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Welcome from the Editor

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume X, Issue 5 (October 2016) of Perspectives on Terrorism at www.terrorismanalysts.com. Our free online journal is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna (Austria), and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts (United States). Now in its tenth year, Perspectives on Terrorism has nearly 6,600 regular subscribers and many thousand more occasional readers and website visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer reviewed by external referees while its Research Notes, Policy Notes and other content are subject to internal editorial review.

This issue begins with an announcement of the 2016 TRI Thesis Award Winner, Erin Miller of the University of Maryland’s Center for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). In the first research article of this issue, Dr. Miller summarizes parts of her dissertation, which uses a group-based trajectory analysis to model the ‘life course’ of 632 organisations, and illustrates a key challenge in the field of terrorism studies: applying the label ‘terrorist organisation’ masks enormous diversity among a broad range of entities, from organized crime groups to political parties and insurgents. An important implication of this is the need for researchers to establish an adequate model of complex realities; all terrorists are not alike and consequently, one set of counter-measures cannot fit all. Her piece is followed by a research article from another finalist in the TRI Thesis Award competition, Dutch scholar and former police officer Jasper de Bie, in which he draws from police dossiers to illustrate important differences and nuances in radicalization processes.

Next, three Canadian scholar-practitioners—Patrick McCaffrey, Lindsy Richardson and Jocelyn Belanger—explain why it is inaccurate to measure terrorism simply by the number of incidents investigated by authorities, given how many incidents either go unreported or are categorized under other labels. Then Martin Gallagher, a retired police officer in Scotland, examines the threat posed by Europeans who have fought with the Islamic State returning to their previously established criminal networks emboldened with new skills and connections obtained from their experiences in Iraq and Syria. In a further article, Ian Turner, a senior lecturer at Lancashire Law School (UK), examines the intersections of human rights law and recent counterterrorism-related legislative measures in the UK. And in the final article of this issue, American University of Nigeria professor Bill Hansen argues that major economic and social reforms are critical to prevent almajirai (street children) from being recruited by Boko Haram or other political and criminal groups in the region.

In our Research Notes section, senior Dutch scholar Bob de Graaff describes the historical implications of fighting movements with an apocalyptic narrative like the one that the Islamic State has embraced. This is followed by our Special Correspondence section, in which Ken Duncan (retired U.S. Senior Foreign Service Officer) explains the detailed nuances and challenges governments face when creating terrorist Watchlists. Psychoanalyst Nancy Kobrin describes how early childhood mal-developments can inform our understanding of jihadist terrorists’ absence of empathy for civilians and non-combatants.

The Resource Section of this issue features an extensive bibliography on (social) media and terrorism, by our Information Resources Editor, Judith Tinnes. This is followed by brief reviews of recent publications in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies by our Book Reviews Editor, Joshua Sinai, who also follows this with a brief movie review.

At the end of this issue of our journal we repeat out crowd-funding appeal. In an earlier appeal we had hoped to raise the modest sum of US $ 5,000 from our readers to cover server and other costs. However, we did not even reach half of that goal, receiving in more than four months of fundraising only US $ 2,275.-. We thank
those 33 donors who contributed that but hope to hear and receive also something from our more than 6,500 other subscribers. To keep our online journal free and independent, we need your support to be able to carry on.

This issue of the journal was prepared by co-editor Prof. James Forest at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts. The next issue of the journal (December, 2016) will be prepared by guest editor Dr. Petter Nesser and his colleagues at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI) in Oslo—in cooperation with the regular editors. It will be an extra-long Special Issue, dealing with Jihadi Terrorism in Europe, based on the proceedings of an international conference held in September 2016.
TRI Thesis Award 2015 Announcement by the Jury

The jury of the Terrorism Research Initiative’s annual competition for the TRI Award for the ‘Best Doctoral Dissertation on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism’ has determined three finalists and among them a winner.

The jury, consisting of Prof. Clark McCauley, Prof. James J.F. Forest, and Prof. Alex P. Schmid (chairman), evaluated 13 theses which were submitted and/or defended in 2015 at an academic institution. Eight of the theses were written by post-graduate students or professionals from Anglo-Saxon countries (US, UK, and Canada); two were from the Netherlands, one from Denmark, one from Pakistan and one from Saudi Arabia. They dealt with the following subjects:

- Captivated by Fear: An Evaluation of Terrorism Detention Policy;
- Aviation Terrorism: Thwarting High-Impact Low-Probability Attacks;
- War on Terror and Pakistan-US Partnership: Effects, Problems and Prospects (2001-2012);
- The Smiling, Scented Men: The Political Worldview of the Islamic State of Iraq (2003-2013);
- A Question of Participation - Disengagement from Extremist Right. A Case Study from Sweden;
- Theorising Militant Groups’ Meso-Level Evolution. A Comparative Study of the Egyptian Islamic and Jihad Groups;
- British Jihadism: The Detail and the Denial;
- The Roots of Violent Extremism;
- Counter-Terrorism in Saudi Arabia;
- The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer (incl. chapter on Islamists Fight over Soccer);
- How Jihadist Networks Operate;
- Everyday Indivisibility: How Exclusive Religious Practices Explain
- Variation in Subnational Violence Outcomes;
- Patterns of Collective Desistance from Terrorism.

After careful evaluation, the members of the jury selected three finalists (the authors of the last three theses on this list) and, among these, the winning thesis: ‘Patterns of Collective Desistance from Terrorism.’ The winning thesis was written by Dr. Erin Miller (College Park, University of Maryland). The other two finalists are Dr. Joel Day (San Diego, United States) and Dr. Jasper de Bie (Leiden, The Netherlands). A summary of the winning thesis in the form of an article is included in this issue of Perspectives on Terrorism. An article based on the thesis of one of the other finalists, Jasper de Bie, is also included in the present issue while an article from Joel Day, based on his dissertation, has been published in the Vol. IX, Issue 6 of Perspectives on Terrorism (December 2015) under the title ‘Terrorist Practices: Sketching a New Research Agenda.’ The winner will receive a prize of US $1,000.- while the other two finalists will, like the winner, receiving a document acknowledging their achievement.

All three finalists impressed the jury by handling successfully large amounts of quantitative and/or qualitative data.
Dr. de Bie’s thesis stuck out by his original use of primary data from 28 investigations based on Dutch police files. He looked at the *modus operandi* of Dutch jihadist networks from 2000 – 2013, using unique empirical data (e.g. wiretaps) for social network analysis (for some of his findings, see his article in this issue).

Dr. Joel Day coded data on 724 sub-national armed groups for the period 1970-2015 and developed a ‘religious practices index’, showing that religious actors initiate conflict at a higher rate than their secular counterparts, that these conflicts last longer, are more deadly, and are less prone to negotiated termination.

Dr. Erin Miller, the winner of the TRI Thesis Award 2015, has for more than ten years been at the heart of the maintenance and updating of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the University of Maryland-based National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Using a group-based trajectory analysis to model the ‘life course’ of 632 perpetrator organisations, she managed to demonstrate that the concept of a ‘terrorist organisation’ is a construct that hides a plethora of diverse groups – ranging from organized crime groups to political parties and insurgents (for details, see her article in this issue). Her conclusion that we must not short-cut the often painstaking work of grappling with the fundamental building blocks of data in order to establish an adequate model of complex realities, is a salutary reminder that all terrorists are not alike and—consequently—that one set of counter-measures cannot fit all.

For the third time in a row the winner of the annual TRI Thesis Award has been a female scholar. In a field dominated by male security experts, this is a remarkable achievement for all three of them: Dr. Tricia Bacon (TRI Award 2013), Dr. Anneli Botha (TRI Award 2014) and now Dr. Erin Miller (TRI Award 2015). Congratulations!

*N.B. The deadline for the next round of submissions for the TRI Thesis Award 2016 (Doctoral theses submitted and/or defended at an academic institution in 2016), is 31 March 2017.*
I. Articles

Patterns of Collective Desistance from Terrorism: Fundamental Measurement Challenges

by Erin Miller

Abstract

To better understand why perpetrator organizations desist from terrorist violence, we must first understand how perpetrator organizations desist from terrorist violence. Here, I aim to improve our empirical understanding of patterns of collective desistance from terrorism in support of a robust research agenda to advance theory and policy on this topic. I discuss two key challenges for empirical analysis of collective desistance from terrorism: operationalization of perpetrator organizations, and operationalization of collective desistance. To illustrate these challenges, I leverage more than 40 years of event data from the Global Terrorism Database among organizations that carried out terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2013. Using descriptive statistics, I critically evaluate the implications of large-N analyses and illustrate their strengths and limitations.

Keywords: terrorist organizations; desistance; disengagement; measurement

Introduction

Efforts to better understand why terrorist groups[1] decline or disengage increasingly leverage large, terrorist attack-level datasets that are promising for developing an empirically grounded, theoretical and practical understanding of patterns of longevity and decline among terrorist organizations.[2] However, there is a distinct lack of clarity about this often-overlooked unit of analysis called “terrorist group” or “terrorist organization.” In particular, we must reconsider the fundamentals of measurement to avoid mistaken assumptions about what constitutes a terrorist organization and how we might best evaluate the activities of such organizations. Here I focus on two challenges: operationalizing terrorist organizations, and operationalizing collective desistance. Specifically, what are the key implications of measurement and analytical strategy for the study of collective desistance from terrorism? By illustrating these challenges, I aim to improve our understanding of the complexity of group-level patterns of desistance.

The Importance of Groups

Although those who carry out terrorist attacks are responsible for their actions as individuals, there is extensive evidence that the collective, or group they belong to or claim to be part of, plays an important role in the perpetration and exacerbation of criminal activity. Researchers have observed and extensively studied peer influences and the salience of co-offending in many behaviors, including alcohol use among college students,[3] desistance from marijuana use,[4] general delinquency and desistance from delinquency,[5] as well as adult offending.[6] With few exceptions,[7] the unit of analysis in studies on co-offending is the individual or the incident.

Some of the most relevant insights on collective offending, and those that could potentially inform our understanding of terrorist group activity, are found in the scholarly literature on criminal gangs. Nearly a century ago, Thrasher observed that while the gang does not cause crime per se, it “aids in making chronic truants and juvenile delinquents and in developing them into finished criminals.”[8] Likewise, scholars routinely observe that group membership is an influential element of engagement in terrorism. Some highlight the motivations of individuals that are generated by collective experiences, including strains or
grievances. Black describes terrorism as “unilateral self-help by organized civilians” characterized by “strong ties among the aggrieved and a lack of ties to their adversaries.”

Others argue that the difference between an aggrieved individual who is able to wage a terrorist campaign and one who is not is a matter of collective identity and resource mobilization. Moghaddam specifically views an individual’s engagement in terrorist activity as a psychological process through which one responds to perceived injustice by joining, assimilating, and drawing on the resources of a group or organization. Ultimately, scholars devote a great deal of attention to the impact of groups on individuals because groups provide a structural, ideological, logistical framework for criminal activity, including terrorism. As Atran suggests, “small group dynamics can trump individual personality to produce horrific behavior in otherwise ordinary people.”

Despite the fact that collective action is an important feature of many types of criminal behavior, scholars have not thoroughly explored the dynamics of the groups themselves, whether street gangs, criminal organizations, or terrorist groups. While there are several possible reasons for this, perhaps the primary obstacle is that systematically collected empirical data on groups are very difficult to obtain. In his introduction to Thrasher’s 1927 study of more than 1,300 gangs in Chicago, Short notes that Thrasher conducted “the most comprehensive study of the phenomenon of adolescent gangs ever undertaken,” but, “The very scope of Thrasher’s investigation, his methods, and his primary purpose also stood in the way of theoretical development. The task of statistical manipulation of more than 1,300 cases on which very little data in common were collected was an impossible barrier to conceptualization beyond relatively crude classification.” Thrasher noted that gangs vary in their degree of cohesion and a group will develop into a more solidified unit “if conditions are favorable to its continued existence” but that “the ganging process is a continuous flux and flow, and there is little permanence in most of the groups.” Unfortunately, we know little about the conditions that are favorable or not to the continued existence of a criminal group.

Likewise, in his introduction to a new edition of the 1980 study that Clinard and Yeager conducted on a sample of 477 Fortune 500 companies, Clinard contrasts it with Sutherland’s 1949 study of 70 of the largest companies. Sutherland, whose efforts took 25 years, considered the full life span of the companies in his sample. Clinard and Yeager investigated more companies in much greater detail, but for only two years, 1975 to 1976. Clinard points out that the authors of both studies acknowledge the difficulty of systematic data collection on such entities.

Despite the difficulty in gathering data, this is not to say that groups have been ignored. Numerous carefully researched and insightful case studies on groups and organizations that engage in illegal activity have been conducted in order to better understand how they operate. In addition, there have been a number of efforts to develop empirically grounded typologies to classify reasons for organizational decline and desistance from terrorism. While many case studies are impressive in their depth, ability to capture nuanced and complex experiences of groups, and while they make rich contributions to the understanding of specific contexts and events, because they are narrow in scope their contribution to theory development and generalizable principles is limited. Analysis of a more comprehensive array of terrorist organizations supports greater breadth of understanding regarding the ways in which these groups desist from terrorist violence.

The Operationalization of Terrorist Organizations

In contrast to research on individuals—which, aliases and mistaken identity notwithstanding, are fairly straightforward to conceive of as individuals—gangs and terrorist organizations are extremely difficult to define and operationalize. The challenge of defining terrorist organizations involves all of the difficulties of defining terrorism itself—in addition to numerous other considerations related to both the behavior of the group as well as its very essence as a group, known in the field of psychology as entitativity.
concept of entitativity, or the degree to which a collection of individuals is an entity, holds that organizations vary in the extent to which their members are similar to each other, engaged in coordinated efforts to pursue common goals, and are physically near to each other, as well as the extent to which the boundaries of membership are fixed and stable rather than fluid. With respect to terrorism, “groups of individuals that carry out violent attacks may be small, clandestine, informally related clusters of people, broad networks united by leaderless resistance, or formally established, hierarchical organizations that are explicit about their existence and their objectives.”[27]

Beyond variation in entitativity, organizations that perpetrate violent terrorist attacks are dynamic and multi-faceted in their behavior, typically engaging in many different types of activity, both legal and illegal, violent and non-violent. In certain situations it is problematic to assume that any organization that carries out at least one terrorist attack is a ‘terrorist organization’ when in fact, the use of violence may be an exception to the group’s usual repertoire rather than a defining characteristic. This is perhaps most likely the case for perpetrator organizations that are attributed responsibility for a relatively small number of attacks. In this sense, reliance solely on event data on terrorist violence can lead to flawed conceptual and theoretical assumptions about the organizations that carry out these attacks.

For example, several recent studies that examine the longevity of terrorist organizations using quantitative analyses of terrorist attack data corroborate Rapoport’s[28] often cited estimation that the vast majority of terrorist organizations last for less than one year.[29] Others, which use more conservatively curated sets of data, estimate that the average life span of terrorist groups is somewhat longer.[30] A key difference is that these latter analyses are narrower in scope. They either include only organizations’ international terrorist attacks; or, they include only those terrorist organizations that are more established and explicitly committed to the use of terrorist violence to achieve their goals, rather than simply any group that has carried out at least one international or domestic terrorist attack.[31]

This difference in how terrorist organizations are defined and operationalized for quantitative analysis has clear implications for the assumptions we make about their activity and the conclusions we draw about their life cycles. Dugan and colleagues characterize perpetrator groups that engage in terrorism for less than one year as “short-lived terrorist organizations” or “short-lasting terrorist organizations.”[32] In reality, this pattern of data might be generated by a number of different scenarios, only one of which is that bona fide terrorist organizations carried out attacks for less than one year and then failed to survive. Other equally plausible explanations include the possibility that the attacks perpetrated by these named “organizations” are actually the work of other full-fledged, long-lasting terrorist organizations that have temporarily adopted a unique nom de guerre for the purpose of carrying out certain attacks. For example, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York was claimed by a group of perpetrators linked to al Qa’ida, calling themselves “Liberation Army Fifth Battalion.”[33] Or, perhaps the attacks were carried out by fully formed organizations that are not typically considered terrorist groups, but rather insurgent groups, non-violent protest groups, or even political parties whose engagement in terrorism is extremely unusual. In any case, the organizations may not be short-lived at all.

LaFree, Dugan, and Miller describe an example of this phenomenon: the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico, which was the leading political party in power in Mexico for most of the 20th century.[34] In 1997, PRI operatives carried out 14 terrorist attacks against opposition political/militant groups. Since these are the only terrorist attacks attributed to the PRI, an analyst equipped with only data on terrorist violence would classify the perpetrator group as a “short-lived terrorist organization” even though by most definitions they are neither short-lived, nor a terrorist organization, because their existence spans nearly a century and is fundamentally characterized by involvement in electoral politics rather than the use of terrorist violence.
The Operationalization of Organizational Desistance

The second important measurement issue involves defining collective desistance from terrorism. Operationalizing any type of desistance is difficult, because it involves quantifying the prolonged cessation of behavior or activity. Regardless of the behavior in question, this raises a number of questions. For example, for how long must one abstain in order to be considered inactive and sufficiently unlikely to reengage? Is desistance an absolute status, or is it assessed relative to historical or typical levels of activity? What is the significance of replacement activity—desisting from one type of behavior, but shifting to another?

Because the operationalization of desistance is not straightforward, applications are typically arbitrarily and idiosyncratically informed by the particular topic being studied and the availability of suitable data. [35] Criminologists have observed that rather than maintaining a consistent state of offending or non-offending, individuals are likely to drift in and out of criminal activity.[36] The same can be true of terrorist organizations. However the measurement of non-offending is further complicated because such organizations, unlike human beings, can be resurrected after inactivity or even “death.” One example of this is the Black September Organization, the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that was responsible for the September 1972 attack on the Israeli team at the Munich Olympic Games.[37] Following this pivotal attack, Black September was the target of Israeli counterterrorism operations code-named Wrath of God and Spring of Youth, which involved the capture or killing of nearly all of its members. The group’s activity peaked in 1973, but declined rapidly and by all accounts, including claims made by PLO leadership, the group was completely dismantled by the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, nearly a decade later the group purportedly announced that it was “resuming revolutionary activities,” raising puzzling questions about what characterizes the entitativity of this, and similar organizations.

A growing number of studies quantitatively analyze large numbers of terrorist perpetrator organizations,[38] including some that investigate the desistance of terrorist organizations in particular.[39] In contrast to in-depth case studies, these large-N studies seek to identify common patterns and principles that can be used to form the basis of a broader understanding of collective desistance. However, where qualitative analyses and case studies risk overlooking the forest for the trees, large-N studies may have the opposite problem. While grappling with large datasets, researchers often rely on analytical techniques and theoretical assumptions that greatly oversimplify the diverse patterns of terrorist activity among groups and organizations. In particular, reducing the dynamics of violent terrorist activity to a dichotomous measure of active or inactive, or to a single number of years active, impedes our ability to fully capture various dimensions of activity, including both time span and frequency of attacks, that comprise the groups’ trajectory of desistance from violence. In addition, when leveraging a large set of data with violent terrorist organizations as the unit of analysis, researchers can sometimes overlook critical contextual variation, such as the non-terrorist activities of the groups involved, or other external factors that influence the terrorist behavior that comprises the dataset.

Several recent empirical analyses of the duration or longevity of terrorist groups are based on the premise that terrorist organizations are often in competition for scarce resources, support, and personnel.[40] Young and Dugan examine the survival of terrorist organizations, finding that perpetrator groups that exist among greater numbers of other perpetrator groups have a greater likelihood of failing (in terms of carrying out their last recorded attack) in a given year.[41] The authors interpret this as support for the hypothesis that groups with greater numbers of competitors are more likely to fail. However it is not clear from this analysis that the groups in question are truly competitors, rather than involved in some other type of relationship, such as collaborators. Phillips uses a similar analytical strategy, in addition to in-depth case studies, to examine the specific effects of violent rivalries[42] and cooperation[43] on group longevity. In contrast to Young and Dugan’s results, Phillips finds that terrorist groups engaged in violent rivalries are actually less likely to cease offending, an observation that is reminiscent of Thrasher’s assertion that gangs “develop through strife and thrive on warfare.”[44]
Others have also investigated the impact of mobilization-related variables on terrorist group survival, including state support,[45] duration dependence,[46] and group size, tactics, geography, and ideology.[47] But perhaps the most important contribution of Phillips’ research in this area is that he begins to effectively bridge the gap between qualitative studies, which typically contain rich detail on a small number of groups, and quantitative studies that provide potential for generalizable findings but frequently overlook important features of how groups co-exist, interact, and evolve.

What is important about this literature is that the theorized mechanisms represent processes rather than states. While scholars have only begun to quantitatively investigate the specific ways in which de-mobilization operates, it would appear that active terrorist organizations rarely disappear overnight. Even the “sudden desistance” investigated by Dugan, Huang, LaFree, and McCauley in the case of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) took place over a period of approximately seven years.[48]

Despite this, virtually all of the quantitative analyses conducted on the topic of terrorist group longevity adopt duration or survival analysis as a methodological strategy, defining the point of terrorist group failure or end as the year of a group's last recorded attack. These methods reduce the data on a group's terrorist activity to a dichotomous measure of whether or not the group was active during a particular time period, or simply the total length of time for which a group engaged in terrorist attacks. This means that a perpetrator group whose activity spans 10 years with an average of 0.2 attacks per year is accounted for in the same way as a perpetrator group whose activity spans 10 years with an average of 20 or 200 attacks per year. Likewise, a perpetrator group whose activity drops from 100 attacks per year to one attack per year and then remains active at that rate for another decade is still considered active in a survival analysis, despite a tremendous decline to what may be an essentially incidental rate of violence. This analytic strategy disregards both theoretical and empirically observed patterns that characterize failure as a process—perhaps a very long one—rather than a discrete state.[49] In contrast, researchers who adopt more qualitative methodologies such as case studies have the advantage of being able to incorporate any and all of these facets of a group's trajectory into their analysis.[50]

Data Analysis

To further illustrate these challenges, I examine data on the violent terrorist activity of organizations identified as perpetrators of attacks in the Global Terrorism Database.[51] The GTD is an event-level database maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, in which terrorism is defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.”[52] At the time of this analysis the GTD includes details on 125,087 domestic and international terrorist attacks that occurred around the world between 1970 and 2013.[53] Because it includes both international and domestic attacks, and does not require that an attack target non-combatants, the GTD’s definition of terrorism is relatively broad, and well-suited for the current analysis. Although the data collection process for the GTD is described at length elsewhere, here I outline some especially relevant details.[54]

Source materials provided information about the perpetrator of the attack in 55% of all cases in the GTD. The data collection team records attributions of perpetrator responsibility for each attack in the GTD as reported in the original source (usually media articles), making adjustments to account for the use of aliases, variation between native language names and English language names, and standardization of acronyms. Although not all terrorist attacks are formally claimed by a perpetrator organization, the media source articles that the GTD data collection process relies upon typically report names of organizations that have at some point been self-identified by leaders, spokespersons, or other group members. In some cases source articles report
attributions of responsibility based on statements made by authorities or witnesses to the attack; however, the
name or identity of the perpetrator organization almost always comes from the organization itself.[55]

Perpetrator groups do not have to be particularly well-organized or well-established to be named in the GTD. In fact, the perpetrators in the full dataset range from loose networks with few members, or members who are not well known to each other, to formal, hierarchical organizations. If a perpetrator group is identified as a faction of a larger group, the GTD attributes the attack to the “parent” group, making note of the name of the faction. The only exception to this rule concerns the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), whose factions are relatively autonomous and represent unique entities in the data. In contrast, attacks by groups identified as “splinters” of other groups are attributed to the name of the splinter group. Presumably there are substantively significant reasons for the organizational cleavage that indicate a meaningful distinction from the “parent” entity. Similarly, if a group changes its name, it is documented as a separate entity. This practice raises some important considerations for evaluating the decline of groups, which I will address in the discussion of the analysis.

**Perpetrator Organizations**

Point of departure for this dissertation research were 3,120 unique entries in the three perpetrator group name fields in the GTD. Collection of the GTD relies on open-source media reports, which often include only generic information about perpetrators, or only names of unaffiliated individuals. Accordingly, 683 of these entries do not reference formal organizations, but are essentially generic descriptors that were reported in the source materials. These range vary in degree of detail and usefulness from “Terrorists” and “Subversives” to “Smugglers and Elephant Poachers” and “Supporters of ex-President Gamsakhurdia” (the first democratically elected president of Georgia), to “Salafi Extremists.”

**Short-term Perpetrator Organizations**

Aside from the generic perpetrator designations there are 2,437 formally named entities in the GTD that have been linked to 57,240 terrorist attacks, resulting in 152,498 deaths between 1970 and 2013. More than 70 percent of these named entities (71%) were active for 365 days or fewer. The 1,726 named organizations that engaged in terrorism for 365 days or fewer carried out 3,561 attacks, which killed 7,059 people between 1970 and 2013. The number of attacks per group ranges from one (1,198 groups; 69%) to 367 attacks perpetrated by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which began carrying out attacks under that name in April 2013. ISIL was also responsible for 1,431 total fatalities from terrorist attacks. The next most active of the short-term organizations was the Dishmish Regiment, which carried out 43 attacks in India over the course of approximately six weeks in 1984.

Figure 1 shows the distribution of time span, in days, of terrorist activity among the perpetrator organizations that engaged in terrorism for less than a year. This distribution is extremely skewed, with 1,361 groups (79%) active for only a single day. For the most part, the organizations that were active for less than one year are extremely poorly documented. In many cases their names are obscure, such as “The Illegal Fisherman of the Night” and “The Armed Secret Organization,” and the only information available about them pertains to their claim of responsibility for a terrorist attack.

There are several possible explanations for the large number of organizations that carry out attacks for less than a year, or only a day. One possibility is that law enforcement or security forces rapidly and effectively countered these organizations. For example, Smith observes about a US-based right-wing group: “The Order existed for only a year after its creation, and it is obvious that the alterations in federal law enforcement policy that took effect during 1983 shortened the life span of The Order and its affiliates.”[56]
Similarly, this is also likely to be true of Saudi Hizballah, which was founded in 1987 as “an alternative political network.”[57] The only terrorist attack attributed to Saudi Hizballah in the GTD is the 1996 attack on the United States military barracks at the al-Khobar towers, a relatively sophisticated truck bomb attack that killed 19 airmen and wounded 386 people. Jones reports that following the al-Khobar attack, Saudi authorities made numerous arrests of Saudi Hizballah members, essentially decimating the organization.[58]

Another possible explanation is that, like many start-up companies or book clubs that fail to gain momentum, the groups never fully engaged as organizations. Though it is difficult to be certain, given the limited information available, perhaps this is the case for the French anti-nuclear group that called itself “Commandos Opposing with Explosives the Self Destruction of the Universe (COPO).”[59]

Figure 1. Time Span of Terrorist Violence, Perpetrator Groups active ≤ 365 days

A third possibility, alluded to above, is that they were fully established organizations that primarily engaged in other types of activity, such as electoral politics, and only carried out terrorist attacks as an exception to otherwise non-violent activities. Indeed, 60 of the 1,726 organizations include the word “party” in their name, though it should be noted that one of these is the “Vengeance Party,” a group that claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and death of a Dutch priest in Lebanon in 1985.[60]

Long-term Perpetrator Organizations

The remaining 711 organizations in the GTD were actively engaged in terrorist attacks for more than one year. These groups carried out 53,679 attacks, causing 145,439 deaths between 1970 and 2013. These perpetrator organizations make up 29 percent of all non-generic perpetrators, but their terrorist activity comprises 94 percent of all attacks and 95 percent of all fatalities perpetrated by non-generic organizations. On average, these organizations engaged in terrorism for 8.7 years, ranging from one year (75 organizations) to 43 years (three organizations). Figure 2 shows that even after the removal of perpetrator organizations that
engaged in terrorism for less than a year, the distribution is still heavily skewed to the right, as more than half of the organizations (55%) carried out attacks for five years or fewer.

**Desistance as a Process**

Consider the trajectories of perpetrator organizations that have engaged in terrorism for more than 40 years between 1970 and 2013. There are nine such organizations: Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Jewish Defense League (JDL), the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command (PFLP-GC), the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and the New People's Army (NPA).
Figures 3a-i show the individual trajectories of terrorist attacks over time for each of these organizations. Note that although these nine organizations were active for similar lengths of time according to the GTD, their patterns of activity are dramatically different.
Figure 3 (a-i): Organization Trajectories, where Time Span > 40 years
While several of these organizations have carried out relatively few terrorist attacks during the period of time in which they were active, others such as the ELN, ETA, PIRA, and NPA were extremely prolific. However, even among the more active perpetrator organizations, the patterns of activity suggest different mechanisms for decline. An analysis of these perpetrator groups based merely on total number of years of terrorist activity or a simple survival analysis would fail to capture this variation. Even a measure of average number of attacks per year is potentially misleading for an organization like the PIRA. Calculated over the entire span of activity, 65.2 attacks per year is actually a very poor measure of a central tendency for almost any point in the PIRA’s 41-year history documented by the GTD.

**An Alternative Analytical Strategy**

Elsewhere, I have used group-based trajectory analysis to begin to address the challenge of modeling desistance as a process. This analytical strategy, developed by Nagin and Land in 1993 to model patterns of behavior over the life course of individuals, allows analysts to estimate discrete classes of trajectories of events over time that represent predicted patterns of activity derived from a set of observed values of change over time. Researchers can also estimate the probability of an observation’s membership to a particular trajectory class of activity that is consistent with its patterns of behavior. Put simply, this is a descriptive analysis that allows one to systematically group together numerous trajectories like those shown in Figures 3a-i, based on their similarity. By doing so, we can identify general patterns of activity over time among perpetrator groups, and estimate how common they are.

The results of these analyses illustrate a variety of trajectories of activity among perpetrator groups, ranging from “low peak; rapid decline” trajectories to “high peak; very slow decline” trajectories. However, they also reveal yet another complication related to the operationalization of terrorist organizations. In fact, some of the organizations characterized by the most rapid rates of decline were those that did not disengage, but instead changed their names and evolved to continue carrying out terrorist attacks recorded as different entities in the database. These include, for example, Tawhid and Jihad, which was the original name of the group that would later become al Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), and subsequently evolve into Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), followed by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and ultimately Islamic State (IS). As noted above, ISIL would be considered a short-term perpetrator organization at the time of this analysis. Surely this is a mischaracterization, given its history.

**Discussion**

By reviewing basic information on the composition of perpetrator organizations in the GTD, I have arrived at several key conclusions regarding the implications of measurement and analytical strategy for the study of collective desistance from terrorism, and how these issues impact our understanding of the longevity and perceived patterns of decline of terrorist organizations.
First, event databases of terrorist attacks are extremely rich and it is appealing to aggregate the data on perpetrator organizations and leverage it to study their patterns of activity. This seemingly avoids the challenge of defining what is meant by a “terrorist organization” *a priori* because it provides information on all groups that have carried out terrorist attacks. However, this operationalization can lead researchers to assume that the organizations are a relatively homogenous set of “terrorist groups” when in fact, the perpetrator organizations in the GTD are more of an assortment of what we might consider quintessential terrorist organizations, criminal organizations, insurgent groups, political parties that engage in occasional terrorist attacks, political parties that routinely engage in terrorist attacks, terrorist organizations that have evolved into political parties, and a plethora of splinter groups, alliance groups, single-use names of perpetrator groups, and, in a few cases, unaffiliated or weakly affiliated individuals who have branded themselves with a group name. This complexity in the data is likely above and beyond variation in the cohesion or organizational structure of terrorist groups, which most scholars would anticipate.

Second, when faced with a dataset of terrorist activity it is important to keep in mind the vast diversity of contexts in which perpetrator organizations operate. Organizations evolve over time, merging with other organizations, splitting apart, and sometimes changing names despite little or no change in the structure of the organization. Furthermore, fluidity of group membership, leadership, and overall identity as allegiances come and go suggest that the entitativity of collectives that engage in terrorism is highly variable and should not be taken for granted. These factors, which would almost certainly come to light in a qualitative analysis of collective desistance among a single terrorist group or a small number of terrorist groups, are more difficult to identify and address when dealing with hundreds of perpetrator organizations.

A third key implication for research is that the analyses here are consistent with theorizing that desistance is a process, rather than a state. The various trajectories of long-active organizations illustrate different patterns that a perpetrator group’s terrorist activity might follow; however, even those that are characterized by rapid decline manifest that this process often takes place over the course of several years. A perpetrator organization’s rate of decline can also vary based on its frequency of attacks. If an organization transitions from heavily active to completely inactive in the span of one year, it is quite possibly due to an artifact of the data, such as a name change. Because of this, in order to better understand the process of desistance, it is important that we use analytical methods that can accommodate dynamic changes in behaviors over time. Analysis of the longevity of perpetrator organizations’ terrorist violence is insightful, but it can be misleading in the absence of information about variation in its intensity over time, as well as qualitative contextual information about the organizations’ evolution.

**Future Research**

In addition to capitalizing on the promise of trajectory models to analyze the process of collective desistance from terrorism, future research should seek to address the challenges related to operationalization of terrorist organizations using large-N data. For example, preliminary analyses of movements identified in the GTD—clusters of diverse perpetrator entities that share common goals—indicate that their patterns of terrorist activity are very different from those of individual perpetrator organizations.[63] While the distribution of active time spans among perpetrator organization is heavily skewed to the right in Figure 2, meaning most have very short periods of activity while a few have much longer periods of activity, the opposite is true of movements. This suggests that while the names of organizations come and go, the broader cause is often much more robust.

Like terrorist organizations, terrorist movements can be very difficult to operationalize. It is not immediately clear what the appropriate level of aggregation or granularity should be—does the Islamic State’s movement consist of those named organizations that have directly evolved over time, with shared leadership, personnel, and resources? Or, is it more appropriate to broadly conceive of the Islamic State movement as any
organization that has pledged allegiance to al Baghdadi? Or, does the broader salient movement essentially consist of all of adherents to Salafi jihadism? Regardless what the answer might be, this research made it clear that quantitative research on how individual groups relate to the broader cause is a necessary next step in order to accurately evaluate patterns of collective desistance from terrorism.

**Conclusions**

Given that this analysis reveals diverse patterns of desistance and substantive variation among organizations classified as having similar trajectories, this finding is consistent with Crenshaw’s observation that the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations is likely to differ depending on context.[64] These results suggest that it is important for policymakers to consider the historical patterns of activity not only among perpetrator organizations that are loosely organized versus hierarchically structured ones, but also differ with respect to degree of intermittency and specialization in offending.

To the extent that future research is able to better identify the events, circumstances, or policies that promote rapid collective desistance from terrorism rather than gradual desistance from terrorism, policymakers may adopt strategies that leverage this information for the purpose of fostering rapid desistance in order to prevent violent groups from continuing to engage in terrorism for decades. However, in order for this research agenda to be truly productive, scholars must embrace the challenging work of multi-method, critical analysis of terrorist perpetrator organizations.

The function of scientific inquiry is not always to simplify complex phenomena, but sometimes it is – certainly in the social sciences–valuable to recognize and expose the inherent complexity. It is often the case that if we are transparent about the limitations of data and statistical methodologies, research on many of the challenging issues faced by social scientists raises more questions than it answers. The results presented here demonstrate that this is certainly true of patterns of collective desistance from terrorism, if one wants to establish a robust research agenda for future inquiry.

**Postscript**

This article summarized some of the methodological considerations on which the author’s doctoral dissertation was based. The thesis itself used a method called *group-based trajectory analysis* to more fully model the dynamics of the “life course” of more than 600 organizations identified as terrorist perpetrators in the GTD. The quantitative work was complemented by case study analysis in order to challenge assumptions that are often based on either case studies or aggregate statistics alone.

The dissertation identified six distinct patterns of post-peak terrorist violence among the 632 perpetrator organizations identified in the GTD as having carried out terrorist attacks for at least one year. These unique patterns of decline in terrorist violence among organizations include both rapidly declining organizations (approximately four out of five of the organizations could be classified as such) and those that declined more gradually or hardly at all (approximately one fifth of them).

It was also found that perpetrator organizations that began engaging in terrorist violence on a rapidly increasingly trajectory, as well as those that have carried out mass-casualty attacks, suicide attacks, or logistically sophisticated international attacks, are disproportionally less likely to be characterized by a rapidly declining trajectory of post-peak activity, compared to those groups whose terrorist activities do not have each of these attributes.

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Dr. Miller has been part of the GTD team since 2004, developing efficient and effective data collection processes. She produces accessible analytical reports that provide context for current events, and she frequently consults with end-users of the GTD, including researchers, policy makers, journalists, and students. She serves as key personnel on research projects related to the GTD, and has created training modules to provide GTD users with insight on data collection methodologies and tools for data analysis.

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Notes


The GTD is missing data on attacks that occurred in 1993 because the original records were lost prior to being transferred from Pinkerton to START. Therefore 1993 is excluded from the analysis. Because 1993 falls at an arbitrarily different point in the life course of each organization, I assume that this missing data do not systematically impact the results of this analysis.


Exceptions to this include the Baader-Meinhof gang, active in Western Europe in the 1970s, and so-named by authorities and the media after two of the group’s leaders. The group referred to itself as the Red Army Faction; Aust, S., & Bell, A. (2009). Baader-Meinhof: The inside story of the R.A.F. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.


Involvement Mechanisms of Jihadist Networks

by Jasper L. de Bie

Abstract

This article aims to illustrate radicalization towards jihadist terrorism as a non-sequential process. It focuses on both continued as well as unsuccessful trajectories of involvement, by studying how jihadists deal with social stimuli from their environment. The material objects of investigation were 28 voluminous police dossiers from the Netherlands; these yielding rich information on 209 subjects. In addition, 28 semi-structured interviews with police investigators, public prosecutors, and defense lawyers were conducted. By studying the factors that enhance, discourage, and sustain possible affiliation with a terrorist network, this investigation found two transformation processes. The first process shows how intended encouragements to internalize the radical ideology can be carried too far, having a counterproductive effect. The second process shows how seemingly discouraging factors are perceived as positive and therefore encourage further jihadist involvement. All subjects studied appear to have been confronted with mechanisms from transformation processes, indicating that even the involvement of experienced subjects is unstable and can fluctuate over time.

Keywords: Netherlands; primary sources; jihadism; radicalization; terrorist organization

Introduction

The process of involvement of new members in extremist networks has been extensively studied [1] and has gained importance due to the ongoing conflict in Syria, the rise of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), and the recent terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States. Such conflicts and attacks can work as catalysts for vulnerable youngsters, triggering a wish to participate in the jihadist movement. [2] It is therefore crucial to increase our understanding of how young people get involved in the jihadist movement. This paper aims to discuss the mechanisms that encourage, sustain, and discourage involvement into jihadism. To define involvement, we distinguish two elements that are often referred to by scholars when they discuss radical involvement: the radicalization process into an extremist milieu and the root causes that initiated this process. These elements will be briefly discussed to illustrate what exactly is meant with involvement in this article.

Root Causes

A radicalization process is often believed to involve a change in beliefs and the internalization of a new mindset.[3] When trying to understand what this change in beliefs initiates, scholars often refer to so called root causes. Previous studies have mentioned numerous potential causes, but scholars do not always agree on the impact of specific causes. For instance, whether or not psychological disorders and mental health problems are disproportionately found among radicals and terrorists, is debated.[4] Some argue that psychological disorders are not more frequently present among terrorists than among non-terrorists.[5] The same goes for the economic background; whereas some scholars argue that there is a relation between terrorism and economic hardship, [6] others argue that there is no relationship at all.[7] A more widely accepted root cause is that a crisis situation exists that a potential terrorist experiences before radicalization occurs. The nature of such a crisis may, however, vary; one can distinguish between personal victimization and political grievances experienced directly or vicariously.[8] There are different types of marginalization and relative deprivation [9] and there are also different types of individual or collective identity-problems triggering radicalization.[10] Despite the relative wide consensus about the presence of a crisis as triggered, several scholars criticize this approach and argue that the number of people experiences existential or
situational crises is large while only a few of them radicalize.[11] Moreover, Pisoiu [12], for instance, states that it is unlikely that unemployment and discrimination lead to the adoption of such extreme career choices as turning to terrorism. Although these remarks here only scratch the surface of the root cause debate and is far from exhaustive, it gives an idea of the variety of alleged root causes and the debates among scholars regarding these.[13]

**Radicalization Process**

Building on the presumed root causes underlying radicalization, scholars often discuss how people then deal with their perceived triggering factors and how this can lead to the internalization of an extreme ideology and the search for affiliation with a larger radical milieu or jihadist network. A key element in this radicalization process has been identified as frame alignment; it refers to the actual reconstruction of a recruit’s mindset in accordance to the extremist movement’s narrative.[14] Many scholars appear to agree that this re-farming capitalizes on the aforementioned crises (i.e. root causes), which make new recruits more receptive for alternative worldviews, [15] in this case the Salafist-Jihadist ideology. The material process of frame alignment can be initiated by individuals by themselves, in the form of self-radicalization (e.g. with the help of the Internet), [16]; however, reconstructing a person’s mental framework is usually considered to be a social or group process. Some argue that it is triggered by friends or near acquaintances who experience the same crisis.[17] Others highlight the role of so-called recruiters who emphasize the newcomers’ problems and then offer them a solution in the form of a romanticizing new life inside a radical brotherhood organization in possession of a superior religious ideology.[18]

The foregoing is obviously only a limited overview of the nature of a radicalization process. It merely serves as a catalyst to discuss the way this radicalization process is often presented. In order to address the radicalization process, scholars often devise theoretical frameworks such as radicalization trajectories or phase models. In these models, the radicalization process is presented as a gradual and sequential process with a clear beginning and a fixed termination point.[19] Every step, from root cause to frame alignment, and from self-radicalization to recruitment, has a particular position in such models. Although some of these models provide a clear and realistic picture of the steps towards affiliation with a radical milieu, they are not uncontroverisal. Borum [20] claims for instance, that many conceptual models of radicalization are underdeveloped and often lack a social-scientific and empirical basis; they also have not been rigorously tested. Moreover, although some models offer valuable insights, it is questionable whether an involvement process indeed follows a linear and consecutive order of stages.[21] The reasons for this, according to Veldhaus and Staun, [22] are the selection on the dependent variable and statistical discrimination, ingrained in phase models. Selection on the dependent variable refers to the sole focus on successful pathways of involvement, without checking if radicalization factors are present or absent in unsuccessful pathways. Statistical discrimination means that a very general trait, which is shared by many random individuals, is defined as a specific radicalization factor.

