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Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume XI, Issue 5 (October 2017) of Perspectives on Terrorism at http://www.terrorismanalysts.com. Our free and independent online journal is a publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University’s Campus The Hague. Now in its eleventh year, Perspectives on Terrorism has nearly 7,600 regular subscribers and many more occasional readers and website visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer reviewed by external referees while its Research and Policy Notes, Special Correspondence and other content are subject to internal editorial quality control.

Here is a brief look at the contents of the current issue:

The first article by Andrew Silke and Tinka Veldhuis explore the phenomenon of violent extremism in prisons, highlighting the most important research findings in recent years. Then Ariel Koch describes the symbolism and rhetoric of contemporary right-wing extremists in Europe and North America, noting their description of those who disagree with them as “treacherous” or “disloyal” in their calls for violence against Muslims, immigrants and left-wing or moderate elements of society. And Cato Hemmingby examines the targeting preferences of militant Islamists in Western Europe, where he finds conservative tendencies and no significant differences between al-Qaida and Islamic State-linked perpetrators.

This issue of Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) also features a Research Note by Thomas Quiggin, who calls for a strategic (i.e., more than tactical) European response to Islamist ideology.

In the Resources section the reader will find a column of 30 short book reviews by Joshua Sinai, followed by two extensive bibliographies compiled by the journal’s Information Resources Editor, Judith Tinnes. Then Ryan Scrivens provides a list of academic theses on terrorism and counterterrorism completed over the past five years. And the issue concludes with a detailed list of recent online, open-source publications on terrorism and counterterrorism, compiled by web analyst Berto Jongman.

The current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism was jointly prepared by editor James J.F. Forest and associate editor Aaron Zelin, with assistance from Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, the editor-in-chief of the journal.
Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons: A Review of Key Recent Research and Critical Research Gaps

by Andrew Silke and Tinka Veldhuis

Abstract

Over the past decade, government policy has repeatedly identified prisons as particularly important environments in terms of both the risks of radicalisation and of opportunities for de-radicalisation. This paper provides an overview of some of the most important research findings that have emerged on prison and violent extremism in recent years. Drawing on this research, the article syntheses and assesses the dominating themes and views in the literature. The paper also identifies a number of significant knowledge gaps that deserve further scholarly attention.

Keywords: prison, prisoners, detention, radicalisation, de-radicalisation

Introduction

In recent years, the role of prisons in countering violent extremism has received increasing scholarly and political priority. [1] With prisons often being portrayed and widely viewed as ‘hotbeds’ of radicalisation, researchers have devoted growing attention to examining the challenges and opportunities that arise with the presence of violent extremist offenders within prison systems. The literature in this area now covers a broad range of issues. Whereas the first publications focused mainly on understanding the risks and dynamics behind prisoner radicalisation[2], more recently authors have started focusing on more technical challenges, such as risk assessment and classification, management strategies, and rehabilitation and reintegration approaches. [3]

This paper aims to provide an overview of some of the most important findings that have emerged in the field in recent years. Given the vast amount of publications and the breadth of relevant issues, we highlight and synthesise some of the dominating themes and views in the literature. Finally, the paper also seeks to identify a number of important remaining knowledge gaps that deserve further scholarly attention.

Religion and Ideology in Prison

Traditionally, religion and ideology have played an important role in prison, and criminologists have long recognised that religious or ideological commitment can have substantial benefits for inmates.[4] Especially for first-offenders, imprisonment can be a disheartening experience. Adopting a belief system can help inmates adopt a new, more positive identity, give purpose and meaning to their prison experience, cope with feelings of guilt and shame, and gain a sense of control and self-significance while in prison.[5]

Scholars on prisoner radicalisation have likewise noted the positive effects of religious or ideological conversion for prisoners, and tend to agree that conversion among inmates is common but that radicalisation towards violent extremism, although potentially dangerous, is very rare. For instance, based on extensive research in the U.S., Mark Hamm concludes that prison conversions mostly “did more good than harm and sometimes even served a de-radicalisation agenda.”[6] Similarly, in an in-depth study among inmates in a UK-based high-security prison, Liebling and colleagues note that religion can offer moral and social guidelines for inmates and help them make sense of their imprisonment.[7]

As such, although it is undisputed that violent extremism can create real and serious security concerns within the correctional system, most authors seem to agree that religion generally has a positive effect on inmates and that, in most prisons, radicalisation is a rare phenomenon.
**Causes and dynamics of prisoner radicalisation**

Arguably, the majority of publications in the field set out to identify the key contextual factors that appear to make inmates vulnerable to violent extremism. It is generally accepted that radicalisation primarily stems from a combination of institutional, social, and individual factors, such as overcrowding and deprivation, violence and group dynamics, and a desire for protection and belonging.[8] In particular, two factors appear to stand out in the discussion on what drives inmates towards violent extremist ideologies and groups: overcrowding and charismatic leadership.

Overcrowding is a common problem in many prisons around the world, and is often seen as one of the central causes behind inmate misconduct and recidivism.[9] Overcrowding creates stress and induces inmates to flock together in subgroups, which compete over scarce resources and social status. Especially in prisons with high levels of disorder and violence, inmates may be inclined or even forced to join a group for protection or access to otherwise unattainable goods. Under such conditions, inmates may become susceptible to the influence of violent extremist groups or ideologies, which may offer social and moral support to deal with the ordeals of imprisonment.

Overcrowded, chaotic, and under-resourced prisons in turn pave the way for charismatic extremist leaders to organise social groups and impose extremist belief systems upon their followers. The role of charismatic leaders is emphasised in the majority of recent publications on prisoner radicalisation. Hamm, in particular, stresses how charismatic leaders select vulnerable inmates and use one-on-one proselytization to recruit groups of followers.[10] Liebling and colleagues describe a similar dynamic in the UK, where charismatic Muslim “key-players” target search for ‘lost’ inmates and offer themselves as trustworthy guides, propagating Islam as a means to find an identity and meaning in life.[11]

One problem, however, with the discussion around the causes of radicalisation within prison is that the evidence base has tended to be anecdotal. Current theories on prison radicalisation are almost entirely based on an analysis of a small number of case studies of radicalisation within prison, combined with a theoretical assessment of likely drivers which draws primarily on the wider literature on radicalisation and also frequently on the literature around prison gangs.[12]

Some much older research has explored how prison can act as an environment for increasing the politicisation of terrorist prisoners. For example, Colin Crawford’s interview survey of 70 paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland found that imprisonment increased their level of political awareness (e.g. “we hadn’t a clue about republicanism”). What is particularly interesting is that Crawford also found that this increasing political awareness led most of the prisoners (70%) to eventually believe that a political settlement to the conflict was the only logical solution (rather than continued violence).[13] In this respect then, the prison experience was associated with elements of de-radicalisation rather than increased radicalisation.

More recent research has illustrated that prison can also be associated with increased radicalisation among terrorist prisoners. In a study focused on detained terrorist suspects in the Philippines, Arie Kruglanski and his collaborators were able to survey 29 prisoners suspected of membership of the Abu Sayyaf group, and carried out a follow-up survey two years later with the same prisoners.[14] The study found that radicalisation increased among the prisoners over the two year period, with the prisoners on average scoring higher across three different measures of radicalisation (‘Islamic Extremism’, ‘Support for Violence’ and ‘Negative Attitudes to the West’). Significantly, the effects were strongest for younger prisoners, unmarried prisoners, and prisoners without children. Perhaps unexpectedly, their attitudes to their prison experience or to prison guards showed no link with increased radicalisation. Prisoners with more negative attitudes were not more likely to become increasingly radicalised. The research also found that prisoners with a high need for cognitive closure were less likely to radicalise than those with a low need. The research team drew attention to the context in which the prisoners were held: the prisoners were all held together in the same compound where they and many other suspected Abu Sayyaf members (including senior figures) had unlimited social interaction.
Management and Allocation of Violent Extremist Offenders Within the Prison System

When it comes to appropriate management and allocation strategies for violent extremist prisoners, a question that frequently arises is whether radicalised inmates can best be integrated into the mainstream inmate population, or whether they should be segregated in separate high-security facilities. Several countries, like the USA, Australia, and the Netherlands have opted for concentration policies, whereas others generally disperse violent extremist offenders across a small number of high-security facilities.[15] Others such as Spain operate a mixed policy, dispersing prisoners belonging to the Basque group ETA, but concentrating Jihadi terrorists.[16]

The UK is increasingly moving to a mixed approach. In Northern Ireland, paramilitary prisoners have always been concentrated. Before the 1998 Good Friday Agreement such prisoners were held in HMP The Maze. Following the closure of that prison as part of the peace process, paramilitary prisoners are now concentrated instead at HMP Maghaberry. In England and Wales, Jihadi prisoners have traditionally been spread among the small number of high security prisons. The Acheson review in 2016 concluded that “Islamist Extremism (IE) was a growing problem within prisons.”[17] This view was not shared by the National Offender Management Service, at the time, which could highlight the low re-offending rate for former terrorist prisoners and the rarity of cases of individuals radicalised in prison in England and Wales who are subsequently convicted of terrorist offences. Nevertheless, the Acheson conclusions chimed with public perceptions and ultimately the government introduced one of the key recommendations: the creation of specialist “separation centres” to isolate terrorist prisoners from the rest of the prison population.[18] Three centres are being established, each located in a high security prison, and with a combined capacity for up to 28 prisoners. There are over 130 Jihadi-related prisoners in England and Wales, so most will still remain outside of the new segregation system.

The first of the centres was opened in July 2017, but researchers have already raised concerns. Drawing on interviews with former British Jihadi prisoners, Tam Hussein highlighted that the ability of terrorist prisoners to radicalise other prisoners in British jails was widely overestimated, and what was significantly underestimated was how exposure to other prisoners actually moderated the views of most extremist prisoners. As one interviewee reported:

I really think that in my time in prison most of the Mojo’s [Muhajiroon] realised they had made errors from being in prison and actually being forced to mix for once. They couldn't isolate like they do on the outside… no one took Mojo Dawah [proselytisation] seriously, and they ended up all…becoming much more mainstream.[19]

John Horgan, arguably the leading international expert on terrorist disengagement and de-radicalisation, has been scathing in his assessment of the separation centres:

The idea of segregating radical prisoners from the rest of the prison population is a terrible idea. In an attempt to solve one problem it will create another, focusing and amplifying radicalization rather than curbing it…It reeks of a knee-jerk political response and just isn’t very smart. Smart monitoring, supervision, program development, resourcing and staff training represent far better solutions.[20]

However, as yet, limited concrete evidence exists on the downsides and benefits of both strategies. Clearly, context is very important, but it is unclear which strategy may work best and under which circumstances.

On the one hand, housing violent extremist offenders together may be cost-efficient and minimise the risk of proselytization. However, Veldhuis evaluated the Dutch terrorism detention policy to concentrate terrorism offenders in specialised ‘terrorism wings’ and found that there was no substantial evidence that concentration was a necessary and helpful response to violent extremism.[21] Similarly, speaking in relation to the Australian policy for also separating terrorist prisoners Sofia Patel has warned that “the assumption that creating an exclusive wing for terrorist offenders will curb the spread of their ideology is inaccurate at best, and counter-productive at worst.” Moreover, concentration policies can produce undesired side-effects, such as intensifica-
tion of extremist ideologies and networks. They can also enhance the prisoners’ ability to plan and orchestrate activities both within the prison and with elements beyond the prison walls. Northern Ireland, for example, provides many such examples including mass escapes, riots, weapon smuggling, co-ordinated hunger strikes, the intimidation and assassination of prison staff, and sophisticated campaigns of political protest. [22].

On the other hand, in their study in the Philippines, Jones and Morales found that integrating terrorists into a gang-dominated prison culture may (temporarily) promote disengagement and encourage de-radicalisation. [23] Jones and Morales argue that, provided that inmate groups are constructively managed, integrating extremists into the general inmate population may create opportunities for positive reform. At the same time, however, integration may also increase the risk of recruitment and dispersion of violent extremist ideologies.

It is clear that what works in one country may not work in the next, and the preferred strategy is likely to depend on a range of contextual factors, such as background and size of the inmate population, available resources and staff, levels of violence and gang activity, and inmate culture. Individual characteristics can also be a factor. For example, charismatic, high profile prisoners, such as the Islamist ideologue Anjem Choudary who was jailed in the UK in 2016, could pose a special challenge for the prison authorities, likely presenting a greater potential risk of ‘contagion’ of ideology compared to someone less charismatic. It is perhaps no surprise then that Choudary was one of the first prisoners transferred to the newly opened segregation centres. [24]

**Effectiveness of De-radicalisation Programs in Prison**

One of the most serious questions in this area relates to the effectiveness of prison-based programs which are designed to intervene with terrorist prisoners and to either de-radicalise and/or disengage them from violent extremism. This issue has attracted considerable (and growing) attention but good evidence about what works in this area remains scarce. [25] Most of the published studies to date have either been descriptive or theoretical. [26] These can provide useful insight into different approaches but are of very limited use in terms of determining, empirically, what impact the programs have.

Two recent studies, however, have shed important light on this area, and both are distinctive in that the research involved direct access to terrorist prisoners and ex-prisoners.

Zora Sukabdi’s (2015) study was carried out in Indonesia and involved interviews and focus groups with 43 male prisoners and ex-prisoners most of whom had belonged to Jama‘a Islamiya (JI) or an affiliate organisation. [27] The sample included a spread of membership ranging from low ranking individuals to senior leadership. At the time of the interviews and focus groups all of the men were identified as having disengaged from supporting violence and illegal activity. A key focus from Sukabdi’s research was to shed light on the disengagement and de-radicalisation experiences of the prisoners, and to also assess their views on what factors made prison-based de-radicalisation programs effective or not. While Indonesian authorities have tried a variety of approaches to de-radicalise terrorist prisoners, overall, the effectiveness of Indonesian efforts in this regard have been considered poor by most reviews. [28] De-radicalisation approaches in Indonesia have tended to focus on four elements: (1) isolating prisoners who are engaging in de-radicalisation programs from other terrorist prisoners; (2) providing practical incentives for prisoners to engage, including holding them in better conditions and by providing economic assistance for them and their families; (3) using former militants to debate with current prisoners the ideology, rationales and justifications for violence; and (4) running workshops to tackle issues such as anger management but also to develop practical skills for future employment and provide new social relationships outside the terrorist network. [29] Thus, Sukabdi’s study offered some potentially useful insight in terms of what lessons might be taken away to inform future efforts both in Indonesia and elsewhere.

The study found that shock experiences in the prisoners’ lives (e.g. the experience of being arrested; seeing family members and friends pursued and arrested by the authorities) was cited by a majority of prisoners as a trigger for behavioural transformation away from violence. Though Sukabdi did not highlight it, this finding very much echoes some of the key findings from Cusson and Pinsonneault’s (1986) highly influential research
on desistance from general crime.\[30\] Cusson and Pinsonneault identified a series of stages through which the offender progressed before deciding to abandon criminal activity, with the first factor being a shock stage resulting from aversive experiences as a result of the criminal activity.

Also significant was the prisoners’ awareness of an ideological change based on their understanding the contexts of *daar al harb* (state of war) and *daar as salam* (state of peace) and coming to see Indonesia as a country where war was inappropriate. 23% of the prisoners also highlighted meeting the victims of terrorist bombings as a transformative experience.

There was also some fascinating insight in terms of the prisoners’ views of what was needed to make an effective rehabilitation programme. In terms of development needs at the start of the interventions, personal self-empowerment was flagged by almost all as a key issue. No doubt partly linked to this, the prisoners also had an overwhelming emphasis on developing vocational skills which would allow them to gain employment, develop their own businesses and be economically self-sufficient after release. Characteristics which were important with the staff running the programme were, first and foremost, a strong knowledge of Islam, followed then by an ability to work in a positive, genuine and respectful manner with the prisoners.

While Sukabdi’s study gives a fascinating insight into the views of prisoners who have been the focus of de-radicalisation programs, a far larger study in Sri Lanka provides us with valuable data on the effectiveness of such programs. Kruglanski and colleagues focused on the experience of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) detainees.\[31\] After decades of conflict, the LTTE was comprehensively defeated in 2009 and approximately 12,000 LTTE members were captured. The Sri Lankan government introduced large-scale programs to rehabilitate these prisoners.\[32\] Key elements included:

Hard core members of the LTTE who remained highly committed to the cause were separated from the rest of the prisoner population, so that they were not able to actively try to undermine the rehabilitation programme.

The authorities did not refer to the LTTE members as “prisoners” or “detainees”. Instead, they were referred to as “beneficiaries.”\[33\] It was believed that this language had more positive connotations and would help foster better relations with staff, and creates a different and more positive self-image for the “beneficiaries” themselves.

Prisoners were encouraged to take part in a variety of activities designed to encourage individual development. This included taking part in yoga to develop spiritual insight, and artistic activities to facilitate individual expression. The emphasis on individual development in these programs, was designed to counteract the heavy collectivistic and group focus which dominated the prisoners’ time in the LTTE.

Prisoners also took part in vocational programs, which were designed to develop skills that would help the prisoners to successfully reintegrate into society after their release. These programs included courses on construction, electronics and carpentry, as well as courses on cosmetics and the clothes industry specifically for female prisoners.

Kruglanski and colleagues carried out evaluations of the impact of the rehabilitation programme, and indeed, this evaluation is probably the most rigorous currently available.\[34\] The evaluation involved 1906 prisoners based across six different centres. Crucially, the researchers were able to compare this sample with a control sample of 152 LTTE prisoners at another institution who for logistical reasons were not able to be part of the rehabilitation programme.

The evaluation showed a significant drop in support for continued political violence among prisoners who experienced the rehabilitation programme compared to those who did not. Similarly, prisoners in the programme showed a significant increase in positive attitudes towards the staff running the centres. Overall, the evaluation showed a positive impact of the rehabilitation programme even among more hardcore individuals among the LTTE prisoners.
The rehabilitation programme overall was seen as very successful, and there were periodic mass releases of prisoners who had taken part in the programme. By the end of 2011, only about 1000 LTTE prisoners remained in detention, and by 2015 only about 100 of the original 12,000 still remained in prison.

Overall, the study provides clear evidence that rehabilitation programs can have a positive impact, and do result in significant differences compared to not running such programs for terrorist prisoners. The study does not allow us to pick apart the impact of different elements of the programme, but it provides an important milestone in evidence in this area. The extent to which the conclusion can be applied with confidence in other contexts while promising is unclear. For a start, one factor is that the LTTE had a nationalist/separatist motivation and wanted to establish a new country for Sri Lanka's Tamil minority in the north and east of the island. After decades of conflict, the LTTE was comprehensively defeated in 2009. Following this, the government maintained a very strong military presence in areas previously under LTTE control with a focus on preventing the re-emergence of pro-LTTE group. Thus, the prison programs took place in a context where the wider conflict had effectively ended, a context which almost certainly assisted rather than hindered the impact of the programs. There is also a question as to what extent ethno-nationalist motivations (versus for example religious motivations) affects the susceptibility of prisoners to interventions?

The Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders

In recent years, concerns over recidivism among violent extremist ex-prisoners and returned foreign fighters have spurred attention for rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders. Research on post-release and probation programs for ex-prisoners has been limited to date, though there has been a recent upsurge in interest. Most of the recent papers however have been review studies which have highlighted some of the significant issues, but evaluative or impact assessments have been rare.

An exception is the study by Schuurman and Bakker, which provided an evaluation of a Dutch reintegration programme for detainees on probation or parole who were involved in jihadist extremism or terrorism, or individuals who were suspected of involvement in such activities and who were about to be released from detention. All of the individuals targeted by the “project adhered to an extremist interpretation of Islam commonly designated as Salafi-Jihadism.” Schuurman and Bakker evaluated the programme over a one-year period between 2013 and 2014, drawing primarily on a series of interviews with staff involved in running the programme.

The number of offenders on the programme was small at just five individuals, and overall, the study assessed the programme as having a mixed impact. While the general framework of the programme was judged to be theoretically sound, the most serious setback occurred when two of the five offenders managed to leave the Netherlands and travel to Syria to join Islamist militant groups (both were believed to later have been killed in combat). Of the remaining three offenders, staff judged that one had de-radicalised, one had disengaged but still held radical beliefs, and the third was assessed as probably not having been radicalised to begin with.

The evaluation also highlighted a variety of obstacles the programme faced in its operation, in particular, problematic relationships with key stakeholder partners such as the Public Prosecution Service and civil authorities; staff in support agencies lacked appropriate understanding or knowledge around extremist offenders; and, staff running the programme frequently reported a lack of line management support which added significantly to stress and workload levels.

