**Resources**

**Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 50 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects**

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

The books reviewed in this column are arranged according to the following topics: root causes, radicalization, and countering violent extremism; anarchism; Ku Klux Klan; foreign fighters; terrorism and organized crime; terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; terrorism and the media; terrorism – legal issues; counterterrorism; Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; the Muslim Brotherhood, global Jihad and Muslim reformers; and the Middle East.

**Root Causes, Radicalization, and Countering Violent Extremism**


This handbook aims to protect American communities from Islamist terrorist threats by their own radicalized youths by educating parents and community leaders about the nature of violent extremist ideologies, how the process of radicalization into violent extremism occurs, how extremist ideas appeal to susceptible youth, how recruitment takes place online and in personal encounters, and how understanding these issues will empower citizens to identify the warning signs of radicalization by those in their midst and take steps to preempt them at the early as possible pre-incident stages. What is especially interesting about this book is that it uses past cases of radicalized American youths as examples to explain how the warning signs of academic theories of radicalization and recruitment can be identified in the ‘real world.’ These cases include the three Denver high school students who were radicalized to leave the U.S. and joint the Islamic State (IS) in Syria, but were apprehended at Frankfurt Airport, following a tip from their families to the FBI; Hoda Muthana, a University of Alabama business student who joined IS in Syria; Carlos Bledsoe, who had converted to Islam and carried out an attack against a U.S. military recruiting center in Arkansas, as well as others.

Each of the book's fourteen chapters concludes with a “What Can You Do?” section, which provides practical measures for parents and community officials to counter the visible manifestations along the potential trajectory into violent extremism. These include discussing subjects such as “extreme ideologies and how to recognize them,” “the psychological processes of justifying barbarism (at the appropriate age),” recognizing “the signs and stages of radicalization,” becoming “familiar with the concepts of groupthink, contagion, and polarization,” becoming “aware of the differences between conversion to Islam the religion, and to Islamism as a political ideology,” becoming “aware of the internal and external elements of the recruitment process,” and teaching “students to look for ‘hidden agendas’ when listening to lectures.” The author concludes that “If nothing else, the take-away from this book is the importance of close relationships with our children and opening discussions about all kinds of extremist groups, predators online and on campus” (p. 223). While the book's focus is on the Islamist threat within the American context, its tool kit can be applied to identifying the radicalization and indoctrination processes that affect potential recruits into other types of violent extremist movements, such as those populated by white supremacists or by far-right wing religiously fundamentalist Jewish extremists. The appendix includes a listing of organizations to assist families in countering radicalization and recruitment into terrorism. The Maryland-based author is a veteran analyst on terrorism who has worked for organizations such as The Investigative Project on Terrorism.

Michael Kimmel, *Healing from Hate: How Young Men Get Into - and Out of - Violent Extremism* (Berkeley,
This book is about how young men can become involved in three types of violent extremist movements in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe: neo-Nazi skinheads, white supremacist nationalists, and Islamist jihadists. Based on his study of the literature on the psychology and sociology of radicalization into terrorism and his own extensive field research, which included interviewing former extremists as well as several organizations that have established programs to attempt to de-radicalize and disengage such extremists from terrorism (in the U.S., Canada, Britain, Sweden, and Norway), the author formulates a theory based on commonalities in the way disparate types of extremist young men turn to violent extremism. One of the paramount drivers in their radicalization and recruitment process is, according to the author, “the issue of masculinity – of [lacking – JS] feelings like a real man, proving one's manhood.” (p. xiv). The author is critical of approaches in the discipline that “tend to overlook masculinity because most of the research on extremism focuses on the political and economic sources of participants' discontent, or their psychological and familial backgrounds. That research is vital, necessary – and incomplete.” The author, in talking with these guys, realized “that adherence to extremist ideology came rather late to the recruitment process, and that their experiences of camaraderie and community with their brothers, their sense of purpose, of sacred mission, and their sense that their lives, as men, actually mattered in the world were far more salient motivations for both entering the movement and staying in it. The movement was their family, and in their family, the band of brothers, they felt validated as men.” (pp. xiv-xv). While the author maintains that he is not offering a “single-variable explanation” because it is still necessary to “analyze the structural, the political and economic forces that marginalize so many” (p. xv), nevertheless, much of his account emphasizes the “gendered quest” in the way mostly young men become attracted to violent extremist movements in order to redress their “emasculating masculinity’s restoration” (p. 8). The author even argues that, in the case of jihadism, “Central to their political ideology was the recovery of manhood from the devastatingly emasculating politics of globalization” (p. 195). He writes sympathetically that in Afghanistan the Taliban’s policies aimed to “reaffirm natural biological differences between men and women” by “remasculinizing” men by requiring them to grow beards and to “refeminizing” women by prohibiting them from revealing any part of their body in public” (p. 195). While the “remasculinization” might constitute one of the secondary variables in the mobilization process for males to join violent extremist movements, it is, in the view of this reviewer, so much played up in the author’s argument that it severely underestimates the role of militant, supra-nationalist ideologies in mobilizing vulnerable young men – and some women too. The author also unfairly critiques Western democracy and secularism that attempt to promote full equality between men and women. In the end, the problems experienced by some young Muslim men in Western societies might be caused by their own traditional, paternalistic cultures that makes it more difficult to assimilate in modern society. There are, nevertheless, other parts of the book that are insightful. This includes the author’s profiling of neo-Nazi and jihadist individuals and their exits from violent extremism, his discussion of the conceptual and practical approaches in countering violent extremism programs, such as those of the British Quilliam Foundation, the Swedish and German EXIT initiatives, and the American Life After Hate initiative, as well as his discussion of disengagement strategies in general. The author is the State University of New York Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Gender Studies at Stony Brook University.


This new edition includes a 21-pages long Prologue. In the 2008 edition, which is reproduced in this edition, the author, an influential American economist at Princeton University (who, following the publication of the book became Chairman of President Barack Obama's Council of Economic Advisers, after which he returned to his university), discusses what he considers to be some of the root causes underlying terrorist insurgencies and the factors that motivate individuals to become terrorists – all of which need to be addressed in order to resolve them. Using empirically derived data, his inferences are drawn from terrorists’ own backgrounds and the economic, social, and political conditions in the societies from which they originate. Based on micro level
data (i.e., the level of individuals), he finds that “As a group, terrorists are better educated and from wealthier families than the typical person in the same age” (p. 5), but that “although lack of education and income are not important root causes of terrorism, they can be part of the solution” (p. 51). At the macro level, he finds that lack of “civil liberties are an important determinant of terrorism,” and that “Wealthier countries are more likely to protect their residents’ civil liberties and political freedoms, so extremists in these countries might be less inclined to turn to terrorism to pursue their agendas” (pp. 89-90). With this thesis disproven by numerous terrorist attacks that originate primarily in Western countries, how does the author address it in his new Prologue? He acknowledges that, with regard to their profiles, “It is certainly possible that terrorism and terrorists are morphing” (p. xiii) with lone wolves carrying out attacks on behalf of foreign-based terrorist groups. As a result, a “broader array of individuals” are engaging in terrorism, although he still insists that the “profiles of terrorists are typically quite different from those of common criminals” (p. xi). With regard to the role of civil liberties as a determinant of terrorism, he still argues, as he did in the first edition, that “Curtailing civil liberties…may inspire more people to resort to violent means than are prevented from carrying out terrorist attacks.” (p. xxiv). Thus, the independent variable of being attracted to extremist ideologies that advocate engaging in violence (the dependent variable) against their perceived adversaries plays only a small role in the author's largely one-dimensional conceptualization of the root causes of terrorism, as opposed to his over-emphasis on Western governments’ coercive responses to the threats posed by violent extremists in the first place. For this and other reasons, this is a flawed account of “What Makes a Terrorist” in 2018.

Anarchism


The George Jackson Brigade was a seven-member revolutionary group based in Seattle, Washington State, which operated between March 1975 and December 1977. It was named after George Jackson, a Black Panther member and prisoner who was killed during an escape attempt from San Quentin Prison in 1971. During the height of their terrorist activities the Seattle Brigade robbed banks and liquor stores, and detonated pipe bombs at government buildings, electric power facilities, supermarkets, banks, a Department of Corrections headquarters, and other targets they had accused of engaging in racism. In this revealing and extensively researched account of the group and its activities (which are listed in detail at the beginning of the book), the author explains how such a small terrorist group could hope that its violent activities and communiques would foment a larger left-wing revolution in the United States. Several demographic characteristics distinguished this group from other extremist left-wing groups, as the author points out. These included the fact that their “members had served more time in prison cells than in college classrooms,” that “Five of the seven were gay or bisexual, a reflection of the loosened limits on gender-orientation in a movement dominated by straight white men up to the close of the 1960s,” and “by virtue of one black member, Brigade membership spanned the racial divide, in contrast to the separatism prominent among radicals at the end of the 1960s” (p. 3). The group’s violent activities came to an end once its members were arrested and incarcerated. In an interesting observation, the author concludes his introductory overview by noting that “Ironically, one of the greatest errors conceded by former Brigade members is, in [Ed] Mead’s words, that ‘we were out of touch with the times.’” (p. 5). The book’s four parts discuss the group’s origins within the wider context of revolutionary movements in the United States, how its members became radicalized, including their involvement in criminal activities, and their underground activities. The author is a Post-Doctoral Teaching Scholar at the Department of History at North Carolina State University in Raleigh.

This companion volume is a comprehensive compilation of the original documents in the form of statements, communiques, and other materials published by and about the George Jackson Brigade. This collection, as the editor explains, is intended as a companion volume to his account of the group (see above review). Following the editor’s introductory overview, it is divided into five parts. Part I, “Profiles of the George Jackson Brigade” (law enforcement perspectives, media accounts, and community accounts); Part II, “Communiques” (letters and community responses); Part III, “The Power of the People is the Source of Life” (political statements and community responses); and Part IV, “When is the Time? Seattle’s Left Community Debates Armed Action” (accounts by others about the group), and Part V, “Processing” (the editor’s interview with several group members). The Appendix includes selected newspaper articles about the group, as well as a selected bibliography.


This companion provides a comprehensive reference resource for the study of anarchism. Its contributors include leading academic experts in the field. The volume is divided into four parts. Part I, “Research on Anarchism,” consists of the editor’s introductory overview on research on anarchism. Part II, “Approaches to Anarchist Research,” covers topics such as post-anarchism, anarchism and art history, participant observation, and anarchism and international relations. Part III, “Current Research in Anarchist Studies,” examines twentieth-century Anglo-American anarchist thought, an anarchist perspective on the fields of sociology and anthropology, anarchism and literature, a Latin American perspective on anarchism, ethnicity and anarchism, and the editor’s conclusions. Part IV, “Materials for Further Research,” provides the volume’s reference resource sections in the form of key terms (which are encyclopedic in detail and arranged alphabetically), resources (such as listings of groups, associations, blogs, archives and libraries, films, videos and DVDs, publishers and bookstores, journals, and conferences), and bibliographies, reference materials and reading lists. With anarchism constituting an important component of terrorism studies (as well as the study of international relations and political philosophy), this companion is highly recommended as a useful resource for analyzing and understanding these issues. The editor is a Professor of Political History at the Department of Politics, History and International Relations at Loughborough University, UK.