**Continued and Failed Involvement**

Two issues emerge from the discussion so far; these will function as point of departure for this article’s analysis. First, most radicalization models focus on the entry process and the analysis ends after the alleged termination point when a potential recruit is embedded in the jihadist network has been reached. This means that factors and mechanisms that ought to keep radicalized people inside the extremist network after they entered, receive little or no attention. Second, as mentioned also by Veldhaus and Staun, the other side of the coin, where alleged involvement factors do not lead to actual involvement, is often ignored. In other words, the unsuccessful pathways of involvement receive little attention. Let us combine these issues and elaborate why it is useful to adopt a slightly different approach.
One could argue that involvement in jihadism does not have a termination point and that recruits are exposed to various factors that influence their degree of involvement long after their initial affiliation. For example, jihadists have to continuously deal with social responses from their environment. Affiliating with a jihadist network initiates informal disapproval and condemnation by the large or smaller sectors of the public or formal criminalization and counter-terrorism measures by the government because both consider jihadism to be deviant.[23] In addition, jihadists can also face reprisals from like-minded peers when they (unintentionally) do not live up to the norms and standards of the group.[24] These negative responses can also – like in the previous section on root causes and radicalization processes–be considered a crisis a jihadist has to face, both during as well as long after the initial radicalization or entry process. Moreover, failure to properly deal with these negative responses could actually discourage people to participate at both an early and later stage, thereby leading to a failed or at least disrupted jihadist involvement. Literature on extremist disengagement touches upon this issue, when scholars describe the different occasions where jihadists become disappointed and disillusioned, leading them to turn away from the extremist environment.[25] This body of research predominantly accentuates the exit of group members who were already fully involved, not necessarily focusing on the early stages of involvement which might turn out to be unsuccessful.

Building on the foregoing, this article aims to discuss both the early and later stages of jihadist affiliation by focusing on factors that both potential new recruits as well as experienced jihadists are exposed to. Furthermore, it will not only focus on the factors that initiate and sustain jihadist involvement, but will also focus on the factors that may lead to unsuccessful involvement of potential recruits and disengagement of experienced jihadists. In other words, we distinguish between encouraging and discouraging factors. However, the goal here is not to compile a full list of all possible encouraging and discouraging factors. Rather, the aim is to describe how militants deal with these factors and how this particular interaction eventually determines their degree of involvement. In that sense, it is not entirely similar to most disengagement studies, since we are interested in how people cope with discouraging factors to stay involved. Yet, the primary focus of this article is not on individual involvement trajectories. Instead it aims to understand how different social processes can affect these trajectories of involvement in general. Before the findings of this study will be reported, the next paragraph will elaborate on the data utilized and methods applied.

Methods

Approach

This article aims to build a more data driven understanding of jihadist involvement through the use of grounded theory methods. Unlike a positivist methodology, Grounded Theory (GT) does not aim to test and verify hypotheses from prior research.[26] Rather, grounded theorists generate a theory inductively (and abductively) through a more open analysis of emergent categories from the data themselves. The principles of constant comparison and theoretical sampling stand at the core of this approach. The former involves comparison between data and emerging concepts during each stage of the research,[27] while the latter means that emerging categories direct the process of data gathering or sampling over time.[28] In order to adhere to these principles, the procedures of sampling, coding, categorizing, analyzing, and theorizing need to be conducted simultaneously and continuously throughout the research.[29] GT methods have been successfully applied on jihadist involvement by other scholars.[30]

Data

This article is primarily based on a unique source of confidential police files that offer valuable insight in the modus operandi of jihadist networks in the Netherlands over time. Access was granted to 28 voluminous
police investigations into jihadist terrorism between 2000 and 2013, [31] focusing on 14 different jihadist
networks entailing 209 individuals. Table 1 provides an overview of relevant background characteristics. Due
to the selectivity of the data, no additional analyses are conducted on these background characteristics.

Table 1: Background characteristics of the 209 studied subjects, based on police files.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background characteristics</th>
<th>Absolute numbers</th>
<th>Percentage¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>84 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>16 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>100 %</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≤ 20</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>26 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35</td>
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<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married / in relationship</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max. secondary school</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Started tertiary education</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment / Study</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>92</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Rounded figures.

Data were gathered during different periods. The first tier of data, which entailed 12 police investigations
from the period 2000-2005, was gathered between May 2006 and May 2008.[32] Based on the preliminary
findings from the first tier, a second tier of data was gathered between July 2012 and December 2013 based
on 16 police investigations from the period 2005-2013. This extended time-frame enabled the adoption of
a long term perspective. A data collection sheet was used to provide structure while gathering data from
the voluminous police files.[33] This sheet contained several items and open questions, concerning group
structure, activities, ideology, etc. The investigations yielded rich data based on original wire taps of both
telephone and Internet communications, recordings of in-house wire taps, transcripts of interrogations of
suspects, witness statements, observation reports, forensic reports, house searches, expert-witness reports,
but also the complete and verbatim court transcripts and lawyers’ pleas.
The basic inclusion criteria regarding the 209 subjects were that: (1) an individual expressed and advocated extremist Salafist-Jihadist ideas or someone explicitly facilitated such jihadism. This means that, to be included in the database, it was not necessary for an individual to actually conduct or prepare violent activities; it was enough that he or she advocated violent ideas; (2) we were able to gather information on the subject beyond his/her personal details; (3) the subject lived or regularly resided in the Netherlands. If the subject did not live in the Netherlands, but played an indispensable role in the network nonetheless, he or she was also included. The current article focuses on the entire group of 209 subjects; not solely the new recruits were studied, but also those who were associated with jihadist networks for a longer period. Since a long-term approach was adopted, particular aspects that affected subjects at different stages of involvement were explored.

This article refers to jihadist networks, since most subjects under observation operated in groups. The 209 subjects can be divided into 14 networks, although some subjects belong to more than one.[34] Individuals were categorized as belonging to one jihadist network when they interacted with each other during a particular episode, while conducting activities together in which the Salafist-Jihadist ideology played a central role. Hence, the network boundaries are foremost formed by the participants’ interactions, activities, and shared violent jihadist ideology, rather than these being determined by actual terrorist attacks or other violent acts. The networks studies are therefore not co-extensive with a terrorist organization as defined by law. What they share, however, is the Salafist-Jihadist ideology, which, inter alia, calls for a purification of Islam by returning to the roots, the way of life supposedly existing in the original Muslim community (Umma) at and shortly after the time of the prophet Muhammed. Crucially, Salafists-Jihadists approve of the use of violence to realize this objective.

Several unanswered questions arose while studying these Dutch police data. Therefore, 28 semi-structured interviews with key respondents were conducted during different stages of the research. Unfortunately, the researcher was unable to gain access to cooperative (former) jihadists, and therefore relied on key informants such as leading police investigators, public prosecutors, and several lawyers who defended various suspects in the 28 police investigations to provide further information. The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. In addition, during the final stages of the document analysis, some ten court hearings of four different criminal cases were attended by the author, which resulted in additional case information.

Unlike the original aim of traditional Grounded Theory (GT) approaches, this study primarily aims to develop a grounded understanding of jihadist involvement mechanisms, rather than generating a new theory. Instead of solely relying on inductive reasoning, sensitizing concepts were developed, which functioned as interpretive devices to help analyzing data and preparing interviews.[35]

**Analysis**

During and after the collection of data, the information was coded with the help of a software program for qualitative analysis (MAXQDA). The analytical process started with an initially open coding procedure, consisting of ‘incident-by-incident’ coding.[36] While comparing different incidents (segments of texts referring to alleged terrorist activity), particular relevant codes of jihadist involvement emerged. Subsequently, ‘focused coding’ was applied to assess the initial codes’ adequacy and depth.[37] Through this procedure, initial codes developed into categories and sub-categories with associated properties. By constantly comparing data with data, data with codes and categories, and re-examining the properties of the initial (sub-) categories, saturation of data was reached. This meant that no new properties or dimensions of the categories emerged from the data. In this way, the relationship between the categories was specified and elaborated.[38]
Limitations

The findings presented below are solely based on this study’s selection of data; they cannot readily be generalized. One reason for this is that the police only have a certain proportion of jihadist activities under observation. In some cases, where the police were unable to obtain information in relation to the past, this also means that some information about the very first moments that militants start associating with jihadist networks might be have been missed. Furthermore, the initial goal of the police investigations was to inform a judge. This is in line with Althoff’s [39] observation that “court files are a construction of social reality in the context of criminal law”. In other words, both offender perspective and circumstances are primarily formulated through the lens of the authorities. Suspects’ statements after arrest are generally the result of ‘forced communication’ which was only selectively transcribed. However, the recorded Internet- and telephone-wiretaps cannot be regarded as ‘forced communication’; they should be regarded as unobtrusive information. Except for the fact that these transcripts were selected and processed by police investigators, we can assume that the recorded conversations happened as they did. Moreover, due to the fact that we had access to the original transcripts, we were largely able to check the data ourselves. Finally, police interpretations can be biased since knowledge among police personnel regarding jihadism may not always be present or up to date. Yet, we did not directly copy the findings and interpretations of the police, but used our own definitions and judgment to assess the information.

Findings

The following section outlines the encouraging and discouraging factors the jihadist militants had to deal with and how this affected their degree of involvement and that of others. The selection of factors is the result of the GT approach, which explains the structure of the text. However, this does not result in a simple compilation of factors, as these factors are often interrelated. It was found that being exposed to encouraging factors on the one hand, and discouraging factors on the other hand, sometimes occurred simultaneously. The result of interacting antagonistic factors, was the militants’ degree of involvement could be very unstable. To illustrate this, the rest of this article is divided into two sections.

The first section (Process I) illustrates a process where subjects were initially exposed to encouraging factors that could stabilize and sustain a subject’s continued involvement over time. However, these encouragements can sometimes go too far and instead turn out to have a discouraging effect on an individual. By describing a process in which encouragements gradually transform into discouragements, this section shows how certain trajectories towards jihadist involvement turn out to be unsuccessful.

The second section (Process II) illustrates a reversed process. The social environment of the studied subjects often initiates discouraging mechanisms that ought to hamper a stable and continued jihadist involvement over time. Although this can lead to disengagement, this section illustrates how the militants under observation dealt with these supposed discouragements. In other words, the discouragements turned occasionally into encouragements that served to assure their continued involvement in jihadism.

Overall, both transformation processes were continuously present and were not distinctive for a particular step or stage. Although the findings are offered in a particular order for analytical purposes, in reality they may have occurred in a less orderly way. The following sections will deal with these processes more in detail.

Process I: From Encouragement to Discouragement

The first process illustrates the circumstances in which new and experienced jihadists are encouraged by mainly like-minded peers to internalize the Salafist-Jihadist ideology and to behave accordingly. The
following will show how this initial voluntary encouragement can turn into an almost forced alignment of both attitudes and behavior.

**Exchanging and Discussing Ideological Materials**

Based on the police files, it was found that distribution and production of ideological sources of information was crucial across time. Through the continuous exchange of ideological materials, such as books, files, videos, cassettes, storage devices, and other types of written, visual or audio materials, subjects informed and stimulated each other to gain in-depth knowledge of extremist ideas. This interaction was initially conducted face-to-face, but more recent police investigations show that this process moved over time towards the online environment. Radical websites, social media accounts, or YouTube channels easily supplied the materials and met the needs of the newcomers. The thresholds thereby lowered and the target group expanded. Besides exchanging radical materials, the Dutch militants also created and produced them. Whereas some subjects translated ideological Arabic texts for speakers nor familiar with Arabic, others explained the ideology themselves through written testimonials. Some subjects developed flyers to promote upcoming events such as public readings or protests, while others produced ideological videos to persuade new recruits to follow the lead of the mujahedeen. Interestingly, both newcomers and more experienced militants distributed and produced materials during the entire period under study. This process of Dawah (invitation to practice Islam) appears to be an ongoing core activity of all jihadist militants, amounting to a constant obligation.

These encouragements were not solely open-ended, but could also have a more instructing, even dictating nature. For instance, readings and lectures in private settings were very directive and helped to align attitudes. The police observations, interrogations, and wiretaps showed that these gatherings were regularly organized in living rooms, backrooms of Internet cafés, garages, and mosques; although over time it became more customary to conduct readings and lectures online. Some subjects would lecture others for hours during online chat sessions. Whereas many of such sessions were hierarchical, with a clear teacher-student relationship, other sessions had a more horizontal nature, where all subjects contributed on an equal level. For example, group chats between subjects 170, 171, 172, and several unknown people in 2012, showed how they used Skype or other audio-based online group chats to inform a broader audience and exchange information at any given time. In these group chats, subjects were allotted two minutes of speaking time in which they were permitted by the others to lay bare their arguments. If they exceeded their two minutes, the microphone was shut down, creating a more even playing field.

These off- and online lectures directed the interpretation of the exchanged materials and instructed participants how to behave in accordance with the Salafist-Jihadist doctrine. Particular phrases and stories from the Quran and the Hadith were cited and explained to the attendees. More in particular, the more seasoned militants in the network tried to bring about in the newcomers what Quintan Wiktorowicz’ [40] called a cognitive opening. They did so by emphasizing the marginal position of most Muslims in the world, often through the display of videos containing horrific pictures of abused, murdered, or otherwise victimized Muslims. The combination of lecturing and displaying videos of maltreated Muslims was meant to function as an incentive to make newcomers internalize ideological beliefs. It appeared to serve to widen their distance from mainstream society in order to motivate them more strongly to rise against the alleged enemies of Islam.

Whereas the gatherings enhanced social cohesion, segregation between male and female participants was often noticed at the same time. Due to strict orthodox rules, it rarely occurred that both genders followed a lecture in each other’s company. Women either resided in a different room while listening to a senior jihadist, or separate female gatherings were organized. A separate lecture was often led by energetic female jihadists, who played an important role in supporting jihadist involvement among women.
The context of gatherings and online lectures developed over time, leading to far more interaction between attendees. Before 2004-2005, the sessions were mainly monologues by senior subjects with jihad experience and extensive knowledge of the material, trying to convince and persuade the attendees. Listeners looked up to these senior jihadists who often portrayed themselves as being ideologically omniscient. This rank disparity often prevented two-way discussion. In later police investigations, however, we noticed that the main speakers tended to be younger and far from ideologically omniscient. This opened up room for debate and discussion. Newcomers to these gatherings began to contributed to the discussions and no longer felt restrained to present their own views. Furthermore, it appeared that many meetings no longer followed a lecturer-listener format. Several participants clustered together to search for answers, and thereby benefited from each other in their collective quest for information. Gradually, a more dynamic, interactive, reciprocal, and less hierarchical process evolved, in which it was less clear who informed whom.

**Inflicting Pressure and Starting Conflicts**

Directions and instructions were imposed upon subjects while exchanging information, which sometimes developed into pressure. As several scholars have already illustrated in previous studies, peer pressure is often useful to encourage others.[41] This study found similar mechanisms of encouraging peer pressure. However, the data also show that pressure could sometimes carry too far and have a discouraging or even deterring effect. This study found several courses of action, spread over the entire studied time-frame, which balanced on this fault line of encouragement and discouragement and sometimes tipped over to the side of deterrence. Based on wiretaps and interrogations for example, many participants, both new ones and those more experienced, tried to unify the sometimes contradictory attitudes through behavioral criticism. They repeatedly reminded each other how they should arrange their lifestyle and how they should behave in accordance to the Jihadi-Salafist doctrine. Some repeatedly reminded others via phone calls to pray at set times, while others pressured them to quit their jobs, choose a suitable profession or follow a useful education. Most subjects encouraged others to wear particular clothing, grow a beard, and stop listening to music. Some subjects even instructed others whom to interact with. If subjects failed to meet such requirements, their behavior was criticized and widely condemned, and alternative behavior was proposed. Whereas such interactions indeed encouraged some subjects to adopt one particular interpretation, it also caused friction with other subjects. In those cases, criticism of behavior can be interpreted as unwanted pressure. In a minority of cases, unwanted pressure even crossed into intimidation and led to fear, as the following quote by a witness shows.

“It just got worse, because Azziz [42] was no longer allowed to smoke and drink in his own house. Azziz thought it [JLB: the network] was like a sect.[…]. Azziz did not want this and became frightened. His friend Omar was also there sometimes and he became frightened too. Then Azziz started to make up all these excuses to keep subject 84 out of his house. Subject 84 then started to circle around Azziz’ house with his bicycle. Azziz did not like this at all and got scared.” (Witness about subject 84, 2005, interrogation)

Intimidation and fear were mainly used by relatively experienced militants who, however, lacked natural authority. In order to compensate this deficiency, they intimidated new and vulnerable recruits, especially those individuals lacking self-esteem and looking for a peer-group to belong to. These recruits appeared to find meaning and comfort through association with inspiring people who disseminated appealing ideological ideas and even told them how to behave. When these recruits became disillusioned with the plans of the network, however, intimidating militants increased pressure, causing the vulnerable recruits to follow up orders reluctantly. The police files illustrate, for instance, that subjects 99 and 104 sold their furniture out of fear from subjects 65 and 81. This fear was inflicted through intimidation by showing them weapons and threatening with violent consequences in case of non-compliance. Subject 99 explains how subject 65 sometimes intimidated him:
“He grabbed some kind of Rambo-knife and he made cutting motions with it. He pretended as if he controlled someone under his foot. He said that this was for the Kuffar”. (Subject 99 about subject 65, 2005, interrogation)

Consequently, subjects 99 and 104 became afraid of their peers and they wanted to abandon the group. The most extreme examples in the police files indicate that, in a minority of cases, encouragements carried too far transformed into discouragements. In other cases, the intimidation was more subtle but nonetheless went too far for those exposed to it.

In other cases, the pressure transformed encouraging situations into disputes and conflicts. These conflicts were primarily noticed in the police files from 2004-2005 onwards. The debates let to conflicts because many participants did not accept criticism, while the opportunity to express open criticism presented itself more often. Some participants got very upset when they were contradicted by others, especially when they (usually more experienced militants) considered themselves ideologically superior. This led to disputes in which some participants tried to force their interpretation upon others. Such disputes occurred among both male and female participants of such meetings. Based on wiretap conversations and according to several female militants, the aforementioned energetic female jihadist had a sharp tongue to criticize other females. Irrespective of gender, the disputes were characterized by a survival of the fittest mentality as participants continuously showed off and tried to overrule each other. Several of them engaged in a great deal of boasting and displayed a certain arrogance in their conversations with other militants. By using clamorous communication, they sought to exert superiority over others. Here is an example of this:

A) “So you are saying they will go there, receive education and return afterwards? What kind of bullshit are you talking?!”

B) “It is not me; it is you who is talking bullshit!!” (Subject 78 to subject 79, 2004, wiretap)

Such conversations were particularly noticeable in online environments, allowing participants to express firmly dissenting opinions, protected by the Internet’s relative anonymity. The Internet wiretaps show that most subjects created an account on particular (radical) websites, while using a pseudonym. This enabled anonymous contributions to religious or ideological debates. Online published material, for instance, was often accompanied by a thread of replies from different people with radical sympathies, who all had firm opinions considered by them to be the truth. Likewise, in group chats or one-on-one conversations on MSN, PalTalk, Skype, etc., participants repeatedly tried to overrule other interlocutors by claiming that their perspective was based on proof. The following conversation gives you an idea:

A) “He claims that it isn’t proof. Hahah, this reminds me of school: reading comprehension. Abdullah [43] is ignorant. He is the one talking without proof.”

B) “This is becoming language philosophy how he [JLB: Abdullah] explains it. We were talking about Kuffar and Taghut in NL, right? Abdullah, you must come with a better explanation if you want to discuss.” (Group chat with subject 171, 2012, wiretap) [44]

What often appeared to happen during such conversations, was that neither of the disputing parties was prepared to admit error. They constantly overruled each other in the expectation to have the virtual audience in group chats on their side. Participants sometimes laughed at those who made an arguable claim and ridiculed the other by calling him or her names or making condescending remarks, or spreading harmful rumors. Winning a point in the debate gave them a feeling of importance. The one who tasted defeat was being belittled by the in-group reprisals he received. Therefore, only few tended to give in for fear of losing face. Some of these discussions escalated so much that conflicts became unavoidable, as the following conversation illustrates:
A) “You are of the hypocrite kind. No you are a dirty hypocrite. Still you haven’t answered me. You point your finger at me, while you don’t have any [proof] to stand on. You benefit from everything the West has invented. You are the colonizer’s bootlicker!”

B) “Benefit? Do you regard the West as a God now? Did the West give birth to the world or something? Or is it Allah who created the world?”

A) ”He is more Mushrik [JLB: polytheist] than he appears.”

B) “[...] All wealth on earth is Allah’s. Even a 5-year-old toddler knows that. What a retarded statement does this guy make!”

A) ”Wollah! Don’t offend retarded people!” (Group chat with subject 172, 2012, wiretap)

Such unresolved clashes in debates were often followed by severe reprisals from others belonging to the in-group. For example, in 2004 a senior militant (subject 25) spread rumors about visits to prostitutes by another senior militant (subject 146). By way of revenge, the latter reported the former’s name to the Immigration Service, claiming that this person was a terrorist threat. As a result, subject 25 appeared on the government’s radar, and he was prohibited from traveling abroad. The most feared reprisal was the (threat of) repudiation from the group. Declaring a fellow militant to be disbelieving (takfir), was a means to discharge someone. This excommunication of an alleged nonbeliever opened the door to justify punishment. In line with what was found in this study, Schuurman et al.[45] mentioned how many members of the so-called Hofstadgroup indiscriminately used the weapon of declaring someone takfir, leading to severe disagreements between members and, in some cases, disengagement from the group. Despite several threats of cutting off limbs, actual violent punishment was not found in the present study. We did find cases of repudiation. For example, in 2006 one participant (subject 141) did not meet the requirement of orthodox clothing, although he was already involved in the jihadist movement for some years. He was wearing Nike shoes, a sign of apostasy, and was therefore repudiated from his group in the name of takfir. After all, Nike is a Greek god and a Muslim is not allowed to worship another god but Allah, according to the group’s ideology.

The above illustrates how subjects tried to regulate each other’s behavior and how this affected their level of involvement in their group. This very much relates to Akers’ [46] Social Learning Theory, a theory that has been applied by several scholars to the study of terrorism.[47] In his theory, Akers elaborates ‘differential reinforcements’–punishments or rewards that follow certain behavior. When criminal behavior is more punished than rewarded, an individual is less likely to continue this behavior. Peer pressure and internal disputes as sketched above have a comparable effect as the punishments mentioned by Akers. However, the penalties by the subjects in the group studied here were not supposed to lead to disengagement. The intent was to regulate behavior and stabilize involvement, but paradoxically pushed some group members out of the jihadist movement. In other words, the end result may be similar to Akers’ explanation of reduced criminal behavior, but the process leading up to it was never planned to bring about such a result.

**Process II: From Discouragements to Encouragements**

Alongside the first process in which encouraging factors sometimes transformed into deterring factors, the militants covered in our police files were simultaneously confronted with an opposite process. The social environment – being friends, family or society as a whole – plays a very important role in this process. On the one hand, the environment can harbor the root causes of jihadist involvement, and can also further such involvement and push a vulnerable individual through the radicalization process. On the other hand, the social environment can also explicitly respond to a person’s jihadist affiliation, which is usually in the form of condemnation.

Especially after 9/11 and the murder of cineast Theo van Gogh in 2004, the Dutch government intensified its focus on jihadist networks. Government policies were devised that extended police authority, increased
surveillance of suspicious milieus, and raised the number of interventions such as by arresting several individuals who formed a security threat.[48] Moreover, media attention and concern by members of the public about extremism rose. This created an environment of increased apprehension about the doings of Muslims and immigrants within Dutch society.[49] Both new and more experienced jihadists needed to operate within this changing context. The question is how this intensified focus by government and society affected the involvement of young Muslims in jihadist networks. The next section will illustrate how the militants coped with this environment.

Dealing with a Hostile Environment

Mainstream society disapproved and condemned the militants’ jihadist ideology in the form of negative media attention and public censure by right-wing politicians. This hostile social climate was present all the time, but rapidly increased after 2004.[50] In addition to a more general shift in both political climate and public opinion, the police files consulted also show that the militants also encountered disapproval from people in their direct social environment. For instance, several militants noticed how people in their neighborhood looked frightened when they saw a subject dressed in traditional Salafist clothing. Moreover, friends and family members also often criticized them and threatened with counter-measures to change their attitudes and behaviors. This usually started with encouragements to choose another path in life, for instance, by forwarding job applications to them or introducing acquaintances who were eligible to marry the subject. Relatives often assumed that when a subject found a job, a wife or husband, and became a parent, he or she would start living a more tranquil and civil life. Some partners of militants took more extreme measures. A police investigator interviewed for this study recalled:

“His girlfriend started to act really strange. She feigned a pregnancy at a particular moment; we had the idea that it was fake. It was the way she talked and it occurred completely out of the blue. From their telephone conversations, we had the idea that she was afraid, that she knew what he was about to do. This [feigning a pregnancy] was a means to prevent him from departing.” (Respondent 14 about subjects 118 and 122, interview August 2012, police investigator)

Some relatives also tried to influence the militant’s associates, for instance by threatening a suspected recruiter with violence if he did not leave their son alone. Furthermore, when such measures had no effect, relatives sometimes reported the young man or woman and his/her associates to the police or the intelligence agency. In several instances, this measure led to police arrests, which will be discussed later. Eventually, the situation often escalated to an actual breach between the militant and his or her family. Whereas such reprisals could hamper or question a militant’s jihadist involvement, this study also documented the following mechanisms that subjects applied in order to cope with adverse reactions in their own (family) surrounding.

The first coping mechanism noticed was brotherhood, which relates to what is often referred to in the literature as social identity or social solidarity.[51] Brotherhood is a highly valued asset in the jihadist movement and was continuously emphasized in conversations during difficult times. Brotherhood offers a sense of belonging and companionship—something many of the subjects studied claimed not to have experienced before. Many admitted that they came from environments deficient of the warmth of togetherness, solidarity, and attachment. The affection between the militants, who continuously call each other brother and sister, sometimes resulted in genuine friendships, something greatly appreciated. Brotherhood had great appeal and needed to be cherished. Some young men in the movement even claimed that a particular peer was the brother they had always wanted to have. Here is an example:

“Brother, know that I wish you the best. Whatever you wish for me, I wish even more for you. Whenever you did something wrong, I immediately forgave you. [...] Have faith, my little brother. We will not be abandoned. Have patience, Janah [JLB: Paradise] is close, I will never forget you. I have loved you since the day I met
The perception of brotherhood not only met personal needs, but also hardened suspects against the exclusion from, and condemnation by, society. The idea that their brotherhood was under threat motivated suspects to neutralize out-group reprisals by arguing that the brotherhood was superior to the out-group. This social differentiation [52] seemed to stimulate the adoption of radical beliefs and routines. Group members encouraged each other to continue their battle against nonbelievers for the sake of the brotherhood, which increased their willingness to protect the in-group and oppressed brothers elsewhere. For example, one newcomer (subject 147) communicated in 2011 with an unknown jihadist in a faraway jihadist theatre of conflict. They talked about the fact they “are determined to sacrifice everything for the sake of Allah”. This jihadist congratulated him for his determination, but warned him to be careful. In reaction subject 147 was very pleased with him and called him the brother he had wished for a very long time.

A second coping mechanism is boasting. This study found that participating in a jihadist network seemed to generate perceptions of self-importance. The militant’s reasoning, customs, possession of weapons, and use of historic noms de guerre appeared to give them prestige. Especially the use of boasting during conversations and discussions suggest this. Whereas boasting could be a hampering factor during Process I, it could also be noticed that boasting was simultaneously useful to deal with discouraging factors in Process II. For instance, being publically labeled a ‘terrorist’ can be seen as stigmatizing and act as deterrent to further jihadist participation. However, several subjects used this criminalizing classification as a confirmation of their importance. The label ‘terrorist’ became for them a badge of honor, depicting their toughness and fearlessness. This emerges from the following example:

“I have been busy lately. Plotting an assassination attempt here, carrying out an attack there, enough to drive you mad [...] I’m just busy now motivating people to slaughter a father.” (Subject 79, 2004, wiretap)

The media played an important role in boosting their ego; increased attention from journalists seemed to confirm the militants’ feeling of importance. Based on wiretaps and forms of in-house bugging, it was found that several militants explicitly followed different media outlets to see what was said about the jihadist movement. They cancelled appointments in order to watch talk-shows, watch the news, in the hope of obtaining information about their deed’s impact. A senior militant (subject 81) even kept a record of all his media appearances. He had a bulletin-board in his basement documenting with newspaper clippings his arrests, trial proceedings, and court verdicts; he also used online search engines to look for his own name. When media attention led to an in-depth interview or TV appearance, militants turned such negative attention into positive financial benefits, as some of them started to ask for money. For example, one militant (subject 80) was interviewed twice about his jihadist involvement by a weekly national magazine and a national television program in 2005. He sought acknowledgement for this ‘achievement’ by repeatedly asking his ‘brothers’ whether they had read and seen his interviews. He claimed that he was awarded 1,500 euros for a single appearance and called it “a bonus for talking rubbish”. Thereafter, he functioned as an intermediary between journalists and other brothers to arrange additional interviews. According to a wiretap of a conversation between a journalist and one militant (subject 80), the newspaper offered 1,750 Euros for an interview or 1,500 Euros if they could follow him for a day. He was, however, too greedy with his counterproposal of 2,500 Euros; the newspaper declined. (Subject 80, 2005, wiretap).

Dealing with Actual Repudiations and Arrests

In addition to condemnations from a hostile environment, both new and more experienced militants also had to cope with more concrete measures taken by members of the out-group. For instance, most subjects followed a particular Imam whose interpretation of the Islam they initially approved of. However, when they openly voiced their disagreement with the Imam due as they radicalized, they were, according to several
witnesses, often excluded from local mosques. Likewise, they were banned from religious websites when they expressed extremist opinions. Furthermore, many of them experienced interventions by the police, such as regular controls on the street, close surveillance through wiretapping of which the more experienced militants appeared to be aware of, but there were also arrests resulting in criminal charges. Many of those affected expressed the view that such actions were deliberate punishments due to their religious affiliation and the way they dressed. Both new recruits and older group members discussed how police and government tended to see all Muslims as potential terrorists. In 2006, for example, one militant girl expressed her distrust of the police and claimed that they made everyone with a beard, a white djellaba or a burqa a suspect. She got very upset when she was asked to take off here niqab during an interrogation, telling the officers:

“Allah is the only legislator. I follow the Quran and the Sunna, the path walked by the prophet. I only abide to the Islamic law and I do not have to justify my actions to you people.” (Subject 153, 2006, interrogation)

The fact that some Muslims had to identify themselves more often than others to the police was perceived by many of them as unjust and discriminatory. This made them feel that they were constantly watched and that they could be arrested without a probable cause. It is a fact that since the beginning of 2000 several Muslim militants in the Netherlands had been arrested for involvement with jihadist networks or for being participants in the preparation of terrorist acts. Whether such arrests led to an acquittal and dismissal, or a conviction, they could leave a heavy burden on those arrested. Arrests often led to a lengthy period of pre-trial detention, with no contacts with the outside world, led to a loss of employment, and had several other negative consequences for those detained. Those affected reacted in different ways. Some felt stigmatized and found it hard to be viewed as criminals, while according to them, they had done nothing wrong. Criminalization was bad enough for them, but they were accused of ‘terrorism’, making the stigma even more severe. In a number of cases, the police had entered their homes by force, using overwhelming manpower, they were blindfolded and often apparently not informed about details of the indictment—all intense experiences for some of them. In a few cases, they accused the authorities of disproportionate use of force or psychological manipulations during interrogations or detention.[53] One lawyer recalled how his client, a newcomer to the group, was affected by his trial:

“After the arrest he never had anything to do with the rest of these guys. The trial had a substantial impact on him and he therefore chose to distance himself from them.” (Respondent 21 about subject 140, interview May 2014, lawyer)

Whereas the interventions discussed above de-motivated several of the Dutch jihadists, or at least disrupted their plans, other militants were not immediately discouraged. Instead, such interventions led to a desire for revenge among them, while others even felt empowered. In other words, the interventions had a rather encouraging effect on some of the Dutch jihadist militants. Several scholars have already stressed how the troubled relationship between the government and particular groups in society can become a causal factor for terrorism, [54] or how state responses to terrorist behavior can fuel and initiate acts of vengeance among members of extremist groups.[55] As a result, a vicious cycle can emerge in which both parties repeatedly respond to each other’s actions, thereby sustaining jihadist recruitment and operations.

The first situation in which a vicious circle can get started is where jihadists are expanding their scope in response to interventions. When militants were deprived of platforms for ideological discussions (such as websites or mosques), they often saw this as an opportunity to create their own community and expand their scope. The police materials studied indicate that some of the militants covered in the investigations actively attempted to reach out to new audiences. This resulted, for instance, in going beyond engaging in joint readings and organizing lectures, but also in initiating spontaneous conversations with strangers in the streets. In addition, some of them started to organize public protests and communal gatherings. These religiously oriented demonstrations aimed to propagate their ideology, inform nonbelievers about their interpretation of Islam, but also to provoke, according to a police respondent, law enforcement to initiate
new interventions. Just like the readings and lectures, the protests enabled subjects to meet other like-minded young Muslims, in an effort to bring them into the fold. Another more organized and structured form of scope expansion was the branding of the movement. Over the years, several of these militants had tried to brand their radical milieu by a specific trademark. Their marketing strategy aimed for a more credible movement while also distancing themselves from terrorism. The idea was that creating a new brand could sell the ideology, attract more people, but also raise money. For example, some of the demonstrations they organized were advertised under a trademark. Scope expansion was primarily initiated by the more experienced militants, and their primarily objective was to win new recruits.

In addition to scope expansion to gain new members, the militants also focused on preventing being arrested themselves. Following several arrests by the police, those who felt that they could be next tried to adjust their modus operandi to prevent future arrests. For example, by meeting in remote and secluded locations, they hoped to escape raising attention. Some of the Dutch militants even exchanged their traditional Islamic clothing for more Western attire and, in their own words, ‘sexy’ outfits. By doing this they tried to keep their lifestyle a secret to avoid any negative attention. Furthermore, the militants were very suspicious of newcomers, warning each other to be alert for potential infiltration by government agents. They also advised each other not to be seen at certain notorious mosques. This increased situational awareness sometimes resulted in very concrete measures such as the issuing of a pamphlet called ‘Lessons in Safety’. Initiated by one of the senior members of a militant group, it explained how to act in case of an arrest and how to position oneself during an interrogation. With a tone of paranoia, the information sheet warned its prospective readers about Abu Ghraib- and Guantanamo Bay-like behavior in Dutch detention facilities:

“During detention they put you in an isolation cell, they give you little to no food, the food is burned, they don't allow you to sleep due to strong light, they wake you up every two hours, they undress you regularly, turn on loud music in your cell, they turn the temperature up and down, pour cold water over you, make you wear woman's clothing, put you in unhygienic areas and prohibit you from contacting the outside world.” (Pamphlet found with several militants)

A third type of response to government interventions consisted of boasting. Due to the intense experience of arrest, trial and detention, those affected often expressed a strong, and over time increasing, antipathy towards the intelligence agency, the police, the public prosecutor, and the Dutch government as whole. By boasting about their encounters with law enforcement, some of those who went through such experiences apparently tried to handle their frustrations and transform them into status-enhancing events. To illustrate this point: several senior militants, when discussing their arrests by the police, claimed their own supremacy over the government agencies they faced, bragging about their resistance during arrest, and praising the violent resistance of others like them. Being arrested in a large-scale police or intelligence operation acknowledged, in their view, their own importance, something they took pride in. Three of them (subjects 79, 81, and 82), for example, boasted about their arrest and how bravely they resisted. One boasted about his knowledge of the prison's corridor structure, while another claimed that, although he was blindfolded, he knew the exact transportation route of the police. During this trip he allegedly frustrated the driver by mentioning the street names the car was driving through. While in detention, they bragged about their triumphs in not abiding to penitentiary rules. In such ways, despite being limited in what they could, they still tried to pretend that they exercised a degree of control over the situation, thereby transforming objective defeat into subjective victory in the mind of those who believed them.[56]

Finally, the militants studied here were also concerned about the after care of their detained brothers and sisters. Those arrested faced material and logistic problems, but they were not forgotten by their peers. These discussed, for example, the choice of particular defense lawyers in order to assemble a good team for the trial; they also raised and transferred money to those detained. Moreover, the wives of those convicted also received financial support during the absence of their husbands. For example, in 2005, one militant (subject 104) ran into the wife of a detained other in a bookshop and gave her 50 Euros because her husband's absence
had caused significant problems in feeding and dressing her children. In addition, the employer of the same bookshop (subject 113), requests her radical husband (subject 117), to wallpaper the apartment of a detained brother (subject 86) before her husband returned from detention. Despite the fact that this type of support was small-scale, such gestures helped to maintain social bonds with fellow jihadi-sympathizers, which functions as an encouragement to return to the jihadist movement after detention.[57]

Coping with Danger

Many of the Dutch militants prepared for, or at least discussed the idea of joining the holy war in a foreign battlefield.[58] The prospects of successfully participating in such a jihad are in general far from positive for young Muslims in Western diasporas who grew up in peaceful circumstances. Most of those seriously considering the idea to go to a jihadist battlefront were aware that they would have to operate in hazardous circumstances while not being sufficiently trained, which greatly increased chances of experiencing severe injury or death. Hence, such prospects appear demotivating and not conductive to participation in a jihad as foreign fighter. Whereas some indeed dismissed the idea of foreign fighting, other were not deterred by the prospects, interpreting the challenges they would face and overcoming them as symbolic awards.[59]

Those who did not appear deterred to engage in jihad tended to embellish the experience of war and death. Participating in jihad was often related to Mohammed’s own quests. Several militants recalled that the Prophet engaged in numerous holy wars in his life in order to save the Umma. This type of appeals appeared to persuade both senior Dutch Muslim militants as well as new recruits to follow Mohammed’s example. Placing themselves on the same pedestal as the Prophet made participation in a jihad a glorious prospect. In addition, by glorifying violence or at least expressing a positive attitude towards the jihad, several militants seem to be able to deal with the almost inevitably negative earthly consequences of entering the combat zone. They talked with excitement about harming the enemies and demonstrated a fearless attitude towards their own death:

“We expect all our Turkish brothers on these beautiful holy battlefields. This must be the most beautiful thing Allah offers you. I have never been this happy. There is nothing more beautiful than a holy battlefield.”
(Documented by subject 167, 2006, videotape)

Attending jihad was often related to Mohammed’s own quests. Several militants recalled that the Prophet engaged in numerous holy wars in his life in order to save the Umma. This type of appeals appeared to persuade both senior Dutch Muslim militants as well as new recruits to follow Mohammed’s example. Placing themselves on the same pedestal as the Prophet made participation in a jihad a glorious prospect. In addition, by glorifying violence or at least expressing a positive attitude towards the jihad, several militants seem to be able to deal with the almost inevitably negative earthly consequences of entering the combat zone. They talked with excitement about harming the enemies and demonstrated a fearless attitude towards their own death:

“We are not afraid of death, because we love death. For us, death is just magnificent.” (Suspect 157, 2006, wiretap)

By romanticizing combat and death, attending jihad was often portrayed and perceived as a higher cause worth pursuing. Both new and experienced militants claimed in various statements to pursue a martyr’s death, because it is considered the highest possible goal for a Muslim, which comes with multiple status-enhancing awards. Martyrs are considered heroes, their actions are framed as compassionate, and their death is glamorized. In such a context, even suicide bombings are regarded as an altruistic act, not to be compared with ‘ordinary selfish suicides’. Furthermore, according to some testimonies, martyrs are attributed with exceptional qualities. Some of the militants also convinced each other, according to the police documents analyzed, that when mujahedeen die, their dead bodies would remain intact. For example, subjects showed each other videos with pictures of fallen mujahedeen who had a smile on their face, indicating that they were satisfied with their sacrifice that would lead them straight to paradise. Photos and videos of such peaceful and delighted faces continue to be spread throughout the jihadist movement to encourage viewers to follow the
lead of the killed mujahedeen. This romanticisation of death had an inciting effect. For some militants a place in paradise even appeared to be their primary goal, as this quote implies:

“It is not important and it is not even our wish to witness the rise of a true Islamic State. The most important goal is to be awarded by Allah.” (Documented by subject 167, 2001, videotape)

To conclude this section on coping with danger, the above discussion illustrates how subjects dealt with many (real and alleged) negative responses, consequences, and prospects that arise when one embraces a Salafist-Jihadist ideology. Several coping were used to neutralize and overcome discouragements. Some were portrayed as ordeals they had to pass through before being awarded by Allah. Other situations were not perceived as negative at all. Moreover, subjects seemed to have learned from past experiences, making it easier for them to adapt to present and future discouragements. These findings relate to several criminological theories. Again Akers’ Social Learning Theory comes to mind. On the one hand, the findings about the symbolic rewards as positive prospects to cope with danger are in line with Akers’ logic that rewards increase the chance of criminal behavior. This logic also applies to the encouragement of brotherhood, which rewards them in the form of being part of an alternative environment. On the other hand, the punishments, such as arrests and detention, did not always have the envisioned effect of reduced criminal behavior, as Akers postulated. Our findings show that certain reinforcements are not continuously perceived as punishments, but can have a counterproductive effect when they are transformed into rewards in the jihadist mental framework. This finding of counterproductive punishments touches upon a second criminological theory, which is Lemert’s Primary and Secondary Deviance Theory.[60] Lemert defines sporadic and minor rule violations as primary deviance. Secondary deviance is criminal behavior that emerges from the authority’s response to the primary deviance. The deviant is stigmatized by the authority’s intervention and will subsequently act in accordance to this stigma. In that respect, the labeling of a subject as ‘terrorist’ by society or the government, can enhance a subject’s status within the jihadist network, thereby encouraging continued jihadist involvement. Likewise, government interventions such as a police arrests can generate a feeling of increased importance, thereby encouraging continued involvement in an extremist jihadist movement.