Overall, while the evaluation was hardly a ringing endorsement for the work, Schuurman and Bakker nevertheless felt that many of the setbacks were the result of teething problems as the programme was being established, and they flagged a variety of areas where improvements were being noticed by the end of the evaluation period. The evaluation also flagged potential issues that should be considered when other reintegration and resettlement programs were being developed elsewhere. First, was the crucial importance of clear communication around the programme and of ensuring strong buy-in from key stakeholders. A second major issue was how to define and measure the success of such programs. Much attention in terms of judging success is focused on rates of recidivism, but Schuurman and Bakker argued that a 100% success rate was not
reasonable and that “with a process as complicated as the reintegration (violent) extremists, upsets are almost inevitable.”

The Major Research Gaps

In general, authors tend to agree that although a vast amount of scholarly and policy attention has been paid to violent extremism in the correctional system, the amount and quality of empirical research into the matter is still insufficient.

In part, the lack of evidence may be caused by conceptual and methodological difficulties. Social phenomena such as radicalisation, recruitment, rehabilitation and reintegration are not only hard to conceptualise, they are equally hard to measure. In part, the problem is also that prisoners in general and violent extremist offenders, in particular, comprise a difficult research population. They are by definition isolated from society and not easily accessible for researchers, they may be reluctant to talk openly or may not be allowed or willing to be interviewed at all.[37] Consequently, there are still a number of issues that are underexplored and require further research:

There is little empirical scrutiny of the underlying social and psychological dynamics behind prisoner radicalisation. Several studies have set out to identify the factors that may be conducive to radicalisation, such as overcrowding, gang dynamics, and the presence of charismatic extremist leaders. Although useful, such accounts fail to explain why, when confronted with the same prison conditions, some people radicalise while others do not. In order to accurately identify those individuals at risk, empirical research is needed that aims to disentangle the social and psychological mechanisms by which contextual conditions may lead to radicalisation in some, but not in others.

Further work is also needed to understand disengagement from violence within prison. Though it is often overlooked a growing body of work illustrates that disengagement frequently occurs among imprisoned terrorists. Indeed, this may be norm for most terrorist prisoners even when prisoners are not exposed to or involved with de-radicalisation programs or other interventions.[38] The dynamics behind this need greater examination.

More research is required into the dynamics behind violent extremist inmate groups or gangs. It is often suggested that inmate groups play an important role in spreading violent extremist ideologies through prison; and more information is needed about the conditions under which extremist groups arise, how they recruit new members, and what their status position is within the broader inmate population. Moreover, as Jones and Morales suggested, inmate groups can play a positive role in maintaining order and structure within the inmate population.[39] As such, it is important to examine how prison staff can positively intervene in group dynamics.

There is a serious lack of good evaluative studies on prison and probation programs aimed at terrorist offenders. Most programs which have been developed appear not to be evaluated. Others receive partial evaluations which often tend to focus on process key performance indicators rather than impact. Often when evaluations have been carried out, the findings are not published or made available, making independent scrutiny and assessment of the evaluation or its conclusions exceptionally difficult. Inevitably this means that there is a serious lack of ‘what works’ evidence in this area. More impact assessments are badly needed.

There is little research into juvenile violent extremist offenders, and how (if at all) they should be treated differently from adult violent extremist offenders. Juveniles and teenagers make up a substantial proportion of the violent extremist offender population, yet many countries do not differentiate in their approaches toward adults and juvenile violent extremist offenders.

There is little knowledge about the challenges that violent extremists face when they are released from prison, and about the dynamics behind violent extremist recidivism. It is well known that ex-prisoners face a range of challenges upon their release, and it is likely that violent extremists face similar and maybe unique additional reintegration problems, such as stigmatisation and difficulties finding employment. Moreover, it
is imperative to examine in detail how conditions of confinement (e.g., concentration or integration, regime, security levels) impact post-release radicalisation and recidivism dynamics.

**About the Authors:** Professor Andrew Silke is based at the University of East London. He has a background in criminology and forensic psychology and has published extensively on issues related to terrorism and counterterrorism. His recent books include the edited collection *Prisons, terrorism and extremism: Critical issues in management, radicalisation and reform* (Routledge 2014).

Dr. Tinka Veldhuis is an Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT). Her research interests are radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism. In particular, she focuses on detention and reintegration of terrorist offenders and on radicalisation and de-radicalisation processes in prison. Her book *Prisoner radicalization and terrorism detention policy* was published by Routledge in 2016.

**Notes**


Mark Hamm. ‘Prison Islam in the age of sacred terror.’ The British Journal of Criminology 49, no. 5 (2009): 667-685; Mark Hamm. Locking up terrorists; Mark Hamm. The spectacular few.


[15] For example, Peter Neumann, Prisons and terrorism.


[33] Arie Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. Bélanger, Rohan Gunaratna, and Malkanthi Hettiarachchi. ‘De-radicalising the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’

[34] Ibid.


[38] See for example Colin Crawford. Defenders or Criminals; John Morrison. ‘A Time to Think, A Time to Talk.’


The New Crusaders: Contemporary Extreme Right Symbolism and Rhetoric

by Ariel Koch

Abstract

A new right-wing extremism is on the rise in contemporary Europe and North America. Those who embrace this ideology articulate extreme hatred towards the left, which they consider “treacherous” or “disloyal”, and towards Muslims and immigrants, and eventually are prone to violence against them. In Europe, a new movement known as the Counter Jihad Movement has emerged. It is exploiting jihadi terrorism and immigration in order to gain more support, mobilize people and justify their struggle on the Internet, on the streets and even in war zones like Syria and Iraq. This article will examine one of this new movement's main characteristics: the use of crusader symbolism as a source of inspiration, activism and even justification of violence as a religious duty in Europe and in the Middle East.

Keywords: Right-Wing Extremism, Crusaders, Counter Jihad Movement, Jihadism, Political Violence

Introduction

In recent years Europe and North America have been experiencing an increase in extreme right wing violence, and as it seems, this wave is not about to fade away any time soon. Although jihadi terrorism is attracting most of public and media attention, right wing terrorism and violence has become an acute problem. According to Daniel Koehler, the founder and director of the Berlin based Institute on Radicalization and De-Radicalization Studies, “right-wing terrorism or racist political violence remains one of the most dangerous threats to Western democracies.”[1] As Koehler notes:

"Although all available national and international statistics in Europe and North America show increasing trends in extreme right-wing violence/terrorism, the basic phenomenon is by no means new: both Europe and the United States have experienced significant extreme right-wing attacks and waves of violence during the past several decades.[2] Nonetheless, according to Jacob Aasland Ravndal, a researcher at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI) and the Center for Extremism Research at the University of Oslo, since the 1990s, extreme right terrorism and violence "has declined," and nowadays it is carried out mostly by “unorganized gangs and lone actors.”[3] However, in the last two years Europe and North America have been suffering from right wing violence that targets immigrants, Muslims, and leftists.[4] Moreover, it seems like right wing vigilantes are flourishing across Europe,[5] and they are involved in hostile and violent activity against immigrants and Muslims at home and abroad.[6]

This article aims to analyze modes of mobilization within the new extreme right,[7] while focusing on Christian crusader symbols and rhetoric, and its use as a tool to direct anti-Muslim sentiment for a fight against those who persecute Christians, mainly the Islamic State (formerly known as ISIS). What role does the Christian identity play in crystallizing the new extreme right? What symbols do right-wingers make use of and how do they see themselves? What characterizes the activity of these factors and what are the possible implications of this activity? In order to answer these questions, I will use textual, audio and video analysis of primary sources and I will rely on a variety of relevant studies, as well as on media reports.
One of the familiar and troubling phenomena of the war in Syria is that of foreign fighters leaving their countries and joining Islamist elements in the ranks of the rebels against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This phenomenon is troubling because in Syria these volunteer fighters absorb political-religious indoctrination, acquire practical knowledge in the use of weapons and gain combat experience. While most of the threat comes from Jihadists, in reality, it is not the only threat. Other extremist movements also motivate and mobilize volunteers for their struggle. Every movement has its specific reasons to fight against its enemies. And if foreign fighters from one extremist movement are capable of producing terror, as we saw in the Paris attacks in November 2015, surely militants from other movements can do the same.[8]

In regard to Jihadi terrorism and activity in the United States and Western Europe,[9] anti-Muslim sentiments (Islamophobia)—which embody a mixture of contemporary politics and medieval history[10]—have increased. In recent years, these sentiments were fueled by ISIS, whose persecution and murder of Christians in Syria and Iraq led to a phenomenon in which right wing elements use Christian symbolism and rhetoric to recruit and mobilize volunteers to fight against the “ancient enemy” of Christendom: The Muslims, and especially their Salafi-Jihadi representatives,[11] either in their homelands or abroad, in Syria and Iraq.

According to a research conducted by Tuck, Silverman and Smalley, some several hundreds of Anti-ISIS are fighting in Syria. The majority of them “did not self-identify a religious affiliation,” but “among those that did express religious sentiments there were a surprisingly large number of Christians […] and a comparatively small number of Muslims.”[12] In other words, there is a movement of Christian volunteers to the battlefronts of Syria and Iraq, and it is not baseless to assume that some of them are holding right wing stances. [13] Although Syria attracts the most attention, it is clear that the Ukrainian arena has long become a magnet for right wing extremists who can train, fight and acquire weapons for future assaults against their various enemies.[14] Both arenas require a separate in-depth studies.

**The Extreme Right Use of the Internet**

According to Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Nick Kaderbhai, “the Internet is seen as allowing for the creation of a virtual community for groups and movements that can support existing physical networks while disseminating different ideologies.”[15] In addition, the extreme right makes an extensive use of the Internet, which enables the formation of a transnational community. Many websites contain multimedia content (i.e. videos, pictures, etc.) and include the availability to purchase products such as military clothing online.[16] Furthermore, these sites include a fundraising appeal and the possibility to do so online. Thus, these sites serve as a tool to raise financial support and volunteers—doctors, media personnel, fighters and weapons experts. Other studies also indicate the extensive use of the Internet by religious fundamentalists.[17]

Gabriel Weimann explains Jihadist extremists use of online platforms – and we can project it on other (non-Muslim) extremists as well – “used for operational purposes such as instruction and training, data mining, coordination, and psychological warfare.”[18] Moreover, a study by J. M. Berger shows that neo-Nazis and white supremacists are more active on Twitter than the supporters and activists of ISIS.[19] In accordance, it is important to note “White supremacist groups are part of a rising specter of far-right extremism mobilization across the United States and Europe.”[20]

The extreme right, as well as other political violent extremists learned how to mobilize and motivate the masses through social networks, and how to spread hatred via these tools.[21] Examples of this can be found in the “Defense Leagues”, which have appeared in recent years throughout Europe. The first “Defense League” was the English Defence League (EDL), a single-issue street movement, which began operating in 2009.[22] Through their Facebook page, that gained tens of thousands “Likes”, the EDL succeeded in mobilizing thousands for what they see as a struggle to prevent the “Islamization” of the United Kingdom (and Europe in general), particularly against “radical Islam”, when it is clear that they spread hatred against all Muslims.

The EDL is linked to various European and non-European Islamophobic-hate groups and movements which
have been supported and reinforced by right-wing elements in Europe and the United States. After the EDL gained public attention, the group inspired smaller but identical groups—the “Defense Leagues”—that formed throughout Europe and which, like the English branch, tried to mobilize people through Facebook pages and to demonstrate and march against Islam, Muslims and immigration.

All these groups form a transnational network that researchers such as Matthew Goodwin, Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Hans Brun, and others, have described as the Counter Jihad Movement (CJM),[23] that is, in many aspects, echoing the “emerging pan-European extreme-right identity.”[24] The CJM was developed as a response to Jihadist terrorism and propaganda in the West,[25] where it continues to pose a significant threat, and which has led to the formation of a European Salafi-Jihadi groups that openly called to the Islamization of the West.[26] According to Roger Eatwell, this reflects the “cumulative extremism”, a process in which one type of extremism ignites other types of extremism.[27]

As Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun noted, there are three “serious problems” with the CJM narrative. First, although “it does not specifically call for violence,” it “includes a paranoid tendency towards conspiracy-theory”—for example, the idea of “Islamization”—which can be used “as inspiration for violent terrorist attacks.” Second, the CJM “can serve to incubate, protect and add a veneer of plausibility and acceptability to traditional forms of far-right xenophobia and extremism.” Besides that, “its amorphous nature and ability to tap into popular concerns about immigration, religion, terrorism and the economy increases the likelihood of violent confrontation and jeopardises Europe’s social fabric.”[28] This article argues that in fact, the CJM does call for violence, but indirectly, with its crusader discourse.

**A New Christian Militancy in Europe?**

Jonathan Sacks, the former chief rabbi of the UK, claimed that secularity is facing the growth of radical and extremist forms of religion, which became an important factor in the world and even within modern (and secular) Europe. He argues, “The twenty-first century will be the start of an age of de-secularization.”[29] One reason for this process is the demographic changes that occurred in Europe in recent years. Another reason is “the use of new electronic media” by “religious radicals.” A third reason is that religion, according to Sacks, offers a strong identity and sense of community: religion “offers meaning, direction, code of conduct and a set of rules for the moral and spiritual life,” which liberal democracies failed to supply.[30]

Contemporary extreme right in North America and Europe includes a variety of groups and movements. Some of them are religiously motivated, mainly by Christianity or paganism,[31] and all of them, nowadays, are sharing hatred to the “Muslim invaders.” Because of the religious nature of Salafi-Jihadism, we can assume that the answer to one’s religious extremism will be another’s religious extremism. This is the case of the CJM, that uses crusader symbols and rhetoric as an anti-thesis and reaction to Jihadism rhetoric and symbolism. Yet, it does not indicate that religion is the most prominent factor within the extreme right. Furthermore, as it seems, the real functions and purposes of the crusader symbolism are as a combination of motivation, religious awakening, and moral justification of violence, and, besides that, for propaganda, recruitment and mobilization.

According to Western right-wing extremists, Muslims nowadays to try to conquer Europe as their ancestors did; for example, when they invaded the Iberian Peninsula, Italy and France, or when the Ottoman Turks occupied large parts of Eastern Europe and reached the “gates of Vienna.” In the end, it was always an alliance of Christians who fought the invaders and expelled them from Christian lands. Although in the past Muslims lived in Christian areas, or maintained trade relations with the Christians,[32] they never tried to reconquer those lands and did not challenge the authorities, until they could do so due to the freedom of expression given to the citizens of European liberal democracies.

These countries tried, in various ways, to integrate the Muslim communities among the (Christian) societies (for example, emphasizing what we know as “multiculturalism”).[33] According to research by the Migration
Policy Institute, “multiculturalism characterized as a feel-good celebration of ethno-cultural diversity, encouraging citizens to acknowledge and embrace the panoply of customs, traditions, music, and cuisine that exist in a multiethnic society.”[34] This multicultural approach, has “utterly failed,” as admitted by Angela Merkel, the German chancellor. Accordingly, senior politicians in France, England, the Netherlands and elsewhere have also expressed strong criticism against this approach.[35]

These politicians argued that multiculturalism allows separatism and lack of integration, which may eventually lead to religious extremism and hence to the rejection of the state, its institutions, symbols and laws; and even the willingness to use violence against its citizens. The failure to integrate Muslims into society led to unrest among many young Muslims, especially the second, third, and even fourth generation of immigrants. Many of these young Muslims, dubbed by Robert Leiken as Europe's Angry Muslims, became the vanguards of Jihad within liberal European countries.[36]

These radical Muslim youths have united in various religious-political inter-connected groups and have begun to call publicly for an Islamic holy struggle (“Jihad”), using their right to demonstrate without fear of the authorities. Although this call was accepted by some European Muslims, it resonated also among their rivals. In this context, it should be noted that the idea of a Christian holy war (“crusade”), in response to the Jihad, is reverberating in the public discourse and is not alien to right wing circles in the West. "The idea that a war against infidels could be something sacred," wrote one researcher, "in Christian history is clearly a Western development.”[37] One can discern such “holy” and militant currents in the Christian world that intensify whenever the real and imaginary conflict between the West and Islam continues; and so is the persecution of Christians in the Islamic world.

**Extreme Right use of Crusader Symbolism and Rhetoric**

Among the extreme right, the use of crusaders (and mainly the Templar Knights) motifs is not new. For example, the American white supremacist organization Ku Klux Klan (KKK) publishes a newspaper called The Crusader. In October 2016, three men were arrested in Kansas, USA, for planning attacks against Muslims. They called their group “The Crusaders.”[38] White supremacists are not the only ones in the extreme right who use Christian motifs as a source of justification for their struggle against Muslims. Similarly, individuals, groups and organizations identified with the CJM, which does not necessarily operate out of a racist view, also make use of crusader symbols and derive inspiration from those Christian knights.

Examples for this can be found with the “Defense Leagues,” whose symbol is the cross of Saint George, with the inscription “In Hoc Signo Vinces” (Under this sign we conquer), which used to be a Crusader slogan. In addition, in CJM circles, there is an extensive use of memes and photos of knights, many of whom are accompanied by a caption that threatens to execute a Crusade as a counter-response to Jihad, such as “Jihad Works Both Ways” or “I’ll See Your Jihad and I’ll Raise You One Crusade,” and others who call for a fight against the “Muslim invaders” as was done by their Christian ancestors.[39]

For example, on the Norwegian Defense League Facebook page there are many images of the crusaders. In a picture that was uploaded on July 18, 2015, a cross appears, and on its lower part a shield with crossed swords, and behind it, the inscription “Templar Knights D.K.”[40] Another example is in the Spanish Defense League (Liga de Defensa Española) Facebook page, in which many memes propagate militant Christian identity. One meme, uploaded on May 10, 2015, shows a Christian knight kneeling, with a sword in his hand, and supposedly saying: “I am not a racist, I am anti-Islam; There are Islamists from all races.”[41] The anti-Islamic crusade is necessary not only as a response to terrorism, but also in order to “preserve European Christian values, white Europeans need to gather forces to fight Islam and Muslims, instead of being fragmented across Europe.”[42]
In this context, it should be noted that Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian Pan-European nationalist who murdered seventy-seven people on July, 2011, defined himself as a “Justiciar Knight Commander for Knights Templar Europe and one of several leaders of the National and pan-European Patriotic Resistance Movement.”[43] Breivik, who for years absorbed anti-Islamic blogs and websites,[44] published a 1,500 page manifesto written in London, in which he expressed support and sympathy for the EDL and Western nationalists. Furthermore, he expounded his theory of Islam’s takeover of Europe, clarifying who are the “allies” of Islam (such as the European left, the elites), whom he accuses of treason, and therefore he condemns them to death. This is why among his victims were sixty-nine members of the Labor Party’s youth wing on the Utoya Island.

To what extent is militant Christianity, embodied in the glorification of the Knights Templar, expressed in Breivik’s manifesto? Beside the fact that the Manifesto binding is the Templar Cross on a white background, the word “Christian” was mentioned on 2,247 different occasions, the word “Crusade” appears 263 times, “Knights Templar” appears 195 times, and “Christendom” appears 119 times. Breivik hoped that this religious rhetoric, followed by his attacks, would lead to a civil war “which he thought was inevitable.”[45] Nevertheless, Breivik’s crusader discourse does not indicate that he was a religious fanatic nor that he was motivated by religion, but instead he should be viewed as a nationalist who thought he could inspire other Western nationalists with the use of crusaders slogans and symbols.

Contemporary extreme right violence, motivated nowadays mostly by Islamophobic hatred, either against the Left or against Muslims, continued after the Breivik’s attack.[46] In October 2015, a neo-Nazi stabbed and injured a German politician in Cologne for her support of allowing refugees to enter Germany,[47] and a few days later, in the city of Trollhattan, Sweden, a neo-Nazi and right wing sympathizer, which expressed hostility to immigrants, stabbed a teacher to death and injured several students in a city school.[48] On June 16, 2016, a British right wing extremist shot and killed Jo Cox, a Labor MP who was known for her support of allowing refugees to enter England.

According to media reports, Joe Cox’s murderer shouted “Britain First” before stabbing and shooting the Cox.[49] Britain First (BF) is the name of an anti-Islamic movement, founded in 2011, that clearly illustrates the term “counter-Jihad”, and defines itself as a “Christian crusader.”[50] This movement was established by well-known right wing activists in England, led by Paul Golding, who had previously been active in the British National Party (BNP), a party supported by white supremacists, neo-Nazis, fascists, and the like.[51] Golding understood that in order to obtain broader public legitimacy he should abandon the neo-Nazi scene and turn into what is known as the Counter-Jihad “new extreme right.”
Indeed, in response to the “Muslim patrol” that appeared in recent years in several Western European countries, including Britain, which enforces Sharia law (i.e. prevent gambling, prostitution, alcohol, immodest clothing or the presence of homosexuals on the streets), BF launched the “Christian Patrol”, in which its members march on the streets with white crosses and even entering mosques, where they distributed copies of the New Testament. White crosses, next to the Templar flags, are also seen at BF marches. Like the EDL, BF are using extensively the internet and especially the social networks. For instance, its Facebook page has almost two million Likes.