Ku Klux Klan


The Ku Klux Klan (called the KKK or the Klan) was a White Supremacist, anti-immigration, Christian fundamentalist, and xenophobic terrorist movement that primarily operated in the American South, although it had branches in other states, such as in the Midwest and the West. Its various configurations operated during the periods of 1865 to 1871, 1915 to 1944, and 1946 to the present. Although it re-emerged “as a full-blown entity in response to the South’s looming crisis over segregation” as a result of the 1954 Supreme Court Brown desegregation decision, it was drastically reduced in size and influence following the 1964 Civil Rights Act, when the federal government and its law enforcement agencies used proactive measures to defeat it. This book focuses on the Klan’s operations in the State of Alabama, which the author breaks down into the three periods of the 1860s, the 1920’s, and the post-1954 timeframe. Although other periods are discussed, the book’s primary focus is on the 1915 to 1949 period. The Klan eventually declined as a full-blown entity in states such as Alabama, when it’s segregationist and terrorist activities, as the author writes, “presented an obstacle to the courting of outside capital and federal relief or because its excesses threatened to prompt federal intrusion into the race issue” (p. 9). What makes this book especially pertinent to the current period is the author’s explanation of its wide appeal during the eras of its strength. He writes, “it represented a political mouthpiece for plain folk in their struggle against entrenched elites” and believed that the targets of their wrath “somehow had it ‘coming to them’ anyway.” (p. 7). Moreover, like today’s Islamists and White Supremacists, the Klan’s “mass support found echoes in religion,” with “most of its religious supporters [coming] from fundamentalist sects” (p. 322).
Of particular importance for countering such extremist movements, the author points out, was its loss of mass support because “Klan activity was a dangerous double-edged sword. While it certainly perpetuated Southern racial customs, excessive Ku Kluxism increased the likelihood of a federal invasion that might disrupt those very customs” (p. 327). At the time of the book’s publication, the author was Assistant Professor at the Center for Labor Education and Research in the School of Business at the University of Alabama, Birmingham, AL.


Stetson Kennedy (1916 – 2011) was an American author and human rights activist. Among his most noteworthy activities was his infiltration of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1940s, which led to his exposing its secretive inner workings to law enforcement authorities. This important book is his account of his infiltration activities, which, as Charlie Patton writes in his introduction, “is not a straightforward work of nonfiction” with some of the narrative embellished and a number of incidents witnessed by others or coming from third-party accounts (p. xii). This is, nevertheless, as David Pilgrim, Curator of the Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia, observes, “a heroic tale where he, posting as a racist encyclopedia salesman named John S. Perkins, infiltrated a Klan organization in Atlanta, Georgia. Risking his life, he donned the Klan hood and robe, burned crosses, gave racist speeches, and clandestinely collected information about Klan activities” (p. xvii). In addition to Stetson’s dramatic account of life inside the Klan, also noteworthy is his prologue, “How to Kan the Klan: A Handbook for Counterterrorist Actions,” which proposes a series of counter-measures, such as revoking the Klan’s corporate charter, passing laws to outlaw wearing masks (such as during demonstrations), registering members and officers in an organization (so as to hold them accountable), disqualifying them from serving as law enforcement officers, outlawing private armies, designating them as traitors and terrorists, outlawing them, removing their tax-exempt status for engaging in terrorism, and preventing them from inciting to riot and expressing racist sentiments. In other measures that the author considers highly effective, he recommends “discounting the Klan's public and self-image” by jeering them at their marches and “tracking down license numbers, publishing members’ names, and bringing employer, creditor, and boycott pressure to bear” (285).

Foreign Fighters


This is a comprehensive account of the factors that drive certain people to volunteer to fight and risk their lives on behalf of the militaries of foreign countries or at the side of insurgent movements throughout history and into the current period. What is especially noteworthy is the author’s historical approach which examines the activities of foreign war volunteers not merely as a current problem but as a phenomenon that can be traced to the late eighteenth century. Similar to David C. Rapoport’s four historical waves of modern terrorism, the author formulates his own broad historical waves theory of foreign fighters. These consist of the first wave from the late eighteenth century until 1917, which he describes as pitting “liberty” against “tyranny,” and included the wars of independence in Spanish America and the wars between the Ottoman Empire and the Greeks and other peoples. The second wave, lasting from the 1917 October revolution in Russia until the early 1980s, pitted the Left against the Right, and included the Russian Civil War, the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, and the protracted Cold War conflicts in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The third wave, started in the 1980s until the current period, and included supporting sides in the Yugoslav Wars, as well as joining militant and terrorist groups that fought in the conflicts in Chechnya, the post-2001 war in Afghanistan, the post-2003 war in Iraq, and the civil war in Syria. There are several problems with the author’s framing of these periods. A first problem is that it took this reviewer a while to differentiate even these three broad waves into their respective years, which the author does not clearly do himself. Secondly, they are overly broad, as the second wave, in particular, also involved a distinct post-colonial conflict wave following the Second World War that
had nothing to do with the Cold War, such as the Israel's 1947-49 War of Independence, which attracted a large flow of Western volunteer fighters (which the author does discuss, in fairness). Finally, a last historical wave should have been demarcated, beginning in the early 1980s and continuing into the current period. It was distinguished by the flow of foreign fighter volunteers into Afghanistan to join the Islamist insurgents that fought the Soviet-ruled regime, as well as the Taliban-allied terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida, and later, the Islamic State, since this period significantly differs in its characteristics from the third historical wave.

The book’s chapters explain the phenomenon of the proliferation of foreign volunteer fighters during these historical waves through processes and drivers such as their recruitment mechanisms, the role of ideologies, personal motivations, social as well as cultural backgrounds in driving them into becoming such volunteer fighters. In addition, the author elaborates different categories in terms of how such fighters position themselves in relation to their home countries. He also identifies the legal responses of their home countries and of the international community to the threats that are posed by the departure and return of such fighters. He also discusses the military significance of the capabilities that such foreign fighters bring to their host militaries’ battle effectiveness (which the author considers to be primarily “in the realms of politics and propaganda rather than on the battlefield”). Additional themes discussed are negative aspects of this phenomenon, such as the presence of criminality by some of these volunteers and how such foreign military services play a role in further radicalizing such volunteers. He also discusses the recurring ways in which foreign volunteers are remembered, for instance, in turning some of them into iconic historical figures (such as the Marquis de Lafayette, a Frenchman who fought in the American Revolution, the British poet Lord Byron, who fought in the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s, and, more recently, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, and Usama bin Laden).

By examining these issues within their respective historical waves (although one can find fault with the author’s periodization of these waves) and by generating cross-historical period findings, this book is a valuable contribution to the literature on volunteer fighters in foreign conflicts. The author is Associate Professor of International History at the University of Leeds, West Yorkshire, England, UK.


The contributors to this comprehensive edited volume examine the spectrum of issues involved in the foreign fighter phenomenon, from Western and non-Western countries to destinations such as the Iraqi and Syrian civil wars, within the context of legal responses at the international, regional, and national levels. Within this overall context, specific issues are examined such as motivations, the role of social media in recruitment, their military impact on the battlefield, governmental countermeasures, and their legal status. Following the editors’ introductory overview, these issues are discussed in the book’s four parts. Part I, “Foreign Fighters: A Multidisciplinary Overview of New Challenges for an Old Phenomenon,” presents this phenomenon’s statistics and characteristics, an historical survey, their motivations, the role of social media in their recruitment, the involvement of women, and the challenge they present for international relations theory. Part II, “The Legal Dimension: The Status of the Foreign Fighters,” discusses their status under international humanitarian, criminal, and humanitarian legal instruments. Part III, “Tackling the Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters at the Supranational Level,” covers the roles of international law, the United Nations, human rights obligations in managing their status; and regional approaches, such as the European Union, OSCE and African Union governance structures for dealing with them. Part IV, “Tackling the Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters at the National Level,” examines the responses at the national level of selected countries such as in Europe, Canada, the United States, Australia, as well as the Middle East; the international legal implications of depriving such fighters’ home country citizenship; and the impact of managing the problem of foreign fighters on refugees from Syria and Iraq. In the concluding chapter, the editors summarize the volume’s findings.
In this account, the author points out that the involvement of volunteer foreign fighters in other countries’ conflicts, such as the contemporary conflicts in Syria and Somalia, are not a new phenomenon, but that over the past two centuries such volunteer fighters have fought on behalf of causes ranging from international communism to aggrieved ethnic groups wishing to be free from foreign domination. Viewing this phenomenon in a broader historical context, the author points out, contributes to a better understanding why and how they join foreign insurgencies, what drives their behavior, and what government policymakers can do in response. Following the author’s introductory overview on “Why Foreign Fighters?” and chapters on the factors that drive such volunteers to fight “elsewhere” and a history of their involvement in foreign conflicts, the book then presents a series of case studies on their involvement in conflicts such as the Texas Revolution (1835–1836), the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), the Israeli War of Independence (1947–1949), Afghanistan (1979–1992) and beyond 1992 and the Iraqi Civil War (2003–2011). In the concluding chapter, the author finds that “little is novel about the recruitment of foreign fighters in contemporary civil conflicts, except perhaps that the use of the Internet has shifted the importance of social organization from recruitment venues to means of facilitating mobilization” (p. 206). Other findings are that “insurgencies use the same type of messaging for all types of foreign fighters,” that an effective response measure is to prevent their recruitment and mobilization process, and, most importantly, “to diminish the salience of the transnational groups through which recruitment is conducted” (pp. 211–212). One of the reasons for this book’s importance is that - when it was first published in 2013 - it was one of the first studies on the phenomenon of volunteer foreign fighters, with its findings still relevant to understanding how this problem has evolved since then. The author is Visiting Associate Professor of International Affairs, and Director, Security Policy Studies Program, at George Washington University, in Washington, DC.

Terrorism and Organized Crime


This is a comprehensive account of the inter-relationship between corruption, crime and terrorism which has led to a more robust, well-funded and lethal category of terrorism. With many terrorist leaders and operatives also engaging in criminal activities, this “entanglement,” as the author explains, has also produced new types of terrorist leaders such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar, AQIM’s leader, who is also known as the “jihadi gangster” (p. 4). Cumulatively, this intersection has larger implications, as the author writes that its impacts on countries’ legitimate economies affect their “economic growth, employment, security, development, and sustainability....” (pp. 4–5). These issues are examined in the book’s chapters, which are divided into two parts. Following the introductory overview, Part I, “The Logic of Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism,” covers the roles of crime and corruption behind mass terrorist attacks, such as 9/11, Bali (October 2002), Madrid (March 2004), Beslan (September 2004), and Mumbai (November 2008); the role of corruption as an incubator of organized crime and terrorism; and locating the criminal pipelines into terrorism, such as in prison. Part II, “The Diverse Businesses of Terrorism,” covers the criminal financing of terrorism, the linkages between narco-traffickers and terrorists, and what the author terms the “Ultimate Fears” arising from the crime-terror connections resulting in the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction. In the conclusion, the author finds that future trends at this intersection will be affected by “the growth of megacities; rising economic inequality globally and within countries and regions; political forces, poor governance, and retreat of the state; civil wars and conflict; sectarian conflicts; climate change; demographic change, including migration and displacement; food insecurity; evolution of dirty entanglements; and technological change” (p. 324). It is such insights and the volume’s comprehensiveness that make it an important contribution to the literature on the nexus between corruption, crime and terrorism. The author is a University Professor at the School of Public Policy, George
Mason University.