Conclusions

This article analyzed the process of jihadist involvement in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2013, while using Grounded Theory methods and studying the records of 28 voluminous police investigations, while conducting also semi-structured interviews with police investigators, public prosecutors, and defense lawyers, and attending several court hearings. Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis.

The first conclusion is that jihadist involvement covers more than the initial entry process. By focusing on social mechanisms that influence individual trajectories, it has been shown that involvement is an unstable process. Subjects have to constantly deal with factors and consequences that either encourage or deter them from further involvement, leading to different degrees of involvement over time by many members. Such factors often originate from their social environment, and continue to be present long after an initial affiliation with the radical milieu. Although the type, shape, and intensity of particular factors may have been dissimilar in different periods studied, and have affect individuals in different ways, both encouraging and discouraging factors were continuously and often simultaneously present. This finding shows that involvement is more than a sequential process leading to an enduring and solid membership.

Secondly, the social mechanisms that were found appear to interact with each other. As a result, the antagonistic involvement mechanisms could transform encouragements into discouragements and vice versa, as the two described transformation processes illustrated. These processes suggest how particular social responses can lead to unintended consequences. On the one hand, the first transformation process showed how particular processes of alleged involvement or recruitment fail to succeed. When intended
encouragements by fellow jihadists are carried too far in the early stages of a recruit's involvement, this can sometimes lead to pressure and conflicts that make potential recruits hesitant to engage more deeply with the jihadist movement. On the other hand, the second transformation process showed how government interventions do not always have a discouraging effect, but rather empower some jihadists to continue to pursue their plans and even feel encouraged to influence others in that process. In other words, some government interventions can have counterproductive effects.

Finally, the foregoing transformation processes applied to both new (prospective) recruits as well as to the more experienced militants. Furthermore, it was also found that all subjects were influenced by other subjects, which means that not only new recruits but also more experienced subjects were still influenced by others. Nevertheless, the degree of influence differed per subject and the direction of influence developed over time. Whereas horizontal influence between subjects was always reciprocal, vertical influence was not. In the earlier cases, before 2004-2005, leading jihadists primarily influenced the lower ranked newcomers, but not the other way around. In these incidences the categorizations 'recruiter' and 'recruit' may have been more appropriate. In later investigations, however, hierarchical structures started to level out, which meant that subjects in alleged lower ranks began to influence those with a higher position as well.[61] This development was enhanced with the rise of the Internet, which facilitated more horizontal interaction and removed communication constraints.

Regardless of the value of these new insights, and despite of the systematic analysis, the current findings cannot be applied to the phenomenon of jihadist involvement as a whole. Recent Western jihadists' affiliation with ISIS in Iraq and Syria have not been incorporated in the data. For broader applicability, future research should test the presence or absence of the transformation processes identified here, while including also ISIS and other jihadist movements as case studies.

Nonetheless, this article offers an alternative perspective on jihadist involvement. It illustrates that involvement processes are far more dynamic than has often been assumed and that government responses, such as condemnations and prosecutions, can sometimes have unintended consequences which favor the jihadists. Therefore, these findings can be useful for the development of prevention policies, especially when such policies focus on the two transformation processes described. To counter involvement in jihadist groups, it may be worth considering to devise policies that stimulate the first transformation process where encouraging involvement factors carried too far and become discouragements instead, and at the same time disrupt the second transformation process where subjects have managed to turn discouragements into encouragements.

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Notes


[14] Peter Neumann et al., op. cit. (note 3).


[27] Ibid., p.106.


[31] The 28 police investigations were purposefully selected with the help of terrorism experts from different investigative authorities. Criteria of inclusion were the richness of the data and diversification over time.


[34] For a more in-depth analysis of the network structures, see Jasper de Bie, Christianne de Poot, Joshua Freilich, and Steven Chermak, “Changing Organizational Structures of Jihadist Networks in the Netherlands,” Social Networks (in press).


[37] Ibid., p.57.


[40] Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Joining the cause”; op. cit. (note 1).


[42] Fictitious name.

[43] Fictitious name.

[44] It was not always clear who the other persons were in a group chat, except for subject 171. Therefore, we indicated the quotes A and B.


[50] Idem.


[53] These accusations were not backed by evidence, which makes it difficult to assess the reliability of these claims.


[57] See also Ian Cuthbertson, “Prisons and the Education of Terrorists,” World Policy Journal 21, no. 3 (2004): pp. 15-22; Mark Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of Non-traditional Faith Groups (US Department of Justice, 2007); Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the Challenge of Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), regarding prison populations that are targeted for recruitment. Similar processes are detected in those studies.

Such perceptions could also relate to cognitive dissonance. This will not be discussed further though, because the data is not fit to illuminate this in detail.


See also on this development Jasper de Bie et al., “Changing Organizational Structures”, op. cit. (note 34).
Classification and Collection of Terrorism Incident Data in Canada

by Patrick McCaffery, Lindsy Richardson, and Jocelyn J. Bélanger

Abstract

Canada is far from immune from the pressing global terrorism threat. Despite low base rates for documented attacks, it would be inaccurate to measure terrorism simply by the number of incidents investigated by authorities. This caution exists for two reasons. First, there is good reason to question current statistics as the majority of incidents either go unreported or are categorized under other labels. Second, every act carries a disproportionate harm. Even foiled attacks increase the level of fear, heighten tension between different groups, and can fragment communities. Social harm can be greater than the crime because it can affect individuals, groups and even nations. For these broad reasons a vigorous response is warranted. Specialized units have been created in many law enforcement organizations, new legislation has emerged and the collection of terrorism-related information is well at hand. Or is it? This paper presents compelling arguments that acts of terrorism are far more prolific than Canadian statistics suggest. Furthermore, this situation will continue to exist because the true nature of terrorism is concealed by systemic failures strikingly similar to those which historically masked the problem of both partner abuse and hate crime.

Keywords: policing terrorism; definition of terrorism; anti-terror legislation

Legislation

The Anti-terrorism Act was passed into law in June 2015 and is arguably the most comprehensive reform of its kind since 2001.[1] According to the Act’s official summary, Bill C-51 will ensure safer transportation services for Canadians. It allows law enforcement to step in and arrest, without question, a person they suspect is about to carry out a terrorist attack. As well, Bill C-51 increases the protection of witnesses who come forward with information on a potential terrorist attack. This Act amends the Criminal Code and over a dozen Canadian laws to change police powers, revise the mandate of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and allow security related information sharing on a scale not previously possible.

Despite Bill C-51, how terrorism is defined can and does vary in Canada. Legal definitions generally serve as the most formally recognized source by many governments and individuals.[2] Section 83.01 of Canada’s Criminal Code defines terrorism as an act committed “in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause” with the intention of intimidating the public “…with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act.”[3] Activities recognized as criminal within this context include death and bodily harm with the use of violence; endangering a person’s life; risks posed to the health and safety of the public; significant property damage; and interference or disruption of essential services, facilities or systems. The Criminal Code provides 33 subsections detailing specific and related terrorism offenses, several cross-referenced to other historically significant acts and conventions.

The abundance of anti-terrorism legislation, coupled with its exhaustive treatment within the Criminal Code can be challenging to navigate. This situation is further compounded by 260 definitions of terrorism [4] and a proliferation of companion terms within the literature.[5] Radicalization, extremism and terrorism are terms that are frequently used interchangeably yet can be misleading.[6] The profusion of definitions between nations also underscores the fluid and sometimes polarizing nature of what may or may not be
labeled terrorism.[7] Likewise the definitional process is itself part of a wider contestation over ideologies or political objectives.[8] On the one hand, it may be commonplace today for people to hear the word terrorism and immediately think of al-Qaeda or ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, who are credited with the vast majority of attacks), yet there are many other emotionally and politically charged variables which can either broaden or narrow one's interpretation in regards to a wide array of extremist organizations (e.g., right wing-based, state-based, pathological-based, eco-based, cyber-based).[9] There are between 250 and 442 recognized terrorist organizations [10] demonstrating (at the very least) that terrorism is far from homogeneous. One consequence is that some front line service organizations (e.g., police, border services, corrections, and transit) have taken it upon themselves to create in house policies, procedures, definitions and labels (e.g., 'active killer', 'honor-based violence', or 'swatting'). While operationally convenient, such practices inhibit the comparison of meaningful data between agencies and may contribute to a miscounting of actual incident levels. Consequently, the purpose of this research was to better understand how incidents of terrorism are counted and tracked.

**Statistics and Labeling**

Statistics Canada currently tracks terrorism according to 13 Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) violation codes. As evidenced in Table 1, a number of these categories show no reported activity. An argument could be made that if the statistics are correct, then the documented police reported rates do accurately reflect the true number of terrorist related crimes that are occurring. However, the more plausible explanation begins with an acknowledgment that all crime statistics can be misleading.[11] [12] The fact is that terrorism in Canada is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to track, and uniform training has not been provided on how to assess incidents. Unlike most crimes, which can be assessed without mention of motivation or ideology, terrorism cannot. For this reason, the vector of reported statistics should, at best, be treated with great caution or as an unreliable indicator of actual activity.

A further complicating factor revolves around understanding motivation. Many front line responders are trained to rely on what can be called incident-based—rather than motivation-based—response protocols.[13] Incident-based protocols are driven mainly by the long-established criteria of severity of injury and damage to property. Under this model the most serious injuries and loss receive the most attention. One’s motive and the potential for community harm are not usually a factor in the incident-based model, yet this is a major component for acts of terrorism. Authorities who have no problem labeling behavior (e.g. such as robbery or damage to property) often struggle when they must deduce the underlying motivations.

**Methodology**

To determine if UCR codes are an accurate gauge of terrorist activity in Canada, it is important to understand how incidents are defined and documented. As a result, a questionnaire was forwarded to 33 municipal Canadian police agencies. Survey items were adapted from a Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS) survey on organized cybercrime [14] and included a short introduction and six questions.

This afforded an opportunity to explore whether police agencies of different sizes follow fundamentally different approaches to documenting incidents. Provincial and federal police services were not considered because it was felt that their responses and resource commitments could reflect a much broader mandate, as opposed to a municipal perspective. However, this should be noted as a possible limitation of this study because police agencies such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Sûreté du Québec (SQ), and the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) also provide contract policing services in addition to their Federal
and Provincial duties. Consequently, these results might not be fully representative of a true cross-section of Canadian police agencies.

Table 1: Number of Terrorist Violations, by UCR Category in Canada from 2010 to 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violation</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property or service for terrorist activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual incidents</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons charged</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in activity of terrorist group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual incidents</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons charged</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate terrorist activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual incidents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons charged</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission or instructing to carry out terrorist activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual incidents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons charged</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbour or conceal terrorist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual incidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons charged</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoax terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual incidents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons charged</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual incidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons charged</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving Canada to facilitate terrorist activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual incidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons charged</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving Canada to commit offence for terrorist group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual incidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons charged</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving Canada to commit offence that is terrorist activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual incidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons charged</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealing person who carried out terrorist activity for which that person is liable to imprisonment for life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual incidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons charged</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealing person who carried out terrorist activity for which that person is liable to any punishment other than life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual incidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons charged</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealing person who is likely to carry out terrorist activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual incidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons charged</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 compiled from Statistics Canada Table 252-0051 Incident-based crime statistics, by detailed violation.

Bill S-7 resulting in new UCR violation codes being introduced in 2013.

Results

Of the 33 agencies contacted 13 (39%) responded. To ensure anonymity police service names and representatives are not reported. The participating agencies serve populations that range from 35,000 to over one million residents, representing almost five million Canadians in total. As can be seen in Figure 1, the geographic distribution was also satisfactory.

Statistics Canada [15] data revealed that the number of sworn officers working in the 13 responding agencies totaled 8,201. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude this preliminary investigation reflects a suitable sample of police agencies.
Of the valid responses, 40% felt their members were unaware of the terrorist UCR codes, with four agencies also commenting that their front-line officers are not required to perform UCR coding. More than half of respondents indicated it was either ‘challenging’ or ‘sometimes challenging’ to decide which UCR terrorist violation code should be used. Respondents further indicated that a wide variety of positions within policing agencies are able to decide whether a violation should be deemed terrorist related, including front-line officers, records/reader/validator positions, auditors and quality control units, a variety of specialized crime sections (e.g., major crime, intelligence, extremism, missing persons) and officers linked to integrated security teams. In respect to how terrorism is defined, only one agency had crafted their own operational definition of terrorism [16], another indicated they did not have a definition, and the rest followed Criminal Code and/or the UCR reporting guidelines, which are the same. No agency has different UCR coding, although one agency was unaware that the codes they had been using were updated in 2013 (this could possibly reflect an outdated records management system). Another respondent indicated that their internal police agency tracking for unsubstantiated reports of terrorism are different from CCJS codes, and that “To date, we have not had a substantiated report of terrorism.” One municipal organization with well over a thousand sworn members wrote that terrorism offences “are the sole mandate of the RCMP to investigate, therefore from a municipal police service there should be no statistics.”

Responses to the open-ended question were thought-provoking. The sensitive nature of terrorist related information was cited as the pivotal factor inhibiting information sharing within and between organizations. One police organization reported that even crime analysts are not always able to access classified data, which they might otherwise use to identify patterns, trends or potential clues. In a similar vein, another reported that special projects that might be related to terrorism can go undocumented due to confidentiality of the information. Another agency reported that once an official counter terrorism organization (e.g., Canadian Security and Intelligence Service [CSIS], Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams [INSET], or Provincial Anti-Terrorism Section [PATS, which is led by the OPP]) receives information, the reporting agency can be restricted from further data sharing on their own issue, stating “information is not shared
exhaustively with the Police of Jurisdiction (POJ) thereby inhibiting the proper cataloguing and counting of such incidents.”

Lack of interoperability, deciding on jurisdiction and connectedness between police agencies was considered a challenge. Likewise the perceived infrequency of terrorist incidents and complicated definition meant that agencies had little experience in this regard. Some respondents saw this as contributing to a peacetime mindset among the police and public alike, which also contributes to the default practice of not classifying a crime as possibly terrorism related. One response that summed up this theme was, “The greatest obstacle is having the members alive to indicators of terrorism and extremism [. . .] our members do not necessarily look at suspicious incidents in and around critical infrastructure as being precursor activity to a terrorist event [. . .] The City is better prepared to respond to natural disaster, than [to] a terrorist event.”

**Discussion**

Research has shown that expectations around handling ideological based crimes are unclear and unfamiliar to most law enforcement personnel, even to those who are very skilled and experienced investigators.[17] [18] For instance, police units with special mandates (e.g., gang, human trafficking, drug, street crime, major crime units) seldom label an incident as “organized crime” because they are resistant to assign specific motivation.[19] In a real world application, this means that whenever a radicalized individual commits a precipitating ‘minor’ offense to further their cause, the incident-based approach obscures the true significance. Thus, a vital opportunity to intercede in an attack-related incident is lost.

The findings from our survey of Canadian municipal police agencies are not intended to suggest that front line officers are failing to perform their duties adequately; they do so with bravery and distinction. Instead what can be deduced is that the official data that is being collected and used to measure the level and frequency of this problem is highly suspect. This in turn negatively effects policy development, legal proceedings, funding, perceptions about the scope and severity of terrorism, and so on.

At the same time Canadian officials have been forced to harden their defenses due to the evolution of terrorism against Western nations (e.g., September 11, 2001 attack on the United States, Canada’s Toronto-18, the November 2015 coordinated attacks in Paris, and the June 2016 Orlando massacre). The protean nature of terrorism (ranging from sole actor to complex attacks) has created the need for a common language for front-line services to uniformly track, understand, and ultimately combat this problem. Conventional models and data cannot be relied upon and our defense system is too porous. Responding to terrorism requires not only a new way of thinking, but a new set of skills and training for criminal justice professionals.[19] An effective criminal justice response to terrorism involves a number of important elements, including close police-community relations, public confidence in the effectiveness of the state’s response, and appropriate processing of reports within the criminal justice system. The quality of police response to terrorism is critical, and nothing is more important than having an accurate idea of the true nature and full extent of the problem. Effective recognition can occur once a greater effort is made to collect comprehensive data and statistics.

**Dissonance Between Policy and Practice**

We contend that the complexity of section 83.01 and strict interpretation of this definition across Canadian policing (and possibly within corrections, border services and transit services) is also a derivative of another systemic flaw. Most police services rely on what can be deemed an exclusive definition of terrorism,[20] this being a crime in which an investigator’s conclusion is based solely upon the offender’s desire to commit an
ISIL-inspired terrorist act precisely like those coordinated throughout Paris, France on November 13, 2015. However, it could be argued that using an inclusive definition—one with a lower threshold—is both more appropriate and consistent with Bill C-51. Accordingly, this would include any crime motivated (in whole or part) towards a terrorist objective. The distinction is critical; if the exclusive definition is used, then a much smaller number of incidents pass the terrorist threshold, and only become evident once a tragedy has occurred. The debate after the Pulse nightclub attack in Orlando, Florida on June 12th, 2016, which killed at least 49, serves as example. Depending on one’s perspective, this dark moment in history could be catalogued as a hate-crime, act of terror, mentally disturbed episode, deed of self-loathing, or mass murder.

As with most human behavior, terrorism may well be multiply determined. What might appear to be a random crime could be linked to a more sinister and opaque objective. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that a terrorist attack is not the first—nor only—crime linked to a tragic event. For example, a 15-year-old Montreal youth was arrested in 2014 after stealing $2,000 at knife-point to finance his own terrorist objectives, which included travelling to Syria.[21] Consider also Abu Bilel al Faransi, who “committed a number of small crimes, from theft to armed robbery”[22] on the road to radicalism and becoming the right-hand man of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed caliph of ISIL.

Let us think through apparent contradictions with the data starting with the number of radicalized individuals joining terrorist groups. An estimated “15,000 foreign fighters have joined [ISILs] ranks since 2010. They come from eighty different countries.”[22] According to an official Canadian government public report, as of early 2014 the government was aware that at least 130 people with connections to Canada were abroad and believed to be supporting terrorism-related activities.[23] Yet, UCR Table 1, which represents Canada’s official measure, reveals only 15 incidents for the same period. Furthermore, the ‘hoax terrorism’ category has documented 123 incidents over the past five years (more than half were related to protests in Montreal in 2012). And while a spate of ‘swatting’, bomb threats and anthrax scares could also fit within the hoax terrorism definition, such calls are typically considered to be nuisance calls.

Language is much more than mere semantic games. It would seem that officials, of all ranks, are resistant to classify any event as ‘terrorist-related’ without overwhelming and irrefutable corroborating evidence. Consider the initial level of debate as to whether the death of Canadian Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent (who was deliberately run over by a radicalized Martin Couture-Rouleau) was simply a traffic accident versus an act of terrorism.[25]

Couture-Rouleau’s passport had already been revoked, and he was on an RCMP watch list for months as a possible Islamic extremist. Couture-Rouleau even called officials while being pursued to boast of his responsibility in the attack. Likewise, it took days for United States authorities to conclude that the San Bernardino California attack on December 2nd, 2015, which killed 14 and wounded 21, was an act of terrorism.

There are several reasons to believe that the percentage of offences that are not classified by the police as terrorist-related may be particularly high. For example, in the first week of November 2015, more than 70 schools in Quebec and in the Ottawa region were evacuated, closed or searched after receiving a threatening email from an anonymous person.[26] Teens were later charged with mischief, although some might question whether the charges would be different if the teens were linked to a radical cause or someone had been injured as first responders rushed to these calls.

The practice of being overly conservative in classifying incidents means that files will still get processed and officials can avoid being called alarmist. One could argue that mental health calls have become ubiquitous
partly because they are an easy way for police to categorize an abundance of atypical behavior. However, there are real world implications. Consider the spike in shooting incidents in Ottawa, since 2014, widely reported to be linked to gangs and battles over the drug trade. Dig deeper and there could also be an underlying terrorism connection. For instance, in January 2016, Ayyub Arab was the victim of what appeared to be a gang shooting in Ottawa’s west end. The victim was linked to Awso Peshdary, a high profile terrorist who had been charged with recruiting, financing and facilitating terrorism in 2015. Shortly afterwards, the Ottawa Sun reported that a vehicle belonging to one of Peshdary’s associates was found at the scene of another homicide. The owners of the vehicle, Ashton and Carlos Larmond, were arrested in January 2015 during an RCMP terror investigation dubbed “Project Servant.”

It can be argued that if the accused’s desire was to ultimately commit an act of terrorism and/or a substantial motivator for any lesser, but related crimes, then such crimes need to be counted and tracked differently. This connection would allow the true magnitude of the problem to be better appreciated with appropriate sentencing. In accordance with the Criminal Code of Canada “A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of that offender.” Gravity can be considered the harm threatened or intended. Determining motivation is however, problematic.

Conclusion

Although special software, such as ViCLAS (Violent Crime Linkage System) Powercase, and Evidence and Reporting 3 (E&R3) has been developed to track sex and serial offenders, a literature search did not reveal any formal measures for tracking ideologically-based crimes. The potential benefits of a common software platform for tracking these crimes are considerable: better situational awareness, improved patrol deployment, integration between federal and provincial justice systems, predictive policing, enhanced management of disparate information sources, and significant cost savings from both prevention and a reduction of data entry duplication. Advancements with criminal harassment and stalking laws suggest there is a potential to shift from a reactive to a preventative approach. That said, it is important to understand and discriminate between ideologically-based offending and non-ideological offending typologies. Innovative approaches for identifying and tracking (as opposed to just assessing) those with a predilection to ideological violence are greatly needed. Understanding and exploring pathways of ideas and behaviors that may lead to violent action should become the priority and be anchored to clinical, front-line and actuarial models.

In order to provide an effective response, the criminal justice system needs adequate data. Data are important from two perspectives. First, the general public and law enforcement are largely unaware of the scope and complexity of the problem because non-sensational terrorism-related crimes remain hidden from view until something devastating occurs. Low base rates for documented attacks should not, at this time, be taken at face value. This perception of sporadic and random incidents only negates the potential for a community-powered response. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that some targets may be immigrants with pre-existing negative experiences with police and the criminal justice system from their countries of origin. This additional hurdle further drives the problem underground and in many ways is strikingly similar to the early days of partner abuse reporting. Once seldom reported and little understood, partner abuse was largely invisible. Although it was difficult to overcome, 20-30 years later partner abuse reporting is less stigmatized and more prevalent. Partner abuse sections are among the busiest in police organizations and are buttressed by an array of public and private support networks. Elder abuse, human trafficking and hate crimes share a similar historical trajectory. Like terrorism, hate crimes also carry an element of disproportionate harm. Ultimately it would be grossly deficient to measure terrorism only by reported
incidents; today’s statistics are not reflective of the true insidious nature of this phenomenon. As Mark Twain said, “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so.”

On a final note, more needs to be known about the nature and distribution of terrorism-related crimes so that criminal justice and community resources can be effectively harnessed. It would permit the allocation of criminal justice resources in an efficient and effective manner, and make it possible to accurately evaluate the efficacy of the justice system (and community-based) response. Sufficient variability exists at the present time in terms of the capture of terrorism-related crimes to warrant a unified national response.

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**Author Note:** Responsibility for the information and views expressed in this document lies entirely with the authors.

**Notes**

[1] An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts. Other significant reforms since 2001 include: The Anti-terrorism Act (Bill C-36, enacted Dec. 24, 2001); Public Safety Act (Bill C-42, enacted May 6, 2004); S-215, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, suicide bombings (Bill S-215, enacted Nov. 30, 2011); C-10, Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (Bill C-10, enacted March 13, 2012); Combating Terrorism Act (Bill S-7, enacted July 15, 2013); Nuclear Terrorism Act (Bill S-9, enacted Nov. 1, 2013); Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act (Bill C-24, Royal Assent received June 19, 2014); and Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act (Bill C-44).


[12] The Statistics Canada website highlights that “Police services are able to utilise these codes as their Records Management Systems are updated to allow them. As a result, these data may be under-counted and should therefore be interpreted with caution” (Statistics Canada, 2015).


[16] Their 32-word definition is “Terrorism – an unlawful act or omission intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group or persons or particular persons for: Political, Religious or Ideological purposes.”


[20] Following several complex, multi-jurisdictional serial homicide investigations that included Clifford Olsen, it became apparent to Canadian law enforcement officials that a system was required to identify and track the modus operandi of serial violent crime/criminals. 'Powercase' is another UK-based software with potential for identifying apparently random or benign ('nominal') clues useful in solving major case crimes that may span several jurisdictions (Paul Bernardo being a relevant example). E&R3 is used by the RCMP for investigating terrorism, however it does not have the correlation and notification abilities found in Powercase, nor is it centralized (Brooks, 2014).


[31] Criminal of Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, s.718.1


[35] Ibid.


‘Criminalised’ Islamic State Veterans
– A Future Major Threat in Organised Crime Development?
by Martin Gallagher

Abstract
This article considers the implications of criminalised Muslim Diaspora community members from the West travelling to the Middle East and becoming involved in the terrorist activities of the Islamic State (IS), and ultimately returning from whence they came. It also reflects on the differences over time amongst the profile of recruits that have taken place since the time of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, to the ascendancy of IS. Recent research indicates both terrorist and organised crime groups draw recruits from the same Diaspora communities, a position supported in this article. While the focus of law enforcement and media attention appears to be on the potential of Islamic State Middle East veterans committing terrorist acts in the West on returning from conflict zones, there may well be a pervasive danger of them bringing significant risk to their countries of origin through enhanced participation in organised crime. The views of a selection of recently retired police professionals were gathered, and were found to support concerns around this potential significant and dangerous outcome of homecoming foreign fighters.

Keywords: organised crime; foreign fighters; Muslim diasporas; Islamic State

Introduction
This article seeks to address the question of the probability of criminalised western Islamic State (IS) veterans returning from conflicts in the Middle East and becoming involved again in serious crime in the West, with an enhanced skill set acquired during their IS participation.

A description of positions on the Crime/Terror Nexus is provided, with illustrative examples. The article then moves on to consider the backgrounds of previous jihadist participants, utilising Sageman's wave notion as theoretical context. The focus thereafter is on the largely IS inspired ‘fourth wave’ of jihadi foreign fighters, and explores the veracity of the religious credentials sighted as a basis for the ‘call to action’ that participants experience. The article then considers the potential implications to organised crime behaviours in countries of origin should ‘jihadists’ with previous criminal experience return to their communities with an enhanced criminal ‘skill set’. This consideration is supported by the findings from a consultation conducted with a group of relevant, recently retired security professionals. The article concludes by sketching policy considerations for the future.

‘Islamic State’[1] is the latest evolution of Tawid wa al-Jihad, the group founded by a former criminal from Jordan, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that first came to prominence during the insurgency in Iraq following the US invasion of the country in 2003. It is an extremist Islamist group currently still in control of large swathes of territory across Iraq and Syria. IS is widely acknowledged as a terrorist organisation, and has been designated as such by governments around the world. Its foreign and local fighters utilise mass execution, religious persecution and hostage taking to further their goals. In addition IS operates a sophisticated propaganda machine serviced through innovative uses of the Internet, and both social and print media. Their aim is the to maintain and expand a Caliphate, with a single religious and political leadership ruling over lands previously held under Muslim rule during the Middle Ages.

The movement of foreign fighters from the West into this recently established ‘Caliphate’ as active participants in IS activities is new. It follows the establishment of strong Muslim diaspora communities in the West, a consequence of the migration of Muslims from Turkey, Morocco and other Muslim-majority
countries since the 1960s. These immigrants answered calls to fill low skilled jobs in the post-WWII rebuilding of Western Europe. These migrants and more specifically, their sons and grandsons now move between the Muslim diasporas in the West and the self-styled 'Caliphate'. Those among them regarded as both 'radicalised' toward jihad and possessing a criminal background are the subject of this article.

**Terrorism and Organised Crime: Links and Similarities**

The period following the collapse of the Soviet Union saw the acceleration of 'globalisation' with a situation developing where for “a myriad (of) criminal, terrorist, or otherwise malevolent state actors… frontiers are irrelevant and governments are an increasingly ineffective hindrance that they attack, undermine, or ignore.”[2]

These changes have led to increased opportunities for mutually advantageous interactions between illegal actors and armed groups, with ever-increasing ease of transportation and communication assisting this process, coupled with terrorist groups embarking on increasing forays into criminal activity in order to self-finance, partly due to the decline of state sponsorship with the end of Cold War rivalry.

Instances of terrorism's overall reliance on organised crime for finance are widespread. Examples of an (at times) symbiotic relationship include the Continuity IRA's relationship with Eastern European sex traffickers [3]; ETA at one time ensuring cocaine delivery to Italy through its contacts with Columbian drug cartels in exchange for weapons from organised crime cartels of Campania [4]; and Hezbollah's use of Mexican drug cartels' smuggling routes.[5]

The strikingly similar operating structures of terrorist and organised crime groups have previously been noted by both Robinson [6] and Asal et. al. [7], who found that both have much in common. The membership of groups operating within both phenomena is highly compartmentalised, resilient with an ability to make quick necessary changes to adapt to altered external circumstances. They are often opportunistic, seek out new connections for benefits beyond the immediate goals of their own group.

Having pointed out some similarities, we nevertheless have to keep in mind Bovenkerk's and Chakra's [8] cautioning that the main goals of organised crime groups are profit-related while those of terrorist groups are political. Jamieson [9] also maintains that both phenomena need to be seen as distinct. Yet it is widely acknowledged that either phenomenon can and does utilise the methods and tactics of the other. Madsen reminds us that in analysing such groups it is important to remain focussed on their motivation, as “the intent for specific acts committed by two groups might overlap, their motivations do not.”[10] As Dishman also observes, “simply put, drug barons and revolutionary leaders do not walk the same path to success. Terrorists may commit kidnappings or extort local businesses, but their fundamental goal remains to shape or alter the political landscape in some manner. Transnational criminal organisations may also employ terrorism as a tactical weapon, but their end game is to avoid prosecution and make money.”[11]

Rollins et al. [12], reporting to the United States Congress, identify 3 areas where potential overlap between the phenomena may occur:

- Through shared tactics and methods;
- Through the process of transformation from one group to another over time;
- Through short-term or long-term transaction based service for hire activities between groups.

Makarenko [13] challenges the clear distinctions between the phenomena that some authors still make. She instead suggests a sliding scale of nuanced metamorphosis between terrorism and organised crime, with the phenomena at opposite ends of a sliding scale, moving along this scale from their original purpose when
they form alliances with those involved in the other phenomena (terrorists aligning with organised criminals to pursue shared goals), and thereafter mutating further when they utilise the tactics of the other to further their own ends. Finally, if they continue to alter their operational activities the group enters what Makarenko terms a ‘black hole’, where they are no longer are clearly organised criminals or a terrorist group, but instead a confluence of the characteristics of both; it may ultimately mutate into a group categorised as being wholly transformed into one which fits the criteria of the other phenomena.

This is a position supported by a subsequent report to the U.S. Congress by Rollins et al. in 2010. That report describes how globalisation, advances in technology, trade, the finance industry and the advent of cybercrime have led many organised crime and terrorist groups to adapt “more readily to new market niches and establish more fluid alliances with external individuals and groups.” The report cites the ransom and hostage plot carried out in Algeria in 2013 as a striking example, with Moktar Belmoktar as the plot leader being an illegal actor with close and long-standing links to both organised crime and Islamist groups.[14]

Such a model fits well with Ekblom’s extension of the Situational Crime model into the arena of Organised Crime. Ekblom sees organised criminals as operating within a ‘niche for offending’ where there is “an identifiable concentration or flow of wealth from which offenders can make a living, using the resources at their disposal to exploit it whilst maintaining acceptable levels of effort and risk,” within a context where organised criminals seek to engineer opportunities and overcome difficulties.[15]

Real world examples of such behaviours present amongst terrorist groups which have found their own niche for ‘fundraising’ are the Colombian FARC and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Members of both have increasingly become involved in criminal activity, initially to fund their cause. However, as circumstances altered through an end of hostilities with the state, they mutated into post-conflict criminal organisations driven by profit relying on their members skills and the reputations attained through their past record of terror to ensure continuing success.[16] These organisations have fallen into Makarenko’s ‘black hole’, becoming mutated organisations, no longer serving their original purpose and utilising tactics from the repertoire of both phenomena. Examples of organised crime’s move to the use of terror tactics for political purposes are the Italian Camorra’s adoption of the bombing tactics of the ELN, and the ‘Red Commandos’ of Brazil embracing terror tactics embellished by a radical socialist ideology to justify the accumulation of illicit gain.[17]

A shift from conflict to criminality is not a new phenomenon. The first African American gang to emerge in the street of Los Angeles was filled with veterans of World War II.[18] In more recent times, Volkov has written on the number of Soviet veterans of the Afghan conflict who became involved in organised crime as their country transformed in the post-Soviet area.[19] Glenny [20] noted the number of veterans of the Balkan conflicts who fill some of the upper echelons of European organised crime. Similarly McDermott [21] refers to the very same phenomenon following the disbanding of the paramilitary United Self Defence Force of Colombia (AUC), while Naim sights a similar transformation of members of the Mexican military into Zeta’s narco-traffickers.[22] These authors all note how each organisations member’s skill sets, honed through brutal conflict, lent themselves particularly well to the management of other illicit activities.

Various other entry modes to participation in organised crime have been noted. The UK National Crime Agency (NCA) has recently attempted to define the common modes of access and summarises these as involvement in petty crime from a young age which leads to a form of progression; specific skills or professions where holders are targeted, recruited or corrupted into becoming facilitators and members of crime groups; and network access where familial links, relationships and peer groups provide access points. The NCA report, while accepting the variety of influences at play, does acknowledge that “young people brought up in deprived neighbourhoods by troubled or fragmented families with no impetus to complete their education are particularly vulnerable to approaches from members of crime groups and street gangs. [23]
Organised Criminal Involvement with Al-Qaeda

To understand the current level of criminal co-operation IS is undertaking, it is necessary to look back at the recent history of ‘Jihadi Terrorism’. Marc Sageman [24] provides a narrative of events, supported by an academic model drawing on David Rappaport’s seminal ‘Four Waves of Terrorism’ theoretical framework [25], where he identifies similar waves of Jihadi terrorist involvement.

The ‘inspirational’ first wave, which brought the cause of a worldview of an international oppressed Muslim community to the fore consisted of religiously inspired foreigners drawn to join Mujahedeen and participate or assist in the conflict in Afghanistan following the invasion by the Soviet Union. This wave included the original members of Al-Qaeda, such as Osama Bin Laden.

The second wave was constituted by ‘elite’ expatriates of Middle Eastern origin who attended Western universities and then, following contact with first wave members and supporters, became involved in the conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir; they also formed the core of the terrorists responsible for the attacks of 11 September 2001.

Sageman noted that these “members of the global Salafi jihad were generally middle class, educated young men from caring and religious families.” The large majority of them were married, many with children; no ‘hardened’ criminals could be detected amongst their ranks; and only a few had connections to petty crime. [26]

Good examples of this wave’s participants, beyond Mohammed Attah and the 9/11 conspirators, were, for instance, the ‘Glasgow Airport’ attackers: Khafeel Ahmed was an engineer with a doctoral degree, and Bilal Abdullah was a Medical Doctor. Both Ahmed and Abdullah had travelled to the West, been educated, and lived in the UK without obvious crime links.

The ‘third wave’ of home-grown jihadists emerged in the wake of the Iraq war and were largely sought out by a variety of ‘inspirers’ to encourage participation. Richard Reid, the infamous failed ‘shoe bomber’ serves as a good example. Reid is perhaps the archetypal criminal convert to Islam of this period (he served three years in prison for a string of burglaries prior to conversion) [27], recruited and utilised by the jihadist leadership. Reid came from a very different background than some of the self-starters of the second wave.

Police opinion regarding ‘third wave’ jihadists like Reid was that although a small proportion had a background in minor criminality, such ties were quickly cut by participants, and seen as to be expunged from their sphere of social interactions. [28]

This is not to say that Al Qaeda and some of its contemporary jihadists did not participate in criminal activities at that time nor have (ex-) criminals amongst their ranks. They did. There are many examples of participation in criminality. Some of Al-Qaeda’s front organisations which had channelled donations from wealthy supporters, and were designated by international bodies as financiers of terrorism, also became involved with international drug trafficking networks. [29] At the operational level, South African organised crime groups were known to have supplied forged documents to Al-Qaeda members. [30]

However, following Makarenko’s scale, being a terrorist who utilises criminality to further political ends (point 2) is far removed from being a terrorist who embraces crime for profit only (point 4).

The recruitment of Reid, and similar individuals of his calibre [31], showed perhaps a dilution of the requirements and expectations for participation in the struggle. The expectation of a solid understanding of the religious cause became secondary, and while the rhetoric continued to contain a religious tone, the depth of understanding amongst those taking up arms was less than with the original mujahedeen of the first wave.

Of particular note in relation to these three generational ‘waves’ is that after each there is a noticeable decline of ‘religiosity’ of the participants. This is a development not missed by the analysts of Europol [32], who see
the current situation as being perhaps best described as an 'extremist social trend' rather than as Islamist 'radicalisation'.

**‘The Fourth Wave’ – The ‘Criminal’ Jihadists**

Many of those now becoming involved in jihadist activities have backgrounds far removed from the 'pioneers' of Al-Qaeda. The largely 'middle class/intellectual' credentials of 'second wave' jihadists have been replaced with recruits drawn from “immigrant gangs (that mix) jihadism with gangsta criminality.”[33] Van San's (2015) study of 35 Belgian and Dutch foreign fighters joining IS found that half were converts to Islam, all aged between 18 and 30, and none holding a university education.[34]

Similarly to the breeding ground for organised crime described above, Sageman found that expatriate communities are the main recruiting ground of the current jihad against the West.[35] In extending Sageman's model, Rik Coolsaet [36] sees a 'fourth wave' of the jihad as being upon us. These are the young Muslims (and converts) who were reacting to the successful establishment of the Islamic State, with the 'third wave' reaction to the post Iraq war conflict having now largely run its course.

The Belgian anti-terrorist police superintendent Alain Grignard sums up the current situation in these words: “previously we were mostly dealing with 'radical Islamists' – individuals radicalized toward violence by extremist interpretation of Islam – but now we're increasingly dealing with what are best described as 'Islamized Radicals'”[37]

Indeed, Watts illustrates this well by noting that “ISIS has turned al Qaeda's recruitment pattern on its head—to spectacular effect…. Unlike al Qaeda, which heavily screened members to weed out potential spies or those with criminal pasts ISIS, at least at its height in 2015, took in any foreigner that volunteers, giving the disenfranchised a new home, purpose and direction.”[38]

Such a situation is summed up in a manner that might be regarded as comic were its context not so serious, in the behaviour of jihadists Yusuf Sarwar and Mohammed Ahmed who purchased copies of 'Islam for Dummies' and 'The Koran for Dummies' before their departure to Syria to join an al-Qaeda offshoot there in 2013.[39] They returned to the UK from their 'adventure' a year later and are now both serving prison sentences of 13 years.

French anti-terrorism Judge Marc Trevidic described the profile of 'fourth wave' participants in these words: “ninety percent... who leave do it for personal reasons: they are looking for a fight, or for adventure, or revenge, because they do not fit in society . . . Religion is not the engine of this movement and that's precisely its strength.”[40]

In drilling further into this 'ninety percent' segment, a UK Special Branch source was recently quoted as stating that 'the so-called jihad in Iraq and Syria has been particularly inviting to some young British Muslims who are already involved in violent crime in this country’ [41]. Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley explicitly stated that IS is seeking to recruit from criminal elements [42], and that 'young people who were getting drawn into gang crime, particularly those with troubled histories, are now turning to (IS)' [43]. Such a path was taken by Mashdur Choudhury, a petty fraudster who travelled with friends from Portsmouth to Syria to join IS [44]. In a similar way Jafar Turay, a wanted ex gang member of Willesden, north-west London went to Syria where he still remains. [45]

Perhaps the following 3 examples typify the personal nature of involvement of IS by western travellers:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ebrahim B. (pseudonym under German privacy laws) – IS Member active in Syria, now incarcerated in Germany</th>
<th>“If I had been picked up by a rocker gang in Jamaica or by Hell's Angels in America or something, I would have gone along with it.”[46]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdelhamid Abaaoud, presumed leader of the French and Belgian IS-inspired attacks of November 2015</td>
<td>A self-described ‘Terrorism Tourist’ with selfies taken of his activities on his mobile phone.[47]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Safro, convicted safe breaker, who was active as an IS member in Syria, now also incarcerated in Germany</td>
<td>Joined IS as he believed he was answering a holy calling. His disillusionment came when he realised execution videos in which he participated were staged, with a fellow German IS member asking if his method of execution looked good on camera. [48]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The quote from Ebrahim B. shows clear parallels to the recruitment path for organised crime members as described in the earlier referenced NCA report [49].