Manifestations of Crusader Symbolism and Rhetoric in the Syrian Context

From the BF Facebook page, we learn about its worldview: its hostile attitude towards Muslims and immigrants, its call to join the struggle against ISIS, as well as the presence of right wing elements in Syria. For example, on June, 2016, BF Facebook page was uploaded a picture allegedly taken in Syria, where eight armed men are seen, one of them is flying the Templar Knights flag. According to the caption accompanying the picture, the eight are volunteers who came to Syria in order to fight ISIS. This picture has received about a hundred enthusiastic and supportive responses, more than 2,000 Likes and over 500 shares.

Although we don’t know what really motivated these armed men, the fact that they are waving this flag in Syria gave to extreme right-wing groups in Britain the opportunity to show how active and determined they are. Even though the photo has been used without the permission and approval of the men, we do know that at least one of them, the British veteran Timothy Scott, was the leader of the right-wing movement PEGIDA (“Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident”) in the UK. Although we don’t know if these men were motivated by religion, we can notice how religious (and militant) symbolism is being used by Anti-Islamists who are willing to take arms and fight for their cause.

The Templar flag is also the flagship of the Knights Templar International (KTI), a British religious organization founded in 2015 in order to strengthen the Christian identity of the UK, and have links to BF and other extreme right-wing groups in Europe. To promote its goals this organization uses a website and a Facebook page that has accumulated over half a million “Likes”. The struggle of these self-proclaimed “modern Templars” is not limited to the Middle East. It is in Europe, too, which they claim to be under a double threat from Muslims in general and from radical Islam in particular: on one hand, a demographic threat that is intensified in light of the “immigration crisis,” and on the other, the threat of terrorism that continues to claim victims in Europe and exploits immigration in order to infiltrate the continent.

Therefore, these so called “modern Templars” help their European counterparts to stop the immigrants before they can cross the border between Turkey and Bulgaria. The KTI assistance, according to their website, is expressed in the dispatch of equipment such as tactical vests, winter clothes and communication equipment.
which are supposed to help a nationalist paramilitary group in Bulgaria to prevent Syrian immigrants from crossing into the country from Turkey. In other words, “modern Templars” are involved in supplying equipment and volunteers to groups fighting against their Muslim enemy, both in Europe and in the Middle East.

Another example of Christian willingness to fight in Syria and Iraq is found on the “Apoyo Voluntarios Españoles Contra DAESH” (Spanish Volunteers Support Against ISIS) Facebook page, which calls on Christians in Spain (and Europe in general) to embark on a “crusade”, reach Syria-Iraq and protect the persecuted Christians from ISIS. This Facebook page began operating in January 2016 and by April 2017 had more than 25,000 “Likes”. The profile picture of the page shows a military beret, a hand grenade and a chain with a cross; the background picture shows the Spanish flag with the inscription “Long live King Jesus” (Viva Cristo Rey). On the flag, there are a Kalashnikov rifle, ammunition and a military helmet.

On this page propaganda videos can be found calling for Christians to join the campaign against ISIS and Muslims in general; Media reports about European and Spanish fighters in Iraq and Syria (some of them veterans), memes, photos and illustrations that show Jesus riding on a white horse, fighting against Muslims; crucifixes with guns attached to them, and alike. It should be added that not only Spaniards join the forces defending Christians in Syria and Iraq. Thus, for example, we can learn about the activities of a “Christian Falange” composed of French citizens.

There are other examples of the willingness to fight for the persecuted Christians in the Middle East and against ISIS, such as “The Veterans for the Protection of Christians Against ISIS International” Facebook page, which opened in early April 2015 and has accumulated over 1,700 Likes by April 2017. This page is of a closed group, and most of its members are Americans and Canadians “with right-wing stances.” The page, which has not been updated since June 2016, is intended to recruit volunteers, especially veterans, who will to defend the Christians in Iraq and the “Jews” (the State of Israel), both perceived as being persecuted and terrorized by Jihadists.

The page is accompanied by memes and illustrations of horrific Crusaders, and has links to the online purchase of clothing with various Crusader symbols and rhetoric. In this context, it should be noted that Christians who fled out of fear of the Jihadists in the Middle East, when arriving in Europe, found that also there, they were still threatened by jihadi sympathizers. This strengthens not only the call for the protection of Christians in Muslim countries, but also within Europe. This understanding might lead to religious radical-
ization and the perception of violence as being capable of defending Christianity and Christians.

Conclusion

For the extreme right wing (either the CJM or neo-Nazis and fascists) circles, Christianity is under a religious and demographic threat, posed by Muslims in general and by Jihadis in particular. In this context, we see how Christianity, and mainly the Templar flag, has become an inspirational and motivational source of empowerment for the extreme right in the Twenty-First Century. Right wing individuals, groups, movements, parties and organizations in Europe and North America use the same militant-religious symbols and rhetoric, whether they really mean it or not, in addition to provide an appropriate response to what they see as a threat posed by Muslims. Furthermore, it is being used not only as a motivational source (to protect Christianity and Western culture), but also for recruitment, mobilization and propaganda.

As we saw, contemporary right-wing extremists in Europe and the United States portray themselves as descendants of the crusaders and as those who are obligated to not only protect European and American Christians and Christendom from terrorism and invasion (by immigrants), but also to prevent the spread of Islam in Europe and elsewhere that according to them, will undermine the Christian identity of their nations and the core values and norms of the Western (-Christian) civilization. Furthermore, it seems that European extreme right, which used to be more pagan than its counterparts in North America, due to the “Jewish nature” of Christianity – nowadays share the same vision of Europe as a Christian space that is under threat posed by Muslims.

Crusader symbols and anti-Islamic rhetoric help to consolidate individuals, groups, organizations, parties and movements in Europe and in the United States (and elsewhere) under a transnational framework, by reviving the crusader heritage and presenting it as an appropriate response to Jihad, even though just for propaganda purposes. Thus, Christian symbols and rhetoric provide a religious justification and inspiration for a physical struggle against a religious enemy. This struggle has an internal aspect—reflected in protest activity on the streets, as well as online—as well as an external aspect, which is expressed by helping groups with a similar worldview who are fighting a common enemy, such as the assistance given by the Knights Templar International to nationalists in Bulgaria, and mobilizing volunteers to fight in the battlefields of Syria and Iraq.

The revitalization of the crusader heritage takes place primarily in the Internet, mainly through social networks. This enables the creation of a virtual community and connections with similar elements from different parts of the world that share the same worldview. This has been true since the EDL began to march in England, followed by a whole network of “Defense Leagues” that drew supporters and fans from Facebook to the streets, where they clashed with their various rivals: the left and Muslims. The same is true for Britain First and other extreme right groups in Europe and beyond, which use the new media for propaganda and as a recruitment tool of people and money; and exploit the immigration crisis and terrorism in addition to spreading lethal hatred.

An example of this was found in Breivik’s attack, in Jo Cox’s murder and in other cases, which demonstrated that those who portray themselves as the “new crusaders” would not hesitate to act violently against their own people, who allegedly collaborates with the “Muslim enemy,” and helped the “invaders” directly and indirectly. Indeed, more and more attacks against Muslims and against the Left occurred in Europe and North America in recent years, sparking fears of civic unrest and lack of security, which is intensified in light of right wing extremists’ involvement in the war in Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, it is questionable whether these volunteers will exploit their combat experience and continue their struggle against “Islamization” even after they return, or will they lay down their weapons? We will discover answers to these questions in the coming years.

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Notes


[2] Ibid., p. 86.


[5] Extreme right vigilantes in Western Europe include groups such as the French “Generation Identity” (Generation Identitaire), the Finnish “Soldiers of Odin” or “Britain First” in the United Kingdom.

[6] In the United States, where according to the Southern Poverty Law Center right wing extremists are on the rise, there are more than 900 hate-groups. See: Marc Potok, “The Number of Hate and Antigovernment ‘Patriot’ Groups Grew Last Year, and Terrorist Attacks and Radical Plots Proliferated,” The Southern Poverty Law Center, February 17, 2016. https://www.spclcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2016/year-hate-and-extremism


[25] In this context we should notice that right wing terrorism was a reaction to other movements’ activities, and was not driven uniquely by fascist world-view. See: Peter R. Neumann, Radicalized (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2016), pp. 28-31.


[41] From the Spanish Defence League Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/LigadeDefensa/photos/a.193934667287716.53961.189960594351790/1061503757197465/. (Accessed: 20.05.2017). (Figure 1)


[45] Ibid., p. 31.

[46] January 29, 2017, Alexander Bissonnette shoot and killed six Muslims inside a mosque in Quebec, Canada. Five months later, during one week of June, there were two attacks that targeted Muslims, the first in Sweden and the second in England. In both cases the attackers used cars as weapon. These attacks occurred in light of several attacks in Europe, in which Jihadis used cars and trucks to mow down their victims.


[54] Online platforms of Britain First (Accessed: 20.05.2017):
- Website: https://www.britainfirst.org/
- Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritainFirst/
- Twitter: https://twitter.com/BritainFirstHQ
- You Tube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCtEsYNHwF37lr9IH7Tv-uA--

[55] Paul Golding himself have two Facebook pages: one private (https://www.facebook.com/people/Paul-Gold-
ing/100014186493099) and one public (https://www.facebook.com/BFActivists), both together have more than 150,000 Likes and Followers. (Accessed: 20.05.2017)

[56] Eight anti-ISIS volunteers, from Britain First Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritainFirst/photos/a.346633882148546.1073741826.300455573433044/1049392898539304/. (Accessed: 20.05.2017) (Figure 2).

[57] PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes) is an Anti-Islamic street movement, launched in 2015 in Dresden, in East Germany, that reflects the CJM, including the use of Christian and crusader symbolism and rhetoric.


[59] Ibid.

[60] Online platforms of Knights Templar International (Accessed: 20.05.2017):
- Website: https://knightstemplarinternational.com
- Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/knightstemplarint/


Exploring the Continuum of Lethality: Militant Islamists' Targeting Preferences in Europe

by Cato Hemmingby

Abstract

This article provides an in-depth analysis of the targeting preferences of militant Islamists operating in Western Europe. In addition to target types, this study has a particular focus on the degree of target discrimination, casualty focus, and soft versus hard target preferences. These features of intent constitute a warning triangle with regard to the lethality potential of terrorist acts. There is also a lone actor vs. group perspective included, as well as a comparative glance between the targeting preference of militant Islamists and actors from other ideological directions in Europe. The main findings are that a soft target focus is dominant and increasing, while particularly well-protected targets are almost totally avoided. There is a substantial mass casualty focus, but only few attacks lead to such results. Indiscriminate vs. discriminate targeting comes out evenly. The jihadists are more ambitious regarding targets in early planning stages, compared to later in the process. Furthermore, there are higher ambitions in launched attacks physically carried out by more than one perpetrator. Both lone actors and groups prefer soft targets, but individuals acting alone are more likely to act indiscriminately and with a limited casualty focus. Attacks directed against name-specific individuals are mostly a one-perpetrator phenomenon. Jihadists are generally conservative with regard to target preferences, attack approach and weaponry. There is no evidence supporting suggestions that there are modus operandi-related differences between AQ and ISIS-linked perpetrators. Shifts in trends seem rather to be influenced by practical and contextual factors.

Keywords: Militant Islamists, targets, modus operandi, tactics, response to terrorism

Introduction

As soon as the dust settles after a terrorist attack a basic question for security authorities is why the target in question was chosen. Even more pressing is the question: will other attacks follow, and if so, who or what are the most likely next targets? In addition, security professionals will analyse details of every attack, in order to enhance the protection of other potential targets. Finally, knowledge on modus operandi-related issues provide the best foundation for selecting scenarios to consider - for example, as part of threat assessments related to protective efforts, as well as for education and training programmes.

Modus operandi (MO) has traditionally not been given too much attention within terrorism research. Three decades ago Max Taylor noted how the focus of terrorism research had been on involvement issues, and not event issues.[1] Other senior researchers have since repeated the call for more research on operational issues. [2] Indeed, the focus on MO has increased in recent years, including works relevant for targeting.[3][4] Still, more research on MO issues is needed - not least because there are quite different activities involved.

Targeting research, like other operational issues, is challenging due to the need for detailed information. The amount and quality of the information available determine the output. Large datasets with basic information are useful for quantitative research on a meta or macro level, but may offer limited insight into operational issues per se. More detailed datasets, where the situational contexts can be derived, allow closer examination of operational issues and targeting preferences, which this article aims to do.
More specifically, this article examines the targeting preferences of militant Islamists operating in Western Europe from 1994 to 2016. Furthermore, this article focuses on three features commonly attributed to militant Islamists - that they target indiscriminately, have a mass casualty focus and prefer soft targets. Obviously they commit such acts, but to what degree? This is important to clarify since these three features of intent constitute a warning triangle regarding the lethality potential of terrorist acts, which is meaningful from the perspective of security within a society. These features are also very much illustrative of why militant Islamists represent a threat for European authorities that is more complex than the threat posed by terrorists during the 1970s and 1980s.[5] This seems to be somewhat overlooked when comparing different periods of time.[6] It will also be argued here that a focus on casualty levels, and on soft versus hard targets, are issues that are rarely thoroughly defined and/or measured - even in works focusing on operational aspects.[7] Also, claims that terrorists are more ambitious in early stages of planning than later are rarely documented. In addition to the issues mentioned above, this article offers perspectives on the issue of lone actor vs. group actors, a comparison to actors from other ideological directions within Europe, and some brief recommendations based on the findings from this study.

**Approach and Dataset**

Research on targeting-related issues is complex. Ideological, moral, strategic and tactical factors are all influencing terrorist decision-making, in addition to external factors beyond the control of the perpetrators. Moreover, interactions between intervening variables make targeting processes profoundly dynamic and rarely straightforward.[9] Analysing the situational context is also essential. Here a customized variation of the triangle introduced by Cohen & Felson has been adopted; it distinguishes between offender, target and situational circumstances.[10] A structured approach, however, cannot necessarily explain target preferences and interlinked features. Therefore, process tracing has also been applied.[11]

The dataset utilised here consists of 246 registered plots and initiated attacks in Europe from 1994 to the end of 2016.[12] By confining the focus to one region with similar societal conditions, the relevance of the research for policymakers and practitioners is enhanced. As for other inclusion criteria, actors must adhere to the Sunni-based jihad ideology, for example as promoted by GIA, GSCP, al-Qaida and ISIS. There must be strong indications of a planned attack, or an attack must have been initiated. A plot is defined as a planned attack that has not yet been initiated. In order to be registered as an initiated attack, the act must have been set in motion against a selected target.

Information available on individual plots and attacks are rated as strong or vague. Strong documentation means there are several, well-documented indications that an attack has been planned or initiated. Vague documentation means that there are concrete indications that an attack is planned, but the indications are fewer and not as precise as in the strong cases. When measuring specific parameters or making comparisons in this article, only plots with strong documentation and attacks have been included. Each attack is assessed individually, which for example means that Muhammed Merah is coded in the data as being responsible for three incidents.[13] This is a prerequisite for a functional dataset on targeting, since every attack is unique. Each item has a case ID and, in addition to basic details, numerous MO and targeting related features have been registered. Nine target-type categories are established in accordance with observed practices of militant Islamists operating in Europe: authorities, diplomatic missions, military, law enforcement, public area, transport, public debate, religious institutions and others.[14] Regarding incidents involving transport, subcategories were established due to the different nature of the targets within this category. It also makes the analysis more useful for the different branches within the transport sector.

This research is built on open sources; the majority of information comes from mass media sources, legal documents and official inquiry reports.[15] Furthermore, a number of articles, reports and books on jihadists in Europe have provided detailed information in some cases.[16] Studies on militant Islamist ideological, strategic and operational texts have provided important insights about the jihadists’ rationale.[17] Finally, online publications from militant Islamists - like al-Qaida’s Inspire and ISIS’ Dabiq - have been examined, although propaganda often differs from actions taken.[18]
One must be realistic with regard to what can be retrieved from open sources. MO research requires detailed information, and the security services have richer data materials than academic researchers in this particular area. This is a main reason for focusing on targeting preferences, rather than detailed decision-making processes in this project. The strength of this research lies in the structured theoretical and methodological approach applied. By casting the net wide from the start, it has been possible to locate more incidents than a narrow approach would have achieved. This has led to a more complete picture with regard to the extent of militant Islamists’ actions in Western Europe for the 23 years under consideration in this study, as well as strengthened the potential for valid inferences. It is an advantage that the author has developed the dataset himself, since close familiarity with the research material ensures consistency with definitions and data inclusion. It is possible, however, that some cases have escaped his attention. Media reports can be overlooked and the security services may thwart attacks without publicly acknowledging them.[19] New information also sometimes sheds new light on old incidents.[20] It is, however, unlikely that additional information on a few missed cases will alter the main conclusions of this research significantly. Geographical boundaries and customized coding will make direct comparison with other projects challenging, but the same factors increase the relevance of this research for practitioners and policy-makers within the area covered.

**Expressed Intention of Producing Mass Casualties not Reflected in the Results Achieved**

The first topic addressed in this study involves the three issues of intent - the casualty focus, the hard or soft target preferences and the degree of discrimination. To begin with, it should be acknowledged that the number of casualties does matter. For authorities and the public, the number of fatalities says something about the severity of an attack, and for the terrorists it is a parameter for success. It also has considerable impact on the relationships between media coverage, public fear and political pressure on authorities to act more decisively.[21] However, mass casualty attacks may also backfire against terrorists in different ways.[22] A common definition of a mass casualty incident is that it involves a number of casualties, calling for an extraordinary effort from the emergency services.[23] Most analysts avoid setting a fixed number of fatalities in order to define a mass casualty incident, since local emergency capacities vary, but contextual information will most often clarify whether the casualty potential is low (e.g. five or fewer victims), or higher. In the latter case emergency capacities are likely to be activated regardless of location.

In 194 cases it has been possible to assess the casualty focus. 47 plots have vague documentation and are excluded from further analysis. According to the 77 plots with strong documentation, there is a mass casualty focus in 87.0% of the plots (see Figure 1.1), and a limited casualty focus in 22.1% (in seven plots both alternatives are present). In contrast, for the 70 launched attacks the mass casualty focus is down to 54.3%, while a limited casualty focus exists in 45.7% of the attacks (see Figure 1.2).

A mass casualty focus dominated in plots for almost the entire period. As for launched attacks, the mass casualty focus dominated significantly in the 1990s due to the consistent MO applied by GIA-linked groups. Meanwhile, a limited casualty focus increased from 2010 onwards. The mass casualty focus among militant Islamists is substantial, and it is rarely controversial within their own ranks. Some perpetrators conduct both limited and mass casualty attacks, like Muhammed Merah in 2012 and Amedy Coulibaly in 2015 - illustrating that tactical and practical factors (and not just moral reflections) influence target decision-making.[24] Regarding the divergence of casualty focus between plots and attacks, the explanation can be found in a few intertwined factors. Groups and larger networks, which dominated the scene until around 2010, seem more ambitious than lone actors. Intragroup dynamics and a perception of high capacity can initially trigger ambitious plans, which are reduced during the planning process. The increased limited casualty focus from 2010 corresponds with more attacks conducted by one perpetrator for the same period of time. The four relevant attacks in 2010 were Mohammed Geele’s attack on cartoonist Kurt Westergaard in Denmark, Roshonara Choudry’s attack on Member of Parliament Stephen Timms in East London, Lors Doukaiev’s attempt to send a parcel bomb to the newspaper Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen, and the Stockholm suicide bomb attack by Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly.[25] Also important to remember in this context is that groups run a higher
This analysis found that 26 of the 70 launched attacks conducted in Western Europe from 1994 to 2016 caused fatalities. In total 555 people were killed, leading to an average of 7.9 fatalities per attack. Eight attacks caused 523 deaths (94.2%), and seven of these were connected to established networks.[27] The eighteen remaining attacks that claimed lives caused four or fewer fatalities. Accordingly, most of these terrorist attacks do not lead to casualties, few attacks cause mass casualties, and those that do are normally the work of established networks. Less connected, ‘inspired’ jihadists rarely achieved grave results. It has been a negative development for the last few years with more attacks, however, and five of eight mass casualty attacks in the
dataset used here took place between January 2015 and December 2016. Several serious attacks have followed in 2017.

Weapon type is highly relevant for determining the casualty factor. Bladed weapons (e.g., knife, axe, etc.) and vehicles have increasingly supplemented explosives and firearms in attacks for the last several years. In the eight attacks causing mass casualties, explosives played an essential part in five of them: the 1995 St. Michel bombing, the 2004 Madrid bombings, the 2005 7/7 bombings, the 2015 November attacks in Paris (combined with assault rifles), and the 2016 Brussels bombings. The highly lethal potential of military assault rifles in particular has been demonstrated on several occasions. Examples include the 2014 Jewish Museum attack in Brussels, the 2015 Charlie Hebdo incident in Paris and the 2015 November attacks, also in Paris. The 2015 Sousse massacre in Tunisia, where one man killed 38 people, fully illustrates the devastating effect that assault rifles can produce.[28] As illustrated in Nice and Berlin in 2016, as well as in Stockholm and Barcelona in 2017, the lethal potential of large vehicles overrunning pedestrians has proven significant.

