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Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume XII, Issue 2 (April 2018) of Perspectives on Terrorism at http://www.terrorismanalysts.com. Our free and independent online journal is a publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative ( TRI) and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University’s The Hague Campus. Now in its twelfth year, Perspectives on Terrorism has close to 8,000 regular subscribers and many more occasional readers and website visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer reviewed by external referees while its Research and Policy Notes, Special Correspondence, Resources and other content are subject to internal editorial quality control.

A brief look at some of the contents of the current issue:

The first contribution in our Articles section addresses the issue of ‘freedom fighters vs. terrorists’ by examining the record of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE); it is authored by Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, a former insider. The second article, by Martin Kriner, looks at the way terrorist recruiters exploit feelings of shame to radicalise people. Another article, by Stefan Malthaner, looks at the microdynamics of radicalisation in the case of the German 'Sauerland Group'. The last article, by a team of authors, explores ‘headhunting’ - the recruitment of talented specialists by terrorist organisations.

This section is followed by a Policy Brief – in the form of an interview which Sam Mullins, one of the members of our Editorial Board, conducted with Max Hill, the British Independent Assessor of Counter-Terrorism Legislation.

This issue features two Research Notes; the first one from Ely Karmon & Michael Barak deals with Turkey’s support for the Palestinian Hamas, while the second, compiled by Teun van Dongen, introduces an inventory of more than 130 Centers, Think Tanks and Institutes in the field of (Counter-) Terrorism research.

This is followed by a Correspondence by a group of scholars who take issue with an article on Boko Haram, published by Jacob Zenn in the December issue of our journal.

In the Book Review section the reader will find - next to twenty short reviews by our Book Reviews Editor - two more detailed reviews from the hands of Beatrice de Graaf and Joshua Sinai.

This is followed by the Resources section which features another Bibliography on ISIS and Syria/Iraq from Judith Tinnes. Berto Jongman shares with our readers the fruits of two months of Web monitoring, listing new online resources on terrorism.

This issue ends with a report from our TRI Theses Writers Network - an overview of upcoming and completed doctoral dissertations from Canada and Flanders (Belgium), compiled by Ryan Scrivens and Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn.

In the future, our journal also seeks to bring to your attention upcoming conferences and workshops in the field of (counter-) terrorism. For this reason, we have placed, in the Announcement section, a job vacancy for the position of an Assistant Editor for Conference Monitoring.

The current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism has been prepared by the Editor-in-Chief, Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, and Associate Editor, Dr. Aaron Zelin, with the support of co-editor, Prof. James J. Forest, who will be the principal editor for the June 2018 issue of our journal.
‘Terrorism’ or ‘Liberation’? Towards a distinction: A Case study of the Armed Struggle of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

by Muttukrishna Sarvananthan

Abstract

This article based on extensive empirical field research and primary sources/data attempts to distinguish terrorism from liberation / freedom struggle by means of a case study of the armed struggle of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. It is argued here that the LTTE was primarily a terrorist organisation/movement because: (i) its struggle was overwhelmingly based on armed violence; (ii) it demanded support from the masses through persecution; (iii) it intentionally targeted civilians; (iv) it substantially relied on suicide attacks; (v) it substantially deployed under-age children; and (vi) it was proactively involved in internecine war.

Keywords: Civil War, Freedom Fighters, Liberation, LTTE, Sri Lanka, Tamil Tigers, Terrorism

Introduction

Mr. Sherman: “What is the difference between terrorism on the one hand and waging a legitimate guerrilla struggle on the other? What is the difference between Al Qaida and George Washington? …… George Washington did use violence.”

Mr. Camp: “Last I checked, though, he [GW] did not blow up buildings with civilians. I mean, the LTTE has been famous for its attacks; its suicide bomb attacks on civilian targets.”

The foregoing exchange took place during a Hearing of the Congressional International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in the wake of the “unrest” [understatement] in Sri Lanka. The Hearing was held on March 15, 2006 at the United States House of Representatives [aka Congress]. Mr. Donald Camp[1] represented the State Department and Mr. Brad Sherman[2] represented the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE].[3]

What is the difference between Terrorism and Freedom/Liberation Struggles? This is the central research question of this article. It will be addressed through a case study of the armed struggle of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE] of Sri Lanka. These ‘Tamil Tigers’ had been waging a secessionist war against the Sri Lankan state since May 5, 1976 [the date of the formal establishment of the LTTE][4] until its military defeat in May 2009. The LTTE sought to carve out a separate state for the Tamil ethnic minority community in the eastern and northern parts of Sri Lanka claimed to be the historical habitats or “traditional homeland” of the Tamils.[5] This article is an outcome of an empirical study based on primary sources/data and extensive field research carried out in the conflict-affected regions of Sri Lanka, in India, and within the Tamil Diaspora community in the UK intermittently spanning over a decade and a half.

In the post-9/11/2001 period there is a tendency to castigate the use of violence for political purposes as terrorism [especially in civil war situations]. This over-generalisation of the term ‘terrorism’ is simplistic because violence has been used in many if not most intra-national and inter-national political conflicts throughout human history. The American and Spanish civil wars, the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, anti-colonial wars of independence [including the Indian independence struggle against the British, notwithstanding Mohandas Gandhi’s adherence to non-violence], communist/socialist revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Third World, and faith-based revolutions [e.g. the Iranian revolution of 1979] have all used, to varying degrees, acts
of violence to attain political objectives. Historically, feudalist, mercantilist, and industrial states have almost all been established through the use of armed force.[7] Therefore, the use of violence [particularly for political objectives], per se, is an inadequate reason to brand a group 'terrorist' or its actions 'terrorism'.

Having said that, there are indeed differences [and similarities as well] between the aforementioned violent conflicts and terrorist campaigns. The twenty-first century is marked by what is popularly referred to as 'new wars'[8], which perhaps began with the end of the Cold War around 1990. The nature and characteristics of different civil wars during different time periods were/are different. Understanding such differences is vital for resolving contemporary internal and international conflicts around the world. Therefore, at the outset we would like to highlight that the objective of this article is not an exercise in semantics; on the contrary, the objective is to contribute to a better understanding of the modus operandi of different armed conflicts around the world and thereby contribute to the resolution of such violent conflicts, one way or the other.[9]

In the same way that all armed conflicts could and should not be regarded as the same, there is no common approach to resolving violent conflicts either. Thus, there is no blueprint for conflict resolution, so to speak, either in theory or practice. There are causes of conflicts; some causes could be real, some could be perceived or even contrived.[10] Besides, every conflict has a goal or set of goals. Certain goal/s are legitimate and some illegitimate,[11] some attainable and some not. Similarly, the protagonists of violent conflict (both state and anti-state armed groups) adopt or employ different means for achieving their set goal/s. Some means of achieving the set goals are legitimate, and some are illegitimate, which applies to both the state and anti-state armed groups.[12] There are instances where a particular goal is legitimate, but the adopted means for achieving the set goal is illegitimate and vice versa.

**Terrorism: an Ideology or a Tactic?**

There has been a variety of political and/or economic systems practiced during the course of human history such as Feudalism, Mercantilism, Capitalism, Communism, Socialism, Fascism, etc. Each of these had certain ideological underpinnings and value systems based on particular historical time periods, nature of political leaderships, and governance structures.

The term 'terrorism' appears resonant with a new ideology [yet another ‘ism’]. However, there seems no apparent political and/or economic ideology or system underpinning terrorism as opposed to the aforementioned 'isms', except for the fact that it is more often than not anti-state armed violence with political motive/s. To the best of our understanding, terrorism is a means of achieving variety of goals such as getting rid of foreign occupation, overthrowing a monarchic or despotic ruler, taking control of territory to set up a separate independent state, overthrowing a capitalist or socialist/communist regime, overthrowing a democratic government, etc. Hence, we would argue that terrorism is a means rather than a goal [end in itself]. That is, a tactic rather than an ideology despite its connotation with the latter.

Terrorism is often touted as a weapon or tactic of choice of the weaker force [anti-state armed group] against a stronger force [state security forces]. It is usually cheaper [in terms of money, material, and personnel] to carry-out a terrorist attack as opposed to a conventional military attack. Yet some terrorist attacks have the potential of inflicting greater collateral damage [both material and human] than conventional military attacks. The weapons of choice of terrorist attacks are bombs [time bomb, suicide bomb, etc] or mines [claymore mine, landmine, marine [underwater] mine, etc] rather than guns. Bombs and mines can be hidden more easily than most guns. These are some of the characteristics that make terrorist warfare asymmetrical, irregular, or unorthodox vis-à-vis conventional, regular, or orthodox warfare.

Religion is "opium of the masses" claimed Karl Marx. Similarly, it could be claimed that terrorism is opium of the ‘wretched of the earth’ [aka ‘underdogs’].[13] One person’s terrorist could be another’s rambo, hero, martyr or freedom/liberation fighter.[14]
Epistemology of Terrorism

During the sixtieth annual sessions of the United Nations [UN] in 2005, the United States along with many other countries proposed a resolution on terrorism to be adopted by the General Council of the UN. However, it did not see the light of the day due to disagreements on the definition of terrorism among member countries. Thus far, there is no universally accepted legal definition of terrorism in international law.[15] On the other hand, there is a variety of legalistic definitions of terrorism in different countries in their respective statute books.

The epistemology of ‘freedom/liberation fighters’ and ‘terrorists’ can be traced to Lenin’s extensive writings on the ‘national question,’ right to self-determination’ and ‘liberation movements’, Mao Tse-Tung’s treatise ‘On Guerrilla Warfare’, and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara’s distinction between ‘revolutionary’ and ‘terrorist’ tactics in guerrilla warfare.[16]

The following extracts from Guevara’s classic Guerrilla Warfare are pertinent to today’s anti-state armed groups claiming political motives because it clearly distinguishes between individual terrorism and popular insurgency/revolution:

“Acts of sabotage are very important. It is necessary to distinguish clearly between sabotage, a revolutionary and highly effective method of warfare, and terrorism, a measure that is generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its results, since it often makes victims of innocent people and destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution. Terrorism should be considered a valuable tactic when it is used to put to death some noted leader of the oppressing forces well known for his cruelty, his efficiency in repression, or other quality that makes his elimination useful. But the killing of persons of small importance is never advisable, since it brings on an increase of reprisals, including deaths.[17]

Sabotage has nothing to do with terrorism; terrorism and personal assaults are entirely different tactics. We sincerely believe that terrorism is of negative value, that it by no means produces the desired effects, that it can turn a people against a revolutionary movement, and that it can bring a loss of lives to its agents out of proportion to what it produces. On the other hand, attempts to take the lives of particular persons are to be made, though only in very special circumstances; this tactic should be used where it will eliminate a leader of the oppression.[18]

In special circumstances, after careful analysis, assaults on persons will be used. In general we consider that this is not desirable except for the purpose of eliminating some figure who is notorious for his villainies [sic] against the people and the virulence of his repression. Our experience in the Cuban struggle shows that it would have been possible to save the lives of numerous fine comrades who were sacrificed in the performance of missions of small value.(…)Assaults and terrorism in indiscriminate form should not be employed.”[19]

The types of warfare adopted in most of the post-Cold War era conflicts are antithesis to what revolutionary icons such as Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara envisioned. For the purpose of this article, terrorism could be understood as a form of armed violence wherein ‘terrorist’ tactics [such as “individual assaults”, “killing of persons of small importance”] are used extensively as opposed to ‘revolutionary’ tactics [such as “sabotage”] as illustrated by Guevara in the foregoing paragraphs. That is, in terms of the distinction by Guevara, ‘terrorist’ tactics, which are generally unpopular, overshadow ‘revolutionary’ tactics, which are generally popular, under terrorism.

LTTE: Terrorist Movement or Freedom Fighters/National Liberation Movement?

There has been renewed interest in the distinction between ‘terrorists’ and ‘freedom fighters’ [or terrorist

Nevertheless, there has been an ongoing debate on the semantics of these characterisations.

In this article it is postulated that, the LTTE is to be viewed primarily as a terrorist movement based on the following characteristics and modus operandi of the LTTE during much of its lifetime:

1. Armed struggle was overwhelmingly based on acts of violence, devoid of mass mobilisation, political agitations, or popular participation;
2. Support of the masses was solicited by persecution rather than persuasion;
3. Deliberate targeting of unarmed civilians in armed attacks;
4. Reliance on suicidal armed attacks;
5. Recruitment and employment of children in active combat;
6. Internecine war against members of its own community.

**1. Overwhelmingly based on Violent Armed Struggle**

It is the political marginalisation encountered by the Tamil minority community in the post-independence period that precipitated the armed struggle by disgruntled Tamil youths. Thus, the armed struggle was a means of attaining a political goal. Therefore, a political strategy should have steered the armed struggle and not vice versa as echoed by one of the earliest analyst of guerrilla warfare in anti-imperial struggles, namely Carl Von Clausewitz, and, more than a century later, by Mao Tse-Tung.

In Sri Lanka's Parliamentary elections in 1977, the Tamil United Liberation Front [TULF] sought a mandate from the people of the Eastern and Northern Provinces (particularly the Tamils) for the establishment of a separate state called Tamil Eelam. The TULF received 57% of the total valid votes cast in the east and north combined. Furthermore, 48% of the total of eligible voters voted for the TULF in that election. This was hardly an unambiguous mandate for the establishment of a separate state. Even more important is the fact that, the TULF called for establishing a separate state by political means. The TULF had not explicitly espoused violence, let alone terrorism, to achieve its avowed goal. Therefore, the LTTE had no moral right to hijack the popular mandate of the TULF [however tenuous it may have been] and claim popular support for its armed struggle. The following observation by Martha Crenshaw about terrorism aptly applies to the LTTE.

“Terrorism is essentially the result of elite disaffection; it represents the strategy of a minority, who may act on behalf of a wider popular constituency who have not been consulted about, and do not necessarily approve of, the terrorists' aims or methods.”

Anti-state struggles [whether it is class-based, ethnicity-based, faith-based, anti-colonial, anti-foreign occupation, or aims at capturing state power, or aims at secession of a minority from an existing state, etc] can employ [a] purely non-violent means, [b] purely violent means or [c] a combination of non-violent means [such as demonstrations, shut outs/hartals, civil disobedience, etc] as well as acts of violence [armed and/or unarmed]. Both terrorist struggles and liberation struggles can employ a combination of non-violent agitation and acts of violence. Nonetheless, whilst non-violent agitations are predominant and violent acts are sporadic in liberation struggles; in terrorist struggles violent acts are predominant. This it is argued here, is a fundamental difference between the two.

The modality of the secessionist struggle of the LTTE, right from its inception, has been overwhelmingly violent and militaristic focusing on the use of force. This was different from the struggles of similar anti-state armed groups such as the one of the African National Congress [ANC]. Whilst the military wing of the ANC was subservient to its political wing, it was the reverse in the case of the LTTE. The LTTE hardly had an explicit or implicit political strategy to back up, bolster or complement its military struggle because
Pirapakaran always believed that *kurtu vanga mudiyathu, thatti parikanum* [[We] cannot ask and get [Tamil Eelam], [instead we must] hit and grab].[33] In fact, there was an intense ideological debate within the LTTE during the late-1970s, whether to solely or mainly rely on ‘individual terrorism’ [*thani nabar payankaravatham in Tamil*] or steer the organisation towards a mass/popular movement combining non-violent mass protests/uprisings and occasional, selective, or targeted guerrilla attacks on state security forces.[34]

In the formative years, the organisational structure of the LTTE was broad-based. That is, a Central Committee was formed incorporating a political wing and a military wing. Veluppillai Pirapakaran (aka Thamby, which means younger brother, or Karikalan; Pirapakaran was called Thamby because he was indeed the youngest member of the Central Committee) was the head of the military wing while Uma Maheswaran was head of the political wing. There were few other members of the Central Committee including Nagarajah [a mathematics tuition master] and Iyer [a Hindu priest]. While Pirapakaran was the sole military leader, the other members of the Central Committee shared the political and administrative leadership under the chairpersonship of Uma Maheswaran. For example, Iyer was in-charge of the finance and the agricultural farms. While Uma Maheswaran was sacked from the LTTE in 1978 on the allegation of having a girlfriend/s,[35] the remaining members of the political wing of the Central Committee continued their attempts to steer the LTTE towards a mass movement espousing a Leninist/Socialist ideology basing themselves on principle of the ‘right to self-determination’ of the Tamil nation. In fact, the LTTE’s very first publication or manifesto was largely an adapted [more or less plagiarised] version of Lenin’s writings on the ‘national question’ and the ‘right to self determination’ of nations.[36]

Due to the intransigence of Pirapakaran, who was obsessed with pursuing an exclusive military struggle, some members of the Central Committee [namely Nagarajah, Iyer, et al] along with many cadres took control of the LTTE in early-1980. They forged a rapprochement with Uma Maheswaran and attempted to steer the LTTE towards a mass movement in alliance with the youth wing of the premier democratic Tamil party, viz. Tamil United Liberation Front [TULF]. Santhathiyar headed the youth wing of the TULF at that time. This attempted re-structuring of the LTTE was dubbed “*puthiya pathai*” [new path]. Under the new management the LTTE was also connected to Gandhiyam, a non-governmental organisation established in the aftermath of the anti-Tamil riots of 1977. Gandhiyam was instrumental in re-settling the hill-country Tamils who were displaced due to the 1977 and 1981 anti-Tamil riots [in the hill-country] in the sparsely populated Vanni region[37] of the Northern Province. They formed a reservoir of recruits to the LTTE under the new leadership [and later to the Peoples’ Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam – PLOTE headed by Uma Maheswaran].

In the meantime, a disillusioned Pirapakaran deserted the LTTE and joined the second most prominent Tamil armed group at that time, called Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation [TELO]. However, the power struggle between Pirapakaran and a handful of his loyalists and Uma Maheswaran and his loyalists continued. As a result of this tug-of-war, eventually, Uma Maheswaran and his loyalists abandoned the LTTE and established a new organisation called the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam [PLOTE]. Disillusioned with this internecine conflict, Nagarajah and Iyer abandoned the armed struggle and settled in the South Indian State of Tamilnadu and continue to live there to date (2018). After the PLOTE was established, Pirapakaran re-captured the LTTE sometime in 1981 [deserting the TELO] and instituted himself as the sole leader doing away with the erstwhile Central Committee that had led to internal bickering earlier. LTTE’s split in late-1979/early-1980 was the first major split; it was due to differences in opinion regarding the ideological underpinning/s of the Tamil national struggle and the pursuant political and military strategy to be adopted.[38]

After assuming sole-leadership, Pirapakaran tightened his grip on power within and outside the LTTE. This culminated in the proscription of all other Tamil armed groups and the physical elimination of the members of those groups by the LTTE, an ongoing process since 1986 until LTTE’s demise in May 2009. During the 1983-1986 period several founder and original members of the LTTE [and its predecessor TNT] deserted due to the autocratic rule of the LTTE leader and went into exile abroad. Pirapakaran became the self-proclaimed sole leader of the Tamil national struggle and, as a consequence, all other democratic Tamil parties and armed Tamil groups were branded as traitors and their members hunted down. Almost the entire leadership of the erstwhile premier democratic Tamil party, the TULF, was eliminated by the LTTE in 1989 in Colombo under
The LTTE never had a political strategy [especially since 1983] towards the goal of establishing a separate state. Its one and only means was militarily defeating the Sri Lankan armed forces; forcing them to withdraw from the “traditional Tamil homeland”, i.e. the Eastern and Northern Provinces of Sri Lanka. Even within the Tamil community and in the self-proclaimed Tamil homeland it never had a political strategy to win over the hearts and minds of the people to support the LTTE’s military strategy or political cause. The LTTE took the support of the Tamil people for granted,[39] instilled fear to obtain support and sought to win sympathy with often exaggerated and sometimes untruthful propaganda. The LTTE regarded all dissidents as traitors, and physically eliminated all those who did not accept their line of thinking and acting. Thus, an exclusive military strategy was not only adopted against the enemy [Sri Lanka’s security forces and the state], but against the dissidents within the Tamil community as well. The LTTE’s often recited mantra has always been that “even if we pardon the enemy, we will never ever pardon the traitors”.

(2) Support Garnered through Persecution as Opposed to Persuasion

Although in the formative years [i.e. from 1972 until about mid-1980s] the LTTE [along with other Tamil armed groups] drew support from the masses through political arguments and persuasion [especially after the successive anti-Tamil pogroms of 1977, 1981 and 1983, which took place outside the Eastern and Northern Provinces], in later years it resorted to instilling fear to draw support to its cause. This was done for recruitment to its ranks as well as for gaining sympathy and support within the country and among the Tamil diaspora communities throughout the world.

After the July-1983 anti-Tamil pogrom, youths joined the LTTE [and many other Tamil armed groups espousing secessionism through armed struggle] in droves voluntarily due to real and perceived injustices meted out to the Tamil minority community by successive governments of Sri Lanka in the post-independence period. However, after the LTTE proscribed all other Tamil armed groups and went on hunting-down its cadres from early-1986 onwards until its demise in May 2009, its political standing among the Tamil community started to wane slowly but surely. Thereafter, the LTTE started propagating contrived grievances, half-truths, and even falsehood to entice youths to join its ranks.[40] On the issue of propaganda, the following observations by Guevara are very relevant and opportune to the case of the LTTE.

“One of the characteristics of revolutionary propaganda must be truth. Little by little, in this way, the masses will be won over.[41] …observing always the fundamental principle that truth in the long run is the best policy.[42] The radio[43] is a factor of extraordinary importance………However, the radio should be ruled by the fundamental principle of popular propaganda, which is truth; it is preferable to tell the truth, small in its dimensions, than a large lie artfully embellished.”[44]

Since the LTTE’s strategy of false propaganda had only limited success, it began to resort to involuntary conscription through indoctrination, threats, abductions, etc. In the aftermath of the Indo-Sri Lanka peace accord of July 1987, the LTTE lost much of the male youth constituency and began to recruit and deploy teenage girls and children [both boys and girls under 16 years old] in combat for the first time. Although women and children [over 16 years old] began to join the LTTE after 1983, they were not deployed on active combat until 1987.[45][46]

(3) Deliberately Targeting Unarmed Civilians in Armed Attacks

As noted earlier, the fundamental distinction between terrorism and liberation struggle rests with the different means of achieving an end. Although both terrorist struggles and liberation struggles may head toward the same end, it is how [or the means by which] they arrive at the predetermined end what distinguishes the two. Liberation struggles involve both violent and non-violent strategies. Importantly, liberation struggles are
waged against the state’s security forces and not against unarmed civilians; therefore the majority of casualties are armed combatants. In the case of terrorist struggles, violence dominates with very little or no role for non-violent protests or civil disobedience. Besides, in terrorist struggles, the majority of victims are unarmed civilians rather than armed combatants. Furthermore, whilst liberation movements target opposing armed forces (the ‘enemy’) or civilian collaborators with their enemy [‘traitors’, ‘quislings’, ‘fifth columnists’], terrorist movements target not only the foregoing but primarily unarmed civilians [including progressives, trade unionists, and intellectuals] who do not agree with terrorists’ brutal tactics to achieving the ultimate goal [whatever that may be].

One of the salient features of the ‘new wars’ of the post-cold war era is that majority of the victims of nearly all civil wars around the globe are indeed unarmed civilians. During the anti-colonial, anti-feudal and anti-dictatorship struggles of the pre-World War II and the Cold-War era, unarmed civilian casualties were small and deliberate targeting of unarmed civilians was almost absent. However, in nearly all the civil wars of the post-Cold War era unarmed civilian casualties are higher than combatant casualties.[47] There have been many instances where state security forces as well as anti-state armed groups deliberately target unarmed civilians and put the blame on the opposite side in order to substantiate their claim of ‘terrorism’ and ‘genocide’ respectively, and this way seek to gain sympathy both nationally and internationally. The distinction between combatants and civilians has become more blurred during the post-Cold War period.[48]

A hallmark of the LTTE was its targeted assassinations of unarmed civilians, including political leaders of the government and the main opposition party, political dissidents, intellectuals, trade unionists, and journalists within its own community. In addition, the LTTE also deliberately attacked civilians outside the Eastern and Northern Provinces through claymore mine and landmine attacks, time bombs and suicide attacks, especially targeting Sinhalese civilians. These attacks were carried-out in order to elicit a backlash against the Tamils living outside the East and North, which could then be propagated as ‘genocide’ against the Tamils like in July 1983.[49] The LTTE frequently set-off claymore mines within the Eastern and Northern Provinces as well against the armed forces personnel and police in urban areas and places where civilians congregated. There was a political motive, in addition to a military motive, behind such attacks. When security forces are attacked, they tend to randomly shoot or beat-up innocent people who happen to be in the vicinity of the attack. These exigencies or extra judicial killings by the security forces are then used to demonise the enemy and portrayed as ‘genocide’ in order to gain sympathy and support for its cause among the local population, with in the Tamil Diaspora, and the international community at large. Therefore, such urban guerrilla [hit-and-run] attacks have dual utility; one military [tactical] and the other political [strategic]. However, ordinary Tamil civilians despised these attacks by the LTTE and have told this author that if the LTTE wanted to attack the security forces it should have targeted the security forces in remote or isolated terrains rather than in places of high population density.[50]

However, LTTE’s suicide attack on the Colombo [Katunayake] International Airport on July 25, 2001 could be regarded as an act of economic sabotage [in Guevara’s parlance, as noted earlier] rather than a terrorist attack because of zero civilian casualties in that operation. Only a couple of air force personnel and the suicide attackers of the LTTE [all armed combatants] were killed in the entire operation. The LTTE did not attack the passenger terminal or harm any civilian staff working at the airport at the time of operation. However, half the entire fleet of aircrafts of the Sri Lankan Airlines [i.e. five out of ten] and a few [unspecified number] attack helicopters and fighter jets of the Sri Lanka Air Force [SLAF] were either completely destroyed or severely damaged. The attackers waited for the last departing aircraft to take off during the early hours of the day [well past midnight] before launching their attack in order not to harm civilians. In the aftermath of the attack, international freight insurance companies imposed war risk surcharge [premium] on exports and imports from and to Sri Lanka, thereby dealing a severe blow to the economy, which resulted in the Sri Lankan economy recording negative growth in 2001 for the first time since independence.

On the other hand, the suicide truck bombing of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka [CBSL] on January 31, 1996 was clearly a terrorist act because of the death of nearly 100 unarmed civilians in that operation despite also being
an act of economic sabotage similar to the attack on the international airport alluded to above. The suicide truck bomb attack on the CBSL was in some ways similar to Hezbollah's suicide truck bomb attack on the US Marines in Beirut in August 1983. This attack was carried out during the rush hours of a weekday morning around 10.30 AM. Several Tamils have pointed out to this author that they cannot condone such mindless violence, because if the LTTE wanted to attack an economic target it could have done it during night-time thereby avoiding civilian casualties. However, in the LTTE’s strategic political thinking, the suicide attack on the CBSL would not have elicited such huge international attention [as reflected in spectacular international media coverage of the attack] if it were carried out during the night-time with zero civilian casualties. Alas, the foregoing line of thinking of the LTTE was counter-intuitive [or backfired] because the strategic political cost of the attack on the Central Bank to the LTTE was enormous in the same way as the LTTE’s suicide bomb assassination of the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991. In the same way as India proscribed the LTTE in 1992 in the aftermath of Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, the United States proscribed the LTTE in 1997, citing the LTTE as a threat to US strategic interests in Sri Lanka and the region, specifically as a result of the attack on the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

The majority of victims in the armed conflict in Sri Lanka have been civilians.[51] In fact, anecdotal evidence indicates that LTTE has killed more civilians [from all three communities, namely Tamils, Sinhalese, and Muslims] than the armed forces personnel, though numbers are unavailable. The LTTE has killed hundreds of Sinhalese villagers in the border areas of Eastern and Northern Provinces in order to make the rest flee their homes in the interior of Eastern and Northern Provinces. Similarly, hundreds of Muslims [who are, in fact, Tamil speaking] were killed inside Mosques in Kattankudy and Eravur in the Batticaloa district of the Eastern Province in August 1990. After these mass murders in the East, the entire Muslim population in the Northern Province [particularly from Jaffna, Mannar and Mullaitivu districts] was ordered to vacate their homes [leaving behind their belongings] within seventy-two hours [in many cases within twenty-four hours] in October 1990. Many of them still languish in several welfare camps in the Puttalam district [North Western Province].

The mass murders and forcible eviction of Muslims and Sinhalese from the Eastern and Northern Provinces were part of the LTTE’s strategic logic of creating an ethnically homogeneous “Tamil homeland” through ethnic cleansing. Only a tiny proportion of the Tamil population condones such a supremacist vision of an imagined Tamil nation as envisioned by the LTTE.[52] Moreover, in the closing stages of the civil war during March-May 2009, the LTTE deliberately attacked Tamil civilians who were attempting to flee to the areas controlled by the security forces of Sri Lanka. These wanton attacks on unarmed civilians alienated even senior cadres of the LTTE such as Thamilini Jayakumaran (nee Sivakami Subramaniam), the political head of the LTTE women.[53]

(4) Heavy Reliance on Suicidal Armed Attacks

To run away from trouble is a form of cowardice and, while it is true that the suicide braves death, he does it not for some noble object but to escape some ill – Aristotle

It is not only an ancient philosopher like Aristotle, but modern medical science as well holds that suicides are acts of cowardice to get away from mental or physical illness,[54] rather than bravery or “martyrdom” as the protagonists of suicidal armed attacks would want the world to believe.

According to an Associate Professor at the Medical Faculty of Kabul University, about 65% of the suicide bombers during 2006-2008 [i.e. 52 out of 80] were physically disabled. His reading is that poor families with disabled members could have been paid hefty sums of money to sell the disabled to the Taliban to be utilised as suicide bombers.[55] Further, this author’s interviews with middle-level LTTE cadres revealed that those who were physically handicapped in combat were encouraged to join the elite suicide squad, the so-called Black Tigers. There are certain criteria and formal career path to join the Black Tigers squad, which will be detailed
The suicide attacks by Jewish Zealots against Roman occupation 2,000 years ago and kamikaze attacks by the Japanese armed forces during the Second World War in the twentieth century offered role models for the revival of suicide attacks in the early-1980s in the Middle East [notably by Hezbollah in Lebanon], which were later adapted and improved upon by various anti-state armed groups such as the Al-Qaeda, Hamas, LTTE, and more recently the Taliban in Afghanistan.[56]

Sri Lanka has one of the highest suicide rates in the world; suicide had been rising in the early 1980s, though an ethnic or religious breakdown is unavailable.[57] Studies have shown that Sri Lankans tend to take away their lives by committing suicide for trivial reasons. In this context, Robert Pape’s revelation that LTTE was responsible for the single largest number of suicide attacks around the world in the period between 1980 to 2003 is not surprising.[58] However, Robert Pape’s attribution of foreign occupation as the primary cause of suicide attacks is contentious.

First of all, in internal wars like that of Sri Lanka, where the presence of Sri Lankan armed forces in territories largely inhabited by Tamil speaking people [“Tamil homeland”] could be regarded as “foreign occupation” is debatable, in spite of LTTE’s claim to that effect [the same argument has been used in the case of Sikh and Kashmiri separatism in India]. Secondly, if indeed Pape’s attribution of foreign occupation as the primary cause of suicide attacks is true, how come the bulk of LTTE’s suicide attacks were carried out outside the “Tamil homeland” [largely in and around Colombo] on civilian targets rather than against the occupying security forces within? Even in the cases of suicide attacks carried out in Iraq after the US-led invasion in 2003 and the rise of suicide attacks in Afghanistan since 2008, the bulk of those attacks were NOT carried out against the occupying foreign armed forces. Rather, the larger number of attacks were carried out against Iraqi or Afghan civilians in places where ordinary people congregate, while a smaller number of attacks were carried out against the Iraqi or Afghan national armed forces. Thirdly, as Horowitz has pointed out [59], if foreign occupation is the primary cause of suicide attacks, why was it that some other anti-state groups such as the Irish Republican Army [IRA], the Basque separatist group ETA, or the Mujahedin in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation [from 1979 to 1989] have not resorted to suicide attacks to drive out the respective occupying forces?

Mia Bloom, another pioneer in the study of suicide terrorism, asserts that suicide attacks are a strategy to “outbid” other competing anti-state groups in garnering public support for the same cause.[60] That is, suicide attacks are a means of establishing supremacy or claim to be authentic representatives of the masses whom they claim to protect or liberate. Whilst in some cases this assertion could be valid, in the case of the LTTE it is NOT valid because the LTTE had emerged as the sole anti-state Tamil armed group by around 1990 when it began to use suicide attacks [barring the first suicide truck bomb attack on July 5, 1987 during the Vadamarachchi operation by the security forces] as a regular politico-military tactic.[61]

When we trace the timings of suicide bombings or assassinations by the LTTE, it is evident that it had resorted to such attacks out of desperation when the military odds were against them in the theatres of war and/or the political odds were against them with regard to popular support from the Tamil people. For example, the first suicide attack by the LTTE was carried out on July 5, 1987, when a suicide bomber rammed a lorry laden with explosives into a makeshift military barrack set up at a school in Nelliady [near Point Pedro town in the Jaffna peninsula]. This was carried out at a time when the Sri Lankan security forces were on an offensive to wrest control of the Vadamarachchi area of the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE, which had a free reign after virtually eliminating all other Tamil armed groups (particularly the TELO and EPRLF) since the early-1986.

The second suicide attack by the LTTE was the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991 in Sriperumbudur [in the outskirts of Chennai, the capital of Tamilnadu state in India]. The assassin was the first woman suicide bomber in recent history; it was the only suicide attack by the LTTE on a foreign territory and the first assassination of a Prime Minister-in-waiting by a foreign armed group. The suicide assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was also a sign of desperation as he was perceived to be anti-LTTE [62] [especially anti-Pirapakaran]. Therefore Pirapakaran wanted to prevent Rajiv Gandhi from becoming the
Prime Minister of India for the second time.[63] Moreover, Rajiv Gandhi was popular among the Tamil people [in Sri Lanka as well as in India] as he was instrumental in pressurising the then Sri Lankan President to enact the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka thereby devolving power to the regions through the creation of Provincial Councils [a second tier of government]. Hence, Rajiv Gandhi's popularity among the Tamils was perceived to be a threat to LTTE's military and political stranglehold on the Tamil masses.

Another prominent suicide attack by the LTTE that was a sign of desperation was the suicide lorry bombing of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka on January 31, 1996. The LTTE, which was de-facto ruling the Jaffna peninsula from 1990 to 1995, was driven out of Jaffna by a major military operation, beginning in August and ending in December 1995. The LTTE wanted to avenge its eviction from Jaffna through a spectacular attack in the city of Colombo, which resulted in the bombing of the Central Bank.

Another vivid example of a desperate suicide attack by the LTTE reflecting frustration of losing popular support among the Tamils was the suicide assassination of a member of parliament from the erstwhile democratic party of the Tamils [the TULF], namely Neelan Thiruchelvam. He was popular among the Tamils as the intellectual standard-bearer of the legitimate democratic aspirations of the Tamils. As a Constitutional Lawyer with a doctorate from Harvard University, he was instrumental in drafting a new Constitution in 1995 transforming the Sri Lankan state from a unitary to a federal state [“union of regions”], which however never did see the light of the day. Espousing federalism to resolve the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict was anathema to LTTE's unwavering maximalist demand for a separate sovereign state for the Tamils. So, bumping him off was necessary to the LTTE in order to veer the Tamil people's desire for a federal solution to the long-lasting ethno-national conflict.

The foregoing four examples illustrate the politico-military psyche of the LTTE leadership in carrying out these suicidal attacks. It is pertinent to note and understand that all the foregoing high profile military attacks could not have been possible using orthodox hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. Except the first one [suicide lorry bomb attack on a military barrack] all other targets were non-military. The LTTE was fully aware of the likely national and international political fall-out as a result of those attacks on unarmed high profile civilian targets and therefore had to hide the affiliation of the perpetrators; that is, it did not claim responsibility for these attacks or used the name of “Ellalan [an ancient Tamil king in Sri Lanka] Force” to claim responsibility for the attack on the Central Bank. Nevertheless, in the worldview of the LTTE, those targets were imperative for its very survival as a politico-military organisation. Therefore, it went ahead with the missions notwithstanding the likely strategic political cost. The LTTE was very possessive of its claim to be a liberation organisation spearheading the freedom struggle of the Tamils against the oppressive Sri Lankan state, and the claim to be the “sole representatives” of the Tamils [occasionally tempered with the claim of “authentic representatives”]. That is why it never owned-up responsibility for any suicidal [or other mode of] attacks on civilian targets or suicidal [or other mode of] assassinations of unarmed individuals. This deceptive behaviour of the LTTE was unique in the world of terrorism, because almost all other anti-state terror groups are eager to claim responsibility to prove their brawn power or their commitment to “martyrdom”.

(5) Recruitment and Employment of Children in Active Combat

All armed forces/groups [either state, anti-state, or quasi-state] that use child combatants do so for lack popular support for their cause whatever that may be. It is only those armed groups that are unable to convince adults of the legitimacy or inevitability of armed struggle and/or justify the violent means of their struggle which are forced to recruit children [either voluntarily or involuntarily], who can be easily brainwashed. Child combatants are a sign of frustration and bankruptcy of political legitimacy of the armed group they belong to. Besides, children are useful for espionage and logistical duties, as the enemy would least suspect them. Therefore, one of the criteria that can be used to distinguish ‘terrorists’ from ‘freedom fighters’ is whether or not they recruit children to fight their war.

The teenage period is an age of rebellion, within the household and/or within the community where they live. It is a time of seeking self-identity and importance. It can also be a time of rebellion against parental authority.
Terrorist groups exploit children’s ‘age of innocence’ for indoctrination, recruitment, and deployment. Children are also usually obedient, compliant to authority, and easier to bully. However, they cannot be effective or efficient fighters on the battlefield since they lack physical strength and/or mental resilience. Therefore, children are often used as cannon-fodder in the battlefield to break through enemy lines [forward defence lines – FDL] and have to pave the way for adult fighters to follow. It is always costly [in terms of human life] to break through forward defence lines because the enemy is well-entrenched. The anti-state armed groups usually lack adequate number of fighters to confront much larger state security forces. That is, anti-state armed groups are far outnumbered in terms of personnel. Therefore, when there is a lack of adult recruits the anti-state armed groups resort to child recruits, because the latter are easier to convince [voluntary recruitment] or conscript [involuntary recruitment]. It is also true that abject poverty drives some parents to voluntarily handover their child/children to rebel groups. This happens not only in Asia but also in Africa.

The LTTE started proactively recruiting children as young as ten years old in the late-1980s. As mentioned above, since the LTTE unilaterally started fighting the IPKF in late-1987 its support among the Tamils started to wane. Hence, it was compelled to actively recruit children in order to compensate for declining adult recruits. Thus, child recruitment for combat is a sign of weakness of a liberation movement. Put it another way, child recruitment by the LTTE was a sign of conversion into a terrorist movement.

The LTTE routinely showed video films of its military operations at schools as a means of enticing children to join its ranks. If this strategy did not bear adequate results, it forcibly kidnapped children to fight for its cause. In a survey conducted in all the five districts of the Northern Province in late-2004, including in LTTE-controlled areas in the Vanni, the interviewed children did not indicate a desire to join the LTTE to fight for their cause.

In the areas under its control, the LTTE and its proxies [camouflaged as NGOs, faith-based organisations and humanitarian agencies] ran numerous orphanages, which were virtually factories producing child soldiers or future adult soldiers. In these factories, camouflaged as orphanages, children used to be indoctrinated about the virtues of Tamils’ freedom struggle and instilled that their saviour and godfather was Pirapataran [aka the ‘sun god’].

In short, the use of child soldiers is a vivid example of moral, ethical, political, and military bankruptcy of self-styled freedom/liberation movements in the late-twentieth and early twenty-first century. The scourge of child soldiers is one of the critical differences between the anti-state armed movements of the pre- and post-Second World War period and the post-Cold War period rebel movements. It would be useful for the modern day self-styled freedom/liberation fighters to do some soul-searching and realise that their predecessors had much greater success in capturing state power and driving out foreign occupation forces without the use of child soldiers and suicide bombers.

(6) Intemecine War against Members of its own Community

One of the conjectures about the protracted conflict in Sri Lanka is that, according to anecdotal evidence, it is probable that the LTTE might have killed more Tamils than the Sri Lankan security forces; especially in internecine war against all other Tamil armed groups since the early-1980s [with the breakup of the LTTE into two or more in 1980 as noted above] until its demise in 2009. This was due to the LTTE’s obsessive-compulsive
claim to be the sole representatives of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. This might well be something unique in the mystical world of freedom fighters/liberation movements. The LTTE has not only virtually decimated all other Tamil armed groups, but also the Tamil democratic parties, dissenting voices in the academia, civil society, and the media in order to establish itself as the sole and indispensable politico-military force representing the Tamils. This type of behavior aligns more with mafia groups rather than liberation movements. This unique but negative characteristic of the LTTE has, overtime, gradually dissipated popular support it once enjoyed among the Tamils during the late-1970s and early-1980s, not only in Sri Lanka but in India as well.

The LTTE’s pathological thirst for the sole leadership of the armed struggle of the Tamils has been absent in almost all other anti-state struggles spearheaded by either liberation organisations or terrorist organisations throughout the world. In the armed struggles of the Jews for establishment of Israel,[67] majority community against the minority apartheid rule in South Africa,[68] Palestinians against Israel,[69] Bengalis against the Pakistani rule in East Pakistan,[70] Kashmiris against the Indian rule, Mujahedin against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, or in Al-Qaeda’s global war against Western countries, a variety of armed groups operate in tandem complementing each others’ role, in spite of occasional internecine conflict among anti-state movements. Rarely, if ever, did any one group stake claim sole leadership the way LTTE did.

Internecine war among freedom fighters is the anti-thesis of liberation struggle that is supposed to be against a real or contrived common enemy. The fact of the matter is that, other terrorist organisations [let alone liberation organisations], either in the past or present, have rarely indulged in killing each other when they were faced with a common enemy because they very well knew that such actions would substantially weaken their cause or undermine attaining their ultimate goal. On this score the LTTE was a terrorist organisation par excellence since it had an explicit policy of systematically annihilating all other armed Tamil groups, and among unarmed Tamil political parties, those had the potential to challenge its supremacy or the vanguard role.[71] In fact, the LTTE had gone even beyond that by purging potential challengers/competitors to the self-appointed supreme leader Veluppillai Pirapakaran within the organisation itself from time to time throughout its existence [i.e. 1972 to 2009], beginning with the murder of Chetti Thanabalasingam in the early-1970s [72] and the attempted murder of Uma Maheswaran in Pondy Bazaar in Madras/Chennai [capital of Tamilnadu state] in 1982 by Pirapakaran himself.

Studies by anthropologists and sociologists have showed that, among criminal gangs, organized crime syndicates, and mafias, internecine warfare is a very common feature. In this light, the LTTE’s systemic intra-group and inter-group purges further lend support to the conclusion that the LTTE was a terrorist organisation rather than as its leaders, supporters and sympathisers claimed, a liberation movement.

Towards a Distinction between ‘Terrorism’ and ‘Liberation’

One of the fundamental guiding principles [and often recited mantra] of the armed struggle waged by the LTTE on behalf of the Tamil people was:

kertu vanga mudiyathu, thatti parikanum ([We] cannot ask and get, [instead we must] hit and grab)

This was often said by the LTTE leadership to its rank and file to justify its resort to arms in the struggle for independence, but also to justify the repudiation of ceasefires and peace negotiations over and over again throughout the civil war period.

Another of Veluppillai Pirapakaran’s mantra was:

sollukku mun ceyal irukavendum (Deed should precede word)

The logic of this statement from the leader [73] is easy to comprehend. In Pirapakaran’s worldview there is no opportunity or necessity to think before you act. A true representative of an imagined nation [Tamil Eelam] should not act like that;[74] yet this statement encapsulates the mindset of “the most dangerous man in South Asia and the public enemy number one of the Tamils.”[75]
The discourses on the semantics of terrorism, thus far, have tended to veer towards abstract conceptualisation. That is, a top down approach from the general to the particular, which is deductive logic.[76] In this article, an alternative approach to the understanding of terrorism has been chosen: a bottom-up approach from the particular to the general, in other words, inductive logic. By way of critically analysing the *modus operandi* of the LTTE, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the LTTE was a terrorist organisation rather than a liberation organisation. The Tamil community’s struggle for equality in Sri Lanka, however, cannot be construed as terrorism.

It is this author’s conviction that the same six criteria that have been postulated to distinguish terrorist struggles from freedom fighting in the case of the LTTE could possibly be applied to other anti-state armed groups as well as state actors. However, since each and every conflict and each and every anti-state armed group are different, these criteria should not become static benchmarks to understand terrorism. Instead, these six criteria could possibly be conceptual thresholds, but dynamic in practical application. Thus, these six criteria should become evolutionary when applied to other cases. In the study of certain states or anti-state armed organisations, one or more of these six criteria could be dropped and new ones incorporated.

As a matter of fact, many sovereign states have been involved in terrorism within and outside their territories [through covert or proxy wars] at certain points of time, throughout human history, until today. This is likely to continue to be so in the future as well. These states come from all ideological persuasions; authoritarian and democratic. Therefore, it is a *sine qua non* to apply the concept of terrorism to sovereign states as well if only because today’s anti-state armed groups (*de facto* states) could become *de jure* states tomorrow.

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Notes

[1] Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, US State Department.

[2] Democratic Party Representative from California State [27th District], USA.


[4] The LTTE was a re-launch of the Tamil New Tigers [TNT], originally established in 1972. The Tamil New Tigers was, in turn, an offshoot of the Thamil Maanavar Peravai [Tamil Students’ League] that was established in 1970 by Sathiayaseelan to oppose the system of standardisation introduced for university admissions disadvantaging Jaffna students. A leading member of the Thamil Maanavar Peravai was Sivakumaran hailing from Urumpirai in the Jaffna peninsula. He became famous after committing suicide when pursued by the police [after throwing a bomb at the police] by biting a cyanide capsule in 1971. Sivakumaran was revered as ‘thiyagi’ [martyr], especially among the youths of Jaffna, after his suicidal death. It is this self-sacrificial incident that inspired Pirapakaran to introduce the cyanide capsule in the mid-1980s which was to be worn by all LTTE fighters during active combat. It is ‘thiyagi’ Sivakumaran who inspired Pirapakaran to bestow martyrdom to LTTE’s military cadres who die in combat.


[6] However, Mahatma Gandhi did not totally reject violence as evidenced in the following quote “I do believe that, where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence…I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she should, in a cowardly manner, become or remain a helpless witness”; URL: http://www.bored.com/findquotes cate_565_Cowardice cate_565_Cowardice cate_736_Suicide.html


[9] Throughout this article ‘conflict’ refers to violent or armed conflict.


[11] What is a legitimate goal and what is not can differ from case to case, and is a matter of ongoing moral debates.

[12] Aka ‘non-state actors’ or ‘non-state armed groups’. In this article the author deliberately uses ‘anti-state armed groups’ because non-state actors could refer to non-governmental/non-profit organisations [both national and international] as well, and non-state armed groups could refer to vigilante/paramilitary groups [mostly set up by the state itself and therefore not necessarily anti-state], criminal armed gangs [mafia, triads] and the like. [Policzer, Pablo, [2005: 6-8], Neither Terrorists nor Freedom Fighters, Armed Groups Project Working Paper Series, Working Paper 5, March, Alberta: University of Calgary. Hence, it is acknowledged here that ‘anti-state armed groups’ have political cause/s or objective/s as opposed to criminal armed groups.