Enrolment in IS by Westernised, but disaffected and disillusioned Muslim diaspora youth also fits very well with the loose transmission of ideology, methods and allegiances that Moises Naim [50] has identified as characteristic across globalised modern societies.

There is much individualised ‘enrolment’ by vulnerable youth in the West, where they disoriented individuals seek involvement through largely self, or small peer group, immersion, rather than by way of cultural involvement. The equivalent of Bloody Sunday, often seen as PIRA’s most effective recruiting sergeant, is not happening on the doorstep of Western diaspora Muslim youths. In general, they and those around them are far removed from the consequences of the wars currently engulfing the Middle East. While their immersion in this conflict comes for some through their associations, be these friends or family, for others it is only through the evening news, from their viewing of YouTube videos and Facebook posts such as the coverage of the violence inflicted on Sunni protesters at Hawijah in 2013.[51] Another source are pronouncements by imams sympathetic to the jihadist cause at a mosque they may attend, or stems from the grooming of ‘influencers’ such as Zhalid Zerkani [52] in Belgium or Edis Bosnic [53] in Bosnia, who seek to identify and guide the curious towards recruitment for IS.

Weggemans, Bakker and Grol [54] noted the high speed with which five Dutch individuals appeared to move from ‘normal’ to ‘radicalised’, and ready to participate in jihad. The biographies of those five youth show a background in petty crime, with participants coming from diverse ethnic backgrounds and ‘bad neighbourhoods’. This same factor has been noted by Higgins [55], when he described two dozen young men who had gone to fight for IS from the ‘grimy’ Molenbeek district of Brussels, where there were the lines between criminality and jihadi violence were blurred, directly echoing Sageman’s findings discussed above.

Consequently, in the case of those radicalised in such a manner, it would perhaps be more appropriate to consider a variant of Makarenko’s scale, applied on an individual basis, rather than looking at group dynamics—that is, seeing the pathway more as a personal rather than cultural journey, whereby IS ‘recruiters’ specifically target individuals with appropriate backgrounds.

There are good examples to suggest such consideration is warranted. One individual who embarked on a personal journey to IS was Aine Davis, who went from being a London drug dealer to become a Syria-based jihadist, “like dozens of others.” [56] Davis had access to firearms circulating in drug supply networks in the UK, as his previous convictions showed. Then we have Suhaib Majeed, provided online ‘tuition’ via the Internet from Syria to conduct actions in the UK, supported by two converts to Islam, Nathan Cuffey
and Nyall Hamlett, who were able to utilise their own network to obtain a number of firearms to mount operations.[57]

The motivation for such individuals wanting to join IS remains to be considered. Jürgen Todenhöfer—a German politician and journalist who travelled throughout the Islamic State to observe the ‘governance’ conducted by IS first hand—perhaps captures this perfectly in his observation that “they (foreign fighters for IS) are people who were unimportant in the West and now told they are in an apocalyptic last battle between good and evil – heroes in Nike trainers and Jack Wolfskin boots . . . posing with their brutality and talking openly and proudly about a religious cleansing if they had the power.”[58]

This observation ties in well with notions of extreme thrill-seeking [59] coupled to a form of (perverse) redemption for past perceived misdeeds, and the ability to create a new identity at odds with the one they held in the West.[60] While many Islamic State volunteers appear motivated by a desire to combat the Assad regime’s brutality or were attracted based on theological grounds, we have the testimony of many IS defectors who have admitted to be motivations by material gain and adventure [61], with their past criminal career pointing to “a predisposition for nefarious activity and violent conduct prior to heading out for jihad in Syria and Iraq.”[62]

Western travellers who participate in IS activities will not all be involved in conflict. The IS leadership not only called for foreign fighters but also appealed for engineers, doctors and construction workers to travel to the Caliphate.[63] The experience such individuals have may, or may not, be significantly different from those highlighted above. What is likely to occur for all travellers though is some form of immersion in quasi-governmental functions, be that as simple as providing some form of ‘protection’, as a basic state necessity. Whether we regard the lands controlled by IS as representing a ‘failed state’, or not, Western participants in its activities will likely have been attracted by the prospect of state-building. The Islamic State’s environment is one where organised crime flourishes [64] and where the skills acquired by participants may well have some bearing on their future. However, the extent to which they develop and utilise them if they leave IS territory will likely be significantly different should they travel to a country such as Libya rather than a modern functioning Western state.

**Opinions on the Subsequent Effects of Former IS Participation**

Current publicly articulated Western government and security thinking is largely focussed on the consequences of foreign fighters returning to Western Europe, committing acts of terrorism, rather than considerations of their possible re-integration in an ‘enhanced manner’ to the underworld of organised crime.

Returning to the work of Weggemans, et al., more recent radicalisation in respect of the current Syrian jihad appears to be unusually fast when compared to the transformations of those who became involved earlier in international terrorism. The question inevitably becomes whether the desire to participate—when confronted with the harsh realities of battle in a desert context with few opportunities for cover, and large casualty rates—will wear off just as quickly as it arose.

The act of joining with IS will mean that on their return to their country of origin identified foreign fighters will be incarcerated. The recent imprisonment of the brothers Hamza and Mohommod Nawaz who returned from Syria [65] serves as a telling example.

The imprisoned, or those who return and escape detention (but are likely to be ever mindful of the possibility of detection), are hardly likely to find themselves enticing prospects for employers, with their previous background in criminality already serving as a dissuading factor. Their participation in jihad will stay with them, and other than those few with funds for their own or those who can rely on a few charitable
institutions that may assist, their prospects for a normal life look bleak. So, what could a former drug dealer possibly do with his enhanced skills in the use of firearms and explosives, coupled with experience of managing illicit commodity routes, to make a living? The answer, a return to crime with a potentially ‘enhanced’ reputation and relevant skill set, does appear a logical proposition. This is not to say that all those who were involved in criminality and have embarked on jihad will return as enhanced organised criminals. Many will no doubt likely try to support their cause through more peaceful means, some may embark on terrorism in their home country, such as Khalid and Ibrahim el-Bakraoi, both armed robbers prior to their involvement with IS and subsequently participated in the Belgian terror attacks of March 2016.[66] Some may slip into obscurity; however, it does seem glaringly obvious that the possibility exists that some (if not all) of returning foreign fighters from ex-organised crime circles will return to their previous way of life in crime.

In light of the historical work of Tilly [67], their (re-)turn to organised crime, is a source of concern. Western foreign fighters generally had no fighting experience when arriving in Syria as recruits. Once there most males are subject to a basic weapons training. Some are moving along the scale of immersion to the ten-stage training of quwat khas (special forces) prior to deployment in combat [68]. Whatever methodology is taught to the newcomers, there can be little doubt that many who undertake IS activities in Syria will become Tilly’s ‘specialists in violence’ through their endeavours there. Tilly’s work has clearly demonstrated that such individuals, when placed amongst non- or less violent individuals invariably act as a catalyst for increased violent activity. Where Western IS veterans become involved in organised crime activity on their return, the experiences and ‘skills’ they bring may well act as enablers for increased levels of violence in their home countries.

However, it would be remiss not to consider that their experiences in IS territory may have a debilitating effect, with post-traumatic stress common even amongst conventional military forces involved in high-intensity conflict zones. Trauma will be taking its toll on these unconventional veterans too, but their instability might not only end in suicide but also in harm to others even when not immersing in crime, with domestic violence being one possible result.

For some, the time of involvement with IS and the distance from their own networks may strain, or sever, links to organised crime groups these individuals may have had before travelling. Yet the ubiquity of social media, and the networking made easy by them, speaks against such a hypothesis.

The motivation of IS recruits is likely similar (in some part) to that of the earlier mentioned shoe bomber Reid. What differs is that Reid was, at the time, atypical. Today, his background is now strikingly similar to the plethora of foreign recruits to IS. While Al-Qaeda targeted true believers as recruits IS has, with the ‘fourth wave’ been also targeting and embracing of those with dubious backgrounds in criminality.

**Expert Opinions on IS Veterans’ Involvement in (Organised) Crime**

Testing hypotheses in respect of IS members is an extremely difficult endeavour. IS, by its very nature, does not present an easy subject for academic enquiry and, for obvious operational reasons, law enforcement and security bodies are inevitably reluctant to share most of the intelligence they hold. However, one source of information that has not frequently been tapped are persons who had, until recently, investigated such activity as part of their professional work.

Utilising initial Delphi method principles [69] to provide a starting point of credible opinion on potential behaviours, eight recently retired senior detectives and two senior analysts who had recently left the field of law enforcement—all with a background in the investigation of organised crime and many with a shared background in counter terrorism—were consulted by the present author through a questionnaire, distributed via email.[70]
The consultees [71] were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QA</th>
<th>Senior Detective with international experience of investigating organised crime (including in Eastern Europe).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QB, QE</td>
<td>Senior Detective with experience of investigating organised crime in UK region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QC, QF</td>
<td>Senior Analyst with experience of investigating organised crime in UK region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QD, QG, QI, QJ</td>
<td>Senior Detective with experience of investigating organised crime and counter terrorism in UK region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QH</td>
<td>Executive level officer with experience of investigating organised crime in UK region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aim of this consultation was to gather their views on organised criminals engagement and relationship with IS.

Contact with respondents no longer working in the field avoided a host of issues in terms of confidentiality of operationally sensitive information. At the same time their recent employment ensured that their views could be regarded as a credible source of expert opinion. While direct engagement with those involved in organised crime may have proved extremely illuminating in terms if diagnosing the potential impact of returning foreign fighters from the Islamic State, such research is beyond the scope of this article. Further research in this regard is no doubt merited.

Here are some of the findings resulting from the responses:

- Respondents were divided regarding the question whether or not Western foreign fighters with a background in organised crime would become involved in criminal activity, with 6 out of 8 believing they would.

- Of the 6 respondents who believed that organised criminals would remain involved in criminal activity while with IS all believed they would seek to expand their criminal networks.

- 7 respondents thought it likely that individuals with an organised criminality background would become disillusioned with IS activities, with a number of respondents citing such individual’s almost intrinsic desire for personal gain being over ridden by the pressure to fund IS activities and frustrations this will ultimately engender.

- 7 respondents saw returning organised criminals reputation, and those of any organised crime groups, as likely to be significantly affected by their IS participation.

- 8 respondents believed that if an organised criminals travelled to the Middle East to become involved in IS activity and later returned to their country of origin, they would re-engage in organised criminal activity.

- All 10 respondents stated that exposure to IS activity in the Middle East would make an organised criminal a more dangerous individual upon return to their country of origin.

In terms of notable observations, respondents provided the following:
Respondent QH was keen to point out that crimes committed would be to the benefit of IS as opposed to being for personal gain due to personal danger, while respondent QE disagreed, believing that organised criminals who travel would likely continue to exploit opportunities for personal gain.

In terms of network expansion, respondent QA cited “recent conflicts in the Balkans, Chechnya and Afghanistan prov(ing) [support for] this case”. Respondent QD pointed out that such behaviour will be in IS interests to ensure the maintenance of their funding streams. Respondent QC believes that “the associated risk here is high. I would anticipate those engaging in other criminality e.g. human trafficking/ black market firearms, will establish criminal networks particularly to assist with smuggling routes back to the UK and other EU markets.”

In terms of reputation, notoriety, criminal kudos and the general ‘connectedness’ of an individual were all thought likely to be enhanced through IS participation, with the intimidation potential of groups containing such individuals as members being increased significantly.

The respondents were particularly clear that if an organised criminal travelled to the Middle East to become involved in IS activity and later returned home, he would return to organised crime activities, using terms like ‘highly likely’ or ‘inevitable’ to describe their belief in this regard.

In terms of the danger factors associated with returnees, QB believed “there would be a tendency to be more violent, ruthless and confident”; QC was of the opinion they “may use their ‘skills’ and new contacts to further (their) criminal career”; QD thought that “their drive, determination to succeed and levels of violence will increase”; QE also thought that “If working with IS has been successful and profitable they are very likely to maintain those links and build upon their successes on their return”; QF sees such individuals as being “enhanced by new contacts, associates and knowledge of commodities, routes and opportunities”; QG believes that such individuals will be “more robust, more resilient and more ruthless”; and QH stated that “As well as being more ruthless (they will be) more surveillance aware and will have the ability to construct weapons and firearms. They will also be more adept at making themselves less subject to intelligence development. In short they will be more dangerous and effective”.

Respondent QB did caution that Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) may be very wary of any adverse attention and/or publicity returnees may bring. QE pointed out that the standing of such a group would likely suffer in the eyes of their surrounding environment.

Respondent QG pointed out that although their standing may rise within their particular OCG, those with whom they ‘trade’ may view groups with such members as “highly dangerous, highly unpredictable and not to be trusted…..(with) their motivation towards power and wealth (being) replaced by motivation to terrorist aims”.

The final observation of note comes from respondent QI, who said: “I would be very surprised if established (my italics) organised criminals left their lucrative business to sign up to fight for their cause. That’s not to say they wouldn’t but in my opinion it would be the foot soldiers”.

**Analysis**

The founder of IS’s predecessor organisation, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was a career criminal with no theological training [72]. It is therefore unsurprising that his organisation has sought from the outset to capitalise on the skills a background in criminality brings.

The views of the respondents above are supported by previous research. Pantucci and Dawson [73] noted in relation to returning IS veterans with a criminal past, that their access to relevant networks will make
obtaining weapons far easier. The worsening involvement in organised crime of those individuals involved with IS who lose their thirst for the 'cause' appears a real, and all too dangerous, possibility.

Not only will such returning ex-jihadists likely have access to international criminal networks beyond their previous reach, their experiences will have led to enhancement, in terms of their contacts, methodology, reach and, very importantly, a major commodity for all involved in organised crime, their reputation [74].

The new contacts and methods criminals embarking as 'would be' jihadists encounter commence even before they reach Syria. Men like Mohammed Abu Mustafa have been smuggling goods from Turkey into Syria for years; now his commodity, and that of his peers, is foreign fighters.[75] Mustafa is one of the many organised criminals operating on the Turkish/ Syrian border involved in getting IS's new recruits into the conflict theatre. To these recruits he is an obvious link into serious criminality. Mustafa's multi-commodity 'business', his branching out into people smuggling, is nothing new. A similar example of such criminal entrepreneurship could be observed following the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989: many Hong Kong based organised criminals got themselves involved in smuggling dissidents out of mainland China, rather than following their usual trade in more standard illicit commodities.[76]

It is a given that the trade of Mustafa and his ilk can flow both ways across borders, and that commodity traffickers can move people, weapons or other goods with equal skill. Contact with men such as him could prove an invaluable starting point for disillusioned IS participants seeking new friends to enhance their previous illicit networks.

Movement through Turkey, the international hub for the heroin trade [77] will no doubt present many tempting opportunities and future networks for exploration to these perhaps reluctant jihadists whether with Mustafa or his peers. Such networks, and the knowledge of how to utilise them, will be part of the enhanced skill set. ‘Roman’, a veteran of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, who became heavily involved in organised crime, perhaps summed this up perfectly when talking about how he was able to function in the world of international organised crime:

“You see, it is very easy for me to work in the country, because as a result of my war trips I have acquired a wide circle of acquaintances in different places…. They recommend to me the right people for the business.”[78]

The work of Gill et al. [79] on PIRA is of particular note for potential comparison purposes with development around IS. They found that while one would expect PIRA members to have close associations going forward with those they were in close geographic proximity too, this was not the case. It was shared skill sets that led to continuing and ongoing associations across terrorist cells. That is, those involved with drugs or kidnapping associated with others involved in similar crimes, rather than where associations through proximity would be expected. Were this to be repeated in terms of IS participants, an enhanced skill set of criminality and new 'contacts' in these fields present significant potential areas for concern, with a massive risk of new crime networks or enhancement of those that currently exist as new skills and actors are introduced. Perhaps a telling example of this type of behaviour to provide illustration would be—to remain with PIRA—their 'franchising' of bomb making skills to the FARC, following the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland [80] and before the recent peace between the Columbian government and FARC.

Participation as a jihadist—whether an individual turns his back on the cause or not—provides that individual also with the one commodity massively important in circles of organised crime: that (as stated above) of their reputation.

The benefits are two-fold. Mustafa, the people trafficker referenced earlier, and his compatriots, will have little to fear in terms of law enforcement entrapment through trading with jihadists, repenting or otherwise. They will feel safe in the knowledge that no law enforcement body is going to allow its agents to be involved in the
extreme behaviours of IS. The typical need for ‘referencing’, where criminals keenly establish the bona fide of their ‘business’ partners before engagement, becomes redundant.

Another benefit comes in terms of the ‘kudos’ in the right circles of having participated in IS’s jihad. Criminals thrive on their reputational enhancement achieved through association with notoriety, James “Whitey” Bulger, a Boston-based organised crime group member and long-time associate of PIRA, would be a prime example.[81] Those known as decapitators and to have been involved in kidnappings where millions are extorted from national governments [82], will no doubt be feared and respected in organised criminal circles should they return, in line with views previously expressed by senior detectives in relation to ‘terrorist kudos’. [83]

The cachet of association with a group such as IS in these circles is clear. The recent claims of affiliation to IS by a German kidnapper [84] and the one of ‘Lizard Squad’[85], a notorious hackers group involved in denial of service attacks, illustrate this perfectly. When one appreciates the consternation and concern these hackers have caused by their claimed association, it is not difficult at all to extrapolate this into the actual level of fear and respect a known association to a group such as this will induce in the relatively closed circles of the underworld organised criminals operate. This likely applies also to an individual who had participated in IS; along with the cachet a group having such members would experience amongst other organised crime groups who it interacted with, or were indeed its rivals. Fear is a common currency amongst those involved in organised crime; fear of retribution for welching on a deal or ripping associates off over an illicit deal is often prevented when there is a history of extreme violence; it serves to maintain a level of intimidation needed for deterrence.[86] The ‘fear’ of participants that would result from former participation in extreme behaviours a la IS is not difficult to imagine. This is not in any way to say that those currently involved in organised crime are angels when it comes to extreme violence. Instead, the potential participation of IS veterans simply brings a new dynamic to an already dangerous milieu.

Discussion

The comments from AC Rowley of the Metropolitan Police Service, and those of a Special Branch source about the recruitment of criminals by IS chime well with the research of Sageman and Perri—namely, that participants are typically drawn from the same diaspora communities. Their views are supported by the Weggemans et al study, the findings of Higgins, and a number of cases such as the one of Aine Davis mentioned earlier.

The majority of the questionnaire participants believe, as does the present author, the basis of the evidence and analogies presented, that organised criminals recruited from the West to participate in the IS jihad will also become involved in criminality while in the Middle East.

The views of participant QA regarding post-conflict criminal activity echo the referenced findings of Volkov, Glenny, McDermott and Naim: participants in a armed struggle with criminal antecedents have a strong propensity to continue criminal activity once the struggle is over. The existence of ‘transferable skills’ makes such a transition extremely plausible.

The unanimous view amongst the experts of the increased danger potential returnees present should not in any way be overlooked. This observation, strengthened by evidence from other authors, is the most important point made in this article. Returning OCG members will likely have far greater skills and capacities that whence they left, and this is likely to present serious future challenges to Western law enforcement agencies.

This author finds himself in agreement with participant QI who observed that it is likely that it will be OCG ‘foot soldiers’ who find themselves seduced by the lure of IS. This low rank predominance does not in any way mitigate the potential risk these individuals may pose in future. If one accepts that it is the young OCG
members travelling (and returning), these individuals will likely have long criminal careers ahead, careers very different in terms of reach and capability from those of the fellow OCG members who did not go to Syria. These individuals will be returning with enhanced reputations in criminal circles, knowledge of international illicit distribution networks and tradecraft tested in the crucible of intense conflict. It may well be the case, as participant QG points out, that other indigenous OCGs may be wary of these returnees. They likely would have good cause to be wary, but this may well not be enough not to ‘do business’ with them.

It may be a number of years before it becomes clear whether these IS veterans will indeed become re-involved in organised crime; what appears clear though is that the potential seems very likely and the implications may be very significant.

Illustrating the Issue

The research and discussion outlined above points to the need to provide an illustration of how the transformation of an individual might occur, building on Makarenko’s work in terms of terrorist groups. Figure 1 illustrates this cycle of radicalisation and re-criminalisation in terms of an individual career.

**Figure 1: A Cycle of Radicalisation to Re-Criminalisation**

From Criminal to Terrorist (and back again)

The model in Figure 1 illustrates the potential journeys of ‘fourth wave’ individuals becoming involved in IS activities, in particular those with a background in serious and organised crime. However, with modifications, it could equally applied to those who have no such previous history. The model shows the individual as a potential participant in organised crime activity, and with potential criminal associations.

This article has sought to engage the reader in thinking about those who are connected to criminality, and their ‘journey’ to participation with IS. Those involved in crime, even at a low level, will have engagement with organised crime activity; this may be as simple as a shoplifter who engages with a ‘handler’ who sells stolen goods and accesses organised criminals for ‘protection’. Or it could be a low-level drug dealer who
sources his commodity from those further up the chain, ultimately from those involved in organised crime. The exemplar individuals highlighted in this article will sometimes come from these lower echelons, but others were full members of an organised crime group. Whatever the ‘fourth wave’ individuals’ initial exposure, they are in some way linked to criminality, even when some degrees away from classical organised crime. Their path to the decision to travel to IS occurs through ‘radicalisation’, a paradigm shift in their mindset, triggered by a variety of push and pull factors, depending on an individuals past and social context. Given such individuals’ previous bent towards criminality there is a strong possibility that a previous skill set will result in associations with actors in IS territory of similar history as well as IS own criminal activities. To illustrate this: think of an organised criminal with pre-jihad know-how of extortion techniques. Following the model outlined above, there is every likelihood that after radicalisation and arrival in IS territory, he will strike up, or be driven towards, association with similar characters involved in extortion activity in support of IS. There is also every likelihood that some will remain willing participants in IS activities and stay in their territories undertaking these, and not move to the next point on the scale, that of disillusionment.

However, for the disillusioned, and those able to negotiate their exit (or perhaps escape) from IS, there is a point of departure from IS, with three apparent potential outcomes. The first is a return to the country of origin and wholesale disengagement, both from IS and their previous life of crime. The second possibility is that of incarceration upon arrival in the home country. Although significant prison sentences await those returning from Syria for having participated with IS, essentially coming home and being caught, their prison terms will end. At this juncture they will either become wholly disengaged, or instead move into option 3, that of re-engagement in crime.

One can also easily imagine those finding themselves incarcerated seeing a return to crime as a positive option on release, their criminal reputation enhanced through IS participation. Additionally, for those without prior organised crime connections, their experience in IS will likely have provided them with criminal know-how, from their trafficking into the conflict zone onwards. If it is not their enhanced skill base that draws them to crime on their return it may well be a period of incarceration with its likely consequence of a realisation, through association with their fellow prisoners, that they have a valuable skill set and ‘standing’ that will be sought by some.

Option 3 is a particular source of concern. It suggests a return to previous activity; with the experience and reputation enhancement resulting from IS participation that may carry massive negative connotations in general society but represents kudos of exceptional worth and operational value in the underworld of organised crime. They are either actually, or likely perceived to be, ‘agents of violence’. If we accept the catalyst argument about such individuals, their impact on the criminal scene they operate in may be extremely significant, resulting in game changing behaviours. This may occur both within their own sphere of criminal operations, but also amongst competitors and associates, as each side steps up activities to match those they see being undertaken by rivals and enemies. Reputations must be preserved.

Arguably, events over the last ten years in Mexico—where ultra-violence from organised crime groups costing tens of thousands of civilian lives has become the norm—may provide a telling warning of what the re-integration of IS fighters and their new ‘skill sets’ in Western organised crime circles might bring to our countries as well.

**Conclusions**

This article sought to draw attention to the parallels between the efforts of IS and other terrorist campaigns, focusing on the potential dangers of returning foreign fighters. It is of particular note that the experts contacted for their opinions on the issue of IS returnees were unanimous regarding the likely future risk of these individuals participating in organised crime upon return to their home countries. The potential impact
of their input into conventional organised crime in Western democracies should not be underestimated and surely merits close monitoring. As indicated above, research among members of organised crime regarding the expected impact of IS veterans would likely prove extremely illuminating. Such engagement should be accompanied by a monitoring of organised crime developments in the years ahead to ascertain whether or not IS veterans do indeed become (re-)involved in serious criminality.

The model that has been provided, Radicalisation to Re-Criminalisation, seeks to individualise the path from criminal to terrorist, enhancing in particular the previous work of Makarenko on the Crime-Terror Continuum. It illustrates the key points in this journey. If organised criminals who participate in IS are allowed to return unchecked, and un-shepherded, it is difficult to imagine a situation where they would not slip into their past associations and utilise their new skill sets and contacts. Although it would be almost impossible to influence those who return in such circumstances without being spotted, the same cannot be said of those who are detected and incarcerated. For them there are two areas that must be addressed. Ensuring they do not slip back into their IS ideology and inflict attacks on their country of origin is one—something which is rightly receiving significant attention. However, of equal import is ensuring that they do not leave prison with their burnished credentials and enhanced skill set to return to the world of crime to cause significantly greater misery and despair than they could possibly have done before they became seasoned foreign fighters. Adequate policies can make an impact on this potential outcome. It would appear incumbent on law enforcement and penal agencies to ensure that such concerns are taken into account by closely monitoring increased levels of violence and new forms of criminality emerging. We might stand at the beginning of more than the usual change to criminal ‘business’: the potential start of a whole new form of organised crime activities facilitated by the involvement of past and present members of IS and other jihadist groups.

About the Author: Martin Gallagher is a serving senior police officer, based in Scotland, UK. He has a background in the investigation of serious crimes. His previous publications relate to the public response to terrorist events, and the nexus between terrorism and organised crime. All views expressed in this article are his own.

Notes

[1] For a full account of the evolution of Islamic State, and the controversy over even its name of reference, see J. Stern, and J.M. Berger. ISIS: State of Terror. London: William Collin. Despite finding their overall research to be of the highest quality my personal view is that as 'Islamic State' is a self-referential term it is the appropriate one (for me) to apply it when writing on IS.


[22] See note 2 above.


[25] David Rapoport's seminal 'Four Waves of Terrorism' identifies the development of terrorism as commencing in the 1880's with an anarchist wave, that lasted for approximately 40 years before the focus of terror tactics used moved to anti-colonial struggles which continued into the 1960's when leftist terrorism came to the fore, dissipating with Rapoport's fourth wave of 'religious inspired' terrorism, commencing with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. This theoretical framework is presented in David C. Rapoport, The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11; in W.C. Kegley (Ed.) The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls. (2003). New Jersey, USA: Prentice Hall.


[31] Such as the ill-fated 'underpants bomber' Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to down an airliner at Christmas in 2009, and the autistic wannabee suicide bomber Nicky Reilly, who failed to detonate his device correctly in an English restaurant in 2008.


[48] See note 36 above.

[49] See Note 23 above.

[50] See Note 2 above.

[52] See Speckhard, A. (2016). Khalid Zerkani: Terrorist instigators may not have blood on their hands, but are as dangerous—if not more dangerous—than the cadres they put in motion. ISCVE Brief Report downloaded 14/04/2016 from URL: http://www.isCVE.org/khalid-zerkani—terrorist-instigator.html.

[53] See Mullholland, R. (2016). Sons Turning to Terror in the Mountains of Bosnia. The Daily Telegraph, 01/05/16.


[57] See note 41 above.


[60] See note 38 above.


[68] See Note 48 above.

[69] It was felt that consulting with the expert group by means of a questionnaire rather than establishing a focus group would embrace the principle of Delphi (See Brown, B. B. (1968) Delphi Process: A Methodology Used for the Elicitation of Opinions of Experts. St. Monica: The RAND Corporation) in avoiding the psychological factors associated with group work. Given also the hypothetical nature of the request to the participants where the researcher was relying on their background to provide general expertise in the field rather than exposure to particular cases or incidents, it was felt that obtaining consensus would be inappropriate, and a second round of contact was therefore not undertaken. This conforms to Woudenberg's reservations on the questionable value of consensus when dealing with expert groups, and its dangers that group pressure may be resulting in conformity (Woudenberg, F. (1991). An Evaluation of Delphi, Technical Forecast Soc Change, 40(2): pp. 131-150).

[70] Copies of the Questionnaire are available from the author on request.

[71] For the purposes of this paper 'Senior Detective' includes the ranks of Detective Chief Inspector, Detective Superintendent and Detective Chief Superintendent. Executive level officer indicates a person who is of a rank above Chief Superintendent. All of the police officers who participated had retired after completing over 30 years’ service. Senior Analyst QC had completed over 20 years’ service, Senior Analyst QF had completed over 10 years’ service.


[73] Pantanucci, R. and Dawson, L. Thick As Thieves: European Criminals Take to Syria's Battlefields. RUSI Analysis. (21/03/14). Downloaded 6 April 2015 from URL: https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C533931D971E60/.


[77] For the purposes of this paper 'Senior Detective' includes the ranks of Detective Chief Inspector, Detective Superintendent and Detective Chief Superintendent. Executive level officer indicates a person who is of a rank above Chief Superintendent. All of the police officers who participated had retired after completing over 30 years’ service. Senior Analyst QC had completed over 20 years’ service, Senior Analyst QF had completed over 10 years’ service.


[79] Pantanucci, R. and Dawson, L. Thick As Thieves: European Criminals Take to Syria's Battlefields. RUSI Analysis. (21/03/14). Downloaded 6 April 2015 from URL: https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C533931D971E60/.

[80] See Note 48 above.


[82] See Note 19 above, pp. 13.

[83] See Speckhard, A. (2016). Khalid Zerkani: Terrorist instigators may not have blood on their hands, but are as dangerous—if not more dangerous—than the cadres they put in motion. ISCVE Brief Report downloaded 14/04/2016 from URL: http://www.isCVE.org/khalid-zerkani—terrorist-instigator.html.


[86] See note 28 above.
A Communitarian Justification for Measures to Prevent Terrorism in the UK

by Ian Turner

Abstract

The threat to the UK and its Western allies from Al-Qaeda related terrorism has declined but groups such as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have filled the ‘void’. In response the UK has introduced a raft of measures to increase its security, fulfilling many of its international and regional responsibilities to prevent terrorism. Human rights law is particularly important in this regard as it imposes obligations on states such as the UK to prevent violations of rights, such as the right to life, by non-state actors such as terrorists. This article seeks to employ a theoretical justification for a reading of this approach to human rights and focuses on legislative measures the UK has introduced to protect them. The philosophy for doing so is communitarianism, notably its critique of liberalism, and the post 9/11 revisions to it by communitarians such as Amitai Etzioni in particular.

Keywords: Preventing terrorism; Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs); human rights; communitarianism; Amitai Etzioni

Introduction

Terrorism is a crime in international law [1] (though there is little common agreement amongst UN member states as to its precise meaning[2]). Yet countries must not leave it to the international community and its courts to prosecute its terrorist perpetrators: they themselves have a primary duty to prevent terrorism by pursuing suspected terrorists and bringing them to justice in their national courts. Following the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks on the United States, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 (2001). This obliged states to criminalise terrorism through their domestic laws, including defining appropriate punishments. This resolution also called on states to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant conventions relating to terrorism. In subsequent years the UN Security Council has gone further in its attempts to prevent terrorism. Resolution 1624 (2005), for example, extended the duty of states to prosecute alleged terrorists in their domestic courts by obliging them to include legislation to prevent incitement to commit terrorist acts within their criminal codes. More recently Resolution 2178 (2014) has sought to impose further obligations on states. It seeks to deter foreign terrorist fighters from transiting countries’ borders, identifying the particular problem of individuals travelling across countries such as Turkey to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Many of the principles identified by the UN to prevent terrorism are contained in its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2006 which was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly.

Preventing terrorism has not been the preserve of the international community. At regional levels, there is the Organisation of American States Convention (1986); the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1998); and the Organisation for African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999). Within Europe there is the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005). Article 5, for example, mirrors UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005), in that it calls on states to criminalise ‘public provocation to commit a terrorist offence’. Articles 6 and 7 are also relevant to the prevention of terrorism, in that they outlaw terrorist recruitment and training respectively. And following the UN’s concern about individuals travelling to join Islamist groups abroad, as per UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), the Council of Europe, too, has sought to address this problem with its Additional

Human rights law is relevant to the prevention of terrorism, too, in that individuals have rights, including the right to life. At the international level there is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Both documents contain references to the right to life: Article 3 in the UDHR and Article 6 in the ICCPR. Regionally, this right is, inter alia, protected in the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In reference to the latter, Article 2(1) of the ECHR is particularly significant in this regard as it imposes a ‘positive’ or ‘substantive’ obligation on states to protect life.

Traditionally, human rights act ‘negatively’ (or ‘vertically’): they are individual ‘freedoms from’ the state, such as ‘freedom from’ torture. Historically, these reflect liberal concerns that the government can pose a threat to the freedoms of the individual. But rights, especially fundamental ones such as the right to life, also act ‘positively’ (or ‘horizontally’). States must take measures to prevent their violations by third parties: see the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Osman v. United Kingdom,[3] for example. This duty is not absolute but states cannot turn a blind eye to concrete threats of harm to individuals by non-state actors such as terrorists. Thus, in clearly defined circumstances, human rights law will be engaged where a state has failed to prevent a person from being killed as a result of a terror attack. There are therefore clear obligations imposed on counties such as the UK to prevent terrorism, whether it be international or regional law, of which human rights is a significant part.

Following 9/11, the UK has been at a significant threat from Islamist terrorism: the ‘Ricin case’, a plot to spread the deadly poison ricin on British streets, in 2003; the ‘7/7’ suicide attacks on the London transport network, as well as four failed suicide bombings two weeks later, in 2005; the ‘Airline Bomb Plot’, a plot to blow up planes flying from London to America with home-made liquids, in 2006 (ten men were convicted of crimes relating to this between 2008 and 2010); car bomb attacks in London and Glasgow in 2007; a failed suicide bombing in Exeter in 2008; the discovery of an explosive device on a cargo plane at East Midlands airport in 2010; the convictions of eight men conspiring to detonate suicide vests across various parts of the UK, including the London Stock Exchange, Big Ben and Westminster Abbey, in 2012; and the bludgeoning to death of an army soldier, Lee Rigby, in a London street in 2013. In recent years there has been the spectacular rise of ISIL, targeting primarily close allies of the UK: its shootings at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium, in May 2014; the offices of the satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, in Paris, France, in January 2015; and a café and a synagogue in Copenhagen, Denmark, in February 2015. Lately, ISIL committed a massacre in Paris, primarily at the Bataclan Theatre, where 89 people were killed, in November 2015, detonated two bombs in Brussels in March 2016 and murdered an 85-year-old Catholic priest in Normandy, France, in July 2016. And at the time of writing this article there has been an Islamist atrocity in the Southern French city of Nice where 84 people were killed by a man deliberately running them over in a truck. Following the attacks in Nice, Bernard Hogan-Howe, the Chief Constable of the Metropolitan Police Service, Britain’s most senior police officer, said that a similar terror attack in the UK was a matter of ‘when, not if’.[4] There seems to be no lessening, therefore, in the dangers facing the UK and its allies. Noting this, and the clear international and regional obligations imposed on states to prevent terrorism, this article seeks to support recent British counter-terror measures by providing a theoretical justification based on communitarianism, especially its critique of liberalism. As the author is UK based, naturally, he examines his own state’s domestic anti-terror laws. But the communitarian approach adopted here is significantly influenced by American human rights discourse, and is sufficiently wide to provide a defence of other countries’ counter-terrorism provisions. Thus, this line of argumentation should also be of interest to other countries.
The Prevention of Terrorism in the United Kingdom

In the prevention of terrorism, of particular concern to states such as the UK is what to do with those that are strongly suspected of engagement in terrorism in the absence of sufficient evidence to satisfy the criminal standard of proof. Or if the suspects are foreigners, they cannot be deported. In the case of the UK, ordinarily, the government would deport foreign nationals to their countries of origin if there is a suspicion that the individuals’ presence in the country was ‘not conducive to the public good’, as per section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971. But in the interpretation of Article 2 of the ECHR, the right to life, and the later Protocol 13, the abolition of the death penalty, the ECtHR has ruled that authorities cannot a deport a person to a country where there is a ‘real risk’ that the death penalty will be executed: see, for example, Al Sadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom.[5] In many countries in the world there is every chance that such a punishment will be imposed on individuals whom the UK suspects have been engaged in terrorism. Of course states like the UK are not going to permit individuals who cannot be deported unfettered freedom to plot terror attacks in their countries. There will, therefore, be many strategies in place to disrupt them. This section examines the measures adopted by the UK. Ultimately, the author wishes to justify these measures on communitarian grounds. But in the short term, to provide this piece with more balance, he will emphasise the effects these provisions have or have had on the human rights of the suspects involved, since a communitarian perspective draws the balance between the competing interests of the state and the individual much more in favour of the former rather than the latter.

1. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001

A few weeks after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, Britain passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA). This introduced the indefinite detention of international terrorist suspects. As per section 21(1), the test for detention was satisfied if the Home Secretary reasonably believed that the terrorist suspect’s presence in the UK was a risk to national security, and s/he suspected that the detained person was a terrorist. Regarding the human rights of the detainees, firstly, there were concerns raised about unlawful deprivations of liberty in contravention of Article 5(1) of the ECHR.[6] The standard of proof for imposing detention was very low—‘reasonable suspicion’, which is the standard of proof required to merely arrest a person, as per Article 5(1)(a)—and the length of detention was indefinite. And the provisions only applied to ‘international’ suspects, not those who had been born in Britain, so were maybe in violation of Article 14 of the ECHR, the prohibition on the discrimination of Convention rights. Moreover, detaining a person indefinitely, merely on the basis of a suspicion, possibly contravened Article 3 of the ECHR, the prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. This was arguably so since many of the detainees were said to have suffered from depression and suicidal thoughts. Indeed, ‘detainee G’ was granted bail after England’s Court of Appeal accepted that his detention had triggered ‘psychotic episodes: G v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.[7]

The UK government was particularly concerned about the liberty issue of indefinite detention, so to make the measures more human rights compliant, it derogated from Article 5(1) of the ECHR, by virtue of Article 15(1) of the ECHR, ‘derogation in time of emergency’. The legality of the derogation issue was considered by the UK’s highest court, the House of Lords (now Supreme Court), in 2004 in A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.[8] The House of Lords found that the threat to the UK from international terrorism post 9/11 had been a public emergency threatening the life of the nation for the purposes of Article 15(1). But the state’s detention provisions were not proportionate to this public emergency, as they were not ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’. Lord Hoffman, for example, said: ‘The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.’[9] The court also ruled that the measures were a disproportionate interference with Article 14 of the ECHR, in that detention applied only to foreign suspects (this not being the subject of an original derogation by the UK government under Article 15(1)).
2. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005

Following the ruling of the House of Lords in the case of A., the UK government replaced the offending provisions of ATCSA with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA). This introduced ‘control orders’ for all terror suspects whether they were British or foreign. According to section 1(1) of the PTA a ‘control order’ was an order against an individual that imposed obligations on them for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism. A control order made by the Secretary of State was called a ‘non-derogating’ control order, as per section 2(3). It was valid for a period of 12 months, but could have been renewed on one or more occasions (section 2(4)). Section 1(4) of the PTA stated what these obligations might be: for example, electronic tagging, curfews, restrictions on visitors and meeting others, a ban on the use of the Internet and limits on phone communication. The British Home Office stated that conditions imposed under a control order were tailored to each case to ensure that a person could not take part in terrorist activity.[10]

Compared to the previous prevention regime under ATSCA, control orders were clearly a relaxation of the state’s power over terror suspects: individuals were no longer being detained in prison, indefinitely—they were free to live at home. But orders were arguably still significantly intrusive of the human rights of suspects, such as the liberty of the subject. The low standard of proof required for indefinite detention under the previous measures—‘reasonable suspicion’—was retained (section 2(1)). And, although the legislation imposed a maximum period of 12 months for an order, since it could be renewed, there was a sense that it was indefinite. The British Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) also believed that the combination of obligations imposed on a suspect could themselves constitute an unlawful deprivation of liberty.[11] The House of Lords seemingly agreed in a couple of cases: see, for example, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ.[12] Here the suspect was subject to the following conditions: residency at a one bedroom flat, away from his normal home, for 18 hours per day (16:00 to 10:00); electronic tagging; compulsory attendance at a police station twice a day; visitors to have been approved by the Home Office; limited use of the telephone; and a ban on the use of the Internet.

