes the dropping of the Post-Cold War variable in the estimation due to a lack of variation, and after an indicator for international migrant stock as a percentage of the total population whose data is available only since 1990 is added in the model specification.[36] As long as the Restricted Immigration Policy variable is concerned, it still remains as an insignificant predictor of terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Incidents</th>
<th>Domestic Incidents</th>
<th>Transnational Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive Immigration Policy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
<td>(0.297)</td>
<td>(0.334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Stock&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.082*</td>
<td>-0.112*</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.681*</td>
<td>-1.928***</td>
<td>1.264***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.445)</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-2.270</td>
<td>-1.800</td>
<td>-3.495***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.264)</td>
<td>(1.618)</td>
<td>(0.957)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.564*</td>
<td>0.656*</td>
<td>0.382*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
<td>(0.280)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.135*</td>
<td>-0.355***</td>
<td>0.276***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>dropped</td>
<td>dropped</td>
<td>dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>27.084**</td>
<td>34.667**</td>
<td>18.656*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.679)</td>
<td>(11.180)</td>
<td>(7.489)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors, *<i>p</i> < .05, **<i>p</i> < .01, ***<i>p</i> < .001, two-tailed tests.

A composite index for the twelve immigration policies is unable to discern an independent effect of each restriction alternative on terrorism. Table 5 delves into the individual effects of the twelve restrictive immigration policies. The estimated results display interesting causal connections between policy alternatives and terrorism. The relationships are mixed: while some immigration policies help to reduce the risk of terrorist incidents, others either contribute to an increase of terrorism or else exert no significant effect. For example, border regulations based especially on nationality criteria appears to have no bearing on terrorism. Given that this null finding is based on the ten sample states including the United States, it is intriguing to ponder about President Donald Trump’s attempts to introduce the travel ban on citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries. The empirical evidence makes his claim unfounded despite the fact that his original logic may have pleased the ears of the right wing.
### Table 5: Effects of Individual Restrictive Immigration Policies on Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Model 1</th>
<th>Domestic Model 2</th>
<th>Transnational Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Border Regulations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universality by Nationality&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill Level Restrictions&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.446***</td>
<td>-0.329**</td>
<td>-0.348*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Recruitment Policy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.953***</td>
<td>1.116***</td>
<td>0.975***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Labor Market Participation&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.421)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Reunification Policy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>-0.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Policy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.220**</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Policy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>0.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration Rights</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>1.107***</td>
<td>0.636**</td>
<td>1.942***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Rights Given to Immigrants&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.676***</td>
<td>-0.878***</td>
<td>-0.648**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enforcement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deportation Policy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0.199*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Enforcement Policy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.094***</td>
<td>0.094***</td>
<td>0.088***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.576</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>-2.288***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.731)</td>
<td>(0.993)</td>
<td>(0.658)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.936***</td>
<td>1.023***</td>
<td>0.763*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.208*</td>
<td>-0.284***</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War&lt;sub&gt;it&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>-0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.320)</td>
<td>(0.422)</td>
<td>(0.288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-5.497</td>
<td>-15.408</td>
<td>10.537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.827)</td>
<td>(9.803)</td>
<td>(10.866)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispersion = 1</td>
<td>10.36</td>
<td>11.46</td>
<td>4.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, two-tailed tests.

**Skill Level Restrictions** and **Other Rights Given to Immigrants** emerge as significant, negative factors of terrorism. **Immigrant Recruitment Policy** and **Citizenship** also achieve significance but in a counterintuitive way. These findings show that terrorism is likely to decrease when states restrict immigration to only those who are highly educated and/or are high income earners, or when states specify how immigrants are registered, where they can live and/or who their employers are. By contrast, terrorism is likely to increase when states provide no...
special visas or procedures to recruit labor or settlers who are then likely to enter the state illegally, or when citizenship is given only by birth from a native father or mother.

The estimated coefficients reported in Table 5 are not suitable for gauging the relative importance of individual restriction policies because they are not standardized, measured in their natural units. To examine which policy alternative is more influential or substantive in preventing future terrorist incidents, this study makes a few methodological adjustments. This study takes a log of terrorist incidents—the outcome variable, after adding 1 to the base. This transformation enables this study to run an ordinary least squares regression model that produces standardized coefficients to compare. Table 6 reports the results.

Which restrictive policy is more effective in reducing acts of terrorism, Skill Level Restrictions or Other Rights Given to Immigrants? It turns out that the latter is more influential than the former. This suggests that it is more important to address the experience of immigrants in a state after arrival rather than trying to keep certain categories of people out in the first place. To see which policy alternative is more likely to increase terrorism, this study compares the magnitudes of Immigrant Recruitment Policy and Citizenship. This study finds that the former is larger than the latter.

Concluding Remarks

Current scholarship offers no systematic empirical analysis on the controversy surrounding the effects of restrictive immigration policies on terrorism. This study builds a first-cut empirical model to help begin to clarify this issue. The rationale for the statistical model is that states have an important role to play in screening immigrants who wish to enter their territory and also to exclude those who pose a potential threat to national security. This study finds the estimated results analogous to a double-edged sword. The twelve different restriction options produce both favorable and unfavorable effects on terrorist activity. This finding suggests that to challenge terrorist threats, states should make a strategic choice in policymaking because not all restrictive policies yield the intended, fruitful outcomes. States should think hard about what policy areas they need to improve and concentrate for terrorism prevention. For example, states can selectively choose some specific immigration measures such as launching start-up visa programs to attract highly skilled foreign entrepreneurs and/or improving the fundamental rights of immigrants as a means to avert possible terrorist grievances.

The empirical analysis of this study that identifies some common ground in immigration policy should be politically appealing to everyone except the right and left political fringe that drives immigration policy debate. Yet, since the outcome variable of this study is general terrorist incidents, it does not take into account the mobilization of foreign fighters (which in some countries were substantial during the period in question). Future research should look into the determinants of terrorism that was carried out exclusively by foreign fighters. It may also be interesting to look at Islamist terrorism that did not begin in the sample countries until at least the 1990s.
### Table 6  Relative Importance of Restrictive Immigration Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Model 1</th>
<th>Domestic Model 2</th>
<th>Transnational Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border Regulations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universality by Nationality&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill Level Restrictions&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.258</td>
<td>-0.216</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Recruitment Policy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Labor Market Participation&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Reunification Policy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-0.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Policy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Policy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Rights Given to Immigrants&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.408</td>
<td>-0.250</td>
<td>-0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deportation Policy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Enforcement Policy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.401</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>-0.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td>0.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim&lt;sub&gt;it-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
<td>-0.399</td>
<td>-0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War&lt;sub&gt;it&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Acknowledgements**

The author would like to thank Alba Alexander, Michael Dirksen, David Ebner, Brody Ford, Anahit Gomtsian, and Veronica Picchi for sharing their wonderful insights.

Notes


[5] This study examines immigration policy, not inflows of immigrants. The former refers to any policy of a state that deals with the transit of people across its borders into the country, while the latter looks at the total number of immigrants from a sending state into a receiving state. For the latter, see Vincenzo Bove and Tobias Böhmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” Journal of Politics, vol. 78, no. 2 (2016), 572-588. This study also explores the effect of immigration policy on terrorism, not the effect of terrorism on immigration policy. For the latter, see Alex Schmid, “Links between Terrorism and Migration,” The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, vol. 7, no. 4 (2016), 1-63; Terri, Givens, Gary Freeman, and David Leal, (Eds.) Immigration Policy and Security (New York: Routledge, 2009).


[24] Shin, “Tyrants and Migrants,” op. cit. The immigration data for Spain come from Shin and those for the other states are garnered from Peters. See Shin, “Tyrants and Migrants,” op. cit.; Peters, “Open Trade, Closed Borders,” op. cit.; Peters, “Online Appendix B,” op. cit. Australia and New Zealand are included in the data analysis because they have also experienced terrorism and because they are included in Peters’ original data collection. When the two countries are excluded, the main findings are similar to those reported in the Empirical Results section.

[26] The twelve restrictions are (1) entry discrimination based on nationality, (2) entry discrimination based on skills or income, (3) ease of naturalization or citizenship acquisition, (4) immigrant rights such as political, legal, or welfare rights, (5) number of refugees allowed to enter, (6) ease of getting an asylum, (7) visas or government programs, (8) labor-market restrictions for immigrants, (9) deportable offenses and administrative processes, (10) border enforcement or employment screening, (11) sponsorship by citizenship and restrictions, and (12) percentage of population allowed to enter annually.


The Threat from Within: A Conjunctive Analysis of Domestic Terrorism Incidents in the United States, United Kingdom, and Ireland

by Joseph Gregory DeLeeuw and William Alex Pridemore

Abstract

This study examines outcomes of domestic terrorism incidents to determine if similarities exist within or between the United States, United Kingdom, and Ireland based on four perpetrator types: right-wing, left-wing, nationalist/separatist, and single issue. We used data from the Global Terrorism Database to examine key characteristics of domestic terrorism, incidents including perpetrator, target, attack, and weapon types and their relationship to incident outcomes. We identified dominant configurations of these key incident characteristics using conjunctive analysis of case configurations and used those configurations to determine if similarities existed between dominant configurations for each perpetrator type both within and between countries. Our analysis identifies the characteristics most prevalent in configurations resulting in property damage, injuries or fatalities, and successful attacks. Although differences exist in each country's experiences with domestic terrorism, the results of our analysis reveal several similarities between the incidents attributed to the perpetrator types in each country, including the targets, attack types, and weapons used. The results of this study suggest future comparative research is required to identify the causes and consequences of these similarities in each country.

Keywords: Domestic Terrorism; Conjunctive Analysis; Terrorism; Global Terrorism Database; Cross-National Comparison

Introduction

While recent international terrorism attacks in the United States and United Kingdom have led to increased levels of terrorism related research in both countries, less attention has been directed at domestic terrorism. Similar to the countries' shared experiences with international terrorism, the United States and United Kingdom have long histories of domestic terrorism involving similar perpetrator types. Centered on the prolonged conflict in Northern Ireland, any discussion of domestic terrorism in the United Kingdom must also include a discussion of domestic terrorism in Ireland and their shared history related to domestic terrorism.[1]

This study examines the characteristics of domestic terrorism incidents within and between the United States, United Kingdom, and Ireland. Due to the limited comparative research on this topic, our primary aim is to develop initial observations of key similarities and differences within and between the countries and to demonstrate the value of conjunctive analysis as a method for studying incidents of terrorism. Utilizing existing open source data and conjunctive analysis, we identify dominant configurations of several key characteristics of domestic terrorism incidents and how those configurations relate to the outcomes of these incidents. Using target type, attack type, and weapon type we identify which configurations are most commonly associated with four prominent perpetrator types: right-wing, left-wing, nationalist/separatist, and single issue. Once we identify dominant configurations based on perpetrator type, we examine the relationship between those configurations and the outcomes of terrorist incidents including fatalities and injuries, damage, and success.

Our study contributes to the literature on domestic terrorism in two significant ways. First, it adds to the limited existing comparative literature on domestic terrorism by providing a comparison of incidents between the United States, United Kingdom, and Ireland. Second, it provides the first use of conjunctive analysis to examine incidents of domestic terrorism. Conjunctive analysis provides a novel approach to examining terrorist incidents as a whole by examining configurations of multiple key characteristics and how those configurations relate to incident outcomes.
Literature Review

Four Main Perpetrator Types

Right-wing, left-wing, nationalist/separatist, and single issue domestic terrorist groups have represented the primary forms of domestic terrorism in the United States, United Kingdom, and Ireland since the 1950s.[2] Although the causes and issues that drive these groups are not universal, corresponding perpetrator types in each country share ideological similarities that may influence their activities.

Right-wing terrorist groups have a diverse range of ideologies that can be described as religiously, racially, or politically motivated. Smith found that in the United States the majority of these groups demonstrated characteristics related to the Christian Identity Movement, specifically the belief that Aryans are God's chosen people.[3] Other groups, including those in the militia and patriot movements, demonstrate a strong anti-government sentiment. The United States has also faced attacks by groups and individuals from the anti-abortion movement. In the United Kingdom, right-wing groups have most frequently been associated with white supremacy movements.

Left-wing terrorist groups are often driven by an ideology that is politically focused and that can be best described as Marxist-Leninist. For left-wing terrorists, the core goals of their operations frequently involve efforts directed at a regime change, an opposition to capitalism, and a desire for social justice.[5] Left-wing terrorism in the United States is best represented by the activities of revolutionary groups like the Weather Underground, whose attacks reached their height in the early 1970s.[6] Research on domestic terrorism in Western Europe found left-wing terrorism to account for approximately 9% of incidents in the region from 1950 to 2004.[7] Previous research utilizing an early version of the GTD to study the social origins of left-wing terrorism identified only two left-wing groups that were known to operate in the United Kingdom between 1970 and 2007: the Angry Brigades and Black Liberation Front.[8]

Nationalist/separatist terrorism often involves groups that are driven by a pursuit for independence or greater autonomy from an existing territory.[9] The conflicts in which they engage are often directed at the state and its representatives. Nationalist/separatist groups seek independence or liberation by inflicting damage on those in power in an effort to force them to withdraw or make concessions.[10] While violence is a central tactic for these groups, they are likely to attempt to limit innocent civilian casualties because they seek, at some level, to attract followers and gain public support. In the late 1960s and lasting until the 1980s, the United States faced its most significant threat from nationalist/separatist terrorism in the form of Puerto Rican groups pursuing independence from the United States.[11] The conflict in Northern Ireland provides the United Kingdom and Ireland with their primary source of nationalist/separatist terrorism. The modern conflict can be traced back to the 1950s, but the origins of the conflict date to the 1500s. The conflict resulted in acts of terror committed by supporters on both sides under the banner of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and numerous splinter groups that originated from or claimed to be connected to the PIRA and UVF.[12]

Single issue terrorism is best characterized as attacks carried out by groups focused on a single specific policy or issue within a society. While single issue terrorist groups tend to develop and dissipate in conjunction with a central issue, some broader issues have influenced the development of groups that have maintained prolonged operational campaigns. A significant number of these attacks were attributed to groups motivated by environmental and animal rights issues. In the past, environmental terrorist groups cited pollution and deforestation as central issues motivating their attacks. Terrorist groups related to the animal rights movement are best characterized as groups that believe animals have similar or equal rights to humans, including the “right to life and freedom from pain and suffering.”[13] Environmental and animal rights groups are known to have operated in both the United States and United Kingdom. The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) originally developed in the United Kingdom in 1992. By 1996 perpetrators in the United States began identifying themselves as being associated with the ELF. At one point, the ELF was identified as the number one domestic terrorism threat in the United States by leaders of the FBI.[14] The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) was founded in the
The Role of Perpetrator Type in Terrorism

While there has been limited comparative research on domestic terrorism, past research on terrorism provides some guidance on which characteristics may play an important role in influencing the outcomes of terrorism incidents, including types of perpetrators, attacks, targets, and weapons. The ideology of a terrorist group can influence how it assigns blame for the issues with which the group is concerned, which targets are relevant and worth attacking, and if the use of violence is acceptable. As a result, ideology can impact perpetrators’ actions, the targets they select, and the tactics they employ. Previous research also suggests similar perpetrator types will select similar targets, employ like attack types, and use comparable weapons, which is why we base our analysis on perpetrator type. Because the right-wing, left-wing, single issue, and national/separatist perpetrator types are present in both the United States and the United Kingdom, and national/separatist are also present in Ireland, it is likely characteristics influenced by ideology will have some similarity between like perpetrator types operating in each country. Each country’s experience with domestic terrorism, and the similarities that exist between the perpetrator types that have threatened the countries, provide the basis for comparing domestic terrorism incidents within and between countries.

Target Selection

Target selection is a crucial step in a perpetrator’s decision to carry out a terrorist attack, and one that is influenced by ideology. The identification of a worthy target and the justification for attacking that target are often driven by the ideology of the perpetrator. Examinations of the relationship between ideology and target selection have shown that different perpetrator types select different targets based on their ideology. Past research has also revealed that the ideology of a terrorist group plays a role in the decision to target civilians.

Right-wing groups concerned with religious, political, or racial issues that they perceive as threats have historically targeted those they feel are responsible for the threat. This includes civilians, government officials, and locations where these individuals spend time. Left-wing terrorists, often concerned with political change, have focused the majority of their attacks on the government in power or symbols of the government’s authority. Nationalist/separatist perpetrators concerned with establishing independence or separating from an existing government have carried out attacks against rival groups as well as government, law enforcement, and military targets more than businesses or educational institutions groups in each country. Single issue perpetrators in the United States and the United Kingdom, the most prominent of which are the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal Liberation Front, have attacked similar targets including businesses and educational institutions rather than military or law enforcement targets.

Attack Type

The existing research on terrorist attack types suggests that ideology can play an important role in the type of attack carried out by a perpetrator. In the United States, right-wing perpetrators have frequently targeted those they perceive as responsible for threats related to religious, political, or racial issues. Right-wing perpetrators have employed attack types that are likely to inflict harm against individuals or locations that they frequent including armed assaults, bombing/explosion attacks, and facility/infrastructure attacks. Unlike the United Kingdom or Ireland, the United States has experienced a large number of anti-abortion related attacks including armed assaults, bombing/explosion attacks, and facility/infrastructure attacks. The United Kingdom and Ireland’s differing experiences with anti-abortion related terrorism may be the result of their existing abortion laws. The United Kingdom has less restrictive laws than other countries in the region, except in Northern Ireland where abortion is banned. Ireland had a constitutional ban on most abortions until a 2018 vote repealing the ban signaled a change for the country.

In the United States, left-wing perpetrators have historically carried out attacks that have been less lethal than right-wing perpetrators. The focus on political change has resulted in numerous bombing/explosion
attacks and facility/infrastructure attacks that were not intended to kill. These attacks were often meant to send a message while limiting fatalities.

Nationalist/separatist perpetrators in each country have historically carried out attacks targeting government targets, individuals associated with a ruling government, and representatives of government authority including law enforcement and military targets. The attack types employed in these incidents have often been those with the potential to cause harm to life or disrupt the operations of the government. These attack types included assassinations, armed assaults, bombing/explosive attacks, facility/infrastructure attacks, and hostage taking.

Single issue perpetrators have historically carried out attacks with little loss of life. While some groups may be willing to accept the loss of life as collateral damage, most do not employ attack types intended to kill potential victims. Attacks intended to disrupt normal operations are often used to target businesses, educational institutions, and individuals associated with both. The attack type most commonly employed by single issue perpetrators in the United States and United Kingdom is facility/infrastructure attacks.

**Weapon Choice**

Variation among the preferred weapon types of each perpetrator type may exist based on the targets they select and their willingness to use violence. Previous research suggests that all four perpetrator types will rely on similar conventional weapons including firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices that have been historically used in other forms of terrorism. Despite past calls for concern about the potential for terrorist groups to employ chemical, biological, radioactive, or nuclear weapons (CBRN), their use has not become widespread. The accessibility and ease of use associated with conventional weapons are likely to make them the preferred weapon types of domestic terrorists. One way in which weapon selection may differ between the countries is in the use of firearms. In 1997, the United Kingdom implemented restrictive gun regulations that may make it more difficult for a perpetrator to acquire and utilize a firearm. Similar restrictive gun regulations are not in place in the United States and Ireland.

**Outcomes of Terrorist Incidents**

At the international level, researchers have examined the relationship between perpetrator type and the outcomes of terrorism incidents. Masters examined the role that perpetrator type played in the casualty rates of domestic and international terrorism from 1979-2005 for several perpetrator types including right-wing perpetrators, left-wing perpetrators, ethno-national perpetrators, and combinations of each. In his examination of 1,473 incidents, he found that all forms of terrorism had become more violent during the period examined. The results of his analysis indicated that the combination of right-wing and religious ethno-national terrorism was the most violent during the period examined. Asal and Rethemeyer argued that ideology may also reveal which perpetrator types are less likely to use lethal force. They found terrorism incidents attributed to left-wing, anarchists, and environmental focused perpetrators were much less likely to result in fatalities than those attributed to perpetrators with religious ideologies.

**Using Conjunctive Analysis to Examine Incident Level Data**

In this study we utilize conjunctive analysis to determine what configurations of incident characteristics are most prominent, based on perpetrator type and how those configurations relate to incident outcomes. Conjunctive analysis is designed to examine how a set of characteristics is related when studied at the incident level, for example when examining incident characteristics of criminal events. Developed by Miethe, Hart, and Regocz, conjunctive analysis of case configurations can be used to explore relationships between categorical variables and builds upon qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), an approach that focuses on the configurations of components at a case level.

 Conjunctive analysis is based on aggregating observations with shared attributes to create counts for each possible configuration of the observed attributes. This approach helps reveal the diversity between combinations
of characteristics and the prominence of specific characteristics.\[41\] This method builds upon existing forms of multivariate analysis and has been used in the past to examine incarceration risks, violence against college students, lethal outcomes of sexual assaults, and self-defensive gun use by crime victims.\[42\] For example, Miethe and Sousa examined risk factors related to carjacking and the potential outcomes. Police accounts of carjacking incidents were used to examine the outcomes of the incidents based on configurations of key characteristics.\[43\] They ranked configurations based on their risk of resulting in a completed carjacking, victims being injured, and a ‘best case’ scenario in which no injury occurred and the carjacking was not completed.\[44\]

While existing research has examined the relationship between terrorism incident characteristics and outcomes, our study represents one of the first analyses to utilize conjunctive analysis in terrorism research and the first to examine domestic terrorism. This approach provides a compelling new perspective from which to understand terrorism incidents. Conjunctive analysis allows for the examination of the combination of multiple incident-level characteristics, including those related to the perpetrator, the victim, and the attack itself. Considering the relationship between multiple characteristics at the incident level improves upon past research by providing an analysis of incidents as a whole. Other areas of criminal justice research have successfully employed conjunctive analysis to examine the relationship between multiple incident level characteristics. It is this capability that makes conjunctive analysis well suited for examining incidents of domestic terrorism because it can help identify key incident characteristics, their relationship with each other, and the frequency in which they are included in dominant configurations. The results of this analysis can provide new insight into domestic terrorism, including which combinations of characteristics are most likely to result in injuries or fatalities, damage to property, or successful attacks.

Our study addresses four research questions:

RQ1: What are the most dominant configurations of characteristics of domestic terrorism incidents within the United States and within the United Kingdom and Ireland?

RQ2: Are there similarities in the dominant configurations of characteristics between each of the perpetrator types within the United States and within the United Kingdom and Ireland?

RQ3: Are there similarities between the United States and the United Kingdom and Ireland in the dominant configurations of characteristics between the same perpetrator types?

RQ4: Are there characteristics that are more prevalent in configurations that result in property damage, injuries or fatalities, or successful attacks?

**Methods**

The Global Terrorism Database

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is a major open source data set that researchers frequently employ to examine domestic and international terrorism. We used the GTD (Version: 8/14), created and maintained by The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), in the current analysis to examine incident level domestic terrorism data for each country from 1970 through 2013.\[45\] The GTD provides consistent coding, clear definitions, and systematic data collection for domestic terrorism incidents in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. Included in the data set is information on over 120,000 domestic and international terrorism incidents that occurred between 1970 and 2013. The GTD includes data on perpetrators, target types, attack types, and weapons used.\[46\]

Before discussing the strengths of the GTD, there are limitations that we must note. First, open source data sources
may exclude a potential incident from the data set either because of a lack of publicly available information or potential errors in human coding. Open source data sets also face the challenge of incomplete or missing data. In cases where accounts presented by the media or other open sources do not identify a perpetrator or lack specific details, data related to that incident may be incomplete. Although data collection has improved with the availability of online news media, reducing the potential for incomplete data or missing events, the information available on older incidents is limited by the coverage offered in existing datasets or archived data. While these limitations are inherent to open source data, the GTD offers the most comprehensive data set that includes countries from around the world.