[22] However, the LTTE did hijack the non-violent ‘Pongu Thamil’ [See the Thamil] agitations staged by the Tamil civil society groups in Trincomalee, Vavuniya, and Jaffna towns [which were under the control of the security forces] in the early 2000s, before the ceasefire signed on February 22, 2002, in order to advance its demand for a separate state. Once the LTTE started getting involved in the Pongu Thamil agitations it coerced the participation of the general public through intimidation. Besides, LTTE cadres occasionally dressed-up in school uniforms took part in the Pongu Thamil [and similar] agitations in order to give the impression that school students were also involved in those agitations, and also as a security cover/ruse on the expectation that the security forces could be reluctant to act against school students.


[25] The last free and fair elections held, not only in the Eastern and Northern Provinces but also in the entire country, until 2015.

[26] The Tamil United Liberation Front [TULF] was the premier democratic political party of the Tamils from 1976 until 2000. The TULF was the successor to the Thamil Arasu Katchi [Federal Party] from 1949 to 1971 and the Tamil United Front [TUF] from 1971-1976. However, in 2001 the Tamil National Alliance [TNA] was formed incorporating the bulk of the TULF and former Tamil armed groups such as TELO, PLOTE, and EPRLF, which gave-up the armed struggle after the arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Force [IPKF] in Sri Lanka in July 1987. The TNA has been the premier democratic political party of the Tamils from 2001 to date, having sixteen members in the current parliament of Sri Lanka (2015-2020).


[28] Notwithstanding the fact that some younger members of the TULF parliamentarians tacitly supported different Tamil militant groups [especially the LTTE and TELO] in the 1970s and 1980s until the LTTE killed almost the entire TULF leadership in 1989 in Colombo.


[30] The liberation struggles envisioned by Guevara, Lenin, Mao, et al, were against colonial, despotic, or feudal rulers rather than against democracies.

[31] See, for example, Clausewitz, Carl Von, op cit, and Tse-Tung, Mao as well as Samuel B. Griffith, op cit.
In this information age, the internet [especially the social media] is what almost all anti-state armed groups use very extensively. Guevara, Ernesto, *op cit* 145.

*Guevara, Ernesto, *op cit* 131.*

*For example, the LTTE usually exaggerated their material and human strengths in order to entice the youths to join the movement. Moreover, the LTTE used to propagate that the Sri Lankan security forces routinely sexually harass and rape Tamil girls and women and therefore girls should join them and be armed in order to safeguard their honour and dignity. Although it is true that considerable number of Tamil girls and women have been raped and harassed by the security forces throughout the civil war period [and beyond], it was not routine and systemic as, for example, was the case in Bosnia in the mid-1990s.*

*For example, the LTTE would forcibly occupy the homes of civilians and confiscate the vehicles of ordinary people claiming that those are “thesia soththu” [national assets].* See, Ganesan [Iyer], *op cit.*

*This was revealed by Ganesan [Iyer], one of the founder members of the Central Committee of the LTTE, and another middle-level leader during the course of interviews with this author. In spite of the fact that the LTTE participated in the Thimpu talks with the Government of Sri Lanka in 1985 [along with other Tamil armed groups] as a result of the facilitation by the Government of India and registered a political party named Popular Front of the Liberation Tigers [PFLT] in 1989 during the ceasefire with the then government, it was never genuinely committed to non-violent democratic political processes [be it participation in elections or organising political rallies or meetings to propagate its policies or demands]. However, the LTTE did use the Tamil United Liberation Front [TULF] until 1983 and the Tamil National Alliance [TNA] since the ceasefire in February 2002 until its demise in May 2009 as its proxy.* See Ganesan [Iyer], [2011], *Eelap porattaththil enathu pathivugal: Pirapakaranodu pulikal amaipai arampitha naatkal....* [in Tamil] [My records of the Eelam struggle: days of establishment of the Tiger movement with Pirapakaran], Southall, Middlesex [UK]: Inioru.

*See, Ganesan [Iyer], *op cit.* In those days LTTE cadres had to be unmarried and were barred from having a girlfriend [females were deliberately kept out of becoming formal members of the group in order to keep the male members entirely devoted to the armed struggle]. This practice existed until Pirapakaran got married in late 1984. Later, with the formal recruitment of females into the organisation since 1985, the cadres were allowed to marry, but having girlfriend/s and extramarital affairs remained prohibited. Pirapakaran also took action to purge homosexuals from the movement in the early-1980s. One such victim was Ranjan [who was popularly known as Ranjan Lala] hailing from the Vadamarachchi area of the Jaffna peninsula. The witch hunt of Ranjan by Pirapakaran also took action to purge homosexuals from the movement in the early-1980s. One such victim was Ranjan [who was popularly known as Ranjan Lala] hailing from the Vadamarachchi area of the Jaffna peninsula. The witch hunt of Ranjan by Pirapakaran was revealed to this author by Nirmala Rajasingam, who was an academic at the University of Jaffna in the late-1970s and early 1980s and one of the earliest academic supporters of the LTTE, but deserted the LTTE in 1984 and sought asylum in the UK and remains there to this day.*

*For example, the LTTE would forcibly occupy the homes of civilians and confiscate the vehicles of ordinary people claiming that those are “thesia soththu” [national assets].* Balasingam, Anton, [1979], *The National Liberation Struggle of the Tamils*, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [underground publication].

*Vanni is the geographical area covering four out of five districts of the Northern Province, viz. Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya. These four districts were/are sparsely populated jungle areas where all the Tamil armed groups had their military camps.*

*This historical narrative of the birth and the first breakaway of the LTTE are based on firsthand experiences and information of this author as well as interviews with former members of the LTTE who are now in exile in India, the UK and in Sri Lanka. However, in any underground organisation/movement of this nature there is no perfect information available, which is acknowledged by this author. Ganesan [Iyer], *op cit.* one of the original Central Committee members of the LTTE, in his memoir [in Tamil] alludes to a similar narrative.*

*For example, the LTTE would forcibly occupy the homes of civilians and confiscate the vehicles of ordinary people claiming that those are “thesia soththu” [national assets].* This was revealed by Ganesan [Iyer], one of the founder members of the Central Committee of the LTTE, and another middle-level leader during the course of interviews with this author. In spite of the fact that the LTTE participated in the Thimpu talks with the Government of Sri Lanka in 1985 [along with other Tamil armed groups] as a result of the facilitation by the Government of India and registered a political party named Popular Front of the Liberation Tigers [PFLT] in 1989 during the ceasefire with the then government, it was never genuinely committed to non-violent democratic political processes [be it participation in elections or organising political rallies or meetings to propagate its policies or demands]. However, the LTTE did use the Tamil United Liberation Front [TULF] until 1983 and the Tamil National Alliance [TNA] since the ceasefire in February 2002 until its demise in May 2009 as its proxy.

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*For example, the LTTE would forcibly occupy the homes of civilians and confiscate the vehicles of ordinary people claiming that those are “thesia soththu” [national assets].* [32] Pirapakaran’s wife Mathivathani [prior to their marriage] was an undergraduate student at the University of Jaffna when she along with a group of female undergraduates staged a fast-unto death campaign protesting some political incident [which this author cannot remember anymore] within the premises of the university sometime in 1982. After few days into the fast-unto death campaign the health of the participants deteriorated. At that moment the LTTE intervened and kidnapped the protesters taking them by boat to Tamilnadu in India. The justification given to the general public by the LTTE for this forcible end to the fast-unto death campaign by an independent group of female undergraduates was that the lives of the protesters have to be saved for the armed struggle and that the LTTE could not allow the protesters to die in such callous manner. The foregoing is a concrete example of the primacy given to armed struggle by the LTTE as opposed to any form of non-violent political protests/strikes. While the group of kidnapped protesters was held in Tamilnadu by the LTTE, Pirapakaran fell in love with one of them, namely Mathivathani, whom he married in 1984.

[33] This was revealed by Ganesan [Iyer], one of the founders members of the Central Committee of the LTTE, and another middle-level leader during the course of interviews with this author. In spite of the fact that the LTTE participated in the Thimpu talks with the Government of Sri Lanka in 1985 along with other Tamil armed groups as a result of the facilitation by the Government of India and registered a political party named Popular Front of the Liberation Tigers [PFLT] in 1989 during the ceasefire with the then government, it was never genuinely committed to non-violent democratic political processes [be it participation in elections or organising political rallies or meetings to propagate its policies or demands]. However, the LTTE did use the Tamil United Liberation Front [TULF] until 1983 and the Tamil National Alliance [TNA] since the ceasefire in February 2002 until its demise in May 2009 as its proxy.

*In this information age, the internet [especially the social media] is what almost all anti-state armed groups use very intensively.*
effectively. Virtual communications have become the most important tool of propaganda for various causes throughout the world. The digital divide, in this respect, has been shrinking day by day.


[45] Until Pirapakaran got married in late-1984, the LTTE did not allow any of its armed cadres to get married and consciously avoided recruiting married persons to its military wing until its demise in 2009.


[49] Anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983 [popularly known as the ‘Black July’] outside the Eastern and Northern Provinces was a spontaneous backlash against the ambush of 13 army personnel traveling in a truck [as a result of a landmine explosion and subsequent firing] near the Jaffna University by the LTTE. This was the first mass casualties of armed forces personnel in the protracted civil war in Sri Lanka. The previous casualties on the government side were all police personnel and only a few army personnel.


[51] The LTTE claimed to have lost around 35,000 of its cadres and the government claimed to have lost around 26,000 security forces personnel out of a total of about 125,000 lives lost between 1982 and 2009. The LTTE incurred its first casualty on November 27, 1982 and the last probably on May 18, 2009.

[52] See also; Sarvananthan, Muttukrishna, [2007], *"In Pursuit of a Mythical State of Tamil Eelam: a rejoinder to Kristian Stokke"*, *Third World Quarterly*, 28 [6], 1185-95; Kristian Stokke’s reply to Muttukrishna Sarvananthan's rejoinder in the same issue of the journal.

[53] See her memoir, Jayakumaran, Thamilini, [2015], *Oru Koovraalin Nilalil* [in Tamil] [In the shadow of a sharp sword]: A Memoir, Kilinochchi [Sri Lanka]: Sivakami Foundation.

[54] “Suicide is the act of deliberately killing oneself. Risk factors for suicide include mental disorder [such as depression, personality disorder, alcohol dependence, or schizophrenia], and some physical illnesses, such as neurological disorders, cancer, and HIV infection.” World Health Organization [WHO]. URL; [http://www.who.int/topics/suicide/en/](http://www.who.int/topics/suicide/en/)

[55] Radgari, Rusuf, [2008], *"Over 60 percent of suicide bombers in Afghanistan are physically disabled"*, *The Mainichi Daily News*, October 22. URL; [http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20081022p2a00m0na002000c.html](http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20081022p2a00m0na002000c.html)


[62] Because the LTTE broke-off from the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord and began fighting the Indian Peace Keeping Force [IPKF] from October 1987 till September 1989 until the IPKF was abruptly requested to withdraw from North and East of Sri Lanka by the then newly elected President of Sri Lanka.
[63] In defiance of the counsel by the then second-in-command/deputy leader, Kopalasamy Mahendrarajah [alias Sri annai or Mahathaya], and the political adviser to the LTTE leader, Anton Balasingam.

[64] Although the survey questionnaire did not directly ask a question whether they [children] would like to join the LTTE or not, regarding questions about their aspirations for the future [education, employment, etc] not a single respondent expressed a desire to become a combatant or join the LTTE in any other capacity. See Sarvananthan, Muttukrishna, [2006], *Children of War: Aspirations and Opportunities*, Point Pedro [Sri Lanka]: Point Pedro Institute of Development.


[67] Three groups were involved; the Hagana, International Zionist League [IZL], and Lechi. [See Tavin, Ely, and Yonah Alexander [Ed], [1986], *Terrorists or Freedom Fighters: A Tool for the Full Understanding of Who They Are and How They Affect Civilization Today*, Virginia [USA]: HERO Books.

[68] Three groups were involved; namely the African National Congress [ANC], Inkatha Freedom Party, and the Pan-Africanist Congress.

[69] At least two main groups, namely the Palestinian Liberation Organisation [PLO] and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP], were involved. The PLO itself was an umbrella organisation of several armed Palestinian groups; Fatah being the dominant one.


[71] For example, while the LTTE eliminated virtually the entire leadership of the TULF in 1989, it did not do any harm to another erstwhile democratic Tamil party, viz. All Ceylon Tamil Congress [ACTC], because it was a petty party with just marginal popular support.

[72] Ganesan [Iyer], op cit.

[73] Noticed by this author on the wall of an LTTE office building on a visit to Kilinochchi [Northern Sri Lanka] in March 2003 as part of a United Nations [UN] Mission to present the post-conflict needs assessment at a workshop co-hosted by the Government of Sri Lanka [GoSL], LTTE, and the UN.

[74] "A nation must think before it acts" – anonymous.

[75] According to an elderly person during a casual conversation with this author in the LTTE-controlled area of Vanni in 2005.

Tackling Terrorism’s Taboo: Shame
by Matthew Kriner

Abstract
This exploratory article provides a conceptual framework for explaining how shame is used by terrorist organizations in their recruitment and radicalization strategies. Shame is a universal emotion, experienced across all cultures, and as such presents scholars with a platform for easy cross-cultural comparisons of radicalization phenomena. Terrorist use of entitative identities to divide society into adherents and apostates, particularly in the study of religious extremists like jihadist entities, provides a verdant ground of understanding how organizations move people into higher states of radicalization, and potentially enticing them to engage in terrorism. However, as an aversive emotion, shame's taboo status has, it is suggested here, led scholars to overlook its role in past studies of radicalization. This article postulates that emotions and identity are an integral aspect of the social self, and because of shame's regulatory power over social identity and norm adherence, it should be at the core of the study of radicalization processes.

Keywords: Radicalization, Recruitment, Religion, Shame, Social Identity, Terrorism

Introduction
Despite the development of a robust global counter-terrorism regime in the post-9/11 era, radicalization continues to present a clear and present danger to societies around the world. Interdisciplinary efforts have yielded promising avenues to be explored, such as the emotional and psychological mechanisms that affect the social identities of human beings.[1] Given this, and knowing that no unique biographical terrorist profile exists, there is a need to expand the radicalization literature to include more emotional mechanisms to better understand how individuals come to embrace the extreme and violent belief systems threatening societies around the world.[2]

Shame, an oft understudied emotion with powerful influence on the self, presents a compelling avenue to explore, given its near universal applicability to all cultural settings.[3] Emotions and identity, through an understanding of the social aspect of the self and shame's regulatory power on norm adherence, can provide a better understanding of radicalization processes. While modern scholarship has largely overlooked shame's role in radicalization as a mechanism used by terrorist organizations, Fyodor Dostoyevsky's The Demons tackles the issue directly, illustrating how deficiencies in the self, such as sexual fetishes and collectively committing a murder, can help cement a secret terrorist cell's motivation to conduct a revolution.[4] Why is it that a Russian novelist was able to pinpoint the complex emotion that drove terrorism in his day, but modern scholars often overlook the same emotion? In the many years since Dostoyevsky's classic was published, the colloquial and academic use of shame in describing emotional states has receded in favor of its hyponymic relatives, such as humiliation, guilt, and anger. According to Scheff, shame's taboo nature in our modern society may play a role in shame's decline.[5] Shame's taboo is so powerful it is often avoided as a discussion topic even on the conceptual level.[6]

This exploratory article will cast aside such concerns and attempt to peel back the complexity of shame as it relates to terrorist organizations' radicalization strategies. It will address what constitutes shame, through the emotion's associated appraisals, tendencies, and goals, and why it is a critically overlooked component in the radicalization process.[7] With both concepts established, this article will explore how radicalization and shame are related to identity formation and narrative framing, and briefly explore two cases. Finally, the article will contribute a conceptual outline of how terrorist organizations use shame-based narratives and shame's unique nature to advance a radical identity within an established in-group, a process that has become known as radicalization.
Radicalization

Like terrorism and most other complex social science concepts, radicalization does not have a clearly agreed upon definition.[8] A general consensus has emerged that, in terms of the radicalization process, *what* individuals believe is less important than *how* they come to believe it.[9] Additionally, extant literature supports the notion that radicalization can be understood as a phenomenon that can manifest itself cognitively and behaviorally, and generally holds no set or shared profile as to who may become radicalized.[10] Understanding *how* an individual comes to a new worldview that is relationally radical to the mainstream of the society requires an examination of mechanisms.[11]

Three critical definitions can provide a robust framework for conceptualizing the role of shame within radicalization. First, Hafez and Mullins argue that cognitive radicalization is more widespread than its behavioral counterpart, and is defined by “acquiring values, attitudes, and political beliefs that deviate sharply from those of mainstream society.”[12] Similarly, McCauley and Moskalenko posit the radicalization process as a “change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the ingroup.”[13] And Horgan defines radicalization as “the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology.”[14] It is critical to note that these definitions do not seek to claim that the use of violence is a necessary outcome of radicalization.[15] Acknowledging that radicalization is not a deterministic pathway to terrorism is critical for the understanding of shame as a radicalization mechanism and fits within the general consensus of radicalization as non-deterministic.[16]

Moreover, scholarly pursuits to find direct causal explanations for radicalization have largely failed.[17] Alternative approaches have reached a consensus that there are many unique pathways and mechanisms that can coalesce into necessary conditions for radicalization.[18] Importantly, radicalization mechanisms have been identified as a useful way to study how someone comes to a radical belief, which incorporates psychological, neurological, and physical stimuli.[19] Interestingly, in their mechanisms-based approach, McCauley and Moskalenko examine humiliation, anger, hate, facing personal demons, and other similar concepts related to shame in both the individual and collective, but fail to address shame directly.[20] This suggests two important factors. First, emotions are a valid and critical mechanism in the understanding of radicalization.[21] Second, shame is routinely overlooked by radicalization scholars in studying how organizations and movements recruit and radicalize.

Discursive approaches are uniquely relevant when examining the issue of radicalization through the emotional framework.[22] Critically, the discursive approach suggested by Costanza, provides a deeply contextual analysis that seeks to limit the Western bias that pervades the field of radicalization studies. Costanza argues that because individuals are embedded within society, and vice versa, our models to assess radicalization must incorporate that unique and personal dynamic. Narratives, according to Costanza, establish “a standard of conformity in which an individual must decide to either leave the group or share in the doctrinally established group narrative.”[23]

Radicalization, therefore, can best be understood as a culturally contextual and highly personal experience, governed by norms, rules, and societal expectations. When radical entities seek to establish deviant norms from the majority norms, narratives used aid in forcing individuals to choose between the old and the new identity. Thus, emotions and identity, being firmly rooted in the social aspect of the self, should be at the core of the study of radicalization processes.

Shame

The first challenge in understanding shame’s role within radicalization is overcoming the traditional aspects of shame that are associated with escape, aversion, and avoidance.[24] Because radicalization narratives are conventionally understood to be aimed at motivating individuals, emotions that are negatively oriented, such
as shame, are not immediately and logically connected to radicalization studies. Shame is a taboo, an often unconscious emotion, which is triggered by self-reflection.[25] That some scholars suggest shame requires self-reflection should not dismiss shame from a central focus in radicalization studies, as it may be one of the most powerful and extensive emotion humans can experience.[26] The power of shame comes from its ability to deeply challenge the core self with or without public exposure, separating it from other self-conscious emotions like humiliation and guilt, which are social reactions to an exposure of wrongdoing or failure.[27] And according to Thomaes, et al., shame can leave people feeling “strongly devalued, inferior, and exposed.”[28] It is commonly associated with internal attributions for a failure of the stable self, but also with external attributions of a failure of the self. It is connected to a need to prevent public exposure, or the potential exposure, of a self-failure.[29] Shame evokes action tendencies such as “defensiveness, interpersonal separation, and distance.”[30] In the context of the socialized radicalization analysis model proposed by Costanza, shame’s role within the social-self interaction makes it a highly valuable emotion from which to assess radicalization processes.

Furthermore, shame is strongly associated with norm regulation through the concern of how others view the self, particularly the concern that others view one as deficient due to an inability to live up to norms.[31] According to Pivetti, Camodeca, and Rapino, “shame and guilt are generally considered to be the most important adaptive moral, or social, emotions, because they tend to assure the adherence to social norms through their internalization, without requiring the use of external sanctions.”[32] Based on the need to meet certain societal expectations or uphold the norms (morals and belief systems), when the total self (and not just a specific aspect of the self) fails to meet these standards, one may individually assign failure to the self or fear that public exposure will bring social pain. Internalization of shame will lead to preemptive attempts to avoid the public exposure; therefore, the overarching goal of shame is to avoid public and peer devaluation.[33]

In most cases, social pain may result in a casting out from the majority group, but in circumstances where the social norms are set by more extreme actors, it can be accompanied by physical ramifications (e.g., honor killings in ultra-conservative Muslim communities or labeling as an apostate by radical ideological terrorist organizations). These failures are rooted in an understanding that their existence runs counter to mainstream values and beliefs.[34] Therefore, when individuals assign a failure to meet standards of a stable internal factor of the self (e.g. being a homosexual in a deeply conservative household), rather than an external factor (e.g., interference by another person) or an unstable factor of the self (e.g., a failed effort), shame will be evoked.[35] When strategically deployed, shame’s inherent power over the individual can have devastating consequences. Yet, its taboo nature has led to it being drastically understudied as an organizational tool in recruitment and radicalization.

Another aspect of shame that lends promise to the study of radicalization is its long-term impact, or its emotional sentiment.[36] According to Halperin, emotional sentiments exist as a baseline state toward a “person, group, or symbol that is unrelated to any specific action or statement by this object.”[37] Discrete emotional responses and long-term sentiments can take the same form, suggesting that long-term communal failures of identity can imprint and be ‘spiked’ by recurring events that mimic traumatic shame-incidents in a collective identity’s shared history.[38] This is supported by Tracy & Robins’ research, which found that individuals routinely exposed to shame, “may learn to regulate it by making external attributions.”[39] Essentially, shame-prone individuals will escape the conscious acknowledgement of shame within the self, and instead will unconsciously blame others for their failure.[40]

Additionally, Tracy & Robins state that if one does not externalize the blame for failures, then they “may need to adopt a long-term strategy of behavioral modification (e.g., working toward becoming a different kind of person).”[41] The implications of shame’s role as a strategically employed mechanism for radicalization by terrorist organizations is apparent in relation to ingroup-outgroup dynamics and identity formation tactics. Exploitation of this condition of shame may be best understood through theories such as: framing theory, which holds strong value in cognitive psychological processes; and uncertainty-identity theory, which suggests that when individuals are uncertain in their identity of the self, they may turn toward more extreme sources of identity to achieve closure.[42] This will be explored in the discussion section of this article. Furthermore, if
framing narratives are meant to evoke specific emotional responses in a populace toward action, and adopting a worldview, then we can also understand strategic invocations of historic shame-incidents as a means of externally applied norm regulation. Additionally, the lack of resolution for specific shame-incidents may create a festering wound in a shared identity that is free to be re-opened by radicalizers at will.

It is important to note that shame is often used interchangeably with guilt or humiliation (including within the clinical setting), and distinctions from guilt and humiliation stem from the individual appraisal of a shame-inducing event. According to June Tangney, differentiation between the two emotions is delicate, but important, and when people feel shame, “they feel badly for themselves; when people feel guilt, they feel badly about a specific behavior.” This presents unique challenges to past research (e.g. fury studies) that utilized shame’s hyponymic cousins - anger and humiliation. However, while this is beyond the scope of this article, the potential of incorrect categorization of such similar emotions in past research on radicalization should be addressed in future research.

What we can infer from the assessment of shame’s emotional uniqueness is that shame is an immensely powerful and formative emotion. Moreover, shame-based narratives are powerful for pushing individuals toward accepting a new worldview, particularly if the social pain derived from non-conformity is amplified with a threat to an individual’s safety, stemming from moral transgressions and norm violations. Second, when an individual’s social value derives from an ingroup that is beset by a terrorist narrative that seeks to divide the ingroup into adherents to their worldview and those that are in a state of impropriety, conditions for the utilization of shame as a recruitment and radicalization mechanism emerge.

The Conceptual Application of Shame to Radicalization Studies

Theoretical Connection

As the study of radicalization has largely shifted from examining what people believe, to how they come to believe it, there is clear value in considering shame as an emotional mechanism within a process of incremental adoption and commitment to a radical identity and worldview. Emotional mechanisms provide a strong understanding of how someone comes to believe something, and in ongoing conflicts, they can shed light on the contributing radicalization factors within an individual or within communities that go unnoticed due to their repressed taboo nature. Terrorist organizations, like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, routinely engage in use of emotion-based narratives in their recruitment and radicalization strategies. For example, in an online statement released in March 2010, al-Qaeda’s infamous radicalizer, Anwar al-Awlaki, posed the following question to American Muslims:

With the American invasion of Iraq and continued U.S. aggression against Muslims, I could not reconcile between living in the U.S. and being a Muslim, and I eventually came to the conclusion that jihad against America is binding upon myself just as it is binding on every other Muslim....

To the Muslims in America, I have this to say: How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters?

Such questions within jihadist recruitment narratives are designed to stoke uncertainty within the dual identity nature of Muslim Americans. In referencing the conscience and juxtaposing a shared proto-Muslim worldview against the framed immorality of the host nation (in this case, America), al-Awlaki and his fellow jihadist ideologues hope to shame listeners into abandoning their attachment to the American identity and taking up arms to rectify its wrongdoings. Such pleas are supported by an internal ‘awakening’ by al-Awlaki who determined that his identity could not support both American and Muslim values in his total self. On the other hand, Muslim Americans who believe the teachings of al-Awlaki to be repugnant, may find it shameful to learn that there are Muslim Americans who agree with him, or that he himself was American. To resolve such painful revelations, they may distance themselves from challenging these individuals, or ignore the contentious topic
altogether.

The following discussion of how shame may play a central role in terrorist organizations’ upstream recruitment and radicalization strategies is not intended to be an exhaustive exploration of the interaction between the two subjects. On the contrary, shame’s near universal presence in our lives and its need for self-reflection suggest that its role within radicalization is likely present across the process as a whole, and not just in discrete applications. [52]

First, shame’s ability to impact identity through peer devaluation and outgroup blame merits significant attention by scholars. Analysis of terrorist organizations’ use of shame can, and should, be conducted on both the individual and group level. Individual and collective experiences of shame are easily exploitable by those seeking to affix an entitative identity onto as many recruits as possible. The nexus between shame’s concern over others’ perception of one’s self and the role groups play in protecting the self through affiliation with an identity group that provides the individual with a positive association, suggest a widespread presence of the use of shame in individuals’ pursuit of a group identity which may affirm their worldview, and the use of shame to increase the group’s identity narrative in a radical context.[53]

Uncertainty-identity theory provides a strong conceptualization of the relationship between shame and “motivational underpinnings of social identity processes.”[54] Because uncertainty is an aversive sentiment, it motivates one to take action at reducing uncertainty, particularly those uncertainties that relate to the self.[55] Most notably, attachment to entitative groups (a pure representation of the ingroup identity) present a clear resolution to the uncertainty of the self’s categorization within the social sphere.[56] These narratives seek to dismiss those within the ingroup that would, if given the proper platform or enough power, dismantle the entitative argument of the terrorist organization.

This is remarkably like the action tendencies of shame, which seek to reduce uncertainty over the potential publicization of moral transgressions and the effect that may have on one’s social standing.[57] Because shame is a cognitive emotion that requires self-reflection, when narratives that seek to force a dichotomous identity upon an ingroup emerge from terrorist organizations, an unconscious or conscious questioning of an individual’s sense of attachment to the shared identity will occur, particularly if they center on morality and norm violation.[58] In such circumstances, when one perceives the ingroup as having positive moral value, adopting those values may provide an avenue to resolve the uncertainty the moral shaming instigated. However, complete avoidance of the shame will likely occur among those that are more concerned with their social image rather than the violation of the moral norm.[59]

Shame Narratives

Additionally, radicalization narratives are not only meant to attract people who are already sympathetic to a terrorist cause but are also meant to divide populations into two groups: sympathizers (and thus potential recruits) and apostates. Apostates, or those who reject the moral identity of the entitative group, thus serve the terrorist agenda by providing a foil against which organizations can attach a negative image to that which threatens the entitative identity they promote. The goal of shame, to distance one’s self from social pain, thus presents terrorist organizations with a strong tool of societal division, particularly when attached to an entitative narrative.[60] Once the societal division has been established, norm violation narratives become an even more effective tool, particularly if the entitative group utilizes previously shared identity factors like a shared religious or nationalist outlook. In situations where identity is multifaceted, such as religio-nationalist or ethno-nationalist, the effectiveness of shame-based entitative group narratives may be particularly pronounced.

In addition to shame’s ingroup role in identification with entitative groups, its relation to norm regulation exposes how radical narratives may find footholds in otherwise ‘normal’ individuals and inoculate communities. The method by which terrorist organizations can utilize shame for norm regulation depends on how the narrative is framed within societies.[61] Examples of these types of narratives exist in jihadist framings of conflicts wherein the concept of the global ummah is evoked as a blanket identity for all Muslims, whereby anyone who
does not seek to act in its protection against aggressors are considered inferior Muslims and possibly apostates. Such narratives may evoke a sense of failure of the self within recipients of the message because much of the narrative is rooted in an already shared worldview via vessels like Quranic texts, shame’s typical goals of distancing become difficult if not impossible to achieve without also rejecting the stable self. Thus, it is entirely possible that an acceptance of the radical narrative becomes easier than rejecting the stable aspects of the self that is deemed to be a failure, thus fulfilling the action tendencies of shame through an unexpected pathway.

Importantly, the application of entitative, or vanguard, narratives to encourage popular support of a more radical identity is not confined to the Islamic world’s internal jihadist challenge to the Muslim identity. Like shame itself, entitative and vanguard narratives are found across most forms of social movements and extremist entities. For example, extreme Israeli settler factions have long utilized a similar narrative that seeks to diminish the majority of the Israeli populace who do not support a stronger adherence to the Greater Land of Israel ideology. Shame is applied in their invocation of narratives that the Government of Israel will at times act as a Nazi-esque regime bent on preventing the ‘true’ Jewish nation from emerging.[62]

Additionally, in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, various shame-incidents are routinely evoked by both sides in their cultural framing of the necessity for in-group adherence and promotion. From the Palestinian side, the Nakba (the great tragedy and failure to stop expulsion of Arabs at the hands of the Zionists) continues to justify a strong ingroup defense against the ‘other’ (Israeli Zionists) which subjected the ingroup to a shameful status.[63] The shame in this instance is a failure to be strong enough to stop the tragedy that befell those who shared the ingroup identity. Radicalizing narratives thus attempt to capitalize on this open sore by stating that a stronger, more self-sufficient Palestinian effort is required to atone for this past failure. Most importantly, anyone who disagree with this approach can be shamed as ‘collaborators’ or ‘sympathizers’ with the Israelis.

On the other side of the conflict, Israeli settlers use similar narrative ploys to exploit nearly identical shame-incidents. In Hebron, the 1929 massacre continues to serve as a recruitment and radicalization agent for individuals to justify aggressive activities that fit a minimal definition of radical behavior.[64] What we can infer from the actions taken is that these individuals have accepted the worldviews on both sides that they must act to atone for past failures of the collective self to prevent an incident from occurring. Failure to have been prepared for the event is a failure internally and collectively, and, as suggested by Tracy & Robins, the shame of the event is shifted almost simultaneously into an anger at an outgroup.[65] While studies have examined these types of incidents and grievances from the perspective of a humiliation motivation, there is a need to look deeper as these types of events. This suggests a longer impact on the individual(s) and thus constitutes an emotional sentiment rather than a discrete emotional response to a specific event or recurring events.[66]

Moreover, these group-based expressions of shame run parallel to individual capabilities to experience shame over the same issues, and both act as norm regulators by rejecting individual failure to adhere to the belief as incompatible with what constitutes a proper Palestinian or Israeli outlook. Additionally, these narratives serve as bulwarks against perceived threats against the ingroup's identity and thus against the norms and values to which they adhere.[67] For those who identify as Israeli, rejection by other Israelis for not supporting the idea that Jews should live in Biblical Jewish lands can lead to the appraisal that they will experience social pain should that opinion be made public. Equally, Palestinians who do not share the belief in the so-called “right to return” may asses that the social pain associated with publicization of their disagreement will be met with ostracization. Ultimately, both sides may find that agreeing with the narrative, or saying nothing at all, is easier than attempting to debate the topic internally, which may bring down social repercussions. While these cases are not the same in terms of degree to terrorist organizational uses of shame, they demonstrate how communal beliefs can justify adoption of more extreme narratives.
Shame as a Terrorist Tool

In further exploring the social devaluation aspect of shame, we can look at efforts like jihadist’s da’wa recruitment. In the United Kingdom, the al-Muhajiroun network’s (and its successors’) street da’wa recruitment efforts offer a unique opportunity to examine the application of shame in recruitment and radicalization efforts. Al-Muhajiroun embraces a stringent entitative narrative of ingroup-outgroup conflict between Islam and the West. [68] The commitment to the identity extends beyond words through physical appearances which signify a ‘true’ Muslim, such as traditional Islamic garb, beards, and other items which essentially create an easily identifiable uniform of the adherent Muslim. Furthermore, according to al-Muhajiroun, true Islam is incompatible with secular nationalism, and thus any Muslim that claims to be British cannot also be a true Muslim, and thus is inferior to the al-Muhajiroun’s members. Such a challenge to the stable self will drive uncertainty, and even the slightest uncertainty can cognitively open the recipients to doubts about their own worldview.[69]

The organization’s action repertoire utilizes a street-level peer-to-peer advocacy for their radical worldview and identity.[70] By challenging people in the streets with their bullhorn style of proselytizing, al-Muhajiroun’s agents thrust the exposed individual into a reflection of the self. Peer devaluation and social pain is not a potential in these circumstances, but is instead immediate and unavoidable given the intimacy of the encounters, decreasing options to achieve shame’s goal orientations such as distancing, removal and avoidance.[71]

As evidenced by watching the al-Muhajiroun network’s online da’wa videos, most targets of the network’s proselytizing will slide by and avoid any confrontation, clearly uncomfortable with the brazen display of radical perceptions which deeply contradict British norms and values. For those passersby who are Muslim and identify more strongly with a pluralistic British-Muslim identity, perceptions of how most British citizens view al-Muhajiroun’s representation of Muslims may evoke a sense of shame for being associated with such perverted understandings of what constitutes a ‘true’ Muslim, and may lead to disengagement and unwillingness to challenge the al-Muhajiroun activists. In contemporary thinking of radicalization wherein the narrative failed to attract support, this would preclude the street da’wa as a success. However, when we consider that shame can act as a mechanism to both attract and push away people, such brazen and aggressive narratives actually benefit the organizational needs of groups like al-Muhajiroun. Essentially, if such efforts by al-Muhajiroun yield one recruit out of every 50 people that walk by, they have also created 49 individuals who aren’t actively banding together against their narrative to the product al-Muhajiroun’s members are selling.[72] This is a crucial victory for entitative groups, as overcoming their relative weakness as a minority status is their greatest challenge.

Framing Shame

To understand how to analyze shame within the radicalization process, it is important to understand the benefit of emotions-based narrative framing. Hafez’s case study highlights the use of emotional narratives within Iraq to mobilize recruits into conducting suicide bombings on behalf of terrorist organizations.[73] Hitting the nail on the head, Hafez explains how these narratives “exaggerate mistreatment of women and appeal to the masculinity of men” to shame them into action.[74] Suicide bombers, were given an elevated status of “extraordinary moral beings who make the ultimate sacrifice” on behalf of the greater in-group identity, the Muslim nation.[75]

The organizations Hafez highlighted in his study used narratives like global persecution of Muslims by Western “crusaders,” failures of Muslim governments to protect against these persecutions (as well as their complicity in the persecutions), and the promotion of the martyrdom of Muslims that have fought and sacrificed themselves to protect the ingroup identity.[76] The purpose is to “weave together these three narratives to suggest a deleterious condition that requires immediate action, offer an explanation of the causes of this persistent condition, and present the necessary solution to overcome the problem.”[77] Hafez argues that “humiliation is at the heart of the mobilizing narratives of insurgents” due to imagery that highlights violations of Iraqi and Muslim norms (i.e., deaths of their women and children, the fall of the Iraqi government, military targeting of mosques during prayers, U.S. soldiers shooting or denigrating Iraqi insurgents by stepping on their backs,
and more).[78] Furthermore, Hafez asserts that these images are designed to “personalize the suffering and heighten the sense of powerlessness and indignations that many Muslims feel.”[79] Such narratives are the gold standard in understanding how uncertainty over one’s status quo can be pushed toward radical worldviews through shame-inducing imagery and framings.

What Hafez describes is a clear attempt to manipulate the emotional sentiment of shame within the Iraqi and broader Muslim identity. Moreover, Hafez highlights a specific hymn that is chanted in insurgent videos which states:

With the Sharp Weapon of Truth
We will liberate the lands of the free
And bring back purity to the land of Jerusalem
After the humiliation and shame. [80]

What is abundantly clear from this passage and the study conducted by Hafez on the role that framing plays in radicalization efforts by terrorist organizations, is the direct and intentional use of shame as a mobilizing and radicalizing agent. The study also highlights the use of entitative narratives which promote ingroup divisions between Sunni and Shia Muslims, and labels Iraqi security forces as “collaborators” of the American forces.[81]

**Shame’s Role in Justifying Violence**

Lastly, in tackling the potential link between shame and the justification for violence, scholarly efforts should turn to theories such as the *shame-rage spiral* for explanation.[82] Through its combination with framing narratives, this theory may shed light on how terrorist organizations can condition an ingroup to be accepting of violent actions to alleviate or preempt the social pain that could emerge in an ‘other’-imposed shame incident. Doojse et al. assert that virtually all ingroups perceive themselves as morally superior and when threats manifest against that superiority, it could provoke a feeling of shame, making it easier to cognitively accept violence to forcibly reject the perceived threat.[83]

Additionally, long-term collective shame sentiments framed by terrorist organizations, such as the ineptness of Muslim regimes in protecting their land against Western invasions, present particularly rich mines of emotive sentiment to draw upon for mobilizing individuals towards radical states and a willingness to justify violence. Failures that are transformed into external blame may become a source of anger that is prompted by an effort to internally escape the necessary self-reflection to process the shame event that is occurring.[84] Prolonged exposure to shame may lead to shame proneness within affected communities and increased “anger arousal, irritability, and indirect hostility.”[85] As of yet, there remains no indication that this shamed into anger state of mind may lead to direct aggression, though it does suggest that individuals suffering from a shame-anger emotional state could be more susceptible to narratives which help direct blame of negative events to external targets.

In terms of jihadist radicalization, narratives that seek to establish a defensive jihad justification may declare the need to deploy violent tactics or intimidation tactics in preemption of another Western effort that could bring shame upon Islam or Muslims globally. By asking the global *ummah* to mobilize, these narratives seek to cast those who do not act as complicit in perpetuating shame upon the collective Muslim identity. The connection between the long-term stable self’s failure to adhere to expected norms of collective defense of the broader ingroup identity and the entitative identity narrative provide terrorist organizations with an immensely influential tool. This may also explain why previous radicalization models portray the increasing assumption of the entitative identity and actions in its defense as a deterministic pathway to terror.
In a stark example of how shame-based activities and narratives can influence individual actions, al-Mahjiroun was linked ideologically to the murderers of British soldier Lee Rigby. Both attackers, Michael Adebowale and Michael Adebolajo, had attended al-Mahjiroun rallies and demonstrations.[86] Adebolajo, it was later revealed, received direct tutoring from Omar Bakri Mohammad, the founder of al-Muhjiroun.[87] One of the issues that motivated the recent convert to Islam, according to Bakri Mohammad, was the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan by American-led Western forces.[88] Narrative calls to defend against the West’s invasion of those two countries are in no short supply, and there is a strong likelihood that the oft-angered Adebolajo was struggling with the shame surrounding the injustices he perceived associated with those invasions. Many others like Adebolajo exist, and not just in the context of jihadism. Shame is a universal emotion and its study within radicalization should extend to other radicalization case studies, especially those that can be described as attitudinal radicalization, wherein justification of violence is accepted, but the use of violence has not yet materialized.[89]

**Conclusion**

This search for a hidden underlying factor that may predispose some individuals and communities to radicalization narratives has identified shame, a self-conscious emotion which manifests itself unconsciously at times, as a potential missing link in more upstream aspects of process-based radicalization models. In addition, it is distinctly possible that individuals and communities routinely exposed to compelling shame narratives and events may carry with them an emotional sentiment of shame that exists more persistently than the discrete emotional experiences a single event may evoke. This persistent emotional predisposition can be kindling for terrorist organizations keen on exploiting cultural, religious and political shifts. For example, in looking beyond the case of al-Muhajiroun to other circumstances of recent domestic radicalization challenges, long-term shame sentiments may play a role in understanding the phenomena of second and third generation extremism in European countries such as France and Belgium, two countries recently beset by waves of terrorist attacks perpetrated by Muslims with an immigration background in their families. To uncover the impact of long-term shame narratives on radicalization, future research should employ empirical assessments of outlets like al Qaeda’s *Inspire* and the Islamic State’s *Dabiq* magazines to assess how shame is situated and exploited in the texts. Additionally, examinations of prominent radicalizers like Anwar al-Awlaki’s statements for shame narratives could provide more robust support to the theoretical connections suggested in this article. Most critically, future research should not shy away from expanding the role of shame beyond the immediate threats posed by *jihadist* terrorist organizations, as shame’s universal presence suggests a broader role in political extremism for this taboo emotion. The rise of right-wing nationalist groups and political parties expressing their own distinct identity as a justification for expelling or maligning those they deem unfit to be part of the community and therefore generally acceptable, should place shame firmly in the exploration of emotional mechanisms which attract, mobilize and then exploit people through radicalization. In addition, future research should also examine, in tandem, shame’s paired emotion – pride. Perceptions of ingroup superiority should not be separated from perceptions of shame. If at one end of a pendular spectrum exists the complete withdrawal from a shared identity due to shame, the other end logically would be the complete attachment to a collective identity due to pride. The two should be explored together and in their interactions.

In conclusion, some terrorist organizations have knowingly, and others perhaps unknowingly, utilized this extremely powerful emotional taboo to exploit societal schisms and drive recruitment and radicalization. Shame gives these organizations a lever to cognitively break into their self and open them up for their radical narrative. Framing conflicts or an ‘other’ as a perpetrator of routine and historic injustices against the society can create a sense of failure of the stable self for not doing more to protect the in-group image and allow for externalization of blame and anger. Moreover, targeted messaging and personal interactions are heightened in their narrative ploys when shame is deployed via peer devaluation, the core tenet of shame’s aversion tendency. In sum, shame deserves a more central place in explanations of both individual and collective radicalization.
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Notes


[8] Borum, 2011a, 7


[23] Ibid., 7.


[34] Costanza, 2015, 7; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007, 348.


[38] Ibid., 23.


[55] Ibid.


[72] These numbers are for example only and are not intended to act as a source of empirical evidence.


[74] Ibid.


[76] Ibid.


[80] Video is 55 minutes, 12 seconds, entitled “Persist” or “Continue,” issued by the Islamic Army in Iraq and distributed through al-Meer Forum (www.almeer.net=vb) in January 2006.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Lewis, 1971, 419.


Spaces, Ties, and Agency: The Formation of Radical Networks

by Stefan Malthaner

Abstract:

The literature on radicalization as well as studies on participation in high-risk activism have emphasized the role of personal ties and radical networks in shaping pathways towards political violence. Yet, our knowledge about how these radical networks are formed remains limited. Drawing on an in-depth case study of the network around the so-called “Sauerland-Group” in Germany, this article examines patterns of network-formation, focusing on: (i) the role and function of different types of social ties in creating and sustaining radical networks; (ii) the importance of different spaces and events in initiating and reinforcing connections between activists; and (iii) the role of individual agency and pro-active connection-making in this process. In a more general sense, this article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of radicalization as a relational process, emphasizing the fact that individual trajectories are closely interlinked with radical networks as the dynamic setting of jihadist micro-mobilization. This network facilitates and shapes pathways into violent activism and at the same time is created and constantly re-shaped by militant activists.

Keywords: Radicalization, Networks, Jihadism, Radical Milieus, Germany

Introduction

That relationships and social networks matter is a rather well-established finding in research on radicalization. Drawing, in part, on earlier works in the field of social movement studies, authors like Marc Sageman and Quintan Wiktorowicz among numerous others have pointed out that participation in acts of political violence is also the result of pre-existing personal ties to militant activists, processes of socialization in radical movements, and small-group dynamics in clandestine cells.[1] Yet, despite these advances, our knowledge about how these networks are formed remains limited, which is partly due to a lack of adequate data, but also results from the fact that radicalization is often studied with a focus on individual characteristics and trajectories.[2] That network-formation processes are of particular relevance to the study of radicalization becomes clear if we look at the phenomenon of jihadist radicalization in the West, which often (if not always) starts as a “bottom-up”-process in which individuals radicalize within the loose context of a broader Salafist movement and actively seek to establish contacts with like-minded activists, with whom they form informal and largely autonomous radical networks, before they initiate ties with jihadist organizations abroad or, in some instances, carry out violent attacks on their own.[3] In other words, rather than representing a process of “being recruited” into an existing militant group, radicalization, in this case, often follows a rather complex, dynamic pattern in which the main social settings of radicalization – informal radical networks – emerge and evolve as part of the process.

Drawing on an in-depth case study of the network around the so-called “Sauerland-Group”, a group of four young men who were arrested in Germany in September 2007, this paper examines the formation of radical “grassroots”-networks as a setting of jihadist radicalization in Europe. Building on the recent literature at the intersection of social movement studies and research on political violence, it focuses on three elements in the process of network-formation: (i) the role and function of different types of social ties in creating and sustaining radical networks; (ii) the importance of different types of spaces, settings, and events in initiating and reinforcing connections and social relations between activists; and (iii) the role of individual agency and pro-active connection-making in this process. This implies conceiving of individuals not as passive objects of radicalizing influences exerted by a (static) social environment, but as entrepreneurs actively creating the ties and networks that then become the setting of their radicalization. In a more general sense, this article thus seeks to contribute to our understanding of radicalization as a relational process by emphasizing the fact that individual trajectories are closely and dynamically interlinked with emerging radical networks.
The limits of this research-design are obvious. As a single case study – even one that comprises more than 40 individuals and three separate local clusters – the mechanisms and patterns identified in the analysis are not generalizable. However, the article nevertheless seeks to identify potentially recurrent mechanisms and to offer a theoretical perspective that can be relevant to the study of political violence more generally, while being aware that specific processes in particular cases will differ with respect to the relative role of these mechanisms as well as in their overall trajectory.