The JCHR was also concerned about possible violations of Article 8(1) of the ECHR, the right to private and family life. It believed that control orders were unjustifiably interfering with the human rights of members of a controlee’s family.[13] Of particular concern was the condition requiring some controlees to move away from their normal place of residence, ‘relocation’, often far away from their family and friends.[14] Like the ATCSA provisions before them, there were also concerns that control orders might contravene Article 3 of the ECHR, the prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. In 2006 the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) reported on its findings following a visit to the UK during 2005. It was able to interview some individuals subject to control orders. In reference to one individual, P., the CPT stated that he was severely depressed and anxious, in considerable distress and despair, with symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. It noted that the depression could not be treated as long as the control order restrictions remained in place. So the risk of self-harm and even suicide was significant.[15]

Other organisations with a particular interest in human rights, such as Amnesty International, were concerned about a lack of procedural rights for suspects subject to a control order. Controlees were being accused by the authorities of involvement in terrorism-related activity. But, as they had not been charged with an offence, they were not entitled to many of the safeguards accorded to those suspected of a crime, such as a right to see the evidence against them, as per Articles 6(2) and 6(3) of the ECHR.[16] The legality of this issue was considered by the House of Lords in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB, AF,[17] where the court found that control orders were in fact civil orders, not criminal ones. Thus, the protections afforded to those accused of a crime in Articles 6(2) and 6(3) of the ECHR did not apply to suspects.[18]

Upon coming to power in July 2010, the then coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats announced a review of the previous Labour administration’s many counter-terrorism measures, one of
which was the control order scheme.[19] It said that over the past decade the British state had become ‘too authoritarian’ and the review was ‘an important first step in meeting our commitment to...creating a counter-terrorism regime that is proportionate, focussed and transparent, striking the right balance between security and civil liberties.’[20] The Government’s review was published in 2011 and recommended the abolition of control orders.[21]

3. The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011

The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 abolished control orders and replaced them with terrorism prevention and investigation measures (‘TPIMs’). Persons affected were permitted a home phone and a mobile one, together with a computer with Internet access. Instead of curfews there was an overnight residence requirement; and ‘relocation’ to another part of the country without a person’s consent was not permitted. Significantly, the standard of proof for the imposition of a TPIM was higher than that previously for a control order: ‘reasonable belief’ as opposed to ‘reasonable suspicion’. TPIMs were time limited to two years, and could only be re-imposed after that period where there was a reasonable belief that the individual had been engaged in terrorist activity during the currency of the order. So with TPIMs there was an attempt to redress, again, the balance in favour of the individual. A relaxation of the obligations imposed on suspects were, collectively, less likely to infringe Article 5(1) of the ECHR, as was the raising of the standard of proof. And the abolition of ‘relocation’ without consent went some considerable way in fulfilling the state’s duty to respect a person’s right to private and family life, as per Article 8(1) of the ECHR. In addition, because of the greater liberties granted to suspects, those subject to a TPIM were less likely to suffer a mental disorder such as depression, so the risks of a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR decreased significantly, too. But in relaxing the freedoms of individuals still further, the state seemingly failed to exercise proper control over some of the suspects. This was especially so after several high profile cases of people absconding, such as Ibrahim Magag in December 2012,[22] and Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed in November 2013; the latter famously escaped by dressing in a burka and disappearing during a visit to a mosque.[23]

Moreover, it will also be recalled that TPIMs could only be imposed for a maximum of two years, unless a person had engaged in terrorism during the currency of the order. The TPIMS legislation came into effect in January 2012 so concern was raised about what the state would do from January 2014 onwards when the first TPIMs would cease. For example, Diana Johnson, then Shadow Crime and Security Minister, said at the time: ‘These are suspects that only this year the Home Secretary was arguing were too dangerous to be left uncontrolled and that was agreed to by judges. We need an urgent independent threat assessment of whether TPIMs on any of the January suspects needs to be extended.’[24] Indeed, at a similar time, a former independent reviewer of anti-terrorism legislation in the UK, Lord Carlile QC, had called for the reintroduction of control orders, to increase security. Carlile was particularly anxious about the threat to the UK from Britons returning to the country after having travelled abroad to join ISIL.[25]

In March 2014 David Anderson QC, the UK’s current Independent Reviewer on Anti-Terror Legislation, published an annual report of the operation of the TPIM scheme in 2013. He said that there were (at the time of writing his report) 10 TPIM subjects, of whom nine had been transferred from control orders in early 2012. All were men believed to have been involved in al-Qaida related terrorism, some at the highest end of seriousness (the planning of credible mass casualty attacks).[26] To this end, Anderson recommended that the power to impose TPIMs should continue, but like any measure short of imprisonment, they would never provide a full guarantee of safety. But properly deployed ‘as a last resort’, they were a ‘useful means of disrupting potentially dangerous terrorists for up to two years.’[27] But this was not without some suggestions for reform. Anderson said that some significant changes were needed if TPIMs ‘were to remain fully credible’, and if they were to perform ‘more than just a containing function’. First, locational constraints on some TPIM
subjects should be stronger than had been the case, ‘in order more effectively to disrupt networks and deter or prevent absconds’;[28] secondly, the standard of proof for involvement in terror activity should be raised from ‘reasonable belief’ to the civil standard, a ‘balance of probabilities’. [29]

4. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015

Following calls for the reintroduction of control orders, or at least a significant reform of TPIMS, the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, announced new statutory measures in 2014. These included temporarily stopping suspects from travelling abroad by seizing passports and temporarily preventing individuals from returning to the UK. These provisions are now contained in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. Section 1 refers to the seizure of passports etc. from persons suspected of involvement in terrorism and section 2 imposes temporary exclusion orders from entering the UK. In particular, the government also reformed TPIMs, which is Part 2 of the statute. Section 16 amends the TPIMS Act, allowing for a residence specified by the Secretary of State, including at least 200 miles away from a suspect’s home. The reintroduction of ‘relocation’ raises concerns, again, about the subject’s right to private and family life, as per Article 8(1) of the ECHR. That said, section 20 of the legislation amends the standard of proof for the imposition of a TPIM, in raising it from ‘reasonable belief’ to a ‘balance of probabilities’. From the perspective of the right to liberty of a subject, as per Article 5(1) of the ECHR, this is a welcome development. The reform of TPIMS in 2015 represents the UK’s current attempts to prevent acts of terrorism by those it cannot either deport on human rights grounds or prosecute because of a lack of evidence to satisfy the criminal standard of proof.

The Prevention of Terrorism: Balancing Rights and Security

The previous section analysed a raft of measures the UK has employed to disrupt the activities of suspected terrorists, particularly since 9/11. It is well recognised, however, that in states’ efforts to prevent terrorism there is a corresponding obligation imposed on them to respect human rights: see, for example, UN General Assembly Resolution 60/158 The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 2005, and Pillar IV of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2006. Often a respect for the human rights of the individual is premised on the basis that it prevents terrorism: a disregard for fundamental freedoms in fact increases the risk of terrorism, thus making states less safe. In reference to the UK’s history of preventing terrorism in Northern Ireland, for example, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Counter Terrorism and Human Rights, Ben Emmerson QC, has said: ‘Human rights-abusive policies increase the presence of terrorism. You only have to look at the recent past in Northern Ireland where internment without trial turned the IRA [Irish Republican Army] from a group with little support into a much larger organisation.’[30] Furthermore, a genuine respect for the human rights of the individual necessitates limitations on the powers of the state, especially in times of public emergency; the views of commentators such as Ronald Dworkin,[31] David Luban,[32] Jeremy Waldron,[33] and Lucia Zedner[34] are important in this regard. Waldron, for example, says that whilst reductions in individual freedoms may prevent a terror action taking place, they necessarily also increase the power of the state, and there is a corresponding risk that these enhanced powers may also be used to cause harm.[35] (Here, one may recall Lord Hoffman’s cautioning against the UK introducing the indefinite detention of terror suspects in the House of Lords in A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.[36]) Waldron also says that the state is ‘always looking to limit liberty’, and a terrorist emergency ‘provides a fine opportunity’: he believes that people become more than usually deferential to the demands of their rulers in these circumstances and more than usually fearful that if they criticize the proposed adjustments they will be reproached for being insufficiently patriotic.[37] In addition, he noted that often those who advocate greater security at the expense of liberty have no idea what difference it will actually make to the terrorist threat.[38] Assuming that this is indeed the case, he concludes
that we should not give up our liberties for the sake of ‘purely symbolic gains in the war against terrorism’. [39]

In the various legislative measures the UK has enacted since 2001 it is obvious that the country has struggled with the competing claims of human rights and security. The earlier measures such as the indefinite detention of terror suspects, as per ATCSA, certainly point to a balance much more in favour of the state at the expense of the freedoms of the individual: they were unlawful infringements of the right to liberty, as per Article 5(1) of the ECHR; and the psychological harm they caused to detainees were maybe violations of Article 3 of the ECHR. The repeal of indefinite detention, in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, still caused concern because of the possible effects control orders had on the human rights of suspects: an unlawful deprivation of liberty, as per Article 5(1) of the ECHR; a denial of a fair trial, as per Articles 6(2) and 6(3) of the ECHR; and a disproportionate interference with a controlee's right to family life, as per Article 8(1) of the ECHR, namely ‘relocation’. These issues affected significantly the government's decision to repeal them in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act (TPIMS) 2011, relaxing the controls imposed on a terror suspect still further. Pointedly, the standard of proof for the imposition of a TPIM was raised from ‘reasonable suspicion’ to ‘reasonable belief’, ‘curfews’ were replaced with an ‘overnight residency’ and ‘relocation’ was abolished. But with some high profile individuals absconding, and the growing terror threat from ISIL, the balance tipped back in favour of the state with the reform of TPIMs in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. Revised TPIMs are clearly not a return to indefinite detention. But the reintroduction of a ‘relocation’ provision suggests a return to the old control order scheme in all but name. This further curtailment of the liberty of the individual, in violation of Article 8(1) of the ECHR, annexing a person from their associates, particularly their family, will in all likelihood increase their marginalisation, thus increasing the risk that they will engage or reengage in terrorism.

To perhaps offset this further intrusion into a person's liberty, the standard of proof for the imposition of a TPIM has been raised to a ‘balance of probabilities’. But TPIMs, like control orders before them, are still civil orders, thus the procedural rights accorded to those suspected of a crime, such as Articles 6(2) and 6(3) of the ECHR, are still denied them. And a combination of controls over a suspect may still amount to an unlawful deprivation of liberty, in contravention of Article 5(1) of the ECHR. This is particularly problematic if liberty has been denied merely on the basis of the civil law, rather than a conviction following a criminal trial—see Article 5(1)(a). It remains an open question, therefore, whether the UK's current balance between the rights of a suspected terrorist and its competing interest of maintaining security intrudes too much on the fundamental freedoms of individuals serving a TPIM, in violation of UN General Assembly Resolution 60/158 The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 2005.

In summary, existing TPIMs still have significant implications for the rights of suspects; and, to draw on Ben Emmerson QC, the ensuing risks to security which these human rights violations might entail should not be overlooked. TPIMs also confer substantial powers on the state that could be used to cause harm, as Jeremy Waldron has argued. However, the reforms to TPIMs were welcomed by David Anderson QC in 2015, in his annual report of the operation of the TPIM scheme in 2014.[40] Thus, notwithstanding the obvious consequences outlined here, there is arguably still a case to be made for supporting them. This is the aim of the next section of this piece.

A Communitarian Justification for TPIMs

According to the Global Terrorism Index, 2015, 32,658 people were killed by terrorism in 2014 compared to 18,111 in 2013: the largest ever increase recorded. Countries suffering over 500 deaths increased by 120% to 11 countries. 78% of all deaths and 57% of all attacks occurred in just five countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria.[41] Excluding the 9/11 attacks, only 0.5% of deaths from terrorism have occurred in the West since 2000.[42] Globally, therefore, the UK and its allies are relatively safe compared
to other countries. That said, this is not to ignore the continuous attacks by Islamist terrorists such as ISIL in Western Europe: Brussels in 2014; Paris in January 2015; Brussels again in January 2015; Copenhagen in February 2015; Paris again in November 2015; and Nice in July 2016. It is perhaps no surprise, therefore, that senior police officers across Europe now claim that the continent faces its highest terror threat since 9/11.

Domestically, because of the significant risk posed to the UK by Islamist groups such as ISIL, the British government increased its national terrorism threat level from ‘substantial’ to ‘severe’, meaning an attack was ‘highly likely’, in 2014.[44] The UK threat level from international terrorism is still at ‘severe’ some two years later. Indeed, discussing this level of threat to the UK, Andrew Parker, the Director-General of Britain’s Security Service (‘MI5’), noted: ‘We face a very serious threat that is complex to combat and unlikely to abate significantly for some time.’[45] Evidently, therefore, a continuation of measures to prevent terrorism in the UK such as TPIMS, as well as newer approaches to stop individuals leaving the country to join ISIL, such as the seizure of passports, is required. Here the author seeks to justify the imposition of these measures to prevent terrorism on theoretical grounds, namely ‘communitarianism’. But as ‘communitarianism’ grew out of a criticism of liberalism, notably the approaches articulated by John Rawls in *A Theory of Justice*, it is necessary to begin with a brief discussion of liberalism to understand fully the communitarian approach.

Historically, liberalism is associated with philosophers such as John Locke and his ‘social contract’ theory. Locke’s principal work was the *Two Treatises of Government*, published in 1689. In the *Second Treatise* Locke argued that individuals covenanted with the state for reasons of security. But Locke was hostile to too much liberty being sacrificed in this bargain of protection, in that this, too, compromised the security of the individual.[46] Locke therefore advocated a minimal state whose power was limited to the public good of society and its preservation, and could not be used ‘to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects’. Thus, Locke believed individuals possessed ‘natural rights’ against the sovereign such as ‘life, liberty, and estate [property]’, which could not be removed without their consent.[48] Of these property was the most important, the protection of which was the chief reason for instituting government.

In *A Theory of Justice* Rawls founded a conception of justice on, perhaps unsurprisingly, respect for the individual. Rawls arrived at his notion of justice by considering what individuals in the ‘original position’ would choose as principles of justice for the basic structure of society. They would decide behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, which prevented them from knowing their place in society, their class position or social status, their fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, their intelligence and their strength. This ensured that no one was advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles.[51] Because of the uncertainty of the ‘veil’ process, Rawls believed two principles of justice would be chosen in the ‘original position’. The first of these, the ‘liberty principle’, which had priority over the second, was—‘each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.’[52] That is, each person would have the maximum amount of liberty compatible with the same amount of liberty for everyone else, which even the general welfare could not override. These ‘basic liberties’ are political freedoms, such as speech, assembly and conscience, freedom from arbitrary arrest and freedom of personal property.

Rawls's second principle of justice, which is perhaps less important to this article, was divided into two: ‘fair equality of opportunity’ and the ‘difference principle’. The former, which prevailed over the latter, suggests that individuals with the same talents and willingness to use them had the same educational and economic opportunities regardless of whether they were born rich or poor.[54] The latter, ‘the difference principle’, is concerned with the distribution of social and economic advantages,[55] that is, goods, wealth and authority to the least advantaged of society.[56]
In this article, the author is justifying recent anti-terror measures in the UK, such as TPIMS, on the basis of communitarianism. TPIMs are anti-liberty—or at least significantly intrusive of liberty—so logically are not conducive to liberalist ideas about the individual and the state, such as Rawls’s ‘liberty principle’; and certainly not compatible with liberalism’s traditional Lockean ideals of ‘natural rights’. This then introduces communitarianism’s critique of liberalism as a natural theoretical basis for the UK’s counter-terror measures. Modern-day communitarianism—such as that proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre,[57] Michael J Sandel,[58] Charles Taylor[59] and Michael Walzer[60]—began in the form of a critical reaction to A Theory of Justice. Sandel states, for example:

‘At issue is…whether the principles of justice that govern the basic structure of society can be neutral with respect to the competing moral and religious convictions its citizens espouse…One way of linking justice with the conceptions of the good holds that principles of justice derive their moral force from values commonly espoused or widely shared in a particular community or tradition. This way of linking justice and the good is communitarian in the sense that the values of the community define what counts as just or unjust.’[61]

Thus, the main theme of communitarianism is that there are common formulations of the public good rather than leaving it to be determined by each individual; the state cannot remain neutral on the issue. And in further rejecting Rawls’s ‘veil of ignorance’ hypothetical exercise, communitarians do not believe that individuals are born free and unencumbered, wholly autonomous agents:[62] they are ‘bundles of particularistic attributes’. We are bearers of a particular social identity; we are someone’s son or daughter, someone’s cousin or uncle; we are citizens of this or that city, members of this or that guild or profession; we belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. We inherit from the past of our family, our city, our tribe, our nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of our lives, our starting point.[64]

More recent theories of communitarianism are those advanced by Amitai Etzioni[65] and Mary Ann Glendon.[66] In attacking liberalism’s seemingly unhealthy emphasis on the individual, Etzioni claims that communitarians seek to rebuild community: there needs to be a strengthening of the bonds that tie people to one another, enabling them to overcome the isolation and alienation of liberalism.[67] Indeed, Etzioni notes that communitarianism is reflected in the preamble to the Constitution of the United States: ‘to form a more perfect Union’. For Etzioni – and Glendon – an important communitarian principle is redressing the balance between liberalism’s emphasis on the rights of the individual and social responsibilities,[69] believing that no society can survive if people only want rights and are unwilling to assume responsibilities.[70] The liberal emphasis on individualism – and neglect of social responsibilities – inherits much from Locke, which significantly influenced the tradition of ‘absolute’ human rights in the US. Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse by Mary Ann Glendon is especially important in this regard:

‘[American] rights talk, in its absoluteness promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus, accommodation or at least the discovery of common ground. In its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone acceptance of the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare states, without accepting the corresponding personal civic obligations. In its relentless individualism, it fosters a climate that is inhospitable to society’s losers, and that systematically disadvantages caretakers and dependents, young and old. In its neglect of civil society, it undermines the principal seedbeds of civic and personal virtue.’[71]

Drawing on communitarianism as a theoretical foundation for the justification of the erosion of rights of terror suspects, particularly through the imposition of TPIMs, the author does struggle with this approach, however: it is in fact wedded to notions of liberalism, at least according to its modern interpreters. Etzioni, for example, is seemingly supportive of traditional liberal concerns about conferring too much power on the state. In his vision of communitarianism, Etzioni claims that free individuals require a ‘community that protects them from the state’, and sustains morality by drawing on ‘the gentle prodding of kin, friends,
neighbours, and other community members.[72] As a source for guiding behaviour, he says that this moral encouragement is preferable to government controls or fear of authorities.[73] This obvious scepticism about the state is further reflected in Etzioni's seemingly unconditional faith in freedom of speech, as reflected, for example, in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. He dismisses suggestions that it should be curbed to bar expressions of racism, sexism, and 'other slurs'.[74] Elsewhere he has discussed other forms of expression such as hate speech and argued that all regulations and codes that limit it should be voided.[75] This liberal approach to communitarianism has not gone unnoticed by earlier exponents of the philosophy, such as Alasdair MacIntyre. In a later edition of After Virtue, MacIntyre takes specific issue with Etzioni:

'I see no value in community as such—many types of community are nastily oppressive—and the values of community, as understood by the American spokespersons of contemporary communitarianism, such as Amitai Etzioni, are compatible with and supportive of the values of the liberalism that I reject.'[76]

Thus, utilising this more contemporary form of communitarianism as a justification for measures to prevent terrorism, particularly in the UK, is going to prove problematic. Indeed, whilst the author is concentrating on attempts to disrupt the terrorist activities of individuals, such as TPIMS, other measures adopted by the UK to curb terrorism are particularly relevant here as well, especially if we are referring to Etzioni's hostility towards limiting freedom of speech. For example, following Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 2005 – ‘public provocation to commit a terror offence’ – the UK has outlawed 'encouragement of terrorism', as per section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006; this is aimed at verbal support for terrorism. If the support is written, then there is a corresponding offence of ‘dissemination of terrorist publications’, as per section 2. Presumably, the communitarianism of Amitai Etzioni would view this as an unnecessary violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and seek to have it overruled by the Supreme Court (assuming, for the sake of argument, British law was in fact under the authority of American Constitutional Law)?[77] This would be especially so as these terrorist offences in the UK are drawn very widely: individuals can be encouraged indirectly, not just directly, to commit terrorism; and the perpetrators can be committing the offences recklessly, not just intentionally.[78]

Why, therefore, is this author seeking to justify a significant portion of anti-terror law in the UK on the basis of communitarianism, and seemingly its more liberal elements as reflected in the writings of Amitai Etzioni? First, of the so called communitarians, Etzioni is the person who has written most about security post 9/11; and, maybe more importantly, he has seemingly become much less liberal – and much more pro-state – since the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. Liberals in the classic sense such as A. C. Grayling have attacked further incursions of individual freedoms for the 'good' of security as a 'mistake of crisis proportions' and an 'act of self-harm', claiming they hand 'the victory to the terrorists at no further cost to them.'[79] This is not the language and tone of the 'new Etzioni' post 9/11; in fact Etzioni takes an opposite view to Grayling. Democracy, Etzioni believes, is threatened when measures to protect it are not taken.[80] He proclaims:

'True patriots…realize that one must protect the nation from all enemies and the essence of what it means to be patriotic is to protect our Constitution and its Bill of Rights with all our might…Only when we have failed to this will have done the terrorists’ job for them.'[81]

In a separate piece of writing, Etzioni elaborates on what states must do to protect themselves from terrorism. He believes all kinds of terrorists – those who use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), suicide bombs, and 'mere' fanatics – cannot be effectively deterred by the ordinary criminal justice system, suggesting a separate system of justice is required for them.[82] Seemingly sharing this author's belief in the significant curtailment of the rights of terrorist suspects for reasons of public protection, Etzioni criticises those who urge that suspected terrorists are to be treated like other criminals; assumed innocent until proven guilty; tried in ordinary courts according to similar procedures employed in the trying of other criminals; afforded
several layers of appeals if found guilty; and incarcerated and released once they have served their terms. Importantly, he suggests that such an approach accords ‘terrorists more rights than they are entitled to, and unduly and significantly increases risks to the security of innocent citizens’. Etzioni’s explanation for why terrorists cannot be treated as ordinary criminals is that they need to be prevented rather than deterred: ‘you cannot punish people who commit suicide after the fact.’

That said, Etzioni does express support for limitations to the power of the state, in its attempts to prevent terrorism. He believes that liberty and security are both important but neither has a priority. Their relative importance changes from time to time and from situation to situation. The safer the nation feels, the more weight judges will be willing to give to the liberty interests. The greater the threat that an activity poses to the nation’s safety, the stronger will the grounds appear for seeking to repress that activity even at some cost of liberty. He claims that this ‘fluid approach’ is only ‘common sense’. With the existing terror threat from ISIL in Western Europe—three atrocities committed in France alone between 2015 and 2016—Etzioni would surely balance the liberty/security divide here much more in favour of the state than the individual. But of course as the terrorist threat declines there would be much more emphasis on the rights of the suspect. Furthermore, even in the most extreme of cases, Etzioni believes that terrorists should ‘indisputably be guaranteed some basic rights’. They should be captured rather than killed. They should not be tortured or turned over to other states that are likely to kill or torture them. And seemingly rejecting the UK’s indefinite detention provisions, as per ATCSA, suspects should be subject to a defined period of administrative detention, rather than holding them indefinitely, which could be extended through legally established channels if necessary. (This approach therefore also excludes counter-terrorism provisions in other countries such as America’s National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, permitting indefinite detention.) In saying this, therefore, Etzioni impliedly supports less intrusive prevent measures in the UK such as TPIMs, and maybe even control orders before them.

Actions to prevent terrorism, particularly in the UK, can be justified further on the basis of human rights law, that is, the state’s substantive duty to protect life, as per Article 2(1) of the ECHR, which was stated above. Indeed, Etzioni is keen to premise his approach to security post 9/11 on the basis of the right to life, too, saying that in all declarations and charters enumerating human rights, this freedom trumps all others. And, from an American perspective, he notes that, significantly, life precedes both liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the Declaration of Independence.

**Conclusion**

Since the atrocities in America in 2001 year after year there have been terror attacks by Islamists. Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria have borne the brunt of these, accounting for 57% of the world’s attacks in 2014. But the security of the UK and its Western allies is not to be ignored. The threat to these countries from Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan has abated, since its leader, Osama Bin Laden, was killed by American special forces in Pakistan in May 2011. In addition, the threat from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has declined following the killing of its main glorifier, Anwar al-Awlaki, by an American drone strike in Yemen in September 2011. But ISIL appears to have filled this Islamist ‘void’. In recent years, France and Belgium, geographically close neighbours of the UK, have been its principal European victims. The last significant Islamist outrage in the UK was eleven years ago, in 2005. But this is maybe more to do with the successes of the police and security forces in foiling terror plots rather than due to a lack of trying on the part of the terrorists. The convictions of ten men for the ‘Airline Bomb Plot’ between 2008 and 2010, and the convictions of eight men for conspiring to detonate suicide vests across various parts of the UK in 2012, serve as reminders to this. Indeed, Britain’s senior police officer, Bernard Hogan-Howe, has warned that an attack in the UK, in severity comparable to attacks recently in France, is only a question of ‘when, not if’. All in all, therefore, the UK should expect further threats to its collective security from Islamists such as ISIL.
States are under an obligation, internationally and regionally, to prevent terrorism. They fulfil this duty, inter alia, by prosecuting alleged offenders. However, there are occasions when governments have insufficient evidence to bring a case to trial, though there are strong grounds for suspecting the engagement of individuals in acts of terrorism. In these instances, states have introduced a range of measures to disrupt the activities of suspects. In so doing, they must also respect their corresponding duty to honour the human rights of individuals. Countries that sacrifice too much individual freedoms in the furtherance of security seriously risk undermining their duties in preventing terrorism, in that they encourage further attacks. In the last fifteen years or so the UK, for example, has struggled with harmonising its obligations to protect its citizens with respect for the human rights of terrorist suspects, particularly following the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The measures it introduced in ATCSA were unlawful deprivations of liberty, and possibly inhuman and degrading treatment. The UK’s latest attempt at striking the right balance between liberty and security is the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. This has reintroduced the ‘relocation’ power for TPIMs (though this has maybe been offset with the raising of the standard of proof from ‘reasonable belief’ to a ‘balance of probabilities’). The statute also created new provisions to deter individuals from joining ISIL in Syria and Iraq, such as the seizure of passports and the temporary prevention of individuals from returning to the UK. Human rights law imposes duties on states, in certain circumstances, to prevent death from non-state actors such as terror suspects. The author of this article supports recent counter-terror measures in Britain ironically on the basis of human rights. Indeed, he aims to go further in offering a theoretical justification for this reading of human rights: a communitarian critique of liberalism. The communitarianism of Alasdair McIntryre, Michael Sandel and others developed as a direct criticism of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, in rejecting Rawls’s ‘neutral’ ‘veil of ignorance’ exercise. These communitarians also disputed the idea that individuals were born as free, wholly autonomous agents. Later communitarians such as Amitai Etzioni and Mary Ann Glendon sought to position the philosophy within a culture of responsibilities, distinguishing it from liberalism’s traditional approach to absolute freedoms, notably in America. Thus, as a theoretical justification for the infringement of the rights of terror suspects, communitarianism’s attempt to rebalance ‘rights talk’ away from the historical liberal emphasis on respect for the individual to the community is suited to the more expansive, ‘collective’ interpretation of human rights articulated here. That said, communitarianism's early suitors such as Alasdair MacIntyre came to fundamentally disagree with its later proponents, such as Amitai Etzioni, viewing them as essentially liberal. This author’s analysis of Etzioni’s approach to freedom of speech and the First Amendment of the US Constitution supports this.

Post 9/11, however, Etzioni has clearly adopted a much less liberal approach to his style of communitarianism by embracing the obvious realisation that to preserve democracy requires an incursion—even a significant incursion—into the rights of terrorist suspects. This is the approach to communitarianism that the present author locates for his theoretical justification for measures to prevent Islamist terrorism in Britain. Etzioni impliedly rejects the UK’s previous indefinite detention measures, as per ATCSA (as well as similar measures in other countries such as America’s National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012), but appears to support a more intrusive framework for the UK than TPIMs, or at least prior to the reform of TPIMs in 2015. Whilst this author analyses his own country’s domestic anti-terror laws, it is hoped that the communitarian approach he employs here, which is significantly influenced by American human rights discourse, is sufficiently wide to be attractive to critical observers in other countries.

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omission.

Notes


[8] [2004] UKHL 56.

[9] Ibid., at para 97.


[12] [2007] UKHL 45.


[14] Op.cit. (2010), at para 72. The House of Lords considered the legality of ‘relocation’ in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AP [2010] UKSC 24. Here the suspect was required to live in the Midlands 200 miles away from his family in London. The court decided that this indeed was a violation of Article 8(1) of the ECHR, but the provision was still lawful, as per Article 8(2), since it was in proportion to the state’s objective of protecting national security.


[17] [2007] UKHL 46.

[18] Ibid., at para 24. But the court did say that in any case in which a person was at risk of a control order containing obligations of the stringency found in this case – AF was subject to a 14 hours long daily curfew, for example – s/he was entitled to a ‘measure of procedural protection as is commensurate with the gravity of the potential consequences’ (at para 24).


[27] Ibid., at p.4.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid., at p.5.


[36] [2004] UKHL, 56.


[38] Ibid., p.195.


[42] Ibid., p.5.


[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin, 1961, p. 604. But what happens if the removal of an individual's property without their consent was conducive to, say, the well-being of the majority, such as taxation to fund war for reasons of security? Russell argues that Locke did not adequately address this obvious contradiction (p.609).


[51] Ibid., p.7.

[52] Ibid., p.53.

[53] Ibid., p.54.

[54] Ibid., p.59.

[55] Ibid., p.61.


[64] Alasdair MacIntyre, op.cit., pp. 204-205.


[73] Ibid.
[77] After very kindly reading an earlier draft of this article, Amitai Etzioni challenged this claim by the author: ‘Regarding free speech, indeed, I do hold that speech should be limited only when it directly [Etzioni’s emphasis] incites violence, which ISIL does. The main problem is that any attempts to define which words do and which don’t have failed, at least in the US. However, I would argue that if a speech or text is, in its totality, an incitement it should be banned.’ (Email to the author, dated 28th July 2016).
[81] Ibid., pp.1-3.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Again, after very kindly reading an earlier draft of this article, Amitai Etzioni wished to explain this point. (Email to the author, dated 28th July 2016).
[87] Amitai Etzioni, ‘Life: The Most Basic Human Right’ 9(1) (2010) Journal of Human Rights pp.100-110, p.105. Again, after very kindly reading an earlier draft of this article, Amitai Etzioni wished to clarify this point: ‘Just before the conclusion, you write that freedom trumps all. I believe it should be the right to be alive.’ (Email to the author, dated 28th July 2016).
Poverty and “Economic Deprivation Theory”: Street Children, Qur’anic Schools/almajirai and the Dispossessed as a Source of Recruitment for Boko Haram and other Religious, Political and Criminal Groups in Northern Nigeria

by William W. Hansen

(with the assistance of Kingsley Jima, Nurudeen Abbas and Basil Abia)

Abstract

Street children, many of whom are ‘almajirai’, are part of a vast underclass that populates the cities of Northern Nigeria. Many of these children and young adults have no means of support other than begging for their daily food, petty crime or providing casual labor. For the most part illiterate, they have few educational skills that would allow them to function in a modern economy. This article argues that the appalling economic conditions experienced by these young people makes them prime targets for recruitment into fanatical religious groups such as Boko Haram, or into one or another of the political/criminal gangs – generically called the ‘Yan Daba’–that proliferate in northern Nigerian cities. It further argues that the underclass from which these young people emerge is the direct consequence of the failed governance of the parasitic predator class that dominates the post-colonial Nigerian state. This, in turn, makes attempts at de-radicalization and bolstering the security forces doomed to failure – unless there are far-reaching social reforms that would undermine the very class that dominates the post-colonial state.

Keywords: street children; almajiri; Boko Haram; economic deprivation theory; underclass; post-colonial state; Northern Nigeria

Introduction: The Almajirai and the Dispossessed

Street children with large, doleful brown eyes, wielding plastic begging bowls, looking like they had just stepped out of a Dickensian novel set in tropical squalor, are omnipresent in most Nigerian cities. While most of those in the southern part of the country are from Christian backgrounds or, at least, non-Muslim, the ubiquity of child beggars in the Islamic North is much more obvious. The term almajiri (pl. almajirai) has come to carry two meanings. On the one hand it’s used as a generic term for the millions of child beggars who flood the streets of northern cities. It also has a narrower and more etymologically accurate meaning: one of an estimated ten million young boys who attend traditional Muslim schools under the tutelage of a malam—a teacher and Islamic scholar. Of course, not all begging street urchins in the North are almajirai nor are they even all males. Many ragamuffin little girls wearing filthy, tattered dresses also spend their days pleading for something in their begging bowls. However, the traditional Qur’anic students constitute a significant portion of these children.[1]

The Hausa word, almajiri, has its origins in the Arabic expression almuhajir; a person who emigrates in search of religious knowledge. While there are some exceptions, effectively almajirai are boys as young as four or five years, from poor rural families who are apprenticed by their parents to an Islamic teacher in an urban area. The reasons for this are mixed according to Imam Dauda Bello.[2] For some parents who send their children away to study with a malam the reasons are spiritual; i.e., both the parents and the child will receive credit from Allah in the afterlife. For other parents, Bello agrees, the primary motivation is poverty. The rural economy of northern Nigeria has been in a state of collapse for nearly the past half-century. In part this is a consequence of the so-called oil boom; but its brutal and deleterious effects have been exacerbated by the feckless and venal governance of the parasitic-predator class that controls the Nigerian state. These parents, finding themselves unable to provide for their progeny, send them off to study with a malam in the
city. In part, this seemingly calloused behavior is motivated by the understanding the Allah will provide for them in ways their semi-destitute parents cannot. A measure of the sheer economic desperation that many northern rural families face is illustrated by a report of the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and Related Matters (NAPTIP), stating that seventy percent of the young women trafficked for either labor or sexual services from rural areas of Kano state, virtually entirely Muslim, was done with the consent of the parents.[3] Given these sorts of actual, lived conditions, how can anyone be dismayed that the victims of such a system turn to radical, even millenarian alternatives; whether religious or political? Arguing that such people, compelled by decisions of the state class to endure such dismal conditions, need to be “de-radicalized” and “pacified” is to exhibit such a profound misunderstanding of the extant social reality as to leave one flabbergasted.

The curriculum in an almajiri school is generally confined to the rote memorization of the Holy Qur’an.[4] When they are not doing their Qur’anic lessons they are sent out onto the streets to beg for their daily bread. Often, even the proceeds of their begging do not belong to them. Much of the time their malam simply expropriates part or all of their daily intake.[5] There have been multiple calls for reform of this system but they usually generate far more heat than light and, typical for Nigerian governance, nothing actually ever happens. In part this is because the traditional religious establishment—the malams—resist losing their control (and the financial largesse attached thereto) over the system. The accusation that many of these youngsters are financially exploited by their malams is an extremely sensitive political issue and very likely to incur the wrath and the opposition of significant sectors of the Islamic clerical class.

Some almajiri school pupils also attend boko (secular) schools but these are exceptional. The system was designed to serve the needs of a pre-modern agricultural society in which literacy, for the most part, was confined to the elite and the upper-levels of the religious establishment. Being a peasant or a slave working on a plantation required little literacy. The traditional almajiri school provided a feeder system that replenished the religiously learned and quasi-literate lower clerical class. Unfortunately, this system has little utility in a modern, bourgeois (even semi-capitalist like Nigeria) society in which even manual workers must have at least a basic literacy, numeracy and some scientific understanding. The social consequence of the continuation of this traditional school system is that there are thousands upon thousands of graduates annually who have none of the educational skills that would allow them to get jobs and function within a modern economy.[6] There are three times as many pupils in traditional almajiri schools as there are in the state-run secular school system which is, for the most part, as public school systems often go, also seriously wanting.[7] The elite (Muslim and Christian) send their children to private schools. Nearly three out of every four school-age children in the Northeast do not attend public schools.[8] This continued practice has the “blowback” effect of increasing the already massive educational/modern skills imbalance between the Muslims and Christians.[9] According to a UNESCO report, ninety percent of southern children attend modern schools. This figure is below forty percent across the North.[10] The practical effect of this is that modern education begets modern skills which beget modern jobs which, ultimately, means that wealth and income flow disproportionately to Christians. This, in turn, exacerbates Muslim resentment of relative Christian success, fuels ethno-religious-regional resentment and makes religiously-inspired, violent, millenarian movements more attractive to the desperate and dispossessed.

There are, of course, exceptions but, for the most part, the graduates of almajiri schools seldom return permanently to their natal village and parental homes. Why would they? There’s virtually nothing to return to as the rural economy is lifeless. Instead, they stay with their malam until young adulthood (mid- to late teens) at which time they become “independent” and go out on their own to survive as best they can as an impoverished, destitute, permanent urban underclass in the mushrooming metropolises of northern Nigeria, forming what Marx (and Fanon) would have referred to as a lumpenproletariat, looking to survive by any means necessary and nurturing deep resentment of the society that has so brutalized and immiserated them.
As such they are readily available and easily mobilized for all sorts of political and social conflict—one of which is the Boko Haram insurgency.

[Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that my research and conclusions concern only Boko Haram and Northern Nigeria. I am not making any general assertion with regard to drivers of terrorism as it occurs elsewhere in the world.]

**Economic Deprivation Theory**

As suggested above, there are crowds of street urchins in every city in Nigeria; north or south. Not so stupid as to try and beg from people who are as poor as they are, these children wait in areas where they feel their take will be greater; outside hotels, banks, upscale shopping areas, Big Men’s houses, etc. Of course, in the wealthier areas they are regularly chased away by uniformed security guards, men who are probably from the very same socio-economic stratum as the youngsters they are shoving away. The rich have long hired the desperate to do that which is distasteful for them. There is deeply embedded poverty in all parts of Nigeria. Citing World Bank figures, a 2016 report by Mercy Corps states that 61% of the overall Nigerian population lives on less than $1.00 per day.[11] In the Northeast (Maiduguri) and Northwest (Sokoto) the scale of poverty is significantly greater. More than three-quarters of the population of these two regions lives in “absolute poverty”; i.e., at the bare minimum necessary to sustain human life.[12] However, here I am particularly concerned with determining the social category from which Boko Haram gleans its support and from which it recruits the bulk of its militants. An 18-year old Muslim youngster attending a “Peace Through Sports” program at the American University of Nigeria, Yola (AUN) said tellingly: “It was either you or Boko Haram. There’s nothing else for us.”[13] It is self-evidently true that very few current or former almajiris or street children in general from Kano, Kaduna or Sokoto, for example, join Boko Haram. Why? Simple: Boko Haram’s origins and presence are primarily in the Kanuri-speaking areas of the far northeast; i.e., Borno state of which Maiduguri is the capital and parts of neighboring Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi and Gombe states and across the borders in Cameroun and Niger.[14] This does not mean that current and former almajiris in other regions of the North are not discontented with their lot but a Boko Haram-like manifestation of that discontent is not available. In fact, as will be discussed below, the bulk of the followers of the millenarian Maitatsine movement in the early and mid-1980s were former religious students. While the Maitatsine had followers throughout Nigeria’s northeast quadrant (Muhammad Maroua, the leader, was a Fulani, originally from Maroua in Far North Cameroun), his movement was centered in Kano and was, for the most part, Hausaphone.

The argument that the bulk of Boko Haram sympathizers and militants come from the above-described urban and peri-urban underclass and that the insurgency is as much a class-based movement as it is religious is hardly undermined by the occasional defector from the more privileged classes—as some would claim, trying to refute “economic deprivation theory”. The notorious Underwear Bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried to set off a bomb on a 2009 flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, was the son of one of Nigeria’s wealthiest bankers and had attended exclusive private secondary schools before gaining an engineering degree from the University of London (while a Nigerian, Abdulmutallab was affiliated with Al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula [AQAP] and had nothing to do with Boko Haram). Alhajji Buji Foi, a wealthy Borno farmer/landowner and former State Commissioner of Religious Affairs, was one of Boko Haram founder/leader Muhammad Yusuf’s major supporters—politically and financially.[15] Foi was summarily executed, along with Yusuf and the latter’s father-in-law who had voluntarily turned himself in, by the Nigeria Police in the aftermath of the initial 2009 conflict during which Yusuf first declared a jihad. Then there is the oft-cited young brother/sister team, both university students, from a wealthy Bauchi family who attempted to run away to join Boko Haram.[16] Likewise it is often reported—to refute the economic argument—that Boko Haram has occasionally recruited university graduates. One struggles to understand why a systemically
unemployed university graduate, merely because s/he has a university degree, is somehow not also part of an economic underclass. I know multiple examples of university graduates who are house help (females) and keke (motorized tricycles) drivers (males) and multiple unemployed ones who simply live at home with their parents or on the streets.

There are obviously problems in attempting to ascribe any sort of mono-causal theory to a social phenomenon as complicated as terrorism and insurrection. In the case of Boko Haram there are multiple factors that one needs to consider; some of them religious, some (especially) cultural, some ethno-linguistic, some even psychological. If there were an automatic, direct cause and effect relationship between poverty and insurrection there would be ongoing insurrections in many if not most countries in the world—with the possible exception of the social democracies of Northern Europe. There are, indeed, multiple factors involved. However, if the people of Northern Nigeria were to be able to live their lives at the same level of comfort as the people of Northern Europe's social democracies, groups like Boko Haram or Yan tatsine (of which more below) would find very little traction. In any society there might be an Anton Breivik, who I might point out, was a Christian. Breivik acted, more or less, as an individual. Boko Haram, no matter how one feels about it and its tactics, had its origins as a social movement that has in the past enjoyed not insignificant support, even if that has declined radically in the past few years.[17] BH support comes primarily from the fact that it speaks to the feelings of millions of people who feel abused by the social living conditions of Nigeria. As I have suggested elsewhere, “Boko Haram is the entirely logical consequence of more than five decades of the post-colonial Nigerian state ruled by a parasitic-predator class that is itself a by-product of the colonial state.”[18] Asking the same predatory state class that created the problem in the first place, to correct it, as most Western governments and security studies proponents do, seems a Sisyphean task at best.