**Increasing Focus on Soft Targets: Hardened Targets are Avoided**

Terrorists often consider the basic factor of how well a potential target is protected, and the level of protection they observe may range from unprotected to very well-protected targets. The latter are considered *hardened targets*, and typically include state leaders, government buildings, military bases and commercial airlines. Targets with no or inadequate protection are referred to as *soft targets*, and can include unarmed civilians (as well as police and military personnel patrolling a street, in contrast to clear-cut distinctions in some reports). [29] Importantly, the toolbox for preventive measures is extensive, but *target hardening* does not automatically lead to a hard target status.[30] A target can switch between being a hard or a soft target, for example, when additional protection officers are provided on special occasions.[31]

In 205 of the 246 cases it is possible to say something about hard or soft target focus. 53 plots have vague documentation and are excluded from further analysis. For the 82 plots with strong documentation, there is a hard target focus in 42.7% of them (see Figure 1.3), and a soft target focus in 75.6% (in 15 plots both alternatives were present). For the 70 attacks the hard target focus is down to 14.3% (see Figure 1.4), while there is a soft target focus in 88.6% (in two cases both alternatives are present).

![Fig. 1.3 Hard Target vs. Soft Target Focus 1994-2016 Plots](image-url)
The soft target dominance in plots is evident, but it is even stronger for actual attacks — in other words, the frequency of attacks against hard targets has decreased. The likely explanation is the combination of robust security at hard targets, and that militant Islamists find it legitimate to attack random civilians. By avoiding hard targets the odds for operational success and escape increases for the perpetrators.

As for the few hard target incidents in our database, it is interesting to note that no attacks involved the hardest targets, like state leaders or highly symbolic state buildings. These are far better protected today than they were just two decades ago. As such, hard targets have become harder, but soft targets are just as soft as they have always been. Accordingly, extensive protection does have a deterrent effect, given the fact that operational success is crucial for terrorists. Commercial airliners are the most consistent hard target with only four recorded attacks. Interestingly, it is possible to observe a shift of focus from hard to soft targets within the law enforcement and military target type categories. From 2000 to 2010 most plots and attacks within these categories were focusing on the headquarters of security and intelligence services or military bases respectively, which normally will have a hard target status. Since Arid Uka’s attack on U.S. servicemen in 2011, a clear majority of plots and attacks have targeted military personnel in a public area, or near the entrance of military premises — that is, in situations where they are momentarily most vulnerable. Likewise, after Bertrand N’s knife attack against police officers near Tours in 2014, plots and attacks against the law enforcement sector have (with one possible exception) been directed against police on the streets, near or in the entrance of police stations, and in one case at their home. In general, it can be said that police personnel in public areas represent soft targets for attackers, who have the element of surprise on their side and are acting at close range.

**Degree of Discrimination**

The discriminate factor is strongly linked to the terrorists’ rationality and ethical framework. If they find it legitimate to stage random attacks, the range of targets is almost unlimited. Indiscriminate targeting refers to attacking random civilians, while if there is some type of constraint in the selection of target, it is discriminate targeting. There are 207 cases where degree of target discrimination is specified. 55 plots have vague documentation and are here excluded from further analysis. For the 82 plots where strong documentation is available, there is an indiscriminate focus in 64.6% of them (see Figure 1.5), and a discriminate focus in 54.9% (in 16 cases both alternatives are present). For attacks, the indiscriminate focus is down to 48.6% (see Figure 1.6), while there is a discriminate focus in 54.3% (in two cases both alternatives are present).
Again, the mid-1990s was marked by the Algerian GIA network’s indiscriminate attacks in France, but apart from that the frequency of indiscriminate attacks is fairly low and even throughout the 2000s. The difference between plots and attacks seen in more recent years is mainly due to the fact that a number of lone actors have slipped under the radar and launched discriminate attacks against military and police personnel. On the whole, there is nevertheless a considerable indiscriminate focus noticeable among militant Islamists. Occasionally, the discrimination issue has become a topic for internal discussions among perpetrators.[38]

Turning to the discriminate attacks, several types of target groups in European societies have received attention from the jihadists. As previously mentioned, police and military personnel has often been a focus. Jews, Christians and media institutions are also among the frequent targets. Militant Islamists have also launched eight attacks against name-specific individuals. Usually these victims have a trophy target status, as they are in the public eye and the perpetrator(s) will receive a high level of recognition for murdering such persons. Individuals alleged to have insulted the prophet as well as participants in the public debate have been particularly targeted.[39] So, although freedom of speech is guaranteed in all liberal democracies, those individuals who draw public attention to themselves by their words or actions may run a higher personal risk.[40]
**Target Type Categories**

Turning to specific target type categories, the starting point for analysis is the 80 plots with strong documentation where targets have been identified and the 70 attacks that were actually conducted during the period from 1994 to 2016. A number of plots and a few attacks have involved several target type categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target type categories 1994-2016</th>
<th>Plots (n=80)</th>
<th>Attacks (n=70)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorities</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic missions</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public area</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public debate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious institutions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As this table illustrates, civilians in a public area and on public transport are the most common target types when it comes to plots, and these two categories are also targeted in more than 50% of the launched attacks - equally divided between them. Regarding transport, the attacks have primarily been directed against the aviation sector and railway trains, except for the bus attacks in the 2005 7/7 and 21/7 cases in London. Looking closer to the threats against aviation, there are four cases involving in-flight incidents and two involving airports. There are 13 incidents involving rail transport, with attacks against underground services and commuter trains dominating. It should be noted that initial plans of targeting the aviation sector are not often followed up on in practice, in comparison to plots involving rail transport.

Terrorist interest for targeting top politicians and highly symbolic buildings is evident in several plots, but not reflected in actually conducted attacks. This must be due to the high level of protection dedicated to VIPs and buildings of this type. However, as has been made clear by the stabbing of MP Timms in 2010 and other cases, politicians a step below the top level are more vulnerable for attacks – especially when out of office. Diplomatic missions from countries like the U.S. and Israel are well protected, therefore initial interest in targeting them may often be discarded in favour of softer targets. Citizens, servicemen and companies from the U.S. and Israel seem to serve as substitution targets to a certain degree, and are addressed later in this article.

Law enforcement and military personnel are attractive targets, as they are symbolic and representatives of the state, and also are often direct parties of the conflict. As described above when discussing hard and soft targeting, we have observed a shift of focus away from the HQs of security services and military bases, to police and military personnel on the streets or near police station and military base entrances. Although somewhat hypothetical, it is possible that Arid Uka’s killing of two U.S. servicemen in 2011, as well as the 2013 Lee Rigby murder, inspired others to use the same attack approach against police and military personnel.

Attacks in the public debate category have primarily been directed against individuals and institutions that have, according to the Islamists, offended the Prophet or promoted blasphemy. Most of the cases have been related to the 2005 Muhammed cartoons and Lars Vilks’ drawings.[41] It is interesting to note that militant Islamists have plotted or carried out more attacks against public debate participants and media individuals than politicians. In fact, this is why former Danish police intelligence and security director general Scharf at one time called for a critical review regarding the use of close protection capacities.[42]

As in the case of public debate participants, the targeting of religious leaders and institutions has mainly been discriminate, like the plots against the San Petronio Basilica in Italy, which has a controversial fresco inside.[43] The churches of interest to Sid Ahmed Ghlam in Villejuif in Paris in 2015, as well as the church attacked
by two men in Normandy (France) in 2016, may have been chosen more at random, and here the perpetrators’ local affiliation may have been a factor.[44] Interest in attacking critical infrastructure targets has been low. This includes nuclear facilities, although an interest displayed in a few cases worldwide should be noted. [45]

**Particularly Exposed: American, Israeli and Jewish Targets**

A target issue of interest not covered above is that the United States, Israel and Jews have been given substantial attention in the jihadists’ discourse and rhetoric, since the early days of the jihad movement.[46] Has this, however, been reflected in the actions taken? The total dataset shows that there have been U.S.-linked targets in 34 of 209 cases where targets could be identified—more specifically, in 9 conducted attacks and 25 plots. The fact that 12.9% of the 70 launched attacks have targeted U.S. interests or citizens, combined with the number of plots where such interest has been identified, shows that statements reflecting anti-American verbal aggression have been followed by action. Launched attacks against trans-Atlantic flights are on top of the list with three attacks, followed by two attacks against U.S. embassies carried out by low-capacity actors. Casualties in attacks where U.S. citizens have been deliberately targeted are found in the 2011 Arid Uka attack against military personnel in transit at Frankfurt airport, and the massacre at the Bataclan concert venue in the 2015 November Paris attacks, where the American band *Eagles of Death Metal* was performing on stage.[47]

Regarding Israel and Jews, militant Islamists and Hezbollah represent a current global threat to them - as seen in attacks that occurred in South America, Europe and Asia.[48] The total dataset shows that there have been Israeli or Jewish targets in 26 cases, more specifically in 19 plots and 7 attacks. Additionally, it has been documented that the 2004 Madrid bombers and members of the Cannes-Torcy network planned follow-up attacks against Jewish targets.[49] 10% of the 70 conducted attacks were directed against a variety of Jewish targets: two schools, two kosher shops, a museum, a synagogue, and a rabbi in a public area. Three attacks caused four victims each: the 2012 Merah attack against a Jewish school, the 2014 Jewish museum attack in Brussels and the 2015 Kosher shop siege in Paris. No attacks have been launched against Israeli diplomatic missions, which have been extensively protected following a Palestinian terrorist attack against the Israeli embassy in Bangkok in 1972.[50]

**Militant Islamists’ Targeting Preferences in Comparative Perspective**

How do the targeting practices of militant Islamists in Western Europe compare to other ideological types of terrorists? Although coding issues do not allow strict comparisons, indications can be found by making a comparison with all ideological types of terrorists in Europe, using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland. The GTD has registered 4,409 terrorist incidents (excluding ambiguous cases) in Western Europe from 1994 to 2016.[51]

Figures 1.7 and 1.8 (below) illustrate that the general public is very much exposed to terrorist activity in general, since the categories “public area” and “transport” most often involve civilians who have no part in the conflict. However, it is important to note that the GTD includes a number of incidents against private property, which is not typical for militant Islamists in Europe. It is therefore reasonable to argue that compared to terrorists in other ideological categories, jihadists target people in public areas more actively. Islamist terrorists also have a greater focus on the transport sector. As with attacks in public areas, this may be related to the mass casualty focus, the intention of spreading fear among the public as well as the societal disruptive effect. The jihadists’ interest for targeting law enforcement is similar to that of terrorists in other ideological categories, but they give comparatively more attention to military targets. Furthermore, terrorists from other ideological directions have initiated more attacks against authorities. However, while the militant Islamists’ interest is largely directed against well-protected top-level targets, cases in the GTD also include incidents directed against low-level and local authorities.
Single Perpetrator Versus Duos and Groups

The issues addressed above are also of relevance for the lone actor vs. group actors debate, although it is often quite challenging to distinguish between these two actor categories. In general, most lone actors have some sort of contact with other extremists.[52] Some of the individuals conducting lone actor attacks have in fact been known to have a clear extremist milieu background, yet they have seemingly acted on their own initiative without involving others. One example is the Dutch-Moroccan Mohammad Bouyeri, who killed filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004. He had ties with the Hofstad network, but apparently planned and launched the attack without involving others.[53] Hence, there is always a substantial uncertainty regarding group and network participation when determining who actually may be involved in an attack. For this reason plots are left out of the discussion here, and a simple distinction is made between attacks physically carried out by one perpetrator and attacks executed by several perpetrators. In total 45 of 70 launched attacks have been carried out by a single individual (see Figure 1.9).
The table below illustrates findings related to hard or soft target preference, casualty focus, and indiscriminate or discriminate targeting attacks only – again, for the period 1994-2016.[54]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attacks 1994-2016 (n=70)</th>
<th>Hard target*</th>
<th>Soft target</th>
<th>Mass casualty</th>
<th>Limited casualty</th>
<th>Indiscriminate targeting*</th>
<th>Discriminate targeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One perp. (n=45)</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>86.7%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several perp. (n=25)</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
<td>84.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Two attacks conducted by one perpetrator included both alternatives.

Both categories are overwhelmingly focusing on soft targets for reasons explained earlier. However, there are differences when it comes to casualty focus and discrimination. Individuals conducting attacks alone have a mass casualty focus in about one third of the cases, while several perpetrators acting together have a mass casualty focus in more than four out of five cases. Regarding discrimination, duos and groups have targeted indiscriminately in four of five cases. This supports the assumption that groups are more ambitious than lone actors regarding a high damage result - both in planning processes and in launched attacks. Those conducting attacks alone are more often than not prioritising discriminate attacks. Interestingly, seven of the eight attacks targeting a name-specific individual were executed by one perpetrator only. As for the two most sophisticated attacks launched by one perpetrator - the in-flight attacks by the shoe bomber Reid in 2001 and by the Nigerian millionaire’s son Abdulmutallab in 2009 - these were centrally led. Regarding type of weapons utilised, the overview for the period 1994-2016 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attacks 1994-2016 (n=70)</th>
<th>Explosives</th>
<th>Firearms</th>
<th>Blades</th>
<th>Vehicle</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One perpetrator (n=45)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several perpetrators (n=25)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Three cases involved arson, toxic letters and hand grenades respectively.
** Two cases involved hand grenades

The single perpetrator category dominates the firearms category, while groups are more often behind attacks with explosives. As for bladed weapons use, the single perpetrator category is dominant. The same applies for vehicles, where the exceptions are the duos attacking Glasgow airport in 2007 and Lee Rigby in 2013. The attacks involving advanced or high-effective (military-grade) explosives, or assault rifles, were all conducted by individuals with links to criminal or Islamist networks.[55] For lone actors without such connections the ‘simple means’ approach prevailed, as it is not easy to acquire weapons illegally in most West European coun-
tries without risking detection through leakage or entrapment.[56]

**Jihadists Appear Conventional in their Targeting and Attack Approaches**

In general, militant Islamists in Western Europe are conventional and imitative when it comes to their targeting preferences – in contrast to suggestions implying that ISIS has shown innovation in this area.[57] The vast majority of targets can be categorized into a limited number of typical target types, and as such the main challenge facing counter-terrorism planners is more the broad range of potential targets the militant Islamists can choose from. Having established that the odd targets are few and far between, elaborating on what is not often struck becomes an issue. One example is that attacks directed against random private homes have been more or less absent, in contrast to what is seen in some other regions of the world.[58] The jihadists are also conservative with regard to attack approaches and weaponry. They can occasionally be creative, but are more adaptive than innovative, although a high level of sophistication and skills have been shown in a few cases - like the 2006 Liquid plot and the 2010 Cargo planes plot. The most advanced plots and attacks have unsurprisingly been linked to established, central terrorist networks.

This study did not have at its disposal information that would enable detailed tracking of the decision-making processes in each case. Nevertheless it appears that those executing the attacks will normally make the final target selection, for the simple reason that most attacks are not centrally organized.[59] Furthermore, it has in some cases been noted how central figures or the core leadership have suggested targeting alternatives, but have still given the perpetrators a say in the final decision regarding target selection.[60] In some cases, target proposals from the core leadership have also been rejected by the perpetrators.[61] From an operational point of view, leaving the target selection to those on the front line has advantages. They will often have local knowledge, be able to blend into the surrounding, and are in a better position to map potential targets that carry a limited risk of detection during the preparatory stage.

MO and targeting-related differences between AQ and ISIS operatives in Europe are hard to identify. Shifts in modus operandi trends appear to be influenced more by contextual and operational factors than by network affiliation. It is true that ISIS has a proven ability to launch complex mass casualty attacks, but so had AQ in the past. The one attack that arguably has had ISIS characteristics - since beheadings became an ISIS signature from 2014 onwards - was the previously mentioned 2015 Lyon Air Products factory incident, where the perpetrator beheaded his boss. That said, intentional beheadings were also observed in several jihadists cases in Europe before then, e.g., in the 2004 attack against Theo van Gogh, the 2007 Parviz Khan plot and the 2013 Lee Rigby murder.[62]

**What are the Lessons Learned?**

Based on the findings of this research into targeting, some brief recommendations can be made. First of all, it has been noted that politicians a step below the top level may be the ones most vulnerable for assassination attacks. Since close protection services are a limited resource, behavioural advice from security authorities and less resource demanding protective efforts based on individual threat assessments offer more cost-effective approaches. When it comes to highly symbolic buildings and premises, like parliaments and government institutions, the general absence of attacks indicates that physical protective measures work. This fact should inform considerations about creating security perimeters around other key institutions.[63] When it comes to diplomatic missions from exposed countries like the US and Israel, the substantial security efforts appear to have a deterrent effect, taking into account that there were only two incidents in our dataset.[64] It is also possible that previous failed attempts to enter U.S. and Israeli embassies may have contributed to the deterrent effect. One example is the incident at the Israeli consulate in Berlin in 1999, when three Kurds were killed by Israeli security guards during an attempt by more than 50 Kurds to storm the consulate.[65] When it comes to police and military personnel in public areas, vulnerabilities have been disclosed with regard to attacks from close quarters. Accordingly, proper tactics must be applied when they do patrols or guard duty. Attacks against crowds in public areas and in transport represent the most challenging issue, since it is not
possible to protect everyone everywhere all the time. Despite this fact, a structured combination of physical
security efforts, police response capabilities and rational behaviour from those attacked can make a positive
difference in this area. Certain crowded areas will benefit from the use of physical protection in the form
of bollards, balustrades and vehicle barriers, in order to counter vehicle attacks and vehicle-borne IED attacks.
Moving to police, a rapid response is vital when attacks take place, as acknowledged by French authorities
after the 2016 Nice attack.[66] The density of ordinary police coverage of an area is key, since local policemen
are most often first on the scene – if they have capacity to counter armed threats. Dedicated mobile response
units can be established in major cities, like the armed response vehicles in London.[67] This is a cost-effec-
tive alternative, compared to maintaining a permanent police presence in a large number of locations.

On top of this, national counterterrorism units, bomb disposal teams and negotiators possess crucial expertise
for some of the most difficult situations. During periods with a high or critical threat level, there will be
a lack of sufficient police resources to secure key assets, buildings and premises. Special police units can be
established for this, like in Berlin, where a dedicated local unit is securing non-federal assets.[68] It is also
important to further develop police-military cooperation, as proven with Operation Sentinelle in France.[69]
As for the general public, information campaigns from security authorities regarding how to behave when
observing suspicious activity or experiencing attacks are potential lifesavers.[70] Such campaigns can also be
of value in order to detect lone actors, who have proven difficult to detect in time with an intelligence-driv-
en approach alone.[71] When it comes to lone actors, research has made clear that information about an
impending attack is often being disclosed among those closely surrounding the perpetrator (e.g., family and
friends).[72]

Recommendations for public areas are also relevant for public transport. As for the aviation sector, airliners
are generally well protected. As demonstrated with the Rajib Karim case from 2010, however, the insider
threat needs more attention.[73] Some countries have taken intensified efforts to counter this threat, as seen
in France.[74] As for airport and railway terminal buildings, they are hotspots that need special attention.
Crowds in check-in zones and counters related to some specific airlines linked to certain countries must be
given enhanced attention. Finally, the cyber threat, which has worried counter-terrorism officials for years,
should not be neglected.[75]

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Notes
other publications include Hoffman, Bruce (1993). Terrorist Targeting; Tactics, trends and potentialities, Terrorism and Political
(2011). Understanding Terrorist Target Selection, in Terrorism and the Olympics, Richards, Fussey & Silke (Eds.). London: Rout-


[12] This dataset is part of a PhD dissertation project on terrorist target selection issues, conducted at the Norwegian Police University College and University of Stavanger. It will be made fully available at the website of first-mentioned at the time of conclusion. URL: www.phs.no


[14] Category Public debate includes media institutions. Category Others covers target types rarely selected by militant Islamists in Western Europe, like critical infrastructure and financial targets.


likely that they prioritized other targets over these. See Osborne, S. (2016). Isis terror cell ‘planned to attack Disneyland Paris and an interest in targeting the DGSI HQ (French security service), a police HQ and the High Court building. It is, however, more

[36] The possible exception is the ISIS-linked Strasbourg and Marseilles cell which was arrested in 2016. Its members displayed planes plot.

[35] These are the 1994 hijacking, the 2001 Richard Reid case, the 2009 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab case and the 2010 cargo

[34] See Nagin 2013: 199. Criminals can be deterred by apprehension and punishment. However, this is less applicable for militant Islamists; they tend to be more concerned about operational failure.


[32] An interest for such targets can be seen in some plots, but they are rarely developed into actual serious attacks.