The contributors to this volume apply historical research methods to examine the causes and nature of past cases of linkages between terrorism and organized crime. This topic is significant because the contemporary linkages between current terrorism and criminality are largely an outgrowth of their past interactions. As explained in the editors’ excellent introductory overview, there are significant similarities and differences between terrorism and organized crime, with terrorists (altruistically) generally seeking to bring about social or political change, while criminals (selfishly) seeking personal profit (pp. 3-4). They add: “Consequently, the terrorist courts publicity to further their cause, while most criminals avoid the limelight” (p. 4). With both terrorists and criminals learning from each other’s modus operandi, the authors also point out that “Terrorists have developed in-house criminal enterprises in order to raise funds or resources, move goods or people and build political capital” (p. 5). The note that while the use of the car bomb (and horse drawn wagon bomb), was first used by anarchist terrorists in the early 1920s, this method “was soon taken up by Al Capone in Chicago”, adding that “Since then the technique has been used by groups ranging from PIRA to Cosa Nostra, Al Qaeda to the Medelin Cartel” (p. 7).

These issues are discussed in the book’s various chapters, which, following the editors’ introductory overview, are divided into three parts. Part I, “Organized Crime,” covers police corruption in Saint Paul, Minnesota, in the early 1900s; organized crime in Chicago and New York; the narco-trafficking network between France and New York City, known as the “French Connection”; and a British organized crime network that operated between the 1980s and 1995. Part II, “Terrorism,” examines two terrorist groups: the Provisional IRA during the 1975 truce in Northern Ireland, and the Ku Klux Klan in America. Part III, “Terrorism and Organized Crime?,” discusses linkages between terrorism and criminal groups in the cases of Somali piracy, narco-terrorism in Colombia, illicit opium trade in Burma from 1800 to 1961, as well as the case of Jamaat-al-Muslimeen as an example of organized crime and terrorism in Trinidad and Tobago. John Morrison, Aaron Winter and James Windle are criminal justice lecturers at the University of East London, England, with Windle also a lecturer in Criminology at University College Cork, Ireland. Andrew Silke is Professor of Terrorism, Risk and Resilience at Cranfield University, Shrivenham, UK.

*Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction*


This is a comprehensive and well-organized examination of the likelihood of terrorist groups (and lone wolves) to acquire and employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in their warfare and the U.S. Government’s programs to address this threat. WMD refers to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. To examine these issues, the book is divided into three parts. The chapters in Part I, “Introduction to WMDs and Interested Groups,” present an overview of the four types of WMD weapons; the probability and impact of employing such weapons, including hurdles to their acquisition and use in attacks; cases of terrorist group interest and efforts to acquire and use WMDs; and U.S. Government policy and programmatic responses to WMD threats. The chapters in Part II, “CBRN: Agents, Threats, and Responses,” discuss the key characteristics of each type of weapon; the processes involved in each of these weapons’ acquisition and use; the debate in the literature on whether, as the author terms it “Anyone Could Do It!” and “Then Why Haven’t They?”, government responses, and conclusions about “Knowns” and “Unknowns” about their future potential use in terrorist warfare. Part III’s concluding chapter summarizes the author’s findings in terms of probability and impact of the use of WMDs by terrorist groups as “low probability” because “Both desire to cause mass casualties and the
capacity to do so using WMDs are relatively rare characteristics of terrorist groups.” (p. 201). Nevertheless, the author cautions, there remains a “significant potential for a surprise attack,” although “where it would occur or with which specific agent is unclear.” (p. 208). It is also possible, the author adds, “that there are groups that are considering alternative means of creating mass destruction that have nothing to do with WMDs.” (p. 208). Thus, the author concludes, “Because there are a number of WMD-related factors that we know we don’t know, as well as some unknown quantity of things we don’t know we don’t know, it is prudent for governments to continue a layered approach to the problem.” (p. 209). With numerous books published over the years about this threat, this book is highly recommended for updating our understanding on these issues in a systematic and well-reasoned manner. The author is Chair of the Department of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies program at East Carolina University in Greenville, North Carolina.

**Terrorism and Media**


This book is about the American governing elite’s use of fear, particularly the terrorist threat, to manipulate mass media in “constructing social life” (p. ix). The author argues that such “symbolic meanings about safety, danger, and fear can lead to major institutional changes and even war” (p. x). This is because “the politics of fear trades on audience beliefs, expectations, and taken-for-granted meanings about social reality, threats, and the nature of those who pose the threats – namely, ‘outsiders’ or ‘the other’” (p. 14). This has had a deleterious impact on American society, the author holds, as “the politics of fear that were promoted by mass media communication and entertainment formats after the 9/11 attacks paved the way for Donald Trump’s presidential victory in 2016” (p. ix). These issues are discussed in the book’s chapters on the mass media as a social institution, how crime and terrorism are covered, how the Internet is used (including by terrorists, such as the Islamic State) to promote the “propaganda of fear,” and how Pat Tilman and Chris Kyle, American military soldiers who had, respectively, served in Afghanistan and Iraq, had their “living accomplishments…recast to promote their reputations in death, and in general, to maintain a propaganda narrative about sacrifice to keep us safe” (p. 228). In the concluding chapter, the author sums up his findings about America’s moving “from war programming to terrorism programming, which promotes the terrorism narrative that the war against terror is never ending, against actual and suspected global terrorists” (p. 230). While one may disagree with the author’s argument as overly dismissive of the actual terrorism threat levels facing America and its allies, his thesis is still worth noting. The author is Regents’ Professor Emeritus on the faculty of Justice and Society Inquiry in the School of Social Transformation at Arizona State University in Tempe.


This is a comprehensive handbook of some 300 alphabetically listed A-Z entries discussing how language is used to describe aspects of armed conflict and genocide. The author’s approach, as outlined in the introductory overview, is that “loaded” language is used to designate conflict in the current period, with words “used not to clarify meaning, but instead to conceal it, or even to transmit outright falsehoods, often based on the ideological stance of their users” (p. xv). The handbook’s entries cover terms such as asymmetric warfare, conventional warfare, counterinsurgency (COIN), covert operations, cyber warfare, decapitation strike, deterrence, enemy combatant (unlawful/lawful), enhanced interrogation, escalating sectarian violence, hybrid warfare, insurgency, irregular warfare, jihad/jihadism, kinetic military actions, low-intensity conflict, narcoterrorism, preemptive war, proxy war, psychological operations (PSYOP), special operations, state sponsors of terrorism, terrorism, unconventional warfare, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and ‘winning hearts and minds.’ Each entry is accompanied by a list of cross references and suggestions for further reading. Some of the entries might be criticized as unfair in certain terms are covered, but they are still worth noting for alternative perspectives on how they can be defined. The author teaches English at the University of Alberta and at Concordia University
of Edmonton, Canada.

**Terrorism – Legal Issues**


This book examines the impact of new counterterrorism-focused judicial practices implemented by the United States in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks regarding the interrogation of detained terrorist suspects. Specifically, it focuses on the issue of what kind of interrogation technique is defensible. To discuss this issue, following the author’s introductory overview, the book is divided into two parts. The first part examines issues such as how the professions of psychology and law approach the issue of harsh interrogation methods; the controversy among psychologists about the role they should play in the interrogation of detainees; and the debates in the legal profession about the role of attorneys in sanctioning harsh interrogation, including whether abusive interrogation tactics are fundamentally incompatible with the rule of law. The author also questions whether “terror warrants” should be granted in cases where terrorists have information that needs to be accessed in order to save lives. The second part focuses on the roles of other professions, such as medical physicians, psychologists, and military legal counselors, in facilitating harsh interrogation methods, and the ethical responsibilities in terms of codes their professions need to regulate such involvement. In the concluding chapter, the author also discusses the need to apply just war standards and the laws of armed conflict when it comes to targeted killings of terrorist adversaries. Although a full discussion of these issues should also include an examination of how the terrorist adversary violates the laws of armed conflict by deliberately targeting civilians and other practices amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity, which might induce responding governments to use “extra-legal” measures in response, this book provides an important and informed coverage of the legal and ethical issues that need to be considered in assessing the involvement of medical and legal professionals in the management and administration of harsh interrogation techniques bordering on, or amount to, torture against terrorist detainees. The author is Professor of Religious Ethics at John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio.


This is an excellent, practitioner-oriented, comprehensive and authoritative textbook enabling the reader to understand the nature of terrorist threats facing the international community and the law enforcement, intelligence, and policy components involved in countering terrorism in several states. The counter-measures employed by Australia, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States receive special attention. The book’s eight chapters cover the nature of the terrorist threat (e.g., the threats presented by groups such as al-Qaida, al-Shabaab, the Islamic State, with a special case study on the IRA); the legal definition of terrorism (e.g., how different governments, including the European Union, define terrorism, as well as how to ensure that a legal definition of terrorism can assist governmental response measures); government policies and statutory preventative measures (e.g., the use of preemption, proscribing terrorist groups, and border controls); the use of surveillance of electronic communications (e.g. terrorist groups’ use of electronic communications and surveillance powers used in terrorism investigations); the exchange of terrorism-related intelligence information among allies (e.g. cooperation policies between EU Member States’ policing agencies, concerns over the emergence of “the surveillance society” and the impact of breaches, such as Edward Snowden’s disclosure of NSA methods of internet surveillance); handling informants in terrorist investigations (e.g., laws and policies in handling informants, including the use of their information and granting them immunity from prosecution, if necessary); countering the funding of terrorism and freezing terrorist assets (e.g., the use of statutory provisions to freeze assets); and government preventative strategies (e.g., countering violent extremism programs, and defining extremism to make it possible to differentiate between non-violent activism and violent extremism). Due to its textbook character, each chapter of the volume consists of an outline of “Topics covered in this chapter,” a listing of chapter objectives, an introduction, text, a listing of “Points for
reflection,” case studies, a conclusion, suggestions for further reading, and citations. This textbook is highly recommended for courses on terrorism and counter-terrorism. The author, a veteran police officer in the United Kingdom, who had retired as a Detective Sergeant, had served as a principal lecturer at Liverpool John Moore University’s Law School until 2017. He currently runs a terrorism and security consultancy firm.