If between 65-75 % of the population of Northern Nigeria (something along the lines of ninety million people) are said to be absolutely poor—living at the bare subsistence level needed to sustain human life— we are talking about a group close to sixty million people. Obviously, the vast majority of these people have not joined an insurrectionary terrorist group, which is true of most revolutions. One could speculate that there must be multiple reasons for this. On the other hand, the mere fact that most Indians did not join Gandhi's protests in the forties, that most Algerian Muslims did not join the FLN in the fifties, that most African-Americans did not join the sit-ins and demonstrations of the sixties cannot be taken as evidence that they did not support the goals of those movements. Insofar as shari'a means justice and justice includes having access to life's necessities (jobs, food, clothing, health care, education, housing) then, I would suggest, the vast bulk of those sixty million economically deprived pious Muslims in Northern Nigeria are likely to support the implementation of shari'a precisely because they believe it to mean justice.

The term “economic deprivation theory”, used in the context of studying religiously inspired anti-systemic insurgencies in northern Nigeria, often appears in terrorism studies preceded by something along the lines of “so-called”, “alleged” or “simplistic” and would appear to be used to refer to, or, more accurately, to dismiss and denigrate what might elsewhere be referred to as a materialist approach to the study of political, historical and social phenomena in Northern Nigeria.[19] The origins of the term are not my concern here but they go back at least as far as Mervyn Hiskett’s 1987 commentary in the Journal of Religion in Africa regarding a debate on what are referred to as the Maitatsine Riots (1980-1985), an earlier manifestation of a millenarian Islamic uprising against what was seen as a corrupt, abusive, and un-Islamic state.[20] Both the Maitatsine (Muhammad Maroua) himself and his movement were based in Kano; but uprisings after his death also occurred elsewhere in the northeast quadrant (an area roughly bounded by the cities of Kano, Kaduna, Yola and Maiduguri) of Nigeria. It was crushed by the military with the attendant loss of thousands of lives, primarily at the hands of the Nigerian military. It is seen as an influential forerunner of, and influence upon, Boko Haram. In this case Hiskett, a prominent British specialist in the history, culture and literature of Islamic northern Nigeria/West Africa, was skewering the separate analyses of I.L Bashir and Paul Lubeck of the insurrection; analyses he labeled “Marxist orthodoxy”. Ascribing something as Marxist orthodoxy, of
course, has long been meant to divest said argument of any scholarly or intellectual validity. Hiskett, whose political views were decidedly on the right, did not completely discredit what he called socio-economic factors—he felt they may exacerbate the condition—in the radicalization process but the basic causes of the Maitatsine insurgency were, in his view, tribal, ethnic, cultural and religious factors.[21]

Economic deprivation theory, at least to its detractors, would appear to mean that its adherents mindlessly attribute social phenomena such as Maitatsine and Boko Haram to economic factors such as a generalized poverty. For these detractors, it would appear there are other far more intellectually exacting explanations to be preferred. As mentioned above, Hiskett attributed the Maitatsine phenomenon to cultural, ethno-tribal and religious factors. Hannah Hoechner claims that all empirical evidence refutes “simplistic economic deprivation theory”. In her case she was referring to Boko Haram.[22] Although she acknowledges that some almajirai may very well become Boko Haram recruits, it is, according to her, inaccurate to suggest that they (Qur’anic students), as a group, are particularly vulnerable. At the risk of appearing to defend a “simplistic” theory, I would suggest that Hoechner is quite mistaken. Much of the research, both empirical and anecdotal, shows the exact opposite of what she claims.[23] Based on focus group discussions among almajirai conducted by my research assistants, Kingsley Jima, Nurudeen Abbas and Basil Abia, in both Maiduguri and Kano as to the vulnerability of these youngsters to the blandishments of Boko Haram, evidence indicates that most of the Maiduguri youngsters participating knew many who had joined the group; one knew more than thirty. Two others knew more than twenty and multiples knew more than ten.[24] Similar discussions conducted in Kano revealed the exact opposite; i.e., none of the participants had any such personal knowledge. This, of course, can be easily explained by the fact that, as is noted elsewhere in this article, BH has little to no grass roots presence in Kano.

“Anonymous” attributes Boko Haram to something the author refers to as the “will to power”. [25] A perceived generalized system of injustice (poverty, destitution, hopelessness) we are to assume, has nothing to do with why this particular group wants power. Using this argument, any opposition group, whether an insurgency or a standard political party, seeking to achieve political power in order to implement a program is motivated by a “will to power”. “Anonymous” would seem to have missed completely that which needs to be explained; i.e., why a group seeks power, not the mere fact that it does.

Another critic of anything even tainted with a materialist analysis is Abimbola Adesoji. The reasons for Boko Haram, claims Adesoji, are rather clear and simple: the Nigerian government (then under Goodluck Jonathan) was unwilling to address the question of Islamic fundamentalism.[26] Adesoji’s argument is, unfortunately, typical of an entire genre of Boko Haram scholarship produced by Nigerian intellectuals of southern/Christian origin. For them the problem is not poverty, not ethnicity, not a predatory state, not corruption and the panoply of other ills facing Nigerian society. The problem is pure and simple: Islam itself or, at least, its Salafist-jihadi variant! If only northern Muslims could be more like their southern Christian co-nationals (implicitly be subordinate to, and learning from them) then the problems with conflict would magically be solved. Adesoji would appear to have only a limited knowledge of the North, of Islam in general and of the history of the region. He even repeats that old and oft-demolished shibboleth that boko is the Hausa word for “book”. [27] This, of course, folds seamlessly into what I call the “academic security studies industry” of which Adesoji is certainly a part. [28] In this view, a phenomenon like Boko Haram is a security problem that can only be solved through the judicious use of force. Even if there are social factors (poverty, abuse, corruption, unemployment) that exacerbate the problem, the issue is still one of the state and security. In this view, state survival and state interests are paramount. Order, as distinguished from justice, can only be achieved by clamping down on, and eliminating, the bad guys.
The Social Base of Boko Haram

In general, the beneficiaries of any social system tend to support it and resist change. This does not mean there are not people who act against what might be perceived their own class interests. History is littered with them. Several have been mentioned above with regard to the current insurgency in Nigeria. The origins of neither Marx nor Lenin were in the working class; the class from which they received political support. Although Fanon was black and came from a lower middle class background, he went to Algeria as a French colonial medical officer, not as a “native.”[29] On the other hand, those who suffer abuse by the same system are at least susceptible to calls for its overthrow. This “call to revolution”, based on an assumed “class solidarity” that transcends all other divisions or cleavages—religious, ethnic, national, cultural—that might divide people, has certainly not been as direct and automatic as Marx and most Marxists had assumed.

In fact, religious, ethnic, national and cultural loyalties have often proven far more powerful than class as a rallying point for mobilization. From the viewpoint of historical materialism, Gramsci has tried to explain this seemingly anomalous phenomenon through the concept of hegemony; i.e., the ways in which the dominant classes have used ideology, control over intellectual production and the definition of what is considered “common sense” to maintain their control.[30] Having said all that, however, does not mean that “class” does not exist as an analytical category and when class and other important identities coincide, solidarity has not been at all unusual.

So, from where does Boko Haram draw the bulk of its support and from which social strata are its militants recruited? Despite those who want to deny or minimize socio-economic factors in understanding and analyzing radical politicized religion in Nigeria, it becomes abundantly clear that the vast bulk of its adherents come from the destitute, the dispossessed, indeed, the wretched of the earth.[31] One hesitates here to use terms relating to social class that have their origins in Europe's industrial revolution; working class, proletariat, petty bourgeoisie, middle class, bourgeoisie. That is why Fanon, very presciently and controversially, noted that in the colonies “Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched.”[32] In that instance he was discussing the coincidence of race and class (whites are rich/the rich are white) in the colonies; but his admonition applies as well to the post-colonial condition in which race, as classically understood, is irrelevant. If the primary contradiction in 19th century Europe was between the owners of industrial capital and the wage earning proletariat, in the 20th century colonial world between the colonizer and the colonized, in 21st century post-colonial Nigeria it is between the predatory state class and the vast and highly differentiated underclass some of whom are in meager regular wage employment, others in irregular day work while a large number are without any visible means of support aside from begging, borrowing, criminality and vagabondage.[33] The accumulation of wealth in post-colonial Nigeria is tied, not to the ownership of industrial capital as it was in Europe 150 years ago, but to control over the state apparatus or intimate access to those who do and the primary source of that wealth comes from looting the state treasury which in turn depends mainly on the revenues derived from exporting oil.[34]

In the foregoing I have suggested that Boko Haram and other similar radical, religiously motivated movements in Northern Nigeria draw the vast bulk of their militant supporters from the disinherited, semi-urban underclass. These sorts of commonplace observations are repeated constantly by those closest to the actual situation. Imam Bello, in referring to young men who are former almajirai, noted: “They have no job opportunities after graduating from almajiri school. You are unemployed, you are poor and you have no means of survival. This makes them easy targets of Boko Haram.”[35] Imam Bello made this point as well with regard to other homeless, jobless young men, sometimes products of an almajiri school, sometimes not – often collectively known as ‘Yan daba; street thugs, petty criminals, muscle for hire, in classical Marxist terminology, a lumpenproletariat – saying, “When they (Boko Haram) came to Mubi they (the ‘Yan Daba) would be given money; 5,000, 10,000 naira. The moment they see money they get interested. They join.”[36]

The argument made here is that Boko Haram, its antecedents like Maitatsine and similar movements are, essentially, class-based phenomena. This, of course, does not mean that other factors such as religion are
not involved as well. Islam, in the minds of the mass of believers, has been perverted by the venal Islamic political class and its compliant clerical allies. The religious patina taken on by these radicals is not a false cover. Their religion in their understanding of it represents a call to justice. Is that so radically different from the promise of 19th century European socialism? Their radicalization is, as it were, “the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, the soul of a soulless condition,” to use words from Karl Marx. A return to an imagined pristine past, a past that has been perverted and diverted by the decadent upper classes and its foreign allies, an appeal to the poor, the abused, the dispossessed to return to a previous glorious condition—a perfection characterized by the early salafist Islam of Medinah—becomes the siren call to which the masses respond. The dynamics of this process are not all that different from the arguments used by nationalists in 19th century Europe in their drive for national self-determination.[37] The imposition of sharia law, the Salafist ideal, consequently, means imposing a system of justice.[38] That the victims of an oppressive system find solace in religion and turn to it, millenarian and fantastic though it may be, for an understanding and theoretical justification of their revolutionary desire does not preclude the importance of the concept of class to understand the mobilisation.

A report for the British Council-funded Nigeria Stabilization and Reconciliation Project (NSRP) by Umar and Erhardt titled “Life Histories of JAS Members” (Jamaat Ahlis Sunna is Boko Haram’s self-name) is illuminating and goes a long way toward providing empirical data with regard to composition of group membership.[39] Information was gained from interviewing family members of militants. Although not all, most militants are Kanuri-speaking males between the ages of 16-32. This linguistic marker itself explains why Boko Haram’s influence and catchment area is going to be limited to parts of the northeast. While 76% of the informants said their relatives in BH were very poor only a few gave poverty as the explicit reason for their joining. On the other hand, every single interviewee said that the desire for income were among the major inducements for joining BH. Some even said the group recruited its members with cash payments, an observation confirmed by Imam Bello.[40] The authors, citing Crenshaw and Bjørø, refer to “pre-conditions” and “structural causes” that lead to the radicalization process; factors such as a destitute economic condition may not be realized by the participants themselves as affecting their choices.[41] More than two-thirds of the family members interviewed acknowledged that their BH relative had formerly been an almajiri. As suggested above, this fact alone almost certainly means these young men were grounded in a conservative and traditionalist theology, were bereft of a modern education and without the skills needed to find gainful employment in the modern economy and, therefore, unemployable or fit only for the most menial types of physical labor. To be sure, as Higazi points out, Salafism as such was not introduced into Northern Nigeria via the traditional Qur’anic educational system, but primarily via Izala, a virulently anti-Sufist group based in Kaduna and Jos that emerged from the post-colonial religious politics of the seventies.[42]

The attitudes of the NSRP informants were largely confirmed by interviews with various Maiduguri clerics as well as the focus group discussions with almajirai themselves.[43] The interviewees also confirmed the speculated but not widely disseminated notion that Boko Haram underwent a significant metamorphosis after the extrajudicial execution of its charismatic founder, Muhammad Yusuf, in 2009.[44] Those joining BH after it re-emerged in September 2010 from a fourteen month long underground reorganization were, the family members say, less ideological and more opportunistic. Those coming in before the 2009 murder of Yusuf and the simultaneous military razing of the BH compound with nearly 1,000 deaths of family members, were more driven by religious beliefs and principles.[45] Post-2009 BH became factionalized, they claim, under Abubakar Shekau’s leadership which has been characterized by a sort of indiscriminate hyper-violence. A smaller group wanted to maintain Yusuf’s policy of directing attacks only toward the state’s security force enemies.[46]

A second NSRP study by Hashim and Walker dealing with the radicalization and de-radicalization of one-time almajirai makes a similar point with regard to the class status of the bulk of the youth who join radical groups; poor, uneducated and unemployed.[47] Of course, the question remains as to why these various
“social engineers” think de-radicalization can work when the conditions that caused the process remain locked in place. Their research determined that former *almajirai* are less likely than members of other male youth networks that proliferate across the North to get involved with radical, religious outfits which are either engaged in, or are advocating insurrection.[48] While some of these groups have emerged from traditional Hausa occupations such as hunting and magic-making, many of them have de-generated into criminal gangs involved in “normal criminality”. Some do double duty as vigilantes, running protection rackets and political thuggery paid for by one or another of Nigeria’s multiple patronage networks of political godfathers who regularly use unemployed young men to intimidate and even murder their opponents. Politics in Nigeria is a blood sport. Interestingly, especially with regard to the question of class, 50% of Hashim and Walker’s *almajirai* informants, asked what the first thing they would do were they ever to be in a position of political power, answered by saying they would work to end poverty.[49]

A third study of youth radicalization in the North, funded by the US government and carried out by Lagos’ CLEEN Foundation, is less satisfactory from the point of view of logic, academic rigor and intellectual content. Yet it still underscores the overall point; i.e., socio-economic factors are the primary determinants leading to youth radicalization.[50] The CLEEN study was conducted in six northern states—Borno, Yobe, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano and Sokoto—with the stated purpose of determining why young Nigerians join *Boko Haram*. One wonders why two of these states—Kaduna and Sokoto—were chosen since *BH* has almost no presence there. Why would one want to study the reasons for Sokoto youth joining *Boko Haram* when they seldom do? Even in Kano, the “capital” of the Muslim north, *BH* has only a very limited on the ground network. *BH* has certainly conducted “actions” in such places but recruiting alienated young men requires a social-cultural presence at the grass roots level and *BH*’s catchment area is almost completely confined to the Kanuri-speaking areas of Borno, Yobe, Gombe and parts of Bauchi and Adamawa states. The study concludes by listing what it calls “Key Findings”. The first four are identified as key drivers behind youth radicalization. The fifth, the study emphasizes, is *not* a factor. Why a non-factor in youth radicalization is included as a key finding is something I shall return to in a moment. The five key findings are:

1. Ignorance of *true* religious teachings (most important);
2. Unemployment and poverty (very important);
3. Poor parental upbringing (important);
4. High levels of illiteracy (important);
5. The *alleged* excesses of the security forces are NOT important in contributing to youth radicalization.

All of the above deserve some comment and, in part, are reasons why I suggested earlier that the CLEEN study was less than rigorous in terms of academic and intellectual rigor. With regard to #1 above, there is no operational definition offered as to what are the “true teachings” of Islam and how such a truth is determined. All religious and political movements have had deviations from the dominant thinking. The majority labels the minority heretics. The losers perceive themselves as persecuted. Both Jesus and Muhammad were scathing in their criticism of the dominant religious discourses of their time. Accusing, say, Muhammad Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau or, even, Osama bin Laden and Abubakar al-Baghdadi of “misunderstanding” the true teachings of Islam seems the height of futility. In fact, that is the crux of their argument; the dominant discourse is itself incorrect. Pope Leo X excommunicated Martin Luther in 1520 because the latter failed to understand and teach “true” Christianity. In a non-religious context Lenin was brutal in his treatment of the Mensheviks and of Kautsky for failing to advocate “true” Marxism, defined from Lenin’s point of view as absolute ideological agreement with himself.

True to historical precedent, CLEEN’s recommendations, written by the study’s lead researcher, Dr. Freedom Onuoha, start with advocating close regulation (implicitly: ban) and monitoring of what dissident, minority,
peripatetic Islamic teachers are allowed to teach; very much within the tradition of Leo X and Lenin.[52] Who would be doing this monitoring? Onuoha proposes a new state agency which would include the State Security Service (SSS) and would determine that which is orthodox and permissible theology.[53] Who’s the Leninist here? Proposing a state agency that would be in charge of determining that which is theologically sound seems a dangerous option. Furthermore, arguing that a radical preacher offering a radical solution to a destitute, mundane existential condition is somehow the cause of the problem rather than its consequence, and that this condition is somehow disconnected from the overall socio-economic environment of his congregants, defies logic.

It would seem Onuoha’s advice is being followed by the Borno state governor, Kashim Shettima, who announced the formation of the Borno State Islamic Preaching Board whose job will be to “monitor and spy” on the preaching of all Islamic clerics…especially in the remote areas. It would also “be alert in spotting unusual and suspicious preaching.”[54] It’s easily seen how such an agency’s remit could be expanded to oversee all Christian preaching as well and, in fact, all political speech which the state wants prohibited.

Findings # 2, 3 and 4 in the CLEEN study are all different aspects of the same phenomenon; socio-economic deprivation. Poverty and unemployment tend to produce children whose parents are unable to bring them up properly. It is exactly these parents who send their children off to be raised, taught and cared for by a malam in the city. Even if they were interested, and evidence would suggest that most are not, these clerics would never be able to provide “proper parental care” to their dozens and sometimes hundreds of wards. Of course poverty and unemployment lead to high rates of illiteracy which, in turn, lead to high rates of poverty and unemployment.

Finding #5 – that “alleged” by the state security forces are not a factor in radicalization—deserves also some comment. First of all, the mere use of the word “alleged” tells us a great deal about the mindset of the study’s authors. Human rights abuses by the Nigerian state security forces are far more than merely “alleged”. According to Higazi, “The brutality of the military in Maiduguri from 2011-2013 is plausibly reported to have pushed many youths in Boko Haram.”[55] Their volume and barbarity have been documented time and again by various international organizations. Amnesty International has recommended that leading officers of the Nigerian military be investigated for crimes against humanity.

[56] One is obliged to point out in this regard that Freedom Onuoha, who directed the study and wrote the introduction and conclusion and, oddly enough, also thinks boko is the Hausa word for “book”, is himself a key member of the Nigerian security establishment; professor and head of the Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, Nigeria Defense College. As such he is typical of the “academic security studies industry” to which I referred above; his numerous writings reflect that outlook. Of course, the automatic response of the Nigerian security establishment is to issue blanket denials of any wrongdoing. The findings themselves that the documented brutality of the Joint Task Force (JTF – Army, Police Force, State Security Service) did not serve to radicalize people and push them into joining BH are belied by multiple sources, including the international human rights organizations mentioned above. One very recent report, based on interviews with former Boko Haram members, states “…a heavy-handed security response began to breed active resentment.”[57]

In an interview a Maiduguri malam gave three reasons for why young former almajirai join Boko Haram: (1) They are very poor; (2) In their opinion sharia = justice and justice = jobs; (3) They feel abused by the Muslim upper classes in Borno.[58]

Conclusion
The foregoing has shown rather conclusively what most close observers of Northern Nigeria had already understood intuitively, through direct experience or anecdotally; Boko Haram, other radical religion-based
movements, “for hire” gangs of political thugs and common criminal networks draw their support and recruits largely from poverty-stricken, destitute young males desperate for an alternative to the life fate and history have condemned them. In a society that can only be described as obsessed with religiosity—Christian and Muslim—fantastical millenarian religious promises offer a solution, illusory though it may be, to this lived nightmare. Secular democracy based on Western liberalism or socialism has failed miserably to deliver the goods. The economic circumstances of the mass of the northern underclass have deteriorated significantly over the past four to five decades with the disintegration of a once-thriving cotton textile industry thanks to the WTO, cheap Chinese textiles, neo-liberal free trade advocates of the Washington Consensus, an IMF loan with “conditionalities” and a parasitic-predator political class that cares for little more than its own hyper-consumption. This, combined with the collapse of rural agriculture due to a combination of climate change, destructive agricultural practices and a corrupt government with no policy options and concerned only with looting the oil rent income, has led to a massive increase in the urban and peri-urban underclass in swollen northern cities. These youngsters are extraordinarily vulnerable to what Aghedo and Eke call “conflict entrepreneurs, desperate politicians who will stop at nothing in the quest for power and resources [and] those who pay street urchins peanuts to execute criminal acts.”[59]

Shehu Sani, an attorney, human rights advocate and now an APC Senator from Kaduna state, had a personal relationship with BH's late leader, Muhammad Yusuf, and was even involved several years ago in negotiations with an eye toward finding a settlement. Referring to almajirai, Sani says, “These are…vulnerable children. They have in many cases turned to extremism and crime because they were sent away by their parents at a very tender age and they grow up under the care of teachers who use them.”[60] Echoing Sani was the then Governor of Kano state, Rabiu Kwankwaso: “There's a very strong correlation between poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and the issue of insurgency and insecurity. A very poor man who is looking for something to eat can easily be recruited by the insurgents and so can the unemployed and illiterate, and that's exactly what is happening.”[61]

In trying to explain late 18th century food riots in England, the late E.P. Thompson referred to a lost “moral economy” based on the notion that peasants had, at least, the right to eat and to have food available at a “fair” price, not a price driven by an impersonal “market” that had no respect for human beings as such; only the profit-driven sales.[62] Paul Lubeck drew a comparison between the followers of the Maitatsine in the mid-1980s to these English vagabonds of 200-plus years ago who were protesting against the increasing ravages of the new market economy and the destruction of the old moral order.[63] Another late British historian, Eric Hobsbawm, advanced the concept of “social banditry” to explain a virtually universal phenomenon occurring in peasant societies—in this case primarily the Mediterranean world of southern Europe between 1850 and 1950—undergoing the wrenching transition from a dependable, if hierarchical, pre-modern society to an impersonal world of the free market in which mere human beings are easily dispensed with.[64] In this author’s view Boko Haram not only can be, but MUST be understood in terms of class as was suggested by Lubeck more than thirty years ago with regard to the Maitatsine. Dismissing them as mere fanatics misses the point entirely.[65] Lubeck went on to write:

> Should the uprooted, deprived and repressed urban masses ever unite around a charismatic leader with a coherent ideology and an organization capable of mobilizing the excluded, then the anti-institutional energy expressed by the Yan Tatsine may generate a radically different outcome than self-destructive, millenarian protest.[66]

Muhammad Yusuf was definitely a charismatic leader. His ideology, unfortunately, was less than coherent and his organization more a series of daily spontaneous reactions which, as Fanon has pointed out, has both positive and (mainly) negative consequences.[67] The result, unfortunately, for the abused and disinherrited of Nigeria’s Northeast has been yet another example of “self-destructive, millenarian protest”. Larry Diamond, explicitly not a Marxist, made something of the same point with regard to a charismatic leader mobilizing the masses. Diamond had been in Nigeria during the Maitatsine insurrection but was writing in 2015 about Boko
Haram saying that unless radical reforms are implemented and a modicum of justice instituted, a radical Islam will continue to mobilize the people.[68] If Boko Haram as it exists in mid-2016 is destroyed, as looks increasingly likely, another, similar movement will arise to take its place unless the manifest injustices of the current dispensation are addressed. Unfortunately, the parasitic-predator class that dominates Nigerian society shows no signs of ever willingly giving up its privileges. Consequently, it will continue to prey upon its citizens and depend upon its foreign friends (the West) to prop up its continued venality—all in the name of security and a never ending “war on terror”.

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The writing of this article was done by Hansen and the arguments and conclusions are his responsibility alone. However, he was helped enormously by his three Research Assistants who carried out field work and interviews in multiple trips to Maiduguri, Kano, Mubi and Yola. He also benefitted from Kingsley Jima’s Senior Honors Thesis at AUN.

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Notes

[1] There is no generally agreed-upon number of Nigerian street children, as there is no agreed-upon definition as to the category itself. Adekunle, et al., “The Growing Population of Street Children and the Accompanying Social Distress in Nigeria”, African Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 2 (1-2) 2010, (p. 42), suggests that in 2009 there were a total of 15 million so-designated children in all of Nigeria. The category “street children” sometimes includes (1) children, under 18 who live and work on the streets with no permanent residence who never attend schools of any kind; (2) children who live and work on the streets but return to some sort of parental home at night; (3) children who live and work on the streets, return home at night and sometimes attend formal school; (4) children who live and work on the streets only certain times of year – “dry season”, for example; (5) almajirai school children who spend part of their time living and working on the streets, part of their time in a traditional Qur’anic school, but return to the “collective care” of their malam’s “learning center” at night. See also Ghenga Salau, “ALMAJIRI: The Story of Nigeria’s Street Children up North,” The Guardian (Ng) Sunday Magazine, 13 August 2016.

[2] Interview with Dauda Bello, 14 November 2015. Imam Bello, at the time of the interview, was the Imam of a mosque in Mubi, a city in northern Adamawa state, northeast Nigeria that had been briefly occupied by Boko Haram. Imam Bello now has a mosque in Yola, the state capital. He is also the Imam of the mosque at the American University of Nigeria where he teaches Arabic as well.


[4] Some traditional Islamic schools have more complicated and variegated curricula but they would appear to be relatively rare. This information was given to me by Ummu Aliyu Musa via e-mail communications the first week of July 2016. Aliyu Musa, who teaches Hausa at the University of Hamburg, is a specialist in Hausaphone philology, culture and literature. See also Adam Higazi, “Mobilization into and against Boko Haram in North-East Nigeria,” in Kadya Tall, Marie-Emmanuelle Pommereulle, Michael Cahen (Eds.), Collective Mobilizations in Africa. Leiden: Brill, 2015, pp. 335-337. Higazi here discusses the various types of traditional Islamic education in the Northeast.

[5] Interview on 28 May 2016 with two Maiduguri-based Muslim clerics who wish to remain anonymous: “Most almajirai are exploited by their malams in the sense that they take part of their earnings from begging.” See also Yahaya Hashim and Judith-Ann Walker, “Radicalization, Counter-radicalization and De-Radicalization and the out-of-school Almajiri of Northern Nigeria”, Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Project (NSRP) 14 September 2014, p 19; A Sokoto malam stated: “Malams go to villages, collect children and make income out of them.”; Iro Aghedo and Surulola James Eke, “From Alms to Arms: The Almajiri Phenomenon and Internal Security in Northern Nigeria”, Korean Journal of Policy Studies, 28/3, 2013, p. 105; Human Rights Watch, “Off the Backs of the Children”: Forced Begging and Other Abuses against Talibes in Senegal, New York, 2010. This HRW report is actually based on an investigation regarding what are called Talibes (students/Taliban) in the Senegambia. However, the Talibes in the Senegambia are the same as the almajirai in Nigeria and the conditions under which they are forced to live are roughly the same.


[8] Ibid., p. 110.

[9] All statistical indices show higher educational/income levels among southern/Christians than among their northern/Muslim counterparts. Colonialism first entered Nigeria in the South and moved gradually north. Pre-colonial southern societies were, for the most part, animist/pagan. In the face of the colonial juggernaut, accompanied by convert-hunting missionaries, these societies collapsed and were relatively quickly converted to Christianity. Western education was soon perceived as a mechanism for upward social mobility as well as a way to outflank the traditional ruling classes. A cohort of Western educated, English proficient clerics soon developed as a necessary complement to the colonial administrators. The opposition happened in the North when confronting a deeply embedded Islamic “high culture”. The Fulani aristocracy correctly anticipated that Western education had the potential to undermine their position. As part of the agreement to accept British suzerainty after 1903, the aristocracy insisted upon severe restrictions on (in their view false) Western education. This is how it came to be called boko. The British, interested primarily in administration on the cheap, complied in order to secure aristocratic Fulani cooperation. Western missionary education in the North was curtailed. The effects of these historical factors are plainly evident today.

[10] Ibid.


[13] Margee M. Ensign, "Local Action to Protect Communities in Nigeria", Forced Migration Review, p. 1; forthcoming, 2016. Ensign is President of the American University of Nigeria, Yola (AUN) which, in partnership with the Adamawa Peace Initiative (API), an independent community group of which Ensign is the Chair, runs multiple community outreach programs. The comment was made to Ensign personally at an event and was concurred in by other youth present at the time. Ensign notes that she's heard similar sentiments many times. (Disclosure: The author is a faculty member at AUN and, therefore, Ensign’s subordinate).


[15] Muhammad Yusuf (1970-2009) came from peasant origins in Yobe state. As a youngster he received a traditional almajiri education and later went to Saudi for advanced Islamic education. Breaking with the Salafist, Izala group, Yusuf advocated total opposition to the secular (“infidel”) Nigerian state. In the early 2000s he began gathering followers who were known collectively as the Yousufiyah (followers of Yusuf). They called themselves Jama’atu Ahrar Sunna (People of the Tradition). Yusuf was extra-judicially executed by the Nigerian police in 2009 after armed clashes with the police and military let to his capture. It was only after his death that the succeeding group came to be known popularly as Boko Haram.

[16] Prince Charles Dickson, “Kids of Rich Nigerians who Finance Boko Haram”, International Center for Investigative Reporting, 2 July 2015. This instance was widely reported in Nigeria to support the fact that economic immiseration had nothing to do with Boko Haram.


[19] I will try to avoid using the term "Marxist" in this context because that term is not only often misunderstood and incorrectly used, but any discussion as to its method is so obscured by the politics of the Cold War, Leninism, the Soviet Union, Communism as to have very little useful meaning. Instead, I will generally use the concept of “historical materialism” referring to an analytical method advocated by Marx and others and distinguished from anyone’s political agenda.


[21] Ibid., pp 215, 222. Furthermore, anyone even slightly familiar with the world of Marxology would, in all likelihood, find the term “Marxist orthodoxy” an oxymoron.

[22] Hannah Hoechner, “Traditional Quranic Students (ALMAJIRA) in Nigeria: Fair Game for Unfair Accusations” in Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos (Ed.) ALMAJIRAI, pp. 215, 222. Furthermore, anyone even slightly familiar with the world of Marxology would, in all likelihood, find the term “Marxist orthodoxy” an oxymoron.

[23] Numerous Islamic clerics, including Dauda Bello, Bashir Suleyman and Ibrahim Jibril (not the real names of the latter two; both are aliases). These clerics have emphasized in numerous interviews that it is poverty, unemployment, lack of proper upbringing and the perceived abuse by the upper classes that drove youngsters into the arms of Boko Haram.


[27] Ibid., p. 6. The Hausa word for book is littafi. In current Hausa the word boko refers to secular (i.e. Western) education as well as the Latin alphabet. In etymological terms, boko has the original meaning of fraud, false, duplicitous, a lie. See Paul Newman, The Etymology of the Hausa boko. Mega-Chad Research Network; URL: http://lah.soas.ac.uk/projects.


[29] Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) was a West-Indian born, Afro-French psychiatrist, existentialist philosopher and revolutionary activist in the Algerian revolution. His theories regarding race, colonialism and violence were captured in four books, the most famous of which was The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press, 2004.


[32] Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, op. cit., p. 5.

[33] A young woman personal acquaintance with a teaching diploma from a federal college of education teaches in a small, private Christian school. Her monthly pay is N10,000, roughly US $23.00 at the current exchange rate.

[35] Interview with Dauda Bello, 14 Nov. 2015, op. cit..

[36] Ibid.


[38] Interview with Maiduguri-based Malam Bashir Suleyman (not his real name) on 28 May 2016. With regard to the understanding of the content shari’a law in Northern Nigeria, see Brandon Kendhammer, “The Sharia controversy in northern Nigeria and the politics of Islamic law in new and uncertain democracies”, *Journal of Comparative Politics*, 45(3), April 2013, passim.


[40] Ibid., p. 8. See also note 28 above.

[41] Ibid., p. 3.


[43] See notes 1 and 3 above regarding the interviews with malams. For the focus group discussions conducted by Jima and Abbas, see note 17.


[45] Ibid., op. cit., p. 17.


[49] Ibid., p. 21.

[50] CLEEN Foundation, *Youths, Radicalisation and Affiliation with Insurgent Groups*, Lagos, 2014. This project was funded by the United States Institute for Peace and directed by Dr. Freedom C. Onuoha of the Nigerian National Defense College in Abuja.

[51] Ibid., p. viii.

[52] Leo ordered the head of the Augustinian Order to tell all his monks to shut up. Clearly that tactic did not work.

[53] Ibid., pp. 102, 103.


[61] Ibid.


[65] Lubeck, op. cit., p. 387.

[66] Ibid.


II. Research Note

IS and its Predecessors: Violent Extremism in Historical Perspective

by Bob de Graaff

Abstract

Islamic State uses an age old apocalyptic narrative to attract followers and legitimize its existence. This research note show which narrative elements were used during previous violence-inciting apocalyptic manifestation in Christianity and Western ideology and how they can be retraced in the communications and enactments of Islamic State. The use of such narratives explains why the movement has been so much more powerful in attracting followers than al-Qaeda. Based on historical experience the prospects of fighting such a movement without annihilating it are gloomy, the more so as apocalyptic movements have a tendency to provoke a confrontation with their opponents as a manifestation of the promised final battle between the forces of Good and Evil which will produce the salutary end state, both of which are central elements in their narrative.

Keywords: Al-Qaeda; Apocalypse; End of Times; Islamic State; ISIS

Introduction

Some ninety years after the Islamic caliphate ended, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed a new worldwide caliphate in Mosul on June 29, 2014. With this proclamation, the leadership of the Islamic State (IS) aroused a certain sense of pride among many Muslims around the world, as he claimed to put an end to a long period of humiliation and deprivation. The lure of the caliphate led to a larger number of foreign fighters to go to Syria compared to jihad travellers in previous jihadist conflicts. What was the magic formula with which Islamic State brought this about?

IS emphasized in its communications that the caliphate is geographically situated in the area that, according to the Islamist’s interpretation of certain traditions, will be the location of the final battle between Good and Evil as well as the locus of the establishment of the salutary end state of Islam. The Internet magazine of the movement, which appears in different languages, is significantly called Dabiq, named after the place where the end of times final battle will take place—a place which was until very recently under the control of IS, although when the city fell into the hands of Turkey-backed rebels, IS was quick to claim that this was not yet the apocalyptic battle foretold in a hadith. IS is a mixture of peddling stories about the victimization of Muslims and the allotment of horrific violence against those who do not share its extreme visions. In its understanding, it is only logical and legitimate that those who were once victimized now should become perpetrators. This form of counter-humiliation eminently suits apocalyptic movements: at the End of Times the first will be last and the last will be the first. There is nothing new here. This involves the use of a story in which a beneficial state is proclaimed as the last stage of history, a narrative that incites the use of violence to bring it about. IS makes use of story elements that have already been used for centuries to encourage people to use violence to bring about the End of Time, in Christian, secular as well as Islamic variants.[1]

William McCants described IS already as an apocalyptic movement, but did not pay much attention to the long narrative tradition which ISIS follows.[2] Frances Flannery does see ISIS as part of a somewhat broader apocalyptic phenomenon but she distances herself from definitions of apocalypse that stress the element of belief in an End Time – something which precludes comparison with movements and authors that did.[3] This Research Note seeks to place the Islamic State’s belief in a centuries-old tradition, stressing the continuity
of certain narrative elements, the changing patterns and the not so bright prospects of the changing technological and geographical context in which a movement such as Islamic State operates. It follows in the footsteps of John Gray, who a decade ago also placed al-Qaeda in the apocalyptic tradition.[4] Now it is possible to extend this line of reasoning even further and, more convincingly, apply it to the Islamic State.

Apocalyptists in all Shapes and Sizes

Stories about such an end state have manifested themselves for thousands of years all over the world and among all faiths and belief systems. Such apocalyptic narratives promise an End of Time where the good elements will finally overcome the forces of evil and then reach definitive salvation. In religious versions it is God who has a plan of salvation for mankind in store and who intervenes in the earthly pool of misery to save his wretched followers. In secular variations the History of Mankind, either by human action or by collective powers, tends to a final End of History state that is beatific.

To be sure, not all apocalyptists are necessarily violent. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish four groups of apocalyptists. The first group believes that man must leave the determination of the End of Time to God or to the course of history. One might call them the determinists, with a reference to Marx, who thought that some economic stages had to be traversed before the stage of the bourgeoisie would be sidelined for the ultimate beneficial dictatorship of the proletariat.

A second group believes that although people have no bearing on the time when the heavenly End of Time arises, they may be able to try to push an end in the desired direction by way of small steps and good deeds. We could call them the reformists.

A third group believes that the world is so corrupt that it is an illusion to think that they themselves will be able to change it for the better. However, well-intended people may try to isolate themselves from the evil and create a precursor of the final paradise as much as is in their power. These people have, for example, founded utopian colonies; and hence one might term them the colonists.

These three groups abstain from using violence in order to bring the salvation empire any nearer. However, this is exactly what the fourth group does: the fanatics. They are convinced that God must be given a helping hand or that the course of history should be accelerated. Consequently, fanatics are voluntarists: they do not want to wait, but instead impose their will on history and others.

Why and how this fourth group does so is the subject of this Research Note. To better understand the behavior of fanatics, it is necessary to identify the narrative elements apocalyptists use.

Ingredients of the Apocalyptic Narrative

Although we might go even further back in time to find the primordial sources of the apocalyptic story, here I will take as a point of departure: the book of Revelation, the last book of the Christian Bible, a text attributed to John of Patmos. There we find already all the apocalyptic narrative elements that would return again and again in later stories. John thanked the addition of Patmos to the fact that the Roman rulers banished him at the end of the first century after Christ to the small island of Patmos in the Aegean Sea because of his Christian beliefs. This offers us already one of the characteristics of many authors of apocalyptic narratives: they are often socially excluded, and frequently people who are put in prison. They feel a strong urge to use this type of story as a payback for those who humiliated them. Within the actual or imagined prison walls they are left with only two weapons for this form of revenge: their imagination and the written word that may be smuggled to the outside world.
They use those weaponized words to match their personal humiliation with a social group to which they feel related and which has also been humiliated in their eyes. In the case of John of Patmos this group consisted of the persecuted Christians. His book was partly intended to comfort those Christians with the promise that at the End of Time the then first ones—the infidels, the powerful and the rich—would become the last and simultaneously the oppressed and wretched true believers would become the first. And there was even more consolation for the oppressed: the direr their circumstances would be, the sooner the end would arrive. But before justice and salvation would be delivered, first a battle between the forces of Good and Evil would still have to take place. Due to the fact that the good God would be on their side, the true believers would eventually win and the disbelievers—the former rulers and the mighty—shall burn in hell. Thus the End of Time does not bring forth any kind of egalitarian society. Fanatics always assume the final state to be a paradise for one group only: their own. The others, the disbelievers and misbelievers, cannot suffer enough. Schadenfreude [taking pleasure from the misfortune of others] about their fate or so-called ‘apocalyptic jouissance’ [5] often runs rampant in apocalyptic writings as those of John of Patmos. In the book of Revelation John is allowed to cast a look ahead of this good state, a kind of celestial sightseeing. This element—looking like Moses from a mountain at the promised land of the future—also appears in many other apocalyptic stories.

This element has a specific function. Apocalyptic narrators juxtapose the world of today—a world of injustice—to an ideal world in which justice reigns supreme. They frame justice and, by implication, they frame injustice. In the case of the Book of Revelation God, first supported by the true believers who engage in the fight against Evil, finally brings justice on the Day of Judgment by separating the sheep from the goats. Every religion or Weltanschauung makes a distinction between the real world and the ideal world, but apocalyptic fanatics make this tension between justice and injustice so great that it seems immoral to not blow the real world to smithereens, thus creating space for the new ideal world. The old world must, according to the apocalyptic narrative, be destroyed to beget the new one.

This struggle between Good and Evil is binary: there is no place—no grey zone between white and black—for an intermediate group. If possible, even more forcefully than against the evil persons of the earth, John rages against the neutrals or ‘lukewarm.’ Their indifference is an eyesore to apocalyptic fanatics who believe in an all-enveloping cosmic struggle. This creates a very sharp ‘Us versus Them’ dichotomy. And the bigger the (stated) love for one’s own group, the greater is the hatred of others, who stand after all in the way of the execution of justice which true believers and the oppressed claim to generate.

**Apocalyptic Thinking in Europe**

In the paragraph above, the terms ‘true believers’ and ‘oppressed’ more or less coincided. This is understandable in the context in which John of Patmos wrote his Bible chapter. Christians were discriminated and persecuted in the Roman Empire, although not as severely at the time of John as he would have us believe. If Christians would live according to the rules that John saw fit, they would have to abstain from using Romans coins, as on these coins the emperor was depicted as a divine figure. Thus arose the image of a contrast between, on the one hand, power, wealth and infidelity and, on the other hand, powerlessness, poverty and true belief—an antithesis that would end with the victory of the latter over the former. In short, the story of John promised, what we would today call empowerment. Because of this juxtaposition of an injustice frame and a justice frame, the story of John of Patmos could easily transcend the limits of a purely religious setting and become a story that would have a subversive effect upon existing earthly power relations. Therefore, when later, during the Roman Empire, the Christian church became more or less the state church, prelates exerted themselves to quell such a subversive, earthly explanation of the book of Revelation.

