

## German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective. A First Quantitative Overview of the ‘Database on Terrorism in Germany (Right-Wing Extremism)’ – DTG<sup>rw</sup> Project.

by Daniel Koehler

### *Abstract*

*This article presents a first quantitative overview of the findings of a private research project, which is running since 2011. The project aims at establishing a comprehensive database of German right-wing terrorist actors (groups, individuals) since the Second World War. It assembles data on incidents in order to gather as much information as possible about respective tactics, strategies, target groups, biographical backgrounds, connections and ideological legitimizations. As a first report and analysis, this article provides a quantitative analysis of right-wing terrorism in Germany, based on data relating to average group size, main target groups, length of existence and main tactics.*

**Keywords:** *right-wing terrorism; Germany; database; quantitative analysis*

### *Introduction*

Due to the discovery of the German right-wing terrorist group “National Socialist Underground (NSU)” in 2011, which allegedly assassinated at least 10 persons and committed two bombings over a period of almost 14 years undetected, right-wing terrorism has been brought back to nation-wide attention. In comparison to the 77 casualties caused in the same year by the lone wolf Anders Behring Breivik, and compared to Jihadist, national separatist or anarchist terrorism, the activities by the extreme right in Germany have been of a lesser order of magnitude. Only a very small number of academic studies have been focusing exclusively on the nature, tactics and structures of right-wing terrorism in Germany in the last decades. A few edited volumes have collected chapters on specific right-wing terrorist groups from different countries, but without looking at it in a comprehensive way and in any depth. We therefore possess few insights into the possibly distinctive characteristic of terrorism from the extreme right.

In order to establish a comprehensive database for terrorism research in Germany, to begin with in the German right-wing context, a unique private research project was started in 2011 by the author. Over the course of three years, the project collected as much information as possible on terrorist activities by right-wing extreme groups in Germany since the Second World War and merged it in one coherent data base. While still ongoing and constantly being updated, the material gathered so far allows the making a first quantitative overview regarding some basic structures of German right-wing extremist & terrorist groups. As a purely quantitative survey, this article will not focus on specific terrorist groups, incidents or strategic concepts. Rather it concentrates on some basic structures such as the typical group size, targeted groups, methods, lifespan, and communication strategies. In addition some insights into the historical development over the last 50 years will be provided, answering questions such as whether or not right-wing terrorist groups got smaller and more flexible over time (based on the “leaderless resistance” concept), whether the target groups or methods changed, or whether certain waves or phases of right-wing terrorist activities can be identified.

### *State of the Art*

Within international research on terrorism, right-wing extremist terrorism has so far only received minor attention, compared, for instance, to Jihadi terrorism. Although some major publications in the last decades focused specifically on this topic [1], they only scratch the surface of the issue—usually with chapters introducing various right-wing terrorist groups or incidents—without an underlying general typology or concept. Most academic publications dealing with the extreme right either focus on parties and political processes such as elections and campaigns [2] or on various subcultural aspects of different right-wing groups which are not part of the more traditional contemporary political spectrum [3]. The formulation of a theory and typology of right-wing terrorism has been attempted by Ehud Sprinzak [4]. His theory of “Split Delegitimization” – differentiating between revolutionary, reactionary/reactive, vigilante, racist, millenarian, and youth counterculture right-wing terrorism – has, however, not found a wide resonance within academia due to a certain lack of empiric groundwork. Sprinzak suggested that for right-wing terrorist groups, the conflict with government would be “secondary” in comparison to “private wars against hostile ethnic communities” [5]. This does, however, not hold true for many right-wing groups and lone wolf actors (e.g. militias in the US, Breivik in Norway) who perceive democratic and multicultural governments as their main enemies. As Sprinzak’s typology was recognized as being “too simplistic” [6] to be applied to empirical analysis, his model remained relatively inconsequential.

Within international research publications, works on German right-wing terrorism are few; only a handful of academic studies can be identified [7]. From an academic perspective, most publications have been of a rather journalistic nature and lack scientific rigour [8]. On the academic level, only a handful of publications can be found [9]; they vary greatly both in terms of scope and quality. Partially due to lack of empirical data, some scholars have formulated theories that are surprising, for example, that right-wing terrorists prior to the NSU series of murders, never directly attempted to kill individuals from their target group and are therefore claiming that there is a ‘new generation’ of right-wing terrorists [10]. In short, with regard to forms and aspects of right-wing terrorism, the field is highly under-researched and under-represented within international and German academic studies of terrorism and political violence. Although some scholars have attempted to establish theoretical foundations for a study of right-wing terrorism, the sheer lack of comprehensive and detailed empirical data about right-wing terrorist actors, structures and tactics has essentially prevented the development of systematic analysis regarding this type of terrorism.

