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Governing a (Better) Global World



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Governing a (Better) Global World

Inaugural Lecture by

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on the acceptance of his position as

Chair in Global Transformations and Governance Challenges

at Leiden University

on 4 February 2022



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Introduction

Madame Rector and Executive Board, Deans, steering group and staff of the programme ‘Global Transformations and Governance Challenges’, GTGC seed grant holders, colleagues, family, and friends. Thank you all for attending this inaugural lecture of the Chair in Global Transformations and Governance Challenges at Leiden University. It is so very special to have all of you together in one place, physically and virtually.

In 2019 the Executive Board of Leiden University took the inspired initiative to create so-called ‘stimulation areas’ for novel interdisciplinary cross-faculty research. Conveners of several other stimulation areas are here today – thank you for joining. The stream that I convene focuses on global transformations in contemporary society and explores how we might better govern these developments. It is a fitting priority subject. We today face profound dilemmas and choices around global transformations, including demographic shifts, ecological changes, new technologies, economic restructuring, geopolitical realignments, and altered cultural politics. Knowledge and policy urgently need solid interdisciplinary research on these topics.

I arrived at Leiden University in September 2020 with a task to catalyse this Global Transformations and Governance Challenges programme (GTGC). Now, seventeen COVID-laden months later, I would like to use these 45 minutes to sketch my personal perspective on the subject. This is by no means to impose my agenda on the GTGC initiative, but to share with you where I come from on these issues.

A chair in Global Transformations and Governance Challenges invites a talk in four parts. First, what could be meant by *global*? Second, what are the main global-scale *transformations* that unfold in contemporary society? Third, how does

governance occur in relation to these global transformations? Fourth, what main *challenges* face the governance of global transformations? The main message of the lecture is that today’s immense global transformations evoke complex governance dynamics that want daring innovations in knowledge and politics.

Global

Part one, let’s start with the global. I first encountered this term in academic discourse exactly forty years ago, in early 1982. The lecturer in my MA module on International Political Economy at one point used the word ‘global’ instead of ‘international’. This shift in vocabulary was novel at that time. Nowadays we constantly hear about ‘global warming’, ‘global markets’, ‘global health’, ‘global security’, and so on. We easily forget that everyday ‘global-talk’ is historically new to recent decades.¹

On hearing that term ‘global’ the first time, my ears immediately went on alert. Already as a student, my main intellectual curiosity was to understand society (how people live together) on a world scale. Yet the field of International Relations, my major subject at the time, invariably conceived of society in terms of states, nations, and countries. Maybe, I thought, the notion of globality could break out of this limited understanding of society.

Some two decades after that MA class, I came to a definition of globality as *transplanetary social connectivity*.² This phrase is hardly pretty, but it conveys a key point: that is, of people being interlinked on an Earth-wide basis. *Transplanetary* means across the planet. *Social* refers to people living collectively. *Connectivity* indicates transactions and mutual effects. So globality, in my conception, is a condition where individuals and groups exchange with and impact upon each other no matter where on the planet Earth they might be located.

Understood in this way, 'global' is qualitatively different from 'international'. International relations transpire between countries, while global relations transpire within planetary domains. International relations entail crossing territorial borders, but not necessarily so for global relations. For example, a domestic flight is as much a part of the global airline industry and global warming as an international flight. Global financial markets operate within countries as well as between them. Global gender politics play out in the home as well as at the United Nations.

4 Globality as transplanetary social connectivity pervades contemporary human existence. The current pandemic connects people across the planet through a virus. The internet connects people across the planet through digital communications. Credit cards and hard currencies connect people across the planet through money. The supermarket is a global food emporium. Much film, literature, music, and sports tournaments connect people across the planet through leisure. Black Lives Matter, Fridays for Future, MeToo, and the Global Right connect people as transplanetary social movements. On all of these counts, and many more, people today live highly global lives.

You may object that global relations are not new. After all, human migrations from Africa to other continents go back many millennia. Notable transcontinental and transoceanic trade transpired a thousand years ago. The Black Death extended across Eurasia in the fourteenth century. The East India Companies were prototypical transnational corporations in the seventeenth century. The Seven Years' War of 1756-1763 was a global conflict, with battlefields in Europe, North America, South Asia, and West Africa. The nineteenth century brought a global gold standard, submarine telegraph cables, and transnational labour activism. All true. Nothing in history is ever completely new.