At the outset, a note on some of the central concepts used in the analysis is in order. The term “radicalization” is used here in the sense of violent radicalization, to refer to processes leading to acts of political violence. As a more thorough conceptual debate, which would need to address the complex relation between cognitive and behavioral aspects of radicalization (radicalization of beliefs vs. radicalization of actions) as well as the fact that radicalization is a fundamentally social process (of joining and disengaging),[4] is beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say that “radicalization” will, in the following, denote to the composite processes by which, as Borum put it, “people come to adopt beliefs that not only justify violence but compel it, and how they progress – or not – from thinking to action”.[5] The term “radical networks” is used here in the sense of emergent patterns of informal social relationships between activists participating, or seeking to participate, in militant forms of action.[6] It is important to note that in research on terrorism, the term “network” has been used in various and quite different ways. In addition to the notion of networks as informal radical “grassroots-networks” adopted here, the term has also been used to describe the overall structure of particular terrorist groups, structured along a more horizontal, de-centralized pattern of semi-autonomous groups and individuals coordinated by central nodes (i.e. al Qaeda as a transnational network).[7]

Social Ties and Radical Networks in Research on Radicalization

As mentioned above, network-approaches have been popular in studies on participation in protest movements as well as in more recent research on radicalization. Numerous works refer to personal ties and informal radical networks in order to explain how and why individuals end up participating in acts of violence, pointing, in particular, to the role of friendship- and kinship relations in facilitating recruitment and to the dynamics of small groups that become “echo-chambers” for radical beliefs and exert peer-pressure on their members.[8] Yet, among these studies, only few undertake more serious efforts to contextualize radicalization within movements and milieus, and even fewer actually analyze the structure or the formation of radical networks, as most of them conceive of social ties primarily as a factor shaping individual pathways and the adoption of radical beliefs.[9] In the field of radicalization studies, Quintan Wiktorowicz was one of the first to focus on how individual trajectories are embedded in broader radical movements, emphasizing not only pre-existing personal ties that function as a social pathway for joining a militant movement, but also intense processes of socialization taking place within closed study groups where ideological commitment is reinforced by personal and emotional ties that render individuals ready to engage in militant action.[10] Even more influential, Marc Sageman has developed a perspective on jihadist radicalization in the West that takes into account its specific micro-mobilization settings. He argues that radicalization, in this case, typically takes place as a process driven by more or less autonomous cliques of like-minded friends in which strong bonds promote loyalty and group-cohesion. These small, tightly knit groups often form in the context of mosques, but then gradually withdraw from that environment and become the site of intensive interactions (echo chambers), in which radical perceptions and beliefs are reinforced.[11] Subsequent research has further elaborated upon particular places and settings of radicalization;[12] and introducing the concept of “radical milieu” Waldmann and Malthaner have drawn attention to the immediate, supportive environment of militant groups, which also forms the social context in which individual pathways of radicalization and recruitment are embedded.[13] Moreover, and a number of empirical case-studies provided valuable insights into the make-up of particular local jihadist networks,[14] without, however, more systematically examining the patterns in which these networks emerge.

In the field of social movement studies, research on participation in high-risk activism has from quite early on drawn attention to the fact that individual pathways are structurally embedded within socio-spatial settings
Analyzing the Formation of Radical Networks: Social Ties, Spaces, and the Role of Agency

While, in research on mobilization and radicalization, the term “networks” is often used to designate relatively stable patterns of relationships that allow for collective action, it is important, as Diani and Mische argue, to highlight their dynamic character, which follows from the fact that networks comprise of social relationships formed and transformed by interactions: “since networks are constructed through interactions – and interactions always entail a degree of contingency and fluidity – then of course, networks change”. [19] Particularly in the case of radical “grassroots”-networks, one should be careful not to reify them as structures determining actions of the individuals involved, but conceive of networks as the outcome of patterned interactions, comprising ties that are situationally activated in often contingent interaction settings. [20] It is with this basic understanding in mind that an attempt is made here to develop a simple conceptual framework to analyze the formation and evolution of radical networks, specifying forms and functions of social ties and some of the conditions and mechanisms of their emergence.

Forms of Ties

A first, useful basic distinction, which is well established in the literature on micro-mobilization, is that between weak ties and strong ties. [21] Strong ties imply prolonged interaction, significant emotional investment, loyalty, and shared values. Weak ties, conversely, are characterized by lower levels of engagement and commitment and may consist in mere superficial contacts based on few encounters. Because these establish links between otherwise unconnected clusters, weak ties are considered crucial in enabling collaboration and the spread of ideas and information across a broader movement, whereas strong personal ties, which generate trust and loyalty, are important for recruiting new members into high-risk activism and underground groups. [22] In other words, weak and strong ties both fulfill crucial but different roles in sustaining political activism as well as in the formation and expansion of network-connections. Passy further specifies three main functions of social ties, namely socialization, structural-connection, and decision-shaping. [23] Social relationships shape more stable patterns of values, norms, and identities (socialization function) as well as more specific and short-term perceptions and expectations that influence decision-making. The structural-connection function of social ties, finally, corresponds to the role of personal relations in “structurally” linking potential recruits to other social activists.

Formation of Ties

With respect to the question of how social ties emerge, a first assumption that can be derived from these approaches, is that new social ties are often facilitated and created by pre-existing social ties. One gets to know new people via the friends and acquaintances one already has, which involves a simple mechanic of connection-making but also a social dynamic of bestowing familiarity and trust on new relations formed via mutual friends (who implicitly or explicitly “vouch” for new acquaintances). Thereby, it is important to take into account that beyond pre-existing social ties that create initial access to social movement activists, important connections are
also formed at later stages, based on newly formed comrade-friendships and acquaintances in a movement or in certain milieus, which inter-link different clusters of activists, connect non-militant activists to more radical cliques, or establish ties with terrorist organizations abroad.

Yet, new ties can also be formed in the absence of direct prior connections, by meeting people in “chance” encounters. These encounters are facilitated and to some extent “produced” by particular socio-spatial settings, shared membership in larger organizations or movements, or co-presence at events. In their earlier work on micro-mobilization, Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson have emphasized the role of different types of social settings in facilitating or constraining the formation of connections between movements and potential recruits. [24] Similarly, in a more recent article, Cross and Snow point out that free spaces created by grassroots activism, which are to some extent removed from state surveillance, provide spaces for militants to form ties with like-minded radical activists.[25] Thereby, beyond facilitating first encounters, particular social-spatial settings can also be conducive to the strengthening of relationships, providing safe-spaces for comrade-friendships to evolve.

Thus, an important element of the analytical framework developed here is the role of socio-spatial settings and events in facilitating the formation of social ties. Based on their relative openness and the types of relationships they allow to be formed, Lindekilde, Malthaner, and O’Connor have identified several types of spaces that are of relevance to processes of radicalization [26]: (a) Neutral spaces are settings of daily life which have no political or radical content but facilitate encounters and the formation of ties by creating structural proximity between otherwise unconnected individuals (workplace, gym, school, etc.). (b) Open movement spaces represent spaces – permanent or temporary (demonstrations, gatherings) – created by activities of the broader (non-militant) movement, including, for example, mosques or Islam-seminars. As these spaces are accessible for a wide range of activists and outsiders, and are characterized by a high turnover, they offer opportunities for a broad range of encounters and foster the formation of new ties between a broad range of hitherto unconnected activists. (c) Local radical milieus are spaces created by more radical parts of a movement in which a more or less stable group of people meets and interacts regularly, including settings such as, for example, smaller Islamic centers, “backstreet”-mosques, or associations around more or less openly radical preachers and activists. While still accessible for outsiders, they are not as open as the first category of spaces, and newcomers are noted and scrutinized and mechanisms of social control enforce a certain degree of conformity and limit defection. These characteristics also mean that they represent to some extent protected spaces that allow for dissident discourse to be voiced openly; but, at the same time, these are spaces that attract the authorities’ attention and participation entails that individuals may be identified as “radicals” and become the object of police surveillance or persecution. A last type, (d) radical micro-settings, are spaces created by smaller radical networks or groups, composed of sites such as private meeting places or shared apartments. Particularly in later stages in the process of radicalization, small radical groups tend to separate from larger milieus and meet in private places that facilitate much more intensive forms of (peer-to-peer) socialization and group deliberation, based on close and personal relationships, and are accessible to outsiders only if one is introduced by a member of that group. Thus, establishing new ties is limited to bringing in close personal friends, and the role of these settings is as much to reinforce established relationships as it is to create new ones. All of these settings are, of course, not only “real-world” physical spaces, but also can take the form of virtual (online) spaces, such as websites, online-forums, chat-rooms, and social-network-platforms, which, analogous to the categories described above, can vary in terms of the openness/restricted nature of access, and their connection-establishing function.

Agency

One of the risks of conceiving of networks in processes of mobilization as simple “conduits” is to ignore the multivalence of social ties; that is, the fact that relationships can facilitate as well as inhibit participation.[27] Another, related tendency is to depict individuals as more or less passive objects of social dynamics, in which ties are formed automatically along a mechanistic logic and individuals’ preferences are shaped by socialization in cliques and networks that are seen as extant and stable. With respect to the processes in which networks are formed, this is misleading in two ways. Not only is there a great degree of selectivity and individual choice about which among a myriad of pre-existing ties and encounters becomes “activated” and significant for a
person's subsequent pathway.[28] There exists also a considerable amount of entrepreneurship and initiative on the part of (at least some) individuals who actively seek to connect certain activists or groups, create and sustain social relationships and thus establish and maintain radical networks. These represent the setting of their own micro-mobilization as well as the basis for their militant activism. While pre-existing ties and socio-spatial settings facilitate and foster connections and relationships, they are also “made” as a result of deliberate and goal-oriented actions of individual activists. As a result, particularly (but not only) in the case of jihadist radicalization in Europe, the distinction between individual pathways of radicalization on the one hand and the formation of radical networks as their relational setting on the other becomes blurred. As this article seeks to show, radical networks are built via connections actively formed between individuals in the process of radicalization, representing the micro-mobilization setting shaping individual pathways and, at the same time, the outcome of radicalization as a dynamic networking-process.

The Formation of the “Sauerland-Group” and its Radical Network

To illustrate and apply this analytical framework, this article draws on the case of the so-called “Sauerland-Group” and the network from which it emerged. The study is based on a combination of extensive use of documentary sources, including restricted court documents and police files, a collection of primary sources (newsletters of local Salafist groups, videos produced by members of the network, letters), and interviews with police-officers, local Muslim activists and religious leaders, as well as former members and family members of activists of one of the Salafist milieus connected to the case.[29] Successive stages of network formation, thereby, are illustrated by charts specifying the most relevant ties as well as milieus and spaces (for legend, see figure 1 below).

The name “Sauerland-Group” was coined by the press with reference to the area in Germany where the group was arrested in September 2007 while in the process of preparing explosive devices they were planning to use in attacks against US military and civilian targets in the country.[30] The three men who were arrested included two German converts to Islam, Fritz G. and Daniel S., and Adem Y., the latter a son of Turkish Muslim migrants. A fourth member, Attila S., had left the group shortly before. The four members of the group came from three different areas in Germany – Frankfurt, Ulm/Neu-Ulm, and Neunkirchen, a smaller town in the Saarland region – and had been members of local Salafist milieus and smaller friendship groups. Within these local milieus, small groups of like-minded friends developed, which then became connected to form a largely autonomous, informal jihadist network, which comprised more than 40 individuals. From that group, more than a dozen travelled abroad to join armed groups in Afghanistan.

The Formation of Close Bonds in Local Milieus and Friendship Groups

Social ties played a crucial role in initial phases of the trajectories of all four later members of the “Sauerland-Group”, triggering their interest in Islam and linking them to local Salafist milieus or friendship groups. Yet, the types of connection and their later role in the process were quite different. In two cases (Adem Y. and Daniel S.) chance encounters in neutral spaces, rather than pre-existing ties, provided initial inspiration and contacts. Adem Y. started to take a renewed interest in Islam after meeting a colleague at work who was an observant Muslim and who told him about his religion in long conversations. This brought him to attend services at a Salafist mosque in the city – an open space of the Salafist movement –, where he met and became part of a circle of like-minded friends, while contact with his acquaintance from work broke off soon thereafter. Daniel S. met a young Salafist Muslim while playing basketball in a street-corner and, impressed by his calmness and self-confidence, became his friend and mentee. In contrast to Adem Y.’s acquaintance who never was part of a radical milieu, Daniel S.’ Salafist mentor became a member of the emerging jihadist network and eventually travelled to Afghanistan, too. Together with two or three other young Muslims they formed a close group of “brothers” in Neunkirchen. They attended a local mosque, but with their increasing radicalization the group gradually isolated themselves within the (moderate) local Muslim community, making the group – even at this early stage – the primary setting of radicalization.[32] Fritz G. and Attila S. both found their way to Islam via pre-existing ties, namely childhood friends who had become observant (Salafist) Muslims. In both cases, these
friends invited them to their homes, taught them about Islam, and gradually introduced them to the milieu around the Multi-Kultur-Haus ("Multi-Culture-House", MKH) in Neu-Ulm.[33] Within that environment, Attila S. and Fritz G. were not only exposed to a framework of interpretation that emphasized the alleged global persecution and suffering of Muslims and the glorification of jihad, but also formed relationships with other young activists, particularly a group around the preacher’s son that organized a religious study circle and produced a newsletter. For Attila S., Fritz G. became like an older brother and mentor and together with at least two other individuals they formed a close friendship group that took a more serious interest in violent jihad, together watching jihadist videos and making plans to join the jihad.[34] While, similar to Adem Y. and Daniel S., this small clique of jihadist friends gradually became the main locus of their activities. In the case of Fritz G. and Attila S., the group seemed much more embedded within the local milieu, where many held at least some sympathies for the mudjahideen in Afghanistan or Iraq.

In other words, radical identities and beliefs were formed in processes at the intersection of – and in interactions between – small cliques of like-minded friends, the larger milieus in which they had formed, and their broader social environment.
Connecting Local Clusters: The Role of Open Movement Spaces and Virtual Spaces

While local Salafist milieus and clusters of activist-friends were crucial in shaping initial stages of the various pathways of radicalization, the actual jihadist network from which the terrorist cell emerged was formed when these local clusters became connected and evolved into a trans-local radical network. In this development, weak ties that had been formed in open spaces of the broader Salafist movement in Germany and Europe, in particular so-called “Islam-seminars” organized by mainstream-Salafist organizations in different parts of the country, were important. Although armed jihad was not discussed in these meetings, they provided opportunities also for radically-inclined activists to meet.[35] In the case of the “Sauerland-Group”-network, a crucial juncture was a pilgrimage journey to Mekka in January 2005, where the contact between Attila S., Fritz G., Adem Y., and two other individuals was formed, facilitated by a previous encounter at an Islam seminar in Bonn.[36] The new-found group spent a great deal of time together during the hajj discussing the jihad, and agreed to stay in touch later on and to pursue their plans to join the armed struggle together. After several visits to Frankfurt, Fritz G., Adem Y., and Attila S. decided to travel to Damascus to learn Arabic in the summer of 2005 (in preparation for the jihad in Iraq, as they thought), where they were joined by several of Adem’s friends.[37] At the language school in Damascus, a chance encounter also helped to establish the connection to the cluster in Neunkirchen, when Attila S. met an acquaintance from an Islam-seminar in Bonn who was a member of the group around Daniel S.[38]

In other words, weak ties that were formed in open spaces of the broader Salafist movement became crucial in connecting the separate local clusters and in establishing the connections that gradually evolved into the close bonds of activist-friendship on which the radical network around the “Sauerland-Group” was built. Thereby, the formation of the core of the jihadist network also marked a step in individual pathways of radicalization, towards discursively preparing and eventually realizing the shift from sympathy for jihad to actually engaging in actions to travel abroad and to join the armed struggle. Forming the network and progressing from beliefs to actions, thereby, seemed to be inextricable part of one and the same dynamic.

Consolidating the Network, Joining the Jihad: Connecting with Terrorist Organizations Abroad

When the core-network had formed (by summer 2005 in Damascus), several activists quite pro-actively tried to find ways to participate in the armed struggle abroad. After some failed attempts, the connection through which the group eventually managed to go to Afghanistan was established, again, via a chance-encounter with
militants from Azerbaijan in the neighbourhood in Damascus where Adem Y., Fritz G., and the others resided. [39] They received military training by an Uzbek group called the “Islamic Jihad Union” (IJU) in a training camp in Afghanistan, and it was the local IJU leader who suggested that they return to Germany to carry out terrorist attacks. Thus, while emerging from a jihadist network that had formed autonomously in Germany, the creation of the “Sauerland Group” as a terrorist cell was to some extent initiated and directed by an international jihadist organization. [40] Yet, back in Germany the group was, again, largely autonomous and – although the attack-plans were kept secret – relied on their network for assistance and support, [41] and remained connected to that network throughout the entire period up to their arrests. At the same time, they provided others within the network with contacts to the IJU and organized their trip to Waziristan. In other words, upon their return from Afghanistan, the network expanded and built an autonomous “jihad-infrastructure”, providing activists with connections and means to join the armed struggle in Afghanistan. Thereby, they “recruited” mainly via pre-existing friendship-ties and established spaces that served as radical micro-settings. Particularly Adem Y. established some kind of new sub-cluster around his previous friendship group in Frankfurt as well as via acquaintances from Islam-seminars. [42] From March 2007 on, he organized regular get-togethers at his house to talk about Islam, sometimes with barbecue in the garden, where Adem Y. took aside people who were willing to join the jihad for preparatory conversations to probe their commitment and to take care of practicalities. [43]

**Figure 4: The Expanded Radical Network**

*Dynamics of Strong Ties and Intensive Interactions in Micro-Settings: The Cell*

The terrorist cell represents a distinct micro-setting of radicalization that is characterized by strong ties and intense interactions among a small (and more or less confined) group of activists. Its function is mainly to reinforce violent radicalization, sustain commitment, prevent defection, and shape decisions. As mentioned above, the “Sauerland-Group” kept their plans secret from most members of the jihadist network and, even though embedded in the network, at the same time formed a very tight core, characterized by close, affective ties and intensive interaction. This configuration created small-group-dynamics of control and mutual reinforcement which were clearly instrumental in taking and sustaining their collective decision to carry out terrorist attacks; as discernible from Adem Y.’s testimony:

“You could note that Abdullah [Daniel S.] had his doubts and wavered a little. […] I think, these were doubts about whether, from an Islamic point of view, everything [the attacks] was all right. […] We then clarified this and explained to him […] that these doubts were from his [inner] devil. We told him that he has to focus on his objective.” [44]
What this statement seems to suggest, is that the “shift from beliefs to action” is not a one-step event, but a continuing process of commitment to action, preparation, and actual violent act, that needs to be sustained in the face of doubts over the legitimacy of violence as well as in the face of technical or logistical set-backs. The terrorist cell, then, is the social configuration that is created in, and sustains, this process.

**Conclusions: The Formation of Radical Networks and Pathways of Radicalization**

Addressing a gap in the current literature on radicalization and jihadist micro-mobilization, this article examined the emergence of radical “grass-roots” networks from which militant groups emerge. It developed an analytical framework that focuses on three elements to explain processes of network formation: different forms and functions of social ties, the particular socio-spatial settings in which these ties are formed, and the role of individual agency in creating ties and forming radical networks. In line with Bosi, della Porta, and Fillieule,[45] it is argued that we need to pay attention to the intersection and interaction between the individual and the group/network level of analysis. Particularly (but not only) in the case of jihadist “grassroots”-networks it seems misleading to conceive of radical networks as pre-existing, static environments to which an individual is exposed. Rather, they constitute dynamically evolving relational settings, formed in processes in which, as the small case study makes clear, individuals often are active agents of connection-making, creating and shaping the networks as well as the spaces in which pathways of radicalization are embedded.

The case-study on the “Sauerland-Group”, while not claiming to be able to produce generalizable results, describes a number of rather typical processes and constellations. The jihadist network, thereby, emerged from connections between three local jihadist clusters (and a few isolated individuals), with pre-existing personal ties and new acquaintances creating initial connections to local milieus. These milieus, in turn, allowed for cliques of close activist-friends to form, which gradually separated from their social environment and became the site of intensive interactions in which radical perceptions and identities were created. Actively seeking to connect with like-minded activists beyond their local milieu, some of the young activists participated in events and visited open spaces created by the wider Salafist movement, where they formed ties that connected different local clusters of radical friends. Their activities created a distinct space, made up of mutual visits, meetings in private homes (and “garden barbecues”), shared apartments in Damascus, or common travels to certain mosques, which constituted a radical micro-mobilization setting that was further expanded via pre-existing friendship- and family-ties. The emerging radical network not only was the site of consolidating radical perspectives and identities, but also facilitated the shift to actually engaging in actions to join the armed struggle.

Obviously, the degree to which radical groups and networks are dynamic and fluent, and to which individuals are active agents (rather than passive fellow-runners) varies significantly. In some cases, individuals may, in fact, radicalize along a pattern in which they are “recruited into” an already established group and are socialized into pre-formed radical perspectives as more or less passive recipient of environmental influences. Yet, the point here is that this is not necessarily the case, and it is not only “leader-types” who have a pro-active role in establishing new contacts, but often also more marginal “follower-type” individuals. Moreover, while this approach seems particularly helpful to analyzing jihadist “grassroots”-networks in the West, it is equally relevant to understanding early phases of recruitment into established armed groups, which often include a significant amount of self-selection, pro-actively forming ties with like-minded activists, and the autonomous emergence of informal networks within broader radical milieus.

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Notes


[9] As many studies reduce social ties to factors explaining the adoption of radical beliefs, they tend to remain, as Crone argues, within an “intellectualist” approach to radicalization. Manni Crone, 2016, op. cit., 597.


This approach allows, at least in some cases, for a triangulation of sources to contextualize and verify information, but also to cover a network of considerable size (more than 40 members in three sub-clusters) and temporal depth (8-10 years). In addition, to systematically trace relational processes, a detailed connection-matrix was compiled, specifying contacts between 17 core-members of the network, including the timing and socio-spatial setting of connection making, as well as the duration and quality of connections. After adding contextual information from the broader qualitative analysis, the results were illustrated in the form of network-diagrams that visualize connections between individuals as well as their embeddedness in broader milieus and socio-spatial contexts. To reference court documents, the following abbreviations were used: »File Fritz G.«, »File Adem Y.«, »File Attila S.« and »File Daniel S.« (Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, Ermittlungsverfahren Fritz M.G. und andere, 2 BJ 20/07-4, 2 StE 7/08-4, Sachakte III.1.8.11/8, Sachakte III.2.10/7, Sachakte III.3.8.3/5, Sachakte III.4.8.4/9).

The group had procured several hundred pounds of chemicals and had started to produce explosives which they intended to use against airports and Israeli and US targets in Germany. After having received a lead from a foreign intelligence agency, German police had put the group under surveillance for several weeks before arresting several members in September 2007. In March 2010, all four members of the group were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms between five and twelve years. For more information on the group, see Stefan Malthaner and Klaus Hummel, "Islamischer Terrorismus und salafistische Milieus," in: Stefan Malthaner and Peter Waldmann (Eds.), Radikale Milieus: Das soziale Umfeld terroristischer Gruppen (Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 2012); Guido Steinberg, German Jihad: On the Internationalization of Islamist Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), vol. 37, no. 12 (2014), 979-998.


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Salafism is understood here as a religio-political movement that emerged from Wahhabism and other Islamic currents in the 1960s and 1970s, subsequently fragmenting into a number of diverse currents. See Quintan Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (2009): 207–239. On the Salafist movement in Germany, see Stefan Malthaner and Klaus Hummel, op. cit.

For details on this process and the role of Daniel S's friend and mentor see Martin Schäuble, op. cit., 204–206.

See also Guido Steinberg, op. cit., 59-76.

See also File Attila S., 18.

"Mainstream" here refers to a strand of Salafism in Europe that is political, with some purist elements, but not jihadist. See Stefan Malthaner and Klaus Hummel, op. cit., 245-246.

File Fritz G., 6–8, 316/317; File Attila S., 22/23; File Adem Y., 11/12.


See File Adem Y., 231.


File Adem Y., 317; author's translation.

Headhunting Among Extremist Organizations: An Empirical Assessment of Talent Spotting

by Steven Windisch, Michael K. Logan and Gina Scott Ligon

Abstract

In recent years, terrorism scholars have proposed that more established and popular extremist organizations make pragmatic assessments of their human capital needs and modify operating standards to acquire members with advanced training and expertise such as medical, religious, or military backgrounds that may benefit extremist activities. To examine these claims, we rely on data pertaining to 105 extremist organizations gathered throughout the Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) project. The results provide empirical support for these propositions by suggesting that older and more publicly supported extremist organizations contain membership populations that possess expertise, and these organizations also become increasingly diverse across demographic characteristics of members. We conclude with suggestions for future research that extend the study of extremist recruitment and provide recommendations for practitioners in terms of addressing terrorism prevention initiatives.

Keywords: Recruitment, Extremist Organizations, Human Capital, Headhunting, Talent Spotting

Introduction

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, violent extremism has gained near universal attention among researchers, media, governmental officials, and the general public concerned about national defense and public safety.[1] Terrorism researchers, in particular, have dedicated considerable energy toward understanding radicalization processes and what people do once they become members of terrorist groups.[2] To a lesser degree, terrorism researchers have also examined the dynamic nature of extremist recruitment, which refers to an “active process through which an organizational insider gets a new person to work for the organization.”[3]

Prior research focused on extremist recruitment highlights a variety of individual-level characteristics that influence a person's receptively toward extremist participation, including one's “biographical availability,”[4] relationship with formal and informal social-networks,[5] and psychological vulnerabilities such as depression, deprivation, and perceived discrimination.[6] Moreover, in the case of extremist radicalization, researchers often focus on individual-level variation such as offender characteristics[7] and distinctions between group-based and lone offenders.[8] While we agree that individual-level characteristics are critical issues that deserve further attention, the current investigation represents a key step forward by investigating variation at the organizational level.

Specifically, we test recent propositions by terrorism scholars who suggested that extremist groups, like conventional organizations (e.g., Apple Inc.), make pragmatic assessments of their human capital needs and modify operating standards to acquire recruits with diverse expertise (e.g., medical, religious, or military training) that may help the group achieve ideological objectives.[9] Currently, however, these claims have not been assessed in an empirical fashion beyond case studies. To address this gap in the literature, we employ data on 105 extremist organizations gathered throughout the Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) project. The purpose of the current article is to empirically test whether there is systematic variation in human capital between extremist groups at various stages of social popularity and organizational age.

Such an investigation may have substantial implications for terrorism prevention initiatives due to the fact that internal organizational activities (e.g., branding, recruitment) have been identified as essential components for ensuring sustainability of extremist activities through the supply of resources (i.e., manpower).[10] From this
perspective, knowing where an extremist group is in its lifecycle can give clues as to what demographics are most vulnerable to recruitment strategies. Finally, due to the analogous group structures and internal dynamics shared among violent extremist groups and conventional organizations,[11] the current investigation has the potential to highlight important points of continuity between terrorist groups and the broader realm of organizational behavior. In the following sections, we discuss specific hypotheses tested throughout the current study as well as key concepts that guide our analysis.[12]

**Recruitment Cycling among Extremist Organizations**

Due to the dynamic nature of extremist violence, organizational tactics often evolve as terrorist campaigns intensify and extremist organizations respond to counter-terrorism measures. For example, both the Provisional Irish Republican Army and al-Qaeda experienced structural and tactical shifts as consequences of effective counter-terrorism measures.[13] Governmental pressure forced both groups to implement a “cellular” organizational structure with increased autonomy among individual cells in order to evade infiltration. As a result of this move from a hierarchical to cellular structure, recruitment efforts were redirected toward individuals who were already close to the movement and within existing social networks – effectively limiting the group's recruitment pool. In addition to external pressures from state and security apparatuses, scholars in the field of terrorism studies have also suggested that recruitment approaches evolve over time as extremist organizations become established and the number of quality applicants interested in joining the group increases.[14] In particular, Bloom argues that, like conventional organizations[15], extremist groups follow a “cycle” of recruitment that alternates between labor-intensive and expertise-intensive recruitment periods.[16]

The labor-intensive period is characterized as “open recruitment,” which is inclusive and contains low standards for acceptance.[17] During this recruitment phase, extremist organizations target “low hanging fruit” - individuals often lacking strong ideological convictions and/or expertise that would benefit the organization. [18] As Bloom argues, this recruitment strategy is particularly common for newly established extremist organizations, as they must initially focus energy and resources toward recruiting large numbers and securing financial resources. While individuals recruited during this phase may lack experience or skills that benefit the organization, this recruitment strategy allows the group to maximize the number of supporters either active in the organization, or at least, sympathetic toward the cause. Such an approach can then have subsequent favorable outcomes on the organization's brand by projecting an image of strength and large size to external stakeholders.[19]

Alternatively, expertise-intensive periods involve raising the standards for admittance and intentionally targeting individuals with expertise that help the group achieve organizational objectives.[20] In these situations, instead of enacting open recruitment strategies, more established extremist organizations engage in “talent spotting” or “headhunting” recruitment techniques.[21] These recruitment strategies involve the selection of educated and trained individuals with specific expertise such as religious, military, or medical training. According to Hunter and colleagues, experts are necessary for sustaining operational functioning as they are more effective and creative in problem-solving matters and possess a wider knowledge-base. This is especially relevant for extremist organizations who control territory and function as service providers (e.g., law enforcement, developing infrastructure, education) in place of government structures. [22]

Based on the propositions set forth by Bloom and Hunter and colleagues that human capital needs shift over time as extremist organizations become more established, we hypothesize that as extremist organizations become more popular, these groups will diversify their workforce by making pragmatic assessments of their human capital needs and acquire members with advanced training and expertise. Moreover, we hypothesize that as extremist organizations become more popular, their membership population will diversify regarding age, race, ethnicity, and gender because the organizational value or benefit regarding expertise and training will offset the composition of a prototypical membership population in terms of observable characteristics (e.g., gender). In other words, these groups begin to place a premium on skillsets rather than maintaining homogeneous individual-level characteristics. These observations lead us to the first and second hypotheses to
be tested in this study.

\[ H_1: \text{Popular extremist organizations are more likely to contain a membership population with experience, expertise, and advanced training.} \]

\[ H_2: \text{Popular extremist organizations are more likely to contain a membership population with an assortment of individual-level characteristics (e.g., gender, race, age).} \]

In the next section, we provide a brief overview of how conventional organizations specialize as they mature and the numerous benefits that can be expected from this recruitment approach.

**An Organizational Perspective on Headhunting and Specialization**

While the application of an organizational perspective to the study of terrorism may seem novel, scholars have generated a considerable body of research that explores the applicability of this framework to help explain violent extremism vis-à-vis organizational theory, signaling theory, organizational trust, transnational advocacy networks, social entrepreneurship, marketing as well as organizational branding and legitimacy. [23] Despite these advances, however, the use of an organizational perspective to study terrorist recruitment remains substantially underdeveloped.

To address this issue, the current study relies on organizational life-cycling (OLC) theory to examine variation in human capital needs among extremist organizations. Research focused on OLC has made considerable empirical advancement by modeling what happens to organizations as they age and gain stakeholder support. [24] In general, OLC models suggest that organizations progress through a number of different transitional stages over time. [25] While there is no straightforward evidence as to how many distinct stages an organization may experience, there is consensus among researchers that each stage is determined by contextual factors such as age, growth, and size. Researchers also agree that an organization’s leadership will prioritize needs of the group based on these contextual factors. [26]

During transitional phases, organizations will inevitably encounter challenges that arise as a firm grows in size, age, and/or popularity. For example, while researchers have found that organizations do have some degree of discretion when dealing with institutional pressures such as growth and stakeholder support, [27] changes experienced by contextually similar organizations (e.g., those in the same industry) can result in commonalities in how disparate organizations respond. [28] In a similar way, it is well-established that the “talent pool” changes depending on the maturity of the firm and that more popular organizations are able to attract a greater number of talented applicants, which increases an organization’s ability to be more selective in whom it hires. [29]

In light of these challenges, OLC theorists have identified some generic strategies across each transitional stage. [30] Of specific focus as it relates to propositions from Bloom and Hunter and colleagues are the human resource (HR) strategies organizations utilize to navigate these changes. [31] By HR strategies, we refer to the formal and informal practices used by an organization to resolve personnel problems. A common HR strategy is to align firm-specific resources in a way that gives the organization a competitive advantage. Dess and Lumpkin identified human capital as one of these firm-specific resources, which involves “individual capabilities, knowledge, skills, and experience of the company’s employees and managers.” [32]

For example, OLC researchers have found that newly formed organizations are less effective at research and development (R&D) activities because young firms lack an adequate number of employees to execute the mission of the organization, much less engage in long-range thinking required for R&D. In these situations, newly formed organizations can overcome a lack of production by conducting open recruitment and hiring minimally competent employees. Moreover, OLC researchers note the importance of formalizing an organizational identity for new firms and have found that identity formation initially plays a pivotal role in determining workforce composition. [33] In these situations, newly formed organizations are more likely to prioritize individual-level characteristics (e.g., age, race) that contribute to the organization’s identity formation.
process. For instance, a newly formed tech company may initially place a premium on appearing energetic and vigorous and as a result recruit younger applicants who project this sense of identity.

As the organization matures, however, recruiting shifts to align human capital needs in a strategically competitive way. For instance, mature organizations will modify recruitment strategies and aim to attract individuals who will enhance the organization's competitive advantage rather than hire unskilled employees because they match organizational identity needs.[34] If successful, these organizations will be able to produce firm-specific resources that are deemed valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate. From this perspective, a focus on specialization rather than individual-characteristics (e.g., gender, ethnicity) as a response to dominant strategic problems (e.g., need to make more sophisticated widgets) occurs predominantly among older, more mature organizations whose goal is to stay competitive by strategically aligning talent in a way that benefits the organization.[35]

Based on existing OLC theory, we hypothesize that older extremist organizations will contain a diversified workforce by making pragmatic assessments of their human capital needs and acquire members with specialized experience, expertise, and advanced training. We also hypothesize that older extremist organizations will possess a diversified membership population regarding age, race, ethnicity, and gender because these groups place a premium on expertise rather than individual-level characteristics. These observations lead us to the third and fourth hypotheses to be tested in this study.

\[ H_3: \text{Older extremist organizations are more likely to contain a membership population with experience, expertise, and advanced training.} \]

\[ H_4: \text{Older extremist organizations are more likely to contain a membership population with an assortment of individual-level characteristics (e.g., gender, race, age).} \]

In the next section, we outline the methodology and analytic approach used to answer our hypotheses. Following this section, we present results from the LEADIR dataset.

**Methodology**

**Data Collection**

The current study relies on data collected from the Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) project.[36] The LEADIR dataset contains organizational and leadership data on extremist organizations active between 1970 and 2016. Organizational data were gathered using a historiometric approach, which involves the testing of hypotheses by applying quantitative techniques to qualitative data.[37] Historiometry is widely used in personality studies and social psychology[38] as well as industrial and organizational (IO) psychology[39] to examine historically notable instances of performance of people and organizations during their period of peak performance (e.g., Dean Simonton uses the approach to study Presidents during their terms in office).[40]

LEADIR relies on historical accounts described in open-source data gathered from academic and government sources (e.g., National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, Southern Poverty Law Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mapping Militant Organizations), scholarly case studies (e.g., The Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, the West Point Counter Terrorism Center), and public-records databases (e.g., Lexis-Nexis). We also used primary documents from extremist organizations themselves, such as propaganda, videos, and websites run by the groups (e.g., all sources were queried and translated from the Open Source Center). Sources were evaluated on a credibility scale, comprised of items to assess internal validity (i.e., report quality, authorship credentials) and external validity (i.e., generalizability), allowing for statistical control of source quality.[41] As one indication of the depth and detail of the data collection, source material for organizations in LEADIR averaged fifteen pages of text or roughly 3,454 words per extremist group.
Information and data resources were gathered by graduate students with expertise in criminology, IO psychology, and information science and technology. Prior to data collection, researchers received 20 hours of training bearing on the nature of ideological organizations, extremist recruitment, and their manifestation in the context of extremism as well as on search tactics and filtering information. This ensured that (a) all data were gathered from reputable sources; and (b) sufficient data were found for a variety of organizational characteristics (e.g., member demographics). The accuracy of the data was safeguarded through periodic “consistency checks” and any inconsistencies were discussed between raters and project managers. Data that were found to be conflicting between sources were further investigated, with information from academic and government resources being the primary sources to determine the final ratings for each of the indices assessed.

In accordance with best practices in historiometric methods,[42] organizational data were collected for specific time spans termed “period of peak performance” in order to ensure enough data was able to be reliably collected from archival records. This period was characterized by (a) consistent organizational performance (e.g., executing attacks); (b) the largest period of growth in terms of membership and/or financing; and (c) relative stability of organizational structure and leadership. The benefit of this strategy is that it ensures that sufficient and reliable data are being collected, coded, and used in subsequent analyses as extremist organizations tend to have the most written about them during their peak performance years. The drawback is that the period of peak performance is not universal and often differs between extremist organizations. Furthermore, any given extremist organization often ebbs-and-flows in their level of activity and determining their specific period of peak performance can be difficult. To mitigate this issue, subject matter experts (SMEs) with ten or more years of domain expertise in terrorism research were consulted for groups without a clear period of peak performance. These criteria (i.e., multiple credible sources, agreed upon period of peak performance) resulted in 105 extremist organizations for inclusion in the present study.

**Coding Strategy**

After data collection, a research team consisting of subject matter experts (SMEs) in extremist organizations developed behaviorally anchored rating scales (BARS) for organizational predictors.[43] These scales included operational definitions with readily observable and concrete examples as a reference point to facilitate reliable, valid ratings for each category of variables (i.e., organizational characteristics, performance-related constructs, and source controls) and were developed with the same practices used in psychometric test development.[44] The development of BARS requires an initial oversampling from the population of interest to identify low, moderate, and high behavioral examples of a given construct. We oversampled by 10%, and then randomly selected 10% of that sample to *a priori* identify benchmark behaviors to exemplify constructs.[45] These illustrative examples provide a sample-bound reference for raters to use in assessing organizational constructs relative to those of other outstanding groups. This approach is commonly employed in the use of historical records to examine organizational behavior.[46] These BARS were also defined, iteratively reviewed, and edited to ensure clarity, parsimony, and uni-dimensionality.

The central purpose of this methodological approach is to reliably assess organizational constructs of interest across independent raters based on SME-generated benchmarks to increase the validity of inferences drawn from the historical records of interest.[47] A benefit of this approach is that it takes into account the context in which each organization conducted affairs, and because of the depth of the investigations, the data are often quite rich. More importantly, as opposed to cross sectional research (e.g., one-time interviews, surveys), historiometric approaches allow us to examine the sustainability of performance.[48] Because the approach itself is rooted in the historical significance of these organizations, examining the lasting (and sometimes non-lasting) effects of their decisions provides researchers with a time-tested gauge of performance.[49]

To assess reliability among judges, raters coded 10% of the sample independently, resulting in an intrarater reliability of \( \alpha = .93 \), which is much higher than the accepted appropriate intrarater reliability with historiometry (\( \alpha = .80 \)).[50] Ratings were then averaged across independent judges to lessen the likelihood of spurious errors in any one individual’s scores.
Sample

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for extremist organizations in our sample. As illustrated, organizational size of these groups varies from less than 100 to over 10,000 members. Organizational size is an ordinal scale of the membership used to assess the number of individuals that contribute to the group’s overall strength. As noted previously, membership data for each of these organizations were collected during the group’s period of peak performance, which is defined by the period in which the organization was most active. Given that best practices in studying organizations via historiometry requires an examination of groups during their period of peak performance, [51] figures relating to organizational size may be slightly elevated. Despite this concern, the rich open-source data gathered during the organizations’ periods of peak performance provide important insights pertaining to these groups that could not have been gathered through other approaches.

Among these organizations, religiously motivated groups accounted for half of our sample (50.0%) followed by ethno-nationalist (43.8%), left-wing (25.7%), and right-wing (13.3%) groups. These ideological clusters are not mutually exclusive and more than a quarter (28.3%) of the extremist organizations were classified in multiple categories. For example, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party prescribes to both ethno-nationalist and left-wing ideological beliefs.[52] Finally, in terms of region of operations, the current sample is diverse with organizations located in six out of the seven continents. With that said, most organizations operated in the Middle East and North Africa (26.7%), South Asia (19.0%), Western Europe (16.2%), and North America (15.2%).

Table 1. Sample Characteristics (n = 105)

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<th>Variable</th>
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<td><strong>Organizational Size</strong></td>
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<td>1-99</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
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<td>100-999</td>
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<td>1,000-9,999</td>
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<td>10,000+</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-nationalist</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region of Operation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Ideology does not add up to 100% because these categories are not mutually exclusive.

Independent Variables

To examine whether older and more popular extremist organizations vary from younger and less reputable organizations in regard to human capital needs, we selected the following independent variables: organizational...
Organizational age is an estimate of the total number of years an organization was in existence. As Miller notes, operationalizing the age of terrorist organizations can be difficult considering how often groups rebrand by changing their name or form and break up alliances.[53] Furthermore, defining the year in which a group ends is often problematic, especially when an extremist organization contains weak organizational boundaries or competing performance goals. As such, we calculated organizational age as the number of years (in whole numbers) that have elapsed between the year in which the group was founded and the year they ended, inclusive of the year of founding. If the group is still active, we used the last year data were collected (i.e., 2016).

In terms of the current study, extremist organizations that underwent a rebranding effort were only considered “new” if the change had a substantive impact on the extremist organization’s mission. For example, we argue that the Islamic State “began” in 2004 when then leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, pledged alliance to Osama bin Laden and formally became al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Prior to the rise of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda was (and still is) the dominant brand among global Jihadi groups. Thus, al-Zarqawi’s pledge of alliance had significant implications for their recruitment and fundraising beyond what was available to Tawhid and Jihadi – AQI’s name before becoming an al-Qaeda franchisee. The same could be said for other al-Qaeda affiliates such al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (2007-2018) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (2009-2018).

For extremist organizations which are currently inactive, we drew from source material as well as incident-level data to determine when each organization ended. We agree with Miller’s assertion that the sole use of incident-level data is not optimal for determining when an extremist organization ended, particularly for those groups which oscillate between periods of violence and non-violence.[54] In light of these concerns, quality control checks were conducted among raters and SMEs to avoid inflating the ages of extremist organizations whose ideology may still exist but which do not advocate violence. Similar protection measures were conducted for groups which have largely disbanded only to resurface under the same or a similar name later. For example, the Army of God (1982-2001), the Red Brigades (1969-1988), November 18 Revolutionary Organization (1975-2002), and the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (1977-1988) are all examples of groups that underwent SME adjudication of age.

In terms of the current analysis, organizational age was recoded into a 4-point categorical variable reflecting the total number of years an extremist organization was in existence. The four categories are as follows: 1) newly formed = 1-5 years; 2) up-and-coming = 6-18 years; 3) experienced = 19-32 years; and 4) veteran = 33+ years. The age ranges coinciding with each category were developed using the mean (19.52) plus or minus one standard deviation (14.06) and remaining values were used to represent extremist organizations at both extremes. Table 2 indicates that 14 extremist organizations were classified as “newly formed” (13.3%), 48 as “up-and-coming” (45.7%), 23 as “experienced” (21.9%), and 20 extremist organizations were classified as “veteran” (19.0%).

The average age of the organizations in LEADIR was approximately 19.52 years old (SD = 14.06). Based on our sample, organizational age is rather high considering most extremist organizations do not last this long. In fact, Rapoport suggests that most terrorist groups last less than one year.[55] Recall, however, that our focus is on “successful” extremist organizations based on the theoretical postulations set forth by Bloom and Hunter and colleagues,[56] which largely excludes extremist groups which lasted less than one year. Furthermore, Philips has recently suggested that terrorist groups are more durable than conventional wisdom suggests.[57]

Our second independent variable is public support, which reflects the degree to which some or all of the public support the organization’s mission, tactics, media reputation, or actions. Indicators of high public support included non-coercive backing such as contributing material support (e.g., money, weapons), publicly displaying sympathy, and claiming allegiances (e.g., social media followership, exhibiting organizational flags or logos) or concentrating government aid toward the group. Alternatively, low levels of public support involved a lack of social acceptance (e.g., social stigma, protests) or coercive support such as imposing taxes or tariffs on citizens or mandating participation in the organization (e.g., Boko Haram). Using a 3-point categorical variable ranging from 1 (very limited to no public support) to 3 (high public support), raters coded each extremist
organization indicating the amount of public support in their favor during their period of peak performance. For example, the Japanese Red Army received a low public support rating because its leaders were not effective in gaining wide-spread sympathy for their organization’s mission. As Table 2 illustrates, 46 (43.8%) extremist organizations were classified as having “little to no public support,” 30 (28.6%) as a “moderate public support,” and 29 (27.6%) extremist organizations were classified as having a “high public support.”

Table 2. Frequency Distribution of Key Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newly Formed</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up-and-Coming</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deep-Level Diversity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below Average</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above Average</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surface-Level Diversity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below Average</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above Average</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dependent Variables**

To examine whether older and more popular organizations differ from younger and less reputable organizations in regard to human capital needs, we selected the following dependent variables: deep-level diversity and surface-level diversity.

*Deep-level diversity* is a 5-point Likert-type scale reflecting the degree to which an extremist organization’s membership is categorized by an assortment of individual characteristics including educational background, wealth, and/or specialized skills such as weapons or religious training. One indicator of deep-level diversity included the degree to which organizations engaged in attacks demanding a high level of expertise or advanced training. For example, the level of technical skill required for driving a truck through a crowded street or shooting people in a populated area is considered low, whereas complex attacks involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or flying a hijacked plane are considered high.[58] As a method of triangulation, we also coded the level of tactical diversity demonstrated by the organization.[59] Tactically diverse organizations are more likely to have the necessary human capital to execute different types of violence (e.g., shootings, bombings, hijackings, kidnappings), while groups with low levels of tactical diversity are likely pulling from a limited membership base.[60] The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) offered comparable quantitative data on both the types of weapons and type of attacks employed by each organization.[61] Whenever possible, we triangulated data with government, media, and thinktank reports (e.g., Militant Leadership Monitor) that profile individual members...
of extremist organizations in our sample.

Overall, deep-level diversity ranged from 1 (organization recruits any person regardless of skillset) to 5 (organization actively recruits individuals based on specialization). Table 2 indicates that 17 (16.2%) extremist organizations were classified as low on deep-level diversity, 36 (34.3%) as below average, 16 (15.2%) as average, 16 (15.2%) as above average, and 13 (12.4%) extremist organizations were classified as high on deep-level diversity. Taken together, a little over half (50.5%) of the extremist organizations in our sampled scored below average on deep-level diversity as compared to just over one-fourth of our sample (27.6%) that were classified as above average.

**Surface-level diversity** is a 5-point Likert-type scale reflecting the degree to which an extremist organization’s membership is heterogeneous in terms of individual-level traits such as race, age, gender and/or ethnicity. Responses ranged from 1 (organization is homogeneous and adheres to strict codes regarding racial, religious, or ethnic status) to 5 (organization is heterogeneous and is welcoming of individuals with assorted racial, religious, or ethnic backgrounds). For example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam received a high surface-level diversity rating because they actively recruited members of a variety of ages and welcomed both male and female members. Table 2 indicates that 19 (18.1%) extremist organizations were classified as low on surface-level diversity, 38 (36.2%) as below average, 25 (23.8%) as average, 16 (15.2%) as above average and 7 (6.7%) extremist organizations were classified as high on surface-level diversity. Taken together, 54.3% of our sample was classified as below average on surface-level diversity.

**Statistical Analysis**

To examine the relationship between our independent (i.e., organizational age and public support) and dependent variables (i.e., deep-level diversity and surface-level diversity), we used between subject analysis of variance (ANOVA). A Scheffe post hoc test was then employed to probe for the sources and direction of differences between extremist organizations.