This well-informed book is based on the author’s extensive practitioner experience as United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture from 2004 to 2010. As he explains, “In this capacity I, along with several different teams, was able to visit a significant number of states and their prisons and police stations. I interviewed perpetrators, witnesses, and victims of torture (in particular those in detention) on the subject of torture and conditions of detention, and then documented my findings and reported them to the United Nations (p. 5). This experience provides this book unique insight on “the causes and dynamics of the routine nature of torture” (p. 5). To discuss these issues, the book is divided into two parts. Part I, “The Phenomenon of Torture in the Twenty-First Century,” examines the nature of torture; the role of a United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture; methods used in the independent investigation of torture; methods used by states to impede objective investigations; the spectrum of torture (e.g., inhuman detention conditions, corporal punishment, capital punishment, enforced disappearance, and domestic violence and female mutilation); motivations and justification for torture; and an assessment of the U.S. counterterrorism campaign during the George W. Bush Administration. Part II, “Torture in Individual States,” covers the author’s personal experience while on official mission for the United Nations in investigating torture in eighteen countries around the world, including China, Georgia, Greece, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Uruguay. In the conclusion, the author commends Denmark for providing “the best example of how torture can be eradicated if the authorities treat detainees with empathy and consider them as clients rather than inmates” (p. 185). His concluding sentence is worth noting: “Let’s hope that the trend toward abolition of corporal and capital punishment will also lead to the gradual elimination of torture, one of the most brutal human rights violations of our time” (p. 188). The author is Professor of International Law and Human Rights at the University of Vienna, Austria.


The contributors to this volume examine the legal and policy components in United States’ counterterrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. The contributors, who are prominent American legal and intelligence experts, many with high level government experience (such as Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and Michael B. Mukasey, former Attorney-General), present differing views on topics such as the nature of the threats presented by al Qaida-type terrorist adversaries, how the U.S. intelligence establishment needs to adjust organizationally to respond to such threats, the circumstances under which harsh interrogation techniques, including torture can or have be used against detained terrorists, how to balance the requirement for security and civil liberties (including the benefits of the Patriot Act), the use of civilian and military courts in trying terrorists, and the role of the executive branch in managing the counterterrorism campaign. Dean Reuter is Vice President & Director of the Practice Groups of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy. John Yoo is the Emanuel Heller Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and a former Justice Department official during the George W. Bush administration.

**Counterterrorism**

With intrastate “small wars” involving governmental responses to terrorist and guerrilla insurgencies, as opposed to conventional large-scale inter-state wars, becoming the predominant form of warfare, how can conventional militaries employ response measures that are effective against such asymmetric adversaries? This book attempts to provide a new conceptual framework to analyze asymmetric confrontations, how they should be fought militarily and through other means, such as reconstruction efforts to solve local socio-economic problems, and how big data derived from the application of qualitative and quantitative tools can generate insights into “what is or is not likely to work” in military engagements between larger militaries and their smaller insurgent adversaries. An important theme running through this account is that such warfare is not necessarily about controlling insurgent dominated territory but about winning the support of the local people who inhabit such territory because “winning hearts and minds” involves obtaining their cooperation to provide information about the insurgents in their midst that can help turn the tide of such battles in favor of a military’s counterinsurgency campaign.

As the authors write, “Information and how it is leveraged… plays a key role in governments’ efforts to defeat or contain insurgencies” (p. xiii). Such information superiority, the authors explain, involving the “knowledge citizens possess about insurgent activities – is the key factor determining which side has the upper hand in an asymmetric conflict. If governments have information, they can use their greater power to target insurgents and remove from the battlefield. If governments lack that information, then insurgents can get away with a range of attacks that continue to impose costs on the government, from IEDs and ambushes of government forces to violence against civilians supporting the government” (p. 16). Big data then comes into play as it provides an accurate means to gain situational awareness of the area of operations, including identifying “cause-and-effect relationships in ways we never could before” (p. 15). To apply the authors’ framework on the use of big data to analyze the three-way interaction of rebels, government and civilians, the book’s chapters explain the authors’ information-centric way of thinking about insurgency, the types of information needed by civilians to assist a military campaign, the role of suppression in defeating rebel activity, how civilians respond to rebel coercion and violence, whether rebel violence is caused by poverty, and policies that enable government forces to gain information from civilians and win their “hearts and minds.” Among the authors’ conclusions is that, in terms of political strategies and development assistance, what “is important is where and how material resources are applied, the sequencing of these activities, the degree of collateral damage incurred in that process, and how they set the stage for political settlement” (p. 297). The application of such a structured methodology and empirical approach makes this book a valuable contribution to the study of the information-centric components involved in “small wars” conflict termination.


With numerous states around the world characterized by weak and fragile central governments and lawless conditions within their societies, armed non-state actors, whether terrorist or guerrilla groups, as well as criminal networks, have filled these power vacuums in a number of countries. This book is an account of the authors’ examination of how non-state actors “that are not recognized as legitimate by the international community” have come to exercise “governance functions across large swathes of territory” in some places. (p. 2). The authors examine cases such as Hizballah in Lebanon, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the Taliban in Afghanistan, pirate clans and al Shabaab in Somalia, the FARC in Colombia, narco-trafficking cartels in Mexico. They also discuss other examples in which governance is delivered by non-state actors, in order to answer questions such as: how should the international community “respond to local orders dominated by armed non-state actors? Should it treat all such orders as a threat? Should it engage in direct relations with unsavory or violent (but sometimes relatively legitimate) governance providers in the hope of promoting peace and security? Or should it respond, as it has done so far with mixed results, by strengthening the capacity and building up the legitimacy of the nominal sovereign, the central state?” (pp. 2-3).

These questions are examined in the book’s seven chapters. The authors begin by presenting a framework
on the conditions that enable armed non-state actors to engage in the provision of governance and then examine the nature of such governance. They also offer case studies of armed non-state actor governance and conclude the volume with generalized findings. In the concluding chapter’s section on “Ungoverned Spaces and Governance Gaps,” the authors note that “A central dilemma that emerges from these cases is that armed non-state actors are often more effective than the state at delivering a predictable local order, even if their governance is not particularly democratic or respectful of individual rights” (p. 121). They also note that “you cannot effectively fight terrorism merely by fighting terrorism” because it is necessary to invest “in local legitimacy and state building” (p. 130). Otherwise, as demonstrated by these examples, intervention efforts will be “replete with unintended consequences and costs of short-sighted or poorly conceptualized efforts by the international community to address alternatively governed local orders” (pp. 141-142). This book is an important contribution to the literature on the issues that need to be considered in the international community’s efforts to stabilize countries experiencing internal disorder and non-state actor governance in parts of their territories. The volume is the product of the Brookings Institution’s Seminar on Reconstructing Local Orders.


Both publications, which are updates of previous editions, provide valuable, systematically organized, analyses and empirical data on trends in global terrorism incidents, societal stability/instability, and prospects for peace, which are essential ingredients in understanding the terrorism landscape and how to formulate counter-terrorism campaigns to resolve such conflicts.

The *Global Terrorism Index 2017 (GTI)* covers the period from 2000 to the end of 2016. Its data is derived from the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s (START) Global Terrorism Database’s (GTD) datasets on terrorism. Following an Executive Summary and Key Findings, the publication’s analysis consists of six sections: “Results” (e.g. maps of terrorist incidents, terrorism in 2016, and the ten countries most impacted by terrorism); “Trends” (e.g. the conflict-terrorism nexus, the distribution of terrorism, and regional trends); ”Terrorism in OECD Member Countries” (e.g. trends since 2014 and the impact of the proclamation of the Islamic State); “Characteristics of Terrorists” (e.g. the drivers of terrorist recruitment, foreign fighters, and lone actor terrorism); “Terrorist Groups” (e.g., the four deadliest terrorist groups, and how terrorist groups end); ”Economics of Terrorism” (the cost of terrorism and financing terror). The seventh section, “Expert Contributions,” consists of five analyses by external contributors on leaderless jihad, rehabilitating and reintegrating terrorism offenders, lessons learned in countering violent extremism in general and, more specifically, in Asia, and the Indian experience in counter-terrorism strategies. The Appendices include the GTI’s listing of the ranks and scores of 134 countries; a listing of the “50 Worst Terrorist Attacks in 2016;” the GTI’s methodology, including the “Thwarted Attacks Methodology”; a table on “Correlates of Terrorism”; and an explanation of the methodology used to assess the economic costs of terrorism.

The *Global Peace Index 2018* ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of “peacefulness.” The GPI utilizes 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators, and measures the state of peace by employing three thematic domains: the level of “Societal Safety and Security,” the extent of “Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict,” and the degree of “Militarization.” In addition to their qualitative scores, the degrees of the “state of peace” characterizing the GPI’s country rankings are also qualitatively grouped as “very
high,” “high,” “medium,” “low,” “very low,” or “not included.” To examine these issues, following an executive
summary, the publication consists of four analytic sections: “Results” (e.g. highlights of the 2018 GPI, regional
overview, and examples of improvements and deteriorations); “Trends” (e.g. a ten year trend in the GPI, as well
as a “100 year trends in peace”); “Economic Impact of Violence” (e.g. the macro-economic impact of peace);
and “Positive Peace” (e.g., defining “positive peace,” trends, the factors that precede a change in peacefulness,
and the relationship between “positive peace” and a country’s state of the economy). The appendices provide
an explanation of the indicators used in the GPI’s methodology; the methodology used in the index’s weighting
criteria; the sources, definitions and scoring criteria used in the GPI; a listing of the GPI’s scores applied to
ranking the 163 states and territories; and a ranking of the economic cost of violence per countries listed in the
index.

(New York, NY: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018), 504 pp., US $675.00

The annual The Military Balance, which is published by the London-based International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS) , is considered the most authoritative, comprehensive and detailed assessment of the military
capabilities and defense economics of 171 countries. It is widely used as an unclassified reference resource
by governments’ military and intelligence agencies, as well as by academic institutions and public policy
research institutes, around the world. The volume is divided into two parts. Part One, “Capabilities, Trends
and Economics,” consists of 10 chapters. They cover general topics such as defense and military analysis,
comparative defense statistics, and country comparisons and defense data. The volume’s primary section,
consisting of 471 pages, provides data on national military capabilities in terms of orders of battle (units,
formations, and equipment of a military force) and defense economics of the 171 covered countries. These are
divided into the seven regions of North America, Europe, Russia and Eurasia, Asia, Middle East and North
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The volume’s second part, “References,”
provides explanatory notes, definitions, and an index of countries and territories.

In a disappointment to this reviewer, unlike the volume’s previous editions, this one does not include any
coverage of terrorist groups, such as al Qaida and the Islamic State. However, there is one exception, an entry
on “Palestinian Territories”. Here we are informed that Hamas’s Izzz al-Din-Qassam Brigades consists of 15,000
to 20,000 personnel. (p. 356). The entry on Lebanon, on the other hand, makes no mention of Hizballah, while
the Taliban is also not listed in the entry on Afghanistan. Al Shabaab is not listed in the entry on Somalia
(although IISS does list the militia-units’ strengths of Somaliland and Puntland), with Boko Haram also not
mentioned in the entry on Nigeria. The only exception is the entry on Syria, which provides the estimated sizes
of the insurgent groups in what it terms the “Territory Where the Government Does Not Exercise Effective
Control” (pp. 364-365).