There are four key strengths to the GTD that make it the appropriate data source for this project. First, it is a comprehensive data set that includes data for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. Second, although the GTD was constructed by integrating several smaller data sets, the entire data set has been reviewed and recoded to ensure the consistency and reliability of the data. Third, the inclusion criteria used to determine whether or not an incident qualifies for the data set is based on a comprehensive definition of terrorism and the presence of at least two of three additional characteristics. This is beneficial for comparisons as incidents recorded in different countries have been evaluated by the same criteria prior to inclusion in the database. Fourth, the database contains incident level data. Using this type of data helps capture a more complete set of characteristics related to terrorist incidents than victim level data. Incident level data also includes information necessary to determine perpetrator type.

Coding the Data

We separated international and domestic terrorism incidents for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland into two groups. The GTD contains data on over 2,500 terrorism incidents in the United States and 4,500 terrorism incidents in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Similar to Enders et al., we used a three-step approach to classify each incident. First, we classified and removed cases in which the targets were identified as foreign missions, foreign diplomatic targets, or international entities as international terrorism. Second, we classified and removed incidents that originated from or were perpetrated by recognized international terrorist groups as international terrorism. Third, we classified incidents that originated in one country and concluded in another as international terrorism, except for incidents perpetrated by nationalist/separatist operating in the United Kingdom and Ireland.

The conflict in Northern Ireland presented a unique challenge because it impacted both the United Kingdom and Ireland, and the attacks related to the conflict are considered domestic terrorism. For this reason, we chose to include domestic terrorism data from Ireland in our analysis of the United Kingdom. The GTD has data on 212 terrorism incidents in Ireland between 1970 and 2013, of which 130 are attributed to groups identified as nationalist/separatist. The remaining attacks are not attributed to perpetrator types examined in this project and therefore do not impact the analysis related to incidents categorized as right-wing, left-wing, or single issue. Because our project focuses on perpetrator type, and the groups responsible for these attacks were also responsible for attacks in the United Kingdom, we chose to include these cases in our analysis.

We removed cases with incomplete or missing data related to the perpetrator type or target from the final data set. We also excluded incidents not attributed to groups and those carried out by unaffiliated individuals or unknown perpetrators because there was insufficient data to classify them. This resulted in the loss of some data, particularly from lone wolves whose ideology and motives could not be determined consistently based on available data. We excluded data from 1993 because they are missing from the GTD data set. START acknowledges that the data were lost prior to combining with the PGIS to create the GTD. Other studies attempted to recreate these data or included estimations based on other data sources. We chose to exclude 1993 from our analysis because alternative methods of replacing the data, including estimations based on other data sources, would not include information consistent with the rest of the characteristics being analyzed.

There were 1,503 incidents in the United States and 4,112 incidents in the United Kingdom and Ireland that fit the criteria for inclusion. We assigned perpetrator types to each of the incidents based on identified perpetrator groups. We coded incidents as right-wing, left-wing, nationalist/separatist, and single issue.
four perpetrator types were based on the groups’ ideology. We gathered information on the ideologies of the
groups in the database from their START Terrorist Organization Profiles, reviews of open source documents
related to the groups, and Hewitt’s chronology of terrorism in America.[51]

We examined five characteristics for each incident: perpetrator type, target type, attack type, weapon type, and
damage. Perpetrator information included the name of the perpetrator group and the distribution of incidents
from 1970 to 2013 for each perpetrator type. Table 1(p.32) shows the 22 categories of target types including
businesses, government, private citizens, educational institutions, and police. Table 2 (p.34) displays the nine
attack types that include assassination, armed assault, bombing, and facility/infrastructure attacks. Table 3
(p.35) presents the 13 weapon types and their respective weapon sub-types, including chemical weapons,
biological weapons, firearms, incendiary devices, and explosives. We included data on weapon sub-types as
it provides a specific description of the weapon if available. For example, the weapon type “firearms” could
include the sub-types automatic weapon, handgun, rifle/shotgun, or unknown gun type. Damage included
information on fatalities, injuries, property damage. Each of these categories revealed important information
about the incidents themselves and the groups involved.

We used three dependent variables in the conjunctive analysis. The first, property damage, is a dichotomous
variable coded as one if property damage was attributed to an incident. We coded incidents in which data were
missing as no reported damage. The second, confirmed injuries or fatalities, is a dichotomous variable coded
as one if injuries and/or fatalities were attributed to the incident. For incidents with missing data, we coded
the incidents as no attributed injuries or fatalities. We made the decision to code missing data for both of these
variables as not present after closely examining the incidents with missing data. In the limited cases in which
information was absent for one of the three variables, it was often present for one of the others. This suggests
the original coder entered data for cases in which damage, injury, or fatalities were present and left the others
blank.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Global Terrorism Database Variables &amp; Inclusion Criteria – Target Type (2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target Type</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion Related</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Airports & Airlines | Includes attacks on airplanes and airports. This does not include attacks using air-
planes as kinetic weapons. |
| Business | Includes attacks on individuals or organizations that are involved in commercial
activities. These attacks include customers who are frequenting a business when it
is attacked, cooperate employees who are targeted because of their affiliation with a
company, and hospitals. |
| Educational Institution | Includes attacks on schools and universities. This also includes incidents in which
students and employees are attacked while at schools and universities. |
| Food or Water Supply | Includes attacks on food or water supplies. |
| Government (Diplomatic) | This includes attacks on facilities and employees of foreign missions, embassies, and
consulates. |
| Government (General) | Includes attacks on government buildings, current and former representatives,
political parties, political events, and other targets where the intent of the attack is
to harm the government. Also included in these attacks are judges, courts, political
leaders, intelligence agencies and their agents, and government employees excluding
the military or police. |
### Journalists & Media
Includes attacks on individuals involved with reporting as well as attacks on media headquarters.

### Maritime (Including Ports and Maritime Facilities)
Includes attacks on civilian maritime targets including ships, facilities, and ports.

### Military
Includes attacks against military units and property.

### NGO
Includes attacks on the operations, facilities, and employees of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

### Other
Includes attacks that do not fall into the other categories.

### Police
Includes attacks on members of law enforcement and related buildings, vehicles, and other property. This category also includes attacks on jails or prisons and their staffs as well as private security.

### Private Citizens & Property
Includes attacks on individuals in public areas. This does not include attacks on individuals classified in other categories.

### Religious Figures/Institutions
Includes attacks on religious leaders, institutions, and places or objects believed to hold important religious value.

### Telecommunication
Includes attacks on facilities or infrastructure responsible for transmitting information.

### Terrorists
Includes attacks on terrorists or members of identified terrorist groups. Also includes targets that are believed to be members of militias or guerilla groups.

### Tourists
Includes attacks that specifically target tourists, including tours and tour buses. This does not include incidents in which tourists are victims but were not targeted because of their status as tourists.

### Transportation (Other than Aviation)
Includes attacks that specifically target public transportation.

### Unknown
The target type is unknown.

### Utilities
Includes attacks on facilities or infrastructure that is responsible for the production or transport of energy. Examples of potential targets include power stations and oil pipelines.

### Violent Political Parties
Includes attacks on political parties that are also considered terrorists. This includes groups that participate in elections but are also identified as perpetrators in the GTD.

Source: Global Terrorism Database: GTD Variables & Inclusion Criteria (2014).

**Conjunctive Analysis of Case Configurations**

We considered all possible combinations of the five independent variables simultaneously and then aggregated them into case configurations based on shared values for both countries separately. Once each incident was fit into a matrix of all possible configurations, we analyzed the total counts for each configuration. For example, within the United States, 87 incidents were carried out by left-wing perpetrators, targeting businesses, using a bombing or explosive attack that employed an unknown explosive type.

We excluded configurations with fewer than 15 total cases from the main analysis reported here, though important configurations with fewer than 15 cases are discussed where appropriate. The decision to use 15 cases as the cutoff point for analysis is based on the cutoff points used in past conjunctive analysis research,
the overall number of configurations that exist for the incidents included in this analysis, and the need to establish a minimum number of cases for the comparison of configurations.[52] As a result of the size of the tables, we present only the top ten configurations by total incidents. Full tables are available from the authors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Assaults</td>
<td>Attacks using weapons other than explosives that are primarily meant to cause physical harm or death to human beings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Attacks designed to kill one or more specific individuals. These attacks are directed at specific prominent individuals. These attacks do not include those directed at general members of a group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Attacks in which damage is caused by high or low explosives. This does not include attacks with nuclear or incendiary devices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Attacks, excluding the use of explosives, which are designed to damage non-human targets. Examples of likely targets include buildings, resource distribution routes, or the production and distribution of utilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijacking</td>
<td>Attacks in which the goal is to take control of a vehicle (including aircrafts, boats, or buses) and alter its original course. These attacks often involve a political or monetary goal. This does not include hostage taking because the primary target is a vehicle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)</td>
<td>These attacks are different from kidnappings because they often occur in the target location and do not involve transferring hostages to another location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)</td>
<td>These attacks are different from barricade incidents because the primary objective is to remove the hostage from one location and transport him or her to another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmed Assault</td>
<td>Attacks intended to cause harm or death to human targets using means other than explosives, firearms, incendiary devices, or explosives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>An attack type is not available based on the data.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Terrorism Database: GTD Variables & Inclusion Criteria (2014).

We identified dominant configurations, including all those with 15 or more incidents, and examined their characteristics. First, we reviewed configurations to identify clustering of key characteristics. Second, we examined configurations to determine if some characteristics were more prominent than others. Third, we examined configurations based on their relationship with the dependent variables.

We compared each configuration and dependent variable against the average for all incidents in its respective country. Based on the 10% standard used in previous studies by Miethe and Sousa and Hart and Miethe, we ranked each configuration.[53] For configurations more than 10 percentage points above the total average, the risk was considered high that the configuration would result in property damage, injuries and/or fatalities, or a successful attack. For configurations 10 percentage points above or below the total average, the risk was considered medium. For configurations more than 10 percentage points below the total average, the risk was considered low.
### Table 3: Global Terrorism Database Variables & Inclusion Criteria
- Weapons and Possible Weapon Sub-Types (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Weapon Sub-Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biological</td>
<td>No Weapon Sub-Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>Poisoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives/ Bombs/ Dynamite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grenade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Letter Bomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pressure Trigger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Projectiles (rockets, mortars, RPGs, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remote Trigger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suicide (carried on the body)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time Fuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Explosive Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fake Weapons</td>
<td>No Weapon Sub-Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Automatic Weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Handgun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rifle/Shotgun (non-automatic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Arson/Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flame Thrower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gasoline or Alcohol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melee</td>
<td>Blunt Object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hands, Feet, Fists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rope or Other Strangling Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sharp Object other than Knife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suffocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>No Weapon Sub-Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiological</td>
<td>No Weapon Sub-Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabotage Equipment</td>
<td>No Weapon Sub-Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle (not including car or truck bombs)</td>
<td>No Weapon Sub-Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>No Weapon Sub-Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>No Weapon Sub-Types</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Global Terrorism Database: GTD Variables & Inclusion Criteria (2014).*
Results

RQ1: What are the most dominant configurations of characteristics of domestic terrorism incidents within the United States and within the United Kingdom and Ireland?

Table 4 (below) shows the distribution of domestic terrorism incidents by nation between 1970 and 2013 that were attributed to the four perpetrator types included in this study. Of the 1,503 incidents in the United States, over 75% were attributed to either left-wing or right-wing perpetrators. In the United Kingdom and Ireland, 98% of the 4,112 were attributed to nationalist/separatist perpetrators.

Table 4: Domestic Terrorists Incidents, 1970-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator Type</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom &amp; Ireland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Issue</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1503</td>
<td>4112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 277,922 possible configurations (Perpetrator Type (4) x Target Type (22) x Attack Type (9) x Weapon Type (13) x Weapon Sub-type (27) = 277,922), we observed 306 unique configurations for the United States. Of these configurations, 21 included at least 15 incidents each and accounted for 47% (710 incidents) of all domestic terrorism incidents in the United States. The other 285 configurations accounted for the remaining incidents. The large number of observed configurations demonstrates the diversity in domestic terrorism incidents experienced by the United States.

Two of the top four configurations, accounting for over 9% of the total domestic terrorism incidents in the United States, involved left-wing or nationalist/separatist perpetrators and were bombing attacks on businesses using unknown explosive devices. For all but one of the top 21 configurations, the weapon of choice was either an explosive or incendiary device. This is consistent with past research indicating a preference by terrorists for homemade and easy to deploy devices.[54] Of the top 21 configurations, including the combination of bombing attacks using unknown explosives, nine accounted for nearly 30% of domestic terrorism incidents in the United States. Left-wing perpetrators were the most prominent perpetrator type, present in over half of the dominant configurations.

For the United Kingdom and Ireland, we observed 322 configurations, 47 of which had 15 or more incidents. These 322 configurations accounted for 3,331, or 81%, of all domestic terrorism incidents in the United Kingdom and Ireland. All 47 configurations with 15 or more total incidents were attributed to the nationalist/separatist perpetrator type.

Unlike in the United States, there was noticeable variation in the top ten configurations in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Five involved assassinations carried out by nationalist/separatist groups using firearms, including three that involved unknown gun types. Four of the top ten configurations involved bombings using unknown explosive types. Another clear difference was the primary targets of the top ten configurations. Four of the configurations involved attacks targeting military or police. This is consistent with what previous researchers
found regarding the target selection of groups involved in the prolonged conflict in Northern Ireland.[55]

The configuration with the largest number of incidents not involving the nationalist/separatist perpetrator type included 14 incidents attributed to single issue perpetrators. This configuration included facility or infrastructure attacks on businesses using incendiary devices, which is consistent with previous research that found attacks attributed to these groups were often carried out against businesses using incendiary or homemade devices with the intent to damage buildings, structures, or non-human targets.[56]

Overall, the clustering of characteristics differed in both countries. In the United States, there was variation among the perpetrator types of the dominant configurations, but most configurations involved a combination of bombings or facility/infrastructure attacks carried out by explosives or incendiary devices. In the United Kingdom and Ireland there was consistency in perpetrator types, as nearly all of the top configurations were attributed to nationalist/separatist perpetrators whose selection of attack and weapon types demonstrated noticeable variation.

RQ2: Are there similarities in the dominant configurations of characteristics between each of the perpetrator types within the United States and within the United Kingdom and Ireland?

We identified several similarities between the characteristics of the attacks carried out by the four perpetrator types in the United States based on the dominant configurations. First, each perpetrator type targeted businesses and carried out attacks on facilities or infrastructure. Second, the primary weapons of choice were explosives and incendiary devices. Third, dominant configurations attributed to left-wing, nationalist/separatist, and single issue perpetrators resulted in medium and low risk for injuries or fatalities.

In the United Kingdom and Ireland, all the dominant configurations were attributed to nationalist/separatist perpetrators. Prominent among these were the targeting of private citizens and property, police, and military. For each target type, we identified a combination of armed assaults, assassinations, and bombings as the attack type. Each of the other three perpetrator types shared similar weapon selection with nationalist/separatist. Although not classified as dominant configurations, ten configurations were attributed to right-wing groups, each accounting for three or fewer total incidents. Six of these attacks involved bombings. We identified five configurations with three or fewer incidents each in which left-wing perpetrators used explosives or incendiary devices. Finally, 22 configurations were attributed to single issue groups, 18 of which employed explosives or incendiary devices. Single issue groups also accounted for two configurations using biological weapons and two configurations using chemical weapons.

In both countries, there were similarities in the dominant configurations of characteristics among perpetrator types. In the United States, similarities in target, attack, and weapons led to shared characteristics in the dominant configurations among the four perpetrator types. These included businesses as targets and explosives or incendiary devices as a primary weapon. Comparisons within the United Kingdom and Ireland are limited by the small number of incidents attributed to left-wing, right-wing, and single issue perpetrators, though there were similarities. As in the United States, targeting businesses and private citizens and their property and use of explosives and incendiary devices were common among the four perpetrator types.

RQ3: Are there similarities between the United States and United Kingdom and Ireland in the dominant configurations of characteristics between the same perpetrator types?

The dominant configurations of incidents attributed to right-wing perpetrators in the United States differed from the right-wing incidents in the United Kingdom. Although none of the configurations attributed to right-wing perpetrators in the United Kingdom met the minimum of 15 incidents needed to be considered a dominant configuration, some comparisons can be made. Dominant right-wing configurations in the United States included mostly abortion-related targets and businesses, while right-wing configurations identified in the United Kingdom included not only businesses but also transportation, airports and airlines, police, and diplomatic government targets. This may indicate important differences in the targets and goals of right-wing perpetrators in the United States relative to the targets and goals of right-wing perpetrators in the United
Kingdom. Though their targets differed, right-wing perpetrators in both countries relied heavily on explosives as the primary weapons used in their attacks.

Although the number of incidents attributed to left-wing perpetrators in the United Kingdom is small, the configurations attributed to left-wing perpetrators in both countries suggest some similarities in targets and weapon choices. In both countries left-wing attacks were directed at police, government, and business targets. The reliance on explosives and incendiary devices by left-wing perpetrators in the United Kingdom is a shared characteristic with the dominant left-wing configurations in the United States.

In the United States and in the United Kingdom and Ireland, the dominant nationalist/separatist configurations included attacks on businesses and government targets using explosive and incendiary devices. As a result of the military nature of the prolonged conflict in Northern Ireland, several of the dominant nationalist/separatist configurations in the United Kingdom and Ireland include assassinations as the primary attack type. While configurations that include assassination attacks by nationalist/separatist in the United States exist, there are far fewer than in the United Kingdom and Ireland.

In the United States and the United Kingdom, single issue perpetrators preferred different weapon types. Unlike the single issue perpetrators in the United Kingdom that relied heavily on explosive weapons, the single issue perpetrators identified in the dominant configurations in the United States relied primarily on incendiary devices including the sub-types gasoline or alcohol and arson. While these weapon types are different, both have the same effect of damaging property and disrupting operations, a motive behind many attacks attributed to single issue perpetrators. Targeting businesses, educational institutions, and private citizens and their property by single issue perpetrators was common in both countries, as was the absence of firearms as a primary weapon. The similarities between single issue perpetrators in targets, attacks, and weapon types are in agreement with past research on single issue groups, which suggests single issue perpetrators, including animal rights and environmental groups, may select similar targets, methods of attack, and weapons as a result of their efforts to work together, share tactics, and at times share members. [57]

RQ4: Are there characteristics that are more prevalent in configurations that result in property damage, injuries or fatalities, or successful attacks?

Table 5 (p.39) shows the dominant configurations of characteristics in the United States ranked by the likelihood of resulting in property damage. In the United States, 12 dominant configurations had a high risk of resulting in property damage. Of these, four targeted businesses and three were directed at abortion-related targets. Left-wing (five configurations) and right-wing (four configurations) perpetrator types accounted for most of these configurations. All of the dominant configurations considered high or medium risk for resulting in property damage involved explosives or incendiary devices.

Table 6 (p.40) shows the same information for injuries and/or fatalities. Only one configuration posed a high risk. These incidents involved right-wing perpetrators targeting private citizens or property with armed assaults using handguns. For the eight configurations identified as medium risk, either incendiary or explosive weapons were used. Of the dominant configurations, 12 posed a low risk and 8 resulted in no injuries or fatalities. These configurations largely involved left-wing or single issue groups using incendiary devices in attacks on facilities or infrastructure.
### Table 5: Dominant Configurations of Characteristics based on Level of Risk for Attacks that Result in Property Damage in the USA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator Type</th>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Weapon Sub-Type</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Percentage Resulting in Property Damage</th>
<th>Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Abortion Related</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Gasoline or Alcohol</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Abortion Related</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Arson/Fire</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Issue</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Arson/Fire</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Issue</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Gasoline or Alcohol</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing</td>
<td>Government (General)</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing</td>
<td>Government (General)</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Gasoline or Alcohol</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Gasoline or Alcohol</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This table includes the 10 most common configurations based on total incidents. Full tables with all configurations are available from the authors. Risk level is based on the relative risk of a successful attack for each configuration. A risk level of high is at least 10 percentage points higher than the average risk of 76%. A risk level of medium is within 10 percentage points above or below the average risk. A risk level of low is at least 10 percentage points below the average risk.
Table 6: Dominant Configurations of Characteristics based on Level of Risk for Attacks that Result in Injuries or Fatalities in the USA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator Type</th>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Weapon Sub-Type</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Percentage Resulting in Injuries or Fatalities</th>
<th>Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing Government (General)</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist Business</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing Military</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Abortion Related Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Gasoline or Alcohol</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing Military</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Gasoline or Alcohol</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Abortion Related Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Arson/Fire</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing Business</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Issue Business</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Arson/Fire</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Issue Business</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Gasoline or Alcohol</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing Government (General)</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Gasoline or Alcohol</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This table includes the 10 most common configurations based on total incidents. Full tables with all configurations are available from the authors. Risk level is based on the relative risk of a successful attack for each configuration. A risk level of high is at least 10 percentage points higher than the average risk of 15%. A risk level of medium is within 10 percentage points above or below the average risk. A risk level of low is at least 10 percentage points below the average risk.*
Table 7 (p.42) displays the same information but is for the risk level for a successful attack. Right-wing, left-wing, and single issue perpetrator types were associated with high risk configurations. The majority of the high risk configurations involved attacks on facilities or infrastructure using incendiary devices. Armed assaults using handguns and targeting private citizens and property were successful 100% of the time for right-wing perpetrators. All but one of the dominant configurations presented a medium or high risk for resulting in a successful attack.

Table 8 (p.43) shows the dominant configurations attributed to nationalist/separatist perpetrators based on the risk of property damage resulting from domestic terrorism incidents in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Fifteen of these configurations involved bombings. Unlike the dominant configurations in the United States, these perpetrators employed several unique weapon sub-types including landmines, vehicles rigged with explosives, explosive projectiles, and remotely triggered devices. The configurations with the lowest risk of causing property damage often involved armed assaults or assassination attempts using firearms.

Table 9 (p.44) shows dominant configurations with a high risk of injuries and/or fatalities in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Unlike in the United States, these configurations frequently involved assassination attempts on military or police targets using firearms. The large number of configurations with high risk levels highlights the violence associated with the conflict in Northern Ireland and how frequently these incidents resulted in injuries or death. The configurations least likely to result in injuries or death were attacks using incendiary devices to target facilities or infrastructure.