**Results**

As a preliminary diagnostic assessment, we employed a Levene's test to assess potential violations of the homogeneity of variance assumption. All four Levene's tests produced a non-significant F-statistic (p > .01), which indicated that heterogeneity of variance was not problematic. As illustrated in Table 3, results obtained in the analyses of variance highlight four noteworthy trends. First, as expected, public support was found to share a significant relationship with the degree of deep-level diversity among extremist organizations $F(4, 102) = 15.88, p \leq .001$. Post-hoc analysis indicated notable differences between organizations with the lowest levels of public support and those with the highest levels of public support. Specifically, extremist organizations with low levels of public support were found to contain lower levels of deep-level diversity, whereas extremist organizations with higher levels of public support displayed significantly higher levels of deep-level diversity ($M = 2.17$ vs. $M = 3.66$). These observations support hypothesis 1: Popular extremist organizations are more likely to contain a membership population with experience, expertise, and advanced training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Analysis of Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. df organization age (1, 101), df public support (1, 102). E reflect effect size using Cohen's (1988) formula; $**p < .01$ $***p < .001$

This finding is in line with prior research focusing on the cyclical nature of organizational popularity and extremist activities (e.g., recruitment, branding, attacks).[62] Based on this framework, increased popularity
leads to sustainable performance, which in turn, leads to more popularity. To ensure sustainable performance over time, extremist organizations have been found to “up-skill” their workforce by recruiting highly qualified members. A common method used to attract highly qualified recruits is to depict the organization as capable of providing meaningful opportunities as well as highlighting military prowess and organizational legitimacy. Web-based approaches such as social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) and video exchange sites (e.g., YouTube) are well suited for developing such an image as they can reach a wide audience and present information in a tailored way. For instance, in a review of YouTube videos posted by The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Dauber found images that projected meaningful jobs with orderliness, training, and resources. Moreover, in an examination of ISIL’s social media output, Zelin found that ISIL often highlights its social services as well as “the great life one can live under the Caliphate, especially by foreign fighters.” The mixture of organizational popularity, operational success, and effective branding creates a need for more qualified recruits that helps ensure sustainability over time when conducting highly destructive acts of terrorism.

Second, public support was also found to share a significant relationship with an extremist organization’s surface-level diversity of members $F(4, 102) = 7.91$, $p \leq .01$. Specifically, extremist organizations with low levels of public support were found to have more homogenous memberships in terms of observable differences, whereas extremist organizations with high levels of public support had more heterogeneous memberships ($M = 2.13$ vs. $M = 3.14$). This observation supports hypothesis 2: Popular extremist organizations are more likely to contain a membership population with an assortment of observable individual-level characteristics (e.g., gender, race, age).

As outlined by Hunter and colleagues, extremist organizations make pragmatic assessments of their human capital needs and modify operating standards based on environmental and organizational conditions. For example, even the most patriarchal terrorist groups have been found to allow women to serve as front-line fighters in times of need. From this perspective, extremist organizations in the process of up-skill their workforce may place expertise and organizational sustainability at a premium and overlook individual characteristics that may not adhere to the prototypical membership profile. In this way, irrespective of the individuals’ background characteristics (e.g., age, gender, race), extremist organizations understand the likelihood of operational success increases with more talented members. As a result, popular extremist organizations are more likely to contain a diversified workforce in terms of age, race, and gender in exchange for sustainable organizational success. Taken together, these two findings indicate that publicly supported extremist organizations are more likely to contain members with high expertise and training and are also more likely to welcome qualified individuals whose surface-level characteristics (e.g., age, race, age) may not adhere to the standard of their ideal membership.

Third, similar observations were obtained regarding organizational age and deep-level diversity. Based on the data, older extremist organizations contained membership populations with more expert, specialized affiliates, $F(2, 101) = 15.87$, $p \leq .001$. In general, differences regarding organizational age and deep-level diversity were most prominent between the “newly formed,” “experienced,” and “veteran” extremist organizations ($M = 1.64$ vs. $M = 3.00$ vs. $M = 3.95$). Specifically, younger extremist organizations were found to attract less talented members compared to the highly specialized skillsets and backgrounds found among older extremist groups. Apparently, older extremist organizations, regardless of surface-level characteristics (e.g., age, race, ethnicity), contained members with more education and training. These observations support hypothesis 3: Older extremist organizations are more likely to contain a membership population with experience, expertise, and advanced training.

This finding further supports Bloom’s argument pertaining to the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) decades long expansion, selective recruitment operations, and the establishment of command and control structures throughout the latter part of the twentieth-century. In particular, PIRA’s recruitment operations were aimed at college students with advanced educational degrees in STEM-related fields (science, technology, engineering, mathematics). As Bloom explains, this approach is in stark contrast to younger extremist organizations which cast as wide a net as possible and accept any recruit, regardless of their professionalism or experience. Moreover, this finding supports prior research pertaining to al-Qaeda, an extremist organization...
that has long been involved in insurgencies spanning from Africa to Southeast Asia over the past three decades [72]. For example, an operations document known as the Manchester Manual lists 14 different desirable assets that characterize a prospective jihadi member such as intelligence, ability to observe and conceal oneself, as well as maturity and a willingness to make sacrifices.[73] Along these lines, recently declassified documents recovered from Osama bin Laden’s former compound revealed that al-Qaeda recruits were asked to provide information on relevant experiences and expertise such as their proficiency in foreign languages, previous occupations, and relevant military experience.[74] Taken together, these lines of research complement our quantitative findings by indicating that older, more experienced extremist organizations assess their human capital needs and target recruits with advanced training and expertise.

Finally, significant differences were identified between the youngest extremist organizations and the oldest organizations with regard to surface-level characteristics $F(2, 101) = 5.25, p \leq .01$. Specifically, older extremist organizations were more likely to contain members with diverse backgrounds in terms of race, ethnicity, and/or age. Based on our results, “veteran” extremist organizations were identified as containing the most diversified membership populations ($M = 1.93$ vs. $M = 2.38$ vs. $M = 2.70$ vs. $M = 3.30$). This observation supports hypothesis 4: Older extremist organizations are more likely to contain a membership population with an assortment of individual-level characteristics (e.g., gender, race, age).

Based on structural inertia theory,[75] as organizations age they invest in stable technologies and gain other resources that develop dense social networks.[76] If we apply this framework to extremist organizations, as these groups age and invest in stable technologies such as web-based and social-media methods (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, YouTube), these groups would expect to see a “return” on their investments in the form of dense social networks.[77] ISIL, for example, has been found to use web-domains and automated mechanisms (i.e., “bots”) to disseminate their messages in a coherent, layered fashion.[78] These methods allow organizations to attract a larger pool of potential recruits from a wider range of demographic backgrounds. The benefit of this approach is that extremist organizations increase their chances of operational success by connecting with more talented recruits and simultaneously poaching talent away from competitors.[79]

Discussion

In recent years, terrorism scholars have proposed that extremist groups, like conventional organizations, make pragmatic assessments of their human capital needs and modify operating standards to acquire members with advanced training and expertise (e.g., medical, religious, or military training) that may help the group achieve organizational objectives.[80] Relying upon data from 105 extremist organizations gathered throughout the Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) project, the current study provides empirical support for these propositions. In particular, our findings point to two conclusions. First, in support of Bloom’s argument, more popular extremist organizations tend to contain highly diversified membership populations in terms of education, training, and skill sets. The mixture of organizational popularity, and operational success creates a need for more qualified recruits that helps ensure sustainability over time while engaging in terrorist campaigns. Second, our results support Hunter and colleagues’ claims that older, more established extremist organizations prioritize specialization, and as a result, recruit members with skills that will benefit the organization irrespective of their demographic backgrounds. In doing so, these organizations diversify their workforce, sustain operational functioning, and increase their competitive advantage.

These findings are important for at least four reasons. First, this study innovatively compares extremist groups to uncover variation at the organizational level. While terrorism scholars have examined radicalization processes and developed models to explain individual-level variation, far less attention has been aimed at understanding organizational-level variation. Our review of the literature indicates that this is one of first studies to conduct such a comparison.[81] Instead of adopting a “one-size fits all” approach toward extremist organizations, the current study draws special attention to the dynamic nature of extremist groups and highlights the importance of exploring heterogeneity between these collectives. In particular, while extremist organizations contain similarities that bring them together (e.g., political or religious grievances), these groups also possess unique
organizational factors that differentiate them from one another (e.g., level of expertise, network density, selection criteria, demographic composition).

Second, despite previous efforts to apply organizational perspectives to the study of terrorism, this framework remains substantially underutilized among terrorism scholars. To address this issue, the current study relied on organizational life-cycling theory to examine variation in human capital needs among extremist organizations. In doing so, the current investigation highlights overlap between violent extremist groups and industrial and organizational psychology. For instance, while there are numerous pressures that uniquely impact an organization’s overall performance, both extremist groups and conventional legal organizations respond to internal (e.g., membership growth and decline) and external pressures (e.g., competition for resources and legitimacy). One takeaway from this study is that, like conventional organizations, the greater the number of quality recruits interested in joining an extremist organization, the better the talent pool these groups have to pursue organizational objectives.

Third, scholars often debate about the effects of organizational age on violent performances.[82] While some scholars have found that older organizations are more likely to be more violent because they learn from past experiences and acquire knowledge that increases chances of successful violent performances,[83] other researchers have found that organizational age does not have an effect or has an inverse effect on violence.[84] Findings from the current study add to this debate by highlighting variation in human capital among older and younger extremist groups. Specifically, we found that older extremist organizations contain highly qualified members with training and tactical expertise, which allows these groups to engage in more complex attacks and execute a wide range of actions (e.g., shootings, bombings, hijackings, kidnappings). From this perspective, in addition to overcoming organizational setbacks, older extremist organizations “up-skill” their workforce, and therefore, increase chances of successful violent performance and sustainability.

Finally, while the focus of the current study tends to favor a “top-down” recruitment strategy, there are important theoretical implications for a “bottom-up” approach. In recent years, emerging insights into the recruitment processes of al-Qaeda and ISIL demonstrate a selection component. Specifically, these organizations have been found to determine whether a recruit has unique skills such as engineering or computer programing versus whether he/she is better suited for combat. While consideration of an individual’s background qualifications are critical in the selection process, placement is often based on environmental and organizational demands. [85] For instance, while officially enlisting as an ISIL recruit in Suluk, Syria, former Columbia University student Mohimanul Alam Bhuiya advertised his “clever… technical knowledge” and hoped to plan attacks that would “break down aircraft” but was rather assigned as a front-line operative.[86] From this perspective, although highly qualified recruits may seek out and enlist into extremist organizations, these individuals might be assigned to serve in a capacity below their training because this role best serves the immediate human capital needs of the group.

In terms of policy, knowing where an organization is situated in its lifecycle can give clues as to which individuals are most vulnerable to recruitment. Based on prior research, there is a growing concern that extremist organizations are increasingly focused on recruiting younger individuals.[87] This demographic is especially vulnerable to organizations that portray themselves as capable of providing a stronger sense of self and purpose. In recent years, governmental and non-governmental efforts have focused on disrupting recruitment processes via counter-messaging campaigns. Since our findings indicate extremist organizations may favor talented individuals who possess advanced educational degrees in science, technology and engineering and prior research highlights the role of cyber-mediated recruitment strategies,[88] we recommend that counter-messaging strategies should be tailored toward younger, highly educated individuals (e.g., experts in software programing, aviation, or engineering) who utilize cyber communication devices. Moreover, according to source credibility theory,[89] the origin of these messages are just as important as content of the message. From this perspective, in addition to targeting highly educated youth, counter-messaging strategies should originate from highly credible sources whom technically skilled individuals hold in high regard (e.g., other technically expert individuals). In this way, using tailored strategies to disrupt recruitment processes may increase counter-messaging viability and effectiveness.
Despite these contributions, several limitations related to this study are important to bear in mind. First, although studies relying upon open-source data have come to play important roles in terrorism research, secondary data have the potential of reporting inaccurate, biased or false information, or are tainted by government censorship and disinformation.[90] It is important to note that in the present effort, however, researchers employed a historiometric technique to overcome source credibility limitations, and this technique is used successfully in a wide variety of other literatures that examine outstanding or unique organizational phenomena.

Second, it is important to note that certain ideological motivations have a role in extremist recruitment strategies. For instance, a variety of ethno-national extremist groups (e.g., National Alliance) are unlikely to target and select individuals who do not adhere to specific individual characteristics (e.g., race, religious denomination, ethnicity), regardless of their expertise and training.[91] In these situations, it is possible to see a divergence from the talent spotting or headhunting recruitment strategies previously theorized because membership is predicated by rigid ideological convictions (e.g., Ku Klux Klan’s slogan of “100 percent American”). Thus, future studies should examine these types of groups to determine how they manage these stringent individual-level selection criteria when searching for highly qualified members.

Finally, while we were unable to examine organizational changes over time, the current investigation represents a key step forward in moving beyond case study approaches that investigate a single group or small number of organizations. In doing so, we provide empirical support that suggests differences in human capital across extremist organizations. Given that best practices in studying organizations via historiometry requires an examination of groups during their period of peak performance,[92] we examined these groups at the pinnacle of their extremist reigns. From a developmental standpoint, this is likely when the organization’s most prototypic mode of performance will manifest itself. From a pragmatic and scholarly standpoint, we have also found that this is when the organization is “watched” the most. Studying organizations during their period of peak performance may yield the most information about organizational style and contextual influences associated with this behavior as more academic biographers and journalists are likely to record events during this period.

In terms of future research, we think it is important to examine the interaction between extremist recruitment techniques and individual life-history characteristics. To date, psychological models of radicalization have been primarily individual-focused. They emphasize the cognitive and emotional processes that motivate individuals’ involvement in extremism.[93] At the same time, researchers have found that extremist recruitment strategies are often tailored around themes of organizational legitimacy intended to highlight strong leadership style, strategic branding, and consistent ideological messaging.[94] An investigation that examines the interaction between consumption (i.e., individual) and messaging (i.e., extremist recruitment strategies) could eventually be used to enhance our understanding of how extremist organizations capitalize on individual vulnerabilities and predispositions.

Moreover, in the case of extremist organizations, there are numerous pressures that uniquely impact an organization’s overall life-cycle and these factors rarely occur in isolation. While the primary focus of this study was on the role of age, public support, and human capital, it is unlikely these are the only factors affecting extremist activities. Rather, organizational characteristics such as leadership style, fundraising, and marketing vary widely from organization to organization, and even within organizations there is often a great deal of variation. As a counterpoint, it is possible our findings regarding public support may also be influenced by regional demographics. For instance, extremist groups like the Taliban often draw from unskilled labor pools to fill their ranks, which might contrast with other groups who have access to better qualified and educated recruits. Moreover, due to the fact that extremist groups have been found to provide training for new members,[95] higher rates of bomb-making experts, suicide bomber handlers, and financial experts among older extremist organizations may be influenced by “on the job” training.[96] Future research should examine these issues as well as investigate other factors that may influence recruitment strategies and the selection of specialized recruits.
Acknowledgment:

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Notes


[16] It is important to acknowledge that Bloom (2016) cautions against universalizing a uniform recruitment process among violent extremist organizations. The purpose of the current article, however, is not to identify a universal recruitment strategy among extremist organizations, but rather to empirically test whether there is overlap in human capital from one organization compared to another at various stages of social popularity and organizational age.


[51] Ibid.


[54] Ibid.


[61] University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Available at URL: www.start.umd.edu/gtd


[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Data drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) at the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Available at URL: www.start.umd.edu/gtd.


[94] Ligon, Harms, and Harris, “Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results.”


Policy Brief

Interview with Max Hill, QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation for the United Kingdom

by Sam Mullins¹

Abstract

The following text is a transcript of an interview between the author and the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL) for the United Kingdom, Max Hill, QC, which took place on March 9, 2018 in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Topics discussed included the role of the IRTL, prosecution of terrorism in the UK, returning foreign fighters, terrorism prevention and investigation measures (TPIMs), deportation of terrorism suspects, the involvement of children in terrorism, hate-preachers, and the British government’s efforts to counter non-violent extremism. The transcript has been edited for brevity.

Keywords: terrorism, counter-terrorism, prosecution, security, human rights, civil liberties, United Kingdom.

Introduction

Security versus civil liberties. How to safeguard the population from the actions of terrorists, while at the same time preserving fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, movement and association? This is the age-old debate that lies at the heart of counter-terrorism (CT) in liberal democracies. The precise balance varies from country to country and across time but in the aftermath of attacks it is particularly likely to tip in favour of security, sometimes at the expense of certain liberties.

The UK is no stranger to terrorism, but - similar to many other countries around the world - it has been on a heightened state of alert since 2014 when ISIS declared its caliphate, and last year the UK was rocked by a string of successful attacks, resulting in 36 fatalities [1]. Within days of the attack on London Bridge and Borough Market in June 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May declared that “If human rights get in the way of [new measures to counter-terrorism], we will change those laws to make sure we can do them” [2]. But although strong powers may well be appropriate, the danger in adopting such a stance is that we end up sacrificing our way of life and playing into the terrorists’ hands. Indeed, a key part of terrorist strategy is to deliberately provoke a heavy-handed response that only adds fuel to the fire [3]. In striving to maintain balance, the British government relies –at least in part– on the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL).

Anti-terrorism legislation in the UK has been subject to independent review since the 1970’s. However, the first IRTL was formally appointed on September 11th, 2001, just a few hours before the fateful attacks on the US by al-Qaeda [4]. The Independent Reviewer’s role is “to inform the public and political debate on anti-terrorism law in the United Kingdom” by way of regular reports submitted to the Home Secretary or Treasury, which then go before Parliament [5]. In addition, the IRTL gives evidence to parliamentary committees and also produces one-off reports on request from Ministers, or at his/her own initiative. These functions are facilitated by virtue of a high level of security clearance, which enables access to secret national security information and personnel. In addition, the IRTL travels widely, engages with all segments of society, and frequently contributes to public discourse on matters of terrorism and CT, utilizing a variety of different platforms.

In March 2017, Max Hill succeeded David Anderson to become the third IRTL. Appointed Queen’s Counsel in 2008, he has been practicing law for thirty years and has fifteen years’ of experience prosecuting terrorism cases ranging from the Real IRA to ISIS [6]. These included the 2003 ricin conspiracy [7], the 21/7 bombings in 2005 [8], the prosecution of Anis Sardar [9], who was responsible for the murder of an American

¹ The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author/interviewee.

On March 9, 2018 - a year into his new role - Mr. Hill addressed the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS) [11] at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Following his remarks, he was gracious enough to grant an interview. Topics discussed included the role of the IRTL, prosecution of terrorism, returning foreign fighters, terrorism prevention and investigation measures (TPIMs), deportation of terrorism suspects, the involvement of children in terrorism, hate-preachers such as Anjem Choudary [12], and the British government’s efforts to counter non-violent extremism. The following transcript of that interview has been edited for brevity.

Interview Transcript

Sam Mullins (SM): People in the UK and elsewhere are becoming more aware of the role of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, but for the benefit of those for whom this is new, could you start by briefly explaining your new position?

Max Hill (MH): The task is to provide independent scrutiny of the use of the legislation – the two Terrorism Acts (2000 [13] and 2006 [14]), the [Terrorism Prevention and Investigative Measures] TPIM Act (2011) [15], and TFA, the Terrorism Asset-Freezing Act, 2010 [16]. In the minds of many there should be a wider remit to look at policy and strategy around counter-terrorism government-wide, but that’s not my remit. The way which I have engaged has been to travel as widely as I can. And where I engage at a civil society level, I have said you can say anything you like to me. If that involves expressing your views on things like Prevent [17], I won’t shut you down but you need to know at the very start that I’m not going to make recommendations on Prevent and I don’t review it. But it seemed to me it was necessary to have those conversations because of the confusion in so many minds between policy and statute. You only uncover that confusion and have a chance of dealing with it if you allow people to say what they think about state intervention into their society. I have tried to separate out the areas within my remit and those that aren’t, but I’ve been as open as I can to conversation across the whole piece.

SM: Your background is as a prosecutor, with fifteen years of experience prosecuting terrorists of all stripes. How does prosecuting terrorism today compare to, say, ten or fifteen years ago and what would you say about the evolution of CT in the UK from a prosecutor’s perspective?

MH: The way we prosecute hasn’t changed dramatically in many respects, although at the practical level, the courtroom presentation of a terrorist case has changed really significantly. In the last of the IRA cases, which is where I came in, we were looking at human witnesses and paper documents and nothing else. Now, although many witnesses are still available to be called, we have full, electronic presentations of evidence, and that has increased efficiency. Particularly when you’re dealing with either foreign conflict, or terrorism which has been borne out of a foreign theatre, bringing far-flung countries to bear on the mind of a jury in London or elsewhere in England was a challenge. Now, that’s much easier to do. That’s been accompanied by the emergence of expert witnesses, where necessary, to assist judge and jury, and advocates, with situational evidence, country-based evidence. If you’re trying to bring to a jury’s understanding separatist conflict in Pakistan, or ideological conflict in Somalia, or terrorism in Syria, expert witnesses can be very appropriate. That’s developed over time, and has also expanded in appropriate cases to theological guidance. Those aspects of prosecution were absent fifteen years ago.

SM: You mentioned Syria, which raises the issue of returning foreign fighters. One of the challenges seems to be in obtaining sufficient evidence where people have spent time in a conflict zone and there are limited opportunities to confirm what exactly people were up to. Figures published by British media in 2016 suggested that only about 20% of known returnees from Syria and Iraq had been charged with an offence [18]. In
your view, how serious a problem is this apparent lack of, or difficulty in gathering sufficient evidence?

MH: It's important to emphasise that in the vast majority of cases returning foreign fighters will be prosecuted. But I've been at pains to leave at least the possibility, let's say in the case of radicalised teenagers or schoolgirls, of other options on return. In terms of the statistics of those who have returned and have been prosecuted, I think that actually we have to wait and see, because in the vast majority of cases those who've returned and have been through the system of investigation and prosecution originally travelled out before the declaration of the caliphate. So, these are British citizens who went out there between 2011, at the start of the conflict, and 2014, when there was a more confused picture on the ground. And, of course, there were legitimate reasons for travel – aid convoys etc. So, where people have returned and there's been a non-prosecution decision, I think that is reflective of the time-period in which these people were actually in Syria or Iraq.

We've not yet seen, to its full extent, the return of those who left after the declaration of the caliphate. Where they did, and where they now return, it is even more likely that they will be prosecuted. But I don't think we've seen that yet. Your question is obviously going to that category of people who require prosecution, but against whom there's intelligence and not evidence. That is a real phenomenon. In terms of legal instruments, that is where the TPIM Act comes into play. And I've said before that I would predict at least a modest rise in the use of TPIM legislation, perhaps to deal with these sort of cases. You have to make a decision between closing criminal proceedings to reflect this issue or maintaining the primacy of open proceedings in our criminal courts, in which case you need the part open, part closed process that's already available under TPIMs and that is the solution that I prefer.

Yes, we do have one recent precedent case (Incedal [19]), for part-closed proceedings in a criminal court, and therefore there may be an argument that with certain returning fighters yet to come [back to the UK], where there is heavy weight intelligence but a lack of evidence, you could make the case for another Incedal-style criminal charge. The court of appeals at the highest levels scrutinized the procedure that was used in Incedal and Lord Chief Justice Thomas ultimately approved it but said that it should be used very rarely. As a criminal lawyer, I believe I speak for almost everyone by saying we do not want to see the proliferation of closed criminal trials. Fortunately, because we have closed process in civil proceedings, we have another route to take, and I think the better route forward.

But there will undoubtedly be a longer conversation about the extent to which intelligence-led information can or should be filtered through to open court proceedings. There are a number of ways of doing that. Gisting, or the process of redaction, is the most obvious that can and should be used. But the impossibility of opening up information that would place covert human intelligence sources at risk means that there is always going to be intelligence information that you cannot deploy in open court.

The final possible mechanism would be to introduce the non-jury trials [NJTs] that we still see in Northern Ireland. The availability of jurors in Northern Ireland, where jurors are selected from communities that have been in conflict in recent history, is much narrower than in England and Wales. So, there are particular reasons why there are good arguments for retaining NJTs in Northern Ireland, but I don't see any good reason for introducing them in our larger population in England and Wales.

SM: You've pre-empted my next question, which is to do with the appropriateness of TPIMs in dealing with people who can't be prosecuted but against whom there is substantial intelligence. Of course, TPIMs are a very expensive tool to apply and there were some high-profile cases where people actually absconded while subject to these measures.

MH: Yes, there has been one or two celebrated absconder cases, although that happened more, funnily enough, under control orders (the precursor regime) than under TPIMs. The Independent Reviewer sits as an observer on every TPIM review group [TRG] meeting. These meetings take place regularly throughout the year - at least quarterly - and I'm always looking at the necessity and proportionality of the TPIM legislation.

What I'd add to that is that the future use of the TPIM Act could, in my view, be a little more flexible, and although everyone hates the phrase ‘TPIM lite', I would encourage the imposition of TPIMs, provided it passes the necessity and proportionality tests, in cases where you don't have to apply the full suite of measures against each individual.

What we tend to see at the moment is a very low number of TPIMs where those subjects are facing almost
Although the section 1 definition of terrorism [27] is comprehensible if very carefully explained, if you don’t look for appropriate solutions to what sometimes could otherwise be a more complex problem. If they have taken life unlawfully then in the vast majority of cases the Common Law offence of murder is fit for purpose. And if they have deployed explosive substances or devices, then in the majority of cases the Explosive Substances Act of 1883 sets it out clearly and simply [26]. So, as a prosecutor you look at the seriousness of the offending and the most apt and frankly, if you don’t take a charging decision based exclusively on the sentencing power that it may give to another country. Sometimes deportation is an effective tool, but for those who would argue politically, it’s right that states should maintain that responsibility. Equally, because of the international nature of terrorism, as we’ve seen over the last handful of years, the mere fact of successful deportation doesn’t necessarily negate the risk because individuals can travel back or, still worse, can train and send others back whom we’re not expecting. So, I think deportation, with the right assurances, has its place and is being used, but shouldn’t be seen as a one-stop solution to risk from individuals or groups. Sometimes one country ridding itself of a problem is merely giving that problem to another country. Sometimes [deportation is] an effective tool, but for those who would argue politically, as it were, that it’s a one-stop solution that rids a state of the problem, it’s much more complicated than that.

But we live in a rights-based society in Europe. That means article 2 [of the European Convention on Human Rights [23]], and article 2 mandates contracting states to consider what in this context we describe as safety on return. Although that has been irritatingly difficult for the British state to apply, it’s right that states should maintain that responsibility. Equally, because of the international nature of terrorism, we’ve seen over the last handful of years, the mere fact of successful deportation doesn’t necessarily negate the risk because individuals can travel back or, still worse, can train and send others back whom we’re not expecting. So, I think deportation, with the right assurances, has its place and is being used, but shouldn’t be seen as a one-stop solution to risk from individuals or groups. Sometimes one country ridding itself of a problem is merely giving that problem to another country. Sometimes [deportation is] an effective tool, but for those who would argue politically, as it were, that it’s a one-stop solution that rids a state of the problem, it’s much more complicated than that.

SM: Another somewhat controversial issue, and one of the things that the UK has often struggled with, has been the deportation of both suspected and sometimes convicted foreign terrorists. The Abu Qatada [20] saga, of course, comes to mind, but there are numerous other cases where it’s been extremely difficult, if not impossible to deport foreign terrorists from the UK due to human rights issues. By comparison, other European countries such as France and Italy appear to make use of deportations far more often (Italy has deported more than 260 terrorism suspects since January 2015 [21]). Of course, David Anderson and Clive Walker’s recent report on deportation with assurances (DWAs) explores this issue in detail, [22] but I’d be interested to hear your thoughts on the reason for this disparity, and whether you think the UK could or should strive to increase its use of deportations as a CT tool?

MH: It comes down fundamentally to the state’s responsibility for an individual, however odious that individual may be. The leading writing on it is David Anderson’s and Clive Walker’s report and I would defer to that. However, the principles that have underpinned removal of people from this country for some time now include the twin objectives, to put it one way, or the collision to put it another way, between national security risk and safety on return [to the person’s country of origin]. Of course, wherever you identify a person who represents a risk to national security, we all want to take every step to minimize that risk and one way to minimize it is to remove the individual. But we live in a rights-based society in Europe. That means article 2 [of the European Convention on Human Rights [23]], and article 2 mandates contracting states to consider what in this context we describe as safety on return. Although that has been irritatingly difficult for the British state to apply, it’s right that states should maintain that responsibility. Equally, because of the international nature of terrorism, as we’ve seen over the last handful of years, the mere fact of successful deportation doesn’t necessarily negate the risk because individuals can travel back or, still worse, can train and send others back whom we’re not expecting. So, I think deportation, with the right assurances, has its place and is being used, but shouldn’t be seen as a one-stop solution to risk from individuals or groups. Sometimes one country ridding itself of a problem is merely giving that problem to another country. Sometimes [deportation is] an effective tool, but for those who would argue politically, as it were, that it’s a one-stop solution that rids a state of the problem, it’s much more complicated than that.

SM: When it comes to prosecuting terrorists, you’ve previously pointed out that existing criminal legislation is often sufficient. We saw this in a number of recent prosecutions in the UK - for instance both the murderers of Lee Rigby [24] and of Jo Cox [25] were convicted of murder, rather than terrorism. Yet many people seem to think there’s a double-standard in how terrorism cases are dealt with. The perception is that there’s a bias towards using the term terrorism and applying terrorism legislation when the offender is Muslim. Can you give us your thoughts on this issue and talk us through the decision-making process in terms of what kind of charge is ultimately applied?

MH: You don’t take a charging decision based exclusively on the sentencing power that it may give a court months or years later. You look at the seriousness of the offending and the most apt and frankly, the most straightforward way of describing to judge and jury what you allege the individual has done. If they have taken life unlawfully then in the vast majority of cases the Common Law offence of murder is fit for purpose. And if they have deployed explosive substances or devices, then in the majority of cases the Explosive Substances Act of 1883 sets it out clearly and simply [26]. So, as a prosecutor you look for appropriate solutions to what sometimes could otherwise be a more complex problem. Although the section 1 definition of terrorism [27] is comprehensible if very carefully explained, if you don’t
need to use that definition as part of the evidence proving guilt, why would you? So, I think that sometimes it's not actually about the charging decision. The use of the word ‘terrorism’ is still very important at the policing and investigative stage so that if, heaven forbid, there were another Lee Rigby case or another Jo Cox case, it's important on day one to describe that activity as terrorism in both cases. But in charging decisions you look at what is most appropriate and worry less about applying the terrorism label. In that context, the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 [28] created a schedule of offences, which at the sentencing stage are aggravated by the presence of terrorism. So, you can pick up the terrorism context specifically as part of the sentencing exercise. You don't have to advertise that at the front end of a criminal trial.

In fact, because there are one or two gaps on the schedule in the 2008 Act, I would support, if the government chooses to go this road, the addition of some other general crime offences to that schedule. I think an example of that would be section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 [29] [wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm], which doesn't appear on the schedule at the moment. So, we can badge things as terrorism early on as part of the investigation, and we should wherever it applies. We can badge things as terrorism at the sentencing stage. In the middle, when we're dealing with an indictment before a jury, what we should do is robustly cover all of the criminality. If that involves some bespoke terrorism offences all well and good. If it involves general crime offences, that also is appropriate.

SM: You mentioned gaps in Counter-Terrorism. An unfortunate development that many countries around the world are currently facing is the increasing involvement of children, under the age of 18, in acts of terrorism. As a result of that, we're seeing changes in legislation - for instance in Germany [30] and Australia [31] - aimed at ensuring that appropriate powers are in place to monitor and manage the level of risk presented by radicalised children.

You were personally involved in such a prosecution in the UK. What legal or other challenges does this pose, and do you see a need for legislative amendments in the UK to manage the risk associated with radicalised children?

MH: I was involved in the prosecution of Michael Piggin, [32], who was 17 at the time he was charged under the Explosive Substances Act, to which he pleaded guilty for making pipe bombs. But he was also charged with preparation for terrorism, to which he pleaded not guilty and ultimately a jury failed to agree on that. It's a very serious aspect of any terrorism case where you're dealing with someone below the age of majority and there are any number of ramifications when that applies.

Starting with the age of criminal responsibility, that varies as you go around the world between about nine in some countries and at least eighteen in others. We [in the UK] have a comparatively low age of ten, so, put simply, we don't have a criminal age of responsibility problem in terms of charging young offenders. Heaven forbid we ever find individuals below the age of ten getting involved in terrorist activity, as opposed to being impacted by the terrorist activity of their parents. That's where the family courts - possibly with the use of closed material proceedings - need to intervene to safeguard those children.

But talking about those who are committing offences, criminal responsibility is a relatively settled issue in our jurisdiction. I appreciate, it is not so elsewhere. But taking individuals into custody pre-charge, and then at the remand stage, post-charge, then at the post-conviction sentencing stage, at all of those stages the age [of the suspect/offender] has a real impact on what is appropriate. I’m particularly interested in the use of Terrorism Act custody suites for young offenders, and where we need robust rights-based procedures for adults in pre-charge detention, you absolutely need to provide support for young adults. There's a National Appropriate Adult Network [33] in England and Wales, which is extremely useful in this regard and the Independent Custody Visiting Association [34], which also plays an important role.

In the later stages, obviously separate sentencing regimes apply for young offenders. In between, in terms of trial, I think whether you're talking about young offenders charged with terrorism, or young offenders charged with other kinds of crime, we've seen a sharp rise in the detection of educational and other disorders at the point of admission into the criminal justice system. In the last decade, [there's been] a sea-change in terms of criminal court procedure for people who are off and on the autistic spectrum. The case of Piggin is a case in point because he suffers from Asperger's Syndrome [a form of autism [35]]. But with or without Asperger's we have a very well-worked, sophisticated system of intermediaries in crown courts
now, who are there to provide support and facilitate communication wherever a vulnerable individual is involved in the criminal justice system, which may be [as a] witness, victim, or defendant. The legal profession is undergoing specific training for the handling and questioning of young people and that's overdue. So, I think the system is reacting to this awareness that there are sometimes more young people going through, and young people with legitimate problems and concerns which need to be addressed.

Back to terrorism specifically, I don't see the need for any specialist regime in terms of offences for young people, and in the case of Michael Piggott, the old offences under the Explosive Substances Act proved valuable and his age was neither here nor there. However, the jury failed to agree that this young man, who was plainly criminal by virtue of his guilt under the Explosive Substances Act, was a terrorist. I don't know, but I suspect that at least part of the problem may have been describing someone of that age as being involved in preparation for terrorism. It may be that applying the section 1 definition to a young teenager like that was even more difficult than it is in some of the adult terrorism cases. Does that mean that we apply a separate terrorism definition for youngsters? No. Does it mean that we lack powers to deal with young people involved in terrorism? No, because general crime statutes provide an answer. But it certainly means that we have to watch this over time and make sure that our processes keep up with, not just the problem but also the needs of young people who are put in front of the courts.

SM: Another challenge that I'd like to discuss with you, which is not new - and in fact is something that the UK and others have been struggling with for many years - is how we go about dealing with people who're involved in the radicalisation and recruitment of others. We mentioned Abu Qatada earlier, but, of course, there's been many others, including Abdullah el-Faisal [36], Omar Bakri Mohammed [37], Abu Hamza [38], and, more recently, Anjem Choudary, who was convicted of inviting support for a proscribed organisation [39]. It could be argued that individuals like these are in some ways more dangerous than someone who conducts an attack, since they often play key roles in the expansion of extremist networks. Yet they've also proven to be extremely difficult to prosecute. Choudary, for instance, evaded the law for many years and ultimately only received a sentence of five-and-a-half years. The maximum sentences for encouragement of terrorism [40] and inviting support for a proscribed organisation [41] are just seven and ten years respectively. So, I'm curious to know your thoughts on why it's so difficult to prosecute such individuals and whether or not you think it might be appropriate to allow longer discretionary sentences for these offences in more serious cases?

MH: I do think that there are a number of what you might call middle-order terrorism offences for which the discretionary maximum sentence set by Parliament in 2000 or 2006 is proven by recent history to be too low. And so, I do think that you can make a case for increasing the discretionary maximum under section 12 [inviting support] to, let's say fifteen years. That is very different to imposing a mandatory minimum sentence, which I disapprove. We see it in other general crime areas in England and Wales - multiple burglary offences being one example, certain types of knife crime being another example - whereas in terrorism I would argue that we should not move to mandatory minimum sentences, but should provide the very experienced and senior judges who try terrorism with greater discretion and a higher potential maximum. I think you could very easily put the Choudary case in that category - a very significant individual. Anecdotally said, to have tiptoed along the margin between legality and illegality for many years. Highly significant within a certain, small sector of the community - the al-Muhajiroun membership. To find that an individual as significant as that is sentenced to no more than five-and-a-half years suggests that it is time for the discretionary maximum to increase. The offence itself, however, I think is fit for purpose. So, I endorse the use of section 12 to deal with that sort of individual, potentially with a higher maximum sentence.

This phenomenon of malevolent individuals online or offline, who are seeking to radicalise a very specifically targeted audience – the question that that poses is whether we need some further offence against that sort of activity? I find that difficult because, I think from the law-versus-rights perspective, section 12 is already a significant intervention bringing with it arguments about intervening against mindset alone, and that is why the sentencing remarks in the Choudary case are particularly apposite because the judge indicated that in section 12 cases, although individuals are sentenced for what they say, it's not just what they say, it's the target audience that they have in mind that is important [42]. There is a difference between a public speaker on a soapbox expressing views with which the majority disagrees - which to my mind is not terrorism - and an individual...
who is specifically targeting what he or she knows to be a vulnerable, tiny minority who may be radicalised by his or her words. That, applying section 12, is or can be [considered inviting support for] terrorism. So, I think it is a powerful offence, with probably not a powerful enough sentencing provision [43]. I wouldn't go a step further and say that we need some other specific offence to deal with radicalisers or hate preachers.

That is all a separate argument to intervening against the platforms that they use for their messaging. The whole tech company debate has been raging, certainly since March last year. My position there has been that we should not intervene by criminalising tech companies and I don't see real force in the argument that we should regard them henceforth as disseminators and charge them under section 2 of the 2006 Act [44]. But, where I've been criticised for that, what I've repeatedly said is that the tech companies, if they haven't done so already, need to wake up, need to realise the abuse of their platforms by a minority, and we've got to see even greater cooperation with investigators. And more aggressive policy towards identifying [terrorist] material and taking it down. We do have the Global Internet Forum [45], which has made a very useful start in data-banking known extremist material so that that's accessible to all tech companies who can then identify and remove it. We do have, certainly in England and Wales, a very successful referral mechanism by way of the Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) [46], who would report that in almost every occasion that when they notify a webhost of extremist material, it is taken down within about 40 minutes.

What that leaves us is putting all of that together and finding a mechanism for stopping the material from being uploaded in the first place. And that's where at the moment I part company with the German solution, where forms of statutory coercion are being used against tech companies [47]. I would rather that we see the tech companies as part of the solution and not part of the problem. Of course, we'd have to revisit that if, let's say, in a year's time more progress hasn't been made. We have to maintain pressure on these vast companies with huge economic power at their disposal to do more, but legislating against tech companies I believe would come with unintended consequences, which unless we're very careful about it, could involve bearing down on the freedom of the internet generally, which would be to the detriment of all of us.

SM: This brings to mind the counter extremism strategy and related efforts in the UK, which have slowly been gathering pace over the last few years. As you know, there were proposals for a counter extremism bill of some kind and although that appears to have fallen by the wayside, more recently we've seen signs of progress in the appointment of Sara Khan as head of the Commission for Countering Extremism [48]. The big challenge, of course, will be in coming up with an operational definition of 'extremism'. What are your thoughts on this, and do you think that measures such as the formerly proposed extremism disruption orders [49] (which conceivably might have banned certain individuals from working with children, or from broadcasting their views online) would be better reserved for those actually convicted of a terrorist offence, as opposed to merely being designated as an extremist in the absence of prosecution?

MH: I find it much more comfortable to imagine a range of consequences on conviction, which would include disruption orders of some sort where, at the moment we have notification requirements and a raft of other consequences of imprisonment - that's much easier to contemplate than imposing those orders as a civil sanction without any prosecution.

What I think is very positive about the current government's approach is that they do appear to have rowed back from their intention to legislate against non-violent extremism. Where the law comes into play and is necessary and must be robust is in relation to violent extremism. That is what we want to outlaw and that is where there should be no safe place to hide for terrorists. Whether they're espousing violent extremism online or they're planning or executing their plots offline, that is where the law comes in as a statutory measure. Where it is non-violent extremism, if we intervene by creating criminal offences and we do that crudely or imperfectly, we will have done what I constantly warn against, which is to create a state in which freedom of thought is suppressed. There are very few countries in the world where that is regarded as a good thing.

From my position, reviewing legislation against violent extremism, I'm relieved that we don't face a further statute against non-violent extremism, which seemed to me would have led to endless arguments, not just about definition of terms but definition of territory covered by these twin statutory regimes. Far better to do what the government has, which is to say that in the non-violent sphere, there should
be a commission for countering extremism. I welcome that, and I also have welcomed Sara Khan's appointment. I've been disappointed that she's been so roundly criticised. It seems to me that it's vitally important that the lead commissioner is given the opportunity to set out her terms, to go through a long process of taking soundings far and wide and then to grapple with the fundamental problem of what is extremism in Britain today. All of that is being done on a non-statutory model, which I welcome.

Violent extremism has no place [in society]. Extremism is abhorrent, but if you get the mesh of the net wrong - in other words if you define your terms badly - that net will catch huge areas of free speech including the general political arena. The expression of a view, however much you might disagree with it, is part of a rights-based society. It's those who then act on that view and turn to violent extremism who must be hunted down and the force of the law applied against them.

SM: I'd love to chat all day about this, but I realise you're a busy man! Is there anything else you'd like to highlight in conclusion?

MH: Although it's been developed in a time of great stress and sometimes disaster through the attacks we've witnessed, what we have in Britain is a pretty remarkable and robust system of investigation and prosecution, which is now underpinned by very impressive interoperability between policing at a national level and at a local level, and between the other sources of investigation. It's never going to be perfect.

Questions are naturally asked about missed opportunities to intervene before one or more of the attacks last year. Further questions are asked about whether more needs to be done through legislation or otherwise. But in the midst of it all, we have a counter-terrorist machine, which demonstrated that it worked in very difficult circumstances running multiple, contemporaneous terrorism investigations, starting with Westminster Bridge, going on to Manchester Arena and London Bridge and Finsbury Park - and the system didn't wilt under that pressure.

So, if there is a positive [element] of the horror from last year, it is that we have a system that works far more often than not. We've got to continually strive to improve it. In a small way, I try to play my part in that. But if people ask me whether I'm dismayed by British policing, or disappointed by what I see, the answer is that increasingly over time it's the opposite, that we have an impressive and dedicated system from the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] Counter-Terrorism Division, to national counter-terror policing, to regional units linking in with general crime policing, and I applaud that.

About the Independent Reviewer: Max Hill, QC, is Head of Red Lion Chambers and, since March 2017, Britain’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Whilst unable to advise or appear in terrorism-related cases during his tenure as Independent Reviewer, Max Hill maintains a heavy-weight crime practice, defending and prosecuting in a number of complex cases of homicide, violent crime and high value fraud and corporate crime. He also has extensive advisory experience, both nationally and internationally.

About the Interviewer: Sam Mullins is a Professor of Counter-Terrorism at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Germany, and an Honorary Principle Fellow at the University of Wollongong, Australia. He is the author of ‘Home-Grown’ Jihad: Understanding Islamist Terrorism in the US and UK.

Notes


[21] “Italy Deports Suspected Islamic State Supporter”, ADN Kronos, March 1, 2018; URL: http://


Abstract

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attributes great importance to the Palestinian issue, portraying himself as the defender of the Palestinians and of the holy Islamic sites in Jerusalem. One should consider his infatuation with the Palestinian cause, and especially Turkey's very robust relations with Hamas, the Palestinian radical Islamist movement, in the larger context of Erdogan and his party's, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), ideological and strategic goals. The Islamist inclinations of President Erdogan endanger the already strained relations with Israel. In addition, they can also undermine relations with the Palestinian Authority and threaten the multifaceted Middle Eastern arena. Moreover, it seems Erdogan dreams of building an Islamist army, on the Iranian model, to fight for the liberation of Palestine.

Keywords: Erdogan, Hamas, Iran, Turkey

The Neo-Ottoman Vision

Ahmed Davutoglu, the academic who published the book Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth), international advisor for the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and later Foreign Minister (2009-2014), was nicknamed the “architect of the new Turkish foreign policy.” Davutoglu’s doctrine revolved around the concept of Ottoman greatness as rooted in a period of revivalism, during Sultan Abdulhamid II’s rule in the late nineteenth century. He emphasized the Middle East, suggesting that Turkey had a responsibility to actively cooperate with the Muslim states in the area, because only by reaching out to them and others in the Muslim world could Turkey become a great power.[1]

Indeed, in the early years of Davutoglu’s tenure as foreign minister, Turkey did pivot toward the Middle East and sought rapprochement with Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Gulf monarchies, and built good ties with countries as far away as Sudan. His policy, dubbed “Zero Problems with Neighbors,” helped establish Turkey as a Middle Eastern power. The second tenet of Davutoglu’s doctrine envisioned Turkey as powerful not just in the Middle East, but also throughout the Muslim world, assuming the mantle of the “protector of Muslims, from the Philippines and Somalia to Myanmar and Bosnia,” carrying for Muslims around the world. Although a country with a secular constitution, Turkey took over the presidency of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 2004 for a ten-year period.[2]

However, rather than being neo-Ottoman in a “secular” sense, the AKP’s foreign policy is asymmetrically focused on Arab Islamists in particular and the Muslim Middle East more generally. The AKP views the world as composed of religious blocks, and this disposition colors its views of the region and the world. The subsequent anti-Western, anti-U.S., and anti-Israeli views have become a new paradigm promoted by pundits, think tanks, and newspapers close to the AKP.[3]

Some commentators claim that the AKP is a concealed form of an Islamist party more dangerous and cunning than Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. According to Mustafa Akyol, AKP is not Islamist because it does not intend to implement Sharia law in Turkey. Akyol prefers to use the term “Muslimist” ideology or “Muslim nationalism,” which implies “an emotional affinity” to the Muslim Brothers around the world, and a presumption of being the rightful party in their disputes with non-Muslims.[4] Muslimism is wrong, argues Akyol, when it blindly supports Muslim Brothers regardless of whatever they do. Erdogan’s rhetoric crossed that line when he failed to criticize the brutal crackdown on the Iranian opposition after the faked elections of June 2009, Ahmadinejad’s threats to wipe Israel off from the map or when he dismissed the atrocities in Darfur by pretending that
“Muslims cannot commit genocide” [4]

According to Kadri Gursel, the AKP’s foreign policy in the Middle East “has been infected with the viruses of Islamist ideology, populism, and emotionalism” and therefore cannot lead a Realpolitik policy. [5] Although Neo-Ottomanism helps present Turkey as a leader of the Sunni world, Turkey developed a multidimensional foreign policy. “I’m neither a Shiite nor a Sunni; I’m a Muslim”, declared Erdogan during his July 2008 visit to Iraq. Turkey’s popularity, after the 2009 Gaza war and the crisis of the Turkish Mavi Marmara ship bound to Gaza, not only grew in the Sunni street but also in the Shiite communities, where Erdogan attracted the support of Lebanon’s Shiites. In 2010, Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah declared Erdogan “a Muslim hero.” Turkey’s defense of Iran, Syria and Hamas in international arena was criticized by the Western media and perceived as a shift in its pro-Western axis. [6]

The quest for “strategic autonomy” is the ultimate goal of this multidimensional approach. Examples include the Brazilian-Turkish-led negotiations on the Iranian nuclear dossier in 2010 and the uninterrupted dialogue with Hamas since their victory in the Palestinian Authority parliamentary elections in 2006. [7]

But all these policies were challenged after the 2011 Arab uprisings, as the status quo in the region changed. At the beginning of the uprisings many observers suggested that Turkey will emerge as the leader of a Sunni bloc. Tariq Ramadan, the grandson of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, stated that “democratic Turkey is the template for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.” Indeed, the AKP government had positioned itself very well for the exceptional events, bolstering its credibility in Islamist circles by actively supporting Hamas in its competition with the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority and against Israeli attempts to isolate it in Gaza; by supporting Sudanese Islamist President Omar al-Bashir, accused of genocide in Darfur; by maintaining excellent relations with the Syrian regime; and by improving its position in Lebanon by courting all the parties in conflict. [8]

The Palestinian Factor

By exploiting the Palestinian issue, Erdogan tries to present Turkey to the Arab public as a leading power in the Middle East, to gain Islamic legitimacy, and to build an economic infrastructure in the region. [9] Speaking in September 2014 in New York at the Foreign Relations Council (CFR), one of the leading think tanks of the United States, Erdogan declared: “The Palestinian issue is an important issue that has an impact not just on the Palestinians, but on all the Muslims and everyone who has a conscience in the world. And in fact, the Palestinian issue lies in the heart of many of the issues in the region. And the Israeli government, although they know this sensitivity very well, has not refrained from putting its own people and the people of the region on fire.” [10]

Erdogan’s speeches are imbued with great sympathy for the Palestinian people and he often mixes it with emotions and identification. In September 2017, he declared at the United Nations General Assembly in New York: “I call on the international community to support our Palestinian brothers and sisters in Eastern Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza in their struggle for an independent and geographically unified Palestinian State.” [11] Erdogan manifests his support for the Palestinians by symbolic gestures. In 2012, he met with Aaed al-Tamimi, a 13-year-old girl who provoked IDF soldiers and was invited to Turkey where she received an award from Erdogan in recognition of her bravery. [12] In December 2017, he hosted a 14-year-old Palestinian boy with Down syndrome, who was detained by Israeli soldiers in the West Bank. [13] In January 2018, he hosted a Palestinian teen who became a symbol of Palestinian opposition to the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. [14]

The Special Relations with Hamas

Since the AKP took office in November 2002, the party’s pro-Hamas rhetoric and conduct as well as government-
sponsored Hamas fundraisings and gatherings, have for the first time turned the traditional Turkish sympathy for the Palestinians into sympathy for Hamas. Thus, young Turks have been exposed to a worldview of “good Hamas versus evil Israel,” while whitewashing Hamas’ violent actions. In March 2006 Erdogan invited a high-level Hamas delegation to visit Turkey, immediately after its success at the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections. Erdogan argued that the visit created an opportunity for the Turkish authorities to “sincerely convey the expectations of the whole humanity to the Hamas delegation.”