The volume’s entries on the conventional and special forces’ military capabilities of the countries it covers are,
nevertheless, of interest to the counterterrorism community for several reasons. One is that terrorist groups,
especially major ones such as Hamas, Hizballah, and the Islamic State, use at least some types of conventional
military systems. For example, the level of sophistication of such terrorist groups also requires them to adapt from
countries’ military surveillance and intelligence capabilities, so their own military planners are likely aware
of the capabilities listed for their adversaries’ order-of-battle. Another area of interest for the counterterrorism
analytic community is the volume’s detailing of countries’ combating terrorism forces. Thus, for example, it
details that the United States’ Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) consists of 63,150 active forces and
6,550 civilians (p. 57); France has 3 Special Forces groups (p. 106); Norway’s Army has 2 Special Forces groups
and one Naval Special Forces group (p. 134); Sweden has one special operations group and one combat support
group (p. 154); the United Kingdom has a large contingent of Royal Navy, Army and RAF Special Forces
regiments and squadrons (p. 164); Russia has 554,000 Paramilitary forces, consisting of 40,000-50,000 Federal
Guard Service’s forces, and 340,000 National Guard forces (p. 205); China’s paramilitary’s People’s Armed Police
consists of 660,000 forces, with the Internal Security Forces consisting of 400,000 forces; India has 1,585,950
Paramilitary Forces and 12,000 National Security Guards (p. 265). Israel has 3 Army Special Forces battalions.
and 1 Special Operations brigade, 300 Naval Commandos, and 8,000 Border Police forces (pp. 340-342); while Jordan has 14,000 forces in its Joint Special Operations Command and 15,000 in paramilitary forces such as the Gendarmerie (p. 344).

Also valuable is the first chapter’s section on “Big Data, Artificial Intelligence and Defence.” It discusses how big-data analysis, machine learning, and artificial intelligence (IA) are providing, “In the military context, the opportunities for remote-sensing, situational awareness, battlefield-manoeuvre and other AI applications [that] seem promising. IISS notes that for the time being it remains unclear whether these new technical capabilities will ultimately shift the balance in favour of offensive or defensive actions” (p. 10). With cyber warfare becoming a crucial component in a country’s military capability, each country entry includes a section on its capacity for cyber operations.


The contributors to this volume examine how chronic state failure in Somalia, which is exacerbated by the jihadi insurgency by al Shabaab, and involvement by local elements in criminal maritime piracy, has made it difficult for the international community to play a role in resolving this multifaceted conflict which has regional and transnational repercussions. To analyze these issues, following the editors’ introductory overview, the volume is divided into four sections. Section One, “The Failure of the International,” covers the involvement of the United Nations peacekeeping, NGO humanitarian assistance, and conflict resolution missions in Somalia. Section Two, “The Rise of the Transnational,” discusses the role of local jihadi insurgents and the involvement of foreign fighters in their warfare as well as Somali maritime piracy and involvement in international crimes. Section Three, “The New Multipolar Politics as a Response to Transnational Disorder,” examines United States policy toward Somalia during the period 1994 to 2012, Somalia – China relations, Japan’s involvement in Somalia, the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa, and the European Union’s intervention in Somalia. Section Four, “Reimagining Intervention – Must History Repeat Itself in Somalia?” discusses the factors leading to the success of Puntland and Somaliland in securing greater stability than its southern neighbor. In the concluding chapter, the editors observe that the book’s contribution goes beyond its discussion of Somalia, since it also covers themes that affect other conflicts around the world, including “new wars,” the “war on terror,” as well as theories of peacebuilding, piracy, and the impact of globalized communications on local conflicts. Emma Leonard is Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, Philadelphia. Gilbert Ramsey is a Lecturer at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, Scotland.


This is an interesting examination by a veteran British national security expert of the international and domestic threats presented by jihadism to Western societies, with a particular focus on how these threats affect the United Kingdom. These issues are discussed in the book’s chapters on the origins and evolution of jihadism; the nature of the “War on Terror,” particularly how the United States responded to al Qaida’s 9/11 attacks, including its fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the author criticizing the Iraqi intervention as achieving the opposite of what had been planned: “sectarian war, terrorism and Islamism took off in a way that not even the gloomiest analysts at Langley or Vauxhall could have imagined” (p. 73). The next chapters discuss the origins and impacts of the Arab Spring; the rise of the Islamic State and how it operated; and the impact of jihadism on the British home front, including counterterrorism failures, such as, at least at the initial stages, failing to keep track of the hundreds of British Muslims who became foreign fighters in Syria. In a provocative chapter entitled “Elephants in the Room,” the author criticizes British counterterrorism with “playing catch-up” and “fighting the last war” with regard to the threats presented by the Islamic State, as he writes that “We are spending billions of pounds building aircraft carriers (and probably sharing them with France), and buying attack aircraft while we have been outflanked by Islamic State’s asymmetrical Internet and social media blitzkrieg” (p. 148).
In a follow-up chapter on “Future Options” for the “inevitably long war with jihadism,” the author examines seven options which he terms as “surrender/defeat,” “compromise,” “status quo,” “full-spectrum intervention,” “An Arab solution,” “The Garrison State,” and “Mix and match,” which he characterizes as “a combination of coalition-building, plus a joined-up strategy of much more kinetic activity on the ground and in the air, and maybe even the offer of a deal to recognize IS” (p. 162). In the concluding chapter, the author proposes a solution to the Jihadist threat which “must come primarily from Muslims themselves both in the US, Europe and in the Middle East” (p. 165). In his final paragraph, he warns that just as the Islamic State’s “beheadings and crucifixions are intended to spread panic among local Arab foes,” if it “gets hold of WMD it will use them in the name of faith,” so the West will need “to resist the caliphate with every device it can…. ” (p. 166). The author is Visiting Professor at Cardiff University and Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis, London, UK.


This account addresses the nature and effectiveness of the American and British cooperation over the years in waging irregular warfare against insurgent movements as part of fluctuations in their “special relationship,” which, the author argues “allowed the two nations to pursue strikingly dissonant policies during frequent counterinsurgency wars” (p. 3). The author examines three themes that underpin the relationship: “political attitudes toward specific conflicts,” “the reciprocity of military assistance,” and the “level of intelligence cooperation as a means of ensuring military success and securing strategic goals” (p. 3). Following the author’s introductory overview on the origins of the “special relationship” between the two countries and an explanation of the nature of counterinsurgency, these themes are applied to historical and current cases such as the British counterinsurgency campaigns in Mandatory Palestine, the Malayan Emergency, Cyprus, South Arabia (i.e. South Yemen), and Northern Ireland. The other cases involve American-led counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In the final chapter, the author concludes on a critical note that British involvement in the cases of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan “left the impression that when at war, the British political management of such conflicts lacks long-term commitment, coherent planning, a convincing strategic narrative, and a fundamental willingness to financial support the war effort to a sufficient level” (p. 204).

With the American military’s advances in counterinsurgency doctrine, the author writes that the American military no longer needs to look to lessons from British–led campaigns in Malaya or Northern Ireland “as exemplars of counterinsurgency conduct” because of its own success in the Iraqi Anbar Province’s “tribal awakening” campaign (p. 205). As a result of American advances in counterinsurgency, the author concludes, the cooperation between the two countries is now “asymmetrical at heart” in favor of American preeminence (p. 205). While this asymmetric imbalance may hold in the counterinsurgency cooperation between the two countries, a major flaw in the author’s account is that in the field of counterterrorism, especially against Islamist terrorists that threaten the two countries, there is reportedly a strong cooperative relationship between the two countries’ law enforcement and intelligence services. This is a significantly more important area of cooperation because it directly affects the security of their homelands. If this cooperation in counterterrorism had been included in the author’s account, it would have added success stories that would have presented a more nuanced picture of the effectiveness of their cooperation in addressing common threats against the two countries. The author is Associate Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations and co-director of the Centre for Conflict, Security and Terrorism, both at the University of Nottingham, UK.

Greg C. Reeson, Stalemate: Why We Can’t Win the War on Terror and What We Should Do Instead (Lanham, MD: Government Institutes/An Imprint of The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2011), 242 pp., US $40.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-6059-0771-0.

This is an argument in favor of employing the full range of instruments of American national power to win the war on Islamist terrorism. To the DIME acronym (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic elements of state power which can be used in countering terrorism,) to succeed in countering the terrorist threat, the author adds “IL,” (which stands for Intelligence and Law enforcement measures). How these elements of state
power are best to be used in countering terrorism is discussed in the book's ten chapters. The author covers topics such as the impact of globalization in producing a new type of terrorism war; understanding the terrorist threat and its evolving structure, including the role of state sponsors of terrorism; the components of U.S. grand strategy and the role of allies in countering terrorism; the roles of diplomacy, information, military, economic (or finance), intelligence, as well as law enforcement elements in countering terrorism. The final chapter examines the impact of significant conflicts that have produced what the author terms a “complex and dangerous world,” such as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, but also the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, Lebanon, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, as well as Africa as well as failed and failing states in general. The final chapter, “The Long Road Ahead,” presents the author’s recommendations for the full application of the DIMEIL’s “comprehensive strategic framework that allows America and its allies and partners to reduce the threat of extremist violence to a level that minimizes the disruption of daily life and reduces as much as possible the risk to U.S. and allied interests abroad” (p. 174). The metric of effectiveness in counterterrorism, the author concludes, “is to stop as many plots and attacks as possible while minimizing the damage done from those that cannot be prevented. When Islamic terrorism becomes nothing more than a nuisance requiring minimal containment action and occasional military strikes, the United States will finally be able to say it has prevailed” (p. 195). Although this book was published prior to the emergence of the Islamic State as preeminent terrorist threat facing the United States, the author’s comprehensive DIMEIL’s counterterrorism framework is worth examining. At the time of this book’s publication, the author, a U.S. Army Major, served as a strategic plans and policy officer for the U.S. Army.


This book examines the effectiveness of the United States’ use of drones in its overall “War on Terror” within the context of the targeted killings of jihadi terrorist adversaries in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria and Yemen. The jihadi terrorist groups targeted by such drones include al Qaida, the Taliban, the Islamic State, and al Shabaab. Effectiveness in counterterrorism is defined by the author as “a decrease in terrorism in the countries where drone strikes occur, not creating “blowback in which radicalization occurs, anti-Americanism is created, and terrorist group recruitment and empathy increases,” and “a collateral damage rate of less than 10 percent…for every ten terrorists that are killed, approximately one civilian is killed” (pp. xxix-xxx). This framework is applied to the seven countries in which the United States has employed drones in the targeted killings of its terrorist adversaries. In the concluding chapter, the author finds that the use of drones in targeted killings of terrorist operatives “are not working” in these seven countries for six reasons: “terrorist attacks and suicide bombings have increased,” the number of civilians killed as collateral damage has increased; drone strikes have not decreased the strength of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; while the number of people being radicalized by drone strikes is “unknown,” they are creating an increase in anti-Americanism; some high-level terrorists have been killed, but “many of the terrorists that are killed are low-level people”; and “Drone strikes are not producing better outcomes for the countries in any of these case studies” (pp. 117-119). The concluding chapter also discusses the fiscal costs of drone warfare to the U.S. military. In this reviewer’s view, the book’s assessment of the effectiveness of drones in targeted killings is overly unidimensional because it overlooks the roles of other U.S. military forces, such as airstrikes by combat aircraft and the use of Special Forces in counterterrorism. Targeted killings and other forms of warfare have, in fact, succeeded in degrading the military effectiveness and presence of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq,. Prior to that, the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, al Qaida’s primary ideologue in Yemen (together with Samir Khan, *Inspire* magazine’s publisher) on September 30, 2011, substantially degraded the group’s ideological appeal. Nevertheless, the author’s discussion of the use of drones in targeted killings in the seven countries is still insightful and a contribution to the literature on the use of drones in military warfare. The author is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina, Palmetto College.