This worked until the thirteenth century. Then came several centuries during which violent apocalyptic movements regularly flared up in South, West and Central Europe, for example in Italian Florence in the
late fifteenth century under the leadership of the Dominican monk Savonarola. Another example are the Taborites, who during the first half of the fifteenth century teamed religious-extremist views with cunning strategic thinking in and from their stronghold in Bohemia, so much so that for a long time they were far superior to large opposing armies. On the other hand, strategic insight was not the strong side of Thomas Müntzer, who with his apocalyptic expectation took the lead of a peasant army during the German Peasant Wars. He and his followers suffered a humiliating defeat in the battle of Frankenhausen in 1525. The best example of an early modern Christian apocalyptic movement is probably the occupation of the city of Münster during 1534 and the first half of 1535 by Anabaptists who mainly originated from the Low Countries. They expected the New Jerusalem to descend upon the city, which would indicate the beginning of the End Times. England also had its share of apocalyptic violence, e.g. both under the Cromwellian practices and the troubles caused by the so-called Fifth Monarchists, who tried to push the prophecy that the world would come to an end in 1666.

What many of these movements had in common was their criticism of the traditional Catholic church, which in its pursuit of worldly power and wealth had, in the eyes of such critics, become rather the Anti-Christ than the representative of God on earth. The new beliefs were often launched and taught by monks and priests who came into conflict with the church, but were also propagated by some lay priests. In all this, the advent of the printing press played an important role. Without the intervention of the traditional clergy believers now began to explain the Bible themselves in their vernacular, and they found a new audience, which partially was becoming literate itself by this time. Thus there was a cocktail of confusion about the accuracy of existing relationships, new spiritual leaders, a new medium and a new audience—a combination that turned out to be a good breeding ground for apocalyptic movements.

The Ideological Apocalypse

After 1700 the apocalyptic ideology did not disappear completely from Western Europe, but the violent variant now manifested itself primarily in ideological terms. This involved systems of meaning in which the transcendent was no longer present; in other words: ‘God was taken out of the equation.’[6] This did, however, not mean that ideologies and their implementation could not contain religious elements. Some of the movements described below, such as Communism or Nazism, are therefore characterized as ‘political religions.’[7] Ironically, some Enlightenment philosophers who wanted to curb religious fanaticism, paved the way for a new form of fanaticism. An important contribution to this end was made by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who sought an ideal civil society, which would do away with the old institutions, but which would not be a place for people who would not abide by the common social contract. He was also a strong supporter of transparency.

Fifteen years after the death of Rousseau, Robespierre was, as it were, the executor of the political testament of Rousseau’s thought. The French Revolution created an ideology of equality among the French patriots, in which Robespierre surfaced as the one who knew how to link rhetorical gift to the relentless will to propel and defend the revolution. Meanwhile the group of counter-revolutionaries and ‘lukewarm’ kept increasing, while that of the ‘good ones’, i.e. of ‘true’ French patriots, kept getting smaller. But within a year, in 1794, Robespierre himself fell prey to this distinctive mechanism and his head rolled from the same guillotine to which he had condemned so many others.

The nineteenth century showed—especially in Russia—a continued combination of revolutionary fervor and an expectation of salvation time. A nowadays hardly known, but in his time among Russian students extremely popular writer was Nikolay Chernyshevsky. His novel What is to be done? became a great source of inspiration for many Russian revolutionaries, including Lenin. In this novel, which he wrote in prison, Chernyshevsky outlined how a kind of super people continuously and with great self-sacrifice worked towards revolution. A well-known part of his novel is the fourth dream of Vera Pavlovna, one of the
protagonists of the book. Pavlovna—wholly in line with the standard apocalyptic narrative—gets a look into the ideal world that will emerge after the revolution.

Another important ideological apocalyptic movement was National Socialism. It was an answer to the great humiliation that many Germans felt after losing the First World War. If one wants to get the real understanding of this feeling of confusion one should consult the 1920s diaries of Third Reich propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels.[8] Like many of his contemporary country-fellowmen, Goebbels had the feeling that the world in which he lived had been turned upside down. In such times of Zusammenbruch [collapse] a new worldview in the form of an apocalyptic idea stood a good chance. In his diary, Goebbels wrote for instance in pure apocalyptic style the supplication: ‘Lord, show the German people a miracle! One man!!!’[9]

Goebbels finally found his saviour in Adolf Hitler and his movement who announced the coming of a Third Reich. Part of the German clergy went easily along with National Socialism, while other church leaders stood impotently by, wringing their hands and wondering why National Socialism with its salvation claims had so much more promotional traction than the word of God, which they spread in half-empty churches.[10] This perplexity is also a phenomenon that is not unusual in the light of an apocalyptic movement: traditional spiritual leaders have to watch how the newcomers with their apocalyptic narrative sideline them in the eyes of a wide audience.

**Self-fulfilling Paranoia**

Those who think that after the Enlightenment the idea of a (violent) apocalypse entirely disappeared from the West are mistaken. In the United States, the idea that the End of Time will come during one's own lifetime is widespread. Regularly Christian militias and their families withdraw from the world on farms or compounds and arm themselves for the big fight at the end of time. Alarmed by the accumulation of weapons in the hands of these true believers, the authorities get literally up in arms, and firmly so, because the expected armed resistance is high. The apocalyptists who see this force majeure approaching, see it as a confirmation that the End Times have now actually begun with the arrival of the forces of Evil. It is a kind of self-fulfilling paranoia[11] on both sides, illustrating the cumbersome relationship between apocalyptists and their opponents. The authorities have the impression that is impossible to talk to the apocalyptists because they are on a different wavelength and that, in light of their threat, a violent confrontation is the only way out. For apocalyptists this confrontation is proof that they have been right from the start; therefore they have a tendency to provoke such a prophesied confrontation.

Such a violent confrontation is often the essence of popular depictions of the apocalypse, both in Christian America and the Muslim Middle East. In the U.S., novels about the End of Time have taken several runs of millions of copies in recent decades. Time and again bible quotes are related to current political situations in these novels. Troops of the Anti-Christ were for many years equated with the Soviet Armed Forces. After the end of the Cold War, the ultimate evil in this kind of novels became Islam. This time, the Islamic savior, the Mahdi, became the representation of the Anti-Christ. And the other way around in recent Islamic apocalyptic narratives, Western armies are seen as the auxiliary troops of the Islamic version of Anti-Christ, the Dajjal.

Hence Christian and Islamic End-of-Time expectations mirror each other. Popular Islamic apocalyptic stories often use Western elements. Thus, one can read that the Islamic Anti-Christ dwells in the Bermuda Triangle, moves with a UFO and has the support of Freemasons. To legitimize their own End-of-Time thinking, Islamic apocalyptists rely on such unlikely authorities as certain American television evangelists or former President Reagan. Many of the popular Islamic representations of the End Times end their story with the US fleet steaming up in the Mediterranean, after which a nuclear confrontation takes place, which leads miraculously to the victory of Islam over the world and the establishment a kind of paradise in Jerusalem.

[12]
Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State

Against this background, it is not surprising that some Muslims launched the idea that al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, who took on the Americans head-on, might be the divinely guided Mahdi, the messianic deliverer for whom they had been longing for so long since he would restore the faith, spread justice and defeat the enemies of Islam. Osama bin Laden never took a liking to that idea.[13] He saw himself not as an End of Days figure and thought that his movement should continue to exist after him. He pictured himself only as a martyr on the road that would eventually lead to the restoration of the caliphate, which had been lost in 1924. To him the caliphate was only a distant dream and it had mainly a rhetorical function.

This was partly due to a doctrinal problem that bin Laden had. He stood in the tradition of the godfather of Islamism, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb. In his writings which were smuggled out of an Egyptian prison, Qutb had argued that there was only one who could rule over Muslims: Allah. Whoever called himself a Muslim ruler was, according to Qutb, by definition, not a good Muslim.[14] This view came in handy as long as Islamists were bent on denouncing and overthrowing the ruling regimes in the Middle East. But at the same time this view was an unsurmountable obstacle for building a new state in the form of a caliphate. Bin Laden and other Islamists were therefore tongue-tied when it came to the question how their new society would look like. They did not come much further than the idea that there and then Sharia would prevail.

This was very different with the people who stood at the origins of Islamic State, like al-Zarqawi. They assumed that wherever two or more Muslims were gathering, one was the sheikh or emir.[15] This assumption allowed for hierarchy and rule in a state. While Bin Laden had called for a gradual establishment of a caliphate, following upon the assent of as many Muslims as possible, one of the successors of al-Zarqawi, al-Baghhadi, proclaimed the caliphate in mid-2014 without consulting the view of many Muslims, let alone others. ‘Hasty and rash’, bin Laden would have said if he had lived, just as, while still alive, he had criticizied al-Zarqawi and his followers because of the extreme violence they used against disbelievers and misbelievers. According to bin Laden and his deputy and later successor, al-Zawahiri, Muslims would be alienated by the extreme violence and this would make the gradual growth of the Islamist movement impossible. Thus Bin Laden and his followers had not achieved much more than the Anarchists around 1900: they did try to destroy the old world, but accomplished very little in terms of creating a new one.

The Islamic State of voluntarists, on the other hand, saw how their strategy, at least initially, achieved much success. Thanks to the proclamation of a caliphate there was now a territory where Sharia could actually be applied and where Sunni Muslims no longer had the feeling of being forced to live in the midst of sin. Moreover, they could get rid of their victimhood complex there. There was ‘empowerment’: victims became perpetrators, a change that was symbolized in the beheadings of Western victims dressed in the same type of orange overalls that Islamists in the American prison camp at Guantánamo Bay have to wear.

All central elements of apocalyptic narratives can be found in the story-lines of IS: the idea of an End State, in the form of the caliphate, where justice prevails because Muslims can be themselves and their lives are governed by Sharia law as well as a sharp ‘Us versus Them’ antithesis, to which Christians, Shiites, Yazidis and others would fall victim in the caliphate. The fact that the roles are reversed between victims and perpetrators, between first and last, is depicted with the stagings of beheadings. The exercise of rule is totalitarian and evokes memories of previous expressions of apocalyptic exercises of power, from the Anabaptists in Münster to the Third Reich of the Nazis. Setbacks do not discourage those rulers, because these are only temporary and can be seen as tests by Allah. Yet with God on their side, they are sure to win the final battle.

For some Muslims in the West who feel disadvantaged, this caliphate idea holds a strong appeal. Traditionally, some internal armed conflicts have attracted foreign fighters who are persuaded that they are under a moral obligation to help their community, which is distressed.[16] For this reason the conflict in Syria, even before the proclamation of the caliphate, attracted many who identified themselves with the fate of the brothers and
sisters in the Levant. And there was more: right before their eyes would be waiting to happen the most world historical event that man could imagine: the End of Time! The foreign fighters could be there as it happens and participate in this final battle. 'Do not miss the boat,' was essentially the slogan with which Islamic State's social media attracted recruits from more than one hundred different countries, including more than 6,000 European Muslims.[17] Moreover, those who would join this final fight would be forgiven their sins. In fact, in Syria and Iraq an enhancement of the small-criminal existence that part of these recruits had led in their home countries became possible through the holiness of the goal. It was a kind of romantic rapper-ideal: you were acting criminal, but 'somehow' you were doing something really noble.

The propagandists of the Islamic State captured this apocalyptic element in many ways, e.g. through its glossy Internet magazine that goes under the name Dabiq, which refers to the IS occupied site in northern Syria where the final battle will, according to a hadith legend, play out between Good and Evil. The twitter app of IS was named 'the dawn of glad tidings.' The IS rival movement Jabhat al-Nusrah does not want to do with less and has a media channel called Al-Manarah Al-Bayda or ‘The White Minaret’—a reference to a place east of Damascus, where, according to Islamic tradition at the End of Times Jesus will descend to start fighting the forces of Evil. As a matter of fact the whole area of Bilaad al-Shaam where IS has established itself is in Islamic tradition expected to be the region where the final battle will be fought at the End of Times.[18] The geographical proximity of Jerusalem, the city where not only many Muslims, but also Christians and Jews hope to experience the End of Times, increases the apocalyptic fervour even further.

Conclusion

IS thus makes use of an apocalyptic narrative thousands of years old, of which the ingredients are available in the form of a number of narrative story elements. To lure supporters, IS apocalyptists had to re-create a new recipe from these ingredients, adapted to the demands of a new time and new circumstances. The leaders of IS succeeded in doing so. They have taken steps the leadership of al-Qaeda did not dare or could not take: extreme violence against other Muslims, particularly the Shiites, and the establishment of the caliphate. Thus IS has a much broader palette of violence at its disposal than the occasional terrorist attacks that were the trademark of al-Qaida. Contrary to the expectations of Osama bin Laden, who advocated a degree of gradualism, the extreme violence exercised by Islamic State appeared to have a great appeal: it serves as a form of empowerment which offers the last the chance to become the first. And, as said before, the revival of the caliphate created in their eyes a world historical momentum that produced a sense of ‘do not miss the boat’ among those willing to believe.

Simultaneously, the Islamic State is in its apocalyptic appearance a superlative compared to previous manifestations of violent End Times beliefs. Where earlier apocalyptic movements believed that the New Jerusalem would take place in their own environment (Münster, London, etc.), attention is now focused upon the real Jerusalem. While previous apocalyptists could only dream of the actual destruction of the world, the apocalyptists of IS have come a a few steps closer to making this dream come true. Experimenting with poison gas attacks is an ominous portent, but it is nuclear arms that are the ideal weapon in the romantic apocalyptic imagination, having the flash, the bang and the destruction that one would associate with the End of Times. It is a pressing question how long the usage of weapons of mass destruction will remain out of reach for apocalyptists. A somber lesson from the past anyway is that the opponents of apocalyptists also often acted with considerable violence, whether provoked or not. This raises the specter of Western interventions on the ground, in Syria, Iraq, Lybia or elsewhere, where IS or its affilates hold sway.

The alternative is to lay a cordon sanitaire around the new caliphate, with all the consequences for those millions of people who abide therein against their will. That does not provide a very pleasant prospect for them, as IS as the umpteenth apocalyptic movement in history demonstrates that what begins as a call for justice easily degenerates into the very opposite.
About the Author: Bob de Graaff is Professor of Intelligence and Security Studies at the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda and at Utrecht University. From 2007 to 2009 he was Professor of Terrorism and Counterterrorism at the Campus The Hague of Leiden University, where he founded the Center for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC).

Notes
III. Special Correspondences

Watchlisting
by Kenneth Duncan

Abstract

Watchlists have become a vital component of any country's counterterrorism strategy. As first developed over three decades ago in the United States by a far-sighted analyst in the Department of State, watchlisting functioned primarily as a means enabling all-source intelligence to be used for the purpose of excluding terrorists and others from entering US national territory. Today with the rise of domestic terrorists, such watchlists must be inclusive of all potential and real terrorists, including those from the growing category of every country's own citizens.

Keywords: watchlisting; watchlists; TIPOFF; terrorist lookout systems; intelligence sharing; profiling

In early 2016, the Dutch government, when holding the rotating chair of the European Union, noted that the absence of common standards between EU governments diminished the impact of information sharing and this in turn undermined the effectiveness of the EU's terrorist watchlist.[1] As a remedy for this situation, the Dutch authorities proposed adopting 12 criteria under which EU member states would agree to share their information on terrorists with the help of a common watchlist. Agreeing with the Dutch conclusion, the UK government viewed the current situation as compromising British security by facilitating the travel of terrorists.[2]

Before we are too critical of the EU’s problem, however, we should remember that in today’s world sovereignty still matters. Individual states within and outside the European Union are entitled to approach the definition of terrorism from the perspective of their own history, policy, and legal systems. And so as the old cliché would have it one man’s terrorist is (still) another man’s freedom fighter or, to put it another way, it all depends upon which end of the gun you are looking at. For the current perspective we need look no further than the Kurds. To coalition forces fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria they are valued allies; to the Turks facing a renewed Kurdish bombing campaign against Turkish civilians and security forces they are terrorists. Indeed it was not too long ago that the EU itself was at odds with the US and Israel over whether to consider Hizballah a terrorist as well as a political organization. And during the Iran/Contra Affair of the 1980s, the US for too long refused to accept that the Iranian government with which it was negotiating the release of US citizens was actually controlling their Hizballah captors and was therefore a state-sponsor of terrorism.[3] In these cases the terms terrorism and terrorist were seen as pejoratives useful for condemning those organizations one opposed or labels to be avoided when the political consequences of too rigorous an application would compromise other diplomatic initiatives.

Yet even if we set aside this definitional question, there are other problems with watchlisting terrorists. To understand them in context, we must first look at how watchlisting works. Through an accident of professional employment, I have been acquainted with watchlisting ever since 1987 when an analyst in the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) created the US government's first all-source terrorist database (watchlist) to support the decision-making of consular visa officers overseas. One of the War on Terror's unsung heroes, John Arriza, first solved the problem of how to marshal the secret intelligence on terrorists held by US intelligence and law enforcement agencies in aid of consular officers overseas. Thanks to his efforts, from 1991 onwards US immigration officials at ports-of-entry were able to detect terrorists attempting to enter the US. And so over a decade before the 9/11 Commission highlighted the dysfunctional nature of intelligence sharing on terrorists and recommended the transformation of intelligence sharing from...
a ‘need-to-know’ to a ‘need-to-share’ basis, John Arriza had solved this problem.[4] In doing so his program, known as TIPOFF[5] grew from a shoebox holding index cards to an electronic database that contained 130,000 names and aliases contributed by 104 US government agencies as well as several foreign countries.

TIPOFF, like any watchlist, was actually a system involving three key functions:

(i) data collection on suspicious individuals;

(ii) the processing and storage of this data in a secure environment combined with a robust capability for finding individuals quickly and accurately; and

(iii) the sharing of results beyond the secret world of the intelligence community.

Each function is fraught with problems. To begin with, rarely in any system would all three of these functions be performed by the same agency and so underlying each function is the need for trust between and among the system’s component organizations—contributors, processors, and end users. Above all, contributors must trust that their sources and methods will be protected so that informants, technical systems, or ongoing operations will not be compromised. Paramount in protecting this information is a secure method of transmission, storage, and dissemination. Contributors must also have trust that their intelligence/information will only be disseminated and used with their permission. This is not only to protect sources and methods but also to ensure that ‘operational leads’ provided by one agency will not be ‘poached’ by another as can and does happen between competing law enforcement agencies at times or between intelligence and law enforcement agencies due to their differing agendas.

This trust must extend further so that even the declassified elements such as the names and related biographical information of terrorists will not be compromised by being made too widely or too openly available so that terrorist organizations would be alerted when the identity, aliases, or affiliation of their members were known. There must be trust too that the irreducible risks in providing this intelligence/information is justified because the system will be able to detect and take action against the terrorists contained in its database while still protecting the secrets that underlie that action. Such trust is even more difficult to achieve when the sharing of this information is between states, for then there must be trust in the professional competence of each state’s respective services and that their security policies are in general alignment. What level of trust for sharing information on Hizballah terrorists, for example, could be placed in the Lebanese government when Hizballah itself was a member of that government?

TIPOFF was a trailblazer in all of these areas. Because TIPOFF was located in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR— one of the key elements of the US Intelligence Community), it had access to all-source intelligence as well as diplomatic reporting and open source material. TIPOFF was able to gain the cooperation of both intelligence and law enforcement agencies by adhering strictly to the principle that the originator retains control of the data it provided throughout the process. Yet even so cooperation was not automatic or seamless. Until the terrorist attacks of 9/11 highlighted the need to make terrorist watchlisting a priority in order to prevent future terrorist attacks from happening even at the risk of compromising sensitive information, TIPOFF had to rely upon the willing cooperation of providers such as CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, whose mission was to pre-empt, disrupt, and defeat terrorists, and the FBI, whose mission was to arrest and prosecute terrorists. For neither organization was watchlisting terrorists a core function and therefore neither was it a priority.[6] Rather, in pursuit of their specific agendas, most agencies were supported by their own databases; hence there was one for al Qa’ida, one for Hizballah, and another one for Hamas etc.

The history of Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Midhar, two of the terrorists who hijacked AA Flight 77, is illustrative of the pre 9/11 situation. CIA identified both terrorists in January 2001 when they were attending an al Qa’ida meeting in Malaysia. Yet their identities were not sent to TIPOFF for watchlisting until August
21, 2001. As a consequence al Midhar obtained a US visa at the US Consulate in Jeddah on June 13 and both entered the US in July.[7]

Nor at the time was TIPOFF intended to be a comprehensive list of all terrorists. This was because the purpose of any watchlist determines its composition. The purpose of a border-security watchlist, such as TIPOFF, obviously is to prevent terrorists from entering the US. Consequently, while TIPOFF did contain information on terrorists from all regions, it was not authorized to enter into its files US citizens or alien residents since both had a right to enter the US and, in any case, the Intelligence Community was not authorized to collect or store information on US citizens. Sharing terrorist information with other countries at that time also was conditioned by their own legal restrictions on the possession of data for their citizens as well as their differing definitions of terrorists and terrorism. Hence TIPOFF was not able to pass information on nationals of the receiving state, nor would that state pass information on US citizens to TIPOFF.

This limitation was not resolved until after the 9/11 attacks when TIPOFF’s successor system’s role was transformed from border-security into counter-terrorism.

Storage and retrieval of terrorists’ identities was and remains problematic too. Who to enter requires a template for managing the degree of certainty about an individual’s identity and activities. When John Arriza created TIPOFF, there was no such universal template for the USG. So he used definitions contained in the report of the Vice President’s (George H.W. Bush) Taskforce on Terrorism and that yielded three categories: reasonable suspicion, reasons to believe, and beyond reasonable doubt.

Reasonable suspicion was just that, a suspicion, and not considered grounds for action should the person trigger a ‘hit’ in the system. It was a placeholder until further information came along or for consular or immigration officers to ask for further proof of the person’s bona fides. Using this criterion, Hamadam al Shalawi was entered into TIPOFF after he twice attempted to enter the cockpit of America West flight 90 on 19 November 1999. This was sufficient to trigger a name check when he applied in Riyadh to renter the US on 5 August 2001. His visa was denied on 7 September 2001. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the FBI suspected that this was a dry run for the 9/11 attacks.[8] Reason to believe was based upon a higher standard and in visa application cases probably would be sufficient to deny the person a visa. Proof beyond reasonable doubt could take many forms, including conviction for terrorist offences, known membership in a terrorist organization, direct evidence of fundraising or recruiting for terrorist organizations, or inciting terrorist attacks.

Aliases are an obvious problem but one that is relatively straightforward: you either know them and the true identity behind a name or you do not. Naming conventions differ by region, custom, culture, and religion and are far more complex. The popularity of certain names such as Mohammed for Muslims or Jesus and Maria for Hispanic Christians can make finding the one from many difficult; a problem compounded when some cultures can only use one name as occurs in Afghanistan. Hispanic patronymic and matronymic conventions are another problem. Equally troublesome is sorting through various versions of anglicised names from Persian, Arabic, Chinese and many other languages – there are over 50 anglicized versions of Muammar Gaddafi for example. One solution employed by TIPOFF was an early computer algorithm that assigned numeric values to names to aid in sorting through this mire. Now we have biometrics coming increasingly to the fore as a means of fixing identities regardless of name confusion or aliases.

TIPOFF was able to put the highest levels of classified material at the service of border security by selectively declassifying only the minimum information necessary. Normally this was the name and sufficient identifying data to enable a consular or immigration officer to be aware that the USG held more information about the individual.[9] Even such limited information as this was only declassified and released with the approval of the agency that provided it. Likewise after a ‘hit’ was obtained, the providing agency always had to approve any further action based upon its classified information. Consular and immigration officers in the
field were instructed by Washington on what action to take but were not told the secret information on which these instructions were based.

In every case the TIPOFF system attached supporting documentation to each file. This was crucial because the highest classification level of the documentation established the classification level of the entire file. Such a precaution was essential in preventing the accidental disclosure of information about a terrorist that might compromise sources and methods. Electronic attachment of the documentation, when possible, also made the entire knowledge base immediately accessible and eliminated the risk of lost paper files. This documentation established which agencies were the ‘owners’ of that information and so needed to be contacted should the name trigger a ‘hit.’ This was absolutely essential when a suspected terrorist was standing before an immigration office at a US port of entry and TIPOFF needed to coordinate a positive identification and an immediate decision on his or her admissibility. This normally involved conversations with the agencies that had provided the documentation to obtain their permission and then releasing this information to an immigration supervisor who was cleared by the intelligence community to receive it. That immigration supervisor then instructed the port of entry on the disposition of the suspected terrorist.

TIPOFF today no longer exists. It and its functions were assimilated initially by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), later by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCC) and The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). But in its history, John Arriza and TIPOFF were confronted by and found solutions to problems that continue to affect such programs today. Its role has changed as a result of this assimilation. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that the threat was ubiquitous—terrorists could plan operations on one continent, fund them from resources obtained on another, and prepare and execute them on a third. To counter such a threat, a border-security watchlist was no longer sufficiently comprehensive. Counterterrorism watchlists now must be inclusive of all terrorists, including the growing category of every country’s own ‘homegrown’ terrorist citizens. The Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, as the current compendium of terrorists is known, now has over 25,000 US citizens among its 1.1 million entries. It is maintained by the NCC and used to populate the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Database and its No-Fly list.[10] Yet it still adds people to the list using categories, such as reasonable suspicion, pioneered by TIPOFF. And the broader mission is the same: to bring together all-source intelligence and use it to go after terrorists around the world.

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Notes
[2] Ibid.
[5] Not the least of John Arriza’s accomplishments was breaking with the annoying habit the US government and military have in reducing everything to an acronym. Refreshingly TIPOFF was not an acronym for anything; it was instead an apt descriptor of its mission.
[6] According to TIPOFF data, CIA and the State Department were the major contributors, followed by NSA. The FBI was the predominant law enforcement provider.
[7] The 9/11 Commission Report, op. cit (note 4); Chapter 8 details their travels and belated US efforts to catch them once they were in the US. See also History Commons – Complete 9/11 Timetable; URL: http://www.historycommons.org/project.jsp?project=911_project .
[8] The 9/11 Commission Report, op. cit., p. 521. – The FBI assessment was cited in footnote 60: “After the 9/11 attacks, FBI agents in Phoenix considered whether the incident was a ‘dry run’ for the attacks.”
[9] This information usually comprised the date and place of birth, nationality and passport number when known. More recently biometrical data are also used by the system.
Nobody Born a Terrorist, but Early Childhood Matters: Explaining the Jihadis’ Lack of Empathy

by Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin

Abstract

In the Qur'an, Allah is described as ‘merciful’ and ‘compassionate’. Why do we find no reflection of that among jihadis who claim to struggle in his name? Jihadis only possess a pseudo sense of empathy. They may appear to be empathic but it is a narcissistic empathy, for they are only empathic within their own group; it does not extend anywhere into their external world as evidenced by their murderous destructive behaviors.[1] Their stoic, dissociated affect shows neither compassion nor remorse as their fellow brethren engage in wanton beheadings and executions. In shame honor societies where children are humiliated and laughed at for having feelings and emotionality, it is no wonder that the capacity for empathy did not develop during their early years. Research by neuroscientists and mental health experts has shown strong links between violence and early childhood. The following observations seek to apply this perspective to jihadist terrorism.

Keywords: Terrorist personality; Profiling, Radicalization; Shame culture; Honor Killings; Autism; Empathy.

Introduction

There are many factors that can impede the development of real empathy in young people—genetic disorders, early disruptions in the child-mother bonding, trauma during stages of separation, environment issues, including pervasive shaming, brain development, epigenetics, etc. Much research still has to be done in these underlying aspects in order to gain a better understanding as to all the ingredients that result in empathy. Early traumatic experiences in children may contribute to abandonment and annihilation anxiety and terrors during their early years. Such experiences can have a crippling effect on them, leaving them riddled with persecutory anxiety, feeling that they are continually under attack as they grow into adulthood.

Through projective identification these children grow up with feelings of revenge. “Now it’s my turn to watch other people suffer the way I have!” This is the pattern by which they learn, in turn, to revenge against the world, to undertake jihad.

The jihadi wears many faces. Many are charming, warm, outgoing, and know how to embrace and invite people into their circle. Lurking behind that there might lie a raging violent man or woman ready to kill at a moment’s notice. Instead of bonding with people in warmth and kindness, they bond to people violently. After a terrorist attack, neighbors have described the perpetrator often as the ‘nice guy’ who lived next door. A jihadi might look normal—but so does a serial killer. In analyzing cultures, empathy or the lack thereof may be an early diagnostic tool to evaluate how risky some people might be to others when grown up.

Neuroscience has shown that empathy is acquired early in childhood by the age of one or two in the maternal attachment phase. The building blocks for morality are intimately related to the acquisition of empathy in these first years as well.[2] Indeed at the 16th Annual World Summit commemorating 9/11 sponsored by the International Institute for Counter Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel, the esteemed American counter terrorist expert Brian Jenkins told the attendees that neuroscientists can ascertain if a six month old baby will have problems with aggression and violence through brain imaging.[3] While this may sound like science fiction, it is not.
Autism, Shame Cultures and Honor Killings and their Possible Links to Terrorism

In 2010 Doïna Harap, the Montreal filmmaker, interviewed me for her documentary Body Language.[4] She also interviewed a series of specialists on autism, including Professor Marco Iacoboni of UCLA who has been credited with discovering mirror neurons for empathy in the human brain.[5] Faulty mirror neurons may be a contributing factor to autism. It is known that people who have autism lack empathy. Independent of the recent debate about the effects of mirror neurons, there is sufficient evidence that jihadis lack empathy. There are many parallels between autism and the jihadis.[6] Furthermore, the documentary Body Language explored the universality of nonverbal communication across cultures and demonstrated that we humans are more alike than we are different. Ninety-four percent of what we communicate is done nonverbally. Autism in particular demonstrates a breakdown in the facility to communicate and to be able to read and correctly interpret facial expression in particular. Professors Diego Gambetta and Steffan Hertog wrote a seminal paper entitled “The Engineers of Jihad” (which has recently been turned into a book) pointing to the role of schizoid autistic demeanor.[7]

Autism is a developmental disorder; it is not a psychopathology. Because of shame, both autism and mental illness are not subjects which are freely discussed in shame-honor cultures as it is too excruciatingly painful to air one’s dirty laundry in public.[8] Of course not all who are diagnosed with autism will become violent, nor does autism itself cause violence, but the biological underpinnings may dovetail in this developmental disorder. Mass shooters and other terrorists, not necessarily jihadis, have been diagnosed with high functioning autism such as Chou of Virginia Tech, John Zawahri of Santa Monica, Breivik of Norway, the Unabomber—they all inextricably bonded violently to people.

In addition, the FBI has estimated that close to 60% of jihadis have had an encounter with law enforcement concerning domestic violence prior to engaging in terrorism. Indeed, in a report by the Center for Social Cohesion in the United Kingdom it was found that in areas where there were jihadis, there was also domestic violence.[9] The list is too long to quote here, but think of Tsarnaev (Boston Marathon), Mateen (Orlando), Bouhlel (Nice), and Rahami (New York) for starters. There is a significant body of literature concerning domestic violence and the perpetrator’s lack of empathy.[10]

Also to be considered is an underlying propensity toward aggression and violence, which may erupt later during adolescent development among those who have been diagnosed with autism. This is in line with jihadis’ lack of empathy as they are acting out their aggression and rage in the form of revenge. Their confused states between fantasy and reality, contribute to impaired thinking. It is as if they spill out their chaotic violent psycho-sexual internal world into the real world through their acts of terrorism, while justifying it under the banner of a political strategic agenda.

One factor to explore is whether jihadis missed a significant developmental step in early childhood—play. In shame honor cultures without sufficient opportunities to play and express one’s self freely in a relaxed, shame free environment a child cannot develop optimally as he or she might. Certain human needs are portrayed as dirty and toxic and therefore must be evacuated, projected externally on to a scapegoat in order to purify oneself. Think of all the ideologies concerning purification. There are many barriers for a child to get his/her needs met in a healthy way in a shame honor culture where children are treated as objects without empathy and in turn they grow up at all too young an age. Later they risk becoming dysfunctional parents and treat their children how they were treated—as mere objects. We, as the targets of jihadi attacks, are nothing more than objects to them. We are not real people with needs, wants and desires. This marks the hallmark of the lack of collective empathy.

Shame honor cultures are highly enmeshed with the absence of personal, individual boundaries. The individual virtually is small to non-existent, becoming submerged by a group-think, a herd-like mentality that becomes dominant. The group self is more important than the individual self.
It should also not be forgotten that the devalued female in a shame honor culture grows up under the threat of death—the honor killing. This is not exactly conducive to stress free living. She is flooded with stress hormones. Yet the devalued, abused female is the one who influences brain development of the baby in utero and after birth to age two—a period when the baby’s brain quadruples in size. The mother is the cultural interpreter for the infant and intelligence is passed on to the next generation mainly through the mother’s genes. Mothers therefore need to be treated in the most optimal manner.[11] This is not to blame the female but to understand the dynamics in which she is culturally trapped. In shame honor cultures the devalued female only gains honor when she has her first male baby to whom she is psychologically wedded. As the source of her “honor,” the male baby is objectified. However he has his own needs and one of them is not to be tethered to her for life just because he is her object of honor. There are indications that the intergenerational transmission of trauma occurs routinely in shame honor cultures.

Pryce Jones described shame honor entities like the tribe, the qabil, the hamula, the clan, and the Chechen teip as closed circles.[12] I would add that such closed circles are psychologically suffocating, and that is why jihadis scream for liberation.[13] While the Prophet Muhammad himself attempted to move beyond the tribe through his strategy of brothering [14], Islam has never really managed to move beyond tribal thinking.[15] As for the converts to Islam who radicalize, I have noted elsewhere, that we in the West also have pockets of shamed honor families—such as single mother families with absent (or polygamous) fathers.[16] In family homes such as these, children are more frequently manipulated and abused. They are not empathically responded to. Hence they do not know nor have ever learned what empathy is. They have been treated like objects.

Is it realistic to expect counter terrorist experts to have the time to study neuroscience, hormone shifts, brain development, depth psychology, maternal attachment, child rearing practices and early childhood development let alone learn the specific languages of each culture? It is a tall order and unrealistic. Yet analysts can be open to entertaining the idea that what goes on behind closed doors in a family when the baby is carried in utero and through the first three years of life establishes the personality of the fledgling child. Early childhood development needs to be factored into the equation concerning the “jihadi-in-the-making”. To grow up in a pervasively shaming environment it is as if its cultural practitioners have implanted a psychological IED (Improvised Explosive Device) in the soul of a child, which then detonates years later under the right configuration of stressors, which we have come to call ‘radicalization’. The prologue to violence is early childhood.[17] This is not disputed by neuroscientists nor by mental health experts. It might be time that some of those involved in terrorism prevention also start paying attention to this link.

Conclusion

Much research still needs to be done in the field of counter terrorism as it is a broad, complex interdisciplinary endeavor. Perhaps it is time to make room for a subfield within counter terrorism dedicated to exploring and researching early childhood development for the jihadi. Such an interdisciplinary endeavor can only be enriching to our task at hand—how to identify and stop the violence, and how to make earlier interventions. Some may wish to argue that child development should have no place in counter terrorism studies as a child is not yet politically motivated to carry out an attack. However, we have had child suicide bombers, child soldiers and now we have the Cubs of the Caliphate. Nevertheless, there is no need to redefine what political terrorism (with all its myriad of definitions) is. Rather a case ought to be made to examine and investigate the interlocking links of all kinds of violence, some of which feed into political terrorism of the kind propagated by the Islamic State that reverse our value system—what is good is bad and what is bad is good.[18] This might be partly due to the fact that as children, these jihadis never developed empathy. Because of that they are cognitively impaired. By understanding the roots of the jihadis’ lack of empathy, we might just get closer to dismantling ticking human bombs before they detonate.[19]
Fühlung: feeling, coined 1858 by the German philosopher Rudolf Lotze as a translation of the Greek empathêia by the root symbol to facilitate thinking about the word’s history and cultural context out of which it arose: “the feeling that one understands and shares another person’s experiences and emotions; the ability to share someone else’s feelings.” The fourth prong for empathy is my “translation,” so to speak, about how empathy and the lack thereof appear in jihadi culture and its mentality. This fourth prong is introduced by the symbol of two crossed swords representing the violence of jihadi’s qital. – See: N. Hartveelt Kobrin. The Jihadi Dictionary: The Essential Intel Tool, for Military, Police, Governmental Agencies and Concerned Citizens. (Mamaroneck, NJ: MultiEducator Press, 2016), p. 86.

Notes
[1] In my recently published The Jihadi Dictionary: The Essential Intel Tool, for Military, Police, Governmental Agencies and Concerned Citizens, I offered a four pronged entry for the word “empathy”. The first prong is a standard dictionary definition, in this case from Webster’s Dictionary: “the feeling that one understands and shares another person’s experiences and emotions; the ability to share someone else’s feelings.” The second prong gives a brief etymology of empathy introduced by the root symbol to facilitate thinking about the word’s history and cultural context out of which it arose: V 1908, modeled on German Einfühlung from Ein: in + Fühlung: feeling, coined 1858 by the German philosopher Rudolf Lotze as a translation of the Greek word empathy, passionate, state of emotion. The third prong is a professional psychological definition introduced by the word of two crossed swords representing the violence of jihadi’s qital. – See: N. Hartveelt Kobrin. The Jihadi Dictionary: The Essential Intel Tool, for Military, Police, Governmental Agencies and Concerned Citizens. (Mamaroneck, NJ: MultiEducator Press, 2016), p. 86.


[18] The term ‘reverse superego’ was coined by Joan Lachkar, Ph.D. See my entry for it in the Jihadi Dictionary, p. 212. It is striking how this idea that there existed people who twisted morality around is recorded in the Bible: “Woe unto them that call good evil and evil good; that change darkness into light and light into darkness.” Isaiah 5:20.

IV. Resources

Bibliography: Terrorism and the Media (including the Internet) (Part 3)

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[ Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism - BSPT-JT-2016-5 ]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the multi-faceted relationship between terrorism and the media, including social media and the Internet. To keep up with the rapidly changing media landscape (particularly social media) and the technological developments in the online environment, more recent publications have been prioritized during the selection process. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography; resources, literature; media; Internet; social media; terrorism; electronic jihad; cyberterrorism; narratives; counter-narratives

NB: All websites were last visited on 17.09.2016. This subject bibliography is conceptualized as a multi-part series (for earlier bibliographies, see: Part 1 and Part 2). To avoid duplication, this compilation only includes literature not contained in the previous parts. However, meta-resources, such as bibliographies, were also included in the sequels.–See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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### Grey Literature


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**Note for the Reader**

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to
the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

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V. Reviews

Counterterrorism Bookshelf:
36 Books on Terrorism & Counterterrorism-Related Subjects

This column consists of capsule reviews of books from various publishers.

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai


This study examines the dissemination via the Internet of psychological and cultural identity themes across Taliban texts in four languages: English, Arabic, Dari, and Urdu. The selected texts are then classified according to five domains: channels of communication, leadership hierarchy, identity of members, organizational ideology, and targeted enemies. Following the introductory chapter on the Taliban’s virtual emirate’s channels of communication, this methodological approach is applied to cover topics in the virtual emirate such as Mullah Omar’s leadership, advocacy of jihad, and approach to international relations. The author concludes that this methodological framework “can be applied to analyze other militant organizations that mobilize religious meanings to incite violence, such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.” (p. 147) The author is an assistant professor of clinical psychiatry at Columbia University.


This is a comprehensive examination of al Qaida during the period of 1989 to 2013—before it was eclipsed by the Islamic State as the most of the global jihadi terrorist groups. This account is guided by a series of research questions such as is there an “official tie” between al Qaida central and its worldwide adherents, is the Internet replacing al Qaida central in command and control, what is the cost to the international community in countering al Qaida, what measures can be used to effectively counter al Qaida, and what new trends are emerging to reshape al Qaida. To accomplish this purpose, the volume’s chapters examine al Qaida’s origins and ideology, funding, marketing and recruiting, the role of the Internet in ‘personalizing’ terrorism, Yemen and al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al Qaida in Iraq and Syria, and al Qaida in North Africa. The authors conclude that “Foreign fighters are the growth area of al Qaeda,” (p. 162) that intelligence and law enforcement are crucial instruments in countering al Qaida (p. 163) and that “droning” the leaders of al Qaeda will not eliminate the threat.” (p. 169) One might disagree, however, with the authors’ conclusion, that while “al Qaeda uses Islam as a tool to achieve its goals. We in the West are realistically hampered from having any semblance of trying to manipulate Islam to solve the terrorism problem,” (p. 172) since the root causes underlying al Qaida’s insurgency are much more complicated than a matter of merely ‘enlightening’ their adherents on the merits of a ‘true’ Islam. Denis Baken is a retired U.S. Army Colonel with a PhD in Biodefense studies. Ioannis Mantzikos, at the time of the book’s writing was a doctoral candidate at the University of the Free State in South Africa.