The AKP government called on Western countries to “recognize Hamas as the legitimate government of the Palestinian people,” while labeling Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas as “head of an illegitimate government.” Turkish officials repeatedly refer to Hamas as a democratically elected group that was denied the chance to govern and call on the international community to engage with Hamas. AKP Group Acting Chairman, Eyup Fatsa, claimed that as Arafat and Fatah in the past negotiated a peace with Israel “this may also be possible with Hamas.” According to him it was explained to the Hamas leadership during the 2006 meetings that “the struggle should continue on a democratic platform; that it should contribute to the peace process; that weapons and democracy cannot coexist; that if it intends to assume political responsibility, it should lay down arms; that Israel and Hamas should reciprocally recognize each other; that this process cannot continue with armed struggle.”

Many Turkish newspapers like the pro-Islamic daily Yeni Safak and the center-right daily Sabah expressed support for Hamas’ leader Khaled Meshal visit and presented it as a Turkish attempt to mediate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hakan Albayrak in Yeni Safak asked Ankara to “put pressure on Israel to force it to withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip instead of urging Hamas to renounce violence, cooperate with Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Palestinian Authority, and recognize Israel.” However, Kerim Balci in the pro-Islamic Zaman argued that contacts should be held “when the time is right” and warned that it is “imperative for lasting peace” that Arab countries and leaders accept Hamas. He wondered whether “Arab countries [will] accept Hamas as their interlocutor? Will they be able to make peace with an ideology that views the destruction of Israel as the first step of a rooted revolution in the Muslim world? Will Hamas leaders be able to embrace the Arab leaders whom they have been declaring infidel, hypocrite, traitor, spy, and convert?”

Turkish center-right and conservative newspapers opposed the visit and columnist Cengiz Candar claimed that Ankara could have conveyed its messages to Hamas through its ambassador in Syria. Criticizing Meshal’s visit, columnist Emin Colasan argued that the great importance the AKP administration attached to Hamas was due to the organization’s plan to “establish an Islamic state.... That suits the AKP very much,” he wrote.

AKP’s government clear support to Hamas and its violent strategy became obvious during the 2008 Israeli Cast Lead operation in the Gaza Strip, following the massive launching of rockets against Israeli territory. Erdogan expressed his anger towards the Israeli government and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert personally, claiming that he was betrayed by the Israeli PM for not informing him beforehand about the projected operation while he was engaged in mediating between Israel and Syria.

In reality this was a well-prepared move. Erdogan and his government did not utter a word against the rocket attacks on Hamas on Israeli territory before and during the operation. Erdogan’s aggressive and undiplomatic verbal attack on Israeli president Shimon Peres at the now famous Davos meeting on January 29, 2009, raised the tension between the two countries at its utmost. Moreover, Erdogan and his government not only fervently supported Hamas but delegitimized PA President Mahmud Abbas, claiming that his legal term ended on 9 January 2009, thus raising Abbas’ suspicions and anger concerning the real goals of Turkey. Ramallah worried about the way in which Turkey became one of the chief supporters of Hamas and the enemy of Al-Fatah showing its shifting toward the radical camp in the Middle East.

Columnist Cuneyt Ulsever deplored the rapprochement with Hamas “because it isolates Turkey in the world and incites anti-Semitism in the county,” for instance after the minister of national education issued a circular requiring primary school children to condemn Israeli raids on Gaza. Her suggested that the AKP minister should have also protested the Hamas brainwashing of the five- and six-year-old children by making them wear
military fatigues and handing them rifles.[24]

Hamas’ Militant and Terrorist Activities Supported by Turkey

Turkey’s operative support to Hamas materialized when the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish ship carrying a sizeable Turkish militant group from the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı - IHH) leading an international flotilla, tried to break the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip in May 2010. In spite of Israel’s attempts through diplomatic channels to convince the Turkish government to transport the humanitarian aid convoy to Gaza through the Israeli border, the Turkish leaders preferred to support the provocative aid flotilla which terminated in an Israeli military operation and the death of nine violent Turkish militants of the IHH.

IHH is a Turkish Islamist NGO established two decades ago in Istanbul, an affiliate of the Union of Good (’İtîlaf al-Khayr), a Saudi-based organization. In the mid-1990s, the IHH was associated with radical Islamist groups in Algeria and Iran and one of the NGOs financing and supporting terrorist jihadist activities in Chechnya and Bosnia. The former head of the French judiciary’s counterterrorism unit, Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere, testified that the IHH played important logistical roles in the facilitation of bogus passports and other counterfeited documents, the trafficking of weapons, recruitment of fighters, and the infiltration of mujahideen into various war zones.[25] Hurriyet columnist Semih Idiz stated that the Erdogan government has close relations with the IHH and stands morally and politically behind this group and argued that events like the flotilla clash endanger Turkey’s long-term interests. This happened, he noted humorously, “because the NGO in question is…a ‘GNGO’: a ‘governmental-non-governmental-organization’.” Another columnist of the same daily, Barcin Yinanc, wondered if the Turkish government mourned the flotilla activists killed by Israel because they “have become martyrs” and went to Gaza not for humanitarian purposes but for jihad.[26]

While Israel decided on an Independent Public Commission with international observers to examine the maritime incident and to cooperate with the UN investigative panel appointed by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, Turkey formed a national commission under the coordination of the prime minister’s office, with the participation of bureaucrats from the Foreign, Justice, Transportation and Interior Ministries for investigating “the treatment to which persons in the convoy had been exposed.” No word about investigating Turkey government’s responsibilities in the incident and its relations with IHH. Following the events of the May 2010 Gaza flotilla, Sheikh Youssef Al-Qaradhawi, a spiritual leader of Hamas, praised Turkey for its contribution: “All the shahids are from among our Turkish brothers – scions of Muhammad the Conqueror and his mighty brothers.” He also thanked the Turkish participants, adding that “another flotilla will avenge the deaths” of the Turkish activists.[27] It seems the Turkish government was interested to achieve at all costs the end of the Gaza blockade and Hamas’ international isolation in its bid for the leadership in the Palestinian issue, growing influence in the Arab world and strategic rapprochement, at that time, with Syria and Iran. The Palestinian issue is also an important card on the Turkish internal arena, a rallying populist flag for the Islamist masses.

When at the end of August 2010, the already difficult peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority finally resumed in Washington after a ten months long stalemate, Hamas staged two terrorist attacks in the West Bank, killing four Israelis and wounding two others, in an attempt to derail the fragile process. Mahmoud Zahar, the Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, rejected in a fiery speech any compromise with Israel, took responsibility for the shootings and indicated that more attacks could be expected. He attacked Palestinian Chairman Mahmoud Abbas who, he claimed, has no right to represent the Palestinian people. [28] Turkey’s reaction to these events was to welcome “the resumption of direct talks between Israel and Palestine,” and to declare that “it was important to avoid unilateral acts which would negatively affect the process”, without mentioning the Hamas responsibility for the “heroic” murder of four innocent civilians or publicly appealing to its leaders to stop the use of terrorism. [29]

While many years have passed since the 2006 Hamas leader’s visit to Ankara, argued Cuneyt Ulsever, Hamas did not take the slightest notice of Turkey’s peaceful appeals. “Did it hand over a single rocket? Could [Turkey]
prevent Hamas rockets...from raining on Israel? he asked. [30] Hamas has refused to recognize Israel and work with the Palestinian Authority in uniting the Palestinian people. “A true friend of the Palestinians would support them to take the road to peace, not that of death, destruction and disunity”, argued Hayri Abaza, another Turkish journalist. [31]

Since the Mavi Marmara diplomatic and political crisis between Turkey and Israel in 2010, and more so since the 2011 agreement between Israel and Hamas to release Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners and the expulsion of 10 operatives to Turkey, Turkey has become a “second home” for Hamas militants and terrorists. There they invest efforts to recruit members, build financial resources and cooperate with other actors against Israel. According to the Turkish media, once they arrived in Turkey the Hamas militants were supposed to be under surveillance of Turkish intelligence and not permitted to circulate unaccompanied. However, Turkey did not require them to remain in the country or forbid them to go to another country if they so desired. [32]

Since 2014, Turkey is host to Salah al-Arouri, a senior Hamas political bureau member and the major operative commander responsible for establishing, funding and strengthening the Hamas military-terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank, operating out of his headquarters in Istanbul. Between May and August 2014, the Israeli security forces detained 94 Hamas members in the West Bank and Jerusalem suspected of involvement in establishing a military-terrorist infrastructure to carry out terrorist attacks in Israel. The network was headed by Riyad Nasser and included cells in Nablus, Bethlehem, the Yatir region, Jerusalem and Tulkarm. Riyad Nasser was recruited and his network’s activity directed by Saleh al-Arouri from Istanbul. [33] According to the Israel Security Agency (ISA), one of the network’s objectives, still in its first stages, was to overthrow the Palestinian Authority and Mahmoud Abbas’ rule. The then-leader of ISA, Yoram Cohen, traveled personally to Ramallah to inform Mahmoud Abbas, who thanked Israel for its assistance. [34]

Saleh al-Arouri was behind the Hamas cell responsible for the abduction and murder of three Jewish youths in Gush Etzion on June 12, 2014. This was followed by a major operation by the IDF in the West Bank and finally led to the 50-day Protective Edge operation, beginning 8 July 2014, in the Hamas ruled Gaza Strip. On August 20, 2014, al-Arouri told the participants of the fourth conference of the World Union of Islamic Sages (held in Turkey) that Hamas was behind the abduction and murder of the three Jewish youths in Gush Etzion. [35] With increased attention on al-Arouri, including concern over the fact he was headquartered in the heart of a NATO country, the U.S. Treasury designated him as a terrorist in September 2015. According to media accounts, the Hamas leader was then deported from Turkey in December 2015. President Erdogan, Prime Minister Davutoglu, and Hamas leader Meshal agreed that al-Arouri would “voluntarily” depart the country and not return, though Hamas will be allowed to continue other operations on Turkish soil. While al-Arouri was the most prominent member of Hamas, ten senior Hamas officials were believed to be still in Turkey before the rapprochement talks between Israel and Turkey by mid-2015. [36]

More recently, the Israeli Security Agency announced that on 1 January 2018, a Turkish citizen, Cemil Tekeli, a lecturer in law, was arrested on suspicion of aiding Hamas terrorists in Turkey. On 21 January, Dara’am Jabarin, an Israeli citizen, was also arrested. The two had been recruited in Turkey by senior Hamas terrorist Zaher Jabarin, released in the Shalit deal. He is responsible for Hamas’ budget and promotes terrorist operations in the West Bank on instruction from Salah Arouri, who serves these days as the deputy chairman of the organization and head of its operations in the West Bank. Investigation findings have revealed wide-ranging Hamas activity in money laundering in Turkey on instruction from Zaher Jabarin. [37] Tekeli admitted during the investigation that Turkey contributes to the military strengthening of Hamas via the SADAT company, established at the behest of Adnan Tanriverdi, an adviser close to the Turkish establishment. The company was founded to assist with funds and war materials the creation of the “Palestine Army,” the goal of which is to fight Israel. One of its employees even helped senior Hamas officials to visit a 2015 weapon show in Turkey, where they expressed interest in UAVs. [38]

Interestingly, when in March 2013 Erdogan decided to reach a reconciliation agreement with Israel, Turkey asked for support from Hamas to recognize his move as a “victory”. Hamas applauded Erdogan for having
won the apology from Israel and informing Hamas political chief Khaled Meshal that Netanyahu promised to "lift the siege on the Palestinian people."[39] Some Hamas voices complained that Erdogan did not stand to his pledge to "accompany the Palestinians during the liberation of al-Quds (Jerusalem)."[40] The day after the deal was made public, Erdogan called the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and heard bitter words from him for having negotiated Palestinian concerns with Israel without so much as briefing Ramallah, even though the Jerusalem–Ankara deal specifically states that it would be the Palestinian Authority, not Hamas, which shall administer Turkish aid to Gaza.[41]

The Islamist ideology of the AKP and Hamas contributed to a deepening of their relationship, as they share common values and vision. Hamas has encouraged Erdogan many times to take an active role regarding the Palestinian issue. In June 2016, for example, Hamas praised Turkey’s “continuing role in supporting the Palestinian issue and in ending the siege totally and “to stop Israel’s aggression against our people, lands and foremost al-Aqsa”.[42] Following President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyye called Erdogan in December 2017, praising the brave attitude of Turkey and its determination to thwart the decision. He stressed that Turkey had a major regional and international role in the region and in the issue of Jerusalem.

**Relations with the Palestinian Authority (PA)**

Under Erdogan’s rule, Turkey-PA relations were not very close, as the Chairman Mahmoud Abbas disliked the warm ties between Turkey and Hamas. However, both sides have attempted to portray an image of cooperation and solidarity. In 2014-2015 the cooperation became stronger as Turkey made efforts to support Palestine’s status as an observer at the United Nations. In January 2015, Mahmoud Abbas was the first guest hosted in the new palace of Erdogan, inaugurated after the latter was elected president. The efforts made by Erdogan to reconcile between PA and Hamas were welcomed by both sides.[43]

Following Trump’s declaration on Jerusalem, Turkey and the PA have strengthened their ties. In May 2017, at the International Jerusalem Foundations Forum (Kudüs Vakıfları Forumu) in Istanbul, Erdogan emphasized the importance of Jerusalem to Islam and called to the Muslims to visit Jerusalem to defend it by challenging occupation and oppression by Israel. He demanded that Israel desist from harming the holy sites of Islam in Jerusalem, “the harassments and assaults against the Al Aqsa Mosque, our first kiblah…The Haram al-Sharif, covering the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, with its 144 dunam land, is a whole, belongs to Muslims and will remain so forever. We will never consent to such provocations, aimed at changing the characteristics”.[44]

**Relations with the Northern Wing of the Arab Islamic Movement in Israel**

Since AKP’s ascending to power, the relations with the Northern wing of the Islamic Movement in Israel have become stronger as both share a common ideology and aim to promote Jerusalem as issue in radical Islamic discourse. In November 2015, Sheikh Raed Salah, the leader of the northern branch, declared that “the victory of AKP in the Turkish elections will contribute to defend the issue of the oppressed and al-Aqsa mosque”. [45] Turkey tried to penetrate east Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa plaza through two dedicated representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, Raed Salah and Akrima Sabri. According to east Jerusalem sources, it is the Israeli activists at the mosque plaza who hang the Turkish flags on al-Aqsa. The main institution out of which Akrima Sabri operates is the Association of Love for Protecting Children in Distress in Ras al-Amoud, which is funding the purchasing of buildings that will become a center for Turkish activity in east Jerusalem. Along with Akrima Sabri’s establishment, the government agency called *Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency* (TIKA), led by Dr. Serdar Cam, a close ally of Erdogan, works in all territories of the Ottoman Empire to rehabilitate the old Ottoman heritage.[46]

According to a report by Israeli journalist Nadav Shragai, since 2004 some $63 million donated by the Turkish
government have gone, mainly through TIKA, to organizations in eastern Jerusalem dedicated to defending and strengthening the Muslim heritage and character of Jerusalem, used for various building or restoration projects. Some money has funded the Murabitoun (formed of male militants) and Murabitat (formed of female militants), two organizations tied to the northern branch of the Islamic Movement. Declaring themselves the ‘Garrison of the Temple Mount,’ the Murabitoun and Murabitat organize groups of radical Islamists to harass and physically assault Jews visiting the Temple Mount.[47]

Another Turkish association that cultivates the Islamic heritage of Jerusalem is the Turkish Islamic Association, “Irade”, which has ties to Hamas and the northern branch of the Islamic movement. [48] On September 28, 2014, it launched an online campaign called, “Al-Quds Amanati” in order to strengthen Jerusalem’s Islamic identity. The campaign gained the support of various Islamic organizations in Muslim countries. Kamal Khatib, a leader of the northern branch of the Islamic Movement, was interviewed for “Irade” in September 2014 and he emphasized the importance of al-Aqsa Mosque to the Muslim world and the campaign on the subject.[49] On the website of the city of Umm al-Fahm, a stronghold of the northern branch, one can find a propaganda video of the “Irade” organization regarding the importance of resistance to Israeli sovereignty on the Temple Mount.[50]

The Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement, headed by Sheikh Raed Salah, which denies Israel’s right to exist, calls for replacing the State of Israel with an Islamic caliphate and does not recognize governmental institutions; it was outlawed by Israel in November 2015. According to the Israeli authorities, a significant body of evidence demonstrates that the Northern Faction is closely related to the Hamas terrorist organization and clandestine cooperation between the two groups is ongoing. [51] Raed Salah was previously convicted for his links to Hamas and for contact with an Iranian agent. Most recently, in October 2017, he was sentenced to eleven months in prison on incitement charges. The Israeli government also banned the two groups funded by Salah’s Northern Branch, the Murabitoun and Murabitat.[52]

**The Israeli Factor**

Mehmet Ali Birand claims that Erdogan’s speech at the 2009 AKP’s third congress represented a “historic crossroads” when it proclaimed the “New Turkish Republic,” a more religious country by changing the contents of the old secularity concept. By proclaiming loudly his criticism against Israel, Erdogan became “a very respectable leader in Middle Eastern countries.”[53] Even in his bid for the presidency, Erdogan used the Palestinian issue to feed nationalist feelings among his supporters. Erdogan was able to divert public attention by stoking popular discontent against Israel’s military operations in Gaza.[54] According to some experts, Turkey puts more emphasis on value-driven policies, standing against Israel’s alleged human rights violations, specifically with regard to the situation in Gaza, as a way to present Turkey as a moral actor.[55] It stands to reason that Turkey thereby hopes to distract from its repressive policies against its own important Kurdish minority, and the Kurds in Syria and Iraq.

In an analysis of Erdogan’s political activity co-authored by Prof. Shaul Kimhi, based on his personality and psychological profile, it was found that when it comes to Israel, it is Erdogan who calls the shots, and he is personally responsible for the deterioration in bilateral relations. One source noted that Erdogan has strong anti-Israeli sentiments, based on deeply rooted religious beliefs. American diplomats, cited in Wikileaks documents, reported that sources both inside and outside the Turkish government confirmed that Erdogan simply abhors Israel.[56]

**The Competition with Iran**

Turkey is allied with Hamas in its fight for ending the Gaza siege by Israel, its search for domination in the internal Palestinian arena and its quest for gaining international legitimacy. But at the same time Hamas has been strategically allied since 1992 with Iran, which has bolstered its military capabilities and largely financed
its terrorist activities against Israel. Moreover, Iran, like Hamas, openly professes the destruction of the Jewish state.

In this sense, there is an ongoing competition between the two regional powers, Turkey and Iran, for the “hearts and minds” of the Palestinian people and close relations with Hamas. The sectarian war in Syria and the larger Sunni-Shia conflict have tilted Hamas towards Erdogan's Turkey while relations with Iran have suffered ups and downs since 2012. The change of regime in Cairo and the closing of the Gaza border and destruction of the smuggling tunnels by Egypt have limited Iran's military and financial support to Hamas.

However, after a period of tension and uncertainty and on the backdrop of president Trump’s decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, Tehran and Hamas recently took steps to improve their relationship. Tehran may be finding comfort now that Hamas is returning to the Iranian orbit. In October 2017, a senior Hamas delegation visited Tehran and met with top Iranian leaders. In January 2018, the Hamas spokesman thanked for their support to the “anti-Israeli resistance front”. Soon after Trump's announcement, both President Hassan Rouhani and Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani called leaders of Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups to pledge Iran's “all-out support” for their struggle against Israel.[57]

Turkey, and its ally Qatar, have been lately hampered in their freedom of action and support to Hamas in Gaza, mainly due to the Egyptian government's firm stand and the Cairo alliance with Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and their own intervention in the internal situation in Gaza. Fatah’s Abbas Zaki, a known Iran supporter, told Al Mayadeen TV in Lebanon that if Turkey abandons the Palestinians in the wake of the agreement with Israel, it will mark the end of the Palestinian issue. He expressed confidence that this will not happen, saying that the agreement is a fruit of circumstances that will change and that Turkey supports “every Palestinian” (and not only Hamas). [58] At the same time the Turkish – Iranian relations have improved, on the backdrop of their alliance with Russia in the civil war in Syria and with their common interest to sabotage any Kurdish steps to independence, in Syria and Iraq.

It would appear that lately Turkey has passed from a regional political and ideological competition with Iran to a kind of emulation of the Iranian strategy to support Islamist and jihadists groups in the region.

**Erdogan Builds His Own Islamist Guards. Palestine Major Target?**

In recent times, Turkey's policy and relationships with Middle Eastern Islamist movements, jihadist organizations, and even ISIS, have been widely discussed in academia, political and defense circles, and in the media.[59] However, the special relationship Turkey and its president Erdogan have with the Palestinian Islamist and terrorist organization and Gaza regime which is Hamas, merit distinct attention as it impacts on one of the most sensitive, and at times explosive, conflicts in the region. It is quite clear that Turkish support cannot serve as compensation for the loss of support by the Muslim Brotherhood regime of president Morsi in Egypt, nor can it replace Iran as a military bulwark for Hamas. In this respect, Turkish-Hamas relations point to the limits of Turkey's influence in the Middle East, as some of the Arab/Muslim states are trying to curb Turkey's attempts to gain more influence.[60]

According to Emrullah Uslu, Turkish support to jihadists is not merely a tactic aimed at removing Assad from power but rather a strategic decision by the Turkish regime to influence Middle Eastern affairs through non-state actors, much as Iran has been doing since the Khomeinist revolution. Turkey's support of jihadists transiting into Syria and its establishment of close ties with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are joint aspects of this strategy.[61]

This trend has accelerated since the attempted military coup of 15 July 2016. A Turkish opposition website, Sound of Silence Group (SoS), one of the few active after the arrest of 231 journalists and closing of 149 media outlets by the Turkish government, claims, like some other observers and analysts, that the coup was actually “self-staged” in order to permit Erdogan the massive purge and enhanced control of the state.[62]
One of the main documents published on the SoS website is a comprehensive analysis of the SADAT organization, actually identifying a longer list of paramilitary organizations in the service of President Erdogan personally, like IHH—Human Rights and Freedoms Humanity Aid Charity, Ottoman Hearths, IBDA–C Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front, KKT—Stay Brothers Turkey and others.[63]

According to its website, SADAT A.S. International Defense Consulting “is the first and the only company in Turkey, that internationally provides consultancy and military training services at the international defense and interior security sector.” It was founded under the presidency of Brigadier General (Retired) Adnan Tanriverdi, by 23 Officers and NCOs retired from various units of Turkish Armed Forces and began its activities in February, 2012. “SADAT Inc. aims at establishing the cooperation among the Islamic Countries in the sense of military and defense industries, in order to assist the Islamic World to take the rank it deserves among the Super Global Powers as a self-sufficient military power, by submitting them the services regarding the organization of Armed Forces, defense consultancy, military training, and ordnance”. Depending on requests, SADAT A.S. has ability to perform the basic and advanced trainings and orientation programs effectively with the training teams composed from professionals chosen from a large circle of reserves at all fields of Armed Forces of Friendly Countries in their own territories.[64]

Erdogan employs SADAT, alongside with other paramilitary organizations, to serve his covert agenda in- and outside of Turkey. One major act attributed by some to SADAT was its role in the coup on 15 July 2016. Substantial indications also show that SADAT adopts a Salafist–Jihadist ideology. There are serious claims about SADAT, which range from providing weapons and guerrilla training to Salafist–Jihadist Al Nusra, Al-Qaeda and ISIL militants to establishing a pro–Erdogan Salafist–Jihadist militia in Turkey and abroad.[65]

SADAT can be compared with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which may provide the potential trajectories for SADAT’s involvement in Turkish politics, still an unexperienced institution which seems to be following the footsteps of its Iranian counterpart in many respects. SADAT, with the support of Turkish Intelligence (MIT), serves as an agent for foreign missions, which is similar to the Quds Force in the IRGC. In parallel to what the Iranian counterpart has been doing for decades by creating its own proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, SADAT has been working with radical groups within the Syrian insurgents, including al-Nusra Front, Ahrar ash-Sham & Jaysh al-Islam and also the extremist groups in Libya, linked to al-Qaeda and ISIL.[66]

The latest worrying event has been the proposal by SADAT, in December 2017, ahead of the summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) called by Erdogan in Istanbul, as published by the Turkish pro-Erdogan daily Yeni Safak, to form a joint “Army of Islam” by the member states of the OIC, to besiege and attack the state of Israel. According to the article, if the member states of the OIC unite militarily, they will form the world’s largest and most comprehensive army and could play a major role in the Jerusalem issue. The number of active soldiers would be at least 5,206,100, while the defense budget would reach approximately $175 billion, dwarfing the Israeli army, which numbers 160,000 active soldiers and Israel’s defense budget of $15.6 billion. Turkey may play an important role as an operational center and an army ranking second among NATO members. The article also mentions the nuclear capabilities of the OIC member Pakistan.[67]

Possibly this proposal is related to the information provided to the Israeli Security Agency by the Turkish militant Cemil Tekeli about SADAT, indicating that it is actually Turkey, helping Hamas to form a “Palestinian Army”. According to the Israeli paper Makor Rishon, Tekeli, who has since been deported to Turkey, is a close associate of Adnan Tanriverdi. The report links this proposal to the growing Turkish activity in Jerusalem and the Jerusalem issue and features a photo of Tekeli with Tanriverdi. Does the Palestinian Army envisioned by SADAT represent the first phase in Erdogan’s battle for Jerusalem?[68]

Israel, but also the international community, should follow closely the disturbing policies of Turkey, an active member of NATO and close associate, in principle, of the European Union.
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Notes

[2] Ibid.


21] Kerim Balci, Zaman, February 20, 2006. Zaman was the “flagship media organisation” of the Gülen-led movement and was shut down in 2016 by an executive decree of Erdogan.


33] Saleh al-Aroui, Turkey-based senior Hamas operative who handles military-terrorist networks in Judea and Samaria, admitted that Hamas was behind the abduction and murder of the three Jewish youths from Gush Etzion, The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC), August 20, 2014; URL: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il//Data/articles/Art_20706/E_152_14_1524442159.pdf.


35] Ibid.


38] Ibid.


41] Ibid.


44] “Kudüs Semalarında Ezanın Susturulmasına İzin Vermeyeceğiz”, (We will not allow the guardian to be silenced in the Jerusalem Sermons) Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Camiuburdağı, May 8, 2017; URL: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/75108/kudus-semalarinda-ezanin-susturulmasina-izin-vermeyecegiz.html.


[48] For the Website of the “forum”, see URL: https://www.facebook.com/Qudusum/.


[50] December 4, 2014; URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K8t9jxT4hOk; # . . . (Jerusalem is Entrusted in Me)

For the propaganda video, see: URL: http://www.um-elfahem.net/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%8A.


[57] Ahmad Majidyar, "Iran and Hamas seeking to further boost relations," Middle East Institute, January 25, 2018; URL: http://www.mei.edu/content/io/iran-and-hamas-seeking-further-boost-relations/.


[62] The Authors of the study are several Turkish government officials who were outside Turkey on 15 July 2016. The Government ousted them despite the fact they had no role in planning or execution of the events. They firmly believe in democratic values and condemn any coup against a democratic government. See Sound of Silence Group (SoS) website, URL: https://15julyfacts.com/.

[63] “SADAT. Erdogan’s Private Army,” Sound of Silence Group (SoS); URL: https://15julyfacts.com/sadat/.


[65] Ibid. About the strange circumstances of the July 2016 military coup in Turkey, see Michael Rubin “Did Erdogan stage the coup?” AEIdeas, The American Enterprise Institute, April 14, 2017; URL: http://www.aei.org/publication/did-erdogan-stage-the-coup/.


[67] “What if a Muslim army was established against Israel?” Yeni Safak, December 12, 2017; URL: https://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/what-if-a-muslim-army-was-established-against-israel-2890448.

130+ (Counter-) Terrorism Research Centres – an Inventory
compiled and selected by Teun van Dongen

Introduction
In the still expanding field of Terrorism Studies, it is difficult to keep track of who is doing what. Anyone looking for a research partner, a particular type of expertise or, perhaps, a research position, will have a hard time finding his or her way in the myriad of centres, institutes, think tanks, councils and foundations that seek to enlarge our understanding of terrorism. Since ‘enhancing security through collaborative research’ is the mission of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), the editors of its journal Perspectives on Terrorism invited me to compile a list of terrorism research centres.

What is a terrorism research centre? There is a vast number of organisations that at some point in their existence conducted terrorism research, but in order to keep this survey manageable, the focus here is on organisations that have terrorism research as a ‘core business’, i.e. that have a department or a programme specifically devoted to terrorism or counter-terrorism and/or that list terrorism and related forms of political violence as one of their research priorities. It is important to note that only organisations with English-language websites are included.

To a significant extent, the list below is building on previous efforts to make an inventory of security and terrorism research centres. First of all, a similar list appeared in Perspectives on Terrorism in 2010 (vol. 5, no. 4). Many of the research centres on that list are still active; therefore, they have been included in the list presented below. Another useful source was the list of ‘Top Defense and National Security Think Tanks’ from the 2016 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, which contains rank-ordered lists of the most influential think tanks in several categories. Not all think tanks in the category ‘Defense and National Security’ conduct terrorism research, but some of them certainly do. Therefore, a selection from the ‘go to’-think tanks index has been included here as well. Third, the reports of the United Nations’ Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UN-CTED) contain the names of some of the participants in the UN’s Global Research Network. Clearly, these participants qualify for a place in the list (as does the network itself). In addition, Google online searches with combinations of search terms like ‘terrorism’, ‘research’, ‘think tank’ and ‘university’ were helpful in finding organisations that did not appear in one of the sources already mentioned.

The organisations identified here have been divided into six categories: (i) universities, (ii) think tanks, (iii) government organisations, (iv) networks, (v) commercial organisations and (vi) other organisations. As this is a list of research organisations, we only included government and commercial organisations that publish freely available research reports in English. Within the six categories, the organisations are listed alphabetically, but no distinction has been made between the British and American spelling of ‘centre’/’center’.

All entries on the list below contain the organisation’s location, its affiliated organisation, its type, the name of its director, a link to its website (or to the site describing its work on terrorism), an e-mail address (or a link to a contact form) and, if readily available, a brief description of the organisation’s work. For the organisations in the category ‘other’, a short characterisation has been added (‘type’). Most of these data points are self-evident, but three may warrant a brief explanation:

- **Location**: this refers to the city where the organisation is based, but the state has been added to the locations of US-based organisations, not only to be more specific about the location, but also to avoid misunderstandings about whether a certain city is in the US, Canada, the UK or Australia. In cases where the reader might be in doubt regarding the specific location of a city, the country has been added.

- **Affiliated organisation**: this refers to organisations that the research centres listed are part of (e.g., some research centres are parts of a faculty and a university).
We are under no illusion regarding the completeness of this list; therefore, we encourage readers of Perspectives on Terrorism to come forward (through info@terrorismanalysts.com) with suggestions for terrorism research centres that might be included in a future inventory. Since the list has been compiled based only on the websites of the organisations, some of the information below may be outdated. We corrected some entries that we knew to be no longer accurate, but since we did not have the time to double-check all information, we cannot rule out the possibility that some of the information presented below is already outdated. Finally, the presence or absence of research centres in the present list should not be viewed as a value judgment on the quality of the research conducted at these organisations.

1 Universities

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Location: Cambridge, MA

Affiliated organisation: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Director: William H. Tobey

Website: https://www.belfercenter.org/project/us-russia-initiative-prevent-nuclear-terrorism

Contact: simon_saradzhyan@hks.harvard.edu

Focus: nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

1.1 Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies

Location: Stockholm

Affiliated organisation: Swedish Defence University

Director: Magnus Ranstorp

Website: http://www.fhs.se/en/research/research-centres-and-programmes/center-for-asymmetric-threat-studies/about/

Contact: registrar@fhs.se

Focus: strategic counterterrorism policy, intelligence studies.

1.2 Centre for Conflict, Security and Terrorism

Location: Nottingham (UK)

Affiliated organisation: School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham

Director: Rory Cormac and Andrew Mumford

Website: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cst/

Contact: cst@nottingham.ac.uk

Focus: “security politics in the UK and internationally”.
1.3 Center for Cyber and Homeland Security

**Location**: Washington, DC

**Affiliated organisation**: George Washington University

**Director**: Frank J. Cilluffo

**Website**: [https://cchs.gwu.edu/counterterrorism-intelligence](https://cchs.gwu.edu/counterterrorism-intelligence)

**Contact**: CCHS@gwu.edu

**Focus**: the centre mentions ‘Counterterrorism and Intelligence’ and ‘Homegrown terror & radicalization’ as research topics.

1.4 Center for Defense and Security Studies

**Location**: Winnipeg (Canada)

**Affiliated organisation**: Faculty of Arts, University of Manitoba

**Director**: Andrea Charron

**Website**: [http://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/index.html](http://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/index.html)

**Contact**: cdss@umanitoba.ca

**Focus**: not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

1.5 Center for International Security and Cooperation

**Location**: Stanford, CA

**Affiliated organisation**: Stanford University

**Director / contact person**: Martha Crenshaw, Joseph Felter

**Website**: [https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/research/organization/6069/67114](https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/research/organization/6069/67114)

**Contact**: [https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/about-cisac](https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/about-cisac)

**Focus**: one of CISAC’s research areas is ‘Terrorism and Homeland Security’; research focuses on “the nature and organizational structure of international terrorist organizations, and how best to prevent, mitigate, or counter violence committed by non-state actors”.

1.6 Center on Law and Security

**Location**: New York

**Affiliated organisation**: NYU School of Law

**Director**: Samuel J. Rascoff

**Website**: [https://www.lawandsecurity.org/](https://www.lawandsecurity.org/)

**Contact**: cls@mercury.law.nyu.edu

**Focus**: big data techniques to counter violent extremism online.
1.7 Center on National Security

**Location:** New York

**Affiliated organisation:** Fordham University School of Law

**Director:** Karen J. Greenberg

**Website:** [http://www.centeronnationalsecurity.org/](http://www.centeronnationalsecurity.org/)

**Contact:** nationalsecurity@law.fordham.edu

**Focus:** the prosecution of jihadist terrorists in the US.

1.8 Center for Strategic Communication

**Location:** Tempe, AZ

**Affiliated organisation:** Arizona State University

**Director:** Steve Corman

**Website:** [http://csc.asu.edu/](http://csc.asu.edu/)

**Contact:** csc.hdshc@asu.edu

**Focus:** “countering ideological support for terrorism”.

1.9 Center on Terrorism

**Location:** New York

**Affiliated organisation:** John Jay College of Criminal Justice

**Director:** Charles B. Strozier

**Website:** [http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/center-terrorism](http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/center-terrorism)

**Contact:** terrorism@jjay.cuny.edu

**Focus:** “The goals of the Center are to study terrorism conceptually in ways that are familiar and appropriate for a university and to identify the practical applications of that knowledge in the search for alternative forms of human security.”

1.10 Center for Terrorism Law

**Location:** San Antonio, TX

**Affiliated organisation:** School of Law, St. Mary’s University

**Director:** Jeffrey F. Addicott

**Website:** [https://law.stmrytx.edu/academics/special-programs/center-for-terrorism-law/](https://law.stmrytx.edu/academics/special-programs/center-for-terrorism-law/)

**Contact:** terrorismlaw@stmrytx.edu

**Focus:** “legal issues associated with antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Particular emphasis is given to cyberterrorism, bioterrorism, critical infrastructure and information assurance technologies”.
1.11 Center for Terrorism and Security Studies

**Location:** Lowell, MA

**Affiliated organisation:** School of Criminology and Justice Studies, UMass Lowell

**Director:** Neil Shortland

**Website:** [https://www.uml.edu/Research/CTSS/](https://www.uml.edu/Research/CTSS/)

**Contact:** ctss@uml.edu

**Focus:** CTSS “leads and facilitates scientific research, education and training to help understand and respond to the evolution, convergence and complexity of domestic and foreign security challenges”. The CTSS was originally established by Prof. James J.F. Forest, who is co-editor of Perspectives on Terrorism and a Jury member of TRI's Annual Award for the Best Ph.D. Thesis in the field of Terrorism Studies.

1.12 Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats

**Location:** Lancaster (UK)

**Affiliated organisation:** Economic & Social Research Council, Lancaster University

**Director:** Paul Taylor

**Website:** [https://crestresearch.ac.uk/](https://crestresearch.ac.uk/)

**Contact:** [https://crestresearch.ac.uk/contact/](https://crestresearch.ac.uk/contact/)

**Focus:** the website lists five programmes:

- Actors and narratives
- Ideas, beliefs and values in social contexts
- Understanding and countering online behaviour
- Eliciting information
- Protective security and risk assessment

1.13 Center for Research on Extremism

**Location:** Oslo

**Affiliated organisation:** Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo

**Director:** Tore Bjørgo

**Website:** [http://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/](http://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/)

**Contact:** post@c-rex.uio.no

**Focus:** the causes and consequences of violent right-wing extremism, policies against violent right-wing extremism.

1.14 Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events

**Location:** Los Angeles

**Affiliated organisation:** University of Southern California
Director: Detlof von Winterfeldt

Website: http://create.usc.edu/research/research/countering-violent-extremism

Contact: create@usc.edu

Focus: “behavioral and environmental factors that influence an individual's proclivity toward joining terrorist networks in the United States or traveling to fight abroad”.

1.15 Center for Security Studies

Location: Zürich (Switzerland)

Affiliated organisation: ETH Zürich, Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences

Director: Andreas Wenger


Contact: karrer@sipo.gess.ethz.ch

Focus: “all forms of counter-terrorism measures past and present, from the Indian-Pakistani conflict to the US’ ‘Global War on Terror’ and European security challenges”.

1.16 Chicago Center for Security and Threats

Location: Chicago

Affiliated organisation: University of Chicago

Director: Robert A. Pape

Website: https://cpost.uchicago.edu/

Contact: cpost@uchicago.edu

Focus: suicide terrorism (including maintaining a suicide attack database).

1.17 Conflict, Terrorism and Peace Group

Location: Auckland (New Zealand)

Affiliated organisation: School of Social Sciences, University of Auckland

Director: Chris Wilson (group convenor)


Contact: socialsciences@auburn.ac.nz

Focus: “the causes, dynamics, aftermath and prevention of all types of violent conflict; inter-state war; ethnic violence and civil conflict; terrorism and counter-terrorism; genocide and mass killing; peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction; and humanitarian intervention”.

1.18 Council on Foreign Relations

Location: New York and Washington, DC
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Richard N. Haass
Website: https://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/terrorism-and-counterterrorism
Contact: https://www.cfr.org/contact-us
Focus: not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

1.19 Cranfield Forensic Institute
Location: Cranfield (UK)
Affiliated organisation: Cranfield University
Director: Andrew Silke (Professor of Risk, Terrorism and Resilience)
Website: https://www.cranfield.ac.uk/centres/cranfield-forensic-institute
Contact: A.Silke@cranfield.ac.uk
Focus: “(1) radicalisation and de-radicalisation processes; (2) risk assessment; (3) prison, detention and terrorism; (4) counterterrorism strategies; and (5) climate change and terrorism”.

1.20 Cyberterrorism Project
Location: not stated
Affiliated organisation: Swansea University
Directors: Thomas Chen, Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald
Website: http://www.cyberterrorism-project.org/
Contact: ctproject@swansea.ac.uk
Focus: cyberterrorism.

1.21 Department of Politics and International Relations
Location: Reading (UK)
Affiliated organisation: University of Reading
Director: Colin Gray
Website: http://www.reading.ac.uk/spirs/research/spirs-cssresearchcluster.aspx
Contact: politics@reading.ac.uk
Focus: critical terrorism studies.

1.22 Department of Security Studies and Criminology
Location: Macquarie County (Australia)
Affiliated organisation: Macquarie University
Director/contact person: Julian Droogan

Contact: bighistoryinstitute@mq.edu.au

Focus: the website lists the following priorities:

- Determine the drivers of violent extremism domestically and nationally
- Map the nature and effectiveness of CVE programs in Australia and abroad
- Provide research into violent extremist narratives and counter narratives
- Deliver policy advice on how best to support CT and CVE in Australia
- Research emerging trends in terrorism such as the cyber domain.

1.23 Global Studies Institute

Location: Atlanta, GA

Affiliated organisation: Georgia State University

Director: Tony Lemieux

Website: http://gsi.gsu.edu/research/conflict-violence-and-terrorism/

Contact: globalstudies@gsu.edu

Focus: not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

1.24 Global Terrorism Research Centre

Location: Monash (Australia)

Affiliated organisation: Monash University

Director: Pete Lentini

Website: http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/gtrec/

Contact: http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/gtrec/contact-us/

Focus: “research into terrorism, counter-terrorism, cultural conflict and cooperation”.

1.25 GW Program on Extremism

Location: Washington, DC

Affiliated organisation: George Washington University

Director: Lorenzo Vidino

Website: https://extremism.gwu.edu/

Contact: extremism@gwu.edu

Focus: ISIS in America, American foreign fighters and ISIS’ online activities.
1.26   Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence

**Location:** St Andrews (UK)

**Affiliated organisation:** University of St Andrews

**Director:** Tim Wilson

**Website:** [https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/](https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/)

**Contact:** Gillian Brunton (gm39@st-andrews.ac.uk)

**Focus:** “the causes, dynamics, characteristics and consequences of terrorism and related forms of political violence”.

1.27   Institute for Conflict Management

**Location:** Delhi

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** K.P.S. Gill

**Website:** [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/icm/index.html](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/icm/index.html)

**Contact:** icm@satp.org

**Focus:** “terrorism, low intensity warfare, sectarian and other conflict, developmental and economic policies in areas of widespread disorder and the effective civil administration of areas under threat of terrorism or other patterns of widespread strife” (the geographical focus is on India and South Asia).

1.28   Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism

**Location:** Syracuse, NY

**Affiliated organisation:** Syracuse University

**Director:** William C. Banks

**Website:** [http://insct.syr.edu/](http://insct.syr.edu/)

**Contact:** insct@syr.edu

**Focus:** national and international security, counterterrorism and post-conflict reconstruction.

1.29   Institute of Security and Global Affairs

**Location:** The Hague

**Affiliated organisation:** Leiden University, Campus The Hague

**Director:** position vacant; until recently Edwin Bakker


**Contact:** ctc@fgga.leidenuniv.nl

**Focus:** interdisciplinary research and teaching in the field of security studies, using a ‘glocal’ approach, i.e. local, national, transnational and global impact are studied and analysed in conjunction with each other. ISGA
and TRI are parent organisations of *Perspectives on Terrorism*.

1.30 Institute for Security Policy

**Location:** Kiel (Germany)

**Affiliated organisation:** Christian-Albrechts Universität zu Kiel

**Director:** Joachim Krause

**Website:** [http://www.ispk.uni-kiel.de/en](http://www.ispk.uni-kiel.de/en)

**Contact:** shansen@politik.uni-kiel.de

**Focus:** the institute publishes a yearbook on terrorism.

1.31 Institute for the Study of Violent Groups

**Location:** New Haven, CT

**Affiliated organisation:** University of New Haven

**Director:** Richard Ward

**Website:** [http://www.isvg.org/organization.php](http://www.isvg.org/organization.php)

**Contact:** [http://www.isvg.org/organization-contact.php](http://www.isvg.org/organization-contact.php)

**Focus:** ISVG maintains a large database on extremist organizations worldwide.

1.32 Institute for the Theory & Practice of International Relations

**Location:** Williamsburg, VA

**Affiliated organisation:** William & Mary College

**Director:** Steve Shellman

**Website:** [http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/projects/vipcat/](http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/projects/vipcat/)

**Contact:** smshel@wm.edu

**Focus:** not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

1.33 International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research

**Location:** Singapore

**Affiliated organisation:** Nanyang Technical University, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

**Director:** Rohan Gunaratna

**Website:** [http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/](http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/)

**Contact:** contact form at [http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/](http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/)

**Focus:** not stated specifically.
1.34 International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation

**Location:** London

**Affiliated organisation:** King's College London, War Studies Department

**Director:** Peter Neumann

**Website:** [http://icsr.info/](http://icsr.info/)

**Contact:** [mail@icsr.info](mailto:mail@icsr.info)

**Focus:** ICSR's research strands include:
- Countering terrorist financing
- Jihadist media strategy
- Western foreign fighters in Syria
- De-radicalisation
- Europe's new far-right
- The King's programme for Middle East Dialogue

1.35 International Crisis Group

**Location:** Brussels (HQ), New York, Washington, DC and London

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** Robert Malley

**Website:** [https://www.crisisgroup.org/](https://www.crisisgroup.org/)

**Contact:** [https://www.crisisgroup.org/contact-us](https://www.crisisgroup.org/contact-us)

**Focus:** the website lists two ‘Global Issues’ related to terrorism, i.e. ‘Jihad in Modern Conflict’ and ‘The Boko Haram Insurgency’.