Yet these precursors are not comparable to contemporary global connections. Regarding scale, the sheer numbers of global transactions today are of an altogether different extent compared to earlier history. Regarding range, today's transplanetary connections touch not one or two areas of a person's life, but every sphere of their being. Regarding frequency, current global links arise not occasionally, but continuously. Regarding speed, Silk Road caravans of old cannot be equated with air travel today. Regarding intensity, contemporary human experience is crammed full of global links. Regarding impact, transplanetary connections shape contemporary society to extents not previously encountered. Thus, it is understandable that global-talk has spread in recent decades, and not before.

To underline, I am not saying that society has become only global. On the contrary, localities, countries, regions, and other spaces are plainly also important in today's global world. Nor has globalisation created a borderless world, as visa regimes and customs controls plainly show. Nor is transplanetary connectivity evenly spread: some situations are more globalised than others. Nor does globality make people the same the world over: if anything, global encounters have accentuated cultural differences. Crucially for politics, the benefits and burdens that arise from global connections are unequally distributed. Thus, any expectations that global interdependence would automatically bring universal freedom, prosperity, justice, and peace are misplaced. Globality is, and will remain, a sphere of struggle.

To summarise, then, for me the global refers to transplanetary social connectivity. Global relations are different from international relations. Globality is today unprecedented in degree. Governing global affairs is steeped in politics and contestation.

Transformations

Now to the second step in this talk: transformations. This term is less ambiguous and contested than globality. A 'transformation' involves a change in character or structure. A transformation in society entails a reconfiguration of the ways that people live together. For example, a change of government is usually not a social transformation, but a change in the ways of governing is a deeper shift.

Here we are interested specifically in *global* transformations: in other words, structural changes in the ways that people are connected across the planet. You could say that globalisation itself is a transformation, as it reconfigures the main patterns of social geography. Yet what other kinds of global-scale transformations pose major governance challenges for our society? Let me highlight seven areas, related to demography, ecology, technology, economy, geopolitics, identity, and knowledge.

First, regarding demographic global transformations, world population has doubled in the past fifty years, from 4 to 8 billion, and is projected to reach nearly 11 billion by this century's end.³ Governing such an immensity of people is uncharted territory in human history. Moreover, the proportion of humanity that lives in urban areas is rising massively, from 30 per cent in 1950 to 70 per cent in 2050.⁴ Meanwhile, the age structure of global population is shifting to older generations, which moreover will be disproportionately concentrated in East Asia, Europe, and North America, while youth will expand especially in Africa.⁵ So the medium-term future brings demographic pressures for large-scale inter-regional migration. Considering the mess of current migration policies, major governance innovations will be required to handle this situation.

Second, regarding ecological global transformations, not only does today's Earth carry more *homo sapiens* than ever before,

but humanity's demands on the planet's finite resources have also sharply escalated.⁶ Resultant pressures on the global web of life include climate change, biodiversity loss, various resource depletions, and a range of transboundary pollutions. Some speak of the onset of an Anthropocene, an epoch in which the human species becomes a significant driver of geophysical change.⁷ Can we, in these circumstances of significant global ecological deterioration, continue with existing modes of governance?

Third, regarding technological global transformations, no previous moment in history has seen such swift development of so many far-reaching new ways for humans to manipulate themselves and their environment. Innovations in transport technology permit larger and faster global mobility of people, viruses, and other substances. Nuclear fission has yielded new global-scale energy and weapons, while nuclear fusion waits in the wings. Digital technologies have brought the internet, now connecting over five billion people globally.⁸ Digitisation also enables unprecedented data processing and artificial intelligence through machine learning. Biotechnology provides unprecedented tools to decipher and manipulate genetic codes. Nanotechnology redefines industrial production. Geo-engineering interventions propose to curb global warming. These various technological global transformations are far outpacing the governance innovation that is needed to channel new engineering capabilities in adequately deliberated and controlled directions.

Fourth, regarding economic global transformations, large proportions of production now occur through global value chains organised with global corporations, many of them extremely large. In addition, global electronic circulation has promoted new forms of commodification, for example, around finance, information, communications, and knowledge. Contemporary capitalism has thereby taken a major 'virtual' turn to intangibles, where production is relatively detached from territorial geography. Crucially, global accumulation

occurs through channels that substantially evade effective state control, prominently including offshore arrangements. Consider, for example, the long road to reach even a modest global minimum tax on profits of the largest transnational corporations, as was agreed through the OECD last October.⁹ Current global inequalities see the wealthiest 1.1 per cent of the world's population own 45.8% of all assets, while the poorest 55 per cent own just 1.3 per cent.¹⁰ Regulating global capitalism – harnessing transplanetary accumulation to the common good – poses a foremost governance challenge of our time.