[31] Cartoonist Kurt Westergaard and artist Lars Vilks are two examples. The protective steps at their homes do not necessarily

[30] For example politicians can receive basic security advice, and be equipped with modest protective measures at home and at their workplace, but they will still be soft targets.


[28] The eight incidents are the 1995 St Michel bombing, the 2004 M11 attacks, the 2005 7/7 bombings, the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack, the 2015 13 November attacks, the 2016 Brussels bombings, the 2016 Nice truck attack, and the 2016 Berlin truck attack. At the time of writing there is no clear direct link between the 2016 Nice perpetrator and central jihadi networks.

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[39] For example the killing of Theo van Gogh in 2004, several plots and attacks against Kurt Westergaard and Lars Vilks, the 2013 attack on Lars Hedegaard, and the 2015 killing of Stéphane “Charb” Charbonnier.

[40] Militant Islamist publications contribute to the creation of a trophy target status and to keep such a focus alive over a long period of time. In Inspire magazine issue 10 (2013), the Islamists presented a dead or alive list, naming 11 people. Most of them were linked to media, namely Carsten Juste (mentioned as Luste, editor-in-chief in Jyllandsposten from 2003 to 2008), Kurt Westergaard, Lars Vilks, Stéphane “Charb” Charbonnier, Flemming Rose (culture editor in Jyllands-Posten in from 2004 to 2010) and Molly Norris (US based cartoonist).


[42] Skjoldager 2016: 153-155


[45] A targeting interest has for example been noted around facilities in the United States, Lucas Heights in Australia, the Dimona facilities in Israel, Sizewell in the UK, as well as facilities in the Netherlands, France and Belgium.


[47] One could also argue that the 2015 Lyon gas factory attack was directed against US interests since the factory was U.S. owned, but the one person killed before the attack on the factory was the perpetrator’s boss. See The Guardian (2015). French terrorism attack: suspect took selfie with severed head. URL: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/28/french-terrorism-suspect-took-selfie-with-slain-victim


[54] Two attacks involved both hard and soft targets, based on the definitions utilised in this project; the 2003 toxic letters case in...
Belgium, and the 2015 Copenhagen attack on Lars Vilks. Furthermore, two attacks involved both discriminate and indiscriminate targeting; the 2015 Copenhagen attack against Lars Vilks, and the 2015 Lyon gas factory incident.

[55] Mehdi Nemmouche and Amedy Coulibaly are two examples.

[56] Not only seen in plots, but also confirmed by former terrorists in interviews by the author conducted from 2013 to 2017.


[58] Regarding the attack against a police couple at their private home in Magnanville in June 2016, there are strong indications that the perpetrator knew the police officer from before. BBC News (2016b). France police killing: Jihadist Abballa 'knew his victim'. URL: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36547663


[60] One example is the 7/7 2005 bombings. Notes from central AQ planner Rashi Rauf revealed that the perpetrators were given the choice between the Bank of England, the G8 summit in Scotland and the London underground. CNN (2012). Documents give new details on al Qaeda's London bombings. URL: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world/al-qaeda-documents-london-bombings/

[61] The Sauerland-cell was encouraged to attack Uzbek targets, Steinberg 2013: 71, 74. Furthermore, there are claims that Merah was encouraged to target the Indian embassy, Naravane, Vaiju (2012). Slain terrorist Merah planned to attack Indian embassy in Paris. The Hindu. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/slain-terrorist-merah-planned-to-attack-indian-embassy-in-paris/article3430764.ece


[71] Hemmingby & Bjørgo 2016: 88-95


Research Notes

On and Off the Radar: Tactical and Strategic Responses to Screening Known Potential Terrorist Attackers

by Thomas Quiggin

Abstract

Islamist inspired terrorists have carried out attacks in Europe even when they had been “on the radar” of officials. But they dropped “off the radar” and then struck. This phenomenon was noted by Dr. Bob de Graaff in a January 2017 article in the Groene Amsterdammer. More attacks followed by individuals who had dropped “off the radar.” De Graaff’s article questioned whether authorities were doing something wrong and whether they miss opportunities during moments of contact. The Dutch National Police (Taskforce Vreemdelingen en Migratiecriminaliteit) responded and organized a two-day event on this subject. Based on the presentations and discussions at the conference, the author of this paper suggests that tactical front-line officials can exploit opportunities to improve assessments that disrupt attacks. In the future, however, the attack levels in Europe will likely increase if no strategic level response is forthcoming. Reciprocal radicalization will also increase. Terrorism is a tactic. Therefore counter-terrorism activities are - by definition - at the tactical level. To be effective at the tactical level, authorities need an understanding of the principal problem at the strategic and operational levels. By analogy, it is as if NATO had been trying to defend Europe while refusing to admit that the Soviet Union existed. The European nations need to understand their invasive strategic level Islamist ideology problem. Without change, the prudent policy now would be to condition the public to accept the deaths and injuries caused by future terrorist attacks.

Keywords: Islamist extremism, Terrorism, Tactical counterterrorism, Strategic response

Terrorist attacks are often carried out by individuals who were “on the radar” and were known to police and intelligence services.[1] How do we assess such individuals more effectively to prevent future attacks? Current approaches appear fragmentary and lack the validation necessary to know if they work.[2]

Terrorism is a tactic used by individuals or groups who believe that violence, or the threat of violence, will help them achieve their political aims. This tactic of violence is part of an overall strategy of the group as it seeks to obtain its goals or objectives. By definition, counter-terrorism is a tactical level activity as it is aimed at preventing an activity at the tactical level (i.e. a terrorist attack). Terrorism itself is a symptom of the larger strategic problem.

The root problem at the strategic level is the rapid spread of Islamist extremism which is driven by the global struggle for the soul of Islam. The battleground is in almost 100 countries, many of which are in Europe and The West. On one side of the struggle is the Islamists – those who believe in a political, Salafist, and supremacist form of Islam. On the other side are the modernists – who want to see Islam as a modern religion accepting of democracy, science and women. The Islamists have the dominant voice in the West and increasingly have the upper hand in many Muslim majority countries. Historical analogies are dangerous, but the struggle for the soul of Islam can be loosely compared to the Protestant Reformation of 1517 to 1648. It should be remembered that 130 years of conflict caused Germany to lose about 40% of its population. The “Islamic Reformation” will last longer and may be deadlier.

Governments regularly tell their employees to “think outside the box” and then usually ignore them or punish them when they think differently. This is a problem at the operational and strategic levels. Strategic thinking has become nearly a lost art in government and even in the military. As Dr. Isabelle Duyvesteyn of Leiden University wrote: “We can at present not but come to the conclusion that we are quite good at tactical disruption of our enemy, instead of generating strategic effect.”[3] This statement captures the nature of the problem of the
invasion of the Islamist ideology into Europe and the West in general. We have tactical responses which are sometimes effective, but no strategy to defeat the problem.

Part of the “off the radar” problem is the increasingly large numbers involved. According to a variety of official sources as many as 85,000 Islamist extremists exist in the UK,[4] the Netherlands, France,[5] Germany,[6] Belgium, Spain and Switzerland.[7] This number could go past 100,000 if Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Portugal and Greece are included. Effectively tracking them all is a physical impossibility for the law enforcement and intelligence agencies. A typical full-time surveillance operation against one individual can take as many as 10 to 20 officers.

The number of extremists will continue to increase due to: (a) migration;[8] (b) the output of Islamist runs schools K-12;[9] and (c) populations that are growing under isolated and ghettoized conditions.[10]

The rapid rise and spread of Islamist extremism in the West is not random. It is organized by a variety of well-funded groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood,[11] Hizb ut Tahrir and the Iranian Khomeinists. Although these groups represent varying theologies, especially the Iranians, they share a common Islamist supremacist ideology. Their ideas on strategy and tactics also diverge on occasion. A variety of Gulf States also fund salafist groups which have strong Islamist leanings.

The United Arab Emirates, for instance, lists 83 groups as being terrorist groups, front groups, proxy groups or fundraisers for terrorist groups,[12] many of which are in Europe. Among the leading European organizations noted by the UAE are the Cordoba Foundation (UK), the Muslim Association of Britain, the Muslim Association of Sweden, the Islamic Society of Germany, the League of Muslims in Belgium, Association of Italian Muslims, Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, the Union of Islamic Organisations of France, and the Finnish Islamic Association. Also noted is the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) which has members in a variety of countries, including Europe.

The largest and most effective of the Islamist groups is the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. It has a permanent, structured presence in at least 81 countries and it continues to spread. The second largest global group is likely Jammat e Islami, founded as a sister group to the Muslim Brotherhood by Ala al Maududi in Pakistan in 1941. More importantly is the fact that many of the most dangerous Islamist groups have been formed by former members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Some of them are front groups (Hamas) while others are spinoffs created by former Muslim Brotherhood members who had different or emerging ideas on tactics. Among them are ISIS (Abū Bakr al-Baghdadi), Al Qaeda (Abdullah Az-zam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden), Hizb ut Tahrir (Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani), the Abu Sayaf Group (Salamat Hashim), and Boko Haram (Mohammed Yusuf). As noted, also included in this list is Hamas (Ahmed Yasin, Abdel Aziz Rantissi) which openly identifies itself in Article Two of the Hamas Covenant as “one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine.”

There is no such thing as a “moderate Islamist” as their most fundamental belief calls for the domination of their form of political Islam over all others. The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna stated that “It is the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be dominated, to impose its law on all nations and to extend its power to the entire planet.”[13] The founder of Jamaat e Islami, Ala al-Maududi, stated that “Islam wishes to destroy all states and governments anywhere on the face of the earth which are opposed to the ideology and programme of Islam.”[14] The motto of the Muslim Brotherhood is Allah is our objective, The Qur' an is the Constitution, The Prophet is our leader, Jihad is our way and Death for the sake of Allah is our wish. Hassan al-Banna’s own slogan was “Islam is the solution.”[15]

Islamist groups should be seen as either “violent” or “not yet violent.”[16] Some Islamist groups have an overtly violent approach to almost every question or problem. This would include ISIS, al Qaeda, Boko Haram, the Abu Sayaf Group and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Other groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood (and its front groups) take a more calculated approach. When operating in the West, for instance, their front groups continue to follow their “bottom up” approach to organizing at the community level. They reject violence and claim victim status at every opportunity. As with many of the Islamist groups, when they gain in strength they start
to become aggressive through campaigns of “Islamophobia” accompanied by lawsuits (lawfare)[17] in order to silence critics. Once in positions of some limited power, Islamist groups will become abusive of others. Once in real power, they become violent and oppressive towards all others (cf. Egypt 2012, ISIS 2014 etc.).

The Muslim Brotherhood as it existed in its home country of Egypt did try from the 1970s to the mid-1990s to separate itself from the worst of its own violence. However, those behind that effort are now mostly dead or have been forced to the sidelines. The official line now of the Muslim Brotherhood to its own followers is one of violence and martyrdom.[18]

The recent rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) is but one small part of the overall problem. The demise of ISIS will not end the Islamist problem. The collapse of ISIS will simply be converted into “martyrdom” in the Islamist narrative and the struggle will continue. Of greater concern is that ISIS proved that Islamists built a caliphate which withstood the attacks of the West and its allies for four years from its inception and three years after it captured Mosul. There is now ISIS controlled territory in the Philippines (Marawi City) [19] as well as ISIS having a significant visible presence in Bosnia,[20] Gaza,[21] Afghanistan,[22] and Egypt. [23]

In the face of this global Islamist insurgency,[24] the EU and Western states collectively lack any shared understanding of the problem. No strategy has been formulated, nor does even a reasonable discussion occur on how to resist the invasion of this Islamist ideology. Much of what are called “strategic plans” or “strategic assessments” are little more that ill defined plans on how to deal with tactical issues such as terrorist attacks or deradicalization programs which are largely failing.[25]

To formulate a strategic approach to the invasion of the Islamist ideology, a variety of key factors need to be understood at the national and EU level. It must be understood that:

- A global Islamist problem exists.
- The Islamist problem is widespread in the Netherlands[26] and Europe generally, and it is growing quickly. Increased levels of migration increase this problem and promote reciprocal radicalization.
- The Islamist extremist movement is organized and well funded domestically and from foreign countries.
- The wide range of Islamist groups are driven by a common objective, even if they have different strategies and tactics.

Current approaches such as Confronting Violent Extremism,[27] Preventing Violent Extremism and deradicalization are having limited effects.

A national level/EU strategy to tackle the invasion of this foreign ideology would require, at a minimum, the following points:

- Identify the Islamist ideology as the problem specifically, not the general presence of Muslims. This must include a statement that political Islam has no place in Europe.[28] This could include listing foreign groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Libya as a terrorist entity, much as some Middle Eastern countries have done.[29] As noted, the United Arab Emirates list of terrorism entities includes multiple European and American groups.[30]
- European nations and the EU need to identify and map the extent of the Islamist networks in their midst. This includes networks, extremist mosques, charities, schools and cultural centres. It must also include supra-national organizations such the International Union of Muslim Scholars[31] run by Yusef Qaradawi, now living in Qatar. The UK report on the Muslim Brotherhood[32] can be seen as a good starting point, as is the Swedish report commissioned by the Sweden’s Civil Contingencies Agency.[33]
- The nations and the EU needs to defund and then undermine the platform of Islamist groups. Defunding should focus on removing the charitable status of Islamist groups as well as stopping the inflow of
foreign money that funds mosques, schools and cultural centres.

- At the tactical level, the above process will simplify and decrease the number and capabilities of the Islamist extremist networks. This will also give the operational and tactical levels the tools and knowledge needed to identify those individuals who go “on and off the radar.”

It should not be forgotten that part of the price of ignoring the invasion of the Islamist ideology is “reciprocal radicalization.” Countries as diverse as Canada[34] and Germany[35] are seeing deadly attacks against Islamists and (mostly innocent) Muslim migrants in general. The greater the spread of Islamist extremism and violence, the more likely that reciprocal radicalization will increase as a problem. Though outside the scope of the conference, it should be noted that another major economic downturn in Europe is likely. Quantitative Easting (money printing), long term low interest rates, high public and private debt along with an uncontrolled derivatives market will ensure that the next downturn is significant.[36] Historically, in times of economic downturn the general population tends to turn on the government and “the other.” In this case, “the other” will most likely be migrants, especially those who are identified as Islamists or Muslims.

The most significant obstacles to a more effective strategy on Islamist extremism in Europe might be political correctness and cultural relativism. The press and the police are literally afraid to discuss or act upon any issue that might identify them as racist or Islamophobic. While not specifically an Islamist group issue, consider that in Rotherham UK, 1,400 girls between the ages of 11 and 14 were raped, drugged and then forced into sexual slavery between 1997 and 2013. The victims were primarily white girls and the attackers were primarily Pakistani Kashmiri Muslims. The violence against these girls was known to police, the social workers and the city council since at least 2002. Collectively, however, they were unwilling to act for fear of being called racist or Islamophobic. When the Home Secretary commented on the official government “Jay Report”[37] on this long-term mass rape, she noted that the problem was one of “institutionalized political correctness.”[38] Denis McShane, the former Rotherham Labour MP was questioned by the media the day after the Jay Report was released. He made a stunning statement concerning the role of multiculturalism in the UK. Speaking to the BBC, he stated he was a “Guardian reading liberal leftie” and that “I think there was a culture of not wanting to rock the multicultural community boat if I may put it like that.”[39] Notwithstanding this official government report and the media reports around it, the problem has occurred in several other cities[40] and may be continuing now. If a variety of politicians at the municipal and national level cannot even act when such violence is occurring, how willing are they to tackle extremists Imams who preach the Islamist ideology?

The general knowledge of politicians, bureaucrats, academics and the press needs to be improved. Among the more thoughtless and ill-informed statements being made are:

- **The current wave of terrorist attacks has “nothing to do with Islam.”** This statement results from politicians who are completely submerged by political correctness or by apologists who have sympathy for the Islamist ideology. Muslims on both sides of the conflict are painfully aware that Islam has a problem as more Muslims die in this conflict than non-Muslims.

- **“To try to understand their motives (ISIS) is futile because their motives are pure and unmitigated evil.” “These criminals are not motivated by any recognizable religion, but by a perverse view of the world.”** These statements were made by Mayor Bonnie Crombie of Mississauga Canada, but they are common in much of the West.[41] The statement is defeatist in that it says it is futile to identify the motives, when in reality the motives of the attacks she was referring to were rather clear. Additionally, it states that the “criminals” were not from any recognized religion. In reality, large numbers of Muslims, such as the Muslim Reform Movement[42], have clearly identified that a virulent form of Islam is responsible for these kinds of terrorist attacks.

- **More people die in their bathtubs every year than die from terrorism.** This is perhaps the most disturbing statement when it comes from politicians or journalists. The weapon of the terrorist is not a knife, a gun or a bomb. The weapon of the terrorist is the fear that is injected into a society. Many terrorist groups call in their attacks before the bomb goes off. They want publicity for their cause, not death. Other ter-
terrorist groups have made the assessment that the greater the number of deaths, the more press coverage (and effect) they will have. Whatever the situation, the measure of terrorism is not death, it is the level of fear and (over)reaction their attacks receive from the society they are attacking. By this measure, the Islamist are successful. Those who insist on using this sort of statement are either fundamentally ignorant of the nature of terrorism or are apologists for the Islamist cause.

- **Lone wolves are responsible for Islamist attacks.** The term lone wolf has come into popular usage, most likely because journalists and academics (to some degree) feel it is a “cool term.” The concept of a lone wolf in Islamist attacks is almost non-existent.[43] Many are sole attackers, but they are regularly a part of a larger network. “Lone wolf” attacks do occur, but the most recent tangible examples are Anders Breivik, Timothy McVeigh and Theodore Kaczynski (Unabomber). None of them were Islamists. Again, the use of this term either reveals general ignorance on the part of the person using it or they are attempting to downplay the networked nature of the larger Islamist problem.

- **The Internet causes radicalization.** The Internet does not “cause” extremism and radicalization. Terrorism existed before the Internet and Islamist extremism was operationalized before email and blogsites were available. CD Rom technology was used effectively to recruit for the Chechen jihad and in radicalizing others into being members of terrorist plots.[44] While greater awareness of the Internet and social media may be an effective tool at the tactical level, it will have little to no effect at the strategic level. The government’s interest in terrorism and the Internet seems to be part of a larger effort at the long-held wish to exert greater government control over the Internet.

- **Women emerging as terrorists is a new phenomenon.** Women have not, in general, played a leading role in terrorist attacks in Europe or North America with only limited exceptions. However, the view that this is somehow new is incorrect. In 1991, British journalist Eileen MacDonald wrote a book with the title “Shoot the Women First.”[45] It was based on research into female terrorists among the radical left and the Palestinians. She identified women as not only a threat, but they would be more likely to shoot first or attack when under pressure and therefore more dangerous than men.

- **The emerging threat from social media is the most dangerous aspect of terrorism.** Statements on the state of social media are frequently alarmist and focus on the “newness” of the threat. However, the governments of the day in 1848 were concerned about the social media of their day – the man portable printing presses that could put out pamphlets immediately after an event. Again, monitoring and attacking social media sites may be quite useful at a tactical level, but it will do nothing to change the strategic problem of the expanding Islamist ideology.

**On and Off the Radar**

It is possible, in the short term, to create a workable assessment model to more effectively measure the likelihood of whether one individual may be at higher risk of becoming an active terrorist than another. Such a tactical assessment model would include group association, ideological thought leader association, money trails, personal belief systems (identity vs ideology), place and nature of education, technical skills background, converts and their situation, quotations and references to extremist ideology in social media and leadership figures.

This model, however, would only function at the tactical level and could not be expected to stop all terrorist attacks. The increasing numbers of Islamist extremists in Europe now are simply overwhelming and are increasing rapidly.[46]

**Future Outlook**

An economic downturn in the West will seriously aggravate both the Islamist extremist problem and the reciprocal radicalization. It is unlikely that any government is ready for this problem. While this is not the place to discuss details, the next economic downturn could be worse than 1980/81, 1990/91, 1999/2000 or 2007/09
Great Recession.

**Conclusion**

The military has an expression that says: “You cannot kill your way out of this problem.” The same can be said for law enforcement and the intelligence services in this case: You cannot arrest or disrupt your way out of this problem. The long-term solution to this problem is at the strategic level. This means the nation state and the EU.

If the nations and the EU do not devise a strategic response to the invasion of Islamist ideology onto their territory, then they must accept the idea that the ongoing fight at the tactical level will continue. The best policy without a strategic response is to condition the population to accept the costs of failure which are more terrorist attacks and more reciprocal radicalization.