1.36 International Institute for Counter-Terrorism

**Location:** Herzliya, Israel

**Affiliated organisation:** Interdisciplinary Center

**Director:** Boaz Ganor

**Website:** [http://www.ict.org.il](http://www.ict.org.il)

**Contact:** ict@idc.ac.il

**Focus:** ICT organizes an annual World Summit on Counter-Terrorism in early September of each year and is the home of many academics with CT practitioner backgrounds. ICT’s website lists eight ‘desks’:
- Cyber
- International humanitarian law
- CBRN
- Jihadi websites monitoring
• Governance and political violence
• Database
• Terrorist prosecution
• Extremism and hate crime

1.37 Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey

**Location**: Monterey, CA

**Affiliated organisation**: n.a.

**Director**: Jeff Dayton-Johnson

**Website**: [http://www.miis.edu/academics/researchcenters/terrorism-research](http://www.miis.edu/academics/researchcenters/terrorism-research)

**Contact**: [http://www.miis.edu/about/contact](http://www.miis.edu/about/contact)

**Focus**: “terrorism and counterterrorism, extremist groups, regional studies of terrorism, and related aspects of international and homeland security”.

1.38 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

**Location**: College Park, MD

**Affiliated organisation**: University of Maryland

**Director**: Gary LaFree

**Website**: [http://www.start.umd.edu/](http://www.start.umd.edu/)

**Contact**: [infostart@start.umd.edu](mailto:infostart@start.umd.edu)

**Focus**: the website lists the following research themes:

• Terrorism and Violent Extremism
• Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism
• Risk Communication and Resilience
• Radicalization and Deradicalization
• Unconventional Weapons and Technology

1.39 Nelson Institute

**Location**: Harrisonburg, VA

**Affiliated organisation**: James Madison University

**Director**: Peggy Plass

**Website**: [http://www.jmu.edu/nelsoninstitute/projects/terror.shtml](http://www.jmu.edu/nelsoninstitute/projects/terror.shtml)

**Contact**: [nelsoninstitute@jmu.edu](mailto:nelsoninstitute@jmu.edu)

**Focus**: “the Institute (...) seeks not only to analyze specific terrorist threats, but also to understand the historical, cultural, philosophical, and religious factors that drive terrorist groups and the consequent challenge
that they present to free societies’.

1.40 Terrorism and Disaster Center

**Location:** Norman, OK

**Affiliated organisation:** College of Medicine, University of Oklahoma

**Director:** Betty Pfefferbaum

**Website:** [https://www.oumedicine.com/TDC](https://www.oumedicine.com/TDC)

**Contact:** TDC@ouhsc.edu

**Focus:** the website lists the following focal points:

- enhancing the resilience of communities to address disaster–related mental health issues for children and families;
- increasing the resilience of children for disaster and terrorism preparedness, response, and recovery; and
- offering training, consultation, and technical assistance to prepare providers and community programs to address disaster preparedness and response for children, families, and communities.

1.41 Terrorism and Extremism Research Centre

**Location:** London

**Affiliated organisation:** University of East London

**Director:** John Morrison

**Website:** [https://www.uel.ac.uk/schools/royal-docks/terrorism-and-extremism-research-centre](https://www.uel.ac.uk/schools/royal-docks/terrorism-and-extremism-research-centre)

**Contact:** e-mail addresses of individual staff members of TERC are available [here](https://www.uel.ac.uk/schools/royal-docks/terrorism-and-extremism-research-centre).

**Focus:** “the act of terrorism itself and the motivations and rationale of the terrorist actor; counter-terrorist policies, tactics and strategies; the history, manifestations and modern-day versions of political, social and religious extremism; internal and external influences on terrorist and extremist individuals, groups and their activities”.

1.42 Terrorism & Preparedness Resource Center

**Location:** Ann Arbor, MI

**Affiliated organisation:** University of Michigan (Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research and the National Archive for Criminal Justice Data) and START (see National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism)

**Director:** Tim Bynum

**Website:** [https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/NACJD/guides/tpdrc.html](https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/NACJD/guides/tpdrc.html)

**Contact:** nacjd@icpsr.umich.edu

**Focus:** “nature of intra- (domestic) and international terrorism incidents, organizations, perpetrators, and victims; governmental and nongovernmental responses to terror, including primary, secondary, and tertiary interventions; and citizen’s attitudes towards terrorism, terror incidents, and the response to terror”.
1.43 Terrorism and Political Violence Association

**Location:** Leeds (UK)

**Affiliated organisation:** University of Leeds

**Director/Coordinator:** Gordon Clubb, Hanna Palgaard Munden

**Website:** [http://tapva.leeds.ac.uk/](http://tapva.leeds.ac.uk/)

**Contact:** not stated, e-mail addresses of individual staff members are available [here](http://tapva.leeds.ac.uk/)

**Focus:** TAPVA is the UK’s part of TRI’s network of national and (sub-)regional associations of PhD thesis writers.

1.44 Terrorism Research Center

**Location:** Fayetteville, AR

**Affiliated organisation:** University of Arkansas, Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice

**Director:** Brent L. Smith

**Website:** [https://fulbright.uark.edu/departments/sociology/terrorism-research-center/index.php](https://fulbright.uark.edu/departments/sociology/terrorism-research-center/index.php)

**Contact:** nkarnes@uark.edu

**Focus:** the website lists the following priorities:

- Providing a comprehensive record of persons indicted in federal courts as a result of FBI “terrorism enterprise” investigations
- Geospatial and temporal patterns of terrorist activities in the United States, including incidents and activities during the planning process
- Prosecutorial, defense, and investigation strategies relating to terrorism
- Factors contributing to terrorist longevity over time and interdiction strategies
- Community risk factors for radicalization or pre-incident activities

1.45 Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center

**Location:** Arlington, VA

**Affiliated organisation:** George Mason University

**Director:** Louise Shelley

**Website:** [http://traccc.gmu.edu/](http://traccc.gmu.edu/)

**Contact:** traccc@gmu.edu

**Focus:** the center studies “all forms of terrorism, transnational crime and corruption, focusing on the political, societal and economic conditions which contribute to the spread of these phenomena, as well as methods used by criminals and terrorists to execute their crimes.”

1.46 Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security

**Location:** Durham, NC
Affiliated organisation: Duke University
Director: David Schanzer
Website: https://sites.duke.edu/tcths/
Contact: https://sites.duke.edu/tcths/contact/
Focus: “terrorism and the means to combat it through education, research and the development of partnerships between universities, industry and government.”

1.47 Washington Institute
Location: Washington, DC
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Matthew Levitt (Director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence)
Website: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/about/research-programs/project-fikra/ and http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/about/research-programs/stein-program-on-counterterrorism-and-intelligence/
Contact: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/about/contact-us
Focus: the Washington Institute runs two programmes related to terrorism: Project Fikra and the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. The goal of Project Fikra is to counter “the spread of extremism in the Middle East.” The Stein Program focuses on “the analysis of terrorist groups, state sponsors, logistical and financial support networks, and counterterrorism policy”.

2 Think Tanks

2.1 African Centre for the Study and Research of Terrorism
Location: Algiers
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Larry Gbevlo-Lartey Esq.
Website: http://www.caert.org.dz/
Contact: Admin@caert.org.dz
Focus: terrorism in Africa.

2.2 Anti-Defamation League
Location: several US cities, see https://www.adl.org/who-we-are/our-organization/regional-offices
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Marvin D. Nathan
Website: https://www.adl.org/what-we-do/combat-hate/extremism-terrorism-bigotry
Contact: https://www.adl.org/contact
Focus: foreign and domestic extremism, terrorism and hate speech/crimes in the US with a focus on an-
ti-Semitism.

2.3 Aspen Institute

**Location:** headquartered in Washington, DC (see [https://www.aspeninstitute.org/contact/](https://www.aspeninstitute.org/contact/) for the various departments and international affiliates).

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** Clark Ervin (director of the Aspen Institute's Homeland Security Program)

**Website:** [https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/homeland-security-program/](https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/homeland-security-program/)

**Contact:** [https://www.aspeninstitute.org/contact/](https://www.aspeninstitute.org/contact/)

**Focus:** not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

2.4 Bangladesh Center for Terrorism Research

**Location:** Dhaka (Bangladesh)

**Affiliated organisation:** Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies

**Director:** A.N.M. Muniruzzaman

**Website:** [http://www.bipss.org.bd/](http://www.bipss.org.bd/)

**Contact:** info@bipss.org.bd

**Focus:** "study, data management and research on terrorism, radicalization and extremism".

2.5 Brookings Institute

**Location:** Washington, DC

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** John R. Allen

**Website:** [https://www.brookings.edu/topic/terrorism-extremism/](https://www.brookings.edu/topic/terrorism-extremism/)

**Contact:** [https://www.brookings.edu/contact-brookings/](https://www.brookings.edu/contact-brookings/)

**Focus:** ‘terrorism & extremism’ is listed as one of Brookings’ research topics, without further specification.

2.6 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

**Location:** Washington, DC (with branches in New Delhi, Moscow, Brussels, Beirut and Beijing)

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** William J. Burns

**Website:** [http://carnegieendowment.org/topic/1284](http://carnegieendowment.org/topic/1284)

**Contact:** [https://carnegieendowment.org/about/?fa=contact](https://carnegieendowment.org/about/?fa=contact)

**Focus:** not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.
2.7 Cato Institute

Location: Washington, DC

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Peter Goettler

Website: https://www.cato.org/research/counterterrorism-homeland-security

Contact: https://www.cato.org/contact-us

Focus: not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

2.8 Center for the Analysis of Terrorism

Location: France (city not stated)

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Jean-Charles Brisard

Website: http://cat-int.org/?lang=en

Contact: contact@cat-int.org

Focus: “organizational, spatial and financial patterns of terrorist activities”.

2.9 Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies

Location: Kabul

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director / contact person: not listed

Website: http://www.caps.af/

Contact: contact@caps.af

Focus: the CCPS is focused on terrorist and insurgent violence in Afghanistan (“the CCPS monitors the activities of the Taliban and the Haqqani network and maintains a database of suicide attacks in Afghanistan”).

2.10 Centre for Land Warfare Studies

Location: Delhi

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Balraj Singh Nagal

Website: http://www.claws.in/research-area/national-security/sub-conventional-conflict/terrorism/

Contact: landwarfare@gmail.com

Focus: not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

2.11 Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies

Location: Ankara
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Ahmet Uysal
Website: http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/anasayfa?dil=en
Contact: orsam@orsam.org.tr
Focus: not stated specifically with regard to terrorism; however, many of the centre's publications are about ISIS and foreign fighters.

2.12 Center for a New American Security
Location: Washington, DC
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Victoria Nuland
Website: https://www.cnas.org/research/middle-east-security/isis-isil
Contact: info@cnas.org
Focus: the website lists 'Iraq/Syria/ISIS' as research areas, with no further specification.

2.13 Center for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence
Location: Montréal
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Herman Deparice-Okomba
Website: https://info-radical.org/en/
Contact: info@info-radical.org
Focus: violent radicalization in Québec.

2.14 Center on Radicalization and International Terrorism
Location: Milan
Affiliated organisation: Italian Institute for International Political Studies
Director: Lorenzo Vidino
Website: http://www.ispionline.it/en/ricerca/radicalizzazione-e-terrorismo-internazionale
Contact: ispi.segretaria@ispionline.it
Focus: “empirical analysis of violent and non-violent extremism in Europe and the world, with a particular emphasis on jihadist ideology.”

2.15 Center for Research & Security Studies
Location: Islamabad
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Imtiaz Gul
Website: http://crss.pk/
Contact: info@crss.pk
Focus: the center lists ‘counter-radicalization’ as one of its main research issues.

2.16 Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism

Location: London

Affiliated organisation: Henry Jackson Society

Director: Alan Mendoza (Co-Founder and Executive Director of the Henry Jackson Society)

Website: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/crrt/

Contact: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/about-the-society/contact-us/

Focus: the website lists 26 research topics, including 9/11, ISIS, Boko Haram, Hamas, extremism, far-right and nuclear weapons.

2.17 Center for Strategic and International Studies

Location: Washington, DC

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Kathleen H. Hicks

Website: https://www.csis.org/programs/international-security-program/international-security-program-archived-projects/homeland

Contact: not stated

Focus: CSIS’ terrorism research is led by the Transnational Threats Project, the International Security Pro-
gram, and the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy (Anthony H. Cordesman).

2.18 Center for the Study of Terrorism

Location: Philadelphia, PA

Affiliated organisation: Foreign Policy Research Institute

Director: Lawrence Husick, Edward A. Turzanski

Website: https://www.fpri.org/research/terrorism/

Contact: not stated

Focus: “fact-based analysis of actual and potential uses of terrorism as a tactic by adversaries of the United States and its allies”.

2.19 Chatham House

Location: London

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: not stated
2.20 Consortium for Research on Terrorism and International Crime

**Location:** Oslo

**Affiliated organisations:** Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), the Police University College (PHS) and the Center for Research on Extremism

**Director:** Rita Augestad Knudsen (senior research fellow, listed as contact person)


**Contact:** post@nupi.no

**Focus:** “violent extremism and terrorism, Islamic terrorism in Europe and the rest of the world, right-wing extremism and anti-Jihadi movements, solo-terrorism, terrorist target selection, the fight against terrorism”.

2.21 Counter-Terrorism Policy Centre

**Location:** Barton (Australia)

**Affiliated organisation:** Australian Strategic Policy Institute

**Director:** Isaac Kfir

**Website:** [https://www.aspi.org.au/program/counter-terrorism-policy-centre](https://www.aspi.org.au/program/counter-terrorism-policy-centre)

**Contact:** [https://www.aspi.org.au/contact-us/](https://www.aspi.org.au/contact-us/)

**Focus:** “the counter-terrorism environment, including policy, legislation, terrorist threat, cross-jurisdiction and international issues.”

2.22 Danish Institute for International Affairs

**Location:** Copenhagen

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** Kristian Fischer

**Website:** [https://www.diis.dk/en/emne/terror](https://www.diis.dk/en/emne/terror)

**Contact:** diis@diis.dk

**Focus:** “current forms of terrorism and extremism, strategies of countering, preventing and managing these phenomena”.

2.23 Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations

**Location:** Brussels

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** Rik Coolsaet
2.24  Elcano Royal Institute

Location: Madrid

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Fernando Reinares

Website: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/research-topics/international-terrorism

Contact: not stated

Focus: manifestations of terrorism in Spain, Europe and beyond, Basque terrorism, Al-Qaeda and ISIS among other terrorist groups.

2.25  Foundation for Defense of Democracy (FDD)

Location: Washington, DC

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Clifford D. May

Website: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/

Contact: info@defenddemocracy.org

Focus: covers a number of geographical areas, with a special focus on the Middle East and North Africa (see the website for an overview).

2.26  French Institute of International Affairs

Location: Paris and Brussels

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Thierry de Montbrial

Website: https://www.ifri.org/en/recherche/thematiques-transversales/securite-defense/securite-interieure

Contact: https://www.ifri.org/en/contact-us

Focus: “the role of social networks as tools of ideological radicalization and informal mobilization, the emergence of new forms of violent opposition, the repercussions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in France, the evolution of the international jihadist movement, the potential physical and cyber threats on critical infrastructure, the improvement of prevention and repression procedures.”

2.27  Global Center on Cooperative Security

Location: Washington, DC, New York and London

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director / contact person: Alistair Millar
Website: http://www.globalcenter.org/topics/countering-violent-extremism/
Contact: http://www.globalcenter.org/contact-us/
Focus: “context-specific research to inform CVE policy and practice”.

2.28 George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Location: Garmisch-Partenkirchen (Germany)
Affiliated organisation: the centre is a joint initiative of the US government and the German government.
Director: Keith L. Wert, Peggy Garza and David L. Oglesby
Website: http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/en/
Focus: the centre mentions two ‘areas of strategic interest’ that are related to terrorism:
- Terrorism, including waging the “Battle of Ideas” to delegitimize terrorism and support for terrorism
- Regional and local crises that could turn into transnational threats and/or spur transnational terrorism

2.29 German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies

Location: Graal-Müritz (Germany)
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Daniel Koehler
Website: http://www.girds.org/
Contact: contact@girds.org
Focus: “the theoretical and practical development of de-radicalization methods, evaluation tools, training manuals, and concepts”.

2.30 Hedayah

Location: Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates)
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Maram Tarabishi
Website: http://www.hedayahcenter.org/
Contact: info@hedayah.ae
Focus: development of, and depository for, counter-narratives to jihadist narratives.

2.31 Henry L. Stimson Center

Location: Washington, DC
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Brian Finlay
2.32 Heritage Foundation

Location: Washington, DC

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: https://www.heritage.org/about-heritage/staff/leadership

Website: https://www.heritage.org/terrorism

Contact: info@heritage.org

Focus: not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

2.33 Hoover Institution

Location: Stanford, CA

Affiliated organisation: Stanford University

Director: Thomas Gilligan

Website: https://www.hoover.org/research-topic/terrorism

Contact: https://www.hoover.org/about/contact-us

Focus: the Hoover institution addresses terrorism in its National Security and Law Task Force and in its Working Group in Islamism and International Order.

2.34 Hudson Institute

Location: Washington, DC

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Kenneth R. Weinstein

Website: https://www.hudson.org/topics/32-terrorism-radical-ideologies

Contact: https://www.hudson.org/about/contact

Focus: not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

2.35 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

Location: New Delhi

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Jayant Prasad

Website: https://idsa.in/terrorisminternalsecurity

Contact: contact.idsa@nic.in
Focus: India’s Naga and Maoist insurgencies.

2.36 Institute for National Security Studies
Location: Tel Aviv
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Amos Yadlin
Website: http://www.inss.org.il/subjects_tags/terrorism/
Contact: info@inss.org.il

Focus: “terrorism in Lebanon, with an emphasis on Hezbollah, Salafist jihadist elements, and Iranian and Syrian involvement in their activity; terrorism trends perpetrated in the international arena, with an emphasis on the Muslim fundamentalist terrorism of al-Qaeda and global jihad; and the fight against terrorism, particularly the … related strategies and dilemmas”.

2.37 Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
Location: New Delhi
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Ruhee Neog
Website: http://www.ipcs.org/issues/terrorism/
Contact: officemail@icps.org

Focus: not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

2.38 Institute for Security Studies
Location: Pretoria, Addis Ababa, Dakar and Nairobi
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: https://issafrica.org/personnel#leadership
Website: https://issafrica.org/topics-regions/search?topics=219&regions
Contact: iss@issafrica.org

Focus: not stated specifically with respect to terrorism.

2.39 Institute of Strategic Studies
Location: Islamabad
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Khalid Mahmood
Website: http://www.issi.org.pk/
Contact: strategy@issi.org.pk

Focus: not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.
2.40 International Centre for Counter Terrorism

**Location**: The Hague

**Affiliated organisations**: Clingendael Institute for International Affairs, T.C.M. Asser Institute, ISGA Leiden University, Campus The Hague

**Director**: Renske van der Veer

**Website**: [www.icct.nl](http://www.icct.nl)

**Contact**: info@icct.nl

**Focus**: “comparative analysis of counter-terrorism policies, strategies and interventions, country and regional analyses, the foreign fighter phenomenon and forward looking trends and threats analyses”.

2.41 International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism

**Location**: Washington, DC

**Affiliated organisation**: n.a.

**Director**: Anne Speckhard

**Website**: [http://www.icsve.org/](http://www.icsve.org/)

**Contact**: info@icsve.org

**Focus**: ICSVE has conducted research based on interviews with ISIS-defectors, seeking to develop counter-narratives to the propaganda of ISIS.

2.42 International Center for Terrorism Studies

**Location**: Arlington, VA

**Affiliated organisation**: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

**Director**: Michael S. Swetnam

**Website**: [http://www.potomacinstitute.org/academic-centers/international-center-for-terrorism-studies-icts](http://www.potomacinstitute.org/academic-centers/international-center-for-terrorism-studies-icts)

**Contact**: webmaster@potomacinstitute.org

**Focus**: the website lists the following priorities:

- To monitor current and future threats of terrorism;
- To develop response strategies on governmental and non-governmental levels;
- To effect continual communication with policy-makers, academic institutions, business, media, and civic organizations;
- To sponsor research programs on critical issues, particularly those relating enabling technologies with policy, and share findings nationally and internationally.

2.43 International Institute for European Affairs

**Location**: Dublin and Brussels

**Affiliated organisation**: 
Directors: Ben Tonra, Marie Cross and Patrick Keatinge (chairs of the institute's Security and Defence Policy working group); Nora Owen (chair of the institute's Justice and Home Affairs working group)

Website: https://www.iiea.com/

Contact: reception@iiea.com

Focus: the IIEA addresses terrorism in its Security and Defence Policy working group and in its Justice and Home Affairs working group.

2.44 International Institute for Strategic Studies

Location: London, Washington, DC, Singapore and Manama (Bahrain)

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: John Chipman

Website: https://www.iiss.org/en/topics/counter-terrorism

Contact: https://www.iiss.org/en/contact-s-us

Focus: not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

2.45 International Peace Institute

Location: New York, Vienna and Manama (Bahrain)

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Terje Rød-Larsen

Website: https://www.ipinst.org/program/preventing-violent-extremism, https://ipinst.org/tag/terrorism

Contact: ipi@ipinst.org

Focus: violent extremism afflicting the Sahel Sahara region.

2.46 Investigative Project on Terrorism

Location: Washington, DC

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Steven Emerson

Website: http://www.investigativeproject.org/

Contact: stopterror@aol.com

Focus: “the operations, funding, activities and front groups of Islamic terrorist and extremist groups”.

2.47 Jamestown Foundation

Location: Washington, DC

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Willem de Vogel

Website: https://jamestown.org/programs/tm/about-jamestowns-terrorism-program/
Contact: pubs@jamestown.org

Focus: “covering terrorism and security issues, utilizing indigenous sources and with attention paid to frequently un-reported or under-reported topics”.

2.48 Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor

Location: Washington, DC

Affiliated organisation: Middle East Media Research Initiative (MEMRI)

Director: Oliver ‘Buck’ Revell

Website: https://www.memri.org/jttm

Contact: https://www.memri.org/request-a-clip

Focus: the website lists the following subjects:

- Jihad in the West
- Women and Jihad
- Alerts, Planning and Training
- Counter-Radicalization Initiative
- Foreign Fighters
- Global Jihad News
- In Depth Threat Analysis
- Jihadi Texts
- South Asia Jihad

2.49 Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies

Location: Almaty and Astana (Kazakhstan)

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Shaukenova Zarema Kaukenovna

Website: http://kisi.kz/en

Contact: office@kisi.kz

Focus: “the current state of the political institutions, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations as well as counterbalancing religious extremism and terrorism”.

2.50 Libyan Center for Studies of Counter Terrorism & Extremist Ideas

Location: Chahat (Libya)

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: not stated

Website: https://www.lcsatei.org/
Contact: libyanantiterrorism2017@gmail.com
Focus: terrorist attacks and extremist ideas in Libya.

2.51 Mackenzie Institute
Location: Toronto
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Jess Sole
Website: http://mackenzieinstitute.com/
Contact: institute@mackenzieinstitute.com
Focus: the institute maintains profiles of terrorist groups.

2.52 Manhattan Institute
Location: New York
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Lawrence Mone
Website: https://www.manhattan-institute.org/other/counterterrorism
Contact: mi@manhattan-institute.org
Focus: not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

2.53 Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
Location: Ramat Hasharon (Israel)
Affiliated organisation: Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center
Director: Reuven Erlich
Website: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/
Contact: info@terrorism-info.org.il
Focus: the website lists the following main research topics:
- Palestinian terrorist organizations, their ideology, activities and military capabilities, their political activity, and their international battle for hearts and minds.
- Palestinian Authority and the de-facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip.
- Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
- Hezbollah in Lebanon.
- Global jihad organizations, mainly ISIS and Al-Qaeda.
- Funding and marketing of terrorism.
- State sponsors of terrorism, mainly Iran and Syria.
- The campaign to delegitimize Israel.
• Anti-Semitism and incitement to terrorism and hatred directed against the State of Israel and the Jewish people.
• Iran and its policy toward terrorism and the State of Israel.

2.54 Norwegian Institute for International Affairs

**Location:** Oslo

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** Ulf Sverdrup

**Website:** [http://www.nupi.no/en/Our-research/War-and-peace/Terrorism](http://www.nupi.no/en/Our-research/War-and-peace/Terrorism)

**Contact:** post@nupi.no

**Focus:** “At NUPI, research on terrorism has concentrated especially on the European rim from North Africa to the Caucasus region, and our main instrument for this research is the research programme the Terror Consortium.”

Some of the questions the institute seeks to answer:

• What are the linkages between terrorism, organized crime, weak states and new forms of organized violence?
• How to distinguish between terrorists and freedom fighters?
• What are the political implications of how various insurgent groups are defined?

2.55 Pak Institute for Peace Studies

**Location:** Islamabad

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** Muhammad Amir Rana

**Website:** [http://san-pips.com/](http://san-pips.com/)


**Focus:** “conflict and development, political violence, religious extremism, ethnic strife, terrorism, governance and democracy, foreign relations, and cultural learning of policy-making processes”. The PIPS has specific programmes about ‘Political Violence and Terrorism’ and ‘De-radicalization’.

2.56 Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research

**Location:** Quezon City

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** Rommel C. Banlaoi


**Focus:** not stated specifically.
2.57 Polish Institute of International Affairs

**Location:** Warsaw

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** Sławomir Dębski


**Contact:** pism@pism.pl

**Focus:** not stated specifically with regard to terrorism

2.58 Quilliam Foundation

**Location:** London

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** Noman Benotman

**Website:** [https://www.quilliaminternational.com/divisions/quilliam-global/research/](https://www.quilliaminternational.com/divisions/quilliam-global/research/)

**Contact:** info@quilliaminternational.com

**Focus:** “radicalisation, extremism, terrorism and how to counter these phenomena”.

2.59 RAND Corporation

**Location:** Santa Monica, CA

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** Michael D. Rich

**Website:** [https://www.rand.org/topics/terrorism-and-homeland-security.html](https://www.rand.org/topics/terrorism-and-homeland-security.html)

**Contact:** [https://www.rand.org/about/contacts.html](https://www.rand.org/about/contacts.html)

**Focus:** RAND is one of the largest US think tanks on defense and security matters; its research program on terrorism, spearheaded by Brian M. Jenkins, goes back to the early 1970s.

2.60 Research Institute for European and American Studies

**Location:** Attiki (Greece)

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** John M. Nomikos

**Website:** [http://www.rieas.gr/researchareas/terrorism-studies](http://www.rieas.gr/researchareas/terrorism-studies)

**Contact:** [http://www.rieas.gr/contact](http://www.rieas.gr/contact)

**Focus:** not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

2.61 Resolve Network

**Location:** Washington, DC
Affiliated organisation: United States Institute of Peace (see below)

Director: Leanne Erdberg (interim director)

Website: https://www.resolvenet.org/

Contact: resolve@resolvenet.org

Focus: the network has four ‘thematic channels’ (Governance and security, Ideology, Intervention Demographics, and Political Violence); in regional terms, the network is focused on Africa, Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East.

2.62 Royal United Services Institute

Location: London, Tokyo, Brussels and Nairobi

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Rafaello Pantucci (director for International Security Studies)

Website: https://rusi.org/themes/terrorism

Contact: https://rusi.org/contact-us

Focus: RUSI is the UK’s oldest think tank on defense and international security; focus not stated specifically with regard to terrorism.

2.63 Southern Poverty Law Center

Location: Montgomery, AL (HQ)

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Heidi Beirich (Intelligence Project Director)

Website: https://www.splcenter.org/

Contact: https://www.splcenter.org/contact-us

Focus: the monitoring of “hate groups and extremists throughout the United States”.

2.64 United States Institute of Peace

Location: Washington, DC

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Nancy Lindborg

Website: https://www.usip.org/issue-areas/violent-extremism

Contact: https://www.usip.org/contact

Focus: “the underlying causes of violent extremism”.

2.65 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Location: Washington, DC

Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Focus: ISIS is one of the centre's core research areas.

3 Governmental Organisations

3.1 Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism

Location: Washington, DC

Affiliated organisation: US State Department

Director: Nathan A. Sales

Website: https://www.state.gov/j/ct/index.htm

Contact: https://www.state.gov/j/ct/contact/index.htm

Focus: the Bureau releases annual Country Reports on Terrorism.

3.2 Canadian Security and Intelligence Service

Location: Ottawa

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: David Vigneault


Contact: https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/contact-us.html

Focus: the websites lists radicalization, various specific jihadist organisations and terrorist finance as main topics.

3.3 Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism

Location: Ankara

Affiliated organisation: NATO

Director: Col. Mehmet Aslantaş

Website: http://www.coedat.nato.int/

Contact: info@coedat.nato.int

Focus: not stated.

3.4 Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation

Location: New Delhi
Affiliated organisation: United Services Institute of India (military academy)

Director: Anil Kumar Ahuja

Website: http://usiofindia.org/CS3/

Contact: http://usiofindia.org/Contact/

Focus: the website lists “Terrorism and Transnational Security. Dealing with transnational and global terrorism” as a research area.

3.5 Center for Terror Analysis

Location: Søborg, Denmark

Affiliated organisation: PET (Danish security and intelligence agency)

Director: Finn Borch Andersen (head of PET)

Website: https://www.pet.dk/English/Center%20for%20Terror%20Analysis.aspx

Contact: pet@pet.dk

Focus: the Centre for Terror Analysis publishes assessments of the terrorist threat to Denmark (see: https://www.pet.dk/English/Publications.aspx).

3.6 Combating Terrorism Centre

Location: West Point, NY

Affiliated organisation: United States Military Academy

Director: Bryan Price

Website: https://ctc.usma.edu/

Contact: https://ctc.usma.edu/contact

Focus: the website lists the following research topics:

- Cooperation, competition and fissures
- Counterterrorism
- CVE, de-rad and disengagement
- Financing and the crime-terror nexus
- Foreign fighters
- Hostage and kidnapping
- Ideology, rules and edicts
- Innovation and technology
- Media and communication
- Operations, plots and attacks
- Recruitment and radicalisation
- Strategy, history and goals
• Terror behaviour
• Weapons and tactics
• Weapons of mass destruction

3.7 Europol

**Location:** The Hague

**Affiliated organisation:** police organisation of EU member states

**Director:** Rob Wainwright


**Contact:** [https://www.europol.europa.eu/contact-us](https://www.europol.europa.eu/contact-us)

**Focus:** Europol's European Counter Terrorism Centre monitors, since 2016, various forms of terrorism and publishes the annual EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TE-SAT reports).

3.8 Federal Intelligence Service

**Location:** Bern

**Affiliated organisation:** Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport

**Director:** not stated


**Contact:** info@ndb.admin.ch

**Focus:** the Federal Intelligence Service issues annual national threat assessments, which include sections on religious and nationalist terrorism and right- and left wing extremism (see the ‘documents’ tab on the website).

3.9 Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution

**Location:** Cologne (Germany)

**Affiliated organisation:** Federal Ministry of the Interior

**Director:** Hans-Georg Maassen

**Website:** [https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/fields-of-work](https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/fields-of-work)

**Contact:** [https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/contact](https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/contact)

**Focus:** the Federal Office (BfV, or Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) lists right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, extremism of foreign fighters, Islamism and Islamic terrorism as fields of work. Its annual reports contain analyses of the trends and development of these threats. The BfV also published a small number of ‘stand alone’ reports on these topics. See: [https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/public-relations/publications](https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/public-relations/publications).

3.10 General Intelligence and Security Service

**Location:** Zoetermeer (The Netherlands)

**Affiliated organisation:** Ministry of the Interior
Focus: the GISC (AIVD, or Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst) publishes occasional reports on the Islamic State (see https://english.aivd.nl/publications).

3.11 National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism

Location: The Hague

Affiliated organisation: Ministry of Justice and Security

Director: Dick Schoof

Website: https://english.nctv.nl/

Focus: the NCSC (NCTV, or Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid) publishes quarterly assessments of the terrorist threat to the Netherlands; see: https://english.nctv.nl/topics_a_z/terrorist_threat_assessment_netherlands/index.aspx.

3.12 Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism

Location: Kuala Lumpur

Affiliated organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia

Director: Dato’ Azmil Mohd Zabidi

Website: http://www.searcct.gov.my/

Focus: the website lists the following priorities for 2018:

- Radicalisation in Southeast Asia,
- Undergraduate Radicalisation in Southeast Asia,
- Developing a Counter-Terrorism Training Module and Facilitating a Counter-Terrorism Workshop for University Undergraduates

4 Networks

4.1 Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society

Location: Waterloo (Canada)

Affiliated organisation: Department of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo

Director: Lorne Dawson

Website: http://tsas.ca/

Contact: http://tsas.ca/contact-us/
Focus: “the TSAS Network links up academic researchers on terrorism, security and society.”

4.2 Global Research Network

**Location:** New York

**Affiliated organisation:** UN Security Council, Counter-Terrorism Committee

**Director:** Gustavo Adolfo Meza-Cuadra Velásquez (Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee)

**Website:** [https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/research/](https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/research/)

**Contact:** [https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/contact-us/](https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/contact-us/)

Focus: “the drivers of terrorism and violent extremism”; “emerging trends and challenges” in the terrorist threat.

4.3 Radicalisation Awareness Network

**Location:** Brussels

**Affiliated organisation:** European Commission

**Director:** not stated


**Contact:** [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-contacts](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-contacts)

**Focus:** RAN’s website lists the following working groups:

- Communication and Narratives working group (RAN C&N)
- Education working group (RAN EDU)
- EXIT working group (RAN EXIT)
- Youth, Families and Communities working group (RAN YF&C)
- Local authorities working group (RAN LOCAL)
- Prison and Probation working group (RAN P&P)
- Police and law enforcement working group (RAN POL)
- Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism working group (RAN RVT)
- Health and Social Care working group (RAN H&SC)
- Steering Committees

4.4 Society for Terrorism Research

**Location:** Newton, MA

**Affiliated organisation:** n.a.

**Director:** Rachel Monaghan

**Website:** [http://www.societyforterrorismresearch.org/](http://www.societyforterrorismresearch.org/)
Contact: SforTR@gmail.com

Focus: STR organizes annual conferences and issues a journal.

4.5 Terrorism Research Initiative

Location: Vienna and The Hague

Affiliated organisation: ISGA

Directors: Robert Wesley, Alex P. Schmid and Edwin Bakker

Website: http://www.terrorism-research.org/

Contact: info@terrorismanalysts.com

Focus: “facilitating cooperative efforts among scholars from a broad range of disciplines and backgrounds. The Initiative brings together individual and institutional research efforts, enabling knowledge accumulation in order to suggest policy-relevant courses of action on security issues related to terrorism.” TRI publishes, together with ISGA, the bi-monthly scholarly online journal Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) at www.terrorismanalysts.com.

5 Commercial

5.1 ControlRisks

Location: for a list of offices, see https://www.controlrisks.com/contact-us/office-search?q=&sort=1

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: Irene Dorner (chair of the Board of Directors)

Website: https://www.controlrisks.com/

Contact: https://www.controlrisks.com/contact-us

Focus: not stated specifically with regard to terrorism, but includes forensic and anti-kidnapping expertise.

5.2 IntelCenter Database

Location: not stated

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Director: not stated

Website: https://intelcenter.com

Contact: info@intelcenter.com

Focus: collection and analysis of data on terrorism (e.g. videos, photos, and data on attacks, hostages and perpetrators).

5.3 Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre

Location: Washington, DC, Singapore and Coulsdon (UK)
Affiliated organisation: HIS Markit
Director: Matthew Henman
Website: https://ihsmarkit.com/products/janes-terrorism-insurgency-intelligence-centre.html
Contact: janes@ihsmarkit.com

Focus: Jane's is a commercial security-related intelligence service which also maintains terrorist group profiles and an extensive database on terrorist incidents.

5.4 SITE Intelligence Group
Location: Bethesda, MD
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Rita Katz
Website: https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/
Contact: https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Corporate/contact-us.html
Focus: monitoring of various forms of terrorism and terrorism-related activities (e.g. cyber and finance).

5.5 Soufan Group
Location: New York (HQ), Doha, London and Singapore
Affiliated organisation: n.a.
Director: Ali Soufan
Website: http://www.soufangroup.com/
Contact: http://www.soufangroup.com/contact/
Focus: much of the group's recent research has been focused on Al-Qaeda, ISIS and foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.

5.6 Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium
Location: Washington, DC
Affiliated organisation: Beacham Group
Director: Veryan Khan
Website: https://www.trackingterrorism.org/
Contact: vkhan@TRACterrorism.org
Focus: for a list of topics that TRAC is collecting information on, see https://www.trackingterrorism.org/about.
6 Other

6.1 Human Rights Watch

Location: New York

Affiliated organisation: n.a.

Type: human rights advocacy group

Director: Nadim Houry

Website: https://www.hrw.org/topic/terrorism-counterterrorism

Contact: https://www.hrw.org/contact-us

Focus: website lists the following topics (in reference to its Terrorism and Counterterrorism Program):

- CIA activities
- Detention without trial
- Edward Snowden
- Guantanamo
- Guantanamo – Military Commission
- Targeted killings and drones

6.2 Radicalisation Research

Location: not stated

Affiliated organisation: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats

Type: knowledge hub

Director: Matthew Francis (website team)

Website: https://www.radicalisationresearch.org/

Contact: https://www.radicalisationresearch.org/contact/

Focus: historical and geographical comparisons regarding various forms of terrorism.

About the Compiler: Dr. Teun van Dongen is an Associate Fellow at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism and a lecturer at Leiden University. He can be reached at www.teunvandongen.com.
Book Reviews

reviewed by Joshua Sinai

Targeted killing is a term used for premeditated extrajudicial assassination by a state organization, usually by its covert intelligence and special forces units. The targets are enemy operatives (e.g. managers of terrorist operations) who are perceived as posing an imminent security threat due to their involvement in murderous activities that endanger the state. An important consideration for opting for targeted killing is that the capture of the targeted persons for arrest is made impossible by their protected presence in hostile territory. Over the years, due to the protracted nature of conventional military and terrorist threats by some of its Middle Eastern adversaries against Israel, such as Iran, Syria, the Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Fatah and Hamas groups, the Jewish State has developed one the world’s top covert special operations capabilities to target selected adversaries for assassination worldwide.

As explained by Ronen Bergman, one of Israel’s top investigative journalists in the field of national security, Israeli covert agencies have conducted targeted assassinations against the country’s Middle Eastern adversaries throughout its pre- and post-statehood periods. The total numbers of such spectacularly conducted targeted assassinations are staggering. Bergman’s informed account is based on “thousand” interviews with “sources ranging from political leaders and chiefs of intelligence agencies to the operatives themselves.” Many of them provided him with highly sensitive government documents, as he writes, that they “never received permission to remove…from their places of employment, and certainly did not have permission to pass them on to me” (p. xiv).

While the author may have received unparalleled access to the workings of Israel’s targeted killing program over the years, his use of figures to estimate the total numbers of such killings is open to debate. For example, he explains that until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada (uprising) against Israel in September 2000, Israel had conducted some 500 targeted killing operations, killing at least 1,000 people, both combatants and civilians (p.xxii). Following the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in September 2000, Palestinian suicide bombers deliberately targeted Israeli citizens on a daily basis, causing the deaths of some 887 Israeli civilians and 250 military personnel - figures which do not appear in Bergman’s text. In response, the author reveals, Israel carried out some 1,000 targeting operations, of which 168 succeeded in killing terrorists - which, in this reviewer’s judgment, is a low success rate. An additional 800 operations were conducted against dangerous individuals from 2005 (when the intifada ended) until late 2017 (p. xxii). However, the author does not explain how many of these operations had succeeded, and numbering the adversary combatant and civilian deaths resulting from these targeted killing operations.

Once the author shifts his account to describing the stories behind Israel’s targeted killing operations, his analysis is on more solid ground. These killings, he explains, were mostly carried out against leading Hamas operatives, such as the firing by a helicopter gunship of a rocket bomb against Hamas’s leader, Ahmed Yassin in March 2004, killing him at his hideout in the Gaza Strip. Another operation involved a revenge targeting of selected senior Hezbollah operatives, such as the notorious terrorist mastermind Imad Mugniyeh, who was killed by a remotely controlled car bomb explosion in Syria in February 2008. This was followed, on January 19, 2010, by a fatal poisoning by an Israeli hit team of Mamoud al-Mabhouh, a Hamas financier, at his hotel room in Dubai. The hit team’s movements were captured by the hotel’s surveillance cameras, but in an example of “bazaar diplomacy,” despite the international storm that ensued (with the Israeli team using foreign passports belonging to innocent citizens), there were no repercussions against Israel, supposedly due to a “behind the scenes” understanding that let Israel off-the hook for the operation. Other spectacular operations included a series of killings in Iran by Israeli covert operatives (and, as the author speculates, by Israeli allies in the region) against numerous scientists who were involved in developing Iran’s nuclear weapons program, which
was directed against Israel, between the years 2010 and 2012.

Employing the tactic of targeted assassinations to protect a country's security and the lives of its citizens, the author argues, involves two difficult dilemmas for a democratic state like Israel. As Bergman writes: “First, is it effective? Can the elimination of an individual, or a number of individuals, make the world a safer place? Second, is it morally and legally justified?” (p. xxi)

Regarding the first question, Mr. Bergman writes that at its height Israel's targeted killing campaign significantly weakened the PLO's terrorist commanders and, together with other defensive measures, had greatly diminished the rate of Palestinian suicide attacks. It also significantly damaged the PLO's and Hamas's top echelons, beginning with the assassination of Hamas's founder, Yassin, in March 2004. While PLO leader Yasser Arafat was repeatedly targeted for assassination over the years, he was able to continuously evade his assassins. The author reveals that, in the late 1970s the Israeli Mossad intelligence service had also engaged in a program to delegitimize Arafat, with evidence of his engaging in homosexual relations with his bodyguards, but the Mossad had decided not to publicize it. The author speculates that when Arafat later “succeeded to a mysterious internal disease” that killed him in early November 2004, “traces of polonium, a radioactive material used in assassinations,” were found on his “clothes and remains,” and that “the timing of Arafat's death was quite peculiar, coming so soon after the assassination of Yassin” in March of that year. Although the author may know whether Arafat's death was a product of an Israeli assassination operation, he explains that “If I knew the answer to the question of what killed Yasser Arafat, I wouldn't be able to write it here in this book, or even be able to write that I know the answer. The military censor in Israel forbids me from discussing this subject” (p. 562).

Regarding the second question, Mr. Bergman explains that the targeted killings were justified when the target for elimination “must be an individual directly linked to terrorism” and that “there should be no killings when there was a 'reasonable arrest alternative'...” (p. 537).

In the conclusion of the book, Mr. Bergman insightfully observes that while Israel's highly successful campaign of targeted assassinations (along with other intelligence operations) “provided Israel's leaders sooner or later with operational responses to every focused problem they were asked to solve. But the intelligence community's very success fostered the illusion among most of the nation's leaders that covert operations could be a strategic and not just a tactical tool – that they could be used in place of real diplomacy to end the geographic, ethnic, religious, and national disputes in which Israel is mired,” and that this “tactical method of combating terror” have been “elevated and sanctified...at the expense of the true vision, statesmanship and genuine desire to reach a political solution that is necessary for peace to be attained” (pp. 629-630).

Despite the author's questionable use of figures at the beginning of the book, this insider-based work make this an indispensable book in explaining the successes and dilemmas facing Israel in its efforts to fend off the continuous and implacable hostility of some of its Middle Eastern adversaries. But, as the author explains, the targeted killings campaign should also have been accompanied by a stronger commitment to achieving a political solution with the Palestinian adversary.

This review is a substantially expanded and revised version of a review that originally appeared in The Washington Times. Reprinted by permission

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

reviewed by Beatrice de Graaf

In recent years, almost all European countries have been provided with one or more studies historicizing their approach to (counter-)terrorism. Until recently, Switzerland was an exception. That has now changed with Aviva Guttmann’s Ph.D. thesis turned into a Brill monograph, *The Origins of International Counterterrorism.* As she notes in her opening chapter, Europe was struck by a series of terrorist attacks in the early 1970s - both by domestic groups and by international terrorist organisations. Mainly due to transnational terrorist operations, Guttmann argues, countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France started to cooperate, bilaterally, and sometimes, in a very ad hoc manner, multilaterally. However, Dutch, Belgian, French and German police officers already exchanged information and intelligence relating to fugitive domestic terrorists like those of the German RAF and, in later years, with the UK on IRA operatives running afoul on the continent. However, with that reservation, Guttmann is correct in noting that governments started to develop more institutionalised policies to counter the threat emanating from international terrorist organisations in the early 1970s. She also correctly notes that the Swiss government played an interesting part in early developments on the intelligence front. This is the history she sought to cover.

One question, however, immediately poses itself to the reader: which approach to adopt in bringing into focus this special international role the Swiss government has allegedly played? She notes quite early in her dissertation that neutral Switzerland sided with the US and UK in supporting Israel against Palestinian terrorist groupings, thereby opting for a ‘breach of the principle of universality’ (p.4). Whose principle, and which universality were supposedly broken, Guttmann fails to elaborate. Does this signal that the author adopted an international rights perspective as her interpretative framework? Not really. Guttmann states in the introduction that her research is embedded in ‘International History’ while focusing on ‘the country’s cooperation with European and other states’ since ‘this helps to understand counterterrorism cooperation mechanism[s].’ Furthermore, she claims that this also ‘contributes to identifying today’s difficulties for international counterterrorism cooperation and can provide insights in counterterrorism studies more generally’. This ‘more generally’ needs to be taken quite literally, since Guttmann subsequently does not further elaborate how she intends to analyse counterterrorism measures and management. Rather, she proceeds with a number of diligent chronologically arranged chapters on how Swiss authorities dealt with a series of attacks and crises in the years 1969 to 1977.

These minute descriptions of attacks, especially one by the PFLP in February 1969 and an abduction by ‘Brazilian rebels’ in 1970-1971 are the real bonus of this monograph. These attacks - and the response by the Swiss authorities - have indeed not been investigated thoroughly before. Guttmann unearths fascinating new details, e.g. on how, at first the Swiss authorities decided on a solo run in dealing with the PFLP hijacking of a Swissair plane, thereby safeguarding their declaratory policy of neutrality. However, when some of the communications with the terrorists and the media got messed up, Swiss crisis managers very quickly accepted US assistance, abandoning a position of neutrality.

Guttmann then continues to describe Swiss participation in UN negotiations on some of the first international counterterrorism conventions, and on how Swiss diplomats were instructed to ‘find an elegant way of doing nothing’ when confronted with US demands in initiating new resolutions and conventions. The chapters on the formation and functioning of the Club de Berne are equally fascinating – especially Guttmann’s assessment that its inception, and the way intelligence sharing worked and was prompted, had everything to do with a joint European stance against Palestinian activism and terrorism, resting on the willingness to engage in large scale intelligence sharing with Israel.