This is an important and extensively researched account about the activities and consequences of state
terrorism, using the Indonesian experience as its case study. As the author writes, over more than six months, from late 1965 to mid-1966, an estimated half a million members of the Indonesian Community Party and its affiliated organizations were killed, with another million or so detained without charge. The consequences of state violence were far-reaching, the author explains, with the largest non-governing Communist party in the world crushed, with Sukarno, the country's popular left-nationalist president deposed, and “a virulently anticommunist army leadership seized power, signaling the start of more than three decades of military-backed authoritarian rule” (p. 3). In another consequence, in what became known as the New Order, the state that emerged “became notorious for its systematic violation of human rights, especially in areas outside the heartland, including East Timor (Timor Leste), Aceh, and West Papua, where hundreds of thousands of people died or were killed by government forces over the next few decades” (p. 5). These gross human rights violations led to pro-independence insurgent movements whose legacy continues to the present day.

To explain these issues, the author seeks to count how many people were killed and detained in the 1965-1966 period, who the victims and perpetrators were and motivated them. He explores what happened to the victims and their families and investigates the consequences of the violence for Indonesian society since then. One of its legacies, according to the author, which is significant in understanding contemporary Indonesian society as well, is that religious life and affiliation in society was substantially realigned. He writes: “Under official pressure, and out of fear of being accused of atheism, after 1965 many Indonesians abandoned their old animist religious belief systems….while doing little to enhance the vitality of the major religions” such as Islam” (p. 302). Of greatest concern is that “by enforcing notions of religious orthodoxy, the New Order arguably paved the way for a pattern of discrimination, persecution, and violence against ostensibly heterodox groups…. “ (p. 302). This also led to the derailment of “women's political and social empowerment…. “ (p. 302). The author is Professor of History at the University of California, Los Angeles.


This volume offers an innovative counterterrorism approach. It seeks to break the religious zeal of jihadi militants through what the author terms “intellectual sabotage.” As the author explains, “The effectiveness of the proposed stratagem depends heavily on the ability to magnify the effects of a theological message that undermines jihadi ideology from within its own framework.” This requires multiple lines of attack, with “the collective impact of the simultaneously delivered actions that will be corrosive” (p. xxvi). As the book's organizing principle, the names of the Prophet Muhammad’s most immediate caliph successors are used as cyphers for the campaign’s “various operations.” The second chapter, “Abu Bakr and Black Propaganda,” focuses on formal and information methods of communication. The third chapter, “Umar and Electronic Delivery,” attempts to correct the messages of violent groups and deliver the “right messages” through the Internet. The fourth chapter, “Uthman and Citizen Saboteurs,” seeks to recruit “violent anti-rationalists and then turning them into saboteurs who can sow various levels of discord within the communities in which they are already a part” (p. xxvii). The fifth chapter, “Ali and Stability Operations,” involves subduing “marginal groups,” for instance, through foreign assistance funding which can also be used to track militants and their sympathizers. Cumulatively, this campaign aims to weave “theology into military strategy and covert operations…. “ (p. xxix). As the author explains in the conclusion, while jihadist ideology on the Internet “is not something that needs to be eliminated,” like peeling an onion, “it should be subverted by organizing the nonobvious ideas that help to comprise it. When done correctly, members of violent organizations will sell their friends for an onion peel.” (p. 119). The author is President of Thomas University, Thomasville, Georgia.


This book's focus, as explained in the introductory chapter, is to examine the “importance of foregrounding temporality and futurity in political analysis and more specifically exploring what is at stake with the rise of
anticipatory governance rationalities…through an in-depth critique of how the problem of temporal contingency has been prioritized within the global security imagination and responded to through the development of security strategies premised upon governing the future through preemptive intervention in the present” (p. 6). This is, according to the author, accomplished through “a comprehensive critical interrogation of one particular manifestation of such rationalities in practice – namely, the preemptive regime(s) of (in)security governance that have emerged within the context of the post-9/11 War on Terror” (p. 6). An example of the “preemptive regime(s)” “(in)security governance” is the Obama administration’s “use of ‘predictive assessments’ in the creation of flight ‘watchlists’ that ban individuals from traveling by air in the United States” (pp. 6-7). Another example is the “2011 targeted killing via drone strike of Anwar al-Awlaki” which, according to the author, is illustrative of “the precarious subjectivities enacted under a preemptive security regime” (p. 10). With these issues discussed in the book’s next five chapters, the final chapter presents the author’s findings in which he criticizes U.S. counterterrorism for “attempting to preempt modes of (in)security governance [by – JS] actively manipulate[ing] our relation to time by ‘making the future present.’ This, in turn, has the effect of compressing the timescale of political decision-making and requiring ‘affective facts’ or ‘gut feelings’ rather than verifiable evidence to serve as the primary basis for such decisions.” (p. 158). In another finding, the author writes that “the originary link between preemption and exceptionalism…was expounded by unpacking the political temporality of preemption and considering how its prioritization of the future inscribes the imagination as the epistemic foundation for anticipatory political action” (p. 164). Those who are trained in the philosophies of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, both cited in the book, might appreciate such jargon-heavy reasoning. Most others, however, may not. At the time this book was published, the author was a postdoctoral Fellow at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.


This is a revealing account of how the Reagan Administration’s war on terrorism against the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime in the mid-1980s was conducted and how, in the author’s view, it came to influence the development of U.S. counterterrorism ever since up to the current period. Although one may not necessarily share the author’s view that in the U.S. war on terrorism, a “terrorist” referred to “enemies of the United States in a new global irregular war,” that “counterterrorist forces” were a “more positive connotation” that referenced “allies,” or that “A war on terrorism was a new way of justifying the application of the power of the United States abroad in offensive conflicts against and within other sovereign nations” (p. 8), the extensively researched and balanced case study on the Reagan Administration’s counter-measures against the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime makes this study an important contribution to the literature on this subject. The author is Assistant Professor of History at the State College of Florida, Manatee-Sarasota.


The contributors to this volume examine significant counterterrorism challenges facing Pakistan and offer suggestions how the country can best address these. The problems that Pakistan’s counterterrorism campaign needs to resolve, the volume’s editor explains, include “the weakness of political institutions, the role of policing, problems within the criminal justice system, efforts to choke financing for militancy, and regulation on the use of media and technology by militants” (p. 2). Otherwise, as the editor writes in the conclusion, “The result would still be a country that is riddled with violence and periodic acts of terrorism even as it remains strong enough to prevent any concerted insurgency that could lead to its collapse.” The editor is director of South Asia Programs at the United States Institute of Peace, in Washington, DC.

Afghanistan, Pakistan and India

As explained by the author, this is an examination of “the imperatives facing the Pakistani state, its strategic (mis)calculations, the attitudes of Pakistani society, and the country's turn toward extremism”. He shows “….how the Pakistani state has helped foster militancy in the country and how the exclusionary nature of Pakistan's Islamization – undertaken by the state more for strategic than ideological reasons, as part of its nationalist project – has mainstreamed extremist narratives. The Pakistani state has done this through manipulating the country's laws and education system. The state could not have imagined the enormous ramifications of these choices on Pakistan's society and on its security” (p. x).

These issues are examined in the book's six chapters, which cover topics such as a brief primer on the four main terrorist groups that operate in Pakistan (the Pakistan Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and al Qaeda); the Pakistani public's views of these terrorist groups, based on public opinion polling and the responses of the Pakistani government to the challenges posed by these terrorist groups; Pakistan's legalization of Islamization in the country, including legalizing extremism and blasphemy laws; the Islamization of the country's educational system, including promoting a “conspiracy-tinged” view of the world, and the students' attitudes towards such indoctrination; and the roles of madrassas (Islamic schools) in the country and their links to extremism. In the concluding chapter, the author explains that while many nations indoctrinate their citizens in “an explicitly nationalistic narrative,” what sets Pakistan apart is the “role played by the Pakistani state and its official institutions, which validate not only paranoia and hatred but also violence in the name of religion. The Pakistani state points the finger at its eastern neighbor for the terror that strikes it. The army justifies its wars as jihad and uses the jihadi narrative to support militants behind the scenes. The state's support of violence in the name of religion extends to a pass for ordinary citizens who respond violently – based on the country's blasphemy laws and anti-Ahmadi laws – to perceived religious intransigence by their fellow citizens. This means cases of vigilante and mob violence that go unpunished, with the notable exception of Mumtaz Qadri's case” (p. 149).

The author concludes that “Nothing less than a conscious ideological shift – a shedding of both the insecurity felt from India and the repressive nature of its commitment to religion – will ultimately change the course for Pakistan” (p. 153). It is such insights that make this book a valuable guide to understanding some of the major problems and challenges facing Pakistani society and the measures required to resolve them. The author, originally from Pakistan, is a Nonresident Fellow at the Brookings Institution, in Washington, DC.


The contributors to this volume examine the Taliban movement from its inception in 1994, the nature of its governance in Afghanistan, and, following its overthrow in late 2001 by the American military intervention, its reformulation into a constellation of guerrilla fighters in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As explained by the volume's editors, the contributors focus on three overlapping themes: “the underlying historical patterns that gave rise to the Taliban and placed limits on the possibilities of Taliban rule”; the crisis of state power in Afghanistan, particularly Kabul's inability to rule the country; and how the country's diverse Pashtun and non-Pashtun communities have “contended with state power” (pp. 11-12). To examine these issues, the volume's chapters cover topics such as the ability to manage the Pashtun community as the “historic key” to ruling Afghanistan; the linkages forged during the civil war between the Afghan political parties based in Pakistan and Iran and the localized anti-Soviet resistance within Afghanistan; the repressive gender policies of the Taliban when and where in power; how the elites from the Pashtun tribes have attempted to consolidate their Pashtun-dominant state power; how the Baluch communities interacted with local Pashtuns under different Taliban governments; the emergence of new Islamist identities among Afghanistan's Muslims and the surrounding region; the Taliban's interactions with foreign states and organizations; and how the Taliban movement fragmented following its overthrow in late 2001. In the epilogue, the editors discuss how the U.S.-allied post-Taliban Afghan government “failed to create alternatives to the vision of order offered by the Taliban” (p. 57). The editors write: “The Pax Americana promised development but only expanded the wide fissures cutting through Afghan society and, in mobilizing diverse foes against the center, rekindled memories of grievances feeding thirty years of war” (p. 355). Although much of this discussion is dated, it provides a useful historical
background for understanding many of the problems that still beset Afghanistan. Robert D. Crews is currently Professor of History at Stanford University in California. Amin Tarzi is Director of Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia.