Fifth, regarding geopolitical global transformations, the structural distribution of world power is altering. This change has two aspects: one more state-centred and another less territorial. Concerning the geopolitics of states, the emergent global geopolitical situation is multipolar, with no single dominant state and more fluid alignments of major countries. Contemporary multipolarity moreover moves state power away from a Euro-American core toward increased influence for China, India, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey. With this shift, the traditional Western script of a liberal international order holds less sway, and it is unclear what alternative narrative, if any, could bring normative coherence to future global governance.¹¹ Meanwhile, should great power conflict loom, world military expenditure stands at US\$2 trillion in 2020, and major states between them hold over 13,000 nuclear warheads.¹²

Yet geopolitical global transformations also extend beyond a redistribution of power among states. As emphasised earlier, globalisation takes world politics beyond international relations alone; hence we might anticipate the emergence of a different kind of dominant power that is less bound to particular states. In this vein, other scholars have spoken of a 'global managerial class', a '*nébuleuse*', and 'global governmentality'.¹³ My own account in this respect, elaborated in other writings, speaks of 'complex hegemony'.¹⁴ This transnational hegemony shapes global geopolitics alongside –

and in some contexts more than – the relative power of major states.

Sixth, regarding more ideational global transformations, significant social-psychological changes are unfolding in respect of collective identity and community: that is, questions of who 'we' are. Several generations ago, people constructed their collective belonging in the world predominantly in terms of nations. In this context, 'we' meant the Dutch, the Liberians, the Vietnamese, and so on. Of course, national solidarities remain powerful in today's global world. However, contemporary transnational politics also prominently involves other kinds of collective identification, for example, around disability, faith, gender, humanity (as a species), indigeneity, profession, race, and sexual orientation. 'We' now has many forms, and 'self-determination' is about much more than national independence, to include also indigenous empowerment and gay pride. Governance becomes more complex when 'the people' to be governed are more plural and less territorial.¹⁵

Seventh, global transformations are also occurring with regard to social knowledge: that is, how people understand their collective existence. Earlier generations broadly held consensus around a Euro-centric modern Enlightenment truth. On this account, the essence of society and history lies in inevitable human progress through the application of secular instrumental scientific rationality. The myth of modernity is by no means dead today, but it is widely challenged: by ecological destruction, by technological dystopia, by spiritual revivalism, by decoloniality, by postmodern relativism, and by so-called 'fake news'. Global-scale governance is an intimidating prospect under any circumstances, but it becomes still more challenging when people are divided regarding the nature of truth.

That, in brief, is my perspective on the developments that a research programme on global transformations might

explore. Note again that all seven areas involve *global* changes: fundamental reordering of the ways that people live together on a planetary scale. The next question, then, is how global transformations are governed, including what possibilities might exist to govern the globe better.

Governance

So on to the third step in this talk: how does *governance* of these global transformations occur? If we want to shape these hugely important changes in desired directions, then we need to understand how these developments are governed. Such knowledge can tell us where and how to intervene in order to affect the global trends.

What is meant by the term 'governance'? Like globality, talk of governance is mostly new to recent decades. The concept spread after the 1980s with the recognition that regulatory activities in society involve more than government, in the sense of the national state. In addition to the state, there is also regional governance, global governance, corporate governance, algorithmic governance, and so on. Thus, governance covers all processes of making rules for society, including government, but also more.¹⁶

Let me start by putting my theorisation of governance in a nutshell and thereafter elaborate. For me, governance of global transformations involves an interplay of four core aspects: actors, networks, practices, and underlying orders. First, actors are the individuals and organisations who take decisions in governance processes: for example, Mark Rutte or the African Union. Second, networks are the collections of actors that together govern a particular issue: for example, a network to govern human rights or a network to govern trade. So governance does not occur through actors in isolation, but through their combinations. Third, practices are the routines that actors and networks follow when governing: for example, bureaucratic exercises, festive ceremonies, and

shared narratives. Thus, actors rarely govern by doing whatever they like, and instead normally follow certain established ways of doing things. Fourth, underlying orders are primary structures of a governance system: for example, capitalism and nationalism. Hence, the practices of governing tend, in turn, to fall into still larger patterns.