This is a comprehensive historical atlas of the Middle East consisting of full-color maps that are accompanied by commentary that explain and visualize the origins and evolution of the conflicts that characterize the region in contemporary times. Beginning with an introductory overview and a chapter on the geography of the Middle East, the volume's chapters cover the region's conflicts beginning in ancient times, the Biblical interlude, the European intervention in the 18th century, the period of the First World War, and the interwar years leading to the Second World War. The final part covers the various Arab-Israeli Wars, religious and ethnic regional fault lines, the 1990-1991 and 2003-2011 Gulf Wars and the Arab Spring. Ian Barnes is Emeritus Chair in the Department of History and International Studies at the University of Derby, UK. Malise Ruthven is a former editor with the BBC Arabic Service and World Service in London.


This edited volume is an important contribution to the literature on countering terrorist financing from an operational military- and intelligence-based counterterrorism approach. As explained in the introductory chapter by J. Edward Conway, the book's co-editor, “This volume traces what works and what does not when counter threat finance analysis transitions from spreadsheets, slide presentations and link charts to operations on the battlefield across Iraq and Afghanistan.” (p. 2) As such, it is intended to serve as an overview and tool kit of methodologies that analysts can use in their countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) work, whether at military or civilian agencies. The volume is informally divided into four parts, with each discussing a different aspect of this topic. The first part discusses the bureaucratic and strategic challenges facing an analyst in an operational military environment. Its chapters discuss the bureaucratic challenges inherent in intelligence collection (including CFT) and the frictions between CFT within the framework of counterinsurgency. The second part focuses on “problem setting,” which is described as the designing the methodologies to counter the threat finance environment. Its chapters discuss the issues involved in estimating the cost of terrorist operations, including salary payments and financing their supply chain. The third part focuses on the planning phase of CFT operations, which is termed the “problem solving” phase. Its chapters discuss the utilization of methodologies and tools such as social network analysis (SNA), Influence Network Modeling (INM), and Multi-Objective Decision Analysis (MODA) to create databases about a terrorist group's finances and financial networks. The fourth and final part synthesizes the previous sections with a discussion of the role of CFT in an overall military counterterrorism campaign's components of “manhunting, of financial sanctions like E.O. 13224, as well as other options like information operations, human intelligence source recruitment, and in some cases, the tough decision to realize when doing nothing might be the best call.” (p. 12) The volume's editors and contributors had worked on CFT issues while serving in the U.S. military or as civilians in a supporting capacity.


This is an insightful and balanced account of how supposedly intractable and largely internal conflicts over sovereignty can be resolved through various conflict resolution methods such as third-party intervention. The types of third-party engagement can range, the author explains, from “low-key facilitation to direct intervention.” (p. 3) The author’s conceptual framework is then applied to the cases of Sri Lanka, Cyprus, Bosnia, Kashmir, and Israel and Palestine. In this cases, the identity of the third-parties included Norway (Sri Lanka), United Nations (Cyprus), United States (Israel and Palestine), with American leverage used in
Bosnia. In the Kashmir conflict, however, it has remained unresolved because, as the author points out, “The UN long ago became irrelevant to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.” (p. 200) For long-term conflict resolution to take hold, the author adds, a “relatively fast track” is required because “the prospects of peace are not necessarily well served by the incremental approach that emphasizes gradual, piecemeal progress and prioritizes less contentious issues over the more fundamental issues that divide the antagonists.” (p. 302)

The author is Professor of International and Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science.


This is an account of the factors required for nonviolent resistance campaigns to succeed and the reasons why they are likely to be more effective than terrorism in achieving a dissident movement’s objectives. As the authors write, “Our central argument is that nonviolent campaigns have a participation advantage over violent insurgencies, which is an important factor in determining campaign outcomes.” (p. 10) The level of participation in such opposition movements is a key factor, the authors find, because “Higher levels of participation contribute to a number of mechanisms necessary for success, including enhanced resilience, high probabilities of tactical innovation, expanded civic disruption (thereby raising the costs to the regime of maintaining the status quo), and loyalty shifts involving the opponent’s erstwhile supporters, including members of the security forces.” (p. 10) This conceptual framework is then applied to examining examples where nonviolent civil resistance succeeded in the cases of the Iranian Revolution (1977-1979), the first Palestinian intifada (1987-1992), and the Philippine People Power Movement (1983-1986), and a case where it failed, the Burmese uprising (1988-1990) Although one may argue that the Palestinian intifada was not entirely ‘nonviolent’ and that it was its violent nature that actually produced a ‘hurting stalemate’ that forced Israel to use conciliation to address the conflict’s root causes – the authors’ general argument is well grounded. An Epilogue provides an update on the effectiveness of Arab Spring’s nonviolent resistance campaign in overthrowing several Arab governments in Egypt and Tunisia. Numerous tables and figures provide data collected by the authors that provide empirical evidence for the validity of their conceptual framework. Dr. Chenoweth is Professor and Associate Dean for Research at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. Dr. Stephan is a senior policy fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, both in Washington, DC.


This is an important account of how terrorist groups fund their operational and organizational capabilities and the counter measures required to disrupt and dismantle their activities and infrastructure. The introductory chapter presents the author’s analytical framework which discusses two types of economies used by terrorist groups to fund their activities. These consist of a ‘gray economy,’ “a combination of licit and illicit activities” used by terrorist and insurgent groups, which focuses on “diaspora support, charities, fraud, legal businesses, and money laundering,” (p. 3) and a ‘dark economy,’ consisting of kidnapping for ransom (KFR), armed robbery and theft, smuggling, trafficking and counterfeiting, extortion and protection payments, and external state support. Also valuable is the author’s discussion of the operational capabilities that characterize effective terrorist groups, which include weapons, intelligence, sanctuary, and training, as well as the requirements for effective organizational capabilities in terms of leadership, ideology, human resources and recruitment, and media, public relations, propaganda, and publicity. Thus, an effective countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) campaign is intended to disrupt and dismantle their financial component which
will impact the effectiveness of a group’s overall operational and organizational capabilities. This conceptual framework is then applied to assessing how the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Lebanese Hizballah, the Palestinian Hamas, the Afghan Taliban, al Qaida, and the Islamic State (of Syria and Iraq), use the gray and dark economies to fund their terrorist activities. The concluding chapter discusses the components of effective counter measures as well as issues for future study, such as emerging trends, such as the increasing use of virtual currencies and Bitcoin. The author is an Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation.


This well-written account charts the violent civil wars in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya through the author’s diaries and writings produced between 2001 and 2015. As a result, the book’s numerous chapters are relatively short. Egypt is not covered, the author explains, because “it is not at war,” while being involved in a brutal conflict with “growing guerrilla violence.” (p. 5) The author concludes that “The demons released by this age of chaos and war in the Middle East have become an unstoppable force.” (p. 434) The author is a Middle East correspondent for the London-based *Independent* newspaper, and has written several award-winning books.


This is an interesting account of what the author terms “the marketplace of ideas about the future” and the experts who produce scenarios, predictions and credit ratings about countries’ political and financial stabilities. The author begins his account by defining prediction as intended to “inform us about the occurrence of a future event by situating it in both space and time.” (p. 6) Forecasting, on the other hand, is a “broader category” that “subsumes the various registers of analysis of possible futures (predictions, constructing scenarios, projections, diagnoses, etc.).” (p. 6) It is important to understand “the fabric of the world’s possible futures,” the author writes, because it “informs us about how we react to political change.” (p. 13) The problem with the way “wonks,” scholars and pundits at various research institutes engage in predicting global political futures, the author argues, is that their predictions tend to confirm the policies of the establishments that support them and underplay in their warning agendas significant issues such as the future of democracy or epidemics around the world in favor of security, defense, and terrorism topics (p. 115), thereby resisting “the desire to know, ultimately showing its ambivalence. We protect this covered secret in its unknown state and do not want to see it unveiled.” (p. 194) However, there are numerous early warning methodologies that are not discussed in this account that attempt to predict the imminence of humanitarian disasters, the emergence of new weak and failed states, and forecast likely terrorist warfare (e.g., whether a terrorist groups is likely to embark on a highly destructive weapons of mass destruction warfare), making this account incomplete and polemical. The author is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and a Research Professor at CERI-Sciences Po in Paris, France.


This is an insightful and important argument by a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General and academic “for a new addition to the *jus in bello* component of just war theory.” (p. 3) The term *jus in bello* concerns whether a war is being conducted justly. The “current theory is deficient,” the author argues, because “It omits a major part of the conduct of war” – which involves more than the tactical component of fighting.” (p. 3) As the
author explains, “War is also conducted at the strategic level, the level at which senior political and military leaders set war aims, identify strategies and policies, approve the military and nonmilitary campaigns necessary to achieve those war aims, and establish the coordinative bodies necessary to translate plans into actions and adapt as the vagaries of war unfold. This strategic level of war has a direct effect on how a war is fought, how long it lasts, and whether the lives used and risked are used well and risked appropriately. Yet few—if any—accounts of jus in bello include it.” (pp. 3-4)

Following a discussion of the effectiveness, and, at times, lack of effectiveness, in the way American military campaigns were waged at the strategic level in the American civil war and in the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (with the latter wars drawing on the author’s command-level involvement in waging those wars), his recommendations for conducting wars justly are worth noting. These consist of seven principals: 1) making the best decisions possible concerning war aims and strategies, 2) adapting initial decisions as the dynamics of war unfold, 3) raising and allocating forces, resources, and funds required to achieve those aims, 4) engaging in adequate diplomacy, 5) ensuring the legitimacy of the war, including maintaining public support, 6) getting the military and nonmilitary agencies in government to work in a coordinated fashion to execute strategies and polices that attain war aims, and 7) establishing mechanisms that facilitate effective dialogue, decision making, action and adaptation to address changing circumstances. (pp. 174-175) The author concludes that these principals provide to just war theory “not a final answer, but another step toward a more complete understanding of jus in bello.” (p. 177) To this one can add that these seven principals are also especially relevant to the formulation of “just” and effective combating terrorism campaigns.

Lieutenant General James Dubik, US Army (Retired), is Professor of the Practice and Director of Teaching at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program, Washington, DC.


An authoritative and detailed account by an academic expert on Russia of the terrorist-related events from May to September 1999 that ultimately led to Russia’s invasion of Chechnya. This was highlighted by two supposedly terrorist bombings in Moscow on September 9 and 13, 1999, in which 224 people were killed, which were used as the justification for Russia’s intervention in Chechnya. In the postscript to the book’s 2014 edition, the author writes that “the available evidence points to a crucial role [in organizing the two terrorist bombings] having been played by the Russian special services….It seems unlikely that General Nikolai Patrushev would have authorized such risky acts without having received some form of approval from his superior, Vladimir Putin.” (p. 260) The author is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University.


An interesting account by a veteran American journalist, with first-hand reporting from Syria and other Middle Eastern countries, of the Syrian civil war. To provide a wider context for understanding current developments, the book’s chapters cover topics such as the history of Syria from the 19th century until 1946 when it gained independence, the period of 1947 to 2011, which the author terms as “wars and coups – then the Assads arrive” (with Assad family rule over the country beginning in 1971), and the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. Readers will benefit from the author’s portrayal of the various players in the civil war, beginning with the factions that support Assad; why Iran backs the Syrian government; the roles of the Kurds, al Qaida and the Islamic State (IS) in the civil war; the interplay between Israel, the Palestinians, and Syria, and the roles of the United States, Russia and other foreign powers in the civil war. In the Epilogue, the author writes
that “For his part, Assad stays in power as the lesser evil, not because of popular support for his policies. Many Alawites, Shia Muslims, Christians, and other Syrians back him in hopes he can defeat the extremist threat.” (p. 249)


The contributors to this edited volume utilize multidisciplinary approaches to examine the issues involved in the application of international law in the aftermath of 9/11 to the challenges presented by non-state actors such as terrorist groups as they have played out in the counterterrorism experiences of the United States, Israel, and Colombia. Specific issues are also examined, such as guerrilla-combatants and the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention, problems inherent in contemporary humanitarian law, the Israeli experience in targeted killings, challenges presented by the U.S.’s Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), terrorism-related adjudication, problems and contradictions in the Goldstone Report on the Israeli military campaign against Hamas in Gaza in 2008-09, problems in applying human rights law in responding to terrorism, and future trends in the law of armed conflict (LOAC). Dr. Ford is senior fellow and Director of the Center for Technology and Global Security at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, and Dr. Cohen is senior lecturer with the faculty of law at Ono Academic College in Israel.


This textbook presents a comprehensive approach to analyzing the components of effective counterterrorism (CT). As discussed by James Forest, the volume's editor (and this journal's co-editor), this textbook's objective is “to help educate future counterterrorism professionals enrolled in university courses and training programs.” (p. ix) This is accomplished through the volume's contributors who are a mix of academics and [former] government practitioners. The textbook is divided into three parts, beginning with Dr. Forest's introductory chapter, which presents an overview of counterterrorism studies, including drawing lessons from the history of counterterrorism over the years. In what is intended as the textbook's chapters' organizing topical structure, Dr. Forest discusses the seven components of effective counterterrorism which need to be implemented in an integrated manner: military, intelligence, diplomacy, information and public diplomacy, economics, financial, and law enforcement. In his concluding section, he notes that another important component of counterterrorism is the capability to bring about terrorists’ disengagement from terrorism as well as an overall termination of a terrorist group's activities.

This framework is then applied in the textbook’s first part, on policy and strategy in counterterrorism (with chapters on CT in liberal democracies, the geographic dimension of CT, combating state sponsors of terrorism, countering terrorist finance, and countering organized criminal networks and terrorism). The second part, on CT’s tactical and operational dimensions, includes chapters on the role of intelligence in CT, the U.S. Government's CT’s research and development programs, and employing civil-military relations to deny terrorists sanctuary. The third part presents case studies on CT, with chapters on countering terrorism in Peru, Colombia, Italy and the Red Brigades, West Germany’s Red Army Faction, the role of democratization in reducing the appeal of extremist groups in the Middle East and North Africa following the Arab Spring, India’s response to terrorism in Kashmir, the U.S. CT campaign to capture Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (al Qaida’s operational mastermind), and Spain’s CT campaign against its domestic jihadists.

With these chapters generally well-informed, this reviewer questions the claim by Francesco Cavatorta, the author of the chapter on democratization in reducing extremism in the Middle East and North Africa, that
“The inability of the United States and Europe to accept Islamist parties and movements thus far as potential democratic actors has fundamentally undermined the international efforts to encourage democracy,” (p. 351) when, in fact, it is the local elites that are more secular who refuse to accept their strict religious authoritarianism, as was the case with the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi’s government in Egypt. The textbook is sufficiently comprehensive in its scope, but it could have benefited from additional chapters on important CT cases, such as the cases of Israel and the Palestinians, Britain and its jihadi homegrown terrorists, and Russia and the Islamist insurgency in Chechnya. Finally, although this topic is addressed in the editor’s introductory chapter, a separate chapter on countering terrorism on the Internet should have been included because of its critical utilization by terrorist groups in their activities and warfare. The editor is Professor and Director of Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts Lowell and a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University.


This book is about what the author argues have been during and after the colonial age “the violent processes of political modernity in Algeria and the violent practices—physical, textual, and symbolic—that have been inflicted on Algeria and its people.” (p. 10) The author adds that such violence by the French colonial rulers, which “was both physical and textual,” continued “to endure in [Algeria’s] post-independence era,” and “is highlighted through examples that show how the processes of producing knowledge, undertaken by the [French] army in the midst of conquests, were violent.” (p. 14) In the Epilogue the author concludes that “The culture of colonial modernity continues to generate events in the present, other transformations notwithstanding.” (p. 226) While not everyone will agree with such an interpretation of the cultural and intellectual impact of the French intervention in Algeria, the author’s understanding of the nature of the resistance to Western secular influences by Muslim populations is worth noting. The author teaches anthropology and African Studies at the University of Kansas.


As explained by the volume’s editors, its contributors attempt to answer the following questions: “how is al-Qaeda known? What version of it emerges as a result of various discursive processes of trying to make sense of out what appeared to be a senseless act and out of the terrorist campaign that followed it, and what are the political consequences of these different interpretations of what al-Qaeda is?” (p. 2) To examine these issues, including the implications of al Qaida’s 9/11 attacks, the contributors apply Jacques Derrida’s definition of such an ‘event’ “as an act of historic proportions that resists immediate subsumption under a given structure of meaning, law, or truth…[because] This ‘meaninglessness’ of 9/11 does not stem from any metaphysical or transcendental quality of the act itself. Rather, it emanates from the difficulty, if not impossibility of making sense of it by means of traditional Western concepts of politics and the Political.” (p. 2) With additional statements such as by Andreas Behnke, the volume’s co-editor, in his chapter on “Fear as Sovereign Strategy and the Popular Tactics of Laughter,” that “the experience of ‘terror’ is therefore tied to the emulation of fear-inducing strategies by the state that wrests the governmentality of fear from the terrorists and reinstates it under the auspices of the extant sovereign,” (p. 101) and with Alan Cromartie writing in the “Afterword: Knowing Knowing al-Qaeda” that “The idea that al-Qaeda is a pathology – that it defies a rational reconstruction – has handed the problem over to closed subdisciplines of the type that are examined in these pages,” (p. 171) readers should judge for themselves whether they accept such alternative interpretations of reality about al Qaida and its attacks. At the time of this book’s publication, both co-editors were Lecturers in the Department of Politics at the University of Reading, UK.

A controversial account by a prominent American investigative journalist in which he argues, among other claims, that in obtaining the necessary intelligence to locate and kill Usama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, Pakistani intelligence had long known of bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad and that it was a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer who had betrayed this secret to the CIA, as opposed to White House claims that his whereabouts were revealed by covertly tracking his couriers. (p. 15) In the book's second half, the author critiques the contradictory nature of U.S. policy towards toppling the Assad regime and maintaining its relations with Turkey.


This book is the published proceedings of a conference held in April 2000 that was co-organized by the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) and the RAND Corporation. The conference's purpose was to review past and future trends in terrorism, as they were perceived at the time. The presented papers were then published in 2001 as a special issue of the journal *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, which is edited by Bruce Hoffman, one of this volume's co-editors. This volume was re-issued in 2015 as part of the publisher's re-issuance of important books that have been published over the past several decades. As such, the papers published in this volume are valuable in shedding light on what were considered to be current and future trends in terrorist warfare at the time. The contributors to this volume (which lacks a table of contents) include Brian Michael Jenkins (“Terrorism and Beyond: a 21st Century Perspective”), Martha Crenshaw (“Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process”), Ami Pedahzur (“Struggling with the Challenge of Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism within Democratic Boundaries: A Comparative Analysis”), Jean-Francois Mayer (“Cults, Violence and Religious Terrorism: An International Perspective”), Alison Jamieson (“Transnational Organized Crime: A European Perspective”), John V. Parachini (“Comparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving Conventional and Unconventional Weapons”), David Veness (“Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An International Perspective”), and Bruce Hoffman (“Change and Continuity in Terrorism”).


This is a comprehensive and balanced account of the origins and evolution of the Palestinian Hamas, which today governs the Gaza Strip and is a major primary resistance movement in the regions where the Palestinian Authority governs in the West Bank. The book's chapters cover topics such as its historical origins as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, its past and current leaders, its Islamist ideology, its political engagement in either joining or boycotting Palestinian politics (including its participation and victory in the 2006 elections), the nature of its governance in the Gaza Strip, the structure of its military arm and its battles with Israel, and its Middle Eastern allies and adversaries (such as Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Syria and Iran). The concluding chapter discusses future trends affecting Hamas. The author rightfully concludes that “It is only through seeing Hamas as a three-dimensional organization full of contradictions and possibilities that we put ourselves in a position to deal effectively with…[its] impact.” (p. 147) The author is an Associate Professor at the Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.

This is a polemical account of what the author terms “the relationship between American power and the production of knowledge and expertise over the past century” in which the study of the Middle East has been “constructed and reified” by “scholars, policymakers, and governmental and nongovernmental institutions” that have been funded to reflect and advance U.S. foreign policy and national security interests in the Middle East. (p. 3) To demonstrate his thesis, the author examines how the American foreign policy establishment has supported writings and publications about the Middle East from 1917 to the current period, including what he describes as establishing “Cold War Universities” in the Middle East during the period of 1922 to 1962. Of particular interest to terrorism and counterterrorism studies is the author’s discussion, which is superficial and incomplete, of what he terms the “rise of terrorism studies” in the aftermath of the June 1967 Six Day War, in which the Nixon Administration funded studies and conferences on terrorism that promoted “Washington’s burgeoning counterterrorism relationship with Israel…on display at the Jonathan Institute’s July 1979 conference on terrorism.” (p. 228) In a section on “Terror Studies and 9/11,” the author discusses the U.S. Government’s funding of research on these issues, including the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) funding, beginning in 2003, of twelve university-based “centers of excellence” on terrorism and counterterrorism studies, including the University of Maryland’s START program. (p. 279) The post 9/11 account, as well, is superficial and does not demonstrate an acute understanding of the nature of studies carried out by academic institutions and research institutes on these issues. In the book’s Epilogue, the author discusses the state of Middle East studies in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The author is Assistant Professor of U.S. and Middle East History at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.


This is an excellent and conceptually innovative examination of the role of state sponsorship of terrorism within the larger context of states’ third party intervention (TPI) in other nations’ conflicts, including those that are intrastate or interstate. Several research questions guide the study, such as the conditions under which governments decide to support terrorist organizations, how such governments manage their sponsorship of terrorist groups, “particularly in comparison to interstate alliance politics,” (p. 30) and “How can variations in sponsorship policy be explained?” (p. 237) To accomplish this research design, the book’s chapters cover topics such as the state of research on these issues; defining state sponsorship of terrorism within the context of ‘realist’ and ‘neoclassical realist’ alliance theories; and applying independent (i.e., systemic incentives for alliance behavior), conditional (i.e., domestic politics), and dependent (sponsorship commitment in terms of hosting, military support, financial support, and endorsement) variables to explain how the phenomenon of state sponsorship of terrorism plays out. This conceptual framework is then applied to a series of case studies on Syria’s third party intervention in the cases of Syria’s relations with the Palestinian Fatah (from 1964 to 1976), Syria’s relations with Turkey vis-a-vis the Kurdish PKK (from 1978 to 1998), and Syria’s policy toward the Lebanese Hizballah from 1989 to 2006. The concluding chapter presents the author’s findings, which are also applied to the three case studies, regarding the conditions for formation of sponsorship, the patterns of sponsorship, theoretical implications, avenues for further research, and policy implications. Also valuable are the numerous diagrams and schematics that illustrate the conceptual framework. The author is a Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellow for International Relations and Security, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin.

The contributors to this edited volume examine the rise and decline of the terrorist group ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom), which was founded in 1959 and conducted its terrorist campaign from 1968 until 2011, when it declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities. The contributors are Spanish academics with expertise on ETA, and come from the disciplines of history, political science, and sociology. The volume is divided into three parts: first, ETA and the Spanish state (the origins of ETA and its evolution up to 2015, ETA’s use of terrorism, and the Spanish government’s counter-terrorism (CT) campaign against it); second, the politics of fear that spills over from ETA’s use of terrorism and the government’s CT campaign; and, finally, what the editors term as the resulting “historical narratives and rituals that contributed to the production and reproduction of identity oppositions and war memories.” (p. 1) These general themes frame four research questions that are discussed throughout the volume: “Are democracies more able to deal with terrorism than autocracies?,” “Does terrorism ‘work’ in liberal societies?,” “When do terrorist groups end?,” and “What are the consequences of violence?” (pages 2-10) As an academic study, some of the discussion tends to be highly theoretical, such as one of the concluding statements that “Terrorism continues to exist through its transformation into collective memory, which is established according to the usual hegemonic social framework (defined by Basque nationalism), making it a political tool that is just as effective in remembrance as when it was a political practice.” (p. 227) Nevertheless, there is much information and analysis in the volume’s discussion about ETA and the Spanish government’s CT campaign to recommend it as a contribution to our knowledge and understanding of these issues.


This short book attempts to explain how the “persuasive powers of narrative” by terrorist groups such as al Qaida need to be countered with new and nuanced national narratives. Following a discussion of how such narratives are framed, the author concludes, with a focus on U.S. counterterrorism in particular, that to be effective “Our national narrative structure should not reflect singularity, but rather, co-existent multiplicity.” (p. 73)


This is a comprehensive and informed intellectual history of the core concepts of Salafi-Jihadism – the extremist religio-ideology that has motivated terrorist groups such as al Qaida and the Islamic State (IS), although, as the author explains, both groups interpret and apply it differently in their governance and warfare. What is Salafi-Jihadism? As the author argues, it consists of five “essential and irreducible features”: tawhid (the unitary oneness of God), hakimyya (the rule of Allah; securing God’s sovereignty in the political system), al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (“To love and hate for the sake of Allah; loyalty and disavowal”), jihad (“to struggle or exert effort, although it has a legal meaning which relates to combat and fighting”), and takfir (“Excommunication of other Muslims, banishing them from the earth”).” (pp. xvii-xx, p. 14) Following the author’s introductory overview, the book’s chapters discuss these five features of Salafi-Jihadism and how they have played out in Islamic religio-ideological discourse over the past centuries, including in the current the post-9/11 period. Regarding future trends, the author concludes that “The Syrian civil war will continue to fuel further changes within the Salafi-Jihadi belief system over the coming years,” and will likely “incubate new phases” in its development. (p. 211)
While the author’s account of Salafi-Jihadism is sound, this book is marred by several assertions that appear overly sympathetic to such an extreme religious ideology. With the groups that espouse Salafi-Jihadism, such as al Qaida and IS repressing any manifestation of moderate Islamic practices and engaging in terrorist targeting of their own societies and the Western far enemies, it is surprising to read the author’s description of this extremist movement as “an extremely resilient soteriology [doctrine of salvation]. Despite domestic repression, civil war, and an international ‘War on Terror,’ it has endured and survived more than three decades of forceful repression.” (p. 211) Here, one may ask, which is the side that is repressing the other? Finally, while the author’s characterization of Salafi-Jihadism as “similar to totalitarian strains of political thinking” is correct, one might question his assertion that “its ascendancy in the post-modern world” can be attributed to the “liberal societies [erosion of] culture, customs, history, tradition and memory, replacing these with relativist mores. It is in these environments that nihilisms then arise.” (p. 26) Is the author implying that liberal societies’ promotion of democratic and religious pluralism, freedom of speech, and women’s equality, etc., are responsible for the emergence of such nihilistic and totalitarian religio-ideologies such as Salafi-Jihadism?

The author is a Senior Research Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) at Kings College London, and teaches at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD.


In this interesting and innovative textbook, the author examines terrorism from a “highly symbolic perspective,” in which “each chapter (1) isolates a specific dimension of symbolism in terrorism, (2) illustrates the contexts and processes that involve the main actors in terrorism, and (3) informs readers about the symbolism of both and purposes and targets of terrorism.” (p. xi) More than forty areas of symbolism are examined in the volume, such as physical symbolism, linguistic symbolism, anthroposemiosis, the social construction of reality, rituals, myths, and symbolic interactionism. These are explained in chapters that cover topics such as what is symbolism, interpreting symbolism in terrorism, terrorism’s symbolic targets, the symbolic culture of terrorism, symbolic place and territory in terrorism, symbolism in religious terrorism, symbolism in Hindu, Sikh, Christian, Jewish, and Islamist terrorism, symbolism in suicide terrorism, symbolism in female terrorism, ‘brand management’ in terrorism, semiotic analysis of terrorism, and symbolic terrorism on the Internet. As a textbook, the chapters include case studies to illustrate the topic and a summary. The author is associate professor in the Nicholson School of Communication at the University of Central Florida.


This is a well-reasoned argument by a leading politically moderate Palestinian academic of the need to come up with workable solutions to the seemingly intractable Israeli-Palestinian state. Following his account of the history of the conflict, from the perspective of a Palestinian, as a sensible optimist he concludes that “while a two-state solution now seems impossible on practical grounds, it still makes sense to say it is possible in theory, with the gap between theory and practice being any unexpected combination of new decisions and actions, regional or worldwide, that would make what now seems impossible a reality.” (p. 218) The author is the President of Al-Quds University in Jerusalem.

With anarchism considered by David Rapoport to constitute the first historical wave of modern terrorism, this volume is an important contribution to the literature on the international anarchist movement’s ideology, leaders, and activities in London, beginning in the early 1880s. The volume’s chapters discuss topics such as the primary London anarchist groups, their “propaganda by the deed” activities, their political journals, and leading figures. One of the author’s conclusions is that “the anarchists failed to achieve working-class unity, not only because of rival socialists and sectarian differences, but precisely because they opposed all organization.” (p. 153)


In this book, the author, a retired psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, applies his experience in working with individuals with disordered personalities to analyze the pathways of individuals in Western countries, especially the U.S., into becoming homegrown violent extremists. It is a highly insightful analysis. It begins with an overview of the psychological characteristics of the types of groups and leaders that recruit such individuals, which is similar to those that exploitive-destructive cults use to “actively seek to alienate all their members from potential moderating influences found in healthy modern families, communities, and churches of origin.” (p. 7) In such cult-like terrorist groups, the author observes, “The destructive cult leader becomes a father/God/prophet himself.” (p. 7) The author is also insightful when he notes that many of the individuals who join such destructive cults/terrorist groups are what are termed “in-betweeners” – persons who are vulnerable “to seduction by an exploitive cult….They are often lonely and are in life transitions.” (p. 10) This psychological framework is then applied to examining how they play out in detailed case histories of a spectrum of homegrown terrorists. These include, as jihadists, Adam Gadahn, John Walker Lindh, Nidal Hasan, Jose Padilla, Richard Reid, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab; as far right-wing extremists and other fringes such as Timothy McVeigh and Ted Kaczynski; and as far-left extremists such as Bill Ayers and his Weather Underground.

Various recruiting mechanisms are also discussed, such as the Internet’s extremist websites and extremist prison chaplains. The Appendices include a useful timeline of homegrown terrorist activities and a glossary of key concepts and definitions.


This is an interesting and well-reasoned account of why the torture of prisoners to elicit information, particularly in the case of suspected terrorists, should be banned because it is ineffective. As the author writes, “The empirical reality is this: the intelligence obtained through torture is so paltry, the signal-to-noise ratio so low, that proponents of torturing detainees are left with an indefensible case when the pro-torture case is examined…against other, effective, noncoercive methods.” (p. 2) This argument is advanced by examining types of torture such as technology to detect deception, the impact of stress and pain on the brain, and drowning, cooling, heating, and starving the brain. In his conclusion, the author writes that “I will not pretend that there is an easy solution available for eliciting reliable, truthful information from captives. Rather, I am making the obvious point that this is an area that experimental social psychology can address quickly and readily.” (p. 265) The author is Professor of Experimental Brain Research at Trinity College, Dublin, and Director of the Trinity College Institute of Neuroscience.

This is an excellent and detailed account by a former *Washington Post* Kabul bureau chief of the Karzai family who had dominated Afghanistan’s political life for some 10 years, with Hamid Karzai serving as the country’s President from December 2004 to the end of September 2014. The significance of the Karzai family, the author explains, is that their rise and fall represent the deterioration of Afghanistan, as well. As he writes, “The president and his brothers began as symbols of a new Afghanistan: moderate, educated, fluent in East and West – the antithesis of the brutish and backward Taliban regime, which blew up Buddha statues and banned kids from flying kites.” (p. 8) With Hamid Karzai “celebrated around the world as a unifier and peacemaker,” by 2011 “the Karzai name had become shorthand for corruption, greed, and a bewildering rage at America. His family had descended into deadly feuds and scrambles for money….President Karzai’s relations with U.S. diplomats and soldiers amounted to little but distrust and traded insults.” (pp. 8-9)


This is a plea by a prominent French journalist of the need during this especially turbulent period in France “to oppose instances of Islamophobic, racist, xenophobic violence case by case. We must counter it with a competing imaginary, a creative and mobilizing one that uplifts and liberates.” (p. 73)


This is an interesting and provocative first-hand account by a Human Rights Watch staffer about the human phenomenon of violence: “what it is, what it does, and how we think and speak about it.” (p. ix) His accounts discuss the use of violence from the period of Taliban rule in Afghanistan prior to 9/11 through the political and social upheaval in post-2011 Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria. Running through these accounts are the topics of military campaigns, including military air power, the psychology of killing, the linguistics of war, theories of nonviolence, and other questions, such as “Why do humans come together to do violence? Why do people find it difficult to kill other people? What is terrorism? Why are we so fascinated by war,” and why does war provoke so much excess carnage, as well as “fierce obstinacy of both civilians and combatants…” (p. x)


This paperback edition of the book’s 2013 hardcover edition includes a new preface which updates the author’s previous findings. These include new cases of lone wolf terrorist attacks, such as the husband-and-wife shootings in San Bernardino, CA, in December 2015 (which may not have been a ‘pure’ lone wolf type attack) and Omar Mateen’s June 2016 shooting rampage at the nightclub in Orlando, FL. The author observes that what makes lone wolves so dangerous is that “they often fly under the radar, making the job of law enforcement extremely difficult in terms of trying to prevent these violent acts.” (p. vii) The author also points out that lone wolves “cut across the political and religious spectrum, with militant far-right-wing lone operatives also active in carrying out such attacks. Also valuable is the author’s observation that the violence launched by lone wolves can be highly lethal because “terrorist attacks are not always complex operations that require detailed planning, resources, training, and leadership directed by a group.” (p. ix) The author is president of Political Risk Assessment Company, Inc., in Los Angeles, CA.

In this theoretical essay, the author, a French historian, examines the use of terrorism in the French Revolution from 1789 to 1799. One of the central questions discussed in the essay is “How was the dread instilled in the revolutionaries by their enemies overcome and transformed into the demand for terror? And beyond this, how was this demand understood and accepted? And finally, what did the Terror found, or seek to found?” (p. 36) The author concludes that “The revolutionary Terror, which is attacked for its revolutionary tribunal, its law of suspects and its guillotine, was a process welded to a regime of popular sovereignty in which the object was to conquer tyranny or die for liberty. This Terror was willed by those who, having won sovereign power by dint of insurrection, refused to let this be destroyed by counter-revolutionary enemies.” (p. 97) This book, which was translated from French into English, is a difficult read, so readers may turn to other books for insights on these issues.


The contributors to this interesting volume examine the nexus of religion and terrorism. Specifically, they focus on how religious doctrine has become “a powerful tool and motivator for individuals and groups in their willingness to engage in acts of terror” (p. 1) The texts of the principal monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam are examined, particularly how they are interpreted by extremist groups to employ terrorism “as the appropriate means to gain God’s favor and blessing.” (p. 1) The introductory chapter sets the stage for the discussion by defining terrorism and its targets, as well as the cognitive, psychological, and social organization of religion. This culminates with a discussion of religious terrorism, which is explained as the product of motivations that “come from a divine or sacred source that requires obedience to a sacred way of life, and to beliefs that are given by a transcendent source.” (p. 10) The volume’s chapters explain the phenomenon of religious terrorism in the cases of Christian fundamentalism and extremism, Jewish extremism’s use of terrorism, “Islamic” religious terrorism, the Muslim ideologies of martyrdom, and the role of religion and religious teachings in al Qaida. The co-editors are professors at Utah State University, where Dr. Ward is an associate professor of political science and Dr. Sherlock a professor of philosophy.

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Movie Review

by Joshua Sinai


This fictional drama is set in 2002, at the height of the Second Palestinian Intifada, which began in late September 2000. After some two years of constant Palestinian suicide bombings, with many Israeli fatalities, Israeli society is in the midst of a deep crisis. As the action begins, on a Friday afternoon, in preparation for the Sabbath weekend, Ruty (Chagit Dasberg) is shopping at Machane Yehuda, Jerusalem’s crowded, historic market, when a Palestinian female suicide bomber blows herself up, close enough for Ruty to feel the bombing’s explosion and see its aftermath, with the killed and injured shoppers lying on the flames-filed ground. Ruty returns home, but does not confide her traumatized experience to anyone. She is so unable to deal with the enormous stress and anxiety she suffered a few hours earlier that she can’t focus on preparing the Sabbath dinner, as she keeps burning cake after cake in the oven. In her disoriented and desperate state, Ruty decides that her only option is to protect her family from this constant crisis and violent carnage outside their apartment. With Ofer (Matan Preminger), her 19-year old son, returning home from his army service for the Sabbath, and her husband, Yoel (Eyal Nachmias) and Noa (Tamar Preminger), their 15-year-old daughter, all taking their afternoon naps, she decides to barricade their 4th floor apartment with a chain lock that is reinforced by a club steering wheel lock. While her family is sound asleep, she removes and hides their cell phones, including detaching the house telephone. She also turns back the clocks to let them sleep longer than they had wanted. When they wake up, they find the apartment locked, disconnected from the outside world (except for the television sets), with their street deserted for the Sabbath. “Why are you doing this?,” the son asks angrily. “I want quiet,” the mother replies. “How long do you plan on this madness?,” the son adds. “Until there’s peace. I don’t know when,” the mother replies. The husband then observes, “this is completely insane.”

Most of the film’s action is set inside the apartment, but it also includes external scenes of what could have happened to the family members if they had been outside. The son’s tank unit is desperately trying to reach him by telephone for a sudden deployment that evening for what is supposed to be a retaliatory operation against the Palestinians in the West Bank. Making matters worse, if he doesn’t return to his unit that evening he will be disciplined for unauthorized absence. The daughter is expecting to go out that evening with her friends to a club for a rock concert. The father is supposed to be jogging with his running group, including a young woman who is reportedly his mistress. Finally, the Palestinian mastermind of the Machane Yehuda bombing, who had escaped from the incident, keeps menacingly showing up at these and other events taking place that evening in Jerusalem.

As the movie’s action progresses to its climactic resolution, we see Ruty’s family’s dynamics play out, with the husband and children becoming increasingly desperate to break out of the barricaded apartment, while the mother does everything in her power to protect her family by detaching them completely from the terrifying and deadly world outside.

When this movie appeared it was considered one of the first Israeli movies to describe the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not only from an Israeli civilian perspective, but from the view of an Israeli mother. This is also unlike other films that present the perspective of Israeli soldiers who deploy in the front lines, such as the “Beaufort” (released in January 2008), which was set at an IDF post in the mountaintop Beaufort castle in southern Lebanon, and which is also well worth watching.
Moreover, “Present Continuous” presents a side of Israel not usually highlighted even in the printed literature: the serious cracks in the population’s resilience to constant Palestinian terrorist attacks, which almost 15 years after the period in which this movie’s plot was set, today, again, features constant Palestinian knifing and gun attacks against Israelis, with Jerusalem’s consumer and tourist economies suffering, as a result. Further exacerbating the tense situation, some 300,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem and its suburbs, while not Israeli citizens, hold Israeli-issued blue identification cards that grant them permanent resident status, thus enabling them to blend in and work in the largely Jewish West Jerusalem. With heightened tensions between Israelis and Palestinians in Greater Jerusalem, this has made Jerusalem’s Jews anxious about the free movement of Palestinians in their midst. Moreover, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition government appearing uninterested in pursuing a serious peace process with the Palestinian Authority, there surely are numerous Israeli mothers like Ruty who are extremely worried about the safety of their families – making this movie invaluable in presenting a portrait of what it is like to live in such a ‘hurting stalemate,’ with constant thoughts of how to escape from it all. It is for this reason that the movie’s final credits include a dedication to both Israeli and Palestinian mothers.

On a side note, despite the movie’s overall disturbing plot line, the family’s dynamics are also marked by some humorous exchanges. Moreover, for those with a sharp eye, at the opening scene when Ruty is strolling through the market, Mr. Preminger, the movie’s director, can be seen for a few seconds sitting outside a café. The film’s son and daughter characters are played by Mr. Preminger’s children, which also enables him to include their appearances in his family’s home movies in the film’s powerful flashback scenes.

This movie, which has received numerous awards at film festivals around the world, is highly recommended for showings in courses on terrorism and counterterrorism as it portrays the psychological impact of constant terrorist attacks on their targeted populations.

The movie’s director and producer, Aner Preminger, who is related to the legendary Hollywood director Otto Preminger (“The Exodus”, 1960), is a professor of film studies at Sapir Academic College, in the northwestern Negev desert, near Sderot, and a Filmmaker/Film Scholar at The Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.
VI. Notes from the Editor

Crowdfunding Initiative on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of Perspectives on Terrorism

Dear Reader,

Perspectives on Terrorism, by some accounts the most widely-read peer-reviewed journal in the field of terrorism research, is celebrating its 10-year anniversary.

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), the non-profit organization behind Perspectives on Terrorism, has continually sought to provide the research community with free and non-partisan information on developments in terrorism and counter-terrorism from around the world.

For the past ten years, the journal’s editorial team, led by Alex P. Schmid, James J. Forest and Robert Wesley— the three directors of TRI – have not only volunteered their time, but have also fully financed the publishing of Perspectives on Terrorism out of their own pockets.

Now, as we prepare to ensure the next 10 years of service to the terrorism research community, we are, with this letter, appealing to those who value open access scholarship to help alleviate at least some of the financial burden associated with the publication of Perspectives on Terrorism.

To this end, we are inviting our readers and supporters to contribute to our new crowdfunding campaign in order to help keep Perspectives on Terrorism free of charge, openly accessible for its tens of thousands of regular and occasional readers.

Any and all contributions are welcome, and can be made online via the website link provided below. We run Perspectives on Terrorism on a shoestring budget—so a little money goes a long way!

TRI is a US non-profit (501c3) organization, so donations may be tax deductible.

We hope you will recognize our efforts to produce an independent journal on behalf of the international research community, and we thank you in advance for your contribution!

Sincerely,

Alex P. Schmid
James J. Forest
Robert Wesley

To make a donation in support of the open-access scholarly journal, Perspectives on Terrorism, click on the following link:

https://www.gofundme.com/perspectivestri
About Perspectives on Terrorism

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at [www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com). It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.

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