Table 10 (p.45) displays configurations with a high risk of a successful domestic terrorism incident in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Seven of the high risk configurations were directed at military or police and utilized armed assaults, assassinations, or bombings as the primary attack type. These results reveal the nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Even configurations with a classification of medium risk had a success rate of 77% or higher. The high level of success among dominant configurations is consistent with research showing the difficulties law enforcement and military forces had responding to domestic terrorism and the potential their efforts had to incite additional attacks against their forces during the conflict in Northern Ireland.[58]

There were similarities between the characteristics of configurations that resulted in property damage, injuries or fatalities, or successful attacks. In the United States, dominant configurations most likely to result in property damage, injuries or fatalities, or successful attacks frequently involved attacks using explosives or incendiary devices as weapons. For the United Kingdom and Ireland, the military nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland had a clear impact on the prominent characteristics in the dominant configurations. While explosives and incendiary devices were often present in attacks that were likely to result in property damage, assassinations targeting military, law enforcement, and private citizens were the most likely to result in injuries or fatalities.
### Table 7: Dominant Configurations of Characteristics based on Level of Risk for a Successful Attack in the USA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator Type</th>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Weapon Sub-Type</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Percentage Resulting in a Successful Attack</th>
<th>Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing</td>
<td>Abortion Related Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary Arson/Fire</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Issue</td>
<td>Business Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary Arson/Fire</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing</td>
<td>Government (General) Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary Gasoline or Alcohol</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing</td>
<td>Abortion Related Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary Gasoline or Alcohol</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary Gasoline or Alcohol</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing</td>
<td>Government (General) Bombing/Explosion Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing</td>
<td>Business Bombing/Explosion Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing</td>
<td>Military Bombing/Explosion Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Issue</td>
<td>Business Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Incendiary Gasoline or Alcohol</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This table includes the 10 most common configurations based on total incidents. Full tables with all configurations are available from the authors. Risk level is based on the relative risk of a successful attack for each configuration. A risk level of high is at least 10 percentage points higher than the average risk of 84%. A risk level of medium is within 10 percentage points above or below the average risk. A risk level of low is at least 10 percentage points below the average risk.*
### Table 8: Dominant Configurations of Characteristics based on Level of Risk for Attacks Resulting in Property Damage in the UK and Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator Type</th>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Weapon Sub-Type</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Percentage Resulting in Property Damage</th>
<th>Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Unknown Type</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Unknown Gun Type</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Unknown Gun Type</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Handgun</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Unknown Gun Type</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Terrorists/Non-State Militia</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Unknown Gun Type</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This table includes the 10 most common configurations based on total incidents. Full tables with all configurations are available from the authors. Risk level is based on the relative risk of a successful attack for each configuration. A risk level of high is at least 10 percentage points higher than the average risk of 49%. A risk level of medium is within 10 percentage points above or below the average risk. A risk level of low is at least 10 percentage points below the average risk.*
Table 9: Dominant Configurations of Characteristics based on Level of Risk for Attacks Resulting in Injuries or Fatalities in the UK and Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator Type</th>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Weapon Sub-Type</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Percentage Resulting in Injuries or Fatalities</th>
<th>Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Unknown Gun Type</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Unknown Gun Type</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Terrorists/Non-State Militia</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Unknown Gun Type</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Unknown Gun Type</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Handgun</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Unknown Type</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This table includes the 10 most common configurations based on total incidents. Full tables with all configurations are available from the authors. Risk level is based on the relative risk of a successful attack for each configuration. A risk level of high is at least 10 percentage points higher than the average risk of 67%. A risk level of medium is within 10 percentage points above or below the average risk. A risk level of low is at least 10 percentage points below the average risk.
Table 10: Dominant Configurations of Characteristics based on Level of Risk for a Successful Attack in the UK and Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator Type</th>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Weapon Sub-Type</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Percentage Resulting in a Successful Attack</th>
<th>Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Terrorists/Non-State Militia</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Unknown Gun Type</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Unknown Gun Type</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Unknown Gun Type</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Unknown Gun Type</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Handgun</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite</td>
<td>Unknown Explosive Type</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist/Separatist</td>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>Unknown Type</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This table includes the 10 most common configurations based on total incidents. Full tables with all configurations are available from the authors. Risk level is based on the relative risk of a successful attack for each configuration. A risk level of high is at least 10 percentage points higher than the average risk of 85%. A risk level of medium is within 10 percentage points above or below the average risk. A risk level of low is at least 10 percentage points below the average risk.
Discussion

The primary goal of this study was to provide descriptive initial observations of the characteristics of domestic terrorism incidents in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. We accomplished this through the use of open source data and conjunctive analysis. Our research is novel because it is the first to employ conjunctive analysis in the examination of domestic terrorism. This methodological approach is uniquely situated for studying these type of questions, and our results are not only important in themselves but provide important initial observations that can serve as a foundation for theory construction.

In relation to our first research question, we found that while the four perpetrator types in the United States were each present among the dominant case configurations, only nationalist/separatist were present in the dominant case configurations for the United Kingdom and Ireland. In the United States, 21 case configurations accounted for 47% of the country’s domestic terrorism incidents. The top two configurations by total incidents, each accounting for approximately 6% of all domestic terrorism incidents in the United States, were left-wing bombing or explosive attacks on businesses using unknown explosive types and right-wing attacks on the facilities or infrastructure of abortion-related targets using gasoline or alcohol based incendiary devices. In the United Kingdom and Ireland, 47 case configurations accounted for over 81% of the country’s domestic terrorism incidents. The top two configurations by total incidents, accounting for 12% and 8% respectively, were nationalist/separatist assassinations using unknown firearms targeting private citizens and nationalist/separatist attacks using unknown incendiary devices on the facilities or infrastructure of businesses. The small number of case configurations that account for the majority of domestic terrorism incidents in both countries suggests that although domestic terrorism can take many forms, it is often manifested in a limited number of configurations. For both countries, this often included attacks on businesses or private citizens and their property using explosives, incendiary devices, or firearms.

The similarities shared by perpetrators of domestic terrorism are not limited to the characteristics analyzed in this study, but also include similarities in the ways they differ from international terrorism. The attack and target types found in the case configurations of domestic terrorism incidents differ from attack and target types found in recent high profile international terrorist attacks in the United States and the United Kingdom. The primary method of attack used in these high profile international attacks was suicide terrorism, an attack type that has been on the rise among international terrorists in recent years.[59] While suicide terrorism has been commonly employed by groups or individuals influenced by or connected to al-Qaeda, there were no attacks identified as suicide bombings included in any of the case configurations for domestic terrorism incidents in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. One shortcoming of GTD data is that they only have a separate weapon sub-type for suicide attacks when a weapon is worn on the body, which makes it difficult to classify complex suicide attacks like those carried out on September 11, 2001.

The target types of recent international attacks also differ from those attacked by domestic terrorists. Attacks on airlines, airports, and mass transportation in both countries by international terrorists have occurred in recent years.[60] Our analysis of the case configurations in this study suggests domestic terrorists in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland have rarely attacked these targets.

For the second research question, we found similarities in the dominant configurations of characteristics between perpetrators types within the United States. Each of the four perpetrator types was responsible for attacks on businesses. Also common among the four perpetrator types was the reliance on explosives or incendiary devices. Fewer similarities existed in the characteristics of the incidents between perpetrator types in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Given the distribution of dominant case configurations, comparisons between perpetrator types are restrained. The use of explosives and incendiary devices were present for each of the perpetrator types and were the most frequently used weapons for right-wing, left-wing, and single issue perpetrators.

In the United Kingdom, firearms were not identified as the primary weapon type for any configurations that included right-wing, left-wing, or single issue perpetrators. Law and location likely influenced the prevalence of firearm use by nationalist/separatist groups engaged in the conflict in Northern Ireland compared to the
absence of firearm use by the other perpetrator types. The United Kingdom has strict gun regulations that limit the types of firearms that can be owned or carried.[61] Although Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, the Good Friday Agreement allowed for the passage of less restrictive gun regulations that has resulted in individuals still being permitted to own and carry handguns.[62] Because attacks carried out by right-wing, left-wing, and single issue groups all occurred in the United Kingdom, it is likely that the country’s restrictive gun laws impacted the availability of firearms, making explosive and incendiary devices the more convenient weapon choice.[63] Similarly, the absence of the use of firearms by right-wing and left-wing perpetrators in the United Kingdom provides an interesting comparison to right-wing and left-wing groups in the United States. Gun ownership laws and the prevalence of firearms in the United States make firearms more easily accessible than in the United Kingdom. Although limited within the dominant configurations, an examination of all configurations supports the findings of past research that identified firearms as a frequent weapon choice of right-wing and left-wing domestic terrorists in the United States.[64]

The findings for our third research question indicate that similarities existed between the incidents carried out by the same perpetrator types in each country based on their weapon selection and, in some cases, target selection. In each country the prominence of explosives, incendiary devices, and firearms in dominant configurations demonstrates reliance of domestic terrorists on traditional weapons. This is in agreement with past research on the weapon selection of international terrorists. Hoffman found the tactics, targets, and weapons used by international terrorists remained consistent and was driven in part by the weapon choice of terrorists. The weapons used by international terrorists were largely conventional, including the use of firearms and explosives.[65] He argued that the use of conventional weapons was likely influenced by their wide availability, efficient cost, and ease of use.[66]

Both of these arguments are supported by our results. First, the results of the conjunctive analysis reveal domestic terrorists in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland relied heavily on weapons that were widely available, cost efficient, and easy to use. In the United States, explosives, incendiary devices, and firearms were found among the most dominant case configurations, with explosives or incendiary devices used by each of the four perpetrator types. In the United Kingdom and Ireland, explosives, incendiary devices, and firearms were prominent in the dominant case configurations. In the United Kingdom right-wing, left-wing, and single issue groups did not utilize firearms, unlike nationalist/separatist groups who relied heavily on firearms in attacks associated with the conflict in Northern Ireland.[67] This is a significant finding because it suggests right-wing, left-wing, and single issue groups carrying out their attacks in the United Kingdom faced difficulty obtaining firearms, a challenge likely created by the country’s strict firearm regulations.[68]

Second, in United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland, the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons was rare. Nuclear weapons were not present in any domestic terrorism incidents in either country. In the United States, only seven incidents involved chemical or biological weapons, and in the United Kingdom and Ireland eight incidents involved chemical or biological weapons. Although the existing fear that international terrorist groups will continue to seek out chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons remains high, our results suggest domestic terrorists have not found these weapons to be effective or efficient choices. Because most domestic terrorists have historically focused on meaningful targets and have not directed their attacks randomly at the general public, these weapons are not likely to be as cost efficient, worth the increased risk of use or production, or as easy to use as the more traditional weapons that we found among the dominant case configurations.

One area in which noticeable similarities existed across nations was between single issue perpetrators, as they primarily targeted businesses, private citizens and their property, and educational institutions. These groups also relied heavily on explosives and incendiary devices to carry out attacks that were likely to result in property damage. These similarities are significant because they support earlier research that predicted single issue animal rights and environmental groups would strengthen their cooperation within the United States and United Kingdom and influence each other across countries.[69] Given the growth of the internet and social networking websites, it is now easy for members of these groups to connect over great distances and increase their level of cooperation. Additional research is needed to determine whether there are connections between single groups within and between the United States and the United Kingdom.
There is growing interest among researchers in the use of the internet in the radicalization process of terrorists. An examination of message boards, websites, and social networking profiles of individuals involved in these groups could reveal if there are connections between supporters of the groups and if they are sharing information on targets and tactics. If online connections exist between single issue groups within or between countries, it may be possible to examine if and how group members influence recruitment or radicalization of members.

The results for our fourth research question revealed characteristics that were prevalent in each country for attacks leading to property damage, injuries and/or fatalities, and success. All 12 configurations considered high risk for property damage in the United States were carried out using explosive or incendiary devices. For the 13 configurations with a high risk of causing property damage in the United Kingdom and Ireland, 10 were carried out using incendiary or explosive devices as the primary weapon, accounting for 26% of the domestic terrorism incidents in the United Kingdom and Ireland.

In the United States, one configuration, involving armed assaults by right-wing perpetrators using handguns to attack private citizens and their property, presented a high risk of resulting in injuries and/or fatalities. Attacks with a medium risk level relied mostly on explosives or incendiary devices. Armed assaults or assassinations utilizing firearms dominated the configurations considered high risk in the United Kingdom and Ireland.

The most common characteristics among incidents with a high risk of success in the United States were attacks on facilities or infrastructure using incendiary devices. This configuration was used to attack private citizens and their property, educational institutions, businesses, government, and abortion related targets. These attacks were most likely to be successful when primary targets were not human. This may result from the limited resistance non-human targets provide in the face of an immediate threat or the lack of human bystanders who are able to disrupt or deter an attack. Thus, target hardening or other efforts to increase the difficulty perpetrators face when attacking may be an effective response to these case configurations. In the United Kingdom and Ireland, the configurations with a high risk level of success targeted other terrorists, private citizens, military, and police with bombings, armed assaults, and assassinations. These configurations accounted for over 1,000 incidents. Given the military nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland, these configurations targeting humans with armed assaults or assassinations coincide with past research on the tactics of nationalist/separatist terrorists.

Future theory construction can build upon the comparison of incidents by perpetrator type by exploring differences between weapon type, weapon sub-type, and attack type frequently employed by each perpetrator type. Research by Phillips used modern portfolio theory to examine choice of terrorist attack methods based on risk and return.[72] Our results and additional analysis focusing on specific groups within each of the perpetrator types could be used to explore how case configurations changed over time in response to attack outcomes, law enforcement responses, or group stability.

**Key Contributions of this Study**

The results of this study contribute to the literature on domestic terrorism and terrorism in four key ways. First, this is the first study to provide a systematic comparison of domestic terrorism incidents between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. In addition to facing threats from similar perpetrator types, similarities were found in the targets, attack types, and weapons attributed to the perpetrator types in the United States and in the United Kingdom and Ireland. The identification of these similarities suggests avenues for future comparisons of issues related to domestic terrorism in both countries – including examinations of the four perpetrator types, their ongoing operations, and law enforcement responses to each of the perpetrator types – and theorizing about the causes of these similarities.

Second, this is the first study to compare the characteristics of domestic terrorism incidents in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland based on the four perpetrator types prominent in domestic terrorism
literature. This comparison revealed similarities between them. Right-wing perpetrators in the United States and the United Kingdom frequently utilized explosives in their attacks. Left-wing perpetrators in the United States and the United Kingdom directed their attacks at businesses, law enforcement, and government related targets using explosives and incendiary devices. Nationalist/separatist perpetrators in the United States and in the United Kingdom and Ireland shared similar target and attack types, with perpetrators in each country targeting businesses and government targets using explosives or incendiary devices. Single issue perpetrators, including animal rights and environmental groups, shared target, attack, and weapon types. In both countries, these perpetrators targeted businesses, educational institutions, and private citizens and their property using explosives or incendiary devices.

Third, this study joins a growing body of criminal justice research utilizing conjunctive analysis to examine criminal activity at the incident level and represents the first application of conjunctive analysis to domestic terrorism. By providing a way to examine the configurations of characteristics, conjunctive analysis serves as an appropriate tool for determining how incident-level characteristics relate to each other and if specific combinations of these characteristics influence the outcomes of terrorist incidents. Future work could build upon this study by examining specific types of attacks, for example assassinations, and additional characteristics associated with the attacks. Further, conjunctive analysis may be a useful tool for law enforcement and the intelligence community as they prepare to prevent and respond to terrorism. Although the open source data we used in the current study is limited by the information that is made public, access to official government data could expand the usefulness of this method. For example, with additional official data law enforcement could examine how the attacks carried out by a specific perpetrator type differ based on the motives of the perpetrators. Access to additional information on the motives of perpetrators would allow researchers to use conjunctive analysis to examine lone actor attacks and determine if there are similarities in the common attack types and weapon types employed by lone actor terrorists with similar motives. Researchers could also use conjunctive analysis to examine the preparatory crimes of a specific terrorist group prior to an attack. Identifying dominant case configurations of these crimes could help law enforcement agencies direct their efforts at disrupting future preparatory crimes.

Finally, the initial observation of similarities in the case configurations between like perpetrator types creates a foundation for future research on why these similarities exist. While past research explored why domestic terrorists rely on conventional weapons for their attacks, additional research is needed to determine why specific perpetrator types select the conventional weapons they use. For instance, why are incendiary devices preferred over explosives by single issue groups in both countries? Past work on single issue terrorism has speculated on the preference for explosives or incendiary devices, but it has yet to explore why one is preferred over the other in both countries.[73] This, along with questions about similar target selections by each of the four perpetrator types in both countries, are important to explore as they may help reveal why similarities exist between the perpetrator types.

**Limitations**

Using conjunctive analysis to examine characteristics of an event can result in the loss of information related to the larger event. By focusing on characteristics of an incident, we are unable to examine the symbolism of an attack or the motives of an individual perpetrator. The only way to address this is to gather additional information on the motives of the perpetrators, a task that is difficult for incidents that occurred long ago. In the future this problem may be less of a concern, as terrorism related incidents receive significantly more media coverage today than in the past.

Second, there are limitations to open source data, including the potential for events to be excluded from the data set because of a lack of publicly available information or potential errors in human coding. The use of multiple sources can also present a challenge, as coders must decide which source provides the most accurate information, sometimes in the face of conflicting information about the incident. Further, because the GTD gathered data on incidents dating as far back as 1970, it is possible that information on less publicized events
may be missing.

Third, as a result of missing or incomplete data, there were additional characteristics we were unable to examine. Information including an identified perpetrator, the number of perpetrators involved in an attack, and detailed descriptions of the events were not present for each incident. Future research could address this limitation by attempting to incorporate these cases into their analysis. This would require doing additional research on each of these cases in order to locate the missing information. This response is complicated by the age of some of the incidents and the lack of reliable data on incidents that received little attention or occurred nearly 50 years ago. If this information was available for more of the incidents, it would be possible to discuss in further detail characteristics of the perpetrators and specific details related to the weapon type, target type, attack type, and damage done associated with the incidents.

Conclusion

This study presents initial observations on the experiences of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland with domestic terrorism based on four perpetrator types; right-wing, left-wing, nationalist/separatist, and single issue. Utilizing conjunctive analysis of case configurations, this study revealed that specific configurations of characteristics were more likely than others to result in property damage, injuries and/or fatalities, and successful attacks. In the United States, we found similarities in the characteristics of incidents carried out by different perpetrator types in the most frequent targets (businesses), attack types (bombings and facility or infrastructure attacks), and weapons used (explosives and incendiary devices).

We also found similarities between the United States and the United Kingdom and Ireland among the case configurations based on perpetrator type. First, right-wing perpetrators in the United States and the United Kingdom attacked similar targets, including businesses and private citizens and property. Second, although the number and proportion of incidents attributed to nationalist/separatist perpetrators was significantly different, the dominant configurations of incidents for this perpetrator type in the United States and in the United Kingdom and Ireland revealed similar targets, attack types, and weapon choices. Finally, single issue perpetrators in the United States and the United Kingdom carried out attacks on similar targets and utilized comparable attack types and weapons.

Our findings contribute directly to the growing domestic terrorism and conjunctive analysis literature by providing the first comparison of domestic terrorism incidents in these countries based on perpetrator type and the first comparative research on domestic terrorism utilizing conjunctive analysis. The results of the analysis also demonstrate the value of conjunctive analysis as a method for improving our understanding of terrorism incidents. Those working in counter-terrorism, and practitioners in general, could utilize the approach employed in this project to improve their understanding of the perpetrator types that may target their jurisdictions. For those in the field with access to data that is not publicly available, it may be possible to examine additional characteristics that would provide new insights into the incidents, and their outcomes, attributed to each of the perpetrator types.

This project was a first attempt to establish whether similarities existed between domestic terrorism incidents in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. Given the existing comparative literature between the United States and the United Kingdom based on the perception of a shared threat from international terrorism, additional comparative research related to domestic terrorism is necessary. Future research can build upon this project by examining additional perpetrator types and incidents attributed to lone actors. While this study included anti-abortion related incidents in the right-wing perpetrator type, others researchers have attributed these attacks to lone-actors or single issue perpetrators.[74]. Future research should examine these anti-abortion incidents and compare them directly to incidents attribute to lone-actors and single issue perpetrators to determine if similarities exist.

Future research is needed to determine if there are theoretical explanations for the similarities that we found
in this study. Future theoretical development and research may help determine why similar configurations attributed to different perpetrator types result in different outcomes and risk levels for property damage, injuries and/or fatalities, and successful attacks. Additional research is also required to determine how the similarities we found in this study may influence legislative and law enforcement responses to domestic terrorism in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland.

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**Notes**

[1] Domestic terrorism in Ireland is discussed throughout this paper where appropriate. Of the four perpetrator types examined in this project, the nationalist/separatist perpetrator type was the only one identified in the available data from the Global Terrorism Database. Our analysis did not identify any incidents attributed to right-wing, left-wing, or single issue perpetrators in Ireland. Additional information on the inclusion of Ireland and the presentation of data is included in the methods section of this paper.


[9] Ibid.


[16] Ibid.


[25] Ibid.


[27] Ibid.


[34] Ibid.


[36] Ibid.


[41] Ibid.

[42] “Global Terrorism Database [Data File].” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2014.


[46] Ibid.


[64] Ibid.


[66] Sutton et al., 2005.


Research Notes

Characteristics of Jihadist Terrorist Leaders: A Quantitative Approach

by Lennart van Leeuwen and Daan Weggemans

Abstract

In June 2018 Mullah Fazlullah, the leader of the Taliban in Pakistan, was killed in a drone strike. This attack can be seen as part of a decapitation strategy, which is frequently used by states. Often being perceived as a symbol of their organisation, jihadist terrorist leaders take important positions in their groups and beyond. It is therefore not surprising that counter-terrorism strategies often target the leadership of terrorist organisations. However, open source data provide only limited information on these leaders and what sets them apart from other members of their organisation. This Research Note brings together the fragmented information on 66 jihadist terrorist leaders in a new dataset, suggesting the existence of a set of common characteristics of jihadist terrorist leaders. Furthermore, when comparing leaders and followers, this study argues that, on the one hand they differ from them when it comes to religious background and criminal records. On the other hand, they are quite similar when it comes to characteristics such as education and socio-economic backgrounds. The most important finding, however, is that leaders tend to have substantial battlefield experience. Many of them have fought in Afghanistan. This suggests that Syria may become (or perhaps already has become) the breeding ground for a new generation of jihadist terrorist leaders.

Keywords: terrorism, leaders, jihadism, profile

Introduction

In today's culture, much of the general public seems to be fascinated by accounts on hunting terrorist leaders. The wide variety of books and films on the search for, and elimination of, Osama bin Laden is illustrative of this phenomenon. This case and other cases of targeted killings and organisational decapitation do, however, not only capture the attention of the average citizen, it also illustrates the emphasis of this modus operandi within counter-terrorism strategies [1]. Despite a substantial scholarly debate on the effectiveness of decapitation [2], it is frequently assumed that the live or death of a terrorist leader has a significant effect on the longevity of a terrorist organisation. This, then, leads to an assumption that there is plenty of knowledge on what sets these leaders apart: what characterises them and to what extent do they differ from other terrorists? This assumption is false, however.

Weinberg and Eubank have noted decades ago that information on terrorist leaders is “sparse” and “fragmented”. [3] More recently, Hofmann has also held that basic knowledge on terrorist leaders is often still lacking. [4] Most evidence on terrorist leadership characteristics still remains anecdotal. On the other hand, many studies have been performed on the characteristics of (jihadist) terrorists in general. [5] However, even with the quantitative analyses of, for example, Sageman and Bakker [6], no single common profile of a (jihadist) terrorist could be established. Nevertheless, these studies have provided considerable insights in some of the basic characteristics of (jihadist) terrorists.

It is the aim of this Research Note to follow in the footsteps of previous research on jihadist terrorists and to improve our knowledge of the characteristics of jihadist terrorist leaders. Closing this knowledge gap will allow a preliminary analysis of the similarities and differences between the characteristics of jihadist rank-and-file terrorists and their leaders. Inspired by the work of Bakker [7] (and therefore indirectly by Sageman [8]), a small database was built with data concerning the characteristics of 66 jihadist terrorist leaders active in the
years 2001-2017. Bringing together fragmented pieces of information can provide new insights, which might lead to a partial rethinking of the wisdom of some counter-terrorism strategies.