It is important to underline the integrative quality of my approach. Most academic explanations of governance focus on one of these four angles. Hence, rationalists reduce governance to the perceptions, values, intentions, and choices of actors. Network theorists reduce governance to the arrangement of actor interactions. Practice theorists reduce governance to its routines, such as the procedures followed and the symbols used. Structuralists reduce governance to one or several macro ordering principles, be that gender hierarchies, imperialism, or whatever. In contrast, my position is that each of these approaches highlights part of global governing, and that a more viable account needs holistically to *interrelate* these four dimensions.¹⁷

Turning more particularly to actors, the premise is that governing global transformations depends to an important degree on decision-takers. True, networks, practices, and underlying orders largely define how actors act. However, no governance happens without actor decisions, and different actors can and do choose different options for addressing global developments.

Which actors matter, though, in shaping global transformations? For one thing, governance does include government, so state actors are prominently relevant. Yet states acting upon global transformations are different from states acting in international relations.¹⁸ Old-style world politics involved mainly government leaders, foreign ministries, armed forces, and intelligence agencies. In contrast, governing global transformations draws in the whole state: the labour ministries, the tax offices, the legislatures, the courts, etc. Much global

governing today occurs through so-called ‘transgovernmental’ relations that link, for example, environment ministries across the world regarding climate change, or health ministries across the world regarding pandemics.¹⁹

‘Intergovernmental’ organisations also figure, on both regional and worldwide scales. These actors include well-known bodies like the European Union and the United Nations. Nowadays, some intergovernmental organisations also centre on emergent powers, for example, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The West no longer leads everything in multilateralism.

Meanwhile, many subnational parts of the state address global transformations as well, often separately from the national government.²⁰ So countless cities and provinces around the world (including Leiden and The Hague) have their own international and global strategies.²¹ We have not only a United Nations of states, but also United Cities and Local Governments.

To make the actor picture still more complicated, governing global transformations also extends beyond the public sector. Here we need to consider business actors, civil society associations, mass media outlets, new social media platforms, philanthropic foundations, political parties, research institutes, expert committees, and citizens at large. Not only do these nonstate actors engage with state-based governing, but in addition they can themselves make rules for global affairs.²² The many instances of private global governance include the Facebook Oversight Board, the Wolfsberg Group, and the World Fair Trade Organisation. Then there are the many so-called ‘multistakeholder’ initiatives that bring together representatives of different affected sectors to devise rules for a given global issue, such as the domain name system or disaster relief.

In sum, then, governance of a global transformation typically involves thousands of actors. Still, and here we move to the concept of networks, this plethora of individuals and organisations do not act autonomously, but are linked through webs of interaction. Theorists have spoken in this regard variously of ‘actor-network’, ‘assemblage’, ‘new medievalism’, ‘regime complex’, and more.²³ For reasons that I have elaborated elsewhere, my own favoured vocabulary in this regard is ‘polycentrism’.²⁴ However, whatever term one chooses, the key observation is that governance of global affairs happens through combinations and interconnections of actors. Hence, there is an ‘assemblage’ to govern global finance, a ‘regime complex’ to govern climate change, a ‘polycentric’ architecture to govern the global internet, and so on.

Global governing through polycentric networks poses promises as well as problems. On the one hand, potential upsides include the mobilisation of diverse experience and expertise. In addition, these networks can provide ample space for creative political action, flexibility, and adaptability. Forum shopping can give more chances to obtain desired policy responses. And polycentric networks can offer multiple channels for citizen participation.

On the other hand, polycentric global governing involves major challenges. One is ignorance, as even many insiders do not know the full extent of the network. Another problem is navigation, as few players have the resources to keep track of the whole process of governing a global transformation. Cross-cultural communication in a complex network can be challenging between different world regions and stakeholder groups. Coordination issues also weigh heavily, as a polycentric network leaves much scope for duplication and contradiction. Compliance challenges arise, as it is hard to enforce so many rules from so many rulers on so many subjects. Then there are problems of transparency (with lots of backrooms for shady deals) and accountability (who in a complex network answers for mistakes).

Moreover, actors within the governance network for a global transformation do not have equal power. Although polycentrism has ambiguous hierarchies and no final arbiter, some players shape – and benefit from – global governing more than others. If we map a network in global politics,²⁵ we see that some actor nodes are larger, indicating that they have more resources and more interactions than others. In addition, these bigger nodes tend to be situated closer to the centre of the network, where greater leverage is concentrated. Hence polycentrism is very much a system of power politics.