Guttmann study’s chief merit consists of her ‘thick’ descriptions of a number of attacks and the measures taken to counter terrorism in the 1970s in Switzerland, as well as in her reconstruction of the Swiss participation in
UN negotiations and its role in the Club de Berne. That said, the absence of a proper conceptual or interpretative framework makes itself felt throughout the book. Mostly in the way the author keeps reiterating Swiss official self-assessments of its government as an ‘important security partner’ or being ‘very well prepared’. She is also bestowing the epithet ‘balanced and coherent’ to an approach, that - as emerges from the author’s own account - relied on luck and ad hoc measures as much as on strategic depth of insight. On the other hand, the author assumes a quite moralistic tone in the conclusion when she appears to blame the Swiss authorities for ‘violating neutrality’. Yet, if the history of terrorism and counterterrorism teaches us anything, it is that questions of legitimacy, constitutional norms and traditions in international relations may be challenged overnight following a major attack or crisis, and might subsequently experience a total overhaul. Understanding how that happens, under what conditions, how countries and governments respond differently to international crises or to public calls for better security are at least as important as unearthing new details on past attacks. It also needs to be said that the subtitle of this volume is misleading; in the end it was not Switzerland that was ‘at the Forefront of Crisis Negotiations etc.’ but countries like West-Germany and Italy, prompted by the US – something which does not really transpire from Guttmann’s work.

About the Reviewer: Beatrice de Graaf holds a chair on the History of International Relations and Global Governance at the University of Utrecht, The Netherlands. She is a member of the Netherlands Royal Academy of Sciences and of the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 20 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects
reviewed by Joshua Sinai

This column consists of 20 capsule reviews of books from various publishers. It is arranged into (i) general accounts (including works on specific topics), (ii) books on counterterrorism (general and legal issues), (iii) anarchism, and (iv) Boko Haram.

Terrorism – General Accounts


This volume is based on selected papers presented at a conference titled “Societies Under Siege: Media, Government, Politics, and Citizen's Freedom in an Age of Terrorism,” held at Kadir Has University in Istanbul, in April 2009, as well as additional papers solicited following the conference. The editors’ introductory overview describes the volume’s objective as aiming to examine “the hegemonic power that is exercised by elites (and mass media) through the discourse of ‘War on Terror.’ The chapters in the volume provide case studies from a wide variety of geographies to debate questions regarding the construction of the meaning of ‘terrorism’, communication of collective identities and otherness, and media frames regarding the ‘War on Terror, civil liberties, and government restrictions’ (p. 4). To examine these issues, the volume is divided into two parts. The first part, “‘War on Terror’, Elite Rhetoric, and Collective Identity,” features articles that examine how the New York Times had covered the United Nations 1972 General Assembly debates on defining terrorism, how British newspaper covered the July 7, 2005, bombings, how the Northern Ireland media covered the PIRA and UDA – Ulster Defence Association, how three Turkish newspapers cover terrorism, and a German perspective on covering the war in Afghanistan. The second part, “Media Frames, Compromises, and Resistance,” includes articles that examine how the news media in Japan cover civil liberties and restrictions on press freedom, how terrorism and anti-globalization movements are covered, how government counterterrorism and surveillance measures are covered, and how cyberspace has become an attractive medium for Turkish hacker and terrorist groups. Banu Baybars-Hawks is Professor and Chair, Department of PR and Communications, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Turkey. Lemi Baruh is Associate Professor, Department of Media and Visual Arts, at Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey.


This edited volume was originally published in 1975 and reissued by the publisher as part of a series of significant books on terrorism and counterterrorism subjects. The book’s chapters were presented at the Fifth Course of the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts, held in Urbino, Italy, between August 12 to 24, 1974. Following a summary of the conference’s proceedings by J. Henk Leurdijk, the book is divided into four parts: part I: “International Terrorism”; part II: “The Arms Race”; part III: “European and Middle East Security”; and part IV: “Peace Teaching and the Study of Conflict.” Although the subject matter of the book’s six chapters on international terrorism are dated, the authors’ analyses of terrorism are still relevant and worth noting. This begins with Brian Jenkins’ excellent chapter on “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict” – which was one of the first attempts to define terrorism – in which he explains that the objective of terrorism’s violence is “designed primarily to instill fear,” that it is “violence for effect,” to which he adds that “the victim may be totally unrelated to the terrorist’s cause. Terrorism is violence aimed at the people watching.
Fear is the intended effect, not the by-product of terrorism” (p. 14). In a further elaboration, he explains that the objectives of terrorists are to “inspire and manipulate fear to achieve a variety of purposes” to gain publicity; cause widespread disorder, including demoralize society and break down the social order; deliberately provoke government repression and reprisals that “may ultimately lead to the collapse of an unpopular government”; used by governments “to enforce obedience and cooperation”; and “is frequently meant to punish” (pp. 16-18). He also makes the important point that, as an Israeli military officer had explained to him, terrorism can be “debilitating” to the targeted enemy, estimating at the time, although it is still current today, that “the total cost in men and money to Israel for all defensive and offensive measures against at most a few thousand Arab terrorists was forty times that of the Six Day War in 1967” (p. 31). The chapter by Gaston Bouthoul, on “Definitions of Terrorism,” also presents a still relevant analysis of the seven characteristics of terrorism, which he explains as being clandestine in nature; as not being restricted to attacking an “overt enemy, but also strik[ing] at the innocent in order to create fear and insecurity”; by acting in secrecy, such an “anonymous, unidentified threat creates huge anxiety”; two traits of terrorism are psychological and “an Adlerian compensation complex, created by deeply resented frustrations and humiliation”; terrorism is “influenced by intellectual and doctrinal fashions”; there is an element in terrorism of “imitation in the techniques employed” by others; and, in an insight that applies to current-day lone wolves, “Among terrorists there is the power of suggestion: there are, for example, solitary men who are controlled by an idee fixe” (pp. 50-53). J. Bowyer Bell’s chapter on “Revolutionary Organizations: Special Cases and Imperfect Models” includes the insight that terrorist leaders “share a commitment to the efficacy of force, tend to have tunnel vision in excluding compromising options, and are convinced of ultimate and complete victory of their just case…” (p. 92). The discipline of terrorism and counterterrorism studies greatly benefits from the insights presented by the re-issuance of such books from the 1970s.


The author employs an ethnographic approach, including extensive field research, to examine the “Hilltop Youth,” the militant religious-nationalist Jewish movement in Israel, who physically push to establish new illegal settlements in the West Bank. They also utilize civil disobedience to oppose the evacuation of settlements that the Israeli government or the Supreme Court consider to be illegal. The first chapter presents an overview of origins of the Jewish settlement in the West Bank in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and how the “Hilltop Youth” emerged in South Mount Hebron as a rebellion against their settler parents’ generation, which they felt was not being aggressively activist in their religious practices and settlement activity. The second chapter discusses the author’s ethnographic field work with the “Hilltop Youth,” including the dilemmas for a researcher-participant in witnessing violent events involving his research subjects. The third chapter assesses the academic research conducted on the Jewish settlers, including theoretical frameworks that examine how an extremist group such as the “Hilltop Youth” emerges within the context of their parents’ generation, and their strong attachment to agricultural settlements. The fourth chapter presents the stories of the youths that the author uncovers in his field research and describes their ideological, social and political outlooks that emerged from his interviews. This includes how they became socially marginalized within the settler movement because of their criticism of what they consider to be the “social failings” of religious Zionism and their tactic of employing extreme actions such as physical confrontation to demonstrate “ownership” of the settlement enterprise. In his conclusion, the author finds that “the Hilltop Youth gangs are a temporary phenomenon that will pass. Their spontaneous gathering together and their aspirations for self-rehabilitation are expressions of their search for meaning, identity and a home” (p. 85). Whether this prognosis will pan out is yet to be determined, but it is an interesting thesis to ponder. For the sake of transparency, this reviewer wrote the book’s Foreword. The author is a lecturer in the Department of Education at Ariel University, in Ariel, West Bank/Israel.


This is a comprehensive collection of primary source statements and writings by leading al-Qaida leaders and ideologues, focusing on the post-May 2011 period, when Ayman al-Zawahiri assumed leadership of the group
following the assassination of Usama bin Laden. The volume is divided into three parts, with the translations arranged chronologically. The first part, “Al-Qaeda After the Arab Spring,” focuses on the May 2011 to February 2014 period. It presents al Qaida’s approach to the Arab Spring, with statements by al-Zawahiri such as “General Guidelines for the Work of Jihad” (September 2013). The second part, “Al-Qaeda and the Syrian Fitna,” focuses the beginning of the rivalry between the Islamist combatants in Syria affiliated with al-Qaida and the Islamic State, which had claimed the primary role in the jihadi insurgency in the country. It includes statements such as al-Zawahiri’s May 2014 “Testimony to Preserve the Blood of the Mujahidin in Al Sham.” The third part, “Al-Qaeda and the ‘Islamic State,’” focuses on the rift between al Qaida and the Islamic State, including the mutual public denunciations by al-Zawahiri and the Islamic State’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It includes al-Zawahiri’s December 2015 statement, “Sham [Syria] Is Entrusted Upon Your Shoulders,” in which he denounces the Islamic State. The volume’s compilation and translation of primary source material, with each statement briefly introduced by the editor, offers researchers an important resource for understanding the evolution of al Qaida in the al-Zawahiri era, including how it approaches its rivalry with the Islamic State. It also includes a useful timeline that plots the evolution of themes presented in the statements. The author is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at the University of Lancaster, England, UK.


Drawing on the field of neuropsychology and what the authors refer to as the ‘biopolitics of security’, the book examines how political speech is crafted to manipulate a country’s population to support the legitimacy of a government’s counterterrorism campaign. The United States is used as the setting for what the authors term a “multiphase qualitative case study approach” used to examine the case of Luis Posada Carriles, the CIA-funded Cuban exile responsible for the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner that killed 73 people and how it contrasts with a the case of Mogamed al-Megrahi, the Libyan intelligence officer convicted in 2001 of the Pan Am Flight 103 airliner bombing that killed 270 people over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988. The analysis of political language used to cover these and other cases, as the authors explain, involves “examining the content of the speech, how speech is assimilated by different political groups, and how the speech is ultimately acted upon by the consumers of the information, namely the electorate” (p. 3). The authors find that in America, such political language has been used to tremendous effect. It claims that “…. although the research suggests that some people may be more genetically predisposed to suspending rationality and more receptive to reactionary political pronouncements, the pervasive social pressures of a militarized society (that controls a massive global military-industrial complex that profits hugely from the war on terror and invests heavily in the war’s narrative) make policy decisions in the war difficult for all American citizens” (p. 142). Although this conclusion may be challenged as unfair, since the authors do not critique the terrorists’ operations that might justify governments’ counter-terrorism campaigns against them, which may explain how the language of such campaigns are shaped, the book still presents an important methodological contribution to examining the neuroscience that underlies the use of political language in society. Joseph Siracusa is professor of Human Security and International Diplomacy and Discipline Head of Global Studies at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University, Australia. Wesley Kendall is Assistant Professor of Law and Law Studies Program Director at West Virginia University Parkersburg. Kevin Noguchi is research Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at Washington University School of Medicine, in St. Louis, Missouri.


This is a conceptually innovative empirical examination of the interaction of motivations and strategies pursued by states and their rebel organization proxies towards each other. It draws on the author’s data set of 455 groups, their target states and supporters over a period of more than sixty years. In the book’s introduction, the author presents the theoretical framework and the hypotheses to be tested, suggesting that “states might be driven by strategic and/or ideational motives in supporting rebels. Yet their calculus is mostly a function of domestic troubles that leaders face and their expectations about dealing with possible retaliation from a rebel group’s
target. When states face internal and external threats simultaneously, they are more likely to resort to rebel groups against their external adversaries. On the other hand, weak states are not necessarily the most preferred sources of support by rebels for two reasons: they do not have the ability to deal with a possible retaliation, and they lack the infrastructure and resources required for maintaining persistent operations against their targets” (p. 20). These issues are examined in four chapters that present the study’s research design, data collection, and coding procedures, as well as the determinants driving state support for armed groups as well as rebels’ own selection drivers. In the concluding chapter, the author discusses the study's findings on trends in state support to rebel groups. The book's appendices present the study’s sample data table, codebook, and the entire cases of state intentional support of rebel groups from 1945 to 2010. Such an empirical approach to analyzing the factors driving state support to rebel groups make this book an important contribution to the literature on state support of rebel groups, whether terrorist or guerrilla in their main tactics. The author is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Koç University, in Istanbul, Turkey.


Political, religious, and communal violence is a pervasive characteristic of Indian society, especially since 1947 when British India was partitioned into a majority Hindu India and the new Muslim state of Pakistan. This book examines how this violent tradition’s origins were represented in historic Indian epics, religious texts, political treaties, plays, poems, inscriptions, and art from 600 BCE to 600 BCE. Although the discussion is brief, the author shows how historic texts have influenced “the Hindutva agenda of the Bharatiya Janata Party, the communal polarization over building a Rama temple at Ayodhya, and the violent destruction of the Babri mosque in 1992” (p. 472). The author also points out that “The idea of a peace-loving, nonviolent India exists, persists, as part of a selectively constructed and assiduously cultivated national self-image in the midst of a society pervaded by social and political violence” (p. 481). Although this book briefly discusses the phenomenon of political violence in contemporary India, the discussion of historical texts provides an important context for understanding the theological and philosophical ideas that shape the approaches to violence and non-violence in contemporary Indian society. The author is Professor in the Department of History at the University of Delhi, New Delhi, India.


This is a highly interesting and innovative conceptual approach to explain the phenomenon of how cults (including cult-like terrorist groups) succeed in indoctrinating susceptible individuals into joining them and the methods that can be used to disengage members from such groups. As the author explains, “the central aim of this book is to show the common social psychological and structural elements that link these varied situations and that result in charismatic, authoritarian leaders shaping the minds of followers so that they are not able to act in their own survival interests. This mind-shaping activity can be usefully termed brainwashing or coercive persuasion. The structures in which this takes place I refer to as totalist systems” (p. 7). To examine these processes, the book’s chapters cover topics such as recruitment, indoctrination into a cults ideology and practices, isolation from family and friends, and the role of “totalist” leaders in controlling the group's members to such an extent that “they will obey his or her orders even to the point of killing themselves, and sometimes even sacrificing their own children....” (p. 3). In terms of organization, the author provides a valuable diagram that visualizes the structure of a totalist system as a network that is led by a charismatic authoritarian leader, followed by secondary leadership/lieutenants, front groups (fellow travelers/periphery), and an inner core of group members (p. 117). This conceptual framework is applied to explaining the experiences of individuals studied by the author who were members of cults such as Aum Shinrikyo, the Church of Scientology, Heaven's Gate, the MEK (Mujahedin e-Khalq), and others. To prevent the recruitment of susceptible individuals into cults, the author presents a public health approach that is based, at the individual level, “on a general improvement in securely attached relationships both in early childhood and in communities,” while at the societal level, the “social, economic and community supports available to families” need to be improved, including “improving education on the importance of security attachment” (p. 205). The appendices include
a useful “Group Attachment Interview” template and a table that distinguishes between the characteristics of relationships in “eye-level egalitarian” groups and those in “abusive, authoritarian” groups. The author, a social psychologist who had been a member of a political cult in her youth, is an Associate Lecturer at Birkbeck, University of London, England, UK.

Counterterrorism – General


As explained by the volume's editors, “Taking into account legal, societal, operational and democratic perspectives, this collection connects theoretical and practical approaches to produce an interdisciplinary and multi-stakeholder understanding of how we might understand and measure impact, legitimacy and effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism” (p. 2). To examine these issues, following the editors' introductory overview, the book is divided into three parts. The chapters in the first part, “EU Counter-Terrorism: Its Scope and Institutions,” catalog the European Union's (EU) counter-terrorism measures and the institutional framework that implements them throughout Europe. The chapters in the second part, “Disciplinary Perspectives on EU Counter-Terrorism,” draw on legal, societal and democratic approaches to examine key concepts, such as the effectiveness of the European Court of Human Rights, and the impacts of European counter-terrorism on human rights and democratic legitimacy. The chapters in the third part, “Practical Perspectives on EU Counter-Terrorism,” complement the theoretical discussions with the perspectives of end-users in society who are affected by such policies, including policy-makers.

What is especially noteworthy about this volume is that counterterrorism is usually viewed as government centric, so it is valuable to focus on the effectiveness of a regional organization, such as the EU, in implementing a counterterrorism campaign, although, in the case of the EU, this campaign consists primarily of legal and diplomatic efforts (including intelligence sharing). The volume's chapters also provide insight into the components of counterterrorism. Chapter 9, “Civil Society and Policy-Maker Perspectives on EU Counter-Terrorism,” by Josephine Doody and Rosemarijn van der Hilst, highlights the difficulty in measuring effectiveness, because, as one of the participants in their study observed, “obviously when you prevent attacks then you might not know that there would otherwise have been an attack,” and, as another participant observed, “No result is a good result” (p. 198). In the concluding chapter, “Governance Gaps in EU Counter-Terrorism: Implications for Democracy and Constitutionalism,” co-editor Fiona de Londras observes that in assessing the effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU's measures, these should be reviewed on a “regular, participatory, public” basis and “capable of bringing about policy, legal, practical and political reorientation by providing a rigorous evidence base for policy (re)evaluation” (p. 228). Both editors are associated with the Durham Law School, Durham University, England, UK.


This book examines the development and impact of anti-terrorism powers in the United Kingdom since 9/11 in enhancing the security of British citizens. Specifically, it examines its impact on maintaining the balance between “the rights and freedoms citizens enjoy (and thus the formal content of citizenship) and the quality or level of security experienced” (p. 2). To examine these issues, the book's chapters seek to answer four related questions: how are anti-terrorism powers “understood, assessed and discussed by different publics across the UK”; how do they impact on the “experience of citizenship”; how do they impact on the state of security; and how these different questions about citizenship and security “connect to evaluations of anti-terrorism powers” (pp. 3-4). The authors conclude that it is crucial for policy makers to engage “with citizens’ views on security and citizenship” and that understanding the impact of anti-terrorism measures “needs to shift from a
straightforward consideration of ‘how to respond’, to include analysis of what anti-terrorism does, in as wide and as detailed a framework as possible” (p. 161). One of the book’s weaknesses is the lack of an examination of the magnitude of the terrorist threats facing Britain, which would have provided a wider context for discussing the impact of anti-terrorism measures on the country’s citizenry. Nevertheless, this book still serves as an important reminder that a government’s anti-terrorism measures need to consider their impact on preserving a democratic society’s balance between the need to ensure security while maintaining an appropriate level of civil liberties. Lee Jarvis is Senior Lecturer in International Security at the University of East Anglia, Norwich, England, and Michael Lister is Reader in Politics at Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, England.


The Human Terrain System (HTS) was a program established in early February 2007 by the United States Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to employ personnel with expertise in social science disciplines, such as anthropology, sociology, political science, regional studies, and linguistics, to embed with deployed military commanders and staff in their theaters of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The “human terrain” refers to the crucial role of understanding by the military of the local population they interact with in the regions in which they are deployed. The program officially ended its operations in September 2014.

The contributors to this edited volume, including co-editor Montgomery McFate, who was one of the program’s creators, discuss their experiences with the program and its contributions to the American military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The introductory chapter by McFate and Janice Laurence discusses the HTS’s origins, mission statement (e.g. to help “the military execute their operations more successfully, with less expenditure of effort” by reducing “its need for the use of lethal force” (p. 10); as well as to “preserve and share socio-cultural institutional knowledge” (p. 11); how the HTS was structured (with five to nine members, including a research manager); and controversies over the HTS program. The remaining chapters are divided into three sections: first, the research process involved in conducting social science in a war zone, including the adaptation of research methods from “pure” to “applied”; second, the issues involved in integrating social science teams with military units; and, third, ethical issues involved in embedding social scientists with a military campaign. Several chapters are especially noteworthy for their discussion of methodologies used in the HTS program that are also useful in academic research. These include Kathleen Reedy’s chapter on “The Four Pillars of Integration: How to Make Social Science Work in a War Zone,” which makes the distinction between measures of performance (e.g., numbers of insurgents captured), as compared to “measures of effect” (e.g., the extent of reduced insurgent influence) (p. 173). James Dorough-Lewis Jr.’s chapter on “Investing in Uncertainty: Applying Social Science to Military Operations,” discusses two valuable methodologies: one, how the effectiveness of the military’s allocation of resources can be assessed through an “effects-based approach to operations (EBAO),” which provides “a framework for holistically assessing the influences that converge toward an environment’s behaviors and capabilities and then modifying those influences to adjust behaviors and capabilities to correlate with desired outcomes” (p. 199). A second valuable methodology is the use of spreadsheet-based “maturity matrices” to track the progress of a unit’s efforts over multiple lines of effort and interim and long-term milestones toward a larger end-point objective. (p. 201). The concluding chapter, “The Human Terrain System: Some Lessons-Learned and the Way Forward, by Janice Laurence, discusses the role of HTS as an experiment vis-a-vis the U.S. military’s existing civil affairs programs, such as in the fields of intelligence, foreign area officers (FAOs), and military information support operations (MISO). She concludes that some of HTS’s contributions included their understanding of the local “social structure, allegiances, and physical, economic, and security needs. They mapped the political power grid. They did damage-control following cultural incidents, such as a soldier’s shooting a Quran or after a patrol inappropriately flex-cuffed and detained a local sheik’s elderly uncle.” (pp. 305-306). Regarding the future of HTS-type programs, Laurence insightfully observes that “Social science has operational relevance for military missions involving not only sustained combat (so-called phases 1 to 4), but especially for the purposes of conflict deterrence and stability operations (phase 0), or as the pre-conflict period has ethnocentrically been called, ‘left of boom’” (p. 313).

This book was published more than 10 years ago, but one of its premises is still relevant to the current era. In the book’s Chapter 8, “Counterterrorism: Strategy and Structure: An Ounce of Prevention?”, the author presents a valuable methodology to conduct a risk-based cost-benefit analysis to structure decisions about prioritizing counterterrorism response measures. While it is generally understood that determining overall risk is measured by the presence of threat, the vulnerability of a target, and the consequences of attacking the target, the author presents a methodology to better operationalize this formula. This begins with the author’s discussion threat as “influenced by the intentions and resources of potential attackers,” (p. 214) “attaching geographic and time coordinates to potential attacks,” (p. 215) and estimating the size of the pools of potential attackers. A target’s potential vulnerability, the author points out, is influenced by the expected cost to protect it against a possible attack. The consequences of an attack are determined by the expected cost of a target’s expected loss to attack. The author then distinguishes between primary and secondary losses. He explains primary losses as “deaths, injuries, property damage, short-term economic disruption (such as the grounding of civil aviation for several days after the 9/11 attacks) and psychological harm.” (p. 211). Secondary losses, the author explains, “are much more difficult to quantify. They include political, social, economic, and legal costs incurred in the course, or as a consequence of responding to the primary losses.” (p. 212). This methodology is then applied to assessing the risk of two attack scenarios: an attack by a small homegrown terrorist cell and an attack by a rogue scientist involving a genetically modified bioweapon. Although the rest of the book’s account (which focuses on the need a decade ago for more effective U.S. domestic counterterrorism organizational structures) has been resolved since then, the author’s presentation of a risk management methodology in counterterrorism is worth noting. The author was a Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago from 1981 until 2017, and is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, Illinois.

**Counterterrorism – Legal Issues**


This book examines European laws as they apply to terrorism-related damages. An important issue in civil liability coverage, the authors explain, is the extent to which “facility operators and security firms, both manufacturers of security goods and providers of security services, are exposed to liability for terrorism-related damage in Europe. The focus is on both potential liability exposure and actual cases. Key questions are: What standards of liability apply? What types of damages are recoverable? Are any defences available? How are cross-border cases handled?” (pp. 4-5). To examine these issues, following the author’s introductory overview, the book is divided into three parts. In the first part, “International and EU Law,” the chapters cover topics such as liability for terrorism-related risks under international law and European Union (EU) law. In the second part, “Liability for Terrorism-Related Risk Under Member State Law,” the chapters examine issues such as the civil liability systems of seven EU member states (England and Wales, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Sweden), including attribution of liability. In the third part, “Assessment of Liability for Terrorism-Related Risk,” the chapters discuss issues such as insurance of terrorism-related risks, contracting for liability limitation, alternative systems for redressing terrorism-related risks, and explore whether there is a role for the European Union in initiatives aimed at the insurance market. In the concluding chapter, the authors observe that “although the case for a liability limitation is weak, civil liability for terrorism-related risk is an issue that requires the attention of policymakers, including the EU” (p. 336). In terms of countering terrorism, the authors conclude that “In developing policies on this issue, the government should keep in mind that its primary responsibility is to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring, and liability for damage caused by such attacks can contribute to accomplishing this objective” (p. 337). This book is an important resource for government (especially their judicial, treasury and commerce departments) as well as business communities.
that manage the setting of risk premiums on terrorism-related civil liability issues for a country’s business sector. Three of the authors are professors of civil law and economics at European universities. Lucas Bergkamp is a partner at Hunton & Williams LLP’s Brussels, Belgium office.


As explained by the volume’s editor, counter-terrorism law is a broad field that “spans criminal, administrative, immigration, constitutional, military and foreign affairs law. It involves the interaction of domestic and supra-national law” (p. 3). With comparative counter-terrorism law an established discipline, the contributors to this volume examine the practice and implementation of counter-terrorism law in 22 countries. A questionnaire was used as a template to guide each country study on a range of its counter-terrorism instruments, such as criminal law, immigration law, administrative measures, military and extra-territorial measures. Also discussed are the influences on a country’s counter-terrorism laws of supra-national institutions, such as the United Nations Security Council and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as well as regional bodies, such as the Council of Europe. The book begins with the editor’s introductory overview, in which he discusses issues such as the centrality of the definition of terrorism in counter-terrorism law. The country studies are divided into five parts: North America (the United States and Canada); South America (Colombia and Brazil); Europe (the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Croatia, Slovenia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania); the Middle East and Africa (Israel and South Africa); and Asia and Australia (Japan, China, Singapore, and Australia). In the concluding chapter, “Thematic Conclusions and Future Challenges,” Kent Roach, the volume’s editor, identifies common themes in counter-terrorism law that emerged from the previous chapters, including areas of convergence and divergence in both laws and practices. In a concluding section, he observes that one area of divergence is “the difficulty of defining terrorism in a satisfactory manner that accommodates domestic dissent and freedom fighting against repressive regimes.” (p. 773). Another area of divergence is the issue of targeted killing and its relation to other measures such as arrest and trial. The author’s concluding note is worth noting: “An important constant is that counter-terrorism law will continue to be a subject worthy of sustained comparative study because of its profound effects on security, human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (p. 777). This volume is an important contribution to the discipline of the legal component in counter-terrorism. The editor is professor of law at the University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.


The contributors to this edited volume address a significant challenge that combating international terrorism presents to international law in ensuring, which is, as the editors explain, “the coherence and unity of the applicability of the principles and rules originating in multiple branches of international law” (p. 1). To examine these issues, the book is divided into three parts. The chapters in the first part, “Improving International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Acts,” cover issues such as international justice cooperation against terrorism since 9/11; the role of regional organizations in Europe and Africa in promoting cooperation in counter-terrorism; the effectiveness of legal instruments such as the European arrest warrant; the distinction between cooperation among intelligence agencies as opposed to cooperation in intelligence collection; and international cooperation in countering terrorism financing. The chapters in the second part, “The Use of Force Against Terrorists,” discuss issues such as the international regulation of the use of force; the role of the U.N. Security Council in authorizing the use of force; the right of states to self-defense against terrorists, including anticipatory self-defense; and the necessity and proportionality when exercising self-defense. The chapters in the second part, “Intersection Between International Human Rights Law and International Law in the Fight Against Terrorism,” cover topics such as the applicability of the laws of armed conflict, including the use of lethal force and targeted killings, in countering terrorist organizations; the interplay between human rights and humanitarian law in countering terrorism; the legal regime covering the treatment of terrorist detainees, including issues of extraterritoriality and habeas corpus, in arresting potential suspects and transferring detainees from one country to another; and defining terrorism as a crime in international and
domestic law. This volume is an important contribution to the legal literature on the role of international law in providing guidelines to government counterterrorism practitioners, as well as academic researchers on these topics. Both editors are professors of public international law at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden University, The Netherlands.

Anarchism


This is a highly informed and well-written account of the roots of the Angry Brigade, England’s militant left-wing group that originated in the mid-1960s and carried out a series of bombing attacks from 1970 to 1972. These bombings were directed against iconic targets such as banks, embassies, and the homes of Conservative Members of Parliament, including the home of Robert Carr, the Secretary of State for Employment at the time. The author, a veteran BBC documentary producer, had produced a documentary about the Angry Brigade for the BBC in 1973, with this book being a journalistic expansion and update of the documentary.


This is an authoritative and detailed account, based on extensive historical documents, of the history of the campaigns waged by American and European police services against anarchist terrorists from 1878 to the mid-1930s. The author explains that at the time anarchist terrorism was the dominant type of terrorism facing these countries, so in response their governments cooperated in the diplomatic arena to counter anarchists, as many of them also operated cross-nationally. The book’s coverage is divided into two periods: 1878-1914, with an epilogue covering the period 1914-1934. To examine these issues, the book’s chapters cover topics such as the origins and activities of anarchist terrorism, including some of their significant attacks, such as their numerous assassination attempts in Germany and Russia, and their assassination of President William McKinley in early September 1901. These terrorist activities led to cooperation by the targeted countries’ police services against terrorism. This was accompanied by the development and implementation of various international legal conventions, such as an 1892 law that “defined anarchist acts of violence as ‘social crimes’ outside the protection provided political crimes in extradition treaties…” (p. 1). Other international conventions included the St. Petersburg Protocol of 1904, in which the signatories agreed to oppose the anarchist movement through international cooperation, although, as the author points out, “The 1904 protocol made no attempt to define an anarchist act or to suggest possible improvements in legislation and extradition procedures affecting anarchists” (p. 290). In the conclusion, the author observes that the period of 1878-1934 in the international campaign against anarchism “deserves a much larger place in the history books” because “It exercised an important impact on a largely secret diplomacy, influencing the actions and attitudes of the European (and to a lesser extent, the American and Asian) states in ways that have seldom been assessed. Efforts to fight the perceived threat of anarchist terrorism influenced extradition law and practice, stimulated the spread of new methods of criminal identification, promoted police expansion, modernization, and centralization, and led to the development of more professional forms of guardianship for both democratically elected and dynastic rulers.” (p. 365). The author is Professor of History at the Louisiana Scholars’ College at Northwestern State University in Natchitoches, Louisiana.


This is a comprehensive and massive collection of primary documents from leading anarchist theoreticians since the movement’s origins in the 1890s, although some historical predecessors are also included. In the introduction, the volume’s editor defines an anarchist “as one who rejects all forms of external government
and the State and believes that society and individuals would function well without them” (p. xiii). Regarding the involvement of anarchists in terrorism, the editor points out that “only a tiny minority of anarchists have practiced terror as a revolutionary strategy, and then chiefly in the 1890s when there was a spate of spectacular bombings and political assassinations during a period of complete despair” (p. ix). Following the editor’s introductory overview, the volume is divided into seven parts. Part I, “Anarchism in Theory”; Part II, “Forerunners of Anarchism”; Part III, “Great Libertarians”; Part IV, “Classic Anarchist Thinkers” (such as William Godwin, Max Stirner, Joseph Proudhon, Michael Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Leo Tolstoy, Emma Goldman); Part V, “Anarchism in Action” (in countries such as France, Italy, Spain, Russia, Europe, the United States and Latin America); Part VI, “Modern Anarchism” (including the New Left, the New Right, and modern anarchists); and Part VII, “The Legacy of Anarchism.” The Epilogue takes the form of a literature review that assesses new developments in anarchist thought and activities. The author concludes that one of anarchism’s main contributions is its utopianism “in that it imagines the world as it could be. But it is also realistic in that it conserves and develops ancient traditions of self-help and mutual aid and profound libertarian tendencies within society” (p. 705).

**Boko Haram**


This is a revised edition of the book’s initial 2015 publication. It is based on the author's extensive field research and interviews in Nigeria from 2012 to part of 2014. The book's chapters are arranged thematically. Following the introductory chapter which discusses some of the research challenges in studying Boko Haram, the chapters provide an historical background to Islam in Nigeria, the emergence of extremist groups which shaped Boko Haram, particularly in 2009, when Muhammad Yusuf was assassinated while in captivity by Nigerian police, and the beginning of the group’s full scale insurgency in 2010 when Abubakar Shekau became the group’s new leader. The volume covers the resort to suicide attacks against Nigerian targets, and the internationalization of Boko Haram in neighboring countries and its reported alliance with al-Qaeda, as well, later on, with ISIS. This is followed by an analysis of the government’s response, which was primarily militarily in nature, and also involved military assistance from the United States and the United Kingdom. In the concluding chapter, the author characterizes Boko Haram’s insurgency as a “hybrid security challenge” that requires “effective countermeasures tackling both violence and the underlying narrative” (p. 154). Moreover, other challenges also need to be addressed because while Nigeria is “an African super-power economically, militarily and diplomatically [it] is also a country facing a range of challenges, from corruption to the effects of climate change, which require political attention, effort and resources” (p. 155). The book’s Appendix includes a valuable selected chronology of key events. The book is well written and reflects the author’s deep familiarity with Nigeria, making it a valuable contribution to the literature on Boko Haram. The author is a research fellow for Security and Development at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in London, England, UK.


This comprehensive account of Boko Haram is arranged chronologically. It divides Boko Haram’s history into five phases: (1) the decades from the 1970s to the 1990s, which laid the basis for the group’s emergence; (2) the period from 2001 to 2009, when the group began its insurgency and its leader, Mohammad Yusuf was killed by Nigerian police; (3) the period of 2010 to 2013, when the group intensified its terrorist campaign; (4) the period from 2013 to 2015, when the group controlled territory in northeastern Nigeria, including the notorious kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls in April 2014; and (5) the period since 2015 when, as the author explains, the group’s ‘state’ largely fell to the militaries of Nigeria and its neighbors” (p. 2). It was also during this latter period that Boko Haram declared its affiliation to the Islamic State. In one of the book’s numerous insights, the author explains that “For understanding Boko Haram, four aspects of Nigerian politics are relevant: cutthroat elections;
pervasive corruption; severe inequality; and the violence and impunity that surround approaches to conflict management” (p. 27). In the concluding chapter, the author points out that “No durable solution can be found to Boko Haram… until politics is brought back into view and confronted. What political complaints does the sect have, and in what ways are these complaints irreducible to economic deprivation? What political decisions are necessary for ending the conflict – who will be the winners and losers? Will arrested Boko Haram members face trials, or be enrolled into deradicalization programs? Will there be reconciliation between perpetrators of violence and their victims?” (p. 302). The author concludes that “….history suggests that the Boko Haram crisis may end with a draw-out, agonizing process of sporadic violence and entrenched impunity, rather than a crescendo of accountability and reconciliation” (p. 302). The book includes a valuable selected bibliography, including a listing of jihadi videos and audio recordings. The author is visiting Assistant Professor of African Studies at Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.
Resources

Bibliography: Islamic State (IS, ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) [Part 4]
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the Islamic State (IS / ISIS / ISIL / Daesh) and its predecessor organizations. To keep up with the rapidly changing political events, the most recent publications have been prioritized during the selection process. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing through more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to broaden the search.

Keywords: bibliography; resources; literature; Islamic State; IS; ISIS; ISIL; Daesh;

Al-Qaeda in Iraq; AQI

NB: All websites were last visited on 21.03.2018. This subject bibliography is conceptualised as a multi-part series (for earlier bibliographies, see: Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3). To avoid duplication, this compilation only includes literature not contained in the previous parts. However, meta-resources, such as bibliographies, were also included in the sequels. – See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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**About the compiler:** Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., is a Professional Information Specialist. Since 2011, she works for the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). Additionally, she serves as Information Resources Editor to ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. In her editorial role, she regularly compiles bibliographies and other resources for Terrorism Research. She wrote her doctoral thesis on Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents (focus: media-oriented hostage takings). E-mail: j.tinnes@gmx.de
Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects

complied and selected by Berto Jongman

Most of the items included below became available online in March and April 2018. They are categorised under these headings:

1. Non-Religious Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns
2. Religious (mainly Jihadi) Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns
3. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics
4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism
5. Counter-Terrorism – General
6. Counter-Terrorist Strategies, Tactics and Operations
7. State Repression and Civil War at Home and Clandestine & Open Warfare Abroad
8. Prevention and Preparedness Studies
   (including Countering Violent Extremism, De-Radicalization, Counter-Narratives)
9. Intelligence
10. Cyber Operations and Information Warfare
11. Risk & Threat Assessments, Forecasts, Analytical Studies
12. Also Worth Reading

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2. Religious (mainly Jihadi) Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns

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A Response to Jacob Zenn on Boko Haram and al-Qa’ida

by Adam Higazi, Brandon Kendhammer, Kyari Mohammed, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, and Alex Thurston

A recent special issue of Perspectives on Terrorism, published in December 2017 (Volume 11, Number 6, pp. 174-190), included an article by Jacob Zenn entitled “Demystifying al-Qaida in Nigeria: Cases from Boko Haram’s Founding, Launch of Jihad and Suicide Bombings.” (URL: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/666/1326) The article makes problematic claims that we - as specialists who have done research on Boko Haram - believe merit a response.

For us, it is important to respond because we believe crucial perspectives are lost when analysts treat Boko Haram as a mere extension of the global jihadist movement. In particular, analysts may overlook or even downplay local political factors, security force abuses, and the internal logics of insurgencies. Moreover, the narrative that Boko Haram was a close collaborator of al-Qa’ida has dangerous implications for policymaking. The policies that have been devised for responding to al-Qa’ida are not suitable for responding to Boko Haram, and treating Boko Haram largely through the lens of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency could hurt many more innocent people and exacerbate a grievous humanitarian emergency.

In the debate over Boko Haram’s transnational jihadist connections, Zenn has been a key voice with substantial influence. Yet he is not, in our view, completely credible, and so any response to his work should not only respond to the substance of his arguments but should also point out some of the patterns in his writing. “Demystifying al-Qaida in Nigeria” reflects a broad flaw in Zenn’s work, namely a pattern of misusing primary data and distorting other scholars’ arguments. Since 2012, Zenn has put forth a one-dimensional narrative about Boko Haram. Zenn exaggerates Boko Haram’s interactions with al-Qa’ida and al-Qa’ida affiliates while excluding most other dimensions in his analysis. In his body of work,[1] his methods are problematic. He cherry-picks and decontextualizes quotations and data points.[2] He ignores contradictions between sources. [3] Meanwhile, he fails to transparently report the positions and biases of the sources he prefers (sources that are, frequently, either anonymous quotations from Nigerian and foreign intelligence services, or selectively cited jihadist primary sources). Finally, he sometimes fills gaps in the evidence by resorting to speculation. The crucial pivot in much of Zenn’s work has been the Boko Haram splinter group Jama’at Ansar al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan, better known as Ansaru, and it is with Ansaru that Zenn’s work is at its most speculative. In his Perspectives on Terrorism article as elsewhere, Zenn attributes sweeping powers to Ansaru and its leaders. He positions those figures at the heart of nearly every central event involving Boko Haram. But Zenn’s claims about Ansaru - particularly his repeated assertion that Ansaru was reintegrated into Boko Haram around 2013 - rests on weak evidence and is not substantiated by the jihadist primary sources he prefers.

Given Zenn’s problematic use of evidence, we regard the debate between us and Zenn not simply as an intellectual disagreement, but as a contest between scholarship and partisanship. As is normal and healthy in an academic sub-field, we have major disagreements with one another over how to interpret evidence related to Boko Haram. These disagreements, however, pale in comparison to our objections to Zenn’s methods.

We have reason to question Zenn’s sincerity and integrity as an analyst. It is not an ad hominem attack to point out that a writer exhibits striking and chronic bias. For several of us, the turning point in our understanding of Zenn’s aims was his 2014 paper “Exposing and Defeating Boko Haram: Why the West Must Unite to Help Nigeria Defeat Terrorism,” published for the conservative British think tank, the Bow Group.[4] The most charitable reading of that paper would regard it as full of poor predictions,[5] paired with ignorant and weakly substantiated allegations. Zenn sought to establish guilt by association for a range of actors, including Hillary Clinton, David Axelrod, current Emir of Kano Muhammadu Sanusi II (Sanusi Lamido Sanusi), and then-candidate and now-President of Nigeria Muhammadu Buhari. A less charitable reading of the paper, and one that seems more convincing to us, would view the paper as an unofficial campaign document for then-President

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Goodluck Jonathan [6] - which would make the paper, by extension, a blatant display of partisanship if not analysis-for-hire by Zenn. Even if some of Zenn's publications have had more thorough scholarly trappings than the Bow Group paper, we are concerned by ways that Zenn's arguments align with powerful interests in Nigeria (particularly the Nigerian intelligence services’ repeated bid to paint Boko Haram as a global threat) and in the United States (particularly the Republican Party’s effort to demonize and undercut the State Department).

This kind of debate has wider ramifications for the field of security studies. The proportion of non-scholars who publish in security studies journals and teach in security studies programs is higher than in many other academic fields. Non-scholars can bring vital perspectives to academic inquiry, but they can also bring dangerous forms of bias that can have unfortunate policy effects. We hope that this response will encourage reflection on the part of security studies scholars about whose work they consider rigorous and whose they do not.

**Rebuttal of Zenn’s Central Argument**

We start by responding to Zenn’s central argument in his article for Perspectives on Terrorism. Zenn “finds Boko Haram to be primarily the result of the individual decisions of militants who sought to engage in a jihad in Nigeria and were empowered to do so because of al-Qaïda’s and particularly al-Qaïda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) and al-Shabaab’s funding, training and advice” (p.174). Responding to the work of several authors of this response, Zenn dismisses the idea that Boko Haram is a “product of ‘multi-dimensional’ factors” (p. 174). We reply that Zenn's framing of causality makes a mockery not only of the complexity of Boko Haram, but also of the social scientific enterprise in general: since the time of at least Durkheim and Weber, there has been widespread agreement among scholars in many disciplines that every social phenomenon has causes that cannot be reduced to individuals’ decisions. Scholarly work on jihadism should take a similarly multi-faceted approach.

Zenn’s framing implies that it is only militants who have real agency. And yet when we examine the careers of Boko Haram militants in detail, we find that the opportunities they encountered and the obstacles they faced were consistently shaped by other actors’ decisions. These include decisions taken by government officials, politicians, security personnel, and non-jihadist Muslim leaders. To give examples: Boko Haram’s founder Muhammad Yusuf preached, early in his career, at the Muhammadu Indimi mosque in Maiduguri (built by Muhammadu Indimi, an oil tycoon); at that time, Yusuf was a protégé of a prominent Salafi preacher, Ja’far Mahmud Adam. In 2001, Yusuf was selected to serve on a government-sponsored committee for the implementation of shari’a law in Borno state - this committee reported to the state’s then-governor, Mala Kachalla. In 2003, multiple sources have reported that Yusuf struck an explicit or tacit agreement with the challenger in, and eventual winner of, that year’s gubernatorial election, Ali Modu Sheriff.[7] All of these figures facilitated Yusuf’s early rise. It is absurd to suggest that it was only militants who made consequential decisions amid Boko Haram’s emergence.

It is also well documented that the leadership’s theological commitments and the interests of their international supporters are not the only - or even the most important - factors shaping its behavior. The group has often responded pragmatically to Nigerian military and security initiatives by changing its own strategy and tactics to capitalize on new opportunities and alleviate risk. In this context, it is revealing to note that Zenn does not cite past articles in Perspectives on Terrorism that argue that Boko Haram’s focus is primarily local. For example, Zenn does not cite Benjamin Eveslage’s 2013 article “Clarifying Boko Haram’s Transnational Intentions, Using Content Analysis of Public Statements in 2012” (Volume 7, Issue 5), which demonstrates that in 2012 – one of the high points, according to Zenn, of coordination between Nigerian jihadists and AQIM – “Boko Haram [tended] to express itself in an intrinsically domestic orientation, and as such, transnationalization is unlikely.”

If assessing elites’ agency and intentions is complicated, Zenn’s perspective barely scratches the surface of understanding ordinary Boko Haram members’ choices. Zenn is silent on such questions, but his framing of militants “empowered because of al-Qaïda’s…funding, training and advice” strongly implies a top-down model where well-funded Nigerian militants could recruit freely. But in most scholars’ field research in northeastern
Nigeria, al-Qa’ida, AQIM, and al-Shabab are almost never mentioned. Moreover, the emerging literature on Boko Haram defectors and former participants finds that ideological and theological motivations often play a secondary role in the process of “joining” the group and participating in violence. Meanwhile, local concerns (experiences with state violence, insecurity, coercion, and economic incentives) are highly important for motivating ordinary fighters.[8] In interviews with over sixty suspected sect members from 2010 to 2017, one of us (Pérouse de Montclos) found that no interviewee referred to al-Qaeda or any foreign terrorist group as a reason for joining the insurgents. So did a small clique of militants with shadowy alliances dupe and bribe thousands of young men (and dozens, if not hundreds, of women) into joining a Janus-faced movement, as Zenn implies? Or are other explanations needed?

In our own research, we have pointed to structural and multi-dimensional factors to explain how Yusuf could attract a mass following up through his death in 2009, and how the insurgency has endured and grown since then. There is compelling evidence that structural factors such as urbanization helped create the conditions wherein Yusuf could recruit. Zenn dismisses the idea that Boko Haram was ever a “mass religious movement,” but video evidence of Yusuf’s preaching in Maiduguri (whose population grew from an estimated 10,000 in 1910 to over 1,000,000 by the time Yusuf rose to prominence) shows hundreds of young men gathering to listen to him discuss religious questions. We need to think about broad social trends in order to understand how Yusuf’s constituency formed.

Moreover, there is compelling evidence that entrenched patterns such as collective punishment have exacerbated and prolonged the insurgency. Zenn has shied away from grappling with the damming and persistent allegations that human rights abuses by the Nigerian security forces (and, increasingly, by the security forces of neighboring countries) have made the crisis worse.[9] These are not abstract factors - they play into specific decisions by the group. When Boko Haram attacked the notorious Giwa Barracks detention facility in March 2014 - was this at the direction of al-Qa’ida, or was it to avenge and free the hundreds of locals tortured and detained there?

Meanwhile, any explanation of Boko Haram must fail if it does not deal with Nigeria’s legacy of endemic corruption. Corruption enabled Boko Haram’s initial rise, by hollowing out popular confidence in the state. Corruption has also detracted from the fight against Boko Haram. As much as $15 billion was stolen from the defense and security budget under the administration of Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015),[10] and corruption continues to plague counter-Boko Haram efforts under the Buhari administration.

Finally, it is worth making a comparison with more careful scholarship that focuses on other jihadist groups with much more clearly documented international affiliations and support than Boko Haram (al-Shabab, for instance). Such scholarship typically acknowledges the importance of local and regional political, social, and military dynamics in shaping these groups’ actions, patterns of recruitment, and strategic goals.[11] Zenn’s complete rejection of these factors in the face of documented evidence, comparable cases, and common sense suggests a fundamental lack of intellectual honesty.

**Zenn’s Key Omissions**

In addition to challenging Zenn’s central argument, we take issue with how he has framed his article. By adopting “case studies,” rather than giving the full chronology of Boko Haram’s interactions with al-Qa’ida and al-Qa’ida affiliates, Zenn is able to skip over key episodes that undermine his argument. Most glaringly, Zenn has little to say here - or in the other main writings of his that we could find - about the most important turning point in Boko Haram’s history, its mass uprising in July 2009 against authorities in northeastern Nigeria.

Here is what Zenn writes in “Demystifying al-Qaida in Nigeria”:

Boko Haram carried out few attacks in Nigeria from 2004 to 2009. However, there was another government crackdown on Boko Haram after Muhammed Yusuf announced in June 2009 that he would soon launch a jihad and a “Chadian extremist with limited ties to al-Qaida” reportedly entered Nigeria to launch an attack on “high profile targets” with Boko Haram. This crackdown in July 2009
killed around 800 Boko Haram members including Yusuf (p. 178).