**About the Author:** Thomas Quiggin has 30 years of practical experience in security and intelligence matters. He is a court expert in the reliability of intelligence as evidence and on terrorism (Criminal and Federal Court). His experience includes intelligence positions for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Armed Forces, the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia, Citizen and Immigration Canada (War Crimes), the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Privy Council Office of Canada and the Bank of Canada. He was also a Senior Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

**Notes**

[1] Bob de Graaff, Losers op en onder de radar, 04 January 2017, De Groene Amsterdammer. This article is available online at https://www.groene.nl/over . Viewed 21 September 2017. Rated A2. (Sources in this paper are rated according the Admiralty System A1F6 or the NATO System. The A to F rating stands for the source of the material which is listed as highly dependable (A) down to not dependable (E) or Unknown (F). the 1 to 6 rating stands for the credibility of the information itself, separate from the source. It is rated as 1 (high credibility) down to 5 (low credibility) or 6 (unable to assess.)


[6] Germany must brace for more attacks by radicalized Muslims: officials, 04 July 2017, Reuters News Service. The article can be seen online at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security/germany-must-brace-for-more-attacks-by-radicalized-muslims-officials-idUSKBN19P1MY . Viewed 21 September 2017. Rated A2. For more on this see also Allan Hall, WE’VE LOST CONTROL! Germany cannot cope with ISIS terror cells because the country’s Muslim population has grown so rapidly, top intelligence official admits, 09 January 2017, The Sun. This article can be seen online at https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2573862/germany-cannot-cope-isis-terror-cells-muslim-population-grown-intelligence-official-admits/ . Viewed 21 September 2017. Rated C3. There may be as many as 400 extremist individuals being tracked in just Berlin by itself. For more on this see Mehr als 400 gewaltbereite Salafisten leben in Berlin. The article can be seen online at http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/28387288 . Viewed 21 September 2017. Not rated.
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What the problem is. A global jihadist insurgency. We know the solution required. Full spectrum counter-extremism led by civil society, Rafiq says, "It is frustrating that we are still having the same conversations I was having in Downing Street a decade ago. We know...


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For more on the problem of migration trends in Europe see the overview paper Anticipating Future Migration into Europe (2018-2050): Beyond the irresponsibility of current political and humanitarian short-termism. This paper is available online at https://www.laetusinpraesens.org/docs10s/futmigrat.php . Viewed 21 September 2017. Not rated.

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For more on the problems of Islamist extremism in Bosnia see Bosnia & Herzegovina: Extremism & Counter-Extremism, date not given, the Counter Extremism Project. The article can be seen online at https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/bosnia-herzegovina . Viewed 21 September 2017. Not rated.


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[26] Among the Muslim Brotherhood fronts in the Netherlands are the Es-Salaam mosque in Rotterdam, the Al-Aqsa Foundation (branch of German head office) and the Liga van de Islamitische Gemeenschap in Nederland (League of the Islamic Community in the Netherlands) or LIGN was founded in The Hague. The UAE list also included the International Union of Muslim Scholars, which has Imams in the Netherlands. The UAE list also listed Islamic Relief UK, which has a branch office in Amsterdam. Another UAE listing was the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe which has a headquarters in Belgium but a presence throughout most of Europe. For source material on these issues see http://www.globalmb.watch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/The-Influence-of-the-Muslim-Brotherhood-in-the-Netherlands.pdf. See also AIVD, The radical dawa in transition. The rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands (2007) pp. 49-52., file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/theradicaldawaintransition.pdf. See also the UAE list at https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/list-of-groups-designated-terrorist-organisations-by-the-uae-1.270037.

[27] See, among many others, Clarke Jones, Why countering violent extremism programs are failing, 30 June 2017, Asia and the Pacific Policy Society. This paper can be seen online at https://www.policyforum.net/countering-violent-extremism-programs-failing/. Viewed 21 September 2017. Not rated.


[36] A variety of economic observers believe that a combination of high speed trading, Quantitative Easing and long term low interest rates have essentially destroyed the price discovery aspect of most financial markets. Most of this economic activity has been driven by Central Banks who are attempting to re-inflate their respective economies following the 2007/2008 economic downturn. One side effect is that the process of creative destruction, that is to say the collapse of non-productive enterprises, has been avoided, meaning that the next economic downturn may be even more destructive. Increasingly high debt which is both private and public, means that governments may not have the resources for bail out and high social welfare costs.


[44] Momin Khawaja was arrested in 2004 in Ottawa Canada for his role in a terrorism plot in the United Kingdom. During the investigation, it was revealed that he had used the “Russian Hell” set of videos about the Chechen conflict as recruiting tools. For more on this, see the report on his radicalization at [https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_2.5_MominKhawajaMechanismsofRadicalization_Aug2016.pdf](https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_2.5_MominKhawajaMechanismsofRadicalization_Aug2016.pdf). Viewed 21 September 2017. Not rated.


Resources

Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 30 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects

by Joshua Sinai

This column consists of capsule reviews of books from various publishers. The reviews are arranged in alphabetical order, per authors' last names.


As explained by the author, “The goal of this book is to analyze the cultural meanings of mental health knowledge and practice produced throughout the War on Terror. My framework for studying the interrelationships of mental health, culture, and power come primarily from cultural psychiatry and medical anthropology.” (p. ix) Viewing the application of medical systems in the War on Terror as “cultural systems,” the book’s chapters cover topics such as bioethics and the conduct of mental health professionals in counter-terrorism; the meanings of symptoms by Guantanamo detainees, such as their underlying motives and their “psychological deterioration,” including an assessment of hermeneutical adjudications in specific detainee cases; how psychodynamic scholarship depicts Arabs and Muslims; how suicide bombers are depicted in mental health scholarship, such as in the works of Donatella Marazziti, Anne Speckhard, Arie Kruglanski, Jeff Victoroff, Fathali Moghaddam, Jerrold Post, and Talal Asad; and assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs, with an assessment of the approaches of specialists such as John Horgan, Rohan Gunaratna, as well as selected programs in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Yemen. In assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs, the author offers practical insights, such as “Which components of de-radicalization programs embody local knowledge and practice and which components can be applied across cultures? How do such programs reflect implicit, unspoken norms about politics, religion, and society, as with state allegiance programs for Yemen and Saudi Arabia enveloped within religious instruction? How do these programs create new ways of being, feeling, and experiencing in the world for militants, their families, and supervising government officials? How do these programs produce new cultural materials such as pedagogical texts and policy documents, as well as novel institutions that reconfigure kinship, community, and social relations?” (p. 156) Although one might criticize the author’s uncritical view of Islamist terrorists, there is significant methodological and analytical insight in this study to recommend it as a major contribution to the literature on the psychology of terrorism and the application of psychology and psychiatry to address the phenomenon of terrorism. The author is an assistant professor of clinical psychology at Columbia University and a research psychiatrist at the New York State Psychiatric Institute.


In 1968, Syrian philosopher Sadik al-Azm—who had obtained his doctorate in modern European philosophy at Yale University, and was teaching at the American University of Beirut—wrote Al-Nakd al-Dhati Ba’da al-Hazima (Self-Criticism After the Defeat), which was a stinging critique of Arab society for its failure to adopt to the modern world, exemplified by the decisive defeat of its militaries in the June 1967 war with Israel. This book was highly influential at the time among progressive Arab intellectuals, and was reissued in an English translation by the publisher in 2011, with a foreword by the late Fouad Ajami, a Lebanese American academic who was also a critic of Muslim Arab society. What is especially pertinent about this book is that the author’s critique of Arab society now especially applies, not necessarily to Arab state political leaders, but to the extremist Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadi groups such as al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State (ISIS) who are waging their various insurgencies throughout the Muslim world. What is al-Azm’s critique? As explained by Ajami, in his foreword, “A ‘traditional people’ who spoke of war in...
obsolete terms of chivalry and the ‘clinking of swords,’ the Arabs were not ready for a modern war, they had thought of the war as a triumphant ‘excursion.’” (p. 11) In what also applies to jihadi-type insurgents (but not current Arab societies), al-Azm had observed that such preoccupation conceals “reactionary resistance to the scientific progress, scientific socialist practice, and cultural revolution that societies walking these paths seek. All this in the name of defending the people's traditions, values, art, and heritage, when it actually shields popular supernaturalism, superstitions, ignorance, and backward worn-out values, regurgitating the old in its obsolescence and leaving social conditions and human relations as they are, that is, in a condition of severe backwardness.” (p. 118) By shifting the book’s lens to focus on current Islamist extremism, it is such insights that make this book so pertinent in understanding the reactionary nature of these movements and the measures that are required to counter them. The author died in December 2016, while living in Berlin, Germany.


This is an important and extensively documented account of the motivations and steps that led Palestinian American extremist Sirhan Sirhan to assassinate of Senator Robert F. Kennedy on June 5, 1968, which in retrospect (according to the author) can be considered as “the first act of the tragedy that culminated in 9/11.” (p. 11) Sirhan's pathway into violent extremism fits the profile of homegrown Islamist terrorists. As the author explains, “Sirhan might have been mentally unstable and angry at a society that had relegated him to the bottom of the heap…. [but he] clearly saw himself, like today's suicide bombers, as an Arab hero.” (p. 10) The book also discusses the assassination's aftermath, the trial—including controversies over physical evidence and witnesses used at the trial—and Sirhan's political attitudes and obsessions. Even though it was written some 10 years ago, the chapter on “The Unaffiliated Terrorist” is especially pertinent to understanding current lone wolf terrorists, as it discusses leading forensic psychology theories to explain Sirhan's possible mental state and motivations. This includes the discussion of psychologist Eric D. Shaw's personal pathway model, “which includes a socialization process, narcissistic injuries, escalatory events, and those terrorists ‘who have suffered from early damage to their self-esteem….Family political philosophies may also serve to sensitize those persons to the economic and political tensions inherent throughout modern society….As a group, they appear to have been unsuccessful in obtaining a desired place in society, which has contributed to their frustration.” (p. 244) Targeting Senator Kennedy, the author concludes, was due to Sirhan's political motivations; he writes that “without Sirhan's Arabness and without the bitterness and hatred toward Jews that had their roots in the conflict in the Middle East, it is unlikely he would have assassinated Robert Kennedy. All the hatred that spewed forth from Sirhan's gun can ultimately be traced back to one source – Palestinian nationalism.” (p. 263) The author is a veteran British journalist and author of numerous books on national security subjects.


The contributors to this edited volume examine the internal and external factors shaping terrorist-type conflicts in India. These include the Dalit movements and violence in Maharashtra, anti-caste violence, ethnic conflict by the Bodos in Assam, the Naxalite threat in Bihar, inter-group conflicts in India, violence against women in Jammu and Kashmir, and challenges to India's security presented by narco-terrorism and cyber-terrorism. One of this volume's contributions is its presentation of the perspectives and insights by leading Indian academic experts on these threats and how to solve them. An example is Deepika Chakraborty's chapter on "Naxalism: Threat to Internal Security, in which he writes that “Until the [Indian] government implements employment, poverty alleviation and land reform programmes, counterinsurgency measures cannot achieve much. Social justice and inclusive growth are the planks on which the government must build
its programme. Only with consolidated efforts on the part of the legal and political framework socio-economic reforms can be implemented, and the problem of Naxalism tackled.” (p. 260)


This book is a collection of papers commissioned for the 2015 Aspen Strategy Group Summer Workshop, in Aspen, Colorado. The workshop was convened to assess America's response to radical extremism in the Middle East. The book is divided into four parts: Part 1, “The Roots and Appeal of Extremism” (e.g., the history and ideology of the Islamic State, strategies to win the ideological war, and lessons on radicalization pathways from Egypt and Tunisia); Part 2, “The Rise of the Islamic State” (e.g. the spread of ISIS in the Middle East and how to fight it); Part 3, “A Toolbox to Counter ISIS” (e.g., military, political and cyber strategies to counter ISIS); and Part 4, “The American Strategy to Combat ISIS and Violent Extremism” (e.g., the principles of a successful strategy for America and its allies to defeat ISIS, and the challenge of countering violent extremism). The numerous insights by the volume's contributors include Princeton University's Professor of Near East Studies Bernard Heykal, who observes that groups such as ISIS flourish because of “an ideology of religious power and domination as well as political, social, and economic realities that provide a wellspring of recruits and supporters who feel deeply disenfranchised and increasingly marginal to the flow of history. Only by addressing seriously these underlying causes and grievances will the phenomenon of jihadism be effectively dealt with.” (pp. 27-28) The volume's authors are prominent experts with high-level government and think tank experience.


Thomas Edward Lawrence (known as T.E. Lawrence and “Lawrence of Arabia”), lived from 1888 to 1935. He became famous worldwide as a British archaeologist, military officer, diplomat, and author of Seven Pillars of Wisdom, which recounted his involvement as a British military officer seconded to assist the successful guerrilla warfare-based Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, which helped to lay the basis for the modern Middle East. This book focuses on the Seven Pillars of Wisdom as “part biography, part essay in interpretation.” (p. 1) The book is divided into two parts. The first part is an account of the more than seven-year period that Lawrence spent writing his book, which was published in 1926. The second part examines Seven Pillars from different angles, including accounts by other participants in the Arab Revolt, and the author's interpretation of major themes in the book, such as Lawrence's attitudes towards the Arabs, “his presentation of history, and the meaning of his autobiography.” (p. 3) The book's Epilogue presents a chronology of four versions of the book's text, as well as other resources for the book's and its chapter's editions. The author recommends that the book's readers first read Seven Pillars since the text provides page references for additional information. This book will especially appeal to T.E. Lawrence bibliophiles and others interested in delving deeper into literally everything associated with Seven Pillars. The author is a Cambridge University-educated British writer with extensive experience in the Middle East, who has written extensively about Lawrence.


This is a highly informative, authoritative and well-written account of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) within the wider landscape revolt by Irish Republican militant groups from the 1960s to the current era in Northern Ireland. As explained by the author, the UVF in its new form was reconstituted in 1965 “as a preemptive
defence mechanism against a perceived Irish Republican Army (IRA) threat, though its main purpose was as an instrument to put pressure on the ruling Unionist Party that was seen as weak on Irish republicanism and far too liberal in its views on northern Catholics and the Republic of Ireland.” (p. xviii) The author describes how, during the period of what became known as the “Troubles,” the UVF “killed 564 people, mostly Catholic civilians, and injured thousands more Protestants and Catholics between its first killing in 1966 and its most recent in 2010.” (p. xviii) It is within this context that the author seeks “to uncover the real causes of the ‘mental or emotional’ reactions that lead people to engage in violence” (p. xxi) and “the generic features of the UVF as a militant group – how it recruited, trained and organized, the disciplinary system of control exerted over its volunteers, its command structures, how it operated when carrying out its ‘counter-terrorist campaign against violent nationalism’ and everyone else, and, perhaps, most controversially of all, the forensic details of violence. It is my intention to look behind the mask of UVF terror to paint as accurate and comprehensive a picture as it is possible to give of a ruthless, organized and determined armed group.” (p. xxiv) This is excellently accomplished through the author’s extensive research and inside access to the UVF’s leading members, such as Billy Mitchell, David Ervine, Billy Wright, Billy Hutchinson and Gary Haggarty. Their loyalist rivals are also interviewed for a balanced perspective on the UVF’s activities. The UVF’s high profile bombing and shooting operations are also examined. The author concludes on a promising note that “The chances of needing to reactivate the UVF as a military-based organization are now slim.” (p. 334) This will depend, however, on “completing its process of transition. It will require legislation from the British and Irish governments to ensure that those who have moved away from their paramilitary pasts can be fully reintegrated and rehabilitated into society. And it will require victims and survivors of the troubles to work through the past to address the toxic legacy of political inspired violence and to ensure that the mantra ‘never again’ becomes the watchword on everyone’s lips.” (p. 334) The author is a Senior Lecturer in Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Camberley, England.


This edited volume’s chapters are based on a symposium on “9/11: Ten Years On,” held at a joint British Academy/University of St Andrews meeting in September 2011. As noted by the volume’s editor in the introductory overview, the contributors’ bring a multidisciplinary approach to examine the relationship between the challenges presented by terrorism and the effectiveness of counter-terrorism response measures. To address these issues, the volume’s contributors discuss a range of topics, such as Alia Brahimi’s chapter on al-Qaida and the 9/11 decade (in which he argues on p. 38 that “the illusion of counter-terrorism was the possibility of a military solution”); Rashimi Singh’s chapter on assessing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism in the post 9/11 era (three lessons are highlighted: a shift in the overall strategic character of war, the law of unintended consequences, and over-securitization of counterterrorism has fueled al-Qaida’s brand of ideology); David Omand’s chapter on recommended limits for Western counter-terrorism policy (with government ensuring that ethical principles are used in security and intelligence operations for public protection against major dangers); Conor Gearty’s chapter on the origins and utility of Western counter-terrorism policy (in which he argues that the 9/11 attacks ushered in new frameworks of laws not only to control al-Qaida-type militancy but to control dissent by other groups deemed subversive); Adrian Guelke’s chapter on misinformation in counter-terrorism (in which he proposes the intriguing observation that Western states, in their eagerness to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria had inadvertently become de facto allies of the insurgent jihadi groups); Audrey Kurth Cronin’s chapter on how and why terrorist campaigns end (with five patterns proposed: decapitation of terrorist group leaders, negotiations with terrorist groups, terrorist groups achieving their objectives, failure by terrorist groups, military defeat by government forces, and shifting terrorist campaigns to other areas, such as criminal activities); Richard English’s chapter on using the case of dissident Irish Republicanism to explain how terrorist campaigns do not end (but will “become enduringly marginal”); and David A. Lake’s chapter on the role of the global insurgency in contemporary world politics (in which he argues that with “no total or permanent solution to the global insurgency” the United States, which overextended
itself in countering terrorist insurgencies around the world, “should favour a strategy of retrenchment.”). The interesting arguments offered by the volume’s contributors are worth addressing in examining the challenges presented by contemporary terrorism and how to counter them effectively.


In this conceptually innovative, well analyzed, and important book, the author examines the question of whether terrorism works. This is an important question, the author writes, because answering it explains “some of the central dynamics of terrorist activity: its causation (why does it occur where and when it does?); its varying levels across place and time (why does it endure for periods and at the specific, differing levels that it does?); the processes by which terrorist campaigns come to an end (why does it dry up in some settings at some moments, but not in and at others?); and the patterns of support involved in terrorism (why are some people more likely to endorse and practice it than others?).” (p. 2) To answer these questions, the author insightfully formulates a conceptual framework, based on four outcomes for a terrorist campaign: 1) strategic victory (in terms of achieving a group's central, primary goal or goals); 2) partial strategic victory (such as a protracted stalemate); 3) tactical success (operational success or acquisition of publicity); and 4) the inherent rewards of struggle (such as attaining prestige and status for the group). (p. 30) This framework is applied to examining the effectiveness of terrorist insurgencies in the cases of al-Qaida, the Northern Ireland Provisional IRA, the Palestinian Hamas, and the Basque ETA, with numerous other terrorist groups also examined, although in lesser detail, such as the Lebanese Hizballah, the Sri Lankan LTTE, the African National Congress (ANC), the German Baader-Meinholf Group (or Red Army Faction), the Pakistani LeT, and others. Among the author's numerous findings is that all these case studies involved considerable human suffering, and yet none of the groups achieved their central goals. Further, “contrary to the confidence so often evinced by terrorist activists about violently achieved progress, very many of the political futures that they have helped to create have been far less worthy of celebration than they had anticipated. Indeed, in tune with historians’ frequent skepticism about historical watersheds, very much in political life (in our al-Qaida, PIRA, Hamas, and ETA case studies, for example) has actually proved continuous before, during, and after those groups’ violent campaigns in pursuit of dramatic change.” (p. 265) As demonstrated by such insights, this book is an important contribution to advancing the discipline of terrorism and counterterrorism studies. The author was, until recently Wardlaw Professor of Politics in the School of International Relations, and Director of the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.


This is an interesting “autobiography” by an Algerian journalist of “Nadia” (a pseudonym) – a young Algerian woman who (against her parents’ wishes) had been married at a young age to “Ahmed,” a petty criminal who became a local leader of the Islamic Action Group (GIA) in the 1990s. As recounted to the journalist, “Nadia” describes her difficult marriage to “Ahmed,” who was constantly disappearing to carry out operations for GIA, while she had to constantly seek GIA safe houses to avoid the government’s security services. Of particular interest is her description of what her husband told her was expected of a terrorist's wife: “he told me about his brothers and what they expected of me: ‘Now that we're married, you're part of the clan. You've become a sister. It's your obligation to cook for them and do their laundry. It will be your way of contributing to the creation of an Islamic state in Algeria. Somebody has to do those chores. The brothers are fighting against the taghout [false idols]. God has ordered them to do it. Besides, anyone who supports them is also indirectly taking part in the fight. I want you to be the one to help. That way, when I become an emir, you'll have the title of 'mother of the faithful' and God will count you among the chosen of the earth.’” (pp. 37-38) With her husband eventually murdered, “Nadia” was able to pull away from the GIA and regain her own life. In the
conclusion, “Nadia” writes that “I hope my story can serve as an example for other young women. It got into this mess because I was in love with a man who, all things considered, I hardly knew. We lived together for only three months. I'll tell my son everything as soon as he's old enough to understand. He has to know the truth some day.” (p. 150) With so many women, whether in the Middle East or the West, marrying jihadi fighters in Syria and Iraq, this book is instructive in showing the actual life they end up living with their husbands, which often is the opposite of the rosy expectations they are promised when they marry them.