To improve this situation, the DTG<sup>rw</sup> began building a knowledge base for the in-depth study of German right-wing terrorism in order to detect potential differences and commonalities with other forms of terrorism.

### *Methods, Sources, and the Database Project*

The main goal of the initial DTG<sup>rw</sup> project was to describe the development of ideologies, strategies, tactics, group structures and networks of German right-wing terrorism from a historical perspective. For the first time in research on German right-wing extremism, an attempt has been made to establish a database for right-wing terrorism that includes as much information as possible on the actors (groups and individuals), incidents, target groups, tactics, ideology, networks, lifespan, communication, effects of government measures, success of the terrorist groups, victims and other relevant data. As a notoriously inaccessible field for research, all available sources have been included: media reports, police investigation files, court documents, academic literature, autobiographies of former right-wing terrorists, verdicts, interviews with former terrorists, investigators and lawyers, intelligence reports (Verfassungsschutzberichte – reports from

the agency for the protection of the Constitution), government reports as well as internal documents of right-wing groups (e.g. strategy papers, books, training manuals). After an initial overview, the data was coded and analysed quantitatively and qualitatively, gathering as much information as possible for each identified actor or incident.

The DTG<sup>rw</sup> consists of two main parts: incidents and actors. While the part on incidents includes acknowledged acts of violence committed by right-wing extremists (e.g. killings, arson and attacks with explosives, kidnappings and hostage takings) not all have a terrorist background; sometimes incidents attributed to right-wing extremists have a rather personal criminal background and can therefore not be included in an analysis about right-wing terrorism. In addition, many incidents, actors or purposes are simply unknown. Sometimes a right-wing motive has only been suspected by authorities. In our database, the part on actors only includes identified actors (groups and individuals) from the extreme right, who planned, prepared or executed coercive acts of violence for purposes identified in the revised Academic Consensus Definition of terrorism (2011), developed by Schmid [11]. Naturally there is a large difference between these two parts in terms of numbers and proportions. This article solely relies on the identified actors, while the database on incidents has to be analysed in a different way.

Although the analysis is still ongoing and the database is constantly updated, it has already become the largest accumulation of information on right-wing terrorism in Germany. Currently the DTG<sup>rw</sup> consists of:

- 84 right-wing terrorist actors (groups and individuals) that could be identified since 1963, using the combined definition of Schmid (2011) and Wagner (2013).
- 123 right-wing terrorist attacks using explosives of some kind since 1971
- 2,173 right-wing arson attacks since 1971
- 229 homicides with a right-wing extremist background since 1971
- 12 kidnappings
- 56 cases of blackmailing
- 174 armed robberies

Of course not every arson attack, kidnapping, blackmailing or robbery can be related to right-wing terrorism, which is why every incident has to be qualitatively analysed and embedded within the database of identified actors. Sometimes one right-wing group for example commits an armed robbery to finance another group's terrorist activities, which was then counted as militant periphery (support structures, recruitment pool, radicalizing milieu). As the scope of the DTG<sup>rw</sup> also aims to cover the militants' peripheral attacks (e.g. averted by police) that failed and plots that have been prepared but not carried out have been included as well.

### ***Definitions***

To gather information on right-wing terrorist actors and incidents in a database requires definitions adequately balanced to recognize the relevant phenomenon and to distinguish it from irrelevant data. As the German legal definitions both of right-wing extremism and terrorism was deemed far too narrow for this project, a combination of two main academic definitions have been applied to identify right-wing terrorist actors, groups and incidents. In addition, the project aimed to include the militant periphery of right-wing

terrorist actors as well. Regarding the definition of ‘terrorism’, which is in itself almost a sub-discipline of terrorism studies, Schmid’s revised academic consensus definition from 2011 was used:

*“Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties” [12].*

Right-wing extremism or radicalism is not less controversial as a concept. In an analysis of different studies of right-wing extremism, Mudde [13] arrived at twenty-six different ways to define the concept, which contained fifty-eight different criteria. In a similar examination of thirteen studies, Druwe [14] found ‘only’ thirty-seven different, partially-intersecting, meanings. In German research at least two definitions are widely used: the ‘consensus group’s and Heitmeyer’s definitions. As a collection of essential characteristics of right-wing extremism the ‘consensus group’ of social scientists defined right-wing extremism as an opinion based on inequality, the affinity to dictatorships, chauvinism, belittlement of National Socialism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and Social Darwinism [15]. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, on the other hand, abstained from a collection of essential characteristics but identified as the core of right-wing extremism a combination of an ideology, which is based on inequality, and a basic acceptance of violence [16]. While Heitmeyer’s definition is far too broad to identify right-wing terrorism the consensus group’s definition with its focus on certain ideological characteristics (e.g. anti-Semitism) remains too narrow; it excludes certain right-wing groups or actors (e.g. Anders Behring Breivik, who would not be counted as a right-wing extremist under the consensus group definition due to his lack of anti-Semitism). Therefore this article and the research project applied the definition elaborated by Bernd Wagner [17] for the data collection:

*“Right-Wing Radicalism is a term for a social reality referring to a family of ideologies, which create organizations, movements, mentalities, fashion, groups and scenes, united by the characteristic constraining of the individual’s freedom as ‘zoon politicon’ and of groups on the account of biological and/or ethnic-cultural reasons and criteria. In addition, these elements suspend freedom and dignity, as well as personal rights, in spirit and action, and introduce non-democratic forms of government. Right-Wing Radicalism aspires to create and maintain an order establishing prerogatives for biological and cultural chosen ones thought of as an ethnos, folk or race and to develop a distinctive culture of life, which is thought to be superior and to be established accordingly through morality and legal status, as well as force, ensuring the submission to this order of every participant.” [18].*

In short the term right-wing extremism covers a broad range of ideologies that essentially see violence as a legitimate tool to combat a political and ethnic ‘enemy’ (including individuals with different culture, religion, nationality or sexual orientation) seen as a threat to the own race or nation. Both are entangled in an active state of war over future existence.

### **Main Findings**

For a first analytical overview resulting from the DTG<sup>rw</sup> project, the following categories will be highlighted in a comparative and quantitative perspective: group size, tactics (main methods), target groups, and lifespan.

#### *Group Size*

Regarding the typical group size of German right-wing terrorist actors an important research question is,

whether theoretical concepts such as “leaderless resistance” from 1983 [19] have effectively altered tactical formations in practice or whether merely an evolution of tactics (in terms of group sizes) can be found. For this analysis, five types of sizes have been used to cluster the right-wing terrorist actors: large associations with more than 100 members, large groups with 10 to 40 members, small groups with four to nine members, small cells with two to three members, and lone actors. To determine the size of a certain right-wing terrorist actor is sometimes challenging if not impossible due to several factors:

- In 12 cases no information about the group size was available.
- In five cases only differing estimations about the group size (e.g. 40-100, “a minimum of six”) were available. In these cases the lowest proven number was used.
- Almost all actors had no official membership status and thus a high degree of fluctuation over time. Members also had different functions, which makes it difficult to link some persons to a terrorist plot. Regarding time, the group size at the time of arrest, detection or disbandment was used. In some cases during investigation, trial and verdict the initial group was divided into categories by the authorities, which also complicates the analysis (e.g.: a group of ten was arrested for planning a bomb attack, six persons were charged, four persons convicted of explosives-related crimes, and two on weapons-related charges). In these cases, the number of identified individuals connected to the initial terrorist activity (including execution, planning, support) was counted.
- In some lone actor cases, there is still a debate going on whether or not other persons were involved. For example, the deadliest terrorist attack after the Second World War in Germany is the bombing of the Oktoberfest in Munich in 1980, causing 13 casualties and 211 wounded. It was perpetrated by an extreme right activist: Gundolf Köhler. Although he was a member of a large right-wing extremist organization (the “Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann”) courts and several investigations still claim that he acted alone, despite the fact that some contrary evidence has surfaced over the years. In this case, the DTG<sup>rw</sup> follows current official police or court statements, meaning that the Oktoberfest bombing is counted as a lone actor perpetrated incident in the database.

Excluding from analysis all the actors about whom we do not yet have good information, it emerges that there were, in total 72 actors between 1963 and 2014. They came from:

- 6 large associations with more than 100 members
- 10 large groups with 10 to 40 members
- 26 small groups with 4–9 members
- 13 small cells with 2–3 members
- 15 lone actors

With 54.2% of perpetrators being part of small groups and small cells, this is by far the most common type of size of right-wing terrorist actors in the DTG<sup>rw</sup>. Lone actors alone count for 20.8% of right-wing terrorist actors.