The next question, then, is to figure out how power works in the governance of global transformations. What circumstances give certain actors more resources and influence within a polycentric governing complex? Partly the answer lies with those actors themselves: certain individuals and organisations are more capable, energetic, clever, and visionary than others. Yet power inequality also results from conditions beyond the actors' own intentions and efforts. To understand these dynamics we must examine structure and structural power in global arenas.

What, then, is the character of the structure: that is, the systemic forces that give the governance network a particular pattern? We find two general approaches to this question in contemporary research. One, practice theories, highlights micro structures in the everyday routines of global governing. The other, structuralist theories, highlights macro patterns of underlying world orders. My own view is that we should incorporate both into our explanations of global governing.

Practice theories have attracted major attention in recent intellectual history, drawing upon Bourdieu's explorations of fields, Foucault's ideas about technologies, and more.²⁶ The broad premise is that we can learn much about governance and power in world politics by examining the ways that people routinely do things.²⁷

Let's take governance of the internet as an example. Rules for global digital communications come from a dense network involving countless actors, many of whom often compete with each other. Yet despite this seeming chaos, the polycentric complex is held together by common practices. In terms of institutional procedures, for example, everyone throughout the network conducts meetings in broadly similar fashions. In terms of language, more or less everyone speaks ruling discourses about 'security, stability, and resiliency'. In terms of ritual performances, everyone in some way holds multistakeholder consultations. In terms of material objects, the various governance actors all brand themselves with freely distributed t-shirts, tote bags, lapel pins, and so on.

Such practices lend important degrees of coherence to what would otherwise be disorderly networks.²⁸ Intuitively, seasoned players in global governing know how to behave if they want to be in the game and influence its outcomes. They need to follow certain institutional procedures, reproduce certain narratives, participate in certain ceremonies, respect certain dress codes, and so on. Thus micro structures of practice bring pattern, regularity, and predictability to the governance of global transformations. The challenge for research and policy is to identify the key practices and trace their sources and effects. With such knowledge, we can steer those practices toward better governance of global transformations. Or, when certain routines are damaging – sexual harassment, for example – then practice theory can help us to undo those activities.

Yet practices are not the only kind of ordering that happens in the governance of global transformations. Other structural forces have a more macro character as underlying orders. The premise here is that actors, networks, and practices usually conform with certain primary organising principles of the overall governance system. These deeper structures set the most generic rules for society.²⁹

Different accounts identify different kinds of structures as the principal underlying order of global politics. Theories focus variously on overarching norms, the power distribution among states, capitalism, patriarchy, racism, intersectionality, neoliberalism, anthropocentrism, consumerism, nationalism, militarism, and more. Given this diversity of perspectives, we are unlikely ever to see consensus on the character of the macro forces that shape governance of global transformations.

My own position on this issue tends to be Weberian, in the sense that I identify several primary structures rather than focusing on a single underlying governing force. I usually look at the particular global transformation in question, ask what systemic patterns could play a significant role, and then empirically explore the impacts of these macro structures on governance purposes, processes, and outcomes. My selection of which deeper structures to stress is especially motivated by a wish to understand – and counter – harmful and disempowering effects.

Yet, whatever underlying orders one emphasises, the key point is to examine macro structures in the first place. Much current analysis of global governing drowns in the minutiae of actors, networks, and practices, thereby missing the primary forces that set the main parameters of action. Omitting underlying orders generates incomplete explanations and compromises our ability to shape – and reshape – the governance of global transformations.

So my general urging is to move from reductionism to holism. Most explanations of global politics focus either on actors, or on networks, or on practices, or on underlying orders. The resulting partial and fragmented knowledge is inadequate. My plea is to examine these four aspects of governing together rather than separately: to build explanations on the principle of co-constitution among actors, networks, practices, and underlying orders.

This shift in approach admittedly poses immense challenges. Analytically, we need to develop more precise theory of how mutual causation of the four dimensions happens. Methodologically, we need to develop tools that enable us to examine this reciprocal determination in empirical research. Such a reconfiguration of knowledge is a task beyond any single individual and requires sustained collective collaboration of a kind that, unfortunately, figures insufficiently in global studies to date.

Challenges

Now to the fourth step in my talk: namely, concerning the practical challenges that face governance of global transformations. My main message here is twofold: improvements require greater effectiveness as well as greater legitimacy. Considerable daring innovation is required to achieve both.

By greater effectiveness I mean that the governance of global transformations must become better at achieving its objectives. Of course, those objectives are subject to much debate: effectiveness for whom and for what purpose? Yet whatever the goals might be, current governance of global transformations usually falls well short in reaching them. In general, global problem-solving scores poorly.