The Alternative Right, commonly known as the Alt-Right, is a set of far-right wing ideologies, groups and individuals in the United States whose core beliefs is that “white identity” is under attack by multicultural forces (i.e., non-white and liberal elements) who seek to undermine the prominence of white people and their civilization. The Alt-Right is considered a destabilizing force in American politics, especially the intentionally provocative protest demonstrations by their adherents around the country. In an example of what may be a precedent to future Alt-Right terrorism, on August 12, 2017, an Alt-Right adherent deliberately rammed his car against a counter-demonstration in Charlottesville, Virginia, killing one person and injuring more than 30 others. To understand this threat, *Making Sense of the Alt-Right* is an excellent account of its goals, predecessors, and activities. What does the Alt-Right want? As the author explains, “The new-Nazi element of the Alt-Right desires the creation of something akin to the Third Reich, with everything this entails. Their best known website is the Daily Stormer, run by a new-Nazi named Andrew Anglin.” (p. 14) Another leader, Richard Spencer, the originator of the Alt-Right term, “supports the idea of creating one or more white ethnostates in North America.” (p. 15) The most prominent Alt-Right leader is Steve Bannon, a “right-wing nationalist and a populist,” (p. 129), who was fired as President Donald Trump's strategic adviser in mid-August 2017 and then returned to run Breitbart, the movement's influential media publication. In the concluding chapter, the author observes that “In a postconservative America, zero-sum identity politics may become the norm, and the Alt-Right will be on the periphery, pushing racial polarization at every available opportunity.” (p. 175) The author is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Alabama, in Tuscaloosa, Alabama.


With much of the literature on jihadi terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida and the Islamic State (ISIS), focusing on their warfare activities in ‘physical’ and ‘cyber’ space, this is one of the few books to examine the cultural dimension of jihadism as it applies to its militant adherents. This is an important topic for study, the volume's editor explains in his introductory overview, because “militancy is about more than bombs and doctrines. It is also about rituals, customs, and dress codes. It is about music, films, and story-rituals, customs, and dress codes. It is about music, films, and story-telling. It is about sports, jokes, and food.” (p. 1) This “rich aesthetic culture,” the editor adds, “is essential for understanding their mindset and worldview.” (p. 1) Research on this topic, the editor notes, is “also highly policy-relevant” about terrorism in general “because it can shed new light on why people join extremist groups and why some groups and movements survive longer than others.” (p. 17)

To analyze these topics, the contributors to the volume, who are leading experts in their respective fields, discuss topics in jihadi culture such as poetry, a cappella songs, a musicological perspective on jihadi anashid (Islamic chants), cinematography, and the relationship between the tradition of Islamic dreams and jihadi militancy, including martyrdom (as Muslim operatives are promised by their terrorist groups to continue living in an afterlife paradise following their death in suicide bombing attacks).
In the concluding chapter, the editor presents an inventory of non-military devotional practices in jihadi groups, such as prayer, invocations, ablution, Qur'an recitation, and exorcism; recreational practices such as video watching, storytelling, and dream interpretation; as well as identity-markers such as dress and grooming, adopting noms de guerre (kunyas), and slogans.

While this volume does accomplish, as the editor notes, an important survey of “the jihadi cultural universe and provide[s] a starting point for more research into the cultures of rebel groups,” (p. 201) one of its weaknesses is that much of the discussion concerns jihadi propaganda which paints an overly glorified portrait of jihadi life. Nevertheless, for counterterrorism services to counter these jihadi narratives, this volume provides the rich material that needs to be considered in counter-messaging campaigns. The editor is senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and adjunct professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo.


The contributors to this conceptually interesting and informative edited volume apply a multi-disciplinary approach to analyze the nature of the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria. As explained by the volume’s editors, Boko Haram’s objective is to establish an Islamic Caliphate in the Borno State in the North East that would ultimately cover the areas of the former “Kanem-Borno Empire,” thereby replacing the modern state system imposed on Nigeria by Western colonialism. The book’s coverage begins with Hussein Solomon’s interesting introductory overview that discusses the contending approaches of traditional counter-terrorism studies and what is known as “Critical Terrorism Studies” (CTS) to analyzing terrorism and counterterrorism in the African context, in which he argues that both approaches are required, although he criticizes the “traditional” approach for “privileging the African state, an artificial and alien entity and often the source of its citizens’ insecurity.” (p. 10) The CTS approach, on the other hand, highlights the importance of “objective conditions” such as economic factors that generate terrorist movements, although he admits that “it remains short on policy options.” (p. 11)

To analyze these issues, the book is divided into three parts. The first part contextualizes the phenomenon of Boko Haram, with chapters on Boko Haram as a jihadist group, its ethnic and religious characteristics, and the influence on it of ideological and operational antecedents with previous revolts in Nigeria. The second part, “The Nigerian State and Boko Haram,” covers Boko Haram’s exploitation of cleavages in Nigeria, the roles of identity and deprivation in driving its insurgency, and problems in the Nigerian government’s response, for instance, focusing on countering terrorism while overlooking the role of radicalization in driving the group’s adherents into violent extremism. The fourth part, “Responses,” assesses the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism campaigns by the government, the West, and regional bodies.

The chapter by John A. Stevenson, Amy Pate and Elvis Asiamah, on “Effective Counter-Terrorism Against Boko Haram,” is especially interesting as it applies an empirical approach, based on field research and quantitative incident data, to assess the effectiveness of various government counter-measures during the period of 2009 to 2014. Although their recommendation may be more ideal than practical, given Nigeria’s deep seated problems, it is still worth noting, as they write that “the United States should encourage the use of local knowledge in counter-terrorist operations against Boko Haram, by simply providing technical assistance for combinations of the military and vigilantes to engage in sweeps to clear the extremist group, as well as ensuring sustained resources for local law enforcement agents to have and employ in their territory. Therefore, the best policies to most effective counter Boko Haram will emerge not from a Nigerian military-led solution but from a more balanced and coordinated effort through CVE programs, hardened target preference, negotiations and police-vigilante combat operations.” (p. 208)

In the concluding chapter, “Nigeria and a War Across States in Northwest Africa,” co-editor James J. Hentz discusses the Boko Haram insurgency within the context of three types of African wars: interstate, civil war,
and what he terms “new wars.” He concludes that “The catholic approach taken by this volume – that of sociology, history, political science, economics and policy studies – is a step toward a critical examination of Boko Haram and conflict in Africa.” (p. 266) Hentz is Professor and Chair of the Department of International Studies and Political Science at the Virginia Military Institute, in Lexington, Virginia. Hussein Solomon is Senior Professor in the Department of Political Studies and Government at the University of the Free State, South Africa.


This is the third edition of the author's masterful and best-selling comprehensive account of the history and manifestation of global terrorism, which was first published in 1998, with the expanded second edition (456 pages) issued in 2006. This edition is some 70 pages longer than the previous edition, with much of its material remaining intact, and it brings the author's analysis of terrorism to the current era, especially with an update on al-Qaeda and new sections on the Islamic State (ISIS), as well as discussions of new developments in terrorists' exploitation of the Internet. While the previous edition's concluding chapter was entitled “Terrorism Today and Tomorrow,” this edition provides two concluding chapters: “Terrorism Today and Tomorrow I: Force Multipliers” and “Terrorism Today and Tomorrow II: New and Continuing Challenges.”

Like the book's previous editions, this book covers topics such as defining terrorism, the origins and evolution of terrorism, particularly in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars, the internationalization of terrorism, religion and terrorism, suicide terrorism, terrorism's exploitation of the media of communications, the psychology of terrorism, terrorism's modus operandi (e.g., tactics and weaponry), and new trends and challenges.

There is much to commend in this important book, such as the author’s insightful observation that “While some terrorist movements have been successful in achieving the first three objectives [attention, acknowledgment, and recognition], rarely in modern times has any group attained the last two [authority and governance]. Nevertheless, all terrorists exist and function in hopes of reaching this ultimate end. For them, the future rather than the present defines their reality.” (p. 268) Another pertinent observation is the author's conclusion that “both ISIS and al-Qaeda and their respective branches and affiliates have locked the U.S. and its allies into an enervating war of attrition – the preferred strategy of terrorists and guerrillas from time immemorial.” (p. 331) He then adds, “Decisively breaking this stasis and emerging from this war of attrition must therefore be among the highest priorities in our ongoing struggle against terrorism.” (p. 331)

The author is a professor in Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service and the director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program, in Washington, DC.


This is an interesting and concise survey of the current conflicts in the Middle East, particularly in Syria and Iraq, and the war between groups such as al-Qaida and ISIS and the geopolitical interventions by Western military and security forces in those countries. This complicated interaction needs to be better understood, the authors write, because “terrorism, misery, state tensions across the Middle East – all interact with wider current geopolitics to create a highly dangerous strategic environment. The West needs a counter-terrorism strategy, a counter-insurgency strategy and a ‘classic’ geopolitical strategy. Weaving such very different elements into one unified whole will be a major challenge.” (p. 2) To analyze these issues, the authors present an innovative framework based on four levels of analysis: “sub-state ethnic and sectarian divisions from which terror groups have emerged; the impact of such groups on state structures and regional state relations; the implications of regional tensions for regional strategic and extra-regional actors, most notably European
states, Russia, and the United States, together with implications for the security and defence of those states; and finally the impact of such threats on geopolitics and state competition between Great Powers the world over.” (p. 6)

The book also examines how such power interactions impact on the international system, international institutions and regimes (such as the Arab League, United Nations, European Union, and NATO), including how a strategy can be formulated and implemented to manage “such a fractious and contentious geopolitical environment.” (p. 6) The authors conclude that with Syria and the Levant forming “the epicenter of a struggle that is ideological, regional and fast becoming geopolitical,” (p. 93) if the West does not act to solve these conflicts “then a whole spectrum of separate evils could merge into a grand strategic one – the worst of all worlds: a world that is ever more prone to shock, but ever less capable of coping with shock. The world is indeed complex, but managing complexity is what government is mean to be for.” (p. 95) Such geostategic insights make this book an important guide for understanding the challenges facing Western governments who are involved in this Middle Eastern cauldron and the solutions that need to be implemented to stabilize the region. William Hopkinson is a former Director of Studies and Deputy Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and Assistant Secretary of State (Policy) in the Ministry of Defence, London, England. Julian Lindley-French is a strategic analyst and Vice President of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Brussels, Belgium.


First published in 2006, this revised edition updates the coverage of Hamas to 2009. As a guide, the book’s chapters are structured chronologically and thematically, with sub-headings taking an interesting—and, at times, even provocative—format of questions and answers (e.g., “Who are the Muslim Brothers?” , “In Hamas’s view, what would be the future of the Jews in Palestine?” , “How much influence does Hamas have on Palestinians inside Israel proper?”, and “Are we witnessing the rise of an ’Islamic and radical arc’, starting from Iran, spanning Syria, Hizballah and then Hamas?” The book’s 13 chapters start with the origins of Hamas, its ideology, strategy and objectives, its leadership and structure, Hamas and Israel, its resistance and military strategy, its political and social strategy, Hamas and ‘international Islamism,’ and ending with what the author terms the ‘new’ post-2006 Hamas, in which it gained control over the Gaza Strip. Although the guide requires an updated edition to account for latest developments, it is recommended as an informative and multi-dimensional account of Hamas. The author, a Palestinian who was born in a refugee camp in Bethlehem, is a senior research fellow at the Centre of Islamic Studies and the co-ordinator of the Cambridge Arab Media Project at the University of Cambridge, England.


The annual *The Military Balance*, which is published by the London-based The International Institute for Strategic Studies, is considered the most authoritative, comprehensive and detailed assessment of latest developments in the military capabilities and defense economics of 171 countries. It is widely used as an open-source based reference resource by governments’ military and intelligence agencies, as well as public policy research institutes and academic researchers, around the world.

The volume is divided into two parts. The first part, “Capabilities, Trends and Economics,” is the volume’s primary section. Following two chapters that provide analyses of defense and military trends (including interesting sections on topics such as the changing defense-industrial landscape, trends in challenges to deterrence, and a four page overview on the roles of special operations forces in projecting military capability), seven chapters provide detailed information about the military capabilities of the 171 countries, with the countries listed according to their geographic regions. For each country, a short section provides a general overview, followed by their organizational formations (e.g., army, air force, navy, cyber, special operations, etc.). The
last chapter consists of tables that provide data on country comparisons and defense expenditures. The volume's second part, “Reference,” provides explanatory notes about using the volume's data and definitions of concepts and terms, such as defense economics and army, air force, and navy forces and equipment.

The volume is also useful for the terrorism and counterterrorism research community as it provides extensive details about selected non-state groups that constitute militarily significant armed actors. In a two-page section on “Selected non-state armed groups: observed forces and military equipment holdings,” (pp. 563-564) three terrorist groups are profiled: Hizballah, the Islamic State (ISIS), and Boko Haram. We learn, for example, that Hizballah has an estimated 4,000 to 8,000 active forces, with an additional 20,000 reserves, and that among these forces between 4,000 and 8,000 are estimated to be committed to operations in Syria. Hizballah's military equipment includes MBT T-72 armored fighting vehicles, surface-to-surface missiles launchers, and SAM air defense systems. At its height, ISIS's total combat strength (at least prior to its current military setbacks and killed fighters) had totaled an estimated 20,000-35,000 personnel, of whom 12,000-15,000 had operated in Syria. A fourth non-state actor, the Kurdish Peshmerga, although not considered a terrorist group, is also profiled.

Of particular interest to the counterterrorism community is the volume's detailing of countries' combating terrorism forces. Thus, for example, it details that the United States' Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) consists of 63,150 active forces and 6,550 civilians (p. 56); France has 3 Special Forces groups (p. 114); Norway's Army has 2 Special Forces groups and one Naval Special Forces group (p. 143); the United Kingdom has a large contingent of Royal Navy, Army and RAF Special Forces regiments and squadrons (p. 174); Russia has a total of 659,000 paramilitary forces, which consist of 10,000-30,000 Federal Protection Service forces, and 160,000 Federal Border Guard Service forces (p. 223); India has 1,403,700 paramilitary forces, which consist of 63,900 Ministry of Home Affairs' Assam Rifles forces and 230,000 Border Security Force personnel, an anti-terrorism contingent of 7,350 National Security Guards, 10,000 mainly ethnic Tibetan Special Frontier forces, a Special Protection Group with 3,000 personnel, and 450,000 State Armed Police forces; and Israel has 3 Army Special Forces battalions and 1 Special Operations brigade, 300 Naval Commandos, and 8,000 Border Police forces (pp. 382–384).


This is a revealing and important account of the life and activities of Leila Khaled, dubbed 'the poster girl of Palestinian militancy' in the late 1960s and 1970s, but who has continued to be active in the Palestinian resistance movement to this day. This biography details Khaled's terrorist activities, beginning with her involvement on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in the August 29, 1969 hijacking of flight TWA 840. This incident, led by her partner Salim Issawi, involved diverting the flight from Rome to Athens, and then its eventual landing in Damascus. In a second hijacking, on September 6, 1970, she partnered with Patrick Arguello (a Nicaraguan-American member of the Sandanista movement) in an unsuccessful plot to hijack an El Al Boeing 707 at Amsterdam Airport. After Arguello was killed on board the plane, Khaled was arrested and spent the next month in London's Ealing police station. She was later released as part of a prisoner exchange. This account, which is based on a series of interviews conducted by the author with Khaled in Amman, where she lived (at least by 2008 when the interviews were conducted), then details Khaled's later life as wife, mother, a member of the Palestinian National Council, a leader of the General Union of Palestinian Women, and a spokesperson for the Palestinian cause.

This book is highly relevant to the current era because of the important questions that it posed to Khaled: “how do militants whose careers start with violent action end them in the arena of political negotiation and discussion? Why, and how, do people – especially women – decide to follow the path of armed struggle, and what do they gain and lose? How does the left-wing revolution of Khaled's day link to the Islamist parties which dominate the armed Palestinian resistance of today? And how does the romanticized, sexualized figure
of the “Aubrey Hepburn terrorist” fit into the wider Palestinian struggle?” (p. 5) Many of Khaled’s answers are especially noteworthy, including her criticism of the culture of suicide bombings, which she refers to as “about death, not about life,” that it “dehumanizes the idea of struggle: ‘We don’t want this generation to think they can just fight by pushing the button,” and “we don’t see this as the best way to mobilize the people.” (p. 124) Khaled also criticizes “the impact that the rise of the Islamist parties has had on the position of women in the West Bank and Gaza.” (p. 126) Finally, Khaled supports Palestinian – Israeli peace once “the core issues, the land and the refugees, are dealt with in a just way…” (p. 138) The author is a British journalist who has published books on Palestinian affairs.


This is an interesting account of the nature of what the author refers to as the third wave of jihadism in Europe, including France, the primary subject of this book. The first wave, as explained by the author, lasted from 1979 to 1997, and was centered in Afghanistan, with episodes in Bosnia, Egypt, and Algeria. The second wave was focused on al-Qaida’s jihad against America, with its “high” point reached in its 9/11 attacks, and followed by the jihadists’ failure in Iraq. The third wave, the subject of this book, began in 2005, with its focus on jihadi radicalization of Western Muslims and terrorist activities in Europe. The peak of the third wave, the author points out, was reached with the shooting rampage at *Charlie Hebdo* in January 2015 and the attack at the Bataclan concert in November of that year.

The author focuses on the case of jihadism in France because it “is exemplary and premonitory, and a deeper knowledge of it can help us decipher situations in which we see jihadism spreading in the West, whether in the rest of Europe or in North America.” (p. xii) In the epilogue, the author criticizes what he terms the French “establishment’s incompetence” in misunderstanding how to deal with its jihadist problem, which was caused by a number of factors, such as neglecting the academic field of Islamic studies, with no “innovative thinking to be found at the top of the highly hierarchical French security apparatus, which would need to be retooled in order to grasp the shift in jihadist organization from pyramidal structures to an unprecedented model in which the actors operate in swarms.” (p. 189) Some of the author’s language is highly philosophical and is difficult to comprehend, such as the following sentence: “In such a context, the places of religion or obedience to which the secularism of the Republic grants a legitimate place within human society – the church, the mosque, the synagogue, and the temple (whether Protestant or Masonic) – cannot be erected into the primordial relays of state intervention.” (p. 198) Despite such complications in the text, the book is still worth reading for the insight it presents on the problem of jihadism in France. The author is professor of political science at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, France, who has published numerous books on these issues.


This book is a comprehensive and detailed account of the history, current operations, and effectiveness of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s primary domestic and external intelligence and agency. The ISI, the author notes, plays a crucial role in Pakistan due to its involvement in Kashmir and in Afghanistan and its role as “a state within a state – as an intelligence agency that was influencing and controlling Pakistan’s domestic and international politics.” (p. 10) The book’s chapters cover topics such as the ISI’s first decade (it was established in 1948) and its operations through the early 1990s, especially its involvement in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Also discussed is the ISI’s involvement in anti-Indian operations in the disputed Kashmir province, as well as its involvement with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT – “Army of the Pure”) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (“Army of the Prophet Mohammad) terrorist groups, which the author characterizes as “the preferred partners of the ISI.” (p. 193) With regard to issues such as greater civilian government control over the ISI, the author writes
that “They still see the military and the ISI as guarantors of the existence of the state of Pakistan, which will only be weakened by excessive reforms.” (p. 236) The author is a German political scientist and historian who had lived in Pakistan from 1989 to 2002, where he formed relationships with Pakistan's political, military and intelligence elites.


This interesting and well-argued book traces the evolution of the jihadi ideology that drives groups such as al-Qaida and ISIS. It is important to study this ideology's origins and evolution because, as the author correctly points out, “Political ideologies take decades to form. The mind of the Islamic state represents the most recent iteration of an ideology that has been developing over the past fifty years.” (p. 12) The book's discussion, therefore, begins with an examination of Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian author of *Milestones*, which was published in 1964, and which the author (citing Gilles Kepel) regards it as “the Islamist version of Lenin's *What Is to be Done??*” (p. 13) Other noteworthy jihadi tracts include the Egyptian militant Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj's *The Neglected Duty*, which called upon Muslims to carry out jihad; the Palestinian Abdullah Azzam's *The Defense of the Muslim Lands and Join the Caravan*, which were published in the 1980s; and the Egyptian Muhammad Khalil al-Hakim's *The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through which the Umma Will Pass*, which was published in 2004. The current Salafi jihadist movement, the author points out, “which originated in Egypt during the late 1960s and the 1970s, and expanded during the 1980s in the war against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, represents the fusion of Salafi-inflected Egyptian revolutionary jihadism and politically awakened Saudi Wahhabism.” (p. 21) Now, these extremist ideologies, the author writes, find expression in *Dabiq*, ISIS's online magazine. The author concludes that “Fifty years after Sayyid Qutb's execution, this is what the tradition of Salafi jihadism, the mind of the Islamic State, has become. There are no more milestones to pass. We have finally reached the gates of hell.” The author is Vice-Chancellor's Fellow, Emeritus Professor and Convenor of the Ideas & Society Program at La Trobe University, in Melbourne, Australia.