The contributors to this volume examine the political, social and legal aspects of India's occupation of Kashmir from the perspective of academic experts who have conducted field research in the region. The volume's chapters cover issues such as the state jurisdictional authority of the Majlis-e-Mushawarat in Kashmir; race, religion, and sexuality, including the committing of sexual crimes in Indian-occupied Kashmir; a profile of Mohammad Afzal Guru, a 32-year old Kashmiri, who was implicated and convicted in the armed attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001; how Indian state repression has traumatized the population under occupation in Kashmir; a critique of Indian policing in Kashmir; an account of the azadi independence movement's mobilization in Kashmir from 1930 to 1975 and beyond. The book also includes an examination of the relationship between commemoration of martyrdom and the formation of symbolic places such as martyrs' graveyards in Kashmir. As explained by Cynthia Mahmood in the concluding chapter, the authors “write from positions of solidarity with the people we study and learn from” (p. 286). Although highly critical of the Indian occupation of Kashmir, with alternative perspectives not included in these accounts, readers will still benefit from the authors’ extensive first-hand familiarity with Kashmir.


The contributors to this volume examine political and national security issues as well as the economic landscape of Pakistan and explore how it will impact on the country's post-2014 trajectory. As explained in the editors' introduction, three clusters of concerns and events are examined: Pakistan's domestic security situation, including the rise of Islamist militant groups; the inability to resolve internal conflicts over the role and nature of Islam in the state, including the sectarian conflicts between Sunni and Shia; and the “rapidly degrading security environment” caused by exogenous factors, particularly the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, “antagonistic” U.S. polices such as the drone campaign against the Taliban and al Qaida in Pakistan, and fluctuations in the Indo-Pakistan rivalry.

These issues are examined in the volume's eleven chapters, which are divided into three parts: Part I: “Security Challenges” (e.g. the militant groups in Pakistan and their implications for domestic and regional stability, efforts at collaboration among various Sunni Islamic movements in Pakistan, assessing the effectiveness and impact of the American armed drone campaign in Pakistan's northwest province, and prospects for the safety of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal). The chapters in Part II: “Domestic Political and Economic Issues,” cover issues such as prospects for greater democracy in terms of civil–military relations and the rule of law, the new media landscape in terms of the use of social media, and economic challenges ( particularly Pakistan's weak energy sector and inefficient and inequitable taxation system). The chapters in Part II: “Foreign Relations”, examine the contentious relations between America and Pakistan and explore prospects for a “more normal” relationship between the two countries, the Pakistani public's attitudes towards America, Pakistan's diversification of its relations with countries such as China and Saudi Arabia, and the impact of the legacy in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan of Pakistan's harboring of militant groups in what the authors term “Pashtunistan.” C. Christine Fair is Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program within the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and Sarah J. Watson is an intelligence research specialist for the Counterterrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department.


This is a highly informed account of the careers of A.Q. Khan (and his activities to build Pakistan's nuclear

This is an excellent conceptual and empirical examination of the causes, nature and manifestations of suicide bombings in Pakistan. To analyze these issues within the context of Pakistan, the author tests five causal factors found in the literature on suicide terrorism: nationalism or resistance to occupation; Islamist fundamentalism or Salafism; presumed effectiveness of the tactic; absolute or relative deprivation; and revenge. Following a chapter on the history of suicide attacks as a tactic of terrorism, these causal factors and the study’s primary and secondary research questions are then applied to examining the landscape of suicide terrorism in Pakistan at the environmental level (Jihadism in Kashmir beginning in 1947, insurrection in East Pakistan beginning in 1971, Jihad in Afghanistan beginning in 1979, the emergence of the Afghan Taliban, the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan beginning in late 2001, and the Neo-Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the current period. The author also explores these issues on the organizational level (al Qaida, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Islam, and Ansar-ul-Islam) as well as the individual level, with the suicide bombers analyzed in terms of their origins, age, gender, education, economic, and marital status. In terms of their profiles, the author finds that “Suicide bombers significantly differ from non-suicidal militants, who tend to be in their late-20s, married, more educated and urban in their origins,” with most suicide bombers “either illiterate or semi-illiterate...” (p. 115). In the conclusion, the author suggests that such a multilevel framework generates findings such as that “the campaign of self-immolation attacks in Pakistan is primarily driven by vengeance, with religious fundamentalism, poverty and perceived effectiveness of the tactic playing varying roles at the levels of individuals, organizations and environment” (p. 147). The author recommends that to counter suicide terrorism, whether in Pakistan or in other regions, “there is a need to create an environment that counteracts militants’ radical ideologies and misinterpretation of Islam”. Yet he concludes that “hard measures” are also required, “especially in view of ideological rigidity and uncompromising nature of the terrorist groups operating in Pakistan” (pp. 148-149). The book’s appendices include a chronology of suicide attacks in Pakistan from 1995 to 2012 and a table profiling the suicide bombers involved. This book is a major contribution to the academic literature on suicide terrorism. The author is Assistant Professor of Counter-Terrorism at the National Defense University, Islamabad, Pakistan.


This is a sympathetic account of the emergence and transformation of the narratives of Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let) and its political arm, Jamat ud Dawah (JuD), since the early 1990s. Utilizing the author’s extensive study of the movement’s primary documents, it links the group’s theologically-infused narratives to the process of increasing Islamization in Pakistan, with a particular focus on its conception of da’wah (proselytizing) and jihad within the Pakistani context. The role of women within this narrative is also discussed, as is the movement’s attitude to the Pakistani government and military. The chapter on the “JUD and the Mumbai Attacks” on November 26, 2008, is especially interesting in demonstrating the JuD’s obfuscatory-like denial of involvement with the
LeT, the attack’s perpetrator, with a claim by Hafiz Saeed, its leader, that the JuD “was not affiliated” with the LeT, “but had instead been engaged in providing humanitarian assistance to millions of people in Pakistan and promoting Islamic teachings” (p. 165). In the concluding chapter, the author provides an interesting comparison of the JuD’s narrative (with the movement also referred to as MDI – Markaz Ad-Da’awa Wal Irshad, the Center for Proselytization and Preaching) with those formulated by other jihadi groups such as al Qaida, Hizballah and Hamas in terms of their opposition to Western-influenced norms and rules, with the JuD’s “preference for accommodation with domestic power structures [suggesting – JS] some similarities with Hizbullah…. ” (p. 235). The author is Director of the Centre for Muslim States and Societies and teaches Political Science and International Relations at the University of Western Australia, in Perth, Australia.

The Muslim Brotherhood, Global Jihad and Muslim Reformers


In this book, the author, a veteran academic expert on terrorism, who passed away at age 71 around when this book was published, provides one of the finest accounts of the historical genealogy of terrorism that culminated in al Qaida's 9/11 attacks against the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon. Focusing primarily on Islamist terrorism's Egyptian origins, the author's account begins with the evolution of violent militant activities around the First World War and in its aftermath. It then continues with the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1920s, the writings of Sayyid Qutb in the 1950s, and the assassination of President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981, by al-Gama Islamiyya (and Ayman al-Zawahiri's involvement in the plot). Bell details how Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the Islamist extremist who was associated with these groups, was able to enter the United States under false pretenses to set up the cell that carried out the first World Trade Center bombing on February 26, 1993. Other notorious terrorist figures are also discussed, such as el-Sayyid Nosair, who assassinated the Jewish militant rabbi Meir Kahane in New York on October 5, 1990. It was a time when the Islamist terrorist threat was still considered a primarily foreign, not an American problem. In an effort to balance his account, the author also discusses militant right-wing Jewish terrorism in Palestine in the 1940s, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo's sarin gas attack against the Tokyo subway system on March 20, 1995, and Timothy McVeigh's bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. The author's conclusion is still pertinent: “The jihadi goal is absolute and cannot be accommodated by the elimination of grievance, through negotiation or by repression. The cause and core of jihadi terror is the conviction that only violence can assure the triumph of Islam and that such a triumph is possible” (p. 178). The book includes a useful glossary as well as a bibliographic essay.


This is a comprehensive and authoritative encyclopedia of Islamic political thought from the birth of Islam in the seventh century to the current period. More than 400, alphabetically arranged, entries, which are written by international specialists, address central themes, historical developments, sects and schools, regions and dynasties, modern concepts, institutions, movements, and parties, Islamic law and traditional Islamic societies, thinkers, personalities, and statesmen. Following the editor’s introductory overview on “The Islamic World Today in Historical Perspective,” for the terrorism and counterterrorism analytic community, topics of special interest include the entries on Afghanistan, anarchism, apocalypse, apostasy, Arab nationalism, Yasir Arafat, authority, ayatollah, Hasan al-Banna, Usama bin Laden, colonialism, communism, coup d'état, crusaders, dissent, opposition, and resistance, dissimulation, excommunication, fatwa, fundamentalism, grievance, Hamas, Hizbullah, ideology, imperialism, Islamic Jihad, Islamization, jahiliyya, jihad, Ayatollah Khomeini, liberalism, liberation theology, martyrdom, messianism, modernism, modernity, Muslim Brotherhood, nationalism, Nation of Islam, nation-state, nonviolence, oath of allegiance, Palestine, Palestine Liberation Organization, Pan-Islamism, patrimonial state, patronage, philosophy, Pillars of Islam, pluralism and tolerance, police,
political ritual, preaching, propaganda, prophecy, al Qaida, racism, rebellion, revival and reform, revolutions, Salafis, Sayyid Qutb, secularism, shari'a, Shi'ism, socialism, sources of emulation, succession, suicide, Sunnism, terrorism, torture, treason, tribalism, Uighurs, 'ulama, usurper, utopia, violence, Westernization, and women.

The entry on terrorism, which is written by Thomas Hegghammer, describes it as “a politically charged concept with no commonly accepted definition” and that “The label 'terrorist' has pejorative connotations and is used by political actors, usually states, to delegitimize their militant opponents” (p. 545). He then makes the interesting point that “Terrorism as such is not treated in the Islamic legal tradition. The root of the modern Arabic word for terrorism (irhab) features in the Qur'an (8:60) in the general sense of 'striking fear in the enemy,” but irhab never emerged as a distinct conception of warfare or as a legal category (although many contemporary Muslim states have Western-inspired antiterrorist legislation). However, the rich Islamic legal tradition on warfare considered certain forms of violent activism and certain military tactics as illegitimate” (p. 545). While one might not necessarily agree with such a conceptual approach to defining terrorism, it is worth noting as an alternative interpretation of what others define as a military concept that is devoid of any “politically charged” or “delegitimizing” characterizations of groups and individuals that engage in this type of warfare. This encyclopedia is highly recommended as an indispensable reference resource on Islamic political thought in general and on terrorism-related subjects in particular.