**Researching Terrorist Leaders**

Following the call of Weinberg, Eubank and Hofmann to advance our basic understanding of (jihadist) terrorist leaders, this Research Note firstly aims to gather open source data on the individuals in this population by establishing an initial dataset on the characteristics of jihadist terrorist leaders. [9] This provides opportunities to learn more about them and what sets them apart from jihadist terrorists in general.

In order to provide a first quantitative comparison between the two populations, many variables mirrored those from the studies of Bakker and Sageman [10]. Some other variables have been added. The variables are ordered in the three categories. The social background category is similar to Bakker’s, with regard to the variables. The second category - career in jihadist terrorist organisations - is largely overlapping with his operationalisation but includes some additional elements. While age and place of recruitment are variables Bakker also used, the prior memberships in other jihadist terrorist organisations has been added here. This last variable may help in understanding the career path of jihadist terrorist leaders. Lastly, this study looks into the battlefield experiences of the leaders: did the leaders participate in wars and if so, where? This was not in the scope of Bakker’s research, but may provide important insights in the development of jihadist terrorist careers.

For identifying leaders, the Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List has been used as a starting point. [11] The heads of the jihadist terrorist organisations and their predecessors are included in the sample. This has resulted in a dataset of 66 jihadist terrorist leaders who were active as leaders between 2001-2017. These leaders are spread across 38 organisations with 18 of them still active as of October 2017, while 32 are dead [12] 7 others are incarcerated, 4 are inactive (e.g. in hiding without operational capabilities or de-radicalised or disengaged). In one case no evidence could be found regarding his current status, while four others are categorised as cases with contradictory information on their status. Here sources are not agreeing as to whether a particular leader is active, arrested, deceased or inactive. The Appendix lists all individuals included.

As mentioned earlier, the data were gathered from open sources. Data on the leaders were found in (auto-) biographies, (inter-) governmental reports, newspapers, scholarly articles, think-tank reports, webpages such as the ‘Mapping Militant Organizations’ section of Stanford University and the Counter Extremism Project, as well as from speeches of, and interviews with, terrorist leaders. Furthermore, less than half a dozen of online forums are used as sources (since they can provide translations of Arabic texts which are published by the media outlets of jihadist terrorist organisations) [13]. While most of these sources can be considered to provide reliable factual information, online forums and news articles are more problematical. Their partisan interest may outpace their desire to provide correct information. As a result, during this study, multiple sources have been used to crosscheck information.

The resulting dataset has been used in two ways. First, descriptive analyses have been used to draw a picture of the characteristics of the jihadist terrorist leaders. Second, these results were used to form the basis for the comparison with the characteristics of jihadist terrorists in general.

**Characteristics of Jihadist Terrorist Leaders**

The dataset resulting from the above-mentioned approach has provided the following insights on the social background of jihadist terrorist leaders, their careers in terrorist organisations, and their battlefield experiences.

**Social Background**

The first category of variables in this study concerns the social background of the leaders. This is detailed in
terms of geography, socio-economic background, education and faith, occupation, and criminal record.

**Geography**
The leaders in the sample are from quite different countries of origin. While most leaders were raised in Algeria (n=7), followed by Pakistan and Russia (n=6 each), no fewer than 21 different countries are identified in this category. Furthermore, looking at the family origin of the leaders, 18 different countries are found, of which Pakistan has the highest leader-count (n=4). As can be seen in Figure 1, most of the countries have a predominantly Muslim population.

**Figure 1: Geographical Background of Jihadist Terrorist Leaders**

In addition, when comparing the countries in which leaders were raised and their current/last countries of residence, it becomes clear that these are the same in 58.1% of the valid cases. 41.9% are currently living in a different country than they were raised in or have died in a different country. This shows that while many leaders emigrate at some point in their lives, most stayed in their country of origin.

Moreover, of those leaders who fought in wars or other violent conflicts (more information on this can be found later in this section) and of which the country of where they were raised is known (n=34), 24 (36.4% of total sample) fought abroad and 11 (16.7% of total sample) fought in their home country. Furthermore, of the 19 cases on which information on both the country where they had been raised and the country of military/terrorist training has been found, 16 (84.2%) have had training abroad and 4 (21.1%) received training in their home country. These findings demonstrate that leaders of jihadist terrorist organisations are often not limited to their home country and tend to gain experiences abroad.

**Socio-economic Background**
Looking at the socio-economic background of the leaders, the data suggests that leaders are predominantly from the middle classes of society (66.7%). The lower and upper class are equally represented in the sample (16.7%). This finding contradicts some of the literature on terrorist leaders. According to both Leiken and Sendagorta, leaders are recruited from the upper classes, while our data show that this not always the case. [14] However, some caution in the generalising this statement is in order, since the number of cases on which data on the socio-economic status was available is relatively low (n=18).

**Education and Religion**
It is often stated that many terrorists are relatively highly educated [15]. The new data on jihadist terrorist leaders subscribes to this position (see Figure 2). 52% (n=13) attended university and of those, 12 graduated and one did not. On the opposite side of the level of education scale, having received no formal education, is
Baitullah Mehsud. He is the founder of the umbrella organisation Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. Moreover, six leaders ended their education after secondary school. Interestingly, 25% (n=5) have ended their education prematurely (i.e. without graduating). Moreover, 48% have graduated from university, while 25% did not graduate from secondary school. Although a wide variety of levels of education could be found among the leaders, most leaders are highly educated.

Further looking into the childhood years of the leaders, it becomes clear that most of them had a religious upbringing, at least to some extent. Of the 20 valid cases, only three had no particular religious background. Furthermore, there is one leader who converted from Christianity to Islam: Tarkan Tayumurazovich Batirashvili (a.k.a. Omar Shishani). Moreover, of the leaders who received an Islamic upbringing, a wide variety of doctrines can be seen (ranging from Deobandism to Salafism and from Wahhabism to Sufism). Interestingly, Sheikh Abu Hashim Muhammad bin Abdul Rahman al Ibr (the arrested leader of Ansar al-Islam) changed from Shia Islam to Sunni Islam. This may also be considered as a case of conversion. Thus, while only represented to a minor extent (n=5), converts who becoming jihadist terrorist leaders are a reality.

Figure 2: Levels of Education among Jihadist Terrorist Leaders

With regard to the professional backgrounds of the jihadist terrorist leaders, it is hard to paint a general picture. Of the 66 cases in total, 28 cases were available for analysis, since these are the cases data were found on the occupational situation prior to or in between membership of jihadist terrorist organisations. The extracted data were, on the one hand, very diverse; professions ranged from low to high on the societal ladder (i.e. from employee of municipal maintenance services to medical surgeon). However, of all occupations found, professions in which the leader takes a teaching role are more common than the other listed in our sample. In eight cases (25,0%) jihadist terrorist leaders had held a teaching position. Furthermore, almost a third (32,1%) have held no jobs. Although one explanation for this might be the young age at which these subjects joined their first jihadist terrorist organisation (usually in their early twenties), no further statistical evidence has been found for this in our sample.

Criminal Backgrounds
Concerning the criminal backgrounds of the jihadist terrorist leaders, the majority (22 of the 28 valid cases) had been incarcerated in their past. The average time in prison (including those who had not been incarcerated) is 2.71 years, but most (n=9) have spent a total of one year behind bars. 8 leaders were incarcerated for 5 years or longer. Overall, leaders tend to have been incarcerated for a period of time in their past. Of only 6 (9,1% of the total sample) it could be determined that they had spent no time in prison. Figure 3 displays the incarceration
of the jihadist terrorist leaders.

Most leaders who have been found guilty in court (n=28) [16] have faced terrorist activity charges or were accused of membership in a terrorist organisation (n=22). Furthermore, there are two counts of kidnapping, four counts of illegal weapon possession, three charges of murder or murder threats, three cases of robbery and petty theft. One future leader had been tried and found guilty of participating in a student protest, while there was one account of undermining the ruling government by promoting the establishment of an Islamic state. While the charges were very diverse, most leaders had been incarcerated or sentenced due to their terrorist activities.

**Figure 3: Incarceration Length of Jihadist Terrorists Leaders**

![Graph showing the distribution of incarcerated time for jihadist terrorists leaders.](image)

**Career in Jihadist Terrorist Organisations**

The second category investigated was ‘career in jihadist terrorist organisations’. This category encompasses the ages of joining the first jihadist terrorist organisation, recruitment (i.e. location of recruitment and social affiliation), age of entering their current or previous organisation, and the number of jihadist terrorist organisations the leader had been part of.

When joining their first jihadist terrorist organisation, leaders were, on average, 28 years of age. Moreover, 50% of them entered the jihadist scene under the age of 26 and most of them were 21 or 22 years old. However, the youngest age identified was 15 and the eldest was 61.

Related to the age of joining their first jihadist terrorist organisation is the recruitment context. Two variables were examined: the location of recruitment and the effect of relatives, friends and other close acquaintances on the joining of such organisations (i.e. social affiliation). Unfortunately, too little relevant data were found on the latter. On the location of recruitment it can be said that Afghanistan often stood out. Of the 43 valid cases, 13 can be directly linked to Afghanistan in their recruitment. The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in the years since 1979, led many Muslims to Afghanistan to fight. This study does not equate joining the resistance movement in Afghanistan with membership in a terrorist organisation, but the location has been vital in the start of jihadist terrorist careers of these 13 leaders. Other places of recruitment have been as diverse as the other countries listed above.

Comparing the ages at which the future leaders joined their first jihadist terrorist organisation with the age at which they entered their current or last (in cases of being incarcerated or deceased) organisation, the ages in the latter variable are generally higher, as one might expect. With the valid number of cases being 45, the average age is 36. While most leaders were 29 or 33 when they entered their current organisation (n=5 for
both), 50% of all leaders were 33 or older. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir is an outlier with his age. Being the eldest case in the sample with a birth date in 1938, he also exemplifies the phenomenon that leaders often tend to break away from their first jihadist terrorist organization.

Of the 42 cases data could be found, 39 have been a member of at least one other jihadist terrorist organisation than their current/last organisation. Nevertheless, the higher the number of other memberships, the less common it becomes (see Table 1). Most leaders have been part of one other organisation (n=23, which is 34.8% of the total sample) while only one leader (Ahmed el Tilemsi) was part of four other jihadist terrorist organisations (also the maximum number of other organisations in this sample).

Table 1: Interorganisational Mobility of Jihadist Terrorist Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Memberships of other jihadist terrorist organisations</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage of total sample</th>
<th>Percentage of total valid cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Battlefield Experience**

The last category explored was battlefield experience. This section will look into the extent to which the leaders had been actively participating in wars or other violent conflicts, and the locations of these battlefield experiences.

Leaders who participated in wars or other violent conflicts are very well represented in the sample. Of the 38 valid cases, 35 score positively on this variable. It is not only a relatively high number within the valid cases, also within the total sample it is a substantial amount. With 28 accounts of missing data, it can be stated that at least 53% of the total sample has had frontline battle experiences - at least to some extent. While some have participated in many conflicts, others have only had battlefield experience in one conflict. Nevertheless, 35 leaders have fought at the forefront on the battlefield. Jihadist leaders are predominantly veterans of war.

The locations of the wars and violent conflicts the leaders participated in are on the one hand diverse, but, on the other hand, a pattern can be discerned. There are fourteen locations in which the leaders in our sample have gained fighting experience. These stretch from Algeria to Indonesia but are predominantly Muslim countries. Two main hot spots emerged. First, conflicts in the Caucasus have attracted and shaped 8 leaders. Second, Afghanistan has had a strong appeal, 21 out of the 66 leaders in total (31.8%) have fought in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union and/or later against the United States and its allies. A substantial number of the leaders have had links to Afghanistan.

**Comparing Leaders and Followers**

In this section, a preliminary comparison will be made between (mostly) Bakker’s findings on the characteristics of jihadist terrorists and our findings on jihadist leaders.

**Geographical Background**

With regard to jihadist terrorists in Europe, Bakker and Leiken argued that there are two types of terrorists
in terms of their geographical origins. [17] On the one hand, there are the first generation of immigrants who were raised in a non-Western country and, on the other hand, there are the ‘insiders’ who were raised in Europe but have a non-Western family origin. The connotation of insiders and outsiders is less applicable to the jihadist terrorist leaders across the globe. While Bakker argues that most jihadist terrorists in Europe are raised there and have different family backgrounds, the leaders in this dataset have predominantly been raised in the country they are residing in.

Nevertheless, the locations of family background do seem to be related. As Jenkins also argued, family origins of the jihadist terrorists in the United States often lay in North Africa, the Middle-East, South Asia and the Balkan region. [18] Unsurprisingly, the jihadist terrorist leaders also come from these regions. The related countries often display strict Islamic doctrines and it is therefore no wonder that these states are linked to jihadist terrorist organisations with their extremist views regarding the teachings of Islam.

**Socio-economic Background**

Several scholars have found that the (jihadist) terrorist comes from the lower or middle classes of society. [19] Nevertheless, Bakker has also found cases of jihadist terrorists in the upper classes in Western Europe. [20] While Leiken argues that the leaders are recruited in the highest societal regions and the common members of the terrorist group in the lower classes [21], this is not reflected in the analysis of our dataset. The present comparison between followers and leaders leads us to conclude that there is no great difference between the two groups when it comes to socio-economic status. We found that only a few leaders are from the lower or upper classes of society. Just like among other members of jihadist terrorist organisations, the middle class is very well represented. The differences are therefore not substantial.

**Education**

Nesser, Bakker, Hudson, and Jenkins have all argued that followers of terrorist organisations are often highly educated. [22] Leiken, on the other hand, has argued that this is mostly true for the leaders. [23] The present investigation has indeed found that leaders tend to be highly educated. Over 48% of them have received a university-level education. However, in contrast to what Leiken argues, this, according to the other four authors mentioned, is not only a characteristic of leaders. Furthermore, in both populations cases of ‘drop-outs’ (i.e. those who did not finish the education they started) have been recorded. The leaders and followers therefore do seem to have much in common when it comes to their level of education.

**Occupation**

(Jihadist) Terrorists often have a wide variety of occupations, according to Hudson and Bakker. [24] Although unemployment has been found in their biographies, its rate is not significantly different from their peers in society. Sendagorta also argues that unemployment in itself is not a very decisive factor in joining terrorist groups. [25] Similar characteristics have been found in the sample of jihadist terrorist leaders. An interesting outcome of our research is that there is a substantial portion of leaders who have had a teaching background and/or were religious preachers. While Bakker and Hudson do not elaborate on the exact professions of the members of jihadist terrorist organisations, it can be hypothesised here that this is a true characteristic of the leaders, since they have been given a didactical role to play in the terrorist organisation.

**Criminal Record**

While Nesser argues that only a few terrorists have a criminal record, Bakker found that 25% of his sample has been sentenced for criminal offenses. [26] Nevertheless, both authors agree that most of the terrorists do not have a criminal record. However, the jihadist terrorist leaders show a relatively higher number of criminal offenses. One-third of the sample has been incarcerated and 42% have been found guilty in court (some leaders have been sentenced in absentia). While it is not always clear what the criminal charges of the members of jihadist terrorist organisations generally were, it can be argued that the leaders of the current sample have a criminal record more often than not. [27]

**Religious Background**

Some scholars have found that, in terms of religious backgrounds, jihadist terrorists have developed their faith over time. Bakker, for example, found that only a small percentage had an Islamic upbringing (22%) and 58
of his 61 subjects had been identified as having increased their faith in the months prior to joining a terrorist organisation. [28] Nesser has also found this, arguing that, before terrorists join an organisation, they have not been very active in observing their religion. [29] Schuurman, Grol & Flower furthermore found that “converts are considerably overrepresented” in Islamist extremism and terrorism. [30]

Leaders of jihadist terrorist organisations, however, do not match this description. Rather the opposite is true. Only a small percentage did not receive an Islamic upbringing and the number of converts is quite low. This contrast may be the result of the different focus areas of the above-mentioned studies. The secular and partially Christian Europe in which the terrorist of the mentioned studies grew up in has provided a totally different ideological context than the predominantly Islamic countries in which the leaders were raised. Nevertheless, this difference in upbringing may be interesting to follow up in future research.

Circumstances of Joining the Jihad

Age

Bakker found that the ages of the subjects in his sample at the time of their arrest were spread large. With a minimum of 16 and a maximum of 59, the average was 27 [31]. This relatively young age is also reflected in the studies of Jenkins (average age of 32) [32] and Hudson (stating that on average the terrorists were in their early twenties) [33] All three authors thus agree that terrorists are rather young.

The data from our exploration point in the same direction. However, as can be expected, the age of current leaders is much higher. This higher age is consistent with the idea that leaders in general are more experienced and thus older. The data thus show that although the distribution of ages varies greatly in both the jihadist terrorist population and among jihadist terrorist leaders, the ages upon entering the jihadist scene are mostly between 20 and 30. However, the leaders of jihadist terrorist organisations are substantially older than the jihadist terrorists in the West.

Place of Recruitment

The places of recruitment can only be compared to a limited extent. Since Bakker’s sample only included jihadist terrorists in Western Europe, his findings automatically differ greatly from the places of recruitment found in our present sample. Nevertheless, both Bakker and Nesser argue that Pakistan is an important place of recruitment. [34] This is also reflected in the sample of the leaders, but is not in terms of a breeding ground. Only three leaders were reportedly recruited in Pakistan. It is Afghanistan that had the greatest recruitment appeal for them. Still, no direct conclusions may be derived from this comparison, due to the different foci of the studies.

In sum, the picture that arises is that leaders and their followers have both similar and differing characteristics. The data of this research does not support a dichotomous conclusion. The leaders do not differ substantially from the followers, but neither are they completely the same. Table 2 provides an overview of the discussed characteristics and the way the characteristics of the leaders and followers are related.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difference/similarity</th>
<th>Legend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographical background</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic status</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal record</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious background</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of recruitment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-- Very different
- Different
+ Similar
++ Very similar
Conclusion and Reflection

This Research Note took some first, exploratory steps towards filling the gap of knowledge on jihadist terrorist leaders, heeding to some extent to the call made decades ago by Weinberg & Eubank and more recently by Hofmann. By first bringing the publicly available data on jihadist terrorist leaders together and then comparing the information on leadership characteristics with existent knowledge on jihadist terrorists in general, some important (but preliminary) conclusions can be drawn.

Looking at the social background, this Research Note makes clear that the jihadist terrorist leaders in this study are not extraordinary individuals. They are not of high or low class and they have not spent significant time in prison. However, more often than not the leaders have significant battlefield experience, which sets them apart from others. Thus, while on the one hand they do not differ much from average persons in society with regard to their social background, there are some indications that they do differ on other grounds.

It is also in the comparison with the followers that the leaders do not substantially stand out. Although having had (1) a more religious upbringing, (2) different occupational backgrounds, (3) a greater criminal record, (4) a slightly higher age, and (5) different places of recruitment, the leaders are generally quite similar to the followers in this study. Geographical backgrounds, socioeconomic status and education are more or less the same for both populations. The present exploration has made clear that there are both similarities and differences between leaders and followers. It is a preliminary conclusion on which future research can build on.

This study shows that many jihadist terrorist leaders have fought in wars and/or other violent conflicts. Their participation has drawn them deeper into jihadist theatres of conflict, which have become important places to build up a network from. The war in Afghanistan in particular, has been a facilitator in connecting individuals with, for example, Osama bin Laden. Therefore, a parallel with contemporary jihadist 'hot-zones' is plausible. Countries at war and in violent conflict such as Syria and Iraq, and in which foreign fighters play or have played an important role (as was the case in the Afghan war during the Soviet occupation), are likely to be breeding grounds of future generations of jihadist terrorist leaders.

Being only an explorative first step into enhancing our knowledge on jihadist terrorist leaders, some caveats about our findings have to be addressed here. With regard to the established dataset, it must be mentioned that, although many data are publicly available, much data is still missing. Missing data, naturally, affects the quality of this study. The dataset must be further enriched (with regard to the saturation of the variables) in order to provide a more solid portrait of jihadist terrorist leaders. The call of Weinberg and Eubank to find more information on terrorist leaders therefore is still valid.

With regard to the second objective of this study - the evaluation of the differences and similarities between the two populations - it has to be emphasized that research is still dominated by studies on Western jihadist terrorists. Further research should focus on more in-depth comparisons between followers and leaders within the same jihadist terrorist organisations.

In order to systematically enhance our understanding of (jihadist) terrorist leaders, future research must build on existing studies, just as this study has built on Bakker’s. Using the same variables, but with different approaches (some are better suited for qualitative research), will lead to new insights. Research on jihadist terrorist leaders could also greatly benefit from the findings of other disciplines. For example, the leadership characteristics identified by organisational studies theories could be used for further analysis. On the effect of leaders on the longevity of (jihadist) terrorist organisation, social movement theory may provide important insights.

In sum, while this quantitative study has thrown some light on jihadist terrorist leaders, much more needs to be done to deepen our knowledge and widen our theoretical scope.

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**Acknowledgements**

The authors wish to thank Ms. Jennifer Dowling for her detailed comments. In addition, the authors thank the editors for their constructive feedback.

**Appendix: List of Jihadist Leaders whose Backgrounds have been Studied (n = 66)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Abu Sayyaf Group | - Khadafi Abubakar Janjalani  
| | - Radulon Sahiron  
| Al-Qaeda | - Osama bin Laden  
| | - Ayman al-Zawahiri  
| Armed Islamic Group | - Rachid Oukali  
| | - Nourredine Boudiafi  
| Asbat Al-Ansar | - Haytham Abd al-Karim al Sa’di  
| Harakat Ul-Mujahidin/HUM | - Farooqi Kashmiri  
| Islamic movement of Uzbekistan | - Tahir Yuldashev  
| | - Abu Usman Adil  
| | - Usman Ghazi  
| Libyan Islamic Fighting Group | - Abdelhakim Belhadj  
| Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat | - Hassan Hattab  
| | - Nabil Sahraoui  
| The Organisation of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb | - Abdelmalek Droukdel  
| | - Masood Azhar  
| Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia | - Saifallah Ben Hassine  
| Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid | - Abu Bakar Ba’asyir  
| | - Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad  
| | - Wirya Salih  
| | - Sheikh Abu Hashim Muhammad bin Abdul Rahman al Ibrahim  
| Ansar al-Islam | - Thamir Saleh Abdullah  
| | - Farid Yusef Umeira  
| Islamic International Brigade | - Shamil Basayev  
| | - Aslan Avgazarovich Butukayev  
| Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs | - Movsar Suleimanov/Barayev  
| | - Khamzat Tazabayev  
<p>| Special Purpose Islamic Regiment |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Leader(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
<td>- Ahmad Fadil Nazzal Al-Khalayleh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Abu Hamza al-Muhajir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State</td>
<td>- Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali Al-Badri Al-Samarrai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Tarkan Tayumurazovich Batirashvili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laskar-e-Tayyiba</td>
<td>- Hafiz Muhammad Saeed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Jihad Union</td>
<td>- Najmiddin Kamolitdinovich Jalolov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
<td>- Nasser al-Wuhayshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Qasim al-Raymi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emarat Kavkaz</td>
<td>- Doku Khatamovich Umarov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Aliaskhab Alibulatovich Kebekov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan</td>
<td>- Baitullah Mehsud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Jamshed Mehsud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Fazal Hayat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Murabitoun</td>
<td>- Abderrahmane Ould el Amar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Mokhtar Belmokhtar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar Eddine</td>
<td>- Iyad ag Ghali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Jamal Network</td>
<td>- Muhammad Jamal abd-al Rahim Ahmad al-Kashif</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabhat Fateh al-Sham</td>
<td>- Abu Muhammad al-Julani (2012 - present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad</td>
<td>- Mohammad Yusuf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Abubakar Shekau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansarul Mislimina fi Biladis Sudan</td>
<td>- Khalid al-Barnawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdallah Azzam Brigades</td>
<td>- Majid bin Muhammad al Majid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakat Sham al-Islam</td>
<td>- Ibrahim Bin Shakaran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Abu Talha al Andalusi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Abu Muhammad al Baydawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahidin Indonesien Timur</td>
<td>- Abu Wardah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jund al-Khilafah in Algeria</td>
<td>- Gouri Abdelmalek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Bashir Othman al-Assimi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat-ul-Ahrar</td>
<td>- Maulana Qasim Khorasani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jund Al Aqsa</td>
<td>- Muhammad Yusuf ‘Uthman ‘Abd al-Salam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Abu Dhar al-Najdi al-Harethi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>- Aden Hashi Ayro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ahmed Abdi Godane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ahmad Umar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haqqani Network</td>
<td>- Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown current organisation</td>
<td>- Hamada Ould Mohamed al-Khairy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**

[1] This was recently again demonstrated by the reported killing of Fazal Hayat (a.k.a. Mullah Fazlullah) with the use of a drone (Al Jazeera. (2018). *Pakistan Taliban chief Mullah Fazlullah ‘killed in drone attack*. URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/pakistani-taliban-chief-mullah-fazlullah-killed-drone-strike-180615094513389.html, on the 16th of June 2018). Fazlullah has been a subject in the sample of this study, but his death is not recorded in the data.