Small group sizes as a visible part of German extreme right terrorism can be dated back to 1963. At that time, a group of eight German right-wing extremists tried to attack infrastructure (power plants) in South Tyrol (Austria). In 1965, a group of three planned to assassinate the Federal Prosecutor General and execute a bomb attack against the German Office for the Prosecution of War Criminals in Ludwigsburg. However, to

the general public small scale right-wing terrorism became visible only in 1973 with the “Gruppe Neumann” (six members) and in 1978 with the “Wehrwolfgruppe Stubbemann” (three members). In fact most of the more or less widely known and lethal terrorist groups have developed small group or cell structures (e.g., “Gruppe Ludwig” [two members, killing 14 person in 9 attack between 1977 and 1984], “Deutsche Aktionsgruppen” [four members, killing two persons in nine attacks in 1980], “Hepp-Kexel Gruppe” [six members, perpetrating four attacks], and “Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund” [three members, killing 10 persons]). Based on the timeframe segmented into roughly four decades (1963-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2014) and the distribution of small units (for small groups and cells) and lone actors, the following observations can be made:

- 1963-1979: eight small groups and cells, two lone actors
- 1980-1989: ten small groups and cells, five lone actors
- 1990-1999: four small groups and cells, two lone actors
- 2000-2014: 16 small groups and cells, six lone actors

Although this shows a clear increase of small units and lone actors since 2000, it has to be mentioned that most actors with unknown size are located in the early decades of the DTG<sup>rw</sup>. Broken down into percentage (including small groups, cells and lone actors) of all known right-wing terrorist actors per decade the numbers are as follows:

- 1968-1980: 40%
- 1980-1990: 78.9%
- 1990-2000: 40%
- 2000-2014: 88%

Therefore, it can be argued that after a first zenith of small scale right-wing terrorism between 1980 and 1989, a clear orientation to small unit tactics by the extreme right terrorist milieu is observable since 2000.

### *Tactics*

Tactics used by right-wing terrorist actors include methods of coercive violence, typically explosive and arson attacks, targeted assassinations, hostage takings and kidnappings. Again some qualifications are necessary. In a number of cases, no concrete tactics could be detected or was made public. In these cases, investigators or courts spoke of “severe crimes planned against the security of the state”, “militant plans” against politicians and civilians or simply used the term “terrorist plans”. Naturally, due to a lack of coherent definitions, standards and legal frameworks these cases occurred more often in the early decades of the DTG<sup>rw</sup>. Moreover, groups that have been mostly active in supportive operations for other terrorist actors have not been included here. However, when a right-wing actor executed, prepared and planned an attack, using one of the above-mentioned methods, the actor was included. In many cases, actors used a mix of terrorist methods either simultaneously or in sequences. Each method executed or planned was counted. Thus the percentages below do not refer to absolute size of attacks in the real world but rather show a distribution of tactics in regard to preference by actors in theory and practice. They exclude actors committing acts of support or without a known tactic.

Decade	Targeted Assassination	Explosive Attacks	Arson Attacks	Hostage Taking, Kidnapping
1963-1979	25.9%	44.4%	22.2%	7.4%
1980-1989	22.2%	44.4%	33.3%	0%
1990-1999	12.5%	87.5%	0%*	0%
2000-2014	13.6%	63.6%	22.7%	0%

This table shows that in the early decades within the DTG<sup>rw</sup>, a broad range of tactics was used by these actors, including hostage taking and kidnappings -tactics almost completely vanishing after 1980. Between 1980 and 1990, right-wing terrorist actors relied on three tactics: explosive attacks (mostly), as well as arson attacks and targeted assassinations. It would appear that a wave of explosive attacks between 1990 and 2000 was followed by another differentiation of tactics since 2000. Two special cases have been excluded but are worth mentioning:

- Between 1977 and 1978 the “Wehrsportgruppe Rohwer/Werwolf” attacked Allied and German military installations, patrols and barracks in at least four cases.
- In 2014 a young right-wing extremist was discovered in Munich with an arsenal of weapons, extensive combat gear, and explosives. While police attempted to enter his apartment he tried to detonate several bombs and killed himself.

A special reference is also necessary regarding the wave of right-wing arson attacks on asylum seeker homes in the early 1990s after the German reunification (1,499 incidents between 1991 and 1994). These attacks are part of the incidents database but could in most cases not been tied to a specific actor or to a specific strategy. Although it is proven that in some instances right-wing groups publically called for, and advertised, arson attacks against asylum facilities it is unclear whether these attacks can be included in an analysis of right-wing terrorism. This phenomenon will be treated differently and needs in depth qualitative analysis. It is very close to Sprinzak’s category of “youth counterculture terrorism” [20].