The articles in this concise encyclopedia were drawn from the editor's five-volume *The Encyclopedia of War* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). This version is devoted to the subject of war since 1900. While most of the entries cover regular warfare, some also discuss terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The coverage of terrorism and counterterrorism is highlighted by the excellent 11-page entry by Seumas Miller on “War Against Terrorism,” which consists of interesting sections on “Terrorism as Crime and Terrorism as War,” “Terrorist Attacks, Disasters, and States of Emergency,” and “Terrorism, Internal Armed Struggles, and Theaters of War.” Of particular interest is the author's taxonomy of the three contexts of terrorist activity: “(1) well-ordered (non-totalitarian) nation-states in peacetime: specifically, well-ordered, liberal democratic states at peace; (2) theaters of war in the context of wars between nation-states; and (3) theaters of war in the context of wars involving non-state actors (e.g., a civil war or an armed insurgency between a government's security forces and some other armed and organized military force).” (p. 201) Other entries on wars, whether inter-state or internal, include coverage of the activities of terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, Hamas, Hizbullah, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and others. This encyclopedia is recommended for placing terrorism and counterterrorism within the larger context of war studies. The editor is Emeritus Professor of History at the University of Northern British Columbia, in Canada.

This is a conceptually innovative approach, based on extensive empirical data, to examine the use of the tactic of terrorism by insurgent groups in major armed conflicts that have erupted during the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, in locations such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. As the authors write, the book “concerns the role of terrorism in twenty-first century warfare. This is a study of the ways in which militants use terrorism to trigger and sustain insurgency. It is also a study of the ways in which the resort to terrorism may signal an end to insurgency, or its failure.” (p. 2) The insights generated by the “patterns in the incidence of terrorism as a tactic” in such conflicts and wars, the authors note, are intended to provide findings for efforts to counter these continuing threats.

There is much to commend in this theoretically groundbreaking book, such as the authors’ findings about the uses and timing of terrorism within wider-scale warfare. As they write: “Terrorism may be used prior to or early in a violent confrontation to incite further violence, gain attention, or for some other purpose. Terrorism used in these early stages is likely a sign of military weakness. Terrorism used later in the context of wider-scale warfare may indicate something different. It may indicate a weakening of an armed group. Terrorism may serve as a weapon of last resort, used when alternative forms of armed action are no longer available or seen as viable.” (p. 6)

With the first chapter defining terrorism (including the phenomenon of “new terrorism”), guerrilla warfare, and insurgency, the discussion concludes with an analysis of the point in an armed conflict when insurgents are likely to use the tactic of terrorism, and whether this timing impacts on the success or failure of the insurgents’ campaign. The successive chapters then examine past and current insurgencies in order to test the validity of these hypotheses in “the role of terrorism as a leading, concurrent, or trailing indicator of armed conflict.” (p. 55) The case studies include Turkey’s Armenian and Kurdish insurgents, the Sikh Punjabi insurgency in India, the insurrections in the former Yugoslavia, Colombia’s leftist guerrillas, the Shining Path in Peru, the LTTE’s insurgency in Sri Lanka, Hizballah’s insurgency in Lebanon, the Naxalites in India, and the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Information for the data gathering was primarily derived from START’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD), as well as other sources.

In the concluding chapter, the authors’ find, based on their data, that “Terrorism was more commonly a trailing indicator than a leading one. It is more frequent for terrorism to appear or peak toward the latter stages of an armed conflict than during its initial phases. The cases, or at least their central tendencies, suggest explanations. First, terrorism appears to be a tactic employed by those whose challenges are losing ground. Second, endgame terrorism also may be carried out in retaliation against segments of a population who are perceived to have betrayed the cause for which the insurgents have been fighting. And, third, there may be a certain amount of desperation involved. The late surge in terrorism may reflect the fact that authorities (or rival groups) are closer to victory. The use of terrorism may reflect desperation and frustration.” (pp. 234-235)

It is such empirically-derived insights about the utility of the uses of terrorism by various types of insurgent groups that make this book an important contribution to the literature on these issues.

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The contributors to this conceptually important volume, as explained by the editors, seek to explain ob-
servable patterns in armed conflicts, such as “what do we know about civil wars? How do we explain these shifting patterns in armed conflict? More specifically, how do we account for where and when civil wars are likely to occur, when and how they are likely to end, and whether or not they will recur?” (p. 1) Following the editors’ introductory overview, the book is divided into three parts. Part I, “Factors That Bring About Civil War,” covers topics such as patterns of armed conflict since 1945, the roles of “greed, grievance, and state repression” as antecedents of civil war onset, the roles of ethnic and religious divisions as identity issues in driving civil wars, the influence of state capacity and regime type in shaping civil wars, and transnational dimensions of civil wars. The second part, “Factors That End Civil Wars and Promote Peace,” covers issues such as the impact of third party interventions in the durations and outcomes of civil wars, including their positive influence in facilitating mediation and negotiating peace agreements; the components of negotiated peace agreements, such as power sharing; the impact of peacekeeping on perpetuating violence or democratization in the post-conflict context; and the legacies of health, education, and economic development on the societies that experience civil wars. The third part, “Emerging Trends in Civil War Research,” discusses the role of transitional justice in contributing to post-war peace and human rights, gender and civil wars, and the nexus between conflicts over issues such as resources and environmental conditions and the emergence of civil wars. The third part’s last chapter by David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, on “Trends in Civil War Data: Geography, Organizations, and Events,” discusses new trends in researching civil wars, including new methodologies and technologies “to examine the geographic and temporal patterns of conflict within a given civil war.” (p. 2)

With regard to the overlap between terrorism and civil wars, the chapter’s authors discuss how a 2012 study had found that “about 56 percent of all terrorist attacks take place within geographical areas with ongoing civil war.” (p. 257) In terms of new directions in the collection of event data they note the use of “fully automated or computer-assisted techniques to extract information from news sources,” which would overcome the problem of sorting through massive amounts of text on conflict events. (p. 257) They caution, however, that “for certain more complex tasks – for example, arbitrating between conflicting accounts of the number of fatalities or event attribution to the correct group – the currently available software is limited in its ability to interpret events.” (p. 257) In a concluding observation they write about the need for progress in data collection “in identifying factors that lead to the outbreak of violence,” and in filling “a significant gap in our understanding of why violent civil conflict begins in some places at some times and not in others,” which they attribute to “lack of data.” (p. 259)

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This is a highly detailed and authoritative investigative account, which reads like a suspense movie, of how Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his younger brother Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, had plotted to carry out the horrific bombing of the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013, their family backgrounds, and a description and assessment of how the United States government’s counter-terrorism measures functioned in attempting to surveil them prior to the attack and in its immediate aftermath. The author, a Boston-based investigative journalist, had spent three years researching this book, which led her to uncover numerous pieces of new evidence that are recounted throughout this account. These include evidence that “in 2011 Tamerlan secretly worked on an investigation that dismantled a ring of crack cocaine dealers who moved the drug from Boston to Portland, Maine,” that he “drove a Mercedes without holding a job,” and that his lucrative pay as a government informant enabled him to get “away with so much villainy that only a hands-off policy formulated at the local level by one or more agencies responsible for national intelligence could have engineered it.” (p. x) While this reviewer is not in a position to verify such new evidence, it is still worth considering. This account also in-
clcludes numerous insights into how the U.S. government’s counterterrorism agencies track individuals with a suspected nexus to terrorism, such as the National Counterterrorism Center’s and FBI’s watchlisting databases, including the ‘No Fly’ listings, and how they cooperate with their Russian counterparts (who had warned them about Tamerlan’s suspicious activities). Also noteworthy is the author’s discussion of the dysfunctional nature of the Tsarnaev family, Tamerlan’s radicalization into extremism, his association with other Chechen extremists, his visit to Dagestan, Russia in 2012, and the step-by-step preparation that Tamerlan took to prepare the bombs that were used in the attack.


This book is an interesting examination of what the author considers the points of convergence between corporate capitalist and terrorist practice in commercial entities in urban areas, with an emphasis on the shopping mall in general and Nairobi’s Westgate Mall in particular. It assesses the proliferation of terrorist attacks against such commercial entities in order to understand the “spaces” in contemporary culture where terrorism, the most “extreme” force, confronts shopping malls, the most “mainstream” force, in this type of “common ground.” As the author explains, Al-Shabaab’s September 21, 2013 attack against the Westgate Mall “is used as a contextual case study that allows for an interactive reading of the relationship between capitalism, globalization, and terrorism, and how these grand narratives relate to people’s lives within everyday space.” (p. 10) To discuss these issues, the book’s chapters cover topics such as developing and designing the shopping mall as “architectronics of entrapment,” “atmospherics of enchantment,” and “spectacle of consumption;” the architecture of securing the shopping mall, including surveillance for terrorism; “spectacles of the shopping mall,” including “commodification of terror and media productions”; and “spectors of the shopping mall,” including the “chimeras of consumption.”

One of the problems with the book (aside from its obfuscatory language) is the author’s underplaying of the serious threat posed by terrorism to shopping malls, as demonstrated by the following argument: “In order for the military-industrial complex to continue being profitable, terrorism is a constant threat and is perpetuated as such. In this regard, terrorism is good for business and keeps the security industry buoyed as it continues to construct ever more impregnable structures that require constant improvement by both security agents and security technologies.” (p. 116)

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This important book is primarily an insider’s account of the author’s extensive involvement, as a civilian clinical psychologist contractor, with the CIA’s interrogation program which was established in the aftermath of 9/11 to elicit intelligence information from just-captured al-Qaida leaders and operatives. It is also an important primer on the mindsets of terrorists, how they operate in their underground worlds, how counter-terrorism is conducted by government agencies, the types of interrogation techniques (including enhanced interrogation techniques) that are used to elicit urgently required intelligence information from ‘high value’ captured terrorists, and how such terrorists spend their time in their detention cells. Working as a civilian contractor, the author and his associate, Dr. John Bruce Jessen, his former air force colleague (they had been involved in working with the military’s Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training), were involved in the interrogations of high level al-Qaida operatives, such as Abu Zubaydah (who was familiar with
logistical operations), Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (the commander of the attack against the USS Cole), Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (the mastermind of 9/11, also known as KSM), Ramzi bin al-Shibh (a key facilitator of 9/11), and Abu Yasir al-Zaza’iri (part of KSM's entourage). The interrogations of these suspects, the author writes, yielded important intelligence information that led to the capture of other al-Qaida operatives, including thwarting a number of significant potential plots. In the concluding chapter, the author offers numerous insights about the components of effective counterterrorism, including the observation about the difference between a law enforcement approach (i.e., “taking a perpetrator off the streets and convicting that person in a court of law” once “a crime has already been committed”) and, in his opinion, a preferred “war-focused, intelligence-gathering approach” that seeks “to obtain actionable intelligence to prevent upcoming attacks before building a case for prosecution – that comes later.” (p. 294)


This is a highly detailed and well-written memoir of the author’s experiences in Iraq over more than a decade, beginning in mid-2003. The author, a British expert on the Middle East, who had studied Arabic (and Hebrew) as an undergraduate at the University of Oxford, had worked for the British Council in the field of development and conflict resolution for some 10 years, when she was presented with an opportunity to help rebuild Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. Eventually, she became political adviser to General Ray Odierno, the commander of the U.S. military campaign in Iraq, from 2007 to 2010. This book, the author notes, “describes the challenges of nation building and how the overthrow of an authoritarian regime can lead to state collapse and conflict. It reminds us of the limitations of external actors in foreign lands, but also where we can have influence.” (p. xi) What makes this book important in the literature on the U.S. military involvement in Iraq are the author’s insightful descriptions and observations, which read like scenes in a documentary, of her close working relationship and familiarity with the top military and political leaders on the various sides of the rebuilding efforts in the country. Among the author’s many findings is the observation that “After all the initial mistakes, the US military felt they had turned the war around during the Surge. They had done everything asked of them to the best of their ability. But all the gains had since evaporated. There was nothing to be seen from all the blood and treasure we had invested. Iran was resurgent, a proxy war was raging in the region and the US appeared to be in global retreat.” (p. 361) In a prescient observation the author writes that concerning the Islamic State (also known as Da'ash), “if the very conditions that gave rise to Da'ash are not addressed, then its ideology will continue to attract adherents, and it will likely be succeeded some time in the future by son-of-Da'ash. And the cycle will continue.” (p. xiii) The author is director of Yale University's Maurice R. Greenberg World Fellows Program and a Senior Fellow at the Jackson Institute, where she teaches Middle East politics.


The contributors to this edited volume, who are leading Indian academic experts on terrorism, examine significant aspects of the threat of terrorism in South Asia and how to counter them. These threats range from cross border terrorism in the cases of Pakistan and India, Indian-Sri Lanka relations in a post-LTTE era, new safe havens for terrorists and smugglers along the Indo-Nepal border, the rise of radical Islamism in Bangladesh, the implications for India of geopolitical rivalries in Afghanistan, and counterterrorism cooperation between India and the United States, including their cooperation in combating terrorism in South Asia. The concluding chapter by Sudhansubala Das and Narottam Gaan, “Combating Terrorism in South Asia: Role of US and India,” presents a valuable overview of the region's terrorist threats in the cases of the al-Qaida-Taliban nexus within the context of Pakistan and Afghanistan, indigenous Pakistani terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Pakistan-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation, Pakistan's military operations against
terrorist groups operating in the country, the problem of youth bulge and violent conflict, separatist terrorism in Kashmir, and terrorism in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. In the chapter's conclusion, the authors insightfully observe that "Regional counter-terrorism efforts will only be as good as the national capacities of individual states to tackle militant efforts," (p. 300) and that "The international community at large should recognize that deviations from the rule of law will make sustainable counter-terrorism successes less likely." (p. 301) Amulya K. Tripathy, is teacher at the Science College (Autonomous) Hinjilicut, Odisha, India. D. Santishree Pandit is a Professor at the Department of Politics & Public Administration, Savitribai Phule Pune University, Maharashtra, India. Roshni Kujur is a faculty member in the P.G. Department of Political Science, Berhampur University, Odisha, India.

Wang Yizhou, et al., ([Translated by Zhang Yidan, Polisher: Jonathon Richard Gartner], The Global Threat of Terrorism: Perspectives From China (Paths International Ltd./Social Sciences Academic Press (China)/Distributed by ISBS, Portland, OR, 2016), 286 pp., US $130.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-8446-4465-3.

This is a substantially expanded edition of the author's 86-page book On Terrorism: Chinese Perspectives (2014) [which was reviewed in this column in PoT's August 2017 issue]. The book's chapters cover topics on terrorism such as definitions of terrorism (with an important point made on p. 1 that "a theoretical definition of terrorism is ultimately an abstract manifestation of a very physical entity"); types of contemporary terrorism (e.g., nationalist and religious extremism, cult-based, far right and far left, and criminal); the North-South income gap and terrorism (e.g., the impact of the economic gap between the North and the South in driving terrorism); great power relations and terrorism (e.g., the dominance of a "single power" such as United States imperialism in strengthening Islamic terrorism); national strategies for eliminating terrorism (e.g., Hegemonic powers such as the United States not dealing with "ethnic relations in a healthy way"); racial conflicts and terrorism (e.g., the role of ethnic revenge in driving terrorist groups); religions and terrorism (e.g., terrorism in ethnic and religious conflicts such as in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Chechnya, Indian Sikh and Islamic terrorism, and cult terrorism); and the three major wars and terrorism in cases such as the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf.

It is valuable for a book on terrorism to be produced in China, but it's unfortunate that the only "Chinese perspective" on the terrorist threat in this volume is a criticism of the United States that "people are wondering why the United States, the most powerful country in the world, was so easily attacked by terrorists and if the military and national defense strategy of the U.S. is rational." (p. 123) Moreover, it would have been valuable for a chapter to be included on the Chinese approach to analyzing the Islamist Uyghur terrorist insurgency in Xinjiang and the Chinese government's counter-terrorism campaign against it – but this topic is not discussed in the volume.

As an edited volume, the identity of the chapters' authors is confusing, with a researcher listed at the end of each chapter, so should one assume that Wang Yizhou is their primary author and that these researchers had assisted in writing each of them? The researchers are affiliated with the Institute of World Economics & Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing. Wang Yizhou is Professor of international Politics and Chinese Foreign Affairs and Associate Dean in the School of International Studies (SIS), Peking University.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comast.net.
Resources

Bibliography: Terrorist Organizations: Cells, Networks, Affiliations, Splits

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism - BSPT-JT-2017-5]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on terrorist organizations – particularly cells, networks, affiliations, and splits. Though focusing on recent literature, the bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to September 2017. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, terrorist organizations, cells, networks, affiliations, mergers, franchising, cooperation, differences, rivalries, competition, splits, splinter groups

N.B.: All websites were last visited on 23.09.2017. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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Grey Literature


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Note

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., is a Professional Information Specialist. Since 2011, she works for the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). Additionally, she serves as Information Resources Editor to Perspectives on Terrorism. In her editorial role, she regularly compiles bibliographies and other resources for Terrorism Research. She wrote her doctoral thesis on Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents (focus: media-oriented hostage takings). E-mail: j.tinnes@gmx.de.
Resources

Bibliography: Life Cycles of Terrorism

Compiled and Selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism - BSPT-JT-2017-6]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on life cycles of terrorism (i.e., the history, origin, evolution, decline, and end of terrorist organizations, movements, types, and individuals). Though focusing on recent literature, the bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to September 2017. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, lifecycles of terrorism, history, origin, evolution, decline, end, current/future trends

NB: All websites were last visited on 23.09.2017. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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**Grey Literature**


Note
Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D. is a Professional Information Specialist. Since 2011, she works for the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). Additionally, she serves as Information Resources Editor to ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. In her editorial role, she regularly compiles bibliographies and other resources for Terrorism Research. She wrote her doctoral thesis on Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents (focus: media-oriented hostage takings). E-mail: j.tinnes@gmx.de.
Resources

Academic Theses (Ph.D. and MA) on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Related Issues, written in English between 2013 and 2017

Compiled and selected by Ryan Scrivens

Abstract

This bibliography contains doctoral dissertations (Ph.D.) and Master’s (MA) Theses on issues relating to terrorism and counter-terrorism. Titles were retrieved manually by browsing the Open Access Theses and Dissertations (OATD) database, using the search term ‘terrorism’. More than 1,400 entries were evaluated, of which 152 were ultimately selected for this list. All theses are open source. However, readers should observe possible copyright restrictions. The title entries are ‘clickable’, allowing access to full texts.

Bibliographic entries are divided into the following sub-sections:

1. Terrorism Actors, Groups, Incidents, and Campaigns
2. Counter-Terrorism Strategies, Tactics, and Operations
3. Counter-Terrorism Policy, Legislation, Law, and Prosecution
4. Terrorism and the Media, Representations, and Public Opinion
5. State Repression and Civil War
6. Terrorism and the Internet
7. Terrorism and Gender

1. Terrorism Actors, Groups, Incidents, and Campaigns


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3. Counter-Terrorism Policy, Legislation, Law, and Prosecution


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7. Terrorism and Gender


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About the Compiler: Ryan Scrivens is Associate Theses Research Editor of Perspectives on Terrorism and Coordinator of the Canadian Network of Ph.D. Theses Writers of the Terrorism Research Initiative. He is also a Visiting Researcher at the VOX-Pol Network of Excellence and a Research Associate at the International Cyber Crime Research Centre. Ryan recently completed a Ph.D. in Criminology at Simon Fraser University, and has since been awarded a Horizon Postdoctoral Fellowship at Concordia University, working with Project SOMEONE to develop ways to build resilience against radicalization leading to violent extremism and hatred.
Resources

Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects

Compiled and Selected by Berto Jongman

The items included below became available online in August and September 2017.

They are categorised under twelve headings:

1. Non-Religious Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns
2. Religious (mainly Jihadi) Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns
3. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics
4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism
5. Counter-Terrorism – General
6. Counter-Terrorist Strategies, Tactics and Operations
7. State Repression and Civil War at Home and Clandestine & Open Warfare Abroad
8. Prevention and Preparedness Studies (including Countering Violent Extremism, De-Radicalization, Counter-Narratives)
9. Intelligence
10. Cyber Operations
11. Risk & Threat Assessments, Forecasts, Analytical Studies
12. Also Worth Reading

N.B.: ‘Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects’ is a regular feature in ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.

1. Non-Religious Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns


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2. Religious (mainly Jihadi) Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns


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