[12] Recent deaths, such as the death of Mullah Fazllulah, have not been taken into account here, as the data gathering was concluded in October 2017.

[13] For instance, a translation of ‘Knights under the Prophet’s Banner’ (originally written by Ayman al-Zawahiri) was found online, as well as a translated interview with the family of Abu al-Walid (deceased leader of the Islamic International Brigade). Other sources included, inter alia, reports of Interpol, the United Nations, and multiple international news outlets (e.g. the BBC, CNN, The Washington Post, The New York Times).


[16] Some leaders have been sentenced in absentia, which results in a criminal offense without having spent time in prison.


[20] Ibid.


[27] The data has not been corrected for the criminal record during the ‘reign’ of the subject. Future research should establish whether the criminal records of the leaders were established during their time at the head of a jihadi terrorist organisation or prior to this.

[29] Nesser, 2006: 327


Research Desiderata: 150 Un- and Under-Researched Topics and Themes in the Field of (Counter-) Terrorism Studies – a New List

by Alex P. Schmid & James J. Forest (Compilers)

Keywords: Research, terrorism, counter-terrorism

Introduction

Seven years ago, the March 2011 issue of Perspectives on Terrorism published a list of 50 Un- and Under-Researched Topics in the Field of (Counter-)Terrorism Studies [1]. That list was primarily meant for students in search of a new topic for their Master or doctoral theses, and has contributed to a number of publications.

Today, we feel there is a need for a new list, based on considerations such as:

i. Much of the research in the field is concentrated on a very limited number of topics;
ii. In particular, much of the attention in the field is concentrated on individual terrorist groups and incidents and not enough on the movements and campaigns of which these are a part;
iii. In the area of counter-terrorism research, significant attention is given to preventing ‘downstream’ individual radicalisation and not enough to preventing ‘upstream’ structural extremism;
iv. There is a continuing dearth of evaluation and replication studies;
v. The links between terrorism studies and some other fields of violence studies (e.g. genocide) are weak, despite the fact that they share certain common characteristics.

Based on such reflections, the editors asked members of the Editorial Board and Advisory Board of Perspectives on Terrorism - and a few other colleagues from the scholarly, policy and practitioner communities - for suggestions that would be incorporated into a new list of the most un- and under-researched topics in the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism. We received many responses, suggesting a great variety of topics and themes, and also added our own research desiderata. We have grouped topics and themes into the following 14 categories:

1. Terrorist Organisations and Terrorist Group Members (25 topics)
2. Radicalisation & De-radicalisation (7)
3. Causes of Terrorism (10)
4. Religion and Terrorism (10)
5. Internet/(Social) Media and Terrorism (15)
6. Terrorism and the Public/Public Opinion (6)
7. War and Terrorism (6)
8. State and Regime-Linked Terrorism (2)
9. Country and Regional Studies (6)
10. Prevention of, and Countering (Violent) Extremism and Terrorism- PVE/CVE (10)
11. Counter-Terrorism by Governments and International Organisations (37)
12. Victim Issues (7)
13. Conceptual Issues (4)
14. The Areas of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies (5)

As we edited the suggestions we had received from our colleagues, we combined and rephrased some of them. For this reason, we decided not to link specific topics and themes to individual respondents whose contributions we acknowledge below.

We hope that this new list will stimulate new research in academia and beyond. We also invite readers to inform us where they see other gaps in our present knowledge of terrorism and counter-terrorism. We hope as well that researchers will share with us studies inspired by the list of research desiderata presented below.

Acknowledgements

We wish to thank all our respondents for their valuable suggestions: Shazad Ali, Christine Boelema Robertus, Richard English, Boaz Ganor, Paul Gill, Rohan Gunaratna, Berto Jongman, Daniel Koehler, Gary LaFree, Clark McCauley, John F. Morrison, Kumar Ramakrishna, Bart Schuurman, Ryan Scrivens, Michael S. Stohl, Judith Tinnes, Ahmet Yayla, and Aaron Zelin.

Research Desiderata

Terrorist Organisations and Terrorist Group Members (25)

1. Purpose and effect of terrorist hoax attack claims and warnings.
2. Creating a dataset on prevented and foiled terrorist attacks.
3. Terrorist groups’ access to conventional weapons (there is more research on WMDs, although most terrorist attackers are using conventional arms).
4. Accepting responsibility for acts of terrorism: accountability of terrorist groups for the consequences of their acts of violence.
5. Before they turned terrorist: the antecedents of terrorist groups.
6. The justification and morality of terrorist violence, according to the terrorists’ own writings and speeches.
7. Why do some persons within a terrorist group – if they have a choice – opt for ‘non-violent’ support roles rather than becoming ‘front line’ fighters?
8. “Non-violent” extremism as a psychological barrier to terrorist violence? Pro- and contra arguments explored.
9. The non-terrorist activities of terrorist movements and perpetrators.
10. Vigilante and death squad terrorism.
11. The division of labour between ‘back stage’ terrorists and ‘front stage’ political parties: case studies.
12. NGOs, charities and refugee organisations as terrorist front organisations: case studies.
14. Unintended blowback effects of terrorist tactics/strategies or behavior (causing loss of sympathisers, creating “bad PR” even among sympathizing audiences), and CT-measures derived from insights into these.
15. Implications for terrorist attacks of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and advances in CBRN.


17. Psychological dynamics and practical issues of leaving violent extremism and terrorism.

18. Successful transformations of terrorist organisations into political parties, and other non-violent organisations.

19. Hostage takings and executions conducted by terrorist groups: empirical research on perpetrators.

20. Typology and inventory of terrorist demands.


22. Terrorism and the impact of innovation.

23. Right-wing/domestic terrorism: structural, legal perceptions, differences to other forms of terrorism, group dynamics, communication strategies, links to other forms of crime etc.

24. Non-jihadist terrorism, other than right-wing terrorism. This could include, for example, anti-abortion, animal rights, environmentalist, or apocalyptic terrorism.

25. Agro-terrorism: Fact or Fiction?

Radicalisation & De-radicalisation (7)

1. Ecologies of radicalisation.

2. Non-radicalisation: Why do some persons and groups exposed to similar push/pull factors and the same structural and conflict dynamics as terrorists chose not to get involved in indiscriminate violence against civilians?

3. Conversion and radicalisation in various contexts (not just prisons).


5. Empirical research on the efficacy of de-radicalisation programs.

6. The issue of de-radicalising/taking care of children who are still residing in Syria and the question who is responsible for them (parents, family, governments of countries of origin of foreign fighters?)

7. Establishment of smart social media algorithms to address vulnerable people exposed to terrorist propaganda. This could analyse interactions rather than mere connections.

Causes of Terrorism (10)

1. Refugee camps as breeding grounds for terrorists: comparative case studies.

2. Causes of terrorism as reflected in (former) terrorists’ own writings.

3. Testing criminological models against terrorism data.

4. Discovering causal mechanisms in the understanding of terrorism and radicalisation.

5. The roles of (sub-)culture in the genesis of terrorism.
6. Developing validated risk factors for involvement in terrorist organisations.

7. A risk analysis of the likelihood of terrorist attacks on, and around, specific dates (e.g. national holidays, anniversaries).

8. The role of revenge in triggering acts of terrorism.

9. Un- and under-employment as factors for individuals opting to join a terrorist organisation.

10. ‘Cool’ and ‘chic’ factors (like in a fashion movement) creating terrorists (ISIS somehow managed to become ‘fashionable’ among some Muslim youth sectors. How was this possible and what were its effects?).

Religion and Terrorism (10)

1. Are there inherently violent “potentials” within fundamentalist religions?

2. Religious beliefs as both a driver of, and barrier against, violence; evidence from different religions.

3. Promoting “contextualised” religious identities as a ‘firewall’ against violent religious extremism; examples from different religions.

4. Research on Salafism and Salafi Jihadism and their associated with Wahhabism (Terrorist recruiters often target Wahhabi youth for faster results. This is also in line with the AQ recruitment manual).

5. The role and place of converts in right-wing Christian and in Islamist terrorist groups.

6. Jihadis in civil war settings and how that has created fractures within the movement historically (How can we incorporate civil war literature with jihadi studies - case studies on Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal, Iraq around the time of the surge/sahwa, and Syria in recent years).

7. The evolution in the relationship between mainstream Islamist groups and jihadi groups since the 1980s and how it’s been complicated, based on complicity through the 1990s, pushing away in the 2000s, then naive enabling post-Arab uprisings, and what that means now as there has been a second push back, especially as AQ and IS have different views on these groups and whether they are considered infidels or wayward Muslims that need to be brought back into the fold through outreach/education.

8. How states have helped incubate or enable the growth of jihadism in major foreign fighter arenas (e.g. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with Afghanistan, Syria with Iraq, Turkey with Syria) - and why that has backfired every time.

9. ‘Saffron terrorism’: killings by Hindutva militants allegedly linked to India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (This might also be researched as state terrorism owing to alleged links between Hindutva terror outfits and India’s governing party).

10. Rohingya Muslims and Buddhism. What is happening and why are some Buddhist monks supporting the military?

Internet/(Social) Media and Terrorism (15)

1. The role of ‘old’ and ‘new’ social media in strengthening terrorism and also in countering terrorism.

2. A comparison of social media campaigns by terrorist groups and non-violent extremist movements.

4. Role of the internet in stimulating and facilitating recruitment into terrorist networks.
5. Terrorists’ and violent extremists’ use of new virtual platforms (e.g., Reddit, Voat, 4chan, 8chan, etc.).
6. The impact of offline events on the online discourse of terrorists and violent extremists (and vice versa).
7. The role of new social media technology in the facilitation of violent extremism.
8. Radical behaviours online that merge into violent extremist behaviour off-line.
9. The effects of media coverage of terrorist plots and acts on fear, anger and support for components of counterterrorism policies among various sectors of society.
10. While there has been much research on jihadi magazines since around 2010, exploring the older magazines from the 80s and 90s would add crucial historical information. This would also be useful in terms of seeing how things have changed or remained the same within the jihadist movement over the past 30 years.
11. Internet-enabled terrorism: analysing causes, its many modalities and possible mitigating strategies.
12. Media departments of terrorist organisations: comparative case studies (e.g. the Global Islamic Media). What is the role of the media in rewarding terrorists and how should ‘news values’ be adapted so as not to do provide terrorists with free access to large publics.
13. Learning from the media: copycat crime - televised terrorist acts repeated by others than the original perpetrators: a review of contagion effects.
15. Discerning intent for action, based on online behaviours and posting styles.

**Terrorism and the Public / Public Opinion (6)**

1. Impact of terrorism on public behaviour at election times: comparative case studies.
2. Does public opinion influence terrorists? If so, how?
3. The impact of terrorism on various segments of the population.
4. Determinants of popular support for terrorist organisations.
5. Educating the public about terrorism: national experiences.
6. Psychological and economic consequences of terrorism for various actors other than direct victims.

**War and Terrorism (6)**

1. War crimes and acts of terrorism: similarities and dissimilarities.
2. The use and misuse of military force in countering terrorism: lessons learned.
3. Justifications of political violence by terrorist groups, resistance movements and guerrilla organisations in conflict situations.
4. War and terrorism: their interplay in the conflict in Yemen (which receives significantly lower attention than the conflicts in Syria or Iraq)
5. Damaged war veterans: the propensity of traumatised veterans to engage in terrorist and other violence after returning to civilian life.

6. The blurring of distinctions between conventional war, irregular warfare and terrorism, especially in relation to civilian casualties, population displacement and urban destruction.

**State & Regime-linked Terrorism (2)**

1. State terrorism in general, but also state terrorism against diaspora communities and opposition groups abroad.

2. False flag operations by government agencies and proxies at home and abroad.

**Country- and Regional Studies (6)**

1. Why are European right-wing extremist groups apparently so much less inclined to use terrorist violence than their jihadist counterparts?

2. Far-right anti-Muslim violence in Europe and North America.

3. There is a comparative lack of reliable, field-based work on Pakistan, compared with the huge importance of terrorism and counter-terrorism in, and relating to, that country.

4. Violence linked to xenophobia, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in the US and Europe.

5. Histories of jihadism in Morocco, post-civil war Algeria, and Libya.


**Prevention of, and Countering (Violent) Extremism and Terrorism- PVE/CVE (10)**

1. Multi-sectorial approaches to building resilience against radicalization to violent extremism.

2. The effectiveness of bulk messaging compared to direct face-to-face communications at the micro-level in CVE and/or PVE.

3. Evaluation of CVE programs, and CT initiatives more generally.

4. The effectiveness of securitization in CVE: securitization vs resilience.

5. Creating CVE databases to parallel START’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD).

6. CVE efforts that focus on violence rather than extremist (fundamentalists/Salafist/jihadist/Islamist) ideas.

7. The use of PR techniques by CVE actors- their intended and actual effects.

8. Evaluations and quality standards for CVE and de-radicalisation programs.

9. Perception of terminology (e.g. the “CVE” or “de-radicalisation” label) by a target population and its effects on the program.

10. Legal and ethical aspects of CVE/ de-radicalisation work in Western and non-Western contexts.
Counter-Terrorism by Governments and International Organisations (37)

1. Learning from the past? The role of historical analogies in counter-terrorism (e.g. “Lessons Learned” from the Malayan Emergency, 1948-60) for the current global struggle against violent extremism.
2. Comparisons of successful governments campaigns to defeat terrorism.
3. The rise and fall (and rise again?) of terrorist profiling.
5. Bomb threat assessments; operating procedures compared.
7. The impact of counter-terrorism- and prevention-programs (such as PREVENT in the UK) on fear, anger and trust in government among various sectors of society.
8. Silencing and punishing the press: journalists as terrorist and counter-terrorist targets.
9. John Boyd’s ODOA (Observe-Decide-Orientate-Act) loop: A potent strategic approach for organising the war against violent extremist groups of global reach?
10. Countering terrorism within the UN System: the mushrooming of programs; who does what, how with which effect?
11. Infrastructure of counter-terrorism: The working of national fusion centers [e.g. CITCO (Spain), UCLA (France), JTAC (UK), NCTV (Netherlands), OCAD (Belgium), NCTC (USA), and ITAC (Canada)] compared.
13. ‘Hard’ vs. ‘soft’ power approaches to countering terrorism: measuring their effectiveness.
14. Research on better indicators for recognising suicide bombers (e.g. by measuring stress levels of voice and of facial expressions).
15. Effectiveness in counter-terrorism: existing and emerging methodologies of measurement.
16. Law enforcement vs. military responses to terrorism- comparing success rates.
17. The effectiveness of blocking terrorist fundraising.
19. Failures of VIP protection against terrorist attacks; determinants of successful assassinations.
20. Non-Western CT-measures/-approaches.
21. Terrorist defectors and their role in countering terrorism.
22. Emergency management (including crisis communication, in social media and beyond).
23. Terrorism and humour (e.g. for CT-purposes or resilience-building).
24. Evaluations of counter-terrorism policies, including conciliatory policies.
25. Communicating with terrorists at the individual level (Often, due to isolation and radicalization, terrorists shoot down their communication channels to the outside world; therefore, they donot receive most messages targeting them).
26. While de-radicalisation might be important, interruption of the terrorist recruitment should have
priority over de-radicalisation programs.

27. New strategies focusing on the interruption of the terrorist recruitment at the very early stages.


29. CT efforts by domestic activist groups or individuals (e.g. citizen journalists such as those from ‘Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently’), or refugees who cooperate with intelligence/police to identify members of terrorist groups.

30. Custodial and community rehabilitation programs, including family rehabilitation, compared.

31. Legal research on material support convictions leading to extreme sentences for non-violent suspects in the U.S.

32. Integrating CVE with military counter-insurgency: a good idea?

33. Testing and validating risk of radicalisation assessment tools.

34. Research on effects/effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts.

35. Measuring the efficiency of counter-terrorism operations.

36. The impact of CT policies on the quality of liberal democracies.

37. Counter-messaging and counter-narratives- does it work and how? Best practices.

**Victim Issues (7)**

1. The psychology of fear in victims of violent crime and victims of terrorism.

2. Coping with anxiety, fear and terror: theories of emotional control.

3. Varieties of (former) victim responses to (new) terrorist threats.

4. The impact of terrorist death threats on the lives of designated targets.

5. Hostage takings and executions conducted by terrorist groups (also with a focus on victims instead of perpetrators).

6. The victim-terrorist nexus: under what circumstances do (ex-)victims turn to terrorism?


**Conceptual Issues (4)**

1. What distinguishes ‘terror’ from other types of fear (anxiety, panic, horror, etc.)?

2. Comparisons between terrorism and other forms of violence (e.g. ethnic cleansing, hate crimes)

3. Mass shootings in U.S. schools: how do these differ from terrorism?

4. The distinction between 'normal' murders and terrorist killings, and, more in particular, the distinction between lone actors and murderers- the 'framing' of such attacks.
The Areas of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies (5)

1. Terrorism research and ethics: moral issues for researchers investigating terrorism and counter-terrorism.

2. Bibliometrical work on terrorism research (i); Multi-disciplinary analysis: What share of research in the total corpus of terrorism research is produced by specific academic disciplines such as psychology, criminology, political science etc.?; research should include open access journals/ data sets/ databases.

3. Bibliometrical work on terrorism research (ii); topic modeling: which terrorism research topics are under-researched / saturated? (a Big Data approach could be very helpful here (and also for the previous topic).

4. Public science practices in terrorism research (e.g. identifying/analysing the landscape of/ developments in open-access publishing of articles, data sets, data bases) and how to foster them.

5. Attracting and mentoring a new generation of terrorism/CT scholars while academe is under external pressures”.

About the Compilers: Alex P. Schmid and James J. Forest are the editors of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.

Note

[1] Alex P. Schmid. 50 Un- and Under-researched Topics in the Field of (Counter-) Terrorism Studies
Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5, Issue 1, March 2011, pp.77-78;
Resources

Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 15 Books on Terrorism & Counterterrorism-Related Subjects

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

The books reviewed in this column are arranged according to the following topics: “Terrorism – General,” “Textbooks,” “Counter-Terrorism,” “Countering Violent Extremism and Disengagement from Terrorism,” “Hizballah,” and “Sri Lanka.”

Terrorism - General


This book examines relationships between terrorist organizations that are not rivals. Examples of rival relations between terrorist organizations with basically similar agendas not discussed in this book include Hamas and Fatah and al Qaida and the Islamic State. The book begins with the author's conceptual framework which discusses questions such as what motivates smaller groups to ally with larger terrorist “hubs.” This framework is then applied to case studies of alliances such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – Special Operations Group (PFLP-SOG) and the Red Army Faction (RAF), al Qaida and the Taliban, al Qaida and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), and others. The benefits of such alliances, the author explains, “range from material or reputational gains, to knowledge acquisition, to increased political and organizational skill. Through alliances, groups can maximize their efficiency by leveraging one another’s specializations and comparative advantages. Under some conditions, they may even aggregate their capabilities” (p. 18). An additional advantage that especially benefits smaller groups, such as EIJ, is to “project themselves as part of a broader movement to another cause through alliances, a particularly valuable asset when the resonance of their cause wanes” (p. 18).

In the conclusion, the author points out the significance for counterterrorism in understanding the nature of these alliances to “anticipate when alliances are apt to occur and attempt to prevent alliances from forming” (p. 280), as well as “degrading hubs’ alliance infrastructure” (p. 281) when possible. Numerous tables are provided that illustrate the types of alliances discussed in the study. This book, based on a Georgetown University dissertation for which the author won the TRI Award for the best thesis in terrorism and counter-terrorism studies four years ago, is an important contribution to the burgeoning literature on the types of alliances and rivalries that characterize the relations between all types of terrorist groups. The author, a former analyst in the U.S. Department of State, teaches in the Department of Justice, Law, and Criminology at American University, Washington, DC.


The contributors to this edited volume examine the question of whether terrorism is effective in producing its groups’ intended results. This is an important question, as the editor notes, because “If the historical record confirms that terrorist violence has failed to deliver in a variety of times and contexts, militants may be less likely to take up weapons and may opt for less costly – and more effective – tactics like non-violence.” (p. 1). Various measures of terrorist groups’ effectiveness are proposed by the volume's contributors, such as securing tactical, operational, and strategic objectives; achieving groups’ longevity; organizational success through establishing a ‘franchise’ system with other terrorist groups; causing fear and disorientation among their adversaries through their attacks; conducting spectacular attacks and gaining publicity; gaining the support of their communities for their cause; coercing government compliance to their demands; and overcoming the counterterrorism measures implemented against them. Among the volume's contributors' great insights is the...
observation by Peter Krause, in his chapter on “When Terrorism Works: Explaining Success and Failure Across Varying Targets and Objectives” that “counterterrorism aims to decrease terrorist attacks (tactical), degrade terrorist organizations (organizational) and prevent terrorists from gaining political concessions (strategic),” but how these objectives and policies can be achieved needs to be better understood. (pp. 47-48). The volume's theoretical chapters are complemented by case studies on the effectiveness of terrorist campaigns by the Spanish ETA, the Polisario insurgency in Western Sahara, and those of the MLN-T in Uruguay and the FMLN in El Salvador. In the concluding chapter, the editor finds that “Terrorism can be effective in delivering tactical returns but it is largely ineffective for realizing strategic goals” and that it is estimated that “only between 5 and 10 percent of groups who have used terrorism as a coercive method against governments have succeeded in generating the political results they seek.” (p. 166). This volume is a major contribution to the literature on formulating metrics of effectiveness by terrorist groups. The editor is Lecturer in International Relations at the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews and Senior Research Fellow at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB).