### *Target Groups*

When it comes to targets of right-wing terrorism, again, a number of cases have to be excluded because no specific information was available or because actors attacked more than one target group. In addition, this categorization aligns with the target typology typically used by right-wing terrorist actors themselves. In many cases, the only evidence comes from statements or documents of the perpetrators outlining, for example, planned attacks against “foreigners” – a highly controversial term in the German context – without necessarily being more specific. This makes it difficult to analyze subcategories, such as right-wing terrorist violence against Muslims. Even most police and court documents do not differentiate the ethnic background of the target groups, but usually use terms like “immigrants” or “persons with an immigration background” are used. Due to this, the category “foreigners” as a target group mainly refers – in the eyes of the perpetrators – to individuals with non-German or ‘non-Aryan’ ethnical background. Right-wing terrorists very rarely seem to focus on a specific group of ‘foreigners’ or delineate what the category means exactly (e.g. Muslims born in Germany, mixed families).

The numbers reproduced below represent proportions of specific target groups. Subsuming any representative of the government or state structure, the ‘Government’ category includes targets such as police officers, judges, politicians, military personnel (German or other), as well as state prosecutors. ‘Infrastructure’ includes mainly buildings such as party offices (e.g. from the Social Democratic Party), court houses, police

stations, schools, but also railways, power supply networks, restaurants and other installations. To the extent that individuals or groups identified by the extreme right as “the Left” (communists, anti-fascists, social democrats not being part of the government) have been targeted, they were subsumed under the category “The Left”.

Decade	Jews	Foreigners	Government	The Left	Infrastructure
1963-1979	21.1%	0%	31.6%	21.1%	26.3%
1980-1989	9.1%	36.4%	45.5%	9.1%	0%
1990-1999	0%	16.7%	41.7%	33.3%	8.3%
2000-2014	28.6%	28.6%	14.3%	21.4%	7.1%

Surprising is the fact that the government always has been a major target of right-wing terrorists, which is contrary to the theory of Sprinzak [21]. In addition it could be expected before the German reunification that the presence of Allied and Russian Forces in Germany would, in theory, provide a basis for right-wing terrorist propaganda. After the reunification, a perceived weakness of especially East German authorities might have triggered attacks on government targets. After 2000 right-wing terrorists again chose different target groups, with a major focus on Jewish communities and persons.

Three special cases have been excluded and are worth mentioning in detail:

- The “Gruppe Ludwig” killed 14 persons in nine attacks between 1977 and 1984, mainly targeting discotheques, prostitutes, and catholic priests. The group’s agenda was to stop moral decay within the Christian-‘Aryan’ culture and society.
- Gundolf Köhler, the perpetrator of the Oktoberfest bombing, killed 13 persons and wounded 211, making it most severe terrorist attack in post Second World War Germany. Köhler planted the bomb at the main entry of the Oktoberfest, which allegedly detonated earlier than expected, killing Köhler. This is the only known right-wing terrorist act that targeted persons indiscriminately. It was obviously designed to inflict mass casualties.
- In 1981 a group of five right-wing extremists founded the “Kommando Omega”. They targeted dropouts (‘traitors’), judges and lawyers with explosives and assassinations.

*Length of Group Activity (Lifespan)*

To show the average length of a group’s active existence among Germany’s right-wing terrorist groups is more problematic. For one reason, it is simply impossible to determine when a group of individuals or lone actors have decided to form a terrorist cell or started preparing for an attack especially since this kind of activity is typically executed clandestinely. Although some court documents and media reports state facts like “have been preparing since...” or “formed a terrorist group in 2001 the latest”, it is completely unclear which criteria have been used to define or recognize the starting point of a terrorist group or act. In addition, media reports, investigation files, court verdicts and other sources might all use different criteria and have different perspectives on when a group was formed or an act prepared. Thus this overview of average time of activity before detection by authorities, arrest, and/or disbandment should be used with caution and as a rough indication only.

Excluding two cases without confirmed information about the actor’s lifespan, the vast majority of right-wing terrorist actors is active no longer than one year (73.2%) before either being detected and arrested by the authorities or before disbandment (sometimes to avoid arrest). It would, however, appear, that if an actor

'survives' more than one year, chances of long-term activity rapidly increase with 13.4% being active between one and five years and 13.4% more than five years. With 14 years of activity the "Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU)" was the most successful German right-wing terrorist actor in terms of lifespan.