Several requirements for greater effectiveness were mentioned earlier among the challenges for polycentric governance networks. Efficiency, coordination, compliance, and accountability become extra complicated when thousands of regulatory actors across the world address a global transformation. To be sure, a certain degree of disorganisation and conflict can be productive. However, today's governance of global transformations more usually leans to an overdose of turmoil.

Alongside orchestration, the other principal effectiveness challenge in governing global transformations concerns capacities. In constitutional terms, for example, governance actors and networks often lack sufficient legal mandate to address pressing global issues. Where mandates for global governing are more extensive – for example, as in the world trade regime – regulatory institutions often could be much more productive in generating decisions, rather than delays and deadlocks. For both the formulation and implementation of decisions, governance of global transformations usually falls short on resources, including people, funds, equipment, data, analysis, and vision.

Deficits in inspirational vision and mobilising narrative point to the other overarching challenge for governing global transformations, namely, legitimacy.³⁰ If governors lack legitimacy, it is very hard for them to acquire mandates, assemble resources, attract participation, take decisions, obtain compliance, and solve problems. In this sense, effectiveness and legitimacy are two sides of a single coin.

Legitimacy refers here to the belief and perception that a governing power has the right to rule. You could say that legitimacy is a meta resource for governance. Without legitimacy, a governing apparatus struggles to operate. People then question its authority, refuse to participate, break the rules, or overthrow the regime altogether. To survive, illegitimate governors are dependent on secrecy, manipulation, and coercion.

Today's levels of legitimacy for global governing are on the whole fragile. Empirical studies show that, around the world, current average legitimacy beliefs for national governments and international organisations are medium among citizens at large and only moderately high among elites.³¹ These aggregate figures hide much variation, though, and legitimacy perceptions are strikingly low toward some institutions (like

the International Monetary Fund), in some countries (like Russia), and from some social groups (like working classes). Moreover, both elites and general populations have little if any awareness of much global governing. Here 'a-legitimacy' reigns.³² People cannot lend legitimacy to governors of whom they are not conscious. Overall, then, current levels of legitimacy are insufficient to propel the necessary expansion of governance capacities vis-à-vis global transformations.

How, then, to raise these legitimacy beliefs? Partly, higher approval could be realised by increasing awareness of existing governance arrangements. Major public education is needed – through schools, universities, old and new media, civil society, and governance institutions themselves – so that today's citizens know more about how their global lives are governed.

However, what to do if people do not like what they learn? Maybe increased public awareness could actually decrease confidence and trust. Perhaps, with more knowledge, people would perceive contemporary governance of global affairs to be more ineffective, undemocratic, unfair, divisive, and violent. And we cannot blame all scepticism about global governance on misguided nationalism, populism, and sovereigntism. All is not well with current ways of governing the globe.

To address such normative legitimacy concerns, we may well need *governance transformations* for global transformations. To guide such reconstruction, we need philosophical innovation. The liberal internationalist script of old may not suffice as a legitimating narrative going forward. Saying this is not to dismiss wholesale all cornerstones of liberal internationalism, such as human rights, national self-determination, open economy, rule of law, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Nor do I embrace a populist, nationalist, mercantilist reaction against liberalism. Rather, we need creative daring in the development of principles of global justice that transcend both liberalist cosmopolitanism and nationalist communitarianism.

Time does not permit elaboration of relevant ideas in this lecture. In brief, as I have discussed in other writings, compelling normative innovations could include notions of postmodern global democracy, global distributive justice, plural identity politics, transcultural epistemic justice, and posthuman ecological ethics.³³ Maybe you would say that these ideas are out of reach today, a bit like advocating human rights in the seventeenth century or decolonisation in the nineteenth century. However, our times may demand a historical leap, where normative transformation is indispensable to a more effective and legitimate governance of global transformations.

Conclusion

So that is my story for today: global + transformations + governance + challenges. Today's global world undergoes systemic changes whose complex governance wants daring innovations in order to achieve greater effectiveness and legitimacy. Time constraints have compelled me to be very compact. Still, I hope that you have some ideas for further reflection.

Thank you again, Executive Board and Deans of Leiden University, for entrusting me with this chair. Thank you, steering group and staff of the GTGC programme, for our fruitful and fun collaborations. Thank you, colleagues at Leiden and around the world, including by now countless students, for helping me over many years to the thoughts that I have expressed today, though you are not responsible for them. Thank you, family and friends, for supporting my work and, more importantly, for distracting me from it.


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