This is an interesting and theoretically innovative attempt to examine the definition of terrorism from an academic perspective. This is significant because of the lack of consensus in terrorism studies as well as among UN member states on how to define terrorism. Some of the problems in defining terrorism, the author points out, include its manipulation as a derogatory label to delegitimize adversaries who employ violence to pursue their political objectives. To redress this problem, the author argues that “there is something qualitatively distinctive about terrorism” in which “the core essence of terrorism is its primary intent to generate a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims. Terrorism, then, is the use or threat of violence with the primary purpose of generating a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims for a political motive” (p. 18). The distinctiveness of terrorism, therefore, is not necessarily in its targeting of civilians, non-combatant or combatant military personnel, but in its use as “sufficient message generators” (p. 21). To examine these issues, the book's chapters discuss topics such as defining terrorism in the policy-making environment, the evolution of the definition debate on terrorism, the notion of terrorism as a form of violent communication, defining terrorism based on its targeting, distinguishing between political terror and terrorism, and the various components that go in definitions of terrorism, including domestic state terror and state-sponsored terrorism. The author is a Reader in Terrorism Studies, University of East London, England, UK.


With underground tunnels increasingly being used by terrorist groups, such as the Palestinian Hamas, to smuggle their fighters across borders to covertly attack their adversaries, this is one of the few comprehensive studies on such a warfare tactic. The need for such a study, the author explains, is due to “The lack of a systematic treatment of underground warfare in history, military theory, and law [which – JS] has left states without resources or records of state practice to turn to. Historically, no attempt has been made to analyze the evolution of underground tactics or to compare the various ways in which the tactic has been used” (pp. xii-xiii). To fill this gap, the book provides a blueprint to conceptualize the threat, the operational measures required to mitigate it, and the legal questions in international law and the laws of armed conflict that need to be considered in countering it. This framework is applied to the book's chapters which cover topics such as the origins and evolution of the use of underground tunnels in terrorist and guerrilla warfare; a typology of different types of tunnels, the way they are employed, and future trends; sovereignty issues under international and domestic law that need to be addressed in countering threats posed by underground tunnels, including the right of pre-emptive and anticipatory self-defense; defining the use of tunnels for offensive military purposes under international humanitarian law; the legality of using underground tunnels by adversaries for military purposes in populated civilian areas; and technological measures that are being utilized to detect and destroy them. In this important book's conclusion, the author calls for recognizing tunnel warfare as a new domain of war and as “a subset of land warfare calling for tailored policies, skills, expertise, processes, and legal interpretations.”
Textbooks


The contributors to this edited textbook examine terrorism and counterterrorism from a multidisciplinary conceptual perspective. The textbook is divided into four parts, with each thematic part consisting of chapters that provide general overviews and essays that focus on specific topics. In Part I, “Approaching the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence,” the chapters cover topics such as guidance on studying terrorism, including how to define terrorism; a history of terrorism in terms of ideology, tactics and organization; and cyberterrorism; while the three essays focus on victims of terrorism. There is also a critique of the sub-discipline of “Critical Terrorism Studies” and a chapter on the role of state terrorism in the “global war on terror.” In Part 2, “Understanding Terrorism,” the chapters cover the root causes of terrorism; the nature of the supporters of terrorism; and terrorists’ utilization of the media of communications. Three essays cover the specialized topics of terrorists’ use of IEDs and suicide bombings in their attacks; the spread of global jihadism; and the impact of terrorist attacks on Israeli society. In Part 3, “How Terrorism Ends,” chapters cover topics such as the factors involved in the termination of terrorist conflicts; conflict resolution in resolving terrorism and the role of terrorist ‘spoilers’ in undermining attempts to resolve conflicts; and the processes involved in individual disengagement from terrorist groups. Three specialized essays discusses the debate over the role of attitudinal and behavioral changes in de-radicalization and disengagement; and the role of drone warfare in counterterrorism. Part 4, “Resources,” consists of two chapters that cover the skills required to write academic papers, exam answers, and dissertations, as well as how to conduct field research on terrorism-related subjects. As a textbook, each chapter begins with an introduction, tables that illustrate the text, a conclusion, a study box that provides key readings and study questions, notes, and reference resources. This volume is highly recommended as a primary or secondary textbook in graduate courses on terrorism and counterterrorism.


This is the latest edition of what is widely considered one of the best, most detailed and encyclopedic textbooks on terrorism and counterterrorism at the undergraduate course level. Following an overview of the textbook’s rationale and organizational principles, it is divided into four parts. Part I, “Terrorism: A Conceptual Review,” provides an overview of the threat of terrorism, how terrorism is defined, and the causes of terrorism. Part II, “The Terrorists,” covers state terrorism; various types of terrorist organizations, such as religious, right-wing and left-wings groups; international terrorism, and emerging terrorist environments that are ‘gender-selective’ and criminally-based. Part III, “The Terrorist Trade and Counterterrorism,” covers terrorists’ tactics and targeting, the utilization by terrorists of mass media, and a case study on terrorism in the United States. Part IV, “Securing the Homeland,” covers the components of counterterrorism, including selected case studies; the nature and organization of homeland security in the United States, and future trends in terrorism. As a textbook, each chapter begins with an “Opening Viewpoint,” side bars, figures and discussion boxes that provide additional information and tables to illustrate the text, various perspectives and case studies on the issues discussed in the chapter, a chapter summary, key terms and concepts, a self-study guide, recommended websites, a web exercise, and recommended readings. The Appendices include map references of significant terrorist conflict regions, significant terrorist leaders and organizations, and a glossary of terms. The author is Professor of Criminal Justice Administration at California State University, Dominguez Hills, California.
Counter-Terrorism


This book was originally published in 2010, by Paradigm Publishers, with Routledge re-publishing it in 2016. Although some of its information about terrorist activities may be dated, its importance lies in its conceptual framework which is relevant to analyzing the factors involved in terminating current terrorist-based conflicts. Termination, the author explains, “means the attacks of illegal violence against unsuspecting citizens framed around a particular contextual situation of issues and demands and carried out by politically motivated groups come to an end” (p. 5). In one outcome, the author adds, “a one-sided victory is determined and the opponent surrenders (either the target government or the terrorists win), although this outcome is relatively rare or short-lived” (p. 5). Most terrorist vs. government conflicts, however, the author explains, are characterized by a protracted stalemate, and one of the book’s major contributions is its adaptation of conceptual frameworks from the discipline of conflict resolution to resolving terrorist-based conflicts. This is highlighted by William Zartman’s work on the sequencing of the termination process for protracted conflicts in which four elements operate cumulatively to transform the nature of the conflict. First, the target government begins to change its thinking about the adversary; second, turning point events occur, such as a major military defeat by one side or the other, that bring about a changed approach; third, both parties begin to express a “negotiation readiness” to address a possible solution; and finally, both parties engage in a reciprocal “interest-based bargaining” to advance mutual gains for a settlement to succeed (pp. 22-23). This framework is applied to anti-American terrorism in the cases of the U.S.-Cuba skyjacking crisis, 1968-1973; the U.S-Iran hostage crisis, 1979-1981; the U.S.-Beirut kidnapping crisis, 1984-1991; and the U.S.-al Qaida conflict, 1998-2009. In the conclusion, the author argues that “The forgoing analysis outlines ideas for thinking about ways to resolve the terrorism problem, reversing the emphasis from the causes of terrorism outbreak to the causes of terrorism cessation.” (p. 211). The book includes numerous tables that illustrate and operationalize the chapters’ analysis and data. The author is Professor at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies, Denver, Colorado.


The contributors to this volume examine the psycho-sociocultural environments that serve as a context for the emergence and proliferation of terrorism and the various psychosocial strategies that can be utilized to effectively counter terrorism. The volume contains 18 chapters that are arranged into two sections. The chapters in the first section, “Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial issues,” discuss topics such as defining terrorism; psychological issues in terms of aggression and concepts to explain terrorism such as evolutionary psychology, social learning theory, and terror management theory; the behavioral profile of terrorists; understanding terrorist groups; the psychological implications of the use of biological weapons and mass contagion; and the role of media in propagating terrorism; The second section, “Countering Terrorism: Psychosocial Avenues,” covers topics such as the motivation of terrorism; rational choice and target selection; the impact of cyberspace in sustaining terrorism; the utilization of risk assessment in counterterrorism; strategies in interviewing terrorist suspects; a case study of countering violent extremism in Indonesia; the impact of government policies in affecting intergroup relations; the role of strategic information operations in countering terrorism; and the psycho-spiritual underpinning the prevention and control of terrorist violence. This volume is especially significant because it brings together leading conceptual approaches on these issues by Western and Indian experts. Updesh Kumar is Scientist ‘F’ and Head, Mental Health Divison, Defence Institute of Psychological Research, Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), New Delhi, India. Manas K. Mandal is Outstanding Scientist and Director, Defence Institute of Psychological Research, Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), New Delhi, India.

This book’s premise is that America’s counterterrorism cooperation partnerships with other nations are complex, ranging from close to mixed. The nature of such counterterrorism cooperation is examined through the lens of five variables (with the first four highlighted): domestic counterterrorism operations to counter terrorism; counter-radicalization programs; tactical cooperation such as “the provision of access, intelligence cooperation, and coordination on detainees”; partner countries’ contributions to bilateral or regional military and diplomatic coalitions to counter terrorism; and cooperation in monitoring ports, airports, and borders (pp. 4-5). This framework is applied assessing the nature of such counterterrorism cooperation with the Muslim-majority countries that had experienced jihadist insurgencies before and after 9/11 such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen in the Middle East, Mali in Africa, Algeria in North Africa, and Pakistan in South Asia. For each of these countries, the author outlines the nature of their cooperation with the U.S. in terms of their mutual threat perceptions. In the conclusion, the author recommends that the United States’ counterterrorism cooperative relationships with its partner nations, which is based on what he terms a threat-based paradigm, be augmented by a partner-centric paradigm in which the partners’ own prioritization of terrorist threats facing them, as well as their own governance challenges, be taken into account. The author then proposes a toolkit for counterterrorism cooperation engagement that would be based on measures such as greater United States’ investment in building the civilian security-sector capacity in partner countries, developing metrics to assess effectiveness in security assistance, using “positive conditionality” to provide assistance in return for “good behavior” (p. 319), and upgrading partners’ military capacity through “train-the-trainer” programs led by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), which are “critical ‘operational enablers’” (p. 323). The Appendix includes a valuable table listing major United States-led counterterrorism-relevant security programs prior to and following 9/11. This book is an important theoretical and empirical contribution to the study of the components of counterterrorism in general and effectiveness of the United States’ counterterrorism cooperation with its Muslim-majority partner countries in particular. The author is Assistant Professor in the School of International Service at American University, Washington, DC.

**Countering Violent Extremism and Disengagement from Terrorism**


This is an examination of how undergraduates from both public and private universities in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand perceive issues of terrorism and counterterrorism. The book draws on the current literature on the subject and the experiences of other countries that face similar challenges, with a quantitative survey then applied to gauge the perceptions of the undergraduate subjects on these issues. These issues are examined systematically, based on three objectives. The first objective was to examine students’ sources of information, their views on the use of terrorism to redress grievances, and how terrorism should be countered. A second objective was to identify areas of concern that might require governmental or community intervention. A final objective was to propose recommendations for mitigating potential radicalization among students. The survey generated numerous significant findings, such as the need to counter the utilization by terrorists of the Internet’s social media sites and to provide credible alternatives to terrorism in the context of addressing underlying grievances that drive terrorist conflicts. Another finding is the need to move from what the author terms ‘selective countering violent extremism (CVE)-inoculation’ to ‘comprehensive CVE-inoculation,’ with universities, at both undergraduate and graduate levels playing an
important role as conducive environments and stakeholders in such programs. The author is Director of the Digital Strategic Communications Division (DSCD) with the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), which is under the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia.


This book is a chronological narrative of the author’s team’s field work-based program to manage the rehabilitation and reintegration of former al Shabaab terrorists into Somalian society from March 2009 to December 2014. The author, a Danish social anthropologist, applied a field research methodology known as high-risk ethnography (HRE) to conduct his team’s work in the anarchic and violent situation in Somalia. Following the author’s return to Denmark in late 2014, the book’s Epilogue, written in March 2018, provides a pessimistic update on his field team’s accomplishment. He writes: “The collapse of the defector rehabilitation project seems near certain, since the Somali government will not be able to handle it and there is only so much the donor community will put up with. But stepping back, and seeing this project in a larger perspective, a few salient statistics stand out: We did manage to extract perhaps 15 percent of al-Shabaab’s fighting strength, if not more. With 1,228 defectors going through the two centers, and 719 reintegrated in our shift, we managed to put a serious dent into the terrorist group” (p. 453). With some 600 jobs created through the program, which the author believes will be sustainable over time, he concludes on an optimistic note that such rehabilitation and reintegration of former terrorist combatants can be “dealt with at the local level,” while, overall, his project “appears to have been an exercise in futility” (p. 457) because of governmental inefficiency and the deteriorating situation in the country. This book is recommended for specialists in countering violent extremism programs in Somalia and beyond.


This is an excellent and conceptually innovative ethnographic examination of the processes of individual disengagement from terrorism in Turkey through an interview-based reconstruction of the lives of 13 former terrorists from the Kurdish PKK as well as left-wing revolutionary terrorist organizations. The author is a former chief superintendent at the Turkish National Police and currently based at the International Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime (UTSAM) in Ankara, where he works as a researcher and a lecturer; this makes him uniquely positioned to conduct this study on Turkish “penitents.” A rites of passage (ROP) model is used to map the cognitive and behavioral trajectories of such individuals from engagement in terrorism to disengagement from it. The book’s chapters are arranged according to an additional conceptual framework of Arnold Van Gennep’s tri-partite formulation of the separation stage (i.e., paths to political violence), the transition stage (i.e., life in terrorist groups and paths away from terrorism), and the incorporation stage (i.e., politics of repentance and life after violence) (p. 8). This framework is applied to examining the motivational and structural factors that influenced these Turkish penitents’ processes of disengagement from terrorism. It explores whether obstacles and inhibitions were present for leaving a group, analyzing also the differences and similarities between the penitents who left a leftist-revolutionary group and those who exited from a separatist organization such as the PKK. In addition, the author analyzes what their current positions in society and “states of mind” are. Finally, the book outlines what can be learned from their experiences that can be applied to facilitating the disengagement processes of others involved in terrorism (p. 227). With answers to these questions discussed in the book’s concluding chapter, the author’s main policy recommendation is worth noting: “it is extremely important for states to allocate more resources to reintegrate former terrorists into society. This will contribute greatly to the stability of any given society by enticing active members of terrorist organizations to disengage from terrorism. More importantly, clear-cut reintegration programs will give all kinds of former terrorists a ‘second chance’ in life” (p. 240).
Hizballah


This is an authoritative, comprehensive and detailed overview of Hizballah. The volume's chapters cover topics such as Hizballah's historical origins in Lebanon; its Shi’ite ideology and grievances; its leadership and organizational structure; the underlying causes driving its terrorist warfare; its military capabilities and its military wing’s warfare tactics; its areas of military operations, including its warfare with Israel; its socio-political activities, including its role in Lebanese politics and government; the relations with its Iranian sponsor and its involvement in the Syrian civil war; as well as its place in the “Post-Arab Spring” Middle East. In the concluding chapter, the authors discuss some of the contradictions in Hizballah’s current activities, such as its close alliance, on behalf of Iran, with Syria’s ruler Bashar al Assad, and its battles against the country’s predominantly Sunni forces, while at the same time claiming to lead the fight against the Israeli “Zionist” enemy on behalf of the Sunni-based Palestinian cause. This leads the authors to conclude that “Ultimately, then, the Party of God faces a delicate balancing act to ensure its legitimacy and survival, both as a domestic actor in Lebanon and as an influential actor across the Middle East” (p. 152). The Appendices include a timeline of Hizballah’s activities as well as profiles of its top leaders. Both James Worrall and Gordon Clubb are lecturers at the University of Leeds, while Simon Mabon is a lecturer at the University of Lancaster, England, UK.

Sri Lanka


The author argues that the Sri Lankan government’s legal prosecution strategy against alleged Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) terrorists during their insurgency (which ended in 2009) had suppressed “the rule of law, justice, truth and human rights” and was a discriminatory “persecution and unjust punishment of suspected terrorists…” (p. 9). To prove his case, the author examines the degree of fairness in using indefinite detention and extracting confessionary evidence in convicting alleged terrorists within the broader context of the government’s counterterrorism campaign against the LTTE. With thousands of Tamil Tigers prosecuted on the basis of such confessions, the book’s chapters discuss the conflicting narratives employed by LTTE and the government in responding to such judicial measures. In the conclusion, the author points out that the use of forced confessions was not a primary factor in the LTTE’s military defeat, with the major factors identified as India’s and China’s support for the Sri Lankan government against the LTTE, as well as the LTTE’s problematic leadership which preached martyrdom while betraying their fighters in the field. Nevertheless, the “oppressive elements” of the Sri Lankan judiciary system, the author cautions, need to be reformed “to prevent the possibility of another rebellion against the state” (p. 200). This book is an important contribution on the role of the judiciary system in a government’s counterterrorism campaign. The author has worked as a human rights lawyer in Sri Lanka and Australia.


Drawing on the theoretical literature of “post-war commemorative practices in order to make claims about how ‘official histories’ are consolidated in the service of nation-building” (p. 16), this is a critical account of the period in Sri Lanka from 2005 to 2015. It demonstrates how the Sri Lankan government employed “exclusionary and repressive” policies “to facilitate the terrible violence inflicted on the Tamils at the End” (p. 319). Although
the book’s research is based on the author’s fieldwork in Sri Lanka in 2012, this reviewer found much of the text difficult reading as it is highly theoretical and jargon laden. Examples includes the author’s adoption of Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse as “not simply that which translates struggle or systems of domination, but it is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized,” or that “The state, in its post-war rhetoric of development, reconciliation and ‘oneness,’ tries to consign the End to the past.” (p. 324). The author is a Lecturer at the Department of Criminology and Sociology, Middlesex University London, England, UK.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.
Bibliography: Terrorism Research Literature (Part 3)

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, and grey literature on the field of Terrorism Research, its sub-disciplines (such as Critical Terrorism Studies), and related disciplines (such as Security Studies), central concepts, theories, methods, models, approaches, and research topics. More recent publications have been prioritized during the selection process. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, terrorism research, terrorism studies, concepts, theories, methods, models, approaches, research topics

NB: All websites were last visited on 22.07.2018. This subject bibliography is conceptualized as a multi-part series (for earlier bibliographies, see: Part 1 and Part 2). To avoid duplication, this compilation only includes literature not contained in the previous parts. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

Bibliographies and other Resources

For a compilation of resources (including a metabibliography) see:


Books and Edited Volumes


Booth, Andrew; Sutton, Anthea; Papaioannou, Diana (2016): *Systematic Approaches to a Successful Literature Review*. (2nd ed.). Los Angeles: SAGE.


Ehrhart, Hans-Georg; Hegemann, Hendrik; Kahl, Martin (Eds.) (2015): *Putting Security Governance to the
Abingdon: Routledge.

El Sayed, Lilah; Barnes, Jamal (Eds.) (2017): Contemporary P/CVE Research and Practice. [e-Book]. Abu Dhabi; Perth: Hedayah; Edith Cowan University. URL: http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-222018131552.pdf


**Theses**

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Gillani, Dayyab (2017): *The Definitional Dilemma of Terrorism: Seeking Clarity in Light of Terrorism Scholarship.* (Doctoral Thesis, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, United Kingdom). URL: [http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12258](http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12258)


Neudecker, Christine Helene (2017, Summer): *CVE Programs and Initiatives through the Ages: A Snapshot of the Past, Present, and Future.* (Master's Thesis, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Canada). URL: [http://summit.sfu.ca/item/17537](http://summit.sfu.ca/item/17537)


### Journal Articles and Book Chapters


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Deradicalization, 12, 119-168. URL: http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/113


Breiger, Ronald L. et al. (2011): Application of a Profile Similarity Methodology for Identifying Terrorist Groups that Use or Pursue CBRN Weapons. In John Salerno et al. (Eds.): *Social Computing, Behavioral-


Cherney, Adrian (2016): Designing and Implementing Programmes to Tackle Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons from Criminology. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide, 9(1-3), 82-94. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2016.1267865


Fitzgerald, James; Ali, Nadya; Armstrong, Megan (Guest Editors) (2016): Critical Terrorism Studies: Reflections on Policy-Relevance and Disciplinarity. [Special Issue]. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 9(1). URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rter20/9/1


Frère, Marie-Soleil; Meyer, Christoph (Guest Eds.) (2018, March): INFOCORE. [Special Issue]. Media, War & Conflict, 11(1). URL: http://journals.sagepub.com/toc/mwca/11/1


Gregg, Heather Selma (2016): Three Theories of Religious Activism and Violence: Social Movements,
Fundamentalists, and Apocalyptic Warriors. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(2), 338-360. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.918879](https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.918879) URL: [https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/49169/Gregg_Three_Theories_2016.pdf](https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/49169/Gregg_Three_Theories_2016.pdf)


Guittet, Emmanuel-Pierre (2016): West German Radical Protest in the Long 1960s. [Review Article]. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 9(1), 150-158. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2015.1120106](https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2015.1120106)


Hänni, Adrian (2016): "Read it in the Papers, Seen it on TV...": The 1981 Libyan Hit Squad Scare as a Case of Simulated Terrorism in the United States. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 9(1), 54-75. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1178523](https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1178523)


Harris, Daniel J.; Simi, Pete; Ligon, Gina (2016): Reporting Practices of Journal Articles that Include Interviews with Extremists. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(7-8), 602-616. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1080/1057600X.2016.1141009](https://doi.org/10.1080/1057600X.2016.1141009)


Jackson, Richard et al. (Eds.) (2017): 10 Years of Critical Studies on Terrorism. [Special Issue]. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 10(2). URL: [https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rter20/10/2](https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rter20/10/2)


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Lim, Kevjn (2016): Big Data and Strategic Intelligence. *Intelligence and National Security*, 31(4), 619-635. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2015.1062321](https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2015.1062321)


Marrin, Stephen (Guest Editor) (2017): Understanding and Improving Intelligence Analysis by Learning from other Disciplines. [Special Issue]. *Intelligence and National Security*, 32(5). URL: [https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fint20/32/5](https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fint20/32/5)


Rousseau, Cécile; Hassan, Ghayda; Oulhote, Youssef (2017): And if there Were another Way out? Questioning the Prevalent Radicalization Models. [Commentary]. Canadian Journal of Public Health, 108(5-6), e633-e635. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17269/cjph.108.6233


Sikkens, Elga et al. (2017, May): Participant Recruitment through Social Media: Lessons Learned from a Qualitative Radicalization Study Using Facebook. *Field Methods, 29*(2), 130-139. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1177/1525822X16663146](https://doi.org/10.1177/1525822X16663146)

Silke, Andrew; Schmidt-Petersen, Jennifer (2017): The Golden Age? What the 100 most Cited Articles in Terrorism Studies Tell us. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 29*(4), 692-712. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1064397](https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1064397) URL: [http://roar.uel.ac.uk/4406/1/The_Golden_Age.pdf](http://roar.uel.ac.uk/4406/1/The_Golden_Age.pdf)


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Wadhwa, Pooja; Bhatia, M. P. S. (2013): Tracking On-Line Radicalization Using Investigative Data Mining. In: Ranjan K. Mallik (General Chair) et al.: 2013 National Conference on Communications (NCC): Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi, India, February 15-17, 2013. [Proceedings]. Piscataway: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Article p4.6_3_1569697811. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/NCC.2013.6488046


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**Grey Literature**


Davey; Jacob; Birdwell, Jonathan; Skellett, Rebecca (2018): Counter Conversations: A Model for Direct Engagement with Individuals Showing Signs of Radicalisation Online. (ISD Report). URL: https://www.isdglobal.org/counter-conversations-model-direct-engagement-individuals-showing-signs-radicalisation-online


onlinejihad.net/2018/06/01/isis-sunset-on-the-decline-narrative


Pantucci, Raffaello; Ellis, Clare; Chaplais, Lorien (2015, December): *Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review*. (CLAT Project; Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series, No. 1). URL: [https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/lone-actor-terrorism-literature-review](https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/lone-actor-terrorism-literature-review)


Note

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., is a Professional Information Specialist. Since 2011, she works for the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). Additionally, she serves as Information Resources Editor to 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. In her editorial role, she regularly compiles bibliographies and other resources for Terrorism Research. She wrote her doctoral thesis on Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents (focus: media-oriented hostage takings). E-mail: j.tinnes@gmx.de.