### *Communication*

Probably one of the most surprising characteristics of right-wing terrorism is the form of communication chosen by right-wing terrorist actors in combination with their attacks. Although terrorism, due to the propagandistic and psychological effects, can always be regarded as form of communication in itself, some scholars have focused on media attention as a central goal of terrorists to gain a podium for their political or religious agenda [22]. Many (if not most) terrorist actors therefore use some form of public claim statement after attacks to connect their group, ideology, brand or statement with the incident. In case of German right-wing terrorism, however, only a small minority of perpetrators claimed in public credit for the attack (including to leave a note, statement, or other form of ideological identification at the crime scene). As a result of the absence of public claims of responsibility for their attacks, public and academia in Germany discuss whether right-wing attacks should be counted as 'terrorism'. While in theory the psychological effect (terrorizing the target group) can be achieved without specific claim statements (e.g., a bombing of a synagogue might be self-explanatory), the propagandistic effect of unclaimed attacks is much weaker, if present at all.

For this survey, only those right-wing terrorist actors who actually tried to execute attacks (including failed ones) were used. This accounts for 42.9% of all actors in the DTG<sup>rw</sup>. Of those, only 19.4% made some form of public claims (e.g., letters, statements at the crime scene, media communiqués – almost one fifth of the attackers) to identify themselves as perpetrators and to spread their political or ideological agenda. As a special case the "Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU)" did produce a video statement claiming the attacks. However, they sent them to different media stations, politicians, and civil society groups only after the group was detected in 2011. In general, public statements of right-wing terrorist actors only very rarely contain concrete political claims or programs. In most cases swastikas or similar symbols were left at the crime scene or the victims and target groups were scorned through the statements.

### *Conclusion*

With this brief quantitative overview, the first step to a more comprehensive analysis of right-wing terrorism in Germany becomes possible. Taking key elements of known right-wing terrorist actors (size, tactics, target groups, lifespan, communication), this article allows to characterize right-wing terrorism in Germany for the first time empirically so that common traits as well as differences with other types of terrorism can be found. Most striking at this point appears to be the lack of typical forms of communication (e.g., communiqués, claim statements) after perpetrating attacks. This holds true for the majority of right-wing terrorist actors in Germany. This is an aspect worth looking into in future studies, showing how exactly (if at all) the propagandistic effect of right-wing terrorist acts is achieved and how the actors themselves think about this strategy (or lack thereof). In addition, knowing more about the targets of right-wing terrorists, what tactics they typically use and how long they usually survive, allows us to identify the atypical cases and subject them to in-depth analysis (e.g., the 'Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund', the 'Gruppe Ludwig', the 'Kommando Omega'). In addition the DTG<sup>rw</sup> has aggregated a large amount of data regarding biographical backgrounds, reaction and effectiveness of police actions. The database also focuses on ideological explanations as well as strategic and tactical concepts. This will allow for a series of multiple, qualitative and quantitative studies,

focusing on German right-wing terrorism in the future.

**About the Author:** Daniel Koehler is currently the Director of Research at the Institute for the Study of Radical Movements (ISRM) in Berlin. He co-founded the first peer review journal on de-radicalization and publishes frequently on radicalization, de-radicalization and terrorism. He can be reached at [daniel\\_koehler@freenet.de](mailto:daniel_koehler@freenet.de).