This framing is inaccurate – or perhaps intentionally misleading. As has been well documented, a series of incidents in 2008-2009 increased tensions between Yusuf and the Nigerian authorities. These included Yusuf’s arrest by the State Security Service in November 2008, a clash between a Boko Haram funeral procession and the Borno State anti-banditry unit Operation Flush II in June 2009, Yusuf’s incendiary sermon “Open Letter to the Federal Government of Nigeria” in June 2009, and Boko Haram’s mass uprising in July.[12] A dialectic of mutual provocations between Boko Haram and Nigerian authorities, at the national and state level, led to the uprising of 2009.

In discussing the background to the 2009 uprising, Zenn gives an extremely distorted version of these events. Zenn implies that Yusuf simply “announced…he would soon launch a jihad” and then suggests that authorities cracked down preemptively (which is wrong). Tellingly, the only source Zenn cites in this paragraph (endnote 37) is an article from an outlet called African Herald Express. The link that Zenn provides (http://www.afran.info/modules/news/article.php?storyid=5884) is not only dead, it does not even appear in the Internet Archive’s cache. Are no other, better sources available? Zenn cites neither Yusuf’s sermon, which is available on YouTube, nor any of the numerous credible articles and reports that describe the events of summer 2009 in detail. Such sources demonstrate definitively that these events shaped the choices made by Yusuf and his supporters to launch their uprising. Nor does Zenn even cite the Wikileaks cables referred to in the African Herald Express article he links (we cite one such cable below, in footnote 14). If it is one of Zenn’s central contentions that “analysis of primary source documents from Boko Haram and al-Qaida also paints a different story about al-Qaida’s relationship with Boko Haram at the time of the group’s founding than is presented in most of the literature” (p. 175), then why does he fail to cite any primary sources when describing the most pivotal event in Boko Haram’s history?

The reason, it seems to us, is simple: if Zenn were to argue that al-Qa’ida and AQIM were uninvolved or only marginally involved in planning or launching the uprising, it would largely discredit his argument that al-Qa’ida and AQIM definitively shaped Boko Haram’s actions. And indeed, the bulk of the evidence indicates that there was no involvement by al-Qa’ida or AQIM in the planning, timing, or execution of the July 2009 uprising. Despite the presence on Yusuf’s “Shura Council” of several Nigerians who had international jihadist connections,[13] local Nigerian authorities believed that al-Qa’ida had deemed Yusuf “unreliable” well before 2009.[14] Moreover, AQIM’s reaction to the uprising - expressing condolences, but never mentioning involvement, and showing real ignorance of Boko Haram’s history, identity, structure, and goals[15] - strongly suggests that AQIM was not involved.

If, however, Zenn were to argue that despite this evidence, al-Qa’ida and AQIM were involved, he would discredit his own arguments in another way - in this instance, he would be indicating that AQIM and al-Qa’ida were not masterful actors, but rather that they had contributed to Yusuf’s bungling of the uprising. Here it is worth noting that not only was the uprising likely sped up by several weeks due to early errors by its plotters, but, more importantly, it resulted in the deaths of Yusuf and many other Boko Haram members. From a military perspective, the uprising was a disaster for the movement.

**Rebuttal of Zenn’s “Cases”**

The question of AQIM and al-Qa’ida’s impact on Boko Haram and of AQIM’s strategic sophistication leads us now into the actual “cases” that Zenn presents. In his article, as throughout his work, Zenn has presented failures as successes in order to paint the most distressing possible picture of al-Qa’ida and AQIM. Consider the first case – Zenn builds much of his analysis around the figure of Ibrahim Harun - but what did Harun accomplish? Harun was arrested before he could perpetrate any of the terrorist attacks that Zenn describes him plotting. Told from one angle, the story of Harun is the story of Nigeria’s close call with a master terrorist. But viewed from another angle, Harun’s impact was negligible: a few plots, a few trips, minimal contact with the most influential Boko Haram leaders on the ground in northern Nigeria, and then a flight to Libya where he

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was soon caught.

Zenn's treatment of the early *Boko Haram* also raises questions about his use of evidence - again, not just in this article, but in his broader body of work on *Boko Haram* and *al-Qaeda*’s affiliates. As elsewhere, Zenn tweaks sources so that they fit into a neat argument. Consider this sentence by Zenn: “Al-Qaida in its *Al-Risalah* magazine in January 2017 also recognized Muhammed Ali as the Boko Haram founder and said his initial funding came from ‘members of al-Qaida residing in the Arabian Peninsula.’”(p.176) But here is the full passage:

> “Then Allah guided a small number of Mujahidin from among the tribes, whose [sic] who would fight in the Path of Allah against those who disbelieve in Allah without fearing the blame of the blamers. This despite their small numbers and meager equipment and weaponry, their great weakness, inability and incapacity, as well as the lack of support (for them) from the scholars, doctors, and others from among those of whom our blessed Jihad is in need. Thus, they continued on their path under the leadership of the Mujahid brother Abu Abdir-Rahman Muhammad Ali al-Barnawi (ra), after his Shaykh and mentor Abu al-Bara al-Dourawi resigned from performing Jihad and reclined to the Dunya. This was in spite of his striving and exerting much effort to establish a strong (and solid) foundation for Jihad, and reviving the concept thereof in the hearts of our Muslim youth here (in Nigeria) with help and funding from members of al-Qa’idah residing in the Arabian Peninsula (May Allah reward them with good). This is after the traces of Jihad had been wiped out (from Nigeria) for more than two hundred years; however, it is extremely regrettable that such financial support fell into the hands of people who were opposed to Mujahidin.”[16]

*Al-Risalah*, then, neither recognizes Ali as *Boko Haram’s* founder nor says that the money from al-Qa’ida members ever reached him. It is true that *al-Risalah’s* account contradicts other narrations of these events – but this is the point. Evidence about Boko Haram’s early history is mixed and contradictory, and it is not easy, as Zenn implies, to reconstruct that history on the basis of “document analysis.” Revealingly, Zenn must draw selectively from jihadist documents - themselves produced long after the events in question, and which were written in the context of an internal power struggle between *Boko Haram* factions and offshoots in which *al-Risalah’s* backers had taken sides - in order to tell the story he wishes to tell. Here we would stress that in security studies circles, jihadist primary sources are often mistakenly credited with a reliability and a coherence that few other fields attribute to their own primary sources. No serious historian of Nazi Germany, for example, would hold up Nazi sources as the sole key to understanding pre-war and war-time developments.

If the issue of funding transfers from *al-Qa’ida* to one individual, Muhammad Ali, is murky, then the issue of what occurred in Yobe State in 2003 is exponentially murkier. Zenn’s one-sided account ignores a large mass of evidence that is inconsistent with, or contradicts, his own preferred interpretation. Who were the group of *Boko Haram*-linked individuals at Kanamma, Yobe, who rose up against authorities in December 2003? For Zenn, these individuals - the “Nigerian Taliban” - constituted an *al-Qa’ida* training camp. Yet contemporaneous journalism, leaked cables from the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, and the present authors’ own field research suggests that the individuals at Kanamma were a heterogeneous group who engaged in activities as diverse as fishing, providing wage labor on nearby farms, and meeting with local authorities. Local informants interviewed by several authors of this response tell a complicated story. To them, the nucleus of the “Nigerian Taliban” were radical students from the University of Maiduguri who had dropped out of school. Some were children of wealthy traders and powerful politicians, but most were of peasant backgrounds from Borno and Yobe states, and even from far away Kogi state. Others associated with the group later were conscripts. For example, Adam Higazi interviewed a villager from the Gwoza area who had been captured by the “Nigerian Talibans” while they were on the run in the Gwoza Hills. He and others were held hostage and made to carry weapons and ammunition and act as guides. The interviewee was rescued by the Nigerian army after a shoot-out in the Gwoza Hills in which several of the “Talibans” were killed.[17] The full picture of what happened at Kanamma will likely never be known, but to depict the Kanamma group as a one-dimensional “jihadist training camp” is simplistic. Here, we would remind the reader that the real question is whether *al-Qa’ida’s* involvement was the decisive factor in making *Boko Haram* and its antecedents lethal - and in this connection, we would remind
the reader that the Kanamma uprising was a hasty, poorly planned maneuver that resulted in swift defeat, with leading militants killed in the aftermath and Muhammad Yusuf scurrying off to Saudi Arabia in an effort to save and later rehabilitate himself. Again, either al-Qa’ida was peripheral or its involvement was disastrous.

Turning to Zenn’s next “case,” the 2009-2010 period, Zenn draws selectively from the recovered correspondence between Boko Haram’s Shekau, AQIM’s Abd al-Malik Droukdel and ‘Abd al-Hamid Abu Zayd, and al-Qa’ida central. This correspondence has established that AQIM offered training and funds to Boko Haram, but additional context should temper Zenn’s claim that “al-Qaidah had a significant impact on Boko Haram…in assisting the group to launch a jihad in Nigeria after Abubakr Shekau became Boko Haram leader in 2009” (p.177).

First, it is worth emphasizing what Zenn only briefly mentions – that whereas Shekau was eager for AQIM’s material assistance, he rejected Droukdel’s advice on strategy. Droukdel explicitly advised Shekau not to declare a jihad, which Shekau did anyway.[18] Second, there is no hard evidence linking Boko Haram’s September 2010 attack on a Bauchi prison to the training and the 200,000 Euro transfer (and indeed, no concrete evidence about how and when that money was used) from AQIM to Boko Haram, much less to AQIM’s orders. Third, Boko Haram’s attacks in 2010 (both before and after the Bauchi incident) included many assassinations in the northeast, micro-incidents that relied on local members’ hyper-local knowledge of where their targets lived and worked. These assassinations concentrated on local politicians, local Muslim leaders, and members of the security services. If AQIM was playing a supporting role, it was not in a position of command and control over Boko Haram.

Zenn’s third “case,” on suicide bombings in the Middle Belt, contains inaccuracies and his data would need to be carefully checked. Zenn has not published his data set (see endnote 64) and he does not mention the source of this data or the methods through which he compiled it. Is it from Nigerian media reports? The only suicide bombings he discusses here are the two well-known bombings from summer 2011 in Nigeria’s capital Abuja and a bombing at a church in Madalla on Christmas Day 2011. When it comes to the bombings beyond Abuja and Madalla, can Zenn provide compelling evidence that all of these were suicide bombings? In the city of Jos (Plateau State), for example, there were several suicide bombings from 2012, but more of the bombings (starting on 24 December 2010) were not suicide attacks but involved car bombs or devices left in public places. Can we be sure Zenn has correctly catalogued the bombings in the Middle Belt, discerning which were suicide attacks and which were not? Moreover, some of these attacks were claimed by Boko Haram, but can Zenn prove that every attack was carried out by Boko Haram or Ansaru?

The Middle Belt is a zone that has long experienced periods of inter-communal conflict, and in 2011-2012 the Boko Haram insurgency added a new level of uncertainty and mutual suspicion to an already volatile mix of violence and tension. Zenn's knowledge of this region is highly superficial, as shown by his definition of the Middle Belt (footnote 63): “Nigeria’s ‘Middle Belt,’ which includes Kaduna, Jos (Plateau State), and areas around Abuja, is a region of central Nigeria populated by diverse ethnic groups. It is where majority Muslim northern Nigeria and majority Christian southern Nigeria meet and where religious clashes have taken place.” Which states does Zenn include in the dataset he claims to have on suicide bombings in the Middle Belt?

There are several problems with Zenn’s understanding of the Middle Belt. First, the geographical coverage of the “Middle Belt” is ambiguous and the term itself is politically contested, so it is important to specify which states or areas of states one is including in the definition. Zenn does not do this. Usually, the Middle Belt includes not only north-central Nigeria, but also parts of the north-west and north-east. The political ideology of the Middle Belt originates from the late 1940s and has a broadly Christian orientation, defined by ethnic minority groups who inhabited the administrative boundaries of the old Northern Region of Nigeria. Contrary to what Zenn claims, it is inaccurate to define the Middle Belt as the meeting point of “majority Muslim northern Nigeria and majority Christian southern Nigeria.” Some Middle Belt leaders sought to break away from the old Northern Region in the 1950s and form a separate region. At different points in time, there have been alliances between minorities in different states of northern Nigeria, including parts of southern Borno,
Adamawa, southern Gombe, southern Bauchi, Plateau, southern Kaduna etc. Many considered themselves to be part of the Middle Belt movement. It is misleading to cut out Muslim-Christian relations in the north-east from the wider Middle Belt and to emphasize attacks in the center over those in other parts of northern Nigeria, as Zenn does:

“It was the suicide bombings in the Middle Belt that made Boko Haram a major threat to international targets and to Nigeria’s unity. Nearly half of the suicide bombings in the Middle Belt targeted churches, especially on holidays such as Easter and Christmas, which escalated Muslim-Christian tensions because the Middle Belt is a fault line between Nigeria’s majority Muslim population in the north and majority Christian population in the south” (p.180).

To be accurate, it was Boko Haram’s attacks on the federal capital of Abuja that increased the threat level for the international community, especially after the bombing of the UN building in August 2011. If Zenn included the bombings in Abuja as taking place in the Middle Belt that would also be misleading, because it is Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and officially outside any geopolitical zone. The other international targets were not generally in the Middle Belt. Non-Nigerian citizens whom Boko Haram or Ansaru possibly kidnapped and/or killed, tended to be in areas of the north-west and north-east that would usually be considered outside the Middle Belt. Even with terrible bombings in Jos, Kaduna, FCT, Kano, Bauchi and elsewhere, it was Muslims and Christians in the north-eastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa who were by far the worst affected by Boko Haram attacks, in terms of the number of fatalities and the number of mosques and churches destroyed.

Contrary to what Zenn implies, bombings in Jos, Kaduna, Bauchi, Yola, Gombe and other towns in northern or central Nigeria - including the Middle Belt - did not threaten Nigerian unity for reasons of there being a metaphorical ‘fault line’ between north and south, but because adherents from different parts of the country were affected in the attacks. The most serious tension was internal between Muslims and Christians in the north, because such conflicts have a history and because Boko Haram never successfully attacked the south. What Zenn also omits to mention is the bombings of public spaces such as motor parks and markets, where Muslims and Christians were killed indiscriminately. This happened in Abuja and in different parts of the north, not only in the Middle Belt. In the case of the polarized city of Jos, as well as there being several bombings of churches and other targets in mainly Christian areas, there were subsequently attacks on a mosque and other targets in mainly Muslim areas, in addition to neutral spaces which were mixed. The identity of the attackers was hardly ever revealed and attribution for attacks was not always claimed by Boko Haram. However, research in Jos suggests the population on both sides of the communal divide were strongly against Boko Haram, which became a common enemy. As elsewhere, Zenn’s analysis is not based on fieldwork or academic knowledge of the places he is writing about, or even good documentary evidence. He relies too heavily on press sources and anonymous quotations from Nigerian intelligence and security officials.

Zenn’s contention that these bombings were primarily the work of Ansaru also appears highly speculative. As discussed above, Zenn has built much of his career around the idea that Ansaru was a formidable, elite group of AQIM-linked terrorists. But his writing here and elsewhere inflates the profile of Ansaru, a group that only carried out a handful of publicly known attacks before largely fading from view in 2013. Zenn has consistently argued, as he does here, that Ansaru reintegrated into Boko Haram after the French intervention in Mali in 2013. One of us has dealt critically, elsewhere, with the claims of Boko Haram and Ansaru training and fighting in Mali. But in any case, Zenn’s contention about Ansaru’s reintegration into Boko Haram is undermined by some of the jihadist sources he cites - the above-mentioned al-Risalah essay, for example, makes no mention of any reintegration. That essay evinces a bitterness toward Shekau that had not dimmed by the time of the essay’s publication in January 2017. Here is the author of that essay, discussing Shekau:

“He even began killing the best of the Mujahidin from those who had memorized the Qur’an in its entirety, and who were preservers of the Prophetic Ahadith. Brothers such as Shaykh Muhammad I (ra), and before that the brother Khalid al-Barnawy (may Allah free him and all Muslim prisoners)
upon whom they opened fire while he was in his car; however, Allah saved him from their plot. Indeed, numerous brothers from among the Mujahidin were remorselessly killed, dozens of whom were accused of being "transgressors". Many of the Mujahid youth were killed for no reason other than not pledging allegiance to "the Imam", and which Imam is that? Numerous Mujahidin were separated from their wives for "leaving the Jama'ah", and which Jama'ah? By the Lord of the Ka'ba, that is what we have seen and witnessed without the slightest exaggeration. Rather, they have committed more than what we have mentioned, that which the mind would find impossible to attribute to a Muslim who fears his Lord, let alone a Mujahid, and that is exactly what happened. We had previously found acceptance between the general masses before they began committing these horrifying actions, like killing the Muslims, plundering their wealth, displacing them and capturing their women in the name of sabaya (female prisoners of war).[20]

Could it have been so easy to forgive? Why should Zenn's argument that Ansaru reintegrated into Boko Haram be accepted, when Ansaru's own leaders never mention such a reintegration and continue to voice hatred for Shekau?

At this juncture it is worth asking how much of a priority Boko Haram really was for al-Qa'ida or AQIM. Although one could argue that Nigeria represented an alluring prize, one could equally argue that AQIM never cared much for Boko Haram. As we have discussed above, al-Qa'ida's and AQIM's support for the early Boko Haram was intermittent at best, and AQIM appears to have played no role in Boko Haram's uprising. Moreover, amid its leaders' own arguments with each other in 2012, AQIM never bragged in its internal correspondence about any successes it believed it had achieved vis-à-vis Nigeria. Zenn, attempting to rebut this argument, seems to deliberately obfuscate the relevant chronology: whereas we note the absence of mentions of Boko Haram in AQIM's internal correspondence from 2012, as well as the lack of any visible trips by AQIM leaders to northeastern Nigeria after early 2013, Zenn says, "Such 'developments' did not 'enthuse' AQIM because when Boko Haram occupied territory in Nigeria in 2013 some of the group's tactics, such as 'enslaving' the kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls, using girls in suicide bombings and burning boys in their school dormitories, were not to the liking of either AQIM or Ansaru members who did not rejoin Boko Haram" (p.182). It should be borne in mind here that Boko Haram's major attacks on boarding schools began in 2013, and the Chibok kidnapping did not come until April 2014. How can these events explain the lack of mention of Boko Haram in AQIM's internal debates - debates about its own effectiveness - in 2012? And why would AQIM leaders not have gravitated toward Nigeria in early 2013, after the fall of their emirate in northern Mali, if they had cared so much about Nigeria? Zenn knows the chronology well, and so to us his explanation here comes across as a deliberate attempt to mislead the non-specialist reader.

Finally, we would note that after years of speculation by Zenn about AQIM-Boko Haram connections, all that the primary sources have conclusively shown about the post-2009 period is that some training occurred (the numbers are not yet known), and 200,000 euros may have been transferred. For those analysts, like Zenn, who want to hold up AQIM as the dominant factor in explaining Boko Haram's rise and behavior, the question of why AQIM did not do more for Boko Haram should be answered.

We close by noting that Zenn has misrepresented our own scholarship. This, to us, is the least important part of the debate - we are more concerned about Zenn's use of primary sources and evidence. But if we have established here that Zenn manipulates the evidence, then the reader should also beware of how Zenn discusses the secondary literature, and how he distorts chronology to imply that scholars neglected to mention evidence that only became available after their publications appeared. Can it be that the area studies community who has worked on northern Nigeria for years is naïve, while Zenn has found the key to understanding Boko Haram through a handful of jihadist documents and a smattering of anonymous quotations in the press? Zenn has been keen to point out instances where we revised some of our early skepticism about Boko Haram's interactions with AQIM. But is it not normal scholarly practice to update one's understanding as new evidence emerges? Zenn, in contrast, has had to overlook profound gaps, contradictions, and challenges to his own assertions in order to argue the same thing in 2017 that he argued in 2013. And, to top it off, if the reader remains unconvinced about the problems with Zenn's analysis, we challenge the reader to assess Zenn's record...
of predictions about Boko Haram and Nigeria. None of us claims to have a crystal ball, but neither have we been so egregiously wrong as Zenn - whether it comes to predicting Boko Haram’s imminent rapprochement with al-Qa’ida and the potential for the Malian jihadist leader Hamadou Kouffa to lead a Nigerian-Malian alliance of ethnically Fulani jihadists (a forecast Zenn and a co-author made in 2016),[21] or to Zenn's above-mentioned fear-mongering about the potential for Islamist, “pro-sharia law” administration in Nigeria under Muhammadu Buhari. A consistent predilection to cherry-pick evidence and to make alarmist predictions is the mark not of a scholar, but of a partisan propagandist.

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Notes


[2] One example comes from “Nigerian Al-Qaedaism,” where Zenn cherry-picks an off-handed reference to Algeria in one of Yusuf’s lectures (which itself mostly concerned supererogatory night prayer) in order to argue that “the influence of Algerian Islamism on Yusuf’s thinking cannot be understated.” If this was so, why did Yusuf not write at length about Algeria in his 2009 manifesto Hadhithi Agidatuma wa-Manhaj Da’watina? Revealingly, Zenn has rarely cited that source, because it would provide almost no support for his argument that Yusuf was tightly linked with al-Qa’ida and its affiliates.
As discussed below, the account by Abu Usamatul Ansary in his “Message from Nigeria” says that money from the Gulf meant for the early Boko Haram never reached the group. But Zenn ignores this contradiction with other sources.

Available at URL: https://www.bowgroup.org/sites/bowgroup.uat.pleasetest.co.uk/files/Jacob%20Zenn%20Bow%20Group%20Report%20for%202017%20Issue.pdf.

One of Zenn’s predictions, for example (Op. cit., p. 3), was that then-candidate Muhammadu Buhari would run a “pro-Sharia law ‘Muslim-Muslim ticket,'” and would pick former Lagos Governor Bola Tinubu (who is a Muslim by background, but could not be considered an Islamist by any honest and informed observer of Nigerian politics) as his running mate. What actually happened was that Buhari picked a Christian lawyer and part-time Pentecostal pastor, Yemi Osinbajo, as his running mate, and focused his campaign on security and anti-corruption.

Indeed, Zenn approvingly quotes Femi-Fani Kayode, a prominent pro-Jonathan media personality in 2014-2015, to argue that the All Progressives’ Congress (Buhari’s party) was an Islamist party with sympathies for Boko Haram. See Zenn, op.cit., pp. 11-12.

One of Zenn’s predictions, for example (Op. cit., p. 3), was that then-candidate Muhammadu Buhari would run a “pro-Sharia law ‘Muslim-Muslim ticket,'” and would pick former Lagos Governor Bola Tinubu (who is a Muslim by background, but could not be considered an Islamist by any honest and informed observer of Nigerian politics) as his running mate. What actually happened was that Buhari picked a Christian lawyer and part-time Pentecostal pastor, Yemi Osinbajo, as his running mate, and focused his campaign on security and anti-corruption.


See, for example, Amnesty International “Stars on Their Shoulders, Blood on Their Hands: War Crimes Committed by the Nigerian Military,” 2015; URL: https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4416572015ENGLISH.PDF.


All of these incidents are discussed at length in our own work, including the very publications that Zenn cites in his article.


Interview in Gwoza town, 9 September 2012.


Upcoming and Recently Completed Ph.D. Theses

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) seeks to stimulate and coordinate high-quality research in the field of (Counter-)Terrorism Studies. One of TRI’s instruments are national and (sub-)regional networks of post-graduate students working on their doctoral theses. TRI networks, led by a local coordinator who is usually her- or himself working on a dissertation, exist in more than a dozen countries/regions. Two of the most active networks are two be found in Canada and the Netherlands (including the Flemish-speaking part of Belgium). The two lists below originate from these networks.

Note: Each entry contains information on the (working) title of the doctoral dissertation, its author, the academic institution where the thesis is being written (including name of supervisor where provided) and the expected date of completion.

From TRI’s National Networks of Ph.D. Theses Writers: List of Canadian Ph.D. Theses in Progress and Completed

Prepared by Ryan Scrivens

Ph.D. Theses in Progress:

Auer, Meagan
- Megan Auer, meauer@ualberta.ca
- Representations of terrorists in the media through an intersectional lens
- Dr. Linda Trimble and Dr. Siobhan Bryne, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta
- April 2022

Bencherif, Adib
- Adib Bencherif, abenc026@uottawa.ca
- Des insurrections touarègues au Mali et au Niger à l’exploration des récits: les pratiques de représentation temporelle et spatiale
- Dr. Cédric Jourde, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa
- 2019

Bérubé, Maxime
- Maxime Bérubé, m.berube@umontreal.ca
- Understanding the framing of Jihad through Al-Qaeda’s inspired English-language propaganda
- Dr. Benoit Dupont, École de criminologie, Université de Montréal
- Fall 2018

Chan, Alice
- W. Y. Alice Chan, alice.chan@mail.mcgill.ca
- Religious bullying: Can religious literacy programs address this phenomenon?
- Dr. Ratna Ghosh, Department of Integrated Studies in Education, McGill University
Crosset, Valentine

- Valentine Crosset, valentine.crosset@umontreal.ca
- Online visibility of Salafist-Jihadist movements across digital platforms: A case study on the Islamic State
- Dr. Samuel Tanner and Dr. Benoit Dupont, École de criminologie, Université de Montréal
- April 2019

Dilimulati, Maihemuti

- Maihemuti Dilimulati, maihemuti.dilimulati@mail.mcgill.ca
- A comparative study of identity reconstruction experiences of highly educated Muslim Uyghur immigrants in Quebec and English Canada
- Dr. Ratna Ghosh, Department of Integrated Study in Education/Faculty of Education, McGill University
- March 2019

Ford, Katie

- Katie Ford, katie.ford@uwaterloo.ca
- Countering violent extremism on university campuses: A critical analysis and Canadian case study
- Dr. Lorne Dawson, Department of Sociology, University of Waterloo
- Late 2018

Haag, Julius

- Julius Haag, julius.haag@mail.utoronto.ca
- The impact of police-citizen encounters on perceptions of justice: Lived experiences of youth in Toronto, Ontario
- Dr. Scot Wortley, Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto
- June 2019

Hai, Nadia

- Nadia Hai, nadia.hai@carleton.ca
- Rebels defining a cause: Movement narratives in Daesh and al Qaeda’s English-language magazines
- Dr. Karim Karim, School of Journalism and Communication, Carleton University
- April 2019

Hossain, Helal

- Helal Hossain, helal.dhali@mail.mcgill.ca
- Gender differences in the perception of Extremism among undergraduate students in Bangladesh: Exploring the role of education
• Dr. Ratna Ghosh, Department of Integrated Studies in Education, McGill University
• August 2021

Knoechelmann, Maike
• Maike Knoechelmann, maike_knoechelmann@sfu.ca
• Sexual assault in conflict zones: Exploring the phenomenon from a rational choice and social control perspective
• Dr. Garth Davies, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University
• 2021

Landry, Joe
• Joe Landry, joseph.landry@carleton.ca
• From fragility to stability: Third party interventions in fragile states
• Dr. David Carment, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University
• Summer 2018

Macnair, Logan
• Logan Macnair, lmacnair@sfu.ca
• The phenomenology of radicalization
• Dr. Richard Frank, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University
• Spring 2019

Masse, Johanna
• Johanna Masse, johanna.masse.1@ulaval.ca
• From resilience to armed resistance: Women's activism during violent conflict
• Dr. Aurélie Campana, Département de science politique, Université Laval
• February 2019

Millett, Kris
• Kris Millett, krisgmillett@gmail.com
• Probing the emergence, mainstreaming and application of radicalization discourse in Canada
• Dr. Amy Swiffen, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Concordia University
• Spring 2020

Neal, Patrick
• Patrick Neal, patrick_neal@bcit.ca
• Active cyber defence as a deterrence option in the information society
• Dr. Bernard Schissel, Interdisciplinary Studies, Royal Roads University
• June 2018
Neudecker, Christine

- Christine Neudecker, christine.neudecker@rutgers.edu
- The method to their madness: An analysis of terrorist attacks using risk terrain modeling
- Dr. Joel Caplan and Dr. Leslie Kennedy, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University
- June 2021

Nolan, Elanna

- Elanna Nolan, elanna.nolan@geog.ubc.ca
- Countering violent Extremism in multicultural cities: A comparative study of national security at the local scale, in Melbourne and Vancouver
- Dr. Dan Hiebert, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia
- 2019

Osterling, Anton

- Anton Osterling, 602bvwcop@gmail.com
- Lone wolf terrorism: Is it a Pandora's box?
- Dr. Nick Ridley, Department of Applied Social Sciences, London Metropolitan University
- 2020

Pumphrey, John

- John Pumphrey, john.pumphrey@royalroads.ca
- Using computational intelligence to inform where and how the Canadian Armed Forces might be employed to prevent conflict
- Dr. Eileen Piggot-Irvine, Faculty of Social and Applied Sciences, Royal Roads University
- 2019

Rahman, Mohammad Azizur

- Mohammad Azizur Rahman, rahman17@myumanitoba.ca
- Refugee labour market experiences and integration trajectories in Canada
- Dr. Sean Byrne, Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Manitoba
- 2020

Rebbani-Gosselin, Meriem

- Meriem Rebbani-Gosselin, meriem.rebbani@umontreal.ca
- Making counter-radicalization: An ethnography
- Dr. Samuel Tanner and Dr. Karine Côté-Boucher, École de criminologie, Université de Montréal
- Spring 2020
Rigato, Brandon

- Brandon Rigato, brandonrigato@cmail.carleton.ca
- Extreme cases: An examination of digital media, collectivism, and violent extremism
- Dr. Merlyna Lim, School of Journalism and Communication, Carleton University
- April 2020

Shkolnik, Michael

- Michael Shkolnik, michaelshkolnik77@gmail.com
- From nascent insurrections to full-blown insurgencies: Why some militant groups engage in sustained armed conflicts
- Dr. Jeremy Littlewood, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University
- June 2019

Tiflati, Hicham

- Hicham Tiflati, hicham.tiflati@gmail.com
- Islamic schooling, identity, and belonging in Montreal: Islamic schooling’s impact on Muslim youth identities and belongingness
- Dr. Roxanne Marcotte, Département de sciences des religions, Université du Québec à Montréal; co-supervised by Dr. Kevin McDonough, Department of Integrated Studies in Education, McGill University
- April-May 2018

West, Jessica

- Jessica West, jessica.l.west@gmail.com
- Building an immune system: Resilience as containment
- Dr. David Welch and Dr. Simon Dalby, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier
- August 2018

Wu, Edith

- Edith Wu, esw1@sfu.ca
- A social network analysis of terrorism in the Middle East: From Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State
- Dr. Garth Davies, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University
- 2021

Recently Completed Canadian Ph.D. Theses:

Ahmed, Kawser

- Kawser Ahmed, umahme33@myumanitoba.ca
- Social conflict and peace-building: the perceptions, experiences, and contributions of leaders of selected community-based organizations in Winnipeg, Manitoba
Dr. Sean Byrne, Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Manitoba
December 2016

Allspach, Anke
Anke Allspach, anke.allspach@ryerson.ca
Modern imperialism: Canadian renditions to torture and the Production of impunity for sovereign racialized state violence
Dr. Carmela Murdocca, Department of Sociology, York University
May 2016

Amarasingam, Amarnath
Amarnath Amarasingam, amarnath0330@gmail.com
Pain, pride, and politics: Social movement activism and the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Canada
Dr. Lorne Dawson, Religious Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University/University of Waterloo
February 2013

Amirault, Joanna
Joanna Amirault, joanna.amirault@humber.ca
Criminalizing terrorism: The impact of context and cohort effects on the sentencing outcomes of terrorist offenders
Dr. Martin Bouchard, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University
August 2014

Bakali, Naved
Naved Bakali, naved.bakali@mail.mcgill.ca
Islamophobia in Quebec secondary schools: Inquiries into the lived experiences of Muslim youth post-9/11
Dr. Aziz Choudry, Department of Integrated Studies in Education, McGill University
June 2016

Clément, Pierre-Alain
Pierre-Alain Clément, pierrealain.clement@yahoo.com
L’État anxieux: le poids de la culture stratégique dans la législation antiterroriste américaine (2001-2016)
Dr. Charles-Philippe David, Département de science politique, Université du Québec à Montréal
May 2017

Cook, Alana
Alana Cook, alanac@sfu.ca
Risk assessment and management of group-based violence
Cook, Joana
- Joana Cook, joana.cook@kcl.ac.uk
- “We are just at the beginning of this process.” An agency-level interrogation of women in U.S. counterterrorism efforts
- Dr. Vivienne Jabri, War Studies, King’s College London
- February 2018

Ducol, Benjamin
- Benjamin Ducol, benjamin.ducol@icloud.com
- Devenir Jihadiste à l’ère numérique, une approche processuelle et situationnelle de l’engagement Jihadiste au regard du Web
- Dr. Aurélie Campana, Département de science politique, Université Laval
- 2015

Gramaccia, Julie Alice
- Julie Alice Gramaccia, lily.gramaccia@gmail.com
- The construction of virtual terror: From bypassing traditional gatekeeping to online terrorist propaganda
- Dr. Anne Beyaert-Geslin, Département sciences de l’information et de la communication, Université Bordeaux-Montaigne; Dr. Aurélie Campana, Département de science politique, and Dr. François Demers, Département d’information et de communication, Université Laval
- December 2017

Hofmann, David
- David Hofmann, dhofmann@unb.ca
- Warriors and prophets: The role of charismatic authority in the radicalization towards violence and strategic operation of terrorist groups
- Dr. Lorne Dawson, Department of Sociology, University of Waterloo
- August 2015

Horncastle, James
- James Horncastle, jhorncas@sfu.ca
- The pawn that would be king: Macedonian Slavs in the Greek Civil War, 1946-1949
- Dr. Andre Gerolymatos, Centre for Hellenic Studies/Department of History, Simon Fraser University
- Fall 2016

Jardine, Eric
- Eric Jardine, ejardine@cigionline.org
The insurgent’s dilemma: A theory of mobilization and conflict outcome
Dr. Jeremy Littlewood, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University
May 2014

Kang, Charanjit
Charanjit Kang, unknown email address
The rise and decline of Sikh anti-state terrorism in India: An economic based explanation
Dr. Garth Davies, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University
July 2013

Kilberg, Joshua
Joshua Kilberg, kilberg@carleton.ca
Organizing for destruction: How organizational structure affects terrorist group behaviour
Dr. Jeremy Littlewood, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University
2011

Kowalski, Jeremy
Jeremy Kowalski, jkowalski@wlu.ca
In and out of place: Islamic domestic extremism and the case of the “Toronto 18”
Dr. William Jenkins, Department of Geography, York University
October 2014

Machold, Rhys
Rhys Machold, rhysmachold@gmail.com
Tentative securities: 26/11, Israel and the politics of mobility
Dr. Kim Rygiel, Department of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University
2015

McQuade, Joseph
Joseph McQuade, joseph.mcquade@mail.utoronto.ca
Terrorism, law, and sovereignty in India and the League of Nations, 1897-1945
Dr. Tim Harper, Faculty of History, University of Cambridge
November 2017

Mirzaei Yengejeh, Saeid
Saeid Mirzaei Yengejeh, saeid.mirzaei@uottawa.ca
Law-making by the security council in areas of counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction
Donald McRae, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa
Nash, Shannon

- Shannon Nash, shannon.nash@utoronto.ca
- Perception vs reality: The idea of Al Qaeda sleepers as a threat to American national security
- Dr. Wesley Wark, Department of History, University of Toronto
- September 2017

Ouellet, Marie

- Marie Ouellet, marieo@sfu.ca
- From emergence to desistance: The structural evolution of violent extremist networks
- Dr. Martin Bouchard, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University
- August 2016

Romaniuk, Scott

- Scott Romaniuk, scott.n.romaniuk@gmail.com
- Under siege: Counter-terrorism policy and civil society organizations in post-socialist Hungary
- Dr. Paolo Foradori, School of International Studies, University of Trento
- April 2018

Scrivens, Ryan

- Ryan Scrivens, ryan_scrivens@sfu.ca
- Understanding the collective identity of the radical right online: A mixed-methods approach
- Dr. Richard Frank, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University
- September 2017

Silva, Derek

- Derek Silva, dsilva28@uwo.ca
- Governing terrorism through preemption: A comparative analysis of radicalization in three western liberal democracies
- Dr. Mathieu Deflem, Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina
- 2017

Smythe, Leanne

- Leanne Smythe, leanne.smythe@twu.ca
- Non-traditional security in the post-Cold War era: Implications of a broadened security agenda for the militaries of Canada and Australia
- Dr. Brian Job, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia
- April 2013
Speed, Shannon

- Shannon Speed, sspeed@uwaterloo.ca
- Governing the ban: The Canadian security certificate initiative and management of non-citizen terror threats
- Dr. Daniel O’Connor, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo
- December 2017

Tishler, Nicole

- Nicole Tishler, nicole.tishler@carleton.ca
- Fake terrorism: Examining terrorist groups’ resort to hoaxing as a mode of attack
- Dr. Jeremy Littlewood, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University
- September 2017

Veilleux-Lepage, Yannick

- Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, yvl@st-andrews.ac.uk
- How terror evolves: An evolutionary framework for the study of terroristic techniques
- Dr. Richard English, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, School of International Relations, University of St Andrews
- February 2018

Wegner, Nicole

- Nicole Wegner, nlw980@mail.usask.ca
- Inter-national imag(ining): Canada’s military in Afghanistan
- Dr. J. Marshall Beier, Department of Political Science, McMaster University
- March 2016

List of Dutch and Flemish (Belgium) Ph.D. Theses in Progress or Recently Completed

prepared by Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn

Aerdts, Willemijn

- Willemijn Aerdts, w.j.m.aerdts@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
- Residual threat in the context of security and intelligence
- Universiteit Leiden; Institute of Security and Global Affairs
- Expected date of completion: 2020

Berge, Wietse van den

- Wietse van den Berge, w.van.den.berge@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
• Examining decision-making within the conflict between Islamic State and the Kurdistan Region in Iraq by using Graham Allison's paradigms of foreign policy analysis

• Universiteit Leiden; Institute of Security and Global Affairs; Prof. dr. Edwin Bakker, Prof. dr. Beatrice de Graaf

• Expected date of completion: November 2020

Boeke, Sergei

• Sergei Boeke, s.boeke@fgga.leidenuniv.nl

• Terrorism in Mali

• Universiteit Leiden; Institute of Security and Global Affairs; Prof. dr. Edwin Bakker

• Expected date of completion: end 2018

Dokter, Annemieke

• Annemieke Dokter, adannemiek14@gmail.com

• Indonesia in historical perspective - Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Darul Islam en Jemaah Islamiyah and the waves of Rapoport

• Universiteit Utrecht; De Nederlandse Defensie Academie; Prof. dr. Bob de Graaff

• Expected date of completion: unknown

Frissen, Thomas

• Thomas Frissen, Thomas.frissen@kuleuven.be

• Societal polarization and violent extremist ideation and the influences of communicative environments.

• KU Leuven; Institute for Media Studies; Prof. dr. Leen d’Haenens

• Expected date of completion: October 2019

Gans, Ben

• Ben Gans, B.Gans@uvt.nl

• Stabilisation Operations as Complex Systems: Order and Chaos in the Interoperability Continuum

• Tilburg University; Netherlands Defence Academy; Research School on Peace and Conflict (Norway); prof. dr. Piet Ribbers, prof. dr. Paul van Fenema, prof. dr. Sebastiaan Rietjens

• Expected date of completion: December 2018

Godefroidt, Amélie

• Amélie Godefroidt, amelie.godefroidt@kuleuven.be

• Analyzing the Impact of Terrorism on Social Cohesion in Nigeria and Belgium

• KU Leuven, Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre for Research on Peace and Development

• Prof. dr. Arnim Langer; Prof. dr. Bart Meuleman

• Expected date of completion: September 2020
Heide, Liesbeth van der
• Liesbeth van der Heide, e.j.van.der.heide@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
• Explaining Processes of Involvement in Terrorism
• Universiteit Leiden; Institute of Security and Global Affairs; Prof. dr. Edwin Bakker; Dr. Marieke Liem
• Expected date of completion: December 2018

Klem, Wouter
• Wouter Klem, w.m.klem@uu.nl
• Securing Europe, fighting its anarchists. Transnational police networks in the struggle against terrorism, 1881-1914
• Universiteit Utrecht; Department of History and Art History; Prof. dr. Beatrice de Graaf
• Expected date of completion: November 2018

Kowalski, Michael
• Michael Kowalski, m.kowalski@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
• Ethics of counterterrorism
• Universiteit Leiden; Institute of Security and Global Affairs; Prof. dr. Edwin Bakker
• Expected date of completion: 2018

Mansoury, Elly
• Elly Mansoury, elly.mansoury@vub.ac.be
• The role of education in the polarization of society
• Vrije Universiteit Brussel; Department of Political Science; Prof. dr. Dimokritos Kavadias
• Expected date of completion: December 2020

Milosevic, Ana
• Ana Milosevic, ana.milosevic@kuleuven.be
• Understanding the social meanings of spontaneous memorials after the Brussels attacks
• KU Leuven; Faculty of Social Science
• Expected date of completion: 2018

Romagna, Marco
• Marco Romagna, m.romagna@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
• Hacktivism: Honourable cause or serious threat?
• Universiteit Leiden; Institute of Security and Global Affairs; Prof. dr. Edwin Bakker, Dr. Bibi van den Berg
• Expected date of completion: June 2020

Roy van Zuijdewijn, Jeanine de
• Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn; j.h.de.roy.van.zuijdewijn@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
• Societal responses to terrorist attacks in Western Europe
  Universiteit Leiden; Institute of Security and Global Affairs; Prof. dr. Edwin Bakker
  Expected date of completion: 2020

Sikkens, Elga
  Elga Sikkens, e.m.sikkens@uu.nl
  Family and upbringing dynamics in radicalization and de-radicalization
  Utrecht University, Department of Pedagogical and Educational Sciences; Prof. dr. Micha de Winter, dr. Marion van San, dr. Stijn Sieckelinck
  Expected date of completion: Fall 2018

Sterkenburg, Nikki
  Nikki Sterkenburg, nikkisterkenburg@gmail.com
  New radical right and extremist right in the Netherlands
  Universiteit Leiden; Institute of Security and Global Affairs; Prof. dr. Edwin Bakker
  Expected date of completion: 2019

Terpstra, Niels
Niels Terpstra, n.m.terpstra@uu.nl
  Why do Civilians Comply with a Rebel Group? Towards a Better Understanding of Rebel Governance and Legitimation Processes During Civil War
  Universiteit Utrecht; Department of History and Art History; Prof. Dr. Ir. Georg Frerks
  Expected date of completion: February 2020

Van Ostaeyen, Pieter
  Pieter Van Ostaeyen, pieter.vanostaeyen@gmail.com
  The usage of social media in the ideological strife between al-Qaeda and The Islamic State
  Katholieke Universiteit Leuven; Faculty of Arts, Near Eastern Studies; Prof. dr. Prof. dr. John Nawas
  Expected date of completion: 2019

Vernimmen, Jonas
  Jonas Vernimmen, Jonas.vernimmen@kuleuven.be
  The right to cultural identity: a legal analysis of value-based education as a means to prevent radicalization
  KU Leuven; Leuven Centre for Public Law, Education Law; Prof. dr. Kurt Willems
  Expected date of completion: June 2020

Volders, Brecht
  Brecht Volders, brecht.volders@uantwerpen.be
  Nuclear Terrorism: organizational dynamics in constructing the bomb
Universiteit Antwerpen; Department of Social Sciences; Prof. dr. Tom Sauer
Expected date of completion: September 2019

Weggemans, Daan
Daan Weggemans, d.j.weggemans@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
Digital Risk Profiling
Universiteit Leiden; Institute of Security and Global Affairs; Prof. dr. Edwin Bakker
Expected date of completion: 2018

Whittaker, Joe
Joe Whittaker, 922288@swansea.ac.uk
Online Radicalisation
Swansea University; Universiteit Leiden; Prof. dr. Stuart MacDonald, dr. Lella Nouri, dr. Alastair Reed, Sergei Boeke
Expected date of completion: September 2019

Wittendorp, Stef
European Union and counter-terrorism, 1975-present
Stef Wittendorp, s.wittendorp@rug.nl
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen; Department of International Relations and International Organization; Prof. dr. J.H. de Wilde, Prof. dr. A.J. University;
Expected date of completion: Summer 2018

About the Compilers:
Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn is Coordinator of the Dutch–Flemish Network of Ph.D. Theses Writers of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI). She is a Researcher at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs of Leiden University (Campus The Hague) and a Research Fellow of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. She has a background in Liberal Arts & Sciences (BA) and International Relations (MA – cum laude).

Ryan Scrivens is Associate Theses Research Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism' and Coordinator of the Canadian Network of Ph.D. Theses Writers of the Terrorism Research Initiative. He is also a Visiting Researcher at the VOX-Pol Network of Excellence and a Research Associate at the International CyberCrime Research Centre. He recently completed a Ph.D. in Criminology at Simon Fraser University and has since been awarded a Horizon Postdoctoral Fellowship at Concordia University, working with Project SOMEONE to develop ways to build resilience against radicalization leading to violent extremism and hatred.

Postscript: Entry from a country without a national TRI Network:
Vesna Poposka
Vesna Poposka, vpoposka88@gmail.com
International legal aspects for protection of the critical infrastructure against contemporary security threats
Prof. Orce Popovski, Colonel at the Military Academy “ General M. Apostolski” - Skopje, Macedonia;
before the end of 2018
Announcements

Job Vacancy at Perspectives on Terrorism

Assistant Editor for Conference Monitoring

The Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) is looking for a new member whose task would be to maintain an online database on academic and professional conferences on terrorism and related subjects (e.g. radicalisation, countering violent extremism). The person we look for will be responsible for creating an online conference calendar that provides relevant information (venue, date, organiser, principal topics, call for papers, keynote speakers, and registration details) in the database. The Assistant Editor for Conference Monitoring will regularly provide conference-related information to over 8,000 readers and 16,000 social media followers of Perspectives on Terrorism, with updates and Conference Alerts. The new Assistant Editor would also develop and maintain a list of contact information of major associations and centres that are organisers of specialised conferences and workshops relevant to the study of terrorism and counterterrorism.

Successful applicants for the new Assistant Editor for Conference Monitoring position should have relevant computer- and Internet-search skills for creating an online web portal with direct hyperlinks to relevant conference information. We will ask for a commitment to this task of monitoring conferences for a period of minimally two years. Like all other positions with the Terrorism Research Initiative and its journal Perspectives on Terrorism, this one is not remunerated. The ideal person we have in mind would have experience as a reference librarian, but we are also open to applications from others who have relevant experiences or are willing to invest time in acquiring these on the job.

Applications with a letter of motivation, a CV and two references should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief of PoT at <apschmid@terrorismanalysts.com> before June 1, 2018.
About *Perspectives on Terrorism*

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PoT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University, Campus The Hague. PoT is published six times per year as a free, independent, scholarly peer-reviewed online journal available at [http://www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com).

PoT seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism-, Political Violence- and Conflict Studies.

The editors invite researchers and readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s Research Notes, Special Correspondence, Op-Eds and other content are reviewed by members of the Editorial Board, while its Articles are peer-reviewed by outside academic experts and professionals. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and waging conflicts. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to. They are responsible for the content of their contributions and retain the copyright of their publication.

*The Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism consists of:*

- Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, Editor-in-Chief
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