Compiled and Selected by Judith Tinnes

Abstract

This resources list aims to provide the Terrorism Research community with an entry point to important resources in the field of Terrorism Studies. It is subdivided into three sections: The first section lists open-access and subscription-based scholarly and professional journals, most of them peer-reviewed. The second assembles websites run by academic, non-/governmental, or private institutes, organisations, think tanks, companies, groups, and individual experts. The third provides a meta-bibliography of subject bibliographies on a broad spectrum of field-relevant topics. The resource list is based on the bibliographic work that the author has been conducting for “Perspectives on Terrorism” since 2013. Like every hand-searched resource collection, this one reflects subjective choices and does not claim to be exhaustive.

Keywords: resources list; terrorism research; journals; websites; bibliographies; meta- bibliography


Journals

Open-Access Journals

Combating Terrorism Exchange (CTX)
https://globalecco.org

conflict & communication online
http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Contemporary Voices: The St Andrews Journal of International Relations (CVIR) (formerly: Journal of Terrorism Research [JTR])
https://cvir.st-andrews.ac.uk

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA)
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/ctta

CREST Security Review (CSR)
https://crestresearch.ac.uk/csr

CTC Sentinel
https://ctc.usma.edu/ctc-sentinel

Current Trends in Islamist Ideology
https://www.hudson.org/policycenters/6-current-trends-in-islamist-ideology

CyberOrient
http://www.cyberorient.net

Defence Against Terrorism Review (DATR)
http://www.coedat.nato.int/datrvolumes.html
http://www.meforum.org/meq

Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)
http://www.rubincenter.org/about-meria

Military Review (MR)
http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Military-Review

Pakistan Journal of Criminology (PJC)
http://www.pjcriminology.com

Parameters
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters

Peace and Security Review
http://www.bipss.org.bd/index.php/section/bipss-journal

per Concordiam
http://perconcordiam.com

Perspectives on Terrorism (PT)
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism

PRISM
http://cco.ndu.edu/Publications/PRISM.aspx

Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società (Security, Terrorism and Society)
http://www.sicurezzaterrorismosocieta.it

Small Wars Journal (SWJ)
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrn

Stability
https://www.stabilityjournal.org

Syria Studies
https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria

Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base
https://www.terrorismelectroniccjournal.org

Terrorism Monitor (TM)
https://jamestown.org/programs/tm

Subscription-Based Journals

African Security
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uafs20

Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rirt20

Caucasus Survey
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcau20

Conflict Management and Peace Science (CMPS)
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/cmp
Counter Terrorist, The
http://www.thecounterterroristmag.com

Critical Studies on Terrorism
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rter20

Democracy and Security
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdas20

Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide (DAC)
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rdac20

European Journal of International Security (EJIS)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security

Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, The
http://www.fletcherforum.org

Foreign Affairs
https://www.foreignaffairs.com

Foreign Policy (FP)
http://foreignpolicy.com

Global Crime
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fglc20

Health Security
https://www.liebertpub.com/loi/hs

Intelligence and National Security
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fint20

International Affairs
https://academic.oup.com/ia

International Interactions
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gini20

International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies
https://www.intellectbooks.co.uk/journals/view-Journal,id=144

International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism (IJCWT)
https://www.igi-global.com/journal/international-journal-cyber-warfare-terrorism

International Journal of Terrorism and Political Hot Spots

International Security (IS)
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/isec

Islamophobia Studies Journal (ISJ)
https://www.jstor.org/journal/islastudj

Jane's Intelligence Review

Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (JIPSS)
http://www.acipss.org/journal
Journal for the Study of Radicalism (JSR)
http://msupress.org/journals/jsr

Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/loi/jacpr

https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wasr20

Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research
https://www.intellectbooks.co.uk/journals/view-Journal.id=148

Journal of Conflict Resolution (JCR)
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

Journal of Democracy
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org

Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (JHSEM)
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jhsem

Journal of Military Ethics (JME)
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/smil20

Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjmm20

Journal of Peace Research (JPR)
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr

Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (JPICT)
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpic20

Journal of Religion and Violence (JRV)

Journal on the Use of Force and International Law (JUFIL)
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjuf20

Media, War & Conflict
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/mwc

Middle East Journal, The (MEJ)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journal/459

Middle East Policy
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967

Militant Leadership Monitor (MLM)
https://jamestown.org/programs/mlm

Orbis
https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/orbis

Political Psychology
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221

Politics, Religion & Ideology
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftmp21
RUSI Journal, The
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi20

Security Dialogue
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/sdi

Security Studies
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fsst20

Small Wars & Insurgencies
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fswi20

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20

Survival
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsur20

Terrorism and Political Violence
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20

Third World Quarterly (TWQ)
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20

Washington Quarterly, The
https://tandfonline.com/loi/rwaq20

Websites

Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN)
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org

Aljazeera Centre for Studies
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en

Amnesty International
https://www.amnesty.org

Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS)
https://www.dohainstitute.org/en

ARK
http://arkgroupdmcc.com

Atlantic Council
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org

Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
https://www.aspi.org.au

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
http://www.aymennjawad.org

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
https://www.belfercenter.org

Bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com

Bin Laden's Bookshelf
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/features/bin-laden-s-bookshelf

Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC)
https://bipartisanpolicy.org

Bored Jihadi, The
http://boredjihadi.tumblr.com

Brookings Institution, The
https://www.brookings.edu

C’BRNE Diary
https://www.cbrne-terrorism-newsletter.com

Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS)
http://tsas.ca

Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)

Carter Center, The
https://www.cartercenter.org

CATO Institute – Foreign Policy and National Security
https://www.cato.org/research/foreign-policy-national-security

Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
https://www.cnas.org

Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS)

Center for Security Studies (CSS) – Digital Library

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
https://www.csis.org

Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS)
https://www.uml.edu/Research/CTSS

Center for the Analysis of Terrorism (CAT)
http://cat-int.org

Center on National Security at Fordham Law (CNS)
http://www.centeronnationalsecurity.org

Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS)
http://www.caps.af

Centre for International and Strategic Analysis (SISA)
http://strategiskanalyse.no/index.php/en

Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST)
https://crestresearch.ac.uk

Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC), Leiden University, Database Terrorism, Counterterror-
ism and Radicalization
http://www.terrorismdata.leiden.edu

Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV)
https://info-radical.org/en

Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT)
http://www.coedat.nato.int

Chatham House
https://www.chathamhouse.org

Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST)
https://cpost.uchicago.edu

CNA
https://www.cna.org

Combating Terrorism Center (CTC)
https://ctc.usma.edu

Conflict Barometer
https://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/?lang=en

Consortium for Mathematical and Computational Methods in Counterterrorism – Mathematical and Computational Methods in Counterterrorism
http://www.rit.edu/cos/smcs/cmmc/index.php

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
https://www.cfr.org

Counter Extremism Project (CEP)
https://www.counterextremism.com

counterideology 2
https://counterideology2.wordpress.com

Country Reports on Terrorism
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/index.htm

Crime Terror Nexus
https://crimeterror nexus.com

Crown Center for Middle East Studies
http://www.brandeis.edu/crown

Cyberterrorism Project, The
http://www.cyberterrorism-project.org

Daesh Daily
http://www.daeshdaily.com

Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
https://www.diis.dk/en

Demos
https://www.demos.co.uk

Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft Vorderer Orient für gegenwartsbezogene Forschung und Dokumentation e.V.
(DAVO)
http://davo1.de

Digital Islam
http://www.digitalislam.eu

emmejihad
https://emmejihad.wordpress.com

Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC)
https://esoc.princeton.edu

European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Standing Group on Extremism & Democracy
http://www.extremism-and-democracy.com

European Eye on Radicalization (EER)
https://eeradicalization.com

Europol – Crime Areas: Terrorism

Eye On ISIS in Libya (EOIL)
http://eyeonisisinlibya.com

FATA Research Centre (FRC)
http://frc.org.pk

Federation of American Scientists (FAS) – Congressional Research Service Reports on Terrorism
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/index.html

Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
https://www.fpri.org

Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI) [Norwegian Defense Research Establishment]
http://www.ffi.no/en

Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD)
http://www.defenddemocracy.org

From Chechnya To Syria
http://www.chechensinsyria.com

General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD)
https://english.aivd.nl

German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en

German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies (GIRDS)
http://girds.org

German Jihad, The
https://germanjihad.wordpress.com

Global Center on Cooperative Security
http://www.globalcenter.org

Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch (GMBDW), The
https://www.globalmbwatch.com
Global Terrorism Research Project (GTRP)
https://ds-drupal.haverford.edu/aqsi

Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC)
http://www.gsdrc.org

GW Program on Extremism
https://extremism.gwu.edu

Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), The
https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv

Hate Speech International (HSI)
https://www.hate-speech.org

Hedayah
http://www.hedayah.ae

Henry Jackson Society, The (HJS)
https://henryjacksonsociety.org

House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence
https://homeland.house.gov/subcommittee/counterterrorism_and_intelligence_subcommittee

Hudson Institute
https://www.hudson.org

Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG)
https://hrdag.org

Human Rights Watch (HRW)
https://www.hrw.org

HUMSEC
http://www.humsec.eu

Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT)
http://insct.syr.edu

Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH)
https://ifsh.de/en

Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC)
http://www.understandingconflict.org

Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)
https://www.isdglobal.org

Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW)
http://www.ispsw.com/en

Institute for the Study of War (ISW)
http://www.understandingwar.org

Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA)

IntelCenter
https://www.intelcenter.com
Intelligence Corner, The
https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog

INTELWIRE
http://www.intelwire.com

International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE)
http://www.icsve.org

International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague
https://icct.nl

International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR)
http://icsr.info

International Counter-Terrorism Academic Community (ICTAC)
http://www.ictaconline.com

International Crisis Group (ICG)
https://www.crisisgroup.org

International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)
http://www.ict.org.il

Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT), The
http://www.investigativeproject.org

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)
http://www.iai.it/en

Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
https://www.ispionline.it/en

James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy
https://www.bakerinstitute.org

James J.F. Forest
http://www.jamesforest.com

Jamestown Foundation, The
https://jamestown.org

Jih@d
https://ojihad.wordpress.com

Jihadica
http://www.jihadica.com

Jihadi Document Repository
http://www.hf.uio.no/ikos/english/research/jihadi-document-repository/index.html

Jihadismstudies.net
https://sites.google.com/site/jihadismstudiesnet

Jihadiist Foreign Fighters Monitor (JihFFMON)
https://dwh.hcss.nl/apps/ftf_monitor/

Jihadologie
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)
https://www.prio.org

Pieter Van Ostaeyen
https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com

Political Violence @ a Glance
http://politicalviolenceataglance.org

Project on Violent Conflict (PVC)
https://www.albany.edu/pvc/index.shtml

Project SAFTE
http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/safte

PROTON Project
https://www.projectproton.eu

Public Intelligence Blog
https://phibetaiota.net

Quilliam
https://www.quilliaminternational.com

Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)

Radicalisation Research
https://www.radicalisationresearch.org

Radicalisations
https://radical.hypotheses.org

RAND Corporation
https://www.rand.org

Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) – Terrorism Studies
http://www.rieas.gr/researchareas/terrorism-studies

Royal Danish Defence College
http://www.fak.dk/en

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
https://rusi.org

Saferworld
https://www.saferworld.org.uk

September 11 Digital Archive, The
http://911digitalarchive.org

SITE Intelligence Group
http://www.siteintelgroup.com

Small Arms Survey
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org

Small Wars Journal (SWJ) Blog
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog
Bibliographies


Bazian, Hatem (n.d.): Islamophobia Bibliography and Existing Academic Research on the Subject. URL: http://www.academia.edu/9419339/Islamophobia_Bibliography_and_Existing_Academic_Research_on_the_Subject


Braden, Andrew; Cobb, Matthew; Braithwaite, Alex (2018, March): Geography of Terrorism. Oxford Bibliographies Online. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0229


International Counter-Terrorism Academic Community (ICTAC) (n.d.-): Resources. URL: http://www.ictaconline.com/?page_id=124


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Seib, Philip (2017): Select Bibliography. In: *As Terrorism Evolves: Media, Religion, and Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 144-178. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108303996.008](https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108303996.008)


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• 30 Books. PT, 10(2), 2016, April, 103-117. URL: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/504


Sinai, Joshua (in press): *Bibliography of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*. Abingdon: Routledge. [ca. 2,000 Titles]


Tinnes, Judith (2014, April–): Bibliography: Muslim Brotherhood. [Ongoing Series]. *Perspectives on Terrorism* [PT]


Tinnes, Judith (2013, October-2014, June): Bibliography: Arab Spring. [2-Part Series]. *Perspectives on Terrorism* [PT]


Tinnes, Judith (2015, February–): Bibliography: Terrorism in, or Originating from, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia. [Ongoing Series]. *Perspectives on Terrorism* [PT]


Tinnes, Judith (2015, April–): Bibliography: Genocide (since 1980). [Ongoing Series]. *Perspectives on Terror-


• Tinnes, Judith (2013, February-): Bibliography: Terrorism and the Media (including the Internet). [Ongoing Series]. *Perspectives on Terrorism* [PT]

  
  


• Tinnes, Judith (2013, December-): Bibliography: Conflict in Syria. [Ongoing Series]. *Perspectives on Terrorism* [PT]


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Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects

Complied and selected by Berto Jongman

Note from the Editor:

The amount of new publications, reports, policy papers, lectures, presentations, videos and briefings in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism can be overwhelming for the untrained researcher as well as for young counterterrorism professionals. In the following, a selection of recent open-source online publications, grouped into a dozen categories, has been made by a seasoned former intelligence analyst. An attempt has been made to select items from a variety of sources and positions, presenting different perspectives. Selection not necessarily means endorsement for a certain position or specific lines of argumentation. The following includes also a number of non-terrorism specific items from the broader spectrum of political violence and armed conflicts reports.

Most of the items included below became available online in July and August 2018. They are categorised under these headings:

1. Non-Religious Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns
2. Religious (mainly Jihadi) Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns
3. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics
4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism
5. Counter-Terrorism – General
6. Counter-Terrorist Strategies, Tactics and Operations
7. State Repression and Civil War at Home and Clandestine & Open Warfare Abroad
8. Prevention and Preparedness Studies
   (including Countering Violent Extremism, De-Radicalization, Counter-Narratives)
9. Intelligence
10. Cyber Operations and Information Warfare
11. Risk & Threat Assessments, Forecasts, Analytical Studies
12. Also Worth Reading

1. Non-Religious Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns


A. Roth. Russian journalists killed in CAR ‘were researching military firm.’ The Guardian, August 1, 2018. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/01/russian-journalists-killed-central-african-republic-investigating-military-firm-kremlin-links


Germany’s right-wing terror network – the NSU on trial. DW Documentary, YouTube, July 13, 2018. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58GgAjmlTuU


2. Religious (mainly Jihadi) Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns

2a. AQ and Affiliates


G. Walters. The Islamic terrorists whose savagery was only matched by their stupidity: one suicide bomber ran out of petrol on the way to his attack while another couldn't stop laughing during his martyrdom video. *Daily Mail Online*, July 6, 2018. URL: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5926961/The-truth-Islamic-terrorists-savagery-matched-stupidity.html


2b. IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh and Affiliates


Terrorism Timeline since 9/11. URL: [https://since911.com/explore-911/terrorism-timeline - jump_time_item_465](https://since911.com/explore-911/terrorism-timeline - jump_time_item_465)


IS claims attack that killed four foreign cyclists in Tajikistan. *RFE/RL*, July 30, 2018. URL: [https://www.rferl.org/a/isis-khorasan-province-possible-attack-four-foreign-cyclists/29398154.html](https://www.rferl.org/a/isis-khorasan-province-possible-attack-four-foreign-cyclists/29398154.html)


Z. al-Shimale. ‘No one was spared’: Sweida massacre leaves Syrians reeling. *Middle East Eye*, July 27, 2018. URL: [http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/No-one-was-spared-Residents-recount-Sweida-massacre-Islamic-State-208185763](http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/No-one-was-spared-Residents-recount-Sweida-massacre-Islamic-State-208185763)

IS claims attack that killed four foreign cyclists in Tajikistan. *RFE/RL*, July 30, 2018. URL: [https://www.rferl.org/a/isis-khorasan-province-possible-attack-four-foreign-cyclists/29398154.html](https://www.rferl.org/a/isis-khorasan-province-possible-attack-four-foreign-cyclists/29398154.html)


Spotlight on global jihad (July 19-25, 2018). *The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center*, July


IS restructures regional branches in Syria and Iraq after 2017 losses. BBC, July 20, 2018. URL: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c2003zd4


Bangladesh – dawn of Islamism. DW Documentary, YouTube, April 17, 2018. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J6DxXI6wD8U

T. Abdulrzaq. ISIS may have been defeated a year ago in Mosul, but the ideology that caused it to grow lives on. The Independent, July 12, 2018. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/isis-mosul-defeat-ideology-region-islamic-fundamentalism-a8442026.html


A. Bodetti. After Middle East failure, is Thailand the next ‘caliphate’ for the Islamic State group? The New Arab, July 6, 2018. URL: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2018/7/6/Is-Thailand-next-for-the-Islamic-State-group


P. Cockburn. After ISIS is gone, Iraq will continue to be a deeply corrupt country. *The Independent,* July 6, 2018. URL: [https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/iraq-isis-corruption-airstrikes-baghdad-patrick-cockburn-a8434371.html](https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/iraq-isis-corruption-airstrikes-baghdad-patrick-cockburn-a8434371.html)


2c. Other


C. Freer. What's so scary about the Muslim Brotherhood. Middle East Eye, August 1, 2018. URL: http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/what-s-so-scary-about-muslim-brotherhood-16006917


A. England. Iraq's Shia militias: capturing the state. Iraq's Shia militias: capturing the state. Financial Times, July 31, 2018. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/ba4f7bb2-6d4d-11e8-852d-d8b934ff5ffa

C. Salhani. What did Qatar think it was doing providing $1 billion to a terrorist group. The Arab Weekly, July 28. URL: https://thearabweekly.com/what-did-qatar-think-it-was-doing-providing-1-billion-terrorist-group


‘It could have led to a nuclear war in the Middle East.’ Foreign Policy, July 27, 2018. URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/27/it-could-have-led-to-a-nuclear-war-in-the-middle-east-shai-gal-dome-of-the-rock/


M. Dickson. The 17-year old terrorist. From cradle to grave, indoctrination to hate Israelis and Jews has been a pillar of Palestinian education. The Time of Israel, July 27, 2018. URL: https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-17-year-old-terrorist/


A. Abu Amer. What is behind the Hamas –Iran rapprochement? Al Jazeera, July 26, 2018. URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/hamas-iran-rapprochement-180725150509789.html

A. Mejidyar. Iraqi Hezbollah threatens retaliation against US of Israel attacks Iranian assets in Iraq. Middle East Institute, July 23, 2018. URL: http://www.mei.edu/content/io/iraqi-hezbollah-threatens-retaliation-against-us-if-israel-attacks-iranian-assets-iraq

Iran will attack opposition groups operating from neighboring states: official. Rudaw, July 23, 2018. URL: http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/23072018


News of terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (July 11-17, 2018.) The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, July 18, 2018. URL: https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/news-of-terrorism-
A third round of escalation, more severe than the previous rounds, with about 200 rockets and mortar shells fired at Israel. The shelling is a continuation of Hamas’ policy of controlled violence creating escalation. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, July 16, 2018. URL: https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/third-round-escalation-severe-previous-rounds-200-rockets-mortar-shells-fired-israel-shelling-continuation-hamas-policy-controlled-violence-crea/


3. Terrorism Strategies and Tactics


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J. Helmhold. IDF uncovers Hamas's operating system for kite terror. The Jerusalem Post, June 24, 2018. URL:


4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism


M. Neugroschel. In Germany, online anti-Semitism is going mainstream, study finds. *The Times of Israel*, July 18, 2018. URL: https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-germany-online-anti-semitism-is-going-mainstream-study-finds/


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5. Counter-Terrorism - General

T. Shelton. What is terrorism? The controversial label that is used and abused around the world. ABC, July 20, 2018. URL: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/what-terrorism-controversial-label-used-and-abused-around-world


6. Counter-Terrorist Strategies, Tactics and Operations


D. Sandbrook. Poison toothpaste, prisoners hypnotized to kill: how Mossad, Israel’s secret service, has become


T. Badran, M.R.J. Brodsky, J. Schanzer. Controlled chaos. The escalation of conflict between Israel and Iran in

P. Cockburn. After ISIS is gone, Iraq will continue to be a deeply corrupt country. The Independent, July 7, 2018. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/iraq-isis-corruption-airstrikes-baghdad-patrick-cockburn-a8434371.html


L. Brown. Hardcore ISIS jihadis who were forced out of Syria are now plotting attacks on Britain from Afghanistan. Daily Mail Online, July 9, 2018. URL: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5931985/Warning-hard-core-jihadis-forced-Syria.html


D. Moritz-Rabson. Over 121,000 Yemenis have fled from recent Saudi-led coalition attacks, UN says. Newsweek, July 5, 2018. URL: http://www.newsweek.com/121000-yemenis-have-fled-recent-saudi-attacks-un-says-1010717


M. Skovlund. The Valley Boys: how a lone special forces team is fighting ISIS in remote mountains of Afghanistan. Black Rifle Coffee Company, July 2018. URL: https://www.blackriflecoffee.com/blogs/coffee-or-die-magazine/
the-valley-boys-the-special-forces-team-holding-the-line-against-isis-k


7. State Repression and Civil War at Home and Clandestine & Open Warfare Abroad

M. Levitt. Iran’s deadly diplomats. CTC Sentinel, 11(7), August 2018. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/iran’s-deadly-diplomats/

Five arrested in plot to assassinate US pastor Brunson & the CIA connection. Newsbud, YouTube, August 7, 2018. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6a5U7wgvbZc


E. Feng. Crackdown in Xinjiang: where have all the people gone? Financial Times, August 5, 2018. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/ac0ffb2e-8b36-11e8-b18d-0181731a0340


Guatemala’s civil war – justice for the missing. DW Documentary, YouTube, July 26, 2018. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T82JiUjiC4s


J. Green. Sentenced to death: senior Muslim Brotherhood members are among 75 people facing execution for posing threat to Egyptian security. Daily Mail Online, July 28, 2018. URL: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6002219/Top-Muslim-Brotherhood-figures-75-people-facing-execution.html


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CIA – Al-Qaeda operations center in Iran's backyard exposed. *Newsbud*, July 17, 2018. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k5ZK6FbTO2w


D. Brennan. Democracy in Egypt: five years after the military coup, opposition has been silenced. *Newsweek*, July 7, 2018. URL: http://www.newsweek.com/democracy-egypt-five-years-military-coup-opposition-has-been-silenced-1005851

A. Link. Interview with Carla del Ponte. ‘The UN has failed.’ *Bild*, June 20, 2018. URL: https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/bild-international/carla-del-ponte-snakes-are-easier-to-catch-than-war-criminals-like-assad-56018484.bild.html


Demand ICC investigation of Burma over Rohingya. *Countervortex*, July 1, 2018. URL: https://countervortex.org/node/16008

8. Prevention and Preparedness Studies

(including Countering Violent Extremism, De-Radicalization, Counter-Narratives)


Talking terror. *Terrorism and Extremism Research Center*, United Kingdom. URL: https://soundcloud.com/user-366747443


S. Khan. I’ve been travelling around the country talking to people about extremism- here’s what I found. *The Independent*, July 12, 2018. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commission-for-countering-extremism-terrorism-sara-khan-far-right-a8441971.html


L. Dearden. ISIS and far-right extremists 'changing tactics', commission warns as study launched across England and Wales. *The Independent*, July 10, 2018. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-


**9. Intelligence**

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**Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Tools & resources.** URL: [http://osint.link/](http://osint.link/)


A. Ram, D. Bond. GCHQ spy agency given illegal access to citizens’ data. Financial Times, July 24, 2018. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/891131a2-8e91-11e8-bb8f-a6a2f7bca546


Bellingcat’s digital toolkit. Open Source verification and investigation tools and methods. Bellingcat, 2018. URL: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1BflP1pRtyq4RFtHJoNpVWoQjmGnyVkfE2HYoICKOGguA/edit

10. Cyber Operations and Information Warfare


Foreign influence operations and their use of social media. Congressional Hearing US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, August 1, 2018. URL: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-foreign-influence-operations-and-their-use-social-media-platforms

E. Kaspersky. If we fight cyberattacks alone, we’re doomed to fail. The Guardian, July 31, 2018. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/31/cyberthreats-global-cooperation-online-crime-borderless


H. Pettit. Gmail redesign leaves 1.4 billion users at risk: US intelligence officials warn new ‘Confidential mode’ creates more opportunities for hackers to steal your data. Daily Mail Online, July 19, 2018. URL: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-5969839/1-4-BILLION-Gmail-users-risk-phishing-attacks-intelligence-


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H. Pettit. Pentagon is developing a 'cyber carrier' to launch online attacks against Islamic State and protect the US from hostile government hackers. Daily Mail Online, July 3, 2018. URL: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-5912561/Pentagon-begins-work-cyber-aircraft-carrier.html


11. Risk & Threat Assessments, Forecasts, Analytical Studies


A3M Global Monitoring. URL: https://www.global-monitoring.com/de


Crisis watch: tracking conflict worldwide. International Crisis Group, July 2018. URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group's+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=f5c344f057-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_08_01_08_00&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-f5c344f057-359787537 - overview


Concern at potential risks posed by the forthcoming release of imprisoned FTFs. CTED Trend Alert, July 2018.