## Notes

- [1] Bjørgo, T., *Terror from the extreme right*. (Cass series on political violence 1). London; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1995; Wilkinson, P., *Violence and terror and the extreme right. Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1995. 7(4): pp. 82-93; Hoffman, B., *Right Wing Terrorism in Europe*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1982; id., *Right-Wing Terrorism in West Germany*. Santa Monica, RAND, 1986; Michael, G., *Confronting Right Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA*. (Routledge studies in extremism and democracy). New York: Routledge, 2003; Pedahzur, A., *Struggling with the Challenges of Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism within Democratic Boundaries: A Comparative Analysis. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 2001. 24 (5): pp. 339-359; Taylor, M., D. Holbrook, and Currie, P.M., *Extreme right wing political violence and terrorism*. (New directions in terrorism studies). New York: Continuum International Pub. Group, 2013.
- [2] Brauntal, G., *Right-wing extremism in contemporary Germany*. (New perspectives in German political studies). Basingstoke, UK; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; Golder, M., *Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties In Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies*, 2003. 36 (4), pp. 432-466; id., *Electoral Institutions, Unemployment and Extreme Right Parties: A Correction. British Journal of Political Science*, 2003. 33 (03), pp. 525-534; Ignazi, P. and Ysmal, C., *Extreme Right-wing Parties in Europe. Sonderheft des European Journal of Political Research 22 (1)*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992; id., *The Re-emergence of the Extreme Right in Europe*, in: *Reihe Politikwissenschaft*. Institut für Höhere Studien, 1995; Jackman, R.W. and Volpert, K., *Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe. British Journal of Political Science*, 1996. 26 (4): pp. 501-521; Kitschelt, H. and McGann, A.J., *The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*. 1996; Klandermans, B. and Mayer, N., *Extreme right activists in Europe: through the magnifying glass*. London/New York: Routledge, 2006; Mammone, A., Godin, E., and Jenkins, B., *Mapping the extreme right in contemporary Europe: from local to transnational*. (Routledge studies in extremism and democracy). London & New York: Routledge, 2012; id., *Varieties of right-wing extremism in Europe*. Routledge studies in extremism and democracy. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2012; Merkl, P.H. and Weinberg, L., *Right-wing extremism in the twenty-first century*. 2nd rev. ed. (Cass series on political violence). London & Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 2003; Minkenberg, M., *The Radical Right in Europe—An Overview*. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008.
- [3] Blazak, R., *White Boys to Terrorist Men. American Behavioral Scientist*, 2001. 44 (6): pp. 982-1000; Borgeson, K. and Valeri, R., *Examining Differences in Skinhead Ideology and Culture Through an Analysis of Skinhead Websites*. Michigan Sociological Review, 2005. 19, pp. 45-62; Borgeson, K., *Culture and Identity Among Skinhead Women*. Michigan Sociological Review, 2003. 17, pp. 99-118; Brown, T.S., *Subcultures, Pop Music and Politics: Skinheads and "Nazi Rock" in England and Germany*. Journal of Social History, 2004. 38 (1): pp. 157-178; Burriss, V., Smith, E., and Strahm, A., *White Supremacist Networks on the Internet*. Sociological Focus, 2000. 33 (2): pp. 215-235; Virchow, F., *The groupuscularization of neo-Nazism in Germany: the case of the Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland*. Patterns of Prejudice, 2004. 38 (1): pp. 56-70.
- [4] Sprinzak, E., *Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: the Case of Split Delegitimization*, in: Bjørgo, T. (Ed.), *Terror from the Extreme Right*. Frank Cass: London, 1995. pp 17-43.
- [5] *ibid.* p. 17
- [6] Bjørgo, T., *Terror from the extreme right*. (Cass series on political violence 1). London ; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1995. p.: 7.
- [7] Hoffman, B., *Right Wing Terrorism in Europe*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1982; id., *Right-Wing Terrorism in West Germany*. Santa Monica, RAND, 1986; Heitmeyer, W., *Right-wing terrorism*, in: Bjørgo, T. (Ed.), *Root Causes of Terrorism*. New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 141-153; Horchem, H.J., *European terrorism: A German perspective*. In: *Terrorism*. London: Routledge, 1992. pp. 27-51; Malthaner, S. and Waldmann, P., *Terrorism in Germany: Old and New Problems*. In: v. Leeuwen, M. (Ed.), *Confronting Terrorism*. Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2003.
- [8] Baumgärtner, M. and Böttcher M., *Das Zwickauer Terror-Trio—Ereignisse, Szene, Hintergründe*. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2012; Fuchs, C. and Goetz, J., *Die Zelle: rechter Terror in Deutschland*. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2012; Gensing, P., *Terror von Rechts. Die Nazi-Morde und das Versagen der Politik*. Berlin: Rotbuch, 2012; Röpke, A. and Speit, A., *Blut und Ehre. Geschichte und Gegenwart rechter Gewalt in Deutschland*. Berlin: Christopher Links Verlag, 2013.
- [9] Borstel, D. and Heitmeyer, W., *Menschenfeindliche Mentalitäten, radikalisierte Milieus und Rechtsterrorismus*. In: Malthaner, S., and Waldmann, P. (Eds).