This volume provides arguments for the need to reform and modernize Islam, particularly as it is practiced in the West. The author, a Canadian journalist and civil rights activist, bases her argument on a series of interviews with eight leading North American Islamic modernizers, such as Ahmed Subhy Mansour, Shireen Qudosi, Jalal Zuberi, Tawfik Hamid, Qanta Ahmed, Zuhdi Jasser, and Raheel Raza. These forms the basis for the discussion in the book's second half on the commonalities of their views. What are these modernizers' objectives? As the author explains, they seek to establish an alternative vision, in contra-distinction to the dogmatic literalism advocated by the Islamist extremists, in which the Quran's violent passages and other problematic Islamic texts are re-interpreted in a reformist manner. As the author writes, “For the purposes of this book, the word ‘moderate’ means a form of Islam that accepts pluralism and is compatible with modernity and Western democracy” (p. 8). As the author elaborates, “Reformists support the contention that Islam must undergo a transformation through the process of critical thinking and independent judgment, which is “ijtihad,” to create a modernized translation or interpretation of the Quran. This means abrogating the violent or problematic texts of the Quran in favor of peaceful verses and new interpretation….” (pp. 181-182). It also implies rejecting “the right of the clergy’ to determine the meaning of difficult passages” (p. 182). In the conclusion, the author summarizes the book's main argument: “Reformists seek a modernized Islam in which mosque and state are separated, where diversity and pluralism – including discussions and criticisms of Islam – are collectively accepted, and where adherents of the faith do not risk physical danger if they choose to exercise the freedoms stipulated under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (p. 242). This approach to reforming Islam represents a minority within the Muslim world, but it is worth considering as one of the measures required in countering the theology/ideology driving militant Islamist terrorism.


This is a comprehensive history of the 80-year long relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Western powers, particularly Britain and the United States, since the MB’s establishment in Egypt in 1928. The period since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 is, however, not covered. This account’s strength is that it is highly detailed and extensively researched, providing a fascinating window into the views and, on occasion, interactions between American and British diplomats and scholars, the various Egyptian governments, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The book is divided into two parts. The first part, “In the Shadow of Empire,” discusses the first encounters, primarily by the British and Egyptian governments with the MB during the
periods of 1928 to 1939, 1940 to 1944, 1944 to 1949, and 1950 to 1952. The second part, “In the Age of America,” covers the interactions between the United States, the Egyptian governments, and the MB during periods of upheaval in Egyptian history, such as from 1952 to 1954 (when the Army overthrew the monarchy), 1955 to 1970 (the age of Gamal Abdul Nasser); 1970 to 1989 (Anwar Sadat, the revival of Islamist fundamentalism, and the Mubarak regime); and from 1989 to 2010 (the strengthening of Islamist extremism).

In the view of this reviewer, this book offers a flawed account due to the author’s pro-MB biases, such as his portrayal of it as a primarily pragmatic organization whose “belief system” was a reaction towards “perpetual Western antagonism for Islam,” (p. 19) rather than, as seen by others, as a Middle Eastern-based fundamentalist religious theology/ideology that prefers the domination of authoritarian and harsh religious institutions and beliefs on society to begin with. Thus, it would be natural for such a traditional religious movement to feel threatened by Western values, which promote greater democracy, pluralism and secularism. An example of the author’s bias is his disparagement of Western criticism of the MB in the late 1940s as comprising “ultra-conservative, or rather, reactionary religious fanatics,” which was “opposed to ‘social progress’,” (p. 102) when this might have been an accurate characterization of the movement not only during that period, but also in the late 1950s during the period of Sayyid Qutb’s inflammatory writings. Despite this criticism, this book is still recommended for its detailed account of how Britain and the United States attempted to understand and deal with the MB, including how the Brothers were perceived by some Westerners as a “moderate” alternative, first to Communism (especially in the 1950s), and later to the Islamist extremism being spread by the Ayatollahs’ Iranian Revolution. The author is Reader in Modern History at Queen Mary University of London, England.


This well-informed book examines several related questions: who are the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, what is the nature of their theology/ideology, how are their members recruited and socialized, how are their social networks constructed and sustained, how do they interact with each other, and how are their ideas about governing formulated and implemented in practice. The answers to these questions are the product of the author’s multi-year field study of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially in Egypt, where he interviewed and studied them from a close vantage point. With regard to the last question, on governing, the Muslim Brotherhood’s short period in power in Egypt is described by the author as one of “incompetence in government,” with “religion manipulated to explain away this incompetence. In a word, many began to suspect that Brothers flaunted Islam to excuse their bankruptcy and lurking authoritarianism” (p. 143). The fifth chapter, on “Islamism in Egypt and Beyond,” is especially interesting for its discussion of the impact of the Muslim Brotherhood theology/ideology on Egyptian militants, including al Qaida’s current leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as how its branches have interacted in revolutionary situations such as in Palestine, Syria, and Libya; in monarchies such as Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco; and as participants in government in Sudan and Tunisia. An Appendix explains the author’s theoretical framework in studying “how organizations employ ideas in macro-level power struggles” (p. 179). The author is University Lecturer in Political Sociology at the University of Cambridge, England, UK.

**The Middle East**


This is an interesting account by a veteran American journalist of the causes of the Middle East’s unraveling, which began with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003 and was further exacerbated by the way the forces unleashed by the early 2011 Arab Spring led to further turmoil, fragmentation, and, in the cases of Libya, Syria, and Yemen, to state failure. The unleashing of such forces, the author observes, “helped call into question the very legitimacy of the modern Arab nation-state” (p. xxii). Also discussed are the rise
of the Islamic State and the catastrophic outflow of millions of Syrians who became refugees in neighboring countries and Europe. This also had repercussions for global jihadi terrorism, with the Islamic State’s “cause being invoked by mass murderers in San Bernardino and Orlando and Munich,” and “the issues of immigration and terrorism have become conjoined in many Westerners minds” as “key flash points in both the June 2016 Brexit vote in Great Britain and the 2016 American presidential election” (p. xxiii). To explain these issues, the author focuses on six individuals from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kurdistan, Libya, Syria, whose personal narratives are woven within the larger strands of the historical period covered in the book. Scott Anderson is a veteran war correspondent who has reported from Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Sudan and many other strife-torn countries.


This is a comprehensive account of the history of the European Crusades in the Middle East, which began with the First Crusade called for by Pope Urban II in 1095 and extended to 1396, when the Christian forces were overwhelmingly defeated by the Ottoman Turks at Nicopolis, on the lower Danube River. As the author explains, the first crusaders “went as pilgrims to the Holy Land,” with pilgrimage perceived as a “form of penance, usually imposed by a priest, undertaken as a way to seek forgiveness for sin; for some it was the path to martyrdom” (p. xvii). Later, the crusades became a component of the Christian “just war” “to recover Jerusalem, to right the wrong that was believed had been done to Christianity…and morally defensible” (p. xvii). It also became a “holy war, the war fought in the cause of religion…. ” (p. xviii). What makes the history of the crusades important to the current era, the author explains, are three factors. First, it paralleled the idea of holy war in Islam, particularly the ideology of the *jihad* as an inner personal struggle and an outward struggle to “preserve Islam from its enemies” (p. xviii). During the crusades the outward jihad was used “to rally the Muslims against the Christian invaders and reclaim the Holy Land” (p. xvii). Second, the author explains that “Crusade” has become a battle cry for the American war against terror, and ‘jihad’ has entered our vocabulary as a pejorative for the Islamic movements in the Middle East. Once again, the presenting cause is religion” (p. xviii). Finally, Jerusalem, as the Holy City, has remained the “chief protagonist” in the conflict, which is “why the holy sites were then – as now – so central to the religious beliefs of Jews, Christians, and Muslims, and why so many thousands of people, for many hundreds of years, have willingly give up their lives to possess the Holy City” (p. xix). With the book's nine chapters providing an extensively researched narrative history of the crusades, it also includes an 8-page color insert of illustrations, more than 25 black-and-white illustrations, 12 maps, a chronology of the crusades, and a list of rulers. At the time the book was published, the author, who had passed away in November 2014, was Professor Emerita of Medieval History at New York University.


Dr. George Habash (1925 – 2008) was a Christian Palestinian who established the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in December 1967, and served as its Secretary-General until 2000, when he resigned due to ill-health. In this political biography, which is the only biography written about him, the author considers Habash as one of the central figures in Palestinian history and its Pan-Arab nationalist secular and “Marxist-Socialist” camp. The author divides Habash’s political life into 9 historical periods: 1925 to 1951 (especially his early life in pre-Israeli independence Lydda and the formative impact of the Palestinian “Nakba” on his political views); 1952 to 1961 (when he received his medical degree in Beirut and his early political activism emerged when he founded the Arab Nationalist Movement and aligned it with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Arab nationalist ideology); 1961 to 1966 (when he shifted his focus towards Palestinian nationalism, and left Syria for Lebanon); 1967 (the impact of the defeat of Arab military forces by Israel in the June 1967 War and Israel's conquest of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip); 1969 to 1970 (when George Habash led the “Popular National Marxist-Leninist Front”); 1971 to 1981 (his rivalry with the Yasir Arafat-led Fatah); 1982 to 1988 (the impacts of the Lebanese civil war and the beginning of the first Palestinian intifada against Israel); 1989 to 1993 (the achievements of the intifada and his opposition to the Oslo Agreement); and 1994 to
2000 (his opposition role in the Palestinian Authority and the end of his political activity).

In the conclusion, the author observes that one of the contradictions of Habash’s political objectives was that his intellectual-led Marxist-Leninist movement was never able to build a bridge to the Palestinian masses, thus failing to become the “progressive vanguard of the Palestinian proletariat” (p. 397). The biography’s focus is on George Habash’s political activities, rather than his involvement in terrorism (the PFLP became notorious for its spectacular aircraft hijackings and bombings), so this is an incomplete biography. Nevertheless, it presents important insights into his political outlook over the years and, especially, his more secular approach to Palestinian nationalism which took a more religious turn in recent years. Hopefully, this biography will be translated into English so that it can be read more widely. The author is an Israeli-based historian on Middle Eastern studies.


This is a balanced and well-informed account of the causes of the civil war in Syria, which began in early 2011, including a discussion of the prospects for its resolution. The account begins with an overview of the country’s political history prior to the 2011 revolution, such as the basis for the Syrian sectarian-based national identity, the rise of the minority Alawite-dominated Ba’thist state and its relations with the Sunni majority, and the long-term rule by Hafiz al-Assad and his son, Bashar Hafiz al-Assad. In the second chapter, “Could the War in Syria Have Been Avoided?,” the author observes that given the regime’s superior military capabilities it believed that “with a militarization of its confrontation with the opposition, it would stand a much better chance of surviving…. ” (p. 81). Another reason for the regime’s interest in pursuing the military option was its belief that political compromise with the opposition would have involved decentralizing the state, which would have implied that the Alawi-dominated regime would lose control over the entire country. (p. 95). The third chapter, “Confrontation Between the Military of the Regime and the Opposition,” includes a useful account of the armed jihadi groups. The fourth chapter, “The Ambivalent Western Approach to the Syria Conflict,” and the fifth chapter, “Intra-Syrian Talks But No Negotiations,” provide a valuable roadmap of the Western, Arab League, Saudi Arabian, and Turkish initiatives to resolve the civil war. All of these ended in failure because, as the author writes, “the al-Asad regime turned out not to be serious about negotiations insofar as these would imply real power-sharing” (p. 167). In the conclusion, the author observes that “As long as no political compromise can be found, the Syrian War is bound to continue, and Syria may be divided into various zones of influence, until a political solution transpires” (p. 183). The author is a former Dutch Special Envoy for Syria, who, operating from Istanbul, maintained intensive contacts with most of the parties in the Syrian conflict.

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