12. Also Worth Reading


URL: https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2018/aug/05/yuval-noah-harari-free-information-extremely-dangerous-interview-21-lessons


C. Aydin. There is no Muslim world. Aeon, August 1, 2018. URL: https://aeon.co/essays/the-idea-of-a-muslim-world-is-both-modern-and-misleading


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Conference Monitor/Calendar of Events

Compiled by Reinier Bergema

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), in its mission to provide a platform for academics and practitioners in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism, compiles an online calendar, listing recent and upcoming academic and professional conferences, symposia and similar events that are directly or indirectly relevant to the readers of Perspectives on Terrorism. The calendar includes academic and (inter-) governmental conferences, professional expert meetings, civil society events and educational programs. The listed events are organised by a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental institutions, including several key (counter) terrorism research centres and institutes.

We encourage readers to contact the journal's Assistant Editor for Conference Monitoring, Reinier Bergema, and provide him with relevant information, preferably in the same format as the items listed below. He can be reached at <r.bergema@terrorismanalysts.com>.

August 2018

A Regional Stabilizer or a Troublemaker? A Role Theory Approach to Turkish Foreign Policy
*National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)*
1 August, Baltimore, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @START_UMD

View on Africa: Boko Haram More Dangerous After Split?
*Institute for Security Studies*
1 August, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Website: visit | Twitter: @issafrica

Living With Genocide: Four Years After ISIS Attacked
*Hudson Institute*
3 August, Washington D.C., United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @HudsonInstitute

Trajectories of Radicalisation and Deradicalisation
*University of Queensland*
5 August, Queensland, Australia
Website: visit | Twitter: @UQ_News

Violent Extremism, Terrorism, and the Internet: Present and Future Trends
*VOX-Pol*
20-22 August, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @VOX_Pol

Advanced Summer Programme: Preventing, Detecting and Responding to the Violent Extremist Threat
*Leiden University Centre for Professional Learning*
20-24 August, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @UniLeidenCPL

Advanced Summer Programme on Countering Terrorism Within a Rule of Law Framework
*International Centre for Counter Terrorism & Asser Instituut*
27-31 August, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICCT_TheHague; @TMCAsser
Training Seminar on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism in Kazakhstan
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
27-28 August, Almaty, Kazakhstan
Website: visit | Twitter: @OSCE

IDSA-IPAG Conclave on “The Digital Age, Cyber Space, and Social Media: The Challenges of Security & Radicalization”
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
28 August
Website: visit | Twitter: @IDSAIndia

The Polythink Syndrome: U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions on 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and ISIS
Macquarie University
30 August, Macquarie, Australia
Website: visit | Twitter: @Macquarie_Uni

114th APSA Annual Meeting & Exhibition
American Political Science Association
30 August – 2 September, Boston, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @APSAtweets

High Level Panel: The Use of International Terrorist Watch Lists
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism
31 August, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICCT_TheHague

September 2018

18th World Summit on Counter-Terrorism
The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)
3-6 September, Herzliya, Israel
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICT_org

The Dynamics of Change in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Region: Politics, (Dis)integration and Reformation in the Borderland
University of Peshawar
4-5 September, Peshawar, Pakistan
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Yemen: The Forgotten War
Studium Generale; Leiden University College Research Centre
5 September, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @sgleiden

Critical Studies on Terrorism Annual Conference 2018
BISA Critical Studies on Terrorism Working Group
5-6 September, Leeds, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a
A Weapon of War? Sexual Violence in the Syrian Conflict
*Chatham House*
6 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @ChathamHouse

**12th Annual International Conference: Trauma, Cohesion and Security: Ongoing and Emerging Themes on Political Violence and Terrorism**
*Society for Terrorism Research*
6-7 September, Liverpool, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @SocTerRes

TARTIS Seminar Series on Political Violence: Mia Bloom
*John Jay College of Criminal Justice*
7 September, New York, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @JohnJayCollege

RAN Expert Meeting: Learning from Adjacent Fields: Gangs
*Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) EXIT*
10-11 September, Copenhagen, Denmark
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

ISIS in Iraq. The Rise, Fall (and Future) of a Terrorist Group
*Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)*
11 September, Milan, Italy
Website: visit | Twitter: @ispionline

RAN Study Visit: Prevention of Radicalisation in Asylum Seeker and Refugee Communities
*Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)*
11-12 September, Malmo, Sweden
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

National Policing Summit
*Informa*
17-18 September, Canberra, Australia
Website: visit | Twitter: @informa_Oz

Syria, Libya and Yemen: The MENA Crises’ Outcome
*Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)*
18 September, Moscow, Russia
Website: visit | Twitter: @ispionline

Resolve Network 2018 Global Forum
*RESOLVE Network & United States Institute of Peace*
19 September, Washington D.C., United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @resolvenet; @USIP

2018 Stockholm Security Conference
*Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*
19-20 September, Stockholm, Sweden
Website: visit | Twitter: @sipriorg
RAN Expert Meeting: Optimising Triple P: Police – Prison – Probation
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) POL, RAN P&P
20-21 September, Dublin, Ireland
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

RAN Expert Meeting: The Role of “Informal Actors” in Preventing Violent Extremism
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) C&N
20-21 September, Helsinki, Finland
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

RAN Expert Meeting: Delivering Testimonials Effectively
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) NVT
20-21 September, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

TARTIS Seminar Series on Political Violence: Hammad Sheikh
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
21 September, New York, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @JohnJayCollege

Securing the Homeland Through Acquisition and Technology
RAND Corporation
24-25 September, Arlington, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANDCorporation

Counter Terrorism / Attacking the Network (AtN) Course
Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism
24 September – 5 October, Madrid, Spain
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Tackling Radicalisation in Education Conference 2018
Inside Government
27 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Cybersecurity and Cyberconflict: State of the Art Research Conference
ETH Zürich
27-29 September, Zurich, Switzerland
Website: visit | Twitter: @eth

RAN Expert Meeting: Working with Local Communities in CVE
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) LOCAL, RAN YFC
28 September, Berlin, Germany
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

October 2018

Jihadi Audiovisualities
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
4-5 October, Mainz, Germany
Congres Radicalisering en Extremisme [Dutch]
Studiecentrum voor Bedrijf en Overheid (SBO)
9-10 October, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @SBO_nl

SEECAT (Special Equipment Exhibition & Conference for Anti-Terrorism) ’18
SEECAT
10-12 October, Tokyo, Japan
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

TARTIS Seminar Series on Political Violence: Joby Warrick
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
12 October, New York, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @JohnJayCollege

Terrorism Experts Conference
Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism
16-17 October, Ankara, Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Film, Public Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Historical and International Perspectives
University of Southern California
16-18 October, Los Angeles, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @usc

The Rise of a Transnational Radical Right in Europe
Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo
18 October, Oslo, Norway
Website: visit | Twitter: @CrexUiO

13th Homeland Security Week
Homeland Security Week
22-24 October, Hyattsville, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @DefenseInsights

Terrorism and Media Course
Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism
22-26 October, tba
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

RAN Expert Meeting: Right-Wing Extremism and Schools
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) EDU
23-24 October, Berlin, Germany
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

2018 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference
Blekinge Institute of Technology
23-25 October, Karlskrona, Sweden
Website: visit | Twitter: @BTHInformation
RAN Study Visit ‘Learning from Adjacent Fields: Exploring the Relation between Hooliganism and Extremism’
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)
25-26 October, Poland
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

RAN Expert Meeting: Prisoner Society
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) P&P
25-26 October, Milan, Italy
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

RAN Expert Meeting: Multi-problem Target Group: The Influence of Mental Health Disorders and Substance Abuse on Exit Work
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) P&P
30-31 October, Zagreb, Croatia
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

November 2018

Border Security, Refugees and CT Course
Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism
5-9 November, tba
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

International Policing and Security pre-Conference Workshops
Charles Sturt University
5-6 November, Sydney, Australia
Website: visit | Twitter: @charlessturtuni

International Policing and Security Conference 2018
Charles Sturt University
7-8 November, Sydney, Australia
Website: visit | Twitter: @charlessturtuni

Istanbul Security 2018: Security of the Future
Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies
7-9 November, Istanbul, Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

TARTIS Seminar Series on Political Violence: Steve Coll
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
9 November, New York, United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @JohnJayCollege

International Cyber Security and Intelligence Conference & Exhibition
ICSIC Canada
14-15 November, Vaughan, Canada
Website: visit | Twitter: @icsic_2017
Bundeskriminalamt Autumn Conference  
*Bundeskriminalamt*  
20-21 November, Wiesbaden, Germany  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@bka](#)

Nordic Conference on Research on Violent Extremism: Theory and Practice  
*Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo*  
29-30 November, Oslo, Norway  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@CrexUiO](#)

Reconstructing Neighborhoods of War: Beirut, Warsaw, Dresden, Aleppo et al.  
*Orient-Institut Beirut*  
29 November – 1 December, Beirut, Lebanon  
Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: n/a

About the Compiler: Reinier Bergema is a Strategic Analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). His research interests include, inter alia, radicalisation and Dutch (jihadist) foreign fighters. He is project leader of HCSS' *Jihadist Foreign Fighter Monitor (#JihFFMON).*
Announcements

Announcement by the TRI Thesis Award Jury

by Alex P. Schmid

Since 2014, the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) has annually awarded a prize for the best doctoral dissertation in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies. The jury currently consists of Prof. James Forest, Prof. Clark McCauley, Prof. Edwin Bakker and Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid (chairman). The criteria which the jury set as quality standards include that deserving theses must demonstrate originality in terms of introducing new data, theory or methodology and that award-worthy theses manifest novelty/uniqueness in their findings. Of the theses submitted in 2017, three met these criteria better than the others and ended as finalists:

Dr. Nicole Tishler. Fake Terrorism: Examining Terrorists’ Resort to Hoaxing as a Mode of Attack. Carleton University, 2017.


The jury was impressed by all three doctoral dissertations but ultimately decided that the award for the best thesis of the year 2017 in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies should go to Nicole Tishler whose thesis covers a real gap in our understanding of terrorism in a magistral way. The jury was also impressed by the thesis of Vera Mironova whose field research in a number of ongoing civil wars was extraordinarily courageous and produced illuminating results. The third finalist is Dr. Dara Conduit who, based on a wide array of Arabic and other sources, revisited and reconstructed the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian conflict.

The jury wishes to congratulate the three finalists for their achievement. The winner, Dr. Nicole Tishler, will receive a check of US $1,000.- and a formal award certificate from the Terrorism Research Initiative. The other two finalists will receive a formal award certificate, signed by the president of TRI, Robert Wesley.

While the main findings of the winning thesis by Dr. Nicole Tishler have been summarised in the opening article of the current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism, an Abstract of the thesis of Dara Conduit can be found below, alongside some passages from the cover letter with which Vera Mironova submitted her thesis to the jury.


From the Cover letter of Vera Mironova introducing her Dissertation:

As of the first part of 2018, the Syrian Civil War is the bloodiest ongoing conflict in the world, and the many attempts to bring the struggle to an end have been ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. One central reason this war has been so protracted is the number of armed factions involved. As the American Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, commented in 2013: “Syria is not about choosing between two sides, but rather about choosing one among many sides.” This multifactional front is a growing military trend in conflicts. Two-thirds of all civil wars between 1989 and 2003 involved more than one rebel group fighting against the government, and since that time, the number of armed groups per civil war is constantly increasing. (...) And although academics and policy-makers have accumulated a substantial body of knowledge about the interaction between groups fighting on opposite sides of the frontline, the internal dynamics between rebel factions and, more specifically, the role ideology plays in these dynamics is not understood as well, which makes choosing a group to support a dangerous guessing game. (...)

And while previous research has looked at this problem from militaristic or religious points of view, my goal is to contribute to understanding how internal competition between rebel factions works and what makes a rebel group successful. I will do this by employing labor market theory and comparing, among other important factors, the human resource policies of different groups. This entails not only looking at the groups, but also the individual fighters. It’s difficult to understand the factions inside rebel forces without understanding the group’s human resources; no armed group can be successful without qualified manpower. Therefore, groups fighting for the same goal within a rebel bloc are also competing for the same potential members, and it is a group’s policies that determine their recruiting, and ultimately their overall, success. And in understanding which policies are successful, it is also important to understand the fighters these groups recruit. First, what decision making process leads prospective fighters to take up arms? And then, once they choose to fight, how do they choose a group to fight with?

In this dissertation, I will explain what I’ve discovered about different fighters’ decision-making processes, step by step. I show that after the initial decision to take up arms (which is based on individual grievances), fighters view armed groups as institutions and make the decision to join or switch groups by comparing their capabilities. The groups that are the best organized internally become the most popular with fighters. At the same time, once a group becomes popular (its supply of fighters exceeds group demand), it is in danger of decreasing the quality of its manpower and its conversion capability. In this case, adopting strict rules grounded in an ideology ensures that only the most dedicated people are in its ranks. Individuals joining for reasons other than dedication to the group’s goal will think twice before joining because membership requires a great deal of individual sacrifices. However, one side effect of using ideology that way is attracting people more interested in ideology than in actual goal of the group: power. Those people not only waste group resources, but their presence is dangerous and leads to internal conflicts. So to be the most effective, a group has to strike a delicate balance between using ideology as a screening mechanism and preventing it from attracting fighters who negatively affect a groups’ military and political strategies.

I illustrate my theory with data based on more than 600 interviews and a focus group conducted with local and foreign members of different armed groups on the Syrian frontlines - ranging from the moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA) to an al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, and ISIS - and a dataset of human resource policies from 40 armed groups based on qualitative interviews with group leaders. I also conducted in-depth interviews with members of an ultra-radical sect inside of ISIS, who are currently in hiding. Most previous evidence in insurgency violence literature is post hoc, relying on retrospective interviews of survivors or an individual fighter’s online footprint. My data, drawn from in-person surveys and interviews on the frontlines of the ongoing conflict, affords information gathered in near real-time, avoids survivorship bias, and also sheds light on the intentions of fighters in making particular decisions. My year embedded with Iraqi Special Operations Forces for the Mosul Operation against ISIS allowed me to further confirm these findings through ethnographic research.

Abstract of Dara Conduit’s Dissertation

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was one of the best-known Syrian opposition groups on the eve of the 2011 Syrian uprising. It immediately involved itself across the emerging opposition landscape, and pledged to uphold the uprising’s democratic goals. Although the Brotherhood’s political platforms had supported democratic
principles for more than six decades, it is more often associated with violence and zealotry because of its involvement in the infamous 1982 Hama massacre.

This thesis uses Debord’s concept of the ‘Spectacle’ to show that the Hama massacre has become a Spectacle of history, where the scale of the event created a mythology that made it difficult to separate fact from rumour, and led to the Brotherhood becoming indistinguishable from the memory of the event. This led the conventional narrative on the Brotherhood after 1982 to consistently depict the group as violent, undemocratic and dogmatic, regardless of the Brotherhood’s pre- and post-1982 behaviour or its contemporary character. Thus, Hama became seen as the example par excellence of the Brotherhood’s nature.

This thesis re-examines the history of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood by asking: ‘to what extent does the Brotherhood’s history influence the group’s role in the 2011 uprising?’ It investigates whether the 1982 Hama uprising has skewed interpretations of the movement, and examines the role that the group is playing in the current Syrian conflict. Using a conceptual framework based on the contentious politics literature, buttressed by the lessons of the political organisations and terrorism literature, as well as interviews with Brotherhood and opposition members, Arabic-language documents and archival research, it is shown that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is neither as violent nor as undemocratic as the Hama uprising implied.

A number of key observations are made in the thesis. First, the Brotherhood has been deeply scarred by its experience as an opposition group under the Syrian Ba’th authoritarian regime. Thus, while the Brotherhood’s operating context has changed significantly since 2011, it in many ways still behaves as a group operating within an authoritarian environment. Second, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has acquired deep flaws throughout its history including a reputation for opportunism that has prevented it from achieving its much-anticipated political rehabilitation in the current conflict. Finally, although the Hama Spectacle bears little resemblance to reality, the Hama uprising itself remained a central influence. Indeed, the memory of 1982, including the large loss of civilian life, the deviation from the group’s long-held goals and the decades of suffering that followed, continued to guide the Brotherhood’s decision-making process through the Syrian uprising. In this regard, the Brotherhood remains shackled to the events of 1982 that have led to a stunting of its political abilities and an impediment to its ambitions for political rehabilitation through participation in the current crisis.
Announcement

Call for Contributors to Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness

by Alex P. Schmid

The mission of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) is to ‘Enhance Security through Collaborative Research’. As one of the founders and directors of TRI, and as Editor-in-Chief of its online journal Perspectives on Terrorism, I constantly look for new ways to fulfil this commitment. For many years, I have had the desire to produce a Handbook of Terrorism Prevention. However, when I was Officer-in-Charge of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) from 1999 to 2005, I did not have the mandate, money or time to write or edit such a major work. Now that I am semi-retired, I finally am in a position to do so.

I am writing to let you know that I am currently preparing a Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness. This volume should bring the best available insights and practices together in a one-stop volume to be published in the ‘Living References’ SpringerLink series, which allows for continual updating of the electronic version of the volume (in addition to the initial paper version). The Handbook will contain 32 chapters (each ca. 30 pages long), from the hand of experts, while three chapters will be written by the editor (see Table of Contents below).

This unique handbook will fill a void in the literature on terrorism. While there are good handbooks on crime- and on conflict-prevention, a similar comprehensive and up-to-date volume in the field of counter-terrorism has been lacking. The individual chapters of the Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness will cover a wide range of topics and also integrate lessons from related fields. The concluding chapter will outline an ambitious agenda for a new policy of terrorism prevention and preparedness by the editor. The expected publication date is 1 January 2020.

With this call, the editor is inviting expert contributors who can authoritatively cover specific aspects of prevention and preparedness as outlined in the table of contents below. If you are interested in becoming a contributor, you will be asked to write an original chapter specifically for this handbook. Each contribution should begin by a review of the existing literature on the specific topic selected. Empirical case studies of national, regional or subject-specific experiences can also be included. Each chapter should identify and evaluate good prevention and preparedness practices and conclude with evidence-based policy recommendations. The first draft of each chapter is to reach the editor by 1 August 2019. If you feel that you possess the required expertise (and can demonstrate it based on your publication record), I would like to hear from you and will then send you details about the project. You can reach the volume editor at apschmid@terrorismanalysts.com.

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Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness

1. Introduction: purpose and organisation of Handbook
2. Conceptual chapter: definitions, typologies and theories of prevention and preparedness

Part I: Lessons for Terrorism Prevention from Literature in Related Fields

3. Contributions from the crime prevention literature for the prevention of terrorism
4. Contributions from the conflict prevention literature for the prevention of terrorism
5. Contributions from the military counter-insurgency literature for the prevention of
terrorism

6. Contributions from (inter-)governmental and private sector counter-terrorism manuals (incl. CVE) for terrorism prevention

7. Contributions from terrorists’ own internal (and retrospective) writings that can be of use for terrorism prevention

Part II: Prevention of Radicalisation

8. Prevention of radicalisation to terrorism in schools (incl. universities)

9. Prevention of radicalisation to terrorism in prisons

10. Prevention of radicalisation to terrorism in refugee camps and asylum centers

11. Prevention of radicalisation to terrorism in religious institutions (esp. madrasa, mosques)

12. Prevention of radicalisation in Western Muslim diasporas

13. Prevention of radicalisation in social media on the Internet (including incitement to acts of terrorism)

Part III: Prevention of Preparatory Acts

14. Prevention of recruitment to terrorism

15. Prevention of financing of terrorism

16. Prevention of cross-border movements of terrorists (border security)

17. Prevention of the procurement of arms and explosives by terrorists

18. Prevention of CBRN materials and substances getting into terrorist hands

19. Prevention of (ab-) use of mass media by terrorists

20. Prevention of (ab-) use of the Internet for terrorist plotting

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21. Prevention of low-tech, single actor attacks

22. Prevention of individual gun- and knife-based assassinations by terrorists

23. Prevention of bombing attacks by terrorists (incl. IED and VBIED)

24. Prevention of kidnappings and hostage-takings by terrorists

25. Prevention of suicide attacks by terrorists

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28. Prevention of terrorist attacks on critical national infrastructures

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32. Prevention of major economic disruptions following acts of terrorism (e.g. on tourism industry)
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About Perspectives on Terrorism

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PoT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University, Campus The Hague. PoT is published six times per year as a free, independent, scholarly peer-reviewed online journal available at [https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism](https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism)

PoT seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism-, Political Violence- and Conflict Studies.

The editors invite researchers and readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s Research Notes, Special Correspondence, Op-Eds and other content are reviewed by members of the Editorial Board, while its Articles are peer-reviewed by outside academic experts and professionals. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and waging conflicts. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to. They are responsible for the content of their contributions and retain the copyright of their publication.

*The Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism consists of:*

Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, Editor-in-Chief

Prof. James J.F. Forest, Co-Editor

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