- Radikale Milieus. Das soziale Umfeld terroristischer Gruppen.*, Campus Verlag: Frankfurt am Main, 2012; Jesse, E., *Rechtsterroristische Strukturen in Deutschland. Vergangenheit und Gegenwart.* Politische Studien. Orientierung durch Information und Dialog, 63 (May-June 2012); pp. 24-35; Maegerle, A., *Rechtsextremistische Gewalt und Terror.* In: Wagner, B. and Grumke, T. (Eds.). *Handbuch Rechtsradikalismus. Personen–Organisationen–Netzwerke vom Neonazismus bis in die Mitte der Gesellschaft*, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2002; pp. 159-172; Pfahl-Traugher, A., *Der Rechtsterrorismus im Verborgenen: Darstellung und Einschätzung der Besonderheiten des "Nationalsozialistischen Untergrundes"*. In: *Jahrbuch Terrorismus 2011/2012*, Opladen, Barbara Budrich, 2012; n.p.; id., *Geschichte des Rechtsterrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Analyse zu Entwicklung, Gruppen und Vergleich.* Einsichten und Perspektiven. Bayrische Zeitschrift für Politik und Geschichte. München: Bayrische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit., 2012. 1; id., *Der NSU und der deutsche Rechtsterrorismus.* In: Backes, U., Gallus, A., Jesse, E. (Eds.), *Extremismus & Demokratie*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012, pp. 180-197; id., *Der Rechtsterrorismus im Verborgenen: Versuch einer Antwort auf zehn Fragen.* 2011; Available from: <http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/47832/der-rechtsterrorismus-im-verborgenem>; Rabert, B., *Links- und Rechts-Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1970 bis heute.* Bonn: Bernard und Graefe, 1995; Rosen, K.-H., *Rechtsterrorismus. Gruppen–Taten–Hintergründe.* In: Paul, G. (Ed), *Hitlers Schatten verblaßt. Die Normalisierung des Rechtsextremismus.*, Bonn, Dietz, 1989; Wagner, B., *Terroristische Tendenzen im militanten Rechtsextremismus.*, in: Backes, U., Jesse, E. (Eds.), *Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie.*, 1993, Bonn Bouvier, 1993, pp. 156-168.
- [10] Pfahl-Traugher, A., *Der NSU und der deutsche Rechtsterrorismus.* In: Backes, U., Gallus, A., Jesse, E. (Eds.), *Extremismus & Demokratie*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012, p. 193
- [11] Schmid, A., *The Definition of Terrorism.* In: A.P. Schmid (Ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research.*, London & New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 86-87.
- [12] *ibid.* p. 86
- [13] Mudde, C., *The war of words defining the extreme right party family.* West European Politics, 1996. 19 (2): pp. 225–248.
- [14] Druwe, U., *Rechtsextremismus. Methodologische Bemerkungen zu einem politikwissenschaftlichen Begriff.*, in: Winkler, J. W., Jaschke, H.-G., and Falter, J. W. (Eds.) *Rechtsextremismus. Ergebnisse und Perspektiven der Forschung.* 1996: Opladen:1996, pp. 66–80.
- [15] Decker, O., et al., *Die Mitte in der Krise. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2010.* Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010, p. 18
- [16] Heitmeyer, W., *Rechtsextremistische Orientierungen bei Jugendlichen: empirische Ergebnisse und Erklärungsmuster einer Untersuchung zur politischen Sozialisation.* Jugendforschung. 1987, Weinheim: Juventa, 1997; Heitmeyer, W., et al., *Die Bielefelder Rechtsextremismus-Studie: erste Langzeituntersuchung zur politischen Sozialisation männlicher Jugendlicher.* Jugendforschung. 1992, Weinheim: Juventa, 1992.
- [17] Wagner, B., *Kriminalistische Grundlagen der Deradikalisierungsarbeit. Ein einleitender Beitrag zur ersten Ausgabe des Journal EXIT-Deutschland. Journal EXIT-Deutschland (JEX).* Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und Demokratische Kultur, 2013. 1(2013), pp. 1-16.
- [18] *ibid.* p. 3
- [19] Kaplan, J., *Leaderless resistance.* Terrorism and Political Violence, 1997. 9 (3): pp. 80-95.
- [20] Sprinzak, E., *Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: the Case of Split Delegitimization*, in: Bjørgo, T. (Ed.), *Terror from the Extreme Right.* Frank Cass: London, 1995. p. 35
- [21] Sprinzak, E., *Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: the Case of Split Delegitimization*, in: Bjørgo, T. (Ed.), *Terror from the Extreme Right.* Frank Cass: London, 1995. pp 17-43.
- [22] Nacos, B.L., *Terrorism and the media: From the Iran hostage crisis to the World Trade Center bombing.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1996; Soo Hoo, K., S. Goodman, and L. Greenberd, *Information Technology and the Terrorist Threat.* Survival, 1997. 39 (3); Weimann, G. and C. Winn, *The theatre of terror: Mass media and international terrorism.* New York: Longman, 1994.